

approaches to policy, and to politics more generally. In this view, any attempt at comprehensive rationality in public decision making is doomed to failure, so the more appropriate course of action is to make a series of smaller decisions, examining the outcomes of those decisions in turn and adjusting. Furthermore, the objective of the policy-making exercise is better understood as *satisficing* rather than maximizing utilities, so that all that decision makers must find is a decision that is good enough rather than one that is optimal.

### *Agenda Setting*

Agenda setting is the final element of policy process that has achieved a great deal of prominence in the discipline. Roger Cobb and Charles Elder were responsible for bringing the idea of agenda setting to a central place in the study of policy in the early 1980s. The basic argument is, of course, that nothing can be done about a problem in society unless it is identified and transferred to the active agenda of a political institution. Thus, one of the most important aspects of political mobilization is generating awareness of the issue and commitment on the part of politicians to attempt to deal with it.

Cobb and Elder's approach to agenda setting was largely purposive, but later approaches to this stage of policy making emphasized the almost random elements of the process. In particular, Kingdon's (1995) work emphasized the need for a "policy window" to open before an issue can be put on the agenda. This idea is not dissimilar to the garbage can model of decision making proposed in 1972 by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen in the bounded rationality literature mentioned earlier, which argues that decisions are largely the product of the fortunate confluence of opportunities and ideas and actors. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the usual rational assumptions about how social and political decisions are made.

The agenda-setting literature has been expanded significantly by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones's (1993) discussion of patterns of movement of issues on and off active agendas. They used some of the same terminology as historical institutionalism, such as "punctuations" to emphasize the rather abrupt changes in the visibility and the

salience of policy problems. Their plotting of the dynamics of agenda in American politics has generated a large new area of inquiry in the United States and in other countries that has made significant progress in mapping the sources of policy change and the political foundations of policy choices.

### **Policy Causes Politics**

A second strand of theorizing about policy in political science, developed or initiated by Theodore J. Lowi (1972), has to some extent reversed the logic of the process model, arguing that policy produces politics. This model involves the assumption that four fundamental types of policy tend to be associated with certain types of political action. They are distributive, constituent, regulative, and redistributive. For example, redistributive policies are assumed to be associated with the immediate applicability of coercion focused on the environment of conduct rather than on the conduct itself. In 1974 Robert H. Salisbury and John P. Heinz used a similar set of policy variables, although relating them more to the types of demands being placed on the policy-making system and the degree of fragmentation of that policy-making system.

The model developed by Lowi has motivated a great deal of empirical research as well as a number of theoretical critiques. Perhaps the most fundamental contribution has been, however, to make political scientists think about policies in more analytic categories. There is always the tendency to think about policies in terms of the names one finds on government buildings—agriculture, defense, housing, and so on. That manner of thinking is useful, but only up to a point, and it may mask some of the internal variations in individual policy areas.

A slightly different version of the "policy causes politics" approach is the argument made by Gary Freeman and others that the differences across political systems are not as great as the differences across policy areas. The technical and political foundations of a policy area such as health may be more similar across countries than are those foundations for disparate policy areas within a single system. As policy ideas spread across national boundaries, these common aspects of policy may become more similar. Pressures from globalization

and from Europeanization have tended to homogenize policy across national boundaries, further reinforcing Freeman's argument.

### *Policy Styles*

To understand public policy, it is important to consider the policy choices made by any one country (or subnational unit). It is also important to compare those choices with the choices made by other countries. This comparison could be done on a policy-by-policy basis, as described for the welfare state below, or the policy-making style of the political system in question could be typified. In this case, rather than policy being assumed to cause policy, policy is used to characterize the political systems; policy becomes the lens through which to compare those systems.

Jeremy Richardson made the first major analysis of policy styles in Western Europe, arguing that the policy styles in these countries could be characterized by two variables. One was an active-reactive dimension, assessing whether a country attempted to anticipate policy problems, and, if so, to what extent, or simply waited until the problem appeared. The other dimension was one of imposition versus negotiation, reflecting in part patterns of corporatist interest intermediation in some political systems.

Almost all the research on policy styles has been done on the industrialized democracies. This pattern has the advantage of holding some important variables, notably wealth and democracy, relatively constant. There have been some attempts to assess the policy styles of less affluent countries, generally attempting to build something on the order of a model of policy making for one region or another. In particular, a great deal of work has been done on the policy styles of Asian countries and their relationship to economic growth.

### *Policy Instruments*

Implementation studies have been concerned with the ability to transform stated policies into effective action. The ability to make the difficult translation from law to action involves a number of components; one of the more important elements is the choice of a policy instrument, or

tool (Christopher Hood, 1976). The basic idea of policy instruments is that the public sector can achieve its goals using a variety of different types of programs—subsidies, regulation, vouchers, and so on—and each of these instruments will have distinct substantive and political characteristics that will influence the likely success of the program being implemented.

While it is common to think of these instruments in more or less technical terms, it is crucial to remember that they do have a strong political dimension. For example, as the politics of governing have changed to cast suspicion on direct public sector interventions, many of the conventional "command and control" instruments of the public sector, such as regulation, have been exchanged for softer instruments. The choice of policy instruments may also reflect the need to build coalitions needed to get legislation adopted. For example, much of the federal support for university students in the United States is provided through private bank loans guaranteed by government. While it might be more efficient to have the loans managed through the universities, it was important to create a political ally in the banking industry.

The study of policy instruments leads to a number of other, even more difficult, questions about public policy and the possibilities of effective public sector intervention. The most fundamental issue that the choice of instruments raises is the possibilities of policy design. Do policy analysts, whether in political science or not, have the ability to design better policies? To do so requires some understanding of the causation of policy problems, the relationship of those problems to the instruments available to address those issues, and some normative basis to evaluate the outcomes of the policy intervention (Pearl Eliadas, Margaret Hill, & Michael Howlett, 2005). The design issue also raises the question of whether the simple functional categories we generally use for policy are sufficient to capture the complexity of the challenges faced when attempting to match instruments to the underlying dimensions of policy problems.

### *Discourse and Deliberation*

The majority of thinking about public policy has used a strongly objective model, attempting to measure policies as dependent variables and then

finding the factors that explain those policy choices. Likewise, economic and utilitarian values tend to undergird much of this analysis, assuming that policies are best understood in terms of how they improve the economic well-being of the objects of the policy. One strand of reasoning in political science, however, argues that policy is best understood in more linguistic terms. The assumption of deliberative models as presented by Frank Fischer (2003) is that the discourse surrounding the policy, and the conflicts between alternative discourses, defines the ways in which policy choices are made. Of course, utilitarian values belong to a discourse, but they are only one among many possible sets of values that can guide policy choices.

Discourse and deliberative models are often best applied in areas such as science policy and some aspects of environmental policy where there are often widely diverging understandings of the nature of the policy. Herbert Gottweiss, for example, has examined the deliberative aspects of research on human biology, and there have been a number of studies of environmental policy that apply the deliberative approach to policy analysis. These studies have demonstrated the range of values that may be involved in complex policy issues as well as something of the ways in which those almost inherent conflicts may be resolved.

### *Welfare State*

Although there are many policy areas, the discussion will focus attention on the development of, and then the challenges to, the welfare state. This special treatment is justified because not only have welfare state politics and policy been central to the legitimation of the contemporary political systems in Europe, and to some extent the rest of the world, but the welfare state has played a central role in theorizing about the politics of public policy. Furthermore, the study of the welfare state has to some extent integrated the study of policy, comparative politics, and normative political theory.

The development of the welfare state and the various forms that this policy regime has assumed has been a rich vein of research and theorizing. Gøsta Esping-Andersen's *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990) is perhaps the most famous work of this sort. Esping-Andersen identified three types of welfare states, based on the

extent to which labor was commodified, and the welfare system was seen as replacement for labor or simply as more of a right of citizenship. Although the Esping-Andersen work has been central to thinking about the welfare state, a number of other studies have attempted to explain patterns of development and differences in the contemporary systems. For example, Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer constructed a development model to explain welfare policy choices, taking into account explicitly the differences between Europe and North America.

Although the welfare state project has been central to legitimating the states of Western Europe, and in improving the quality of life for most citizens of those countries, the model for building a social safety net for all members of society has been under a good deal of pressure since at least the late 1970s. The oil crisis of the 1970s brought the cost of these programs to greater public attention, and those costs have only continued to increase. Furthermore, the continuing aging of the societies with well-developed welfare states will exacerbate the financial problems. In addition to the manifest fiscal problems of the welfare state, this model of governing has been the source of large-scale ideological assaults driven by shifts in the consensus that had dominated policy. Those assaults came from both the political Right and, less predictably, from the political Left, which complained about the depersonalization and bureaucracy of the welfare state.

The pressures on the welfare state have engendered a number of important studies that have integrated the study of the policies themselves with the study of comparative politics. For example, Paul Pierson and his collaborators have been concerned with the role of demographic and fiscal pressures on the erosion, or at least recasting, of many welfare state programs, even in the countries that have been among the most committed to this style of governing. Rather than being a simple economic response, however, these transformations are considered in a very political light, reflecting the variety of pressures being exerted on government and the internal politics of organizations within the public sector itself.

The pressures on the welfare state reflect the confluence of political, economic, and social change and the impact of that juncture of forces on

a set of very successful public programs. Somewhat ironically, the welfare state that had been crucial for legitimating the state has now become a source of delegitimation in many political systems. In an era of neoliberal economics and politics, these programs no longer have an uncontested place in governing but yet remain crucial for the well-being of many segments of society.

### Public Administration

The third body of literature to be included in this entry, public administration, has been a component of public sector studies virtually since that inquiry began. Governments have always had to have some means of implementing their programs (see above), and the public bureaucracy has been central to that role. As important as public administration is in implementation, however, its role is not limited to that activity, and public administrators play a major role in shaping public policy and making public policy directly too. Finally, civil servants also play a role, and an increasing role, in linking the public sector and the public, so that public administration has become a central locus for emerging forms of democratic control over governing processes.

### Bureaucracy

To this point, this entry has dealt with bureaucracy and public administration as virtually identical concepts, but the two should be differentiated. Public administration is the more general term, while bureaucracy refers to a particular organizational form, and especially to the ideal-type model of bureaucracy developed by Max Weber in 1946. That conceptual distinction does not, however, prevent *bureaucracy* being used as a word of opprobrium for public administration, referring to the perceived inefficiency and excessive formality of those public organizations.

As the concept was developed by Weber, bureaucracy was meant to be the highest level of development of rational-legal governance. Rather than oppressing the public, as is now often argued, the bureaucracy should provide both greater equality and greater transparency than the traditional forms of governance that it would replace. The reliance on law, the separation of the bureaucracy

from political controls, and the development of files were assumed to allow citizens to know when decisions were being made in their case and to have some justification for those decisions. These patterns would be markedly different from the patrimonial administrations that characterized many governments at the time that Weber wrote and that also characterize many governments in the early 21st century.

Although the Weberian model of bureaucracy and associated model of the state were dismissed almost completely by reformers stressing markets (see the discussion of new public management [NPM] below) and/or social networks as alternatives to the hierarchy of bureaucracy, the bureaucratic model has made something of a comeback. Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert (2004) have argued for the emergence of a “neo-Weberian state” that would reassert some of the values of bureaucracy, albeit while retaining many of the reforms that have produced greater efficiency in the public sector. In particular, the neo-Weberian state is an attempt to recapture accountability for service delivery instruments that have become increasingly divorced from controls by legislatures and political executives.

### The New Public Management

The Weberian style of bureaucracy not only produced a number of benefits for the public sector and for citizens, but it was also the focus of intense criticism. Rigidity, reliance on formal authority, impersonality, and overspecialization were but a few of the numerous criticisms leveled at formal bureaucracy. Beginning from the end of the 1970s, NPM (Hood, 1991) posed a series of challenges to the bureaucratic model and, to some extent, became a new paradigm for public administration.

NPM has been defined in any number of ways and has been argued to be both the salvation and damnation of the public sector. At its most fundamental, NPM implies at least (a) the use of market-type mechanisms for public policy and for public management and (b) an emphasis on the role of managers in the public sector, often using the mantra of “let the managers manage” (see Peters, 2001). To this core set of ideas in NPM might be added some notion of the citizen as an important



actor in the process, although citizens are more likely to be conceptualized as customers than as full-fledged citizens participating in a democratic, political process.

As NPM has evolved, the style of governing has become one of *making* the managers manage rather than merely letting them manage. Performance management has been one of the principal instruments for that change in emphasis. The measurement of the outputs of individuals and programs, and using that information to make decisions about budgets, retention, and other important outcomes for the organization and its managers, places pressure on those managers to perform as well as possible. To be successful, however, that performance must be measured well and there must be a means of enforcing the results.

### *Public Personnel*

The people who work for the public sector are one of the crucial elements explaining the relative success or failure of administration. There is little disagreement on the proposition that the public should, to the extent possible, employ the “best and brightest.” Indeed, management in the public sector is almost certainly more difficult than in the private sector, given the absence of clear criteria for success and failure, the transparency of most of the operations, and the absence of control over many aspects of the personnel and budget systems.

Public personnel management raises a number of highly technical questions about the employment, training, and motivation of public employees, but there are several crucial political questions as well. The following sections focus on three political concerns: (1) the role of representative bureaucracy, (2) the politicization of the civil service, and (3) the importance of understanding the rewards of high public office, whether elected or appointed.

#### **Representative Bureaucracy**

*Representative bureaucracy* is one of the classic topics in public administration. The term was coined toward the end of World War II when it became clear that there would be a socialist government in the United Kingdom (UK) at the end of the

war and that the implementation of what appeared to be a rather sweeping set of policy initiatives would be the responsibility of a civil service that was in cast of mind, if not of party membership, conservative. Could the new government expect support from this civil service, or would its social background prevent its whole-hearted support?

The question of to what extent membership of the public service mirrors the nature of society has both empirical and normative elements. The empirical questions require identifying the extent to which the members of the civil service are representative of the population, and especially the extent to which women and members of minority groups are included in government. The answers to these questions vary markedly depending on what level within the government is being considered. As a whole, the public sector in most industrialized countries does represent the society reasonably well, and often is more than half female. On the other hand, at the higher levels of the public bureaucracy, women, and especially minority group members, tend to be underrepresented.

The second part of the empirical question concerning representative bureaucracy is whether it really makes any difference. One version of the role of representation is a passive one, in which merely having women and minority group members in the public service is assumed to present a positive image to the public and to produce better outcomes. In a more active version of representation, those minority representatives would assume a more active role in governing and in attempting to use their positions to redress some of the inequalities that may exist in the social and economic benefits available from government.

The normative questions about representative democracy are based on the logic that the public sector should be a “model employer” and should demonstrate that more equitable hiring practices can be effective. They are further based on the logic of attempting to use the public sector as a means of addressing long-standing social and economic deprivations experienced by social groups, with public servants adopting a more active representational role in that process. These normative stances may not be as effective as their advocates might like them to be in improving the lot of members of society, but they do express some commitment toward social justice through administration.

### Politicization

Another important political question about recruitment of public officials is the extent to which political criteria are, and should be, involved in the selection of public officials. The logic of bureaucracy and the civil service is that public administrators should be selected on the basis of merit and that political criteria should be irrelevant. On the other extreme, however, there is a perceived need by politicians to have advisors, and to some extent also managers, who will support their programs.

Although the norm of a professional and depoliticized public service is certainly accepted in the industrialized democracy, it is also under attack. The movements toward a more politicized public service are generally subtle and the argument in favor of the movement is difficult to press overtly, but politicians clearly want to have greater control over their public servants. The movement toward greater politicization reflects in part the consequences of adopting NPM, with many programs being moved from direct ministerial control. Furthermore, contemporary changes in personnel management, reflecting the logic of NPM, have made it easier for ministers to make decisions about hiring that are not done strictly on merit criteria.

For many of the less developed countries, politicization of the public service is quite common. The failure to institutionalize a merit-based civil service reflects the importance of public service employment in less affluent countries. For politicians in these often clientelistic administrative systems, the ability to distribute public office is an important means of building a political power base. In addition, political leaders may perceive the need for loyalty from their civil servants, as well as commitment to particular policy agendas, which is crucial for their vision of development as well as their political future.

Although merit recruitment is the usual standard for a "proper" civil service, all public sectors have some place for political recruitment. At one extreme among the industrial democracies, the United States has more than 4,000 political appointments in positions that in many other countries would be career positions. In France and Belgium, there is also large-scale use of political appointments in ministerial *cabinets* that advise ministers

and help enforce their decisions. In a number of other cases, a parallel bureaucracy may be created with political appointees to some extent shadowing the actions of the career public servants.

### Rewards

Decisions about the level of rewards for public employees are a final issue in personnel policy. Although there is a good deal of evidence that pay is not the prime motivation for individuals joining or remaining in the public service, it must be considered. Financial rewards are increasingly important because of the adoption of ideas from NPM concerning the opening of the public service to direct entry from outside. These rewards may be especially important for the top officials of the public sector, who may be responsible for extremely large organizations but receive very modest rewards. At the extreme, the Secretary of Defense in the United States, who is responsible for the largest organization in the world, receives a "princely" salary of \$180,100, while his subordinates receive even lower salaries.

If we want to understand the importance of public rewards for the public sector, however, we need to move beyond formal salary levels. The formal salaries and visible benefits of public officials are but a small portion of the rewards for high public officials in many countries. At the extreme, the nominal salaries of the leaders of China are less than \$100 per month, but that figure does not begin to take into account the huge range of housing, transportation, and other benefits from holding office. At the other end of the dimension of visibility, public officials in Australia and New Zealand receive few indirect rewards and are held to close account for the benefits they do receive.

The degree of rewards received by public officials, and especially those informal rewards received in addition to their formal salaries and benefits, is important for the legitimacy of the system as well as for recruitment. The relationship between rewards and legitimacy often represents a negative spiral in which low legitimacy makes it difficult for some governments to provide adequate resources to their employees, and therefore, those governments may choose to provide a number of intransparent rewards. They are almost inevitably exposed

to public scrutiny, increasing public cynicism about government and reducing legitimacy.

### Politicians and Bureaucrats

Thus far, this entry has considered the role of public servants primarily as the providers of public services to the public. That role is certainly their dominant image for most citizens, but senior public servants also play a crucial role in the political processes of their countries. Although both scholars and practitioners had understood for years the importance of civil servants in making policy and in advising their political masters, the understanding was largely anecdotal until Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman (1981) began to conceptualize and measure the relationships more precisely. Their work has been the foundation of a number of other studies on the roles of civil servants in a range of countries. Although there are a number of differences across political systems and across time, the research does find that the same roles appear in most countries, although they may be interpreted differently.

The Aberbach et al. approach to the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats is largely attitudinal, judging the extent to which both sets of actors have attitudes that are conducive to cooperation and to effective policy making. These relationships can, however, be considered in terms of structural relationships. For example, Peters identified five ideal types of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats and then used those models as a means of comparing the styles of executive politics in a number of countries. These models ranged from the formal Weberian/Wilsonian domination of governing by elected politicians to an administrative state in which experts in the bureaucracy dominate policy. All the models were conceived of as ideals, but there were certainly empirical referents in a number of countries.

Finally, the relationship between civil servants and politicians can be conceptualized as a bargain between the two sets of actors. It can be argued that politicians give up some of their personal powers in this bargain so that they could create a professional and career public service and thus gain the loyalty and commitment of an expert body of professionals. Likewise, the civil servants cede their capacity to

complain publicly about policies in return for a more or less guaranteed position in the structures of governing and a predictable set of rewards.

### Accountability

While public administrators have a powerful role in governing and exercise substantial control over the public as they implement programs, these officials also have substantial influence over public policy. In both their roles—implementing policy and making policy—bureaucrats have been able to exercise their power with little direct control from the public (but see below). The traditional model of accountability for public servants was that they were accountable to their ministers (or to some other political official), the minister was accountable to the legislature, and the legislature was accountable to the people. Even in nondemocratic regimes there has been some sense of the necessity of holding public officials accountable for their actions, often to the hegemonic party rather than to duly elected officials.

To make the hierarchical model of accountability function effectively, governments have developed a number of instruments that enable political officials, and the public, to detect malfeasance and to force some reckoning for failures (whether of commission or omission). These instruments are too numerous and beyond the scope of this entry, but some generalizations should at least be mentioned here. One is that many of the instruments for accountability are internal to the executive branch of government, and they require ministers (and other public servants) to exercise control over their subordinates.

A second generalization about hierarchical forms of accountability is that legislatures have played a central role. This role is easier for well-staffed legislatures with strong committees, such as the U.S. Congress, but it is true even for the less well-resourced legislatures. In addition, as cabinets and prime ministers come to dominate parliamentary systems, their legislatures appear to be using the enforcement of accountability as a means of recapturing some of the powers they may have lost. Legislatures appear to be adding staff and creating structures to facilitate this central function, but they still have a great deal to do to be effective controllers for the executive.

In addition to the revival of legislatures as a locus of accountability, public policy and administration have become increasingly influenced by law and the courts. Public administration has always been the implementation of law, and in some administrative systems such as that of France and those derivative of that tradition, there has been substantial *ex ante* judicial control. Legal means of control over administration have, however, become more central, especially in Westminster systems in which the courts had relatively little capacity to control the other branches of government. However, with the adoption of some constitutional instruments such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada, and the UK's membership in the European Union (EU), the courts have gained a greater capacity to enforce accountability even in those systems.

To some extent, all these mechanisms for accountability, even those with a strong institutional foundation, depend on transparency and openness. If an administrative system can keep its practices hidden from the public and from political actors, then the possibilities for exercising control over that administration are very limited. The central role of transparency is at the heart of many efforts by international organizations, for example, the World Bank, to promote transparency and accountability in transitional and developing countries. Transparency is important for maintaining accountability in general, but it may be especially important in the ongoing war against corruption in these systems.

The traditional, hierarchical model of accountability was built on some heroic assumptions, and to some extent it is now being complemented by a range of other approaches to accountability that relies on a variety of different instruments. The most important addition to the repertoire of accountability instruments has been the use of competition both to identify problems in service provision and to find the means of enforcing control over less successful programs. This method of control is to some extent manifested in performance management (see above), and it further rely on the "customers" of programs paying attention to the success or failure of the programs that serve them and becoming mobilized politically if the programs perform poorly.

A final point concerning accountability is that we need to recognize the growing importance of output legitimation in many countries. The

traditional democratic model of legitimation is that the political process, along with inputs such as voting, is central to legitimating government and its policy decisions. To an increasing extent, however, the public sector is legitimated by its ability to provide services. This change is, at least in part, a consequence of the NPM and its emphasis on service provision, but it is also in part a function of the declining centrality of political participation in many democratic systems. Furthermore, many scholars argue that the alleged democratic deficit in the EU, due to inadequate mechanisms of representation, has required output legitimation.

### *The Centrality of Administration*

Although most citizens, and many political scientists, do not consider public administration as a central part of contemporary politics and government, it is difficult to understand what is happening in governance without understanding the central role of the public bureaucracy. Furthermore, the centrality of administration may be increasing as many political institutions lose some of their capacity for governance and the actions of public administrators become more important both for making substantive decisions and for linking state and social actors.

The increasing centrality of administrative actors in governing is to some extent a paradoxical result of some reforms of the public sector that were designed to transform administration and to make service delivery more market and customer driven. Although many of these reforms were directed ostensibly at the public bureaucracy as traditionally organized and managed, the net effect of the reforms has been to reduce the power of the political officials nominally in charge of government. In reality, NPM was a broader theory of governance as much as a theory of public administration per se. Its explicit demand was to let the managers manage; its implicit recommendation was that politicians should absent themselves from the process of governing as much as possible.

### **Linking the Fields of Inquiry**

The preceding discussion has considered three major fields of inquiry in political science somewhat in isolation from one another, namely, (1) the role of representative bureaucracy, (2) the politicization of the civil service, and (3) the

importance of understanding the rewards of high public office, whether elected or appointed. While that strategy helps clarify each of the three fields individually, it does not capture the reality of governing and the close interconnections between policy choices, the administration of policies, and the overall governance capacity of these systems. The purpose of political science can be understood as finding ways to explain why certain policy choices are made, why they are effective, and what their consequences are for citizens. All these three fields focus on what governments actually do to improve the lives of their citizens.

If we adopt the basic Lasswellian principle that politics is about transforming the life chances for citizens, then we should begin with the study of public policies and work back from those outputs of the political process. These policy choices can be conceptualized both as a dependent variable for the political process and as an independent variable for explaining the steering capacity of the political system. That is, the nature of the policy process, as well as the demands being pressed on the system, may serve some purposes well but may not enable the governance system to steer effectively. For example, Scharpf has pointed out that the design of policy-making systems in the EU and in Germany tends to produce suboptimal results, and hence the steering capacity of these systems is not as great as it might otherwise be. There are mechanisms available to overcome those problems, but they too may present governance challenges. Furthermore, in other cases, the outputs of the political system may reflect the interests of dominant groups in society, but by ignoring other interests, they may complicate its steering and diminish its overall legitimacy.

When beginning to think about the broader processes of governing with making policy choices, however, it is important to remember that making and implementing policy is not a final set of choices. Almost all policy making in contemporary political systems consists of revisioning and attempting to improve older policies, sometimes incrementally and sometimes radically, but there tends to be a framework for public action that must be addressed. That is, remaking policy, or policy succession feedback from the earlier attempts to make policy, is a crucial part of assessing the success and failure of those interventions. For comparative political analysis, the capacity and

willingness of political systems to respond to feedback is one crucial element for understanding the differences in policy making.

The feedback process places public administration in a central position. There are certainly political processes for providing feedback, but the connections between the bureaucracy and the environment are crucial. Hood (1976) noted that the tools of government (see above) included both detectors and “effectors” and that the public bureaucracy was central to both. The involvement of the bureaucracy in feedback occurs in part through its connections with clients, and especially because of the role of street-level bureaucrats. The public bureaucracy may also be important in detecting more “objective” problems in policy, given the wide range of data collection in which it is engaged.

As patterns of governing continue to shift toward the greater use of market and civil society actors, the bureaucracy may become even more important as a locus for steering. The public bureaucracy is crucial for managing instruments such as contracts and partnerships and in providing the linkage between networks of social actors and the public sector. Political leaders may not have the technical capacity for some of these aspects of contemporary governing and may not be willing to engage in the continuous bargaining and adjustment needed for coping with networks. These patterns of governing may therefore be uncomfortable for many public servants who believe that they are being forced to make too many policy decisions and for politicians who may feel they have lost control of governing.

In addition to being linked through some aspects of the common problems with which they are concerned, these three major components of political science are also linked through theory. Each area has its own particular theoretical and conceptual issues, as identified above, but there are also some common theoretical strands that unite them. Perhaps the most apparent of these is institutionalism, and the fundamental assumption that structure matters. These three bodies of research all recognize that agency is also a part of any explanation; however, at the heart of the three, and perhaps especially public administration, there is also a strong sense that structures to a great extent constrain that individual agency (Peters, 2001).

While institutionalist approaches may appear the most logical means to link these three sets of

literature, they may also be addressed through other approaches, such as rational-choice models. Certainly, rational choice has been applied to both public administration (Murray Horn, 1995) and to public policy, providing a good deal of insight into these aspects of governing. Rational choice has, however, been applied to the more comprehensive issues associated with governance only to a limited extent. Although that has been the case, one can see how that application might be made. The design of governance structures can be considered from the rational perspective almost as easily as can the design of administrative structures or the choice of policy.

In addition to the central role of institutions in making and implementing public policy, a number of the central concepts in political science are relevant for understanding governing. Governing involves the use of power, as the public sector must impose its decisions on society and is often confronted by countervailing power within society. Power is often subtle and is seen as much in what does not happen as in what does. Governing also involves the use of authority and legitimacy, allowing governance without the overt application of power. The list of fundamental concepts could be extended, but the fundamental point is that public administration and policy are not distinct from the remainder of political science but rather may be at the heart of the discipline and its concerns.

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See also Governance

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## GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL

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Few terms are as insecurely defined or controversial in a normative sense as *global governance*. A

major part of the problem is the word *governance*. How does this differ from traditional notions of government exercised by sovereign states and their legal subdivisions? Must governance be institutionalized and rest on national, legal, and moral authority? To the extent that governance exists beyond the state, must it be created by formal agreement among states? Or should governance be understood to include all forms and degrees of rule, exercised by states and nonstate actors, whether based on law and institutionalized or much less formal in nature? If governance is other than traditional government by states, from where does such governance derive its legitimacy? What is the relationship between authority and legitimacy? Indeed, does legitimacy actually matter if there exists a capacity to govern effectively? Does authority imply legitimacy or only effective governance?

Confusion is compounded by the word *global*. Is the analytical focus only on some form of world government—that is, a truly global manifestation of some form of rule that extends over all the territory and persons in the world? Or should global be understood as including all forms of governance, however narrow in function and limited in territorial reach?

The answers to each of these questions obviously affect the answers to still others: How old or new is global governance? How do present patterns of global governance differ from those of the past? This entry discusses several forms of global governance, including international governmental organizations (IGOs), international regimes, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the legitimacy of global governance.

### International Governmental Organizations

Not coincidentally, even as *globalization* in the 1990s became a popular way to describe a vast acceleration in the volume and pace of transnational activities, so did global governance gain prominence in diplomatic and academic circles as a concept that seemed to capture the increasing challenge of managing issues that were beyond the geographical reach of individual states to address on their own.

The term *global governance* was associated early on in the decade with the Commission on Global Governance. In 1991, a group of distinguished public figures met in Stockholm and pledged to

form an international commission intended to help build a more effective system of world security and governance. The United Nations' (UN) then–Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali endorsed the initiative, and in 1992, the commission was established with 28 members from around the world, who served in their personal capacities. The commission issued its report *Our Global Neighbourhood* in 1994, making recommendations for the reform of the UN Economic and Social Council and certain other UN bodies. Few of the recommendations were implemented, so the report constituted more of a landmark than a watershed.

Be that as it may, the commission experience did seem to link global governance with the UN and, more broadly, with IGOs whose members are states. In the modern state system, growth in IGOs went hand in hand with the expansion of international law in the 19th and early 20th centuries. More than 20 times as many treaties from 1851 to 1950 took the multilateral form as in the period between 1751 and 1850 (Charlotte Ku, cited in Jan A. Scholte, 2005).

One trend was multilateral conference diplomacy, beginning after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, with the Concert of Europe, an informal consultation mechanism of European government officials. The concert convened periodically to deal with perceived general European problems, including arms races and potential clashes over imperial expansion, which was the main focus of the 1884–1885 Berlin meeting. Over time, the number of countries attending multilateral conferences increased and included some beyond Europe. The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 banned aerial bombing, chemical warfare, and the use of hollow-point bullets; attempted to control the proliferation of submarines and armed merchant vessels; and established the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In addition, the two Hague Conventions, along with the later Geneva Conventions, profoundly shaped the laws of war and related matters, such as the treatment of prisoners.

Meanwhile, beginning with the 1826 Panama Congress, there was also a series of inter-American and Pan–Latin American conferences. The inter-American meetings eventually led to the creation of the Pan-American Union in 1910. Later inter-American conferences were overshadowed by U.S. military interventions in the Caribbean basin, but

after the Roosevelt Good Neighbor Policy and as World War II loomed, the Americas forged an almost united hemispheric alliance against the Axis.

Another parallel trend in the establishment of IGOs was that of functional and/or regulatory organizations that from the outset concerned themselves about global matters within the area of their expertise. What is now the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was created in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874. An agreement on universal time coordination (UTC) based on the Greenwich prime meridian was concluded in 1884. Technical standardization started with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in 1906. The International Labor Organization (ILO) was founded in 1919. Functional IGOs to date include a total of 19 UN-specialized agencies—among them, well-known organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)—as well as numerous others outside the UN system, such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) founded in 1930, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and any number of other regulatory bodies at the regional level.

The aftermath of the two world wars saw a momentous advance in universal IGOs: the League of Nations and then the UN. Both organizations institutionalized great power control at the council level that seemed to recall the earlier Concert of Europe and were primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with peace and security issues. The same, by definition, was true of post-World War II alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, and the Organization of American States, which alone included a process for resolving disputes among its own members. On the other hand, economics was the focus of the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD—the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its eventual successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Likewise, economic recovery and growth were the central motivation for post-World War II European institution building that over time produced the

European Common Market and today's European Union (EU). Yet another area of concern for universal IGOs has been law and justice, including the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and most recently the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Overall, the growth in the numbers of IGOs has been so rapid that *The Yearbook of International Organizations, 2004–2005* (Union of International Organizations, 2004, Appendix 3, Table 1) was able to list some 245 as “conventional” IGOs and another 1,743 under the classification of “other international bodies.”

### International Regimes

Foreshadowing later discussions about global governance, regime theory appeared in the 1970s and 1980s partly to explain how international cooperation might continue even as United States' post-World War II dominance gradually eroded. This was a concept of what has been described as “governance without government” that did not require a “hegemon,” or at least one dominating the entire international system.

Regime theory postulates that states cooperate through institutional arrangements, rules, or shared practices. According to Oran Young, the capacity of these regimes depends either on the ability of a dominant actor or on jointly maximizing shared interests. Some authors point out the role of influential groups of experts, constituted as epistemic communities, who define the problem at stake and suggest solutions; others, in a more functionalist vision, consider the regime as spontaneously emerging when it is needed. According to this perspective, states succeed in cooperating when (and to the extent that) they are able to form institutional arrangements or sets of roles, rules, and relationships of the sort we have come to think of as international regimes. This perspective attempts to explain successes and failures in terms of whether such regimes are created.

Regime theory paradoxically, for all its emphasis on states, was important not least because it pointed away from an exclusively state-centric view of global affairs. Rather, as Hedley Bull (1977) suggested about the same time, cooperation and order are as commonplace in international



society as competition and anarchy. Cooperation might result in the creation of constitutionalized IGOs—which themselves often proved to be more than the simple sum of their state parts—but equally significant were international treaties and other much less formal arrangements (“conventions” in a different sense) that shaped outcomes in particular issue areas. There were regimes to protect endangered species and transnational ecosystems, to curb nuclear proliferation and chemical warfare, and so on. Moreover, regime theory highlighted the prominence of epistemic communities linking experts inside national bureaucracies, IGO bureaucracies, and NGOs.

### Postinternational Perspectives on Global Governance

Classical-realist international relations (IR) theory rested so firmly on the presumed egoistic behavior of states and assumptions about anarchy in world politics that it put little stock in international organizations and international law. Therefore, it is not surprising that IR theory was late in acknowledging the significant presence of NGOs, let alone in beginning to conceptualize their influence on and even direct involvement in governance both within and across state boundaries. In fact, there has been such a proliferation of NGOs in the past few decades that they have become increasingly impossible to ignore. James Rosenau (2003) describes this growth as a veritable “organizational explosion.” Many of even the most “local” among the millions of NGOs are concerned with issues that also resonate at regional and global levels, and many if not most such NGOs are networked with others that advance their joint positions transnationally.

The same reference work on international organizations (Union of International Organizations, 2004, Appendix 3, Table 1) cited earlier for numbers of IGOs lists 7,261 “conventional” NGOs and an additional 13,590 under the heading of “other international bodies.” Many of these NGOs have institutionalized relationships or are at least selectively engaged with IGOs. Rosenau (2003), for example, noted that NGOs were involved with some 70% of World Bank projects in 2002. The literature on globalization has tended to characterize the proliferation of NGOs

and their transnational activism with the rise of “global civil society.” A related body of writings has built on earlier work on nonstate actors and transnational corporations (TNCs) to spotlight the growing importance of “private authority” in global governance and international affairs generally (see, especially, A. Clair Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter, 1999; Rodney B. Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, 2002).

However, the NGO and TNC dimension of the organizational explosion is only one of numerous sweeping changes in the global system identified by *Postinternationalists* like Rosenau, as well as Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (2004, 2008). They argue that these changes are the fundamental trends that profoundly shape patterns of governance at all levels. The central analytical challenge, as Rosenau (1997) expresses it, is how to assess

a world in which the [domestic-foreign] Frontier is continuously shifting, widening and narrowing, simultaneously undergoing erosion with respect to many issues and reinforcement with respect to others? . . . Under what circumstances does authority along the Frontier accrue to like-minded states, to global regimes, to transnational organizations, to subnational entities, or to coalitions of diverse types of actors? (p. 5)

Postinternational change is the product of simultaneous processes of fusion and fission of authority. The first is reflected in the growth of networks that connect and influence the behavior of persons geographically far from one another. As has often been observed, some associations are falling apart even as others come together. In his book *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization* (2003), Rosenau describes this dual process as “fragmegration.” The main argument is that “the best way to grasp world affairs today requires viewing them as an endless series of distant proximities in which the forces pressing for greater globalization and those inducing greater localization interactively play themselves out” (p. 4). The second tendency is the fracturing of existing political units into islands of self-identification that localize and often specialize authority and that may encumber efforts to deliver collective goods.

Postinternational theory sees the world today (also historically) as inhabited by countless actors of many different types that reflect different identities, are differentially engaged in countless issues, and exercise effective authority in particular domains and contexts.

Accelerating change is producing an increasingly complex universe of actors in global/local politics. Ferguson and Mansbach call them *polities*, while Rosenau prefers the term *spheres of authority* (SOAs). Polities are collectivities with a significant measure of identity and institutionalization, a degree of hierarchy in their organization, and the capacity to mobilize persons and groups for political purposes (value satisfaction). Some entities more clearly meet these criteria than others. For instance, most states, international institutions, TNCs, major NGOs, and criminal and terrorist organizations are polities. By contrast, most markets are not polities because they lack the requisite identity, institutionalization, and hierarchy.

Polities coexist, cooperate, compete, and clash. They often overlap, layer, and “nest” (Ferguson & Mansbach, 1996) and hence share some of the same “political space”—territory, institutions, issues, identities, markets, and/or cyberspace. Polities are all “becoming” in the sense that political evolution is constant, although they evolve at different rates and not necessarily in a unilinear fashion. In the postinternational framework, each type of polity is only an ideal type and assumes many different forms in practice. There are, for example, many variations in the structures and processes of cities and empires, and the same is plainly true of sovereign states, IGOs, NGOs, TNCs, and so on—not to mention hybrid polities such as public–private partnerships or polities arising out of networks or alliances. The “domain” of any polity—its “reach” in political space—consists of the persons and groups who identify with it and comply with its directives, as well as the resources it can therefore command.

All polities are authorities and govern within their respective and often overlapping domains. Thus, governance exists within, across, and beyond the jurisdictions of sovereign states. Global governance, in turn, refers to the totality of discernible polity authority domains in the world. It is important to understand that postinternational theory defines authority and governance as

effective influence or control. Authority need not be legitimate to be effective, although almost every polity offers some sort of ideological justification for its existence and behavior, and those that are widely regarded as legitimate obviously tend, for that very reason, to be all the more secure.

A postinternational approach presumes that another related assumption of traditional IR theory—that the world is fundamentally anarchic—tells us little more than that there is no effective world government. Human affairs are largely governed—that is, ruled on a day-to-day basis—not only by states but also by a multitude of individual polities that exist within, crisscross, or transcend individual states. Some of these polities are internally dysfunctional or inclined to disruption and violence, but many if not most act individually and collectively in a peaceful, fairly effective, patterned, and often predictable manner. This is the “real world order.”

### The Legitimacy of Global Governance

Long before a global financial crisis triggered a major downturn in the global economy in mid-2008, there was a rising worldwide antiglobalization movement revolving around resistance to free trade and unregulated markets, to the Washington Consensus model for development, and to presumed threats to local culture, labor standards, and the local and global environment from more open borders and rapid economic change. The earliest mass demonstrations occurred in 1999 and ebbed and flowed in subsequent years at meetings of global economic institutions, the G7 (+1), G20, and the World Economic Forum at Davos. For most of the antiglobalization protesters, global governance was and continues to be a symbol of unrestrained economic liberalism and thus something that is *inherently* illegitimate.

Among scholars, policymakers, and attentive publics more favorably inclined to a globalizing world, there has also arisen a separate debate about the legitimacy of international institutions and other actors engaged in global governance. This discussion has usually been framed as concern about a “democratic deficit” in global governance. In sum, the ideal notion of governance in liberal democratic states has been that it derives from the “consent of the governed,” expressed in elections

and other democratic processes. How can such an ideal be translated to governance by international institutions and other nonstate actors? Indeed, should the same sort of ideal apply?

In fact, from one perspective, the entire problem is vastly overstated. First, except for a few high-profile institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the EU, most global governance actors operate with little publicity and far off the radar except for those relatively few states and citizens most closely affected by their activities.

A second and important reason is that most of the states in the world are not democracies and many of those who claim to be have a serious democratic deficit of their own. It is not an exaggeration to say that most international institutions are paragons of democratic virtue by comparison with most states.

From a third perspective, the problem is minimal because states are the main actors in international institutions and regimes. In a legalistic sense, states thus “consent” at least to this governance on behalf of their citizens.

This third perspective is what Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane (2006) term “the Pedigree View,” that “legally constituted institutions, created by states according to the recognized procedures of public international law and consistent with it, are ipso facto legitimate or at the very least enjoy a strong presumption of legitimacy” (pp. 412–413). As they observe,

The Pedigree View fails because it is hard to see how state consent could render global governance institutions legitimate, given that many states are non-democratic and systematically violate the human rights of their citizens and are for that reason themselves illegitimate. State consent in these cases cannot transfer legitimacy for the simple reason that there is no legitimacy to transfer. (pp. 412–413)

Moreover, as Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004) emphasize, many international institutions have a tendency to build on their initial mandate, which may itself be sufficiently ambiguous as to invite improvisation.

Scholarship on organizations generally (not just IOs) has made it abundantly clear that organizations

routinely behave in ways unanticipated by their creators and not formally sanctioned by their members. Organizations that start with one mission routinely acquire others. . . . They exhibit mission creep. They wander far from their original mandate. . . . They develop new rules and procedures in response to new problems they identify. They formulate rules that are politically safe and comfortably routine rather than efficient or effective. . . . [They act] like the bureaucracies they are. (pp. 2–3)

How, then, may we best understand the issue of the legitimacy of global governance? It is crucial to recognize that legitimacy is different from authority. Authority, for those inclined to a legalistic interpretation, rests on a legal right to exercise it. For the Postinternationalists and Constructivists Barnett and Finnemore (2004), authority is the capacity to “rule” effectively, which may be bolstered by—but does not depend on—law and general approbation.

Legitimacy, at root, is the widespread belief that a global governance actor has the *right* to exercise whatever authority it does. That belief may be influenced by an actor’s constitutionality, state pedigree, and internal democratic character and processes, as well as matters such as the actor’s reputation for moral authority or possession of expert knowledge. However, legitimacy derives *fundamentally* from a global governance actor’s ability to deliver the goods that its constituents (members and wider publics) need and want. Success in doing so, over time, establishes a track record and tends to attract broader support, identity, and even loyalty. Consistent failure, obviously, courts the reverse.

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*See also* Authority; Governance; International Organizations; Legitimacy; Political Systems, Types

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## GOVERNANCE, GOOD

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The concept of good governance has multiple meanings, but it most generally refers to a standard or model for how states or other political entities should govern and be governed. This usually includes a long list of normative principles to which these entities should adhere, such as transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and impartiality. Quite commonly, good governance is defined in terms of its antonyms—that is, by referring to phenomena that indicate its absence, such as corruption, nepotism, favoritism, particularism, or patrimonialism. Within policy

circles of the developmental aid community, the concept has been used as an agenda for reform of developing countries, such as civil service reforms, securing property rights, or installing judicial independence. Within the academic community, where close synonyms such as institutional quality or quality of government have been developed, the concept has been systematically linked to several highly desirable outcomes, most notably economic growth and long-term development.

The concept was first launched by the World Bank in the late 1980s and early 1990s in a series of reports that sought to develop a new strategy for aid conditionality. Previously, the Bank had refrained from taking political criteria into account in its donor policy. By demanding that recipient countries adhere to the agenda of “good governance reforms,” this stance was changed. By the late 1990s, the concept started to surface on the research agenda of several academic fields in the social sciences, most notably in economics and political science. To a considerable extent, this development was propelled by the appearance of empirical measures, or worldwide governance indicators, made publicly available by the World Bank Institute.

To apprehend the scope of meanings attached to the concept, a series of distinctions is needed. First, good governance may be defined in terms of what it is (as a good in itself) or in terms of what it is good for (e.g., good for economic development). The former may be called an *internal* definition and the latter an *external* (or functionalist) definition of good governance. In the internal case, some properties of the governance system of a country must be singled out in advance, together with a notion of why these properties make the system better or of a higher quality. This could, for example, be the idea that good governance is to be equated with the rule of law. Countries abiding by this principle are then considered to have good governance, regardless of whether the rule of law leads to other desirable consequences. In the external case, empirical scrutiny is required to determine what properties of the system are considered to be good, namely, those that are found to exert an influence on some preferable, external outcome. In this case too, rule of law might be considered to be part of good governance but only to the extent that rule of law can be shown to influence, for example, economic growth or other desirable phenomena.

Second, good governance may be defined in terms of *procedures* or *policy content*. Procedural definitions refer to regulatory principles, codes of conduct, norms, or other value-laden criteria that constrain the forms in which politics may be conducted. Definitions demanding certain contents, by contrast, require certain policies to be enacted by the political system, such as market deregulation or state privatization.

Third, there is a fundamental difference between procedural definitions referring to the input and the output sides of the political system. The former, where *access* to public authority is regulated, is the realm of decision-making bodies, such as parliaments, cabinets, juntas, party executive committees, or royal councils. The output side concerns, instead, the *exercise* of public authority: how reforms are implemented, rules enforced, court cases decided, and so on. This is the realm of the public administration, the courts, and the law enforcement bodies of the state apparatus. Different regulatory principles guide our general thinking as to what makes different political systems better than others on these two sides of the political system. On the input side, democracy and the principle of political equality (one person, one vote; civil and political rights, etc.) is the most well-established norm. On the output side, key guiding principles are the rule of law, administrative effectiveness (or efficiency), and impartial policy implementation. The most comprehensive procedural definitions of good governance encompass all these normative views and facets of the political system, whereas other more specific notions concentrate on the output side, or even on certain aspects of the output side (such as administrative corruption).

The academic discourse has concerned itself with both the causes and consequences of good governance or quality of government. Starting with consequences, the strongest empirical regularity, as already mentioned, concerns the positive link to long-run economic growth. The theory underlying these findings posits that governance is key to shaping the incentives of key economic actors in society, in particular their propensity to invest in physical and human capital and technology, the key generators of growth. Most critical in this regard is the security of property and contract rights for a broad cross section of the population. Simply put, investments require transactions where

a commodity at one time or place is traded for a return that occurs at another time or place. Key examples include borrowing and lending, a demander and supplier some distance apart, and the parties to an insurance policy. Secure contract rights (or contract enforcement) underpin beliefs among economic actors that their agreement will be carried out in these situations. Secure property rights, in addition, guarantees that the fruits of such transactions are not at some later point of time expropriated by the state or by other economic actors. Research on the determinants of economic growth has highlighted the importance of good governance or quality of government in securing these contract and property rights.

Other positive consequences of good governance have been uncovered in the literature. Some of these concern individual-level phenomena. Empirical studies show that corruption has a negative impact on ordinary people's feelings of trust, not only in political authorities but also in one another (the latter sometimes being referred to as interpersonal trust or social capital). The more general governance indicators published by the World Bank Institute have even been found to be strongly related to feelings of happiness or life satisfaction. Thus, people living in countries with better working government institutions are on average happier than those living in corrupt and ill-governed countries, other things being equal. Studies of peace and conflict have also taken interest in the quality of government institutions. It has been argued that dysfunctional government institutions make both civil war and interstate belligerence more likely.

The literature on causes of good governance or quality of government is most refined in the area of explaining the origins of corruption, but key insights from this work apply to other, broader governance phenomena as well. There are two general approaches to understanding the prevalence of corruption or other forms of illicit behavior on behalf of government officials. The first is the principal-agent model. According to this view, a collective body of actors (e.g., the top political leadership in a country) are the *principals* who delegate the performance of some government task to another collective body of actors (e.g., the bureaucracy), the *agents*. As in any situation where authority is being delegated, the problem from the

perspective of the principal is that the agents may acquire specific information about the task at hand that they do not disclose to the principal, or that they may have other private motivations affecting their behavior than the goals of performing the delegated task. In the case of corruption, administrators delegated the task of collecting a tax, for example, may collude with firms and collect bribes rather than taxes. The principals will try to monitor the behavior of their agents by exacting legal remedies for those being caught collecting bribes. Seen from this principal–agent perspective, the level of corruption—or, more generally, the extent to which good governance is being upheld—in a country is primarily a function of the individual incentives and risk perceptions of the agents. The principal, in turn, may affect these individual motivations by use of control instruments such as increasing the effectiveness of the monitoring system and the severity of the legal punishment exacted.

The principal–agent model of corruption (or other forms of governance failures) has been a forceful tool for understanding this phenomenon, but it suffers from several limitations. The most serious flaw is probably the implicit assumption that the principals are benevolent—that is, that their overall goal is to promote good governance and quality of government in the country. In a more pessimistic (some would say, more realistic) scenario, however, everyone has something to gain personally from a dysfunctional system as long as a large enough body of actors continues to play foul. This may be called the collective action theory of good governance or quality of government. According to this theory, government officials at any hierarchical level (and even ordinary citizens) may reason as follows: True, the best solution for all would be to have a government free from corruption or other forms of dysfunctional behavior. But as long as most other actors take bribes, why should I play fair? As should be clear, this structure of incentives leads to a collective action problem: Despite the fact that everyone realizes that another outcome would be preferable, if most others are expected to play foul, everyone will play foul. To break the deadlock of the collective action dilemma, actors have to start believing that a large enough number of other actors will from now on play fairly.

The study of good governance or quality of government is a fairly new and rapidly growing

field of research. The future of this field will in large part hinge on how well the literature resolves a number of tensions inherent in the concept itself. These include, above all, the tensions between narrow (e.g., corruption) and broader (e.g., impartial government institutions) concepts of good governance, between functionalist and internal understandings, between definitions referring to policy contents and those referring to procedures, and between definitions stressing the input and those stressing the output side of the political system.

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*See also* Corruption; Corruption, Administrative; Rule of Law; State Collapse; State Failure; State Formation

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## GOVERNANCE, INFORMAL

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Many academic observers would argue that we have witnessed a shift from government to governance over the past decenniums, reflected in “softer” and more indirect steering mechanisms. Governance also involves more interaction between

public authorities and other social actors. Still, from a distance, the discussion seems rather confusing, in that different meanings of the concept of governance are used in the literature. According to a few European scholars, the term *governance* basically refers to “new” ideas related to the involvement of society in the process of governing. According to some American specialists, on the other hand, the term retains much of its original steering conception. To overcome this conceptual challenge, one may understand governance as consisting of four activities:

1. the process of articulating common priorities,
2. the process of bringing coherence to these priorities,
3. the process of and capacity for steering, and
4. the processes of establishing some form of accountability.

Based on this perspective, this entry explains the characteristics of informal governance and the different forms it takes and discusses how informal governance may be evaluated in terms of effectiveness and democracy.

Governance can assume many different forms and can be classified along different dimensions. Focusing on the extent of formality, one can argue that governance is formal when the production of authoritative decisions and actions takes place in a single hierarchical structure, such as a democratically elected legislative assembly and government.

Moving to the opposite pole, informal governance means that the production of public values arises from the interaction of a plethora of public and private and collective and individual actors. The mechanisms in use depend, moreover, to some extent on the cooperation of the involved nongovernmental actors. Informal governance means that participation in the decision-making process is not yet or cannot in fact be codified and publicly enforced. But it may also mean that a certain group of decision makers agree *informally* to advocate or enact particular policies, while still acting in *formal* decision-making contexts.

Informal governance is not new, nor should it be associated with specific institutions or levels of government. Governments have been engaged in informal governance since time immemorial, and

informal governance can be found in institutions such as the European Union (EU), as in national, regional, and local policy processes.

### Why Informal Governance?

Although not new, governments have come to rely more heavily on informal governance. Many reasons exist for this shift toward informality. One is the declining trust in, and respect for, government in many countries. As most formal instruments of governance rely on a government’s legitimate authority to be effective, the waning of legitimacy makes traditional instruments less certain. Likewise, governments have experienced direct mechanisms as costly and inefficient, compared with the use of the private sector as partners in implementation. Governments are seldom the sole proprietors of expert knowledge, often needing to rely on other institutions’ expert knowledge, and a wide range of stakeholders wish to participate in the policy process. Ideological changes toward “new public management” and a “network society” have also stressed the need to move away from direct government involvement to more indirect forms of governing and informal governance.

Some argue that informal governance is propelled by the EU, and to a significant extent, informal governance can be claimed to be a necessary part of the EU system, because the EU can often actually make policy by way of informal routes and networking. One example of this is the Eurogroup: the circle of finance ministers arguably shaping European economic governance by pre-agreeing on all critical decisions made by the council, deciding on overall orientation of economic governance in the euro area, and establishing common interpretations of the European Monetary Union’s (EMU’s) core policy instruments. In spite of its important role, the Eurogroup is seen as administratively precarious and only semirecognized by law. It is formally recognized that it should meet informally, and consequently neither a secretariat nor a Eurogroup mailbox exists in Brussels.

### Forms of Informal Governance

Even if informal governance appears as a concept in the literature, one should not treat all forms as virtually identical. These interventions in the name

of, if not by, the public itself need to be invested more carefully, and one should attempt to put into perspective the various political, economic, and administrative logics of choice involved.

One way to categorize different forms of informal governance, proposed by B. Guy Peters, is to divide informal governance into soft law, networks, partnerships, coproduction, multilevel governance, and the so-called open method of coordination.

The basic idea of *soft law* is that the public sector does not establish all the rules for action but permits social actors to bargain within a broader established policy statement. One example is negotiated rule making in the United States, where the affected parties and relevant government agencies are permitted to bargain among themselves with regard to the final and operating rules. This commonly discussed form of governance stands in contrast to the hard law of legal command and formal regulations.

*Network* is a second type of informal governance, covering mechanisms through which state and society have become more closely linked. Networks represent a broad and general category of interactions that is grounded in interdependency among actors simultaneously keeping their operational autonomy intact. These actors interact and negotiate over a period of time, creating an institutional framework of rules, norms, shared knowledge, and social imagination.

Public-private *partnerships* represent a distinct subcategory of networks and a common mechanism for implementing public programs. The basic idea of these arrangements is that a relationship is created between the public sector and one or more private actors, intending to deliver a specific service jointly. Most commonly, these arrangements materialize as written contracts between the involved partners. Building or using existing trust is arguably a necessary condition to make these partnerships work.

*Coproduction* is closely related to partnerships and departs from the idea that the public sector will cooperate with private actors in the delivery of a service, therefore running the risk of devolving the necessary authority to these actors. Public programs directed at “neighborhood watch” and different kinds of user boards consisting of, for example, school teachers and parents have served as examples of informal governance—in the form of coproduction.

*Multilevel governance* is usually understood in terms of public actors who, through bargaining, make decisions and coordinate their actions. But even if a clear hierarchy does not exist, multilevel governance still does not by definition include social actors. On the other hand, the use of these interactions, and the way they steer clear of the traditional hierarchy, may provide social actors with greater opportunities for influence.

The so-called open method of coordination, a distinct form developed in the EU, resembles to some extent the form of soft law discussed above. This cannot be defined as a single method, rather a variety of mechanisms, such as benchmarking and sharing best practices to change the behavior of the relevant actors (in the case of the EU, the governments within the union). But the basic ideas of benchmarking apply much more widely and indicate that this model should be understood as a more general form of informal governance.

### Evaluating Informal Governance

Informal governance can be evaluated on different terms, and the specific forms mentioned above will to some extent score differently depending on which criterion is used. However, relevant literature on the subject tends to agree that informal governance has consequences for its steering capacity. Permitting a wider range of actors to become involved in, for example, policy processes means that their views will be known to actors with a formal capacity to make decisions. This may improve the quality of decisions and, thereby, prevent later problems when policies are actually implemented. However, this may also slow down the process and make bargaining among the different actors more complicated.

The most problematic aspects of informal governance are still related to democracy and accountability. Informal governance, whatever specific form it takes, means that some social actors become part of the public policy process, while others do not. To evaluate informal governance in democratic terms, questions need to be raised about authority, participation, and assurance: Who has the authority to invite participants? Who participates and on what terms? And finally, how are justice and reliability assured?

Just asking these questions leads one to draw the inevitable conclusion that the existence of



informal governance definitely challenges core ideas about democracy. These challenges appear at two levels. From the viewpoint of representative democracy, we are entitled to ask whether informal governance can be developed in such a way that its foundation in representative government remains clear. But informal governance may also lead to a broader discussion about democracy and to whether the whole idea of democracy should be rethought in such a way that informal governance becomes less challenging.

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*See also* Coordination; Governance, Multilevel; Networks; Soft Law

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and the way in which policy was made and implemented within an increasingly populated European political arena. Feeding into the broader governance debate, which seeks to understand the challenges to governmental capacity presented by processes such as hollowing out and fragmentation, multilevel governance highlights the vertical relations between actors and institutions across various territorial levels, alongside the transforming horizontal relationships between state and nonstate actors. Proponents of multilevel governance reject the state-centricity of many alternative accounts to highlight the blurring of boundaries between domestic and international politics, wherein authority is increasingly shared across levels. In turn, the growing multiplicity of both state and nonstate participants and of policy implementation is highlighted. A key empirical question underpinning theories of multilevel governance is therefore the extent to which central governments are subsequently losing their authority and capacity to achieve their policy preferences. This entry identifies the commonly understood strands that underpin accounts of multilevel governance before considering the various distinct forms that multilevel governance can assume. This entry then provides an account of multilevel governance's major strengths, while highlighting the weaknesses identified, to illustrate its utility as a theory of political science.

#### Historical and Theoretical Context

The intellectual origins of *multilevel governance* can be found in the study of the EU. Influenced by the emerging perspective of the EU as a distinct political system, the term was first used by Gary Marks in 1992 to capture developments in European policy making. Prior to the 1980s, the study of the EU and the process of European integration were dominated by approaches that were influenced by the field of international relations (IR). Drawing on the tradition of pluralism within IR studies, the neo-functionalist approach, which prevailed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, suggested that despite their initiation of the integration process, national governments were increasingly losing control in a complex network of state and nonstate actors. The neo-functionalist perspective was not unanimously accepted and was countered

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## GOVERNANCE, MULTILEVEL

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Multilevel governance gained prominence in the field of European Union (EU) studies, where it was applied to explain patterns of European integration

by the intergovernmentalist approach, which drew on the realist approaches in IR to stress the ongoing dominance of national governments within European structures. Its assumptions were strengthened by the reassertion of national authority and the continuance of national veto across the majority of policy areas, and the intergovernmentalist approach emerged as the dominant approach to EU studies from the 1960s onward. However, by the mid-1980s, the structures of the EU had begun to undergo a series of significant reforms, including the creation of a single market (the common market) following the 1986 Single European Act and the continued extension of qualified majority voting across a range of policy areas, which in turn reduced the scope of national veto. In particular, the ongoing shift toward qualified majority voting influenced new perspectives regarding the EU, wherein the EU was perceived as a distinct political system, with parallels to domestic political institutions, rather than simply as a vehicle, or process, of integration. In turn, greater attention was given to the role of subnational and supranational actors within EU policy making, which led to a reappraisal of traditional conceptions of center–periphery relationships. It was against this theoretical and empirical backdrop that Marks sought to move away from a two-dimensional analysis, centered on the upward flow of power from national to supranational actors, in order to highlight the effects of the downward seepage of power to subnational actors and their resultant impact on the policy process. He also drew on ideas regarding fragmentation, policy networks, and the role of nonstate actors to indicate the horizontal, as well as the vertical, flows of power.

### Essence of Multilevel Governance

The burgeoning role of subnational governments as key actors in the European political arena has attracted increasing academic attention, within which multilevel governance has emerged as a key theoretical response. A central assumption of multilevel governance is that the process of European integration has meant that authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government—subnational, national, and supranational. In contrast to the earlier state-centric views, multilevel governance has stressed the

apparently independent role played by subnational actors in the European policy-making process, suggesting that regional governments have sufficient independence from national governments to shape their own preferences and directly influence the EU agenda. In turn, as Marks has noted, national governments are perceived as no longer representing the sole interface between the domestic and supranational arenas. The theoretical focus of multilevel governance can be located within the governance narrative, which has gained increasing currency since the mid-1990s as a way of understanding the challenges of steering and coordinating policy making and policy implementation within an increasingly complex social system. Central to the governance debate is the ability of national governments to assert their agendas on increasingly segmented polities, wherein concepts such as hollowing out and fragmentation have been applied to suggest that national governments have become simply one among a range of competing authorities. Multilevel governance thus refers to the negotiated, nonhierarchical exchanges between institutions at the supranational, national, regional, and local levels, highlighting the vertical layering of governance processes at these different levels.

As with so many concepts and theories in political science, multilevel governance is without an all-encompassing definition, and disagreement exists regarding its scope and utility. Nonetheless, there are several commonly agreed strands. A shared starting point is the acceptance that decision making occurs at various territorial levels and is characterized by the participation of state and societal actors. In turn, this has meant that the identification of the discrete and/or nested levels of decision making has become increasingly difficult in the context of complex, overlapping networks. Within this context, according to Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (2004), the role of the state is under transformation, as emergent nonstate actors seek to develop new strategies of coordination, steering, and networking to protect, or even enhance, their autonomy. It is important to note that multilevel governance does not necessarily confront the sovereignty of states directly, and it casts national governments as the most important pieces of the European puzzle. Nevertheless, by highlighting the inability of national governments to monopolize the policy process, theories of

multilevel governance make important judgments regarding state capacity, suggesting that the sharing of decision-making competencies among actors at various geopolitical levels has involved a significant loss of control for individual national governments. This has been compounded by the shift away from nested political arenas to increasingly interconnected policy networks, wherein subnational actors operate in both the national and international arenas, creating a range of transnational associations. Instead of being explicitly challenged, EU states are therefore

being melded into a multi-level polity by their leaders and the actions of numerous sub-national and supranational actors, [and] one does not have to argue that states are on the verge of political extinction to believe that their control . . . has significantly weakened. (Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, 2001, p. 27)

Reflecting on their changing capacity, many accounts of multilevel governance have identified the development of a gatekeeping role for state actors, wherein national governments act as a mediator between subnational and supranational actors to control access to the European policy arena in order to achieve or defend its preferred policy outcomes. Adopting the role of gatekeeper is perceived as enabling state actors to address strategic alternatives to zero-sum power struggles, as they seek to move away from “authoritative allocation and regulation ‘from above’ to the role of partner and mediator” (Beate Kohler-Koch, 1996, p. 371).

**Competing Models of Multilevel Governance**

In many respects, multilevel governance had assumed the guise of a conceptual umbrella, and it had been suggested that the breadth of its focus

was sometimes at the expense of its explanatory power and analytical vigor. In particular, multilevel governance had been criticized for its focus on relationships between state actors across different levels rather than across different sectors, for being overly descriptive, and for overemphasizing the role of subnational actors in the policy process. Andrew Jordan (2001), for example, suggested that while multilevel governance (MLG) provides an “appealing picture of what the EU looks like,” it was “weak at explaining which levels are the most important and why, and what actually motivated the experiment in governance in the first place” (p. 194). This led him to conclude that “the most we can currently say about MLG is that it needs to be subject to a great deal more case-study testing before it can be adopted as a general account of how (parts of) the EU operate(s)” (p. 204).

In response to such criticisms, Hooghe and Marks sought to delineate two contrasting views of the organization of multilevel governance, which they labeled simply Type I and Type II, summarized in Table 1. Type I multilevel governance focuses on formal intergovernmental relationships at a limited number of levels. These jurisdictions are general purpose, bundling together a range of policy responsibilities, and the membership boundaries of each jurisdiction do not intersect. Alternatively, Type II is composed of specialized jurisdictions wherein governance arrangements are organized around functionally specific governance networks (Hooghe & Marks, 2003).

As this brief overview suggests, Type I and Type II multilevel governance have different intellectual foundations, and therefore, they seek to explain different manifestations of the policy process. With its emphasis on power sharing among a limited number of formal governmental levels—international, national, regional, meso, and local—Type I multilevel governance has been influenced

**Table I** Types of Multilevel Governance

<i>Type I</i>	<i>Type II</i>
General-purpose jurisdictions	Task-specific jurisdictions
Nonintersecting memberships	Intersecting memberships
Jurisdictions at a limited number of intervals	No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels
Systemwide architecture	

Source: Hooghe and Marks (2003, p. 235).

by theories of federalism, which have been developed and applied beyond the parameters of individual nation-states. Type I multilevel governance is characterized as a “nested” or “Russian doll” model, wherein there is only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale, which is intended to be stable for several decades or more. The bundling together of policy functions in a system of Type I multilevel governance is perceived to gain the benefits of varying territorial scale while minimizing the number of jurisdictions to be coordinated. Within this typology, nation-states remain of central importance, reflecting the emphasis given to national boundaries as a key organizer of political activity, and the focus of analysis is therefore on individual governments or institutions rather than on specific policies or issues. Alternatively, Type II multilevel governance reflects too many of the concepts associated with the governance narrative to present a fluid and complex picture of governance. Unlike the general purpose design of Type I multilevel governance, jurisdictions in Type II multilevel governance are task specific and organized around explicit problems or policy areas, their organization being flexible as governance demands change. These jurisdictions can entail intersecting memberships and can be organized across a range of jurisdictional levels, without being constrained by the nested hierarchical structures associated with Type I multilevel governance. Type II governance structures are intended to secure optimum efficiency in policy making and will be discontinued once they have served their purpose, in accordance with the emphasis on flexibility. Each typology is therefore based on a different conception of power. Type I is suited to dealing with zero-sum conflict about basic values, because it facilitates logrolling and cross-issue trading. However, Type II is effective in solving ad hoc coordination problems among individuals sharing the same geographical or functional space (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Nonetheless, the two typologies are not mutually exclusive, and often, Type II governance is embedded within a Type I structure, for example, general-purpose jurisdictions can coexist alongside special-purpose jurisdictions; and formal institutions of government can actively assign functions to special-purpose bodies charged with addressing particular problems. The result of this has been described as a

“baroque patchwork of Type II jurisdictions overlaying a nested pattern of Type I jurisdictions” (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 238).

### Strengths and Weaknesses

Multilevel governance has made an important contribution to political theory and has utility across a range of empirical settings. It has drawn on a range of ideas and concepts in political science—such as internationalization, regionalization, complexity, governance, and policy networks—to highlight the transdisciplinary approach that is needed in analyzing many contemporary issues and challenges. In particular, the theory bridges the traditional dichotomy between domestic and international politics to emphasize the “blurring of the distinction between the two through the process of European integration” (Bache, 2008, p. 28). Although developed in the context of EU policy making, multilevel governance has also gained increasing salience across a range of geopolitical settings, being perceived as a far more relevant way of understanding intergovernmental relationships by moving beyond the characterization of the zero-sum nature of intergovernmental relations implicit in previous approaches. While it remains contested, the broad appeal of multilevel governance reflects a shared concern with the role of nonstate actors, the growth of intersecting jurisdictions, increased complexity across the policy arena, and the challenges posed to state power. In this respect, multilevel governance has made an important contribution to the broader governance debate, providing a theoretical model, the robustness of which has been reinforced by the later distinction between Type I and Type II, which highlights the relationship between vertically organized territorial units of governance on the one hand and the interplay between task-specific, horizontally organized jurisdictions on the other. Multilevel governance has therefore been seen to provide a way of understanding the interaction of complexity within and between all jurisdictional levels, highlighting the role of state and nonstate actors. In this sense, multilevel governance can be seen as having been successful in moving beyond simplistic conceptions of the linear exercise of power that was implicit in earlier intergovernmentalist approaches by focusing attention on the impact of processes such as supranationalization,

decentralization, devolution, and the dispersal of authority to semiautonomous bodies. In turn, multilevel governance can be used to sharpen questions regarding the mechanisms and strategies used to govern within a system of multilevel governance not just by national government actors seeking to ensure their influence in an increasingly complex policy arena but also by regional and subnational actors who similarly seek to ensure their influence.

Nonetheless, there have been several criticisms of multilevel governance as a way of understanding contemporary policy making and implementation. While posited as a counter to state-centric approaches, there are criticisms that multilevel governance has overstated the erosion of the governing capacity of nation-state actors, and it has been suggested that an emphasis on the plurality of competing interests has led to “fundamental questions” about the structure of power relations being “downplayed” (Paul Stubbs, 2005). It has also been suggested that multilevel governance has been overly descriptive at the expense of analytical vigor (e.g., Jordan, 2001). This was acknowledged by several exponents of multilevel governance, contributing to the delineation between Type I and Type II multilevel governance discussed above; see, for example, Hooghe and Marks (2003). Nevertheless, despite attempts at refinement, there is uncertainty regarding the ability of multilevel governance to “travel” across alternative geopolitical settings, with a distinction being made between the “theoretical vagueness” of multilevel governance as a concept, which can travel, and its precise and “rigid” modeling, which is unsuited to different contexts (Stubbs, 2005). A pronounced normative dimension has also been identified within several later accounts of multilevel governance. Despite suggesting that “there is no agreement about how multi-level governance should be organised,” Marks and Hooghe (2004) have argued that

the dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is *both more effective than, and normatively superior to* [italics added], central state monopoly . . . that governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture variations in the territorial reach of policy externalities. . . . To internalize externalities, governance must be multi-level. (p. 16)

The normative justification for the application of multilevel governance has been perceived as a “very dubious elision” of “what governance should be, whilst a legitimate question in normative political science, is of a different order to questions of what governance *is*” (Stubbs, 2005, p. 69). Thus, as Bache and Flinders have argued, it is therefore important to distinguish between multilevel governance as an analytical mode and a normative concept.

### Role in Future Political Analysis

While some aspects remain contested, multilevel governance has emerged as an important way of making sense of policy making and implementation in an increasingly crowded polity. Although its roots are in the study of the EU, the way in which multilevel governance bridges the divide between the study of international and domestic politics has meant that its utility has extended beyond the field of Europeanization and into a range of alternative analytical areas. To promote the ongoing salience of multilevel governance, a key challenge will be in ensuring that it remains responsive to the organic evolution of the political world that it seeks to explain. Returning to the study of the EU, the 2004 enlargement saw 10 further countries formally join the EU, which were joined by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007; and accession negotiations are going on with several other states. As the EU continues to expand east, it is likely that questions will emerge regarding the possibility of stretching a Type I jurisdiction of an EU that comprises upward of 27 countries or the extent to which Type II governance arrangements will be used in policy making and implementation. Another emergent issue is the extent to which the changing context of policy making, as perceived within accounts of multilevel governance, has challenged traditional conceptions of democratic accountability. In turn, this necessitates their reappraisal, as while different forms of multilevel governance may add to the legitimacy of policy making through increased efficiency, this may reduce democratic legitimacy unless new means of connecting citizens with these shifting locations of power are identified. Finally, as noted by Bache and Flinders, there is some evidence that suggests the emergence of unintended consequences

arising from forms of multilevel governance that are beyond state control, and a key future research agenda will entail making sense of their occurrence.

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See also European Integration; Europeanization of Policy; Governance, Good; Governance, Informal

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## GOVERNANCE, URBAN

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The term *governance* is increasingly used in urban politics, policy, and administration to signify activities related to public policy that are undertaken jointly by multiple actors, including some outside government. Gerry Stoker (2000) defines governance as “working across boundaries within the public sector or between the public sector and private or voluntary sectors” (p. 93). Although the literature has dealt with governance at different levels, the idea has special relevance at the local level, where solving problems or creating the capacity to act often involves mobilizing support from other sectors and other levels of government. This entry first discusses the evolution and types of governance and then focuses on models of urban governance.

### Why Governance?

Social and economic changes have increased the permeability of policy making. The literature points to forces such as globalization and fiscal pressures across advanced industrial democracies, particularly because of demographic change and economic competition. Jan Kooiman (2000) describes this complexity as the growing ungovernability of society. At the same time, the demands and expectations of citizens have increased. Rising education levels, more critical citizens, and decreased trust in government have increased pressures for reform and alternative service delivery.

These reforms have opened up government to the market, and in some cases it has led to more participation at the grassroots level. As Donald Kettl in 2000 and B. Guy Peters in 2001 note, the wave of privatization in the United States in the 1980s and trends such as new public management abroad or government “reinvention” here have produced new contractual relationships

with private sector and nonprofit organizations. These changes have also multiplied quasi-governmental agencies and special districts. Most governance theory and research is concerned with describing, explaining, and managing *processes* within this new context, particularly processes of bargaining and cooperation.

While cities in the decentralized American system are particularly sensitive to business investment decisions, Stoker (2000) contends that fragmentation and interdependence are more generally high in urban policy across countries. Problems such as poverty and the redevelopment of distressed areas are not easily solved by government alone. Theories of local governance have evolved more broadly to embrace other types of local policy partnerships.

### Types of Governance

Two general approaches to governance are identified by Jon Pierre (2000), and while these apply to governance at the national level, they are useful for thinking about models of local governance as well. One is governance as goal definition and policy making. Pierre and Peters (2005) define it in terms of four activities:

1. goal definition (articulating a common set of priorities for society),
2. coherence (consistency and coordination),
3. steering (finding ways of achieving goals), and
4. accountability.

In the literature on *local governance*, urban regimes or governing coalitions set the policy agenda and goals more generally within the community, in contrast to the more specialized governance relations in policy networks.

On the other hand, research on governance as networks emphasizes interactions within policy domains such as education, economic development, or public safety, as described, for example, by Walter J. M. Kickert, Erik-Hans Klijn, and Joop F. M. Kopenjan (1997), Laurence J. O'Toole (1997), Rod A. W. Rhodes (1997), R. A. W. Rhodes and David Marsh (1992), and Fritz Scharpf (1993). Interdependent and cooperative relationships in networks are often depicted as distinct

from those in hierarchies or markets, as noted by Kooiman (2000) and Rhodes (1997). According to Pierre and Peters (2005) and Stoker (2000), collaboration, of course, entails costs in terms of time and effort, and processes of negotiation and compromise may also produce outcomes that are not congruent with the goals of all participating organizations. The research on urban governance as policy networks is often more prominent in European research, as local governments often have less autonomy from the central government and play an important role in delivering the services of the welfare state. But work on civic capacity and urban education in the United States also falls into this category.

### Urban Regimes and Governing

Models of local governance arose in response to earlier debates on community power and contemporary debates over the role of economic development in American local government. In 1987 John Logan and Harvey Molotch, for example, depicted urban governance as occurring through local growth coalitions, composed of city officials and locally dependent businesses such as newspapers, utilities, banks, and developers. The most influential framework for understanding cross-sectoral governance at the local level has been urban regime analysis. A "regime" connotes a set of governing arrangements, and in its usage over the past few decades, it indicates cooperation across institutional boundaries, beyond the formal apparatus of government. According to Karen Mossberger and Gerry Stoker (2001), collaboration is a response to the fragmentation of authority and interdependence between the policy-making capacity of democratic institutions and the wealth-generating resources of the market economy.

Early versions of regime analysis emphasized cross-sectoral goal setting and steering rather than network, for example, historical variation in regimes, and suggest change over time in goals, resources, and partners in American cities. Their typology described directive regimes during the period of urban renewal, concessionary regimes in the 1960s, and entrepreneurial regimes that responded to later cuts in federal aid and capital mobility with economic development initiatives. For Stephen Elkin, regimes are also goal setting and

steering in the most fundamental sense. They are “constitutive” or formative institutions that shape the interaction between the democratic state and the privately controlled market. Elkin also depicts historical and geographic variation in regime types.

According to Clarence Stone (1989), urban regimes are governing arrangements also; but more concretely, they are carried out by a governing coalition, “an informal yet relatively stable group with *access to institutional resources* that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (p. 4). Stone’s work echoes many of the same themes found in the network literature—interdependence, congruent goals, the mobilization of resources, negotiation, and mutual adjustment of goals through interaction over time. The social production model of power in regime analysis is necessary to overcome the fragmentation of authority and resources. Regimes embody the “power to act” or the “capacity to act” rather than simply domination over other actors. According to Stone, the goal-setting and steering aspects of regimes are significant—urban regimes are more than economic development coalitions: They are governing coalitions that set priorities for the city as a whole. Over time, Stone (2005) has broadened the concept, arguing that regimes may vary in their stability and that cross-sectoral participation does not require the presence of business. The participation of other groups varies with the policy agenda of the regime.

Stone and his collaborators on education reform have formulated the concept of “civic capacity,” applied to cooperation within a more specific local policy network (rather than a governing coalition). Civic capacity is needed “to devise and employ formal and informal mechanisms to collectively solve problems,” but it also engages a broader range of actors than governing coalitions, including neighborhood residents and community groups as well as policy professionals, universities, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and other stakeholders in the particular issue. Influencing policy requires changing governing arrangements within policy subsystems rather than winning sporadic victories through interest group pressure. Some other scholars have used elements of urban regime analysis to explain cooperation in local policy networks—for example, in AIDS policy.

The range of actors, the motivations, and the difficulty of mobilizing resources and maintaining collaboration would be expected to differ across policy areas.

### Other Models of Urban Governance

At the same time that urban regime analysis developed in the United States, economic restructuring and changes in the welfare state in many countries increased pressures at the local level and the possibility that urban regime analysis could explain new forms of governance appearing in many places. One study of 11 cities in the United States, Germany, and France found stable urban regimes in all three countries, particularly where there were locally dependent businesses. There are also instances where no stable regime has formed in any of the countries in the study.

The cross-national use of the urban regime concept poses some challenges, however (see Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). European institutional contexts offer markedly different patterns of resources, authority, and incentives for cross-sectoral collaboration at the local level. In Europe, greater fiscal support from central governments, more public ownership of municipal land, and other factors lessen the need for business involvement as a critical factor for the “power to” achieve development and support local services. In some countries, business is more centralized (as in the United Kingdom), or corporatist arrangements are largely worked out through the national parties. Stronger parties more generally lend a national character to political relationships at the local level, in contrast with the United States. Partnerships in small U.K. cities, for example, appear to be the result of top-down initiatives from central government rather than an expression of the social production model of power at the local level. Economic development partnerships are apparent in several Western European countries, but despite some parallels with urban regimes, the central government often played a large role in the formation and priorities of the partnerships. And European instances of cross-sectoral cooperation are not always setting agendas for the city as a whole. Furthermore, economic development policy in Britain tends to resemble a discrete



policy network with strong vertical links to the central government as well as business participation. As such, it appears to be closer to the model of networks within policy domains rather than a governing coalition that influences citywide priorities.

Pierre (2005) and Alan DiGaetano and Elizabeth Strom (2003) have argued for a broader concept of urban governance that is more comparative. There has been a burgeoning literature on local governance across many countries, conceived of as a local multi-actor collaboration that fits either policy networks or governing models. Studies show evidence of trends toward governance at the local level in most advanced industrialized countries and in some other countries as well. One edited volume containing studies of a dozen Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries reveals the presence of public-private partnerships in 10 of them. The authors caution that these “may not look like urban regimes” but that there is increased local economic development activity and greater dependence on other organizations outside of government at the local and regional levels (see Robin Hambleton & Jill Gross, 2007).

### Conclusion

Concepts of urban governance have been useful for describing patterns of urban policy making in both citywide agenda setting and in local policy domains. While forms of governance differ across countries, the concept has described trends toward policy making, mobilizing the resources of multiple actors in governing coalitions or networks. There are many questions about governance that bear further scrutiny—the role and legitimacy of actors outside of government, the costs and difficulty of coordination, the consequences of unequal power within coalitions and networks for representation and for problem solving, and diffused accountability for achieving public purposes. All of these are important questions for empirical investigation and for theory, across different countries, policy areas, and forms of urban governance.

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*See also* Governance, Administration Policies; Governance, Informal; Governance, Multilevel; Regime (Comparative Politics)

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## GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

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Governance is usually defined as the processes through which a plurality of actors aim to produce and deliver public purpose in the broad sense of political visions, operative plans, problem definitions, policy solutions, infrastructures, regulations, resource allocations, and public services. Governance can be provided by unicentric forms of government based on hierarchical command structures. It may

also involve forming multicentric forms of quasi markets where public and/or private actors compete to deliver goods and services on terms defined by elected governments. Finally, governance may take the form of pluricentric partnerships and networks in which policy decisions are reached through negotiated interaction among interdependent actors.

The study of governance networks constitutes a novel research field based on the “discovery” of nonhierarchical forms of governance involving networks of public and/or private actors. The basic argument prompting the recent surge in governance network research is that public policy, defined as common attempts to achieve a desired outcome, is the result of governing processes that are no longer controlled by the government, instead involving a wide range of relevant and affected actors engaged in ongoing negotiations that give rise to a stable pattern of horizontal interaction constituting a specific mode of coordination. It is this “heterarchic” mode of coordination that is dubbed “governance networks” in the academic literature.

The focus on governance networks has an empirical background in the widespread recognition of the increasingly fragmented, complex, and dynamic character of contemporary society. Fragmentation increases as a result of the functional differentiation of society into relatively autonomous subsystems and organizational entities. At the same time, the breakup of the sedimented forms of political alignment and identification spurs multiplication of political actors and identities. Complexity increases as a result of the growth and interweaving of crosscutting policy problems, and it is further augmented by the advent of new forms of risk and the blurring of the boundaries between institutions, sectors, and scales. Finally, new societal dynamics are created by the proliferation and interconnection of new spatial and temporal horizons of action. The contingent articulation and interaction of the different rationalities, procedures, and strategies for solving policy problems and exploiting new opportunities produces new and unpredictable developments. The result of the growing fragmentation, complexity, and dynamism is an increasing ungovernability of society that makes it difficult to meet the growing steering ambitions demanding that public governance be flexible, knowledge based, targeted, responsive, and inexpensive. The mobilization of the knowledge, resources, and energies of relevant

and affected actors through governance networks offers a promising way out of this impasse.

Leading politicians and executive administrators seem to have taken governance networks to their hearts. Governments around the world and at different levels increasingly aim to govern at a distance by creating arenas for self-governance and self-regulation. Public agencies and managers are becoming linked through new initiatives aiming to promote joined-up government. Last but not least, public and private actors are brought together through the formation of different kinds of partnerships and collaborative governance.

After closer inspection of the definition of governance networks and a brief account of the theoretical roots of the concept of governance networks, some caveats regarding the discussion of governance networks are presented here. This is followed by an assessment of the merits and problems of governance networks in public policy making. Finally, some of the main theories of governance networks are presented before a concluding discussion of the major themes in the research on governance networks.

### Defining Governance Networks

Governance networks can be defined as (a) a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors, (b) that interact with one another through ongoing negotiations (c) that take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework; (d) facilitate self-regulation within the limits set by external forces; and (e) contribute to the production of public purpose. Other defining features might be added, but this definition captures the essence of what are commonly referred to as governance networks.

This entry attempts to unpack this dense definition of governance networks by considering each defining feature in turn. First, governance networks articulate a number of public, semipublic, and private actors who, on the one hand, are dependent on one another's resources and capacities to get things done and, on the other hand, are *operationally autonomous* in that they are not commanded by superiors to act in a certain way. The interdependent relations between the network actors mean that they are horizontally, rather than vertically, related. However, the horizontal relations

between the network actors do not imply equality in terms of authority and resources. There might be an asymmetric allocation of material and immaterial resources among the network actors, but since participation is voluntary and the actors are free to leave the network—and since the actors are mutually dependent—no single actor can fully exercise its power to exert hierarchical control over anyone else.

Second, members of governance networks interact through negotiations that combine elements of bargaining and deliberation. The network actors may bargain over the distribution of resources to maximize outcomes; however, to facilitate some degree of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, the bargaining process must be embedded in a deliberative process that facilitates trust building, reciprocal recognition, learning, and common understanding. Nevertheless, deliberation within governance networks will seldom lead to consensus, since it transpires within a context of power struggles that breed conflict and social antagonism. Hence, outcomes involve a collective agreement-based compromise and tacit acceptance of decisions despite grievances.

Third, the negotiated interaction between the network actors does not take place in an institutional vacuum. Rather, it proceeds within a relatively institutionalized framework that is shaped and reshaped in the course of action. In the beginning, when a governance network is formed, there is no agreed-on institutional framework that determines where and how a legitimate decision is to be taken. However, the ongoing interaction of network actors will lead to the formulation of an incomplete and precarious framework of rules, norms, values, and ideas that condition the future interaction in the network by defining appropriate action. (*Value* refers to everything that is considered to have a value, be it material, ideological, ethical, or other, by most people/citizens.)

Fourth, governance networks are relatively self-regulating, as they are not part of a hierarchical chain of command or components of markets. Rather, they aim at regulating a particular policy field or problem area based on their own ideas, resources, and dynamic interactions, and they do so within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework that is adjusted through negotiations between the participating actors. Nevertheless, governance networks always operate

in a shadow of hierarchy as public authorities and other legitimate and resourceful actors aim to facilitate, shape, and constrain the network's preference and capacity for self-regulation. Governance networks that are metagoverned in this way only enjoy a bounded autonomy.

Fifth, governance networks contribute to the production of public purpose within a certain policy area. Public purpose is an ensemble of visions, values, plans, policies, and regulations that are claimed to be valid for, and directed toward, the general public. As such, the network actors are engaged in political negotiations about how to identify and solve emerging policy problems and provide new opportunities. Networks that do not contribute to the production of public purpose in this broad sense cannot be counted as governance networks.

Governance networks, as defined above, may have *different functions*. Some governance networks merely contribute to the exchange of knowledge, ideas, and experiences, while other networks aim to coordinate action in order to avoid conflicts and duplication of efforts. Some governance networks might even attempt to arrive at a common understanding of emerging policy problems and formulate joint solutions. Governance networks may also take *different forms* as they grow autonomously from below or are initiated from above, are open or closed, are loosely connected or highly integrated, are short-lived or relatively permanent, and have a sector-specific or society-wide scope. Finally, governance networks have many *different labels* as they are frequently referred to as planning cells, think tanks, public boards and committees, commissions, partnerships, and so on. The different labels, forms, and functions of governance networks attest to the broad relevance of the concept for describing contemporary interactive governance.

### Theoretical Roots

The increasing prominence of governance network research is rooted in theoretical developments in organization theory, political theory, policy analysis, Europeanization studies, and international relations. The conception of organizations as open systems adapting to environmental changes—and the subsequent recognition that this environment consists of other organizations—paved the way for a new focus on the interorganizational exchange of information and resources taking place through

relatively stable forms of network-based negotiation. Likewise, the recognition of the limits of the corporatist and neo-corporatist images of Iron Triangles, linking state agencies and social partners in tightly organized decision-making arenas, spurred the attempts of political theorists to distinguish between different kinds of more or less integrated policy networks that may include a broader range of public and private actors.

If both organization theory and political theory gradually arrived at some notion of governance networks, the real breakthrough for the new focus on governance networks came in the field of policy analysis. Decision-making theorists revealed the limits of the rational decision-making model in the face of the complexity of increasingly fragmented policy processes in which social and political actors struggle to link problems and solutions in highly contingent policy decisions, and implementation theorists demonstrated the failure of comprehensive planning and top-down programming in the face of the fierce resistance of street-level bureaucrats, user groups, and interest organizations. The inescapable conclusion was that public policy making becomes more efficient if the key actors are somehow included in the policy process and develop an ownership to joint decisions.

The empirical discovery and analytical description of the European Union as a networked polity in which public and private actors negotiate within and across multiple levels and the current transformation of international regimes into transnational networks where private actors play an increasingly important role in policy making have further contributed to the development of theories of network governance.

### Some Caveats

Policy making and public governance are not congruent with the formal political institutions in terms of parliament and public administration but take place in and through interactive forms of network governance. Some scholars tend to describe the result of this apparent shift from government to governance as a hollowing out of the state. However, others note that the growth of interactive forms of governance in the shape of networks and partnerships has not mitigated the role and impact of the state. The state may have lost its privileged position in public policy making, but

many of the former state powers remain in place and new capacities are developed as central and local state agencies take on the task of metagoverning governance networks at different levels. As such, state power is not reduced; rather, it is exercised in new and subtle ways.

A common misunderstanding is that governance networks are an entirely new phenomenon. In many countries and policy areas, there are long traditions for the corporatist involvement of the social partners in the formulation and implementation of policy, and interaction between public and private actors is a key feature of modern government and a constitutive trait of pluralist theory. What *is* new, however, is that political theorists and central decision makers increasingly view governance networks as both an efficient and legitimate mechanism of public governance. This is evidenced by the increasing reliance on governance networks at all levels of government.

When discussing governance networks, it is important to counteract the tendency to perceive governance networks as the perfect solution to all kinds of public governance problems. Governance networks are no panacea. When it comes to the exercise of public authority, there are good reasons for placing this task in the hands of public bureaucracies that can be held accountable for their action and inaction. Likewise, when it comes to the production of fairly standardized public goods and services, private markets might provide good value for public money. Governance networks have little to offer in relation to these public tasks, but they have their strength in relation to the large amount of "wicked problems" in public governance where the nature of the policy problem is uncertain, specialized knowledge is needed, and there are many relevant stakeholders from different sectors and levels and a high risk of conflict.

### Merits and Problems of Governance Networks

Today, governance networks are increasingly perceived as a suitable response to the question of how to tackle complex and crosscutting policy problems and governance tasks. Hence, both political scientists and practitioners praise governance networks for their potential contribution to efficient governance. Efficiency gains derive from the distinctive features of governance networks. First of all, it is

often claimed that ongoing negotiations among relevant and affected actors give governance networks a large potential for proactive governance. The network actors can identify policy problems and future opportunities at a relatively early stage and produce adequate responses that allow for adjustments in the face of new developments and changing conditions. This helps explain why small states with strong traditions for negotiated governance have done relatively well in the face of fluctuations in world markets.

Governance networks are also regarded as important instruments for the aggregation of information, knowledge, and assessments that can help in qualifying policy decisions. The network actors often possess specific knowledge that is relevant for political decision making, and when the knowledge of all of the network actors is pooled together, it represents an important basis for formulating and selecting innovative and yet feasible solutions or responses to the problems and challenges at hand.

In addition, governance networks are said to establish a framework for consensus building or, at least, for the civilizing of conflicts among the stakeholders. Governance networks tend to develop their own logic of appropriate action, which regulates the process of negotiation, the formulation of shared objectives, and the resolution of conflicts. Trust building through social interaction, through joint fact-finding, and through mutual learning further contributes to mediation of conflicts.

Finally, governance networks tend to reduce the risk of implementation resistance. If the affected actors are actively involved in the decision-making process, they will develop a sense of joint responsibility and ownership for the political decisions, even when they disagree with crucial aspects of these decisions. The shared ownership will oblige the stakeholders to support, rather than hamper, the implementation of public policy based on collaborative interaction.

The problem is that the potential efficiency and legitimacy gains of governance networks are only fully realized in well-functioning governance networks. Changes in the composition of a network and the presence of unresolved tensions and conflicts, weak and ineffective leadership, frustrations over the lack of clear and visible results, and external events that jeopardize the policy process tend to destabilize governance networks and turn them

into inefficient talking shops. Careful institutional design and network management might prevent major dislocations and mitigate the impact of various disturbances, but optimizing the functioning of governance networks on all dimensions poses a daunting task. Even apparently well-functioning networks might cause problems for public policy making, either by enabling particular veto players to block new and innovative policy initiatives or by attempting to shift the costs of expensive policy solutions to third parties. To avoid such problems, elected governments and other forms of political agency must exercise their powers to overrule veto players and provide incentives for the networks to find responsible solutions.

### Theories of Governance Networks

The concept of governance networks is descriptive, but the study of the emergence, functioning, and results of interactive forms of network governance certainly has explanatory ambitions, though not in the classical sense of aiming to establish deterministic causalities with a lawlike character. The ambition is to produce open-ended, context-sensitive knowledge that is relevant for the actors engaged in network governance. Explanation is established through theoretically informed empirical analysis of network-based policy processes and policy outcomes. The attempts of politicians and administrators to metagovern the relatively self-regulatory governance networks, the sociopolitical conditions and institutional design of governance networks, and the power struggles among the key stakeholders are central factors in explaining the outputs and outcomes of networked policy making.

Explanation of the formation, development, and impact of governance networks may draw on central insights from two of the main theories of governance networks: interdependence theory and governability theory. Both theories tend to view social action as driven by interest-based calculations, but they differ in their view on the prospect of overcoming conflicts and facilitating collaboration among multiple stakeholders.

*Interdependence theory* is inspired by historical institutionalism. It defines governance networks as an interorganizational medium for interest mediation between interdependent—but conflicting—actors, each with a rule and resource base. Governance networks are formed as a result of

strategic calculations of independent actors who choose to interact because of their mutual resource dependencies. The formation of governance networks counteracts the institutional fragmentation caused by new public management reforms. Governance networks are formed through incremental bottom-up processes but are recruited as vehicles of public policy making by public authorities. The network actors pursue different interests through internal power struggles, but they are held together by their mutual interdependence, which facilitates negotiation and compromise.

*Governability theory* combines rational choice institutionalism with a systems theoretical view of societal development. It defines a governance network as a horizontal coordination between autonomous actors who interact through different negotiation games. The formation of governance networks is seen as a functional response to the increasing societal complexity, differentiation, and dynamism that undermine the ability to govern society efficiently through hierarchy and market. Governance networks are viewed as gamelike structures that facilitate horizontal coordination among systems and organizations and are held together partly by the anticipated gains from resource pooling and joint action and partly by development of mutual trust that helps overcome collective action problems and mitigate conflicts.

Institutional theories of normative integration and theories of governmentality advanced by Michel Foucault and his followers also provide insights into the intricacies of interactive governance. These theories do not focus explicitly on governance networks, but they tend to view governance as a decentered process involving a plethora of public and private actors. While differing in the emphasis on the role of power and conflict in societal governance, both theories take an interpretative approach to social action, emphasizing the role of institutions and discourses in shaping the identity, perceptions, and actions of social actors.

*Institutional theories of normative integration* define governance networks as an institutionalized field of interaction between relevant policy actors who are integrated in a community defined by common rules, norms, and perceptions. Governance networks are regarded as a normative response to

the twin problems of totalitarian overintegration and individualistic underintegration of social agency. They are formed through a bottom-up process whereby contacts established due to the recognition of interdependence are evaluated and extended on the basis of institutionalized logics of appropriateness. Over time, governance networks develop their own logic of appropriateness, and the network actors become normatively integrated through the construction of solidarity and common identities.

*Governmentality theory* implicitly defines governance networks as an attempt by an increasingly reflexive and facilitating state to mobilize and shape the free actions of self-governing actors. Governance networks are interpreted as a political response to the failure of neoliberalism to realize its key goal of less state and more market. The problematization of neoliberalism has led to the formulation of a new governmentality program, associated with advanced liberal government that aims to shift the burden of government to local networks in which the energies of social and political actors are mobilized and given a particular direction in order to ensure conformity. Governance networks are constructed and framed by particular governmental technologies and narratives that aim to recruit social and political actors as vehicles of the exercise of power.

### Major Themes in First- and Second-Generation Research

Although the field of research is relatively new, it is possible to talk about first and second generations of governance network research. The first generation attempted to convince us that something new was occurring. As such, it was primarily preoccupied with explaining why and how governance networks are formed, how they differ from traditional forms of governance in terms of hierarchy and markets, and how they contribute to efficient governance within different policy fields and at different regulatory scales. The first generation succeeded in linking the rise of network governance to new societal trends, in fleshing out the distinctive features of governance networks vis-à-vis state and market, and in analyzing the formation and functioning of governance networks in different countries, in policy areas, and at different scales.

Slowly but surely, the research agenda has proceeded beyond the preoccupations of the first generation of governance network research. Governance networks no longer represent something new and exotic; rather, they are an intrinsic part of modern governance. At this stage, new and as yet unanswered questions have come to the fore and constitute the research agenda of a second generation of governance network research. The new generation does not constitute a clear break with the past as there is a considerable overlap in terms of scholars and research themes. However, the research agenda has been expanded to include a number of pressing questions. First, there is a growing number of researchers who are analyzing the sources of governance network failure and the conditions of success. Second, a large number of scholars are studying how public authorities and other legitimate and resourceful agencies can regulate self-regulating governance networks through different kinds of metagovernance. Third, the persistent critique of the tendency to view networked policy processes as depoliticized, managerial problem solving has prompted studies of the role of political conflicts and power struggles. Finally, political theorists and public administration researchers are paying increasing attention to the democratic problems and merits of governance networks.

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*See also* Governance, Administration Policies;  
Governance, Global; Governance, Good; Governance,  
Informal; Governance, Multilevel

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## GOVERNMENT

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Government is a key concept in comparative political science that has undergone frequent changes in terminology and has different importance in the intellectual traditions of democratic countries. Its core, more current definition refers to all activities of steering within human groups, from tribes to the state and to supranational and international organizations. This entry first discusses the meanings of the term *government* and then reviews the main functions of government. In the third section, the different contemporary models of government are illustrated. The subsequent two sections examine the key institutional aspects of government and the new approaches to the study of government, such as the so-called core executive models, the rational choice institutionalism, and governance studies.

#### Terminology

In the Middle Ages, the terms *regere* and *gubernare* were used as synonyms. The tradition of English- and French-speaking countries derived to *govern* and *government* or *gouverner* and *gouvernement* from the Latin term *gubernare*, whereas the German-speaking countries derived their main term *Regierung* from the Latin word *regere*. The French terminology preserved the notion of *régime*,

which later was frequently used in a pejorative sense. The term *ancien régime* originally referred to the French system of government from about the 15th century until the French Revolution. Following Alexis de Tocqueville's 1856 work on the concept of *ancien régime*, the term was usually not used in a value-free and neutral way to refer to the prerevolutionary system under the Bourbon dynasty. Still, Max Weber, in his political writings, denounced the "régime" of his country as "half-patriarchal, half caesaristic."

In early-modern times, *government* and *administration* were rarely differentiated. Later, under the impact of the division of power theories of the 18th and 19th centuries, they were combined under the heading of the *executive*—as contrasted with the *legislature* or *parliament*. In the era of absolutist monarchy, *government*—defined as the auxiliary institution of a monarch—was the most important term. With the increasing constitutionalization of monarchy, *government* was no longer the leading institution in a political system but became a subsystem under the control of parliament and jurisdiction. Even in constitutional regimes with a dualistic structure but without a dominant parliament, as in Britain and the United States, the legal state or *Rechtsstaat* promoted the idea that government could not act without being empowered by a legislative decision. In Germany, positivist legal thinkers restricted the possibility of acting without mandate from parliament in the so-called *justizfreien Hoheitsakte* (governmental acts as an emanation of a sovereign will in the state, not underlying judicial review) in foreign policy and military affairs.

After the parliamentarization of monarchical regimes, the political power of government was increasingly differentiated from the mere technical execution of decisions taken by a common enterprise of legislature and government. New terminology arose due to the rise of the parties in parliaments. With the tenure of Benjamin Disraeli as prime minister in Britain, the term *party government* came to be used to demonstrate the integration of those politicians who are currently holding office. Parliamentary majorities and the prime minister and his or her ministerial crew were united by a common organization originally though not yet provided for in the statutes of the legislature—that is, the parties or parliamentary party groups.

Outside Britain or the United States, there is rarely one homogeneous majority party governing the country. Governmental coalitions or *Regierungskoalitionen* are directed by various office holders with quite different names, such as the British *prime minister*, the French *président du conseil*, or the *imperial* or *federal chancellor* in the German and Austrian traditions. In the hierarchy of government, there are normally two or more levels. In Britain, *the cabinet* constitutes only the inner core with ministers of state and parliamentary secretaries. In the United States, government is normally described as *the administration* or *the executive*.

### Key Functions of Government

In parliamentary systems, the government has several functions. Most important is the function of *initiating policies*. Quite frequently, parliamentary bills are prepared by the executive offices. Moreover, government has the increasingly important function of *implementation*. Research on implementation has shown that laws and decrees are changed substantially by modes of implementation in the hand of bureaucracies under the guidance of governmental offices. A third function of government is *coordination*. The office of the government leader has to ensure that policies and bills and their implementation are complementary and do not contradict each other. With the growing power and fragmentation of parties in parliament during the 20th century, conservative political theorists frequently complained that countries were becoming increasingly difficult to govern. *Ungovernability* was a polemical term that became a popular exaggeration of political reality in the 1970s. The highly normative debate on governability was a reaction to the growth of the new social movements—the ecological and right-wing populists. The more progressive analysts who fought against the conservative doomsday scenarios accepted the new society of movements. They accepted the ecological movement as a promising source of change in society. These theorists came to less negative conclusions about the populist movements, which criticized "the system" but did not challenge the system as a whole, instead directing their criticism primarily at individual institutions and at the behavior of the "political class."



The postmodern cultural turn created other derivations. In France, Michel Foucault developed the expression *gouvernementalité*, which tried to link the mode of governing and regulations with the specific rationality of a decision. The mode of governing in this context aims less at direct influence of the individual and collective actors and focuses more on the indirect impact of action. *Gouvernementalité* tried to overcome the restrictions of an outlook that puts the sovereignty of state at the center of analysis. The dichotomy of notions, such as governing oneself and governing over others, is meant to strengthen the self-responsibility of modern citizens. Criticism in this theory is directed not so much against the existing governments and their institutions but against the underlying rationality of governmental aims and actions.

In the history of comparative research, the original term *comparative government* is rarely used anymore, and the dilemma of how to define government is avoided by adopting the new term *governance*, which came into use in the 1990s. In recent encyclopedias, “government” is no longer listed as an entry but is generally replaced by entries on “governance” and “governability” instead. In other professional dictionaries, only specialized articles such as “government regulation,” “government budget constraint,” or “government lawyers” and “government statistics” are included.

### Models of Government

Government as a subject of comparative political science in recent years is no longer at the center of scholarly attention as it used to be until the 1970s. The literature on executive government in parliamentary systems is often not written by political scientists. Biographies and journalistic approaches dominate (Rod Rhodes, 2006). Government was defined as an institution that has the authority to allocate values within a legitimately recognized set of institutions. Experience increasingly showed, however, that government was no longer capable of making the desired allocations. Complex arrangements rest on horizontal forms of interaction between actors, independent of each other and no longer embedded in one hierarchical structure. Such horizontal relations have always been studied by political science, as in the “cozy triangles” of interest groups, administrators, and parliamentarians.

In some European systems, the existence of federal actors and constitutional courts with certain veto powers complicated decision making. Postmodern polities developed this kind of cooperation with a certain regularity. Governance includes decision making not only via deliberation and negotiation but also through implementing bodies. Governance is no longer centered on the coercive power of the *state*—the incarnation of national sovereignty—although *governance* is not just another term for the *market*.

In a family tree of comparative politics, Philippe Schmitter in 2009 differentiated between three main branches of comparative politics: (1) *historical-sociological institutionalism* from Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber to Raymond Aron, Gabriel A. Almond, and David Apter; (2) *legal constitutionalism* from Maurice Duverger and Carl J. Friedrich to Klaus von Beyme; (3) *rational institutionalism* in the public choice tradition from Mancur Olson and Albert Hirschman to Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, and William Riker. Public policy and administration—no longer lumped together under the heading of “government”—could be studied under the auspices of both neo-institutionalism and rational institutionalism. Schmitter’s plea was in favor of “complexification”—that is, of using different approaches depending on the problem to be addressed.

In spite of the dominance of the notion “governance” during past decades, the term *government* is still used in various ways. In a recent essay, the political scientist Jean Blondel concluded that the governments are a recurrent feature of all social organization. In a broad sense, government comprises—especially in the British tradition—the central institutions of decision making, such as parliament and government. In 1930s and later, *government* was used in the broader sense of a whole political system. The classifications of systems since Aristotle, such as “monarchy,” “aristocracy,” and “democracy,” have been treated under the notion of “classification of governments.” Later, government appeared in subtypes of representative democracies, such as “parliamentary government” and “presidential government.” These prototypes were developed by Britain and the United States. In a parliamentary government, the cabinet is responsible to parliament. There is mutual dependence, contrary to the

dualism in a presidential government; parliamentary majorities can topple the government by votes of nonconfidence, and governments can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. In general, there are parliamentary governments throughout the European continent and in the British dominions. Presidential government in many variations was developed in Latin America and Eastern Europe when those countries were making the transition to democracy. Presidential government tends to be less dependent on parties, especially the parliamentary party groups. Under Charles de Gaulle, a semipresidential government with a popularly elected president was reinvented in France, a system that had existed in the Second French Republic (1848–1851), in the Weimar Republic (1919–1933), and in Finland (since 1919). With the third wave of democratization since the early 1970s, new variations were created in Eastern Europe, such as in Poland and Russia. As suggested by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (2005, pp. 8ff), in a post-modern media society the various types of executives are becoming more similar—that is, there is a “presidentialization of parliamentary government” that exists even in the United Kingdom.

### Institutional Settings of Government

In a narrower sense, government “is” governmental organization, including the chief executive and his or her office, the cabinet, and the ministries. The varieties of governmental organizations depend on constitutional provisions, conventions, and standing orders of parliament and routine orders in the bureaucracy. In the governments of Great Britain and some Commonwealth countries, the government is dominated by the prime minister. In the French Third and Fourth Republics, the *président du conseil* was weak and ministers had more room for maneuvering. The British principle of “hire and fire” is rarely valid in continental government organizations because coalition parties and important politicians representing wings of the majority party limit the power of the head of government. The German chancellor system is somewhat closer to the British prime ministerial government, though it has always needed a coalition government—with one exception, 1957–1961 under Konrad Adenauer, and even in this case, the federal chancellor preferred a coalition to provide

majorities for a case of less comfortable majorities in forthcoming elections. The cabinet or council of ministers was legally recognized for the first time, though rather late, in the constitutional laws of the Third French Republic (1875).

Beyond these legal principles, governments in most countries have developed informal traditions. In European parliamentary systems, governmental organization is hierarchical and bureaucratic. The collaborators of the chief of government are mostly experienced professional civil servants. The recruitment of politicians for important offices is determined by the strength of their parties. When the influence of parties is strong, the cabinet considers its leader as *primus inter pares*. This is, however, incompatible with the legal framework of the German government. Nevertheless, German history shows strong chancellors, such as Konrad Adenauer or Helmut Schmidt, and weak chancellors, such as Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Angela Merkel. These latter leaders were restricted in their power by a *grand coalition* of the two major parties. Such a chancellor has to set guidelines for all ministers, as mandated by Article 65 of the Basic Law. Some offices, such as agriculture or health, also attract exponents of important interest groups. Moreover, in the United States, the Senate has an important influence on the composition of government because it confirms the president’s appointees for certain government offices.

Several years ago, it was common to identify the United States with having an “amateur type” of government and France with a “technocratic type” of leader who usually came from a few *grandes écoles* (elite schools). Most European parliamentary systems are somewhere in between. As noted above, Germany is relatively close to the British type of selection of government officers, which could be dubbed the “parliamentary party type.” In systems with a high number of parties and the resultant fragmentation, coordination is more difficult, and governmental stability may be underdeveloped. The most important example was Italy before Silvio Berlusconi’s period. In fact, the highly fragmented party government increased the number of offices. With a strong factionalism within parties, as in the case of the Italian *correnti*, the government apparatus expanded. In general, it was largely accepted that coalition governments increased the number of offices. But

prime ministerial, single-party governments of the Westminster type contributed still more to the proliferation of offices, up to the point where one third of the governing parliamentary group in Britain held executive office. The “executivization” of parliamentary personnel had repercussions on parliament. When all the capable deputies held office, the remaining parliamentarians were weakened, and it was not easy to organize parliamentary activities independent of the government. Some systems, therefore, limited the number of ministers, as in Norway. The cabinet in a narrow sense and the government in a broader sense in parliamentary systems comprise a number of offices from a dozen to several dozens of governmental posts. In the presidential system of the United States, the patronage power of the president can result in about 4,000 nominations for government positions. In Germany, there are about 20,000 employees in the government in a broader sense, but only about 150 positions are held by secretaries of state and leading ministerial directors who can be dismissed at any time. German government in a broad sense includes also trustees for special tasks (about 27) and parliamentary secretaries of state who are parliamentarians, and as exponents of their respective parties, they connect government and parliament. Their main task is to support the views of government and to defend governmental propositions in parliament to find a majority of favorable votes.

Recent research on government in Europe increasingly turns to the study of multilevel government within the European Union (EU), characterized by the fact that most parliamentary legislation in member countries is the implementation of EU decisions and directives. The European influence on national government depends on the policy arena, most frequently in environment, agriculture, traffic, and communication. The least affected so far is the most important area for citizens—that is, social security (about 5%). According to Klaus von Beyme (1998), not more than one quarter of the laws in European countries are the absorption inside each country of decisions made by the EU.

### New Approaches to the Study of Government

Three approaches have recently been used to study governments in order to overcome the conventional

classifications of types of government: *core executive models*, *rational choice institutionalism*, and *governance studies*.

#### Core Executive Models

The six core executive models that have been differentiated by Robert Elgie (1997) more exactly indicate the true center of power than traditional notions such as parliamentary government:

1. *Monocratic government*: The key feature is personal leadership by a prime minister or president.
2. *Collective government*: Small, face-to-face groups decide policy, with no single member controlling.
3. *Ministerial government*: The political heads of major departments decide policy.
4. *Bureaucratic government*: Nonelected officials in government departments and agencies decide policy.
5. *Shared government*: Two or three individuals have joint and equal responsibility for policy making.
6. *Segmented government*: A sectoral division of labor among executive actors with little or no cross-sectoral coordination.

These “ideal types” are rarely found in modern democracies, but elements of them are combined in fluid patterns and sometimes one model succeeds another.

#### Rational-Choice Institutionalism

George Tsebelis (2002), in his approach to rational choice, posits that governments in order to change policies must get individual actors or veto players to agree. Institutional veto players are specified by the constitution and partisan veto players are specified by the party system. Tsebelis (2002) reverses the usual meaning of notions such as parliamentary and presidential government: “Agenda control most frequently belongs to governments in parliamentary systems and parliament in presidential ones.” If the veto players are differentiated according to policy areas, the old

taxonomy of representative systems is more or less irrelevant.

### *Governance Studies*

The concept of governance (derived from the Latin term *gubernantia*) has a wider range than that of government because it includes all individual and collective interactions of governments with nongovernmental organizations, interest groups, social movements, and citizen groups. Even before the invention of the notion of governance, the governmental organization was integral to the communications network involving interest groups and expert bodies of political advice. Also included in the notion of governance are long-term policy networks and short-lived networks established for individual decisions. The increasing complexity of the decision-making process has contributed to a wide debate on “government overload,” namely, a higher number of demands that are difficult or impossible for government to meet. This overload contributed to the discussion on ungovernability that occurred in the 1980s. Governance studies have shown that the generic analyses of ungovernability were misleading, given the new forms of overcoming crises and deadlocks that have been developed in postmodern societies.

The term *governance* was first widely used in the subdiscipline of international relations where “governing without government” (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 1995) played a major role. Moreover, in the subfield of international relations dealing with developmental politics in the Third World, the term *good governance* has been used. It aims at finding normative criteria for efficient aid to developing countries. This approach was directed against an ideological motivation for aid to developing countries in the times of the Cold War. Later, the instrumental combination of multilateral developmental strategies and the ideological preoccupation of developed democracies for the promotion of democracy in the Third World were criticized by the elites in the Third World. Building on the resolutions adopted by the United Nations since 1996, scientific criteria for good governance were developed.

Governance gained a central importance for the discipline when *network* became the central expression for a great variety of interactions beginning in

the early 1980s. *Governance* is a new term for old approaches that started with theories of neo-corporatism on guided cooperation of governments and interest groups and theories on governmental steering when the term *planning*, which dominated in the 1970s, became obsolete. Theories of the cooperative government and interdependence management in the science of administration also prepared the road for studies of governance. The older approaches were clearly centered on “actors.” Governance was not only a new game of words but part of a neo-institutionalist turn in the social sciences. Governance approaches were built on the experience that policy formulation became more difficult in postmodern societies. There is more differentiation in the new century in the realm of interest groups and social movements than in neo-corporatism—a dominant paradigm in the 1980s—aimed at cooperation between state agencies and main actors, such as organizations of business and trade unions. Self-organization in a civil society made “steering” less easy. The core executive was no longer dominant even in the area of traditional government because many governmental and para-statal agencies are involved in policy formulation and policy implementation and a new term—*agencification*—has been invented. In the name of new public management reform for greater efficiency, a separation of policies and operations was recommended by Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot (2003). Lobbying also changed in postmodern governments. Clientele relations grew up between ministerial and para-statal agencies and organized interests, as Marian Döhler (2001) pointed out. Think tanks and councils of experts gained an important role in many policy fields.

Moreover, the role of the media has increased. Public affairs agencies and international organizations of attorneys that do not permanently work for the same interests grew in importance against the traditional organized lobbies. Privatization and liberalization of former state monopolies in infrastructure (e.g., mail services, telephone, railroads, and energy supply) have created new profiles of governmental tasks. The old instruments of government such as laws, persuasion and propaganda, coercion, and regulation developed a different relative weight. As already suggested by von Beyme (1998), today, there is virtually no institution that is “sovereign,” for example, “the

legislator”—as an actor that includes both parliament and government.

These changes left political science with considerable pessimism as to whether institutional policies can create more efficient policies. There are two approaches to answering this question. One approach prefers the *transformative perspective* and accepts that institutional arrangements can be changed only by long-run changes in culture and outlooks. “Path dependency” of governmental institutions has been discovered and tries to explain why French centralization or German federalism is so difficult to be transformed because historical traditions and vested interests prevent radical change.

Another approach believes in the possibility of creating a deliberate design of a regulating system and that a kind of “metagovernor” (as described by Bob Jessop) or “third-order governing” (according to Jan Kooiman) survived in postmodern society.

In both approaches, government ceased to be “government” in the traditional sense in which it had been under the impact of theories on states and sovereignty for almost 500 years after Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, or Thomas Hobbes.

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*See also* Comparative Politics; Governance, Administration Policies; Governance, Good; Neo-Corporatism; New Public Management

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## GRANGER CAUSALITY

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Granger causality is the concept that if a variable causes another variable, it should help with the prediction of the latter variable. First, Granger causality is defined informally and formally. Next, the standard hypothesis tests used to evaluate the concept are presented. Third, the interpretations of these tests for Granger (non)causality are discussed. Then, some caveats and limitations are presented before turning to some common extensions and applications.

The statistical concept of Granger causality is related directly to the idea of causality and causal inference in the social sciences. In the (social) sciences, it is the case where two variables are causally related if

- the change in one variable temporally precedes that of the variable it causes,
- there is a nonzero correlation among the two (or more) variables, and
- the relationship among the variables is logically nonspurious.

Granger causality assesses the first two of these using a statistical test, leaving the third to the justification of the analyst. Granger causality analysis asks whether a variable helps in predicting another, which requires both temporal precedence and correlation. One of Clive Granger’s seminal

time-series papers on this topic developed the statement of the concept and presented the most common statistical tests used to assess causality.

If a variable  $Z$  at Time  $t$  Granger causes a variable  $X$  at Time  $t$  or  $Z_t$  Granger causes  $X_t$  then the following three statements are logically equivalent:

1.  $Z_t$  helps predict  $X_t$  (i.e., it lowers the error of the prediction),
2.  $Z_t$  is not exogenous of  $X_t$ ,
3.  $Z_t$  is linearly informative about future  $X_t$ .

The assumption that makes these three statements equivalent is that there is a linear relationship between  $Z_t$  and  $X_t$ . Granger causality can be defined more generally and can also encompass nonlinear relationships. In this case, only the first two statements are relevant.

The formal definition of Granger causality is actually a statement of noncausality. A variable  $Z_t$  is Granger noncausal for  $X_t$  if the past values of  $Z_t$  do not help predict the current (or future) values of  $X_t$  over a prediction based on the past history of  $X_t$  alone. Under the assumption of linearity, then, this is the same as analyzing a dynamic regression of  $X_t$  on past values of  $X_t$  and  $Z_t$ , or

$$X_t = d + \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_i X_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_i Z_{t-i} + e_t,$$

where  $d$  is a constant,  $\alpha_i$ s are the coefficients for the  $p$  lagged values of  $X_t$ , and  $\beta_i$ s are the coefficients for the  $p$  lagged values of  $Z_t$ . If  $Z_t$  Granger causes  $X_t$ , then some of the  $\beta_i$  coefficients are different from zero. Note that by including the lagged values of  $X_t$ , the variable  $Z_t$  must add more to the prediction of  $X$  than its own past (and thus help minimize the prediction error  $e_t$ ) to deem it causal. Testing whether these are equal to zero is thus a test of Granger noncausality.

Statistical tests of Granger (non) causality depend on comparing the residuals of the model in the above equation with those of a model where  $X_t$  only depends on its past values, or where one assumes that  $\beta_i = 0$  for  $i = 1, \dots, p$ . Statistical tests for Granger causality are generally implemented as a comparison of the mean

squared prediction error of the previous equation with

$$X_t = d + \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_i X_{t-i} + u_t.$$

This amounts to comparing the variance of  $e_t$  with  $u_t$ . If the variance of the former is smaller than  $Z_t$ , Granger causes  $X_t$  under the earlier assumptions. A Granger causality test is done most commonly using either an  $F$ , Wald, or likelihood ratio test for whether  $\beta_1 = \beta_2 = \dots = \beta_p = 0$ . These test statistics degrees of freedom are typically corrected by a factor of  $T - 2p - 1$ , where  $T$  is the sample size and  $p$  is the number of lags. This helps account for the estimation of the potentially large number of parameters in these equations.

While this test statistic is easily and commonly implemented, it depends on several assumptions. These include (but are not limited to) the following:

1. The relevant information and variables have been included in the model used to conduct the test. Any relevant omitted variables can lead to a biased test.
2. The relationship between the variables is linear and the errors in the equations are normally distributed. (The result can hold for nonlinear and nonnormal cases but requires other assumptions.) In this most common case, testing for Granger causality is reduced to the comparison of the minimum mean squared regression errors defined above.
3. There is no residual correlation in  $e_t$  or  $u_t$ , meaning that the lag length  $p$  is sufficient to remove any residual serial correlation from the regressions used to construct the test.
4. The variable  $Z_t$  is stationary. Nonstationarity could induce spurious correlation, since then there could be an error correction mechanism between the variables that naturally implies a Granger causality relationship among the variables. Extensions of the standard Granger causality tests exist for this case.

Finding that one Granger variable causes another depends on the information set or the variables that are included in a model. So if one were to introduce a variable  $Y_t$  that is causal for  $X_t$  and

correlated with  $Z_t$ , one could find that the effects of  $Z_t$  on  $X_t$  work through this new variable. The same is not necessarily true for findings of Granger noncausality, since the existence of a variable that would turn a noncausal relationship into a causal one is nearly impossible.

It is important to note that tests for Granger (non)causality *do not assess the direction* of the causal relationship. The null hypothesis is that the past values of the variable  $Z_t$  do not help with predicting  $X_t$ . Rejecting this hypothesis could occur if there were a positive or negative correlation among the past values of  $Z_t$  and the current  $X_t$ . To interpret the causal direction of the effects of  $Z_t$  on  $X_t$ , one typically employs a vector autoregression model or computes the dynamic effects of changes in past  $Z_t$  on contemporaneous  $X_t$ . This is where theory helps identify that the relationship is nonspurious and provides some ideas about the expected direction of the effects of one variable for forecasting the other. Formally, impulse response functions or the vector moving average interpretation of a vector autoregression model are used to determine the direction of these effects. The vector autoregression model and its estimated effects will demonstrate the same causal relationships identified with a Granger causality test and provide the magnitude and direction of any causal effects.

The above definition of Granger causality is what is known as *bivariate Granger causality*. The concept can also be extended in several ways. The first involves the multivariate case. Suppose now that  $Z_t$  and  $X_t$  are vectors of observations at time  $t$ . Then, we say that  $Z_t$  is non-Granger causal or *block exogenous* of  $X_t$  if the past values of the matrix  $Z_t$  do not help in predicting the current values of  $X_t$ . The earlier test statistics can then be extended to their matrix equivalents and used to assess whether the past  $Z_t$  values help predict  $X_t$ .

A second extension is what is known as *contemporaneous Granger causality*. A variable  $Z_t$  instantaneously causes Granger  $X_t$  if the contemporaneous and leading or future values of  $Z_t$  help in predicting the current value of  $X_t$ . To test this hypothesis, one looks at the contemporaneous relationships (the  $e_t$  and  $u_t$  residuals for the vector autoregression) to see if there is a correlation among the current values of the series.

The third possible extension is to move beyond the assumption of minimizing one-step prediction

errors. Multistep Granger causality can be defined by looking at the  $h$ -step residuals for a regression of  $X_t$  on past  $X_t$  and  $Z_t$ . If past  $Z_t$  minimize the  $h$  periods of forecast errors in  $X_t$  better than the past  $X_t$  alone, then  $Z_t$  is said to be multistep Granger causal for  $X_t$ . A final extension is to panel data. One can extend the same ideas used in assessing Granger causality in time-series data to collections of time series that are part of a panel of time series.

Granger causality is a useful test and tool for determining which variables help predict each other in multivariate time-series models. It is used commonly to justify which variables are included in a vector autoregression or other multivariate time-series models since it allows the analyst to justify different (weak) exogeneity assumptions. The point of a Granger causality test analysis is that one uses the results to support an argument about the predictive power of a variable on another in a time-series model.

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*See also* Causality; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Time-Series Analysis

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## GRAPHICS, STATISTICAL

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Statistical graphics provide visual displays of quantitative information. While graphs have been an

important tool in the statistical sciences, their role and applications have evolved over time. In the past, graphical displays were generally employed for pedagogical purposes and to present the final results of an analysis. Currently, graphs are being incorporated more directly into data analysis itself, where they are used to provide insights and directions for further investigation. In this entry, the basic elements, major advantages, and recent developments of statistical graphics are presented.

Statistical graphs are used for several purposes. First, they provide a tool for exploring the contents of a data set; in effect, graphical displays enable researchers to interact directly with the “raw material” for their analyses. Second, graphs enable researchers to look for structure in their data; they provide a ready means to identify interesting features such as concentrations of observations at particular data values, covariance across variables, outliers in distributions, and so on. Third, graphical displays are useful for checking the assumptions of statistical models; for example, they can be used to examine distributional shapes of constituent variables or to search for systematic patterns among model residuals. Fourth, graphs remain an excellent vehicle for communicating the results of statistical analyses; they provide fairly intuitive representations of complex models that can be understood by broad audiences.

Of course, all of the preceding objectives could also be achieved through numerical methods, such as equations and tabular representations. But graphs have several advantages. For one thing, an enormous amount of information can be represented directly or summarized in a single well-constructed graph; therefore, graphical displays are useful for depicting large, complex data sets. At the same time, graphs are not as reliant on underlying assumptions as are numerical summaries of data such as descriptive statistics or model coefficients. And graphs almost inherently encourage greater interaction between the researcher and the data; interesting features stand out immediately and graphs provide the means to pursue them to gain further insights.

### Historical Evolution

The earliest “modern” graphical displays, generated during the Enlightenment period of the 17th

and 18th centuries, downplayed depictions of empirical data in favor of graphing the abstract functions that seemed to describe the dynamics of the observable universe. But a minor scientific revolution occurred at the end of the 18th century, when an iconoclastic Scottish political commentator, William Playfair, published *The Commercial and Political Atlas* (various editions were produced between 1786 and 1801) and the *Statistical Breviary* (1801). The substantive objective for each of these books was to provide information about the British economy, relative to other nations. But they are remembered largely because Playfair developed a number of graphical displays to illustrate his data and support his arguments. Playfair’s innovations would be recognizable immediately to a modern reader; they include bar charts, pie charts, and line charts.

During the 19th century, graphs were used widely in scientific communications. This period is characterized by the use of creative pictorial devices to convey information as efficiently as possible. For example, a famous map by French engineer Charles Joseph Minard depicts Napoleon’s march during the Russian campaign of 1812. It has been hailed as the finest statistical graphic, in large part because it encodes information about six different variables into a single display. Graphical representations of empirical information waned once again during the first half of the 20th century. During this period, statisticians turned their attention to confirmatory methods and hypothesis testing. These are strategies where the characteristics of the data need to be well understood before the tests are applied to gain insight about the values of specific parameters. And since assumptions about the processes that generated the data precede the tests, graphical displays tend to be less useful.

Beginning in the 1950s, and continuing through the first decade of the 21st century, there has been a strong resurgence of interest in statistical graphics. There are several reasons for this recent trend. First, there has been an increasing emphasis on exploratory methods, through the influence of the late John Tukey and his followers. Second, there has been productive research on the psychology of graphical perception, so there is greater understanding of the ways that people process visual information. Third, there have been major advances in graphical methodologies, providing new tools



for pictorial representations of numeric information. Fourth, the widespread availability of powerful computing equipment and high-resolution, fast-refreshing, graphical displays means that scientists now have the means to render graphs quickly and easily. And fifth, the “data explosion” of recent years has encouraged broader reliance on graphical strategies for coping with the sheer volume of information confronting many researchers.

### Graphical Information and Human Perception

A graph can be effective only if the information contained therein can be extracted easily and accurately by its intended audience. Understanding how to accomplish this requires some understanding of human graphical perception. An influential theory developed by William S. Cleveland holds that interpretation of graphs comprises two fundamental tasks: table lookup and pattern perception. Table lookup refers to the process of moving from the displayed geometric rendering of the data back to the numerical values that generated the display. This process is facilitated through careful attention to the axes and scales that define the plotting region(s) of a graphical display.

Pattern perception is, itself, composed of three more fundamental perceptual tasks: First, *detection* refers to the ability to perceive the individual elements of the data in a graph; it usually involves the selection of suitable plotting symbols to represent data points. Second, *assembly* refers to the ability to combine separate elements together in a way that facilitates recognition of nonrandom structure within the data—for example, the shape of a univariate distribution or functional dependence of one variable’s values on another variable’s values. Third, *estimation* is the ability to make quantitative comparisons across the geometric elements in a graphical display. For example, observers can typically make quite accurate judgments about relative differences when data points are plotted along a common scale. But it is more difficult to make similarly accurate comparisons of quantities that are represented as differences in angles, areas of geometric shapes, or gradations in color.

Theories of graphical perception are important because they provide standards for judging the quality of graphical displays. Relying on Cleveland’s

theory, the objective is to encode the data with geometric devices that optimize the three components of pattern perception. However, compromises are almost always necessary; for example, emphasizing the individual data points facilitates detection but may impede assembly. As a result, there is seldom any single *best* display for a given data set. Instead, different graphs may provide different useful perspectives on the same basic information.

### Types of Graphical Displays

There are many situations in which the analyst is confronted with labeled quantitative values, such as the raw data values associated with individual observations or summary values calculated for subgroups within a data set (e.g., the conditional means on a variable or the percentage of observations within each subset). For such data, pie charts, bar charts, and dot plots can be used. Pie charts require relatively inaccurate visual judgments of angles and areas, while accurate interpretation of bar charts can be impeded by the arbitrary location of the origin on the scale that defines the lengths of the bars. Carefully constructed dot plots can overcome these problems, and they can be adapted to a wide variety of specific situations. Therefore, they are the preferred analytic graphical display for labeled data values.

Graphical displays for univariate data enable visual assessments of a distribution’s most important features—center, spread, shape, and outliers. Again, there are several possibilities, including univariate scatterplots, histograms, smoothed histograms, quantile plots, and box plots. Univariate histograms are simple to construct and interpret; however, they are effectively limited to small data sets. Histograms are familiar and easy to interpret. However, the contents of a histogram can be affected by the definitions of the categories (or “bins”) used to delineate its bars. Smoothed histograms overcome the problems caused by bin definitions, but they are similarly affected by technical aspects of the smoothing process. Quantile plots overcome all of the preceding problems, but they are cognitively demanding and probably not familiar to many social scientists. Box plots focus on the most important quantiles of a data distribution; they are easily interpreted and are especially useful for comparing univariate distributions.

There is really only one type of graphical display for bivariate data: the scatterplot. But careful attention to the details is critical for optimizing the information conveyed by this type of display. For example, the plotting symbol used to represent individual observations must be visually prominent and resistant to overplotting effects. And the plotting region should be fully enclosed by the scale rectangle, with none of the data points colliding with any of the axes. Grid lines should not be included within the plotting region. And if the objective of the graphical display is to assess the relationship between two variables, then there is usually no need to include point labels. Finally, a scatterplot smoother (i.e., a curve that traces out the conditional mean of the variable plotted on the vertical axis across the range of data values on the horizontal axis) can be used to summarize the relationship between the variables plotted in the display.

Multivariate data pose particular challenges for statistical graphics. While it is possible to draw a three-dimensional scatterplot, using an oblique orientation on the data space to simulate a perspective view, such displays are generally not very effective. Instead, other devices have been employed to represent multiple dimensions of variability in a two-dimensional display medium. For example, a scatterplot matrix is the graphical analog of a correlation matrix, showing scatterplots between all possible pairs of variables arranged in a regular, square layout. Conditioning plots and trellis displays show one- or two-dimensional graphical displays for subsets of a data set, where the subsets are defined by intervals of values on other variables. And finally, there are a number of related strategies for “touring” high-dimensional data, by taking projections of the data points into a smaller dimensioned subspace that can be visualized directly.

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*See also* Data Visualization; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

#### Further Readings

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## GREEK PHILOSOPHY

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Greek philosophy is often taken as synonymous with ancient Western philosophy, or as thought in the age of classical Athens, represented by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Strictly speaking, however, it means the thoughts expressed and transmitted in Greek before the Byzantine period, except for Christian writings. It covers the period from the early 6th century BCE to 529 CE (the year of the closure of the Academy [a school founded by Plato around 385 BCE] by Justinian I). In a long tradition, it has formed our ways of thinking about the world and human beings and is therefore regarded as the basis of Western civilization. This entry first examines the essence of Greek philosophy and then reviews the development of Greek philosophy from its origin to the classical period, particularly the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

Greek philosophy has four stages: (1) early Greek (or so-called Presocratic) philosophy (early 6th to mid-5th century BCE), (2) classical philosophy (late 5th to 4th century BCE), (3) Hellenistic philosophy (3rd to 1st century BCE), and (4) the philosophy of late antiquity (1st to early 6th century CE). In the first two stages, philosophers were active mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean region (Asia Minor, Greece, and southern Italy), and in the latter two, their activities were extended to the Near East and the whole Mediterranean region. It should be remembered that many philosophers living in the Roman Empire wrote their works in Greek (e.g., Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus, Galen, and Sextus Empiricus).

What we possess is the transmitted body of Greek philosophical texts, mostly of the classical

and the Roman periods. While a large portion of the ancient books were lost, some have been transmitted to us first in manuscripts (earlier in papyri and later in codices) and then in printed books. Quotations or references included in those books are also edited as “fragments” or “testimonies” of Greek philosophers, for example, the Presocratics (*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* by Hermann Diels) and the Stoics (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, by Hans von Arnim). Luckily, a few important texts are also preserved in papyri, inscriptions, and so on. Therefore, studies of Greek philosophy consist of the intellectual excavation of original thoughts and the reexamination of their heritage.

Greek philosophy is by no means monolithic, but rather, it is characterized by variety and competitiveness. Greek philosophers provided polar ideas such as “monism versus pluralism,” “materialism versus idealism,” “absolutism, relativism, and skepticism versus agnosticism,” “free will versus determinism,” and “eudaimonism and hedonism versus asceticism.” Nevertheless, they shared some essential features: inquiry into nature and being and open debate between different positions. Their philosophical inquiry was based on experience and reason—that is, the pursuit of truth through argument (*logos*). By pursuing rationality and universality, Greek philosophy achieved systematization of science and knowledge and thus participated in shaping political science. This feature dissociates it from the preceding cultures of Egypt and Babylonia and from the other cultures outside Europe. Therefore, Greek philosophy is often evoked as a source of the cultural identity of Europe and the West.

### The Beginning of Philosophy

Philosophy (Greek *philosophia*, meaning “aspiring for wisdom”) is generally thought to have started in Greece in the beginning of the 6th century BCE, with Thales of the Ionian city Miletus, whom Aristotle calls “the founder of philosophy.” Although Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men, probably left no writings, he and his compatriots, Anaximander and Anaximenes, started a philosophical inquiry (*historia*) into nature. The early philosophers were interested mainly, but not exclusively, in natural phenomena, such as celestial motions and the structure of the universe. They

asked what the “origin” or “principle” (*archê*) of the world and all things is and presented different candidates: water (Thales), fire (Heraclitus), air (Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia), the unlimited (Anaximander), and the unchanging One (Parmenides). In the mid-4th century BCE, Empedocles from Sicily established the four-element theory (fire, air, water, and earth) and thereon explained the cycle of change of the universe, in terms of mixture and separation, by means of the two powers, love and strife. As Empedocles composed the religious poem called *Purifications* and the cosmological one called *On Nature*, arguably in a single work, inquiry into nature and moral thinking came together in the early philosophers. They often used metaphorical expressions, but the first crucial step can be clearly observed: They sought one or the smallest number of principles to explain the whole world.

The Ionian tradition of inquiry developed both natural sciences (astronomy, mathematics, and medicine) and social sciences (geography and history). Herodotus, in the investigation into the causes of the Greco-Persian Wars, collected a wide range of geographical and cultural information about the regions of Egypt, Asia, and Europe. His *Histories* (*Historiai*, meaning “inquiries”) provided ample examples of the conflicting ethical and legal values adopted by different peoples and societies and thus introduced a multicultural and relativistic way of looking at the world, which was further developed by the Sophists.

The first stage of Greek philosophy is often characterized as a progression from *mythos* (myth) to *logos* (reason). This means that the way of understanding the world changed from mythical stories based on Greek religion to more rational or scientific explanation. Yet the actual development was not so straightforward. Philosophical theories and explanations still contain many mythical or irrational factors but philosophers at least share interest in the program of rational inquiry, and on this basis, they compete with each other to attain the truth.

### The Sophists and Socrates

In the mid-5th century BCE, when Athens experienced democracy and prosperity under Pericles, professional thinkers and teachers called Sophists

appeared and became influential in the society. These intellectuals played an important role in the democratic society, where free citizens sought power by cultivating their own ability and the Sophists taught young people how to succeed in society.

The greatest Sophist, Protagoras of Abdera, propagated the famous “Man measure thesis”: “Man is the measure of all things: of those which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.” This thesis, which bases moral values not on gods but on human beings, promoted a radical relativism fitting for democracy. Protagoras was successfully teaching virtues—that is, political excellence.

What the Sophists actually taught was rhetoric—the art or skills of speech—for it was crucial in the court or the assembly to speak persuasively in front of a large audience. Gorgias from Sicily developed the technique of public speech and reflected on the power of speech (*logos*), noting that it can move people and the country and therefore becomes a source of political power. The Sophists’ appeal to the power of speech attracted people but was regarded as radical and dangerous to traditional morality.

The Sophists investigated the basis of society and the political system. One of their inventions was the contrast of *nomos* and *physis* (law or custom and nature), and based on this contrast, they put forward a social contract theory. This theory initially tried to explain how and why social and moral systems differ in societies, but it was later used to attack the current customs and morality. Antiphon, the Athenian politician, teacher of rhetoric and Sophist (though there is a controversy over his identity), wrote a treatise called *On Truth* (of which three large fragments have been preserved in papyri), where he insisted that while it is human nature to do harm to others in order to get more, laws and customs prevent one from doing so.

The work of Herodotus and Thucydides in their *Histories* contains the origin of Greek political thought. Their description and comparison of Persia, Sparta, and Athens reflected the serious discussions and controversies over the different political systems in the late 5th century BCE: monarchy, oligarchy (also called aristocracy, i.e., rule of the best), democracy, and tyranny. Several comparative studies on the Athenian and Spartan constitutions

(*politeiai*) were written and circulated in this period. It is noteworthy that in democratic Athens, the oligarchic system of Sparta was popular among the intellectuals, including Socrates, Critias, Xenophon, and Plato.

Critias was an oligarchic politician and political thinker influenced by the Sophistic movement. A fragment of the tragedy *Sisyphus*, attributed to him, claims that gods were invented by a clever man to deceive people into obeying laws. The Sophist Prodicus expressed a similar rationalistic view on the origin of religion—that gods are personifications of the useful things and heroes. By casting radical doubts on traditional values, the Sophistic enlightenment movement contributed to re-forming the ideas of politics and ethics as distinct from those of traditional religion and to considering them objectively and scientifically.

Socrates belongs to the same generation as the Sophists and was regarded as a major Sophist by his contemporaries (as depicted in Aristophanes’s comedy *Clouds*). It was his pupils, above all Plato, who distinguished him from the other Sophists and natural philosophers. Since Socrates did not write anything, it is difficult to determine his original thought, but a few philosophical contributions are generally ascribed to him. First, Socrates raised questions on moral issues, such as courage, justice, and goodness. He often began his inquiries with a request for a definition, and in doing so, he often revealed his interlocutors’ ignorance. Second, he often drew a conclusion from a series of examples, thus making use of the logic of induction. Third, by this cross-examination, he urged people to take care of the soul (*psychê*)—that is, one’s own self. However, his radical way of questioning was seen as dangerous and subversive of ordinary beliefs and traditional morality. Socrates was convicted of impiety and for corrupting youth and was executed in 399 BCE. But his way of life became a major subject of the later philosophers, and Socrates was made the model philosopher for Cynics, Stoics, Cyrenaics, and skeptics of the Academy.

### Plato

Plato was born in a famous Athenian family, and in his youth, he wished to be active in politics, as was usual in his society. His life was changed by his encounter with Socrates, and particularly after

seeing the trial and death of Socrates, he kept his distance from Athenian politics and concentrated on philosophy and scientific research in the Academy. It is reported that Plato visited Syracuse a few times to convert the despot Dionysius to philosophy, but in vain. Plato wrote some 30 works in the form of dialogues, most of which feature Socrates as the main speaker.

Plato made full use of the dialogue form. The author himself never appears or speaks in the dialogues. Readers are urged to think for themselves about the issues discussed in the dialogue. While it is often assumed that the main character, Socrates (or a few others), speaks for Plato's position, the opposition often has a good point to make. For example, when in the *Gorgias*, Calicles, the young Athenian, challenged Socrates and defended the life of politics by an appeal to "natural justice," some readers strongly sympathized with Calicles's position, despite Socrates's eventual refutation. Friedrich Nietzsche is an obvious example of a later philosopher whose work reflects the perspective taken by Calicles. Nietzsche openly defended the "will to power" and tried to overturn Platonist morality. It is sometimes suggested that Plato himself experienced such a tension and conflict between the life of philosophy and the life of politics as depicted in the dialogue.

Plato's dialogues put forward several paradoxical arguments of Socrates—for example, that no one willingly does wrong and that it is better to suffer injustice than to do injustice. His emphasis on the need for a thorough examination of moral concepts and values appeared to ordinary men to turn their lives upside down. In urging people to take care of the soul, Plato makes a sharp distinction between the soul and the body and its desires. Then, the soul in itself is able to contemplate the essence of each thing—what it essentially is, or what Plato calls its "Form." The Forms are distinct from sensible things, and cause their being, while the sensible things partake of the transcendent Forms. For example, "Beauty" itself is different from beautiful things but makes things beautiful. This is Plato's theory of Forms, presented in the dialogues, including the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, and so on.

Socrates himself was probably not interested in politics and lived a nonpolitical life as a private citizen. However, Plato's dialogues understand his

life as engaging in true politics and present him as the ideal statesman. The trial of Socrates is reinterpreted as fundamentally political. His cross-examination of his accusers at his trial and his constant advice to his fellow citizens to take care of the soul and virtue, instead of the body, money, and reputation, constituted a true political activity to make the *polis* better, but they gave rise to misunderstanding and hatred toward Socrates and eventually led to his death.

Through the Socratic dialogues, Plato explores the tension between politics and philosophy and expresses the principle that justice in all its forms can be understood only through philosophy. In this way, the famous idea of philosopher-kings or philosopher-rulers is conceived and proposed in the *Republic* (the Greek title *Politeia* meaning the being of a state or a constitution). The main question of the dialogue is what justice is and whether a just person lives a happy life. The Sophist Thrasymachus first raises a radical claim of justice as the "advantage for the stronger"—that the stronger people exploit the weaker in the name of law and justice. Following him, Glaucon and Ademinatus (Plato's older brothers) reformulate this claim into a formidable challenge to morality: that people obey the law and do justice only because they think it necessary (while wanting to avoid it) on the basis of the social contract. Against this, Socrates has to demonstrate that justice is *good* both in itself and for its results. To consider justice and injustice more clearly, Socrates then suggests that they construct a state (*polis*) in argument and compare its justice with that of the soul. The basic principle of founding the state is that everyone does one's own work (labor division according to one's nature). If each class, namely, rulers, warriors, and producers, does its own work, the state is just. On the other hand, when someone transgresses this boundary, various types of injustice occur. The just state is discussed to show by analogy the justice of the soul. When the three parts of the soul, namely, reason, spirit, and appetite, harmonize to make a single whole, the soul is just. Thus, the *Republic* deals with political philosophy in the context of discussing justice.

The conditions of the ideal state are a focus in the central books of the *Politeia* (Books 5–7), where some original proposals are discussed, such as equality of men and women in ruling, abolishment

of the family, and a common property system. Socrates' most challenging proposal for realizing the ideal state in this world is to unite philosophy and politics by either making the philosopher a ruler of the state or making the present ruler a philosopher, since the philosopher, who has knowledge of "Justice," "Goodness," and the other Forms, alone can make a state just and good in the proper way. To become a philosopher, however, one needs a long course of education and hard training, first in general education in literature and physical training and second in the mathematical sciences. The final stage consists of training in dialectic (the art of dialogue), which is said to deal with the reality or the Forms by *logos* (reason) alone.

Plato's idea of political science was criticized by his contemporaries and by later philosophers. Isocrates, Plato's rival teacher of rhetoric, insists that sound judgment is more important than the theoretical sciences, such as mathematics, in making one a good citizen and politician. Aristotle also criticizes Plato's idea of unity in Book 2 of the *Politics*. A state should not seek a strict singleness as proposed in the *Republic* but should be realized in a harmony of diverse elements. This echoes the modern criticisms of Plato as totalitarian. According to Karl Popper and other critics, Plato's notions of dictatorship, the "noble lie," eugenics, and censorship resemble the modern totalitarian ideologies of Nazism and Stalinism. Whereas in the 19th century Plato's *Republic* was read as a "utopian" work, in the 20th, there was greater emphasis on its political implications. However, it should be noted that Plato's main aim lies not in the political blueprint but in the ethical contrast between the tyrant, who rules for his own interest and greed, and the true philosopher.

Plato places the Form of the "Good" in the highest position in the realm of reality. This implies that the natural world and human activities have a common basis. This idea is developed in his later dialogue, the *Timaeus*, in which the origin and structure of the universe are explained as the god's (Demiurge's) creation by means of mathematical principles. Goodness and beauty are regarded there as the foundation principles of the universe. Plato's cosmology (which he called "a likely myth") was influential in late antiquity and the Middle Ages as a part of his political thought.

Plato wrote two other dialogues that deal with political philosophy: the *Statesman* (*Politicus*) and the *Laws* (*Nomoi*). The *Statesman* defines the art or knowledge of statesmanship as the interweaving of different elements in a state, particularly courage and temperance. Plato's last work, the *Laws*, discusses the principles and laws of a new colonial state. Although the differences between Plato's ideas in the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws* are matters of much debate among modern scholars, it is clear that Plato examines political science as a major subject in his whole system of philosophy.

### Aristotle

Aristotle was born in Macedonia, the son of a medical doctor. Probably because of this background, he was more interested in biology and other natural sciences than in mathematics (which Plato ranks high as a more abstract and academic science). He joined Plato's Academy as a youth to study philosophy. After his master's death, Aristotle founded his own school, the Lyceum, and led scientific projects in biology and political science. Although he tutored the young Alexander the Great for some years, it is uncertain what influence he had on the prince.

While all his published works were lost, his lectures fortunately survived and were edited by Andronicus of Rhodes, the Peripatetic philosopher of the 1st century BCE. The *Corpus Aristotelicum* (Works of Aristotle) is the transmitted body of texts from this edition, and it is normally assumed that the order of treatises more or less represents Aristotle's original scheme of sciences: namely, logic, physics (natural philosophy), metaphysics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, and poetics. On the other hand, one must be cautious in using the lectures, since they are often sketchy and may seem to contradict each other. Modern scholars have tried to distinguish the different layers of composition within the *Corpus*, but no agreement has been reached so far.

Aristotle founds the logical system of syllogisms and discusses epistemology as the basis of the whole of science. In the *Posterior Analytics*, he defines the scientific demonstration as necessary reasoning from the true and primary premises. Whereas it remains controversial how much of this principle he applies to particular sciences, such as physics and ethics, the idea of a demonstrative and

deductive system lays the basis for all scientific disciplines. Another important method in use is dialectic. In the academic fields where we cannot secure true premises, we should collect common opinions and reputable views of experts (called *endoxa*) first. Then, by examining the *exdoxa*, we can hope to find truth in them. The method of dialectic is applied in several places, mainly to provide the starting points for establishing his own theories.

While physics deals with the world of changing things and their unchanging causes, human practice and morality should be treated differently. As distinct from the causally necessary phenomena, human issues cannot be reasoned about or proved with the same strictness. Therefore, in studies of ethics and politics, we should be content with something true “for the most part.” This clear distinction between the theoretical and practical sciences is one basic divergence from Plato’s thought.

The aim of lectures in ethics and politics is practical, namely, to make the listeners good human beings and citizens. Every person seeks the good—that is, happiness (*eudaimonia*, not in the sense of modern “happiness” as a subjective feeling)—but its conceptions differ among people. Aristotle argues that since the *eudaimonia* of human beings is the realization of their natural activity, and since their essence lies in rationality, the human *eudaimonia* is sought in the activity of contemplation (*theōria*). Ethics is included in politics, which is the highest science for the human good. Aristotle again bases his inquiry on human nature: Since a human being is by nature a political animal (i.e., animals that form a *polis* to live together), which is equivalent to the rational animal (the animal that has *logos*, i.e., reason and speech), the *polis* (political community) is the first completion of self-sufficiency of this political nature of human beings. In *Politics*, Aristotle then examines family, slavery (which he notoriously favors), citizenship, various constitutions, and education.

Aristotle is also said to have engaged in joint research on some 158 constitutions (*politeiai*) of Greek and foreign states. Perhaps the most important one was the Athenian Constitution, which was discovered in 1880 in the Egyptian desert. This work provides essential reports of the political system of Athens, collected in his school.

The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle spread throughout the world and formed a basic way of

thinking about the world and life. The most important legacy of Greek philosophy is perhaps the whole system of our scientific and philosophical inquiry, which we now take for granted.

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*See also* Normative Theory in International Relations; Political Philosophy; Political Theory

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## GREEN PARTIES

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Green and alternative movements first emerged in several Western European countries in the 1970s accompanied by a more general generational change toward postmaterialist values. They were mostly concerned with environmental issues, such as the antinuclear movement, but also with peace and women’s issues. Since then, the electoral as well as the parliamentary performance of green parties has improved remarkably in many democratic societies (mostly, however, in European countries). Thus, green parties were not just a temporary phenomenon—as many political observers had suggested in the early 1980s—but have developed into a stable element of many party systems around the world. In 2001, the green parties created a “global network” that consists of 61 member parties:

*15 from Africa:* Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, and South Africa;

*12 from the Americas:* Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia (2), Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela;

*14 from the Asia-Pacific region:* Australia, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Philippines, Polynesia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Vanuatu; and

*32 from Europe:* Austria, Belgium (2), Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands (2), Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

Most green parties outside Europe developed later, in the mid- or late 1990s, and have remained relatively minor players in terms of electoral success. Consequently, comparative research and scholarly debates focus mainly on Western European green parties. The central scholarly contributions revolve around four topics: (1) the rise and development of the Greens in Europe (Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, 1989; Michael O'Neill, 1997; Dick Richardson & Chris Rootes, 1995), (2) their political profile (Kitschelt, 1989; Rihoux, 2001), (3) their electoral and parliamentary performance (Pascal Delwit & Jean M. de Waele, 1999), and (4) their participation in national governments (Ferdinand Müller-Rommel & Thomas Poguntke, 2002).

This entry documents the rise of green parties and describes their political profile, performance, and participation in national governments. Last, this entry discusses the impact of green parties, both as a voice for those whose views are not represented by established parties and as a way of bringing attention to issues these parties have not addressed.

### From Social Movements to Green Parties

The early 1970s saw the rise of new social movements in many countries of the Western world.

Most of these movements emerged spontaneously from politically independent citizen initiative groups. These groups were generally interested in specific issues such as the provision of parks, and they protested against urban renewal, new highways, or the construction of nuclear power plants. They mobilized public opinion via unconventional political behavior characteristic of earlier student movements, such as demonstrations and occasional sit-ins, information campaigns, and other similar tactics.

In the mid-1970s, one particular issue became dominant in several European countries: nuclear energy. At this time, heavily influenced by the oil crisis, most European governments had decided to expand their nuclear energy programs. It was precisely the issue of nuclear power that stimulated the rise of environmental movements at the national level, since governmental decisions on nuclear power expansion could not be resolved at the local level. Thus, more and more local action groups formed national "anti-nuclear power" umbrella organizations to concentrate their impact on policy making. In addition to issues of nuclear energy and environmental protection, the debate over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) dual-track decision on intermediate nuclear forces and the stationing of cruise missiles and Pershing II rockets in Western Europe in the late 1970s strengthened these movements. This debate created considerable solidarity among the new social movements across Europe.

In the early 1980s, most national social movements expected the established left-wing parties to act as effective safeguards against unlimited growth, environmental degradation, and the deployment of nuclear weapons. Yet, for different reasons, these parties could not accommodate these demands. Hence, one of the main reasons for the foundation of the Greens was their negative experience with existing left-wing parties, as well as the perceived inability of established political parties and institutions to come up with a fundamentally different policy approach.

### Political Profile

Green parties in Western Europe can be characterized by three elements: First, most of these parties follow the idea of the concept of New Politics



(emphasizing quality of life, citizen participation, and self-actualization rather than material affluence and economic growth). They generally embrace a left-wing standpoint consisting of fervent egalitarianism (equal rights for minorities), strong ecological and antinuclear power orientation, and solidarity with the Third World. They campaign for a genuine sharing of wealth between rich and poor nations and for assistance to underprivileged countries in creating their own self-sufficient economies, free of financial domination by industrial nations. In a nutshell, green parties introduced a new form of programmatic and ideological thinking that is less consistent with the traditional ideological Left–Right dimension. Instead, they offer a set of alternative values that differ significantly from the established parties.

Second, green parties display a much stronger preference for participatory party organization than established parties. Their organizational structure gives local party branches more autonomy in decision making and a maximum of interest articulation from grassroots initiatives. Thus, the process of decentralization is considered an essential precondition for meaningful participation.

The third and last characteristic that sets green parties apart is that they have an electorate with attributes that differ significantly from those of established parties. Comparative data on the electorate of the Greens have, for instance, shown that followers of new social movements are among the majority of green party voters. They are for the most part young, highly educated, and occupy white-collar and government jobs where the traditional class conflict is virtually nonexistent.

Although there was some diversity in the programmatic demands, and in the degree of participatory party organization, green parties developed rapidly: Between 1980 and 1984, new green parties were founded in 12 Western European countries. By the late 1980s, these parties had gained significant electoral and (in some countries) parliamentary success.

### Electoral and Parliamentary Performance

The electoral performance of green parties in Western Europe has varied markedly across countries over the past 3 decades. Most of these parties have participated by now in six or more national

elections and have therefore stabilized their electoral performance in major European countries. Overall, the average electoral results of green parties range between 1.5% and 7.3% of the total suffrage. In six countries, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, electoral support for the Greens was higher than 5% of the overall vote in the past three national elections.

This comparably low electoral support for the Greens is also reflected in their parliamentary representation. During the period ranging from 1978 to 1984, only three green parties (in Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland) have succeeded in passing the electoral threshold for gaining representation in national parliaments. Between 1985 and 1997, the number of green parties in parliaments has increased from three to nine: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. Meanwhile, green parties were also represented in the Italian, Irish, Greek, Czech, and Portuguese parliaments. However, compared with most other parties, the absolute number of green party members in parliament is rather low. The average parliamentary strength ranges from 0.3% in Greece to 6.5% in Luxembourg. In sum, the electoral and parliamentary performance of green parties in Europe has remained marginal except for the green parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.

### Participation in National Governments

The majority of green parties in national parliaments serve as opposition parties and therefore have no impact on government formation or policy making. Outside Europe, the Greens in Brazil are the only green party to have participated in government after the 2002 national elections. In Europe, seven green parties have entered governments as coalition partners: The Greens in Finland were the first to become a member of the ruling government coalition (1995), followed by the Greens in Italy (1996), France (1997), Germany (1998), Belgium (1999), Ireland (2007), and, last, the Czech Republic (2007). Interestingly, the parliamentary duration of these parties prior to government participation varied substantially. The Greens in Belgium and Ireland held the longest representation in national governments (18 years each), followed by the German Greens (15 years),

the Finnish Greens (12 years), and the Italian Greens (9 years). The French and the Czech Greens were immediately invited to participate in government after having entered parliament in a national election. Thus, we can differentiate between three types of governing green parties: First, the *professionals*, defined as green parties with a long duration of preparliamentary and parliamentary participation before entering government (e.g., in Germany and Finland); second, the *parliamentary experienced* Greens who have accumulated long experiences of parliamentary participation but low duration in preparliamentary activities (e.g., Belgium, Italy, and Ireland); third, the *preparliamentary experienced* Greens who had some extraparliamentary experience before entering parliament and government (e.g., in France and the Czech Republic).

### The Impact of Green Parties

The individual and collective political relevance of the green parties can be summarized in two points: First, green parties mobilize many citizens with new value orientations by making it possible for them to find expressions for their views at the ballot box. The Greens therefore serve as political vehicles for those citizens whose grievances have been ignored by the larger established parties. By making themselves the spokespeople of the dissatisfied, green parties also stimulate a process of change of party loyalties and are paving the way for increasing volatility within Western European party systems. Second, green parties affect political issues and the tone of political life by bringing controversial matters into the public debate. If the issues prove popular, they are adopted by one or more of the larger established parties. This led to changes in the programs of major European parties. Finally, and by means of conclusion, the political impact of green parties to a very large extent depends on the emergence of New Politics issues influencing mass public opinion and the inability of larger left-wing or right-wing established parties to harness these issues and integrate them into their political agenda.

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*See also* Environmental Issues; Postmaterialism; Social Movements

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## GROUNDED THEORY

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Developed by the sociologists Anselm L. Strauss and Barney Glaser at the University of California at San Francisco in the late 1960s, grounded theory (GT) has become one of the foremost research styles in qualitative and interpretative social, political, and educational research. Aiming at empirically GT generation rather than at theory testing or mere description, GT provides the researcher with a rich set of research heuristics, the so-called constant comparative method. GT is, unlike ethnography or interviewing, not a method of data generation. It is also, despite its somewhat confusing name, not a theory. Instead, it is a general model for certain types of research designs, the results of which are substantive theories of the field under scrutiny. This entry discusses the origins of GT, basic procedures, its role in political science, and recent developments.

### Origins

Epistemologically, as well as in terms of social theory, the origins of GT are primarily in early American pragmatism and interactionism as represented by Strauss. At the sociology department of the University of Chicago, he was trained in the pragmatist logic of inquiry (of Charles Peirce, John Dewey, and George H. Mead), with its strong notion of reality being brought forth constantly in interactively dealing with the physical and social restraints of the “world out there.” By the same token, Strauss was influenced by the empirical fieldwork practice of E. C. Hughes, a descendent of Robert E. Park’s human ecology approach. A second strand of origin lies in the Columbia School and its leanings toward the development of middle-range theories—a heritage brought into the project by Glaser, who was trained under Robert K. Merton before he worked with Strauss in San Francisco. While Strauss advocated the need of a research style that allows for creativity to be brought into the scientific process, Glaser represented the call for rigor in qualitative and interpretative research and theory development.

Developed in practice during an organizational ethnography on death and dying in hospital wards, the first monograph on GT, instead of being a method textbook, served more as a political statement against the orthodox consensus of structural-functionalist theories and logico-hypothetical methods. Published in 1967, amid the political uprising of the civil rights and student movements, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, and its methodological statement, was meant to support these new ways of thinking among young researchers. Since GT was among the first qualitative research styles spelled out in its practical details and at the same time offered a way to systematically develop empirically grounded scientific theories, it was quickly adopted by a broader group of social science researchers. While originally developed in the field of medical sociology, GT has gained a standing in most areas of sociology, psychology, education, ethnography, and social anthropology.

### Basic Procedures and Heuristics

Though advocating rigor in theory development, the most basic rule of GT is that it is not to be

understood as a rigid set of rules. Researchers are meant to grasp the general guidelines of GT in an interpretative and flexible manner in order to adapt its heuristics to the circumstances of practical research. Among these basic guidelines is the call for understanding the entire case—that is, instead of either comparing single items on various cases (as in quantitative research) or interpreting in depth single cases (as in hermeneutic approaches), GT developed a heuristic that integrates key features of both strategies into its constant comparative method. A second basic rule underlines not only the inevitability but also the need for and the advantage of the researchers’ subjectivity and creativity. Following Dewey’s notion of research as iterations of problem-solving cycles, it is the creativity of abductive processes that bridges the gap between a problem systematically laid out in processes of logical reasoning and results obtained in experimental practice. The notion of creativity goes hand in hand with the pragmatist claim that there is no universal reality to discover. Third, research is seen as a joint endeavor of a community of practice comprising not only the research team but also the scientific community. In terms of GT, this endeavor is understood as a work in progress, which gives scientific activities a down-to-earth flavor of practical day-to-day activities that need to be organized and articulated interactively among research participants. Finally, GT assumes social reality to consist of complex phenomena requiring a similarly rich theoretical understanding that primarily accounts for variation. This includes the notion of theory as a never-ending process.

In GT, both analysis and theory building start immediately with scrutinizing the material produced in investigating a first case. Thus, analysis here is thought of as a continual interplay of data generation, data inspection, and theoretical reasoning in an iterative-cyclical procedure. Single incidents of phenomena occurring in the data are compared with each other to develop a conceptual, theoretical understanding of what these incidents mean with respect to the research question under scrutiny. No a priori hypothesis drives this process. The researcher starts from a research question that in the beginning is more like a vague research curiosity: What is going on here? It is the interplay of data analysis and conceptual thinking that at the same time allows for

a step-by-step stating of the research question more precisely.

The comparative analytical mode employed in GT is called *coding*—that is, occurrences of a certain phenomenon in the data are compared with other occurrences of the same or a similar phenomenon. Here, two comparative heuristics alternate. Whereas in the first phase the analyst compares incidents where the phenomenon occurs that are as similar as possible (homogeneous cases), in the second step, he or she will compare these with incidents as different from the first ones as possible (heterogeneous cases). The first step serves to develop the theoretically relevant properties of the concept to be constructed on the basis of the empirical data. While still adding to the development of properties, the second step is more dedicated to determining the scope of the concept. The aim is to find out under which conditions and in which contexts the concept still holds and which variations of the concept are necessary in order to account for the complexity of the phenomenon in reality. This scope is called *conceptual representativeness*.

The coding process consists of different modes. As the GT procedures of Strauss and Glaser have been developed in different directions over time, there is a Glaserian two-mode procedure and a Straussian three-mode procedure. Both Glaser and Strauss start with *open coding*, which tries to break up the data in a line-by-line analysis and develop those units into theoretical concepts that in light of the research question appear to be relevant. Glaser on his part continues with a coding mode called *theoretical coding*. Here, the concepts derived inductively from the data are compared with and linked with theoretical codes chosen among a larger number of code families (e.g., dimensions, cultures, and types). The aim of this procedural step is for the researcher to come up with a central core category. Viewed from the perspective of this core category, the analytical structure developed in the course of the project should answer the research question. Strauss in his more widely used approach instead suggests two further coding modes: axial and selective coding. In *axial coding*, researchers seek to establish empirically grounded relations between different concepts, often by using a so-called coding paradigm that offers a set of basic questions to answer for a phenomenon under scrutiny. These questions serve to

account for contexts, intervening conditions, causalities, strategies, and consequences. Though not operating with theoretical code families, *selective coding* likewise aims at discovering a core category, thereby integrating the variety of concepts into a coherent theoretical perspective.

As analysis does not limit itself to a single case, empirical material on further cases is integrated in a step-by-step procedure called *theoretical sampling*. Different from random sampling, this selection strategy draws on the basic findings of the theory under construction. By posing generative questions derived from open ends in the theory-building process, the researcher determines which material on which types of cases is needed to continue the relevant comparative strategies at a certain point in the project. Thus, not only homogeneous and heterogeneous sampling strategies on cases and materials but also on incidents within the material alternate flexibly. The criterion for switching from one strategy to the other is called *theoretical saturation*. A certain comparative step ends when the researcher does not gain any more conceptually relevant insights from it.

An important issue in most qualitative strategies is the question of how to deal with previous practical and theoretical knowledge. Right from the beginning, GT has underscored the importance of studying social phenomena unbiased from pre-given theoretical frameworks and has encouraged researchers to start their empirical investigations right away. At times, this has been critically interpreted as a *tabula rasa*—a critique that was encouraged by the late Glaser's naïve inductivism. However, even in the early writings, Glaser and Strauss denied starting with a *tabula rasa* and Strauss for his part repeatedly advocated the advantages of a knowledge-based *theoretical sensitivity* as opposed to the definiteness of pre-given theoretical frameworks.

### Grounded Theory and Political Science Research

Compared with other social sciences, the usage of GT in political sciences is less widespread. This is true not only for GT but also for all kinds of sound and systematic qualitative research methods. Overall, qualitative research is not yet well established in political science. This might be due to the fact that this field has a long tradition of normative,

value-driven theorizing, which fits well both with theory-testing procedures—as a test whether the reality of political systems indeed behaves as maintained in normative theories (e.g., theories of democracy)—and with presenting exemplary evidence in an illustrative manner. The place of GT, in contrast, lies in the domain of developing explanatory theories of interactions between political actors as representatives of, for example, political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), legal institutions, or lay groups. It can be observed, however, that young scholars from the field of political science are increasingly attracted by GT, for example, for studying policy making, community power structures, or empowerment processes.

### Variants and Add-Ons of Grounded Theory

Over the more than 40 years of its existence, GT has developed into a number of variants: some of them challenging the original claim, others representing add-ons to the basic model. The most important split happened between the two originators of GT during the early 1990s, when Glaser accused Strauss and his coresearcher Juliet Corbin of forcing the data into preconceived concepts (e.g., by using the coding paradigm). Glaser himself proposed a purely inductive version of GT and rejected both the use of previous knowledge and the verification of data. Strauss on his part regards previous knowledge as an inevitable and useful precondition of empirical research but only when it is used in a sensitizing instead of a definitive manner. Also, he insisted on the need for a constant process of experimental verification to come up with scientific theories based on which predictions of future developments can be made. Recently, some of Strauss's students came up with alternative or additional concepts of how to do GT. Adele Clarke, for example, suggests further developing GT into a situational analysis by using a set of mapping techniques to better represent the various perspectives occurring in the data. Another strand of discussion introduced by Kathy Charmaz centers on the notion of a constructivist GT as opposed to older, objectivist versions of GT.

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*See also* Case Studies; Constructivism; Hermeneutics; Qualitative Versus Quantitative Methods

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## GROUPTHINK

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The rather Orwellian-sounding word *groupthink* is one of those pieces of social-scientific terminology that has entered popular usage, where it is now used rather loosely and colloquially to refer to defective or dysfunctional group decision making in general; the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee concluded in 2004, for instance, that there was evidence of groupthink in the mistaken assessment that there were weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq prior to the 2003 American invasion. The chairs of that committee were using the term to refer to a kind of generalized or collective misperception. In the study of public policy, foreign policy analysis, psychology, and management, however, groupthink has a rather more precise usage. It was originated by the late social psychologist Irving Janis in his book *Victims of Groupthink*, first published in 1972 and later reissued in a revised form 10 years later as simply *Groupthink*. Although Janis himself did apply his theory to domestic cases such as the Watergate scandal—and the theory has also been used to explain management fiascoes such as the 1986 decision to launch the space shuttle *Challenger*—within political science it has exerted

its greatest impact on the study of foreign policy decision making. The theory has been heavily criticized in recent years for reasons that are detailed below, but Janis's basic assumption that individual behavior can be altered by group pressure is supported by a substantial body of empirical research.

Janis defined the groupthink phenomenon as a process through which a group reaches a hasty or premature consensus and then becomes closed to outside ideas or alternative thoughts within. The effort to achieve unanimity and agreement overrides the desire to consider a full range of policy alternatives. High group cohesion or excessive camaraderie lies at the heart of the groupthink phenomenon and may develop where the members think too much alike or have developed powerful links of friendship or collegiality that inhibit the challenging of assumptions. While Janis did not feel that groupthink was inevitable in such a situation, he maintained that this kind of group can fall victim to groupthink where members of the group come to prize "concurrence seeking" (unanimity or agreement) over the comprehensive, rational consideration of all available courses of action. Janis illustrates his theory with a range of examples in which he claims that groupthink played a central role in the decision making, including the 1941 decision by U.S. admirals at Pearl Harbor to ignore reports that the naval base was about to be attacked by Japan, the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the 1965 escalation of the Vietnam War. He contrasts this with what he calls *vigilant appraisal*—in which decision makers do rigorously and thoroughly consider all possible options—and holds up the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 as a notable instance of a case in which this kind of superior process occurred.

According to Janis, groupthink has a number of antecedent conditions in addition to high group cohesiveness. For instance, it is encouraged where the group is insulated from outside advice, where an aggressive or opinionated leader prevents meaningful debate, where norms requiring the use of methodical procedures are absent, where most members of the group come from a similar social and educational background and/or think alike, where the group is confronting high levels of

stress, and where its members are experiencing temporarily low levels of self-esteem. Janis also identifies a number of symptoms that can be used to diagnose the presence of groupthink. These include the presence of an illusion of invulnerability among the group; collective rationalization about the risks of a chosen option; a belief in the inherent morality of the group, in which members come to believe in the exclusive moral rightness of their cause; the appearance of stereotyped views of outgroups or "the enemy"; the exertion of direct pressure on those who dissent from the majority opinion; self-censorship, where doubters fail to express their true feelings; the false perception of unanimity, where in fact some members may harbor personal doubts about the policy option chosen; and finally, the emergence of self-appointed "mind guards," where members of the group take it on themselves to protect the group and its leader from dissenting views (guarding minds much as a bodyguard guards us physically).

It is important to realize that groupthink is essentially a theory about the policy process; it does not necessarily tell us about the outcomes of decision making. In other words, a process free of groupthink will not guarantee policy success, nor will procedures fraught with groupthink necessarily lead to policy disaster (although Janis argued that the *likelihood* of an undesirable outcome was greatly increased by the presence of groupthink). It is possible that sheer luck, for instance, will intervene in a rather fortuitous fashion to break the general causal chain between process and outcome.

In the years since Janis's book was first published, the theory of groupthink has been subjected to a variety of criticisms, and it has been adapted and reformulated in various ways. Probably the most common criticism of Janis's theory is that it is too vague and imprecise—allowing almost anything that might be labeled poor collective decision making to be categorized as an instance of groupthink—and some have critiqued the theoretical coherence of the model Janis developed. As Philip Tetlock and his colleagues have suggested, four broad criticisms can be raised against Janis's work in this vein: First of all, Janis relied on qualitative case studies, a method that

frequently tempts the researcher to emphasize evidence that “fits” a theory; second, there is a suspicious correlation between the presence of groupthink and flawed decision making in Janis’s book, even though Janis concedes that process is not everything; third, critics have noted an equally suspicious all-or-nothing quality to the way in which Janis’s case fits so conveniently into the categories of groupthink or vigilant decision making; and last, there are various conceptual problems with the model itself, especially those having to do with distinguishing the causes from the consequences of groupthink. Certainly, Janis lumps together a bewildering variety of factors; some have questioned the inclusion of a belief in the inherent morality of the group and the stereotyped views of outgroups in his list of antecedent factors, for instance, since these appear to have little to do with consensus formation.

Others have critiqued the model on empirical grounds, and later analysts have challenged Janis’s interpretation of the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam case studies, the two centerpieces of the book *Groupthink*. The contention that Lyndon Johnson did not receive competing advice on Vietnam, or that he and others felt “an illusion of invulnerability” on this issue, has been strongly questioned in recent years. The evidence we now have suggests that Johnson himself agonized quite extensively over the decision to escalate the war. The recent declassification of secretly taped phone calls that Johnson made in late 1964 and throughout 1965 reveals a president who was deeply troubled by the issue of Vietnam and quite pessimistic about the chances of winning the war. Similarly, it has also been argued that Janis’s interpretation of the Bay of Pigs episode sits poorly with what we now know. In giving the go-ahead for the invasion of Cuba, John F. Kennedy and his advisers may have been influenced not so much by a feeling that they could not fail as they were by faulty (and perhaps deliberately misleading) intelligence assessments provided by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Rather than being influenced by group processes, Kennedy may have simply believed that a great World War II general like Dwight Eisenhower would not have advised him to go ahead with a plan that had little chance of success.

One response to these kinds of criticisms has been to reformulate Janis’s original argument in the effort to lend it more theoretical rigor. Some have attempted to better specify the kind of leadership behavior that gives rise to groupthink. Paul ’t Hart, on the other hand, argues in his study of the Iran–Contra decision making under the Reagan administration that groupthink is not one phenomenon but two. Noting that the decision makers in some of Janis’s cases do not appear to be laboring under an illusion of invulnerability, ’t Hart distinguishes between what he calls Type I Groupthink (or Collective Avoidance) and Type II Groupthink (Collective Overoptimism). ’t Hart argues that the first kind of groupthink occurs when members perceive that the likelihood of successfully resolving the problem confronting the group is low, while the latter occurs when the likelihood of success is seen as high. Prompted by the desire to “look beyond groupthink,” analysts of foreign policy decision making have also reexamined the wider literature on group behaviors within social psychology for clues as to how other theoretical frameworks might be developed. One such approach has become known as the *new-group syndrome*. Paul ’t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, the theory’s major advocates, have proposed that in ad hoc or newly formed groups, the lack of well-agreed norms and the absence of any existing organizational culture create uncertainty among the members. Group conformity is especially likely under such circumstances, they argue, and members are particularly likely to accept strong direction from a leader or other dominant individuals.

Nevertheless, Janis’s theory has also been supported by a large body of empirical research that has essentially confirmed his original claims about the ways in which group cohesion can lead to defective decision making. Perhaps the greatest strength of this approach is that it highlights the fact that groups are more than the sum total of the individuals who compose them; once policymakers form a group, the resultant body subsumes (and may overwhelm) its members. Individuals often behave differently in groups from how they do on their own, and the greatest contribution of groupthink has been the way in which it highlights the

fact that even the “best and the brightest” can fall prey to dysfunctional group dynamics.

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*See also* Consensus; Foreign Policy Analysis; Leadership; Policy Process, Models of

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## HEALTH POLICY

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Health policy denotes normative and procedural dimensions of assuring physical, mental, and social well-being, including but transcending medical care. Spanning normatively and empirically contested domains, however, health policy means different things to different people. Sometimes it concerns content such as financing or organizing health services; sometimes it emphasizes the process by which valued ends are sought and occasionally attained; and sometimes it implies power and whatever else may influence the formation and implementation of health-related activities. This entry describes the values and practices intrinsic to health policy, focusing on six areas: (1) definitions of health, (2) values underlying responsibility for health, (3) the context of health care practices, (4) political actors in the health policy process, (5) options in providing health care, and (6) reforms in health care systems.

### Definitions

Definitions of health range from perfect well-being through functional capacity to psychological perceptions. According to the World Health Organization, health is considered a state of physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. For the functionalist Talcott Parsons (1964), "Health is a state of optimum *capacity* of an individual for the effective performance of the roles and tasks for which

he has been socialized" (p. 274). For the postmodernist Walsh McDermott (1977), "Health is a relative state that represents the degree to which an individual can operate effectively within the circumstances of his hereditary and his physical and cultural environment" (p. 136).

Health was originally an individual concern, then a concern of the family, and then of larger collectivities up to and including society. Given the changes in technology, health moved beyond physical encounters (the germ theory of disease) to socioeconomic concerns (contributions to productivity) and postmodern reconstruction of well-being (cultural coping with chronic disability).

Different societies perceive health in different ways and differ about the meaning of disease and ill health. Beliefs about health, disease, and illness also differ according to gender, socioeconomic status, profession, and social role. As definitions of health change over time, perceived health needs of people change. Paradigms about what constitutes health have been broadened by scientific investigations as well as the emergence of new ideas.

Prevention of illness is the first line of defense; restoration or rehabilitation of health through medical intervention is the remedial approach; and capacity to cope with chronic conditions is a third method. Systems of health services (which include a gamut of opportunities and interventions ranging from psychosocial supports through episodic pharmaceuticals to invasive therapies such as surgery) are valued in all societies and provide an arena within which occur struggles over the allocation of

values as well as the pursuit and exercise of power that represent both policy and politics.

### Values

Anthropologists note that the most important thing to know about people is what they take for granted. Unarticulated values guide behavior and generate consensus about its intrinsic propriety. Only when challenged by other deeply held views do such basic orientations become manifest—and then perhaps only dimly. But although elusive and pervasive, basic orientations serve as selective filters that inhibit or distort comprehension of alternative viewpoints based on other equally basic but unarticulated values.

Common values and beliefs determine the demands made on health policymakers. The more widely values and beliefs are shared, the easier and greater the public's acceptance of proposed policies. Public opinion sets the boundaries and direction of health policy, while the social system sensitizes policymakers about health demands and supports. Most countries share basic goals in health policy: universal (or near-universal) access to health services, equity in sharing the financial burden of illness, and good-quality health care. Given the ever-larger share of public money in funding health care, governments are increasingly concerned about cost control and efficiency. Patient satisfaction, patient choice, and autonomy of professionals are important goals too.

Normative preferences about responsibility for health care range from a commitment to individualism, where a person is the only one responsible for his or her well-being, to an abiding concern for general welfare, where the state (acting on behalf of all of society) ensures an all-inclusive system of health care for all. Empirical practice involves three dimensions of health care services: (1) equitable access, (2) effective quality, and (3) efficient production.

One cleavage that informs health policy divides those who stress an essential solidarity among all humans (at least those within a delimited territory) from those who espouse the individual responsibility of each human being (with perhaps concessions for age-specific categories such as children and the elderly). The former view is egalitarian or solidaristic; the latter is characteristic of libertarianism or

radical individualism. As modern communications globalize Western orientations, their spread elicits challenges and responses from non-Western societies about how to regard, amend, or replace these values. "Great" traditions (to use Robert Redfield's term) such as the Confucian and Islamic as well as "little" traditions such as regional variants and local folkways provide options as they interact with the globalized values of a secularized Judeo-Christian culture.

### Context

Health policy cannot be divorced from the situational and historical context in which it is made. The legacy of previous policies, including the absence of such policies altogether, provides a contextual limit on policy options. The situational environment provides demands for policy action plus support for as well as constraints on what policymakers can do. The environment within which policy is made as well as the substantive processes that underlie the formation and implementation of specific health policies must be understood.

Health policy analysis is applicable to all societies. Regularities in the policy process and similarities among actors who try to influence it transcend differences in levels or degrees of development. Within government are policymakers including politicians, advisers, judges, and administrators. Outside governments are groups with major stakes in policies that affect them; these range from organized institutions to social forces and latent interests, and even foreign entities. How far such groups participate in policy making depends on how open or closed the political system is. Even if the array of problems and their solutions are different, procedures and routines in policy making are comparable.

While empirical experience with goals and means for health policy indicates potential global convergence on patterns of performance, countries implement changes within their own historical legacies and within the constraints of existing national institutions and political boundaries. The timing and speed of change vary as well. Some governments implement major changes rapidly whereas others, including those characterized by well-organized stakeholders, adjust, delay, or even abandon health policies.

The health sector comprises a major share of the economy in each country. It employs many workers, accounts for a considerable portion of gross national product (GNP), absorbs large amounts of resources (including often unrecorded payments out of pocket), and generates vested interests. Since any expenditure is income for someone else, a “penny saved” deprives someone somewhere of his or her earnings.

Health is also influenced by public policies that initially appear to be unconnected with health care or services. Civic insecurity, political instability, environmental pollution, revenue generation, and economic regulation—all affect changes in morbidity and mortality, not to mention the provision of health services *per se*. Health policy draws on many sectors whose relevance is not at first glance self-evident.

Health policy is of global concern beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Efforts to promote health cannot be restricted to a particular country because diseases do not confine themselves within geographical borders. They are transferred from one place to another through travel, migration, commerce, and social exchange. Efforts to prevent disease and to promote health require cooperation and collaboration among agencies at local, national, and international levels.

### Actors

Structures and procedures of political institutions have important consequences for the adoption and content of health policy. Enduring institutions—both governmental and nongovernmental—interact in the policy-making process. Policy actors are individuals and groups, both formal and informal, that seek to influence the creation and implementation of public policies. Potentially such actors include everyone, but degrees of activity over time vary. Some potential players never enter the game; others dominate almost every stage of play. In the health sector, actors include branches of government, governmental agencies, commercial enterprises, nongovernmental institutions, organized interest groups, and professional associations. The role each actor plays, in combination with relationships among actors in formal and informal settings, determines health policy outcomes.

Interest groups are fundamental partners in policy making. To the extent that health policy interests are shared, collective pressure allows greater policy influence. But the dynamic of interest groups is not simple. While salient interests are represented by groups, the strength of representation is not tied to the salience of an issue. Some groups are already vested due to past history, and salience itself may be a consequence of interest group action. The study of health policy must identify the policy actors and their political resources. Common resources include information and bureaucratic knowledge, a network of contacts, citizen support (including size as well as strategic location of constituency), an ability to make political contributions, and an ability to mount a public relations campaign. While few groups ever use all such resources at all times, the profile of an organized group’s ability to make use of some combination of them is critical for policy influence.

In addition to organized interests, political legacies matter as do key political processes. For example, the United States developed a health care system that relies on private financing and voluntary hospitals for the provision of health services. Public sector responsibility is confined to targeted financing for the poor, the elderly, and a limited public hospital network. Subsequent efforts to reform the American health system face increasingly vested interests and widely accepted routines of private health care.

Significantly for health policy, the American system of government is built on an enduring Madisonian system of checks and balances that gives well-mobilized interests the ability to impede or block policy initiatives. The American health system has numerous groups powerful enough to oppose any reform that might harm their own economic interests.

Robert Alford’s classic conceptualization of health policy posits three categories of actors engaging in “dynamics without change”: (1) professional monopolists, (2) corporate rationalizers, and (3) citizen-consumers—the latter getting the proverbial short end of the stick. While institutions of representation, government, policy making, and intergovernmental relations may be stable, processes by which health policy are shaped and implemented have undergone marked changes during recent decades. These changes challenge the

notion that health policy is made by a unified center or by coordinated pillars at the helm of representative political regimes.

### Options

Health care systems are characterized by country-specific mixes of public and private funding, contracting, and modes of providing services. The five main sources of funding are (1) taxation (general revenues, earmarked taxes, and tax expenditure), (2) public insurance, (3) private insurance, (4) direct patient payments (copayments, coinsurance, deductibles, and uninsured services), and (5) voluntary contributions. For some low-income countries, external aid is a major source as well.

Among the three basic contracting models, the integrated version places funding and ownership of services under the same (public or private) responsibility. The best known example is the British National Health Service (NHS) that provides tax-funded health care for all. The second contracting model allows governments or third-party payers (often administrative agencies for social health insurance but sometimes private health insurers) to negotiate long-term contracts with health care providers. The third model, common in private insurance, is reimbursement when a patient pays the provider and then seeks reimbursement from the insurance agency. Therefore, the ownership and management of health services can be public, private (both for-profit and not-for-profit), or a mix of those. Moreover, there are country-specific mixes of formal and informal care, traditional and modern medicine, and medical and related social services.

Combinations of those core elements—funding, contracting (including payment modes), and ownership—determine the allocation of financial risks and decision-making power among the main players in health care. Government ownership and tax-funded services require strong government influence, whereas private funding (insurance and direct patient payments) combined with legally independent providers restricts the role of the state even though governments can—and often do—impose rules to protect patients or safeguard the quality of and access to health care.

National arrangements for financing health care vary. In Scandinavia, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the major share of health care funding is

financed by general taxation, whereas systems of health insurance are the major source of funds in Germany, France, and other continental countries. In all countries, patients are expected to pay a proportion of health care costs out of their own pockets through copayments or deductibles. In most cases, however, governments mitigate the effects of user fees by exempting certain groups or by setting annual limits on how much families must pay.

Variations in funding and contracting models in health care can be traced to country-specific historical developments, but two events in Europe played a crucial role as models for policy. The first was the introduction of mandatory social health insurance for industrial workers and their families in Germany in 1883. Several other countries in Europe followed the German example of state-sponsored (but not state-administered) mandatory social insurance to protect the family income of industrial workers against the risks of illness, disability, unemployment, and old age. Mandatory membership enforced by social insurance meant that the so-called sickness funds had stable revenue streams and could create wider pools of shared risk. In the past decades, these nongovernmental funds became core actors in the public policy arena by sharing the responsibility for social policy making but under ever-greater government regulation.

The second major innovation in the funding of health care was the establishment of Britain's NHS in 1948. The NHS extended the German insurance model by providing coverage to the entire population with costs paid out of general taxation. Although hospitals in the United Kingdom were nationalized, family physicians remained independent as practitioners. Postwar reconstruction in Europe was characterized by popular support for the expansion of state-sponsored schemes. Some countries followed the German example of employment-based schemes; others preferred the population-based NHS model.

The spread of the two models was not restricted to Europe. Nations throughout the world sought to implement policies to protect the incomes of their populations (or population groups) against the financial risks of illness, disability, and old age. By the end of the 20th century, funding for health care in most countries had become hybridized by adopting elements from both the British and German models. Employment-based arrangements for

certain categories of workers were combined with population-wide and tax-based universal schemes.

### Reforms

The 1970s saw a shift from expansion and popular support for welfare state arrangements to reassessment and retrenchment. Economic, demographic, and ideological factors contributed to the reshaping of the popular notion of the welfare state as a solution for social problems to that of an economic burden and a cause of economic stagnation. After the oil crisis, economic stagflation with persistently high levels of unemployment meant that state revenues stagnated or declined while public expenditures continued to grow. Moreover, as the end of the postwar baby boom became visible, demographers revised earlier demographic projections downward and future pension outlays upward.

Ideological views about the role of the state also changed. On both the left and right of the political spectrum, critics agreed that state powers had become too intrusive in the lives of individuals. Discontent over fiscal burdens and disappointing results of public programs, rising consumerism, and patient advocacy groups claiming a stronger say in the allocation and organization of health care—all challenged existing arrangements for providing welfare. Governments sought alternative models of governance to reduce the dominant role of the state and decentralize decision making, with more space for choice and entrepreneurial ideas. Some countries introduced market competition in health care by reducing state control over the funding and planning of health care services. They also sought to broaden patients' choice of provider and health plan. Other countries turned to traditional tools of controlling public expenditure by setting strict budgets, reducing the scope of public insurance, and increasing direct patient payments.

During the past few decades, attempts to change health policy have been stimulated by economic recession and by severe fiscal problems in the state treasury rather than by an ideologically driven taste for reform, although the 2010 health reform bill in the United States was intended to address not only economic concerns but also issues of social justice. Declining government budgets have adversely affected service delivery, even in countries that previously had

reasonably well-performing systems for the public delivery of health services. Pressures for changes in health policy often emanate from central ministries such as finance and planning. In many cases, the ministries of health struggle to reinterpret and to respond to policy directives outside their control.

Economic realities of recession and fiscal crises affect not only the types of policies that are implemented but also reactions to them by the users, beneficiaries, and citizens. The stage of raising revenue through the introduction of user fees to supplement government budgetary resources was critical for many governments because of the endemic economic crisis. But the success of the policy, however logical in theory, was constrained by the dwindling capacity of citizens to pay for health care. Furthermore, the administrative cost of collecting user fees and of monitoring exempted categories of users often exceeds the revenue collected. Although well intended, the initial policy had not considered inevitable transaction costs.

For several decades, health policy reforms have been premised on the assumption that improving the ability of government to manage its business will lead to improved social and economic progress. The first generation of reforms sought to cut public expenditures and to revive the private sector. Measures included budget cuts, tax reforms, limited privatization, liberalization of prices, and, most conspicuously, efforts to downsize the public sector. The latter was invariably described as bloated and in need of surgery followed by a strictly enforced diet.

When it became evident that the transformation of government would require a long time and that the savings from reduced bureaucratic costs would be insufficient to provide even basic levels of public services, a second generation of policy reforms sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government. While the first-generation reforms stressed downsizing, contracting, and improved control over budgeting and public expenditures, the second generation advocated decentralization to subnational levels, creation of semiautonomous agencies in the central government, and reforms of human resource management (recruitment, selection, and training).

Recently, the agenda of health policy refocused yet again as a third generation of reforms seeks to improve social outcomes through better service

delivery. This strategy emphasizes sectorwide approaches, particularly in health and education, to produce a coherent program for delivery of services that involves both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. While these generations of policy reforms are overlapping rather than strictly sequential, all have been driven by a combination of external and internal agencies. Multilateral and bilateral aid entails conditionalities that require a (commitment to) change in governmental behavior before money can be transferred. In turn, national planning commissions and ministries of finance require line agencies to adopt reforms that may include a combination of these generations.

Policy reforms range across a repertoire of instruments: streamlined budgets, staff reductions, raised tariffs, contracting out, and other forms of privatization. Reform of the health sector has focused on four main options, none of which is mutually exclusive and all of which may occur at the same time. These are the establishment of autonomous organizations, introduction of user fees, contracting out of services, and the enablement and regulation of the private sector.

While these issues characterize features of health care systems and health policy, they do not explain the causes or effects of policy change. To understand why countries embark on particular reform paths, not only external and internal pressures for change must be investigated but also structural features of social policy making that enable politicians and policy entrepreneurs to change the system despite the fact that institutional legacies and popular support for existing policy arrangements create barriers to change.

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*See also* Functionalism; Individualism; Institutions and Institutionalism; Interest Groups; Libertarianism; Policy Analysis; Policy Community; Policy Cycle; Policy Learning; Policy Network; Reform; Responsibility; Solidarity; Values; Welfare State

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## HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)

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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart, Germany, on August 27, 1770. His political writings, including those on political philosophy, owed much to his reactions to the fragmentary nature of the German territories within the Holy Roman Empire and Napoleon's attempted forced unification of them under a common civil

code, between the early 1790s and the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. Hegel's trenchant critique of the abstract universalism of the French revolutionaries in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) did not prevent him from celebrating every Bastille Day until his death on November 14, 1831. His alternative was a form of civic nationalism based on shared traditions and cultural attachments, an ideal that he championed against the ethnic nationalism espoused at the time by many German romantics. In itself, the fact that Hegel allied himself so clearly with the civic nationalists in this particular dispute should do much to unsettle the received picture of him as an apologist for Prussian authoritarianism and a forerunner of Nazism.

Today, Hegel is notorious for his claim, made most famously in the *Philosophy of History* (1831), that history is the gradual revelation of *Geist* (translated as "Spirit" or "Mind" and synonymous with God's temporal self-manifestation) in the world, a dialectical process that critics allege he believes occurs without the knowledge of individual human agents and largely through the brutal intervention of quasi-mystical "world-historical individuals." The meaning and significance of such claims are easily misunderstood and, in certain cases, apparently deliberately distorted. Hegel approaches the historical record as a philosopher, and in this role, he seeks to discover the rationality underlying the shifting events of the past. He explicitly distinguishes this "philosophical history" from the other forms of history, including those undertaken by the early chroniclers and those who would now be seen as historians, both of whom he acknowledges have legitimate functions to perform in providing an understanding of the past. The philosopher's primary task, however, is to try to arrive at knowledge of the fundamental processes at work in the world. According to Hegel, knowledge can only be of a rational system of related concepts and propositions; hence, knowledge of the fundamental structural processes of human action must presuppose the ultimate rationality of the world. It is partly because he holds this view that Hegel claims, most notably in the Preface to *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1821), that "what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational." Knowledge is of reality and, Hegel argues, everyone presupposes reality to be structured by a coherent system of fundamental

principles or laws. To "comprehend" something is to understand that particular thing as being underpinned in particular ways by such a coherent system of laws. A philosophical history attempts to discover those laws as they have been revealed through past actions and events.

This presupposition informs every branch of Hegel's philosophical system. Hence, in the preface to *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, he states that the fundamental task of his political philosophy is "*to comprehend and portray the state [Staat] as an inherently rational entity*" [italics added]. It is this project that has led a great many critics to allege that Hegel is simply an apologist for the Prussian state. In reality, Hegel is seeking to discover the ideal type of the *Staat* that is implicit within the self-image of the world's most developed empirical politically organized communities. This project necessitates an attempt to rationalize certain negative features of the world, not least war. Nevertheless, the project has a profoundly critical thrust, in that some elements of empirically observable states do not cohere with the majority of the other elements of those states. In this sense, these wayward features of empirical states cannot be included within a conception of the state as an ideal type. The irrational elements must be excluded, which in practice means that the incongruent features of the world should be reformed, a process that may require radical changes to existent states. Hegel's most significant analysis of an incoherent social practice concerns slavery, in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. While the master treats the slave as a thing that can be owned and used, in giving him orders he treats him also as a being with capacities for cognition and practical reason—that is, as a person. More than this, the master seeks to gain a sense of his own power and status by dominating the slave. Yet he can never be satisfied with recognition from a lesser being. Similarly, the slave is denied the recognition that he seeks innately from his master. Hence, the master-slave relationship is self-contradictory and unsatisfying for both parties; the situation tends to drive each to destroy the other or to try to reconstruct their relationship on a more egalitarian footing. This struggle for recognition is the primary motor of human progress.

Hegel's project would have profound implications even if he had restricted his conception of the

proper subject matter of political philosophy (the *Staat*) to the state as it is understood by many contemporary political scientists and philosophers: the formal legal-political organs, including the legislature, executive, judiciary, civil service, police, army, and so on. In fact, Hegel adopts a wider conception of the *Staat* understood as an order that encompasses conventional sociopolitical, economic, and legal practices and institutions in such a manner that, in essence, it represents a thoroughly modernized ideal of the ancient Greek polis. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* analyzes the relationships within the ideal type of the modern state through the interactions of its three “moments”: (1) the individual will, (2) *Moralität* (translates very loosely as “morality”), and (3) *Sittlichkeit* (usually translated as the “ethical life”). In Hegel’s view, the individual will is free when the agent acknowledges the determinate action that results from that will as an expression of a law that he (the individual) has set for himself. (Hegel is concerned with men, not women, as commented on below.) Institutions and practices are justified to the extent that they facilitate such freedom. Hegel explores this claim through his discussion of the individual right to private property, which he analyses as the means for the facilitation of the determinate expression of the individual’s will in the world. This discussion leads him to an analysis of contract as a moment of the interaction of the wills of different persons. This leads him to the discussion of wrong action and the first stage of his analysis of punishment as the annulment of crime. Hegel conceives this “cancellation” of wrong action as the reharmonization of the individual’s will with itself and with the social practices and institutions that provide the will with its initial content (its socialization) and background. Underlying Hegel’s theory is a proposition that recurs throughout his writings: The reality of an object—in this case, the determinate individual will—is constituted by the coherent principles underlying it. If existent states were to embody their ideal type, then the criminal act would represent of necessity an internal contradiction within the individual. Punishment enables the individual’s rational will to reassert itself in practice, by communicating the *Staat*’s disapproval thereby “reminding” the individual of the nature and legitimacy of the

presupposed meanings and values that form the basis of his rational will.

Hegel titles this part of *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* as “Abstract Right.” He argues that the lack of determinacy in such a (logical rather than temporal) “moment” is overcome through *Moralität*. Yet even this second “moment” is limited because it lacks an external referent, being concerned solely as it is with the individual’s internal moral life, the qualities of his particular character, virtue, and conscience. The individual can overcome these limitations only by being an active participant in the *Sittlichkeit* (“ethical life”) of his community. The first facet of ethical life in which the individual participates is the family. This is the realm of love and hence the unreflective honoring of one’s duties to the members of one’s family. In essence, in the family the individual acts without asking why or what is required of him; in this sense, Hegel calls the family the realm of “immediacy.” This realm is limited, however, in that the person is treated as a facet of a group, rather than as an individual with his or her own desires, beliefs, values, plans, and will. The person moves closer to expressing his or her individuality through participation in civil society. In Hegel’s view, this nonpolitical public realm encompasses the economic system, voluntary associations, and the like. The fruits of private property are realized here in the “system of needs,” partly through employment and self-expression through work. (Yet Hegel appreciates that these fruits are associated with unemployment and poverty.) In civil society as a whole, individuals face each other as self-interested agents, bound together by contracts that they have entered into self-consciously and deliberately. In this sense, it is a realm of mediated action.

In spite of any appearance of pure self-determination, the individual’s actions in civil society are necessarily conceived and executed within a shared framework of common modes of action, norms, conventions, and, ultimately, civil laws. These underlying structures are maintained through the action of the state, conceived as living interactions of citizens in the context of the formalized legal and political organs. To the extent that the state embodies its ideal, it enjoys the self-conscious loyalty of its citizens. This is true patriotism: the self-conscious emotional identification of individual citizens with the community as the latter is



embodied in the state, with this identification being based on an uncoerced recognition that one's own highest good is realized through respecting the good of one's *Staat*. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* concludes with pregnant discussions of the tragic inevitability of war and various forms of imperialism, with the latter in particular anticipating many Marxist theories. Finally, Hegel argues that progress is inherently tragic, in the sense that human development is driven by world-historical individuals, such as Napoleon, and world-historical states (here, one might think of the contemporary United States), who in driving the world forward, inevitably bring about their own fall from grace.

Hegel's claim that the *Staat* should be conceived organically has led many to argue that he sees individual human beings as mere adjuncts of the state qua political-legal institutions or as organs and limbs to be directed not by their own individual wills but by the automatic functioning of the state as some form of collective whole. On this view, Hegel held the state to be the determining agent and the individual to be valuable only to the extent that he or she served the state's interests and will. This unappealing picture is crowned literally by Hegel's retention of the monarch as the embodiment of the state, exercising the sole function of signing bills into law. In reality, Hegel holds that individuals in a well-ordered state would be active, self-conscious, and critical patriots; organized through various civil society associations; and represented politically through their membership of corporations that are integrated formally into the state apparatus. To the extent that they fail to be so in practice, the particular state fails to live up to its ideal. Throughout, the guiding principle of Hegel's political philosophy is "to be a person, and respect others as persons" (*Philosophy of Right*, Part 1, sec. 36).

Certainly, problems remain. Even though Hegel describes polygamy as slavery for women, he excludes women from full citizenship, claiming that they are incapable of freedom in that they are guided by emotion rather than reason. Other critics have balked at his corporatism and retention of the monarch, even if in only a largely ceremonial role. Hegel himself acknowledges different contradictions within his rationalization of the world: Free economic activity seems to result inevitably in poverty for some respectable workers, and self-interested states remain the primary

actors in an international system thereby destined for conflict and war. Despite the claims of both friends, such as Alexandre Kojève, and critics, such as Karl Popper, Hegel never claimed that the world that we have now is perfect. Rather than believing that we have reached the "End of History," Hegel insists that philosophical insight always comes too late: The philosopher can only rationalize a stage of the world when it is in its death throes.

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See also Citizenship; Civil Society; Constitutionalism; Idealism; Identity, Social and Political; Individualism; Liberty; Nationalism; State

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## HEGEMONY

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Hegemony derives from the Greek term *hēgemonía* (ἡγεμονία), referring to the predominance of one of the city states (e.g., Sparta or Athens) over the others and its related leadership in issues of common interest. In modern times, it has come to be used

in reference more generally to the predominance of one actor over others. In contemporary political science, we can distinguish two traditions in the use of the term *hegemony*. In international relations theory, hegemony has been used more or less directly in reference to the original Greek meaning, where it refers to the predominance (primarily in terms of economic and military power) of one state over others. Alternatively, in Marxist-inspired political science, hegemony refers to the predominance (especially in an ideological sense) of one social group over others. Finally, Robert Cox has established an approach in critical international relations theory in which the differences between these two traditions are transcended.

### Hegemony in International Relations Theory

In international relations theory, the concept of hegemony has been applied to the phenomenon of one state's being strong enough to maintain an international order that is beneficial to (most) other states as well. Two main traditions can be distinguished here, the neorealist theory of hegemonic stability and the theory of historical cycles of global hegemony and leadership.

#### *Hegemonic Stability*

The theory of hegemonic stability (developed in the 1970s by Charles Kindleberger and subsequently subscribed to by many neorealist authors) argues that the interstate system will be relatively peaceful and stable if there is a hegemonic state that provides certain public goods to the system (most basically prosperity and security). A state will be a *hegemon* if it has both the capability and the will to perform this function. The capability of a state depends on the (relative) size and level of development of its economy, its ability to dominate certain key technological sectors, and its political and military power. During much of the 19th century, Great Britain dominated the world economically, politically, and militarily. Through its role as a stabilizer in the European balance of power and through its management of the gold standard, it was able to secure a measure of stability in interstate relations, which was beneficial to the growth of a liberal world economy. Similarly, after 1945 the United States became the hegemon:

It emerged out of the war as by far the strongest military and economic power, and it used its power to create the institutional framework (the Bretton Woods system), which facilitated the unprecedented expansion of the world economy in the following decades.

When the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the early 1970s and the hegemony of the United States weakened, hegemonic stability theory predicted the erosion of the liberal regime established by the hegemon as well. However, no such development took place. This gave rise to an alternative interpretation. In his *After Hegemony* (1984), Robert Keohane argued that collaboration between states needs to be based not only on the exercise of hegemony but also on the recognition by states that voluntary cooperation can be beneficial to them. Crucial to this approach is the concept of complex interdependence, which explains why states engage in cooperation through the creation and reproduction of international regimes.

#### *World Systems Theory*

Very similar conceptions of hegemony have been developed by scholars who started theorizing interstate hegemony from adjoining disciplines such as historical sociology (e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein) or political geography (e.g., Giovanni Arrighi and Peter Taylor). Wallerstein (1980), the intellectual founder of world systems theory, defines hegemony as that "short moment in time when a given core power can manifest simultaneously productive, commercial and financial superiority over all other core powers" (pp. 38–39). According to Wallerstein, there have been three instances of hegemony in the history of the capitalist world economy: (1) the United Provinces (1620–1672), (2) England (1815–1873), and (3) the United States of America (1945–1967). All these powers displayed some common characteristics. First, they initially achieved a relative advantage in agro-industrial production, then in commerce, and finally in finance. Second, hegemonic powers tended to be advocates of global "liberalism" in economic and political terms. Finally, in all three cases military power rested primarily on naval capabilities. The conditions that determine the rise of a particular country to hegemony in the system are manifold: Geographic location and size, the strength of the state apparatus,

the availability of new technologies capable of giving the country in question a competitive advantage over other core powers, the availability of sufficient investment capital and human capital (skilled labor), and a productive agricultural sector can all contribute to the attainment of hegemony.

Some authors with intellectual roots in international relations, such as George Modelski and William R. Thompson, have taken a historical view and arrived at insights very similar to those of world systems theory (although without using the word *hegemony*). Modelski's "long cycle of world leadership" consists of four phases: the phase of (1) *global war* among major powers in the system, resulting in the emergence of a (2) *world power* assuming the leadership role; after a period of 2 to 3 decades, the world power's leadership starts to wane in the phase of (3) *delegitimation* so that eventually a strong challenger rises in the phase of (4) *deconcentration*, whose challenge results in a new global war. According to Modelski, there have been five such cycles in the history of the world system: the Portuguese cycle (1494–1580), the Dutch cycle (1581–1688), the first (1689–1791) and second (1792–1913) British cycles, and finally the American cycle (1914–present). Decisive for the attainment of world leadership is the "capacity for global reach": The aspiring power must be securely located, preferably on an ocean; it must possess ocean-going sea power (potentially more than half of all available sea power); it must have sufficient financial resources to pay for its navy; and it must have a political structure that can lend coherence to a global enterprise. The principal challengers have been land powers: The French challenged the Dutch leadership only to find the English taking over the lead, and similarly the French and German challenges eventuated in leadership by (again) Britain and the United States.

Ultimately, these different approaches to hegemony are in agreement on one fundamental point: They all conceptualize hegemony as a relationship between states. This contrasts sharply with the original definition of hegemony in Marxist thought.

### Hegemony in Marxist Political Theory

*Hegemony* in the Marxist tradition is usually associated with the name of Antonio Gramsci, the leader of the Italian Communist Party between

1924 and 1926, when he was arrested by the Fascist regime. In fact, the term was already used extensively by various Russian socialist leaders in the decades leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In this early debate, hegemony referred to the leading role that the proletariat might play in the revolutionary struggle against the feudal order, provided it could transcend its internal divisions and develop a coherent ideological project. Gramsci was concerned to rethink political strategy in light of the very different experiences of the Russian and the West European revolutions of 1917–1919. In Russia, the capture of state power gave the revolutionary forces a sufficient grip on society at large to implement their political program. In the West (as the failed revolutions in Germany and Italy showed), the political power of the ruling class did not rest primarily on the control of the coercive apparatus of the state but was diffused and situated in the myriad institutions and relationships in civil society. In reflecting on these historical experiences, Gramsci developed his understanding of hegemony beyond its early forms by emphasizing the importance of intellectual and moral leadership and of the hegemonic group being able to bind other social groups and by recognizing the possibility of hegemony being exercised by any social class (in particular the bourgeoisie).

No social group can rule by force alone. In any class society, the ruling class, that is, the social group that has the ultimate control over the primary means of production, organizes, reproduces, and reinforces its position of economic power through a complex mix of noneconomic mechanisms. These include ideological or religious power, institutional forms, and ultimately the (threat of the) use of force. Under certain historical conditions, the balance between force and persuasion can move from one end of the continuum to the other (without either ever completely disappearing). Hegemony, in the classic Gramscian sense, is then defined as a form of class rule based primarily on consent by the subordinate groups (produced by the political, intellectual, and moral leadership of the hegemonic group) rather than on *coercion* (resting on the application of physical force).

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have critiqued Gramsci's thought, and in particular the adoption of Gramsci's ideas by more recent

Marxist authors, as being marred by a lingering materialist determinism. They have argued for a radical reinterpretation of Gramsci's theory of hegemony on the basis of discourse theory: Hegemony then becomes a strictly subjective phenomenon. Their intervention has led to continuing debate in Marxist thought between those committed to further developing historical materialism and those arguing for a constructivist (or post-structuralist) turn.

### Transnational Hegemony

Robert Cox became the founder of an approach that became known as neo-Gramscianism or transnational historical materialism in which he brought the earlier two traditions together by applying Gramsci's understanding of hegemony to the analysis of international politics. He argued that to understand global politics we need to abandon the idea that is central to the classic paradigm in international relations theory, namely, that the state is the key unit of analysis. Basing himself on a materialist position, he argued that it is social relations of production that are key and that therefore the basic unit of analysis should be the state-society complex rather than the state conceived as a black box. Cox enlarged the scope of his project by making the crucial claim that Gramsci's core ideas can fruitfully be applied to the analysis of a globalizing *international* capitalism even though Gramsci himself was primarily concerned with analyzing politics in national contexts.

Hegemony, in Cox's understanding, is simultaneously a relationship between social forces as well as a relationship between states: The international hegemony of states such as Great Britain and the United States is in fact the outward projection of the domestically grounded hegemony of a particular configuration of social forces. American hegemony in the post-1945 era was grounded in the hegemony of the class coalition (or in Gramsci's terminology *historic bloc*) of internationally oriented transnational corporations and the organized industrial working class. The longer-term historical dynamics of the global system are determined by the patterns of interaction of hegemonic and nonhegemonic state-society complexes: societies characterized by the predominance of consensual and coercive forms of class

rule, respectively. The international order can be characterized as hegemonic when a specific national configuration of class forces is able to project its predominant influence externally, thus supporting a leading role for its state; or it can be characterized as nonhegemonic (Cox speaks of "rival imperialisms") when such leading class coalitions remain "domestic" because they are too weak to project their influence outwardly.

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*See also* Civil Society; Class, Social; Constructivism; Interdependence; International Regimes; Marxism; Power; World Systems Theory

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## HERMENEUTICS

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As one might expect of a concept and tradition of thought that traverses vast expanses of history and a variety of disciplines, the term *hermeneutics* is inconducive to short summary or univocal definition. In the broadest of terms, hermeneutics refers to the theory and methodology of interpretation, that is, the theory and methods of understanding, or making sense of, an object of investigation. The proper objects of interpretation are taken to be

“texts” or “text analogues” whose meanings are unclear, strange, puzzling, confused, fragmentary, incomplete, or seemingly contradictory. The primary aim of hermeneutical investigation is to provide a reading or interpretation of the text that removes or mitigates its obscurity or puzzling aspects by disclosing its underlying meaning and coherence. Additionally, hermeneutical inquiry involves systematic reflection on questions about the very nature of interpretation: What is interpretation? What makes one interpretation better or more correct than another? What is the proper scope of interpretive inquiry? What are its social and political implications? One’s stance on these and other questions will decisively shape one’s conception of hermeneutics. This entry discusses its history, various meanings, and possible applications in political science.

### History and Meanings

Consistent with the varied contemporary understandings of the term, the etymological roots of the word *hermeneutics* are equally rich and complex. The word first appears in ancient Greek as the verb *hermēneuein* (“to interpret”) and the noun *hermēneia* (“interpretation”). Specifically, its origins point to Hermes, the wing-footed herald of the gods who traveled between the mortal and immortal worlds, delivering messages from the latter to the former. As such, Hermes is associated with activities that are later regarded as central to the hermeneutical enterprise, namely, the activities of interpreting and illuminating alien or opaque systems of meaning (in Greek, a *hermēneus* was an interpreter), of translating meanings from one world or language into another, and of mediating between different people or worlds. At the same time, Hermes’s reputation as the discoverer of writing, music, and poetry points to the strong emphasis that advocates of hermeneutics place on the role of language in human life. Coming to an understanding of some phenomenon, hermeneuticists contend, inevitably requires a grasp of the linguistic practices and symbolic systems through which the meaning of that phenomenon is expressed. Finally, the connection between hermeneutics, interpretation, and language is apparent in the title of Aristotle’s work on the relationship between language and logic, *Peri Hermeneias*,

which was later translated into Latin as *De Interpretatione*.

Although originating in the classical world, the concept of hermeneutics is sharply altered during the modern period. With the advent of the Protestant Reformation and its shift of responsibility for interpreting the Bible from the Church Fathers to individual Christians, hermeneutics, especially in Germany, becomes increasingly identified with efforts to expound the proper principles and methods of Biblical interpretation. This notion is broadened over time to include methods of philological and legal interpretation but nonetheless remains the dominant understanding of hermeneutics into the 19th century, when the philosopher and theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher advances a view of hermeneutics as a universal discipline that encompasses all fields of study in which the interpretation of texts (in the extended sense of the term) is a central concern. According to Schleiermacher, universal hermeneutics aims to articulate the general principles of all understanding that constitute the foundation of the specialized fields of hermeneutical inquiry.

Perhaps the most significant shift of meaning occurs in the late 19th century, when the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey conceives of hermeneutics as providing the methodological and epistemological foundation of the *Geisteswissenschaften* (the social sciences and humanities). Contending that the central task of the *Geisteswissenschaften* is to understand lived experience in all of its abundant richness and diversity, Dilthey differentiates the mechanistic and nomological forms of explanation characteristic of the natural sciences from the types of hermeneutical understanding that in his view constitute the methodological and epistemological foundations of the human sciences. While the former strive to explain the behavior of physical objects through the discovery of causal laws, the proper aim of the latter, Dilthey argues, is to understand the historically constituted mental life and lived experience that is an essential aspect of human reality.

Consequently, the human sciences are both irreducible to and partly independent of the sciences of nature. Not only is their subject matter ontologically distinct from that of the natural sciences, but this ontological difference yields a methodological distinction. One of Dilthey’s central projects was to

develop a view of hermeneutics as providing the proper methods for the study of human existence. This project is taken up and variously reformulated by several leading representatives of hermeneutical thought in the late 19th and 20th centuries, including figures as diverse as Max Weber, Robin George Collingwood, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, Peter Winch, Paul Ricoeur, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Clifford Geertz, and Quentin Skinner.

### Hermeneutics and Political Science

Although Dilthey is the first writer to argue that hermeneutics, or interpretation, provides a firm foundation for the human sciences and constitutes its central task, it is only during the later decades of the 20th century that hermeneutical perspectives become a significant part of the discourse of Anglophone political science. Largely in response to the growing prominence of positivist epistemologies, the champions of hermeneutics simultaneously criticized many of the central claims of positivism and outlined their own post-positivist conceptions of political inquiry. Importantly, hermeneutical critics held that positivist orthodoxies not only sustained a model of scientific explanation that was inappropriate for the social sciences, but they also obfuscated important issues of power and politics that could only be identified through careful attention to the interpretive dimensions of political affairs.

On the one hand, hermeneuticists challenged the central commitments of positivism: that the covering-law model of explanation constitutes the only valid model of scientific explanation; that sense data can be directly perceived and represented in a neutral, noninterpretive observation language; that empirical data can be neatly divorced from theoretical frameworks; that scientific explanations are necessarily value-free; and that the methods of the mature natural sciences provide the proper model for the study of political affairs. Although articulated in various ways, the hermeneutical critique of positivism generally turns on an analysis of a key task of social and political inquiry that has no echo in the physical sciences, namely, the radically reflexive and doubly hermeneutical task of interpreting interpretations. Because human beings are self-interpreting animals whose individual and social

self-interpretations constitute an essential part of social reality, no investigation of social or political phenomena can neglect this task on pain of distorting the phenomena it purports to explain or understand.

At a minimum, hermeneuticists maintain, social and political inquiry must begin by understanding agents' self-understandings and self-interpretations. It is only on the basis of such understanding that one can, first, identify properly what stands in need of explanation and, second, combat the often fatal tendency of social scientists and laypersons to project their own languages of understanding onto the agents, cultures, traditions, and practices they study. More generally, because self-interpretations partly constitute human and social reality yet typically change over time and vary across cultures, the conceptual unity that is a central feature of the covering law model and a necessary condition of precise prediction rarely, if ever, obtains in social science. In short, the inherent mutability and instability of social reality undermines the positivist imperative to develop a nomological and predictive science of society and politics.

On the other hand, hermeneuticists have developed their own accounts of the proper practices of political inquiry. The central premise of hermeneutical approaches is that interpretation takes place within specific backgrounds or contexts that are conceived, for example, as traditions, webs of meaning and belief, constellations of social relations, or practices embedded in what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls a "form of life." In the act of interpretation, both the interpreter and the text (or text-analog) are "situated" within one or more of these contexts or backgrounds. The relationship between them is therefore not one of a disinterested, disembodied observer in search of objective, context-free knowledge. Rather, it involves a dialogical and fallible process of navigating within and between often disparate linguistic, cultural, historical, and political contexts to better understand or make sense of the text or texts under investigation.

Most significantly, interpretation involves movement within what is called the hermeneutic circle. Hermeneuticists contend that an adequate interpretation of the meaning or sense of a text requires an analysis that is circular in a double sense: first, any effort to establish the meaning of a text must proceed by moving back and forth between a reading of particular parts of the text

and the text as a whole, with the latter being read in light of the former and vice versa; and, second, both the individual parts of the text and the text as a whole must be located within a larger context, background, or field of conventions and assumptions from which they derive their meaning and to which they contribute. The process is therefore unavoidably holistic and circular—there is no privileged standpoint outside the circle of meanings from which one might establish the meaning of a single element within the text or of the text as a whole. This, however, does not imply that the standards for assessing interpretations are subjective or arbitrary. Because even individual beliefs and attitudes are only intelligible against a background of publicly available “intersubjective” and “common” meanings, the latter provide a publicly accessible evidential basis for evaluating the adequacy of an interpretation.

Although hermeneutical writers argue that interpretation is an indispensable part of all social inquiry, the deliberate appropriation of hermeneutical methods is more common in some areas of political inquiry than in others. Hermeneutical approaches are most frequently deployed in political theory and legal interpretation and in scholarship that examines the historical development and transformation of ideas, concepts, and institutions. They have also gained considerable currency in areas of comparative politics and international relations where scholars explore issues of nationhood and national attachments, the politics of recognition, and a host of problems involving cultural, ethnic, religious, and class differences and conflicts. Finally, they have acquired prominence among a wide range of scholars—including scholars who use multiple or mixed methods—who investigate the multiple dimensions of empowerment and disempowerment that reside in language, social practice, and the complex legacies of cultural and political traditions. These scholars have found hermeneutics to be a valuable resource for analyzing how language can conceal and distort relations of power yet also open new possibilities for enhanced understanding, resistance, social transformation, and political renewal.

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*See also* Constructivism; Discourse Analysis; Methodology; Positivism; Thick Description

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## HIERARCHICAL/MULTILEVEL MODELS

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*See* Multilevel Analysis

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## HINDUISM

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Hinduism is more a civilization than a religion: not only because it is associated with a full-fledged social system, the caste system, but also because it is closely linked with an ancient culture spread over a clear-cut territory (today's India) and endowed with a language (Sanskrit). As a civilization, Hinduism does not display much cohesion and homogeneity. At first sight, it seems to possess the classic duality between what Robert Redfield calls a “great tradition” and a “little tradition,” which one may call “popular Hinduism,” composed of local practices. According to Shyama Charan Dube, however, this schema is complicated in the Hindu case by the lack of unity in the great tradition itself.

#### A Religion of “Unity in Diversity”

Most Hindus traditionally share a common belief in reincarnation, consider the seven sacred cities

(Ayodhya, Mathura, Haridwar, Benares, Kanchipuram, Ujjain, and Dwarka) as pilgrimage centers, worship god according to similar rituals in their respective temples (*pujas*), and celebrate the same festivals, including the *Kumbh Mela*, for which people gather together in millions every 9 or 12 years. Yet Hinduism does not have an orthodoxy enshrined in one book and guarded by an ecclesiastical body but encompasses several religious streams founded by gurus who pay obeisance to any one of the many gods of the Hindu pantheon (Shiva, Vishnu, or one of his avatars, or the *Shaktas*, who worship the Goddess under one form or another). Thus, the Hinduism of the great tradition appears as a “conglomeration of sects” (Romila Thapar, 1989, p. 207), known as *sampradaya* (from the Sanskrit *samprada*, to transmit); indeed, the essence of the sect lies in “the uninterrupted transmission from one master to another” (Catherine Clémentin-Ojha, 1990, p. 19) of the message of the founding guru, which itself derives from a revelation. (However, a Hindu sect may also take the form of a *panth* [way], where the founder is not considered as having been the recipient of a divine revelation.) Isolated from one another, these sects are also rivals to the extent that they compete for patronage and for the pre-eminence of their particular teachings.

The main, if not the only, current of Hinduism—which became formalized in a way that approximates to an “ecclesiastical structure” (Thapar, 1985, p. 17)—was that of Shankara. This ascetic reformer of the 8th century responded to the spread of Buddhism by establishing monasteries (*math*) in the four corners of India—Sringeri in the south, Dwarka in the west, Badri in the north, and Puri in the east—at the head of which were placed *shankaracharyas*, ordained to exercise a spiritual authority comparable with that of the Buddhist clergy.

### The Making of Hinduism

In spite of the common features listed above, the remarkable diversity of Hinduism prevailed for centuries, to such an extent that until the 16th century there was no single religious tradition known as “Hinduism.” The development of a collective Hindu consciousness was inhibited not only by the extreme social and religious differentiation

within Hinduism but also by a tendency to discount the importance of the Other and therefore to ignore the need for solidarity in the face of that Other. In the process of sociocultural integration, a capacity for assimilation in the caste system is revealed: Insofar as the hierarchy represents a system of gradation based on the notion of ritual purity, everyone can find a place in it, below the *Brahmins*, according to the degree of conformity with the exalted values personified by *Brahmins*. As a result, invaders such as the Huns found themselves classed as *Kshatriyas* (warriors), observing the ritual practices prescribed for these castes and recognizing the authority of the *Brahmins*.

Paradoxically, the ability to integrate newcomers also reflected an inability to recognize the Other as such. Brahminical texts assume that the indigenous social order has a homologous relationship to the cosmic order, the *dharma*; and it is the preservation of this relationship in equilibrium that tends to demand the assimilation of foreign elements into the social system. The same texts describe this society as endowed with a language and territory with unique attributes and thus enable the rites necessary to perpetuate the *dharma* order to be performed. Sanskrit is that language par excellence, and other languages are seen as, at best, degraded forms of it. Parallel to this, North India—*Aryavarta*—is considered to be the land where the rites necessary for the maintenance of *dharma* are fulfilled.

This belief in a privileged connection between India and *dharma* underlies the logic of the social system of the *varnas*, which consists of *Brahmins*, *Kshatriyas*, *Vaishyas* (merchants and artisans), and *Shudras* (the servile castes). In a foundational myth of the Vedas—the basis of the *Brahmanical* great tradition—these *varnas* are described as owing their origin to the sacrificial dismemberment of the cosmic Primeval Man, the *Virat Purushan*, when the *Brahmin* proceeded from this mouth, the *Kshatriya* from his arms, the *Vaishya* from his thighs, and the *Shudra* from his feet. This division of the social structure into four parts reflects the belief in a correspondence between Hindu society and the totality of the cosmic order, a correspondence that hampers the development of a distinct identity. Nothing outside it can have any meaning or be worthy of interest. In the absence of “them,” there cannot be “we” and “us.”



The term *Hindu* was originally derived from the name *Indus* and was used successively by the Achaemenids, the Greeks, and the Muslims to denote the population living beyond that river. However, it was not appropriated by the people who themselves bore this designation, nor did they use it themselves till the medieval period. This development has to be seen in conjunction with the penetration of the subcontinent by Muslim invaders, who were the first to put up a sustained resistance to the capacity of the indigenous culture for assimilation. For example, to be integrated into the *Kshatriya varna*, Muslim leaders would have been obliged to recognize the natural superiority of the *Brahmins*; in fact, they refused to give up the practices required by Islam and indeed were prepared in certain circumstances to clash with the Hindus, such as over cow slaughter. Such antagonism contributed to the emergence of a Hindu consciousness.

The Hindu consciousness apparently found its principal expression in the 17th and 18th centuries in the empire of Shivaji and then in the Maratha confederation. In 1720, *Brahmins* took over the latter kingdom, in which they had formerly served as chief ministers (*Peshvas*—a name they retained when they became the ruling dynasty) and military chiefs. These two political institutions were formed in Maharashtra in opposition to the Mughal Empire and in the name of *dharma*; the slaughter of cows, which the Muslims sometimes offered as a sacrifice, was thus forbidden there. However, according to Christopher Bayly, the conquests of the Marathas in the direction of the Gangetic plain were not examples of religious war based on ethnic or communal consciousness. They resulted from a motivation that was ritual in character—to restore to the Hindus certain holy places, such as Varanasi, which were revered throughout India.

### From Hinduism to Neo-Hinduism

Things changed after the establishment of the British Raj in the mid-19th century. The proselytizing activities of the Christian missionaries and the (selective) reformist zeal of the administration fostered a reaction from the Hindu upper castes, mostly from the *Brahmins*, who were the custodians of the Hindu tradition.

The Brahmo Samaj was founded in 1828 not as a conservative movement but as the instrument of

Hindu revivalism. Admitting that Hinduism had lost its pristine purity—as the European Orientalists were arguing since the 18th century—its leaders claimed that it could regain it through a reform process drawing its inspiration from a Golden Age that was associated with the Vedic period. This invention of tradition was the touchstone of a new Hindu nationalism that acquired its definitive shape in the late 19th century and early 20th century. In 1875, the Arya Samaj claimed that the Hindus descended from the first people of the earth—the Aryans—whose language, Sanskrit, was the mother of all languages. In 1915, this movement was the crucible of the first Hindu nationalist party, the Hindu Mahasabha. A few years later, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar gave an ideological charter to Hindu nationalism in a book called *Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?* (1923).

The Muslim mobilization in defense of the *Khilafat* (caliphate) had a catalytic effect, and from then on, the Muslim minority was the real *bête noire* of the Hindu nationalists because of its Pan-Islamic solidarities and its reluctance to assimilate into the Hindu civilization. The Hindu identity had crystallized primarily in reaction to this so-called threatening Other. Its contours were further hardened by the census operations, which enumerated religious communities from 1871 onward, and by the politicization of religion under the impulse of populist politicians.

The erosion of the traditional inner diversity of Hinduism continued during the 20th century under the influence of these different forces. Among them, the most powerful was—and still is—the Rashtriya Swayamasevak Sangh (The National Volunteers Corps), which was founded in 1925 and has developed several fronts after independence, including a student union, a labor union, and a political party, the Jana Sangh, whose heir, the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party), led the ruling coalition from 1998 to 2004. While Hindu nationalism has stagnated in the early 21st century, its social activities (including free medicine and education) and its proselytizing zeal (aiming to reconvert Christian communities especially) have increased.

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*See also* Buddhism; Christianity; Islam; Religion

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## HISTORICAL MEMORY

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The concept of “historical memory,” often expressed as “collective memory,” “social memory,” or for political scientists, “the politics of memory,” refers to the ways in which groups, collectivities, and nations construct and identify with particular narratives about historical periods or events. Historical memories are foundational to social and political identities and are also often reshaped in relation to the present historical-political moment. In this entry, the origins and uses of this concept in contemporary political science are discussed. This applies particularly to recent transitions from authoritarian rule and the formation of newly democratizing political cultures.

The study of memory has a long tradition in other social science disciplines. Yet until fairly recently, political scientists tended to dismiss historical memory as a conceptual or research arena. There seemed to be three general reasons for this: First, political scientists saw memory as too subjective, as properly the realm of psychology, difficult to measure, quantify, and operationalize in ways

that could be compared and generalized. Second, political scientists tended to hold that “relevant” memory belongs to the discipline of history, of sorting facts, validity, and particularities, and that particularities were simply not what was driving the discipline of political science. It was for the historians to decide what constituted the dividing line between memory and history. Third, political scientists tended to view collective memories as codified in social and political institutions, and therefore it was more useful to study institutions than memories. Institutions enshrine memories.

Despite these biases against the study of memory as a lens on politics, political scientists have come to appreciate that historical memories powerfully influence politics in observable as well as subjective ways; that they are constructions of fact, myth, and interpretation; and that they fall outside the rubric of institutions as usefully understood. Historical memories are the less conventionally institutionalized dimensions of politics—symbols and sites for contestation, associations, palpably expressed through representations, testimonials, imagery, the media, public opinion, and political discourse.

In political contexts that involve transitions from conflict, war, and repression, all of which involve traumatic individual and collective experiences, collective memories prove difficult to ignore politically. Memories often become mobilized to challenge opponents, including the state. States themselves can be aggressive as purveyors of national memory, illustrated by the recent proliferation of officially sponsored truth commissions and “museums of memory” around the globe. Implicitly, the nation-state has always been preoccupied with developing a national memory that exudes unity, continuity, stability, and purpose. This is often expressed through commemoration, educational textbooks, and official political rhetoric. There is a significant and growing set of debates on statecraft, the nation and memory, or the memory-nation.

### History of the Term

The French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs is widely regarded as the founding father of collective memory studies. His work *On Collective Memory*, originally published in 1925, broke new

ground in the sociology of knowledge. Halbwachs emphasized social interaction as foundational to individual memory—as formed in relation to groups and collectivities—and remembering itself as a process subject to the needs of society as a whole. Both classic and more contemporary works in sociology and history argue persuasively that memory is reconstructed over generations to fit particular social and political contexts.

Following this vein in the 1980s, the French historian Pierre Nora made a major contribution to reawakening interest in Europe concerning the relationships between memory and history. Together with a team of well-known researchers, Nora produced a seven-volume study locating and classifying a host of French *lieux de mémoire*, or “sites of memory,” that evoke or symbolize, in an emotive sense, the modern French nation. In the past, according to Nora, history and memory blended together fairly seamlessly. Historic *lieux de mémoire*, including monuments, the national flag, school history textbooks, commemorative dates, national museums, and others, served to project a shared sense of civic values and an allegiance to the French Republic. Nevertheless, Nora claimed that such cohesive projections had given way in postmodernity to particularistic, fragmented, subnational identity sites. Nora claims that a psychologization of memory, an individual psychology of remembering, has increasingly replaced the memory-nation and the social rituals and emotive symbols that accompany a shared, master past.

Memory scholars often charge that Nora’s analysis leans toward sentimentalizing the notion of a national memory or lamenting the loss of shared national narratives, of some kind of master memory. Postcolonial, subaltern studies scholars note with irony such lament or nostalgia. Scholarly work on voices and memories of the subaltern, including memories of the French colonial past and French practices in Algeria, Haiti, and elsewhere, prove powerful correctives to any tendency to romanticize the French nation. In addition, studies of Vichy France, including most prominently that of the French historian Henry Rousso, emphasize the deliberate efforts of the post–World War II political elite to recraft a national memory of French collusion with the Nazi regime as a memory of resistance to Nazism. In his history of

the evolution of memories regarding France and World War II, Rousso termed the French preoccupation with this period the *Vichy syndrome*, a constantly erupting societal neurosis about French failure to prevent or, for the most part, even to challenge the fascist takeover of government.

The British international relations theorist Jenny Edkins emphasizes the violent production and reproduction of the state through commemoration, particularly in the aftermath of wars, genocides, famines, and terrorism, when states attempt to erase memories of atrocities committed and compelled by the state as well as against other states. Yet Edkins also shows that citizens do not accept such erasures lightly. Edkins’s work on World War I, the Vietnam War, the Holocaust, and September 11, 2001, demonstrates how in spite of states’ intentions, families and groups in society frequently challenge states to mourn and to be held accountable for atrocities. Edkins terms societal challenges to state erasures an *encircling* of traumatic memory. Recent historical memory scholarship warns against neat divisions between state and society in battles over memory. Rather, scholars emphasize negotiation, tense collaborations, complementarities, as well as struggles within civil society over memory itself.

### Historical Memory and Transitions From Authoritarian Rule

Historical memory began to make an impact in political science when it came to be recognized as an important dimension in regime transition during the latest “wave” of democratization since the 1970s. The first political science theorist to study historical memory in an intensive way was the Spanish scholar Paloma Aguilar, who documented how political discourse was gradually reinvented to allow for a more consensualist elite interpretation of past conflicts across the political spectrum, thereby facilitating the mid-1970s Spanish transition from authoritarianism to democracy, involving a consensus between the moderates on both sides—the “old” elite and the opposition. More than a quarter century after the Spanish transition from Franco (1939–1975), however, long-repressed memories of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) have resurfaced and produced a range of collective action, debate, and

legislation. This is illustrative of the nonlinear nature of historical memory, where generations-old events and phenomena can be recalled and deployed as if they occurred far more recently.

Scholarly debates on the politics of memory have emerged in several transitioning regions of the world, including Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet republics. In the case of Chile, for example, the American political scientist Brian Loveman and the Chilean social psychologist Elizabeth Lira traced a powerful pattern of conflict and subsequent political elite amnesia, manifested chiefly as postconflict congressional declarations of amnesty, from the 19th century to the very recent past. Drawing a good deal from Holocaust studies, the Argentinian sociologist Elizabeth Jelin conceptualized and led a major collective memory social science research initiative. The project produced 12 volumes on what Jelin framed as “state repression and the labors of memory” in the aftermath of dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil, as well as in Peru at the close of the Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) regime. The purpose of the project was both to define a memory studies field in Latin America’s Southern Cone, Brazil, and Peru and, implicitly, to contribute to rebuilding the social sciences in the wake of their devastation by dictatorship. Like most scholarship on historical memory, the agenda was thus ethical and practical as well as intellectual and interdisciplinary.

Historical memory studies emphasize the fitful process of what is (or as Nietzsche once said, what must be) forgotten to forge a viable politics of the present. Framed in an instrumentalist way, historical memory is at the service of political actors and institutional processes. Embedded in many of the historical memory studies, however, is a serious critique of officialist approaches and policies of “forget” to move on. Common to historical memory works are at least three arguments: first, that different generations are entirely capable of interpreting the same political events differently; second, that political ideology or partisanship continues to weigh heavily on interpretations of past political events; and third, that in the aftermath of traumatic conflict, a significant number of both citizens and political elites profoundly desire consensual collective memory images, crafted by the political class, that convey national unity and

peace. Such consensual images can have the ability to overcome ideologically driven memory divides, at least for a while. The studies remind us that though national political trauma may have occurred decades ago, memories of such trauma continue to influence politics at several levels.

At the same time, memories can be powerfully enduring in spite of social change or dominant political discursive attenuation. Official memories can be perceived as being imposed far more than embraced. And on the ground, in countries such as Chile, state actors and institutions are in constant reactive mode to grassroots memory mobilizing. Social historians document how individual and collective memories part dramatically and are not obviously reconcilable and that distinct communities temporalize traumatic memories quite distinctly.

While calls to remember atrocious pasts have been consistently embraced by grassroots sectors, there is also considerable a desire to forget. This desire is not limited to the political elite, for whom resurrecting painful pasts can prove contentious and costly. The wish to forget can also be heard from communities affected most directly by armed conflict, including formerly displaced families that have lost loved ones and are uncertain whether they can return either physically to their former communities or mentally and spiritually to their memories of violence and loss.

In their studies of communities in Ayacucho, Peru, the region in which confrontations between the Peruvian military and the Shining Path most frequently occurred (1980–2000), the scholars Ponciano del Pino and Kimberly Theidon reveal a pattern of narration in indigenous accountings of the recent past that they have termed *toxic memory*. Toxic memory emerges from experiences of intense, direct violence within a community for which there is no recourse, no sense of the possibility of social justice, or remorse from the perpetrators. Public memory debates in such settings are explicitly constrained by the knowledge of what violence particular agents are capable of exacting and by power dynamics that make no guarantees that such violence will be prevented in the future.

Today, the term *politics of memory* is most often associated with studies that assess human rights politics and policies—prosecutions, truth telling, commemoration, reparations—as well as

with what is commonly referred to as the “transitional justice” literature. Transitional justice studies analyze how particular political institutions, policies, and actors hold human rights violators of previous regimes accountable for their crimes. Such studies focus on the judiciary, the military, and civil society organizations, as well as the executive and legislature. Government-sponsored truth-telling processes, for example, are largely symbolic exercises to produce official and societal acknowledgment of past atrocities and to drive home the message of never again. Such processes are fraught with debate over political intent: What truths should be privileged and what downplayed? Where should remembering begin? Should testimonies be private or public? Can witnesses be subpoenaed? How will the findings be deployed? Truth-telling designs have significant political implications, some anticipated, but some, such as the irruptions of memories themselves, unanticipated.

The anthropologist Richard Wilson argues that government-sponsored truth commissions attempt to craft narratives of the past that render the present more governable and that “manufacture bureaucratic legitimacy” for the state. At first glance, such would appear to be the case for the truth commissions of Chile (1991) and Peru (2003), both of which include the term *reconciliation* in their official titles, suggesting an intention to build consensus and foster national unity. The United Nations–sponsored Guatemalan truth commission, in contrast, defines itself as a body for “historical clarification,” explicit in its intent to examine long histories of violence and injustice that make even the concept of reconciliation more distant. The proliferation of truth commissions, memory debates, and the like can be interpreted as a sign of leaders striving for a new kind of credibility. In contrast to an earlier period in which political leaders attempted to move on, to “turn the page” on painful memories, politicians are increasingly resorting to political manipulations of memory, championing explorations of the past, and instrumentalizing memory to serve their agendas or to enhance their status.

The transitional justice literature brings international institutions and actors deliberately to the fore, marrying international influences with local power dynamics. Yet a politics of memory literature is a more apt conceptual frame than transitional

justice for such policies, given that much of the movement to hold human rights violators accountable, and to bring an important measure of justice, is taking place in posttransitional rather than transitional contexts. In addition, a politics of memory frame allows us both to reach back in historical terms and at the same time, therefore, to reach beyond the focus on human rights violations of repressive regimes, to violence and/or dramatic phenomena that mark distinct temporalities for distinct collectivities. It is clear in the Chilean case, for example, that the indigenous Mapuche communities possess deep historical understandings of what constitutes trauma, as well as what constitutes continuity in Chile. In contrast, the Chilean right consistently evokes memories of the 1960s land reform and takeovers during a democratic regime as a haunting traumatic memory. Politics of memory studies heighten our analytical sensitivity to distinct temporalities as well as more broadly to the role of timing in political processes.

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See also Accountability; Conflict Resolution; Democratization; Genocide; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Political Culture; Transition

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## HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

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History and sociology have been, since the 19th century, two completely separate fields based on different views of society. History was supposed to deal only with the main political or military events, with important people shaping the world, its battles, its diplomatic quarrels, while sociology was supposed to be concerned with the evolution of the society as a collective body changing through various stages. Sociology was frequently ahistorical, neglecting individuals and their values, outlining, on the contrary, the structures and the functions of crucial institutions, their role within the process of modernization leading all societies toward some kind of progress. History and sociology were competing, excluding each other from the realm of social science. History was the noble science, often building a kind of philosophical approach accepted by everyone on the meaning and the destiny of random events. Increasingly, though, these two fields have intersected, resulting in the discipline of historical sociology, which studies sociology within a historical framework. This entry describes the historical foundations and the contemporary historical sociology, including its subfields, is discussed.

### Historical Foundations

From Auguste Comte to Émile Durkheim, sociology was mainly based on positivism and an objective knowledge of society excluding ideologies, values, and even cultures from the variables explaining social phenomena. Even though Durkheim, the father of contemporary sociology, once said that sociologists need historians trained as sociologists, he nevertheless saw history as a

chronology of dates and singular events unrelated to any more general social laws. For example, in a comparative study of suicide, Durkheim acknowledged the role played by religion; however, his explanation of the rate of suicide did not consider the role of history or of political crises.

The Marxist tradition was also built outside any real historical explanation. Historical materialism, a theory explaining changes based on contradictions occurring between class interests structured by capitalism, did not in fact focus on the impact of specific historical events but instead simply described these contradictions as created by the nature of ownership. History was therefore seen as an objective result of social contradictions. Karl Marx, like Durkheim, was also a positivist and advocated a form of functionalism. He did not deal with religion, regarding it as a means of alienating the working class; he did not compare religions and their influence on the emergence of a specific kind of capitalism or political system. His work, like Durkheim's analysis, did not contain any serious comparative research that would have shown how, in the long run, cultures, religions, and values shape almost all social phenomena, such as the state and the public realm, the occurrence of conflicts or revolutions, the process of secularization, the nature of education, and even different kinds of capitalism. Although Marx was aware of this need for a historical and comparative dimension, and although he looked seriously at the values of various individuals in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* (1852) and short articles written for various newspapers, he ignored history and culture in his main works, such as *Das Kapital* (1867). Thus, the Marxist movement's neglect of crucial variables such as states and religions resulted in a reluctance to look seriously at other elements of culture, such as loyalty to a nation, which is shared by most citizens; deeply rooted traditions and the molding of cultures; and the values and behavior of all individuals, regardless of their position in the economic structure. This weakness had important consequences for contemporary sociology, which was largely shaped by Marxism or by a Durkheimian positivist view looking at correlations between purely morphological variables.

Therefore, to find traces of historical sociology in previous centuries, one must look at Alexis de

Tocqueville's work. During the first part of the 19th century, far from his own society, Tocqueville discovered the culture, history, and religion of the United States. He also traveled to Algeria and Ireland. He was keen to learn as much as he could about India's caste system and values. At the core of his work is a historical comparative sociology dealing with different kinds of states, religions, and cultures and numerous interpretations of individualism and even of liberty and equality within societies based on almost the same kind of capitalism. In his main book *Democracy in America* (1835), Tocqueville implicitly compared France with the United States and showed that everything was quite different within the same socioeconomic system; comparative histories (presence or complete absence of feudalism and therefore of nobility) and cultures (Catholicism vs. Protestantism) therefore matter deeply. Tocqueville also raised the kind of issues that are much discussed today: Is it possible to import some institutions, such as democracy, into another culture molded by a different religion? At what cost? With what kind of collective movement leading, in reaction, toward nationalist anger? He foresaw this crucial contemporary discussion related to the importation and exportation, through soft or military means, of various regimes and institutions in societies shaped by contradictory histories and values. Tocqueville was mainly a politician; unfortunately, he never built a systematic model laying the foundation of historical sociology. He remained alone in his comparative historical attempt, and not until almost the end of the 19th century did the real birth of modern historical sociology appear through Max Weber's work.

In Weber's main books, such as *Economy and Society* (1920) or *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), and in his numerous studies of ancient Judaism, China, Japan, or even the Muslim world (looking seriously at Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam), he was clearly comparing sociologically different societies shaped by various histories, religions, and cultures. Deeply concerned by the values of each actor, by their degree of rationality or irrationality, and looking at the interactions among all of them, the way they met and organized their world together, Weber can be seen as the founder of historical sociology. Among sociologists, he was the first to deal extensively with

questions of power, state, and authority in different historical frameworks, from sultanism to feudalism, patrimonialism, and modern rational bureaucracy in the context of capitalism. Far from any positivist methodology and avoiding an evolutionist interpretation common among most authors studying the process of modernization, Weber permanently underlined the intentions of every individual and tried to understand his or her decision and his or her reasons for acting in a particular way. Weber's interpretative approach to historical sociology finally provided a valuable comparative methodology. For example, Weber was the first to call attention to charismatic authority—the fact that some individuals possess personal and almost magical qualities that allow them to lead people, crowds, political parties, or even a nation. Neither Marxist economic analysis nor Durkheim's positivist methodology was able to interpret this personal quality (charisma) of some leaders in ancient as well as modern societies and in authoritarian states as well as in democratic ones. Even though he argued that a process of rationalization or bureaucratization was increasingly shaping all modern societies, he kept a non-evolutionist view by outlining the unpredicted individual power of some individuals within different cultures.

### Contemporary Historical Sociology

Weber's interpretative sociology has many heirs and, today, one can argue that he remains at the core of contemporary historical sociology, which became, in the 1960s, a legitimate subfield. His influence on most issues is obvious. Four different fields within this subdiscipline are considered below.

#### State

Alone among the founding fathers of sociology, Weber gave us a convincing theory of the state as an institutionalized and differentiated institution serving the general interest, recruiting its own ruling elite through meritocratic competition, and concentrating in itself all means of violence previously controlled by specific social groups or by forces located at the periphery. Today, to bring back the state as a crucial variable, one can look either at Tocqueville or, even better, at Weber's

analysis. The contemporary rediscovery of the state began, in fact, mainly thanks to a kind of revision of an evolutionist Marxism.

Immanuel Wallerstein and Perry Anderson then, while remaining Marxists, nevertheless were the first to introduce a strong comparative perspective into their work during the 1970s. Wallerstein, an American sociologist, in the three-volume *The Modern World System* (1974, 1980, 1989), described, on the one hand, the birth of the state located in the core of Europe, on its Atlantic facade, where the bourgeoisie needed a state to protect its economic interests and its wide-ranging foreign economic relations, and, on the other hand, Eastern Europe, unaware of either capitalism or the birth of the state. In his *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974), Perry Anderson, the director of *The New Left Review*, contrasted Western and Eastern Europe. He showed that the state was born before capitalism, in those Western regions where an intense feudalism, in the context of Roman law, led to an extreme pluralism favorable to the earlier differentiation of a state that made it easier to protect the dominant economic interests. In the East, on the other hand, a mighty nobility kept its power, using it against the peasantry's revolts. These analyses, while keeping to an instrumentalist view of the state, clearly belong to comparative historical sociology; nevertheless, they remained quite schematic in their use of history, and they completely ignored the cultural element.

Stein Rokkan, a Norwegian sociologist, drew many conceptual maps of Europe based on two different axes: the first one, East/West, dealing both with the economy and, in a new approach, with territorial aspects and the second, North/South, based on a broad opposition between Protestantism, Catholicism, and regions of Counter-Reformation. It was immediately clear that the neo-Marxist conception of the state had been supplemented by a more rigorous, comparative, Weberian interpretation. Rokkan's innovative work brought us to the core of historical sociology because he was able to compare different paths of state building in the context of meaningful territorial variations, thus raising a definitive argument against any kind of evolutionism. Rokkan was clearly following Weber's comparative lesson when he described the absence of state building in the core of Europe, from Hamburg to Barcelona through Geneva,

Bern, and Milan, where the market was predominant and each strong city was unable to conquer its surrounding territory. This comparative approach was also evident when he showed how Protestantism, in the North, allowed the early building of the nation through a common consensus while Catholicism led to an internal split of the nation in the South. However, Rokkan remained focused only on a sociological approach; his interest in history was still too limited.

Rokkan did not base his work on a deep knowledge of English, French, German, or Russian history. If he had, he likely would have shown, for instance, the incredible strength of the French state as a reaction against the formidable power of the Catholic Church; he would have acknowledged the weakness of the state in the strong and consensual English society; and he would have described more precisely, following Weber, different types of states. This task had been initiated by Charles Tilly in his comparative work on the European state-building process. Tilly, both a historian and a sociologist, showed the crucial influence of wars on the growth of the state's bureaucracy. This perspective has also been taken by Samuel Finer, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Joseph R. Strayer, Theda Skocpol, and other specialists on the state. Thus, according to Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, one can use the broad opposition between strong and weak states as useful ideal types based on a comparative history of state-building processes explaining not only different kinds of strikes, collective actions, and new social movements but also various importation and exportation of types of states in another cultural context. At last, sociologists are themselves becoming historians, working like them on archives and primary resources while raising specific sociological questions.

### *Citizenship*

The Weberian sociohistorical approach has also been applied to the question of citizenship. In a lecture in London given just after World War II, Thomas Humphrey Marshall, an English economist, presented a famous evolutionist interpretation of citizenship based on three dimensions of citizenship (civil, political, and social) corresponding more or less to three different centuries (the 18th, 19th, and 20th) and illustrating mainly the



British case. However, this model was criticized for not applying, for instance, to the German or French cases and for being even less applicable to Eastern European societies. In some societies, such as Germany, citizenship emerged first in the social dimension, while the civil and political dimensions emerged only recently, with the creation of the Federal Republic after World War II.

Other contemporary societies still ignore most dimensions of citizenship. Marshall's notion of citizenship also implied a strong consensual and democratic nation with a near absence of strong political and religious cleavages, a weak state, and an efficient representative political system bringing a deep feeling of loyalty, with citizens sharing a common interest.

In France, on the contrary, serious internal cleavages led to deep ideological conflicts: among them, the permanent antagonism between the state and the Catholic Church, which led to a divided loyalty. Citizens were supposed to be loyal to the state, while confining their religious identity to the private sphere. Until the middle of the 20th century, some Catholics did not really feel at home in the strong republican universalist state. Moreover, a strong radical right arose, wishing to destroy the strong state that it viewed as an artificial source of French identity, while the real French identity was Catholic. The Jacobin culture battled against religious beliefs that challenged the nation's common culture and that prompted the birth of a unique public space open to meritocratic procedure. In a context such as this, any private identity of the citizen is supposed to be hidden from the public realm. In such a historical context, one cannot hold two identities, such as French and Catholic, so far as public allegiance is concerned. Any multiculturalist identity is largely ignored and fought within such a strong republican state. For instance, in Turkey and in France, this militant notion of citizenship may explain the willingness to ban the veil from the public sphere. Thus, a comparative approach to the concept of national identity based on different historical paths to emancipation can explain why citizens are expected to show their religious, cultural, and/or gender identities in one case, whereas in another, they are barred from doing so. The French principle of *laïcité* is thus shaped by a long history through which politics was built by separating it from private life: In the

public sphere, the French citizen is not permitted to show up his or her religious, cultural, or familial allegiances; his or her commitment to French citizenship is prior to any other sources of identity and may even exclude them from public life. This is the main basis of the culture of the Jacobin state. The multiculturalist approach of North American authors such as Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, and Will Kymlicka cannot be easily imported into France, Turkey, or Tunisia or into societies molded by a thick conception of culture such as Japan, a country eager to keep a homogeneous culture and reluctant to open itself to diversity. In the same perspective, one can also make a comparative study of Jewish emancipation. For example, Jews in France are openly asked to assimilate completely when entering the public sphere, thereby quickly submitting their collective identity to their citizenship; whereas in the United Kingdom, the United States, or in various empires such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire where collective identity is seen as legitimate, they are able to keep it.

### *Elite*

The comparative study of the recruitment of elites to positions of power is also more and more bound to a historical sociology approach. To understand why the circulation of elites is shaped by a specific network, one must take a comparative approach in studying both the state and the ruling class. The stronger the institutionalization of the state, the stronger its differentiation; the weaker the penetration of business or private interests within the state structure and the state elites, the weaker the penetration of the political parties, of the churches, of any recruitment of the elites based on some kind of affirmative action. In such a secularized public realm, civil servants, like a strong civil army, are protected by their role and status within the state from any political, religious, or economic pressures coming from outside. The reverse is also true: The weaker the state, the stronger are those kinds of penetration within the elite. Thus, the horizontal circulation of elites is shaped by the actual presence of different kinds of states resulting from a long history.

To summarize this point, the stronger the state, the weaker and less homogeneous is the upper

(ruling) class. In addition, the stronger the state, the more open the vertical circulation. For example, where there is a state-owned educational system that is not subject to clientelist or other social intervention, there is greater meritocratic recruitment across all social strata. One can thus not only outline the remarkable differences in the elite recruitment circulation within almost the same capitalist societies but also study the recruitment, for instance, of political elites in African societies where even now, the state is often shaped by different long-term histories framed by thick cultures that have not experienced the process of differentiation.

### *Nationalism*

Nationalism has also been studied through a new kind of historical sociology approach. According to some main theorists, nationalism is a normal and functional phenomenon within strong industrialized societies in which collective identity has been threatened by individualism and a process of atomization. Nationalism—as defined by the British sociologist Ernest Gellner and as viewed by most authors whose ideas have been framed by a developmentalist interpretation—is supposed to be a normal process of socialization controlled by the state in order to bring citizens together in a sort of nationalization of the mind owing to mass communication and the educational system. Gellner's interpretations (and also the important contributions of Karl Deutsch and Elie Kedourie on nation building) are largely evolutionist, ignoring nationalism as a historical phenomenon implying the use of violence, the impact of ideologies, the cultural reaction against Enlightenment, or a contemporary colonial domination. Following the work of the English philosopher Isaiah Berlin, nationalism can, in fact, be described as a “bent twig” reaction based on a neglected cultural identity. Thus, to understand its appearance, one again needs a historical comparative approach explaining why German or Russian nationalism in the 19th century was mainly a cultural reaction against the French state imposing its domination in the name of Reason; why during the 20th century, the struggle for decolonization was also a kind of collective nationalist protest; and why, for instance, Algerian nationalism took such a bloody form in reaction to

the violent form of colonization imposed by the strong French state while countries colonized by England or the Netherlands were more frequently able to liberate themselves without a violent reaction to violent repression. This approach can tell us the following: (a) why this type of nationalism may suddenly appear from within a society, as a collective reaction of a repressed culture usually organized by the radical right—a populist uprising against the establishment as a political target, seen as an almost foreign power cut off from native culture; (b) why one cannot find an obvious nationalism in pluralist societies, such as the United States, wherein populist collective actions are quickly exhausted; (c) why civic and ethnic forms of nationalism grow in different historical contexts; (d) why not only “imagined communities” but also realms of memory and rediscovery of the past feed nationalist movements and to what extent nationalism and patriotism are distinct phenomena; (e) why transnationalism can penetrate a society with a weak state that is more open to globalization than a strong nation-state; and (f) why loyalty to a diaspora remains more alive when immigrants are spread within weak state societies in which immigrants are able to keep their identity and are not required to assimilate into a homogeneous whole.

Nevertheless, historical sociology must avoid the pitfalls of relativism and culturalism. By outlining the impact of different cultures or types of states as a crucial factor, this comparative perspective must be careful not to invent a new kind of determinism conditioning each specific history. It must only try to discover regularities, collective behaviors, and processes initiated by various participants but occurring similarly even within different historical contexts.

Tocqueville and Weber used essentially historical secondary works to ask those comparative sociological questions. Today, as “sociology meets history,” to use Tilly's famous phrase, social scientists must become increasingly aware of the necessity to build their work within a long-term historical framework. They themselves must look at various kinds of historical data, through which they can ask sociological questions. If, in turn, historians are to be trained as sociologists, in the spirit of the French *Annales* School, the two fields will meet more and more frequently, with historians

recently starting to study the transformation of contemporary societies.

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*See also* Citizenship; Durkheim, Émile; Elites; Nationalism; State; Weber, Max

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“American science of politics.” Notwithstanding its universal scientific aspirations, its emigration, and export to other countries, especially subsequent to World War II, and the waves of foreign influence that have at times significantly contributed to shaping the field, political science has borne a unique relationship to American political life and to American democratic ideology. Although the history of the discipline could be written from many perspectives, an important dimension of that history is the democratic narrative. The field has always been committed to creating a truly scientific study of politics, but, despite changing images of science, there has been a consistent search for a discipline that would contribute to realizing and enhancing democratic values and institutions. In this respect, as well as with regard to matters of methodology, the genetic imprint of the American form has remained manifest in the extended speciation that now characterizes so many other countries within which the field has taken root and evolved.

There has, however, been a constant ambivalence about the discipline’s practical relationship to politics, and it has often been suggested that the simultaneous commitments to science and democracy have not always been in harmony. Although this tension has in part involved the problem of reconciling scientific and political criteria of judgment, it has also been the consequence of a long-standing assumption that only by remaining aloof from politics and establishing its claim to scientific objectivity could the discipline gain the cognitive authority that would facilitate practical purchase. Such distance was viewed as necessary in part because many, particularly in the late 19th century, who attempted to speak politically from the podium discovered that politics was often a dangerous object of inquiry, particularly when inquiry involved advocacy. Consequently, it is not surprising that some have suggested that the discipline has at times become alienated from the realities of political life, but self-consciousness about its relationship to politics has significantly informed political science’s successive crises of intellectual identity. Despite sometimes contradictory claims about the extent to which claims about politics and government produced by political science have influenced political ideas and behavior, the images produced by the discipline have, in various ways,

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## HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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The idea of politics as a subject of science is as old as Aristotle, but, as Bernard Crick stressed, political science as a distinct academic discipline and branch of social science originated as a uniquely American invention. Although there were, in many respects, functionally equivalent studies of politics in other countries, the history of political science, from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, was primarily a story of the

such as through diverse levels of pedagogy and through their influence on a variety of media, been reflected in the practices of citizens and political actors.

There was, from the point of the formation of the American Republic, a theoretical paradox that has been the central axis in discussions of popular government. This paradox, which was bequeathed to the field of political science, emerged with respect to validating American democracy—and validating America as a democracy. While it was assumed that a republican or democratic regime was predicated on the existence of an intelligible and autonomous people, it was, at the same time, difficult, after the American Revolution, to identify any such entity. This search for a “people,” and for democracy, was, and has been, through the end of the 20th century, confronted, and conducted, in two distinct ways. One approach has been to argue that, despite great social diversity, there is an American people that has been the author and subject of democratic government. The other approach has been to argue that the existence of such a national community is not necessary to achieve the ends of popular sovereignty. One persistent aspect of the democratic vision in America, represented in both of these approaches, has, however, been its accommodational character. The tendency has been to adapt the concept of democracy to changes in the perceived realities of American politics.

This paradox of democracy was first exemplified in the *Federalist Papers*, which were devoted to a defense of the proposed 1787 Constitution. While the authors maintained that the Constitution, manifesting the accrued wisdom of Western political thought regarding a science of politics, created a popular government that was republican, or representative, rather than purely democratic, they had difficulty clarifying and defending their continued allegiance to the basic idea of popular sovereignty. The concept of a people that had been at the core of revolutionary ideology, as well as essential to the arguments of certain of the anti-Federalist criticisms of the new document, seemed to have an anomalous ring when juxtaposed to the images of American politics advanced by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. The Federalists and anti-Federalists shared the worry that there was not an identifiable American people, which

transcended the smaller communities of the various states. From one perspective, the genius of the authors of the *Federalist* was to invent the very idea of a unified people that encompassed more local constituencies and that was to be represented in and by the new national government. To the extent, however, that the oft-mentioned “people” had a concrete meaning for Madison, as voiced in *Federalist No. 10*, it seemed, in the end, to refer either to the sum of self-interested individuals or to diverse and divisive factions that were characterized by their attachment to their own rather than a public good. In place of the traditional republican notion of an organic people, Madison conceived of a virtual people that would arise out of an institutional and social balance of conflicting interests. He argued that the disease of republican, and now American, government was factionalism but that it could be transformed into its own cure through an intricate constitutional design combined with fortuitous demographic and geographical circumstances. Political discourse and commentary, however, kept alive the civic republican image of a people capable of, and the subject of, popular government, which lay beneath the surface of American diversity. The origins of political science were closely involved with vouchsafing that image.

### The Science of the Democratic State

During the 19th century, academic publicists produced their own version of the people, which was represented in the concept of the “state.” While today many tend to look back on this concept as an archaic formalistic and legalistic artifact or as an intellectual reflection of American state building, it was in fact the nucleus of a theory of American democracy. Apart from a reference to the American states, the word *state* had, by the beginning of the 19th century, little currency in the language of American politics. The introduction of the concept of the state was largely through the work of the German émigré Francis Lieber, beginning about the time that his acquaintance, Alex de Tocqueville, visited America. Tocqueville had noted that the new world of American democracy demanded a “new science of politics,” and Lieber can reasonably be designated the founder of American political science. There was already a

nascent program of civic education within the traditional American college and university curriculum of moral philosophy, which was devoted to practical ethics and to educating the American elite in the principles and duties of public life. Lieber focused on expanding this field of study by integrating German, largely Kantian and Hegelian, philosophy and images of world history (*Manual of Political Ethics*, 1839). He applied that philosophy to the circumstances and traditions of the United States and to devising a solution to the perennial democratic paradox. His adaptation of the German philosophy of the state (*Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, 1853) paralleled the work of individuals such as the German theorist Johann K. Bluntschli (*The Theory of the State*, 1895), and, for nearly a century, it provided the intellectual, institutional, and professional foundation of academic political inquiry in the United States.

After a period in South Carolina, Lieber, who was a strong supporter of the Union cause, was appointed, in 1857, as the first professor of political science at Columbia College in New York. His work was perpetuated and refined by second-generation theorists such as Theodore Woolsey at Yale, Herbert B. Adams at Johns Hopkins, and, above all, John W. Burgess, who was Lieber's successor at Columbia. What Lieber, and the later American state theorists, who were educated abroad and imbibed the German paradigm of *Staatswissenschaft* (in German, "political science"), created was the image of a democratic people as well as a history of democratic institutions that sprung from ancient Teutonic origins, passed through English government, and culminated in the American polity. Although Americans had at first been wary of the word *democracy*, it had, by the middle of the 19th century, been largely divested of its radical overtones and become a general term of approbation in the United States as well as in many places abroad. Unlike some of his European counterparts and correspondents, such as Edouard Laboulaye in France, as well as the American historian George Bancroft, who all commented extensively on American political society and contributed significantly to the 19th-century democratic narrative, Lieber, still feared "democratic absolutism" and, like Tocqueville, majoritarian rule. He inveighed against ideas such as women's suffrage and tended to eschew the

word *democracy* in favor of phrases such as *self-government* and *hamarchy* by which he basically meant representative institutions. His vision of the state, however, was essentially that of an associationally and institutionally diverse but organic people and its pedigree that gave theoretical substance to the idea of democracy.

Although the "state talk" of 19th-century political inquiry, as well as that of public intellectuals such as Orestes Brownson and Elisha Mulford, paralleled the discourse of democracy in political life, it remained, like many later constructions of political science, far removed from the language of politics in the United States. The most essential feature of the concept of the state during this long and formative period in the evolution of American political science was that it did *not* refer either to forms of government or to the institutions of government but rather to a community whose voice expressed a will and interest that was expressed through the agency of government but preceded, in both time and authority, both the constitution and the government. This vision often reflected and abetted the conservative ideology of theorists such as Burgess, who wished to propagate and justify limited government as well as to curtail democratic populism while maintaining the ethic of popular sovereignty, and it was in some ways both inspired by, and functioned to legitimate, the cause of the Union before and after the Civil War. But it was also embraced by social scientists on the political left, such as the economist Richard Ely, who perceived the state as authorizing government intervention in social life. The theory of the state provided a scientific identity for the discipline and sublimity for its subject matter, but, above all, it offered a distinct answer to the congenial paradox of American democratic theory, and it was an answer that extended well into the Progressive Era after the turn of the century. The 19th-century American state theorists, despite their attachment to a certain conception of individual natural rights, all rejected contract theory and its implications. They claimed that there was, from the outset, a primordial people who both authorized and placed limitations on government. Burgess (*Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, 1891) validated this picture with a singular and ingenious account of American history. He argued that modern states, and particularly the United

States, were the prime examples of those founded on a national unity and that they represented a self-conscious democracy that was the apex of political history. Nations, as ethical and geographical units, he claimed, tended, at least in the West, to become states—that is, a people with a government—and the highest examples of the latter were those that had achieved the popular or democratic form.

Burgess's interdisciplinary School of Political Science at Columbia (1880) represented an attempt to replicate the form of scientific education that characterized German universities, and his aim was both to educate an American administrative and political elite and to influence government policy. The imprint of this curriculum is still evident in contemporary political science programs, and Columbia produced the first professional journal of political science, *Political Science Quarterly* (1886), which was devoted to the assumption that the "domain of political science" was the study of the state and that among the social sciences concerned with this subject, political science occupied the "dominant position." Similar institutional developments took place under Adams at Hopkins, which published *Studies in History and Political Science* and which was the site of the first professional Political Science Association, and in Europe, there was the beginning of institutions such as *École Libre des Sciences Politiques* in France and the London School of Economics in England. By this point, political scientists were still not always clearly distinguished, either intellectually or professionally, from historians and economists, but it was primarily the theory of the state that bound them together. The third generation of political scientists, which included Bernard Moses at Berkeley, Woodrow Wilson at Hopkins and Princeton, and Westel W. Willoughby at Hopkins, did much to institutionalize further the field of political science in American universities during the last years of the 19th century and early years of the 20th century, but by the last decade of the 19th century, a significant theoretical transformation had begun to take place. Theorists such as Wilson (*The State*, 1889), who established the department of politics at Princeton, continued in many ways to affirm some aspects of the traditional theory of the state, but, in part as a consequence of urging a more active administration, they began to blur the line between state and government. The problem,

in a country of great and increasing complexity and multiplicity, was to specify the locus of the invisible community that putatively constituted the American people, and eventually, no one did more than Willoughby (*An Examination of the Nature of the State*, 1896) to empty the word *state* of its original theoretical meaning and transform it into an analytical or juristic category and synonym for government. This, however, precipitated a crisis in democratic theory.

Although it has often been assumed that there was a fundamental break between the state theory of the 19th century and the conceptions of both political inquiry and politics embraced by early-20th-century political scientists, the continuities in many respects exceeded the innovations. One might very well ask how the largely conservative academic culture that dominated 19th-century universities, such as Columbia, produced progressive, reform-minded scholars, such as the historian and political scientist Charles Beard and, particularly, Charles Merriam, who might well be considered the father of 20th-century political science and who contributed so significantly to transforming the discipline. In addition to retaining commitments both to the idea of scientific inquiry and to its application to practical ends, one thread of continuity was a persistent belief in, and dedication to, the national state as encompassing both government and community. During the early part of the 20th century, Progressive politics as well as political and social thought continued to be predicated on the belief, such as in the case of sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (*Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind*, 1909), that there was at least an incipient national political community or, like Herbert Croly (*The Promise of American Life*, 1910), that such a community could be created and mobilized and in whose name government could legitimately and authoritatively act. It was, however, eventually out of the ruins of both traditional state theory and the Progressive vision that a new account of democratic government in America emerged. The decline of the state as a theory of democracy was paralleled by the beginning and evolution of the theory of democratic pluralism and by the account of science and forms of research that the latter entailed.

During the last years of the 19th century, professional social science associations began to break

away from the umbrella of the American Social Science Association, which had its roots in a variety of reformist causes, such as the abolition of slavery, and to affiliate more directly with academic institutions, under the assumption that this would provide scientific authenticity and authority. The American Political Science Association (APSA), with the leadership of individuals such as Willoughby and its first president, Frank Goodnow, was formed in 1903, when it broke away from its affiliation with the more conservative American Historical Association, and the *American Political Science Review* began publication in 1906. The practical concerns of the previous generation were perpetuated in the creation of this organization, but it represented an emerging progressive ideology as well as a commitment to endow the discipline with yet greater scientific authority by embracing what was viewed as the methods of modern empirical science. For individuals such as Wilson and Goodnow, who were dedicated to more efficient and effective government, the goals were still ultimately practical. There was, however, something of a theoretical hiatus regarding both democracy and the nature of politics as the original concept of the state continued to wane, and, at the same time, departments of political science and government continued to emerge at major universities such as the University of California, Berkeley; University of Illinois; University of Wisconsin; Harvard University; and Stanford University.

### Pluralism and the Liberal Science of Politics

The demise of the theory of the state was in part a reaction, in the context of World War I, to its German, and now allegedly authoritarian, origins, but it was also a consequence of the dimming Progressive hope of awakening or creating a democratic public, which could rise up and take power back from corrupt politicians and a capitalistic economic hegemony. Social scientists, in the wake of immigration and growing cultural and class differences, became overwhelmed with evidence of social and economic diversity and contentiousness. There was an increased sense that there was no homogeneous American public but rather only complex congeries of interests and groups that exceeded even Madison's account. In 1907, Harvard historian Albert Bushnell Hart,

after presenting an exhaustive account of discarded theories of popular government in the United States, noted that even though the idea of the state as the basis of a theory of popular sovereignty seemed to still hold sway, it really did not fit the present circumstances of American politics. Although he expressed faith that America was a democracy, he could no longer, any more than most of his contemporaries, account for it theoretically. To provide such an account was the task of pluralist theory as it evolved during the first third of the 20th century. Individuals such as Lawrence Lowell (*Public Opinion and Popular Government*, 1913), and, later, Walter Lippmann (*The Phantom Public*, 1925) questioned the existence of an actual public or even the reality of a public opinion that commentators such as James Bryce (*The American Commonwealth*, 1890) had emphasized as constituting the heart of democratic society in America.

Despite the publication of William James's *Pluralistic Universe* (1904), the term *pluralism* had not, at this point, in any substantial manner, entered the discourse of American political science. Although Arthur Bentley's pointed critique of the concept of the state and his analysis of interest groups as the essence of politics (*Process of Government*, 1908) would become a central reference for later pluralist theory, it had very little immediate impact, and Bentley never employed the term *pluralism*. It was during Harold Laski's brief sojourn in the United States, subsequent to World War I, that the term was introduced into the conversation of political science, as part of his attack on the idea of state sovereignty and centralized authority and his propagation of the notion that the state was merely one association among many in society. Laski's principal concern, as in the case of Tocqueville, was his own country, but he, as well as other English theorists such as Ernest Barker and A. D. Lindsay, helped instigate a debate about pluralism that focused on whether political reality consisted of anything more than an endless process of group interaction with the government functioning as an arbiter and whether this could add up, empirically and theoretically, to democracy. It was difficult, however, for American political scientists to give up the idea that the state was nothing more than government and that government was not the agent of a general popular will.

Merriam embraced certain democratic values associated with cultural diversity and political pluralism, but he was equally impressed with the divisiveness inherent in such difference and with the antidemocratic sentiments and practices of certain groups. He retained the assumption that democracy ultimately required unity, even if, in his view and that of his student Harold Lasswell, it was necessary to introduce it from the top down through social control, civic education, and even the judicious use of propaganda. They transferred their hopes for a democratic society to the actions of governmental elites informed by social-scientific knowledge, but no articulate image of American democracy and the American political system appeared, for example, in Merriam's principal work of this period (e.g., *New Aspects of Politics*, 1925), even though he sponsored much of the research and modes of inquiry that seemed appropriate for a changing image of politics.

The strongest riposte to the normative theory of pluralism associated with Laski and other writers of the period, as well as to empirical political scientists and sociologists whose work increasingly lent support to the notion that politics was irreducibly pluralistic, was the work of William Yandell Elliott (*The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics*, 1928). He spoke for many of his generation when he argued that to give up the concept of the state as an organic public was, in effect, to give up democracy as well as the autonomy of political theory and political science. Elliott did not reject the reality of pluralism, but he believed that it tended to undermine the communal basis of democracy. He argued that in an age dominated by empiricism and pragmatism, as well as by the threat of foreign doctrines such as fascism and communism, it was still possible to perceive, and suggested that it was at least necessary to believe in, what he called a "co-organic" community in American political life, which was the basis of constitutional government. A somewhat similar, but ideologically different, position had been advanced by Mary Parker Follett (*The New State*, 1918). It was difficult, even for someone such as John Dewey (*The Public and Its Problems*, 1927), who along with Laski was perceived by Elliott as a purveyor of relativism and its destructive implications for democracy, to sever the idea of popular government from the existence of a national

community that transcended the complexity of modern "great society."

By the end of the 1920s, however, the concept of pluralism had become Americanized and formed the basis of an empirical account of American politics, a normative image of democratic practice, and closely connected to what G. E. G. Catlin, a transplanted British scholar who championed both pluralism and the work of Merriam, referred to as *The Science and Method of Politics* (1927). For the first time since Madison, a description of social diversity and conflict and of group pressures on government was transformed into a theory of popular government that would provide much of the content of a new and widely embraced image of democratic identity. The group theory of political reality became deeply entrenched in political science as it evolved into an argument about how the process of interest-group politics constituted a form of both democratic interaction and representation. This had been implied by the early research of individuals such as Pendleton Herring (*Group Representation Before Congress*, 1927), but, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, a number of individuals such as Peter Odegard (*The American Public Mind*, 1930) and John Dickinson ("Democratic Realities and Democratic Dogma," *American Political Science Review*, 1930) elaborated a pluralist theory of democracy that contained all the essential theoretical elements that would be rearticulated and reconstructed a generation later in the work of individuals such as David Truman and Robert Dahl.

At the core of this theory was the claim that all societies consisted of groups seeking their self-interest and that this, at any stage of social evolution, required mechanisms for compromise and adjustment. In the context of modern society, such adjustment was achieved through the medium of government that functioned as an umpire acting pragmatically in response to the needs of the situation and with respect to matters of intervention and control. It was through participation in groups that individuals realized their goals and achieved identity, and it was through groups gaining access to influence, more than through formal institutions, that democratic representation was most essentially effected. Stability in society was achieved through a balance of conflicting social pressures constrained by appropriate enabling institutions



and a basic consensus on the rules of the game. Majoritarian democracy was viewed as a myth that belied the fact that majorities were little more than aggregations of individual preference that were democratic only in the sense that they had the capacity, through elections, to effect a circulation of elites.

From the 1920s to the 1940s, political science continued to be institutionalized and expand as a part of higher education in the United States, and during this period, the membership of the APSA tripled. The work of Merriam and Lasswell, at the University of Chicago, represented the most important development, but early forms of political science were emerging in England, France, and Germany. During the later part of the 1930s, there was little in the way of a further explicit statement or elaboration of pluralist theory, but it became, in both politics and the academy, the basis of an account of the United States as a democratic society, and it was advanced as distinguishing the American polity from the growing number of totalitarian regimes that seemed to be characterized by excessive unity. The name for this new democratic identity was liberalism, and the manner in which pluralism was transfigured as liberalism is a crucial chapter in the story of the evolution of democratic theory in American political science.

Although common in Europe, the term *liberalism* had seldom been systematically invoked in either American politics or political science before the 1930s. While politicians such as Woodrow Wilson, and later Franklin Roosevelt, began tentatively to court this label for a variety of policy initiatives, everyone eventually seemed anxious to adopt this synonym for democracy. A variety of individuals, including Herbert Hoover, claimed to be the “true” liberal, but Roosevelt won the title, and his opponents eventually accepted the name he had originally pejoratively bestowed on them—Conservatives. The term *liberalism* gravitated into the language of political science, often via those such as Dewey who were sympathetic to the New Deal, but eventually political theorists, such as George Sabine in his paradigmatic *A History of Political Theory* (1937) emptied the concept of its concrete political meaning and began writing the history of Western political thought and institutions as a story of the progress of liberalism that, despite the temporary aberrations of totalitarianism, found

full expression in American society. Although in the work of Dewey, as well as a number of political scientists, there continued to be a certain correspondence between the academic and lay visions of liberalism, two quite distinct traditions of discourse began to evolve as liberalism, in the language of political science, was reified, provided with a philosophy and history, and reimposed as a description of American politics. To the extent that liberalism had a definite conceptual meaning in the literature of political science and political theory, other than a name for American government and society, it tended to stand for pluralism and attendant values such as individualism, social freedom and difference, bargaining, and compromise. Philosophers, such as T. V. Smith at Chicago (*The Promise of America*, 1936) took the position that what characterized democracy was less any absolute doctrine and regime than a commitment to toleration and the propagation of diversity within a procedural framework for settling conflicts.

By the early 1940s, on the eve of World War II, the basic elements of this vision were extracted from the research of mainstream political science, systematized by individuals such as Herring, and presented as the *Politics of Democracy* (1940). Herring saw his task as taking all that was often considered bad about politics—from pressure groups to bosses and soft money—and demonstrating that they were all, if understood scientifically, part of a democratic process. One reason for the rearticulation of pluralism qua liberalism was to provide a response and counterideal to the doctrines of totalitarianism. For Lasswell, political science continued to be part of “The Developing Science of Democracy” (*The Future of Government in the United States*, edited by Leonard D. White, 1942).

### The Behavioral Era and the Reconstitution of Science and Democracy

Just as the discipline was expanding in the United States after World War II, it was proliferating abroad. In 1949, the International Political Science Association (IPSA) was formed in Paris, which brought together national associations from numerous countries in Europe and elsewhere. The emerging national forms of the discipline were in many respects increasingly responsive to and reflective of the social and cultural milieu in which

they were situated, even though the American commitment to empirical and quantitative studies was widely accepted and promulgated along with more traditional historical and institutional forms of research. In the United States, David Easton's *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science* (1953) set the agenda for the next decade by defining political science as the study of the "authoritative allocation of values" and making the case for moving beyond mere factual research as well as traditional historical and institutional forms by advancing empirical theory and adopting the methods of natural science. The behavioral "revolution," for which Easton was often the principal spokesperson, significantly transformed the practice of political science and increased in large measure the substantive and methodological contributions on a variety of subjects, including survey research and voting behavior. It was, however, in many respects, less a revolution than a recommitment to the visions of both the scientific study of politics and liberal democracy that had informed the discipline for nearly half a century, and it was also in part a response to the first significant challenge to those visions.

By the 1950s, the academic image of liberalism had become increasingly dominant as individuals such as Daniel Boorstin (*The Genius of American Politics*, 1953) and Louis Hartz (*The Liberal Tradition in America*, 1955) set out to demonstrate that although there might not be an American public, there was, for better or worse, in addition to the institutions that held the fragments of society together, a historically rooted liberal value consensus and tradition that gave credence to the concept of *e pluribus unum*. This notion of a liberal consensus that transcended and reconciled group differences became an essential element of the revived group theory of politics. The continuing attempt to give meaning to the idea of liberalism, and to equate liberalism with democracy, was, however, catalyzed and galvanized by a persistent but often still somewhat submerged attack on liberalism that had begun to influence what had been, since the 1920s, a thoroughly American political science. By the 1950s, liberalism, because of both doubts about interventionist government and events such as the McCarthy hearings, had become a highly contested concept in American politics. Often, for quite different reasons, it was also losing its positive

valence in academic discourse as a somewhat subterranean critique of liberal democracy, and political science began to infiltrate the discipline and form a counterpoint to the postwar behavioral movement in political science and its rededication to a scientific study of politics based on emulating what was assumed to be the methods of natural science.

This critique, largely conceived and mounted by émigré scholars, was gaining a place in the literature of political theory, and it was manifest in journals such as the *Review of Politics* with its theological antiliberal perspective as well as in the perspective of the president, Robert Hutchins, and those involved in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago who set themselves directly against the Chicago image of social science. What emerged was a new mode of political theory that would eventually lead a number of scholars to make an identity choice they had never previously been confronted with—that is, a choice between political science and political theory. The confrontation between this critique and the reconstituted pluralist account of liberal democracy in political science made up the dialectic of democracy in the postwar generation. At this point, what really separated mainstream political scientists from political theorists was less a commitment to science, as opposed to a commitment to normative theory, than holding two quite different ethical positions on the issue of democracy.

The predominantly German scholars who emigrated to the United States, beginning in the 1930s, were in many respects a philosophically and ideologically diverse group, which included Hans Morgenthau (*Scientific Man and Power Politics*, 1946), Eric Voegelin (*The New Science of Politics*, 1951), Leo Strauss (*Natural Right and History*, 1953), Hannah Arendt (*The Human Condition*, 1958), and members of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School such as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Otto Kirchheimer, and Max Horkheimer. What they had in common, however, was a suspicion of, if not antipathy toward, liberalism, which as a political theory they believed was philosophically flawed and which as a political form, they claimed was inherently pathological and represented political institutions that historically, as in the case of Weimar Germany, were on the threshold of totalitarianism. This form of antimodernism, rooted in the

politics and intellectual context of early-20th-century Germany and in various transcendental philosophies such as that of Heidegger as well as forms of socialist thought, was a strange and difficult body of ideas for Americans to absorb. These theorists, who rejected scientism and who were wedded to images of the decline of Western civilization, represented a profound challenge to a conception of democracy based on commitments to empiricism, relativism, liberalism, and historical progress, which had characterized American political science for half a century. By the end of the 1950s, the work of these foreign scholars and indigenous fellow travelers had largely begun to define the subfield of political theory, which heretofore had been an integral dimension of mainstream American political science and the principal vehicle of its vision of democracy. This challenge, coupled with the continuing concern about presenting a coherent image of democracy as a counterpoint to totalitarianism, prompted the postwar reconstitution of group theory and the pluralist account of democracy.

David Truman's *The Governmental Process* (1951) and Earl Latham's *The Group Basis of Politics* (1952) revived the relevance of Bentley's work, and Robert Dahl's *Preface to Democratic Theory* (1955) established the genre of empirical democratic theory that was devoted to vouchsafing the image of pluralist democracy. The latter work was in one respect less a "preface" than an "epilogue" and codification of ideas that, during the 1930s, had become an essential part of the identity of political science. Dahl returned to Laski's and Barker's term *polyarchy* as a synonym for a form of democracy that Dahl contrasted both with majoritarian or "populist" types and with what he claimed was Madison's excessive emphasis on constitutional checks and balances at the expense of adequate attention to the informal and social dimensions of group interaction where, in effect, minorities ruled. In *Who Governs?* (1961), Dahl explicitly embraced the term *pluralism*, and his theory of pluralist democracy was offered in part as a counter to the claims about elitism and the structure of community power advanced by individuals such as C. Wright Mills (*The Power Elite*, 1956) and various sociologists such as Floyd Hunter. But it was also an attempt, during the Cold War, to systematize and accentuate an image of Western liberal democracy that supported the faith of those

who opposed the political ideas and institutions of the East. Dahl, like those after him such as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (*The Civic Culture*, 1963), argued that we should begin by examining the character of those countries that we know to be democracies and by extracting an empirical basis for a normative theory that, Dahl claimed, was most fully represented in the "American hybrid."

The critique of liberalism and pluralism was, however, perpetuated by a wide range of political theorists in the 1960s, and the "end of ideology," which had been proclaimed by sociologists such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset as the future of the dominance of pluralist liberal democracy, failed to materialize. While the debate that precipitated between political theory and behavioral political science during this period has often been represented as a conflict between "scientific" and "traditional" theory, the underlying issue was the nature of democracy. The émigré-inspired critique was at this point joined by theorists such as Sheldon Wolin (*Politics and Vision*, 1960) as well as by the persistent progressive statist countertradition that had remained alongside pluralist theory in political science and that was now represented in a new form by individuals such as Elmer E. Schattschneider (*The Semisovereign People: A Realist View of Democracy in America*, 1960). Schattschneider argued that interest-group politics had an upper-class bias as well as a corrosive effect on party democracy. Grant McConnell (*Private Power and American Democracy*, 1966) and Theodore Lowi (*The End of Liberalism*, 1969) mounted sustained attacks on what they claimed democratic and institutional pathologies of the theory and practice of "interest-group liberalism." Despite their similarities, the critiques of behavioralism and liberalism that were inspired by the émigré theorists and those that were rooted in the American tradition were sometimes uneasy allies, such as in the Straussian-inspired *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (1961), but a growing intellectual split between political theory and mainstream political science characterized the 1960s and evolved through the 1980s.

#### From Postbehavioralism to the 21st Century

Although in 1961 Dahl had proclaimed that with respect to the behavioral movement it was possible

to write "An Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," both the commitment to pure science and the pluralist theory of democracy continued to be the target of widespread criticism from both political theorists and a number of more mainstream political scientists. This dissatisfaction sprung in part from what seemed to many to be political science's lack of relevance for and attention to political events such as the Vietnam War, the crisis of American cities and problems of civil rights, and Cold War politics. The Caucus for a New Political Science challenged the authority of the APSA, and in 1969, Wolin pitted the "vocation of political theory" against what he claimed was the apolitical "methodism" of behavioral political science. At the same time, the president-elect, Easton, repudiated the tenets of much of what had represented the behavioral movement when he announced a "new revolution in political science," a "post-behavioral revolution" that would recognize the deficiencies of the pluralist theory of democracy and embrace a new "credo of relevance" that would give precedence to research on pressing contemporary political issues rather than to the immediate advancement of scientific theories and methods.

By the early 1970s, concerns about practical issues led the mainstream discipline to seek an identity for the postbehavioral era by a return to what Lasswell had championed as policy science, and a more ecumenical spirit was apparent as the debate about behavioralism wound down and the issue of maintaining professional inclusiveness became more prominent. Although the controversy about behavioralism had created an intellectual breach between mainstream political science and the subfield of political theory, it also had the effect of relocating, or dislocating, the discussion of American political identity and democratic theory. While political science continued, in various ways and degrees, to validate the traditional liberal vision, it tended, after the 1970s, to concede to political theory the role of normative theorizing. The conversation about democracy and liberalism increasingly became the property of the interdisciplinary and relatively autonomous enterprise of political theory and absorbed into an eclectic conversation that was determined more by the reigning academic philosophical authorities than by any direct relevance to the particularities of American politics. Debates about liberalism, often centering on philosophical

arguments such as those of John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Jürgen Habermas, and Richard Rorty, became a large part of the focus of political theory, while both political science as a whole and political theory as a subfield became increasingly pluralized.

By the mid-1980s, it was increasingly difficult to speak in general of political science as a discipline and of the history of the field as a whole. Although the debate about behavioralism had fractured the field, it had also constituted the terms of a common conversation that in some respects defined the discipline. The centrifugal forces of specialization, increased concerns about social and gender diversity within the profession, and other internal tendencies toward pluralization in the field were accentuated by the need to recognize the growing distinctions among national practices of political science. In 1982, the IPSA Study Group on the Comparative Sociology of Political Science was formed, and in 1986, it was supplemented by the International Committee for the Study of the Development of Political Science. These two groups merged in 1988, forming the IPSA Research Committee for the Study of Political Science as Discipline, which was formally recognized as IPSA Research Committee 33 (RC 33) in 1989. Since its formal establishment, RC 33 has been active in all of the IPSA Congresses, and it has also undertaken a number of inter-Congress workshops, conferences, research projects, and publications devoted both to the study of the history and character of political science in various countries as well as to features common to the field as a whole. The research sponsored by this endeavor has made it clear that despite many similar concerns and research programs, political science is no longer consistently the science of politics as it evolved in the United States.

The beginning of the 1990s was a watershed for political science. The public policy orientation inspired by the events of the 1960s began to fade, and many believed the growing popularity of what Anthony Downs had referred to as *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) and what came to be referred to as rational choice analysis promised a new methodological basis for disciplinary identity and a reconstruction of democratic theory. This trend, however, was paralleled, and challenged, by those who had begun to advocate new directions in institutional and historical research (e.g., *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich

Rueschemeyer, & Theda Skocpol, 1985). There were calls for more diverse approaches to the study of politics as the enthusiasm for rational choice declined (e.g., *The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Assessment of the Theory of Rational Choice*, edited by Kristen Monroe, 1991). The collapse of communism and the bipolar world of the Cold War also heightened the sense of plurality as the basic condition of both politics and political science, and it catalyzed a renewed concern with the theory of democracy as a variety of national communities sought to define, and redefine, themselves as democratic societies. In this context, pluralism emerged once again as a dominant theme. Not only had politics become internationally more diverse but concerns about multiculturalism and philosophies such as postmodernism accentuated the value and reality of diversity.

After its intellectual estrangement from mainstream political science, a unifying and driving force in the increasingly dispersed conversation of political theory continued to be a critique of the liberal/pluralist vision of democracy and an attempt to resurrect some version of participatory democracy. By the early 1990s, however, there was a subtle, but in some ways quite fundamental, shift in perspective. Although the idea that democracy must be rooted in unity was still evident in the work of individuals such as Robert Putnam (*Bowling Alone*, 2000), who stressed the importance of social capital and a communal basis of democracy, the concept of pluralism once again appeared in the discourse of political theory as the centerpiece of the democratic imagination. The concept was seldom any longer that of the interest-group liberalism of the 1950s, but theorists such as Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, despite some critical emendations, maintained their faith in social diversity as the ultimate value of democracy. Both John Rawls (*Political Liberalism*, 1993) and Jürgen Habermas (*Facts and Norms*, 1992) manifested an increased acceptance of the social realities of liberal democracy, and the many and various versions of both deliberative and radical democracy embraced the ethic of pluralism.

The manner in which the critique of pluralist liberalism by democratic theorists gave way, during the closing years of the 20th century, to the idea of pluralism as the core of democracy uncannily mirrored the path of conceptual transformation that occurred in the first quarter of the century. And the

new pluralism, like the emergence of the old pluralism, seems in large measure to be a response to the ineluctable realities of the sociology of contemporary society. Dahl took it as a virtue that in a polyarchial society one might say that no one governs or that minorities govern, but the problem always was that if this is the case, then it also means that democracy, as the mediation of public decisions through the general citizenry, is difficult to identify. Plurality, one might argue, is surely a necessary condition of any realistic concept of democracy, but it may not be a sufficient condition. In the last analysis, the philosophical reconciliation of pluralism with democracy has been no easier than it was at the time of Madison.

By the beginning of the 21st century, it was difficult to discern any clear basis of unity in the discipline (*Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, edited by Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Ingram, 2002), and by the end of the first decade, it is still not easy to specify what trends may be most significant. In the United States, concerns about methodological diversity surfaced once again in what came to be known as the *Perestroika* debate, but, unlike the conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the issues appeared to be more professional than political. The discipline's origins were closely tied to a definite practical mission of political reform and political education, and, like the meaning of democracy, the relationship between political science and politics remains unresolved. In addition to noting the continuing tendencies toward specialization within and among subfields, it is necessary to recognize that in taking account of the history and current practices of the field, the story of political science, despite some intimations to the contrary (*A New Handbook of Political Science*, edited by Robert Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 1996), is no longer simply the story of the American science of politics.

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*See also* Behavioralism; Democracy, Theories of; Interest Groups; Liberalism; Paradigms in Political Science; Pluralism; Political Science, International Institutionalization; Political Theory; State

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**HOBBS, THOMAS (1588–1679)**


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Thomas Hobbes is regarded as one of the greatest political thinkers in the Western tradition for his contribution to the development of the concepts of political obligation and state sovereignty. His theory is often associated with absolutism in domestic politics and with realism in international relations. A long line of interpreters, however, have questioned such associations.

Hobbes was born in Malmesbury, England, on April 5, 1588. For much of our knowledge of Hobbes's early life, we have to rely on the notes of his contemporary and friend John Aubrey. Hobbes was of humble origin; his education at Magdalen Hall in Oxford was sponsored by an uncle. For most of his life, Hobbes worked for the earls of Devonshire. In his capacity as tutor, he travelled extensively in Europe and came in contact with the finest minds of the time, including Galileo, Descartes, and Leibniz. Hobbes fled to France during the English Civil War and was tutor of mathematics to the future King Charles II, who was also in exile.

The intellectual context of 17th-century Europe inspired Hobbes to plan a comprehensive system of philosophy that explained everything that could be explained, resorting to one basic principle, namely, “motion.” Hobbes's project was made up of three parts, the first on metaphysics, the second on man's physiology and psychology, and the third on politics. The political crisis in his country induced Hobbes not to follow the order of the original project but to begin his investigation with the study of the rights and duties of citizens. Indeed, the political climate also explains why Hobbes translated Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* in 1628. According to Hobbes, Thucydides' work affords us important insights into the weaknesses of democracies and was relevant at a time when there were growing tensions between Charles I and Parliament.

It is not from history, however, that Hobbes thought that political science should take inspiration for its methodology. In *Brief Lives*, Aubrey relates an anecdote that sheds some light on the method that Hobbes used in his political writings. Apparently, Hobbes was 40 years old when by chance he came across the 47th proposition in the

first book of Euclid's *Elements*. Although at first the proposition appeared counterintuitive to Hobbes, its demonstration convinced him of its truth. This, Aubrey tells us, was the beginning of Hobbes's love affair with geometry.

Hobbes believed that it was possible to apply the formal rigor of geometry to the study of politics and demonstrate logically, proceeding from assumptions to conclusions, the causes of civil war and the conditions for "immortal" domestic peace. Hobbes firmly believed that he had succeeded in his endeavor, and he famously claimed that political science was not older than his book *De Cive*. The concepts and ideas put across in *De Cive* are very close to those expanded in *Leviathan*, which was published in English in 1651, after the execution of Charles I (in 1649). *Leviathan* is regarded as one of the masterpieces of Western political science. In addition to being brilliant in style, *Leviathan* brings to light in an unparalleled way the protection-obedience principle that lies at the foundation of the Western concept of political obligation: Citizens obey the political state in exchange for protection.

Hobbes explains the sources, nature, and limits of political obligation in three steps. In the first step, Hobbes describes some immutable characteristics of human nature. To begin with, he emphasizes that every man regards self-preservation as *summum bonum* and fears violent death at the hands of others "as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature" (*De Cive*, Epistle Dedicatory); he stresses that all men are capable of rationality and that "every man by reasoning seeks out the most appropriate means to achieve his ends" (*De Cive*, chap. 14, sec. 16). Furthermore, he stresses the natural equality of men, in the sense that "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest" (*Leviathan*, chap. 13, sec. 1) and remarks that some men (who we cannot easily identify) are not satisfied with natural equality but want dominion over others and are in perpetual contention for power, honor, and riches.

In the second step, Hobbes imagines a state of nature where there is no authority, no private property, no industry, and no common definition of just and unjust, right and wrong. Under such conditions, everyone's means of survival are very limited and unprotected. Hobbes puts it to his reader that the combined effect of the action of

men living in such conditions is a war of all against all: Driven by a fear of being attacked, all individuals, who are rational and concerned with self-preservation, and who are equally vulnerable and equally dangerous, attack each other in anticipation. Hobbes points out that life in such conditions is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (*Leviathan*, chap. 13, sec. 9). He claims that reason makes man understand the first and fundamental law of nature, namely, that he ought "to seek peace" (*Leviathan*, chap. 14, sec. 4) if he thinks he can obtain it, and that if he cannot obtain it, he may use his right of nature and defend his life by all means.

Finally, having argued that the result of the joint action of natural men and women living in the state of nature is a state of war "of everyone against everyone," Hobbes examines the conditions that would bring about the opposite result, namely, a state of "immortal peace." As the nature of man cannot be changed, Hobbes argues that the only way to avoid the horror of anarchy is for individuals to "lay down their right to all things," to enter a social contract with one another, and to appoint a sovereign with the primary task of protecting their lives and bodily integrity. The sovereign, Hobbes stresses, is not part of the social contract but simply retains the original natural right to all things. Hobbes explains that sovereign power can reside in one man (or woman) or an assembly, but its characteristics are the same: It must be absolute, unconditional, unlimited, irrevocable, and indivisible. Hobbes maintains that it would be irrational to impose restrictions on the sovereign power as it would restrict its ability to protect its citizens. He also claims that if there were to be someone who could restrict the sovereign power, then this person would, in fact, be the sovereign. Hobbes leaves virtually no scope for resistance to the state: A Hobbesian citizen can only disobey to protect his own life. Because of his notion of sovereignty, Hobbes is regarded by many as the champion of the absolute state.

In the 20th century, David Gauthier led the camp of those who suggested that game theory (prisoners' dilemmas, coordination games, supergames, etc.) sheds light on Hobbes's political argument. On the one hand, game theory has been used to support Hobbes's claim that from a set of undemanding assumptions he demonstrated that the

state of nature turns into a state of war; on the other hand, the game-theoretical armory has also been deployed to claim that Hobbes's enterprise ultimately fails in that rational agents cannot escape from the state of war and cannot create the Leviathan in the way suggested by Hobbes.

Critics of game-theoretical applications to *Leviathan* have pointed out that Hobbes stresses that, historically, states are rarely born out of contracts. In this view, the state of nature is not meant to describe a state that precedes the creation of the political state but a state into which people might fall into as a consequence of civil disobedience. In other words, the state of nature describes a state of civil war.

There is textual evidence to support the view that, for Hobbes, fear of punishment alone cannot guarantee long-term order and stability and that citizens need to be educated. In *Behemoth*, Hobbes singles out popular ignorance as the primary cause of the English Civil War. The state of nature is a thought experiment used by Hobbes to teach citizens why we ought to remain in political associations and why bad governments are better than no governments at all.

In Chapter 13 of *Leviathan*, in addition to stating that the state of nature materializes into civil wars, Hobbes also claims that it occurs in some primitive societies and that it describes the relations between states. He famously compares states to "gladiators with their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another" (*Leviathan*, chap. 13, sec. 12) in a constant posture of hostility and war. Such remarks have induced some interpreters to claim that Hobbes is one of the founding fathers of realism. It has been claimed that Hobbes's pessimistic view of human nature, his idea that men are self-interested and seek power after power, his concept of anarchy, and his notion of the sovereign state inspired the realist tradition of international relations.

Whereas there is universal agreement among interpreters of the importance of Hobbes's contribution to the development of the concepts of political obligation and state sovereignty, no such agreement exists as to the association of Hobbes with absolutism and with realism. Points of contention among the interpreters are Hobbes's views on natural law, morality, God, and religion. The dominant view maintains all or most of the following claims: (a) the laws of nature for Hobbes

are prudential rules that recommend the creation of the absolute state; (b) the state is the source of all law, all justice, and all morality; (c) the detailed analysis of the Bible that occupies a large part of *Leviathan* is meant to support the claim that the ecclesiastical powers are totally subordinated to the civil power and that a citizen must obey the Leviathan in everything except if he or she is asked to renounce the belief that Jesus is the Christ.

In contrast to the above views, since the work of A. P. Taylor in 1938 and Howard Warrender in 1957, a long line of interpreters have argued that Hobbes's laws of nature are not just samples of prudential morality, that Hobbes makes the Leviathan accountable to God, that the sovereign power is absolute but not arbitrary, that not all justice in Hobbes's construct is legal justice, that Hobbes is ultimately committed to the individual and not to the state, and that the claim that Hobbes is a precursor of John Austin and legal positivism, or indeed a founding father of realism, is ungrounded.

The most renowned works on Hobbes in the 20th century are those by Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, Howard Warrender, Michael Oakshott, C. B. Macpherson, David Gauthier, Jean Hampton, Quentin Skinner, Sheldon Wolin, and Noel Malcolm.

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*See also* Realism in International Relations; Sovereignty; State

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## HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

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The term *human development* (HD) that came into prominence through the work of Amartya Sen denotes the development toward a more humane society in which a maximum number of people live in dignity. From a humanist position, a dignified life is a life that people have reason to value because they are free to shape it in accordance with their own and mutually agreed ideals. This notion of HD is inspired by an inherently emancipative idea of the “good life” that unifies republican, liberal, contractual, and democratic thought, as noted by David Held (2006). To be human in this perspective means to have the potential to reason, to judge, to choose, and, thus, to be an agent who is in control of one’s actions and life. The most humane life is an emancipative life that one lives in self-determination.

### Human Development as Emancipation

Mastery, control, and autonomy are features of human emancipation emphasized in Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan’s psychological theory of self-determination (2002). In the evolution of our species, self-awareness became the most salient feature of the human intellect. Self-awareness creates a need to realize oneself in what one is doing, and this implies a need to act in self-determined ways. Self-determination is thought to become a dominant striving as soon as humans are existentially secure, so that the trying to thrive can replace the struggle to survive as the main director of human energies. Self-determination is an inherently emancipative striving that, if satisfied, creates feelings of being in unison with oneself. Because self-awareness is an evolution-shaped feature of every human being, self-determination is the most universally and most specifically human striving.

Sen also draws on the emancipative notion of HD in psychology, but he relates it to societies as the unit of reference. When the good life is an emancipated life, the good society is a society that makes a maximum number of people capable to live emancipative lives. Because, as members of the human race, all people are of equal existential value, every person has the same right to an emancipated life; opportunities to live in emancipation must be equally distributed in a humane society. In that sense, HD theory construes the ideals of freedom and equality as interdependent rather than contradictory.

Due to Sen’s capability approach, the HD of societies can be measured by how widely emancipative capabilities are distributed. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) follows the capability approach in its annual Human Development Report, which publishes a Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI summarizes on a per-country basis information on the average person’s life expectancy, educational attainment, and per capita income, assuming that longevity, education, and income increase ordinary people’s capabilities to live an emancipated life.

In the perspective of HD, democracy becomes an integral part of the definition of development for the following reasons: Human emancipation requires freedom of choice in private and public affairs, and such freedoms are granted through the civil and political rights that define democracy.

The emancipative notion of HD has been criticized as prescribing a Western view of the good life. But supporters of the HD approach note that this criticism is defensible only on two questionable premises: The potential to live an emancipated life is not a universal human potential but one that only Western people possess, and emancipation is not a universal human value because non-Western people do not desire it. Neither of these positions is tenable. First, the potential for emancipation is anchored in a most general feature of the human mind, namely, self-awareness, which is not the sole property of Westerners. Second, the claim that emancipation is not a valued feature of life among non-Westerners has been empirically disproven. Whether people value emancipation can be seen in whether feelings of being free in shaping their lives impact satisfaction with their lives. Only if freedom over their lives increases people’s satisfaction

with their lives is emancipation of value for people. As Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have shown, feelings of freedom over their lives increase people’s life satisfaction in all cultures. Thus, HD’s emphasis on emancipation does not prescribe a specifically Western view of the good life. It champions a particularly humane view.

### The People Empowerment Framework


Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann widened the capability approach into a people empowerment framework (PEF). The PEF specifies how economic conditions, cultural norms, and institutional rules interact in empowering people, relating each of these three areas of social reality to human emancipation as a common underlying theme. Figure 1 depicts the PEF.

In line with the emancipative notion of HD, people empowerment denotes ordinary people’s potential to govern their lives themselves through

the practice of personal freedoms in private matters as well as political freedoms in public affairs. The joint and equal emphasis on personal and political freedoms resonates with Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “negative” and “positive” freedom: To be truly free, people must have the right to follow their personal preferences in private matters and to make their political preferences known, bargained, and counted in public matters.

### Elements of People Power

To make freedoms practicable for people, social reality must meet three criteria. First, ordinary people must have command over participatory resources that make them capable to exercise freedoms. Participatory resources include material means, cognitive skills, and connective opportunities; these resources empower people on the level of capabilities, widening their objective-action repertoire. Second, ordinary people must have internalized self-expression values that make them



**Figure 1** Human Development as People Empowerment

Source: Adapted from Welzel, C., Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H.-D. (2003). The theory of human development: A cross-cultural analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43, 379–401.

strive to exercise freedoms. Self-expression values emphasize freedom of choice and equality of opportunities; they empower people on the level of ambitions, widening their subjective-action horizon. Third, ordinary people must be granted *democratic rights* that license them to practice freedoms. Democratic rights establish equal personal and political liberties; they empower people on the level of *entitlements*, widening their legal-action radius.

Participatory resources, self-expression values, and democratic rights constitute three distinct, though interdependent, elements of people power. The pattern of their interdependence is governed by the “utility logic of freedom.” This logic becomes evident when rethinking participatory resources, self-expression values, and democratic rights as, respectively, capabilities of, ambitions for, and entitlements to exercising freedoms. Doing so makes a number of logical connections obvious. For one, utility suggests that people become ambitioned to exercise freedoms only insofar as they find themselves able to exercise them. The utility logic also suggests that entitlements to exercise freedoms come into wide and frequent use only insofar as people are able and willing to use them. Together, these propositions suggest that self-expression values grow in response to grown participatory resources and, then, that popular pressures for democratic rights grow in response to grown self-expression values and participatory resources.

The three elements of human empowerment are interdependent not on conceptual grounds only. Empirically, as shown by Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann (2003, pp. 368–369), the interdependence is reflected in very strong correlations between societal-level measures of participatory resources, self-expression values, and democratic rights. The three elements correlate so strongly that statistically speaking they reflect one and only one empirical dimension. Content-wise, this dimension represents people empowerment—which is a unity of empowering capabilities, mentalities, and entitlements. Because of their interdependence, the three elements of people empowerment establish equilibria that resemble vicious and virtuous cycles of HD. Most societies are found on either consistently low or consistently high levels of HD in all three elements. HD is a syndrome of

developmental conditions that is not easily disentangled. This is part of the reason why it is so difficult to get development started: It needs a synchronized effort to trigger economic, cultural, and institutional changes, as they mutually condition each other.

Democracy represents the institutional element of people empowerment and as such is highly conditioned by the economic and cultural elements of empowerment. No question, democracy can be imposed from the outside by foreign powers, or it can be adopted from the inside by unilateral acts of domestic power holders—irrespective of the social conditions. But in such cases, one most likely deals with a socially aloof version of democracy, in which case the freedoms that define democracy are not coming into wide usage by most of the people. Only when ordinary people are capable of exercising freedoms and only when they are willing to do so will the freedoms granted by democracy come into wide use. Only then do we witness socially embedded democracy.

Sometimes one finds democratic freedoms institutionalized at a level that goes beyond most people’s capabilities and ambitions to struggle for these freedoms. When this is the case, power holders are free to corrupt formally enacted freedoms, and in general, they use this leeway to their benefit. Thus, when democracy is conceded by power holders in the absence of popular pressures, it is usually corrupted democracy. By contrast, when one finds democracy to be effective in the sense that its freedoms are really respected by those in power, this is usually a tribute to ordinary people’s capabilities and ambitions to practice freedoms and struggle for them.

### Strengths of Human Development Theory

Compared with other concepts in the social sciences, HD theory offers a broad perspective by integrating economic, cultural, and institutional aspects of social reality into a common framework. This breadth of perspective does not come at the expense of the analytical focus. Instead, HD theory sharpens the analytical focus by relating all three aspects of social reality to the empowerment of people as the lead theme.

The HD framework is inspired by an emancipative idea of the good society and the good life. This

normative inspiration constitutes the framework's integrative core. However, the normativity of the concept is limited to providing a standard against which to evaluate a factual state of affairs as desirable or undesirable. Having a standard to evaluate reality does by no means mean to prescribe reality. Rather, it provides a basis for interventions to change it.

The only other concept in the social sciences comparable with HD in its integrative potential is social capital (SC). With its emphasis on *assets that facilitate collective action*, SC theory sets a focus similar to HD theory's emphasis on *assets that empower ordinary people*. Thus, the three assets championed in SC theory—networks, trust, and norms—resonate with the three assets highlighted in HD theory—capabilities, ambitions, and entitlements. However, SC theory lacks two properties of HD theory. First, SC theory lacks an evolutionary perspective that theorizes how development transforms different types of SC. Second, SC theory has little grounding in psychology and has hence difficulties to anchor SC in the human motivational system. By contrast, with its evolutionary perspective, grounding in psychology, and humanistic inspiration, HD theory offers an appealing integrative framework for the social sciences.

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*See also* Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Development, Political; Development Administration; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Participation; Social Capital; Values

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## HUMAN RIGHTS, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

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Human rights are inherently comparative. Empirical analysis on and advocacy for human rights are grounded in significant questions relating to human well-being and how such well-being varies across units, whether these units are individuals, groups, countries, or regions. Comparative politics is concerned with explaining variation in social and political phenomena across these very same units. Legal and normative frameworks for human rights have sought to establish rules and norms about how states and individuals ought to treat one another, and the human rights community has sought to make such a set of constraints on human behavior universal through the vehicle and mechanisms of public international law. Through the specification and testing of social theory on observed similarities and differences in the protection of human rights across individuals, groups, countries, and regions, comparative politics helps provide solutions to enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights. But it is crucial in this effort that comparison remains committed to methodological considerations of case selection and bias, measurement error and data availability, universality and particularity, and causal heterogeneity (see, e.g., Todd Landman, 2002). Absence of attention to these key issues can lead to insecure inferences and the possibility of perverse outcomes that can endanger human rights. This entry first examines issues related to methodology and describes some commonly used measures of human rights. It then discusses research on human rights and the contributions of comparative politics to such research. It concludes with a look at some of the challenges for future research in the field.

#### Methodological Considerations

Broadly speaking, comparative analysis variously includes large-*N* statistical analysis of many

countries over time and space, small-*N* qualitative or quantitative analysis of most similar or most different countries, or single-country studies of human rights developments at the national or subnational level. Such comparisons have struggled to overcome significant ontological, epistemological, and methodological challenges in order to provide valid, meaningful, and reliable inferences in this burgeoning subfield of research. But there is now, however, a distinct subfield and strong community of researchers specifically dedicated to the application of the theories and methods in social science to significant human rights problems and puzzles that includes systematic comparative analysis. The American Political Science Association (APSA), the International Political Science Association (IPSA), and the International Studies Association (ISA) have all established specialized human rights sections. The European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) hosted a joint workshop, The Systematic Study of Human Rights Violations, organized by Steve Poe and Sabine Carey in 2002; the *Journal of Peace Research* published a special issue dedicated to political science analysis of protecting human rights, while other mainstream journals in comparative politics and international relations have increasingly published empirical studies on human rights that adopt a comparative framework of some kind.

Comparative studies have tended to sidestep normative concerns over foundations for human rights and have adopted a pragmatic approach that seeks to conduct systematic research on the conditions under which such protections are (or are not) made possible. Such a focus can help us understand how best to prevent human beings from doing their worst to one another, as well as how to overcome some of the structural barriers to achieving greater human dignity for a larger cross section of humankind. Comparative analysis of human rights is thus essential for explaining and understanding the conditions under which human beings forge their existence, assert their dignity, and seek protections for their different identities, for the pursuit of self-determination, and for the exercise of agency and autonomy. Like the study of markets, social classes, and democracy, the study of human rights reveals much about human nature and the ways in which structure and agency

interact to create extraordinarily different life experiences across the globe and provides valuable insights into the types of real protections that need to be in place.

### Measures of Human Rights

Beyond its normative and ontological concerns, comparative analysis of human rights problems is predicated on the genesis and use of comparable measures of human rights either within states or across states. Such measures can be qualitative or quantitative, and both types of measures provide some gauge of the degree to which human rights are being respected, protected, and fulfilled by states (see Todd Landman & Edzia Carvalho, 2009). To date, such measures have included events-based data on violations of human rights, standards-based data on country protection of human rights in principle and in practice, survey-based data on perceptions and experiences of human rights, and socioeconomic and administrative statistics on government inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes that have a bearing on human rights. These measures still tend to be biased toward the protection of civil and political rights, but progress has been made recently on providing comparable measures of some socioeconomic rights (see Landman & Carvalho, 2009).

### Causes, Conditions, and Consequences of Human Rights

In using these various measures, much comparative research has been carried out in an effort to explain and understand cross-national similarities and differences in the protection of human rights. There is now a large body of large-*N* quantitative studies, small-*N* qualitative and quantitative studies, as well as a vast array of single-country studies that examine the causes, conditions, and consequences of human rights protection around the world. Extant global comparative studies on human rights protection have tended to focus on a narrow set of civil and political rights and carried out diachronic and synchronic analyses to estimate the effects of a series of important explanatory variables that account for their variation. Such explanatory variables have included economic development, population and population growth, democracy and

democratization, multinational corporations, internal and external violent conflict, the end of the Cold War, U.S. and European foreign aid, domestic constitutional provisions, and religious differences and ethnic diversity. In addition to consideration of civil and political rights, other global comparative projects have focused on discrimination, minorities, and conflict; U.S. refugee policy; and the provision of basic human needs.

The most recent area of interest has been the examination of the growth and effectiveness of the international human rights regime. Linda Camp Keith (1999) and Oona Hathaway (2002) were the first scholars to analyze the relationship between ratification of human rights treaties and human rights protection, while controlling for a variety of other variables. Their analyses do not find robust support for such a relationship. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui (2007) added a layer of complexity to the relationship by specifying models that included an interaction effect between treaty ratification and democracy, which in turn has an effect on human rights protection. Landman's (2005) analysis included the level and timing of democratization, a feedback process between treaty ratification and human rights protection, as well as a weighted measure of treaty ratification that took into account the filing of reservations across the main international human rights treaties.

### Common Themes of Analysis

Analyses of human rights problems and puzzles that use a relatively small and intentional selection of countries address a number of common themes and adopt a wide range of comparative methods. The dominant themes at this level of analysis include the struggle for rights and the relationship between social mobilization, political liberalization, and repression (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink, 1999); the similarities and differences in the formation, function, outcomes and impact of truth commissions (e.g., Priscilla B. Hayner, 2002); the legacies of authoritarian rule (Luis Roniger & Mario Sznajder, 1999); nonstate violence, "uncivil" movements, and death squads (Leigh Payne, 2000); and the ways in which human rights norms have transcended state sovereignty through the use of transnational advocacy

networks that help form alliances and informational networks between domestic and international human rights organizations that are able to put pressure on rights violating states (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). These various small-*N* studies have adopted a range of comparative-case or focused-comparison strategies, including most similar systems designs (MSSDs), which compare different human rights-related outcomes across similar cases; most different systems designs (MDSDs), which compare similar outcomes across different cases; and the mirror image of MSSDs, which compare similar variation across similar cases and even different outcomes across different cases.

### Comparative Strategies

Single-country studies have long been an important part of comparative politics, and social science more generally, for their use in description and classification, in plausibility probes, in generating and testing hypotheses, and as crucial cases (i.e., the most likely and least likely examples) that can confirm, inform, or disconfirm existing theories. The human rights themes that are addressed in single-country studies vary little from those that have featured in the large-*N* and small-*N* comparative studies, but as in the comparison of a few countries, single-country analysis has allowed for much greater attention to process tracing and dynamic relationships between actors, conditions, and rights. The work of Darren G. Hawkins (2002) provides a good example of how process tracing provides a deeper insight into the causal mechanisms within a single country. In his study of authoritarianism in Chile and the response of the Pinochet regime to international human rights pressure, Hawkins shows that the rule-oriented factions within the regime grew increasingly wary of the possible delegitimizing power of international human rights pressure, gained ground over time, and were largely responsible for the various moves the regime made toward democratization and improvement in human rights protection; these lessons, as Hawkins shows, apply to an analysis of South Africa and Cuba.

Increasingly, the inferential logic of large-*N* studies has begun to be applied to single-country studies using subnational divisions within individual

countries, such as democracy and human rights in the federal systems of Mexico and India and democracy and political violence across the administrative districts of Nepal. In these studies, the use of states in a federal structure as the basic units of analysis allows for a large number of observations (or increased degrees of freedom) for the analysis of variation in human rights protection while, at the same time, controlling for similarities, since these units are all from the same country. In this way, comparative research in federal systems is a form of MSSD and offers tremendous promise for research in the field of human rights.

Taken together, there is a natural synergy between human rights and comparisons, and the field of comparative politics brings much to bear on our understanding of the conditions under which human rights can or cannot be protected in the ways that are outlined in the international law of human rights. Systematic analysis of human rights problems is a burgeoning subfield in comparative politics and in many ways is a natural place in the larger discipline of political science in which to locate such analysis. While the international human rights regime seeks to use the mechanism of international law to govern the ways in which states relate to their citizens, it is within states and it is across states that the promotion and protection of human rights varies. This variation, which makes a reference to an ideal standard outlined within the many international human rights norms and instruments, is best analyzed through the various methods available to comparativists. These methods, which have developed through the analysis of many areas of research outside any concern for human rights, have served and will serve human rights well for the future.

### Challenges

Despite the many virtues of comparative analysis for human rights research, there are many challenges that remain in the field. Comparative politics does not have its own distinct theoretical tradition but engages in rationalist, structuralist, and culturalist theorizing that can be developed more fully in ways that will prove fruitful for human rights research. The attention to rationalism in Neil Mitchell (2004) and Hawkins (2002) is laudable, especially since both afford an equally large role for

ideational approaches. Mitchell's "principals" are motivated by material self-interest, as well as ideology, and it is precisely the differences in these motivations that help explain the differences in levels of atrocity that he observes across his three cases. Moreover, the model that he develops ought to travel to other cases both in the past and in the contemporary period. In a similar fashion, the different factions in Hawkins's analysis of the military regime in Chile are not only motivated by the quest to maintain power but also by a particular attachment to legal rules and standards both within and outside the Chilean constitutional order. This kind of innovative development and testing of theories is needed in future comparative research on human rights.

For example, the field has not yet developed a set of formal models of the kind found in the political economy literature that use the relative costs and benefits of attention to human rights to explain either domestic or international state behavior. At the international level, there are signaling and reputational factors that may explain why states ratify human rights treaties, while at the domestic level, human rights can be theorized as a set of public good for which states have different welfare functions. Moreover, spatial econometrics and simple gravity models can start to examine possible spillover and bandwagon effects, as well as the influence of large and powerful states on other states. In all of these examples, systematic comparative analysis of the variation in state behavior can provide the evidence base to test models that have been developed at a particular level of conceptual abstraction.

Finally, it is clear that more attention is needed on methodological issues. For questions of measurement, more attention is needed on the sources of human rights information, the procedures for coding human rights information, the development of measures of economic and social rights, and the provision of indicators that capture the many different dimensions of human rights (Landman & Carvalho, 2009). These measurement issues are pertinent to all forms of comparative analysis from large-*N* studies to single-country analysis. For studies that compare a few countries or a single country, more attention to the process of case selection is needed to avoid indeterminate research designs and severe forms of selection bias.

MSSDs and MDSDs offer good first solutions for case selection, while greater attention to negative cases and crucial cases is required to make the most of single-country studies of particular human rights problems. Human rights research is a field worthy of study within comparative politics, where the standards for high-quality and systematic rules of inquiry apply equally, while the need for a strong evidence base is paramount for policy-makers and advocates interested in the promotion and protection of human rights across the world.

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See also Comparative Politics; Equality; Equality, Political; Human Development; Human Rights in International Relations; Liberty

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## HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Human rights is the soul of politics. The essence of human rights is the idea that all persons possess equal moral worth, that social order exists to preserve the essential humanity of its members, and that therefore the exercise of all forms of political authority is properly bounded by its impact on fundamental human dignity. In contemporary international society, this norm has become the theoretical basis for the legitimacy of all states—albeit poorly realized in practice. The emergence of the principle and practice of human rights is an essential area of international law, a hallmark of global civil society, and a response to the multilayered challenges of globalization, along with the persistence of state abuse. The politics of human rights also provides a fascinating test of the power of transnational citizen action and international cooperation to sporadically transform state sovereignty. This entry traces the evolution of this emerging norm, charts some systematic patterns of violation, assesses the range of international remedies, and discusses challenges to the concept and its application.

### Historical Development and Emerging Consensus

While most cultures have had some historic standard of humane treatment for their members, the notion of universal and natural rights rises with modernity and increasing interactions across borders. The early arguments put forth by the Spanish theologian Bartolome de las Casas to recognize the essential humanity of the Indians of the Americas culminated several centuries later in the transatlantic movement against the African slave trade, which secured its abolition. During the 19th century, the



increase in costly collisions among the rising European powers led to recognition of the horrors of war as a violation of universal standards, the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the drafting of a series of codes of conduct for the treatment of civilians and prisoners: the Geneva Conventions (four treaties developed between 1864 and 1949). Meanwhile, new types of democratic regimes based on citizenship and social contract inscribed the protection of life and liberty as a requisite of rule within the state, a practice that was later exported. The British Magna Carta laid the foundation in limiting the sovereign's powers of coercion, France's Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen asserted rights that transcend social class and condition, while the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights established a normative hierarchy in which fundamental rights supersede even the democratic popular will.

The contemporary international human rights regime was established in reaction to the horrors of the Holocaust—the first modern-era genocide committed by modern means within Europe, coupled with border-crossing war crimes and international aggression. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed on December 10, 1948, is widely considered to mark the birth of the modern norm of international human rights. Over the following decades, a global architecture was constructed, consisting of an expanding body of international law, global and regional monitoring and sanctioning institutions, an emerging practice of humanitarian intervention, humanitarian and governance foreign assistance, and a growing global network of human rights movements. Jack Donnelly has calculated that more than 140 states now subscribe to the foundational documents that delimit human rights in theory: the Universal Declaration and two International Covenants—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

While human rights began as a legal defense of the lives and physical integrity of political dissidents and religious or ethnic minorities from the malfeasance of dictatorships, its mandate has expanded in claims, subjects, and mechanisms. During the Cold War, the Western bloc sought to globalize civil and political rights via the ICCPR,

while the socialist states emphasized social rights such as education and health care under the ICESCR. Meanwhile, developing nations added to the canon a concern with collective rights of development, identity, and, eventually, attempts to secure accountability of nonstate actors such as multinational corporations for abuses connected with globalization. From decolonization onward, the increasing presence of non-Western states in international society brought diverse calls for expansion of the human rights agenda to socially marginalized as well as politically oppressed groups, attention to government negligence as well as repression, and culturally based critiques of the liberal norms. Since the 1990s, the claims and subjects of human rights have been expanded to previously unrecognized groups such as children and indigenous peoples. Islamic and Confucian cultural critiques of the liberal Western basis of human rights were largely transcended at the global level at the 1993 United Nations' (UN) Vienna Conference on Human Rights, which declared a consensus that human rights are "universal, indivisible, and interdependent" (although such challenges reappear regularly in selected states' defenses against international criticism). By the 21st century, international human rights enforcement mechanisms had been strengthened significantly—but only in the core domain of massive and systematic violations of life and liberty by government action of pariah states.

### Defining Rights and Setting Standards

Like other forms of international law, human rights standards are a *mélange* of explicit treaties, customary international law, pilot domestic standards, and scholarly interpretation. For example, in assessing Spain's 1998 request for the extradition of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet from Britain to face charges of crimes against humanity, a British court considered its obligations under the Convention Against Torture, the European Court of Human Rights, Chile's own amnesty and claims of sovereignty, British legislation, and expert testimony. The Universal Declaration and the twin International Covenants are considered to encompass a comprehensive foundation, with more specific standards and jurisdiction developed by the more widely subscribed phenomenon-based

treaties: the Geneva Conventions on war crimes, the Convention Against Torture, the Genocide Treaty, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Another set of treaties is linked to vulnerable populations; they establish valuable benchmarks and monitoring obligations but are less widely accepted and less effective sources of pressure on states: the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Refugee Convention. The most recent 21st-century international norms, the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability, establish new populations of international concern but still struggle for broad recognition.

The conceptual core of human rights standards is to provide protection and empowerment against evolving threats to human dignity. To meet this mandate, fundamental human rights must be universal and inalienable—immune from contingent variations in geography and political conditions. Such rights must be enforced by the international system that provides a safety net for uneven citizenship regimes, incorporates increasing numbers of displaced persons and noncitizens, and acts to check rogue states. But international rights are also meaningless without international duties. In this sense, the key emerging debate on enforcement is the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (approved by the UN in 2005), which proposes a broad but important obligation on member states to act collectively where the state cannot or will not, in cases of massive and gross violations of fundamental rights.

### Patterns of Abuse

If human rights violations are a form of political pathology, the search for a remedy begins with the study of the symptoms and analysis of the causes. The study of patterns of abuse has become a sub-field of international relations and several social sciences. Violations can be measured and monitored by a combination of testimonies of survivors and witnesses, government records, country case studies, statistical patterns of demographic records and potential correlations with determinants of abuse, and forensic anthropology of gravesites.

War crimes such as massacres of civilians and torture of prisoners of war are often associated with counterinsurgency struggles and participation of paramilitary forces on both sides, which constitute an increasing proportion of conflicts. While state-sponsored slavery was almost eliminated by the 20th century through international cooperation, state-tolerated forced labor by private parties along with associated trafficking in persons has actually increased in the 21st century, in tandem with the pressures of globalization. Genocide, the attempt to systematically eliminate a population defined by identity characteristics, has also experienced a lamentable revival in the aftermath of the Cold War. Genocide is associated with recent defeat in international war, the collapse of hegemonic influence, and competitive political mobilization by “ethnic entrepreneurs”—and can rarely be attributed primarily to “ancient hatreds.” Moreover, mass expulsions of ethnic cleansing often spill across borders to create new zones of conflict, as Rwandan refugees contributed to the epochal war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Massive numbers of political prisoners and gulag-like prison complexes are characteristic of dictatorships, especially totalitarian regimes such as communist North Korea or theocratic Iran, and increasingly concentrated within such regimes. However, Amnesty International estimates that around half of all states practice torture with some regularity, and this includes some democracies—especially recent democracies in the developing world. High levels of social inequality and low levels of judicial accountability are the leading factors associated with the systematic occurrence of torture, especially in Latin America. Discrimination by race, religion, caste, gender, and national origin is still endemic and often state supported in South Asia and the Middle East, while even some democratic developed countries generally respectful of their own citizens have responded to high levels of migration with discriminatory policies that violate international standards.

### Remedies: The International Human Rights Regime

The ensemble of local, national, and global human rights organizations has been labeled an “international human rights regime”—an issue-specific

pattern of global governance. There is no definitive enforcement of human rights, but critical combinations of various forms of transnational pressure have resulted in significant reforms, such as the demise of the apartheid system in South Africa. Human rights campaigns are often catalyzed by transnational issue networks that include social movements, international organizations, and experts, in fluid habitual exchanges that pressure states from above and below. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink depict human rights appeals as a “boomerang” launched by a powerless civil society that reaches around the state to secure transnational pressure, while Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink propose a phased “spiral model” in which such pressure evolves through phases of state denial, normative lip service without policy change, then limited local empowerment, more systematic reform, and eventual state socialization and internalization of human rights norms.

At the global level, standard setting and monitoring by international organizations depend mostly on “naming and shaming”—but the vigor of China’s efforts to avoid annual censure by the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR), including generous aid packages to influence the votes of member states, suggests that such symbolic diplomacy does have a diffuse impact on violators. In addition to the Commission (now Council), which considers country situations, each of the major treaties generates a member state reporting regime, such as the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee. Issue-specific UN rapporteurs conduct field visits and issue reports on abuses such as forced disappearance, which can be influential in international or bilateral sanctions, or even secure the release of prisoners highlighted by the reports. At the regional level, the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union also host Human Rights Commissions, which vary correspondingly from the highest to lowest level of activity, in accessibility to individual versus state complaints, and in mandated impact on member states’ domestic policies. Bilateral diplomacy can also serve as an important source of signaling, especially by superpowers with influence over abusive regimes, and seems particularly useful in occasionally freeing prominent political prisoners or protecting

officially stigmatized ethnic or religious groups (such as Soviet Jews). However, diplomatic pressure alone has proven relatively unavailing in addressing broader patterns of repression imbricated in the dominance of the target regime.

Transnational legal processes run the gamut from a global, to a regional, to a bilateral exercise of universal jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court (ICC), following the UN’s postwar tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, is the only permanent universal body with jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Its combination of an autonomous Prosecutor and Security Council referral, with the standard safeguard that it can act only when domestic remedies are exhausted, has secured the participation of more than 100 member states—but not the United States. The ICC has been used mainly for war crimes in Africa since its 2002 activation. The EU and OAS also have human rights courts with contentious jurisdiction and the ability to levy sanctions against member states. Since treaties such as the Convention Against Torture and domestic mechanisms such as the U.S. Torture Victims’ Protection Act grant willing states universal jurisdiction to prosecute foreign nationals in their own domestic courts for crimes against humanity committed abroad, several states have also secured national-level criminal or civil judgments against fallen dictators and war criminals (such as Argentine generals). The Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon, who brought the Pinochet case, has been particularly active in testing the parameters of transnational legal accountability in a variety of cases.

Global economic sanctions have been issued in a few of the most egregious cases of gross violations by pariah states but have sometimes had a contradictory humanitarian impact even where consensus was achieved. Bilateral diplomacy and sanctions have been more widespread and influential, including trade and investment limitations, foreign aid conditionality, and limitations on military assistance to repressive regimes. While the U.S. Office of the Treasury sanctions dozens of states each year, only a proportion of sanctions are based on human rights violations—but they include gross violators such as Burma, North Korea, and Sudan. Although U.S. foreign assistance legislation, such as the Kennedy, Harkin, and Leahy

amendments, specifies that neither development nor military assistance should be given to violators, these limits have been very unevenly enforced and often overridden on national security grounds by the executive; however, the *threat* of suspension of aid has occasionally secured investigations, accountability, and even a reduction in violations by client states. The corresponding carrot for the stick of economic sanctions is human rights–directed foreign assistance, such as governance aid and support for global or recipient country human rights organizations. The Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada have vital and effective programs of human rights foreign aid, training, and civil society promotion.

The ultimate enforcement of human rights is armed intervention against the violating authority. While the UN Security Council can authorize intervention in response to massive crimes against humanity, in practice the UN has acted only in the aftermath of regime collapse or conflict resolution—and UN peacekeeping forces on the ground as violations unfolded notably failed to protect victims in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Timor. More muscular interventions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against abusive regimes did halt violence and contribute to subsequent return of refugees in Kosovo and Afghanistan but with controversial civilian casualties. Attempts to regionalize intervention in African conflicts have foundered most recently in Darfur. Unilateral interventions without multilateral consensus are often questioned as a selective rationalization of national interest on spurious humanitarian grounds, but it must be noted that the countervailing interests of neighboring powers afflicted by spillover violence have been the only check on some of the worst violations, such as the Cambodian genocide halted by a Vietnamese invasion or the murderous regime of Uganda’s Idi Amin displaced by Tanzania.

International human rights movements monitor, lobby, protest, and reform human rights around the world—usually in conjunction with local organizations and victims. The flagship global organization Amnesty International, established in 1961 to advocate for “prisoners of conscience,” now comprises millions of members in more than 150 countries—and has secured the freedom of around one third of its subjects from

diverse regimes. Along with peers such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty’s nonpartisan annual reports on country conditions and monitoring of conflict situations and emerging abuses often influence global and bilateral condemnations and sanctions. Country-specific campaigns, increasingly mobilized via the Internet, are credited with shielding some local advocates and pressuring vulnerable repressive governments for limited reform. An additional element of advocacy mobilizes transnational identities, such as trade unionists defending their threatened colleagues in Colombia, Christians pressing for religious freedom in China, and women’s groups campaigning to have genocidal rape designated as a war crime by the International Criminal Court. Local human rights movements generally seek to transcend political and ascriptive identities and derive their power from a combination of Gandhian nonviolent collective action and globalized information politics. Such protests contributed strongly to transitions to democracy in many Latin American countries, South Africa, and the Philippines, and former political prisoners became the first democratic leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic, South Korea, and Timor. Human rights campaigns dedicated to identifying new genres of transnational abuse have introduced new forms of leverage through boycotts and new mechanisms of global governance such as codes of conduct for multinationals to limit labor abuses and an international certification scheme to stem the trade in “blood diamonds,” whose illicit export contributed to war crimes in several notorious African conflicts.

### Human Rights Reform

When the international human rights regime is successful, states engage in human rights reform. Human rights reform can be studied from a policy design, comparative, or transnational perspective—since such reforms have often been diffused or implemented by global as well as national institutions. Retrospective accountability for abuses committed in a prior war or dictatorship is labeled “transitional justice” and generally consists of some combination of investigation (“truth commissions”), adjudication, and reparations. Human rights literature is replete with debates on the effectiveness and impact on regime stability of different

forms of transitional justice, from Argentina's maximalist trials of former military rulers that led to rebellions to South Africa's explicit trade-off of truth for justice. Postconflict accountability is increasingly implemented by a hybrid blend of global and national institutions, as in Cambodia and Sierra Leone, which marks an evolution of sovereignty and international law.

New democracies and regimes responding to civil rights campaigns against chronic discrimination also establish forward-looking institutions and policies to improve citizen rights. National human rights institutions for domestic monitoring of policies as well as practices relevant to human rights, mandated by the UN under the Paris Principles, were originally established by Western European democracies but have diffused to dozens of states in Latin America and Asia. Such human rights institutes sometimes overlap with and sometimes replace ombudsman offices, which are empowered to independently investigate and represent citizens (and in some cases, migrants) against allegations of abuse by any government agency. Finally, programs of human rights education for agents of authority, vulnerable groups, schoolchildren, or the general population are promoted by global agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, regional bodies such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's High Commissioner on National Minorities, and national governments seeking to implement international human rights norms.

### Challenges

While the struggle for fundamental human dignity has advanced tremendously in the years since the Universal Declaration, challenges to the theory and practice of human rights continue. Since human rights are based in a liberal legal model of the primacy of the public individual, cultural, sociological, and even feminist critiques of universalism question the rights' relevance for the pursuit of disparate collective social goals and identities. During eras of renewed conflict, especially the unconventional transnational threat of terrorism, states revive old arguments about national security trumping inalienable rights—and human rights scholarship contests the rationale

and record of such logics. Critics and campaigners alike note the increasing salience of abuses committed by private actors who are not accountable under the “government and opposition” model the international human rights regime was created to address: from multinational sweatshops, to private security contractors, to patriarchal religious authorities. Moreover, many abusive situations result from a lack rather than a surfeit of state authority. Human rights advocates and theorists respond that these concerns suggest the need to expand human rights norms and mechanisms, not abandon them. While human rights has not halted “death by government” or other systematic abuses of power, it has proven to be a resilient tool for the voiceless and vulnerable to often endure and occasionally prevail.

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*See also* Civil Society; Ethics; Genocide; Governance, Global; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Indigenous Peoples' Rights; International Law; International Regimes; Intervention, Humanitarian; Normative Theory in International Relations; Rights; Rule of Law; Sovereignty

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## HYBRID REGIMES

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The notion of hybrid regimes—that is, regimes that were characterized by the presence at the same time of key aspects of different models or types of regimes—has been present in the classic political science literature for years (Samuel E. Finer, 1970). The basic change in recent decades is the increase in the number and variety of hybrid regimes as a side effect of the widespread phenomenon of democratization in all areas of the world. This entry clarifies the notion, points out how to distinguish hybrid regimes from transitional phases, and builds on existing empirical research to show the varieties of hybridism in contemporary times.

### Meaning

As regards the term *regime*, consideration is given here to all government institutions and norms that are either formalized or are informally recognized as existing in a given territory with respect to a given population. While formal and informal institutions may no longer configure some form of nondemocracy and do not yet configure a complete democracy, they still bear traces of the previous political reality. In addition, to have something that may be labeled a regime, at least minimal stabilization is needed. This is the key aspect differentiating a regime from transition phases, which are characterized by short duration. The precise length of time that is considered necessary before classifying something as a regime rather than a transitional phase is arbitrarily—but reasonably—stipulated.

Such a regime does not fulfill the minimalist requirements of a democracy, such as (a) universal suffrage, both male and female; (b) free, competitive, recurrent, and fair elections; (c) more than one party; and (d) different and alternative media sources. One important aspect of this definition is that in the absence of just one of these requirements, or if at some point one of them is no longer met, there is no longer a democratic regime but another political and institutional setup marked by varying degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity. Moreover, in a democracy, be it only minimal, institutions and rights should not be subject to, or conditioned by, nonelected actors or exponents of

other external regimes. The former refers to the armed forces, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, a hegemonic party, or even a monarch with pretensions to influencing decision-making processes or the overall functioning of the democracy; in the latter case, a regime might be conditioned by an external power that deprives the democracy of its independence and sovereignty by pursuing nondemocratic policies.

In addition, such a regime does not have the key aspects of nondemocratic regimes, and a basic reference must be made at least to traditional and authoritarian regimes. The former are based on the personal power of the sovereign, who binds his underlings in a relationship of fear and reward; they are typically *legibus soluti* regimes, where the sovereign's arbitrary decisions are not limited by norms and do not need to be justified ideologically. Power is thus used in particularistic forms and for essentially private ends. In these regimes, the armed forces and police play a central role, while there is an evident lack of developed ideology and mass mobilization. Basically, then, the political setup is dominated by traditional elites and institutions. As for the authoritarian regimes, the definition advanced by Juan Linz is still the most useful one: a political system with limited, nonresponsible political pluralism; without an elaborated and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities; without either extensive or intense political mobilization, except at some points in their development; and in which a leader, or, occasionally, a small group, exercises power from within formally ill-defined, but actually quite predictable, limits. However, with respect to such a definition, which identifies five significant dimensions—limited pluralism, distinctive values, low political mobilization, a small leading group, ill-defined but predictable limits to citizens' rights—we need to stress the constraints imposed on political pluralism within a society that has no recognized autonomy or independence as well as no effective political participation of the people, with the consequent exercise of various forms of state suppression.

Having considered definitions for minimalist democracy, traditional regime, and authoritarianism, it is now possible to define *hybrid regimes*. As suggested by Terry L. Karl (1995) in relation to some Latin American countries, they may be characterized by “uneven acquisition of procedural

requisites of democracy,” without “civilian control over the military,” with sectors of the population that “remain politically and economically disenfranchised” and with a “weak judiciary” (p. 80). But this definition refers only to authoritarianisms that partially lose some of their key characteristics, retain some authoritarian or traditional features, and at the same time acquire some of the characteristic institutions and procedures of democracy. A hybrid regime, on the other hand, may also have a set of institutions where, going down the inverse path, some key elements of democracy have been lost and authoritarian characteristics have been acquired. Thus, an adequate definition has to be completed by, for example, including some of the aspects that can be recurrent in authoritarian situation, such as the existence of incumbents who routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition fair media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results.

This discussion, however, prompts reflection about two elements. First, a hybrid regime is always a set of ambiguous institutions that maintain aspects of the past. Second, it is, consequently, a “corruption” of the preceding regime, lacking as it does one or more essential characteristics of that regime but also failing to acquire other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian. Consequently, the term *hybrid* can be applied to all regimes preceded by a period of authoritarian or traditional rule followed by the beginnings of greater tolerance, liberalization, and a partial relaxation of the restrictions on pluralism or all regimes that, following a period of minimal democracy in the sense indicated above, are subject to the intervention of nonelected bodies—the military, above all—that place restrictions on competitive pluralism without, however, creating a more or less stable authoritarian regime. Moreover, in disentangling empirical realities that fit the previously formulated definition of the hybrid regime from different transitional situations, it should be stressed that there has been some sort of stabilization or duration, perhaps at least a decade, of those ambiguous, uncertain institutional setups. Consequently, to avoid a misleading analysis of democratization processes, a hybrid regime can be defined as a set of institutions that have been persistent, whether stable or unstable, for about a decade; have been preceded

by authoritarian rule, a traditional regime (possibly with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy; and are characterized by the breakup of limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous participation, but with the absence of at least one of the four aspects of a minimal democracy.

### A Classification

On the basis of the previous definition, then, a crucial aspect of hybrid regimes is that there may be (or there may emerge) veto players—that is, individual or collective actors who are influential or decisive in maintaining the regime in its characteristic state of ambiguity and uncertainty. These actors may be an external, foreign power that interferes in the politics of the nation; a monarch or authoritarian ruler who has come to power through more or less violent means; the armed forces; a hegemonic party run by a small group or a single leader; religious hierarchies; economic oligarchies; and other powerful groups or a mixture of such actors, who are either unable or unwilling to eliminate other prodemocratic actors, assuming that in the majority of current hybrid regimes the alternative is between democracy and nondemocracy.

From this perspective, an effective classification should focus on the legacy of the previous regime and the constraints preventing a country from becoming a minimal democracy. Thus, the types of hybrid regimes that develop depend directly on the classifications of authoritarian regimes and democracies that have already been established and the factors that prevent democratic change. The core assumption of this typology is that traditional and democratic regimes can, by virtue of their characteristics, give rise to different results, while it is more likely that the survival of authoritarian veto players points toward a single solution.

However, when switching from theoretical hypotheses to empirical analysis (see Leonardo Morlino, 2009), three analytic axes emerge with clarity: a first one where electoral process, political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression and beliefs, and freedom of association and organization are grouped together closely; a second where state functioning stands alone; and a third one, conceptually close to the second one, where rule of law and personal autonomy are also strongly connected. Additional empirical analysis

shows how three models can result by merging the second and third components also. Thus, the first model of hybrid regime, termed *limited democracy*, derives from the first component and is characterized by universal suffrage, a formally correct electoral procedure, and elective posts occupied on the basis of elections and a multiparty system but where civil rights are constrained by the police or other effective forms of suppression. Consequently, there is no actual political opposition and, above all, the media are compromised by a situation of monopoly to the point that part of the population is effectively prevented from exercising their rights. The notion of limited democracy is also well developed by Wigell (2008). The second empirical model is that of *democracies without law* or *democracy without a state*, as the state can be conceived of as a government based on the primacy of the law, where there are no relevant legacies or powerful veto players or any forms of state suppression or nonguarantee of rights but simply a situation of widespread illegality in which the state is incapable of performing properly due to poorly functioning institutions. Limited democracies and democracies without state are confirmed as empirically relevant classes for which different, contrasting elements need to be stressed: on the one hand, the lack of an effective guarantee of rights despite the presence of state institutions and, on the other hand, the lack of the rule of law and of a functioning state, with laws that are not applied because the judiciary has no effective independence, there is widespread corruption, and the bureaucracy is flawed and inefficient. The third model suggested by empirical research is that of *quasi democracies* characterized by regimes where all main aspects mentioned above are deeply rooted in ambiguity: There is illegality and at the same time partial constraints in the effective guarantee of rights. This model is the most empirically relevant one (see Morlino, 2009).

### Conclusion

On the grounds of existing empirical analyses, hybrid regimes are a reality and empirically support an autonomous model of regime vis-à-vis democracy, authoritarianism, and the traditional regime. The three models of hybridism developed through empirical analysis suggest that the most significant empirical problem is to ensure the existence of institutions that are capable of performing

their functions. Hence, there are countries where strengthening of the state and/or promoting more effective guarantee of rights might transform the regimes into democracies.

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*See also* Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Democratization; International Regimes; Transition

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## HYPOTHESIS TESTING

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The primary means of conveying the strength of empirical findings in political science is the null hypothesis significance test (NHST). This paradigm, along with its strengths and weaknesses, is therefore important for nearly every quantitative study in political science. This entry reviews the current hypothesis testing paradigm and its history, discusses the underused idea of statistical power from tests, and points out some common misinterpretations of hypothesis testing.

### The Current Paradigm: Null Hypothesis Significance Testing

The current approach to hypothesis testing in all of the social sciences is a synthesis of the Fisher test of significance and the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test. In this 20th-century procedure, two hypotheses are set forth: a null or restricted hypothesis,  $H_0$ , which is set against an alternative



or research hypothesis,  $H_1$ . Thus, they are supposed to describe two complementary notions about some political science phenomenon of interest. The research hypothesis is the probability model that describes the author's belief about this phenomenon and is typically operationalized through statements about an unknown parameter  $\theta \in \Theta$ . In the most basic and common setup, the null hypothesis asserts that  $\theta = 0$ , and the research hypothesis asserts that  $\theta \neq 0$ . Such a two-sided test is the overwhelming default in assessing the statistical reliability of individual regression parameters.

Once the hypotheses are established, a test statistic  $T$ , some function of  $\theta$  and the data, is calculated and assessed with the distribution under the assumption that  $H_0$  is true. Commonly used test statistics are sample means,  $\bar{X}$ ; chi-square statistics from tabular analysis,  $\chi^2$ ; and  $t$  statistics in linear and generalized linear models. Note that the sample space of the test statistic must correspond to the support of the specified null and alternative distributions. The key idea is that test statistics that appear to be "unusual" for the null distribution (e.g., those in the tails) cast doubt on the original assumption that this is the true distribution.

The test procedure  $\phi$  assigns one of two decisions,  $D_0$  and  $D_1$ , to all possible values in the sample space of the statistic  $T$ , corresponding to supporting either  $H_0$  or  $H_1$ , respectively. The  $p$  value (also called the associated probability) is equal to the area in the tail (or tails) of the assumed distribution under  $H_0$ , which starts at the point determined by  $T$  on the horizontal axis and continues to positive or negative infinity. If a predetermined significance level  $\alpha$  has been specified, then  $H_0$  is rejected for  $p$  values less than  $\alpha$ ; otherwise, the  $p$  value itself is reported. More formally, the sample space of  $T$  is split into two complementary regions,  $S_0$  and  $S_1$ , such that the probability that  $T$  falls in  $S_1$ , causing decision  $D_1$ , is either a predetermined null hypothesis cumulative distribution function (CDF) level ( $\alpha =$  size of the test, Neyman-Pearson) or the CDF level corresponding to the value of the test statistic under  $H_0$  is reported as follows:

$$p \text{ value} = \int_{S_1} P_{H_0}(T = t) dt \quad (\text{Fisher}).$$

Thus, decision  $D_1$  is made if the test statistic is sufficiently atypical given the distribution under


$H_0$ . This process is illustrated for a one-tailed test at  $\alpha = .05$  in Figure 1.

### Historical Background

The current NHST is a blend of two extremely important but incompatible schools of thought in 20th-century statistics. R. A. Fisher developed a procedure that gives significance levels from the data with the intention of possibly "nullifying" a straw man hypothesis, but Neyman and Pearson set up a very rigid decision-making process to arrive at one of two possible competing conclusions.

### Fisher's Test of Significance

Originally Fisher, in 1935, developed his test of significance in the context of randomized experiments, where the physical act of randomization of units to treatment and control group is the basis for unbiased inference. Fisher posited a single and sharp null hypothesis,  $H_0$ . The simplest and most popular  $H_0$  is that the treatment effect is zero for all units. Note that this  $H_0$  is more restrictive than the usually tested null hypothesis that the average effect is zero across the sample. Under the sharp  $H_0$ , all (potential) values of the outcome variable under treatment and control can be either observed or inferred for each unit. Hence, the distribution of



**Figure 1** Null Hypothesis Significance Testing Illustrated

the statistic  $T$  is assumed to be known. Since the distribution of  $T$  is solely determined by randomization, it is called the *randomization distribution* of  $T$ . Using this distribution, one can compare the observed test statistic against its distribution under the null hypothesis. An observed value that is “very unlikely,” given the null hypothesis and the implied randomization distribution, is taken as evidence against the null hypothesis in what is essentially a stochastic version of the “proof by contradiction,” according to Guido Imbens and Don Rubin. More specifically, as the statistic moves away from its conditional expected value,  $E(T|H_0)$ ,  $H_0$  becomes progressively less plausible (less likely to occur by chance). However, as is shown below, the stochastic nature of this proof by contradiction creates some logical fallacies. The relationship between  $T$  and the level of significance produced by the test is established by the density outside the threshold established by  $T$  (one- or two-tailed), going away from the density region containing the expected value of  $T$  given  $H_0$ . The outside density is the  $p$  value, also called the *achieved* significance level. Fisher hypothesis testing is therefore summarized by the following steps:

1. Identify the null hypothesis.
2. Determine the appropriate test statistic and its distribution under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true.
3. Calculate the test statistic from the data.
4. Determine the achieved significance level that corresponds to the test statistic using the distribution under the assumption that the null is true.
5. Reject  $H_0$  if the achieved significance level is sufficiently small. Otherwise, reach no firm conclusion.

The Fisher construct naturally leads to the question of what  $p$  value is sufficiently small as to warrant rejection of the null hypothesis. This measure of extremeness or what is considered as unlikely should be based on the specific application but involves necessarily some arbitrary judgments. Fisher established the CDF thresholds of .10, .05, and .01 as “convenient” and nothing more. Therefore, there is absolutely no scientific basis for

making hypothesis test decisions at these levels whatsoever; they have merely become convention. This suggests a great amount of caution about making decisions about, say, .049 versus .051, a difference that is typically swamped by measurement error in the social sciences anyway.

### *Neyman and Pearson Hypothesis Testing*

During the same period when Fisher was developing his exact test of significance based on the sharp  $H_0$ , Neyman and Pearson were interested in methods to estimate *average* treatment effects, such as  $\theta = 0$  over the sample, and to construct confidence intervals around this estimate. They rejected Fisher’s idea that only the sharp null hypothesis needs to be tested. Since only the assumption of the sharp null hypothesis allowed Fisher to derive the exact randomization distribution of  $T$ , Neyman and Pearson can only derive certain properties of this distribution. This is the price they have to pay to allow “nonsharp” hypotheses about average differences between, say, treatment and control groups. Neyman and Pearson argue that a more useful procedure is to propose two complementary hypotheses:  $\Theta_A$  and  $\Theta_B$  (or a class of  $\Theta_B$ , such that  $\Theta_A \cup \Theta_B = \Theta$ ), which need not be labeled “null” or “alternative” but often are purely for convenience. Furthermore, Neyman and Pearson point out that one can posit a hypothesis and consecutively test multiple admissible alternatives against this hypothesis. Since there are now two competing hypotheses in any one test, Neyman and Pearson can define an a priori-selected  $\alpha$ , the probability of falsely rejecting  $\Theta_A$  under the assumption that  $H_0$  is true, and  $\beta$ , the probability of failing to reject  $\Theta_A$  when  $H_0$  is false. By convention, the first mistake is called a Type I error, and the second mistake is called a Type II error. Note that  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are probabilities conditional on two mutually exclusive events:  $\alpha$  is conditional on the null hypothesis being true, and  $\beta$  is conditional on the null hypothesis being false. A more useful quantity than  $\beta$  is  $1 - \beta$ , which Neyman and Pearson (1933, 1936) call the *power* of the test: the long-run probability of accurately rejecting a false null hypothesis given a point alternative hypothesis.

In this setup, we want to develop the test that has the highest power for a given a priori  $\alpha$ . To


state this more precisely, let the test function  $\phi$  take on the values 1 if  $D_1$  is reached under  $\Theta_B$  and 0 if  $D_0$  is reached under  $\Theta_A$ . Hence, the set of data points or values of  $T$  for which  $\phi = 1$  is equal to the region of rejection (this is only approximately true for randomization tests). For a given significance level  $\alpha$ , the problem is to select a test  $\phi$  such that  $1 - \beta$  is maximized for all  $\theta$  belonging to  $\Theta_B$  subject to the condition that  $E_\theta[\phi] \leq \alpha$  for all  $\theta$  belonging to  $\Theta_A$ .

To accomplish this goal, the researcher considers the fixed sample size, the desired significance level, and the research hypothesis, then employs the test with the greatest power. Neyman and Pearson's famous lemma shows that under certain conditions (a sufficient condition is that the probability density tested has a monotone likelihood ratio) there exists a "uniformly most powerful" test that has the greatest possible probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis in favor of a point alternative hypothesis, compared with other tests. Formally, this comparison employs the *power function* that is based on Type I and Type II error rates. Again, the probability of a Type I and Type II error can be stated as follows:

$$P(\text{Type I error}) = P(\text{reject } \Theta_A | \Theta_A \text{ is true})$$

$$P(\text{Type II error}) = P(\text{accept } \Theta_A | \Theta_B \text{ is true}) \\ = 1 - P(\text{reject } \Theta_A | \Theta_B \text{ is true}).$$

The last expression gives the probability to reject  $\Theta_A$  as a function of  $\theta$  and builds the basis for the power function. If  $\theta$  belongs to  $\Theta_B$  then the power function gives the probability of making the right decision, that is, reject  $\Theta_A$ . If  $\theta$  belongs to  $\Theta_B$ , then the power function gives the probability of a Type I error rate, which is smaller than or equal to  $\alpha$ . Ideally, a power function of a one-sided test would be a step function, equaling 0 as long as  $\theta$  belongs to  $\Theta_A$  and equaling 1 as soon as  $\theta$  belongs to  $\Theta_B$ . It is already clear from the discussion above that this sharp and error-free distinction between  $\Theta_A$  and  $\Theta_B$  is impossible. However, the better a test, the steeper the slope of the power function between accepting  $\Theta_A$  and accepting  $\Theta_B$ . In general, the power of a test increases with the preset level  $\alpha$ , the sample size, and greater difference between values from  $\Theta_A$  and  $\Theta_B$ . Figure 2 illustrates the power functions for a one-sided test. We use a normally




**Figure 2** Power Function for a One-Sided Test;  $\alpha = .05, .01, \text{ and } .001$

distributed sample of size  $N = 10$ . We estimate the power function at  $\mu = 105$  for  $\Theta_A: \mu = 100$  against  $\Theta_B: \mu > 100$  with a standard deviation of  $\sigma = 10$  and varying values for  $\alpha$  (.05, .01, .001).

Figure 3 illustrates the power functions for a normally distributed sample of varying size with  $N = 10, 20, \text{ and } 100$ . Again, we estimate the power function at  $\mu = 105$  for  $\Theta_A: \mu = 100$  against  $\Theta_B: \mu > 100$  with a standard deviation of  $\sigma = 10$  and a fixed  $\alpha = .05$ . Again, the power functions are based on a one-sided test. The influence of the sample size on power is further discussed below.

In comparing the Neyman-Pearson approach with Fisher's exact test of significance, note how different the following steps are from Fisher's previously described steps:

1. Identify a hypothesis of interest,  $\Theta_B$ , and a complementary hypothesis,  $\Theta_A$ .
2. Determine the appropriate test statistic and its distribution under the assumption that  $\Theta_A$  is true.
3. Specify a significance level ( $\alpha$ ) and determine the corresponding critical value of the test statistic under the assumption that  $\Theta_A$  is true.



**Figure 3** Power Function for a Normally Distributed Sample of Varying Size;  $N = 10, 20,$  and  $100$

4. Calculate the test statistic from the data.
5. Reject  $\Theta_A$  and accept  $\Theta_B$  if the test statistic is more extreme than the critical value from the expected value of the test statistic (calculated under the assumption that  $\Theta_A$  is true). Otherwise, accept  $\Theta_A$ .

The Neyman-Pearson approach is important in the context of decision theory where the decision in the final step above is assigned a *risk function* computed as the expected loss from making an error. Most political scientists are surprised to see the word *accept* in this context since they are trained not to accept a null hypothesis, but Neyman and Pearson do not have a null; they have a partition of the decision space.

#### *The Synthesis of Fisher and Neyman-Pearson*

The NHST attempts to combine the two approaches described above giving a synthesized approach. There is no attributed authorship for this notion, and it appears to have come from textbook writers in the mid-20th century who may have been afraid to offend either Fisher or

Neyman-Pearson (the conversation between these powerful voices was unusually vitriolic).

Neyman and Pearson's hypothesis test defines the significance level a priori as a function of the testing procedure and not as a function of the data. Conversely, Fisher's test of significance defines the significance level afterward as function of the *data* after the test. The current paradigm in the social sciences mixes these two approaches by pretending to select  $\alpha$  a priori but actually using  $p$  values (or asterisks next to test statistics indicating ranges of  $p$  values) to evaluate the strength of the evidence. Thus, the NHST allows inclusion of the alternate hypothesis but precludes a search for a more powerful test.

The NHST also tries to reconcile the two differing perspectives on how the hypotheses are actually defined. It adopts the Neyman-Pearson convention of two explicitly stated rival hypotheses, but one is always labeled as the null hypothesis as in the Fisher test. In some introductory texts, the null hypothesis is presented only as a null relationship:  $\theta = 0$  (no effect), whereas Fisher intended the null hypothesis simply as a straw man to be "nullified." The NHST pretends to use the Neyman-Pearson

decision process except that failing to reject the null hypothesis is treated as a quasi decision: “modest” support for the null hypothesis assertion. There is also confusion in the synthesized test about  $p$  values as long-run probabilities. Since the  $p$  value or range of  $p$  values, indicated by asterisks, is not set a priori, it is not the long-run probability of making a Type I error but is typically treated as such, even with a single sample and a single test. Neither Fisher nor Neyman and Pearson would have been satisfied with the synthesis. Fisher objected to Neyman and Pearson’s preselection of the significance level as well as the mandatory two-outcome decision process. Neyman and Pearson disagreed with Fisher’s interpretation of  $p$  values.

### Underlying Problems With the Null Hypothesis Significance Test

The basis of the NHST rests on the logical argument of *modus tollens* (denying the consequent) but adds a necessary probabilistic aspect:

If  $X$ , then  $Y$  is highly likely.

$Y$  is not observed.

Therefore,  $X$  is highly unlikely.

This logic seems at first to be plausible. Yet it is a fallacy to assert that obtaining data that are atypical under a given assumption implies that the assumption is likely false: Almost a contradiction of the null hypothesis does not imply that the null hypothesis is almost false. This means that the NHST rests on a fundamentally flawed logical basis. The remaining issues in this section are merely common misinterpretations.

### The Inverse Probability Problem

A common interpretive problem with null hypothesis significance testing is a misunderstanding of the order of the conditional probability. Many people have a belief, which stems directly from Fisher’s perspective, that the smaller the  $p$  value, the greater the probability that the null hypothesis is false. This incorrect interpretation is that the NHST produces  $P(H_0|D)$ : the probability of  $H_0$  being true given the observed data  $D$ . But the NHST first posits  $H_0$  as true and then asks what the

probability of observing these or more extreme data is. This is clearly  $P(D|H_0)$ . In fact, a more desirable test would be one that produces  $P(H_0|D)$ , because then we could simply search for the hypothesis with the greatest probability of being true given some observed data. Bayes’s law clarifies the difference between these two unequal probabilities:

$$P(H_0|D) = \frac{P(H_0)}{P(D)}P(D|H_0).$$

The two quantities,  $P(D|H_0)$  and  $P(H_0|D)$ , are equal only if  $P(H_0) = P(D)$ , and there is absolutely no theoretical justification supporting such an equality.

### Significance Driven by Sample Size

There are two misinterpretations about the role of sample size in null hypothesis significance testing. First is the belief that statistical significance in a large sample study implies real-world importance. Many have observed that an NHST based on a large sample size almost always results in statistical significance (Macdonald, 1997). This is a concern in political science research since we do not want to infer that some subfields have greater legitimacy just because the corresponding data sets tend to produce smaller  $p$  values: “a prejudice against the null” (Greenwald, 1975, p. 1).

The second misinterpretation is that for a given  $p$  value in a study that rejects the null hypothesis, larger sample sizes imply more reliable results. This is false: Two studies that reject the null with the same  $p$  value are equally likely to make a Type I error even if they have dramatically different sample sizes. This mistake results from a poor understanding of Type II errors. Unlike the case above, two studies that fail to reject the null hypothesis are identical in every way except that the sample sizes are qualitatively different. The test with the larger sample size is less likely to make a Type II error since the sample size is always in the denominator of the equation for statistical significance. To show why this is true, Figure 4 displays two tests for  $H_0: \mu = 0$  versus  $H_1: \mu > 0$ , with sample sizes of 9 and 12, respectively, and the true distribution normal (3, 3). The shaded region is the area under the true sampling distribution of  $\bar{X}$  to the left of the area determined

by setting  $\alpha = .05$  under the false assumption that  $H_0$  is true.

Thus, the shaded region is the probability we would fail to reject the false  $H_0$  (i.e.,  $\beta = P(\text{Type II error})$ ). It is clear from Figure 4 that the probability of a Type II error is much lower for the test with a larger sample size, even though the probability of a Type I error is identical. The area under the true sampling distribution of  $\bar{X}$  in either panel of Figure 4 not shaded is equal to  $1 - \beta = 1 - P(\text{Type II error})$ , which is the power of the test. It follows from above that the second test with a larger sample size has greater power.


**Replication Fallacy**

Another misinterpretation of null hypothesis significance testing is the belief that one minus the  $p$  value is the probability of replication (producing significant results in repeated iterations of the same study). This is equivalent to the two misconceptions:

$P(H_0) = \alpha$  and  $P(H_1) = 1 - \alpha$ . The term *replication fallacy* describes the wrong belief that a low  $p$  value such as  $p = .05$  implies that 95 out of 100 replications will be statistically significant. The error is obvious when one recalls that  $p = P(D|H_0)$  and is thus a function of a single data set producing a single test statistic.

**Asymmetry and Accepting the Null Hypothesis**

Failing to reject the null hypothesis does not rule out an infinite number of other competing research hypotheses. Null hypothesis significance testing is asymmetric: If the test statistic is sufficiently atypical given the null hypothesis then the null hypothesis is rejected, but if the test statistic is insufficiently atypical given the null hypothesis then the null hypothesis is not accepted. This is a double standard:  $H_1$  is held innocent until proven guilty, and  $H_0$  is held guilty until proven innocent. Despite the fact that it is very risky to accept implicitly or



**Figure 4** Type II Errors for  $\bar{X}$ , Differing Sample Sizes

expressly the conclusion from a nonrejected null hypothesis, such instances are common.

There are two problems that develop as a result of asymmetry. The first is a misinterpretation of the asymmetry to assert that finding a nonstatistically significant difference or effect is evidence that it is equal to zero or nearly zero. This acceptance of the null hypothesis is damaging because it inhibits the exploration of competing research hypotheses. The second problem pertains to the correct interpretation of failing to reject the null hypotheses. Failing to reject the null hypothesis essentially provides almost no information about the state of the world. It simply means that given the evidence at hand one cannot make an assertion about a relationship: All you can conclude is that you *can't* conclude that the null was false (Cohen, 1962).

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*See also* Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Statistical Significance; Statistics: Overview

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## IDEALISM

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As a category in metaphysics, “idealism” usually refers at the most general level to the proposition that “reality” is in some sense mental rather than material. In political philosophy/theory, idealism refers to theories that hold concepts and propositions to be the constitutive and determining factors in politics, a claim that includes the belief that “material” processes are actually mental at root. Normatively, idealists tend to hold that the values by which personal and political conduct should be judged are in some sense “spiritual,” usually founded on some notion of human nature that individuals are innately driven to realize in their daily lives. They also tend to reject utilitarianism, claiming that it celebrates man’s animality rather than his inchoate humanity or, in many cases, immanent “divinity.” That noted, idealists have tended to hold theological beliefs that were heterodox at best or even atheistic. Beyond these very general claims, little is shared by those political theories that are commonly labeled “idealist,” aside from certain common misinterpretations made by nonidealists. For example, there is no necessary requirement to understand the world “idealistically”—that is, as ultimately “good,” peaceful, or providentially ordered. Similarly, there is no common tendency to deny the existence of the external world outside of thought (the denial that is most associated with Berkeleyian solipsism). Instead, what is characteristically at issue is one’s understanding of the concept of

“reality,” especially social reality. Idealists tend to hold that the closest one can get to any mind-independent world “out there” are the various (interpreted) sensations excited by (it seems) that world in our consciousnesses. Consequently, one can only analyze with even a modicum of precision those sensations and the ideas to which they give rise. Hence, the realms of human conduct such as social life, politics, aesthetics, and economics are constructs of the mind but are no less real for that (in fact, they are real because they are such constructions). Counterfactually, humans have no direct access to an underlying material world, meaning that the only “reality” that one can become aware of and can analyze and criticize rationally is the mental reality of interpreted thought.

Plato (ca. 428–348 BCE) was the first recorded idealist political philosopher. He claimed the world that we perceive is made up of imperfect ideas, which are themselves copies of a world of purely mental entities, each of which forms part of a single eternal coherent system of concepts, ordered with reference to the “Form of the Good.” Only that single system is real, and our actual, imperfect ideas at best imitate what is real, and do so only to the extent that they reproduce elements of that system. To the extent that our beliefs do not match the eternal system of concepts, they trap us in mere opinion and error. This claim has highly significant ethical and political implications. According to Plato, the good life is one lived in accordance with the virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice, with the last of these being achieved through the correct

ordering of the first three virtues within the individual's soul and within the life of the ancient Greek city-state or polis. Possibly on grounds of its impracticality rather than on philosophical grounds, Plato's later political works (*The Laws* and *The Statesman*) replaced the *Republic's* system of rule by "guardians" with systems relying on greater constitutional checks. Nevertheless, many scholars have seen even these later books as totalitarian models.

There were many philosophically significant idealists in the centuries after Plato, most notably Neo-Platonists such as Plotinus (ca. 205–270 CE) and Iamblichus (ca. 250–325 CE), Cambridge Platonists including Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) and Richard Cumberland (1631–1718), and the solipsistic idealist Bishop George Berkeley (1685–1753). Nevertheless, after Plato, the next significant idealist political philosopher was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) sought to develop what he saw as the leading "spirit" of Kant's critical philosophy, placing particular stress on the significance of the self-expressing will as the basis of practical reason. His early individualism gave way to an increasingly collectivist political position, reinforcing Kant's earlier rejection of Fichte's self-proclaimed discipleship. Fichte's *Closed Commercial State* (1800) advocated an autarkic, corporatist, quasi-military state, while his *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808) stressed the need for state control of education as a precondition of the orderly development of the German people, the (allegedly predetermined) stages of which he set out in his *Characteristics of the Present Age* (1806). Idealism's next great philosopher was the much misunderstood Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831).

Idealism was imported into the United States via the writings of the St Louis Hegelians, whose most important political philosophers were William Torrey Harris (1835–1909), Denton J. Snider (1841–1925), and Thomas Davidson (1840–1900). Their greatly modified form of Hegelianism emphasized the role of education in creating the conditions for the individual to enjoy a stable and worthwhile social existence. Yet members disagreed over the relative weight to be given to individual will and conscience, on the one hand, and social conventions and norms, on the other, and the movement dissolved into its current obscurity.

A more lasting idealist heritage is found in Britain. Even though there were some idealist philosophers with an interest in politics in England in the 19th century—most notably, John Grote (1813–1866) and John Hutchison Stirling (1820–1909)—idealism first held sway in Anglo-American political philosophy (for approximately 50 years from the 1870s to the 1920s) through the dominance of British idealism. The origins of this tradition as an identifiable intellectual movement can be traced to Oxford University, especially the writings of Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882). His *Prolegomena to Ethics* and "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation" were published posthumously (in 1883 and 1886, respectively). Green defended a perfectionist ethics developed along the lines of Fichte's early philosophy. This ethics was founded on the claim that individuals experienced an inherent if often imperfectly articulated need and drive to develop their higher capacities through social citizenship and an active commitment to the Aristotelian virtues of temperance, wisdom, courage, and justice, with the latter spelled out as the honoring of Kant's categorical imperative and the realization of a "kingdom of ends" in a society orientated around a determinate ethically and aesthetically enriching common good (what later idealists called a "concrete universal"). In this way, Green claimed that individuals would manifest the "eternal consciousness" (which he saw as an immanent God) within their individual minds. This ethical perfectionism did not issue in a political perfectionism, however, largely because Green held that no one can be forced to act ethically. The most the state or any other group or individual can do is help foster the conditions under which individuals can develop, primarily through educational opportunities for all, employment contracts, and temperance reform. He invoked the medieval notion of a legitimate (according to Green, enabling) political order as a "societies of societies," much in the way that John Rawls was to invoke it 100 years later.

Green's preference for local democratic politics and his endorsement of the "rights recognition thesis" were shared by followers such as Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923) and David George Ritchie (1853–1903). Bosanquet was especially sensitive to the individual character's vulnerability to state interference, whereas Ritchie saw more danger

coming from socioeconomic factors and thereby saw more opportunities for beneficial state action. Ritchie sought to combine some form of utilitarianism with evolutionary theory, as a socialist alternative to the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, and in this sense his thought pointed toward the New Liberalism of Leonard Hobhouse and John Hobson. It is notable that Bosanquet's analysis of the ideal type of the modern state anticipated much of the contemporary literature on the state versus failed or quasi states.

Outside its Oxford heartland, idealism was also influential through the Coleridgean idealism of Frederick Denison Maurice (1805–1872), the quasi Hegelianism of John McTaggart (1866–1925), and the personal idealism of Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856–1931), James Seth (1860–1924), and Hastings Rashdall (1858–1924), among others. Idealist philosophy was also influential in the subsequent decades in India (primarily through Sir Brajendra Nath Seal [1864–1938], whose humanism emphasized the parity of Eastern and Western cultures, and the philosopher and statesman Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan [1888–1975], who emphasized intuition over the rational consciousness of the earlier idealists), Canada (primarily through John Watson [1847–1939] and Leslie Armour [born 1931]), Australia (primarily through Francis Anderson [1858–1941], Mungo MacCallum [1854–1942], Ernest Burgmann [1885–1965], and Garnet Portus [1883–1954]), and South Africa (primarily through Arthur Ritchie Lord [1880–1941]). The leading Italian idealists differed significantly in their political persuasions: Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) was an outspoken liberal who was persecuted by Mussolini; Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944) was explicitly the philosopher of fascism, with his *Theory of Mind as Pure Act* (1916) being an attempted philosophical justification of the authoritarian nation-state as the protector of the people and the developer of their being as a corporate person.

Even though John Dewey defended Greenian ethics when young, at this time America's most significant defender of idealist political philosophy was Josiah Royce (1855–1916). While Royce denied any significant debts to either Hegel or Green, he acknowledged similarities between his own position and those of Green and Kant. Royce held conflict and struggle to be preconditions not

merely of an ethical life for the individual but of a meaningful life. Only by orientating one's life around some worthwhile end could life be given purpose and value and even then only if that orientation is made freely by the individuals themselves. The end, however, must be one valued within one's community, for in that way one's orientation toward it represents an act of loyalty, which Royce argued was a necessary feature of a worthwhile life. Ultimately, Royce held that every valuable human society developed through the action of a spirit within it that transcended the minds of individual citizens.

Several subsequent political philosophers have exhibited idealist tendencies, most notably Robin George Collingwood (1889–1943) and Michael Oakeshott (1901–1990) in Britain, both of whom, along with the other British idealists, attract significant scholarly attention today. The main themes defended by these idealist philosophers form the heart of much contemporary political philosophy and social theory, including the social construction of reality; the interrelationship of personal self-realization and cultural forms; the politics of recognition and identity politics; the state as an ideal type (in opposition to what is now called the "quasi state" or "failed state"); the defense of the participatory enabling, welfare state against attacks from advocates of the competition state; and the critique of utilitarianism as a dehumanizing theory of public policy. What is most remarkable is the extent to which many of the idealists discussed above provide more extensive and deeper insights into these very live political issues than one finds in most mainstream contemporary political philosophy.

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*See also* Citizenship; Common Goods; Communitarianism; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hermeneutics; Individualism; Kant, Immanuel; Liberalism; Normative Political Theory; Patriotism; Rights; State

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## IDEALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Idealism in the field of international relations has usually been identified with the perspectives, theories, and methods derived from the Wilsonian tradition. Referring to the ideals espoused by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, idealist perspectives such as liberalism and neo-conservatism assume that there are universal political and economic ideals that humans should aspire for. In international politics, these ideals are said to be liberty, freedom, democratic systems of representation, free markets, and capitalist trading systems. Certain forms of idealism also see international institutions (economic and political) as ensuring transparency and reinforcing the incentives for states to cooperate. Post-World War II idealism also incorporated some of the tenets of scientific positivism in the hope of first studying and then isolating variables that contaminated the ability of nation-states to cooperate so that such variables could be eliminated over time. For much of idealism's history, it has been contrasted with realist international relations theory, which sees national ideals as relative and pluralist, derived from an anarchical order of international politics founded on power and an order that cannot be transcended. There are two forms of idealist approaches usually considered in international relations—liberalism and neo-conservatism. This entry discusses these two approaches as well as the relationship between idealism and realism and the political nature of the term *idealism*.

## Idealist Approaches

### *Liberalism*

Liberalism assumes that while states operate within anarchy, and that states are indeed primarily self-interested, this self-interest lends itself to cooperation rather than conflict. Since the end of World War II, liberal idealism has had three branches. *Institutional liberalism* posits that international organizations and regimes facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty among states and increasing transparency. Some institutional idealists, sometimes termed *neoliberal institutionalists* or even *institutionalists*, may not even consider themselves “liberal” in the sense that they would argue that international institutions can facilitate cooperation regardless of the type of domestic political system of a nation-state. *Economic* or *commercial liberalism* asserts that open trading systems make cooperation more likely because the benefits of trade outweigh the costs of going to war. *Political liberalism* assesses the likelihood of cooperation or conflict as based on the nature of a country's political system. Political liberalism has developed into a separate research program of democratic peace theory—which posits that democratic countries are less likely to go to war with one another because of the structural and cultural nature of democratic decision making. While many liberals would disagree with the “idealist” moniker, they still see certain ideals as universally valid and posit that an international community where those ideals were allowed to flourish would be a much more peaceful and stable one than the unstable one we currently have.

### *Neo-Conservatism*

Neo-conservatism began as a domestic political movement in U.S. politics, but toward the conclusion of the Vietnam War and thereafter it became an approach to U.S. foreign policy and has now emerged as an approach to international politics. Neo-conservative argues that the United States bears a “special burden” because of its unique status as a nation-state and eventual great power. What has made the United States unique is the moral vision on which it was founded—liberty, human rights, democracy. These are universal principles, unlike those constituting past great power enterprises. Furthermore, these principles

have made the United States powerful by—as the neo-conservative sees it—“right making might.”

Neo-conservative idealism differs, however, in two major respects from liberal idealism. First, the neo-conservative emphasizes action—in U.S. politics it is sometimes termed *movement conservatism*. The United States’ imperative to act may sometimes outweigh its imperative to cooperate with multilateral organizations, which constrain nation-states in their abilities to act. Against threats not only to U.S. national security but also to the ideals of Western civilization, neo-conservatives argue that certain liberal institutional restraints can be dangerous in that they get in the way of an effective, expedient, and forceful American action. Second, neo-conservatism maintains a skeptical stance toward the scientific positivism of liberals. Neo-conservatives argue that while scientific studies can provide us with generalizations, and even statistical evaluations, they do not give meaning to these evaluations, nor could such studies serve as a guide toward moral action. In using “value-free” lenses in these scientific studies, such studies missed certain qualitative features of emerging threats, such as ideological and cultural attributes that made certain regimes or groups more of a challenge to the West than others. Furthermore, such scientific evaluation, and judicious reflection in general, could get in the way of action. Nevertheless, some of the most prominent neo-conservatives in both policy circles (such as Paul Wolfowitz) and intellectual circles (such as Joshua Muravchik) readily admit the connections between neo-conservatism and liberalism.

### Idealism and Realism

The term *idealism* in international relations is an old one. Idealism emerged as a dominant force in thinking about the world largely as a reaction to the World War I. In that conflict’s wake, it was assumed that war was senseless and hardly effective at obtaining national objectives. This thinking became a centerpiece during the so-called First Debate among international relations theorists between realists and idealists during the interwar period of 1919 to 1939. Idealism permeated many of the peace movements, the push and eventual construction of the League of Nations, as well as some of the political initiatives (such as the

Kellogg-Briand pact) to use legal means to outlaw war. This First Debate has been depicted as one in which idealists, putting their faith in Enlightenment principles such as reason, naively assumed that war could be legislated or collectively securitized away through international organizations such as the League of Nations. Ultimately, the depiction goes, interwar realists such as Edward Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr, and post-World War II ones such as Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, Arnold Wolfers, and Kenneth Osgood, “won” this debate when World War II disconfirmed much of the basis of interwar idealism.

Morgenthau, in *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, positioned scientific approaches to international relations as a form of idealist theory. Morgenthau asserted that such approaches approximated particularist bourgeois ideals (liberty, property, wealth, etc.) as universals, using those as a barometer to measure the “progress” of nations in global politics. According to Morgenthau, because these were abstract ideals, the study of these by the social scientist ignored the realities of power politics. Nevertheless, these scientific approaches toward the study of international relations became dominant during the 1950s and 1960s behavioral revolution of American social science, and thus, positivist frameworks because of their “problem-solving” approach to social action are considered by many classical realists to be another form of idealism.

Neo-conservative Joshua Muravchik has justified calling both liberalism and neo-conservatism forms of Wilsonianism with the helpful binary of possession versus milieu goals. Realists argue that the ordering principle of international politics—*anarchy*—by definition implies that there is no overarching or policing supranational authority. Thus, nation-states have possession goals—they seek to acquire as much power as possible to ensure their own survival. Both neo-conservatives and liberals, on the contrary, argue that the environment of international politics is subject to change if the political and economic institutions of members change; therefore, democratic states, such as the United States, can and should have milieu goals that seek change in the international environment. That is, a world constituted by economically and politically liberal democracies is much more stable and inclined to cooperation than a world constituted by totalitarian or authoritarian

regimes. Or, in another realm, a world where international trade can occur openly without tariffs or other forms of national economic protectionism is one where cooperation is more likely than in a world where trade occurs in isolated pockets, if at all.

As such, both liberalism and neo-conservatism have at their core a faith in the idealist “democratic peace” account, which posits that democratic countries are less likely to go to war with one another because of the structural and cultural nature of democratic decision making. They have also spawned a number of evaluative institutions, such as Freedom House and Transparency International, which assess nation-states’ economic and political development trajectories using operationalized liberal ideals as a metric.

Realist scholars and analysts have issued vibrant criticisms of both liberal and neo-conservative assumptions and policies. In addition to the realist-idealist debate in the interwar period, debates between realists and liberals in the 1980s and 1990s centered on the primary motives of nation-states and the implications such motives had for cooperation. Liberals posited that nation-states sought absolute gains and thus would cooperate with other states in certain interactions (such as trade) so long as both would gain, even if certain states gained more than others. Realists argued that nation-states sought gains relative to other states, and thus nation-states were more cooperation-averse because power was more important to nation-states in relative terms rather than absolute terms.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, realists and neo-conservatives have disagreed about the conception of U.S. foreign policy interests and acutely quarreled over the strategy of U.S.-led democratization of nondemocratic areas. Realists have argued that democratization is a fool’s errand, one that wastes U.S. resources for little, if any, strategic gains. Ideals such as freedom, liberty, and capitalism are complex, arising in the West from a particular constellation of factors, and thus, such ideals are hardly transferable to every global region. Neo-conservatives posit that fostering democratic regimes, which sometimes necessitates U.S. assistance through force, not only promotes universal ideals but also serves as a demonstration to the international community that these ideals are worth fighting

for. This realist/neo-conservative debate over democratization as a U.S. foreign policy strategy can be considered part of the larger debate realists have had with all forms of idealism over the past century.

### Political Nature of the Term

It should be noted that many liberals and neo-conservatives would eschew the label “idealist.” Often, idealism has been equated to a naive form of belief that peace is just around the corner if certain principles were implemented to amend the anarchical state of international politics. Both liberals and neo-conservatives have argued against their realist critics that their views, far from being naive, are derived from pragmatic social and historical patterns of human existence. For example, liberal democratic peace proponents would point to the many statistical studies proving that no two fully formed democracies have ever gone to war with one another. Neo-conservatives have also suggested that there is very little about realism that is “realistic,” since it fails to recognize the inherent threats to U.S. interests that pure power calculations cannot predict—for instance, the hostility that originates within and from volatile rogue regimes.

As evidence for the political purpose behind the label *idealism*, one can consider that the term was deployed in the 1990s by realist scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, against the then emerging perspective of constructivism in international relations. Other scholars have argued that constructivism, which sees intersubjective understandings, identities, perceptions, discourse, and social structures as central to international relations, reflects a liberal bias. While it is highly debatable that constructivism is a form of idealism, this attempt by realists and other scholars to label it as such is reflective of the more generally pejorative aura the term *idealism* still conjures in some circles of international relations. This is problematic, simply because all international relations perspectives, even realism, can be considered idealist in the sense that they approximate a world of particular ideals and seek mechanisms through which humans can realize those ideals for a more stable existence.

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*See also* Conservatism; Constructivism; Democratic Peace; Democratization; Realism in International Relations

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## IDENTITY, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL

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*Identity* is a somewhat ambiguous term and a contentious concept. With regard to individuals, groups, and societies, a differentiation between personal, social, and collective identity is common. In popular language and essentialist concepts, *personal identity* is used to denote an individual's self-concept: certain typical traits and meanings that are perceived as relatively stable over different situations and over time and that distinguish the self from other persons. Although some have questioned the universality of this concept, the idea of an essential inner self of the individual dominates at least contemporary Western concepts of the person. *Social identity* refers to societal or cultural influences on the development of the self, to memberships of individuals along a continuum of interaction groups (e.g., families, sports teams, political parties, and other networks), and to social categories (e.g., according to social roles such as mothers, teachers, sports fans). As such, social identity is also part of the personal identity. The terms *cultural identity* and *collective identity* mostly denote social identities of a large scale (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, class) and sometimes are also used to describe a relatively long enduring stability of values, institutions, symbols, and aims of a group, a society, or a nation-state

(e.g., represented in national consciousness). *National identity* is a special form of a collective, political identity, which consists mostly of a self-image based on certain assumptions about common features as descent, history, language, culture, subjective feelings of belonging, and/or citizenship. Furthermore, the term *identity* is used not only with regard to the microlevel and its aggregates but also to describe certain traits at the meso- or macrolevel (e.g., the identity of the Americans, the British Empire, or the Eastern world).

For some, *identity* means absolute sameness of human beings; thus, if used in a social or political context, it carries connotations of strong homogeneity between persons and a collective. From a normative democratic perspective, this meaning is rejected because it is linked to ideas of a homogeneous people, authoritative leadership, and dictatorship as well as a sharp definition of insiders and outsiders and a demarcation of friend and foe.

Others use *identity* to depict scientific concepts that play a certain role in the humanities and social sciences. Most of them point to the fact that identity usually has multiple facets, which can gain different salience in different situations and thus may also change over time in intensity and meaning. In addition, the term *identification* is used to denote a feeling of sameness with another person or group and loyalty toward its motives, ideals, aims, leaders, and so on.

Since, in the human sciences, there are many differing concepts of social and political identity, this entry concentrates on concepts referring to the levels of individuals and groups as holders of identity. After a few remarks concerning the historical roots of the concept of identity and a brief mention of some concepts referring to personal identity, the entry discusses selected major approaches to social identity. The final section deals with questions of political identity with respect to societies, especially at the level of national identity, and considers its relationship to subnational and supranational units of identification. Other aspects of political identity such as party identification or identity of social and political movements are not dealt with here. Similarly, this entry also does not deal with identity politics at the macrolevel (e.g., affirmative action in multicultural societies).

### Historical Roots of Identity Research

Early concepts of identity primarily dealt with the self as personal identity from a psychological perspective and concentrated on the development and consistency of the psyche. By contrast, sociology is concerned with social identity and its structural determinants, and social-psychological research focuses on human fundamentals in differing social contexts and thus on the interplay between cognitive, affective, and evaluative processes and social, cultural, and political influences and on their respective consequences for subsequent behavior.

The history of concepts of social identity in modern social sciences begins toward the first third of the 20th century. Early protagonists such as William James, Charles Horton Cooley, and George Herbert Mead had in common the view of identity as a product of constructions and perceptions of reality in social interactions. This was a main basis for the theoretical link between the individual and society. They argued that consciousness and self-knowledge are not natural, *a priori* characteristics of human behavior but features that both originate from and influence the processes of social interaction. Cooley's metaphor of a "looking glass self" describes how persons take their ideas about themselves from their perceptions of other persons' opinions about them. Somewhat later, James and Mead differentiated the self into the components "I" (internal perspective) and "Me" (external perspective). The component "Me" is determined by culture and society; it reflects social roles and expectations from others toward the person. These are learned and internalized in processes of socialization and identification with other persons or collectives. The component "I" means the spontaneous, active, more autonomous part of the self, which is not only a presupposition for the ability to identify with others and to learn social roles but also a necessary condition for the ability to keep a critical distance to the social self. This approach was further developed in theories of symbolic interactionism and phenomenology. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann conceptualized the socialization process as a dialectical one between identification by others (objective) and by self (subjective); they see this process as a mirror of a broader societal dialectic between subjective and objective reality.

In subsequent research, some authors concentrated on the "I" (personal identity) and linked this to ethno-methodological concepts, such as that of Alfred Schütz, or to the cognitive-structural approach of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. These approaches also distinguish an "ideal self," which means culturally framed ideas of how the self ought to be. The fit between these normative ideas and the perception of how the self actually is strongly affects a person's self-esteem.

Another approach, schema theory (e.g., Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor), in part also deals with personal identity and its cognitive components. Schemata are highly generalized and organized cognitive structures in memory that guide perceptions and interpretations of new information and memory recall and thus help reduce the amount of necessary cognitive processes of orientation. Identity is defined as a system of possibly hierarchically and context specifically ordered self-concepts. Situations that fit an individual's self-schemata are more likely than contrary information to be processed and stored in memory and thus form a consistent and relatively stable self-schema. Research shows that individuals' schematic identities are different in intensity and amount. Highly complex, multifaceted self-schemata may contribute to psychological health in situations that threaten part of the identity (e.g., if a person's identity as a worker is threatened because of unemployment, the psychological activation of other identities such as being a good father and a gifted singer in church might help uphold his self-esteem). Critics of schema theory argue that—because of its emphasis on learning effects and automatic cognitive processes—it leads to a too passive and static perspective of identity.

Cognitive dissonance theory (Leon Festinger) and social attribution theory (Philip E. Tetlock) additionally integrate the affective motivational basis of identity, namely, the desire for a positive self-esteem, in their models of information processing. Thus, if cognitions or attitudes become dissonant with each other or with behavior because of new information, individuals try to reach consonance by cognitive strategies such as downplaying the inconsistent new information or changing its meaning. In this way, an individual's self-serving bias is activated when positive events or outcomes of actions are attributed to the self, whereas for negative ones the situation or others are blamed.



## Social Identity

### *Approaches of Role Identity*

Other authors concentrated on the “Me” component of the self. In this context, Ervin Goffman laid the foundations of role theory. He distinguished between a personal identity (individual uniqueness of life experiences) and a social identity (role expectations and roles) of the individual. Both confront the individual with demands in daily interaction, which he conceptualized as a kind of role play on stage. It is assumed that persons do not identify totally with their different roles, because of ever-changing social interactions. A reflexive and somewhat distant relationship toward one’s own role identities is seen as especially characteristic for modernity. Thus, in traditional, relatively static societies, the “I” is strongly determined by the identification with (often primordial) social collectives (e.g., family, tribe, and guild) and, therefore, keeps close to the “Me,” possibly throughout one’s entire life. In modern societies, as Norbert Elias has argued, processes of social change, societal differentiation, and mobilization as well as globalization lead to an ongoing individualization. On the one hand, this is linked to rising freedom for the “I.” There are more role models to choose from, identity facets can change often from situation to situation, and multiple aspects of identity can coexist. On the other hand, they can also compete or even come into conflict with each other and thus result in identity crises. Erik Erikson defines a (healthy) identity as one that guarantees sameness and continuity of the self throughout life in one’s own perception and that includes the expectation that others will recognize this self. But modern societies can also produce problems such as a negative identity (e.g., identification with roles that are evaluated negatively by society and the individual him- or herself, because a positively evaluated role takeover was too difficult and failed) or competing identities (diverging structures of personality because of status inconsistencies in complex societies). Thus, modern societies produce more dangers and uncertainties concerning an individual’s identity and thus create the need for life-long reflection about the relationship between the “Me” and the “I.”

Some criticisms of this approach were directed toward the differentiation between personal identity

as an ostensibly “true” one and role/social identity as a “false” one or as a “calculating” perspective on the self.

Whereas in earlier concepts the self was related to interactions with other persons, in role theory the self is related to features of the social structure. Role identity depicts a certain position or status within a social system. All role theories share the assumption that society is differentiated into social roles, which carry behavioral norms, and that identity entails the internalization of these roles by individuals laying the ground for patterned, structured, and routinized action. In their concepts of identity, some theorists combine the symbolic interactionism approach with role theory. In this kind of theory, society is seen as a rather stable structure that results from repeated patterns of behavior of individuals and groups. Macrolevel structures are seen as the product of the multiple roles that individuals perform in day-to-day interactions. The self and its identity are created by these interactions and by the meanings that the multiple roles have for the actors, and—in a reflexive process—identities provide the meanings of the roles.

There are various approaches for a systematization of multiple roles and identities. For instance, Peter Burke’s taxonomy is oriented along different social situations: *Person identities* denote self-meanings, the meanings that characterize the individuality (as being active or passive, ambitious or unpretentious). Individuals carry around these identities across different situations and they are activated frequently. *Role identities* are activated in specific situations where individuals perform in certain functions (e.g., being a daughter, a mother, a wife, an artist, or a sports fan). The meanings linked to such roles or functions are determined by culture and socialization as well as the individual perceptions and assessments of these roles. *Social identities* emerge from the identification of individuals with social groups or categories. They define the belonging of insiders as well as of the outsiders on the basis of similarity/difference and they may lead to common bonds and actions. Individuals have identities of all three types and usually more than one of these types is invoked in social interactions.

Peter J. Burke and others also examine internal processes of an individual concerning his or her identity and its influence on behavior. Identities

here are seen as meanings attached to the self. The process of identity invoking is conceptualized as a perpetual control system, a circular process of self-definitions of identity meanings and their attachment to experiences in a feedback loop. This is assumed to lead to a permanent verification of the meanings of one's identity. Behavior is thought of as a function of the relationship between situations and identities.

Sheldon Stryker's analyses of the psychological organization of identities led him to a hierarchical concept of saliency and commitment. The main idea is that an individual's behavior is shaped by how often and how intensively his or her identities are activated. *Identity salience* refers to the probability that a specific identity is activated by others or by oneself. A salient identity is one that is invoked frequently and across different situations and contexts. The saliency of an identity determines the probability that the individual will enact roles that are consistent with this identity, that he or she will interpret situations as suitable to perform such roles, and even that an individual will seek opportunities to perform these roles. *Identity commitment* refers to the dependency of an individual's relationships to others on certain roles. The strength of the commitment defines the extent and intensity of an individual's attachment to other persons to whom he or she is linked by an identity. Strength of commitment and saliency usually go hand in hand, and the higher the position of an identity in the hierarchy, the greater is the probability the identity will be activated and thus shape behavior, which in turn reinforces its salience.

Others concentrate more on social positions as basis of roles and identity. George McCall and Jerry Laird Simmons distinguish between a conventional and an idiosyncratic component of role identity (similar to Erving Goffmann's distinction between social and personal aspects). The conventional component refers to expectations and internalized meanings linked to social positions; the idiosyncratic component refers to the individual meanings the respective roles have for the person. In this approach, a *prominence hierarchy* orders the identities according to their importance for an ideal self, which is seen as a result of the support an individual gains from others for a certain identity, an individual's commitment to an identity and reward for activating an identity. A *salience hierarchy* is

seen as a function of the identity prominence, a psychological need for support and rewards, and the perceived opportunities for the activation of identities in specific situations and thus is important for concrete behavior.

#### *Social Identity Theory and Social Categorization Theory*

Two other closely related theories in social psychology have gained much importance in identity research, namely, the so-called social identity theory by Henry Tajfel and the social categorization theory by John Turner and colleagues, both together often denoted as the social identity approach. This approach was developed in the 1960s as a cognitive theory of group identity to explain prejudice, discrimination, and conflicts between members of social categories or groups and has since generated a huge body of research to test its basic assumptions and to generate new hypotheses. In part, it rests on earlier research and also shares some assumptions with other approaches to explain prejudice and conflict, but in other aspects it clearly departs from them.

Earlier research to explain prejudice focused on psychological traits and defects of the unconscious of individuals (e.g., the concept of the authoritarian personality in the work by Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford or on attitudinal predispositions learned in early childhood (as in the concept of symbolic racism of Donald Kinder and David Sears). But both approaches are limited with respect to identity insofar as they remain restricted to the personal level and cannot explain changes in discrimination and conflict. Another concept, the theory of social dominance (e.g., James Sidanius), not only goes beyond personal identity but also has difficulties in explaining why and under what conditions discrimination and conflicts arise in certain situations. It claims that all societies are hierarchical and have at least one hegemonic and one subordinate group that usually hold prejudices against each other. This social dominance orientation reflects a normal psychological desire to belong to a high-status group. Thus, individual and institutionalized discrimination is seen as a normal feature of societies, which are perpetuated by processes of social identification, self-esteem

maintenance, and social comparison. Realistic group conflict theory (e.g., Muzafer Sherif) assumes that conflicts between groups are based on competition for scarce resources and thus follow the principle of individual rationality. The conflicts are seen as the basis for ingroup identification and for ongoing psychological processes of stereotyping and discrimination of the outgroup. A recommended solution for such conflicts is to alter the group identification by imposing superordinate common goals. Critiques of this approach emphasize that the framing of the group conflict and the proposed solution undermine its rational choice basis. Furthermore, a change of identity by imposing superordinate goals may be possible only in very restricted situations, not in real-life conflicts of a broad range such as conflicts between ethnic groups or even nation-states, which may lead to war.

The social identity approach suggests that identification with an ingroup and distinction from/discrimination against outgroups are two sides of one coin and that competition for scarce resources is not a necessary condition for these processes. The empirical roots of this research are based on the minimal group paradigm. Here, in laboratory experiments, artificial groups were formed on the basis of overtly senseless tests (e.g., whether somebody preferred Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky as a painter) or even by lot, which was known by the participants. The participants had no interaction, there was no competition, and they did not know anything about each other. When asked to reward members of their own and of the other group, they consistently favored their own group and thus showed bias against the other group. Moreover, this ingroup favoritism did not occur in a way that maximized the benefit for one's own group (which would have supported the realistic group conflict model), but led to a maximum difference between both groups. Thus, a distinction of groups based on purely cognitive belonging produced ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination.

Social identity theory also rests on claims about psychological needs: Individuals strive for positive self-esteem, which leads them to identify with groups that will enhance their self-image. This is only possible if the ingroup is distinct from other relevant groups in a positive way. Moreover, a need to reduce uncertainty compels persons to compare and categorize groups as well as the self

in relation to such groups. This social-psychological approach also takes a perspective on identity that differs from the sociological symbolic interactionist concept, because it does not conceptualize all identities as inherently social. Rather, it argues that group identity is formed in contrast to personal identity, claiming a continuum between both, along which behavior can move. Thus it assumes that group psychology and behavior are qualitatively distinct from the intra-individual and individual ones. The central aim is to explain under what conditions and how group bias occurs. For this process, three main tenets have been defined—namely, the salience of group membership, the situational context, and the individual's beliefs. Thus, for a social identity to affect perceptions, cognitions, attitudes, and behavior, the mere awareness of group membership is not enough. As long as the personal identity is more salient than social identity, the individual will behave in an interpersonal manner that takes account of personal traits and relationships between the actors. But if social identity becomes psychologically more salient, group behavior will occur. Since everybody develops multiple group memberships and corresponding social identities, the objective context is also relevant for defining which special social identity fits the situation best. Subjective interpretations of the situation as well as beliefs about the group memberships intervene in this process. The most important beliefs refer to chances for individual mobility or chances for social change, both of which represent the poles of a continuum. These imply corresponding strategies, if the outcome of a comparison between one's own membership group and another one is negative. For example, if a person thinks that it is possible to leave the ingroup and become a member of a comparable group with a higher status, he or she will act in this direction. This presupposes a belief in an open social structure or society. By contrast, if the personal strategy does not promise an enhancement of self-esteem, an action as a group member will be undertaken to change collectively the status of the ingroup, which includes a high saliency of social identity. Such actions can include social creativity (e.g., a change of the dimension of comparison, a change of the evaluation of the compared attributes, or a change of the group of comparison) or social competition/confrontation.

Whereas the ingroup favoritism/outgroup bias has been demonstrated consistently, empirical support for the self-esteem motive has been less strong. This may have contributed to a rise in interest in the cognitive dimension of the theory during the 1980s in the work of John Turner et al. They understand their self-categorization theory as an extension and elaboration of the social identity theory. Here, social identity is defined as a set of cognitive representations of the self. Two contributions are mentioned here, namely, the concept of multiple levels of inclusiveness and that of prototypicality. The idea is that self representations are organized along a hierarchy of categories, which are defined by similarity within classes and dissimilarity between classes, based on the metacontrast principle (this means, the interesting dimensions of categorization are classified in a way that minimizes the differences within a category and maximizes them with regard to other categories). Meaningful comparisons and classifications presuppose a similarity of the interesting traits and respective categories at a higher level. Thus—instead of a continuum between the personal and the social self—they suggest at least three main levels of identity. The most inclusive and therefore superordinate level is that of human beings against other forms of life (animals, plants); the intermediate level comprises membership in social groups as against other comparison groups (e.g., men and women, Europeans and Americans, the political Left and Right); and the subordinate level focuses on the individual and the differences from other ingroup members. Obviously, on the level of social groups, these again can show different patterns of inclusiveness, which can be seen as hierarchical or nested patterns (e.g., women, European women, left-oriented European women as against their respective counterparts). A group prototype is someone who shows the highest value of metacontrast on a certain dimension of comparison. Thus, prototypicality can change depending on the situation. Prototypes can serve as a model for other group members and thus can foster self-stereotyping of ingroup members and stereotyping outgroups. This depersonalization contributes to ingroup homogeneity and distinctiveness as well as to outgroup bias and is seen as central to all group processes.

From a sociological point of view, a general critique is that the ontological assumption of an

independent person fluctuating between personal and social identities restricts the possibilities to account for social processes, especially with respect to the influences of political and economic macro-factors, because these can only be taken into account as specific traits of the situation. Another problem is that most research in this field relies on laboratory experiments and thus cannot simulate the complexity of the real-life world, which questions the external validity of such findings. From the perspective of political science, another deficit is the relative neglect of motivational factors and emotions linked to identities and their consequences.

### *Narrativity of Social Identity*

Recent research in understanding social identity is also linked to social constructivism and the discursive approach, resting on poststructuralist perspectives and the interpretive paradigm. It is not concerned with individual or social-psychological processes of identity but concentrates on narrative, linguistic constructions of identity. A central assumption is that a person's identity is not a stable outcome and entity but has to be conceptualized as a permanent process of construction in language and talk in changing situations. Within this process, prevailing ideologies are said to be powerful mechanisms to determine identity so that an individual only has the illusion of an actively and freely chosen concept of the self. An example is Michael Billig's work on the link between thinking and arguing. Narratives are also seen as a person's self-representation toward others, which may appear stable and continuous but in fact can change (e.g., Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen). On the whole, these different approaches toward social identity have laid the ground for and can contribute ever more to the understanding of political identity as well.

### **Political Identity**

National identity is one among other collective identities, and—in contrast to many other political identities—it is linked to a political as well as a territorial point of reference, a political community at the level of the nation-state. This community usually is thought of as one that encompasses people of both sexes, from all age-groups, and from all

social strata. Typically, national identity also rests on beliefs about certain commonalities among the members of the group, such as a common ancestry, ethnicity, language, religion, culture, and values; a sense of belonging; political rights; participation, and so on. These are often thought to overcome contrasting and competing utilitarian interests of the members (e.g., those between different classes) and thus are crucial for the integration of society. Some of these characteristics also apply to sub- (local, smaller regional) and supranational identities (encompassing more than one nation in bigger regions ranging from border areas over continents to the whole human race or referring to supranational political units such as the European Union [EU]). Problems of national identity are most prominent in research, whereas sub- and supranational identities are often discussed only in their relation to national identities.

In political science, diverse subdisciplines deal with national identity, national movements, nationalism, and nation-building processes. With respect to national identity in the more restricted sense of the topic, research is based mainly on political sociological and political cultural approaches resting on behaviorism and working with surveys, although it is less linked than the topic of social identity to certain authors or research schools. In contrast to sociology and social psychology, political science is also less concerned with the cognitive basis of identity and more with affective components and its determinants and consequences. Moreover, identity is rarely treated as a cognitive categorization but rather as an attitude, as identification. Especially when dealing with national identity on a microlevel, the purely cognitive categorization seems self-evident, because there is almost no one who does not know to which nation he or she belongs. But categorization processes become a topic when dealing with stereotyping between different nationalities within a country or between countries. Here, questions concern the intensity of collective identification, the relationships between identifications with different collectives, and reference objects as the content and meaning of identity.

#### *Intensity of Political Identification*

People have been and still are ready to fight for their country. Wars in the name of country and

nation again and again have shown unbelievable cruelties and destruction. Usually the losses and pains are not only on the side of the losers but also on the side of the winners. So the question is why people fight voluntarily and willingly in wars. Yet all nations and societies can function only for a time on the basis of common instrumental aims and interests; in the long run, they probably need a basis of common values and norms, which underlie a common identity. Moreover, most interests and identities are not mutually exclusive but work as reinforcing foundations of integration. Without these forces of integration any nation will fall apart, inner conflicts may arise, and civil war can be a consequence.

The different scenarios of war between nations or civil war within a nation may depict the poles of a spectrum from extreme national identification (highly salient cognitive national identity and strong affective identification) to a total loss of a common national identification (be it against a background of other interests or identities, such as in class struggles, race riots, or religious confrontations, or against a background of other national identities, such as in secessionism and separatist movements). Diverse national as well as cross-national survey research findings show that a purely cognitive identification with a nation (knowledge about one's national belonging, also called national consciousness) usually does not go along with a bias for one's own nation and aggressiveness toward others. Yet a purely cognitive identification is seldom seen. More often national consciousness is accompanied by positive feelings toward one's nation—for example, those expressed in national pride. In most, but not all countries and periods of research (also depending on the kind of measurement and the indicators used), the strength of positive feelings toward one's own nation shows links to ingroup bias and outgroup discrimination. Thus, for example, with the increasing intensity of national identification, it is not only the probability of constructive patriotism (seen as critical loyalty to one's own nation) that increases but also the probability of blind nationalism (designating an attitude that puts one's own nation on top of everything, regardless of its state of affairs: "Right or wrong, my country"). Moreover, this often coincides with skeptical or hostile attitudes toward immigrants and immigration per se and mistrust of

other countries and peoples. Research has also shown that an extremely strong national identification often is accompanied by low identification with other political collectives and social groups and even more private roles—a loss of other identities giving place to the national one or the national one replacing the others. With regard to determining factors, within Western democracies a high level of education and a favorable socioeconomic position often lead to only moderate levels of national identification, at least in times of peace. By contrast, fast social change, feelings of anomie, and sometimes feelings of relative deprivation foster national and nationalistic attitudes. A perceived threat from immigrants and from other nations often contribute to a rise in national identification. This also points to the fact that national identification is also dependent on the political context. Thus, for instance, in Eastern European countries, national identification today is much stronger than in most Western countries as a consequence of their newly won freedom from the former Soviet empire. Similarly, intellectuals and higher status groups in non-Western societies, as in the Middle East, often exhibit a higher level of nationalism (or religious fundamentalism) because of feelings of relative deprivation and of being dominated by the West, as noted by Bettina Westle and Paolo Segatti (2011). Historical facts and contextual events may also lead to periods where great parts of the population show only low levels of national identification or even negative feelings toward their own nation. This has been observed in countries that have been occupied or were defeated in war (e.g., Belgium) and in countries where many in the population felt guilty or ashamed about former wars and war crimes (e.g., West Germany).

Thus, all in all, it is known that some collective national identification is necessary for the inner cohesion of nation-states, but there is no straightforward answer to the question of how much intensity of national identification is needed and at which point it might become harmful. It can be said that the possible effect of national identification not only depends on the intensity of these feelings but also on the question of how far the national identity is accompanied by other identities or is exclusive. Moreover, it varies with the self-image of the nation, the content, meaning, or objects of national pride (which reflect the dimensions of the ingroup

definition). Finally, strong positive feelings toward one's own nation are a precondition for nationalistic attitudes, but such feelings do not automatically result in nationalistic attitudes. And those feelings are per se neither helpful nor harmful, unless they become politically mobilized and lead to action. In Western democracies, mostly populist and right-wing parties mobilize traditional nationalistic attitudes on the basis of economic problems, which then typically are not directed against other countries but against the perceived cause of the economic problems—for example, immigrants or, in Europe, the European Union.

#### *Relationships Between Nonpolitical and Political/National Identifications*

National identity usually coexists with other diverse social and political identities. As political psychology shows, one can feel, for example, as a woman, a mother, a scientist, a dancer, and a member of a nation. Such identities belong to different domains of life and therefore usually do not compete or conflict with each other. Rather, they can be activated differently in diverse situations; for example, talking with children will activate one's identity as a mother, going to a party will highlight the salience of one's identification as a dancer and probably as a woman, teaching students a lesson will activate one's identity as a scientist, and getting confronted with the problems of foreign students or going to an international meeting may activate not only one's identity as a scientist but also one's own national identity. In the same way, national identity is compatible with various other political identities within a country, such as party identification or being a trade unionist, and even with identities that go beyond the nation-state, such as being a member of Amnesty International or identifying with Greenpeace. In the latter cases, the activation of the international identity may compete with the national identity, but it also can strengthen it, depending on the concrete conditions of the situation. Because national identity is rather close to the collective end of the continuum of possible identities between personal and collective, it can include many other identities. But situations that will primarily or even exclusively activate national identity are rather rare, as in the case of a national celebration or in cases of international conflicts.

*Relationships Between Different Political/  
National Identifications and Between  
Subnational and National Identities*

More difficult are the relationships between national identity and other political identities, which also refer to nationality and/or to potential or real territorial-political collectives. Thus, there are many countries that can be called multinational states, because people who identify with more than one nation live within such countries. This is caused by different historical developments, which often underlie different situations and relationships between the respective nationalities.

A typical example for a historically multinational country is Switzerland, where French, German, and Italian populations (and even a small Ladino one) live together, in different parts of the country, with a great deal of autonomy and without major problems. Most of the Swiss citizens feel as though they are Swiss citizens, though they may have French-, German-, or Italian-Swiss identities as well. Another example is Belgium, with a Walloon (French speaking), a Flemish (Dutch speaking), and a small German-speaking population. Though these populations live in different parts of the country and there are highly complex political institutions for representation, conflicts between Wallonia and Flanders arise again and again. One example of aggressive conflicts and the desire for separation is Northern Ireland, though Britain has decentralized its political structures. Spain is another example where decentralization of political structures was undertaken to give people of different historically rooted nationalities, who also live in different parts of the country, more autonomy. This was partly successful, for example, in Catalonia. But other parts now also strive for more autonomy, and Euskadi (the Basque part) especially has a separatist movement, with the aim of creating a separate state together with the Basques living in France. On an individual level, these examples show that citizens tend to identify more intensively or even exclusively with their (officially) subnational identity than with their national one and sometimes strive to form a sovereign nation of their own. Historically rooted feelings of national identity that accompany contemporary distinguishing features with regard to other parts of the population or that even lead to political cleavages (e.g., a different religion or

language, translated into politics) and/or that go along with feelings of economic deprivation are factors that often lead to inner conflicts and secessionist or separatist movements. But a favorable economic situation can also contribute to the wish for more national autonomy to avoid having to share welfare benefits with the poorer parts of a country, as is the case with northern Italy. Yet to satisfy the desires associated with such political identities through institutions of territorial autonomy is evidently possible only if the respective populations with a common we-feeling live predominantly in different internally homogeneous parts of the country or belong to a diaspora in which national minorities live in adjacent territories of another country.

In countries that are made up of many different ethnicities/nationalities and/or in countries where the populations of different nationalities are spread over the territory, such solutions are not possible. Such countries also show quite different histories and current situations with respect to questions of national identity. One typical situation is produced by nation-building processes in postcolonial countries. Often boundaries were drawn that did not respect traditional (prenational) we-feelings, such as in Africa, and therefore may lead to inner conflicts as well as to conflicts between countries. In other postcolonial cases, such as in India, huge populations with quite different ethnicities, traditions, languages, and cultural customs have succeeded in forming a common political identity.

Another constellation could be found after the dissolution of greater political entities, as in Eastern Europe in the 1990s with the breakdown of the Soviet empire. The Soviets have tried for almost a century to build a common communist identity that should overcome earlier ethnic and national identities. Yet this was only partly successful, and today these countries attempt to rebuild their earlier national identities in a situation of newly gained political sovereignty. This situation also produced new national, territorially concentrated, as well as dispersed minorities and diasporas. Thus, the split of former Czechoslovakia into two states is an example of a peaceful solution for the national self-determination of two populations with different identities and living in different parts of a country. The Baltic countries are an example of relatively peaceful ways of dealing with

minorities, especially the large Russian minorities (mainly members of the former military and their families) by granting them certain minority rights and possibilities to gain full citizenship. By contrast, in the former Yugoslavia, extremely violent conflicts especially between (mainly Catholic) Croats, (mainly Orthodox) Serbs, and (mainly Muslim) Bosniaks developed, which destroyed the country and led to a division into several parts.

Other typical contexts in which different national identities play a role are caused by migration. Today there are so-called immigration countries—those where immigrants dominate an indigenous population, such as Australia, or where national subcommunities are formed from different subpopulations, including indigenous populations, descendants from early settlers, and new immigrants, as in the French- and English-speaking regions of Canada. Another example is the United States, where the population includes not only the indigenous American Indian population but also the descendants of immigrants from Europe, Latin America, and Asia, as well as the descendants of African slaves. These different populations come together with quite different backgrounds with respect to their identities—in some cases with a strong national identity, in others with a negative national identity with regard to their countries of descent, and in some with a nonnational but mainly ethnic identity based on race, language, or religion. Against this background of different ethnic or national identities and the feeling that a common political national identity is necessary to guarantee societal integration and stability of the political system, different ideas have developed (which in more or less moderated forms also have influenced other immigration countries): the perspective of a melting pot; the concept of a multicultural, ethnic pluralist society; and the group dominance and assimilation perspective. The melting pot concept suggests that all citizens regardless of their ethnic or ancestral national background form a common political identity and in the long run mingle with each other in such a way that the different identity backgrounds lose importance and form a new common composite identity. The multicultural concept, often associated with the metaphor of a salad bowl or mosaic, implies that the different ethnic and national groups keep their distinctive characteristics and identities but are

respected as equal and as complementary reinforcing loyalties. The group dominance concept articulates that in multiethnic and immigration countries, there is one dominant group that claims to have preeminent rights and can legitimately expect newcomers to adapt to their rules and lifestyle and in the long run adopt the dominant group's national identity. These ideas are also linked to different identity politics. The melting pot concept disregards ethnic and former national identities. By contrast, the multicultural concept is linked to policies such as affirmative action in order to support the different identities, especially in cases where some groups have historically been deprived of social or political rights and chances of economic advancement. The assimilation concept is linked to politics that promote but also demand that immigrants adapt to the dominant group. As different and contrary as these concepts are, they all are intended to ensure peaceful relations between groups with different identities. However, there is no uncontested evidence that shows which concept works best. For example, in some cases the respect and support of different identities have helped pacify conflicts between groups, but in others they have led to a reinforcement of ethnic, exclusive identities with aggressive potential toward groups of other identities. Also, when individuals and groups keep their former national identification in addition to the new one, their national loyalty may be questioned, especially if the country of origin and the country of immigration should become involved in a conflict. Thus, identity politics in multiethnic and multinational contexts (with dispersed settlement) may involve a choice between two hazardous alternatives—like the one the sailors confronted between Scylla and Charybdis.

Finally, a new form of multiple national identity seems to arise with processes of globalization and migration, namely, so-called transnational identities. They may become characteristic for persons who live in more than one country, perhaps because they work in more than one country or because they have their family in one country and work in another, who migrate and re-migrate. With regard to multicultural societies, evidence and speculations about this kind of multiple identity are rather diverse, reaching from the expectation that for such individuals national identity will



lose any relevance and they will develop into cosmopolitans to the contrary expectation that the different identities may reinforce each other permanently or to the expectation that those identities permanently will conflict with each other and cause individual identity crises.

*Relationship Between National and Supranational Identity: The European Union*

The idea of a cosmopolitan identity as well as concepts of a supranational identity mostly remained apolitical, because they did not have any specific political object of identification. Yet this is changing in the EU, as it develops from a mainly economic community to a political unit. Protagonists of European integration increasingly see a European identity as necessary for the chances and stability of this multilevel political community. A crucial difference from other situations such as nation-building or immigration countries is that the EU consists of countries that have developed their national identities for a long time. Thus, if a common European identity is to develop, it should not be in competition with the primarily ethnic or ancestral national identities but should be formed against the background of current national identities. Therefore, and before the foundation of the European Community (EC) was based on the aim of overcoming national rivalries and securing peace between its members, many supporters of the EC/EU expected that the national identities would lose importance for the sake of a developing European identity. Yet empirical data (mainly collected in the Eurobarometer surveys) show no decrease in national loyalties and no rise of European identity. They also reveal, from country to country and time to time, differing relationships between national and European identifications, with correlations ranging from negative to none to positive. Thus, the idea of a compatibility of national and European identity gained ground, which some researchers conceptualize as a hierarchical system (similar to identifications with one's town, one's region, and one's nation in federal countries) and others as a nested structure (like a Russian matryoshka doll), which is more apolitical and refers to territories, or as a structure like a marble cake, in which national and European components might mix and blend. Although compatibility of both identities can be

shown for most of the member countries, the national identities until now remain by far stronger than the European one. Moreover, it seems as if changes in the relationship between the two identities follow a pattern, which has to do with the EU policy itself. Times of enforced integration and policies, which bring to mind a competition between member countries or between the national and the EU level, tend to reduce the European identification and to strengthen the national ones perhaps because of fears about a loss of national achievements. Thus, it is still an open question how far the existing European identity may reach in times of stress, and there are doubts about an EU-wide loyalty, for instance, in case of redistribution policies. Reasons for the difficulties in developing a strong European identification are manifold—for instance, the absence of a common history, a common language, culture, religion, media system, and so on, as well as the absence of clear boundaries and a clear aim with regard to common political structures. Researchers who conceptualize European identity in strong analogy to national identities therefore are mostly pessimistic about its chances, whereas others hope for the possibility that a common democratic culture might arise out of the heterogeneous general cultures and that this demos-based identity can be become sufficient for future political cohesion

**Content and Meanings of Political Identities**

The intensities of national, subnational, and supranational identifications and the links between them tell something about the relevance of these identities but nothing about their content or meaning. For a long time, answers to the question about the meaning of national identity were primarily informed by historical and macrosociological research. These mostly formulated dichotomous typologies, for instance, state-building nations versus nation-building states, cultural versus political nations, or ethnic versus civic nations. Sometimes, the former were linked to an Eastern model and the latter to a Western model. Additionally, the former ones are seen as less compatible than the latter ones with democracy, with openness toward immigration and with peaceful relations to other countries. Thus, the ethnic nation is associated with a high potential for aggressive nationalism,

whereas the civic nation is linked to a loyal and constructive, but not fanatical, patriotism. Although these dichotomies have become somewhat contested in recent years, on the individual level they are mirrored, albeit not in a perfect way, as shown by diverse national survey data and by two studies in 1995 and 2003 of the International Social Science Programme (ISSP). An ethnic national identity mostly refers to primordial, ascribed features such as ancestry (“blood”), place of birth, and place of living and religion, whereas a civic identity builds on achievable and voluntary characteristics such as subjective feelings of belonging and political rights and institutions. Additionally, both kinds of identity can be linked to cultural objects, for example, language and way of life. Yet these types of identity do not distinguish between nations but rather between different strata of the population within countries. Furthermore, in some countries something like a postnational identity, denying the relevance of nationality and instead referring to the humanity as such, can be found. In any case, the ethnic type of national identity tends to go along with a more closed concept of the nation, in respect to immigrants as well as to other nations and supranational communities.

Finally, recent research questions also deals with the meaning of European identity. Some works on public narratives and discourse analyses find that national identity and European identity are intertwined in a strong way. Either they assume that the image of Europe has already influenced nation building in the early historical phases, or others find that different narratives about Europe are built into the national narratives. But again, analyses of ordinary citizens’ thoughts about their national identity and their European identity (on the basis of the Europe-wide survey data of the project “Integrated and United” in 2008 and 2009) do not support these assumptions. Thus, both the national and the European identity concepts, and the links between them, do not distinguish different nations but rather different groups of individuals within nations. An ascribed national identity mostly goes along with a concept of European identity, which rests on the same characteristics, as is the case with religion as a basis of both identities and political rights, whereas cultural features are seen as a dimension that differs

in the respective nations and in Europe as a whole. With the ongoing processes of modernization, internationalization, and globalization, the meanings of political identities and their consequences will remain a major field of research in the future.

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*See also* Citizenship; Civil Society; Democratization; Ethnicity; European Integration; Individualism; Multiculturalism; Nation Building; Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Patriotism; Political Culture; Political Integration; Political Socialization; Racism; Regional Integration (Supranational); Secession; Social Cohesion

#### Further Readings

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## IDEOLOGY

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The word *ideology* was coined by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy, who defined it as the “science” of the “intellectual faculties” of animals, therefore as a component of zoology but a component crucial for man, an animal for whom thought is fundamental. What Destutt de Tracy called *idéologie*, he might have named *psychology* (*psyche*, “soul” in Greek) if, as an empiricist and a utilitarian, he had not disapproved of this term. Ideology as he meant it was not just a general grammar but a form of logic that should enable men to think better and therefore to live better together in society. This entry first examines the evolution of ideology in Marxist thought. It then describes the development of the concept of ideology in 20th-century thought—for example, in the analysis of education, the elaboration of structuralism from a Marxism perspective, the explanation of totalitarianism, and the analysis of the relationships between ideology, science, and religion.

### Ideology in Marxist Thought

This meaning was radically transformed by Karl Marx (and Friedrich Engels). In their theory—devised for the political purpose of bringing about a liberating revolution—ideology constitutes a sphere of society to be conceptually distinguished from the other two spheres, the economy and

politics. Marx took up the word *ideology* and used it negatively to criticize the understanding that the driving force of history is ideas; Marx claimed that the driving force is not ideology but labor. Dividing thinkers into idealists and materialists, Marx declared that ideology was the idealist’s illusion. However, despite the fact that society depended on the economy, ideological illusion was an essential part of that society, necessary to its operation. According to Marx, professional thinkers—that is, philosophers, clerics, jurists—believed that the world is governed by ideas. This belief had to be overturned, for in fact effective history was the history of production, labor, and modes of production. Men’s consciousness, which was formalized in philosophy, religion, and law, amounted to a mystifying derivative of their material practices. In sum, Marx explained, ideology was “false consciousness,” and in their false perception, men turned reality upside down: “If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process” (Marx, *The German Ideology*, Pt. 1, sec. A). The error could be corrected, but the victims of the illusion were caught in a formidable trap: They did not know they were under the spell of false representations—hence Marx’s stigmatizing of religion as “the opium of the people.” The same applied to belief in political representation (universal suffrage, elections, parliaments); such belief mystified men by denying the reality of class differences. Marx’s theory of ideology is thus inseparable from a theory of domination (*Herrschaft*): Ideology works to stabilize the existing social order, wherein one group necessarily dominates all others. The dominant class dominates economically (as the labor-exploiting class), politically (it holds state power), and ideologically (its ideas impose themselves as a general belief system).

### The Concept of Ideology in 20th-Century Thought

Marx’s analysis of ideology as illusion was explicitly reused by Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron in their theory of how pedagogical and political authority is legitimated. The initial target of their critique was the ideology of giftedness, a

model for their critique of ideology as legitimation of authority. In the modern French educational system, Bourdieu and Passeron explained, teachers, pupils, and parents all believe that scholastic success depends on having a gift, when in fact it depends on the “cultural capital” a person has inherited. False belief in giftedness was what enabled the system to function, objectifying the failure of some pupils and legitimating the success of others in psychological terms when in fact that success was the product of the schooling system’s “symbolic violence.” Domination is all the more effective because the social mass of “the dominated” is blind to the principle of domination. Theories of ideology thus became linked to theories working to criticize and combat illusion and alienation.

In Marx’s thinking, the polemic aspect was crucial because while criticism was an active practice amounting to revolutionary mobilization, it was also an intellectual one (the subtitle of *Capital* is “Critique of Political Economy”). Ideology was to be criticized in the name of science, which combated ideas that were derived not from true knowledge but from mere opinion (or the *doxa*, a Greek term Bourdieu liked to use). But ideology was not just false; it was also linked to the interests of the respective classes battling each other. The ideology of the nobility in ancien régime France (according to which the social order was founded on three hierarchically ranked groups: the nobility, on top, followed by the clergy, and then the third estate) ran up against the ideology of the bourgeoisie, a class fighting in favor of its own understanding—corresponding to its own interests—that all men had equal rights. This egalitarian, individualist ideology triumphed with the French Revolution, and it allowed the market system to develop and spread. But the revolutionary proletariat, declared Marx, could free itself from all such illusions and attain true knowledge. The various Marxist theories could therefore present themselves as true knowledge that coincided with the only true ideology: the ideology of the proletariat.

While ideologies divided society, they also played a functional role: It was precisely because ideology was an illusion that it enabled the given social order to maintain itself. In Louis Althusser’s structural Marxist perspective, developed in the mid-1960s, ideology is the sphere of representation, and it

could be an efficient cause of some forms of social organization, though in the last analysis, that role was determined by economic organization. An example of this relation between the sphere of representation and the economic sphere is Christianity in the feudal mode of production. The feudal arrangement known as the *corvée* amounted to blatant exploitation in that the serf had to work for the feudal lord for a certain amount of time every year, receiving nothing in exchange. By sanctifying this social order, Christianity enabled the feudal system of extorting “surplus value” to remain in place, whereas in the capitalist economy, that same extortion was masked by the form known as the wage. Moreover, in the capitalist economy, the ideology of equal human rights allowed for the perpetuation of a system based on radical inequality—the inequality between those who had to sell their labor power and those who were in a position to buy it. Revolutionary struggle, then, in Marx’s understanding, was first and foremost an ideological battle whose ultimate purpose was to dispel illusion.

The understanding that ideology stabilizes existing social power relations was used in various forms by all communist regimes. In these regimes, ideology—in the form of propaganda and dogma that can be changed at any moment by the political power—would promote “true” doctrine. This in turn explains why for Hannah Arendt and Carl J. Friedrich, the existence of a single mass party with an official ideology was one defining attribute of the totalitarian syndrome. There was no need for people to believe in the ideology; in a totalitarian system, ideology of itself forbade all discourse except the one emanating from the party, and it did not matter that people knew that discourse to be a false one. Here, ideology has been virtually emptied of content, becoming little more than an obligation to lie and to acclaim the party and its leader.

In Maoism, on the other hand, ideology was conceived of as the ultimate condition for the triumph of the revolution. Ideological combat was the driving force of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, launched in 1966. The understanding here was that the political and economic revolution had not been enough to transform China radically, lastingly; what was needed was a revolution in belief that would replace the bourgeois

ideology with a new, people's ideology (wherein a sense of the collective would put down individualism, for example). As Mao saw it, having pure, radical revolutionary ideas was more important than having experience or expert knowledge. The ideological superstructure was presented as a force with the power either to slow down the revolution or to drive it forward. This explains the attacks in Mao's China against such doctrines as revisionism and Confucianism and also the violence against people who bore these "deviations" or traditions within them: They were stigmatized as—and treated like—vermin that had to be eradicated. In this way, Maoism actually reversed Marxism: The structure of social power relations was understood to *depend* on representations—that is, doctrinal purity. The Chinese Cultural Revolution can be understood as a war waged by one component of the political elite against other components, but it did not bring ideological struggle to an end; it continues in post-Maoist China. The party's hold on the means and content of communication has been the determinant for keeping it in power, and it does not hesitate to use strong coercive means. In any case, the collapse of Soviet communism definitively devalued the prestige of communism in the West. The "end of ideology" announced by Daniel Bell in 1960—namely, the end of the prestige of communist millenarianism—affected not only communist sympathizers but also the communist parties themselves. Some authors say that religious belief has returned to fill the void left by communist ideology, as if a society needed ideology. The claim leads to establishing an equivalency between a political program such as communism and systems of representation that are not necessarily linked to programs for transforming the world. This brings up the question of the political meaning of Islamism and its relation to theocratic programs.

The role played by Marxism as dogma in the Soviet regime led analysts to describe it as an "ideocracy": Because the communist party and its leaders had to justify any and all decisions with reference to an absolute truth whose prescriptions had to be followed in all circumstances, communist ideology has been described as a millenarian religious thought system. The same term has been applied to Nazism, but this disregards the real difference between the rudimentary totalitarian language of

Nazism—the Nazi *Weltanschauung*, comprising *Führerprinzip*, hatred of democracy and Marxism, and anti-Semitism—and communist ideology, structured by abundant and in some cases sophisticated doctrines and numerous cultural references. Communist ideology has been compared with church ideology, and the term *ideocracy* has been extended to include power systems such as Islam in which religion structures social life. The anthropologist and political thinker Ernest Gellner grouped together communism and Islamism as ideocracies but specified that Islamic regimes do not impose a single economic form on their societies (as communist regimes did) and, thus, they allow the development of the market and industrial society. From this perspective, ideology appears a universal social dimension that can take a variety of forms, depending on the content of its doctrine and institutions. For example, scriptural religions such as Protestantism, where all individuals are called on to read the Bible in their vernacular language, have an effect on the social system as a whole: They foster national cultural homogeneity in countries where they are the dominant religion. The social sciences' use of the notion of ideology presents insoluble epistemological problems. Distinguishing ideology from true scientific knowledge presupposes that those who set out to do so (such as Althusser and Bourdieu) are in possession of a differentiation criterion. Marx believed he had one; he believed that history itself was the movement of a self-affirming, self-deploying truth. As Bourdieu saw it, sociology—which implies doing sociology of sociology—would provide such a criterion. This claim may seem similar to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's that he possessed absolute knowledge in the form of "the science of science."

The belief that ideology stands opposed to true knowledge, that it is false consciousness as opposed to knowledge of objective truth, may thus appear the result of a paradox, since what is assumed to be science (historical materialism for Marx and Marxists, critical sociology for Bourdieu and Bourdieusians) is understood to be beyond critical suspicion.

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See also Liberalism; Marxism; Political Philosophy; Theocracy; Totalitarianism; Utopianism

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## IMMIGRATION POLICY

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The migration of people from one territory to another is one of the oldest practices of mankind. However, immigration policy is a broad label encompassing a range of different and formally unrelated issues as diverse as the Viking settlement of Anglo-Saxon England following the Roman withdrawal in 410 CE; the triangular trade in slaves up to the 19th century; European immigration to the New World in the 19th and 20th centuries, and large-scale resettlements following conflicts such as World War II, the 1947 India–Pakistan War, and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The first part of this contribution sets out what these issues are in the countries listed above before moving on to consider how they have been analyzed in political science.

### Defining Immigration Policy

Conventionally, immigration policy is considered to refer primarily to the responses of governments in developed countries to migratory pressures from less developed countries post-1945. These essentially “rich” developed countries can be further subdivided into three broad categories. First, predominantly Anglo-Saxon immigration countries

such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have traditions of accepting immigration that long predate 1945. Second, Western European countries have since 1945 been transformed from countries of emigration to countries of immigration. This transformation has not been uniform: Thus, France, the United Kingdom (UK), West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria all experienced large-scale immigration during the 1950s and 1960s, while countries such as Spain, Italy, and Ireland have only become destinations for immigration since the end of the Cold War. Lastly, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have themselves also become destinations for migration since the turn of the millennium and especially since becoming member states of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007. Notably, the developed countries of Asia, particularly Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, have only experienced comparatively minimal levels of immigration.

Despite constituting just a relatively small element of human migrations both historically and contemporarily, immigration to developed countries has become one of the most sensitive, controversial, and therefore important domestic political issues. For this reason, the area has attracted increasing attention from scholars across a range of cognate disciplines, including economics, sociology, development studies, anthropology, geography, demography, history, education, psychology, and political science. Within political science, scholars of public policy, political theory, comparative politics, political economy, and international relations have all contributed to our understanding of this field.

At its most elementary level, immigration policy addresses the control of entry to a state’s territory. The physical control of borders, through passport controls, visa requirements, or quite simply a barrier, remains one of the key deliverables for any government and indeed constitutes one of the fundamental elements of state sovereignty. In this context, the EU’s policy in recent decades of removing border checks between its member states (the so-called Schengen Agreement) and replacing them with a closely guarded external border vis-à-vis third countries is particularly significant. However, and especially in the modern age of global travel, a high degree of control over frontiers, although frequently promised in election

campaigns, is seldom easy to deliver, and borders, whether they are the U.S. border with Mexico, the Israeli border with Gaza, or the EU's external borders in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, are notoriously porous. In consequence, illegal immigration remains a major challenge, both from a humanitarian perspective of human trafficking and in the context of enforcement. Prevention and return have become a top priority in international diplomacy: Thus, the EU has signed readmission agreements with a range of countries, as well as seeking the cooperation of countries such as Libya in preventing boats from leaving for southern Italy in the first place.

### Five Dimensions of Immigration Policy

When it comes to managing and shaping migration flows, as opposed to simply controlling their entry, it is possible to identify five principal constituent elements of this field: labor migration, the increased importance of political asylum, the growth of immigration of dependents, ethnic immigration, and issues related to the integration of immigrants into the host country.

#### *Labor Migration*

First, labor migration has perhaps been the single most important element of immigration policy, and it underpins much of the migration that developed countries have received over the past 60-odd years. This is hardly surprising given the existing and indeed growing differences in wealth between developed countries and their neighbors. The desire to work is also a major driving force behind illegal immigration and residence. While the authorities in developed countries do formally seek to clamp down on such activities, for instance, by raiding building sites and farms where illegal immigrants are known to work, they are also often tacitly tolerated as a useful contribution to the economy. Several countries, such as Spain, Italy, and the United States, have also instituted amnesties, sometimes repeatedly, to regularize the status of illegal immigrants.

Labor migration can be both high skilled and low skilled. For instance, much of the labor migration to Western Europe up to the early 1970s, which numbered millions of people, was low

skilled, largely from Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. In some countries, notably West Germany, such migration was explicitly expected to be temporary in nature, leading to the coining of the (pejorative) term *Gastarbeiter* ("guest worker"). Labor migration was radically cut back during the 1970s and 1980s, but high-skilled migration has witnessed a resurgence since the late 1990s, with a range of countries now introducing points-based immigration systems originally pioneered in Australia and Canada.

This resurgence has been linked to two key developments in Western societies: first, the twin phenomena of increasing life expectancy and falling birthrates has created a demographic imbalance and the prospect of falling populations in many countries, especially Germany, Italy, Spain, and Eastern European countries, and labor migration is one key option for redressing this. Thus, the UK's decision not to close its labor market to the new member states of the EU in 2004 led to large-scale labor migration of up to 1 million persons, as a result of which the UK's population is projected to increase rather than decrease over the coming decades. Similarly, the comparatively dynamic state of the U.S. population is also largely down to recent immigration. The second key development is skills shortages, which have emerged in a range of sectors, most notably information technology.

#### *Political Asylum*

The second element of immigration policy has been the rise in importance of political asylum. Asylum is a humanitarian policy designed to afford protection to those persecuted for their political views in their home countries and its legal expression, the 1951 Geneva Convention, constitutes one of the best known cornerstones of international law. With low numbers of claimants globally until the end of the 1970s, the ability to seek political asylum was initially largely notional. However, since then, numbers have risen strongly, generally affecting those countries with an already existing sizeable immigrant population. Thus, West Germany was the principal destination for asylum seekers in Europe during the 1980s; since then, the UK, France, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, and

Belgium have also all emerged as major recipient countries. With rising numbers have come rising costs and not infrequently social tensions, which in turn have propelled asylum up the political agenda. In response, governments have introduced a range of measures to restrict the ability of refugees to lodge asylum claims, such as visa restrictions for major countries of origin, the principle of the “safe third country” (i.e., transit country), and the “safe country of origin” principle. Refugee organizations such as the UNHCR (the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) criticize that such measures undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of the Geneva Convention.

The annual numbers of asylum seekers have fluctuated widely over the years. The early and late 1990s were major periods of asylum migration, although, since the early 2000s, applications have dropped back. In the case of Germany, which had hitherto been the world’s most significant destinations for asylum seekers, these are now historically low levels. In processing asylum cases, government agencies have generally tended to take a restrictive view of claims, and initial recognition rates have generally been around 25%, although in some countries they are as low as 5%. Nonetheless, the tendency of rejected asylum seekers to appeal their decision through the courts, plus logistical difficulties in physically deporting such persons once legal avenues have been exhausted, has meant that many asylum claims take years to complete, which has in turn led to a considerable backlog of cases in many countries.

#### *Immigration of Dependents*

Third, most developed countries have since the 1970s experienced a rapid growth in the immigration of dependents. Such migration is considered “secondary” because it cannot take place without the immigration of a “primary” migrant—typically a labor migrant but also potentially a recognized refugee. The quantitative dimension of such secondary migration should not be underestimated, and dependent migration currently constitutes the largest form of legal migration to developed countries, exceeding both asylum and labor migration. Crucially, dependent migration is generally regarded as a human right and in consequence, many countries have not found it easy to impose

restrictions on this form of migration. Nonetheless, the right to family reunification has certainly been circumscribed in recent years, with countries imposing conditions such as minimum living space, maximum ages for dependent children, and, most recently, the introduction by several European countries of pre-entry requirements such as the successful completion of language and integration courses.

#### *Ethnic Immigration*

The fourth aspect is ethnic immigration, which broadly speaking refers to privileged entry conditions sometimes granted by countries to persons of specific ethnic and/or cultural origins. For instance, Israel guarantees residence to Jews from all over the world, regardless of whether they have any active ties to Israel. Likewise, the origins of the Green Card Lottery in the United States (through which 50,000 permanent green cards are issued annually on the basis of computer-generated random selection) lie in a decision by Congress to privilege immigration from Ireland. But the single largest instance of this immigration has been to Germany, with more than 4 million ethnic Germans having immigrated since 1950. Initially, these came from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, but since the late 1980s these have come overwhelmingly from the countries of the former Soviet Union. Typically, such ethnic Germans had been living in these countries for centuries but had then experienced persecution at the hands of the communist authorities. Germany initially offered generous immigration conditions, including extensive financial assistance, but the very large numbers that arrived between 1989 and 1993 (more than 1.4 million) led to this being sharply curtailed. The relative weakness of the German economy since 2000 has caused ethnic German migration to fall back to much lower levels.

#### *Integration of Immigrants*

The final aspect of policy to be considered here is in fact one of the most difficult: the successful integration of immigrants into their new host societies. Strictly speaking, integration is not related to the process of immigration itself; however, because integration arises as a direct consequence



of immigration, the two are conventionally viewed under the same rubric. The principal policy challenge here is that immigrants across the developed world broadly speaking show similar socioeconomic deficits compared with the indigenous population, including higher unemployment, lower educational outcomes, lower wages, and substandard housing. That said, there are significant differences in the socioeconomic profile of immigrant groups: For instance, in the UK, people of Indian origin are generally better integrated socioeconomically than those of Bangladeshi origin.

The challenge of integration encompasses a particularly wide range of policy fields, including education, labor market, housing, health, and law and order. It includes not only residence policy but also citizenship and naturalization policy. What is more, integration is a highly symbolic area and touches on powerful mobilizers such as cultural identity and belonging. For instance, the question of Muslim head scarves in France, and especially in its schools, has polarized public opinion for more than 20 years and is considered by some to be challenging the Republican emphasis on secularism. Similarly, populist politicians such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, and Jörg Haider in Austria and the French Front National, have often politicized what they see as incompatibility between Islam and the respective indigenous culture. In this way, integration covers both substantive and symbolic issues, and in political debate, perhaps unsurprisingly, the two often get (deliberately) blurred.

Certainly, since 2000, governments across Europe have imposed new, largely symbolic restrictions on the acquisition of citizenship by foreigners. Thus, most countries now require applicants for naturalization to pass a citizenship test and to attend a citizenship ceremony, often involving an oath of allegiance as well. Such practices are of course well established in traditional countries of immigration such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, and indeed these countries' experiences have explicitly served as a template for the introduction of these citizenship policies in Europe. At the same time, there has been a general liberalizing trend across Europe in the acquisition of citizenship at birth, with countries increasingly using *ius soli* (the territorial principle) as well as *ius sanguinis* (the principle of descent). In parallel, dual citizenship,

which once was widely rejected in European citizenship policies, is increasingly accepted, if not formally then through far-reaching exemptions.

### Political Science and Immigration Policy

Together, then, these five key dimensions illustrate the complexity and the multifaceted nature of this controversial policy field of immigration policy. Arguably, this explains why scholars have struggled so far to develop an integrated, multidisciplinary perspective on immigration that can address the holistic aspect of the field while still capturing the specificities of its individual constituent elements. Indeed, the dominant explanations for migration and integration have come from economics and sociology, respectively. For instance, economists argue that wage differentials between economies create incentives for labor migration from the lower wage (or poorer) country to the higher wage (or richer) country. Certainly, this is a powerful explanation and helps account for both formal and informal labor migration over the decades, including the guest worker migration to West Germany, illegal migration from Mexico to the United States, and Polish migration to the UK after its 2004 accession to the EU. But equally, straight economics encounters difficulties in fully accounting for why some countries receive more asylum seekers than others.

From the perspective of political science and its several subdisciplines, including public policy analysis, immigration policy is a relatively new object of study, and scholars have yet to bring its full analytical toolkit to bear on its various elements. To date, though, a number of key approaches can be identified in the literature. The first approach is grounded in political economy, regulation, and welfare, with Gary Freeman as its leading exponent. In his work, he emphasizes the role that organized interests, and especially business interests, play in structuring immigration policy, thereby creating a clear pressure toward liberalization. A second approach draws on the role universal human rights play in requiring states to accept "unwanted" immigration, including dependent migration. At the same time, as Christian Joppke (1999) points out, states have proved to be quite activist in responding to such challenges; for instance, Germany's 1993 constitutional amendment to limit asylum can be

seen as a *prima facie* example of a state wresting back control over a policy are.

Joppke's analysis is particularly germane to the issue of state sovereignty, which in turn has underpinned the contribution of international relations to our understanding of immigration policy. Here, the question of control and the ability of states to exercise it have traditionally been dominant. However, more recently, other aspects have come to the fore, in particular globalization, as Saskia Sassen points out, and increasingly security, as Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Japp de Wilde have described. Indeed, Samuel Huntington took the latter argument several steps further in an (in) famous article mapping out a "clash of civilizations" between Christianity and Islam—a relationship that of course lies at the heart of much of the debate, at least in Europe, about integration.

Beyond international relations and political economy, a number of seminal contributions have been grounded in political theory, reflecting the fact that asylum and citizenship are two issues that directly intersect with notions of equality, justice, ethics, and pluralism. As well as discussions of asylum from this perspective (e.g., Matthew Gibney, 2004), multiculturalism has emerged from the pluralist stable as an influential model for immigrant integration (Bhikhu Parekh, 2005). However, although multiculturalism remains popular in the New World and especially Canada and Australia, it has found fewer devotees in Europe: On the contrary, recent debates in the Netherlands and Germany have reemphasized the more assimilatory nature of integration.

Elsewhere in the study of citizenship and integration, Adrian Favell's exploration of the philosophies of integration in the UK and France remains an indispensable point of reference, as does Yasemin Soysal's provocative discussion of "personhood" and its implications for the "hollowing out" of national citizenships in Western Europe. Other authors, such as Randall Hansen (2000) and Simon Green (2004), emphasize the importance of history and path dependence in understanding the evolution and operation of citizenship policy in France, Germany, and the UK.

Last but not the least, a thriving subfield has sprung up in recent years examining the development and role of the EU in immigration policy. The creation of the Schengen area plus the importance

of some common labor market policies has made immigration within the EU a more important concern. As well as important overviews of this field, especially that of Andrew Geddes (2008), security has been the focus of extensive attention.

### Conclusion

Although a brief overview such as this cannot hope to do full justice either to the complexities of the field of immigration policy or to the rich variety of the scholarly canon dealing with this policy, this entry has sought to do two things. First, it has sketched out in broad terms the nature and challenges of immigration policy as well as political actors' and institutions' responses to it in comparative perspective. Second, it has introduced the principal scholarly contributions of political science to our understanding of immigration policy in all its forms. There is no doubt that collectively these contributions have served to emphasize the centrality of the discipline to the purpose of understanding this vital policy field more broadly. At the same time, much remains to be done. Leaving aside the perhaps rather lofty aspiration of developing an integrated, cross-disciplinary model of immigration, the challenge for political scientists in this field is to provide further insights at all levels, to include the roots of party political positions on immigration, psephological aspects of immigrant voters, the formulation processes of government policy, the development of cross-national migration responses, the evolution and formalization of citizenship and integration policy, and the process of administration of these policies.

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*See also* Citizenship; Path Dependence; Racism; Security Apparatus; Sovereignty

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## IMPACTS, POLICY

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The concept of policy impacts refers to the effects and consequences of public policy on individuals, groups, the broader society, and the natural world in which we live. All policies have intended targets but are more or less successful in attaining their stated goals. This entry examines the nature of public policy in political science, discusses several taxonomies for understanding the targets for public policy, and also discusses the linkages between the design of policies and their final outcomes.

### Public Policy and Political Science

Public policies are the mechanisms used by governing authorities to allocate benefits, burdens, and regulations for the society. Public policies are what governments and their agents *produce*, including statutes, budgets, resolutions, proclamations, programs, and direct contacts with people. Policies must be understood as nested in one another. Thus, the U.S. Constitution is a fundamental public policy. Statutes passed by Congress or state legislatures

also are policies, as are the guidelines written by agencies as policy is implemented. Court rulings may change a statute, and thus court rulings also are public policies. A program established by a local government to regulate or provide services is itself a part of the public policy chain. These policies are revealed as texts and also in the actual practices and discourse of those involved in crafting or implementing public policy. Policy as written may not be the way it actually is perceived and may or may not be put in place exactly as written. Policy may have intended as well as unintended consequences: direct effects and indirect ones.

Although the effects of public policy have always been of concern to political science, this field was slow to develop. Part of the reason is the sheer complexity of policy content and the difficulty in finding common elements across different levels and types of policy. Another reason for the slow development of theory about policy impacts is the assumption that policy consequences are guided mainly by policy-specific theory, which often is simply not an accurate understanding of policy effects. So, for example, it is sometimes assumed that the impact of environmental policy depends on what theory of the environment is embedded in the policy rather than on theories of human behavior and values.

During the past 20 years, however, political science has embraced the study of policy consequences to the point that some are advocating a “policy-centric” approach to the study of politics in which two major questions dominate the field. The first is how to explain and understand how and why governments produce the kinds of policy designs that they have, and the second is how to understand the impacts of those designs.

### Theories of Policy Consequences

Theodore Lowi is generally credited with being the first to offer a systematic theory of policy impacts. He popularized the phrase *policy creates politics*, thereby reversing the common causal pattern in political science. Lowi contends that there are characteristics of policy that encourage affected people to mobilize and that without these characteristics, elites will dominate. His typology is based on two dimensions: the probability of coercion and whether the policy identifies specific targets or

consists of general rules that affect the environment of groups. From these dimensions, he posits four types of policy: distributive, regulatory, redistributive, and constituent. Regulatory policy, involving the imposition of costs in the environment, will produce pluralist competition according to Lowi. Policy becomes a temporary compromise between competing groups, but if policy becomes too harsh on some, they are expected to mobilize and change the governing officials or change the policy. Redistributive policy, such as welfare policy, Lowi contends, does not produce pluralist forms of subsequent participation but instead is dominated by elites who lead major segments of society who act to insure social stability. Distributive policy is the classic pork barrel and is inherently elitist, according to Lowi's framework. His fourth type, constituent policy, produces individualistic claims on government.

James Wilson proposed an alternative to Lowi's typology. Wilson's typology begins with whether benefits are narrowly focused or broadly cast, and whether costs are narrowly focused or dispersed broadly among the public. When benefits are broadly distributed (e.g., national defense) and costs are broadly distributed (e.g., taxes supporting national defense), then all people have about equal incentives to incorporate this policy into their behavior. The result is majoritarian politics. In majoritarian politics, elected officials pay special attention to what the majority wants. When benefits are concentrated on just a few (such as welfare recipients) but costs are distributed widely among taxpayers, there is little incentive for those bearing the costs to pay attention to the policy itself but great advantage to potential beneficiaries. This produces what Wilson called a clientist style of politics in which elected leaders distribute favors to their clients while apathetic taxpayers do not pay attention. A third type of politics, entrepreneurial politics, occurs when small portions of society pay the costs to benefit large groups—for example, education. This type of politics results in virtually uncontrolled growth because of the strong political payoffs for distributing numerous benefits at the expense of so few. Since most policies are either entrepreneurial or clientist, government grows until it becomes inefficient and produces more goods and services than people actually want.

A third typology, which seems to explain more about attitudes and participation patterns, was developed by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram. Their theory recognizes that public policy involves far more than the allocation of benefits and burdens, and that all aspects of policy design may be important. Policy design refers to the empirical characteristics of a statute, agency guidelines, or practices of street-level officials. They contend that policies contain common observable elements that influence the types of impacts of the policy. Policies typically have target populations—the people affected positively or negatively by the policy, goals or problems to be solved, benefits or costs or both that are being allocated, and rules that guide or constrain action or specify who is to do what to whom, when, and with what resources. Policies also contain tools that motivate agents or members of the general public to take the action recommended by the policy and rationales embedded in the policy text or used to legitimate the policy. Policies typically have an implementation “chain” in which one level of policy directs the actions of another at a “lower” level. Hence, policies contain people, whose behavior impinges on policy consequences. Policies also contain underlying assumptions about how people behave and what motivates them, about cause and effect, about scientific knowledge, and about the values that should be pursued.

Policies are not simply instrumental means, however, and contain symbolic and interpretive elements that are important in understanding their impacts. For example, policies that impose burdens on people may simultaneously show their respect for these people. Or policies that impose burdens may denigrate the target groups and blame them for their own plight. The consequences of these two types of policy are quite different.

Schneider and Ingram's theory contends that policy designs are sometimes produced in institutions dominated by divisive social constructions that stigmatize some and extol the virtues of others. These social constructions interact with vastly unequal political power of target populations producing policy designs that, in turn, produce distinctive political attitudes and participation. Schneider and Ingram posit four types of target populations. *Advantaged* populations have considerable political power and positive social constructions, such as being “deserving,” “intelligent,”

hardworking,” and so on. Advantaged groups mainly receive benefits from government, but even if regulations are imposed, they tend to be those supported by the advantaged populations themselves as necessary to sustain their social position. Politics is a “game,” but it is winnable if played by the rules. Advantaged groups have high levels of traditional political participation.

*Contenders* also have a great deal of political power but carry negative social constructions. Contenders know that they are controversial and that their interests clash with others. The types of policy they receive tend to provide significant benefits that are however well disguised and protected from public view. The consequences of such designs are that contenders become suspicious and vigilant. They believe that the political game involves the raw use of power and is often crooked. Their participation patterns tend toward low mobilization but high levels of financial assistance to candidates and office holders, along with intense lobbying.

A third type of target group Schneider and Ingram called *disadvantaged* in that they have almost no political power and are socially constructed as helpless, needy, and unable to function effectively in a highly competitive society. Public officials need to be careful with disadvantaged groups, because there would be political damage if an official appears to be mean spirited; on the other hand, there is nothing much to be gained by providing benefits to these people. Hence, policy tends toward paternalistic assistance and considerable rhetoric about the needs of these people but inadequate resources to meet their needs. The results of such policy designs is that disadvantaged people come to believe that they are helpless and needy; that government “wants” to assist but does not have the resources to do so; and that their problems are best resolved through religious organizations, nonprofits, and local government. Traditional participation tends to be very low—low turnout, lack of contacting officials, and not much participation in interest groups.

The fourth type of target groups are *deviants*—people with almost no political power who are viewed negatively as dangerous, violent, a threat to “our way of life.” Policy directed at these groups tends to be overly punitive, as policymakers realize that considerable political capital can be gained by

punishing these groups and holding them responsible for most of society’s problems, and the groups themselves have so little credibility that they are unable to respond. Traditional participation among deviants is very low but other forms—strikes, demonstrations, riots, terrorist attacks—will occur.

This typology also is useful in understanding policy consequences for social justice. The dynamics of degenerative democracy produces too many benefits for advantaged groups. The groups themselves support public officials who provide them with desired policy, and others will not complain because the positive social construction of advantaged groups means that they are viewed as “deserving.” Often, their interests are characterized as being necessary for the public good. And punishment for deviants will also become excessive as political leaders seek to outdo one another in being “tough.” In degenerative politics, where divisive social constructions interact with power to produce distinctive types of designs, disadvantaged people continue to suffer from limited access to opportunities—poor schools and unemployment producing a continuing underclass.

One primary contribution of political science to the study of policy impacts has been to broaden the discussion beyond the narrow emphasis on whether policy has been successful in solving problems or achieving its instrumental goals. Deborah Stone, for example, has been especially influential in addressing the many complexities of policy consequences. Policies typically have multiple goals, some of which may be in conflict with others. Additionally, a policy success in the eyes of one person may well be a policy failure in the eyes of another.

The question remains, however: Are there any systematic characteristics of policy designs that increase the likelihood of policy producing desired consequences? Implementation scholars disagree over this question, as some such as Paul Sabatier argue that strong statutes are more likely to produce desired outcomes. Strong statutes contain clear statements of objectives, strong tools such as mandates, and little or no discretion for lower level agents. Others contend that policy designs must be fit into context and that designs that permit greater discretion at lower levels enable local officials to use local knowledge and are more likely to produce desired results. Still others focus on an analysis of

the context itself and argue that the characteristics of policy at a higher level need to differ, depending on context. For example, if cause and effect theory is uncertain or weak, or if the context varies extensively across locales, then policy should encompass a learning mode sometimes called *adaptive management* so that local-level agencies can adjust the policy as they learn more about its consequences.

Some political scientists question what constitutes “good” public policy. Many focus on economic criteria such as efficiency, although complexities in measuring societal benefits and costs typically prevent most policies being assessed in efficiency terms. Some propose that effectiveness is a guide—in the sense that it is effective in addressing problems. As mentioned above, however, there may be many different indicators of effectiveness and little agreement on which are more important. Others have added that justice (fairness) must be considered when assessing the desired consequences of policy and that support for citizenship and institutions also must be ascertained. Unintended consequences must be considered and weighed against the positive effects.

To summarize, political science has made major contributions to the study of policy impacts, particularly in proposing a more complex way of conceptualizing what is meant by public policy and by broadening the discussion beyond the narrow view that policy serves only to solve a specific problem. Policy has many consequences for democracy, and theories of policy impact need to embrace them.

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*See also* Implementation

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## IMPERIALISM

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The term *imperialism* contains the prefix *imperial*, at once an adjective and a noun. As an adjective, *imperial* means pertaining to empire or the ruler, an emperor or empress, and this is used to refer to characteristics that befit a ruler, such as majesty, regality, or grandeur. The term *imperial* also conveys the character of rule by a sovereign state over its dependencies or a commanding quality or manner of that rule. For these reasons, the term *imperial* has been associated with despotic, high-handed, and/or authoritarian rule. As a noun and in the context of political authority, an *imperial* is a member of imperial party, including troops. Imperialism in the senses above implies the pursuit of grandeur or the desire, policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of one political entity over another. From the above perspectives, imperialism has a long ancestry in multiple traditions and thus may be found historically to exist on many continents. One could reasonably speak of imperialism in the contexts of historic China and France, the Moguls in India, the Roman and Holy Roman empires, the Ottoman, Mali, and Mayan empires, and the like. In most of these contexts, an imperialist would mean an adherent of an emperor or empress or an advocate of such an adherence. The associated irredentist processes and forms constituted imperialism in its present understanding. For instance, these empires necessarily originated from a locality before outward expansions that required the dismantling of competing governments and the subordination of the resident authorities. Still, their ideologies, policies, systems of law, and organizing principles and norms emerged from contexts that are different from those of modern imperialisms.

The shift toward modern imperialism began under Pax Britannica, the period when Great Britain set the terms of the European order (and by

extension world order) owing to its defeat of France at Waterloo in 1815, its unchallenged sea power, and control of the key naval trade routes. Pax Britannica coincided with scientific and industrial revolutions, the rise of finance capital and consumer society, transformations in the material conditions of states, and advances in warfare and bureaucracy that set the context for unprecedented overseas British expansionism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Subsequently, Britain came to dominate overseas markets and managed to project its “influence” over most regions of the world. The terms and conditions of British expansionism gave modern imperialism its distinctive characteristics. Above all, the new British expansionism involved a worldwide colonial system. From Waterloo in 1815 to the 1870 Franco-Prussian War to the beginning of World War I in 1914, Great Britain helped set in motion processes, structures, and relationships under a colonial order consisting of zones of influence, colonies, protectorates, trusteeships, and the like. Moreover, Britain associated its own dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa), other European powers, most notably France, and Japan and the United States in the management of this order under distinct colonial systems. For the above reasons, the expansionist activities of the era extending from the 19th century to the early 20th century were dubbed the New Imperialism.

There is a long-standing debate in Britain and the West, particularly among politicians and academics, about the motivation, wisdom, and utility of *imperialism* as well as the usefulness of the term itself. Most authors would trace the debate back to John Hobson’s 1902 critique of imperialism and questions raised about the factors contributing to the New Imperialism. Accordingly, the roots of the New Imperialism are found in policies linked to the resolutions of the following problems: the maldistribution of wealth and underconsumption, the requirements of finance capitalism; commercial competition among rival industrialized countries; the erosion of British hegemony and the subsequent breakdown of the concert of Europe; challenges to Britain’s dominance in world trade; quest for a supply of cheap raw materials to support home industries as a means to recovery from the Long Depression of 1873 to 1896 and beyond; the abandonment of free trade by rival European powers;

and the need to overcome the constraints of domestic markets through export opportunities. Furthermore, it has been argued that imperialism was an instrument of national cohesion in the face of domestic restlessness, working-class militancy, and the emergence of radical left-leaning parties after the Depression. For others still, the New Imperialism was a matter of national pride (France after defeat in the Franco-Prussian war): a sign of national grandeur and manifest destiny (Germany on industrialization and the United States under the Monroe Doctrine) or a marker of racial equality and non-discrimination (Japan after Meiji).

The New Imperialism soon turned into formal colonial regimes under which imperial powers took administrative control of “foreign” lands and turned them into colonies and dependencies. Initially, imperial powers established control through chartered companies such as the British East India Company. These corporations were afforded semisovereign status under letter patents that afforded them rights and titles allowing them to acquire territories outside of Europe and to exercise within them the total monopoly of power. The transition to formal imperialism in India and elsewhere was thus effected when companies transferred their prior administrative functions to European governments. The new administrative arrangements also associated trained natives as civil service for colonial rule. Thereafter, Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, the United States, and others proclaimed sovereignty or overlordship of foreign populations under diminished legal and political capacities. Formal imperialism in Africa began dramatically with the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), which moderated competition between colonial powers by defining “effective occupation” as the criterion for international recognition of territorial claims. The Sykes-Picot (-Sazonov) Agreement of 1916 was the moral equivalent of the Berlin Agreement for the Ottoman provinces of the Arab World. A secret agreement, it defined the respective spheres of influence of the United Kingdom and France in West Asia with the assent of Imperial Russia and in anticipation of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. The post-World War I mandate system revived the mythical “White man’s burden” under a so-called sacred trust as the means to incorporate former German colonies into existing imperial orders.

Among observers and scholars, these activities led to multiple explanations about the advent of imperialism. Conservatives favored political and psychological factors and therefore linked imperialism to the need to preserve the social order. Liberals who had been reluctant backers of imperialism nonetheless branded its economic benefits despite contravening free trade. Marxists, however, were struck by the rivalry and mutual suspicion that characterized international diplomacy throughout the era. Imperialist ambitions and rivalries in East Asia inevitably came to focus on the vast empire of China whose sovereignty barely survived the unequal treaties imposed on it by European powers. In any case, some Marxists attributed World War I to imperial ambitions and rivalries. Among them, Vladimir Lenin (1916) advanced the thesis that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism.

Since Lenin, the debate on imperialism crystallized around two central questions. First is the extent to which imperialism was necessary and inevitable given the nature of the international order and the uneven capacities of states and economic agents. The second, favored by some Marxists, gravitates around the preposition of a necessary relationship between capitalist developments and imperialism. The relevant theses have been taken up in different contexts by world system theorists who view imperialism as part of a general, gradual extension of capital investment from the “core” of the industrial countries to a less developed “periphery.” With the globalization of capital and the ubiquitous importance of civil society, other Marxists puzzled about the persistence of critical dimensions of imperialism under Pax Americana (the relative peace in the Western Hemisphere as a result of U.S. leadership during the second half of the 20th century). They turned to Antonio Gramsci’s theses on the advent of hegemony, particularly on the role of “spontaneous consent” in perpetuating what might reasonably be called imperialism. They also drew attention to the ideological function of education in order to gain insight into the expansion of capitalism and the associated market institutions and modes of government.

On decolonization and the formal transfer of power to the newly created independent states, increasing numbers of scholars and politicians have dismissed the utility of the notion of imperialism in

today’s world. The dismissal is founded on two orders of deficiencies. The first, found in conservative and liberal theories, is the focus placed on the outward bureaucratic and organizational dimensions of imperialism at the time of creation and maintenance of domination and subordination. The second, found in Marxism and other radical theories, is the focus on dated historical events, for instance, the modes of expansions that established unequal economic, cultural, and territorial relationships between imperial states and their formal dominions. Indeed, it is hard today to entertain the possibility of direct or outright imperialism in which any power could claim to be justified by law or providence to take over the government of a territory other than its own. Nor could any power insist on a right to unequal relations with other political entities.

Indeed, the focus on state identity and ideology or culture and discourses may be misplaced today. To be sure, the novelty of the New Imperialism and the formal colonial empires that followed it had to do with the scale of the colonial order. The construction of empire required a domestic ideology associated with state identity and rationalizing narratives (of destiny and providence). The imperial project also required self-justification—for instance, to right the wrongs done by others or to improve the lot through trusteeships or mandates. In these regards, imperialism had the backing of elements of civil society. These elements successfully articulated their own private desires, passions, and motives of acquisition, enrichment, and self-aggrandizement as the national interest and then caused legislators and executives to spring into colonial adventures as means of defending the latter. These private interests were comforted in their positions by ideologues such as consumer advocates seeking to advance the good life, liberal progressives (who once engineered mandate systems under the sacred trust), and so-called cosmopolitans and internationalists. Science helped define conceptions of the moral qualities of subjects, the status of individual societies within the moral order, and the entitlements or deserts due to them. International law, legal doctrines, and jurisprudence completed the discourses of the emergent international order by providing the norms and instruments of empire. Each discourse played a part in defining the morality and ethics of war and peace.



Thus conceived, imperialism is not an arbitrary act. Historically, it remains a reflex or realism that has been guided, according to material conditions, by the available logics of power, the permissible modes of interventions, the applicable political and ethical traditions, and a recurrent theology and ideology of a preordained but singular hierarchical order lodged in the West. From this sovereignty flow inherent rights and privileges, a notion of predestined leadership, an assumed legitimacy of interests, an a priori and necessary absolution of sins against others, and a singular expectation of access to the necessary resources of its chosen lifestyle, presently the good life. These imperial claims, which were once contested within colonial empires, are yet to disappear from international relations today. Indeed, real and aspiring imperial states continue to demand deference from others even in the postcolonial world. This is not done without contestations, but to underscore the point, we still witness occasional unilateral political and military interventions to remind us of the lingering presence of the imperium.

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*See also* Power; Power and International Politics; Superpower

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goals. Implementation is closely affiliated with the classic political function of executing laws, but implementation research also focuses on the execution of authoritative policies other than laws, such as administrative rules issued by government and policies made by local governments. Several stages, factors, and actors are involved in the implementation process and affect its results. Implementation is a continuation of the policy formation process, but it also involves new actors. The implementation process and its results depend on whether the policy design is valid and on what policy instruments have been selected. Also, the number and interests of the actors that are involved in carrying out the policy and the relationships between them affect the implementation process and results. Managers have an important but difficult task in transforming and communicating the policy down to the frontline workers. Because of the discretion that these workers typically have, they play a key role in delivering the policy to citizens or firms and enforcing the rules associated with it.

While most implementation studies analyze the implementation of one particular policy or a set of related policies, some bottom-up implementation scholars are more interested in local problem solving. These problems are typically defined by the researchers themselves, for example, Christopher Hull and Benny Hjern. They would often focus on a set of policies that have an impact on a given policy problem, for example, chronic youth unemployment or helping small firms grow. The relevance of this kind of research depends on whether the reader accepts the definition of the problem. This entry focuses on official public policy goals and mandates as a standard for implementation is warranted from a democratic effectiveness perspective. Democracy concerns not only how policies are made but also whether or not they are executed. Policy goals formulated in legislatures, governments, and local governments have a particular legitimate status and are relevant for holding government accountable.

The start of implementation research was stimulated by evaluation research. President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society social policy reforms in United States in the 1960s and 1970s fostered a lot of evaluation research. The effects of the new welfare state programs were assessed and improvements in social engineering suggested. As most

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## IMPLEMENTATION

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Implementation refers to the carrying out of policy or authoritative actions in support of policy

evaluation studies actually showed little or no effect of the social program interventions, the first interpretation suggested that the program was a failure and based on wrong program theory. However, gradually, another interpretation emerged that the causal theory behind the planned policy intervention might after all be valid, but the intervention had not taken place as intended. This led to an interest in studying the relation between planned and actual interventions and the administrative process in between policy making and social interventions.

Most people consider Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky's 1973 book *Implementation* to be the first major piece of implementation research. It was a case study of a federal economic development program in Oakland, California, that had been created to enhance minority employment. It failed to do so, however, due to the complexity of many actors having to work together and because it was based on an invalid causal theory of how to stimulate minority employment. The book certainly opened the field of implementation research, yet some pieces of earlier research by, for example, Herbert Kaufman and Jerome Murphy had actually focused on implementation problems.

The organization of this entry is based not on a chronological review of the implementation literature but on the Integrated Implementation Model (Figure 1). The model was developed by Søren Winter to integrate some of the theoretically most promising implementation factors identified by various implementation scholars into a common analytical framework.


For dependent variables, the model focuses on both the actions of implementers in delivering policies and the societal outcomes in relation to the official policy objectives. Implementation research was long dominated by stories of implementation failures. The implementation of policies typically failed to achieve the planned outcomes, and implementers failed to deliver the mandated services or in enforcing regulations. Or the process suffered from serious delays. Implementation research focused mainly on barriers to successful implementation. However, gradually, more optimistic studies were made. One of the important insights was that time horizons matter. Often, policy programs suffer from start-up problems that are gradually ameliorated over the years on the basis of experience.

Sometimes, it may take a decade or more to carry out a successful implementation. Implementation results also tend to vary among localities at any given point in time.

The first set of factors, which affects implementation results, is the policy design. Even perfect implementation processes and outputs are not likely to be successful if the expected causal relationship between policy objectives and means is invalid. Second, implementation is affected by the commitment of authorities and organizations that are involved in implementing policies and by the interorganizational relations between them. Third, managers' transmission of organizational policies to the staff is crucial. While management matters, it is no simple matter! Fourth, this complexity is due to the discretionary behaviors of street-level bureaucrats in their interactions with target groups. These bureaucrats typically enjoy some autonomy vis-à-vis the legislation and their managers. Fifth, target groups not only are passive recipients of public policies but are often active in affecting implementation outputs as well as outcomes. Sixth, implementation results are conditioned by socioeconomic factors. What makes organizations, street-level bureaucrats, and target groups important political actors in the implementation process is that their contributions to implementation are affected by their action models, which for all three sets of actors analytically are made up of actor interests and the resources the actors master. After presenting the theoretical implementation framework in the following, some major implementation research strategies and methodologies will be discussed before the entry is concluded.

### Policy Design

Too many implementation researchers have erroneously put the whole blame for any lack of goal achievement on implementation. This is in sharp contrast to the early evaluation scholars who had blamed the policy design for any lack of effect. As noted by Peter May, well-designed policies are necessary but not sufficient for improving implementation prospects. A policy design typically contains a set of goals, a mix of instruments for obtaining these goals, a designation of governmental or non-governmental entities charged with carrying out the goals, and an allocation of resources for the



**Figure 1** The Integrated Implementation Model

Source: Winter, S. C., & Nielsen, V. L. (2008). *Implementering af politik* [Policy implementation]. Copenhagen, Denmark: Academica.

requisite tasks. Policy design, and particular policy instruments, has received substantial research interest since the 1980s, for example, by Stephen Linder and Guy Peters, Lester Salamon, and May.

According to this literature, any policy can be disaggregated into one or a mix of few generic policy instruments. Unfortunately, the common research interest has not led to agreement on any typology of instruments. One simple classification focuses on rules (often combined with sanctions for noncompliance), economic incentives, and information, all of which aim at affecting the behavior of either target groups or intermediaries (implementers).

Policy designs may affect the implementation process and results in various ways. The pioneers of implementation research saw goal clarity as the

key to implementation success. However, according to later research, conflicting, unclear, and ambiguous goals are the rule rather than the exception in public policies, and decent implementation results can be achieved even in these circumstances. Different mixes of instruments are not equally effective in obtaining a given policy objective. In summarizing the scant empirical evidence in the field, May suggests that policy designs are important in affecting the incentives of intermediaries to carry out their requisite tasks, particularly through affecting their commitment and capacity and by signaling desired actions.

The selected instruments may also affect the overall implementation structure and process because certain instruments tend to favor the formation of particular implementation structures.

Mandates aimed at regulating the behavior of target groups normally require a staff for inspecting and enforcing the mandate and a set of sanctions. Information strategies and use of economic incentives such as environmental taxes can sometimes be implemented with less staff, although there is no one-to-one relationship between instruments and staff requirements. Some taxes are relatively automatic and easy to collect, such as an environmental tax per unit of gasoline sold, while others require a substantial staff for inspection and enforcing, for example, taxing diffuse pollution.

However, while, as already indicated by Pressman and Wildavsky, the validity of the causal theory linking instruments to objectives is crucial, the research documentation of instrument effects is still meager. One reason is that effects of instruments on implementation often depend on the context, including the political context. Consequently, designing good policies is not a simple, technocratic process such as selecting the best types of materials for building a bridge.

Policy design also involves organizational design, that is, what types of organizations are to be involved in implementing the policy, and what types of incentives can be used to increase their commitment to the policy and its objectives? Organizational implementation structures are often quite messy and uncoordinated. Some top-down implementation scholars like Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier hold quite optimistic views on the ability of policy proponents to structure the implementation process to provide more commitment and loyal implementation. Critics of their viewpoint, however, argue that policies are often political compromises that also include policy opponents with little interest in making an effective implementation structure.

The roots of problematic policy designs and implementation problems can often be found in the prior policy formulation process. For instance, conflicts in this process often create a policy with conflicting and ambiguous goals and an invalid causal theory embedded in a policy design that does not adequately connect the goals to the means. Furthermore, symbolic policies are sometimes adopted to address a policy problem without actually offering the means that could achieve the stated objectives. And as first claimed by Eugene Bardach, conflicts in policy formation

often continue in the subsequent implementation process. It is important to understand that ineffective policy designs are not always due to lack of knowledge on the part of the policy designers. According to Terry Moe, policy design of instruments and organizational structure is first of all a political process, in which political actors—including both policy proponents and opponents—try to maximize their own interests. This includes the selection of an organizational structure that will maximize their long-term control of the implementation process.

Unfortunately, the research evidence on how different organizational arrangements contribute to implementation success or failure is rather modest. For example, we have very little evidence on the effectiveness or efficiency of using federal or state government field offices, local governments, nonprofit organization, or private firms for delivering public services. One study found that Danish central government field offices pay more attention to, are more committed to, and comply more completely with, the national employment policy rules on emphasizing quick job placements than is the case for local government agencies. May and collaborators show not only that cooperative regulatory strategies adopted by central or state governments toward local governments can provide more commitment and compliance at the local level by preventing flooding but also that these strategies can backfire for particular “bad apples.”

According to many studies, outsourcing relatively technical public tasks is in most cases more efficient than public provision of services. However, the research on the effects of outsourcing of more classic social services to for-profit or nonprofit providers is much more limited and has more inconsistent findings. When comparing the effects of employment service provision of public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in the United States, Carolyn Heinrich and colleagues did not find any difference, while Danish analyses find that for-profit and nonprofit providers deliver both poorer outputs (e.g., in terms of job emphasis) and poorer employment outcomes with much higher unit costs than public providers. However, the overpricing may be due to large subsidies of outsourcing applied by the Danish government. More research is needed on how various types of organizations contribute to implementation success.

### Interorganizational Relations

Implementation processes are characterized by organizational and interorganizational behaviors that represent different degrees of commitment and coordination. In their seminal implementation study, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) focused on the “complexity of joint action,” according to which successful implementation is likely to be negatively related to the number of actors, the diversity of their interests and perspectives, and the number of decision and veto points. Given the great number of actors, subsequent decisions, and veto points that is typical in policy implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky stated in their book *Implementation* that the fact that federal policies work at all is amazing. As an illustration, they suggested a series of subsequent implementation decisions with a relative high probability of success in each of, say, 90%. Yet, according to Pressman and Wildavsky, it only takes seven decisions to lower the cumulated chance of success to less than 50%.

One of their key insights was that the complexity of joint actions is not found only when implementing organizations fundamentally disagree with the policy objectives or with each other; it even takes place when implementing organizations generally agree about the reform goals but have slightly different perspectives on the implementation. For some authorities or organizations with implementation tasks, contributing positively to the implementation may be at odds with other commitments, or they may simply prefer other tasks that are more crucial to the core tasks of the organization. Or it may just be that organizations have different time lines for contributing to the implementation assembly process. However, serious conflicts of interest and bureaucratic politics tend to make implementation even more difficult.

Thus, how organizations contribute to the implementation process is strongly affected by their action model, which consists of their interests and their resources for pursuing them. Implementing organizations may have interests that are identical with the public policy. They agree both with its goals and means. Their interests may also be convergent. Although not agreeing with the goals, they agree with the means. An implementation success is more likely if organizations have interests that are identical or at least converge with the

policy. However, implementation prospects are based not only on interests but also on the resources that organizations can use for pursuing their interests.

Bardach describes the implementation process as a series of “implementation games” that organizations play for promoting their own interests. The complexity of joint action and implementation games may lead to implementation failures, delays, or biases in the implementation outputs and outcomes that are produced. The notion of “the complexity of joint action” seems related to the proverb of “too many cooks spoil the broth.” However, according to Laurence O’Toole, this problem applies only to certain kinds of interorganizational implementation settings. Decision points are not independent of each other. An early agreement on basic understandings can enhance implementation success by promoting “bandwagon effects” in later decisions, and decisions can be merged by crafting “package deals.”

Implementation prospects also depend on the type of resource dependencies among participating organizations. The “complexity of joint action” is most relevant for a chain of sequential relations. Here, a particular organization, A, cannot produce its implementation contribution without receiving outputs from another organization, B, while B does not need any outputs from A. It is like Christmas tree lights where one dead bulb can put out all bulbs if they are connected on series rather than in parallel. The parallel connection resembles pooled relations where multiple organizations can produce implementation outputs independently of each other. This can produce relatively good implementation results although the coordination may not be optimal. Finally, reciprocal relations—where two or more organizations are dependent on each other—can decrease the likelihood of veto points because both organizations have incentives to cooperate. Reciprocal relations can be created based on exchange of services or money. Accordingly, better implementation results can sometimes be obtained by replacing sequential relations by reciprocal or pooled ones.

Interorganizational relations and the role of outsourcing and third parties in implementation have stimulated a substantial research interest under the labels of policy networks, governance networks, or implementation regimes. A common

theme is the dependency of public authorities on resources from the private sector—for example, interest groups, associations, and firms—for implementing public policies. Perceived benefits for policymakers and implementers may be expertise, information, legitimization, or more cost-effective ways of providing services or enforcing regulations. In some countries—particularly the United States—private for-profit and nonprofit actors are involved so much in policy implementation that Brinton Milward talks about the “hollowing out of the state.” Network studies focus on the character of networks and interdependencies, why networks are created, if and how they are sustained over time, and the democratic and participatory consequences of networks. This is also a key interest in corporatist research that studies the formal integration of major interest organizations into public policy making and implementation. Given the enormous research interest in networks, surprisingly few studies have so far examined the effects of different types of networks on implementation outputs or outcomes.

While interorganizational implementation research focuses on commitment and collaboration at the organizational level, managers have important roles in bridging inter- and intra-organizational levels when supervising street-level bureaucrats. However, much of the normatively based management literature fails to acknowledge the difficulties involved in this managerial task. The role of managers is considered below after discussion of the role of street-level bureaucrats in the implementation process.

### Street-Level Bureaucracy

After the first group of implementation studies had focused mainly on the role of organizations in policy implementation, in 1980, Michael Lipsky turned the policy process upside down. He claimed that street-level bureaucrats are the real policymakers. His theory of “street-level bureaucracy” focuses on the discretionary decisions that each frontline worker is making when delivering policies to individual citizens. Often such decisions are made in face-to-face interactions with clients behind closed office doors or in the field as when an environmental inspector is inspecting a farm. It is not easy for managers to monitor bureaucratic

behaviors in such encounters. Their discretion makes street-level bureaucrats essential actors in implementing public policies.

Although Lipsky emphasizes the individual role of street-level bureaucrats in implementing public policies, it is an ironic aspect of the theory that their similar working conditions make all street-level bureaucrats apply similar behaviors whether they are teachers, police officers, nurses, doctors, or social workers. It also means that organizational differences and bureaucrats’ individual attitudes are not expected to have important implications for their behaviors.

Although trying to do their best, street-level bureaucrats are experiencing a gap between the demands they meet from legislative mandates, managers, and citizens on one side and their high workload on the other. In this situation, they all apply a number of coping mechanisms that systematically distort their work in relation to the intentions of the legislation. They ration services; make priorities between their tasks; process their clients through simple, standardized procedures, tending to favor the easier and more resourceful clients (creaming); and seek to control clients. Over time, street-level bureaucrats develop more cynical perceptions of the clients and modify the policy objectives that are the basis of their work. These coping strategies imply that the implementation of public policies is systematically biased compared with legislative mandates, for example, for individualized, yet equal treatment. According to Lipsky, even increasing staff resources is no solution to coping problems because more resources may lead to more demand for services.

A group of implementation scholars has a strong focus on these frontline workers. What unites them is a conviction that the behaviors of these workers have important implications for implementation that are inversely related to these workers’ rank in the hierarchy. While Lipsky focuses on similarities in street-level bureaucratic behaviors, some implementation scholars seek to explain variation in the behaviors of these bureaucrats. They typically differ with respect to the aspects of frontline workers’ behaviors they consider as dependent variables and to the concepts they apply. While Lipsky’s coping strategies are reporting supposedly dysfunctional behaviors, John Brehm and Scott Gates suggest that street-level bureaucrats work, shirk, or

sabotage. Bureaucrats persistently and loyally implement public policies when working. They do too little when shirking—either for leisure or because they disagree with the policy. Sabotage is a conscious attempt to actively counteract the aims of the public policy because these bureaucrats disagree with the policy mandate and follow another course of line. In their empirical work, Brehm and Gates find that street-level bureaucrats actually do work—not because of managerial directives and control—but because they fundamentally agree with the policy (refer to text below).

Other implementation studies examine the actions of these frontline bureaucrats, for example, in terms of the effort that they spend, the choices they make on what kind of clients and what aspects of their behaviors to focus on, and the tools that they employ, as well as the decisions they make. Particularly in regulation research, some research has focused on the styles that inspectors employ in day-to-day interactions with target groups (regulatees). Inspectors may, for example, differ in how legalistic versus flexible they are and how coercive versus trusting they are. However, style also seems to be a useful concept for social policy implementation, for example, when analyzing caseworkers' professional distance to the client versus personal involvement in addition to the above style dimensions. Studies of street-level bureaucrats typically find considerable variation in their behaviors, including both coping and styles.

This raises the crucial question of how this variation can be explained. Again, studies vary in the explanatory variables they consider. Some focus on the organizational norms by which frontline workers are socialized, which form their basis for treating clients. This research tradition has participants from both sociology (e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Erving Goffmann, and Margaretha Järvinen) and political science (e.g., Jodi Sandfort, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Michael Musheno). Some studies within that tradition pay particular attention to how bureaucrats, often unconsciously, use power to make citizens comply with their directives. Through identity work, bureaucrats are trying to make citizens accept their identity and diagnosis as these are specified by the bureaucrat. Citizens must accept the frontline worker's definition of their problematic behavior and cooperate

and improve to be perceived as a deserving client, which is often a precondition for receiving services. Thus, a client is "created." The function of identity work is to make each client fit the repertoire of measures that are available to the worker. These "institutionalization processes" are based on the norms of the organization.

While this perspective emphasizes the role of organizations for individual behaviors, other perspectives focus on the role of people. With inspiration from the classic theory of representative bureaucracy by Donald Kingsley, some studies suggest that street-level bureaucrats' behaviors are affected by their social background, for example, socioeconomic, ethnic, and gender as well as educational background. According to the classic theory on representative bureaucracy, the actions of public administration reflect the values of the social strata from where bureaucrats come. The theory was refuted for decades by studies of bureaucrats particularly in central government. However, recently some scholars—for example, Kenneth Meier and collaborators—have claimed that the theory might have more relevance at the front lines. Thus, social background and norms are likely to be more relevant when services are delivered and regulations enforced in direct interactions with citizens and firms and where bureaucrats typically have substantial discretion. According to some studies, gender does matter, for example, for prosecution and conviction in rape cases. By the same token, some studies indicate that minority students perform better in schools with a minority representation among teachers above a certain threshold.

Whereas the previous perspectives assume some kind of collective impact on the behaviors of street-level bureaucrats—that is, from the very job functions of street-level bureaucrats in general, organizational norms, or earlier socialization into the norms of a certain social group—some studies focus on the effects of individual differences among street-level bureaucrats in terms of their abilities and attitudes. Peter May and Søren Winter have found some empirical support for the importance of individual factors. They report substantially greater variation in caseworker behaviors within local employment service agencies than between these agencies. They also found that street-level bureaucrats' knowledge and attitudes have a considerable influence on the extent to

which their behaviors are reflecting the policy mandate.

According to Winter, several kinds of attitudes can affect street-level bureaucratic behaviors, that is, their attitudes on (a) the policy, (b) the effectiveness of the tools that are available, (c) the target groups, and (d) their perceived workload. Bureaucrats' attitudes on the factors that are most closely related to their daily work—such as how they perceive and evaluate various tools, their clients, and their workload—appear to have stronger behavioral effects than their ideological—and more abstract—view on the overall policy. How street-level bureaucrats perceive the adequacy of their workload seems to have stronger behavioral effects—for coping and other kinds of behaviors—than have differences in their actual workload.

According to this research perspective, street-level bureaucrats are even more important as policymakers than implied by Lipsky's and the other street-level bureaucracy perspectives above because individual street-level bureaucrats are making important authoritative decisions on the content of the policies, which are delivered to citizens and firms, based on the bureaucrats' own individual preferences. However, although there is a substantial variation in their behaviors, Winter and May also found that Danish street-level bureaucrats show a considerable loyalty to the law.

### Management

As indicated by the above analysis, managerial control of street-level bureaucrats is no easy task. The very nature of street-level bureaucrats' practices implies that they exercise considerable discretion in encounters with target groups that are normally not very visible to managers. While bookstores abound with simple recipes for excellent management, these are rarely based on systematic empirical research on public management. And the existing evidence is limited and suggests that managing street-level bureaucrats is by no means a simple but a difficult and complex task.

In a meta-analysis, George Boyne finds surprisingly few studies on effects of management on performance or outcomes. Yet he finds some evidence that management does matter. However, because such studies measure the direct link between management and outcomes, it is hard to

know through what kinds of street-level bureaucratic practices managers can bring about better outcomes. Some causal links are missing. Unfortunately, so far, very few studies have examined the effects of management on street-level bureaucratic behaviors. Most studies indicate that these effects are limited and context contingent. The research challenge is to specify to what extent and how management affects street-level bureaucratic behaviors in given contexts. Such research has just begun, however. Some preliminary findings from studies of the implementation of employment policy by May, Winter, and associates can be mentioned.

Principal-agent theory offers a promising way for studying these relationships. According to its basic assumptions, a principal (manager) and his or her bureaucratic agents may not share all preferences, and the relationship is characterized by information asymmetry that systematically disadvantage principals. When applied to the management of street-level bureaucrats, managers' influence seems to vary with the visibility of street-level bureaucratic practices. Some are quite transparent and easy to measure and monitor, for example, social caseworkers' application of sanctions when clients are absent from mandatory employment promoting measures with no good cause. Other kinds of behaviors are more invisible, for example, coping behaviors and to what extent employment service bureaucrats emphasize immediate jobs in conversations with clients. Managerial objectives are likely to be better reflected in frontline practices when these are relatively visible.

Having an effective manager does not always result in better implementation. Sometimes street-level bureaucrats experience a multiple principal problem. Their local managers are not always loyal to the letter and spirit of the law. This may be reinforced if local political bodies resist national policies. Managerial tools also vary in the extent to which they are goal directed or capacity building. While capacity building through increasing staff or general information provision might generally improve the implementation of national policies, the effect of using the more goal-directed management tools may depend on whether local policies support or oppose national ones. Examples of highly goal-directed management tools are managers' clear signals of their expectations for frontline behaviors and recruitment of workers with a better



fit with the goals of the organization. Greater application of such managerial instruments tends to induce poorer implementation of national policies among street-level bureaucrats when local policies resist national ones.

Finally, management is relational. This implies that the effect of management practices on street-level bureaucratic behaviors is often contingent on the characteristics of individual street-level bureaucrats, including their expertise, motivation, and perception of the applied management tools. In a study of the implementation of Danish employment policy, May and Winter found that all managerial effects on the extent to which caseworkers emphasized jobs in conversations with clients were contingent on caseworkers' perceived professional knowledge—for example, delegation improves implementation when workers have knowledge but weakens it when they do not. Similarly, in line with Bruno Frey's theory on motivation crowding in and out, Danish studies by Lotte Andersen and Thomas Pallesen show that performance pay and regulation of university faculty have positive effects on research publication productivity only if the faculty perceives these instruments as supportive of professional norms rather than as monitoring or control.

Although the direct and contingent effects of management on the behavior of street-level bureaucrats are often limited, indirect effects must also be taken into account. These include the impact that managers have on the attitudes of their frontline workers and on in-service training and the way in which managers by designing or changing organizational structures can shape bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors.

### Target Groups

The target groups of a public policy have important roles both for the production of implementation outputs and outcomes. Target groups affect the implementation behaviors of agencies and street-level bureaucrats, and outcomes that achieve policy goals often require that target groups change their behaviors.

In depictions of the classic ideal type of the democratic chain of control, citizens are active when articulating political demands and electing political representatives but relatively passive and

law-abiding subjects when it comes to the execution of the law. However, as much service production and regulatory enforcement take place in interactions between street-level bureaucrats and target populations, citizens and firms do often play an active role in shaping implementation outputs in a kind of coproduction of services and enforcement.

As noted above, clients can be relatively powerless in processes of coping, identity work, and creation of clients, but the power of target populations in implementation processes varies across and within policy areas. There is a huge difference between the position of nonunionized welfare minority clients in welfare and employment policy implementation on one hand and organized farmers in the implementation of agricultural support and environmental programs on the other hand. As is the case for street-level bureaucrats, the role of target populations in policy implementation depends on their action model in terms of their preferences and abilities. Relevant resources are cognitive skills, expertise, wealth, affiliation with other actors with resources including powerful interest groups (whether the group has a positive or negative social construction), and institutional arrangements and norms.

For decades it has been debated in the regulatory literature whether regulated industries tend to capture the public regulatory enforcement apparatus to make it a servant rather than a master. While capture was earlier the dominating research position, for the last couple of decades, the capture theory has found less theoretical and empirical support. The role of interest groups in implementation processes varies among political systems. Often strong interest representation is found in implementing committees in some European countries with strong corporatist traditions. According to Scandinavian studies, interest organizations still have a strong role in policy implementation, even though their formal inclusion in the policy-making process has been reduced during the past few decades, when their position apparently has weakened when compared with that of legislative bodies. In some more pluralistic political systems such as the United States, interest groups tend to be more fragmented in terms of representation, are generally less formally involved in policy making and implementation, and more often act as external pressure groups. Yet some recent research indicates that the

role of U.S. interest groups in implementation—including administrative rule making—may be stronger than previously expected.

As Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen has found, the resources that individual firms and organizations can engage in conversations with regulatory inspectors can put pressure on these inspectors. This may affect their enforcement directly but also indirectly through the formation of the informal rules of the game for such interactions, which in turn affect how regulations are enforced. She found that regulations are more leniently enforced for public institutions, which speak the same language as the regulators, than for private firms. Also, big firms with substantial expertise in the regulatory area as well as local economic importance—tend to be more successful than small ones in negotiating enforcement terms.

For social policy implementation, some theories claim that clients with few personal resources are systematically disadvantaged in their interactions with the administrative system. According to the access theory originally developed by Bernhard Schaffer and Huang Wen-hsien, clients have to cross three thresholds to get access to the services to which they are entitled. The first is the registration threshold. For many services, eligible clients must apply themselves, which tends to disadvantage clients with poor educational background, poor knowledge about their rights, and low social status. This can be reinforced by some emotional factors, including stigmatizing. Some clients do not perceive themselves as deserving assistance, or they may hold personal ideals of dignity in fending for themselves.

Second, clients must cross the competence threshold, which requires that one can handle the interaction with the bureaucracy, including being acquainted with the formal and informal rules of the game and applied decision criteria and being able to formulate one's thoughts. This again disadvantages clients with a poor educational and social background. Finally, clients must be able to cross the efficiency threshold, and some do not make it because they do not fit with staffs' perceptions on how available services would be most effectively distributed among clients. Also, the efficiency threshold tends to bias the implementation systematically to the benefit of clients with more resources but disadvantages clients with a poor educational

and social background (refer also to Lipsky's concept of "creaming" earlier).

Target groups have also important roles in relation to implementation outcomes. Most public policies aim at changing the problematic behaviors of—or conditions for—citizens or firms by either regulating their behaviors or providing services for them that will help them do better. Most policies build on an explicit—or often implicit—causal theory on how these behaviors and conditions can be changed by public intervention. However, as indicated above these causal theories are not always valid. Unfortunately, political science research has not paid much attention to the outcomes of public policies and the mechanisms that affect how citizens and firms respond to public policies and the way in which they are implemented. Some attention to these issues has been paid in regulation research in the borderline between sociology, economics, psychology, and political science. While developed for regulatory policies, the theorizing seems to have some relevance for social policies as well.

Citizens' and firms' responses to public policy implementation are based on their individual action model according to which their behaviors are influenced by their ability and motivations (refer to the above text). Among abilities, cognitive skills are very important. This first includes knowledge of the rules, which may be one of the most important factors in explaining how citizens and firms respond. When people do not comply with regulations or get their rights, it is often not because of lack of will but lack of knowledge of the rules. For decades, many parents of handicapped children in Denmark have not been compensated for taking care of their child at home because they are not aware of their legal rights. Second, favorable outcomes also depend on whether people know how to translate rules into concrete action. Farmers may know the agro-environmental rules but may not know what a particular rule implies for their farming practices. Financial capacity and resilience can also be important—not least for firms in regulatory policies.

Three main types of motivations can be identified. Economic motivation concerns the perceived net utility of different courses of action including compliance/noncompliance. For regulatory and criminal policies, deterrence theory involves a

calculation of costs and benefits of not complying. Into that calculus enter both the perceived risk of being detected and the risk of being punished if violating the law, the costs of required additional investments and other production costs for complying, and the expected profits from different courses of action. Studies seem to converge on finding substantial effects of perceived detection risk, while most studies find no or weak effects of perceived sanction risk. Economic motivations also seem relevant for target groups in several social policies.

Social motivation builds on the wish of citizens and firms to get respect and social recognition from peers by following their social expectations. Thus, people comply not because they agree with the policy but because “significant others” expect them to comply. Those may be peers, friends and family, or customers and other firms, for example, trade organizations. For example, the fact that drunk driving has become socially less acceptable has helped the implementation of anti-drunk-driving programs. By the same token, some anti-drunk-driving information campaigns have successfully targeted young women rather than young men to encourage women to tell male drivers to avoid drunk driving.

Even street-level bureaucrats may affect the behaviors of target groups by setting up social expectations, for example, based on their styles of interaction with clients or firms. Legalistic rather than flexible enforcement styles may signal to regulatees that rules and instructions must be taken seriously, and legalistic styles may provide more certainty for firms when making decisions on investments in technology that would allow more compliance.

Normative motivation is based on moral and conscience. People or firms follow the law not because significant others expect them to do so but because they agree with the law or because they at least feel a general moral duty to obey laws even if they do not agree. The latter civic duty varies substantially between and within countries and is important for achieving policy goals. Because of the role of different motivations and resources in shaping citizens’ and firms’ action models, target populations’ responses to policy implementation can involve a complex weighing of economic, social, and normative motivation along with abilities.

One implication of the different types of motivations is that public agencies and their street-level bureaucrats may not always be the most effective agents for implementing public policies. Third parties may sometimes be perceived as more important, competent, or trustworthy by target groups, and third parties may trigger more social and normative motivation. The anti-drunk-driving information campaign above with young girls as a third party is one example. Another is that in a study on agro-environmental regulation in Denmark, Winter and May found that advice from third parties (e.g., farmers’ associations and their agricultural consultants, who are highly respected among farmers) enhance farmers’ normative motivation to comply with the rules. In contrast, similar advice from public inspectors did not have such effect even when farmers listened to them.

### Socioeconomic Environment

The task environment in terms of socioeconomic conditions is important for implementation processes and successes. It is quite a different challenge to implement an employment policy program in a recession than in a boom, and often substantial regional variations can be found as well at any given point in time. It is also a different challenge to implement an agro-environmental program in areas with a high livestock density with many large pig farms and a much greater risk of nitrate pollution than in areas with little animal husbandry. Consequently, it is important to isolate the effects of implementation from effects of task environments. As an example, no less than 60% of the variation in labor market integration of refugees and immigrants among Danish municipalities in the beginning of this century can be explained by differences in task environments. This is because the social composition of the target groups and the local labor market situation varied substantially among local governments.

### Research Strategies and Methodologies

In the early 1980s, two opposing implementation research strategies were developed. Top-down implementation scholars with Mazmanian and Sabatier as the leading ones saw implementation as a control problem. They typically focused on the

implementation of one particular law according to its official goals. These scholars tended to focus on the role of organizations in the implementation process and on how policy statutes could be structured to increase the clarity of goals and the commitment of implementing organizations.

Bottom-up researchers on the other hand examined mainly interactions between street-level bureaucrats and citizens or firms in a given problem area. Some of the leading scholars were Benny Hjern and Richard Elmore. They focused on the capacity of street-level bureaucrats to change the problematic behaviors of or conditions for citizens or firms. This capacity includes an experience-based knowledge of the incentives and conditions that operate on citizens or firms. While such information is crucial for problem solving, it is rarely systematically provided and used in lawmaking and implementation processes at higher levels. They also focused on the discretion and autonomy that these street-level bureaucrats have versus higher level officials. They emphasized the lack of central control over the decisive implementation processes that are taking place at the bottom. As mentioned above, some bottom-up scholars even disregarded official policy goals as an evaluation standard and instead used problem solving as defined by themselves or local actors as a standard.

A problem for these research strategies was that top-down scholars tended to ignore the bottom—particularly the discretionary role of street-level bureaucrats—and that bottom-up scholars tended to remain at the bottom and rarely got far enough up to focus on implementation mechanisms at an organizational level of analysis. Many bottom-up studies were very descriptive and added little to theory building. In the debate between the two contending perspectives, theoretical, methodological, and normative arguments were mingled together. Attempts of synthesizing the two strategies were made without much success, and the theoretical conflict among implementation scholars was not very fruitful for theory development. Although the integrated implementation model that has organized the previous part of this entry focuses on both top and bottom, it is not a real synthesis of the two strategies. It rather seeks to integrate some of the most promising theoretical elements from the implementation literature into a common framework.

The first generation of implementation studies relied on case studies, and most of these used mainly qualitative research methods such as document analysis and loosely structured interviews. These were sometimes combined with quantitative analyses of, for example, program intake and the social situation of target groups after program participation. Exploratory case studies were natural in an early stage of implementation research when knowledge about implementation mechanisms was very limited and when the main purpose of the research was to generate hypotheses and research ideas.

However, as first claimed by Malcolm Goggin, the case study tradition gradually became a barrier to theory testing, generalization, and the accumulation of theory and knowledge on implementation. Most implementation studies focused on many explanatory variables. As an example, the implementation model by Mazmanian and Sabatier has 21 different variables. Often key variables varied from one study to another. Implementation research ran into the “too many variables but too few cases problem.” The single-case-study methodology did not allow isolating the crucial variables for implementation success. Accordingly, Goggin recommended greater use of comparative case studies and big-“*n*” studies to allow for statistical control for third variables.

From the mid-1980s, more quantitative research designs with many cases and the application of statistical designs have gradually been employed in implementation research and in the affiliated research fields of public management, regulatory enforcement and compliance, and recently also in a few network studies. This has led to more systematic testing of theories and hypotheses with control for third variables including task environment. Gradually, statistical methods have become more advanced with the introduction of methods that take the hierarchical or multilevel character of data into consideration (e.g., street-level bureaucrats nested in organizations), use of instrumental variables, and time-series data for examining causal directions.

However, the case study tradition still continues parallel to the application of quantitative research designs. It is particularly popular in network studies and in studies of power relations between street-level bureaucrats and clients.

### Conclusion

Policy implementation is neither an automatic nor dull process. It is a genuine political process for which the achievement of outputs or outcomes that match policy objectives cannot be taken for granted. Implementation results are affected by the chosen policy design and the validity of the causal theory behind it. The results are also affected by the commitment and cooperation of organizations that are involved in the process. Managers have a difficult role in transmitting policies to street-level bureaucrats that have a key discretionary role when delivering policies to target populations. The latter are not passive subjects but participate in shaping implementation outputs as well as outcomes.

Parallel analytic action models have been constructed for explaining the behaviors of implementation actors and target groups based on the interests and resources of the actors. Particularly in the first decades of implementation research, scholars sought to take steps to create a general implementation theory. This process led to very diverse analytical frameworks and research strategies but to little theory accumulation. Implementation is too complex to be accounted for by one theory. Different theories are relevant for explaining different stages or parts of the implementation process, outputs, and outcomes. Rather than a general theory of implementation, the integrated implementation model presented here can be perceived as a framework for analysis or as a series of spotlights that shed light at some key aspects of the implementation process that are worth examining more closely if one wants to understand what implementation is about.

Some observers have claimed that after a peak in the early 1980s, implementation research has come to an end. However, as shown by Harald Sætren, this is far from the case. The number of publications on *implementation* using that term has continued to grow exponentially since the 1970s. However, the growth has taken place particularly in journals and publications outside the core of political science, public policy, and public administration. Implementation studies have become widespread in education, health, environment, law, and economics and much more so than in the former core publications. However, even within the core journals, the number of implementation articles applying the *implementation* term

has stabilized at a level not far below the peak of the 1980s.

However, implementation research as it has been presented here is often performed under labels other than “implementation,” such as (new) governance, policy design and instruments, network studies, outsourcing, public–private partnerships, street-level bureaucracy, management, “new public management,” principal–agent studies, performance, regulatory enforcement, and compliance. Accordingly, the total amount of implementation relevant research has increased considerably and continues to do so yet under various labels. At least two reasons for the described development can be identified. First, fashions are important for research interests and how they are labeled. Second, when for good reasons more and more implementation scholars gave up constructing *the* general implementation theory, several scholars got interested in partial aspects of implementation under various labels.

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See also Bureaucracy; Bureaucracy, Street-Level; Collaboration; Effectiveness, Bureaucratic; Performance; Regulation

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## INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS

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The concept of “indigenous” as used in United Nations (UN) documents seeks to clarify a diffuse relationship between the modern sovereign state and a special type of traditional community that does not itself constitute a political entity. A report to the UN by Martinez Cobo in 1987 describes indigenous peoples as people who have a historical continuity with preinvasion or precolonial societies, who consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, who form at present nondominant sectors of society, and who are determined to preserve and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories and ethnic identity. This early description is rephrased in different forms maintaining the core criteria of priority in time, cultural distinctiveness, experience of marginalization and dispossession, and self-identification. The terms *first nations*, *first people*, and *aboriginal* convey a similar meaning. This entry analyzes the notion of indigenous peoples' rights, its global recognition, why they contest rights, the legal use and control of territories, and the most recent developments.

### The Two Rights

The notion of indigenous peoples' rights may be interpreted in two ways. Most generally, it refers to a moral entitlement, perceived as restoration and redress of previous wrongs, and as such it has developed as a part of the decolonialization process

and the global agenda for human rights. These rights are expressed most clearly in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, passed by the General Assembly in September 2007. This nonbinding declaration states that indigenous peoples have the individual and collective right to the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the charter of the UN, and other human rights mechanisms, and that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.

A second understanding refers to the legal rights most clearly expressed in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 of 1989, *Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention*, which is binding for the signatories and sets out procedures for how rights should be implemented in agreement between the state and its citizens. Rights granted within the legal structures of sovereign states through treaties and court decisions are creating a precedence expressed as a customary international law.

### Global Recognition

The two kinds of rights are mutually reinforcing. The driving force behind a global recognition has been an indigenous movement initiated from the 1970s onwards among American Indians, Sami, Inuit, Maori, and Australian Aborigines, who found similarities in their situation across widely different continents and historical contexts. A common theme among emerging national and transnational organizations was the experience that the expanding social and economic domain of modern states ignored the life ways and livelihood of indigenous minorities; hence the first claim was for recognition.

A seminal event in the debate on indigenous rights was the establishment of the UN Working Group for Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in Geneva in 1982. The Working Group proper consisted of five experts who met yearly in July and allowed representatives from indigenous peoples worldwide to attend and give brief presentations. These meetings developed as significant meeting places for hundreds of delegates and advocacy organizations, which spoke at the plenary session and used the corridors and lounges and meeting rooms to forge new networks, exchange experiences, and

develop strategies. By 1993, the WGIP had developed a draft for the Declaration on Indigenous Rights, and indigenous issues were raised in documents from conferences such as the Rio Conference on Sustainable Development (1992) and the World Conference Against Racism in Durban 2001. A Special Rapporteur position on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples was created in 2002. The same year saw the establishment of the UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues in New York composed of eight state representatives and eight delegates from indigenous organizations.

### Contested Rights

The rights of indigenous peoples are contested in many ways. It has been relatively easy to identify who are indigenous on continents where colonizers arrived from across the water as in the Americas and Australia. But Africa and much of Asia represent special conceptual challenges. The dominant position of White colonial forces left all of Black Africa in a subordinate position that in many respects was similar to the position of indigenous peoples elsewhere, as first comers, nondominant and different in culture from the White intruders. The important difference from most settler states is that formally White colonial forces withdrew from Africa. Accordingly, many politicians argue that all Africans are indigenous, or alternatively, that this distinction does not apply to the African continent.

In addition to inevitable problems, then, in defining who are indigenous, another challenge is that any procedure for singling out one group for special treatment or affirmative action goes against a cherished liberal principle of equal treatment of all citizens. It also goes against administrative preferences for clear-cut and unambiguous target groups and routines for equal treatment. Some opponents claim that indigenous rights represent a new form for racism, distributing favors according to descent, while the main argument for special rights is a compensation for previous injustice.

### Legal Rights

A crucial aspect of indigenous rights relates to the use and control over territories. The ILO Convention No. 169 goes far in recognizing, in Article

14, "the rights of ownership and possession." However, this convention has so far been ratified by only 20 countries and has occasioned extensive legal debates on implementation.

In a few cases, indigenous groups have been delegated control over larger territories and formed a governing body/parliament. The Inuit of Greenland achieved home rule as early as 1979. Nunavut was separated from the Northern Territory in Canada in 1999 with jurisdiction over territorial matters. Some northern indigenous peoples of Siberia control their own autonomous republics within the Russian state.

Land rights issues most commonly come up in negotiations with governments or are taken to the courts. An important judgment in Australia, the *Mabo* case in 1992, established the concept of "native title." Native or aboriginal title reflects the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their laws and customs, to their traditional lands, in the cases where it has not been explicitly extinguished. The judgment thus denounced the doctrine of *terra nullius*—that before the colonialization the land belonged to nobody. The subsequent Native Title Act 1993 attracted considerable international interest and established a precedent that has been argued in court cases in many parts of the world, even though later amendments reduced its scope.

In New Zealand, the Court of Appeal, in a case in 1987 that revisited the interpretation of the rights inherent in the Treaty of Waitangi from 1840, laid down the notion of "fairness" as a guiding principle for relations between the Maori and the Crown.

In Canada, forms of self-determination have been recognized in a series of treaties. The Nisga'a of British Columbia went to court in 1969 for a declaration that their title to land had never been surrendered by treaty or otherwise extinguished. An agreement in support of aboriginal title was reached in 2000. The James Bay Cree reached an agreement with the Government of Quebec in 2002 in a treaty symbolically perceived as a nation-to-nation agreement.

Another case with wider impact was the decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2001 in the case of *Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua*. The Court found that the Nicaraguan government had granted concessions to a foreign

transnational company for logging on traditional lands without prior consultation and consent from the community. Thus Nicaragua had failed to implement the land rights provision of its own laws, and in violation of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. The decision set a regional precedent that is potentially applicable to similar struggles elsewhere against the incursion of transnational corporate interests.

In Botswana, a group of San indigenous peoples took the government to court after they were relocated from their traditional territory, the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. In 2006, the court ruled in favor of the applicants that they were lawfully in possession of the land they occupied and that they were deprived of it forcefully and without their consent. This was seen as a victory, as the case was argued as an “indigenous rights” case. However, while the verdict recognized rights based on continuous occupation, the Botswana government’s violation of existing statutory laws was the main justification. In effect, a ruling that prohibited access to water in a desert environment has prevented the enjoyment of “possession.”

In many of these cases, the courts have stressed the significant connection between indigenous land rights and indigenous identity. It is in the nature of these cases that the court has ruled against aspects of the development policies of their own governments, and verdicts may be counteracted by state policies. But such cases are supported by—and contribute to—an emerging body of international law. As argued, for instance, by James Anaya, the essence in this process cannot be reduced to a set of rules with fixed meanings but is a normative system that has developed “however grudgingly and imperfectly” to support indigenous peoples’ demands.

### Further Developments

Indigenous peoples are tied to their land by way of making a living. They also have spiritual connections to territories where ancestors are buried, and harvesting, herding, or hunting creates ties between people and nature and enhances a sense of belonging. An enduring and dynamic relation to land is best achieved through a measure of self-determination. The struggle for recognition of territorial rights (of ownership or possession) is an

ongoing concern that has brought tangible results in some cases, while in other parts of the world it has only just begun.

However, this option is not always possible to implement. In many cases, the mix of indigenous and settler populations is such that it will not be possible to identify an indigenous ownership without discriminating against nonindigenous neighbors. Moreover, economic factors increasingly mean that the exercise of traditional adaptations often on a reduced territory can only carry a small population. Indigenous peoples find themselves as part of the global migration from countryside to urban areas and part of the pool of landless laborers and squatters.

The challenge for the future, then, in following up the intentions of self-determination as captured in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples will be to find ways to develop instruments for nonterritorialized self-determination. This will mean devolution of power within defined areas of activities, most obviously matters of language, culture, and education, but theoretically a broad range of areas can be included. Procedures for election of a representative body would have to be worked out based on self-identification and some criteria of descent. Such systems are in operation, for instance, for elections to the Sami assemblies in Scandinavia.

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*See also* Human Rights in International Relations; Identity, Social and Political; International Law; Multiculturalism; Self-Determination; Sovereignty

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## INDIVIDUALISM

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The concept of individualism comprises at least three basic ideas in the political realm. First is the dignity of man: Following the Kantian formula, each individual being exists as an end in himself or herself and not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will. Second, the idea of autonomy holds that an individual's thought and action are his or her own and not determined by agencies or causes outside his or her control. Third comes privacy, according to which each human being should enjoy a private life, an area in which the individual should be untroubled by others and able to act and think in accordance with his or her own free will.

This concept of individualism is indissociably bound up with the tenets of modernity and with the conviction that meaning, truth, and value originate in—and exist for the benefit of—mankind. What we call our “modern societies” are no longer *holistic*, to use Louis Dumont's term. Holistic societies were understood as the units that existed before the individual, in which individuals had only to occupy their designated place. In individualistic societies, this relationship is turned on its head: Man's role is to grow into his or her autonomy and to learn to judge independently by detaching himself or herself from entrenched customs and prejudices.

However, this first brief overview of the concept should not hide the fact that individualism continues, as it always has, to lend itself to widely divergent interpretations. In a seminal book on this topic, Steven Lukes identified not less than 11 forms of individualism and added that they were not mutually exclusive or jointly exhaustive. As Pierre Birnbaum and Jean Leca have also shown, the notion of individualism can be interpreted in innumerable different ways that are not always in harmony with one another, whether we

are referring to *utilitarian individualism*—a vision of independent units motivated by a common quest for well-being, *romantic individualism*—that of individuals inspired by their search for the most authentic form of the self, *juridical individualism*—which makes the individual the source and end of all law, *ethical individualism*—taking individual conscience as the supreme judge of the validity of moral norms, *sociological individualism*—emphasizing the distance between the subject and the plurality of his social functions, or, finally, *epistemological individualism*—which makes the individual a conscious subject distinct from his object.

This entry proceeds in four steps. The first two parts sketch a series of semantic histories that reveal alternative uses of the concept of individualism, ranging from a pejorative meaning to a positive conception associated with the defense of autonomy and the spirit of individuality. Both of these interpretations continue to feed into contemporary discussion. The next section proposes an explanation of methodological individualism since the concept has a distinct meaning when it is used in an epistemological sense. Finally, the fourth part examines the current debate on the relationship between political liberalism and individualism.

### Individualism and the Dissolution of Society

As shown by Lukes, individualism has long carried and still carries a pejorative connotation, a strong suggestion that to elevate the individual is to harm the superior interest of society. The first uses of the term in the French form *individualisme* grew out of the general European reaction to the French Revolution and to its alleged intellectual source, Enlightenment thought. The Catholic counterrevolutionary Joseph de Maistre might have coined the term when, in 1820, he spoke of this “deep and frightening division of minds, the infinite fragmentation of all doctrines, political Protestantism carried to the most absolute individualism.” It was the followers of Henri de Saint-Simon who were the first to use the term systematically and associate it with the perceived evils of the contemporary age—namely, disorder, antagonism, atheism, and anarchy. In that sense, Saint-Simonians shared the counterrevolutionaries' critique of the celebration of the individual and their revulsion for social

atomization. However, unlike the counterrevolutionaries, they applied these ideas in a historically progressive direction: Social order was to be not the ecclesiastical and feudal regime of the past but rather the industrial order of the future. As pointed out by Koenraad Swart, these anti-individualists held that the 18th century had been successful in breaking down the traditional values but had failed in developing a new positive philosophy. In part because of the great influence of Saint-Simonian ideas, *individualism* came to be a widely used term over the course of the 19th century to describe a serious evil undermining social and political order.

However, it was a liberal thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville (2009), who was to give the most comprehensive definition of individualism. In *Democracy in America*, he opposed the egoism of our fathers—“a passionate and exaggerated love of oneself”—with individualism,

which is a considered and peaceful sentiment that disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and to withdraw to the side with his family and friends; so that after thus creating a small society for his own use, he willingly abandons the large society to itself. (Book 2, sec. 2, chap. 2)

Above all, we owe to Tocqueville the idea that individualism would be inextricably bound up with democratic revolution: “Aristocracy had made all citizens into a long chain that went from the peasant up to the king; democracy breaks the chain and sets each link apart” (Book 2, sec. 2, chap. 2). Tocqueville was also one of the first to call attention to the paradox of democratic times: the combination of individualization (in the sense of a withdrawal into the self) and conformism (the subjection of all individuals to identical codes of behavior). While pointing out the danger of isolation inherent in increasing individualism, Tocqueville therefore also took care to counterbalance this term with a celebration of what he saw as its opposite: the spirit of individuality.

In a similarly pejorative vein, socialists such as Pierre Leroux have contrasted individualism with an ideal cooperative social order. Identified with the twin concepts of anomie and egoism, individualism came, for these authors, to encapsulate the social,

moral, and political isolation of individuals and their dissolution from social purposes.

This usage of the term—associating *individualism* with a form of conformist withdrawal into the self—continues to hold sway in contemporary literature. In *The Lonely Crowd*, David Riesman thus described mass conformism by positing three character types—*tradition-directed*, *inner-directed*, and *other-directed* individuals—linked to three models of society. The last type relies on the judgment of other individuals, basing their conduct on that of those around them and on the model of mass communication. This hypothesis was critiqued by Richard Sennett, who argues for a reversal of Riesman’s schema: Rather than moving from an inner-directed to an outer-directed model, the West—according to Sennett—is in transition between a society directed by others to a society ruled by the desires of individuals’ inner life. According to this analysis, the risk today is that the predominance of individual private life might eventually destroy the public sphere.

This diagnosis is echoed by Christopher Lasch’s theory of the narcissistic individual, which notes that society is being taken over by the “self” and particularly by a new form of therapeutic sensitivity in which individuals are excessively preoccupied with their own health, safety, and well-being. According to these thinkers, the danger of our times is that collective life might gradually wither away with the rise of the individual. In addition, they hold that the modern democratic wave has elevated the individual to ever new heights, leading to neglect of the collective effort that democracy should properly involve. Individualism is amalgamated in this view with a form of social atomism believed to destroy all possibility of social cohesion, as well as all democratic and civic participation in community life. In a similar vein, a number of theorists have recently challenged individualism in the name of community, with its appeal to rootedness, belonging, fraternity, and harmony. It is interesting to note the high degree of convergence between different critiques of individualism coming from disconnected historical periods and completely opposing political stances—one need only point out that the critiques outlined above come from thinkers as different as De Maistre, Karl Marx, and Carl Schmitt or contemporary communitarian thinkers.

### Autonomy and the Spirit of Individuality

Nevertheless, individualism is not always understood in the sense of conformist egocentrism described above. It may also take in the ideas of a quest for autonomy and defense of a spirit of individuality. Defined in terms of *autonomy*, individualism is understood as the conviction that no natural subordination of the human being is possible and that every individual must be free to decide for himself or herself in the face of moral, religious, and political authority. This unlimited sovereignty of the individual is consequently based on a conception of human nature as being “individuated” before being social. In other words, every human being is a unique individuality with the capacity for self-definition, reasoning, and autonomous decision. The thesis at the heart of this individualism, originating in the English Protestant tradition of the 17th century—Milton, Hobbes, Locke—and continuing, in different incarnations, in the work of Rousseau, Paine, Kant, Jefferson, or Madison—is that every one of us is, partially at least, independent of our positioning in a particular social context and capable of freeing ourselves from it. Norms thus originate in the individual and not the group, an idea that legitimates the right to resistance against political power. The conception of the individual as a pre-social being is not to be taken in a descriptive, temporal, or historical sense: It would be clearly absurd to deny that human beings need a social context in order to develop. The principle has a merely normative meaning, as a thought experiment that allows (at least partial) independence of the human being from his or her social group to be asserted as a legal principle.

The defense of a form of individualism adapted to democratic times, meanwhile, can be found in the work of many different authors. Tocqueville, for instance, distinguished two forms of individualism. The first indicates the withdrawal of individuals into their own private sphere; the second, however, introduces the idea that individuals may be led, by way of personal interest, to devote themselves to the public good. As Tocqueville demonstrated in his analysis of the rise of associations in the United States, “You first get involved in the general interest by necessity, and then by choice; what was calculation becomes instinct; and by

working for the good of your fellow citizens, you finally acquire the habit and taste of serving them” (Vol. 3, Pt. 1, chap. 4a).

It is John Stuart Mill above all who must be credited with the idea, outlined in his book-manifesto *On Liberty* (1859), that the free development of individuality is one of the first requirements for the well-being of humanity and the condition for civilization, instruction, education, and culture. Mill transforms the atomist notion of the individual by emphasizing the collective advantages inherent in the development of individuality and diverse points of view: Pluralism is thus seen as indissociable from the defense of the individual, since it is the only state of affairs that allows every individual to exercise truly free choice. Mill thus opens the way to a form of individualism that is not only social but also encourages solidarity: What he advocates is not a denial of the relationship between individual and society but instead an optimization of this relationship to ensure the free development of all individualities. In the 19th century, socialists such as Louis Blanc similarly saw individualism as a major cultural principle. Like many other concepts, individualism was initially introduced by its opponents but gradually adopted by its tenants. The disciples of Charles Fourier denied any basic opposition between individualism and socialism and Joseph Proudhon openly claimed himself as an individualist. At the end of the century, Jean Jaurès posited that socialism was the logical completion of individualism. Less than a century later, Lukes likewise argued that a humane form of socialism would be the only viable means of realizing the values of individualism.

The output of John Rawls can also be situated in the tradition of Mill. The principles formulated in *A Theory of Justice* (1971) are highly individualist in that they are based on an absolute priority accorded to individual liberty, which Rawls argues must not be sacrificed to the broader well-being of society. However, Rawlsian principles are also egalitarian; they envisage a system of cooperation based on an equitable distribution of opportunities between individuals and acknowledge that the success of justice in a given society must be judged on the situation of the least privileged. In a similar vein, other authors have attempted to clarify the conditions for individual autonomy. The writings of Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, emphasize the

gulf between the individual *de jure* and *de facto*: For individuals to be capable in real terms of choosing a life path and acting autonomously, the lack of provisions for collective protection of those in insecure situations must be remedied.

In more recent times, other more optimistic approaches than those outlined in the first section have been formulated, emphasizing the link between individualism and democracy. Anthony Giddens, for instance, argues that the erosion of traditional modes of coherence also generates democratic effects. The progress of gender equality and sexual tolerance should encourage us to relativize worries about individualism, since individualization should not be confused with selfishness. The crisis of the political domain is thus explained less by the apathy of individuals than by a mismatch between traditional politics and more societal, postmaterialist aspirations (environment, sexuality, etc.).

### Methodological Individualism

One should be aware that individualism has a very different meaning when it occurs in the context of ethics or sociology from when it is used in an epistemological sense. In ethical terms, individualism is a doctrine that holds the person to be the supreme point of reference. Sociologically speaking, we define a society as individualist if its law, customs, and social constraints grant a broad autonomy to individuals. The methodological interpretation of individualism, meanwhile, is completely distinct from other forms: It is an attribute of the researcher and his or her methodology, not of the object of study. Elaborated primarily by Karl Popper and subsequently systematized by authors such as Raymond Boudon, the theory of methodological individualism posits that to explain a given social phenomenon—whether in the domain of methodology, political science, sociology, or any other branch of social science—it is essential to reconstruct the motivations of the individuals concerned by the phenomenon in question and to understand it as the outcome of an aggregation of individual actions governed by these motivations. In this sense, as Jon Elster has written, methodological individualism is a form of reductionism since it holds that any social phenomenon can be explained by the characteristics of the individuals who make

it up. For Elster, explanation always works by opening up “black boxes,” and this can only be done at the level of interacting individuals.

One should clear up two common misunderstandings. First, methodological individualism is not the same thing as an atomist concept of society: It may very well demonstrate that individual actions have meaning only in a specific social context and that individuals judge, decide, and act according to the social situation in which they find themselves. As pointed out by Lukes, explaining phenomena in terms of the microlevel does not preclude reference to holistically characterized causes. In another sense, however, it is true that methodological individualism is clearly distinct from methodological holism in that it rejects any representation of social structures as real and autonomous collective beings. Second, methodological individualism does not mean adhering to economic liberalism or ethical individualism. Boudon and Elster demonstrated that Marxist theory, for instance, often draws on a typically individualist methodology: Social phenomena are analyzed as the consequences of aggregation and interference effects between the actions of individuals each pursuing his or her own interest. One should therefore underline, as Birnbaum and Leca do, that employing an individualist methodology is not the same thing as suggesting that all societal forms are governed by individualist values. Conversely, arguing that modern society is imbued with individualist ideology does not preclude using a holistic methodology. There is therefore no reason why one might not reject methodological individualism while remaining a firm believer in the supreme importance of respecting persons and valuing their autonomy, privacy, and self-development.

### Individualism and Political Liberalism

Despite these caveats, methodological individualism has often been reduced to an economic (monetary or rational choice) model, elevated to the status of a theory that is not merely explanatory but also prescriptive of a comprehensive system of social mechanisms. Over the past half-century, individualism has thus come to encapsulate a cluster of ideas propagated by libertarians or neoliberals. For Cold War liberal thinkers such as Friedrich

Hayek or Ludwig von Mises, individualism was considered as a protective bulwark against the dangers of ideological thinking from both right and left.

Consequently, authors such as Lukes now consider that defense of individualism's core values inherent in the ideals of liberty and equality has been hijacked and harnessed to various doctrines that embody libertarian thinking and promote market-favoring policies. The argument suggests that libertarians have captured the high moral ground from which liberal critiques of the market and arguments for redistribution can come to look concessionary and defensive. Colin Bird goes a step further in claiming that it makes no sense to clarify liberal values as individualist (rather than collectivist) in the first instance and ends up declaring the unhelpfulness of the dominant idiom of individualism and even the obsolescence of the label "liberal individualism." Lukes also views individualism as an ideological construct in the double sense that it embodies and conveys illusions and that these illusions serve partisan interests.

However, it is one thing to say that liberalism need not be identified with an atomistic model of human conduct and that there is no single or eternal view of the relation between the individual and society—that the liberal distinction between public and private spheres is neither permanent nor unalterable since, in Judith Shklar's words, the important point for liberalism is not so much where the line is drawn as that it be drawn somewhere, and under no circumstances be ignored or forgotten. It is quite another thing to claim that the individualist/collectivist dichotomy should be discarded altogether, as if it were possible to conceive of political liberalism without a firm commitment to individualism seen in its fullest sense.

Consequently, some liberals argue that the neo-liberal approach is an incorrect interpretation of individualism and that the liberal commitment to individuality has resources that can be opposed to the libertarianism of economic conservatives. For instance, this commitment might be reformulated—as Jeremy Waldron did with the concept of liberty—as a commitment to equal individualism. This would give rise to a principle justifying social policies that do not infringe on the primacy of the individual but that rather—quite the opposite—aim

at creating the necessary conditions for the full development of individuality by all persons concerned.

In a similar vein, George Kateb argues that a proper perspective should include two types of individualism. The first is the individualism of personal and political rights; the second is democratic individuality. These two types of individualism are closely connected since democratic individuality is, according to Kateb, the best achievement that can grow out of a culture in which personal and political rights are recognized. Put differently, democratic individuality could not exist without rights-based individualism, and any attack on the centrality of rights should be considered as an attack on democratic individuality.

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*See also* Anomia; Citizenship; Communitarianism; Democracy, Types of; Equality; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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## INEQUALITY, ECONOMIC

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Inequality is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, depending on many factors and lending itself to a great variety of explanations and evaluations. The existence, shape, and origins of inequalities are significant both from a positive perspective, owing to the fact that the economic, political, and psychological attitudes and behavior of individuals or groups are affected by the relative position they occupy in the distribution of meaningful resources, and from a normative one, as a consequence of the fact that in general a situation characterized by inequalities compares unfavorably with one of equality or with lesser inequalities. In this entry, a brief overall survey is provided that can be summarized in the following questions: Inequality of what? How large are the inequalities? Inequality among whom? Inequalities due to which causes?

### Inequality of What and How Large?

The qualification of inequalities as economic lends itself to various interpretations: In a narrow sense, it regards the differences in the levels of personal income or wealth; in a broader sense, it includes all the values that directly or indirectly derive from economic activities, which can be used in obtaining them or can be exchanged with them. In the first case, its interpretation is straightforward, in the second, it requires the integration of different systems of inequality that include, besides income and wealth, elements such as health, knowledge, power, or availability of public services, and so on, whose distribution among individuals does not coincide with that of income. In the case of income

and wealth, the size of the inequalities can be determined in terms of monetary units and in ways that are sufficiently precise, although not stable and exposed to a certain margin of error. For other aspects that can be broadly termed *economic*, this is not possible, and the differences between the positions can be described only in ordinal terms of *larger* and *smaller* (possibly with qualifications such as *much larger* or *much smaller*); in still other cases, even this is impossible, and one is limited to an incomplete or partial ordering. The measuring of inequalities raises problems even in the case of items that are directly expressed in monetary terms: In international comparisons, the per capita incomes of different countries are usually translated into a single currency through purchasing power exchange rates, whose value is affected by the choice of national baskets of representative consumption goods. Even more serious are the problems arising from the presence of externalities and of goods whose production counts as income when they are sold in the market but not when they are consumed by the producer or within his or her family, an occurrence that is usually more frequent in poorer countries or among lower income groups. To face these problems, a number of alternative and broader notions of economic welfare have been suggested, among them that of *net economic welfare*, proposed by Joseph Stiglitz, which adjusts gross domestic product (GDP) by subtracting from it negative factors (“bads”) such as pollution and by adding the contribution of beneficial nonmarket activities such as leisure, household production, child care, or looking after sick people.

There are good reasons both for treating the inequalities existing in the various spheres separately and for pooling them in a single comprehensive notion of economic inequality. The reason for treating them separately is that the pattern of inequalities of one sphere does not coincide with those of others; that their economic and political consequences as well as the moral criteria for evaluating them are different, according to Michael Walzer, and that the instruments available for redressing them are usually specific to each sphere (redistributing income has no immediate impact on inequalities in health, education, or power). The reasons for pooling them is that the shortcomings in one sphere can, at least partly, be compensated

for by advantages in another and that the overall condition of people depends on the positions they have in each of the relevant ones.

There have been many attempts at finding criteria for combining the individual positions in a number of separate spheres to form an overall indicator of their standing both in absolute terms and relative to each other. One of the most relevant of these is the one proposed by Amartya Sen (1993) with the term *capabilities*, defined as “combinations of *functionings* a person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection” (p. 31), which represents an all-encompassing notion of what has value for an individual and covers the whole range of possible valuable life experiences that are within reach of a person (including alternatives that are mutually exclusive). The solution Sen put forward can be applied both to individuals and to groups or whole populations; in this second form it has inspired the adoption by the United Nations of the Human Development Index (HDI), as a benchmark for the evaluation of social policies and policies for development, an index that is calculated for each country on the basis of data concerning income per head, the expectation of life at birth, and the level of education. For each of these variables, each country is given a score corresponding to the point in which it is placed in the interval that separates the position of the country that ranks first from that of the country that ranks last, the general index being formed by the simple average of the indexes concerning the individual variables.

### Inequality Among Whom?

A system of inequalities is defined

1. by the choice of the particular sphere, or groups of spheres, to be considered;
2. by the identification of the population about which the comparisons are made and of the units within it whose positions are compared; and
3. by the specification of the moment or span of time that is taken into consideration.

For the sake of simplicity, we shall limit ourselves to consider a single sphere of value (that of income)

and to a static approach, considering a single moment in time. The definition of the population for which inequalities are assessed requires on the one hand that its members have a sufficient number of elements in common to make it relevant, and on the other that they present sufficient differences to make it interesting; both conditions depend on the nature of the problems examined.

The most frequent cases are those in which the population is defined on a national level, but Branko Milanovic notes that an increasing number of studies make reference to the broadest possible definition of the population, which of course corresponds to the whole of humanity. At the other extreme are populations that are formed by specific groups (such as the workforce of a single factory or the members of a single union), local communities, or even single families. As a general (but by no means universal) rule, we can say that the size of the inequalities increases with the size of the population but that its significance can move in the opposite direction, because individuals or groups living close together or having much in common tend to have a sharper perception of what makes them different.

We have a disaggregated representation of inequalities when the population is seen as formed by single individuals and an aggregate one when it is seen as formed by groups of individuals having in common certain characteristics such as gender, age, living in the same area, working in the same sector, having a similar professional qualification, belonging to the same ethnic group, or even belonging to the same bracket or fraction (decile, quintile, etc.) in the distribution of income. The case of families is in some ways ambiguous in that they can be considered both as elementary units and as groups. Aggregation is of course a matter of degree insofar as any group can be split into a number of subgroups or lumped together with others to form a wider group. When the aggregate approach is adopted, the systems of inequalities present both an external and an internal side: In the first case, the position of a group is considered in terms of a representative figure or parameter (typically the average or the median value) and compared with that of other groups; in the second, comparison is made of the position of each single individual or subgroup with those of other individuals or subgroups that make up the larger one.

The aggregate and disaggregate approaches are more often complementary than alternative, given that the position of single individuals in the larger populations is usually the joint result of factors affecting the position of the group to which they belong compared with that of other groups and of factors affecting their personal position in the former. The choice of an aggregate or disaggregate approach is far from neutral and can have relevant ethical and political implications: Presenting world income inequalities in aggregate terms through a comparison of the per capita incomes of different countries leads naturally to development policies that work through transfers of resources to governments; more disaggregate approaches lead to policies that are directly targeted to individuals or local communities. Similarly, policies of affirmative action addressed to disadvantaged groups (like women or ethnic minorities) often take the forms of reserving to members of those groups coveted positions or privileged conditions for obtaining them, measures that do in fact improve the average position of the targeted group but tend to increase the inequalities within it and often do little to improve the conditions of its most disadvantaged members.

Another meaningful distinction, according to Larry Temkin, is that between analytical and synthetic representations of inequalities. In the first case, we have a set of separate data regarding the differences between the position of every single element (individual or group) into which the population has been divided and that of each of the others; for a population of  $N$  elements, this representation takes the form of an  $N \times N$  symmetrical matrix. The synthetic versions take the form of a single numerical indicator, whose value reflects the dispersion of the positions of the various elements, or more exactly the extent to which the distribution of values within the population diverges from equality. The most well-known and frequently used measure is the Gini index, which is especially sensitive to the variations of the extreme positions and takes on a zero value in the case of full equality and a value of 1 in the case of maximum inequality, when all resources belong to just one individual or group.

Synthetic representations may be thought of as the expression of inequalities in the singular, describing properties of entire populations or collective entities: analytical representations, on the other hand, as expressions of inequality in the

plural, describing the relative positions of different individuals or groups. Analytical representations are closer to what might be called the direct perception of inequalities, that is, the actual conditions of individuals and the way they compare themselves with other individuals: Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, for example, have shown that individuals are often more concerned with how much more or less than others they earn than with the absolute level of their income and that less wealth can be as painful (or even more painful) than actual poverty. The empirical descriptions of systems of inequalities combine in general synthetic and analytical aspects, as well as aggregate and disaggregate ones.

The systems of inequalities characterizing a given population can show at the same time stability and variability: stability, as the pattern of relative positions remains basically the same, and variability, as the individuals occupying the different positions keep changing all the time. A high degree of variability or mobility tends to dampen significantly the economic, social, political, and psychological impact of any given system of inequalities.

### The Causes of Inequalities

The factors that give shape to a raw system of economic inequalities among individuals, by which is meant those that precede any corrective intervention by the state or other authorities, normally operate within a general competitive framework and can be grouped into three broad categories:

1. macrofactors, which determine the relative levels of average incomes of whole communities (typically countries);
2. personal factors, which determine the relative positions that individuals living in the same country can attain through their choices and actions; and
3. microfactors, which correspond to gaps in the general framework and provide privileged conditions for particular organizations or individuals within them.

The individual positions in a given system of inequalities are to a varying degree affected by each of the aforementioned factors.



The general framework is that of a competitive capitalist market economy in which the income people earn broadly corresponds to the contribution they have given to marketable production through their work and the resources they have made available. The rule applies fully and directly only to units (persons or firms) that sell their products in the market and are motivated by the maximization of income (or profit, in the case of firms). When production is organized by public bodies, or by nonprofit organizations, the rules are different, but still subject to the indirect influence of those of the capitalist sector, owing to the fact that individuals and resources can move or be transferred from one to the other. Before reaching individuals, the flows of income (mainly capital income but to a certain extent even incomes from labor) deriving from the sale of production can be partially modified by intermediate actors (corporations, financial institutions, insurance companies, families, etc.), which pool different flows and redistribute them among their members or associates.

The macrofactors are those that affect the position of a country in the world economy; they include the nature of the goods it produces, their prices, the efficiency of its firms compared with those of other countries, and its currency's exchange rate; they play a crucial role in determining the relative level of its per capita income and, owing to their frequent fluctuations, its variation through time. Each of them has a direct positive effect on relative per capita income that is sometimes accompanied by indirect negative ones; an appreciation of the exchange rate, for instance, reduces the competitiveness of national firms, making the goods they produce more expensive in terms of foreign currencies.

The personal factors are those that determine the precise position of individuals and the roles they perform in the economic system of the country they live in; these include their natural gifts (in terms of intelligence, health, and physical dexterity), the social milieu in which they were born and grew up, the choices they made regarding their development and during their working life, how much they worked and the effort and commitment they put in, how much they saved, the risks they took, and the luck they had. Mainstream explanations of income inequalities among persons living in the same country see them as arising from competitive market

interactions of individuals having different personal characteristics.

The microfactors are mainly sociological and usually "local," in the sense of having a direct influence on specific sectors or locations; they reflect the structure of organizations (firms, unions, etc.) or networks within which and between which elements of power, monopoly, and discrimination play a significant role: They typically offer to insiders privileged channels of access to valuable resources from which outsiders are excluded or that they face obstacles in accessing. The inequalities they produce are sheltered from the competitive forces that are characteristic of the basic framework and have a "durable" nature insofar as they affect individuals' conditions throughout their lives and are often transmitted vertically through generations and horizontally among persons who share some easily recognizable and permanent traits (such as gender, ethnic origin, or faith). These microfactors can be grouped into the three broad categories of hierarchization, exclusion, and exploitation, which perform different but often complementary roles, according to Charles Tilly.

*Hierarchization* has been defined by Göran Therborn (2006) as "institutionalized ranking of social actors": The subjects occupying the higher ranking positions, usually limited in number, have at their disposal a variety of resources (finances, prestige, power, etc.), the access to which is subject to their control and approval, or from which those of lower rank are excluded; inequalities of this kind are generally codified by rules that are both formal and stable in time, and sometimes transmitted to designated heirs.

*Exclusion* occurs when access to positions associated with wealth and prestige is barred to subjects who would otherwise qualify, on the basis of characteristics such as gender, race, or religion, which are easily ascertained by the insiders and cannot easily be modified by the excluded.

*Exploitation* has been examined from various points of view: the Marxist one, for which every relationship based on the separation between workers and the means of production involves exploitation, is both too broad and insufficiently comprehensive; more limited versions refer to the presence of elements of monopoly and/or of coercion, which alter the distribution of the fruits of labor to the advantage of those who control them.

According to Tilly's version, similar to Marx's but more sociological and not limited to relationships between capital and labor, exploitation "operates when powerful, connected people command resources from which they draw significantly increased returns by coordinating the effort of outsiders whom they exclude from the full value added by that effort" (*Durable Inequality*, p. 10). Common to all these versions is the idea of a systematic and long-lasting distortion of relationships in favor of the exploiter, which (a) could be removed without significant loss of efficiency and (b) is accompanied by forms of "categorical inequality," that is, by the attribution to the exploited and exploiter of distinctive characteristics (in terms of race, gender, culture, or class) that tend to both consolidate and justify the exploitation. Alongside exploitation, and sharing some of its traits, Tilly proposes the category of "opportunity hoarding," which arises when groups of people sharing some recognizable characteristic establish preferential relationships that ensure them the control of resources, which they take advantage of to the exclusion of outsiders but without exploiting the latter.

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*See also* Class, Social; Inequality, Political; Social Stratification

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## INEQUALITY, POLITICAL

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Political inequality is the unequal influence of the citizens on the collective decisions. It stems from a situation in which one person or one group within a community differs in its impact on the decisions that affect the whole community. Defined as an antonym, political inequality is the absence of political equality, a fundamental attribute of democracy. The principle of political equality departs from the idea that decisions can only be adopted by the persons who are subject to them, and that all preferences must be taken into account before deciding. From the point of view of the quality of democracy, addressing the levels of political inequality in a democracy is therefore essential. There are, however, two contradictory conceptions of political inequality, which frame differently the study of democratic quality. After a brief contextualization, this entry reconsiders these two main conceptions of political inequality and underlines the principal implications for the quality of democracy.

Discussions on the concept of political equality are intrinsically linked to democratic discourse. As such, the scope of political equality has gradually been changed, in parallel to the development of Western democracies. In the early 19th century, few men and almost no women were usually entitled to participate in the political sphere. Political equality existed but only for a reduced group of men from the high socioeconomic strata. It was not put into question, however, that suffrage should be extended to women, slaves, or the lower social classes. Only late in the 19th century was universal suffrage steadily introduced in most democracies and political rights expanded to the whole population. The new status of citizenship enabled all citizens to be political equal. Although by the end of the 20th century most societies labeled as democracies had incorporated universal suffrage as a basic norm, the ideal of political equality is far from being realized in many countries, and there are significant differences across them. Political inequality remains for that reason a major field of research.

### Formal Versus Substantial Inequality

Further development of the liberal and republican theories resulted in two competing understandings

of political inequality, which roughly reflect the distinction between formal and substantial inequality.

### *Formal Inequality*

For formalists, universal suffrage and universal entitlement to participate in public matters are the basic features of political equality—a set of rights that allows citizens to equally influence collective decisions. Political equality is legally and formally guaranteed through the existence of these rights. In most democracies, indeed, the law endorses all citizens with the same rights and the same opportunities to participate in political decisions, and public institutions and administrations are prevented to avoid any type of discrimination against any of the citizens. Following this conception, political equality is equivalent to liberty, as the freedom to choose whether to participate or not. Once political equality is formally established, citizens might freely decide to become politically unequal. Freedom provides in fact with the opportunity to become unequal. As a logical result, freedom is only possible if there is political inequality; in other words, political inequality is a reflection of the citizen's decisions, an expression of their liberty. From this theoretical perspective, the principle of freedom is clearly superior to the equality principle.

### *Substantial Inequality*

From a drastically different perspective, political inequality basically refers to the unequal distribution of political resources among the citizens. It comprehends not only formal equality but also substantive equality. Hence, formal equality is not a sufficient condition in a democracy, as its existence does not guarantee effective influence in the collective decisions of all the citizens. Unequal distribution of political resources—based on differences of income, education, skills, gender, race, and so on—undermines political equality; those who collect more political resources have a greater capacity to affect political decisions. Political inequality in this second meaning is inextricably linked to social inequality and social stratification. Because there normally is correspondence between a citizen's position in the stratification scale and his or her capacity to influence politics, there is an overlap of the concept of political inequality with

social inequality. As an attempt to delimitate the former from the later, political inequality has been defined as the sum of three components: participatory inequality, unequal responsiveness, and unequal policy delivery. Participatory inequality is unequal political participation among the citizens, which might be caused by unequal rights to participate (formal equality), unequal capacity to participate (unequal distribution of resources), or unequal disposition to participate. Unequal responsiveness is uneven attention by the government, biased because of economic, ideological, or political factors. Unequal policy delivery is asymmetrical redistribution of favorable policies among the citizens, benefiting some groups more than others.

### **Implications for the Quality of Democracy**

Addressing political inequality from either a formal or a substantive point of view has important implications with respect to the quality of democracy, regarding both how it should be measured and what goals should be attained through political equality.

Measures of formal political equality are based on objective indicators of the available rights and freedoms in a given society. Higher democratic standards can be achieved if there exist more alternatives to participate in collective decisions, if there are more freedoms and rights that citizens can enjoy, and if these rights and freedoms are more inclusive. Most democracies qualify high in this dimension, which is an indicator that formal equality is broadly extended.

However, a measure of the quality of democracy in terms of formal political equality has an important limitation with respect to political participation. There may be citizens who would like to participate in political decisions, who have the will to participate and freely decide to do so, but who lack the necessary resources to do so—they may not know how to participate, they may not have the time, and so on. A country may have a high degree of formal political equality, but there may be no guarantee that all citizens who wish to influence politics can effectively participate. There must be a minimal standard of life to ensure that all citizens are able to make their democratic choices. Restricting political inequality to a formal conception might therefore provide a partial picture of democratic quality.

When the substantive dimension is added to the definition of political inequality, measures of the quality of democracy are confronted by further critical dilemmas. Assessing levels of substantive political inequality is an extremely complex task, as measures of political inequality rely most of the time on subjective interpretations, which make them more difficult to control. Two indicators have generally been used to measure substantive inequality: levels of political participation (turnout, number of people working for a party, number of people who demonstrate, etc.) and political concentration (the extent to which office holding is monopolized by a group of individuals). Contrary to the measure of formal political inequality, though, many countries with relatively high ranks of formal equality rank relatively low on substantive political equality, with low levels of participation and high levels of political concentration. Formal equality does not in fact guarantee substantive equality.

Nevertheless, increasing substantive equality might also have a negative impact on the quality of democracy. Two main arguments have been developed against an increase in effective participation. First, the quality of the decisions is questioned. If all citizens are obliged to participate in the decision-making process, those with little interest in politics and low levels of education will be entitled to a voice. It is not certain, then, that they will be able to choose what is best for the whole community. A second concern is that increasing equality might endanger a basic principle of democracy: freedom. There are two possible ways to increase equality: Either citizens' socioeconomic status is equalized to avoid inequality based on unfair distribution of political resources, or citizens are obliged to participate. Although empirical studies are not always consistent in their results, the first option seems unfeasible in a reasonable period of time. The only sound option for increasing participation, therefore, is to make participation compulsory. Yet compulsory participation directly damages freedom, because it constrains individual liberties. In this situation, citizens do not freely decide whether or not to participate, but they are obliged to do so by the state; put differently, political participation—an act that is meant to be the expression of maximum liberty—is transformed into an obligation. Compulsory participation is hardly reconcilable with freedom, as it is extremely difficult to find the

limits that do not harm individuals' liberties. There is, therefore, an unsolvable contradiction between increasing equality and ensuring freedom.

### Inequality, Citizenship, and Immigration

A final issue concerning political inequality deals with the concept of citizenship and, as an extension, with immigration. Whether from a formal or substantive perspective, political inequality is at the core of the debate on citizenship. First, the status of citizenship is required to enjoy political equality. Political rights and freedoms are guaranteed only to the citizens, those who belong to the community and are legally recognized as such. Although substantive political equality cannot be ensured by the state, in contemporary democracies all people who have *full* citizenship formally should enjoy the same rights and freedoms. Second, and as a consequence, because immigrants do not have full citizenship, they constitute a specific, sometimes very large, group in the community that lacks basic political rights, such as the right to vote. While much discussion has been done on the extent to which political rights should be expanded to immigrants—that is, on the inclusiveness of the political rights—the right to vote is normally restricted to citizens. Formal inequality is therefore a feature of many democracies. Indeed, even if immigrants belong to the political community, they are not entitled to the status of citizens. Accordingly, and from the point of view of the quality of democracy, political inequality in a democracy may be addressed from three alternative outlooks: (1) Is there formal equality for citizens? (2) Is there formal equality for citizens and noncitizens? (3) Is there both formal and substantive equality?

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*See also* Citizenship; Democracy, Quality; Equality, Political; Liberty

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## INFERENCE, CLASSICAL AND BAYESIAN

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*See* Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

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## INFERENCE, ECOLOGICAL

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The ecological inference problem is a long-standing problem that encompasses a rich set of intriguing puzzles. Scholars with diverse backgrounds and interests have a stake in approaches to ecological inference problems, which appear as frequently in political science as they do in medicine, geography, economics, or sociology. The problem occurs, for instance, when one is interested in the behavior of individuals, but has data only at an aggregated level (e.g., precincts, hospital wards, counties). In other words, a data limitation creates a situation where the behavior of individuals must be surmised from data on aggregated sets of individuals rather than on individuals themselves. Since the goal is to make inferences from aggregate units that are often derived from an “environmental level” (i.e., geographical/ecological units such as a county or precinct), the term *ecological inference* is used to describe this type of analysis. More generally, the problem manifests itself whenever one has data at one level of aggregation (e.g., the state level) but is interested in

inferences at another level of data aggregation (e.g., the county level). Accordingly, the term *cross-level inference* is often used as a synonym for ecological inference. This entry discusses the nature and implications of this problem.

A classic example of the ecological inference problem in political science occurs when one tries to determine how members of different racial groups cast their ballots. Because the United States employs the secret ballot, the only data available for solving this inquiry are at the precinct level, where vote totals and racial demographics can be obtained but not vote totals broken down by racial categories. Epidemiologists confront identical methodological issues when they seek to explain which environmental factors influence disease susceptibility using only data from counties or hospital wards, rather than individual patients. Economists studying consumer demand and marketing strategies might need to infer individual spending habits with an analysis of sales data from a specific region and the aggregate characteristics of individuals in that region, rather than from data on individuals’ characteristics and purchases. These different queries are substantively varied, and it would be simple to identify a host of other equally unique queries that fit into the ecological inference mold.

In addition to substantive applications that span many fields, the mathematics of the ecological inference problem are also related, sometimes isomorphic, to inferential problems in other disciplines, even when the subject matter is not substantially related. For instance, geographers have long been intrigued with the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP). MAUP occurs when the estimates at one level of aggregation are different from the estimates obtained at a different level of aggregation. Many statisticians and mathematicians have been captivated by Simpson’s paradox, which is the reversal in direction of association between two variables when a third (“lurking”) variable is controlled. Described in this way, Simpson’s paradox (and consequently ecological inference) is akin to the omitted variable problem discussed in virtually all econometrics and regression texts. While notation and terminology may differ, the similarities of the underlying problems cannot be denied.

The main difficulty with cross-level inference is that not only might the estimates at different levels

of aggregation be different, they could be substantially different and even lead to different conclusions. William Robinson (1950) was among the first to point out this conundrum with correlation coefficients. He examined the relationship between nativity and illiteracy. At the individual level, the correlation coefficient was .118. If the data were aggregated at the state level, the correlation coefficient reverses sign and becomes  $-.526$ . If the data were aggregated at the census geographic divisions, the correlation coefficient remains negative at  $-.619$ . The same phenomenon occurs when race and illiteracy are examined. The correlation at the individual level is .203. At the census division level, the correlation is .946. At the state level, the correlation is .773. While these correlation coefficients do not change sign, they vary widely and imply different substantive conclusions. In fact, such wide discrepancies are common, and worse, in a given application, a researcher is unable to determine if his or her aggregated results bear similarity to the true individual-level relationship.

Let us consider the challenge of inferring how individuals voted from election returns aggregated at the precinct level. Because U.S. elections employ the secret ballot, individual vote choices are unknown. Election returns, however, are reported at the precinct level, and aggregate individual racial categorizations can usually be obtained and merged with the voting data. Hence, for any given precinct, the available data include how many votes each candidate received as well as the precinct's racial composition. The simplified problem can be summed up with a  $2 \times 2$  contingency table.

	<i>Candidate 1</i>	<i>Candidate 2</i>	
Group 1	$\beta_{11}z_1$	$(1 - \beta_{11})z_1$	$z_1$
Group 2	$\beta_{21}z_2$	$(1 - \beta_{21})z_2$	$z_2$
	$y_1$	$y_2$	

The known elements of this problem are the proportion of voters in each group,  $z_1$  and  $z_2$ , and the proportion of votes received by each candidate,  $y_1$  and  $y_2$ . The unknown elements are the proportions of each group that voted for each candidate,  $\beta_{11}$ ,  $\beta_{12}$ ,  $\beta_{21}$ , and  $\beta_{22}$ . If we assume that Group 1 and Group 2 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, then  $z_2$  is simply  $(1 - z_1)$ . Similarly, if we

assume that all votes were cast for either Candidate 1 or Candidate 2 and there were no abstentions, then  $y_2 = (1 - y_1)$ . Such contingency tables are usually available to describe each areal unit in the data set. In our voting application, since a set of precincts comprises the voting district in question, one might index these values with a further subscript to identify the precinct. For each precinct  $i$ , then, we have the following relationship:

$$y_{1i} = \beta_{11i}z_{1i} + \beta_{21i}(1 - z_{1i}).$$

This relationship holds exactly for each of the  $I$  precincts in the district, yielding a system with  $I$  equations (one for each precinct) and  $2I$  unknowns (two parameters,  $\beta_{11i}$  and  $\beta_{21i}$ , for each precinct). From basic algebraic properties, we know that there is not enough information to solve for these parameters given these equations. The fundamental indeterminacy is that multiple values of the parameters satisfy these restrictions. Note as well that adding observations of further precincts does not change the indeterminacy. Each new precinct adds one more equation to the system and two more parameters to be inferred.

The ecological inference problem is an example of an ill-posed inverse problem, or an inverse problem with many "solutions," that is, a problem that encompasses a fundamental indeterminacy. Although one may wish to obtain a point estimate or "solution" to the problem, there is not enough information to narrow down the feasible set of estimates to one particular point estimate. This type of problem has been described as "partially identified" because while the available information does not allow one to identify the parameter of interest without the imposition of strong assumptions, it does often allow one to identify a "region" within which the parameters must lie, thus partially identifying the problem. How to proceed with partially identified problems such as the ecological inference problem is not obvious.

There are various strategies for pursuing problems of the partially identified ilk. However, for any particular application, how to proceed in identifying an estimation strategy is not straightforward and rarely obvious on the basis of theory alone. The key criterion involves the costs and benefits associated with different types of inferential errors. Every assumption involves an acceptance of potential

error in estimation. Some of these assumptions may be more palatable than others. Importantly, one must never allow excitement over the possibility of a point estimate to override careful and explicit consideration of attendant assumptions. There are no pat answers, no generic solutions.

Many methods have been proposed for obtaining estimates for ecological inference problems. Although the multifarious approaches to this problem have been distinct, they can be seen as lying along a continuum. The left end of the continuum is characterized by a lack of assumptions and, concomitantly, high credibility. Even when no assumptions are imposed, the data can allow one to narrow the range in which the true values of the parameters of interest lie. The best known procedure for obtaining a range of possible estimates comes from Oris Duncan and Beverly Davis's method of bounds. The ideal situation occurs if the bounds are sufficiently informative. If they are not, one might choose to move along this continuum, but then assumptions, which may or may not be true, must be made. At the right end of the continuum are approaches that lead to a precise point estimate for each parameter. There are, to be sure, many different approaches clustered on the right, in the region of strong and numerous assumptions. Indeed, the bulk of the effort has been directed toward obtaining point estimates or to somehow identify a problem that is only partially identified. In general, one cannot zero in on precise estimates without making restrictive assumptions and thus trading reduced credibility for increased precision. Empirical researchers should be aware that no solution comes free. Every method yielding point estimates necessarily rests on assumptions that are strong enough to remove the indeterminacy of ecological inference. Researchers contemplating application of any method should carefully consider whether the associated assumptions are credible in their applications.

In practice, it is rare that one can accept point-identifying assumptions with great confidence. The prudent researcher should then resist the temptation to embrace any particular estimation method. Instead, the analysis of aggregate data should be a process. First, one should determine what one can learn from the data alone without imposing any assumptions. Then, one should consider various assumptions that have identifying power. A

productive approach is to "layer" the assumptions, imposing them sequentially in order of decreasing plausibility. As more assumptions are imposed, one will be able to draw conclusions that are increasingly sharp but decreasingly believable. This process of inference illuminates the respective roles that data and assumptions play in empirical research. Moreover, it enables both researchers and their consumers to adjudicate how best to reconcile the inevitable tension between the strength of conclusions and their credibility in ecological inference problems.

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*See also* Aggregate Data Analysis; Measurement, Levels; Multilevel Analysis; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

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## INFORMATION, POLITICAL

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*See* Political Communication

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## INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

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Institutional theory has been grappling with one major problem: how to explain the dynamics of

change in institutions. Scholars in the three long-standing “new institutionalisms”—(1) rational choice institutionalism (RI), (2) historical institutionalism (HI), and (3) sociological institutionalism (SI)—have increasingly sought to “endogenize” change, that is, explain it “from the inside.” In response to criticisms that their analytic frameworks could account for continuity but not for change, which they explained mainly “from the outside,” as the result of exogenous shocks, these neo-institutionalists have increasingly sought to explain the origins of and shifts in interest-based preferences, historical paths, or cultural frames. Whereas many of these scholars have sought explanations using one or other of the two existing alternative approaches, others have turned instead to ideas and discourse. For some of these neo-institutionalists, this was but a brief encounter, in particular for RI scholars, since taking ideas and discourse “seriously” undermined many of the very premises of their approaches. Others, however, broke with some of the fundamental premises of their own institutionalist tradition with their turn to ideas and discourse. Because these latter scholars have come to have as much if not more in common with one another than with those in the institutionalist tradition from which they emerged, they have come to be seen as part of a fourth new institutionalism, discursive institutionalism (DI)—sometimes also called the ideational turn or constructivist institutionalism.

The three long-standing neo-institutionalisms, although very different, tend to share one common assumption: Institutions serve primarily as constraints. RI focuses on rational actors who pursue their preferences following a *logic of calculation* within political institutions, defined as structures of incentives; HI details the development of political institutions, described as regularized patterns and routinized practices subject to a *logic of path dependence*; and SI concentrates on social agents who act according to a *logic of appropriateness* within political institutions, defined as socially constituted and culturally framed rules and norms. By contrast, DI focuses on sentient agents who convey substantive ideas through the interactive processes of discourse in given meaning to contexts following (contextualized) *logics of communication*. Institutions, here, rather than static external rule-following structures, are dynamic structures

and constructs of meaning internal to agents who have the ability not only to create (and maintain) institutions but also to communicate critically about them and to change (or maintain) them through collective action. But while institutional context in DI therefore refers first and foremost to the structure, construction, and communication of meaning, it can also be understood in terms of the background information provided by the other three neo-institutionalisms in political science, with which discursive institutionalists may engage and from which they often emerge. This background information is all about the structures, understood in terms of historical institutional rules and regularities, sociological institutionalist cultural rules and frames, and rational choice institutionalist incentives and power asymmetries, that constitute the context within which collective action occurs and that affect the ways in which discursive institutionalist meaning structures are constructed.

Thus, the four institutionalisms share with one another a core focus on the importance of institutions, but they differ in their definitions of institutions, in their objects and logics of explanation, and in the ways in which they deal with change (see Table 1). This entry turns first to the examination of attempts to endogenize change and the move to ideas in RI, next in HI, and then in SI, before exploring the same in DI, in particular through the interactive dimension of discourse. The entry concludes with a consideration of the interrelationships among the four new institutionalisms.

### Endogenizing Change in Rational Choice Institutionalism

RI posits rational actors with fixed preferences who calculate strategically to maximize their preferences and for whom institutions represent the incentive structures that reduce the uncertainties resulting from the multiplicity of individual preferences and issues. The very premises of RI about the fixed nature of preferences and the stability of institutions ensured that preference formation was long of little interest to RI scholars, while institutional change was ruled out analytically a priori, given equilibrium-based assumptions that entailed that change could only come from the outside, through exogenous shocks. The inability of RI to deal with institutional change from the inside and



**Table 1** The Four Institutionalisms

	<i>Rational Choice Institutionalism (RI)</i>	<i>Historical Institutionalism (HI)</i>	<i>Sociological Institutionalism (SI)</i>	<i>Discursive Institutionalism (DI)</i>
Object of explanation	Behavior of rational actors	Structures and practices	Norms and culture of social agents	Ideas and discourse of sentient agents
Logic of explanation	Calculation	Path dependency	Appropriateness	Communication
Definition of institutions	Incentive structures	Macrohistorical structures and regularities	Cultural norms and frames	Meaning structures and constructs
Approach to change	Static—Continuity through fixed preferences, stable institutions	Static—Continuity through path dependency interrupted by critical junctures	Static—Continuity through cultural norms and rules	Dynamic—Change (and continuity) through ideas and discursive interaction
Explanation of change	Exogenous shock	Exogenous shock	Exogenous shock	Endogenous process through background ideational and foreground discursive abilities
Recent innovations to explain change	Endogenous ascription of interest shifts through RI political coalitions or HI self-reinforcing or self-undermining processes	Endogenous description of incremental change through layering, drift, conversion	Endogenous construction (merge with DI)	Endogenous construction through reframing, recasting collective memories and narratives through epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, communicative action, deliberative democracy

*Source:* Schmidt, V. A. (2010). Taking ideas and discourse seriously: Explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth new institutionalism. *European Political Science Review*, 2(1), 1–25.

its difficulties in accounting for preference formation have led scholars in the RI tradition in recent years to seek to endogenize change. For some, this has meant remaining within RI and seeking to explain change through shifts in political coalitions. For others, it has also entailed looking to HI approaches for the origins of preference formation, in particular for the origins of institutions, and for trajectories of change. For yet other scholars, however, endogenizing change has involved the turn to ideas—with most doing so in ways that did not undermine RI basic premises and a few moving to DI.

In their attempts to find new ways to account for preference formation and institutional shifts, RI scholars have mostly looked to political coalition formation, although they have also sometimes sought a rapprochement with HI. Those RI scholars concerned with political coalitions often focus on formal electoral institutions, arguing that these act as incentive structures to produce the political coalitions that implement certain kinds of policies. But whatever the value of this insight within purely RI analytics, the problem is that it remains highly deterministic, as institutions are portrayed as determining politics, which in turn determine

political outcomes, and it still cannot explain the origins of the institutions or of the political coalitions that created them, let alone why institutions or policies might change over time. When RI scholars try to respond to the question of origins by turning to HI, they often go back to the founding moments of the electoral institutions. But in this case, institutional foundations serve to explain contemporary political institutions that explain current political coalitions that explain current policies. And where is endogenous change?

Instead of using HI to enhance substantive theorizing, RI scholars sometimes seek to build HI insights into game-theoretic analysis. Avner Greif and David Laitin, for example, redefine the goal of institutions—from self-enforcing to self-reinforcing or self-undermining institutions—and their effects as *parametric* in the short term, meaning exogenous and fixed for agents who act on self-enforcing beliefs, but only *quasi-parametric* in the long run, meaning endogenous and variable as individuals are led to act in a manner that does not reproduce the associated beliefs. The problem here is that although this may better account for change over time in game-theoretic terms, we are still left with the irrationality of the choice of institutions to begin with; the deterministic trajectory of change over time, now for better or for worse; and the limited rationality of these supposedly rational actors at any given point in time.

Relatively few RI scholars have turned to ideas to solve the problem of institutional change. Among those who have, the most significant RI engagement with ideas began in the 1990s, although it has remained rather circumscribed ever since. It never took ideas very seriously, since ideational explanation was deemed useful only when and if explanation in terms of objective or material interests was insufficient. This, RI scholars argued, would occur if ideas come before interests, as road maps—in which case ideas are little more than mechanisms for choosing among interests; if ideas come after interests, acting as focal points—in which case ideas serve at best as switches for interests; if ideas are embedded in institutions, in which case it is the institutions rather than the ideas that really matter; if ideas are after the fact legitimization of actors' interest-based action—in which case ideas are not really taken seriously at all; or even if, following the work of Douglas North, ideas are

“shared mental modes”—in which case ideas would necessarily have an effect on the content of interests, undermining the very RI definitions of interests as separate from ideas.

The problem for RI scholars, then, and the reason most quickly abandoned the pursuit of ideas, is that they could not continue to maintain the artificial separation of objective interests from subjective ideas about interests, that is, beliefs and desires. Such subjective interests threatened to overwhelm the objective ones that are at the basis of the rationalists' thin model of rationality, by undermining the fixed nature of preferences and the notion of outcomes as a function of preexisting preferences. And without fixed preferences as well as neutral institutional incentive structures, RI scholars lose the parsimony of the approach and everything that follows from it, including the ability to mathematically model games rational actors play as opposed to, in the words of Fritz Scharpf, the “games real actors play.” This helps explain why the foray into ideas for most dyed-in-the-wool RI scholars was short-lived. For those who persisted, however, a whole new approach to the explanation of interests and institutions has opened up.

For DI scholars engaged with the RI tradition, subjective interests replace the objective ones of RI, as ideas about interests that bring in a much wider range of strategic ideas and social norms. And these must be explained in terms of their meaning to the actors within a given meaning context rather than in terms of some set of universally identifiable interests. Material interests, economic in particular, which are at the basis of much of the institutional incentives in the rational choice institutionalist literature, are not ignored. But DI scholars tend to separate material interests analytically into material reality and interests rather than to conflate them, such that material reality constitutes the setting within which or in response to which agents may conceive of their interests. This makes for a DI ontology that is largely constructivist, much as in SI (see below), by contrast with the materialist ontology of most RI scholars, who assume that they can attribute material interests to actors, regardless of how those actors themselves construct their own ideas about their interests. And it makes for a different approach to epistemological questions of knowledge and certainty.

In DI, the kind of knowledge and degree of certainty agents may have with regard to their ideas about material reality may differ, depending on the aspect of material reality with which they are concerned. Illustrative of this epistemological observation is Ludwig Wittgenstein's little noticed distinction in *On Certainty* between language games based on our everyday experiences in the world, which tend to admit few doubts or mistakes, and language games based on our (social) scientific pictures of the world, which may always allow for doubts, mistakes, and even gestalt switches. A problem with RI is that it tends to develop (social) scientific pictures games of the world that it treats as if they had the certainty of experience games.

Analyzed using the terms of RI, Mark Blyth suggests that the problem is that RI scholars assume that most phenomena are explainable in terms of "Knightian risk," as part of a directly observable world in which agents can calculate the subjective probability of the likely outcomes of their preferences, such as in the U.S. Congress. But much of the phenomena that RI scholars seek to explain are not directly observable and are much closer to "Knightian uncertainty" because of the impossibility of knowing let alone statistically predicting the effects of all the forces that may have an impact on economic and political realities. For these phenomena, agents are not simply unsure about how to achieve their interests but also unsure of what their interests are, given that the uncertainties are too great, the moment unique, prediction impossible, and agents' interests always structurally underdetermined. Thus, for example, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the economic crisis following the oil shocks of the 1970s were both cases of Knightian uncertainty, as governments, business, and labor at these critical junctures all sought to reconstitute interests through alternative narratives and causal stories about the reasons for the crisis, seeking to produce new political coalitions for collective action, with new ideas about how to replace existing institutions.

Needless to say, the economic crisis that began in 2008 is a similar moment of Knightian uncertainty, when the economists' predictive models of rationalist behavior proved unable to cope not simply because they wrongly predicted but because their use actually altered the market, by acting, in the words of Donald Mackenzie, as an "engine"

transforming the environment, not a "camera" recording it. It is important to note, however, that while the predictive failure of economists' picture games contributed to the radical uncertainties of the economic crisis, where bankers went very wrong is when they ignored what they knew with a high degree of certainty from their cumulative experiences of lending and of assessing the reliability of risk, creditworthiness, and the likelihood of repayment over time and turned instead to predictive models that they believed were more certain because they were based on "scientific" methods.

Knightian uncertainty need not always be connected to such dramatic moments, however. DI scholars in the RI tradition have identified numerous cases in which ideas about interests may be in question under more everyday circumstances. For example, actors may not know what their interests are because they are in a new area of activity and thus have to determine which utility to maximize (interests), how to maximize it (strategies), and to what end (goals). Alternatively, long-standing ideas about interests may come into question at a critical juncture, say, when a central figure in a system signals an idea that leads to a shift in belief system. In both of these instances, scholars challenge RI logics only in special circumstances—with new ideas in new areas of activity or when old ideas are questioned. In both cases, however, by limiting the importance of ideas to the period of uncertainty between the end of the old institutional "game" and the beginning of the newly agreed institutional "game," DI scholars risk making it appear that DI is significant only at the critical moment of changing DI ideas, which is preceded and followed by RI-crystallized preferences and frozen institutions. Institutions, however, also change over time as the ideas that infuse them change, as other DI scholars in the RI tradition suggest. This is because institutions themselves are not neutral structures of incentives but, rather, as Bo Rothstein suggests, may be the carriers of ideas or collective memories that make them objects of trust or mistrust and changeable over time as actors' ideas and discourse about them change in tandem with changes in their performance.

DI scholars who engage with the RI tradition, then, like RI scholars, speak the language of interests, incentive structures, and collective action. But they see these as infused with a wide range of ideas

and norms rather than narrowly focused on an instrumental rationality of utility maximization, with incentive structures normative rather than neutral, interests subjective rather than objective, and their explanations, where these are RI pictures of the world, much more uncertain than RI scholars recognize.

### Endogenizing Change in Historical Institutionalism

HI explores how institutions, understood as sets of regularized practices with rulelike qualities, structure action and outcomes. It emphasizes not just the operation and development of institutions but also the path dependencies and unintended consequences that result from such historical development. The emphasis of HI on macrostructures and path dependence means that it has no agency built into it, making it difficult for it to explain why change may occur other than exogenously. And by focusing on critical junctures, with big bangs followed by path-dependent continuities, HI can be as equilibrium based as RI—which is even more problematic for an approach that purportedly explains “history.” HI’s inability to explain change from the inside along with its lack of agents has spurred scholars in the HI tradition to seek to endogenize change. And here, whereas for some this meant remaining within HI to theorize incremental change and/or to turn for agency to RI, for others it has meant a turn to SI and, increasingly, to DI.

In their attempts to introduce agency, HI scholars have most often looked to RI for the micro-foundations to their macropatterns. But in so doing, they have often simply reinforced the immobility of institutions. One example of this is the varieties of capitalism (VOC) school pioneered by Peter Hall and David Soskice, which explicitly married the two frameworks in its analysis of the binary division of capitalism into liberal and coordinated market economies. VOC is HI in its definition of the historically grounded macro-institutional rules and regularized practices of the two different capitalist varieties, RI in its focus on the rationally based, microfoundational logic of coordination games among firms and other relevant actors. But, however valuable the insight into the rationalist logics of complementarities among components

and coordinating mechanisms among corporate actors within different macro-institutional contexts, the result is a very static depiction of capitalism that critics have also found overly functionalist and unable to account for the changing conditions resulting from global and regional economic and institutional forces.

Recent revisionist approaches to HI led by Kathleen Thelen and Wolfgang Streeck, which describe incremental change in institutions through endogenous processes of layering of new elements onto the old, through conversion by means of reinterpretation or redirection, or by drifting through deliberate neglect or exhaustion, do offer a way out of the HI statics of VOC. But they do this at the expense of VOC’s theoretical RI logic, since allowing for incremental change by definition makes for unfixed preferences and unstable institutions. Their “soft” RI framework of strategic actors trying to achieve advantage by interpreting or redirecting institutions enables them at best to provide empirical accounts of rationalist behavior. And they still cannot *explain* preference formation or why any given institution was the object of layering or conversion in one or another way, although they can *describe* it. Peter Hall and Kathleen Thelen do more to explain preference formation, with a clearer theoretical picture of the use of RI for HI incremental change, when they cast institutions as the target of rationalist strategic action by economic actors, who use them as resources to achieve their goals, with change depending on deliberative interaction, defection, and reinterpretation. But if actors are engaged in constant deliberation and reinterpretation of their perceived—read subjective—interests, then here too, the use of RI cannot go very far in theoretical terms because preferences are not fixed, are subjective rather than objective, and institutions are not stable enough to theorize as incentives. And once preferences are seen as subjective, with agency consisting of deliberation and reinterpretation, the way is open to taking seriously the role of ideas in altering agents’ perceptions of their preferences and of discourse in deliberating and reinterpreting agents’ institutions.

The HI analytic framework is generally more open to the turn to ideas than RI. This is because whereas RI has certain ontological and epistemological presuppositions about agency that clash

with those of DI, HI has none, since it lacks agency. As a result, whereas RI scholars have largely resisted the turn to ideas, HI scholars have been divided over how far to go with regard to ideas. The question here is where the tipping point is between HI scholars who continue to see institutions as constitutive of ideas and those who might better be called DI scholars within an HI tradition because they see ideas as constitutive of institutions even if shaped by them. Interestingly enough, even foundational books that are purportedly exclusively HI often contain chapters that can be seen as DI, whether because they focus on the role of ideas and knowledge in the making of policy, add to RI explanations of interest calculations a focus on processes of power and persuasion, or mix HI and DI (in the HI or SI tradition). These may involve showing how policy actors may consciously layer new policy ideas onto the old or illustrating how battles over ideas generate new institutional paths of development.

But if HI and DI approaches can be found in the same articles and chapters, then the question needs to be raised about how to reconcile HI and DI. For some DI scholars in the HI tradition, HI and DI can fit easily together, with HI providing structures, DI agency. Often, this is formulated as actors' ideas and discourse set the goals and indicate motivation while the (historical) institutional context provide the constraints for actions that also structure political openings for mobilization and articulation of interests. The problem with this mix is that it risks papering over some very real differences between HI and DI, in particular that HI portrays institutions as constraining structures external to actors whereas DI defines institutions as internal ideational constructs and structures (discussed as follows). Moreover, it leaves open the question of whether there can be a specifically HI approach to agency.

Recent endogenous approaches to agency in HI have tended to borrow from evolutionary biology to explain institutional change in terms of how populations' genetic predispositions, combined with environmental factors, make for the success, replication, proliferation, and genetic feedback of certain preferences. The problem with this approach, from a DI perspective, is that it appears mechanistic, with no sense of the critical thinking of sentient agents (read real people) consciously

changing their institutions—for better or for worse—through deliberation and contestation, as well as consensus building around ideas. Sven Steinmo is arguably the only HI scholar who has managed to combine DI with an HI approach to agency through evolutionary biology, when he provides evolutionary narratives of the trajectories of change in states' economic and social systems that show not only how human institutions evolve but also how human agents who are creative, have ideas, and communicate with one another about what they are doing are also a key element in this approach, along with the unanticipated consequences to purposive behavior, and the fact that what they do occurs within evolving institutional context. This, then, is a mix of HI and DI, but one in which the HI tends to predominate.

But how, then, to give each analytic framework its due? Some scholars separate the HI examination of the institutional context of historical rules and regularities, critical junctures, and incremental change from the DI analysis, in which they then use the results of the HI investigation as background information. This helps show how sentient agents may infuse HI rules with contextualized meanings, construct understandings and responses to critical moments, or come up with the ideas that lead to the layering of one institution over another, the reinterpretation of an institution, or the conversion of agents to another institution. Other DI scholars interweave HI and DI together in discussions of evolutionary changes across time, while giving primacy to the ways in which evolving ideas affect changes in institutions.

This said, DI does not purport to explain all change—this would be a big mistake since “stuff happens,” events outside of people's control occur all the time, material conditions do change, actions often have unintended consequences, and actors often act without prior ideas and discourse about what it is they will do. As HI scholars remind us, processes of change are often unconscious—as people may act without any clear sense of what they are doing, creating new practices, renewing old rules, or destroying them through drifting or exhaustion. DI, however, shows that much change can and should be explained in terms of sentient agents' ideas about what to change (or continue)—if nothing else, in response to occurrences on the outside—that is, to the stuff that happens.

DI scholars who engage with the HI tradition, then, like HI scholars, also speak the language of institutional rules and regularities, critical moments, and incremental change. It is just that they infuse these structures with agency by focusing on the ideas of real actors that help explain changes in institutions or continuities, at critical moments or incrementally over time.

### Endogenizing Change in Sociological Institutionalism

SI focuses on the forms and procedures of organizational life stemming from culturally specific practices, with institutions cast as the norms, cognitive frames, scripts, and meaning systems that guide human action according to a logic of appropriateness. In SI, therefore, one cannot talk about a turn to ideas as such, since ideas have always been at the basis of the approach—as norms, frames, and meaning systems—and constructivism as opposed to RI's positivism as the generally accepted view of the nature of reality. One can, however, nevertheless talk about a split in SI between those whom we could continue to label as SI scholars because they see ideas more as static ideational structures, as norms and identities constituted by culture that frame agents' actions and identities, and those whom we could call DI scholars in the SI tradition, because they see agents' ideas as constituting culture and framing action.

DI scholars who engage with the SI tradition, then, like SI scholars, also speak the language of cultural framing, ideas, and discourse. It is just that they ensure that these are more dynamic and, thereby, better able to explain institutional change (and continuity). Importantly, DI scholars go beyond the SI scholars who put ideas into cultural context to put them into their "meaning" context as well—that is, by treating ideas as empirical subjects to be studied in their own right. And such meaning contexts constitute very different kinds of institutions from those of RI, HI, and SI.

For the three older neo-institutionalisms, institutions are structures external to agents that constitute rules about acting in the world that serve mainly as constraints—whether by way of rationalist incentives that structure action, historical paths that shape action, or cultural norms that frame action. For DI, by contrast, institutions are

internal to sentient agents, serving both as structures (of thinking and acting) that constrain action and as constructs (of thinking and acting) created and changed by those actors. This internal capacity to create and maintain institutions derives from what Vivien Schmidt defines as agents' *background ideational abilities*. This is a generic term for what John Searle defines as the *background abilities* that encompass human capacities, dispositions, and know-how related to how the world works and how to cope with it or for what Pierre Bourdieu describes in the *Logic of Practice* as the *habitus* in which humans beings act "following the intuitions of a 'logic of practice.'" But the psychology of cognitive dissonance is also relevant here, which shows that people generally act without thinking and become conscious of the rules that might apply only if they are in contradiction. These background ideational abilities underpin agents' ability to make sense in a given meaning context, that is, to "get it right" in terms of the ideational rules or rationality of a given discursive institutional setting.

But how, then, do we theorize about the process through which sentient agents get it right or, better, manage to bring about change in the ideational rules? Theoretical approaches in DI on how to plot change in ideas remain underdeveloped, despite much empirical analysis on changes in ideas.

Some of the most popular theories of ideational change focus on the notion of paradigm shift, building on Thomas Kuhn's seminal work in the philosophy of science. Peter Hall, who has produced one of the most influential such analyses in terms of paradigms, formalized the process of ideational change by identifying three orders of change in paradigms: minor first-order change of policy instruments, moderate second-order change of policy instruments and objectives, and revolutionary third-order change of instruments, objectives, and core ideas. The first two orders of change suggest evolutionary development within a paradigm through first-order renewal and second-order recasting of ideas, while the third order of change is revolutionary, since it would replace one paradigm with another. This approach takes us a lot farther than HI's critical juncture approach, by looking into the moment of crisis to explain where the ideas came from, who picked them up, and whether or not this produced a major change in ideas. But

however evocative the concept of paradigm shift may be as a metaphor for change, the theory itself still has problems similar to the HI critical juncture literature. It does not theorize closely enough the conceptual processes of ideational change, that is, how old ideas fail and new ideas come to the fore; the reasons for ideational change, that is, why certain ideas are taken up rather than others; the agency in ideational change, that is, who is projecting the ideas and how; and the defining moment(s) of transformation, since paradigm theory's emphasis on abrupt shifts in ideas rules out not only evolutionary change but also revolutionary change in ideas that is not abrupt.

One promising way forward is to build on the work of discourse analysts who can be loosely seen as DI scholars in the SI tradition. Discourse analysts theorize the process of ideational continuity and change by showing how different elements may be added to ideas embedded in discourse, thereby bringing about change in ideas incrementally even in times of stability, and not just at critical junctures during paradigm shifts. The theoretical concepts of the various discourse analysis schools—once translated from the sometimes difficultly accessible and internally referential language—can provide added value to the analysis of ideas. For example, discourse analyses that build on Michel Foucault can offer insights into how to investigate the “archeology” of what was acceptable in a given discursive formation over time, from one period's *episteme* to the next, through examination of networks of rules establishing what is meaningful at any given time. Conversely, discourse theories built on the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe can point to different ways in which concepts may be employed, such as nodal points from which all other ideas take their meanings in an ideological system, for example, how communism in Central and Eastern Europe served to distinguish between “real” (communist) democracy and “bourgeois” democracy.

There is one final problem with this focus on ideas, which is that we have yet to fully explain the dynamics of institutional change through agency. Although concentrating on ideas gets us closer to why institutional changes occur, they still do not explain how such institutional changes occur, that is, how the ideas themselves promote institutional change. For this, however, we need to consider

another aspect of DI, which is the interactive side of discourse. How ideas are generated among policy actors and communicated to the public by political actors through discourse is the key to explaining institutional change (and continuity).

### Endogenizing Change in Discursive Institutionalism

DI is an umbrella concept for the vast range of works in political science that take account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through discourse. So far, we have mainly focused on the substantive dimension of ideas and discourse. But even here, we have only touched on the surface of the range of discursive institutionalist approaches. DI scholars consider ideas and discourse at different levels of generality, going from policy ideas to programmatic ideas or paradigms to deeper philosophical ideas. They also consider different types of ideas, including cognitive ideas justified in terms of interest-based logics and necessity and normative ideas legitimated through appeal to values and appropriateness. And they consider different forms of ideas and discourse, including frames, narratives, myths, story lines, collective memories, scripts, argumentative practices, discursive struggles, and more. Many of these approaches tend to refer to agency, but often in a residual manner, through reference to the carriers of ideas. But the interactive dimension of discourse, which focuses on agents who communicate ideas, is equally important to the endogenization of change in DI.

Studies of the interactive dimension of discourse also come in many forms. They may be divided into those focused on what Vivien Schmidt has called the discursive construction of ideas in the “coordinative” policy sphere or the discursive communication of ideas in a “communicative” political sphere. The coordinative discourse encompasses the wide range of policy actors engaged in policy construction who may be organized in epistemic communities of elites with shared ideas, in advocacy coalitions of elites with shared ideas and policy access, and advocacy networks of activists contesting ideas in international politics or who may act as entrepreneurs who serve as catalysts for the ideas of such discursive communities. The

communicative discourse encompasses the wide range of political actors who bring the ideas developed in the context of the coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation. These actors may include political leaders involved in the top-down mass electoral process of public persuasion, in public debates or in policy forums of informed publics. Or they may be members of civil society engaged in the bottom-up discursive interactions of grassroots organizations, of social movements, or local participatory governance and of citizens whose voices are heard not only in opinion polls but also in votes—where actions speak even more loudly than words.

This interactive dimension is key to the endogenization of change in DI. Without discourse understood as the exchange of ideas, it is very difficult to explain how ideas go from individual thought to collective action. We do not, after all, know what people are thinking or why they act the way they do until they say it. And we do not for the most part engage in collective action or in collective (re) thinking of our actions without the articulation, discussion, deliberation, and legitimization of our ideas about our actions. This is why, in addition to the background ideational abilities that explain the internal processes by which institutions are created and maintained, we need to recognize the importance of what Schmidt has called the *foreground discursive abilities* through which sentient agents may change (or maintain) their institutions following a logic of communication. This is a generic term for what Jürgen Habermas calls *communicative action*, and it is at the basis of theories about deliberative and discursive democracy, about public debate, as well as about coordinative discourses of policy construction and communicative discourses of political communication.

These foreground discursive abilities are essential to explaining institutional change because they refer to people's ability to think outside the institutions in which they continue to act, to talk about such institutions in a critical way, to communicate and deliberate about them, to persuade themselves as well as others to change their minds about their institutions, and then to take action to change them, whether by building discursive coalitions for reform against entrenched interests in the coordinative policy sphere or informing and orienting the public in the communicative political sphere.

Conveying “good” policy ideas through a persuasive discourse helps political actors win elections and gives policy actors a mandate to implement their ideas.

Scholars in the SI tradition have little difficulty with this approach to discourse, especially since, as we have already seen, discourse analyses of all kinds are loosely seen as part of SI. Moreover, even when the word *discourse* is not used, DI scholars in the SI tradition often elucidate its interactive effects, as in recent work on contentious politics, which wed organizational and social movements theory and offers evidence of how leaders, social movement activists, and the everyday public spur change through ideas that persuade through discourse.

Scholars in the HI tradition also have little difficulty with discourse, since DI can add dynamics to the historical processes of ideational change, by focusing on who talks to whom, where, and when. Differentiating between a coordinative discourse in the policy sphere and a communicative discourse in the political sphere implicitly acknowledges the importance of institutional structures as well as practices. By the same token, however, HI can provide additional structure to DI by describing the formal institutional contexts that shape interactive patterns of discourse.

Scholars in the RI tradition have the greatest difficulty dealing with the interactive process of discourse, or taking the exchange of ideas in public debates seriously, because talk is by definition cheap while instrumental actions are assumed to speak more loudly than words. But can the substance of ideas not matter, as part of the persuasive power of discourse? Margaret Levi, in her presidential address at the American Political Society Association (APSA) in 2006, tacitly acknowledged this when she called for research on leaders' communication because leaders have the power to inspire change as well as the capacity to change constituents' beliefs—although she never engaged with DI work on leadership, discourse, or deliberative democracy.

RI's problems with ideas, discourse, and deliberation follow from its restricted definition of agency and rationality. In RI, agents are rational in an unthinking manner, meaning that they respond to incentive structures in ways that maximize their interests (expected utility), pursuing their goals in accordance with their beliefs about the facts. In DI,



agents are rational in a thinking manner: They also pursue their goals in accordance with their beliefs about the facts, but—as already noted—they are not only able to think, say, and act but also to think about their thoughts, reflect on their actions, state their intentions, alter their actions as a result of their thoughts about their actions, say what they are thinking of doing, and change their minds in response to persuasion by others regarding what they are thinking, saying, and doing. Such self-consciousness and self-knowledge along with the ability to express it is summed up in the term *sentient* when used to define agents in DI (scholars also use the term *reflexive*), who may change their minds based on persuasion—by contrast with RI's *rational* agents, for whom interaction is based on manipulation, as agents calculate how they will influence others to serve their own interests. A problem for RI scholars as a result of their definition of interaction as manipulation is that they cannot explain how one overcomes entrenched interests—that is, ones that cannot be coerced, tricked, or bribed into changing their actions.

DI approaches focused on deliberative democracy in particular have elaborated on such insights related to communicative action. Deliberative democracy is seen to occur when parties are reasonable and use evidence-based arguments to reach agreement, where persuasion is the key to creating shared understandings and building consensus, and in which the process itself is based on inclusive, open, trusting, and consensual interaction. Deliberative democracy is considered to be a better form of decision making because open dialogue may unlock untapped knowledge, generate new skills and know-how, produce higher quality reasoning for more legitimate policies, and create new, more collaborative interrelationships among the parties to the deliberation. Deliberation need not be limited to idealized communication situations, however, especially since power and interests cannot easily be eliminated from deliberations, although being aware of these may help minimize the potential effects of domination. But awareness of power and interests or even manipulation is no guarantee of discursive success.

Deliberation on its own, in other words, does not necessarily ensure a more democratic outcome. Power and position do matter. The question is how to define power and position in such a way as

to also take account of the power of ideas and discourse. The problem with RI and HI is that they tend to reify questions of power and position by assuming that power is a function of position and that strategic interests derive primarily from agents' power and position. DI holds instead that power cannot be defined by (objective) position alone, since ideas and values infuse the exercise of power and (subjective) perceptions of position. Moreover, actors can gain power from their ideas even where they may lack the power of position—as in the case of social movements or entrepreneurial actors who set the agenda for reform in policy or political spheres. Power itself, moreover, derives not only from position, meaning actors' ability to wield power, but also purpose, since actors' ideas and discourse about how they can and should wield that power (i.e., not just in their own strategic interests but in the general interest) may reinforce or undermine the power they derive from their position, depending on the responses of their audience to their stated purposes. This is the essence of political leadership.

Further support for the view that discourse and deliberation are necessary complements to investigations of power, position, and interests also comes from experimental political psychology, which seeks to probe the nature and limits of (RI defined) human rationality, in particular with regard to framing effects. Framing effects occur when different but logically equivalent phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences *irrationally* (in RI terms), for example, when people reject a policy program when told about its negative effects (e.g., it leads to 5% unemployment) and accept it when told of its positive effects (e.g., it leads to 95% employment). This represents a blow to RI, which assumes total information on the part of rational actors, at the same time that it provides an opening for DI. This is because framing effects are shown to be moderated by contextual forces involving elite competition and rhetoric that result, as James Druckman has shown, in a process of framing and counterframing (DI's communicative discourse), interpersonal conversation in heterogeneous groups among citizens (DI's deliberative democracy), or discussions among homogeneous groups of experts (DI's coordinative discourse). This said, experimental political psychology also demonstrates the limits of deliberative effectiveness and the importance of

not idealizing deliberation, given principles of human cognition that point to limited attention spans, cases in which communication may reduce participants' persuasiveness, and the importance of power relationships.


One final illustration of the value of DI approaches to the explanation of change (and continuity) comes from the insights it can lend to the use of the different forms of institutionalism. RI accounts tend to present human responses to given incentive structures as inevitable. This can be seen as part of a normative discursive strategy to get the reader to accept this, or to rebel against it, as in the case of globalization and convergence to a single neoliberal model. HI accounts of path-dependent institutions, in particular where they combine with RI, may add the inexorable to the inevitable. With regard to the globalization of capitalism, it can be seen as part of a normative discursive strategy to suggest that there is no convergence in capitalism since there are two different varieties that will continue into perpetuity. SI accounts of cultural framing may dispute both RI inevitability and HI inexorability by claiming that cultural embeddedness makes all national cultures incomparable. This can in itself be part of a normative discursive strategy to resist attempts to impose any kind of internationalized order on national economies. And what kinds of ideas and normative discourse are embedded in DI, then? That there is nothing inevitable, inexorable, or incomparable in this world, because the future is open to new ideas conveyed by discourse. With regard to capitalism, it would dispute the inevitability of neoliberal convergence, the inexorability of a binary split in capitalism, and the incomparability of culturally embedded forms of capitalism. Instead, DI shows that rationalist logics, historical path dependencies, and cultural frames are conditional on public choices that result not just from the power clash among interests, the prerogatives of position, or the scripts of culture but from the battle of ideas through discourse and deliberation. The global economic meltdown clearly demonstrates the ideational underpinnings of many views of capitalism.

### Conclusion

While some scholars have moved from one of the older neo-institutionalisms to DI, others straddle

institutionalisms, and yet others remain squarely within one or another institutionalist approach. To get a sense of how all of this fits together in a very general way, Figure 1 situates many of the scholars' works cited above within each of the four institutionalisms while arraying these along a horizontal continuum from interests to culture, with history in between—and along a vertical continuum from statics to dynamics, with interests, history, and culture at the static end, ideas and discourse at the dynamic end. HI sits between RI and SI, mainly because RI and SI are largely incompatible, whereas HI can go to either side when it adds agency. DI comes underneath all three because, although it is distinctive, it can rest on the insights of any one of the three and because scholars often see themselves as continuing to fit into one or another of the traditions even as they cross the line into DI.

This leaves one final question: what is the added value of approaches that take ideas and discourse seriously, by contrast with the other three new institutionalisms? DI endogenizes change, explaining much of how and why public actors bring about institutional change through public action. With regard to the other institutionalisms, moreover, the discursive approach helps explain the actual preferences and strategies of actors in RI and HI, and it helps to explain changes in the normative orientations emphasized by SI. Where DI can go wrong is when it considers ideas and discourse to the exclusion of issues of power (read RI instrumental rationality) and position (read HI institutional structures), when it assumes that DI deliberation necessarily trumps RI manipulation, or when it



**Figure 1** A Visual Map of the Four Institutionalisms

Note: DI = discursive institutionalism; HI = historical institutionalism; RI = rational choice institutionalism; SI = sociological institutionalism.

overdetermines the role of ideas and discourse by forgetting that “stuff happens” or that historical institutions and cultural frames affect the ways in which ideas are expressed and discourse conveyed. We should not forget that ideas and discourse that seek to promote change often have little effect on the crystallized ideas about rationalist interests and cultural norms or on the frozen landscapes of rationalist incentives, historical paths, and cultural frames. The research agenda for political scientists concerned with explaining institutional change endogenously, therefore, should be to use DI to show empirically how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional change, and when they do not, that is, when RI, HI, and SI may be sufficient because change can be explained better exogenously.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Constructivism; Discourse Analysis; Discursive Institutionalism; Rational Choice

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## INSTITUTIONALIZATION

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Institutionalization is the process by which organizations acquire identity and legitimacy. Institutionalization involves more than building formal structures and processes. For organizations to become institutions, structures need to be, as famously noted by Philip Selznick (1957), “infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (p. 22). This is true for corporations and churches as much as for political parties and government agencies or for entire political systems. Institutionalization means members begin to value the organization for itself; it elicits a normative, value-based commitment or is supported by deeply held cultural beliefs in its mission. The result is a high degree of legitimacy with both members and external stakeholders in the organization’s environment. Internally, institutionalization involves achieving a consensus on the organization’s mission and goals (identity) beyond the acquisition of necessary resources and skills. Externally, a highly institutionalized organization enjoys a high degree of social acceptability with key constituencies or the public at large (legitimacy). Institutionalization is a process with different stages: Once an organization has developed effective working practices, these are transformed into norms that get accepted and then embedded in organizational life. However,

institutionalization is not a linear process. Being, or rather becoming, an institution is a matter of degree. Organizations or political systems for that matter exhibit different degrees of institutionalization. Importantly, over time, institutionalization may move in both directions—that is, increase or erode (deinstitutionalization), or simply stall.

The concept of institutionalization has been developed mainly by organizational sociologists who emphasize that individual action is shaped by, and embedded in, larger social structures. Political scientists have tended to look at institutions as given, fixed frameworks for political behavior but have shown less interest in their emergence, with the exception of constitutional design. The origin of public organizations in particular remains a neglected area of research for which the concept of institutionalization can serve as a useful analytical tool. This entry first reviews different concepts and mechanisms of institutionalization and then presents typical criteria of institutionalization before discussing some constraints and challenges of institutionalization faced by public sector organizations.

### Concepts and Mechanisms of Institutionalization

Any discussion of institutionalization needs to be based on an understanding of the term *institution*. At the most general level, we can think of institutions as “patterned behavior,” as relatively stable, valued sets of formal and informal rules, norms, and practices that constrain but also enable political behavior. In short, institutions give structure to political life, but they also emerge from actor-based social and political processes. A key question for political scientists then is not only to what extent institutional structures shape or even determine individual political behavior and processes but also to what degree actors can purposefully create, design, or mold institutions to serve their needs or interests. This duality of actor (or agency) and structure lies at the heart of institutionalization research.

There is considerable disagreement among different schools of new institutionalism about the role of institutions and about the drivers and mechanisms of institutionalization. The most important divide runs between rational choice institutionalism and sociological (or organizational

or normative) institutionalism. In the rational choice approach, institutions are essentially “rules of the game” that emerge as the result of political choice by self-interested actors, be it to solve collective action problems or to advance specific interests. This suggests that institutional arrangements are rather malleable and open to design. A typical approach in this vein is the principal–agent framework: Political principals create and delegate powers to administrative or international agents to perform certain functions or to entrench their policy preferences. Yet organizational arrangements can be stabilized, or institutionalized, through mechanisms of “lock-in,” based on the logic of increasing returns: Actors have an incentive to stay on a path of institutional development once it is chosen not because it is functionally superior but because they are rewarded by positive feedbacks, such as learning and coordination benefits. Historical institutionalism makes a similar argument about the lock-in effect of choices (at critical junctures) in the formative period of institutions (“path dependency”). However, it gives more importance to the role of ideas in sustaining institutional trajectories. This constructivist component brings historical institutionalism closer to sociological institutionalism.

The sociological approach views individual behavior as governed by norms and rules that define appropriate (as opposed to instrumental) behavior according to certain values. The key mechanism of institutionalization is an increase of normative commitment to the organization. In this account, formal structures and processes, which are the center of many rational choice approaches, are only a thin layer; “thick institutionalization” (as Selznick says) occurs when value-based commitment of internal and external stakeholders is solidified, as expressed in unifying ideologies or rituals or in the administrative entrenchment of the organization’s mission. A more strongly constructivist strand of the sociological approach holds that culturally determined cognitive beliefs, rather than values, are the main factor in the institutionalization process. Certain organizational practices are “objectified”—that is, they are institutionalized in the sense of being taken for granted as social facts. This is the most powerful form of institutionalization as it does not depend on incentives or shared values any more.

The different institutionalisms shed light on different dimensions and two stages of the institutionalization process. Rational choice approaches take an actor perspective and focus on the initial creation of a formal organization for a specific purpose. This perspective runs the risk of explaining institutional creation by exclusive reference to functional needs and rational calculation. It may overestimate the room for rational design and neglect obstacles to sustained institutionalization. Constructivist schools insist on the overriding importance of the second, more complex step to imbue formal structures with values and beliefs. Conversely, this structural approach leaves open questions as to how the various actors and interests populating the volatile world of politics relate to abstract processes of norm routinization or harmonization (politics of institutionalization).

### Criteria of Institutionalization

How can we assess the degree to which an organization has been institutionalized? At a general level, the degree of standardization of organizational procedures and practices is an important indicator. However, routinization of behavior may in practice be disconnected from “value infusion”—that is, from the degree of legitimacy that the organization can command. Samuel Huntington proposed four more specific criteria or attributes: (1) *adaptability* refers to the extent to which organizations have learned to adapt to, and deal with, a dynamic environment, which is largely a function of age and experience; (2) *complexity* (the internal equivalent of adaptability) refers to the capacity of the organization to develop differentiated internal structures (diversification) that create stability and help it thrive in a changing environment; (3) *autonomy* is not only the most interesting criterion from a public organization’s perspective but also the most difficult to measure; it seeks to capture the extent to which an organization is independent and able to make its own decisions based on protection from external influence and control over its resources; (4) *coherence* refers to the degree of internal discipline and unity, the level of consensus on institutional purposes and procedures; more coherence results in more effective ways of working.

The profile of a highly institutionalized organization or entity, then, would include the following

features: advanced internal differentiation of structures as well as solid consensus and coherence, control over decisions, including resources, and the capacity to manage the boundaries with the organization’s environment.

In the case of public sector entities, however, institutionalization, defined as the attempt to maintain some autonomy from the environment through internal differentiation and external boundary management seems particularly difficult to achieve—and not always desirable from a perspective of democratic control. Unless the organization in question occupies a monopoly or a similarly privileged position (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] is a good example), there are many constraints holding back public sector organizations in their quest to fully institutionalize.

### Constraints and Challenges of Institutionalization in the Public Sector

First, public organizations often operate under a rigid mandate that imposes complex and mutually exclusive goals. The use of public authority and associated norms of accountability and predictability demand that public organizations formalize their practices to a higher degree and demonstrate sufficient congruence with the social environment that they are supposed to serve or regulate. Ambitious expectations, set by a political process that has to accommodate various interests, are often not matched by sufficient resources. Politicians may be loath to delegate sufficient powers and discretion. The political process is highly volatile, and especially a start-up organization may not be granted sufficient time by impatient constituencies to prove itself and consolidate. Second, newcomers often face tough competition for turf in a crowded institutional space. Successful institutionalization may even require the dismantling or deinstitutionalization of competing structures or organizations. Third, there is the normative concern in democratic societies about “runaway bureaucracies”—public organizations that abuse autonomy by placing their own interests above the public mission. However, keeping public entities strictly accountable and responsive may curtail their ability to develop their own identity and ambition; there might be a trade-off between internal identity and external legitimacy.

Given all these constraints, how is successful institutionalization at all possible? The public administration literature is indeed replete with accounts of failed institutionalization and pathologies of misguided institutionalization. At the same time, successfully institutionalized public organizations do exist. A functional account that explains the origin of public organizations by the needs they purportedly serve (to cope with new tasks or conditions) is clearly inadequate as it ignores the complex politics of institutionalization that is conditioned by existing institutional orders and power distributions. First, contingent events, such as the occurrence of crises, can be an important factor to explain the success of an institution: It manages to position itself as the adequate, even necessary, response to an urgent situation. Second, some institutional newcomers benefit from fashionable trends in public sector organization, such as the creation of agencies at arm's length from political executives. Start-ups that conform to these "isomorphic pressures" are more likely to overcome obstacles to institutionalization. Third, and finally, the role of leadership deserves further study, as suggested by Arjen Boin and Tom Christensen: leaders not in the sense of charismatic visionaries but leaders as facilitators of process who guide the emerging entity through the different stages of institutionalization, striking the right balance between internal development and external demands.

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*See also* Agencies; Autonomy, Administrative; Bureaucracy; Change, Institutional; Institutional Theory; Institutions and Institutionalism; Organization Theory

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## INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONALISM

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Most fundamentally, the social sciences have defined institutions as human made. As they were created by men and women, institutions order social, political, economic, and even cultural intercourse. Indeed, institutions constitute the very basis for human interaction. Consequently, institutions bear within them equally the potential danger of the most deep-seated social control as well as the promise of human liberation from both the social bond and the constraints of nature. Institutionalism is the study of the origins, effects, and potential for reform of institutions.

### Definitions

The meaning of the term *institution* is wide ranging, from more restricted to more elaborate and also along several dimensions. One dimension is the degree of formalization of an institution. At the most informal pole, it is common to speak of habits, customs, or conventions. A habit is any action whose repetitive nature comes to be recognized by a self-conscious actor and thus is internally represented. A custom is a habit that is shared by members of a collectivity and hence social. A convention is any agreed-on procedure. Language itself is a convention, as both the meanings of words and syntactical structures require social agreement for communication. The same is true for other social "codes" such as myths and rituals that both embody, and thus communicate, social ideas and ideals but yet require some understanding of such collective representations for their decoding. To the extent that a convention is adopted by ever larger numbers of people and comes to be collectively

binding, it is eventually described as an institution. This movement from an informal to a formal setup is termed *institutionalization*. As it entails a shift from an individual to a society and from freedom to constraint, it can be viewed as a transition from nature to culture.

The degree to which institutions are collectively binding, however, constitutes a second dimension of variation. A tradition or folkway has been followed over time and by a particular group, such that an individual's cultural identity may incline him or her to adhere to a given custom. The French term *moeurs* and the English *mores*, which correspond to the German *Sitte*, connote slightly more social obligation. A norm, which may be defined as an internalized belief, is more strongly binding, because its transgression is open to moral or social sanction. The Hegelian distinction between *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität* is based on the isolation of the moral rule from the original moral community (*Gemeinschaft*) and its transfer to the society (*Gesellschaft*), after which, ultimately, it undergoes a synthesis through the state (*Staat*). A law is a collectively binding decision whose interpretation is subject to adjudication only in specialized juridical bodies and by breaking which one is subjected to punishment, again by public institutions with a monopoly on the exertion of legitimate force, as pointed out by Max Weber. Consequently, the workings of some institutions may depend on other institutions or on institutionalized settings. As discussed in classical political theory, the establishment of the state or Leviathan is the decisive shift accomplished by the move from the state of nature to civil society.

In a similar vein, institutions vary with regard to whether they are self-reinforcing or require intervention by some sort of meta-institutions. If a certain rule is adhered to by all relevant actors because it is in their self-interest to conform, the rule is termed to be self-enforcing. However, some perspectives on institutions claim that rules need to be elaborated for actors to be able to understand how to follow them—or indeed to calculate their self-interest—such that cultural and social guidelines as to what is appropriate behavior must flesh out the skeletal “rules of the game.” Furthermore, some sets of preferences and rules (such as majority rule) may not necessarily produce stable outcomes. Instead, more elaborate

procedures may set limits to the possibility of choosing, such that one may speak of institutional or structure-induced equilibrium, as opposed to a natural or preference-induced equilibrium. This is the subject both of public choice or rational choice theory and of institutional economics. Here, we see that the study of institutions may extend from a narrowly defined set of rules to, first, a more elaborated context necessary for understanding the workings of these institutions and, second, as T. R. Voss emphasizes, to an analysis of the equilibrium outcomes produced by these institutions and institutional contexts.

The term *institution* refers to the action of introducing an institution, to the identity of the actor (*Instituteur*) that introduced the institution, and to the thing that has been introduced. Institutions can be introduced by religious and secular authorities as well as by groups and communities, as in canonical institutions, institutions of inheritance, and social institutions. Institutions are created by divine or mortal beings and, hence, set apart from nature. Institutions may produce a person of high morality, a group, or a regime. Even Charles de Montesquieu defined laws very broadly to include both the institutions of the legislature and the mores and manners of the nation, in general. Thus, institutions include the totality of social forms and structures and may be established by law or custom. Consequently, three types of institutions are especially important: (1) social institutions, such as kinship, marriage, family, and inheritance; (2) constitutions, which are the written or unwritten law governing the exercise of public power and the procedures for making laws themselves; and (3) regimes, which refers to the process of giving something the character of an institution. Social institutions govern relationships among individuals within societies and hence establish a social order. Constitutions regulate the relationships among citizens, political representatives, and the state and hence create a political order. Regimes are often found in the international arena, where, being beyond the reach of the sovereignty of nation-states, international agreements are used to create international regimes or international orders, and international organizations with the legitimacy and normative weight of an institution are active in the implementation of the agreed-on normative order or international norms.

To *institutionalize* something or the *institutionalization* of something may refer to the frequency, permanence, or widespread nature of a habit, a virtue, or even a vice—the granting of an official status as institution to a custom or procedure. *Institution* also refers to the inculcation, indoctrination, or introduction of norms, habits, and knowledge in various forms of instruction, education, or upbringing. In addition, *institution* or *institute* may refer to the corporate body or building from which such instruction is imparted, such as a private institution or institute of scientific study. Institutions meant for instruction or induction (e.g., the military, clerical institutions) form and regulate individuals and hence should (in theory) be reliable. Closed or total institutions are responsible for psychic and physical healing, such as hospitals or psychiatric institutions. Financial institutions and institutional investors hold money in trust for large numbers of individuals and should (again, in theory) be held accountable to their investors. Individuals who have fully imbibed and internalized such instruction and are employees of such institutions are known as professionals. In each of these trust relationships, there is a potential for betrayal of trust, which has been the focus of much social scientific analysis of institutions and professions.

Financial institutions, institutional investors, and the governmental framework for monetary transactions all form markets. Political institutions and constitutions frame public policies. Social institutions help socialize individuals; different psychological stages, pedagogy, and social relations help form the psyche. The study of these institutional effects is known as institutionalism. Unlike institutions that are viewed as arbitrary, institutionalism is by nature a relativistic approach: Institutions that may have been introduced as arbitrary results of contingent events may have unintended consequences for human nature, societies, politics, and markets. Consequently, institutionalists view developments in these spheres as artifacts of institutions, and hence, they are neither natural nor necessarily desirable.

### **Institutions and Institutionalism Spanning the Social Sciences**

The study of institutions and institutional effects spans the social sciences. In the areas of philosophy

of knowledge, philosophy of right, and political philosophy, institutions have been viewed both as mental representations and concrete political structures. As cognitive representations, institutions help structure thought, thus constituting perceptual lenses or schema. The origins and legitimacy of social and political institutions has been a perennial problem, being divided into historical or empirical and rational views. The historical view shared by classical authors such as Georg Friedrich Hegel sees traditions, customs, norms, laws, and institutions as inheritances that have achieved legitimacy (if they have indeed achieved it) by standing the test of time. Moreover, their functioning rests on this historical context. The rational view, by contrast, aims to distill the essence of an institution via logical analysis, often through recourse to a hypothetical account of institutional origins or the use of a particular procedure, as in the contract theory of Thomas Hobbes or John Locke. The work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau bridges these extremes by taking a historical, anthropological view of the development of social institutions but a contract view of institutional legitimacy; freedom is defined as living under a rule one makes for oneself. Such procedural legitimacy is further developed by Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas but has been called into question in the so-called communitarianism debate.

One strand of the sociological and anthropological tradition views institutions as cultural products that substitute for instinct and thus confer an evolutionary advantage for human societies with particular institutions. More generally, institutions create social order both by specific sets of positive and negative sanctions imposed to prevent social deviance and by giving symbolic expression to the social order, for example, through myths and rituals. Indeed, the very categories of thought, such as notions of time and space, are socially contingent and linked to social organization. Thus, the sociological meaning of the term *institution* ranges from concrete social practices or structures to ideas, representations, and even socially contingent interpretations of ideas and categories, as we observe in the social thought of Émile Durkheim.

A central division deals with whether institutions are functional and hence have evolved from universal human needs, even if the exact institutional



configurations vary from society to society, or whether institutions are more aptly viewed as historical residues and products of social interpretation. A second problematic concerns the issue of free will versus determinism (also referred to as agency vs. structure): Do institutions *determine* behavior or simply make some courses of action more likely because they appear to be “normal” or “appropriate” and may be sanctioned by punishment or social disapproval if not followed? Talcott Parsons’s theory of action proposed that previous patterns of behavior serve as points of orientation for actors, for example, in establishing a repertoire of social roles, but that individuals are free to conform or deviate from these expected patterns.

The lines between sociological, social-psychological, and psychological views on institutions are blurred, as all share a focus on mental representations, of which language and cognitive operations are central. Here, the idea that the meaning of sounds is arbitrary and that meaning arises from the juxtaposition of phonetic oppositions as well as the focus on classificatory systems, binary codes, and cognitive routines from the fields of computer science and artificial intelligence have been quite influential. These representations or routines not only mediate between the individual subject and the external world but are also formed or canalized through these interactions, as in Jean Piaget’s theories of developmental stages or Sigmund Freud’s focus on early childhood traumas. Given the potentially arbitrary nature of these historic residues, an emancipatory program in social psychology is possible—although its adherents, such as Erich Fromm or Herbert Marcuse, vary in the extent to which they stress social and economic versus purely psychological causes for personality (and societal) deformation.

The institutional tradition in economics stresses the “embeddedness” of economic transactions in social structures and culture. In contrast to Adam Smith’s claim that “man” has a “natural” tendency to “truck, barter and exchange,” economic institutionalists emphasize the cultural, social, and even normative bases for exchange as well as the ways in which social and cultural motivations and practices—such as striving for social honor—shape and even distort economic behavior. Some examples include Torsten Veblen’s “conspicuous

consumption” of the leisure class, John Commons’s analysis of the impact of historical experience and government policies on the organization of industrial relations, and Max Weber’s classic analysis in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Even Joseph Schumpeter, who coined the phrase *methodological individualism* and drafted the economic model of democracy, stressed the ways in which historic residues predating the capitalist era buttressed capitalist economic arrangements and argued that as these precapitalist foundations are on a decline, capitalism itself will become unstable. Similarly, the work of Karl Polanyi analyses the economic and political instability resulting from the historically unique effort of capitalism to disembed the market from social arrangements and institutions.

In law and political science, political institutions were long understood in terms of the norms embodied in constitutions. Nevertheless, both the social context for political institutions and the rise of the modern state, as well as the impact of institutional arrangements on the behavior of politicians and voting patterns, were considered by classic political institutionalists, such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber.

### Behavioralism Versus Institutionalism

In the aftermath of World War II, however, a behaviorist revolution swept through the social sciences, pushing institutions and institutionalist analysis into the background. Though more popular in the United States than in Europe and other parts of the world, behavioralism focused on assumed universal regularities of behavior: In psychology, Burrhus Frederic Skinner studied scientific stimulus and response; in sociology, Talcott Parsons proposed structural functionalist requirements and a universal movement from traditional to modern society; in economics, the neoclassical model with its universal uniformities of market behavior rose to undisputed dominance; in political science, pluralists including Robert Dahl and David Truman, among others, focused on the observable behavior of voters and interest groups. By the end of the 1960s, however, limitations of these behaviorist models led to a rediscovery of institutions, which James March and Johan Olsen labeled the *new institutionalism*.

### *Rational Choice and the New Institutional Economics*

Rational choice theorists and new institutionalist economists understand institutions as a response to dilemmas of collective choice and collective action. Assuming human actors to be rational, self-interested utility maximizers, these scholars investigate the irrational or suboptimal consequences of such rational action when outcomes depend on the decisions of more than one actor; that is, they study strategic action.

Rational choice studies of legislative decision making are based on the Condorcet Paradox or Arrow impossibility theorem, which demonstrates that even when individuals possess transitive preference orderings (e.g., preferring Restaurant A to Restaurant B to Restaurant C), group decision making may not result in a stable choice. As a result, majority rule is inherently unstable, and these institutionalists study both the conditions for democratic stability and the ways in which institutional rules, such as the agenda-setting privilege of the political executive or the veto powers of parliamentary chambers or committees, allow stable political choices to be made. Spatial models of preferences serve as an important tool for this type of analysis. Game theory is simply a method of economic analysis based on the payoff functions of the actors (or players) and the rules for their choices (or moves). Such games often result in suboptimal outcomes, as in the famous prisoners' dilemma, in which both prisoners confess to a crime out of fear that their co-conspirator will betray them. Institutional rules or particular strategies may be of some help in improving these outcomes, for example, by turning a noncooperative game, such as the tragedy of the commons, into a cooperative one.

The new institutionalist economics explores the origins of economic institutions and their effects, especially the legal framework for the market, which directly affects the distribution of property rights and the calculation of transaction costs. Some influential models for understanding the development of institutions are transaction cost economics, which postulates that institutions develop to minimize all costs related to economic transactions, including information costs and the dangers of mutual dependence; principal-agent theory, which understands contracts and organizational structures

as responses to the need of "principals" to control their "agents," such as owners-managers, governments-bureaucracies, and voters-politicians; and path dependency, which uses the concepts of sunk costs and increasing returns to explain why initial contingent events lead to inefficient but stable paths of economic or political development. Central issues deal with whether or not socialized or disembedded individuals can be taken as the point of departure for these models, whether institutional arrangements can be modeled as if emerging from a state of nature, and whether historically given institutional starting points are necessary.

### *Sociological Institutionalism and Economic Sociology*

As sociology deals with the social order, the entire field can be said to be institutional. Nevertheless, a distinct group of sociologists have built on the behavioral psychology and organization theory to elaborate a view of individual cognition and collective decision making within organizations that they have termed *sociological institutionalism*. Here, cognitive limits on human capacities for gathering and processing information (bounded rationality) result in various coping mechanisms, such as accepting the first more or less acceptable alternative (satisficing) in place of maximizing utility or reliance on standard operating procedures that reduce choice and thereby structure and coordinate action. Routines and scripts may produce patterns of organizational behavior that can be termed *quasi-chaotic*, as in the garbage can model, which posits that choices within organized anarchies are largely random. Newer applications of this perspective have focused on the reliance of myth and ceremony even in modern business organizations, the socialization in time of various managerial cohorts, and the role of organizational isomorphism between political systems and organizations of immigrants to produce particular cultural patterns of postmodern citizenship. Social constructivist approaches have stressed especially the socially contingent development of norms, ideas, and institutions, even in the international arena. Economic sociology also focuses on the social and cultural bases of economic institutions and concepts, such as inheritance or the household, thus adhering to the institutionalist tradition in economics more faithfully than the

new institutional economics or new economics of organization.

### *Historical Institutionalism*

The concepts of economic sociology, also found in the corporatism and other varieties of capitalism literature, focus on the historical, social, and organizational conditions for alternate modes of capitalist economic formation. Historical institutionalism, more generally, follows the research program of Max Weber in understanding economy, politics, and society in terms of historically contingent, particular developmental paths, whose meanings depend on the subjective interpretations of human actors. Some historical institutionalists emphasize path dependency, sequences, and temporal orderings. Others argue that the historical approach may give us leverage precisely on questions of human agency and configurational causality. The main problem with this approach is related to the causes of institutional stability and change. Its main methods are process tracing and thick description as well as, in some cases, analytic narratives.

### **Current Debates**

Institution is so fundamental to the social sciences that it is not surprising that the definition of and research on institutions spans an enormously broad range of concepts, methods, and topics. Nevertheless, the study of institutions deals with the formation and impact of stable social arrangements, even if these may range from ideas and normative concepts to actual local, national, and international organizations, associations, and states. The central cleavages within institutionalist analysis help study whether a state of nature can be posited or whether particular culturally and historically grounded starting points must be addressed, whether institutions evolve or are products of conscious human design, and whether institutionalist outcomes are functional or historically contingent, and if so, what normative consequence follows from the artifactuality of institutions and their impact on social life.

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*See also* Behavioralism; Change, Institutional; Constructivism; Discursive Institutionalism; Institutional Theory; Institutionalization; Logic of Appropriateness; Path Dependence; Process Tracing; Rational Choice; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Schema; Script; Veto Player; Weber, Max

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## INTEGRATION

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*See* Political Integration

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## INTELLECTUALS

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The concept of intellectual as a category emerged in the late 19th century and bloomed with the political phenomena of the 20th century. Before that, as in the work of the medieval historian Jacques Le Goff, for example, the term referred to clerics. Intellectuals appeared in France during the Dreyfus Affair of 1894, in which Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a French artillery officer of Jewish descent, was tried and falsely convicted of treason; he was later exonerated and, in 1906, received a full pardon. The term *Dreyfus Affair* was coined by the writer Maurice Barrès in 1898 to designate the writers, scholars, and publicists who were convinced of Dreyfus's innocence. It is thus at the intersection of science and public debate that the intellectual stands. Throughout the 20th century, intellectuals emerged as major players in politics and public affairs. If one speaks in the plural, intellectuals designate a group of scholars and artists whose intervention in public space finds its legitimacy in their expertise and knowledge. Very soon, the figure of the intellectual also appeared in the singular as a symbol of political idealism or commitment in the political struggles of the century. Today, they are represented by writers such as Salman Rushdie, who have been persecuted for their beliefs and writings and have become symbols of freedom of expression. During the last quarter of the 20th century, the growing part played by intellectuals in economic debates on globalization as well as in discussions on issues of redistribution and social justice allowed the emergence of new actors. In this entry, the changing roles of intellectuals and the new challenges facing them are discussed.

### Intellectuals and Engagement

The Dreyfus Affair established the legitimacy of intellectuals to intervene in public debate in the name of universal values. From that moment onward they have never left the political scene,

announcing or accompanying its principal evolutions. The history of intellectuals during the first half of the 20th century is marked by both fascism and communism. If certain intellectuals such as the philosopher Martin Heidegger, the famous historian of the Middle Ages Ernst Kantorowicz, and the jurist Carl Schmitt appeared favorable to Nazism in its early days, most intellectuals rallied to the camp opposing Hitler. Most, like Stefan Zweig or Walter Benjamin, chose exile. The German novelist and short story writer Thomas Mann and the philosophers Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno, and Ernst Cassirer found refuge in the United States. Meanwhile, many intellectuals were attracted by the Soviet system, in which they saw the possibility of the realization of the communist ideal. The interwar period marked a first peak of the membership of intellectuals in communist parties, which was renewed after World War II and the prestige gained by the victory of the Allies. This was then followed by the Cold War, and intellectuals often were regarded as *compagnons de route* in the image of Jean-Paul Sartre in France.

Intellectuals not only participate in political debate, but they also judge political events. They thus played a major role in the interpretation of the Holocaust and in the debates on how to deal with this legacy in public discourses, as in Germany, and also in the interpretation of the Nazi phenomenon and its German roots (see the *Historikerstreit* in 1986 between the historian Ernst Nolte and the philosopher Jürgen Habermas). Intellectuals also have attempted to provide an existential reflection, as in Primo Levi's works. They have been similarly involved not only in the debate against racial discrimination in America in the 1960s (Hannah Arendt and Toni Morrison) and in Third World struggles for independence (Frantz Fanon) but also in the assertion of former colonized cultures—for example, Aimé Césaire and Leopold Sedar Senghor, the spokesmen for Negritude, or more recently, Raphaël Confiant and Patrick Chamoiseau for Creole.

One of the most important influences of intellectuals on political life was the challenging role played by dissidents in the Soviet Union and other communist states. Long persecuted, imprisoned by the Soviet regime, and silenced, they asserted themselves in favor of change in the climate of international relations. The Helsinki Accords of

1975 allowed the appearance of the Charter 77 movement led by Jan Patočka and Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, which placed the defense of human rights at the heart of its approach and appealed to the West, and similar movements in Poland, where intellectuals played a central role in the Solidarnoc movement as also in the round table discussions that allowed the nonviolent transition toward democracy in the late 1980s.

### Intellectuals and the End of History

The events of 1989, the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet empire, would seem to corroborate theories that shook the global intellectual debate since the political scientist Francis Fukuyama in an article, based on a Hegelian reading of history, described the final victory of liberal democracy over totalitarian regimes as “the end of history.” By contrast, Samuel Huntington, who propagated the idea of a “clash of civilizations,” which the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed to confirm, shaped the global debate in a different way.

One of the striking influences that intellectuals have had over the past 20 years concerns the role played by neo-conservatives in the United States. The meeting of a group of students at City College of New York, including Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, and Irving Howe, led to the birth of neo-conservatism; they combined the anticommunism of the Cold War period and the theories of the philosopher Leo Strauss, who had emigrated to the United States to escape the Nazi regime. Neo-conservatism affirms the equal responsibility of intellectuals and political leaders. Neo-conservatives argue that to combat terrorism, the United States should assert its power internationally to promote the development of democracies. This theory had considerable resonance after the September 11, 2001, attacks. It was on this basis that American forces intervened in Iraq in 2003 to create a new political order.

### New Theoretical Objects

Recent years have seen the intellectuals expanding the scope of their study to new objects as well as the emergence of new voices. Following the theories of John Rawls (*A Theory of Justice*, 1971), the Indian

economist Amartya Sen, recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998, and the Bangladeshi Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 2006, have played a central role not only in the renewal of economic theory but also in stressing the importance of equality and justice in international relations. This movement signals the new role of today’s intellectuals who raise questions of public interest concerning the future of the planet such as the principle of responsibility expounded by philosopher Hans Jonas in the early 1960s about the nuclear threat and now dealing with environmental policies, besides public health and bioethical issues.

Intellectuals are also faced with this question: What is the nature of social change to come? Whether postcolonial thinkers, theorists of the “multitude,” representatives of gay theory, or philosophers of recognition, their answers are often combined with a strong critique of democracy. The debate concerns both the nature of power in contemporary societies and the possibility for formerly oppressed groups to express themselves. It allows the renewal of old theories (Marxism, anarchism) at the same time as the emergence of new objects. In recent years, intellectuals dealt with questions of law and justice (Jürgen Habermas, Giorgio Agamben, and Roberto Unger), media and communication (Noam Chomsky), ecology (Vandana Shiva and Peter Singer), or HIV/AIDS. They have especially sought to bring in new players in the line of subaltern studies that developed predominantly in India or Latin America or postcolonial studies (Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Paul Gilroy). These theories, postulated by women scholars such as Judith Butler or Gayatri Spivak, were based on the result of gender studies and the formation of identities as ideological constructs. Theorists of recognition (Axel Honneth, Seyla Benhabib, and Nancy Frazer) refer to Charles Taylor’s theories of justice as a basis for classifying recognition as a political category.

### Politics at the Heart of Intellectuals’ Reflection

The current relationship between intellectuals and politics has developed into a more complex form than it had throughout the 20th century. The links between intellectuals and politics assert themselves as more deeply embedded than ever. One could

indeed imagine in the early 1970s that the complexity of our societies and the development of globalization heralded the disappearance of intellectuals and their replacement by competent experts and scientists, while new trends such as globalization asserted the primacy of the economy at the expense of politics. Nevertheless, a number of intellectuals today enjoy an international reputation further enhanced by the circulation of ideas, globalization of information, use of the Internet, and mobility of students.

At the international level, the most burning issues remain political. If in Western democratic societies intellectuals agree with the criticism of capitalism, they must nevertheless remember that their existence is linked to the practice of democracy. It is this battle that is waged today by intellectuals in all countries where freedom of expression is restricted. Dissidents under repressive regimes have struggled for historical truth and the recognition of different communities that make up society. The other big question now concerns the dynamics of political and religious radicalization. A number of intellectuals, for example, call for a modernized reading of Islam.

The past decades have discredited the idea of a peaceful unification of the planet and confronted intellectuals with all forms of conflict, from the most global to the most local, bringing out old nationalist confrontations but also religious clashes. “What is most peculiar about our age is the conviction that evil is installed at the core of history and our frenetic rejection of that conviction” (Thérèse Delpech, 2007, p. 175). If they want to meet the challenges of democracy, intellectuals have a long way ahead

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*See also* Agenda Setting; Civil Society; Critical Theory; Globalization; Neoliberalism; Political Philosophy

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## INTELLIGENCE

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Intelligence refers to an awareness that leaders hope to have about the threats or opportunities that face their nation, either internally or from abroad. Armed with this information, they may make better decisions about how to protect and advance the national interest. An understanding of threats and opportunities can be reliably acquired only through the careful collection and study of information about domestic and foreign situations, such as plotting by internal subversives or the machinations of external terrorist factions and rival nations. This gathering of information, along with the interpretation of its meaning, lies at the heart of intelligence.

Stated more formally, intelligence is the knowledge and foreknowledge of dangers and opportunities—both domestic and foreign—as a prelude to decision and action by a nation's leaders. Strategic intelligence refers to the objective of achieving a global understanding of dangers and opportunities; tactical intelligence is concerned more with threats and opportunities on specific battlefields or theaters of war.

The academic study of intelligence has progressed by leaps and bounds in recent years. The most important developments in the field are efforts to move beyond spy memoirs and to apply rigorous research standards to the questions of how nations gather and analyze information on world affairs and engage in other intelligence activities. More and more studies are presenting empirical data, testable hypotheses, and theoretical frameworks. Scholars in the field have also been conducting in-depth interviews with practitioners and have benefitted from

the extensive number of intelligence documents that have been released in recent decades. In the United States, such documents include the Church Committee reports (1975–1976) as well as reports from government panels examining intelligence such as the Aspin-Brown Commission (1995–1996), the Kean Commission (2004), and the Silberman-Robb Commission (2005).

This entry considers the nature of intelligence, highlighting some key examples involving covert action and counterintelligence activities on the part of the United States. It then examines the results of intelligence activities and notes some distinctive features of intelligence in democratic regimes.

### The Nature of Intelligence

Intelligence may be considered a process, a product, a set of organizations, and a set of missions.

#### *Intelligence as a Process*

As a process, intelligence is a series of interactive phases whereby government officials plan what information to collect from around the globe, use machines and human agents to gather the information, assign experts (“analysts”) to make sense of the information, and finally, distribute the findings to decision makers. This sequence of activities is known as the intelligence cycle.

#### *Intelligence as a Product*

As product, intelligence consists of facts and interpretive reports about homeland, world, or battlefield conditions. In the United States, for example, the most prestigious intelligence report is the *President’s Daily Brief (PDB)*, a succinct summary of global events over the past 24 hours, delivered to the president and a few other top policy officials each morning. Important, as well, in the United States, is the National Intelligence Estimate or NIE, which attempts to make more lengthy long-range forecasts about world events and relies on detailed research.

#### *Intelligence as a Set of Organizations*

As a set of organizations, a nation’s intelligence “community” focuses on a number of responsibilities: code-breaking and electronic-eavesdropping

organization, the gathering and interpretation of photography from satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, the interpretation of military information gathered by intelligence units within the uniformed services, and their gathering of tactical information in theaters of combat.

#### *Intelligence as a Set of Missions*

##### Collection and Analysis

As a set of missions, intelligence refers first of all to the range of activities encompassed within the intelligence cycle, known in short as “collection and analysis.” This is Mission Number One for a nation’s intelligence agencies, that is, the duty to place on the desktops of prominent leaders the best information possible to help illuminate the domestic and foreign security situations they face. In the United States and most other affluent nations, the intelligence agencies have two additional responsibilities: (1) covert action and (2) counterintelligence (CI).

##### Covert Action

Covert action is a secret activity designed to influence events in other nations in a direction favorable to a nation’s best interests, not simply gather information abroad. This mission expanded rapidly in the democracies during the Cold War as a means for combating the aggressive use of intelligence operations by the Soviet Union to spread communism around the world.

Covert action is often grouped into four categories: (1) propaganda, (2) political, (3) economic, and (4) paramilitary activities. Propaganda, sometimes called psychological warfare or simply “psy war,” is the most extensively used form of covert action. During the Cold War, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secretly produced a flood of worldwide propaganda disseminated by way of its vast, hidden network of “media assets”—foreign newspaper editors and reporters, television correspondents, magazine editors, and book editors. This source of “perception management” (in the intelligence euphemism) was meant to supplement the normal overt sources of information about the United States distributed through official channels, such as White House press releases and State Department public bulletins.

During the Cold War and till today, political covert action includes secret financial aid to friendly politicians and governmental officials abroad—what British intelligence officers refer to as “King George’s cavalry.” During the 1960s, the CIA provided covert funding to the Christian Democratic Party in Italy for its behind-the-scenes political battles against the Soviet-sponsored Italian Communist Party. Normally, propaganda and political covert action work together hand in glove.

Covert action in the form of secret economic operations can also be used to undermine adversaries abroad, for example, by encouraging labor unrest (as in Chile during the 1970s) or by sabotaging electrical power lines and mining harbors (approaches used by the United States against Nicaragua during the 1980s). Paramilitary (PM) activities are the most extreme, and controversial, form of covert action. Adopting this approach, a country will enter into warlike operations against an adversary—everything from weapons supplies to one of the sides that is engaged in a foreign civil war to large-scale “secret” (or, at any rate, never officially acknowledged) wars or assassination plots aimed against foreign leaders. Classic illustrations of PM wars are the failed Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba in 1961 and the struggle against communist forces in Laos from 1962 to 1968, with the CIA advising and arming the indigenous anticommunist Hmong tribesmen.

Before assassination as an instrument of U.S. intelligence was prohibited by an executive order signed by President Gerald Ford in 1976, and reaffirmed by every American president since, the White House instructed the CIA to carry out plots to kill Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of Congo, among other leaders of small nations caught in the tug-of-war between the United States and the Soviet Union. None of the plots was successful. Despite the executive order against assassinations, a waiver exists in times of authorized war, and as a consequence, the White House ordered CIA plots against the lives of Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Osama bin Laden of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization in the early years of the 21st century. None succeeded. Overt U.S. forces eventually captured Hussein during the Second Persian Gulf War that began in 2003; he was tried and executed by provisional Iraqi authorities. Bin Laden remains at large.

### Counterintelligence

The third core intelligence mission is known as counterintelligence (CI). As with covert action, this mission is rarely mentioned in a nation’s official documents. Yet CI grew quickly as a mission during the Cold War in the face of the rising confrontation between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. The purpose of CI (of which counterterrorism is an important subset) is to thwart the hostile activities of foreign intelligence services and terrorist organizations directed against the homeland.

The practice of CI entails both security and counterespionage (CE). Security is the passive or defensive side of CI and relies on static safeguards such as security clearances, polygraphs (lie detection machines), codes, fences, sentries, alarms, badges and passes, curfews, restricted areas, and checkpoints. CE is the aggressive or offensive side of the mission. The ultimate goal is to infiltrate the hostile intelligence service with an agent (or “mole”), a ploy known as a “penetration.” With a penetration agent inside the enemy’s camp, one can possibly learn what moles the enemy has managed to burrow inside one’s own camp. The Soviets successfully used this approach against the United States during the 1980s and 1990s by secretly recruiting Aldrich Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI, who revealed to their masters in Moscow the names of CIA moles inside Soviet intelligence and other information that undermined the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations against the Soviet Union. Other major democracies also experienced Soviet penetrations of their political and intelligence agencies.

### Results of Intelligence Actions

In each of these missions—collection and analysis, covert action, and CI—nations have registered successes and failures. In the United States, for example, the CIA successfully tracked the development of Soviet weapons systems by way of surveillance machines and human agents. Yet the agency failed to warn the nation of the Al Qaeda attack of September 11, 2001, against the United States and incorrectly concluded in 2002 that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, thereby helping precipitate the Second Persian Gulf War.



With respect to covert action, the CIA successfully overthrew leaders in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) who were deemed unfriendly to the United States. Yet presidents would soon find out that this secret approach to foreign policy often failed, as with the Bay of Pigs operation during the Kennedy administration. Another failure occurred with the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan administration, when—despite an express law that prohibited such activities—the National Security Council staff worked illegally with elements of the CIA to conduct paramilitary operations in Nicaragua (where the anticommunist Contras were at war against a Marxist regime). During the Reagan years, the United States also experienced covert action successes in Afghanistan, when the CIA helped drive the Soviets out of that country. Once more in Afghanistan, this time in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the second Bush administration enjoyed covert action success when the CIA helped rout the Taliban regime that had provided a haven for the Al Qaeda terrorists who had struck Washington, D.C., and New York City.

Similarly, on the CI front, the United States has caught many spies, including those who stole the secret of the atom bomb and gave it to Moscow; but Washington suffered the failures of Ames, Hanssen, and several other Soviet and Chinese penetrations during the Cold War. In the United Kingdom, Harold “Kim” Philby spied for the Soviet Union at the highest levels during the Cold War. With respect to all three intelligence missions, one can expect ongoing successes and—conducted as they are by mere mortals—inevitable failures, too.

The intelligence agencies of the United States are distinct in some ways from those of other nations. They are large and technically advanced, and they are dispersed in their organization and management far more than is usually the case even in other democracies. The U.S. secret agencies also share common traits with their counterparts abroad, such as an inability to foresee and collect all the information that national leaders may need, a periodic misinterpretation of information by analysts and (sometimes intentionally to further their own political agenda) by decision makers, and from time to time critical failures of CI.

In democratic regimes, another aspect of intelligence has garnered much attention: maintaining

accountability over secret agencies as a guard against their abuse of secret power. In the United States, for example, journalists and lawmakers discovered during the 1970s that the CIA and its companion agencies had been misused by politicians to spy against American citizens—chiefly anti-Vietnam War dissenters and civil rights activists. This led to a reform movement and the establishment in Congress of specific intelligence oversight committees with the responsibility of keeping an eye on the secret agencies and rein in any wrongdoing. Compared with the time of benign neglect before the reform movement, the new intelligence accountability has provided a serious check against the abuse of secret power. Critics argue, however, that overseers on Capitol Hill have failed to consistently supervise the intelligence agencies. Moreover, disputes have arisen over whether the second Bush administration misused the agencies once again for spying against American citizens, especially by tapping their telephone conversations without proper warrants. The search continues in the United States and other democracies for the proper balance between efficient intelligence services, on the one hand, and the exercise of proper accountability to preserve liberty, on the other.

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*See also* Accountability; Leadership; Liberty; Prediction and Forecasting; Secret Services; Security and Defense Policy; Security Apparatus; Strategic (Security) Studies; Terrorism, International

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## INTERACTION EFFECTS

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Many hypotheses in political science are conditional in nature. Institutional theories typically argue that actors respond differently to similar stimuli when they inhabit different institutional environments. Political culture arguments typically come down to the claim that the ways citizens behave depends on the environment in which they were socialized. Approaches that emphasize strategic interaction identify equilibrium responses that depend on key parameters; when a key parameter is above some critical level, one strategy combination is an equilibrium, while entirely different behavior (as encapsulated in a different comparative static relationship between key variables) is expected when that parameter falls below the critical value. However, many context-conditional claims are tested as if they were unconditional claims. Robert Franzese and Cindy Kam, for example, show that 54% of the articles appearing over a period of 5 years in journals covering three disciplines used statistical methods but only 24% of these used interaction terms in their empirical analysis. The review of the literature by Thomas Brambor, Robert Clark, and Matt Golder is even more discouraging. Examining three leading political science journals over 5 years, they found that more than 90% of the articles that actually specified conditional tests made at least one of the common errors those authors warn about. Some ways to test for interaction effects are presented below.

To get a sense of how multiplicative interaction models allow one to test context-conditional claims, consider the simplest case, where  $X$  is hypothesized to be associated with a continuous variable  $Y$  in the presence of condition  $Z$  but not in its absence. Assume  $Y$  and  $X$  to be continuous variables and  $Z$  is defined such that  $Z = 1$  when the factor in question is present and  $Z = 0$  otherwise. The multiplicative interaction effect approach to testing such a claim is to estimate using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ + \varepsilon. \quad (1)$$

To see how this model can be used to capture a context-conditional claim, examine the case where

the condition is absent—that is, when  $Z = 0$ . Equation 1 would, therefore become

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2(0) + \beta_3 X(0) + \varepsilon,$$

which simplifies to

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \varepsilon.$$

Thus,  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$  serve as estimates for the intercept and slope, respectively, in a linear model of the relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  in the absence of condition  $Z$ . Similarly, Equation 1 allows us to estimate the relationship between these variables when  $Z$  is present (i.e., when  $Z = 1$ ). Once again, substituting the value of the modifying variable into Equation 1, we get

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2(1) + \beta_3 X(1) + \varepsilon,$$

which simplifies to

$$Y = (\beta_0 + \beta_2) + (\beta_1 + \beta_3)X + \varepsilon,$$

which shows that Equation 1 allows us to estimate the intercept ( $\beta_0 + \beta_2$ ) and slope ( $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ ) of the linear relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  in the presence of  $Z$ . It is the ability to yield estimates of relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  for the case where the hypothesized condition is met as well as when the condition is not met—and the ability to *compare* those estimates in a straightforward manner—that makes multiplicative interaction effects models a powerful tool for analyzing context-conditional claims.

The promise offered by interactive models has, more often than not, gone unfulfilled as a result of careless application despite the relative simplicity of the technique. Brambor, Clark, and Golder argue that the most common errors found in the literature related to multiplicative interaction models are (a) the failure to include them when appropriate, (b) omission of the individual terms that make up the interaction, (c) failure to calculate the theoretically relevant quantity of interest, and (d) the standard error of the same.

The previous discussion assumed that the modifying variable,  $Z$ , was dichotomous, but it need not be so. In general, we can examine how the

relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  depends on  $Z$  by taking the partial derivative of (1) with respect to  $X$ :

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 Z,$$

and we can see that according to (1) the relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  is a linear function of  $Z$ . This derivative is often referred to as the marginal effect of  $X$  on  $Y$  at some level of  $Z$ . When  $Z$  is equal to zero, the effect of  $X$  on  $Y$  is  $\beta_1$ . But the magnitude and sign of the marginal effect of  $X$  on  $Y$  can change as  $Z$  changes (to the extent that  $\beta_3$  is nonzero).

This simple setup allows the researcher to test many types of context-conditional claims. For example, the modifying variable,  $Z$ , can either *augment* or *inhibit* the relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$ . Typically, if  $Z$  is an augmenting variable, the sign of the coefficient on interaction term ( $\beta_3$ ) will have the same sign as the coefficient on the variable being modified ( $\beta_1$ ), but if  $Z$  is an inhibitor, the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term will have the opposite sign of the coefficient on the variable being modified. If the theory being tested claims that  $Z$  either augments or inhibits the effect of  $X$  on  $Y$ , then it is also useful to check to see if  $X$  actually has the hypothesized effect on  $Y$  at some levels of  $Z$ . To do this, one can calculate the marginal effect of  $X$  on  $Y$  across the observed range of  $Z$  and compare these conditional marginal effects with their associated standard errors to determine if the marginal effect is (a) ever statistically distinguishable from zero, (b) always statistically distinguishable from zero, or (c) is only statistically distinguishable from zero at certain values of  $Z$ . If the modifying variable is either dichotomous or ordinal, it is easy to report the effect of  $X$  on  $Y$  in a simple table of marginal effects and their associated standard errors—a set for each of the values that  $Z$  takes on. If  $Z$  is a continuous variable, it may be easier to present this information by plotting the line  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$  and its associated confidence interval over the full range of  $Z$ .

The practical implications are likely to be quite different depending on which of these three situations is the case. For example, if  $Y$  is some factor that is considered desirable and one believes that it

is brought about by an increase in  $X$  but only in the presence of  $Z$ , it should be the case that  $\beta_3$  is greater than zero and  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$  is greater than zero when  $Z$  is sufficiently high. It is possible that, consistent with its role as an augmenting modifying variable,  $\beta_3$  is significantly greater than zero but that  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$  is not significantly greater than zero over any of the observed ranges of  $Z$ . If this is true, then there is no evidence of a relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  for  $Z$  to modify, and there would be no basis to argue for supplying  $Z$  because it encourages the beneficial consequences of  $X$ .

In addition to inhibiting or augmenting a relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$ , the simple model in Equation 1 can be used to capture the case where the modifying variable changes the sign on the marginal effect capturing the relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$ . It is possible that for some values of  $Z$ ,  $X$  is positively associated with  $Y$ , while for other values of  $Z$ , it is negatively associated with  $Y$ . Evidence of this would be found if  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$  is significantly greater than zero for some values of  $Z$  and significantly less than zero for other values of  $Z$ .

It should be noted that the basic logic of interaction outlined here can be extended to other types of modifying relationships and to estimators other than OLS. For example, the effect of  $X$  on  $Y$  may depend on the value of  $X$  itself (as in quadratic, cubic, and higher order specifications). The effect of  $X$  may depend on the value of more than one modifying variable and even the interaction between some or all of those modifying variables. The method is quite flexible and one should, with some creativity, be able to specify a model that with some additional calculation will produce the quantity of interest implied by the theory being evaluated.

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*See also* Causality; Regression; Statistics: Overview


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## INTERDEPENDENCE

In political science, *interdependence* refers to independent social actors who wish to preserve their identity but who are structurally affected by one another's behavior, whether they like it or not. The actors are involved in each other's affairs (functional or integrative interdependence), or they are part of the same system (systemic interdependence). These two types of interdependence do not exclude one another: If actors are part of the same system, they are indirectly involved in one another's affairs, and conversely, social systems are based on the involvement of actors with each other. In terms of the structure–agency debate, however, it makes sense to distinguish systemic interdependence from the behavioral, more policy-dependent, types (see Figure 1).




**Figure 1** Three Types of Structural Interdependence

Source: de Wilde, J. H. (1991). *Saved from oblivion: Interdependence theory in the first half of the 20th century* (p. 20). Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth.

The structural effect can be operationalized into three qualitative dimensions (see Figure 2). They express how given actors can be mutually affected by one another's behavior. The first dimension concerns the *degree* of mutual involvement. This relates both to the quantitative characteristics of the intertwining and to the existential value of the relationship for the actors.

The second dimension concerns the *character* of mutual involvement: confrontational versus constructional interdependence. The difference is related to two connotations of the term *dependence*: subordination, and need or want. The more idealist expressions of interdependence rhetoric generally refer to the second connotation: interdependence as the consequence of a mutually perceived necessity of cooperation or interdependence as a symbiosis—two can do more than one. Sometimes this is referred to as positive interdependence. Cooperation creates a surplus value. Especially, economic interdependence is often emphasized in this context. However, interdependence can also be the consequence of a mutually perceived necessity of obstruction or competition. There is a stalemate: Due to the other(s), neither side can reach its goals. Confrontational interdependence is typical for a balance of power. One classical example is the Cold War situation of Mutual Assured Destruction between the United States and the former USSR.

The third dimension concerns the *(a)symmetry* of mutual involvement: the distribution of costs and benefits. Even in the case of a surplus value, there tends to be conflict about the price to be paid. This can relate to the contractual conditions, as is the case in conflicts between employers and labor unions. It can also relate to structural asymmetries in the world economy, as is the case in North–South relations. It can relate to the uneven distribution of costs of preventive measures versus costs of failing measures, as in many environmental issues (e.g., the price for preventing upstream pollution vs. the price of cleaning costs downstream). Additionally, distributional issues are about free-rider dilemmas. It can also relate to issue linkages, for example, the impact of functional and integrative interdependence on the identities of the participating actors. Finally, the existential value of the relationship can be asymmetrical. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr.



**Figure 2** Qualifications of Structural Interdependence

Source: de Wilde, J. H. (1991). *Saved from oblivion: Interdependence theory in the first half of the 20th century* (p. 27). Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth.

(2001) distinguish in this context between sensitivity costs and vulnerability costs. Some actors may be able to develop alternatives for the lost profit, whereas other actors may lack such options.

The concept of interdependence has a long history in political science, but it is seldom defined carefully. Often, it serves rhetorical purposes, emphasizing a need for cooperation, even (or especially) when conflicts are paramount. As such, it can be traced back in the academic literature to the late 19th century, when the first generation of scholars started to talk about globalization and its consequences.

Generally, the rhetoric of interdependence is associated with progressive liberal thought, in which trade relations and social contract are valued as mutually profitable for those involved. Particularly in the work of Sir Norman Angell, this is developed into one of the first interdependence theories. But left-wing syndicalists, such as Francis Delaisi, also expected that economic interdependence would provide a structure that would end political myths about the ideal of the nation-state. In *Les contradictions du monde moderne*, published in 1925, he emphasized the need to manage interdependence by means of permanent international institutions. This comes close to the theory

of functionalism as developed by David Mitrany and the pluralist theories of Charles Merriam. A more neutral early attempt to develop interdependence as an analytical concept can be found in *The Interdependent World and Its Problems*, published in 1933 by the historian Ramsay Muir.

All of this literature shares a normative concern about the need to manage globalization: Interdependence means trouble but only when it is neglected. At the same time, the literature has a word of admiration for the achieved levels of globalization. There is a hope for, and a belief in, the possibility of social learning. Therefore, interdependence theories are generally put in the idealist tradition in international relations, even though they are far from utopian.

The contemporary interest in the concept originates in the book *Power and Interdependence*, first published in 1977 by Keohane and Nye. They worked on the same themes as the first generation of theorists: the functional development of international organization in response to (transnational) globalization processes. An important difference is empirical: When Norman Angell, in 1918, argued for the need to create a protective union of democracies, this was a utopian idea, whereas NATO had existed for almost 3 decades when Keohane

and Nye reflected on existing international regimes in 1972 and 1977. In addition, they emphasized the consequences of conscious manipulation of interdependencies for purposes of political power. Especially in terms of *soft power*, a term later coined by Nye in 1990, asymmetries in the intertwinement will be contested and can be exploited by the stronger side. The limit of this type of relational power, however, is set by the reciprocity inherent in interdependence: The continued existence of the relationship is a precondition for exploitation of its political power.

Also, in political rhetoric, both the 1970s and the 1990s showed waves of popular use of the term. Politicians, especially those working for international organizations, appeal to interdependence to silence their opposition: Global interests should take precedence over local, ethnocentric interests; or, one step further, the local, ethnocentric interests in the long term require that immediate priority is given to the global interest. In this speech-act capacity, interdependence asks for solidarity where it is lacking (North-South context), for cooperation where it is lacking (East-West context during the Cold War), and for common action where it is lacking (global challenges, e.g., in the environmental realm).

A rather different approach to interdependence has been developed by the sociologist Norbert Elias. His insights are especially relevant for understanding the social impact of the complexity that is typical for situations of complex interdependence, as well as the interdependences created by a division of labor (functional differentiation). In line with Mitrany's findings, Elias emphasizes that increasing interdependence leads simultaneously to increased collectivization and increased individualization.

Isolationism is the first policy response to the discovery of complexity and dependence—an attempt to reduce costs and complexity by neglecting other actors and by pulling out (e.g., U.S. policies toward Europe and Japan after World War I). When this does not work, the second response is imperialism—an attempt to reduce costs and complexity by controlling or conquering other actors (e.g., German and Japanese policies after World War I). Only when this does not work either does a third response emerge: the acceptance of pluralism and a willingness to compromise in face of shared overarching interests (e.g., the creation of

the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system after World War II). This tension between the structural dimension of interdependence (i.e., a practical impossibility to achieve aims unilaterally) and the cognitive dimension of interdependence (i.e., the interpretation of the structure by the actors involved) is at the heart of the academic and social-political discourses on interdependence. Overall, the concept of interdependence has discursive functions in trying to show that actors cannot avoid dealing with one another and analytical functions in trying to map out the structure of world politics.

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*See also* Globalization, Power; Power and International Politics; Sovereignty

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## INTEREST GROUPS

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Interest groups are formal organizations, usually based on individual voluntary membership, that seek to influence public policies without assuming government responsibility. The majority of interest groups do not have primarily political goals. They are normally engaged in a disparate range of activities—work, recreational, philanthropic, humanitarian, and cultural—that develop independently in society. Such groups enter the political arena when they require some form of public intervention (financial, administrative, etc.) to support their interests or when they wish to influence the adoption or implementation of government decisions so as to secure some advantage or to protect the interests they represent. The goals of interest groups may be very specific or may be intended to make an impact on the entire political community. The strategies used to influence decision makers involve the combination of a repertoire of tactics, the breadth of which varies in relation to each group's organizational resources. In this entry, the origins and types of such groups and their respective functions in political decision-making processes are discussed. Their role with regard to the quality of democracy is also critically examined.

Since the end of the 19th century, there has been an exponential growth in the number of interest groups, prompted by the changes that have contributed to shaping the contemporary world. Industrialization has played a decisive role in this respect, favoring a specialization of production and services that has in turn given a strong impulse to the establishment of myriad groups with differentiated social interests. The formation and consolidation of nation-states has been equally important. Industrialization and the emergence of nation-states also engendered numerous conflicts of a social, political, and cultural nature that contributed to generating collective movements, interest groups, and parties. The further development of interest groups was encouraged by the extraordinary conditions created by the two world wars, which forced governments to involve the organizations of civil society in managing the emergency created by the wars. The establishment of new groups was also stimulated by the increasingly pervasive role of the state in society in the wake of the development of

the welfare state, which created new needs and new interests.

The type of political regime that offers the most opportunities for groups to organize themselves independently and to influence decision makers is liberal democracy. By contrast, in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, interest groups are established, controlled, or backed by a single party or state and often used exclusively as instruments for mobilizing consensus. This entry deals only with interest groups active in contemporary democracies, as, indeed, does virtually all the literature devoted to these political actors. Particular attention is given to examining the general functions of interest groups in the political system and the obstacles and opportunities they encounter in the various phases of the process involved in influencing public decisions.

### Definition

The above definition indicates three distinctive traits of interest groups. First, they are described as formal organizations—in other words, fairly permanent structures governed by clearly defined rules and with an identifiable membership and leadership. These characteristics are absent in informal associations—for example, certain groups of influential citizens, anomic groups, professional elites—which are sometimes included in the family of interest groups. This should, however, be avoided, because the intrinsic difficulties of ascertaining the presence of informal groups would make any reliable census of groups active in different policy arenas impossible, and an analysis of the inner workings of such nebulous associations would be no less problematic.

The second distinctive feature of interest groups is that they are made up of individuals who join on a voluntary basis. Members usually enter freely, participate in the group's activities, and discuss the objectives proposed by the leaders. If they are dissatisfied, they leave the organization. Analysis of the internal functioning of groups clarifies the conditions that favor or discourage participation and collective action. It should also be added that there is a type of interest group where membership is not entirely voluntary. These are *institutional interest groups*, which, as discussed herewith, are not vehicles for democratic participation.

The third qualifying element of interest groups is the particular way in which they try to influence policy making. They do so without seeking government office; indeed, they do not present electoral lists. In this respect, interest groups differ from political parties, for whom it is important to take part in elections in order to be able to exercise political power. As interest groups usually represent fairly circumscribed interests, they cannot hope to win elections and so prefer to convince the elected representatives rather than the voters of the validity of their case. This difference between political parties and interest groups seems to be at least partly contradicted in the real world by the frequent presence of small, single-issue political parties and large interest groups—for instance, trade unions—that have a wide range of concerns. It is also true that political parties appear to be increasingly incapable of representing general concerns, tending instead to turn into vehicles of economic interests. Nevertheless, it is precisely to offset their diminished ability to aggregate political demands that parties tend to increase their delegative powers by occupying public offices, while interest groups limit themselves to supporting, during electoral campaigns, those parties that declare a willingness to respond to their requests; alternatively, they might endorse individual politicians or place some of their representatives in a party's list of candidates.

### Types of Interest Groups

The most common typology of interest groups employed in the literature distinguishes between *sectional* or *economic* groups and *promotional* or *cause* groups, which are organized to express particular policy objectives. Economic groups reflect the major "interests" of society and represent people who join the organization mainly because of their occupation. The three main types of economic interest groups are trade unions, business (employers), and professional organizations representing lawyers, doctors, engineers, and so on.

Cause groups consist of organizations that pursue goals not directly related to the material interests of their members. These groups are voluntary organizations formed by people who share some common aspiration unrelated to their jobs. The cause group category can potentially be divided into a multitude of subgroups, because it encompasses

all sorts of voluntary organizations. Cause groups include cultural, religious, and recreational associations; organizations for the promotion of human rights and the welfare state; charities; and environmental and peace groups. Many of them are also *public interest groups*—namely, organizations that seek to promote collective goods by securing the approval of policies whose benefits may be shared equally by all people, irrespective of their membership or support of a given group. The development of public interest groups from the 1960s onward was a consequence of more widespread education, the adoption of more sophisticated means of mass communication, social protest, and the introduction of extensive social welfare programs.

Among cause groups, another category that deserves mention are the "not in my backyard" groups, otherwise known as *NIMBYs*, due to their widespread growth in recent years in many countries. *NIMBYs* are hybrid groups because the motivation of members is basically material and brings immediate benefits for members of that group only. The main goal of *NIMBYs* is almost always to defend the area in which their membership lives. Typical demands, often accompanied by highly visible forms of protest, are that a nuclear power station or a radioactive waste dump, prison, airport, or main road be built anywhere else rather than "in my backyard." The objectives of *NIMBYs* may also find support among people outside the "threatened" area, in the name of a wider, shared cause such as environmental conservation or the battle to create alternative energy sources. In this respect, *NIMBYs* can be related to cause groups and among these, in some cases, to public interest groups.

The distinction between economic and cause groups has led to the formulation of various hypotheses about how they function and their relationship with decision makers. It has been argued, for example, that economic groups are more long lasting because there are material incentives at stake for the membership that cause groups are less likely to be able to offer (see below). It has also been claimed that cause groups, even those with a large following, have a limited impact on policy making because they are barred from the corridors of power, while economic groups, in particular business groups, have easier access. This claim has been contested by Wyn Grant, who distinguishes between *insider* groups, which are consulted regularly by government



bodies, and *outsider* groups, which do not want or are unable to establish privileged relationships with policymakers. According to Grant, cause groups may also become insiders, forging special relations with public officials. A further source of debate is the notion that insiders are more influential than outsiders; this too has come in for criticism on the grounds that, in many cases, the latter are also capable of conditioning the political agenda.

Mention must also be made of *institutional interest groups*, which may be either public or private. Institutional public groups are local or regional governments and the various branches of central government, which compete with each other to influence the political process to their own advantage. Institutional private groups are social organizations—industrial and financial companies, universities, churches, and hospitals—which, in certain circumstances, may commit a proportion of their resources to influencing the decision-making process.

As has already been said, the issue of democratic participation is largely extraneous to institutional groups. Unlike economic and cause groups, institutional groups are hierarchical organizations run in a managerial fashion by leaders whose main concern is to ensure the continuity of their institution irrespective of the specific interests of the membership. The decision to enter the political arena is generally taken by leaders without prior consultation of the membership, whether they are blue- or white-collar workers, shareholders, worshippers, or patients. In other words, in contrast to economic and cause groups, institutional groups have less need to obtain the approval of their membership to justify their political engagement or to address their needs and concerns, according to Robert Salisbury (1984). Institutional groups occupy an important position in the branch of literature devoted to the analysis of policy making. This is inevitable, because they have always had a dominant role in U.S. policy making, at both state and federal levels; are always widely present in policy networks active in the European Union; and manage, obviously, to condition the choices of the various national governments.

#### *Levels of Organizational Complexity*

Many interest groups have a simple organizational structure. Their political action begins and

ends inside the boundaries defined by the local territory in which they operate. For instance, many public interest groups involved in environmental preservation have as their exclusive political targets the city council and/or the regional public authorities. Other groups have a more complex organizational structure with basic units embedded in a national structure. These second-level organizations help shape and unify the disparate demands of first-level organizations, the advantage being that it is possible to supply decision makers with aggregate information and to formulate more effective requests.

Third, there are also “umbrella” organizations called peak associations, which coordinate the activities of various second-level associations from different sectors. For example, in Germany, the main unions of the various categories of workers belong to the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), which is analogous to the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) in the United States or the Trade Union Congress in the United Kingdom. In the EU, workers and employers alike are usually represented by second-level associations and by intersectorial peak associations. But many big corporations that represent themselves directly can also be found. There is also an associative level that includes, under a broad umbrella, the peak associations of different member states, giving rise, for example, to the European Trade Union Confederation and the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe.

Second-level and peak organizations are widespread among economic interest groups but are rare among cause groups, perhaps, as Salisbury (1975, p. 187) suggests, because the latter have a shorter lifetime. For this reason, they do not reach the degree of organizational complexity that leads to the formation of second-level and peak associations.

#### **Interest Groups and Public Policy Making: Pluralist and Neo-Corporatist Approaches**

The two most important approaches that have been adopted in the literature on interest groups are pluralism and neo-corporatism. Pluralism actually started in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century as a reaction to the monistic theory of the

state. However, it was principally developed in the United States as an empirical approach to the analysis of political phenomena, through a series of works on the American political system published between the 1920s and the 1960s. Later adaptations have enabled pluralism to survive the numerous criticisms received in the second half of the century, when the major weaknesses of the approach were highlighted.

According to pluralists, the political process is driven by competition between many interacting groups that tend to self-limit their requests, thereby making the political system more stable. Competition is compatible with democracy because negotiation between many interests favors the dispersion of power, and so, according to David Truman, no one group is able to permanently get the better of the others. Robert Dahl concedes that some groups are stronger than others but argues that the dispersion of political power between the host of government institutions offers the possibility of access to weaker groups, which then have a chance of obtaining a hearing in some crucial phase of the decision-making process. According to pluralists, the competition between groups offers not only stability and democratic compatibility but also the possibility of making a decisive contribution to shaping public policies that have a broad consensus among citizens. Pluralists do not believe in the abstract concept of the general interest because this presupposes that its constituent parts form an indivisible whole, while empirical evidence suggests that many interacting interests influence government decisions, leading the way, but only in a transient fashion, to what is significant for all.

The pluralist approach has been heavily criticized for having presented an erroneous picture of the political system capable of regulating itself exclusively by virtue of the competition and compromises between groups. This view neglects the fact that the relations between groups are not balanced because some exercise a permanent influence while others are marginal or insignificant in the process of decision making. The idea of leaving the adoption of shared policies up to an agreement between partisan interests appears, then, to be both unrealistic and uneven. Their legitimacy would be based on existing power relations between the groups, and their implementation would be to the

detriment of the weaker ones. The pluralist illusion of being able to explain the functioning of the political system in terms of the self-regulatory activities of interest groups involves a weakened state authority. In the real world, however, state intervention is indispensable for redressing imbalances in opportunities for access to decision-making arenas. The cogency of these criticisms forced the pluralists to abandon the idea of attributing to interest groups the ability to ensure the governability of the political system. This idea was, however, resumed in Europe by the neo-corporative approach in its reassessment of the role of the state.

Neo-corporatism is the institutionalized participation of interest groups in government activities that favors the elaboration of policies agreed on jointly by major organized groups and decision makers. Some features of neo-corporatist agreements can also be found in the *state corporatism* established in authoritarian regimes, such as in Portugal and Spain between the two world wars. However, neo-corporatism can be distinguished from state corporatism because, according to Philippe Schmitter, the former is a *societal corporatism* that is not imposed from above but arises in a voluntary fashion from within society and is compatible with the system of democratic representation. Instances of a neo-corporatist system were identified in various continental European countries in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, in Scandinavia and Austria. Subsequently, the number of studies based on the neo-corporatist approach diminished considerably, because the changes that have occurred in the international economic system have forced many governments to prefer public policy strategies centered on the market rather than agreements stipulated between groups, which are the most distinctive trait of neo-corporatism.

In a neo-corporatist agreement, the protagonists of tripartite negotiations with a government are the representatives of capital and labor; the policies adopted are economic and relate in particular to the control of prices and salaries. For the neo-corporatists, the state, in contrast to the way in which it is depicted by the pluralists, possesses extensive powers that are used to authorize, regulate, and sanction the activities of organizations to ensure that they respect stipulated agreements and collaborate—sometimes by exercising delegated public functions—to implement agreed policies.

Unions and employers' associations respect commitments undertaken with government because they have a monopoly on representation in their sector and exercise effective control over their members, who are often obliged to lend their support, because respect for various binding norms is a condition of membership. The importance of the control functions assumed by groups over their membership has led neo-corporatists to replace the traditional expression *representation of interests* with of the term *intermediation of interests*.

A favorable condition for trilateral negotiations is the presence of a prolabor party in the government. Unions take part because they feel supported by the left-wing party, which offers, in return for moderate wage claims, measures to boost employment and a commitment to maintaining the welfare state. In turn, employers' associations accept negotiations because they expect the government to maintain a low level of union conflict, thanks to their influence over the unions, and to support investment in industry. The factors that enable trilateral negotiations, according to neo-corporatist scholars, make it possible to produce better and socially more equitable public policies than those implemented by executives operating without the institutionalized collaboration of large, organized interest groups.

Neo-corporatism has greater theoretical ambitions than pluralism, but these have not been achieved because no generally accepted theory has ever been provided regarding the nature of neo-corporative agreements. Are they an extension, within the state machine, of the pluralist representation of interests? Or have they been "captured" by the state, subordinating them to state control? Furthermore, the numerous political and socioeconomic prerequisites necessary for the establishment of a neo-corporatist system have inevitably meant that the empirical cases are limited to the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and, to a more limited degree, Germany. Neo-corporatism cannot, therefore, be viewed as a general theory of the action of interest groups in contemporary democracies. Finally, neo-corporatism lacks a theory of the representation of groups that explains, logically and normatively, the privileged access to decision-making spheres of certain groups (unions and employers' associations) rather than others.

## Mobilization

The study of the conditions for collective action is probably the field of interest group research in which there has been the greatest progress. Various contributions have examined the fundamental reasons that lead an individual to join a given organization, the means adopted by leaders to recruit members, and the contextual factors that influence mobilization. The preliminary theoretical basis for this strand of literature was provided by Mancur Olson Jr. in his book *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965). Olson revolutionized previous work on the conditions of collective action and laid the foundations for the development of a coherent body of knowledge. He demonstrated, thereby refuting a pluralist claim, that there is no automatic correspondence between the need of a given social group or category of people to manifest a policy preference and the transformation of that need into organized action. The latter can only occur under certain conditions and with certain resources. Groups that operate in unfavorable conditions and without adequate resources will be penalized in their efforts to influence the shape and outcome of public decisions.

According to Olson, in the most frequently occurring situations, it is not rational for an individual to support an organization that pursues a collective good even if he or she wishes to obtain it. The collective good, for example, the conservation of nature or the improvement of urban transport, is an indivisible good from which everyone can benefit. For this reason, the beneficiaries of collective goods will tend to avoid paying the costs of sustaining the organization (membership fees, participation in meetings and demonstrations, etc.) and act as free riders instead, waiting to reap the benefits of other people's efforts. Furthermore, rational individuals calculate that the contribution of their own effort to the success of a large organization's initiatives will be substantially irrelevant. Moreover, they take advantage of the scale of the organization, concealing their opportunistic behavior behind the anonymity of large numbers.

To overcome the difficulties deriving from the obstructive attitude of free riders, organizations are forced, according to Olson, to come up with selective incentives for its members (insurance policies, legal assistance, etc.) or alternatively to threaten imposing sanctions, a strategy resorted to

by many unions in the United States and the UK. Invoking closed-shop legislation, they demand that firms only employ workers who are already union members or willing to become members. Among economic interest groups, Olson adds, it should be easier for smaller organizations to obtain support, because they can offer their membership particularly selective incentives. For example, groups representing farmers or artisans can increase their membership by offering advantageous medical insurance or convenient individual retirement schemes. Olson clarifies that his analysis mainly explains the behavior of economic interest groups, while it applies poorly to associations that do not offer incentives readily translatable into material benefits.

Following the path taken by Olson, James Wilson identified solidarity and purposive incentives in addition to material ones, going on to formulate a theory of collective action applicable to all kinds of interest group organizations. Solidarity incentives offer supporters the gratification that comes from feeling part of a group, while purposive incentives induce the members of an organization to actively promote some good that might also benefit a wider spectrum of nonmembers. Each of the three types of incentives is of varying importance, in relation to the other two, in fuelling individual support for an organization. Individuals join and support organizations for a variety of reasons that are often hard to distinguish from one another. It should, therefore, be taken into account that support for an organization is often the result of a combination of all three types of incentives.

Wilson's theory, with the importance it attributes to solidarity and purposive incentives, gave fresh credit to the widespread conviction that collective action is also motivated by ideals, without any expectation of a material reward. The greatest, and by no means negligible, weakness of this typology is that solidarity and purposive incentives, unlike material ones, are hard to distinguish and measure, making it difficult in turn to assess their specific weight. The subsequent development of the theory of incentives has, however, continued to focus on nonmaterial incentives, without, as a consequence, dispelling doubts stemming from theoretical assumptions that have not been adequately measured and checked.

Olson's theory of selective incentives paved the way for a fuller understanding of the conditions

that facilitate or penalize the mobilization of different types of interest groups. Public interest groups such as pacifist, environmental, and child protection organizations are among those that are penalized, making it harder for them to enter the political arena. They have a very wide potential membership, but the incentives are almost exclusively purposive, with little intrinsic value. As the only major investment required is essentially emotional, people join but also abandon such organizations with considerable ease, making them highly unstable. In this respect, they are similar to collective movements. By contrast, economic groups, which have a more limited potential membership and can offer quite considerable material incentives and returns, find it easier to enter the political arena and establish themselves as key interlocutors for public decision makers.

### Access

What difficulties and advantages must be taken into account by interest groups when seeking to establish useful contacts with decision makers? An examination of the issue of access does not clarify how groups manage to be influential in the decision-making process but does help ascertain the more or less favorable conditions for exercising influence. In liberal democracies, the possibility of access is conditioned by both variable and permanent factors. Variable factors include the resources available to a group (size of membership, expertise, money, existing contacts with political elites, good reputation, etc.) or the existence or otherwise of a public opinion favorable to the issues interest groups wish to submit to decision makers and the political significance of those issues.

The permanent factors that have a bearing on access include the nature of a country's institutional structure and its policy style. A democracy with a unitary institutional system has fewer access points than a federal democracy, because in the former, power is fairly concentrated, while in the latter, it is distributed among a larger number of independent decision-making bodies. The number of access points in the United States, for instance, is particularly high, due to the nation's federal structure, the division of government between the president and Congress, the powerful congressional

committees, and a judicial system with constitutional powers to intervene in legislation. It is also high in the EU, which, like the United States, has an institutional system that separates powers both vertically and horizontally.

The varying degree of accessibility is influenced by the country's prevailing policy style. Every liberal democracy has its own particular policy style, which is perhaps not uniformly discernable in all policy areas but is prevalent in many of them. Policy style is the set of standard procedures generally adopted by institutions to devise and implement public policies, according to Jeremy Richardson, Gunnel Gustafsson, and Grant Jordan (1982). The access of groups to many areas of policy is easier when governments adopt a reactive policy style, because decision-making powers are not concentrated, and public bureaucracies depend in large measure on the technical information supplied by the groups. In these cases, the state usually avoids coercive measures that may discourage the setting up of new groups and reduce the fragmentation of existing ones. Public policies take the form of ad hoc measures uncoordinated with previous decisions and are mostly designed to satisfy the short-term demands of groups with ease of access to public bureaucracies, as noted by Michael Atkinson and William Coleman (1989). The access of groups is more selectively filtered when centralized governments and independent bureaucracies adopt an anticipatory policy style, using intrusive policy methods, without excluding coercion, the aim being to effect significant change in society and the economy.

Governments that adopt an anticipatory policy style may disregard interest groups while pursuing their public policy goals or may involve only broadly representative organizations capable of ensuring that their membership adheres to agreements stipulated by the state. The result, in this case, is greater selectivity in access, which benefits more well-organized groups.

Nowhere in the real world do governments adopt a purely reactive or anticipatory style. Both should therefore be seen as ideal types that represent the opposite extremes of a spectrum of possible combinations, including the various policy styles of the liberal democracies, some closer to the anticipatory model and others to the reactive one.

## Lobbying

The main objective of interest groups is to influence governments in order to obtain favorable policy outcomes. However, influence is a continuous and unresolved political process, which by its very nature is unmeasurable. Furthermore, other factors may influence legislators' policy decisions more than interest groups—for instance, other legislators, party leaders, the personal convictions of the legislator, the media, and so on. Faced with the difficulty of measuring influence, scholars have tended to focus on the phenomenon of lobbying, extending the original meaning of the term to encompass the whole set of strategies and tactics used by interest groups to influence policy making.

Lobbying was initially understood in quite specific terms as one or more face-to-face meetings between representatives of an interest group and legislators, sought by the former so as to influence the decisions of the latter in a way that benefits the group's preferences. To be effective, a lobbyist—who may either be a member of the group or an expert hired specifically for the purpose—must establish a relationship of trust with the policymaker, supplying data and information that facilitate the adoption of policies favorable also to the interest group. In its broader reformulation, lobbying involves a much wider range of initiatives, including contacts with bureaucratic bodies, the premier's office, the courts and parliament, the use of the mass media, the preparation of memoranda, the forging of links with individual functionaries, and so forth.

Lobbying has been extensively studied in the United States, where it is widespread. This is due to the multiple points of access offered by the institutional system, the weakness and relative lack of representativity of the political parties, and a dominant political culture that favors pragmatic, nonideological dealings between citizens and legislators. American literature in this field can boast hundreds of case studies devoted to the lobbying activities of pressure groups. However, they have made little contribution to furthering an understanding of the phenomenon because they lack a shared theoretical basis. According to Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech (1998), scholars tend to use their own method of measuring the impact of lobbying and a generally narrow analytic

perspective without adopting a comparative approach or making any attempt to build on previous work.

The results of the large-scale surveys of lobbying in Washington, D.C., and the state capitals in the second half of the 1980s have been more useful. These studies, which are more theoretical, refer to a large number of cases and consider the context; they have shown that the tactic used most widely by lobbyists is to cultivate face-to-face contacts with public bureaucrats, seeking, at the same time, to extend the range of their contacts among public decision makers and those capable of influencing them in order to exchange information, establish cooperative strategies, and anticipate the moves of competitors. Furthermore, the gamut of strategies used varies according to the issue in question and whether it has a moderate or high political saliency or level of conflict. The position occupied by the group in the political process also seems to have considerable bearing on the choice of strategy. Groups operating within the political process adopt *inside strategies* that involve lobbying legislators and bureaucrats, taking legal action, and supporting certain candidates in elections. Marginal groups use *outside strategies* such as public forms of protest and organizing meetings to promote their cause. The media are resorted to in equal measure in both inside and outside strategies.

Lobbying is less developed in Europe than it is in the United States, because the conditions for lobbying are less favorable. In particular, the prevalence of unitary state systems reduces the number of access points and limits the legislative power of parliaments; these are mainly used by representatives of interest groups as a channel for drawing the attention of the media and the government to issues that concern them. Moreover, European scholars have displayed little interest in the theme of lobbying due to the importance attributed in interest group literature to the neo-corporatist approach, which takes it for granted that there is continuing collusion between policymakers and the representatives of economic interests while largely ignoring the lobbying activities of noneconomic groups. Despite these limits, the number of studies of lobbying in different European nations has increased in the past decades. In particular, there has been a steady growth in the amount of research devoted to lobbying in the EU,

which has a multilevel institutional structure offering many direct points of access for individual groups and national associations. Both invariably maintain close contacts with national ministers present in Brussels, who often act as intermediaries between interest groups and European institutions.

The majority of interest groups employ one of the many lobbying agencies based in Brussels. At the beginning of the 1990s, it was estimated that more than 10,000 individuals were employed in such agencies, for the most part run by British or American consultants, who generally had more expertise than colleagues from elsewhere in Europe. The result of the lobbying of European institutions is the preponderance of large European industrial groups and their associations in the technical committees set up by the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Public interest groups are underrepresented or excluded. However, they have greater success with the European Parliament, which is generally more receptive to broader interests. European lobbying seems to be less adversarial and more inclined to favor compromise policy solutions, while in the United States there tends to be just one winner, often the main interest group that has financed the election campaign of the decision makers. Furthermore, in the multilevel system of the EU, lobbying on a certain issue may continue at national, regional, and local levels while the adopted policy is being implemented.

### Critical Reappraisals in the Study of Interest Groups

#### *Policy Networks Approach*

Since the second half of the 1980s, pluralism and neo-corporatism have come under fire on the grounds that they offer an inaccurate image of the key characteristics of policy making. Critics have noted that in the United States, the prototype of the pluralist political system, a small number of groups adopt collaborative and collusive behaviors in certain areas of policy that are very similar to those described by neo-corporatists. Conversely, in political systems traditionally associated with neo-corporatist agreements, where one would expect cooperation between a small number of groups to be the dominant feature, scholars have identified policy areas corresponding to the pluralist model of a large number of competing groups. To overcome

the incongruent features of pluralism and neo-corporatism, European scholars developed the policy network approach. This focuses on the way groups are conditioned by certain characteristics of the state and of policy making. The state has turned into a network of independent administrative apparatuses that forge permanent ties with groups that are recipients of their decisions, while policy making is sectorialized into various different specialized policy areas. As a consequence of this conditioning, the activities of interest groups are channeled into different policy networks, each of which is made up of the public and private actors interested in formulating and implementing given policies.

The task of research is to examine and classify the different types of policy networks that pluralism and neo-corporatism, according to the policy network approach, erroneously reduce to a single typology of policy making. On the contrary, policy making is sectorialized into different areas of policy within which various policy networks may be active. These are differentiated depending on the number of actors, their stability, the degree of rigidity of their boundaries, and various other dimensions. Apart from the differences, the different types of policy networks also have some features in common: The actors cultivate nonhierarchical relations and promote interests that may at times be conflictual but are interdependent, because there is a mutually beneficial exchange of information, expertise, and, with time, trust.

The two most common types of policy networks are *policy communities* and *issue networks*. The former comprise a limited number of groups, are stable over time, have quite rigid boundaries, and are characterized by a consensual decision-making style and a fairly balanced internal distribution of power. By contrast, issue networks are fairly unstable, have uncertain boundaries, are potentially conflictual in terms of interaction, and have an unequal distribution of power.

The limitations of the policy network approach include the absence of shared definitions, the limited operational value of various dimensions used to distinguish the different types of network, the lack of attention devoted to conditions that might lead to the transformation of a network, and the failure to integrate it with any theory of the distribution of power. As regards this final point, however, it

should be stressed that the policy network approach seems compatible with pluralism, not only because it admits the existence of an oligopolistic political market dominated by policy communities impenetrable to “unrecognized” groups but also because it emphasizes that policy networks are never entirely closed, that no one interest dominates broad areas of policy, and that policy making takes place within a variety of policy networks characterized by close relations between different interests and different government offices.

The theory of policy networks has the advantage of being a more precise analytic tool than the one proposed by the pluralists and neo-corporatists. What’s more, it bridges the gap between studies on interest groups and those on public policies, sharing with the latter an interest in the characteristics of the social and temporal context in which groups operate. The attention to context has enabled the policy network approach to distinguish between issues that provide incentives for participation and those that mobilize a small number of actors. This in turn has made it possible to formulate some useful hypotheses about the differing propensities of groups to participate and the different levels of conflict within networks.

### *Historical Institutionalism*

Historical institutionalism overturns the vision of the relations between interest groups and institutions delineated by pluralism and neo-pluralists who would like to see the state reinforced so as to avoid policy making being dominated by interest groups. Institutionalists hold that the margins for independent initiative on the part of interest groups are actually more limited than neo-pluralists believe, because lobbying must necessarily take place within existing political institutions. The possibility for groups to succeed in influencing public decision makers depends on the structure and functional logic of the institutions that offer highly conditioning restrictions and opportunities. If significant changes take place in institutions, interest groups are obliged to adapt to the new margins of initiative offered by the revamped institutions.

An example of the institutional conditioning of interest group activities is provided by Ellen Immergut in her comparative analysis of health reform policies adopted in three European nations.

Immergut points out that doctors' associations in France, Switzerland, and Sweden tried to prevent the expansion of state control over the medical profession and the establishment of a public health service. The numerous veto points posed by institutions in Switzerland and in France during the Fourth Republic enabled minority, but well-organized, groups to block legislative initiatives in favor of a public service. By contrast, the institutional situation in Sweden and during the Fifth Republic in France favored the formation of governments that were unconditioned by medical associations and their allies and that were thus able to introduce health reforms. Despite the novelty of its proposed analytic criteria, historic institutionalism is not an alternative approach to pluralism and its subsequent reworkings, because the relatively low number of research studies carried out do not provide adequate grounds for empirically justifying its explicative assumptions. Moreover, these do not appear to be entirely incompatible with the basic ideas of pluralism. Rather, they seem to be useful tools that can be used in the crowded field of neopluralist studies.

### Interest Groups and Democracy

Can interest groups improve the quality of democracy and enhance the development of citizens' representation and good government? Groups promote democracy if they help citizens win better opportunities for representation. And they contribute to good government if they give citizens the possibility of preventing or punishing abuses of power by making governments accountable for their actions toward the political community.

#### *Group Representation in Liberal Democracies*

The interest group system favors political equality if it promotes wider representation, so as to prevent governments equipped with partial information about citizens' preferences from favoring the expectations of a minority. However, research conducted in the United States during the 20th century and the early 21st century demonstrates the existence of a permanent imbalance in representation, because business groups and professional associations find it easier to organize themselves than cause groups. They can act more rapidly when

they feel threatened, and they represent people with a high social status, income, and education. They are also dominant in areas of policy that have particular strategic significance for the whole political community.

In Europe, a permanent representational imbalance has been detected both within the EU and in individual member states. Large economic groups occupy a preponderant position within European institutions, even though the number of organizations present in Brussels grew continually in the past 2 decades of the 20th century. In member states, permanent representational imbalances were generated by neo-corporatist experiments that benefited business groups and unions and marginalized less organized social categories from policy making. Permanent imbalances have also been detected in policy communities that are dominated by economic interest groups and are inaccessible to citizens.

Therefore, there is a good deal of converging empirical evidence suggesting that interest groups have a limited ability to favor balanced representation in the decision-making process. However, many scholars take a less negative view of the dynamics of representation, stressing that the characteristics of policy making vary in relation to time, area of policy, and the issue at stake. It may be that the relative degree of representational imbalance is more significant in a certain period in a specific area of policy and less so in the same area at a later time. Furthermore, certain decision-making processes prompt the mobilization of just one of the potential parties involved, while others generate disputes in which hundreds of interest groups take part. The variations in the number of actors participating in the decision-making process suggest that the imbalance is probably less uniform and rigid than it has frequently been made out to be and may be susceptible to attenuation.

Pluralists who have advanced such arguments support their case by pointing to the surge in political participation that took place during the collective movements that sprang up in the 1960s and 1970s. The increase in the number of groups also contributed to "opening up" policy communities, which is why the notion of issue networks was developed in the United States to emphasize that the number of actors participating in decision-making processes had grown. More in general, the



crowding of the policy-making scene has also made the outcome of decisions more uncertain for business groups. Their omnipresence in the various decision-making arenas is not necessarily proof of their strength but may be the result of a defensive reaction to the wider range of public regulative interventions regarding issues directly affecting their interests. Moreover, the business community is also split by internal divisions that make problematic the formation of unified coalitions for promoting common lobbying strategies.

None of the criticisms leveled at the thesis of representational imbalance denies that it exists. Instead, they stress that this imbalance is an unavoidable result of group competition, and it may be mitigated when competition becomes greater. The debate on representational imbalance suggests that the system of interest groups is relatively open because it enables new actors to enter policy arenas, especially in periods of increased competition and allows many disparate interests to get a hearing from governments. Nevertheless, the group system is characterized by permanent imbalances that penalize citizens and the less organized associations. In this respect, they mirror existing inequalities in society.

#### *Groups and Democratic Accountability*

Various factors contribute to defining citizens' political judgment of governments. One of these is the degree of accountability of government action. In the liberal democracies, voters punish abuses of power by voting governments out of office or reelect them if they consider that the government has respected the law and acted in their interests. To monitor the actions of decision makers in the interval between elections, citizens rely on organizations, which are generally better equipped to ascertain when the abuse of power gets the better of responsibility.

The public organizations that monitor government actions are parliament, the judiciary, and various bureaucratic agencies. The most important private ones are the political parties, the media, and interest groups. The latter have an interest in preventing the abuse of power so as to ensure fair competition between all the players in the field and to avoid some groups obtaining an unfair advantage in the decision-making process. Moreover, groups

are forced to follow the governmental process very closely because the final decisions on the different issues are highly unpredictable. This explains why researchers have discovered that a large part of group lobbying is devoted to the gathering of information in the face of uncertainty about the intentions of political elites and other players involved in the preparation of ongoing legislation. The need to achieve fair competition and to gather information for reducing their uncertainty about legislators' preferences makes interest groups a sort of watchdog of public officials. In this respect, there is more than a point of convergence among the groups' special interests and those of ordinary citizens for an effective control of decision makers.

But conversely, insofar as they represent particular interests, groups have also the temptation to cultivate confidential relations with governments, and this sometimes leads to collusion. When this happens, the correct functioning of the democratic process is compromised, because it induces decision makers to identify their public mission with the taking of decisions favorable to groups with which they are in collusion. The risk can be reduced when both the groups and governments operate within a system that has effective cross-checks. This works well in liberal democracies if there are strong political parties; a parliament that exercises its powers of control over the executive; an independent judicial system; an efficient, autonomous bureaucracy; and civil society and media that are autonomous from the state. What emerges from the above is that interest group competition enhances the development of open but permanently unbalanced political representation and that the contribution of interest groups to the control of political elites can be effective if carried out in the context of democratic regimes that exhibit high qualitative standards.

As a closing remark, it should be remembered that there are some findings that represent a largely uncontroversial view of interest groups' contribution to democracy. First of all, these judgments emphasize that groups offer significant opportunities for communicating with governments, enabling citizens to influence public decisions more effectively than if they acted individually and limited themselves to exercising their right to vote. In addition, the variety, number, and presence of groups at all levels of the government process guarantees

the vitality and capacity for renewal of liberal democracies. Groups contribute by helping produce better citizens and motivating them to participate in elections and engage with issues of public interest. Moreover, the great diversity of views expressed by groups give governments an accurate picture of the worries and concerns of civil society, permitting minorities to voice certain of their key needs on specific issues that distracted majorities resulting from elections might otherwise neglect to represent. Finally, it should not be forgotten that, in collaboration with other political actors—public and private—groups can help create rights and obligations protected by the law and often provide expertise that contributes to improving the quality of policy making.

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*See also* Accountability; Collective Security; Democracy, Quality; Neo-Corporatism; Parties; Pluralism; Policy Network; Representation

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## INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

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Intergovernmentalism seeks to understand the reasons why states join together and to provide a realistic approach to the analysis of regional integration mechanisms. It tries to overcome the contradiction between Hobbes's vision of a competition among sovereign states and the modern process of regional and global integration. This entry explores how this concept emerged in connection with European integration and has been expanded to analyze forms of political and economic cooperation more generally.

Intergovernmentalism first found expression in the 1960s in the work of Stanley Hoffmann, who took a realistic view of the construction of Europe. Hoffmann, who taught at Harvard and Sciences Po in Paris, attempted to explain why states as nationalistic as France could bring themselves to give up certain sovereign powers in order to promote the common market, while at the same time opposing the strategies of the European Commission (EC). European integration cannot be explained simply in terms of the neo-functionalist spillover effect, according to which successful integration opens the way for new cooperation. Although it is true that Europe developed from an initially common, then enlarged market, the single market was only created when the political decision to set up a

single currency was made. Intergovernmentalism thus represented a criticism of both functionalist methods and institutionalist approaches. The former give priority to the process of integration, while the latter stress the significant role of institutions in governing interstate relations.

First, as regards the functionalist theories, it is clear that, as noted by Hoffmann, the interests of political elites do not necessarily coincide with those of the EC bureaucracy and that national elites may use their veto to block any transfer of power affecting their sovereignty; integration cannot be conceived of as a functional process that would be spontaneously built up, as postulated by functionalism. The Empty Chair Crisis, in which President Charles de Gaulle boycotted meetings of the Council of the EC in opposition to the EC's attempt to reduce the scope of application of the veto and increase the EC's own resources, and subsequently the Luxembourg Compromise that ended the crisis in 1966, deciding in favor of France and maintaining unanimity rule, symbolized this resilience of the state. Moreover, again in opposition to functionalism, not all sectors are integrated at the same rate. Some key matters remain within the exclusive domain of intergovernmental cooperation (the second pillar of the Public Environmental Center for Sustainable Development [PECSA], one of the constitutive pillars of the Union—as they were defined by the Treaty of Maastricht, which defied the European “architecture” in 1992—devoted here to defense and security), while others are governed by the simultaneous imperatives of cooperation and integration, as with the fourth pillar (economy and finance) in which the European Central Bank (in charge of integration) coexists with the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin Council; in charge of cooperation).

As regards institutionalist approaches, intergovernmentalism suggests that international institutions favor negotiation by reducing transaction costs but that it is more effective in the technical fields of “low politics.” In “high-politics” areas of sovereignty, including the most prestigious prerogatives of a sovereign state, states endeavor to protect their powers and thus delegate them with the greatest parsimony. There is, therefore, a major contradiction between technical matters that could be fully integrated and the more political matters

in which cooperation requires unanimous agreement and recourse to the veto.

Intergovernmentalism therefore proposes an approach to regional integration through which states accept the principle of cooperation depending on which common interests are at stake. As Morten Kelstrup has shown, the realistic approach becomes compatible with regional integration that allows the sharing of common gains, and thus the external relationships of the states involved are strengthened. Not only do states have an interest in associating, they also remain the chief players in the cooperation or integration policy for this purpose. The successes of the European Union (EU) could thus be explained by the proper functioning of states capable of fostering the opening of civil society and waiving certain attributes of their sovereignty. Intergovernmentalism is therefore more directly concerned with the decision processes used by states in defining and then facing their interests before defining the area of agreement opened up by the relative powers of the parties.

Hence, the integration process must be based first on the awareness that neighboring states have converging interests, a fact that can be attributed to the accelerated maturity of an international anarchy in which sovereign states are in a free competition. In such conditions, interstate cooperation is envisaged as a rational solution to optimize the use of means pooled by the member states. This is why the veto was progressively dropped in favor of a decision-making mechanism via a qualified majority. Sovereignty did not disappear but instead became pooled sovereignty. The European Economic Community was thus envisaged as a multiplier of power for weakened states. The international organizations institutionalized the technique of interstate bargaining. Their decisions became the lowest common denominator on which states could agree. In this ongoing negotiation, the great powers took precedence, but all states were strengthened by their participation in the organization. Contrary to the functionalist or federalist theories, which postulate a metasovereign integration, intergovernmentalism thus suggested that the transfer of power strengthened states internationally and bolstered the political elites with respect to their domestic public opinion.

This initial approach was completed in the 1990s by Andrew Moravcsik, who developed the

idea of liberal intergovernmentalism. Like Hoffmann, Moravcsik considered that the decisions of international organizations resulted from bargaining between rational states. The interest of this approach is its liberal aspect, which is revealed by national choices. States always seek to impose their national interests, but these are no longer envisaged purely through the reductionist view of general interest as embodied in a neutral power. On the contrary, the national preferences expressed by government members in regional organizations for cooperation or integration are the result of the demands of social players who have succeeded in imposing their opinions in national administrative and political circles. Liberal intergovernmentalism thus appears to be a method for combining Robert Putnam's internal and external levels and doubly strengthening governmental powers: The external constraints give the executive a means whereby to influence domestic public opinion, and the internal constraints are used to put pressure on the external partners that prefer to reach an agreement rather than face failure. The negotiation that could be complicated by this two-level game is in fact simplified by transparent institutional mechanisms that reduce the transaction costs, fostering trust by guaranteeing mutual respect, and turn out to be effective aids to decision making. Based on Nash's equilibrium, liberal intergovernmentalism explains why and how states manage to come to an agreement by reducing their demands out of fear of marginalization or fear that they will be held liable for failure. The result is that the state, and also the executive, is strengthened by participation in regional organizations of which it controls the agenda, the procedures, the information, and the instruments of legitimation.

Intergovernmentalism is not, however, the only explanation for the construction of Europe. First, it would be an exaggeration to suppose that the integration of the Old World was the sole initiative of the hard core of the EU, constituted by France and Germany. Although these countries played a major role, that should not obscure the fact that horizontal agreements were concluded between the smaller states to oppose this hegemony. Moreover, the United Kingdom balanced things out by backing agreements when it suited its interests. Moreover, while intergovernmentalism provides a good explanation for the role of states in intergovernmental conferences preparing the founding treaties of the

EU, it should be noted that the Commission has the power of initiative and that, since the Single Act, which was concluded in 1986 to amend the Rome Treaty and deepen European integration, it is the Commission that has fixed the European agenda. The loss of influence of the Council of General Affairs and External Relations, which for many years was the political hub of Europe, and the rise in importance of the technical councils symbolize the rise of the experts who handle EU business day to day and apply the treaties. Nor is it enough to reduce Europe to the two-level game since, on the contrary, it demonstrates multilevel governance, by which many nonstate players are freed from state interference and develop multiple transnational cooperations that weaken the states. Finally, the overly positivist definition of national preferences taken into account by intergovernmentalism is also criticized by constructivist approaches.

The theory of intergovernmentalism also includes the realist school, which has markedly changed under the influence of these multiple instances of international cooperation. As a result, realism has been modified by four elements. First, the interstate relationship was revisited and appeared as more complex than the traditional jungle, now seen as a mixture of competition, cooperation, and friendship. Second, international anarchy has become the *raison d'être* of cooperation, since states seek to join forces in a threatening environment. Third, the ongoing bargaining between states provides a satisfactory answer to Joseph Grieco's question as to whether states refuse to conclude agreements from fear that their neighbor might obtain higher relative gains. Finally, intergovernmentalism has become part of a realism that has abandoned the former balance of power in favor of a balance of threat or balance of interests. This neoclassical realism is thus resolutely optimistic since, according to Charles Glazer, cooperation has become the instrument of self-help.

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*See also* Cooperation; European Integration; Institutionalization; Multilevel Analysis; Realism in International Relations; Regionalism; Transaction Costs

### Further Readings

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## INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

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*See* International Organizations

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## INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

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*See* International Law

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## INTERNATIONAL LAW

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International law is a system of law that is predominantly created by, and designed to govern the actions of, states. Public international law, the subject of this entry, can be distinguished from private international law, which addresses aspects of private legal relationships that span national borders. International law is a horizontal system of law in which states, at least in legal theory, enjoy sovereign equality. Lacking a legislative body or a law enforcement agency, international law functions very differently than a system of law in a modern liberal democracy. International law has grown enormously in scope and complexity since World War II. The number of states has expanded through decolonization and disintegration, international

law has come to address a far wider range of subjects than ever before, and there has been a considerable increase in the number of international courts and tribunals. This entry first looks at how international law is created and enforced, and reviews some of the most significant recent developments in specific fields of international law, before considering competing explanations of the impact of international law on the behavior of states and the attitude toward international law of developing countries, the United States, Europe, and China.

Some scholars consider that the predictable patterns discernible in the interstate relations of the ancient world, including the Greek city-states and Mesopotamia, could be regarded as forerunners to the current system of international law, and systems of international law are also said to have developed in precolonial Africa and South Asia. The modern system of international law is, however, usually dated from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, and the term *international law* did not come into use until the late 18th century. By the 20th century, international law had evolved into a global system of law. There are contrasting views as to the political significance of the contemporary system. Since the emergence of international relations as a field of study in the early 20th century, the dominant realist paradigm has downplayed the impact of international law on the course of world events. Liberalism assumes an important role for international law as an agent of world peace, but World War II stymied hopes that international law could triumph over military might, especially where accompanied by a political determination to use violence. As international law continues to grow in sophistication, so we are seeing more nuanced theoretical approaches to explicating its impact.

### Sources of International Law

There are at least three ways in which the term *source* is used in relation to international law.

#### *Legal Positivism and the Source of Legal Obligation*

States have a legal obligation to comply with international law. The theoretical source of this obligation is state consent. Legal positivism, the

philosophical foundation of international law since the 19th century, assumes that law is made through human agency as opposed to deriving from the metaphysical or religious realms. States are bound by international law because they have agreed to be bound by that law. Although legal positivism underpins the “real world” of international law, it has plenty of critics in the academy, who regard it as inadequate for the contemporary world. Particularly in the 1990s, much of the scholarship critical of legal positivism and the system of international law founded on legal positivism went under the banners of “critical international legal studies” and “new approaches to international law.” This scholarship emphasized the indeterminacy of legal argument and found fault with legal positivism for not taking sufficient account of the role of nonstate actors, the concerns of women, those in postcolonial societies, and indigenous peoples. Heightened awareness of the masculinist bias of international law has given rise to changes in specific fields of international law, including refugee law and international humanitarian law. Liberal scholarship in international law emphasizes the plurality of actors in the international sphere, including transnational networks of judges and government officials.

### *Formal Sources*

The formal sources specify the ways in which international law is made. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which sets out the sources of international law that the Court is to apply, is usually understood more generally as a statement of the formal sources of international law. Although the statute specifies no hierarchy, the order in which the three sources are listed provides a guide as to the relative practical importance of each source. Listed first are conventions, or treaties, which are legally binding agreements between states and, to a lesser extent, between states and intergovernmental organizations. Second is customary international law. States create custom through their actions, where that practice is accompanied by *opinio juris*, a belief that international law requires the state to behave in that way. The third of the formal sources is general principles of international law. The formal sources of international law permit us to distinguish

between rules, principles, and concepts that are, strictly speaking, part of international law and those that are not. Article 38 also specifies two subsidiary means for determining what international law permits or does not permit on a certain subject. These are the writings of distinguished international lawyers and judgments of international courts and tribunals.

### *Material Sources*

If the formal sources elucidate the ways in which international law can be made, the material sources are the specific documents in which a particular point of law is set out—the Charter of the United Nations (UN) or a resolution of the General Assembly, for example. To state that a text constitutes a material source of international law is not to assume that it has legal status as a formal source of international law: The material source may have set out a rule that then becomes binding through another process.

### *Change Within International Law*

The doctrine of sources suggests the processes by which international law evolves. There is no single formal source of international law that serves as the motor of change. International customary law is often codified into treaties. The Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, put into written form international law that had already emerged in custom. Usually in such cases, however, the treaty not only codifies custom but also represents the “progressive development” of international law; through this process, international law is updated. Two general principles of law are relevant here: Where the terms of two material sources of international law appear contradictory, the more recent prevails, and where apparently contradicting law can be found both in specific and broadly applicable instruments, the more specific overrides the more general.

### **Compliance and Enforcement of International Law**

Compliance with international law is aided by the fact that, at least in theory, states choose the law

to which they wish to be bound. States are not bound by a rule of customary law if they have been persistently objecting to the emergent rule, although, in practice, the crystallization of a rule may be clear only in retrospect. States are bound only by those treaties to which they agree to be bound. Participants in treaty negotiations have an opportunity to help shape the terms of the agreement, although in large-scale negotiations the impact of any one delegation may not be as significant as the theory of state consent might suggest. Compliance with international law is also enhanced by the fact that multilateral treaties commonly permit reservations, which allow states to exclude from their undertakings any provisions with which they disagree. Even those states that have signed a treaty can choose not to proceed to ratify and hence not be bound by the final text of the treaty. The fact that international law is a horizontal system means that one of the most important factors promoting compliance is reciprocity: If one party to a conflict treats the prisoners of war of the other combatant according to international humanitarian law, it is much more likely that its own nationals will in turn be treated appropriately.

There are two alternative approaches to maximizing compliance with international law, and each has its supporters within the academy. One approach takes as its starting point the assumption that states have a propensity to comply and generally only fail to do so when there are financial or bureaucratic impediments. This, the managerial approach, is associated with the writing of Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (1995) and emphasizes the continuity of policy choices, to which changes are made only incrementally when perceived as necessary. The second approach is that of enforcement, by which it is assumed that states will only comply where they see a direct benefit from doing so. If a decision to comply is the product of a cost-benefit analysis on the part of national decision makers, rates of compliance should be significantly affected by the presence or absence of enforcement mechanisms. In practice, most fields of international law contain elements of both the “carrot” and the “stick” approach.

There are several methodological problems associated with attempting to determine with precision the rate of compliance with international

law—most basically, the fact that there may not be a clear divide between compliance and noncompliance. Many treaty provisions are worded in such a way that it is a matter of interpretation as to whether a particular party has complied with its obligations. It is not difficult to assess whether a state has or has not complied with an obligation to submit a report on its implementation of a human rights treaty, for example, but it may be more difficult to assess on the basis of that report whether the state has implemented the treaty fully, in both letter and spirit.

A notable feature of the system of international law over recent decades has been the growth in the number of international courts and courtlike bodies. Historically, states—or at least their decision-making elite—have been far from keen on the idea of being required to abide by the outcome of a third-party decision in relation to issues with high political stakes. The dispute resolution process within the World Trade Organization stands out because it is compulsory. Any member state that believes that another member has breached an agreement can initiate a case. The dispute is heard by a panel whose report is then adopted by the Dispute Resolution Body unless there is a consensus against adoption. Appeals are heard by an appellate body. Should a member not comply with the outcome of this process, retaliatory trade sanctions may be imposed. Despite the fact that a considerable proportion of trade disputes are settled informally, there is strong scholarly interest in the workings of the dispute resolution process because its establishment in an intergovernmental organization with such large membership is a historically significant development.

The two international courts with the greatest potential impact on world politics are the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

### *The International Court of Justice*

The ICJ is one of the principal organs of the UN. The ICJ can hear cases on any subject matter brought to the Court by states, so long as it finds that the states concerned have consented to the jurisdiction of the Court. Expressions of consent may have been open-ended or relate only to the case in question. The Court can issue an order for

provisional measures—the equivalent of an interim injunction—which are designed to protect the rights of parties during the period before the Court decides on the case itself. The Court has averaged less than three cases per year but has become increasingly busy in recent years. States have complied with the judgments of the Court in a majority of, though not all, contentious cases, but compliance with provisional measures has not been good. In its 2001 decision in the *LaGrand* Case, the Court confirmed that orders of the Court indicating provisional measures are binding. Should a party to a dispute heard by the Court not comply with the decision of the Court, the other party/parties may request the assistance of the Security Council in obtaining compliance. This would clearly politicize the question and would not be useful if the grievance were against one of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Council has never formally declared that it is acting to enforce a decision of the ICJ.

In addition to hearing contentious cases brought by states, the ICJ can respond to requests by certain bodies within the UN for advisory opinions. These are nonbinding responses to questions of law. Examples include the 1995 opinion on the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons and the 2003 opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory.

### *The International Criminal Court*

The establishment of the ICC in 1998 was one of the most momentous international law developments of the late 20th century. The ICC exercises jurisdiction over individuals who commit serious breaches of international law through the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity, and it will have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a definition of the crime has been agreed on. A key principle in the statute is that of complementarity; the ICC was not intended to replace national courts but to operate in situations in which states are either unable or unwilling to act. The ICC is set to have significant political impact, in large part because, despite its having jurisdiction over individuals rather than states, this necessarily gives rise to broader political implications. This is particularly evident in the

case of aggression. Aggression was included in the Statute of the ICC at the insistence of developing countries, but there was no agreement during the negotiations as to how aggression was to be defined. Historically, aggression has been considered a crime committed by states, but the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II declared that individuals were accountable for crimes against peace. It would be very difficult for the Court to find that an individual had committed the crime of aggression without passing judgment on the actions of the state in question.

The issue is similar in relation to the trigger mechanisms by which a case can be brought before the Court. A situation may be referred to the ICC Prosecutor by a state party or initiated by the prosecutor with the authorization of a pretrial chamber. In both these situations, the state in whose territory the conduct in question occurred or of which the person accused of the crime is a national must have given its consent. A situation can also be referred to the prosecutor by the Security Council, and if brought by this means, the Court will have jurisdiction even if the crime was committed in a nonstate party by a national of a nonstate party and in the absence of consent by the territorial state or the state of nationality of the accused. The United States has not become a party to the statute of the Court, one of its principal objections being that, contrary to the principle of state consent, the Court can hear a case against an individual whose country is not party to the statute. The United States did not, however, veto Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), which referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC despite Sudan being a nonparty to the statute. The first four situations referred to the Court were all African.

The ICC complements the work of national courts as well as other types of bodies, including criminal courts established on an ad hoc basis and truth and reconciliation commissions. Truth commissions have no prosecutorial powers and are not courts. They attempt to acknowledge and document a history of human rights abuses within a particular country or area—often those that took place under a regime, or during a period of turmoil or civil war—as a step toward healing wounds within that society. They represent a midpoint between a blanket amnesty for perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law



violations and formal criminal trial. More than 20 truth commissions have been established since 1970, including in Uganda, Nepal, and South Africa. Both a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a special court established jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN operated concurrently in Sierra Leone in the wake of its civil war. Other ad hoc tribunals include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Both Timor and Cambodia have hybrid courts in which criminal justice is being pursued through what can be understood as internationalized domestic courts.

### The Substantive Content of International Law

International law can be divided into a number of overlapping subfields or regimes. While this is useful as a way of classifying the vast and growing amount of international law, it should be remembered that any single material source may well have relevance to more than one of these fields. Enforcement methods vary between fields and in their mix of carrot and stick approaches.

#### *International Law and the Use of Force*

This field of international law specifies the circumstances under which a state may or may not use force against another state. One of the most striking features of the current system of international law is its incorporation of a general prohibition on the threat and use of force in interstate relations. The Covenant of the League of Nations attempted to delay and, if possible, avoid a state resorting to war, but the Charter of the UN goes further and permits states to use force only in self-defense or if authorized to do so by the Security Council. The Charter recognizes the inherent right of a state to self-defense if it is a victim of an armed attack. Having responded in self-defense, the state concerned is expected to report its actions to the Security Council, and it is assumed that the Security Council will then take appropriate action. Although the initial plan was for individual states to make military forces available to the UN, this has not occurred, and in practice, the Council authorizes others to use force on its behalf. What

had previously been regarded as the sovereign right of a state to choose to go to war in pursuit of its political objectives was removed by the Charter and in its place was established a system of collective security in which the whole international community is to work together to prevent, and respond to, threats to international peace and security.

The international law of the use of force is not so clear as to how states should respond to acts of violence by nonstate actors, including terrorists. Nor is it well equipped to deal with internal wars. The Charter of the UN upheld sovereignty as a fundamental principle of the international system; according to Article 2(7), the UN is not to interfere in the domestic affairs of states. While a strong affirmation of sovereignty is welcome from the perspective of a developing country being able to strengthen its position against external meddling in its political and economic affairs, it is less useful in safeguarding human rights. This raises the controversial question of the legality of humanitarian intervention. Although the vast majority of international lawyers would agree that humanitarian intervention authorized by the Security Council in response to a threat to international security is legal, only a few believe that contemporary international law permits unilateral acts of humanitarian intervention. Those who do believe that humanitarian intervention is not covered by the general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter generally seek support for their views in international customary law.

International legal scholarship in this field examines particular instances of the use of force to assess their legality and any likely possible impact on customary international law. In recent years, for example, a focus on the legality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) use of force during the Kosovo crisis was followed by debate regarding Operation Enduring Freedom as a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the scope for a state to justify the use of military force in response to a terrorist attack as a valid act of self-defense. Such debate was then overshadowed by the 2003 Iraq War, which most legal scholars deem to have been illegal. While the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia claimed to derive authority for their use of force from Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), the vast majority of international lawyers

question the assertion that Iraqi noncompliance with Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) could have reactivated the Council's authorization for the First Gulf War. Indeed, both the United States and the UK had written letters to the Council regarding Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002), in which they emphasized that any further Iraqi noncompliance would need to be considered again by the Council.

One of the criticisms most commonly leveled at international law within political science is its apparent inability to enforce rules, particularly those concerning the use of force, against the most powerful. This was a recognized weakness of the UN Charter from its earliest days. Security Council enforcement can ensure compliance on the part of less powerful states and those without an ally among the permanent members of the Council, but international law arguably relies on "carrots" to ensure the compliance of the most powerful. The illegality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq became so clear that, for example, it served to delegitimize and weaken international support for U.S. foreign policy.

### *International Economic Law*

International economic law (IEL) regulates international economic activity. While many aspects of international law have economic implications, IEL is generally understood as incorporating those legal regimes with the most direct economic consequences, such as the international law of trade, investment, currency, and finance. The growth of this field of international law is reflected in the establishment in 2008 of a Society of International Economic Law. International trade law is the most developed branch of IEL. The breakdown of the Doha Round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization and the associated turn to bilateral and regional trade negotiating processes is one of the most significant recent developments in IEL.

For many years, few other than the specialists kept track of what was happening in the periodic negotiating rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization. The protests at the 1999 ministerial meeting in Seattle marked a new era. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization have moved to enhance their accountability through increased transparency, and some

legal scholars are promoting the need to develop a body of international administrative law to address governance questions in intergovernmental institutions. IEL regulates multinational corporations only indirectly, and developing countries have since at least the 1970s called for more effective regulation of the behavior of multinational corporations, especially in relation to human rights and environmental matters.

### *International Environmental Law*

As a field of international law, international environmental law is relatively recent. Key global treaties include the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 1987 Montreal Protocol, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Climate change is arguably the most significant issue in international environmental law today, with considerable scholarly focus being directed toward the architecture of the post-Kyoto regime and the implications of climate change for other fields of international law, including the international law of human rights and the law of the sea.

There are clear implications of measures taken to protect the environment for international economic relations, and from the perspective of a developing country, this field of law has often been criticized for perpetuating Western colonial dominance. Where an environmental issue—such as ozone depletion—is of a truly global nature, developing countries have, however, found themselves in a stronger negotiating position and able to secure differentiated responsibilities. Types of differentiated responsibilities have included, *inter alia*, those that distinguish between industrial and developing countries with respect to the central obligations contained in the treaty and those addressing aspects of implementation, such as delayed compliance schedules, and financial and technological assistance.

### *The Law of the Sea*

This is a far older branch of international law and addresses all aspects of ocean use. Historically,

customary international law evolved to address navigation and fishing. One of the most fundamental principles in the law of the sea is that of the “freedom of the seas,” by which the oceans are a global commons available for use by all. Naval powers—the United States now as with the UK before it—emphasize the importance of this principle. Over time, however, coastal states have increased the extent of their regulatory reach into the oceans adjacent to their territory. The primary material source of international law on the oceans is the 1982 Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which entered into force in 1994 and sets out just who has what sort of rights in which parts of the ocean and seabed. It defines a number of zones, including those of the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone. The United States has not ratified the Convention but respects most of its provisions, which are also found in customary international law. Topical within the study of the law of the sea in recent years have been questions of maritime boundary determination, protection of fish stocks from over-fishing, delimiting the outer edge of the continental shelf, and maritime security. Climate change is raising new questions, including those relating to the melting of polar ice and the future of the maritime zones associated with states that may disappear as sea levels rise.

#### *International Human Rights Law*

International human rights law (IHRL) is concerned primarily with the protection of individuals from threats to their human rights stemming from the state. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights together make up what is informally referred to as the International Bill of Rights. There are a considerable number of more specific human rights treaties at a global level, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 2006 Convention on the Rights

of Persons with Disabilities. Global IHRL is complemented by many regional treaties.

Human rights law has traditionally assumed a distinction between public and private spheres of human activity and focused on the first of these to the detriment of those who suffer human rights abuses in the private sphere. Recent years have seen increased recognition within IHRL of the need to increase human rights accountability for corporations, international organizations, multilateral development banks, multinational peacekeeping operations, and individuals. Compliance mechanisms in IHRL often consist of a regularized collection of self-reported data, with review by an international committee. The number of human rights treaties continues to increase, but the focus has shifted to the need to work for better compliance with existing human rights treaties rather than their continued proliferation.

#### *International Humanitarian Law*

International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the international law of armed conflict, addresses human rights in wartime and thus overlaps with IHRL as well as with international criminal law. Traditional means of ensuring compliance with IHL include appeals by the International Committee of the Red Cross, prosecution before international tribunals, training programs in military academies, and condemnation by other states. The war on terror launched by the Bush administration gave extra vigor to debate regarding the relevance of IHL to conflicts involving fighters not representing states and a perceived need to rethink ways of ensuring respect for IHL. The increasing privatization of war has also raised questions regarding the IHL accountability of private security firms.

#### *International Criminal Law*

International criminal law (ICL) overlaps both IHRL and IHL as well as other fields such as the law of the sea—consider, for example, the crime of piracy. Transnational offences addressed by international criminal law include drug trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrime. Some actions are specified as international crimes in the relevant treaty. Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide states in that the Contracting Parties “confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.” Other treaties, including the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, do not explicitly describe the conduct in question as an international crime but require all parties to make the offence a crime in national law and/or to prosecute or extradite the alleged offender.

There is no agreed definition of terrorism in international law, but a number of counterterrorism conventions have been negotiated in response to particular forms and acts of terrorism. These include the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the 1998 UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the 2000 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Most counterterrorism conventions define the elements of the offence and incorporate provisions requiring the state in which an alleged offender is found to proceed with extradition or prosecution.

### **The Impact of International Law on the Behavior of States**

Amazing as it may seem to most international lawyers, political scientists are divided over whether international law does or does not influence the way in which states conduct their affairs, particularly as regards the “high-politics” issues of war versus peace and even in relation to “middle-range” political issues in which some degree of national interest is at stake. Fundamental questions concerning state behavior in relation to international law necessarily reflect broader theoretical positions regarding the relationship of international law to world politics. At the time when the discipline of international relations emerged after World War I, liberal internationalists painted a picture of the possibility of a world in which war was not inevitable and promoted international law and institutions as the way to achieve such a world. The idealists shared a moralistic, optimistic outlook on world affairs. The establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice could be regarded as embodiments of this idealist perspective. But as the inevitability of world war

became apparent in the late 1930s, Edward Hallett Carr spoke out against what by then appeared to be the utopian dreams of the liberal internationalists. In *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939*, Carr claimed that it is not that ethics and international law have no place in world politics but that the bottom line is always power.

World War II ushered in an era in which realism dominated the discipline. The United States has functioned as the hegemon of the international relations discipline since World War II, and in the United States, the discipline of international relations is firmly embedded in political science (rather than, e.g., history or philosophy). The leading postwar U.S. realist, Hans Morgenthau, had been disillusioned by the failure of international law to prevent World War II, and the focus of classical realism on power politics and national interest typically leaves little room for international law. Where realists do refer to international law, it is generally to downplay any independent influence of international law on the course of world politics. Realists believe that they deal with the world as it really is rather than as it ought to be.

The seeming mismatch between the hard-line approach of Cold War realism and the reality as lived by government international lawyers encouraged some lawyers to seek to demonstrate that international law did have a real-world impact. One approach was to recount the experiences of foreign policy legal advisers. It appears that there is a wide range of experiences here, from being intimately involved in the decision-making process, as was the case in the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to not even being consulted before a major policy decision with legal ramifications is taken. The role of foreign policy legal advisers can be characterized as generally being that of a neutral professional when first asked for advice on the legality of a proposed course of action, with that role shifting to one of a policy advocate once a policy decision has been taken.

Another approach toward demonstrating the relevance of international law was to speak in terms of the “functions” or “roles” of international law. U.S. scholars tended to focus on crisis situations, at which times international law was shown to be valuable in choosing between and legitimizing policy options and in providing language and institutions through which the parties

could communicate with each other. Hedley Bull, associated with the so-called English School of International Relations, believed that despite the anarchical nature of the international system, there is such a thing as international society. According to Bull (1994), international law serves to identify the idea of a society of sovereign states, state the basic rules of coexistence, and help mobilize compliance with the rules of international society. International lawyers, and those international relations scholars with an interest in international law, have generally not needed to justify their respect for international law as much in the UK and Europe as in the United States.

Regime theory flourished in the United States and elsewhere in the 1980s and early 1990s. Regime theory began as an approach to analyzing processes of international cooperation that may or may not incorporate a formal organizational structure of which the particular focus of much research was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Recognizing that intangibles are integral to processes of formalized and less formal processes of international cooperation, regime theorists referred to norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures. The fact that international regimes are generally founded by multilateral treaty opened up possibilities for interdisciplinary cooperation, although there is no single regime theory approach to international law because the regime vehicle has been used by theorists across the spectrum, including those of an essentially realist persuasion.

The primary ongoing use of regime theory is in relation to questions of regime design and effectiveness in the study of environmental cooperation. Even perfect compliance may not mean that a treaty is effective if the provisions it contains are inadequate to meet the objectives for which it was established. It is generally accepted, for example, that even if all parties were to fully comply with their Kyoto commitments, the emissions reduction targets in the treaty were inadequate to make a significant impact on the problem. Names associated with regime theory include Kenneth Abbott, Stephen Krasner, Duncan Snidal, Volker Rittberger, Jørgen Wettestad, and Oran Young.

From the perspective of those who view international law as a largely coherent system of law, much of the international relations literature that does recognize norms—including within a regime

framework—remains inadequate because it does not attempt to distinguish a legal norm from any other norm. In 2000, a special issue of the U.S. journal *International Organization* presented a framework within which to analyze “legalization,” the increasing amount of law evident in international institutions and process. Current research questions on legalization include those of its causes and consequences and why it is that governments favor legalization in some institutions, issue areas, and regions more than in others. Europe, for example, is much more highly legalized than some other regions of the world.

In recent years, scholarship on the political functioning of international law has been influenced by constructivism. Although, as with realism and liberalism, there are many variants of constructivism, they share a perspective on norms and identity as central to the social and political sphere. Constructivists break down the divide between social structures and agency, regarding structure as being continually recreated by agency, just as norms create identity and expectations. Constructivists acknowledge the interrelationship between international law and world politics. They do not deny the functions of international law as identified by liberals but more consciously point to international law as having a socially constitutive function.

### **The Global Distribution of Power and Attitudes Toward International Law**

Many of the most ardent advocates of international law have been inspired by the ideal of a rule of law functioning in the international sphere to the benefit of all states and people. Given the increasing scope and complexity of international law in the early years of the 21st century, it is thus timely to consider the attitude toward international law of those most and least powerful in the international political system.

#### *Developing Countries and International Law*

The rapid process of decolonization resulted in many new states joining the system of international law as political and legal entities in their own right. Acutely aware that their formal legal equality as sovereign states did not equate with

economic equality, these states in the 1970s launched a campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO agenda included recognition of the right of every country to adopt the economic and social system that it deems most appropriate for its own development, full permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural resources and all economic activities, and the regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational corporations. The campaign failed, although a number of its elements have resurfaced in other contexts. Developing countries are finding new levels of negotiating weight in areas in which their consent and participation are essential to the industrialized world, including in global environmental regimes. Although they have not yet been able to steer the international economic agenda in the direction that they would like it to go, developing countries are now more able to recognize the implications and resist some of the demands of the developed world. It is, nevertheless, necessary to distinguish among developing countries. While the leading developing countries are increasingly becoming active participants in international dispute resolution bodies and in the development of new legal regimes, the least developed simply do not have the legal expertise and financial resources at their disposal to play a full role in international law.

There remains a clear North American and European dominance in international legal scholarship, but there have been a number of influential international lawyers who have voiced a developing world perspective on international law. Most of these scholars prefer to retain the term *Third World*. Some of those who established a strong tradition of Third World scholarship on international law include Georges Abi-Saab, Francisco Garcia-Amador, R. P. Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, and Taslim Elias. In recent years, a number of scholars, including Anthony Anghie, B. S. Chimni, Makau Mutua, and B. Rajagopal, have self-identified their work as TWAIL or Third World Approaches to International Law. They have been influenced by postcolonial theory and critical approaches to international law and have contributed to reinvigorated interest in the history of the discipline and its subject matter. TWAIL scholars have emphasized that colonialism was not simply an unfortunate episode in the history of

international law but rather constitutive of international law and that international law cannot be separated from its colonial past.

### *The United States and International Law*

The United States played a leading role in establishing most of the key institutions that make up the contemporary international order, including those of the UN, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. From 2001 to 2009, under President George W. Bush, the United States came under considerable criticism for what was seen as an increased tendency toward unilateralism and associated decline in support for international law and institutions. Evidence for this charge included U.S. failure to support the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Some practices of the United States for which it came under criticism, such as that of ratifying human rights treaties only to the extent that their provisions corresponded with rights already existing within the U.S. legal system, were not new to the Bush administration. President Barack Obama, elected to office in 2008, recognized that his administration would need to work hard to restore the reputation of the United States so far as its commitment to international law and institutions was concerned. To further this goal, at the time of this writing, the Obama administration was seeking Senate approval for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

### *Europe and International Law*

Europe was the birthplace of modern international law. During the administration of George W. Bush, some observers contrasted what appeared to be strong European support for international law with the more instrumentalist approach of the United States. The United States was accused of using international law as a tool when it chose to do so, without lending its weight to strengthening universal support for human rights and respect for the international rule of law as something far greater than a U.S. policy tool. The allegedly undesirable U.S. attitude toward international law can be seen reflected in several strands of U.S. scholarship, including recent applications to international

law of rational choice and game theory that purport to prove that international law serves as no more than a weak exogenous constraint on state action. And yet, if the U.S. attitude is attributable to its position of hegemony, so could European attitudes be interpreted as a product of relative power. From this perspective, Europe has been determined to shore up its moral and legal weight because it is unable to match the United States in terms of sheer military and economic muscle. Setting aside transatlantic tensions, it cannot be denied that the European Union has a highly effective legal system and the most highly developed system of human rights protection in the world and that Europe remains a bastion of intellectual support for an international law that purports to be of universal value.

#### *China and International Law*

With its rising power, China and its attitude toward international law are subjects of increasing interest and speculation. In common with most developing countries, China places greater emphasis on sovereignty than does the rhetoric of Western liberal democracy, but China has nevertheless been supportive of multilateralism and collective security. Some critical commentators see China as drawing on its dual identities of major power and developing country to accept many of the benefits of its increasing economic weight without an associated cost. Cynics also suggest that the apparent commitment of China to multilateralism may be a function of its relative power, a strategy to be pursued until China's position in the international order is such that it can operate unilaterally if it so chooses. And yet, particularly given that nondemocratic countries are generally assumed less likely than democratic countries to uphold international law, China's attitude toward international law and the extent of its integration into the international system have been noteworthy.

#### **Increasing Complexity and Possible Fragmentation of International Law**

International law is transforming from a minimalist body of law addressing selected aspects of interstate relations toward a much more dense web of law affecting all aspects and levels of governance and under increasing pressure to tackle issues of

normative and institutional hierarchy. Some fields of international law, notably IHRL, do not seek to regulate the external conduct of states but set standards for the internal functioning of states, and international law is thereby permeating domestic legal systems to an increasing degree. The growth in the number of international courts and courtlike bodies is creating the potential for states to “forum shop” as well as for competition between legal regimes. Tensions between, for example, international trade and human rights or the environment may be exacerbated by the degree to which the state's actions in one of the regimes in question—in this case, trade—are subjected to third-party dispute resolution.

One contemporary approach to international law and its place within world politics that is arguably responding to the growing complexity and centrality to world politics of international law is that of international constitutionalism. Writers on international constitutionalism have in common the use of constitutional language derived from the domestic context to interpret the growing complexity of the contemporary system of international law and its constituent regimes. While the language of constitution has long been used within international law—the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention has often been referred to as a “constitution for the oceans,” for example—the constitutional metaphor is now being employed much more tightly and, in many cases, with a more clearly normative agenda.

Theorists differ as to the extent to which international law is able to function independently of the international distribution of power, but few, if any, would claim that it could disengage completely from fundamental geopolitical shifts in the balance of power. This suggests that with the rise of Asia, including China and India, international law is set to undergo further significant change in the 21st century.

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*See also* Compliance; Constructivism in International Relations; Idealism in International Relations; International Organizations; International Regimes; International Society; Liberalism in International Relations; United Nations

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## INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)

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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a voluntary organization of 187 member countries that operates as a major multilateral institution. Its goals include promoting international monetary cooperation and stability of the exchange rate, thus aiding the expansion of international trade and economic well-being of its member states.

In March 2010, the European Union decided that there might be a need to call the IMF in case one of the members of the eurozone needed financial assistance. In July 2007, less than 3 years before Dominique Strauss-Kahn was appointed managing director of the IMF, the institution had fallen into disrepute and was widely regarded as almost useless; indeed, the primary task of the new managing director seemed to be to cut costs and reduce personnel. There appeared to be no role, in the new world of “great moderation” of the early 21st century, for an institution that had been created in 1944 to police exchange rates and that had progressively become the firefighter and police officer of international financial crises. The global financial crisis that had started as a U.S. banking crisis only weeks before Strauss-Kahn took office radically changed the outlook: Not only was the IMF needed again for emergency lending to countries faced with sudden liquidity shortages, this time mostly in Europe, but its expertise was widely sought in determining the extent of damage in the global banking sector, helping with fiscal consolidation plans in the worst hit economies, and elaborating reform proposals under the mandate of the newly created G20. Just as in the aftermath of each international financial crisis, the IMF is alive and back in business—but in a different business. This entry describes the complex evolution of the IMF,



first examining the role of the Washington Consensus and taking into account the 2008–2009 crisis and then investigating the problems that are at stake for the institution.

### Structure and Governance

The IMF was created, along with the World Bank, at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, only weeks after the landing of allied troops in Normandy. It was initially conceived as the cornerstone of the international monetary system of fixed exchange rates that was to be instituted in the aftermath of World War II. The consensus among the Allied forces at that time was that a fixed exchange rate system was needed to prevent the reappearance of the kind of “competitive devaluation” and other beggar-thy-neighbor policies that had prevailed as reactions to the financial crisis of 1929 and were then widely regarded as having played a major part in the depth and length of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The initial British plan, put forth by John Maynard Keynes, was to institute a world exchange system based on a new world liquidity instrument, the *bancor*, which would be issued and managed by a genuine world central bank. This plan had been rejected by the U.S. delegation which favored the so-called gold exchange standard: All currencies have to be convertible and have a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, which by itself is convertible into gold at a fixed parity of \$35 (U.S.) per ounce.

In December 1945, when the first Articles of Agreement were signed, the IMF counted 29 member countries. Membership progressively expanded to 187 countries in 2010. Its main governing body is the Board of Governors, which meets once a year, where all member countries are represented by a governor, who is usually the head of the central bank. Most executive tasks are, however, delegated to the executive board, which comprises 24 members. Only large economies have their own representative, the others being distributed in regional groups and electing representatives. In both boards, voting rights are distributed unevenly in broad accordance with relative weights in the world economy (see the last section of this entry). As of August 2010, eight countries had their own representatives in the Executive Board: The percentage of voting rights for the United

States of America is 16.74; Japan, 6.01; Germany, 5.87; France, 4.85; the United Kingdom (UK), 4.85; China, 3.65; Saudi Arabia, 3.16; and the Russian Federation, 2.69. The least represented region is sub-Saharan Africa, with only two representatives for 43 countries and a total of 4.35% of voting rights.

### From Surveillance to Structural Adjustment

In the original Bretton Woods system, the role of the IMF was essentially one of macroeconomic surveillance: making sure that countries with—partially—convertible currencies (i.e., essentially developed countries of the West and Japan) were managing their economies in a manner broadly in line with the requirements of a fixed exchange rate system—that is, maintaining balance-of-payments disequilibria within reasonable limits in a world of strictly limited and state-controlled international capital movements. In principle, the IMF also had to ensure that enough international liquidity is provided, but in practice, this role was taken over by the United States, which issues the international reserve currency and holds a blocking minority share in the qualified-majority voting mechanism of the Fund. In 1969, the creation of a new reserve instrument, the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), was supposed to give the Fund more leeway. This was initially limited by the U.S. opposition and later became defunct because of the relative abundance and autonomy of international liquidity in the world of global finance in the 1990s. The SDRs were in fact never really used on a significant scale. There were two major allocations of SDRs: In August 2009, a general allocation of 161.2 billion was made to all member countries, and in September, a special allocation was made to members who had joined after 1981 and who had not benefited from the previous allocations. As of August 2010, the total amount of SDRs allocated amounted to 204.1 billion, equivalent to approximately \$317 billion (U.S.).

Until the end of the Bretton Woods era (symbolically proclaimed in August 1971 by U.S. President Richard Nixon, who officially suspended the dollar convertibility into gold), the IMF was thus largely confined to making sure that exchange rate adjustments by members would remain infrequent and not too large and that balance-of-payments disequilibria were not excessive, at least

outside the United States. It did intervene in a few European countries—most visibly Italy and the UK in 1977—to provide liquidity and assistance in cases of serious difficulties and to gain access to international, private financing. The Jamaica Agreements, in 1976, sealed the end of the Bretton Woods era, by officially admitting the plurality of exchange rate regimes and eliminating gold as a reference in the international monetary system. By the same token, these agreements signaled the weakening of the IMF.

The irresistible rise in international short-term capital flows and international lending, consequent to the generalized floating exchange rate system and to the external-accounts surpluses generated by the first oil shock in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries, led to a first wave of sovereign borrowing during the second half of the 1970s, mostly in Latin America, which was then widely regarded as the promised land of economic growth. After the U-turn in U.S. monetary policy in 1979–1981, under Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, to fight two-digit domestic inflation and the second oil shock, Mexico defaulted on its foreign loans in August 1982, thereby signaling the start of a long series of external debt crises. The IMF did not play a major role in the resolution of these crises—the U.S. Treasury acted almost unilaterally to solve a problem that primarily concerned U.S. commercial banks—but emergency lending to distressed sovereign borrowers and technical assistance for adjustment plans became a part and parcel of the IMF's new role in international finance.

### The Washington Consensus in Question

One of the major tasks of the IMF was to counsel governments in countries needing structural economic reforms. After the introduction of reforms and the collapse of the Soviet economy, the consequent transition of former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe provided the Fund's teams with a king-size experiment to elaborate and test ambitious and wide-ranging transformation and adjustment plans that would soon become known as the Washington Consensus: a cocktail of structural reforms usually involving tax reforms, public employment reduction, cuts in social expenditures, privatizations and liberalization

of external financial transactions, and standard predicaments for macroeconomic adjustment—fiscal consolidation and tight monetary policy.

The massive privatization movement that ensued in the first half of the 1990s fueled the expansion and globalization of financial markets along with the rise of private borrowing. In parallel, many countries had been moving away from floating exchange rates, which had proved to be a source of instability rather than being the means of national monetary sovereignty. Pegging the exchange rate to a foreign currency became the norm again, not only in Europe but also in Asia and Latin America. This environment led to overconfidence and indeed to excessive reliance on external financing in many countries. The second Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997, soon followed by the Russian and Latin American crises, led the IMF to further increase lending facilities and provided a large-scale experiment for its structural adjustment plans. The social and political costs incurred by national governments, together with the severity of the subsequent recessions, aroused strong criticism of the doctrine on which IMF interventions were based and forced most emerging economies to turn away from external financing. Instead, with policies of pegging their currencies with an undervalued exchange rate, they aimed at external surpluses and foreign exchange reserve accumulation and tried to build regional banks to free themselves from the tutorship of the Fund and rely on a form of “self-insurance.”

### From Lending to the Poor to Lending to the Rich?

The global crisis of 2008 to 2009 radically changed the outlook. The G20 took over global leadership as of November 2008 and had to rely on existing institutions for expertise and for conducting rescue operations for the worst hit economies. Hence, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the IMF regained influence, even though their legitimacy could be questioned, not least by the large emerging economies. The IMF became the promoter of coordinated fiscal stimulus plans to prevent generalized deflation and depression; it moved further in the direction of nonorthodox predicaments by advocating a light-handed approach to fiscal consolidation in the

aftermath of the crisis, both by pressing governments not to start consolidating too early, which might destroy the fragile recovery, and by suggesting that central banks accept slightly higher inflation targets to ease fiscal adjustment.

In April 2009, at the London Summit of the G20, reforms were announced in diverse areas such as surveillance and monitoring of global financial risks, transparency and the fight against tax havens, and emergency interventions for financially distressed economies, most particularly in Europe. For this purpose, the decision was made to increase the Fund's lending capacity to U.S.\$750 billion. Half of this additional funding came from EU countries, and it was soon to be drawn on by other European countries—both from the EU (Hungary, Estonia, and Romania) and from outside the EU (Iceland). Though a few poor countries did get aid from the IMF, it clearly appeared that the larger lending facilities had been designed to help relatively rich countries and incidentally to help the EU Commission and national governments to restore macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline in economies that had very close links with the core of the EU—that is, the eurozone. In doing so, the IMF also reasserted the structural adjustment plans that had characterized the Washington Consensus, though with apparently greater care for social expenditures. And in March 2010, when the Greek public debt crisis reached a climax, the EU leaders could not agree on a bail-out plan unless the IMF were part of the lending-of-last-resort mechanism, the German government counting on its expertise and the severity of its predicaments to impose discipline on the Greek government or indeed any eurozone member that might, later on, fall victim to speculative attacks on purportedly unsustainable debt.

### **A New Role in Preventing Financial Instability**

Solving the current crisis, which had started in 2008, is only a part of the renewed mandate of the IMF; preventing future ones by reforming international financial governance has also been set high on the G20 agenda, and the IMF is, along with the Basel Committee and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)—the coordination institutions for major central banks and the major source of

the prudential regulation doctrine for commercial banking—a major actor in the new global effort to reduce systemic risk. Thus, the Forum for Financial Stability, a coordination committee within the Fund, has been turned into a full-fledged and permanent Council of Financial Stability, with a mandate to monitor global financial developments and issue early warning signals in case of perceived mounting imbalances and excessive risk accumulation. And the IMF has been entrusted with the mission to study new instruments of banking regulation, including taxation on risk taking, and possible limitations on the free movement of capital, at least for short-term, speculative capital flows. This could clearly yield a radical change in financial globalization. But how far will national governments be willing to go?

### **Which Legitimacy?**

One of the major weaknesses of the IMF lies in its own governance structure and is apparent in its highest ranking officials: Traditionally, while the Chairman of the World Bank is a U.S. citizen, the General Director of the IMF is a European. This dominance of Europe is even reinforced in the current top-ranking management by the fact that, alongside Strauss-Kahn, the chief economist is Olivier Blanchard, a French-born professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This governance structure itself reflects the distribution of capital and voting rights among member countries. Initially justified by the overwhelming domination of the United States and the European economies in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the country-wise distribution is increasingly being contested, especially by large emerging economies. The latest reform, implemented in 2006, redistributed about 5.4% of voting rights to the benefit of 54 countries; among those who have gained the most are China, Korea, Brazil, and Turkey. However, the United States still possesses nearly 17% of voting rights, which amounts to a veto power, and the EU countries, taken together, have about 32% of voting rights, whereas China has only 3.65%, India 1.89%, and Brazil 1.38%.

At the G20 summit of April 2009, it was decided to reallocate 5% of voting rights. Yet this would not suffice to yield a system of representation more in line with economic and financial

weights of countries in the global economy. This very slow change in the IMF governance and practices may well be a major factor in the current acceleration of regional plans, especially in Asia, to organize monetary and financial stability independently of worldwide institutions that appear to be too closely controlled by Western countries. The pending and highly sensitive issue of exchange rates among major international currencies and the evolutions required to facilitate the return to a more balanced international economy still makes the task of the IMF more complex and further weakens the legitimacy of its current governance.

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*See also* Central Banks; International Political Economy; Multilateralism; World Bank

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national and international politics. In general, organizations exhibit higher levels of goal specificity and formalization than other types of collectivities, such as social movements, informal networks, or more or less diffuse communities.

There are many different types of IOs. The main distinction is between the IOs constituted by states and those that are constituted by other actors. The former are known as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and the latter as international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs or sometimes simply NGOs). Some INGOs have individual members, some have a combination of individuals and locally or nationally organized groups as members, and some are umbrella organizations for national nongovernmental organizations.

IGOs have several formal characteristics in common. Since they are established by governments, they have a formal document serving as their “constitution”—usually a formal treaty in line with requisitions in international law. Moreover, they usually have headquarters with permanent staff, regular meetings of representatives of member states, and rules for decision making and other organizational processes. IGOs also differ in important respects, such as competence and membership. Membership is open to all countries or restricted according to geographical, functional, or other criteria. Competence can be wide, covering a broad range of issues, or restricted to a narrow domain.

The category of INGOs is often subdivided into profit- and nonprofit-oriented organizations. Profit-oriented organizations are mostly multinational companies, such as Nike or Shell Oil Company, or various kinds of business organizations representing such companies directly or indirectly, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Nonprofit organizations cover wide areas of specific group interests, such as Disabled Peoples' International (DPI), or promote core values, such as peace, human rights (e.g., Amnesty International), and environmental protection (e.g., World Wildlife Federation [WWF]).

This entry, unless otherwise stated, focuses exclusively on IGOs. A final section, though, is devoted to INGOs. In the following two sections, brief overviews of the historical development of IGOs and the study of IGOs are provided. Subsequent sections examine in some depth three

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## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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International organizations (IOs) have three defining features: (1) they are constituted by members from more than one state, usually more than two; (2) they are oriented toward the pursuit of common goals, at least initially; and (3) they have a certain level of explicit formal structure, usually established by a treaty or constituent document. IOs are material entities, usually with offices and personnel. In most cases, they have a legal personality, and thus, they can function as actors in

aspects of IOs and institutions that have been particularly prominent in international relations (IR) research: Why are IOs established? What do they do? What impact do they have?

### The IGO System: Patterns of Development

International cooperation has taken place as long as states have existed, but the first institution that met the conventional defining characteristics of an IGO was the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR), which was established in 1815. Another 4 decades would pass before the next IGO was established, for the river Donau. The Industrial Revolution and the increase in various forms of communication and transaction across borders led to a more rapid increase from the 1860s. Most of these organizations were established to solve well-defined coordination challenges. Examples include the International Telegraphic Bureau (later International Telegraphic Union), established in 1868; the General Postal Union (later Universal Postal Union), established in 1874; and the International Bureau of Weight and Measures, established in 1875. More than two thirds of the IGOs established before World War I dealt with technical coordination and/or economic activities. Since the end of World War II, growth has been higher for IGOs operating within social and cultural domains. The two world wars reduced the population of the IGOs to some extent, but the first decade or two following the peace settlements saw particularly high growth rates. As the total number of IGOs has increased, the average organization has become more specialized in functional terms and more narrow in terms of its membership base. According to Cheryl Shanks, Harold Jacobson, and Jeffery Kaplan (1996) the involvement in the activities of IGOs differs substantially: “Older” states tend to participate more than

“young” ones, rich states more than poor, democracies more than authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, and large countries more than small.

Describing the development of the IGO “population” in numbers is a less straightforward task than one might think. The reason is simply that numbers depend on the precise definition applied. For example, some overviews include only organizations established directly by governments while others also include organizations created by one or more IGOs. The authoritative source is the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, which is published by the Union of International Associations. Table 1 is based on this database and applies this definition.

The total number of IGOs also includes organizations that are created by other IGOs. Shanks et al. (1996) found that these emanations constituted 70% of the total IGO population in the early 1990s, thus bringing the total number up to more than 1,100. The legal status of IGOs that are created by other IGOs is not very clear. New rules were defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations (VCLTIO), which opened for signature in 1986. At the time of writing, this convention is not yet in force. Questions about their legal status notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that this type of IGO also plays an important role in international relations.

The development of IGOs has been driven partly by changes in the fabric of the international system itself. Two aspects seem particularly important: (1) changes in networks of interdependence and (2) increase in the number of states.

In essence, cooperation is an effort to manage *interdependence*. The more sensitive or vulnerable one actor is to the activities of others, the stronger its incentives to try to influence their behavior. For

**Table 1** Number of International Organizations

Year	1909	1956	1985	1995	2005
IGO	37	132	378	266	246
INGO	176	973	4,676	5,121	7,306

Source: *Yearbook of International Organizations*, <http://www.uia.org>. Numbers for 1909 to 1995 are taken from <http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/ytb299.php> (accessed December 1, 2010). Numbers for 2005 are taken from the 2005/2006 yearbook edition, Appendix 3, Table 1, p. 2966.

cooperation to emerge, this interest must be mutual so that both (all) parties see some possibility of improving outcomes by exchanging commitments with prospective partners. Taken together, these observations suggest that the scope and level of cooperation will reflect the strength and configuration of interdependence relationships.

This is a complex hypothesis, and previous research provides only partial tests. In bivariate analysis, conventional measures of interdependence—such as volumes of international trade, investment, and several forms of communication—correlate positively with the number of IGOs. Results are, however, sensitive to the choice of operational definitions of the key variables. The best “fit” is achieved when we link interdependence measured in terms of *absolute* volumes of transactions to the *total* IGO population, including also emanations. However, the basic argument refers to sensitivity and vulnerability, and these are concepts pointing toward *relative* measures of interdependence. Thus, a country’s sensitivity to external economic events is primarily a function of the importance of foreign trade to its national income (measured as foreign trade in proportion to gross domestic product [GDP]). When we replace absolute with relative measures, we find that the population of IGOs has grown at a much higher rate than the level of interdependence. Moreover, the argument linking interdependence to organizations puts as much weight on *configurations* of interdependence as on aggregate volumes of transactions. A survey of the case study literature would bring out many observations that support—at least indirectly—the latter proposition. As far as we know, however, no existing database provides the kind of data required for more extensive and refined testing. The upshot of all this is that while we may safely conclude that interdependence is a major factor generating incentives (*demand*) for cooperation, we cannot claim to understand equally well supply-side mechanisms and the interactive dynamics of the demand–supply relationship.

As the first shots were fired in World War I, the number of sovereign states had not yet reached 50. Today, there are about 200 such states. This increase can be expected to lead to more IGOs for at least two reasons. First, as the number of states increases, the average state is left with jurisdiction over a declining share of the world population and

world resources. This reduces its capacity to serve its people through purely unilateral measures. Second, as the number of actors increases, so does the number of potential partnerships. This effect is amplified by the fact that states that have recently escaped the rule of their former masters often are particularly eager to engage in cooperative ventures with new partners.

The development of the IGO system also seems to reflect changes in the fabric of national political systems as well. Two features seem particularly important. One is the expansion and upgrading of public policy in relatively “new” domains, such as social security and environmental protection. The other is the tendency for national administrative systems to become increasingly specialized and differentiated. The development of the IGO population, particularly over the second half of the 20th century, reflects both of these changes to a significant degree.

### The Study of IGOs

In the first decade or two after World War II, the United Nations (UN) became a special case of IOs as its universal membership and increasing scope of competences made it appear more important than any other IO. Its uniqueness and importance attracted scholars to conduct a number of studies of the internal functions of the UN, such as the voting patterns in the General Assembly and the recruitment of staff to the Secretariat. Pioneers in this field such as Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson studied IOs as bureaucracies with the aim of understanding the decision-making and other political processes taking place within the IOs. This approach provided quite sophisticated classifications of structural and functional aspects and much empirical insight into the work of IOs. It did not to the same degree generate testable propositions linking these taxonomies to variance in performance or impact.

Disillusioned by external developments—the failure of the UN Security Council to deal with pressing issues such as the nuclear arms race and the Vietnam War and occasional setbacks in major regional integration projects—and left with a research program that did not effectively get at the underlying causes of these difficulties, many scholars reoriented their agenda to move away from IGO structures and procedures toward institutions that were defined as

sets of rules and norms governing certain activities. The existence of formal organizations was, of course, recognized, but international regimes—defined by Stephen Krasner as the rules, norms, principles, and procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area—emerged as a new and more exciting topic. The interest in international institutions was also driven by a growing critique of the dominant grand theory in the study of international relations: realism. The new emphasis on institutions challenged a core assumption of realism. It did so in part by claiming that states may establish international institutions even if short-term self-interest would be better served by free riding and that these institutions tend to acquire a life of their own by influencing state behavior in their own right. It also did so by suggesting that nonstate actors could significantly influence government policies and outcomes of international processes.

Over the past 10 years or so, there has been a renewed interest in the study of IOs. The constructivist turn of much IR research has inspired some reformulation of the research agenda, highlighting, *inter alia*, the role of IOs as providers and custodians of norms and rules serving as frames of legitimacy for the behavior of states as well as groups and individuals. It has also led some to revisit “old” questions. For example, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore have studied the bureaucratic features of IOs in a somewhat different framework and succeeded in providing new insight into the importance of these features in shaping international politics more broadly.

The split between the study of organization and the study of regimes, though, is by no means total. Many scholars see regimes and organizations as two subgroups of international institutions. Moreover, in real life, organizations and regimes are often intertwined. Starting from the regime tradition, one could say that regimes are often served by organizations; starting from the IO tradition, one could say that organizations often play important roles in developing and managing regimes.

### Why and How Do States Establish IOs?

The institutional turn in studies of IOs made the study of international institutions an integral part of the study of international cooperation.

International institutions can help states solve common problems through coordinated action. The realist tradition has always pointed to the anarchical structure of the international system as compelling states to be deeply concerned about security and (relative) power. The international system was described as a self-help system where states have to be very cautious about getting involved in cooperative ventures that could benefit others more than themselves. Moreover, they will expect others to free ride as long as they can get away with it. Institutional theory challenges this understanding by, *inter alia*, pointing to institutional “services” that can reduce uncertainty and help parties negotiate as well as enforce agreements. An IO can, for example, help establish a base of consensual knowledge, facilitate negotiations, and develop operational standards against which performance can be measured and compliance monitored.

Research following this functional approach, first developed by Robert Keohane, has explored how different configurations of preferences can shape outcomes. Much interest has been devoted to the malignant configuration known as the prisoners’ dilemma game. If played only once, or a finite number of rounds known in advance, the dominant strategy for each party will be to defect. Evidence from experimental research indicates that individuals playing this game tend to cooperate more than static game theory predicts. Moreover, Robert Axelrod and others have used computational modeling to study the evolution of cooperation in reiterated games and found that certain strategies of conditional cooperation do better than strategies relying more primarily on defection. By acknowledging the political malignancy of certain configurations of interests and at the same time demonstrating how regimes and organizations can inspire and facilitate cooperation, research pursuing the “functional” approach helped bridge the gap between the realist school and the institutionalists. The role of IOs tends, though, to vary with the problem structure. Fortunately, many of the common challenges facing governments generate less malignant configurations than that constituting the prisoners’ dilemma game.

The realist tradition claims, in essence, that powerful states will create institutions that serve their interests. IOs that contradict the interests of

powerful states will either not be established or, if they are, have little or no impact. The hegemonic stability theory suggests that a “hegemon” is essential for the establishment of strong international institutions and IOs. A dominant actor will have a higher interest in the collective good in question and at the same time possess the capabilities to provide (much of) that good by unilateral action. Now, power defined as the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not have done can be exercised by various means. In the literature on international institutions, various forms of leadership have been discussed, such as structural leadership, where more general power resources are activated; intellectual leadership, where knowledge is activated in order to facilitate solutions to common problems; or entrepreneurial leadership, where the ability to identify solutions and find compromises is activated. All these various resources or abilities on behalf of individual actors can be important in establishing and maintaining international institutions.

Decision makers as well as students of international cooperation have long recognized that a base of consensual knowledge is a necessary condition for negotiations to succeed. The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC)—a formal IGO—was established to translate findings from scientific research into usable knowledge for policymakers. The work of the IPCC also illustrates how political conflict can threaten to contaminate such processes and how a combination of organizational design and leadership may provide fairly good protection.

More generally, cooperation often builds on a broadly accepted ideational foundation. IGOs and INGOs often play a role in disseminating causal and normative beliefs that shape the perceptions of international problems. In some cases, they may even contribute to the development of collective identities. Various mechanisms may be at work, but two examples are often in focus. First, an image of a common enemy might increase the actors’ perception of common interests and thus strengthen incentives for cooperation. Second, states engaged in cooperation might find themselves to be perceived as a model for others, an effect that might increase the self-confidence of the cooperating parties and lead to further cooperation. Even in the absence of such profound change, ideas can

make a significant difference. Particular attention has been given to the role of transnational networks of experts—often referred to as “epistemic communities”—in developing common problem descriptions and diagnoses, combined with ideas about effective “cures.”

### What Do IOs Do and How Do They Do It?

As pointed out at the beginning, IOs are created for some purpose—usually to achieve goals that their members find it hard to achieve (as effectively) on their own. More specifically, four roles have attracted particular attention.

One is the role of *providing an arena* for exchange of information, negotiation, and related processes. As an arena, an organization establishes a meeting place, specifies the activities to take place under its auspices, and provides rules regulating these activities. As arenas for exchange of information and ideas, IGOs, INGOs, and sometimes even informal networks often facilitate learning and other types of policy diffusion. Although IOs are not the only possible way to establish communication among parties, they have some characteristics that make them efficient in this respect. IOs have some degree of autonomy from the parties involved and can thus be seen as impartial. An IO serves as a place where the parties can meet on neutral ground for negotiations. A prominent example of this is how the secretary-general of the UN is assigned a role where he can offer conflicting parties the use of his “good offices.” In general, leaders of secretariats of IOs are often assigned the role of chairing international negotiations. This can imply a more active role than simply providing an arena for negotiations. The assumed impartiality and the expectation that secretariat leaders represent common interests of members make them suited for such assignments. The arena role of IOs makes it possible, at least to some extent, to regulate the access of actors to problems and the access of problems to decision games. And, finally, IOs serve as independent actors in specifying the official purpose as well as the rules, location, and timing of negotiations among the parties.

IOs not only serve as an arena for members to exchange information but also play an active role in providing information themselves. We can



distinguish between factual information about the world in general and about characteristics of the member countries, information about actors' behavior, and information that elucidate causal connections—that is, the potential effects of the IO's decisions. Many IOs serve as providers of all these kinds of information in their respective field. The importance of information is connected with the consequences of uncertainty in the relationship between states. Rational actors are assumed to behave purposively on the basis of the information available to them. Thus, the information actors possess about other actors' interests can be a critical determinant of their own behavior. The more information the IOs provide, the less likely it is that there will be misperception and misunderstanding among the member states.

The second aspect is the role of the IOs in creating decision-making rules that affect the subsequent outcome of the interaction of members or other actors. The formation of actors' interests is influenced by various constraints, which will be dealt with in the subsection on framing of decisions below. Here, the focus is on how actors' behaviors that enable them to realize given interests are influenced by constraints caused by decision rules. The decision rule is an important determinant of the capacity of the IO to aggregate divergent preferences. Other things being equal, aggregation capacity reaches its maximum in strictly hierarchical structures and is at its minimum in systems requiring agreement (unanimity). Decision rules in IGOs are affected by the anarchic structure of the international system and accompanying principle of the sovereignty of states. Since there is no formal authority that can enforce decisions, states are only committed to decisions they agree to. Thus, compared with lawmaking in national political systems, the role of international law in general is weak. Consensus is the most common decision-making rule in actual use in IGOs. It is also a very demanding decision rule, leaving the burden of proof with those who want new measures taken and giving a veto to any significant party that is opposed. The majority-voting rule produces more ambitious decisions, but it does so at the risk of more defection in the implementation stage.

In most IGOs, formal decision rules tend to favor small member states. This is most evident where unanimity or consensus is required and also

where decisions are made by voting based on the principle of one state, one vote (e.g., the UN General Assembly). Even where votes are weighted, the small will most often be overrepresented. In the EU Council, for example, votes are distributed so that 1 citizen of Luxembourg balances about 24 citizens of Germany. Now, Germany's voting power still trumps that of Luxembourg by a wide margin (29 to 4), and Germany leads by an even larger margin when it comes to power in basic games such as trade and investment. Moreover, if we look at the total population of IGOs, we will find that rich countries participate more than poor, large more than small, democratic states more than authoritarian, and old states more than young. In this respect, the IGO system reflects the social stratification of world society. Although originally made in a different context, Stein Rokkan's well-known observation that "votes count but resources decide" carries an important lesson about IGO politics as well.

The decision rule also influences the relationship between the IO and major powers. Unanimity is likely to produce compliance at a low cost, since the decisions will be self-enforcing compared with a situation where major powers would have to enforce the decision made in the IO. Although the formal decision rule is unanimity, the actual decision making in several IOs is of course influenced by the distribution of power among the members outside the IO. For instance, in the case of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), large producers such as Saudi Arabia can easily undermine most production decisions of the organization by unilateral market behavior. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia enjoys a stronger influence on OPEC decision than what follows from the one country one vote rule.

IOs are essential for creating rules and regulations for states' behavior in the international system. Sovereign states would be very reluctant to submit themselves to behavior rules if nobody else made similar commitments. When treaties or conventions are negotiated, they are normally subject to subsequent ratification by member states. When a certain number of states have ratified the treaty, it enters into force. This system ensures that the individual state that signs the treaty is only committed when a number of others join. IOs provide an efficient way to promote such

conditional cooperation among states in an anarchical system.

The third aspect is the role of IOs in establishing a common perception of problems and solutions. Decision making through negotiations among parties is heavily influenced by the way in which the actors think about their problem. The variation among parties in their perception of the situation, beliefs about their own and others' interests, and cognition of the world in general makes it harder to reach common solutions. In the short run, self-interested actors are influenced by constraints imposed on policy choices by agreed-on rules. In the long run, conceptions of self-interest may be reshaped as a result, in part, of practices engaged in over a period of time. An IO can influence the actors' perceptions of the situation surrounding their decisions; in other words, the organization can frame member states' decisions. International institutions can also play a role in the formation of interests and collective identity among members. An important premise for this aspect is the assumption that states' interests are not exogenously given but are endogenous to interaction among states.

Increased cooperative behavior might come about as a result of several different processes of identity formation performed by the IOs. First, there can be various intersubjective systemic structures consisting of shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge embedded in international institutions, in terms of which states define their identities and interests. Second, there are systemic processes in the external context of state action that lead to increased interdependence and also imply both an increase in the "dynamic density" of interactions and the emergence of a "common Other." This reduces states' ability to act unilaterally and increases the extent to which actors share a common fate and, thus, their willingness to form international institutions. Third, strategic behavioral practice has two effects on identities and interests: Through interaction, actors form identities by learning, which makes them see themselves as others do, and by engaging in cooperative behavior, an actor gradually changes its own beliefs about what it is, thus helping internalize the new identity.

The fourth aspect is the role of IOs in performing politics on behalf of its members. Volker Rittberger and Bernhard Zangl identify five types of IO operations: First, norms and rules usually

require further specification and codification to be implemented in practice. This is often done by the member states that have the potential for various interpretations of the practical consequences of the rules and regulations. In several cases, the IO takes responsibility for specifying the rules agreed to by the members. In the EU, this is a task often handled by the EU Commission, and in the World Bank, detailed plans for conditionality of various funds are left in the hands of the World Bank bureaucracy. Second, in a number of areas, the implementation of IO decisions is simply carried out by the IO itself. Several special agencies of the UN are entirely devoted to this kind of operative tasks, particularly in the field of economics and sociology, such as humanitarian relief and development aid, but also in security affairs, when the UN deploys peacekeeping forces. Third, when members themselves implement decisions, the need for independent monitoring arises, particularly to verify accusations of members' defection. Only with a reliable system of monitoring the other parties will the individual members implement their own commitments. This also has a positive feedback on their willingness to make credible commitments in the first place. In case of disagreement among members regarding their compliance, the IO can also perform a role in adjudication. Fourth, if monitoring and adjudication do not make members abide by the rules, sanctions will have to be imposed. These can take the form of verbal or written condemnation, economic sanctions, or the use of force. In many cases, it is the member states that have to exercise the sanctions, but in some cases, the IOs themselves can perform some of the sanctioning acts.

### Measuring and Explaining Effects

The importance of IGOs has long been a matter of some controversy in the study of international relations. Realists have consistently argued that IGOs reflect rather than shape configurations of state interests and power and therefore merit attention primarily as tools rather than actors. The fortune of an organization—and ultimately its survival—depends on the extent to which powerful members see it as serving their interests. A somewhat similar argument has been made by scholars inspired by Marxist notions of class conflict. Others, adopting what is often referred to as a

sociological approach, have argued that IOs and regimes can best be understood as embedded in, and in important respects also constituted by, normative “deep structures” of international society. A common denominator for all these lines of reasoning is the proposition that IOs grow out of, and therefore also reflect, some more fundamental and important structure of the international political system or international society. In the aggregate, and over the long haul, they may modify or reinforce the structures in which they are embedded, but overall, IOs can best be understood as “intervening” variables, reflecting at least as much as shaping the international system. Some organizations will be actively involved in international political processes, but few will, by their own weight, leave a distinct and significant imprint on important outcomes.

This pessimistic conclusion has been challenged by scholars working within an institutionalist framework. Grossly simplified, the essence of their arguments may be summarized as follows. First, for an IO to serve as a useful tool (“agent”), it will need some amount of independence from its “principals.” Rational principals understand this and will therefore grant that much autonomy. Second, even without the approval of its principals, an agent—for example, an international secretariat—will often succeed in obtaining some “slack.” This slack is likely to be largest for secretariats that work for a politically homogeneous group of members and that have been able to build up substantial expertise or possess other relevant resources. Moreover, an agent is likely to develop its own interpretation of its mission and base its behavior on that interpretation as long as it is not explicitly overruled. Third, over time, most organizations and regimes establish rules and develop practices into which participants—also representatives of member countries—will to some degree be enmeshed and socialized. As these structures and practices mature, they often acquire the status of default options or standard operating procedures.

Despite occasional skirmishes, a fairly broad consensus has emerged that there is at least some merit in all these propositions. A closer scrutiny will show that they, to some extent, refer to different dependent variables, different policy domains, or different causal mechanisms. The realist argument focuses on individual IOs as actors in “high politics” and measures importance mainly in terms

of the extent to which they influence state interests, the distribution of power, or the basic ordering principle of the international political system (anarchy). By this standard, the vast majority of IOs do indeed obtain a low score, particularly when compared with the great powers that occupy center stage in (neo)realist theory. The so-called functionalist theory focuses on the role of IOs in managing networks of international interdependence. Growing interdependence is seen as involving increasing sensitivity and vulnerability, which generates new demands for coordination and collaboration—first within “low-politics” domains such as trade and investment, transport and communication, labor market regulations, and health and environment. The IOs are established and designed to supply coordination services and facilitate collaboration. To the extent that they perform these functions effectively, organizations contribute to further development of interdependence networks, which in turn may generate new demands for IO services—in part, by changing domestic configurations of interests and influence.

Early functionalist theory sent an upbeat message that this dynamic interaction of demand and supply would eventually lead to the build-up of supranational systems of governance. Empirical evidence and refinement of causal models soon showed that there is nothing compelling about that trajectory; in fact, interactive feedback loops similar to those that generate momentum can also lead to cascading collapse. This does not imply that the basic mechanisms highlighted by (neo-)functionalist theory are not at work; rather, the main lesson seems to be that we are dealing with more complex systems, involving nonlinear relationships, conditional effects, and interplay. Finally, the sociological approach calls attention to IOs and INGOs as arenas for, and facilitators of, socialization and transnational diffusion of ideas and norms. Most studies examine the role of particular organizations in legitimizing or spreading a more or less well-defined set of ideas, but some take on the demanding challenge of determining the aggregate effect of the universe of organizations on complex macrolevel variables, such as world culture.

The best way to make sense of such diversity is to sort answers and propositions by the questions to which they refer. With a wide range of research

interests, this exercise will generate a fairly complex matrix. All we can offer here is a selective and brief overview, focusing on some of the effects that have been subject to extensive study. Although not explicitly used in much of the empirical literature, the distinction introduced earlier between organizations as arenas and organizations as actors may serve as a crude organizing device.

As pointed out in the previous section, IOs can serve as arenas for exchange of information and ideas between member states. Several studies indicate that organizations often enhance policy convergence even in the absence of formal agreement by exposing members to new information and ideas that lead to unilateral adjustments. Others find that individuals who participate actively in the work of an organization over an extended period of time tend to develop a stronger identification with the organization itself and its mission, norms, and values. The strength of this socialization function seems, though, to be moderate. A recent study found that even in a relatively powerful and prestigious bureaucracy (the European Commission), 39% of the staff members interviewed saw themselves as “very attached” to their own nation, while only 25% said the same about Europe. Moreover, socialization seems to leave the greatest impact on staff members recruited to the organization at an early and formative stage of their career before some other identity has been firmly established.

Research aimed at determining the importance of IGOs as actors has pursued two main strategies. One has focused on the capacity to act. Capacity has been defined in somewhat different terms, but most definitions point to at least two components—autonomy and resources. The interest in autonomy is premised on the assumption that independence from member states and other actors is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for influence. Autonomy is sometimes measured in terms of organizational properties such as decision-making procedures, the existence of a supranational bureaucracy, and the existence of some binding dispute settlement mechanism. One study combines these indicators in a 7-point ordinal scale and applies this index to a sample of 30 regional integration “arrangements.” Of their cases, 67% fall within the lower range (0–2) and only 17% within the upper range (4–6). Consistent with functionalist logic, economic interdependence

has a positive and significant effect on the autonomy of IGOs. Consistent with institutionalist arguments, IGOs tend to become more independent as they mature over time. Other studies measure autonomy in behavioral terms, in most cases by studying the role(s) played by specific bodies, in particular the secretariat. The most comprehensive study of international environmental regimes found that secretariats have little or no independence in 41% of the cases included. Another study reported that secretariats are confined to functions of office keeping, and information gathering and dissemination in nearly 60% of the cases included in their database. The main conclusion seems to be that a large majority of IGOs obtain a low or, at best, moderate score on structural as well as behavioral indicators of autonomy.

A survey of the resources of IGOs would show a very wide range of variance; the European Union (EU) and the International Whaling Commission clearly play in very different “leagues.” And they do so by resource endowments as well as constitutional design.

The other approach is more direct, trying to determine the actual influence of one or more IGOs on particular processes or outcomes. Much of this literature focuses on one or a few cases, most often one of the large and presumably important organizations (such as the UN, the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], or World Trade Organization [WTO]). A survey of this literature will first of all confirm that IGOs vary substantially in terms of what they achieve as well as how they operate. It will, however, also indicate certain patterns; for example, influence seems to vary with constitutional provisions, resource endowments, and “positive” interdependence among member states. It also provides interesting insights into the roles played by specific bodies or individual leaders. For example, secretariats can exert influence by performing quite different functions—ranging from contributions to the development of a base of consensual knowledge to high-profile political initiatives. The former do not make headlines but may over the long haul be as important. Even a “technical bureaucracy” can make a nontrivial difference by facilitating negotiations or monitoring performance.

The case study literature is rich in interesting observations and important insights, but most

refer to one or a few specific organizations or issues. Over the past 2 decades, an increasing number of studies have used large databases that provide a more solid basis for general conclusions. Many of these studies have examined the role of IGOs in managing conflict and fostering or maintaining peace. Findings sometimes diverge, but one may at least conclude that IGOs sometimes contribute significantly. Thus, one study, relying on data covering the period 1946 to 2000, found IGOs to be more successful than any other type of third party in mediating negotiated settlement of military disputes. While this study and several others concentrate on specific functions (such as mediation), others take a broader view and try to determine the overall contribution of IGOs to building or maintaining peace. Much of this research is inspired by Immanuel Kant's vision of "eternal peace," which identified three pillars, today often referred to as democracy, interdependence, and international law and organization. Overall, the findings from previous research support the propositions that democracy and interdependence are positively associated with peace, but results for IGOs vary—some are, in fact, negative. This has led some scholars to suggest that only certain types of IGOs enhance peace—notably, those that are composed largely of democratic states. A study published in 2006 finds robust support for this revised hypothesis. This finding points to a more conditional and less independent role for IGOs in fostering and maintaining peace; the main mechanism at work seems to be one of interplay in which "densely democratic" IGOs serve to amplify the positive impact of member state democracy.

Other studies indicate that there are more mechanisms at work linking IGOs to democratic political systems. States in transition to democracy tend to join IGOs at higher rates than any other group of states. Moreover, democratizing states show a strong preference for IGOs in which most other members are established democracies. Third, it seems that membership and active participation in such organizations tend to reduce the risk of backsliding. All this suggests that IGOs composed largely of established democracies can play a significant role in helping consolidate new and fragile democratic systems. And since relations among democracies are the most peaceful, contributions to consolidating new democratic systems can have

a positive, albeit marginal, and indirect effect on world peace. The EU is probably the most well-known example, but the basic proposition is supported also by large-*N* studies, indicating that there is a more general effect.

The research literature is less sanguine about the effect on established democracies of active involvement in the activities of IGOs. Several studies indicate that IGOs sometimes operate in ways that tend to enhance the influence of the executive branch, privilege technical and, in some cases, "scientific" expertise, and in other ways remove decision-making processes from arenas where the ordinary citizen can play an active role. Other studies have found that these effects are at least to some extent offset by other democracy-enhancing features, such as constraints on the power of domestic special interest groups and protection of individual rights. The latter effects seem to be most evident for countries that do not (yet) achieve top scores on democracy scales.

### International Nongovernmental Organizations

This entry has so far focused on IGOs. Much of the cooperation that takes place across borders is, however, initiated and conducted by individuals, voluntary associations, or other nongovernmental actors. Civil society seems as involved as governments in cooperative projects with partners in other countries. To develop and manage such areas of cooperation, they often establish international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), or transnational organizations (TNOs). The UN Economic and Social Council (UNECOSOC) considers all organizations that are not established through formal agreement between or among governments as nongovernmental. Most of the research literature has adopted a more narrow definition requiring that a majority of the members be private parties. Today, INGOs outnumber IGOs by a wide margin, and the growth rate is higher in the nongovernmental sphere. To be sure, most INGOs have small budgets, limited staff, and little or no political influence. But others are impressive organizational complexes. The Catholic Church counts more than a billion "members." Several humanitarian organizations have billion-euro budgets and thousands of employees. Taken together, the 200

largest transnational companies account for about one fourth of the world production of commercial goods and services. In multiple ways, TNOs can indeed be important actors.

In international relations research, INGOs have been studied particularly in their performance of three different functions. One is that of managing activities that most governments do not consider public policy domains. For example, while governments accept overall responsibility for law and order, few, if any, see this responsibility as involving a duty to establish and enforce internal rules for particular sports or proclaim and interpret principles of religious faith. Within the arena of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), most governments would see the production and distribution of private goods as activities to be undertaken mainly by the private sector (albeit subject to public regulation). Another function performed by many INGOs is that of advocacy, including activities ranging from high-publicity campaigns to confidential lobbying. Third, some INGOs engage in activities for which most governments accept at least some responsibility. Most important is the area of humanitarian assistance, but INGOs are involved also in what might be called private regulation—most often in the form of standard setting, “enforced” by mobilizing the market power of concerned customers or through public naming-and-shaming campaigns.

Although often studied as different from IGOs, important propositions from research focusing on IGOs apply also to INGOs. Both merit attention as arenas as well as actors. Patterns of growth are strongly correlated (about .80, depending on the exact specification of the model). So are patterns of participation; in fact, INGOs tend to be even more dominated by wealthy and liberal democracies. For both types of organizations, autonomy, resources, and leadership are important determinants of influence. And although INGOs often make headlines by criticizing or opposing governments, relationships are often friendly and supportive. Thus, for many humanitarian organizations, grants from governments and IGOs constitute important sources of income. And in many campaigns, INGOs, governments, and IGOs work side by side—for as well as against a particular cause.

Social science research often portrays (I)NGOs rooted in civil society as, overall, a positive transformative force. At least three more specific propositions to that effect can be found in the research literature. One suggests that TNOs by and large tend to have more democratic internal structures and procedures than their IGO counterparts, providing individual members better opportunities for active participation and real influence. This observation is no doubt true for a number of INGOs, though not for all. The aggregate effect will, however, depend also on who exactly are empowered through these organizations. Even an organization with a perfectly democratic internal structure may speak for only a small fragment of civil society. And as far as it can be determined, the social stratification of world society is reflected as clearly in the nongovernmental sphere as within the IGO system. A second proposition sees transnational cooperation as a worldwide mobilization of concerned citizens in defense of universal values (such as basic human rights) or profoundly important collective goods (such as nature’s life support systems). Again, it is easy to identify a number of INGOs that fit this description well. Yet if one looks at aggregate figures, one will also find that the largest group of TNOs consists of those that are established to serve interests related to economic activities. Finally, some scholars, notably John Boli and George Thomas, have suggested that organized transnational cooperation serves, in the aggregate, as a transformative force shaping a new world culture characterized by more inclusive identities (“world citizen”) and widespread acceptance of reason and voluntarism as fundamental pillars of authority. This is a bold and interesting hypothesis, but at this point, it seems prudent to postpone judgment until more comprehensive and solid evidence becomes available.

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*See also* Constructivism in International Relations; Cooperation; Governance, Global; International Law; International Regimes; International Relations, Theory; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Realism in International Relations

### Further Readings

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## INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

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The field of international political economy (IPE) requires two definitions since it is both a subject, a field of study, and an object, a thing to study. Defining IPE as a thing to study, as an object, is quite straightforward. It refers to the global or international distribution of power, wealth, and prestige among state and nonstate actors. IPE as a field of study, as a subject, in contrast, has at least two different histories and as such requires a more complex explication.

This entry traces the evolution of these twin histories of IPE. The first history pertains to the so-called American school of IPE that emerged during the early to mid-1970s in the context of the oil crises and breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The second history pertains to the contrasting British school of IPE that has altogether different origins. Rather than forming one body of knowledge, these two schools have developed distinct research trajectories, agendas, and methodological orientations. IPE as a field of study is therefore plural.

In brief, the American school has, over time, become an increasingly analytically coherent and methodologically homogeneous body of scholarship. It emerged during the mid-1970s to analyze a purported crisis of U.S. hegemony and then evolved into a particular set of arguments concerning the importance of institutions, credibility, contracts, and commitment in IPE. The British school has, in contrast, blossomed into a multidisciplinary exercise that is both methodologically plural and decidedly lacking in defined boundaries. The British school began long before the 1970s and has drawn on the contributions of historians, economists, journalists, and geographers. Recently, both schools have had to accommodate still other bodies of scholarship with a claim to be IPE. Contemporary IPE is at the very least, plural.

### The Development of American IPE

#### *The Cold War and Political Science Foundations of American IPE*

What makes the contrast between the American and British schools of IPE salient is the relationship of American IPE to its parent discipline of political science and the politics of the Cold War, a relationship that does not exist in the UK or elsewhere. American political science has only relatively recently come to embrace political economy as a distinct approach concerned with the core question of distribution. After World War II, American political science was behavioralist and functionalist in its orientation. Its behavioralism developed as a result of the focus of political science after pre-World War II on the formal institutions of society—constitutions and the like. Since this focus failed to anticipate the collapse of interwar democracy in Germany and the emergence of fascism, the

lesson learned was to focus on actor behavior, not constitutional form. Second, the United States emerged from World War II as a superpower intimately concerned with the relationship between knowledge and national security—hence the focus of early postwar American political science on policy-relevant scientific knowledge.

While behavioralism dominated the study of American politics, the study of the societies outside the Western core demanded a different analysis. The thrust of these “modernization” arguments was to extend the teleological logic of Talcott Parsons’s functionalism to the developmental trajectories of the non-Western world, which was expected to develop in a sequence like that already undergone by the West, especially the United States.

American political science in its moment of refounding the Cold War developed a fourfold division of the field where American politics analyzed the putative end of history for all developing states—the American present; comparative politics analyzed current real-world deviations from that trend and thus how far other countries had to travel to get to that end; international relations situated these processes in the bipolar structure of the Cold War; and political theory, the fourth subfield, kept the Marxists out and the liberals in.

As a consequence, in the early years of the Cold War, the structure of political science in America left very little room for political economy, international or not. In part, because it smacked of Marxism, but also because the move toward ever greater formalism in its sister discipline of economics in this period that depoliticized the subject in another way, IPE as “a way of thinking” had to wait for events to make room for (international) political economy to come back to political science.

That moment arrived in the 1970s when the developed world underwent its first major recession while the experience of the United States in Vietnam tempered belief in its ability to command the world. Stagflation, oil shocks, unemployment, and low growth, coming on the heels of civil right rebellions at home and revolutions abroad, shook the self-confidence of American political science. In this moment of crisis, a few American political scientists began to argue that the separation of politics and markets, especially the sidelining of questions of distribution in international relations

and economics, was perhaps part of the problem. It was in this context that the American school of IPE emerged. Where economics retreated, political scientists began to ask a series of questions that would define what IPE (as a subject) was and what it should investigate (as an object) for the next decade and a half; a distinct IPE then began to take shape.

### *Orienting Issues and Questions of American IPE*

The first concern of these theorists was the notion that the United States was in decline. With the U.S. growth rate slowing, its industrial base shrinking, and its deficits rising, Europe and Japan seemed to be in the ascendance, while the United States was falling by the wayside. Yet if the United States was in decline, how could global order be provided in an environment of multiple players, all with different interests? Moreover, if the United States no longer set the terms for the other players in the system, which states would prosper and which would fail in this new world?

Taking up these concerns were scholars such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, whose idea of “complex interdependence” challenged traditional realist notions of state interests and state action. Keohane and Nye argued that as the problems faced by states became more complex and less amenable to unilateral solutions, so the focus of scholars had to be shifted outward from the traditional “high politics” of international relations (qua security politics) to the political economy politics of, for example, trade protectionism and economic development. Such a stance argued for attention to the complexity of ties that bind states and a focus on how markets are important predicates of, as well as arenas for, state action. Such a stance was not without its realist critics to be sure, but this intervention made possible a broader opening of the agenda of American political science to questions of economic governance and distribution; it made room for IPE in the United States.

When complex interdependence was juxtaposed with the question of the decline of the United States, the result was a set of theories called hegemonic stability theory (HST). What animated this scholarship was, in large part, a particular reading of the monetary history of the 20th century inspired by the work of Charles Kindleberger.



Kindleberger's key idea was that a single stabilizer was needed to stabilize the world economy. Drawing this conclusion from a study of the monetary relations of the interwar period, he developed a theory of hegemonic transition that spoke directly to U.S. declinist fears.

#### *From Hegemonic Stability to Regimes*

The basic story of HST was that following World War I, the United Kingdom (UK)—once the world's biggest market, banker, and power—emerged severely weakened. While willing to assume the burdens of leadership—that is, act as a lender of last resort, provide a market for distressed goods, and lend countercyclically to promote stability—the UK was simply unable to do so given its diminished capabilities. The United States on the other hand was able to do the same by the 1920s, but it was, because of its domestic politics, unwilling to do so. Lacking such leadership, trade collapsed, nationalism followed, and the turmoil of the 1930s and 1940s ensued. Could the same thing happen again now that the United States was in decline—especially when, unlike the last time, there was no obvious candidate to replace it?

The theoretical lesson drawn from Kindleberger's analysis rested on a classic public goods undersupply argument: a single, large hegemonic state being the only type of state able and willing to take on the cost of providing the public good of financial order because the majority of benefits flowed to itself. Smaller states may benefit from such order, but they have an incentive to free ride in terms of its provision. As such, "no hegemon, no order, big problem" became the lesson American IPE drew from Kindleberger, but it could have been worse. Taking their cue from the same scholarship, but framing it with a realist analysis, scholars such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin paid attention to the costs and benefits of being the hegemon and suggested that when costs rise and benefits fall in the hegemonic state, with more nimble "challenger states" rising more quickly and seeking to change the distribution of benefits in the system, the result was usually a hegemonic war. The future then, according to this emergent school of American IPE, was bleak if the United States really was in decline.

So how does one save the system from itself in the absence of a hegemon? American IPE scholars,

seeking this answer, began to investigate how system governance could be provided in the absence of a hegemon. One solution quickly became dominant: the provision of global public goods either by a limited number of key actors or through the "demand" for "regimes" that could act as functional fillers for systemic governance. This body of work, which became known as regime theory, and later as the turn to the study of international institutions, was a direct consequence of the attempt to puzzle a way through the predicaments of HST.

#### *From Regimes to Institutions and Compliance*

For much of IPE, given the purported centrality of a hegemon for stability, cooperation in the face of free riding became a core problem to be explained. Regime theory seemingly offered a way out. The basic idea behind regime theory was that where unilateral state action fails, coordinated action through issue-specific regimes—principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures to promote the convergence of expectations—might work. By giving a focal point to such expectations and by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, cooperation between states (in terms of mutual policy adjustment) may become easier by acting through regimes. As such, regimes were seen as issue-specific informational networks that intervened between interests and outcomes, providing stability in the face of hegemonic decline.

Where regimes came from was, however, another issue. The very public goods undersupply argument that drove HST also haunted regime theory. One could appeal to state interests to supply regimes to be sure, but by the logic of HST, such supply should decline over time as hegemonic state capabilities waned. Moreover, why should states comply with regime dictates?

One set of theories that "solved" this puzzle by virtue of the rationalist logic it employed was the literature that developed out of regime theory in the early 1990s and that went on to become the mainstay of contemporary American IPE research: the literature on international institutions. Following a game-theoretic logic, these theorists argued that self-interested states would comply with regimes to the extent that doing so lengthened the "shadow of the future" for cooperation, thus lessening the present discounted pay-off to free riding in the present.

As such, cooperation via institutions becomes a Nash equilibrium (self-reinforcing) strategy.

Building on this insight, American scholars working in this tradition have highlighted how uncertainty about the future forms a barrier to cooperation. Consequently, what international institutions (G20 meetings, the Basel Agreements, etc.) do is reduce the opacity of the system through the provision of information, which lowers uncertainty and increases the possibility of cooperation and the density of ties, thus making side payments and monitoring possible, thus furthering cooperation still more. Rules thereby act not as limits to state action that states would resist but as resources that allow states to credibly commit to each other, thus lengthening the shadow of the future further.

This move beyond the impasse of regime theory and HST defines the main thrust of American IPE scholarship today. A focus on rules (legalization) and how they are related to bargaining positions, enforcement costs, and credibility have become the touchstones of contemporary analysis across a huge number of issue areas. From questions of institutional design to a generalized use of open-economy macroeconomics as the basic framework for contemporary work harnessed to microeconomic logics and statistical techniques, American IPE has narrowed in its methodological orientation, developing a preference for analytic rigor and theoretical coherence over traditional “big questions” such as America’s decline or, contemporaneously, the rise of China. It remains, however, at least in the opinion of its protagonists, the very definition of what IPE is. Regardless of what other practitioners in other places happen to think they are doing, the rationalist study of institutions, bargaining, and commitment is IPE, “American style.”

### *The Other American School(s)*

Yet not all American IPE scholars fit so easily into this particular representation of IPE. Realist analyses have hardly given up the field. Work by David Andrews and Jonathan Kirshner on the relationship between power and money in IPE stresses realism’s continuing relevance. Similarly, as Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons contend, there is also a rich vein of constructivist scholarship within American IPE that deals with issues that are seemingly “off the radar” of mainstream

rationalist work. For example, how nationalist and neoliberal ideologies affect state behavior, choice of currency regimes, and even the behavior of international organizations has become grist to this constructivist mill.

Most important in generating this other strand of American IPE has been the existence of the *Cornell Series in Political Economy* as a publication outlet and the pioneering work of Peter Katzenstein, the editor of this series. If scholars such as Keohane and Krasner were instrumental in giving voice to the mainstream of American IPE, Katzenstein’s contribution was critical in opening up space for this “other” American scholarship.

Katzenstein’s work has always evidenced a strong concern with the interaction of domestic structures and IPE. However, rather than reducing these factors to a study of legislatures, coalitions, and bargaining, as do most mainstream American IPE scholars, Katzenstein developed an understanding of the role of states in IPE that drew on more historical institutionalist understandings of politics. This different approach to what IPE is, in combination with the focus of the *Cornell Series* on cognitive and ideational factors as explanatory variables, opened the door for American scholars who do not sit so easily in the mainstream of U.S. IPE research. In sum, while it is often lambasted as narrow and insular, American IPE contains within it more diversity than its protagonists often admit.

## **The Development of British IPE**

### *Origins of British IPE*

Britain may have also fought the Cold War, but the Cold War did not define its scholarship as it did in the United States. Moreover, skepticism regarding the scientific pretensions of the study of politics runs deep in the UK—hence, in part, its innate methodological pluralism and analytic eclecticism. But what is of critical significance here in understanding British IPE’s different orientations are two factors: (1) the failure of British political science to replicate the “four-field” structure of American political science and (2) the very different history of economic and political decline in the UK.

First of all, according to Ben Clift and Ben Rosamond, while the events of the 1970s may have provided the intellectual opening for American IPE, this moment does not mark the critical opening for

IPE scholars in the UK, since British IPE has a far longer lineage than can be ascribed to the economic dislocations of the early 1970s. Second, there never has been a “parent discipline” for British IPE; it has always been a multidisciplinary exercise. British political science neither saw itself as the end of the developmental telos nor sought to “keep the Marxists out.” Nor was there any necessary connection to international relations theory in political science.

These differences are themselves explained by the four “drivers” of the British school of IPE. First, there is a long tradition of scholarship that deals with the political economy of British imperialism, which has given much of British social science a particular historicist cast. Second, there is the postwar literature on decolonization and the global role of sterling in that period, which is IPE in all but overt self-identification. Third, there is the enormous literature on the UK’s own economic decline, especially the international determinants thereof, which makes the boundary cast in the United States between IPE and comparative political economy much more permeable in the UK. Fourth, there has been a continuing concern with the centrality of the state in both domestic and international economic relations.

As a result of these very different lineages of scholarship, for Rosamond and Clift, the main question has less to do with problems such as the domestic preference formation of states rather than the degree to which the historical resolution of social and economic struggles have become inscribed on the state and predispose it to certain types of action. This view of British IPE gives us an understanding of not just how but why British IPE differs from its American namesake.

In short, lacking the concerns that animated American scholarship and grappling with its own particulars, British IPE has become more historically focused and more open to a variety of perspectives than its American counterpart. It has as its point of departure a basic skepticism of the worldviews that underlie American IPE and the models of cognition and causation that they enshrine. It has never been a subfield of political science, nor is it particularly beholden to political science as a field. IPE in the UK exists in departments of politics, sociology, geography, and anthropology. If American IPE is a subfield of

political science, British IPE can (almost) lay claim to being a field of the social sciences in its own right, or at least a reinvention thereof focused on questions of global distribution and power.

### *The Other Transatlantic Bridge*

As well as different material drivers, British IPE has a different set of intellectual progenitors that go beyond the confines of Britain itself but do not include the United States. As Randell Germain has argued, the legacy of the Canadian scholar Robert Cox looms large in this regard. The difference that Cox made was that due to his influence, while historical materialist approaches were marginalized in the United States, in Canada, such “critical” perspectives were constitutive of a very different type of mainstream of research. As such, there was a transatlantic bridge for IPE, but it ran from Canada to the UK and bypassed the United States.

In the UK itself, Benjamin Cohen highlights the influence of Susan Strange as the main protagonist for the development of a British version of IPE. Rather than simply focus on the power structure, as American realists are wont to do, or focus on the informational environment, as American neo-liberals are fond of doing, Strange developed a more nuanced conception of power that operated through global knowledge and production as well as military and financial structures. This view of power was relational as well as material, and it paid close attention to the ideological. Strange also stressed the importance of finance for understanding IPE and competition between different global authorities, including private authorities, as key aspects of global governance. She took seriously the notion of IPE as an “open range” where a plethora of approaches should coexist, and in doing so, she anticipated much of what British IPE scholars were to produce over the next 2 decades.

Taken together then, Cox, Strange, and the very different political and institutional legacies of British development and decline gave rise to a distinct and different British school of IPE. This school was not simply a reaction to, or a rejection of, American IPE. Rather, it was a school of thought that had set up its own stall and carried on as if the Americans didn’t really exist. The result has been a research community animated by an entirely different set of concerns. This is demonstrated by comparing the

publication themes of the two schools in their respective American and British journals.

### *Comparing American and British IPE*

Taking the U.S.-based journal *International Studies Quarterly* (ISQ) as representative of American IPE beyond the rationalist mainstream and the British journal *New Political Economy* (NPE) as representative of British IPE yields the following comparisons. Of the 372 articles published in ISQ over the period 1997 to 2008, 31% were identifiable as “liberal approaches,” 17% were “realist,” 9% were “mixed,” and the rest were scattered across the categories of constructivism, feminism, poststructuralism, and neo-Marxism, which hardly suggests a disciplinary monotheism. Since American IPE exists as a part of political science, it is not really surprising when the biggest single category that emerges from the ISQ sample is “questions directly related to existing debates in IR theory,” while the second is “security studies,” Cohen’s (2008) twin cores of U.S. international relations (IR) theory.

Repeating this exercise for NPE gives quite different results. Few, if any, of the contributions to NPE speak of the core issues of IR theory. Instead, they cluster around three topic areas: (1) the evolution of advanced capitalist states (17%), (2) development (17%), and (3) globalization (14%). The remainder are similarly scattered among various topic areas. Many of NPE’s articles would sit well in journals such as *Comparative Studies in International Development*. Given this, what do British scholars publish and research under these rubrics that is so different from the work of American scholars? Several areas stand out in contemporary British IPE that are largely absent in American IPE: a concern with ontology and philosophical foundations, a focus on normative concerns and ethics, critiques of finance capitalism and globalization, and historical materialist, Gramscian poststructuralist, feminist, and “everyday” IPE.

### *The “Critical” Concerns of British IPE*

Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan put it well when they argue that the differences between American and British IPE can be summed up in the quip that in the American school “data and observation are so unproblematic we can accept them as real,”

while in the British school “data and observation are so problematic that we can dispense with them altogether” (2009, p. 123). However, for the British school, data derive from methods, and prior to methodological choices lie ontological, epistemological, and general philosophical concerns.

Lacking the scientism of their American peers and embracing Cox’s injunction that the point of theory is critique, British IPE views the role of IPE as taking the measure of the world rather than simply measuring it: to judge and to evaluate, to be a “critical” body of theory. Doing so necessarily breaks the distinction between positive and normative theory that American IPE relies on and instead opens up British IPE to questions of legitimacy and ethics.

For example, although American IPE scholars have certainly been active in the area of understanding international finance, British scholars have been far more critical in their examination of international finance. From Strange’s *Mad Money* (1998) to Paul Langley’s concern with the construction of the “ethical investor,” British writing on finance has developed a far more critical view of finance in IPE.

Pushing this critical edge still further are the various Marxist scholars who form an important part of British IPE—a species almost extinct in the United States. Building on the legacy of Robert Cox, a new generation of British historical materialists has sought to engage IPE from their own particular intellectual angle. In the hands of these scholars, the notion of hegemony radically departs from its American meaning of simple “dominance” by a state toward its original Gramscian meaning of “intellectual leadership and subordination” by transnational class forces and historic blocs.

Finally, there are scholars within British IPE who try to transcend the very notion of IPE itself. Feminist scholars form one such community within British IPE. Their focus on social reproduction—that is, how the division of labor in capitalism rests on a prior division of labor of the household and how such gendered structures are replicated through the practices of IPE—forms the core of this enterprise.

In a similar manner, the so-called everyday IPE scholars contest the notion of a state-centric IPE. For most IPE scholars, the answer to the question of “who governs?” in IPE is usually “some sort of set of elite actors.” In contrast, for “everyday” scholars

such as Leonard Seabrooke, non-elite actors, the masses, not the elites, their patterns of consumption and production, and crucially their ability to confer legitimacy on or withhold it from elite actions, all come to the fore as explanatory factors in the world economy. Scholarship in this vein has engaged issues as diverse as pension reform, the relationship between housing finance and global financial power, and the ability of microstate tax havens to persist despite OECD efforts to shut them down from this interdisciplinary “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” perspective.

In sum, British IPE is quite a different species from American IPE. It has different origins, orientations, logics, philosophical concerns, targets, agendas, and even views of causation and matter. It is not simply a variation on a theme, it is quite a different beast; hence the claim that IPE is plural. But it may be worse than that, for beyond the United States and the UK, there lie many claims to IPE that can just as easily be recognized as such, even if the authors use different labels.

### Asian IPE

The United States and Britain (or more correctly Britain and Canada) are not the only places that have made a contribution to IPE scholarship. As Walden Bello has argued, the distinctive contribution that scholarship “in and about” East Asia has added to IPE is the literature on the developmental state. That is, a literature developed in and about East Asia that focuses on the state as an active agent in economic development. Moreover, there was, argues Bello, a strong normative edge to such scholarship that argued “for” states in development against the neoliberal inclination of American scholarship. From its inception, these models were set up as a challenge to scholarship that sees universalist processes as stemming from the Western experience.

The distinctive focus of this literature on the state-as-actor enables it to open up issues that Western, especially American, IPE approaches miss due to their relegation of such processes to “domestic politics.” As such, the economically positive “legacy-effects” of colonialism, the role of labor repression (and the lack of democracy) in state-led industrialization efforts, the importance of equalitarian land reform, and how the politics of firm–state relations changed over time, all come

into focus. By tying the actual developmental history of the East Asian states into the story of the evolution of East Asian/developmental state scholarship, Bello argues convincingly that this literature is itself an important contribution to contemporary IPE—a contribution that belongs to neither the United States nor the UK.

### Underdevelopment and IPE: France and Latin America

IPE is then not only constituted by what its U.S. and British partisans think it is. There are Asian contributions, and there are also telling absences. Turning first to the lack of IPE in continental Europe, particularly France, Nicolas Jabko highlights three main reasons why IPE remains “underdeveloped” in France. First, in France, heterodox economists, rather than political scientists, tend to be the political economists in France. Particularly important here is the work of the economists of the French “regulation school,” who tend to concentrate on the internal dynamics of capitalist economies. As such, both politics and the notion of the “international” as a distinct sphere of action are underplayed. Second, there is a strong bias against importing U.S. scholarship. Third is the relationship to Marxism. While both the UK and France have long-standing legacies of Marxist scholarship, there was, in the postwar period in France, a general flight from Marxism in economics and political science rather than the embrace of it as in the British case. As such, IPE in France, and in Europe, in general, remains, as Jabko puts it, “underdeveloped.”

A similar story exists in Latin America, where a strong indigenous theory of IPE—dependency theory—offered a powerful alternative theory of international political and economic processes. Dependency theory argued that capitalism is a system of unequal exchange that locked peripheral economies into exploitative relationships with the core states of the rich North. Rather than stimulate the development of the whole economy and generate broad-based growth, international economic relations retarded the growth of peripheral economies while promoting export enclaves. This in turn produced a politics of inequality domestically that could only be held in check by repressive forces. Jose Gabriel Palma argues that these once popular IPE literatures turned pathological when, over

time, the fit between the facts generated by the world economy and the theory diverged so much that the goal of dependency theorists became saving the theory at the expense of reality. As such, the theory lost its relevance, and a genuine Latin American contribution to IPE disappeared and left the field to other approaches.

### **IPE in All but Name? Sociologists and Economic Historians**

One consequence of not being able to “bind” IPE is that one is bound to run into other academics who are doing essentially the same thing, but do not call what they do IPE. So the question becomes to what extent there is any IPE beyond self-described IPE scholars. John Campbell, for example, argues that international political sociologists have for many years been IPE scholars. Such sociologists have studied topics such as the diffusion of norms on an international level, how neoliberalism has been transmitted around the world, how the international division of labor is structured, and how the comparative economic performance of different states is explainable by regime type: literatures that are “IPE in all but name.” Michael Oliver provides a second example of “IPE in all but name” in the work of economic historians. Oliver notes that economic historians tend to differ from IPE scholars in two ways. First of all, most economic historians seek neither empirical laws nor narrow methodological perspectives. Yet, despite this difference in approach, there exists a strong similarity between economic history and IPE. In short, some of the biggest names in IPE are economic historians in the broadest sense of the term, in that they use historical sources and construct historical narratives, so there is a natural overlap.

### **Is the Future of IPE Fractured?**

IPE as an object can be reasonably well defined; IPE as a subject, as a way of knowing practiced by a community of scholars sharing a common branch of scholarship, is far more fractured. There is a distinctive American school, based in political science, that is becoming more distinctive over time with its common focus on “open-economy politics,” allied to statistical and formal methods centering on questions of institutional design, compliance, and

credibility. Yet within this supposed monolith is a thriving IPE scholarship of a different stripe.

There is also a distinctive British school. Its origins and concerns are quite different from those of the American school, and rather than the methodological narrowing we see in the American school, British IPE threatens to become not just an “inter-discipline” but the veritable reinvention of the social sciences. Beyond America and Britain (plus Canada), there are claims to be made for an Asian IPE based on the literature on the developmental state and for the importation of work by sociologists and economic historians. In one sense then, the future of IPE is bright. Monocultures get wiped out by rare events, but hybridized systems do not, and IPE seen globally is certainly hybrid. But in another sense, there are dangers on the horizon.

Although diversified on a global level, local pockets of IPE, especially the American school, are extremely homologous and badly hedged. They constitute a local monoculture that seemed to be on a high for several years, but the recent financial crisis has thrown their methods (the utility of time-series analysis) and insights (the ubiquity of transparency and information as stabilizing technologies) into question in some quarters. Moreover, if the orientation of the project overall is to “become more like economics,” then the school risks redundancy, since many scholars do this already and do it better. They are called economists.

The British school, while well diversified, faces a different type of redundancy. If the many different research communities of British IPE “let a thousand flowers bloom,” in doing such important work, techniques and technologies established in other fields become rather pointlessly rehashed and reinvented. There is a very real risk that British IPE ethicists skim the philosophy enough to be thinly informed, that everyday British IPE scholars reinvent a weak-kneed sociology of practice, and that British Marxists haul out Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci once again without making any actual progress.

In sum, if the boundaries of IPE are not drawn narrowly, it becomes increasingly difficult to say what IPE is, and what it is not. If other fields such as sociology and economic history (and geography) are included, then it has to be defined as an interdisciplinary field in its own right. But doing so has its own costs in terms of coherence and stability, as

in any field of knowledge. On the other hand, drawing boundaries too tightly puts at risk its very existence as a field of knowledge.

In many ways, the British school has less at stake. If the orientation of the field is toward “a thousand flowers,” then cross-pollination and what Strange calls “open range” are virtues. British IPE will persist no matter what form it takes because its precise form is less important than its (hybridized) content. In contrast, the American school has much more at stake, but this stake rests on a series of rather narrow technologies and theories that may not be as transcendentally appropriate as many of its protagonists think. By either measure, IPE is (at least) a plural field of study with an interesting future.

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See also Economic Policy; Hegemony; Liberalism; Power; Realism in International Relations

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## INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

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Three points structure this consideration of international public opinion. First, international public opinion research relies on statistical methods used in domestic marketing and polling research. Second, public diplomacy is closely related to consideration of public opinion dynamics in international affairs. Finally, international public opinion research has rested on a particular understanding of the organization of the international system. As information technologies change the nature of community and individual identity formation, we should expect concomitant changes in the organization and analysis of public opinion.

The utility of opinion metrics, both in business and politics, is found in the ability to reveal projected variation in cognitive and affective responses to variation in product design, price points (when relevant), or other changes in key stimulus features, regardless of whether they are commercial or political in nature. Do changes in some sort of stimuli produce changes in attitudes about the object of matter at hand? Whether we are considering a “new and improved” product or a new campaign slogan, precise public opinion metrics offer an important means of evaluating variation in design, availability, and product presentation.

With respect to *international* public opinion, the analytical specificity that undergirds market research (target marketing of micropopulations facilitated by data mining and computer analysis) and public opinion polling in political and policy

domains (often with the same level of specificity found in consumer marketing) is often lost. In domestic spheres in advanced market economies in Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the world, consumer data and survey data are used to populate statistical programs that create groupings or clusters of consumers (or voters or any other germane activity). Niche media markets are then used (and often created) to reach precisely constructed market niches. The reader can see evidence of this phenomenon by visiting a local magazine distributor and noting the numerous and often esoteric variety of magazines catering to every taste, hobby, or habit. Magazines devoted to sailing, for example, aggregate consumers who share this interest, and in doing so, they provide a platform for advertisers to efficiently reach that precise audience. Similarly, users of online book-sellers will be met by an opening web page that is populated by book suggestions that are uniquely tailored to that person according to his or her past purchases.

As we move away from the specification of niche populations according to complex mathematical analyses of demographic data concerning the minutiae of economic behavior, lifestyles, and political life, we usually lose this degree of specificity. Instead, we tend to see aggregations involving more general features of entire nation-states and regions. Analyses are less nuanced. The degree of specification changes, in part, owing to the enormous costs associated with multinational data collection and analysis. It is also limited by challenges associated with variations in language, culture, and economic systems, all of which put strains on both the internal and the external reliability of statistical analyses. External validity, for example, concerns the extent to which one might safely generalize the causal inference—first, from the sample studied to the defined target population and, second, to other populations that exist across time and space. Put in less technical terms, serious questions arise as to whether we can, with any confidence, speak of public attitudes about culturally specified concepts such as freedom, democracy, and rights in large-scale multinational studies.

There are, however, several noteworthy studies that have attempted to do serious transnational comparative survey work. One of the more important efforts at overcoming these limitations is the Pew



Research Center's *Global Attitudes Project*. As of 2009, Pew has conducted more than 175,000 interviews in 55 countries. Another example is found in WorldPublicOpinion.org, a consortium of domestic polling organizations from around the world that was organized and managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland. At the time of this writing, the consortium includes research centers in more than 25 countries across all the major continents. A number of associations and academic organizations are also involved in the analysis of international public opinion. One of the oldest is the World Association for Public Opinion Research, founded in 1947.

Noteworthy efforts such as these aside, the scale of international public opinion measurement tends to limit the practical application of metrics. Publics in international public opinion are most often defined by the commonality of manageable geographical space, usually defined in terms of the nation-state and its subdivisions in provinces, states, or districts. That is, statistically and demographically specified subgroups, as found in commercial or domestic political marketing, are not found in most publicly available analyses of international public opinion. Instead, pollsters, policymakers, scholars, and politicians speak of larger aggregations, such as American, Japanese, Russian, or other nationally defined collective of common identity.

Besides its broader nature, international public opinion is also more likely to be concerned with the dynamics of international public standing of nation-states and closely related questions about the effectiveness of various public diplomacy programs intended to affect those standings. Clarifying this idea requires a brief detour into public diplomacy.

Whereas traditional diplomacy involves negotiations, *démarches*, and other forms of official communication between representatives of nation-states, public diplomacy by contrast focuses on the ways in which a government of one country communicates with and therefore influences (or so it is assumed) publics in another country or region. The term *public diplomacy* was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, then dean of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He defined it as

the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses

dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy . . . [including] the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another . . . (and) the transnational flow of information and ideas. (From an early brochure of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, Fletcher School, Tufts University)

There is, however, no generally accepted or broadly shared definition of public diplomacy. For example, it isn't clear whether it involves only international broadcasting (and today Internet outreach) or if it also properly includes educational and cultural exchange programs, disaster relief and aid programs, and other forms of international communication of cultural, political, and policy intent. Nor is there a well-specified social science theory or set of theories that serve to ground the expectations some observers have concerning what public diplomacy can realistically achieve by affecting international public opinion. Therefore, those responsible for public diplomacy may lay out ambitious goals such as improving international opinion toward the United States, when in fact there are major methodological challenges associated with measuring the extent of such change. It is not clear how one might go about finding communication stimuli capable of producing a measurable cognitive effect in a generally specified foreign audience over the short term. As Robert Entman has made clear, political communication and social psychological research findings do not support such an optimistic expectation.

In sum, international public opinion is often contextualized by an undertheorized discussion about international public opinion concerning broad aggregations, such as the standing of the United States in world opinion. Unlike the analysis of domestic public opinion in politics and economics, methodological, logistical, and theoretical encumbrances limit the sorts of data collected and questions asked. Generally, international public opinion analysis tends to follow the contours of geopolitically drawn maps: We are presented with aggregate statistics about opinion profiles according to national identity.

Target marketing strategies that rely on rich streams of demographic and lifestyles data point to

forms of aggregating “publics” that do not necessarily rest in geopolitically determined identities. Put differently, an underlying premise in international public opinion research is that publics, by nature, can be understood or conceived of only in terms of the coincidental sharing of geographical space. Where one is born is, along with socialization, a fundamental element to public opinion. International public opinion is therefore analyzed according to a particular understanding of the nature of the international system itself. Comparative opinion profiles according to national boundaries are most often understood as defining the parameters of the concept itself. We can speak of how a given nation-state is held in good (or low) regard by the citizens of an array of other nation-states.

But as Benedict Anderson has taught us, aggregations of this sort, as natural as they may seem, are synthetic and, relatively speaking, quite new to human history. Anderson (1991) defines a nation as “an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p. 7). An imagined community is different from an actual community because it is not (and cannot be) based on everyday face-to-face interaction between its members. Such a thing is possible only in communities rooted in a shared and small geographical space. Instead, in a nation-state, members hold in their minds a mental image of their affinity. We are “Americans,” “Germans,” or “Russians” not because we know all of our kinsmen but rather because of a mental state that defines the contours of a mapped affinity group—the nation.

The formation of such an imagined affinity group became feasible only with the rise of print capitalism. Anderson (1991) notes that the basic structure of two forms of imagining that first flowered in Europe in the 18th century were the novel and the newspaper. “For these forms provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation.” (p. 25). The nature of possible imagined communities is associated with the nature of communication systems.

The information environment of the first decade of the 21st century, where communities and individuals across the globe are knitted together by high-speed and low-cost computer and telecommunication links, opens the door to new forms of imagined communities constituted by aggregations

rooted in cyber rather than physical space. As with imagined communities qua nation-states, the basis of collective affinity is a sense of communicated and shared values and norms. But whereas newspapers and, to a lesser degree, books were confined to a fixed geographical space, communication today is uprooted from both space and time. Communication appears everywhere in real time.

James Rosenau’s work, especially *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier* and *Distant Proximities*, has led the way in helping us think about the international system in this new way. An alternative model to the geocentric understandings of the public and public opinion is therefore found in the consideration of affinity groups consisting of individuals working collaboratively according to shared norms and values, though not necessarily in shared physical space. In this way, one might even say that we move away from international—where the nation is still the central organizing principle—public opinion to global public opinion.

One expression of global public opinion, understood in this way, can be found in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or what Ann Florini calls a third force in the international system. Between 1973 and 1983, the number of transnational human rights organizations doubled from 41 to 89. In the next decade, the number doubled again. Between 1973 and 2000, the number of NGOs working for women’s rights increased by 300%, a figure that probably underestimates the larger number of organizations that work for women’s rights but not exclusively. There is little doubt that NGOs of all types—working for human rights, environmental issues, nuclear nonproliferation, economic development, and many other causes and concerns—are a growing factor in international affairs. The point here is that transnational advocacy organizations and social movements constitute an expression of a nongeographically rooted public created by a set of values and norms that are shared across the globe through new media. Supporters and constituent elements of transnational NGOs are members of a community of shared beliefs and values—publics—without necessarily being members of a shared geographically defined community. They constitute a new type of international public opinion.

But their importance is perhaps found not in the growth of their individual numbers but rather in

the growth of their coordination and cooperation. In domestic politics, it is often said that public opinion exerts pressure to create particular outcomes. In international affairs, communities of like-minded individuals and organizations may achieve something similar. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) define transnational advocacy networks (TANs) as “characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (p. 8). Networks are “communicative structures.” Communication structures create new forms of imagined communities, as Anderson argued. This opens up fascinating new ways to conceptualize and study international public opinion.

This entry has reviewed international public opinion in the context of the more precise domestic analysis of opinion research. It has also noted the close relationship between international public opinion and public diplomacy. Finally, this entry has reviewed recent thinking among international affairs scholars with regard to the changing nature of the organization of the international system. New information technologies open up the possibility of imagined communities that are not rooted in geographical space but rather in cyberspace. In short, we may now consider the public opinion measurement of communities consisting of those who share similar values and norms and organize themselves into communities accordingly but who do not share common physical space.

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*See also* International Solidarity; Political Communication; Public Opinion

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## INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

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Unlike many concepts in international relations, there is broad agreement on the definition of international regimes. Stephen Krasner (1983) provided the standard definition, according to which international regimes are “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (p. 1). Regime theorists generally try to explain the emergence, persistence, change, and decline of these relatively stable patterns of international collaboration and coordination. International regimes are to be distinguished from national regimes, which describe the formal and informal structure of political power in a country.

All major theoretical schools of international relations are represented in the study of regimes. The first articulations of the realist theory of hegemonic stability and of (neo)liberal institutionalism appeared in the early 1970s. Arguably, the first coherent expressions of constructivism in international relations also appeared in this period and treated the diffusion and use of knowledge in relation to technology transfer. The study of international regimes experienced its golden age from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, but the remarkable productivity of the research program has since shifted the focus of inquiry to the related normative questions of global governance and toward disaggregating regime theory to include the influence of domestic interests on the international delegation of authority and sovereignty.

### Realists' Regimes

Many realists see in international regimes an extension of the power politics that suffuse all international political life and apply economic rationality to explain the creation and demise of regimes. According to the hegemonic stability theory of international regimes, only powerful states can supply regimes as public goods, and they will do so only when they expect a net gain in their relative power positions as a result. Other states are then able to act as free riders by benefiting from the regime without contributing to its provision, or they can be caught as forced consumers if they do not desire the regime but cannot escape its scope. Though the hegemonic stability theory of international regimes can explain the demand for and supply of regimes, it has been criticized with the observation that many regimes are not strictly public goods because they are excludable and potentially rivals. Moreover, a group of states might be able to supply the regime jointly in the absence of a hegemon, as is the case with the small minority of states that provides the vast majority of the United Nations' (UN's) budget.

Some scholars have modified this realist account by positing that states are not uniformly sensitive to gains reaped by others. A given state is less likely to measure its own gains relative to those of an ally or a small and distant state than to those of a rival or powerful neighbor. Weighing relative gains implies that all states, rather than a lone hegemon, will seek to create and maintain regimes as long as they assess their own benefit to be greater than the benefit accrued by other relevant states. The resurgence of classical realism, which is less reliant on an economic concept of rationality, also provides a modified institutionalist explanation according to which dominant states will establish regimes with rules congenial to themselves in order to create an institution whose normative and regulatory inertia will benefit them even after their power begins to wane. That the five great power victors of World War II have the only seats on the UN Security Council endowed with permanence, veto power, and a UN-sanctioned right to possess nuclear weapons serves as an example. Other variables, such as whether a state is revisionist or satisfied with the status quo as well

as the polarity of the international system, can also be integrated into such analyses.

### Neoliberals' Regimes

Neoliberal theories also heavily incorporate micro-economic analogies. Liberal theories of international regimes that focus on domestic preference aggregation and upward causality also exist, but they tend to be less well developed than the neoliberal theories. The core theses of the neoliberal account are that regimes would be unnecessary were it not for the "market failures" of an anarchical system, that international regimes are not mere epiphenomena of power, and that many states are interdependent, such that the advantage to the one depends on the success of the others. Specifically, market failures include the lack of an authoritative international legal framework, imperfect information, and transaction costs, all of which inhibit states from having confidence in contracts. Regimes alleviate this problem by providing states with more and better information about others' activities, reducing transaction costs by providing a single standard for all rather than many bilateral standards, and extending the shadow of the future so that defectors can be punished.

The neoliberal literature relevant to international regimes is vast, but there are several common elements. Among these are the analytical assumption of states as unitary, utility-maximizing actors and the use of game-theoretic analogies to formalize the collective action problems that give rise to regimes. Briefly, there are assurance games in which all parties prefer the same outcome and for which no regime is required, coordination games in which there are multiple outcomes that the parties find acceptable and that will often require a mere convention, and collaboration games in which the parties must forgo their maximum strategies to achieve the optimal outcome. Examples of these would include food safety (where there is little or no incentive to cheat), a common language for international flight personnel (where several coordination points are effectively equivalent), and the nuclear nonproliferation regime (where there are strong incentives to cheat), respectively.

The microeconomic logic used in neoliberal regime analysis provides a parsimonious framework,

but it naturally assumes knowledge of actors' interests, which are in turn a function of their preferences. However, this framework provides no insight about the sources or form of these preferences, and the neoliberal approach has been criticized for imposing definitions of utility on actors rather than discovering them. The assumption of a single, definitive preference ranking for each actor and a neglect of the normative consequences of regimes are further sources of criticism.

### Constructivists' Regimes

Whereas the realist and neoliberal approaches assume unitary actors with clear and singular preference structures, the constructivist approach problematizes these and seeks to ascertain actor preferences rather than assign them. Instead of assuming that actors follow a logic of consequences, which is based on their assessments of the costs and benefits of different courses of action, constructivists would argue that decision makers follow a logic of appropriateness, in which they choose a course of action based on their perception of the situation and of their roles in it. Accordingly, the way in which an issue is framed and the inputs of the domestic and international political processes are important determinants of the final regime outcome.

One source of input that can operate at domestic and international levels is epistemic communities. These are networks of professional experts with technical knowledge about the problem a regime could solve. For example, the Bretton Woods institutions would have been anathema to both the protectionist and liberal Ricardian ideas that had dominated before World War II, but institutional innovation was clearly required to rebuild the world economy in its wake. As Keynesian liberal interventionism gained currency among economic experts, however, the victors were able to agree on institutions that would allow both free trade and an active industrial policy, though such institutions had been previously unthinkable. Without changing the physical nature of the problem or the constitution of the actors, new knowledge can substantially recast actors' understanding of a problem and their likely courses of action.

Many constructivists would argue that cooperation in the context of regimes presumes a preexisting repertoire of shared normative concepts and communicative deeds. Taking this line of argument further, some constructivists problematize the normative structures and social institutions that, they would argue, provide the conditions of possibility for concepts such as rationality, legitimacy, and cooperation in the first place. Hypothesizing such malleability in international institutions has led many critical theorists to question whether the current configuration of international regimes could not be recast to become more just by making them less reflective of the prevailing power and distributional structures. The constructivist approach has been criticized for lacking some elements that would support a cumulative research agenda, such as a falsifiable corpus of theory and hypothesis-generating research questions.

### Empirical Analysis and Open Questions

In the empirical study of regimes, qualitative methods dominate because though there are some regime characteristics that most studies seek to explain, such as effectiveness, robustness, and change over time, the issue areas and characteristics of particular regimes differ too much for the construction of data sets and quantitative methods to be practical. Where theoretically applicable, researchers often devise a formal model, such as a game-theoretic matrix; derive hypotheses from the model; and try to show the similarities between the model and the case in question. Where comparison between regimes is sensible, comparative case studies are also widely used. One recent project has produced the International Regimes Database, which includes data pertaining to 23 regimes and 172 regime elements. The researchers involved hope that this will allow others to analyze certain dimensions of regimes across cases and to develop broadly valid hypotheses and generalizations. Because comparison between regimes is often not sensible, it has also been suggested that counterfactuals could be an appropriate tool to isolate the independent effects of regimes. In fact, a proposal has even been made to study international nonregimes—that is, issue areas in which the conditions

indicate that a regime would be likely to occur but none is present.

Despite these innovative proposals, scholarly interest has somewhat migrated away from the study of international regimes as such. This change shows that regime theory is partially a victim of its own success. The research program has served to move the debate beyond the crude conceptions of international anarchy that had previously dominated it, but attention has now broadly shifted to the normative consequences of different forms of international and global governance and the closer examination of mechanisms within and below regimes. Specifically, much research in the rationalist framework has begun to examine how authority is delegated from various domestic structures and processes to international and supranational decision-making fora. Constructivist research is now primarily concerned with the legitimacy of the authority thus delegated and how to make the resulting decisions and policies more representative of interest groups at all levels. Recent studies have also begun to consider the transnational aspects of international regimes more closely by investigating when and how private entities, such as firms and cartels, have developed regulatory regimes among themselves. This trend is also visible in the research treating the governance implications of public-private partnerships, in which governments and private firms contract to perform some function.

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*See also* Anarchy; Constructivism in International Relations; Cooperation; Delegation; Governance, Global; International Organizations; International Political Economy; International System; Market Failure; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Public Goods; Realism in International Relations

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HISTORY

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The academic field of international relations (IR) is barely a century old. Its roots, however, go much further back. This entry exposes some of these historical roots before it describes the emergence of academic IR—with its university departments, specialized courses, and plethora of journals and books devoted to the causes of war and the preconditions for a lasting peace.

The entry pays much attention to the evolution of IR in the aftermath of World War I and the emergence of its distinctive issues and approaches. Then, it follows the growth of IR as a more mature, multiparadigmatic social science in the wake of World War II. The final sections of the entry emphasize the tempestuous discussions that have marked scholarly IR after the end of the Cold War.

#### Philosophical Forebears

When did the science of IR emerge? According to the popular foundation myth formulated by Edward Hallett Carr in the late 1930s, it emerged from World War I, driven by a wish to create a peaceful world. Myths are not wrong, but they are not historical descriptions either. The science of IR has a more complicated birth than this. Its subject matter has been adumbrated by scholars, statesmen, and soldiers for centuries.

What is the subject matter of IR? At its core lie discussions of war and peace—not only from the standpoint of single states but also as properties of a larger society or system of states. Thus defined, foreshadowings of IR are found already in antiquity—in the West, most famously in Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian Wars* (ca. 550 BCE) and in the East, in Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra* (ca. 300 BCE). However, as antique state structures unraveled or

were swallowed up by empires, discussions of interstate relations disappeared; early-medieval authors like Cassiodorus, Procopius, and al-Shaybānī discussed both war and diplomacy, but relations among states were not in their purview.

Discussions of interstate relations reappeared, however, in the postimperial age. The rise of city-states in Italy and the rediscovery of classical authors like Thucydides were attended by probing discussions of war and peace and relations among states. In Florence, for example, authors like Niccolò Machiavelli and Francisco Guicciardini reintroduced antique themes of power and princely leadership and applied them to the affairs of their own times.

Renaissance discussions tended to concern philosophical issues such as the nature of the good society and the qualities of political leadership. In the wake of the Reformation, the scholarly discussions grew more descriptive and practical, partly because of the advent of more effective state structures ruled by powerful dynasties who concentrated political power, religious authority, and military command in royal hands and partly because of the emergence of new concepts and secular theories.

### *Sovereignty, Contract, and Perpetual Peace*

The important concept of sovereignty emerges in the late Renaissance. It received its classic formulation by Jean Bodin. The social and political implications of the concept were explored by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, who wrote a learned treatise titled *Law of War and Peace* (1625), which discussed IR in light of natural law and human gregariousness. The English social philosopher Thomas Hobbes presented a different view. He argued in his *Leviathan* (1651) that rational individuals safeguard their interests by agreeing to establish a powerful state that will establish laws and protect them all. No such arrangement exists among states, however; states exist in a lawless “state of nature.”

Such discussions evolved hand in hand with the 16th- and 17th-century evolution of the modern state—by the development of fiscal and military structures, by the concentration of power in the hands of powerful monarchs, and by growth in international trade. New political concepts and theories emerged, many of them grafted on to the

theories of social contract expressed by Hobbes during the English civil wars and, later, by John Locke during the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

Hobbes and Locke based their political philosophies on the same thought experiment: They imagined what relations among sovereign human actors might have looked like in the absence of any overarching state authority. The resulting vision—the imaginary “state of nature”—opened up a new way of conceptualizing relations among sovereign political units, on the individual as well as the collective level. Subsequent authors applied this vision to relations among sovereign states. The Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza evolved from Hobbes’s argument a bleak description of interstate relations in terms of jealous sovereign actors that pursued their interests in ruthlessly egotistical ways. Christian Wolff and Émeric Vatell pursued the vision of Locke and developed a more harmonious view of rational actors that pursued their individual goals yet also understood the role played by common interests and cooperation.

These two attitudes to the world—the Hobbesian and the Lockean—evolved and interwove in subsequent years. A new step in the history of IR began during the Enlightenment, when the early notions of conflict and cooperation gave way to a more widely shared systemic perspective on the interrelations among sovereign actors.

This perspective was first expressed in two discourses that emerged in the 18th century: one orbiting the concept of balance of power and the other concerning plans for a perpetual peace. The notion of political balance is old—it was noted by Thucydides and invoked by Renaissance scholars like Francesco Guicciardini. These early authors, however, tended to apply the notion to the policy of single states (later called “containment”) or to relations between pairs of states (later called “counterpoise”). But a new notion appeared during the wars of Louis XIV, when authors like Francois Fénelon noted that the order of all of Europe was maintained by a principle of balance. In 1713, the diplomats who wrote the Treaty of Utrecht noted that their aim was to establish “a durable balance” in Europe. These examples suggest a new understanding of the balance of power as a mechanism that would bring order to Europe’s state relations. They indicate that Europe’s macropolitical scene is seen as a unity composed of several sovereign states.

This portrayal of Europe as a system of states evolved in subsequent decades. It reached its mature form in the work of William Robertson, who set out to explain both the origins of balance-of-power policies and the mechanisms of its operation. Robertson's explanation was very influential. On the basis of it, Edward Gibbon argued that balance-of-power dynamics have prevented the multistate system of Europe from sliding back into empire. Gibbon, thus, drew an analytical distinction between a balance-of-power system of sovereign states and an empire.

The notion of a perpetual peace, too, has long forbears—its roots can be traced back to religious thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, Dante, and Erasmus. During the Enlightenment, however, secular scenarios for a new and peaceful world order were expressed by thinkers who relied on appeals to human reason, natural rights of freedom, the reality of historical progress, and an implied notion of Europe as a system of sovereign states. Duc de Sully was among the first thinkers to propose a way of establishing peaceful relations among the sovereign states of Europe. Abbé de St. Pierre was another important contributor.

When major Enlightenment philosophers began to wrestle with the question of peace and cultivated new cosmopolitan ideals, the theoretical trickle became a flood: The cosmopolitan approach held that human beings are rational and peaceful and that conflict and war are the result of dysfunctional regime types. This attitude was expressed most famously by Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant in his essay *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795).

### *The Turn-of-the-Century Breakthrough*

Balance-of-power theories and perpetual-peace plans were products of the early Enlightenment and were infused with the optimism of the age. Both theories invoked the use of reason in the service of a better world. By the 19th century, their themes and concepts were applied by soldiers, statesmen, and scholars in various fields—in history, in law, and in the new social sciences (geography, economics, sociology, and political science). Two developments helped pave the way for a more mature notion of IR.

First, there emerged a clearer notion of Europe as a system of states. The German historian

Leopold von Ranke contributed to this by introducing the concept of “the Great Powers.” It simplified the discussion because it reduced the Western system of states to a few formative states—*die grossen Mächte*—that drove the process and imposed their rules of conduct on the system at large.

Second, historians began to explore the interstate affairs of the very recent past and, even, current events. In England, John Seeley and Edward Freeman made the case for “contemporary history” as a worthy object of study. In Germany, Heinrich von Treitschke examined the nature and evolution of states. In his extremely popular lecture series on politics, Treitschke included some thoughts on the contemporary relations among states, during which he noted that there existed two basic approaches to the subject: The first was the “moralizing doctrine” of the British advocates of free trade; the other was the “naturalistic” approach, anchored in social philosophers like Machiavelli and Hobbes. Treitschke ridiculed the first and condoned the second.

Geographers began, in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, to view the state in light of biological theories—Friedrich Ratzel and Johan Rudolf Kjellén saw states as organisms and interstate relations as competition for scarce resources and living space. Economists observed novel relations in international trade. French writers were quick to observe these new relations. The economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu wrote an influential book on colonialism, *De la colonisation chez des peuples modernes* (Of Colonization Among Modern Nations, 1874); the sociologist Jacques Novicow sought to capture interstate relations in social science terms in his *Politique internationale* (International Politics, 1886). International questions were discussed in magazines—first in the many monthlies and quarterlies that emerged in the final decades of the century (*The North American Review*, *The Review of Reviews*, *Journal des deux mondes* [Review of the Two Worlds], and many others) and then in professional social science journals (*Political Science Quarterly*, *American Political Science Review*, and *Journal of Race Development*).

A most significant contributor to the evolution of IR theory was a new movement in international law. It was explicitly cosmopolitan and sponsored by an international network of legal activists. They



founded a journal, *Revue de droit international et législation comparée* (RDI; *Journal of International and Comparative Law*), as well as the Institute of International Law in Ghent. They were wedded to the idea that international conflict could be avoided by the elaboration of international law—indeed, they believed that conflicts could be solved by the establishment of international institutions devoted to adjudication and arbitration.

One of them, the Scottish scholar James Lorimer, wrote an essay that reduced centuries of scholarly speculation to a few basic points. In an essay for the RDI in 1871, titled “Final Problem in International Law,” Lorimer explained that international politics is played out in a community of states whose members are sovereign and that it, as a result, lacks a central body of legislation. It is, thus, a lawless society—an “anarchy,” as Lorimer dubbed it. Lawlessness is, however, not the same as orderlessness, continued Lorimer. Order is imposed on this anarchical society by two mechanisms: (1) the political principle of balance of power and (2) the economic principle of interdependence. Since neither result in a stable order, it will be necessary to add a third ordering principle—namely, a centralized legislature and mechanisms that can enforce its laws.

In the liberal states of the West, other activists entertained similar views. A growing number of people joined organizations that opposed war and promoted peace. Members of national assemblies established the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1889) designed to solve conflicts and ease international tensions. Such efforts contributed greatly to the Peace Conference in Hague in 1899, which, in turn, established the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This Hague conference was attended by nearly all the sovereign states in the world. And it was eagerly supported by more than 400 peace organizations.

This optimistic atmosphere waned during the final years of the century by the new and darker mood of *Realpolitik*. The German historian Heinrich von Treitschke expressed this new sentiment with his portrayal of politics as a competition among territorial states for power and influence. This change was noted by the American historian and diplomat Paul Reinsch in *World Politics* (1900). The “age of reason” was in his opinion replaced by an “age of force.” The change was,

according to Reinsch, hastened by the Franco-Prussian War (1871), which led to the unification of Germany and to the alteration of Europe’s established political relations. It was also hastened by the growth of industrialism and nationalism.

The new zeitgeist was well represented by the advent of social Darwinism and by the new imperialism, which Reinsch held to be one of the most influential ideas of the age. Other ideas also emerged in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War and affected scholarly discussions of war and peace. Among them were liberal and radical ideas that protested the new militarism and warned against new wars on the continent. Critical voices were carried by members of the evolving social sciences: geography, economics, sociology, and political science all made their imprint on the systematic study of war, peace, and IR. Norman Angell’s *Great Illusion* (1910), for example, drew on liberal theories of finance and trade to warn against war in the industrial age and to condemn statesmen who foolishly still imagined that wars could be won. Weapons systems are now so destructive and industrial nations are so tightly tied together in webs of interdependence that war among them would bring disaster on them all.

### World War I and After

The debate about IR has a long prehistory. World War I converted this debate into a field of scholarly study. It happened quickly, as a sudden burst when the war deteriorated, counter to all military opinions, into a stalemate of deadly trench warfare. Between 1914 and 1917, the vast armies of Europe’s industrial states shelled each other senseless at the average cost of 100,000 young soldiers’ lives per week. How could this meaningless slaughter happen? How could it be brought to an end? What could be done to prevent a similar catastrophe in the future? Statesmen and scholars struggled to answer these questions. And the scholarly study of IR emerged as one of the results.

Similar questions had long been discussed by historians, lawyers, and antiwar activists. Two additional groups added their voices and helped boost the scholarly study of IR. The first group consisted of wealthy industrialists who had sponsored research on war and education for peace before World War I—men like Alfred Nobel,

Andrew Carnegie, and Richard Garton. The second group consisted of political operatives—men like James Bryce and Philip Noël Baker in England and Woodrow Wilson in the United States. For with the senseless destruction of World War I, civil servants, diplomats, statesmen, and their advisers also grew increasingly concerned with issues of war and peace.

### *War as a Catalyst*

The outbreak of war in 1914 spurred a flurry of attempts to explain its causes and identify the conditions for a lasting postwar peace. G. Lowes Dickinson, a classics scholar at Cambridge University, argued that although Prussian militarism was an immediate cause of the war, the deeper cause was the lawless or “anarchic” state of affairs among sovereign states. He justified his claim in a slim 1916 book, *The European Anarchy*.

Other authors and activists, too, designed proposals for such ordering organizations. In the United States, Yale mathematician Irving Fisher presented an idea for a “league of peace.” A most influential scheme was presented by Leonard Woolf, a British civil servant turned author and publisher. His *International Government* (1916) deeply influenced diplomats and statesmen like Robert Cecil, Jan Smuts, and Woodrow Wilson. At the Peace Conference in Paris (1919), President Wilson relied on Woolf’s argument to push for a League of Nations.

Wilson’s initiative transformed international politics. His arguments at the Paris Peace Conference challenged the views of old statesmen. His vision of a League of Nations appealed greatly to the broad public. It formulated, among other things, a need for research and education in international affairs.

While Wilson met with other statesmen in Paris to convince them of his vision for a postwar League, legal experts and scholarly advisers met to discuss postwar collaboration in international research and education. The world’s first Department of International Politics was established at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919—financed by a generous endowment from the wealthy industrialist David Davies. Institutes of International Affairs were founded in Britain and the United States in 1920. The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) established

a department of IR (1924). In the United States, comparable departments were established at Georgetown University (Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 1919), University of Southern California (School of International Relations, 1924), and University of Chicago (The Committee on International Relations, 1928), to mention but a few. The impression left by this development is that the scholarly study of IR emerged during the 1920s as an English-language discipline—in spite of the fact that Switzerland established the first school entirely devoted to IR (Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1927).

Early IR continued the perpetual peace tradition. Kant’s famous essay *Perpetual Peace* was a central text in many early reading lists that were steeped in a liberal faith in free trade, popular democracy, and collective security. Contemporary popular textbooks were written by Ernest Satow, David P. Heatley, S. H. Allen, and P. Potter. They tended to discuss the causes of war and the preconditions for peace—and commonly saw the causes of war as irrationality or ill will and the preconditions for peace in rational diplomacy with an eye toward establishing norms, rules, and international institutions.

### *Idealism and the First Great Debate*

These first years of scholarly IR were conducted in President Wilson’s shadow. This is easy to understand: In the wake of a shockingly destructive war, the tired populations of the West cleaved to Wilson and his League as their one great hope (he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919 and was generally hailed as a worthy recipient). Also, the League was in its earliest years an active and apparently effective organization. The foreign ministers of the Great Powers attended League meetings and used the League machinery to improve relations and settle their differences.

Not all observers, however, shared this general confidence in human reason, trade, and international law. Some still saw world events through prisms of competition and power. Their case was strengthened as world events were marked by deepening economic crises and interstate competition, and the League met with declining success. The League could not prevent the Chaco War, Japan’s occupation of Manchuria, Italy’s invasion

of Abyssinia, or Germany's rearmament. The changing relations among the Great Powers, combined with the advent of insistent rhetoric drawn from strong political ideologies, altered the political climate. And the study of IR altered with it.

There emerged authors who, invoking the apparent ineffectiveness of the League, criticized its cosmopolitan advocates and called them "idealist" or "utopian." In the name of "realism," they rejected the idea that international organizations such as the League could prevent war. Authors like Frederick L. Schuman, Frank H. Simonds, and James T. Shotwell rejected the assumption that undergirded liberal internationalism—that human beings are inherently pacific and, if left to their own devices, would establish peaceful relations with one another. Many authors held that humans are basically self-interested and that, although they pursue their egotistical goals in rational ways, they will inevitably enter into conflicts with one another. Others argued that humans are not fully rational. Still others claimed that evil and sinful impulses have corrupted human reason and behavior.

The American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr drew on all these arguments. In *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932), Niebuhr argued that individual humans may be both well-meaning and rational but that these qualities do not apply to human collectivities—such as states—whose behaviors tend to be both amoral and irrational. He also argued that the Idealist and the Romantic fail to understand the brutal character of the behavior of all human collectives and the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all intergroup relations.

Such bleak assumptions were commonly held by refugees from Europe's illiberal states. Among them were Jewish scholars who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s and settled in Britain or the United States. Some of them—for example, John Herz and Hans Morgenthau—found teaching jobs at U.S. universities. Arnold Wolfers, who taught at Yale in the late 1930s, argued that the discipline of IR was suspended between two poles or traditions—a liberal tradition rooted in Locke and Vatell and a realist tradition informed by Machiavelli and Hobbes.

This idea of two traditions received a particularly influential formulation by Carr. He taught IR at the University of Wales in the late 1930s and divided the evolution of the scientific study of IR

into two phases: first a utopian, League-focused phase that emerged in the wake of World War I and then a second, realist phase that emerged in the 1930s after a critical Great Debate. Carr expressed his two-phased account in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939). The book was immensely influential and his thesis of considerable didactical value.

The French philosopher Alexandre Kojève presented an alternative account. And if Carr influenced a generation of English IR scholars, then Kojève influenced a generation of French social philosophers. Kojève was, like Carr, a Hegelian and argued that ideological strife ended with the French Revolution and that after Napoleon, the Enlightenment ideals of reason, rights, and equal recognition were universally accepted in the West. History was, in his view, at an end. His opponents begged to differ. They argued that world events were, in fact, deeply affected by ideological strife between liberalism, communism, and fascism. This clash was all the more serious, they argued, as each ideology had a Great Power behind it to back it up.

This late-interwar discussion included a broad range of perspectives. Liberal internationalism was beleaguered. On its left were socialist and communist parties and labor unions whose discussions about war and peace were informed by an alternative internationalism. Socialists and communists drew on Marxist political economy, elaborated in the shadow of Nikolai Bukharin's and Vladimir Lenin's theories of imperialism. On the far right were nationalist and fascist arguments, often informed by a social Darwinism that saw IR as a perpetual struggle among countries and races for power and living space. The fascist movement was largely anti-intellectual and poor on theory; however, there were exceptions—the antiliberal arguments of the German lawyer Carl Schmitt being a notable case.

### World War II and After

By the end of the 1930s, liberal internationalism had lost its luster, squeezed between realism and radical approaches—both of which saw international politics as a struggle for power.

The war also added geopolitical dimensions to IR theorizing. Whereas World War I had largely been a European civil war, World War II was a global struggle. Also, World War II was fast paced: If the fighting paused in one theatre, it flared up in

another region. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin fought the war with maps of Europe in hand; Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt consulted globes in their offices.

The United States emerged as the preeminent Great Power during the course of the war. President Roosevelt had two wartime aims: (1) to bring Germany and Japan to unconditional surrender and (2) to build a strong antifascist alliance of states—the United Nations (UN)—which would last beyond the war and provide the stable basis for a postwar world order. Roosevelt worked hard to achieve both goals. Like Wilson before him, Roosevelt established a worldwide political organization based on the principle of collective security, the United Nations Organization (UNO). In addition, he worked to establish economic organizations to coordinate the world's commercial relations. In 1944, delegates from the UN alliance met in the New Hampshire town of Bretton Woods and established the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and a liberal set of trade rules (GATT). This Bretton Woods system was meant to secure a postwar world of open, democratic states in free pursuit of commercial ventures. Roosevelt's scheme was, in other words, informed by a liberal vision of order and peace.

Just as American politicians emerged as leaders of the liberal world in the wake of World War II, so also did American scholars emerge as leading practitioners of scholarly IR. Quincy Wright was one of them. In 1941, he published *The Study of War*—an encyclopedic tome of more than 1,000 pages. Bernhard Brodie of Yale University was another of these leading scholars. Soon after the war, Brodie published *The Absolute Weapon* (1946), a book that discussed the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and assessed the impact of atomic weapons on IR. Its message was that atomic power will change the way we think about strategy and diplomacy, and war and peace. Would atomic weapons destroy the world, or would they inaugurate an era of stable world peace, wondered Brodie, echoing Kant's question of 150 years before.

### *Realism and the Second Debate*

The realist approach was entrenched when relations between the United States and the former USSR descended into enmity and competition in

the wake of World War II. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan relied on traditional *Realpolitik* when he reassessed the U.S.–Soviet relationship in 1946 and recommended that President Harry Truman adopt a foreign policy stance based on a doctrine of unwavering containment.

Morgenthau, too, advocated a realist approach. His *Politics Among Nations* (1947) quickly became a basic textbook in IR. It exercised an immense influence in the United States and elsewhere. Realism was also embraced by other influential scholars, like Georg Schwartzberger in Great Britain and Raymond Aron in France. All saw IR as a high-stakes game played out in a system of sovereign, self-interested states who all seek to maximize power, security, and chances of survival.

Although realism dominated postwar scholarship, it was not the only approach. Realism was well suited to capture the deteriorating postwar relations between the United States and the former USSR, but it was hard to view other state relations through those very same realist lenses. It was difficult to grasp the development issues of non-Western states—their efforts to achieve political independence, economic growth, and peaceful interrelations did not suit the realist vocabulary well. It was also hard to capture some Western issues. Relations between North and South America were a case in point; communication or discussion in this context was often phrased in radical—sometimes even Marxist—terms of exploitation and repression. Relations among the United States and Western Europe were also hard to grasp in realist terms; they were commonly discussed in terms of liberal internationalism instead. Postwar relations among the states of Western Europe were also marked by a degree of cooperation and coordination insufficiently captured by the old realist concepts of “alliance” and “league.” Politicians like Jean Monnet and academics like Ernest Haas used terms such as integration and federation to describe new, tighter, and more peaceful forms of interstate relations.

Also, realism showed signs of deteriorating. It provided a convenient discourse for warning against Soviet expansionism, but leading realist scholars (like Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan) cautioned against the uncritical use of terms such as balance and containment to justify ideological crusades against communism. Another movement

emerged in the United States whose members criticized the realists for their excessive reliance on “wisdom” and on the anecdotal use of historical “interpretation.” They argued that IR should be studied through more scientific approaches with an eye to establishing patterns or regularities in interstate behavior. They compiled data sets on conflicts and wars and used statistics to identify regularities and patterns in them. This, it was argued, would enable IR to establish general propositions about interstate behavior and escape the old “interpretive” approaches.

Wright had paved the way: His painstakingly compiled data of centuries of past wars and his statistical analyses provided the basis for his encyclopedic *Study of War* (1941)—this substantial tome was equipped with figures, charts, and fold-out tables. The advocacy of quantitative methods triggered a new “great debate” in the IR community. This debate was part of a larger “behaviorist” orientation in the social sciences and related to the development of computer technologies and the hope of subjecting vast data sets to statistical analyses.

### *New Schools and Approaches*

This Second Great Debate found its classic representation in an exchange between J. David Singer and Hedley Bull. Singer was a behavioralist from the University of Michigan and an early compiler of data on conflicts and war—such as the important Correlates of War Project. Bull was an influential traditionalist scholar from the LSE and Oxford and a member of the British Committee on International Relations, the members of which had developed an alternative approach that stressed cooperation over confrontation—an English School that had Grotius and his notions of law and society as major sources of inspiration.

The debate between the two was largely a discussion of methodology. Other issues were soon pulled into its wake, however. One such issue concerned the value of IR as a field of knowledge; the other its proper object of study.

Kenneth Waltz touched on all these issues in his book *Man, the State, and War* (1959). Waltz sought to identify and map the main arguments that philosophers and statesmen had applied to the study of IR through the ages. He isolated their

theoretical cores and categorized them according to three “images”—that is, whether they were located at the individual, the social, or the systemic level of analysis.

Waltz’ book anchored IR theory in history and defined the scholarly field as part of a rich tradition of political ideas. LSE professor Martin Wight did much of the same thing. He too identified three schools of thought in IR and called them realism, rationalism, and revolutionism. Each school represented a distinct ontology, argued Wight—a distinct view of the world. Realism sees the world in terms of states, state interests, and power; rationalism perceives the world as inhabited by rational humans driven toward cooperation; and revolutionism observes the world through the lenses of right and wrong and dreams of a peaceful and unified world. Each approach constituted a distinct school of thought, sustained by a distinct tradition, argued Wight. He demonstrated how philosophers like Hobbes, Grotius, Kant, and others had contributed to these schools in various ways.

As the 1950s evolved into the 1960s, new controversies were added to the scholarly debate. For a time, the influential schemes of Waltz and Wight helped keep a certain order on the debate. But controversies soon emerged that defied easy categorization. Within the scientist camp, for example, there emerged a political dividing line. On one side were scientists who were concerned with issues of security. These scientists collaborated with the U.S. government and established a new field of security studies; among them were scholars like Albert Wohlstetter and Thomas Schelling, who were associated with the RAND Corporation, a private research center that was largely funded by the U.S. Air Force. On the other side were social scientists who were concerned with justice and peace; among them were the economist Kenneth Boulding and the sociologist Johan Galtung. These scholars updated the old banner of the peace movement to include opposition against atomic weapons and claimed a new field of peace research.

These two scientific communities contributed importantly to IR over subsequent decades. They were very similar in methodological orientation, but they disagreed strongly on epistemological and ontological issues. They were matching bookends, enclosing the social-scientific approaches to issues

of war and peace but from opposite sides, disagreeing strongly on the ultimate nature of politics and the reasons for studying it.

### Systems and Structures

Political discussions intensified as the Cold War entered a new phase. In the wake of World War II, colonies in Africa and Asia had demanded self-government. As the old imperial powers were reluctant to grant such independence, the locals organized liberation movements to fight for sovereignty and self-rule. The 1960s saw a growing number of armed struggles directed against French and British rule.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev observed that armed rebels challenged the imperialist powers of the capitalist West and began to support them. The Americans responded, predictably, by trying to contain what they saw as Soviet expansionism. This quickly involved U.S. forces in conflicts around the world, and American statesmen and scholars were confronted with a horrible dilemma.

The U.S. containment of anticolonial movements in the Third World led the United States to side with the old colonial powers of Europe and seriously undermined America's liberal advocacy of free trade and anticolonialism. This became painfully obvious as the United States increased its support for the French war effort against anticolonial rebels in Indochina. In 1954, the French pulled out, and the United States continued the war in Vietnam on its own.

The escalation of the Vietnam War changed the world's perception of the United States and fueled criticism of U.S. policies. Members of the profession engaged in the general debate on colonial independence, sovereignty, development, and the reasons behind U.S. engagements in foreign wars. Professors and students drew on increasingly radical perspectives that portrayed U.S. behavior as driven by the internal needs of the capitalist system and portrayed the United States as a prowling, neo-imperialist Great Power. Some added, invoking the Marxist notion of false consciousness, that the capitalists legitimized their expansion through the production of false ideology and presented it as universal truth. Such radical arguments were also voiced by non-Western political leaders—Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, “Che” Guevara, and Ho

Chi Minh. They gained adherents among radical IR scholars.

One effect of this development was to boost what Wight had called the revolutionary approach to IR and elevate it on par with the two established traditions of realism and rationalism. By 1970, IR was commonly presented as having three rivaling approaches or schools or—invoking Thomas Kuhn's fashionable term—three “paradigms,” each with its own distinct ontology.

Another effect was to challenge the traditional concept of power—one of the key concepts of IR. The traditional definition viewed power in terms of specific resources—as the outcome of a systematic application of force, wealth, or propaganda. Discussions about colonialism and conflict, and wars and wealth in the Third World pulled alternative definitions of power in its wake. Power could, for example, be seen in terms of social relationships—a state possesses power by virtue of its position in a social structure or its ability to define the main rules of interaction. By this view, the Great Powers of the West derived their superior resources and privileges from their ability to maintain an international world economy that enriched them while they exploited, impoverished, and repressed everyone else.

A third effect of this was to direct attention toward what Waltz had called the systemic level of analysis. Revolutionist theorists included sweeping discussions of the inherent needs of the capitalist system. They developed new theories of imperialism. André Gunder Frank portrayed the United States as a metropole and other countries as satellites and identified the mechanisms that enriched the first but impoverished the second. Immanuel Wallerstein's *Modern World System* (1974) presented 500 years of world history in terms of interactions between a powerful and wealthy world core and a poor periphery. This analysis of the modern world economy had a deep and long-lasting influence on IR scholarship.

Realist authors, too, developed systemic approaches. Waltz defined the interstate system in terms of the distribution of capabilities among major power centers or “poles.” His *Theory of International Politics* (1979) presented a reformulation of the old balance-of-power theory, anchoring it in sociological theory and in microeconomic reasoning. Robert Gilpin presented a similar argument

in his *War and Change* (1981). He argued that Great Powers always sought to impose their own rules on international games in an effort to bring about a world order that suited their own interests. He then portrayed the history of the modern world as a system in which Great Powers had regularly risen to and fallen from hegemonic status, igniting major “hegemonic wars” in the process, with each new hegemon imposing its own order on the post-war world. George Modelski and William Thompson followed up this idea and developed a theory of long cycles or waves of hegemonic leadership.

Authors from the rationalist tradition followed suit. Robert Keohane presented a systemic alternative to Waltz and Gilpin’s neorealism. The fall of a Great Power is not necessarily attended by war and followed by a new world order, he argued. If U.S. hegemony were to unravel, the system that the United States established after World War II is so rational and serves everyone so well that it will not be essentially changed by America’s demise, argued Keohane in *After Hegemony* (1984). The demise of the United States will, in other words, not necessarily cause strife and conflict.

By the mid-1980s, then, the scholarly field of IR was dominated by three main approaches, each with grand, systemic theories at its core. These theories were all affected by economic reasoning: the radical approach most directly, as it relied on concepts and arguments from classical political economy, and the realist and rationalist approaches more subtly. Waltz drew on theories of neoclassical oligopolistic competition, while Keohane drew on neo-institutionalist economics. Both incorporated game theory. Scholars who explored these two traditions further found so much similar ground that they began to transcend the ancient rivalry of realism and rationalism and merged into a so-called neo-neosynthesis.

### The End of the Cold War and the Ideational Turn

Systemic theories met with much skepticism. Realists claimed that such theories were static and could not easily account for change. Rationalists argued that they were abstract and excluded human elements. International politics involve people who make decisions and shape events, they argued. States do not balance; statesmen do. And

when statesmen decide to balance, they do not heedlessly react to abstract concepts such as “capabilities”; they balance against what they perceive as concrete and tangible threats.

Some scholars retorted that statesmen may well act on perceptions, but such perceptions are in turn part of larger systems—of “epistemological communities”—that socialize statesmen into the collective norms of distinct societies and thus condition their perceptions of the world.

This was the vantage point of Richard Ashley whose “Poverty of Neorealism” (1984) amounted to a sweeping condemnation of Waltz. Neorealist theory is a distinct epistemic system, argued Ashley; it is totalizing and repressive and invokes the authority of “science” to justify its claim for objective knowledge where no such claim could exist, he argued. Other writers added their voices to this critical charge. Neither neorealism nor any other IR theory offer objective knowledge of the world. They are all mere reflections of distinct epistemic communities and contingent on particular conditions in time and space. This was the message of the scholars who contributed to James Der Derian’s book *International/Intertextual Relations* (1989). They portrayed IR as resting on a flimsy foundation of subjective assumptions that belonged to a narrow group of privileged, largely White, middle-class males who forced their articulations on more marginalized others, whose voices were consequently silenced by the imposition.

This criticism was not new. But whereas earlier criticism had flowed from materialist social science theories (e.g., from the Marxist false-ideology thesis), the critical claims of the 1980s hinged on ideational philosophies—on, for example, semiotics, linguistics, or symbolic interactionism (often inspired by Parisian postmodernists). These philosophies became a springboard of the poststructuralist turn that affected the social sciences in the 1990s.

### *Globalization and Change*

Several long-term trends conspired to enhance the force of this poststructuralist turn in IR. Two of them are indicated by the terms *communication revolution* and *globalization*. The means and modes of international transport were changed by new technologies. Goods, money, text, and images

were brought faster and cheaper around the world, fueling a steady expansion of commerce and credit. Easier travel encouraged increased migration, and whereas earlier waves of migration had brought Europeans out into the world, a new wave brought non-Europeans in. Such trends were long studied in terms of the old IR concept of interdependence. During the 1980s, however, when the introduction of relatively inexpensive personal computers represented a quantum leap in worldwide interconnectedness, new concepts and theories were applied—such as textual interrelationships, symbolic interaction, and multiple identities.

The liberal democracies of the West adapted to globalization. They did not always do it peacefully—national groups with traditional truth claims and monocultural assumptions clashed with immigrant demands for tolerance and understanding. Communist dictatorships, however, did not adapt well. Around 1990, the Soviet Union collapsed—for a variety of reasons; the refusal to adapt to the communication revolution for fear of losing political control was, perhaps, the most important one.

The Soviet collapse altered world politics. When Russia, the former USSR's crisis-ridden and non-communist successor, was in no shape to assume the role of America's superpower rival, the Cold War ended. The collapse also altered the perception of world politics. On the one hand, it reduced the relevance of neorealism and revolutionism—the fall of the former USSR weakened neorealism by striking at its assumption of a bipolar balance; revelations of the cruelties and the deep illegitimacy of the Soviet system weakened the ideological appeal of revolutionism. On the other hand, the Soviet collapse enhanced the relevance of ideational approaches. For it was not only the material capabilities of the old USSR that collapsed around 1991, it was also the Stalinist system, and it was the exhaustion of the old communist outlook that altered the international climate and ended the Cold War. Many observers concluded that ideas shape policy and that power capabilities may be the foreign policy tools of states but that ideas define the uses to which the tools are put. Alexander Wendt made this point in a much discussed 1992 article, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."

Finally, the Soviet collapse embarrassed the more formal or scientific approaches to IR. It came

as a total surprise to scholars who had long argued that the scientific method could produce general explanations of the past as well as predictions for the future. Their failure to predict the Soviet collapse embarrassed them and made their scientific approach vulnerable to criticism. A new Great Debate ensued. It was all the more heated as IR's entire philosophy of science was suddenly questioned.

### *Fragmentation, Realignment, and Ideational Approaches*

The conceptual toolbox of IR became richer and more diverse during the 1990s. It was filled with new approaches imported from other disciplines—neo-institutionalism, gender theory, culture studies, postcolonial analysis, and literary criticism among them. The substantial foci of IR, however, changed less. One of the established issues, the relationship of the Great Powers, reemerged in the wake of the Cold War: With the dissolution of the USSR, the world was no longer a bipolar system, but what kind of system was it? The United States emerged from the Cold War as the only remaining superpower, but what kind of power did it have?

Joseph Nye adumbrated an answer in *Bound to Lead* (1990): namely, that the United States led a unipolar system by virtue of its ideas, ideals, and example—that is, by its "soft power." Other authors made similar points. Samuel Huntington argued in *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993) that the Soviet collapse would be followed by an age deeply affected by conflicts of faith and civilizational ideas and ideals. Robert Kaplan wrote influential reports from regions of conflict—*Soldiers of God* (1990), *Balkans Ghosts* (1993), and *The Ends of the Earth* (1996)—and described these conflicts as driven by religious faith and ethnic identities.

Such claims stirred much debate. Francis Fukuyama protested the notion that future wars would be civilizational in nature. He argued instead that war would steadily diminish in the post-Cold War world and that there was now only one sustainable route to modernity: the liberal-democratic path. With communism on the ropes, liberal democracy had emerged dominant. Liberal definitions of reason, rights, and equal recognition



were striking roots everywhere, pushing religion, nationalism, and other philosophical relics into the dustbin of history. The age of the great ideational struggles was over, argued Fukuyama. Not only is the Cold War at an end, history itself is at an end, he concluded in *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992)—with a nod to Friedrich Hegel and Alexandre Kojève. Bruce Russett formulated a similar argument but from a scientist's perspective—and with a nod to Kant. In *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (1993), he argued that democratic states trade with one another, evolve interdependencies, and common interests. Democracies do not go to war with each other. By this logic, the spread of democracy was practical peace work.

Fukuyama and Russett were right about one thing: The number of interstate wars dropped after the Cold War. But Huntington and Kaplan, too, had a valid point: There were regions in the world that did not conform to the worldwide trend of growing order and peace. Conflict and war still marked an area between the eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean—a vast region from the Balkans via the Middle East, along the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush, to the Bay of Bengal. Some of its conflicts were related to the retreat of the former USSR and some to the expansion of the United States. Most of them involved national and religious identities.

This was worrisome. For this vast and varied region of sustained conflict also contained the world's richest stores of oil; Western statesmen feared that conflict would disrupt its extraction and smooth transport. This region was also predominantly Muslim; Western analysts feared that conflict might produce new and radical mutations of political Islam as well as proliferation of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—especially if crisis-ridden Russia lost control of its old Soviet WMD stockpiles.

Such fears soared to new heights on September 11, 2001, when Islamist terrorists crashed hijacked passenger jets into the Pentagon near Washington, D.C., and into Manhattan's World Trade Center. The newly elected president George W. Bush responded by striking out against Afghanistan, ousting its Islamist government, and installing a friendly regime in its stead. In the fall of 2003, President Bush ordered an invasion of Iraq. Amid loud protests and shrill warnings, he declared a

“war on terror,” arguing that Iraq's dictatorial regime had stockpiles of WMDs and nursed terrorist connections.

No WMDs were found in Iraq. No terrorist connections were convincingly established. Many in the world, including IR scholars, argued that the Bush administration had invaded Iraq either as the result of panic or confusion, or as a calculated effort to secure access to the region's oil reserves. Regardless of reason, the faraway and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wasted America's soft power and weakened its standing in the world—partly by its ongoing costly military exploits and by its policy of cutting taxes while increasing spending. In the first years of the new millennium, America's role in the post-Cold War world was increasingly described in terms of empire rather than hegemon: The United States was more commonly seen as an imperialist than as a democratizing force.

Turmoil and wars in the Middle East and Central Asia sparked new energy debates. The Great Powers of the world—with the significant exception of Russia—were deeply reliant on foreign oil, and their dependence presented a serious security risk for each of them. Also, the continued consumption of fossil fuels represented a security risk for them all: Many scientists claim that the burning of oil released such large amounts of carbon gases that it altered the composition of the earth's atmosphere and changed the global climate—and thus created a security risk of another kind. By the end of Bush's second term, the United States was still the world's most powerful country, but it was deeply distrusted. When the American economy entered a deep economic crisis, its image as a leading world power was on the rocks. Fareed Zakaria spoke on behalf of many observers when, in *The Post-American World* (2007), he portrayed the international system as increasingly multipolar, where countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China might represent new centers of power alongside an enfeebled and distrusted United States.

### Conclusion

The contours of scholarly IR that emerged in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) grew more defined during the subsequent years of imperialist expansion. It came into its own as a scholarly field during World War I, emerging as a branch of

the social sciences in the wake of that Great War. It was then preoccupied with the causes of war and the preconditions for a stable peace.

IR has since added other concerns to its scholarly ambit and evolved as a more varied scholarly field. It has become too varied, according to some observers—especially as IR scholars have engaged in abstract philosophy-of-science theorizing. True, IR may no longer have a sharp and single focus. However, its core concerns are still apparent as a set of overlapping issues, such as war and peace, wealth, and power. And these are maintained by the disciplinary history that marks IR as a scholarly field.

Also, the theoretical foundation of IR has remained fairly constant over time. IR scholars still hang on to their old notion of a pluralist field composed of opposing approaches. The two classic approaches—the Hobbes-based realism and the Locke-derived rationalism—are still dominating the scholarly debate (although both have adapted to the changing world). A third approach has drifted in and out of the field, advocating change and revolution—now in world affairs, now in scholarly approaches, but it has always sought to introduce critical, collectivist, and, one is tempted to add, romantic perspectives to the field. At the beginning of the 21st century, the basic approaches of IR, then, still conform to the three perspectives described by James Lorimer at the end of the 19th century.

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*See also* Balance of Power; International Law; Liberalism; Realism in International Relations; War and Peace; Westphalian Ideal State

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THEORY

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International relations (IR) theory is an area of social theory that seeks to account for international or world political events, patterns, relations, and interactions. Traditionally, as the concept implies, the focus of IR theory has been on the study of interstate relations and interactions: mainly on why states go to war with each other and why, under certain conditions, they may refrain from doing so. Yet it is important to note that in recent decades, the meaning, scope, and the interests driving IR theorists have expanded significantly beyond traditional interstate concerns. This expansion has been driven by the increased awareness of challenging new issues in international politics, such as globalization, human rights, global poverty, environmental threats, and global gender hierarchies. Interest in these issue areas has not only stimulated developments within traditional IR-theoretical approaches, such as realism and liberalism, but it has also seen a significant pluralization within the field to include a host of new perspectives.

When considering the history of IR theory, a subject that first emerged in the aftermath of

World War I and became consolidated in the post-World War II environment, it is notable that the meaning of the notion “IR theory” has developed in two distinct senses over the years: in terms of the perceptions scholars have of the scope of “IR” and, simultaneously, in terms of the meanings attached to the notion “theory.”

Having been a part and parcel of historical, economic, philosophical, or political inquiry during earlier centuries, in the 20th century, IR theory came gradually to form a disciplinary field distinct from other subfields of political science, such as political theory, or a base for theorizing in other social science disciplines, such as sociology, history, or economics. IR theory, as conceived by many commentators in the mid-20th century, focused primarily on state interactions on the level of the international system (not within the state) and in reference, by and large, to political relations (not economic or social relations). However, driven by the increasingly transnational and crosscutting nature of global problems, the boundaries between IR theory and other social sciences have been progressively reconceived by IR theorists during the past few decades. Many IR theorists now analyze phenomena beyond interstate relations and often use concepts and theoretical premises usually characteristic of other fields, whether it be economic analysis, the study of domestic social relations, or ethical or philosophical inquiry. Hence, it is not surprising that the nature of IR theory as a discrete academic subfield has been under some debate recently.

It should also be noted that while the scope of IR has expanded, the meaning of what counts as theory has at the same time shifted within the field. A number of so-called postpositivist scholars have in recent decades turned away from explanatory science, traditionally IR theorists’ main focus, in favor of understanding meanings and ideas in international politics. Thus, different views have arisen of the very meaning of theory. While for some it entails explanatory theory aimed at trying to establish the causes of world political developments, for others it is concerned with interpretive theory, seeking an understanding of why specific ideas or discursive systems of meaning have come to proliferate. In addition, some scholars make the argument that IR theory should primarily be viewed as normative theory (i.e., dealing with questions of “ought” and not just “is”), while others argue that

it should function as critical theory (i.e., challenging existing systems of power and oppression in world politics).

Given the contestation over the scope of the subject matter of IR theory and the meaning and purpose of theorizing itself, there is thus no singular conception of IR theory that we can turn to but rather a number of contested visions of it. In view of this, it is important to understand the plurality of ways of framing IR theorizing today. Whereas 40 years ago, three theories of IR were commonly referred to as exhausting the field—realism, liberalism, and either the English School or Marxism—today, a number of critical and postpositivist traditions of thought have entered this field, such as constructivism, critical theory, normative theory, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, feminism, and green theory.

This entry first discusses, in historical perspective, how theoretical arguments have developed around the idea of IR. Second, it discusses the distinct theoretical schools of thought, or isms, commonly conceived to be characteristic of IR theory today, highlighting key issues and themes on which theorists agree and disagree. This discussion is followed, finally, by a brief assessment of key developments in IR theory, with a view to deciphering where future interests and fault lines of IR theorizing might lie.

### IR Theory in Historical Perspective

The idea that there should be such a thing as IR theory at all is of a relatively recent origin, being in many ways a 20th-century invention. IR theory is a term that arose in the early and mid-20th century with the attempt by a specific set of, mostly Anglo-American, academics to develop systematic theoretical thought to serve as the basis for a newly emerging (sub)field of the social sciences—IR or international politics. While initially conceived as a subject matter for historians, lawyers, or political theorists, the professionalization and institutionalization of academic disciplines during this period also led scholars interested in the empirical domain of IR to establish a discipline of their own, including a set of specific theoretical assumptions and concepts appropriate to its study.

These concepts did not arise from nowhere, however. In fact, many 20th-century IR theorists

have taken their cue from much earlier thinkers. It could be argued that IR theory—that is, the attempt to systematically understand why states or political units go to war with each other or engage in other international forms of social interaction—was first developed in ancient Greece by Thucydides in his account of the Peloponnesian wars. IR was also clearly theorized in the medieval and early-modern periods in various scholastic and republican tracts, perhaps most notably in Niccolò Machiavelli's writings and in the treatises of those interested in the ethics and legality of war, such as Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius. From these early writings on IR arise not only many of the patterns of thought that continue to characterize IR today, such as the view of IR as power politics, but also many concepts used in current theory, such as the notions of sovereignty or just war. Yet these texts were not explicitly IR-theoretical: They were seen as part and parcel of wider historical, legal, political, or ethical reasoning.

The theorization of IR as we tend to understand it today arose in the 20th century. It is closely tied to the rise of the discipline of IR, which arose also in a very specific context, since it was “invented” to address the problem of war in the aftermath of World Wars I and II. After World War I, an impetus arose to address, urgently and systematically, the question of why states ended up engaging in destructive wars. To study this subject, the first Chair of International Politics was established at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919, and in the 1920s and 1930s at a few other universities. The focus of postwar IR specialists was thus on developing a systematic understanding of why wars occurred, specifically with the aim of allowing the international society to avoid them in the future. A number of commentators, such as Alfred Zimmern and Leonard Woolf, developed and argued for notions of collective security capable of averting the kind of disaster that World War I had been.

However, the most famous IR theory text that was to arise in the first part of the 20th century came in reply to the interwar commentators. It was written by Edward Carr, the Chair in International Politics at Aberystwyth at this time, and was called the *Twenty Years' Crisis*. Carr was one of the early key scholars seeking specifically to establish a theoretical understanding of IR. In so doing, he drew attention to the failings of the

interwar commentators. He argued that they had been far too “idealistic,” prioritizing normative and utopian ideals instead of recognizing the “realities” of power politics. Carr dismissed these idealists in favor of the development of “realist” theorizing, which took seriously the sources of conflict between states, the role of national interest in shaping states' actions, and the role of power politics in IR more widely.

Carr played a key role in setting out the theoretical parameters of what became known as realist IR theory, and it is also fair to say that he was instrumental in establishing realism in the post-World War II context. Realist thinking was also strengthened by the onset of the Cold War, which seemed to prove the importance of power politics, as well as by the influence that Hans Morgenthau came to have during this period. In *Politics Amongst Nations*, he argued that international politics is shaped by objective laws based on human nature and, crucially, that the key to understanding IR lies in the idea of interest defined in terms of power. Unlike liberal idealists, he claimed that the actions of states should not be judged in terms of universal moral standards but with reference to the specific interests that states hold and by the need for prudential action on the part of their leaders. Power politics may be necessary in international politics in defense of the national interest.

It is the centrality of power in these early realist analyses that initiated a whole set of fascinating work on the core dilemmas in international politics, notably on the idea of security dilemma, explored initially, for example, by John Herz: How can states cooperate when the attempts of some to gain security inevitably create insecurity in other states?

Although realism became the core strand of thought in Anglo-American IR theory during these years, it was substantially modified as a theoretical system by Kenneth Waltz, who in 1979 made a radical break with the classical realist tradition by modeling the international system in accordance with the methods of positivist science. He characterized this system as one of anarchy, within which all states are conceived as “like units,” interested ultimately in nothing but their own survival. This structural, or neorealist, argument set a new standard in IR. Not only did it reshape realist thought, but it also influenced the work of the new brand of

liberal internationalists in the 1970s, such as Robert Keohane—even though Keohane believed that the self-help logic could be mitigated in international politics through the development of international institutions. In its more classical forms, realism also strongly influenced the so-called English School developed in the United Kingdom (UK); for while the focus here was on the idea of an international society, the realist prioritization of state relations still formed the core of this school.

It is important to note that realists, many liberals, and many English School thinkers share certain important assumptions about what IR theory is and should consist of. Paradoxically, the best statement of this notion of IR theory is provided in Martin Wight's essay "Why is there no international theory?" Wight was skeptical of the possibility of international theory because of the perception of war as recurrent and inevitable by many and because of the attractions among political scientists of political theory conceived in terms of the "good life"—patterns of thought that, in his view, seemed far removed from the realities of international politics. Yet Wight gave a very clear account of what IR theory should be: It should be concerned exclusively with international and not domestic politics, and it should be able to deal with, although possibly also look beyond, the endless recurrence of war. This was precisely the sort of theory that Edward Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Waltz, and others developed for the discipline. Despite some methodological disagreements between scholars (the so-called second debate) throughout the 1950s and 1960s, there was substantial agreement on the meaning of the focal point of IR theory, at least in terms of its object of study—state behavior and the explanation of the causes of war and conditions for cooperation. This consensus on the theory of IR broke down, however, in the 1970s and 1980s with the rise of the interparadigm debate and, subsequently, the fourth debate.

The interparadigm debate in the 1970s challenged the classical understandings of IR theory in terms of what the field should focus on. In light of both the oil and the financial crises in the 1970s, two new perspectives gained currency: complex interdependence theory and Marxism. These paradigms were conceived to challenge the realist focus in two respects: First, while accepting the state as

a key actor, both refused to reduce all international politics to the pursuit of national interests, instead looking beyond the state to the role of economic factors and nonstate actors; second, they challenged the negative conclusions of the realists, arguing instead that forms of cooperation beyond mere constant struggle for survival was possible. This entailed a challenge to both the dominance of realism and the realist theoretical obsession with survival and brute (military) power; there was now a need also to explain why states cooperated and, for Marxists, why certain patterns of inequality outside mere military relations continued to persist and structure IR.

These echoes critical of realism were picked up and developed even further in the 1980s when a variety of so-called postpositivist theorists started to criticize realism, not just on the basis of its theoretical assumptions about the state but also because of its philosophical, normative, and political leanings. Philosophically, realist theory was accused of positivism in its attempt to establish laws and regularities in international politics as well as objective scientific knowledge of human affairs—goals that were viewed as unfeasible and inappropriate within the social sciences. In addition, realism was condemned normatively and politically for constituting a conservative bulwark for statists and Great Power apologists; it was seen to be reproducing a negative and cynical vision of the world and one that unfairly prioritized the interests of great powers over other parts of the world. Critical theorists extended this criticism to include many liberals as well—those who had accepted some central assumptions of realism, notably with a focus on the self-interested state.

Critical theorists emphasized the need to go beyond problem-solving theory (perceived as central for realists, liberals, and even some Marxists), by unraveling the ways in which theories of IR reproduced particular ideological interests and power relations in the world.

The postpositivist criticism led to the proliferation of a whole new set of IR theories—feminism, constructivism, poststructuralism, and critical theory—and caused the onset of a more theoretically pluralist way of approaching IR theory. Indeed, whereas in the 1970s and mid-1980s many IR theory textbooks highlighted just three traditions of IR theory (realism, liberalism, and either the

English School or Marxism as a third option), today IR theory textbooks cover anywhere between 8 and 14 different theoretical approaches (see Scott Burchill et al., 2005; Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, & Steve Smith, 2007).

### IR Theories

Given the plurality of approaches that exists today in IR theory, we must, to understand contemporary IR theory, engage with the theoretical pluralism in the field. With this in mind, this section examines some of the core isms in IR theory today and the issues and debates that divide them.

#### *The Isms*

To characterize any field in terms of a set of “isms” is hugely problematic, although often also attractive for cognitive reasons. While this approach is used here, because such a terminology is seen to have distinct advantages in clarifying some of the key divisions of thought on IR theory, this usage also has important problems that need to be kept in mind.

First, it must be remembered that it can be historically misleading to characterize the thought of specific individuals as belonging to unified isms. Thus, for example, as historians of the discipline have noted, idealists in the interwar period were not necessarily unified in their frameworks of thought constituting an ism, and nor were they necessarily idealists. Indeed, the use of the *ism* label can be a useful way of rhetorically dismissing or sidelining thinkers, and Carr’s attack on idealism can be seen as one such rhetorical attack. Second, it is important to note that isms may be identified on very different grounds in analyses. Thus, in IR theory, some isms may be strictly IR-theoretical isms, such as realism, but others may have much wider meanings alongside their meanings in IR (e.g., constructivism in philosophy and social theory, liberalism in political theory and economic science) or meanings entirely beyond IR (e.g., critical realism in philosophy). Third, and perhaps most crucially, the isms approach to any subject creates the problem of specifying which isms “count.” Talking in terms of isms is one way of justifying and legitimizing some approaches over others and simultaneously of excluding some

of them. Now, the approach adopted here to IR theories is expansive, yet it by no means includes within it all the approaches that could be considered IR-theoretical. For example, anarchism is not treated here as a distinct IR-theoretical school, although grounds exist for saying that it might constitute one. It should also be noted that within the approaches adopted here, there are various subdivisions and also that not all authors have consistently throughout their career sought to serve a single and unified idea of an ism.

With all the above caveats in mind, the isms that are discussed here are realism, liberalism, the English School, Marxism, critical theory, feminism, constructivism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, green theory, and normative theory. These constitute the core theoretical strands of thought currently commonly referred to and developed in IR, although they are not isms in the same sense (normative theory, e.g., may be conceived as a subfield of study and poststructuralism as an ethos rather than a theory).

#### Realism

As pointed out earlier, realism provides the core reference point for much of IR theory. This is not because realism is necessarily correct but because it has played a significant role in the rise of the idea of IR theory and because the very idea of IR conceptually remains tied to key realist assumptions. The core realist assumptions can be defined as threefold. Realist IR theory argues (a) that the state is the core unit of international politics, (b) that the national interests of the state play a crucial role in defining the shape of international politics, and (c) that because of the emphasis of states on survival and self-interest, cooperation between states is difficult to maintain, and war between states is always a danger and likely to be recurrent. While these constitute core assumptions that most realists would agree on, there are important subdivisions within realist thought that need to be considered.

*Neorealism* is a term coined to refer to those realists who follow Waltz’s reformulation of realism—that is, a theory that bases its analysis on the postulation of a structural impediment to state cooperation, the structure of anarchy in the international system. Given the structural constraint of anarchy, states are predisposed toward self-help

behavior. Classical realists, whom Waltz criticized, explain the causes of war in terms of individualistic or state-based levels or, like Ned Lebow, have turned to the language and theoretical explanations of classical Greeks rather than modern social science to generate explanations of current affairs. Offensive and defensive realisms are strands of thought that both often follow a neorealist or structural-realist theoretical framework, yet they disagree on how states are likely to act in the pursuit of their interests. Defensive realists emphasize that self-help states can satisfy their security by pursuing defensive postures by seeking to balance against rising powers. Offensive realists, drawing on John Mearsheimer's work, argue that states in a self-help system always strive to maximize their power and to dominate the system and, thus, are inherently offensive in their posture.

### Liberalism

Liberalism is another core IR theory school. Its basic principles arise from liberal political theory but are extended to the international realm, albeit as with realism, in a variety of different forms. Classical liberals tend to advocate a form of liberal internationalism, believing that the expansion of liberal principles, when more universally embraced, result in more peaceful international interactions. One core doctrine that has arisen from classical liberalism is democratic peace theory, which—drawing on Immanuel Kant's thought—argues that democratic states are unlikely to wage war with other democratic states.

There are also, however, other strands of liberal IR theorizing. Complex interdependence is a concept launched by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s. They argued that states by this time had become so interdependent with one another in nonmilitary issue areas, such as the economy and the environment, that this entailed that the typical hierarchization of national security and military capabilities was not necessarily any longer regarded as a top priority on the part of states or that cooperation between states in the other areas was impossible. *Neoliberal institutionalism*, developed by Keohane and others in the mid-1980s, was, on the other hand, based on the claim that even if one accepts the neorealists' prioritization of self-interest and anarchy as a given structural condition, it does

not necessarily lead to the conclusion that states will not cooperate with one another. This is in large part because states often prioritize absolute gains over relative gains and hence can be persuaded to pursue cooperative endeavors in ways that contravene the realist logic. In the case of the European Union, for example, the neoliberals argue that a preference for absolute gains and mutual cooperation has overridden the relative gains logic of the realists.

### The English School

The English School is a tradition of thought associated with a number of English or U.K.-based scholars who have shared a certain set of methodological and conceptual starting points in the analysis of IR. Key figures here include Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and John Vincent, and more recently Barry Buzan, Robert Jackson, Nicholas Wheeler, and Tim Dunne. The English School thinkers share a historical and interpretivist approach to IR; that is, they do not tend to apply quantitative methods to the study of IR as many realists and liberals do, but rather, they emphasize the interpretation of the motives, norms, and understandings of actors.

Crucially, they focus conceptually on the theme of international society: The English School conceives of international politics in terms of a rule-bound society of states, which forms an international society in which a set of rules, norms, and institutions are mutually agreed on. English School thinkers are not necessarily cosmopolitans or postrealists, however. In fact, the English School is subdivided into *solidarist* and *pluralist* strands. While the solidarists accept the idea of human rights and humanitarian intervention as increasingly important, with mutually accepted rules defining the nature of international society, pluralists continue to maintain a belief in nonintervention and sovereignty as the key principles of international society.

### Marxism and Historical Materialism

Although Marxism has its roots in the 19th-century writings of Karl Marx, within IR theory, it made a somewhat belated appearance compared with the other social sciences. Although some realists had an interest in Marxism early on (notably

Carr), Marxism entered IR theory debates only in the late 1970s. At that time, it came to be associated in particular with the so-called world systems theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Contra the realists, he argued that the driving dynamics of world politics was economic in nature: The structure of the capitalist mode of production globally is what positioned states within international politics and influenced their interactions. Wallerstein divided the world into the core (West), the semiperiphery (East Asia), and the periphery (the developing world), each zone possessing distinct functions in the global capitalist system of production and hence also in the state system.

World systems theory was heavily criticized for what many perceived to be its overly structural and economic focus. Yet Marxist ideas have also been developed by others, notably the so-called neo-Gramscian school drawing on Robert Cox and other historical materialists, such as Justin Rosenberg and Mark Rupert. The neo-Gramscian strand of thought is most famous in extending the politico-economic understanding of IR to the analysis of hegemony—that is, the way in which ideological consensus is created and reproduced in IR and how this is tied to specific class or economic interests.

### Critical Theory

Critical theory is a multifaceted set of ideas associated with the idea of emancipation and one with origins in the so-called Frankfurt School theory of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas. Critical theorists in IR have tended to emphasize the idea of critical theory as distinct from problem-solving theory. Cox famously argued that problem-solving theory fails in being unable to transcend existing social reality by narrowing its focus merely to solving specific technical problems within the parameters of otherwise unquestioned social conditions, whether it be the capitalist system of production, patriarchal gender relations, or narrowly electoral systems of democracy. Contrary to such traditional theorizing, critical theorizing has the aim of challenging and rethinking the ideological premises that exist for the dominant perceptions of reality that make societies function as they do and that blind us to many forms of oppression that we live with on an

everyday basis. Critical theory thus aims to go deeper in its critique of societal underpinnings: It seeks the emancipation of people from societal and structural systems of oppression that often go unnoticed in realist and liberal problem-solving theorization. In IR theory, these themes have been developed most notably by Andrew Linklater.

### Constructivism

Constructivism starts from the premise that social reality, rather than being fixed and natural, is premised on and depends on the thinking and intersubjective agreement of human actors. This means that social reality, including international political social reality, is socially constructed.

In IR theory, there have been numerous extensions and applications of constructivist theoretical ideas. Wendt's argument that international anarchy is socially constructed has been one important development of constructivism. Wendt argued that we cannot assume, as the realists do, that the lack of international government necessitates a self-help system. Instead, anarchy is what "states make of it": That is, those states that have developed relations of trust and shared norms between them are likely to interact in "friendly" ways with each other, even if other states have been socialized into distrust and hence to realist politics of self-help. Others, such as Jeffrey Checkel and Friedrich Kratochwil, have applied constructivism to explain developments such as the end of the Cold War, whereas Martha Finnemore has used it in understanding the expansion of human rights norms. In the post-Cold War setting, constructivism has provided a fruitful way of developing dynamic interpretations of change in world politics.

Yet it is important to note that constructivist ideas can be developed and applied in very different ways. While Wendt's constructivism is explicitly moderate and seeks to build bridges with the positivist realist and liberal IR scholars, other constructivists, such as Friedrich Kratochwil and Karin Fierke, argue for more extensive interpretive and linguistic forms of constructivism, where the idea of social construction is recognized as a deep-running aspect not just of social forms "out there" but also of our explanatory categories themselves. Constructivism, we must recognize then, is no united theoretical camp, and indeed, various subdivisions have been



recognized to exist within this broad school (moderate or “thin” constructivism vs. radical or “thick” constructivism; American vs. continental constructivism).

### Feminism

Feminism emerged in IR in the late 1980s but has been a rather contested addition to the field. This is because feminism tends not to study IR as classically conceived. Cynthia Enloe famously argued that feminists are concerned not only with the international but also with the way in which the international is penetrated and constituted by the personal. International power relations for feminists are built on a whole set of global and domestic interpersonal power relations. Thus, relations between husband and wife in a diplomatic family or between Western consumer women and women working in the “feminized” garment industry in Indonesia are global relations of power too and important for making the world of international politics go around as it does.

Feminists argue that if social actors are really socially constructed, as many constructivists and others have argued, then IR theorists must also recognize that social actors and social relations are also constructed in gendered ways. Indeed, IR, feminists argue, has been constructed as a field of masculine actors pursuing masculine aims. Not only have women been silent in the discipline and practice of diplomacy, but they have also been an uninteresting area of study and simply do not seem to matter for IR theory as traditionally conceived. However, if theory and IR are conceptualized differently—as analysis interpersonally constituted in the form of global (rather than merely international) relations of power—then perhaps there is much more to IR and many more layers of power than traditional IR theory recognizes. This is what the feminists, through various interesting studies of war, tourism, the sex industry, and peace building, have tried to demonstrate.

### Poststructuralism

Poststructuralism has been an influential force in the field since the 1980s, especially in Europe. Yet this is a difficult approach to label, in that many of its advocates reject any *ism* label as a valid

description of their approach. Nevertheless, scholars such as James Der Derian, Jenny Edkins, David Campbell, and R. B. J. Walker do seem to share certain assumptions that distinguish them from other IR theorists and that could be termed post-structuralist in nature. Their key contribution is that they take the epistemological critique of positivist knowledge to its fullest conclusion: They highlight that instead of an analysis of international politics “out there” (the ontology of international politics), we should study the discourses that make particular realities (or ontologies) seem natural. In short, for them, international politics is what it is because people accept particular discursive ways of understanding what IR consists of. This is why IR theorists should be aware of how international political actors and IR theorists themselves, by working with particular theoretical notions, come to reproduce or bring into existence particular “realities.” This insight has been applied in fruitful ways: Poststructuralists have studied, for example, how discourses of “othering” create enemies in IR or how discourses of nationalism and ethnicity construct wars and civil strife.

Another key aspect of this theoretical stance is its refusal to advocate a specific set of political or policy convictions; positive, “truth-bound” ethical and political positions characteristic of realist, liberal, and Marxist and critical theory schools of thought are seen as dangerous in world politics. Instead, they advocate an attitude of critique and inquiry over assertive statements of truth, knowledge, and action. Thus, as Campbell has argued, poststructuralism is not a specific theoretical or political account of what world politics should look like but rather a critical ethos of approaching the analysis of IR, which places emphasis on deconstructing existing schools of thought (see Campbell in Dunne et al., 2007).

### Postcolonialism

Postcolonialism is a line of thought that in many ways shares in the poststructuralist skepticism of “true” and “objective” knowledge claims. Knowledge claims, they argue, have tended to exclude and marginalize many parts of the world as “uncivilized,” “barbaric,” and hence legitimately “governed,” with significant consequences for the colonized or the developing states and

populations. Postcolonialism has as its building block the realization that knowledge is always produced from somewhere, from particular social and political conditions, and that knowledge makers can often be unaware of the way in which their knowledge creates the “self” and the “other”—that is, how it constructs visions of ourselves and how it might exclude or silence “the others.” Edward Said famously argued that in Western knowledge of the Middle East, for example, an Oriental subject was considered as a particular kind of inferior, barbaric individual, while the West was idealized as civilized, peaceful, and educated. The key aim of postcolonialism is to challenge such biased readings, whether it be in international law, democratization, or gender relations/analysis.

#### Green Theory

Green theory provides another important, and for many a timely, corrective to the way in which IR theorists have framed and thought about the nature of world politics. Green theorists challenge the assumption that the “high politics” of international politics concerns matters of interstate war, highlighting instead the inherent and deeply challenging nature of environmental risks as a crucial aspect of contemporary world politics. Green theorists also challenge the ecology-blind or ecology-unfriendly frameworks of theoretical thought that have dominated the discipline. They seek to direct us to consider the ways in which anthropocentric assumptions about humans and nature have informed IR theorizing to the exclusion of values of interconnectivity with nature. There are various strands of green thought and theorizing, extending from more limited engagements with environmental thinking to “deep ecological” frameworks.

#### Normative Theory

Normative theory is a subfield of IR theorizing (rather than a specific school of thought as such) that specializes in understanding the different normative and ethical underpinnings that are given for actions or interpretations in IR. Normative theory was ignored in the discipline by the realists and neoliberals, who conceived of the study of international politics in purely explanatory and value-neutral terms. Normative theorists have been at

pains to point out that normative assumptions about what is desirable or good are constantly made by IR scholars—even when theorists are incognizant of such normative assumptions. Thus, normative theorists have pointed out, for example, that realists argue not just for a particular explanatory account of the causes of war but also implicitly in so doing for a communitarian ethic, which sees the state as a key moral community in international politics. Normative theory scholarship sometimes also goes under the title *international political theory* or *international ethics*, terms that, while not interchangeable with the idea of normative theory, also indicate the considerations and intersections of normative thought with political theory and international law as well as ethics. One of the key issues in international political theory and in international ethics has been the question of just war: that is, what constitutes just behavior in conditions of war and in justifications for war. Other key questions concern global poverty and the duties of redistribution of wealth globally, as well as an engagement with the normative implications of dealing with climate change.

#### Themes That Divide IR Theorists

As seen above, there are a number of and diverging approaches that one can take in theorizing about IR. This section briefly highlights the core differences between these on certain key issues.

#### The Scope of the Field

As previously mentioned, a key line of division in IR theory during the past few decades has concerned the scope of the study of IR. The classical thinkers, realists, liberals, and the English School thinkers had a clear sense of the scope of the discipline: It focused exclusively on the question—the core focus of IR—of why states go to war or why they decide to cooperate. Yet in the 1980s, a plurality of challenges to the state centrism of IR theorizing emerged. Critics, from feminists, to poststructuralists, to postcolonialists, have argued that IR encompasses not just interstate relations but also the transnational politics of trade, the ideological construction of states, the nature of policies and politics, and interpersonal global relations of power.

With this development, there has also been a strong tendency in recent years to import into IR theory assumptions, knowledge, data, and models from other social sciences. This is evident both from the increased popularity of positivist approaches, within which rational choice theorizing, an interdisciplinary movement in the social sciences, has played an important role, and from the emergence of feminist, Marxist, and poststructuralist forms of thought. There has been an expansion within all these theoretical schools in cross- and interdisciplinary research, although some doubts still remain as to just how much IR theorists are listened to in other fields.

These interdisciplinary moves have generally been welcomed within IR, but they have also led to discussions about the boundaries of IR. Indeed, what is IR theory today as opposed to economic, sociological, or political theory? There is no fixed answer among IR theorists at present, which has given IR theory as a discipline something of a brittle basis. Indeed, some have argued that IR theory as a project has failed and that we would be better off doing away with the idea of IR theory as a separate body of thought and to engage in general social theorizing instead. Alternatively, many argue, we should rename the field and its theories by using the terms *world politics* or *global sociology*. So displeased have some scholars become with the parochial insistence of some IR theorists on the discreteness of the field that they have abandoned the discipline to engage theoretically with sociologists, economists, lawyers, or historians instead.

Yet the social structure of IR persists. As Ole Wæver has suggested, IR theory is not just an abstract academic exercise but also a social structure within academia. IR labels, approaches, and positions continue to structure the research of academic scholarship, arguments, and careers, as well as teaching. Indeed, given the deep entrenchment of IR and IR-theoretical “identities” in academia as well the intellectual benefits of teaching IR in terms of a set of discreet theoretical perspectives, IR theory still exists and continues to be framed as by and large distinct if linked to other social-scientific perspectives.

#### Philosophy of Science, Methods, and Epistemology

Another clear line of division in IR theory has revolved around the idea of positivism—that is,

around the claim that IR can and should be studied by means of scientific methods aimed at finding regular patterns of behavior and interaction and that IR scholarship can and ought to be objective and value-neutral. The methods of knowledge construction in IR have always been a subject of debate in IR, and positivism has not always been influential. Carr and Morgenthau, for example, were strong advocates of a historical and interpretivist approach and adverse to positivist attempts to systematize IR into a study of regular patterns and variables. It was only by the 1960s and 1970s that a positivist (or behavioralist) worldview obtained a strong foothold in American IR, and as a result, there has been a distinct turn within it toward systematization and the observational testing of theories.

Despite the central position of positivism within IR, the postpositivist movement of recent decades has posed a strong challenge to this philosophy of science. Indeed, the third and fourth debates in IR were brought on by the head-on collision between mainstream American IR scholars’ advocacy of positivist language and methods, on the one hand, and the claim by many critical theorists (many of them outside the United States), on the other, that this view of science was blind to many important theoretical developments and unfairly delegitimized approaches that did not conform to its research agenda.

The sharp dichotomization on how to generate knowledge in IR (a question that involves differences in philosophy of science, epistemology, and methodology) was given both an explanation and in some senses a justification by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s famous *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, which argued that there is a fundamental philosophical dualism at work in the social sciences, including IR, which makes it impossible to reach an agreement on whether the aim of IR should be generalization (positivism) or interpretive understanding (postpositivism). Both approaches, Hollis and Smith argued, have their strengths and their weaknesses, but they remain mutually exclusive. Hollis and Smith’s “two-stories account” has had a strong impact during the past few decades, especially in Europe. Nevertheless, it has been challenged, notably in the form of the so-called critical-realist movement, which seeks to transcend the polarization of positivist and postpositivist

scholarship by advancing a new philosophy of science that is critical of both the objectivism of positivism and the relativist excesses of some forms of postpositivism.

### Theory Versus Practice

There has also been a deep disagreement among IR theorists about the aims of IR theorizing. Notably, there is a division in the discipline between those that see a strong policy-making role for IR theory and those who would like to refrain from excessive interaction with policymakers and their particular interests.

A famous exchange between William Wallace, Ken Booth, and Steve Smith during 1996 to 1997 brought out the dynamics of the theory-versus-practice debate very well. While for Wallace IR as a discipline had become too abstractly theoretical, with many (especially critical) theorists retreating to their ivory towers and disengaging from policy making, for Booth and Smith the problem was that (a) not all academics, from all theoretical schools of thought, would be freely invited to engage with policymakers because of the inherent biases and interests that drive decision making and (b) the practice of teaching and creating alternative views of knowledge could itself be seen as a form of political practice, potentially being more influential than entering into the halls of power.

There seems to be no solution to the theory-practice dilemma in contemporary IR theory, but the accusation that IR theory is too abstract to be useful continues to be made by some scholars and policymakers. At the same time, some theorists complain of policymakers' lack of interest in alternative ways of framing and understanding problems. The picture is in other words mixed: While some IR theorists are closely engaged in policy making, others have decided not to engage with, or are pushed out from, policy-making circles.

### Trends in IR Theory

As emphasized and exemplified above, IR theory is strongly characterized by theoretical pluralism. But what are the key debates in IR theory at present and what are they likely to be in the future? This is a difficult question, for it depends on whom one asks and where one looks.

Interestingly, it seems that there are distinct geographical differences in what kinds of IR theory are seen as preponderant or promising. In the United States, it is fair to say that realism and liberalism in their neo-forms, as well as increasingly in their more classical forms (neoclassical realism and Kantian liberalism), play a key role. Realism and liberalism are arguably dominant also in debates on IR in China and Russia. In addition, constructivist analysis is increasingly being taken seriously in the mainstream American context. Indeed, it seems that currently these three theoretical schools—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—usefully cross-fertilize each other.

Yet, curiously, while this triumvirate of theoretical approaches dominates and frames debates in key journals such as *International Organization* and *International Studies Quarterly*, it could also be argued that increasingly, theoretical debates are currently being conducted largely *within* and not just between these theoretical schools. Indeed, much of realist debate at present concentrates on arguments between offensive and defensive realists, and neoliberals have also turned inward to discuss different ways of understanding institutional logics. Thus, there is a curious fragmentation of debates in IR, as Wæver has pointed out (see his chapter in Dunne et al., 2007).

Different perspectives tend to dominate in Europe. First, it is notable that constructivism is very popular in Europe, especially in Germany but also within the UK. Yet in both the UK and on the Continent the scene is also more varied. Realists tend to be few, while critical theorists of various persuasions have a strong position in the field. In the UK, for example, Marxism and Gramscian thought still play key roles in debates, as does critical theory, both in its classical and poststructuralist formulations.

IR theory, albeit sometimes in fragmented forms, continues to be developed and reconfigured. However, it seems to develop in different ways in different geographical contexts. This is partly because IR theory does not develop in a vacuum: Like any social theory, it is tied to specific social and political contexts and interests. With this in mind, it is important to note that IR theory continues to be mainly an Anglo-American discipline and that theoretical voices from Latin America, Africa, or Asia are rarely listened to, and

they certainly do not structure the field (but often seek to fit in it).

In any case, and despite its many failings and silences, IR theory is by no means on its deathbed. As Alexander Wendt and Duncan Snidal, the editors of the new *International Theory* journal, have argued, in many ways international theorizing is at its liveliest at the present juncture: There is a great deal of work being done in different traditions, and different theoretical tools are used by the scholars involved. Moreover, IR theory continues to be firmly embedded in the social and institutional structures of academia. In other words, it continues in being a placeholder—even if a contested one—for many scholars trying to grapple with international and world political trends as well as with the plurality of approaches being used by their colleagues to explain these.

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*See also* Anarchy; Constructivism in International Relations; Critical Theory in International Relations; Feminist Theory in International Relations; Idealism in International Relations; International Relations, History; International Relations as a Field of Study; Liberalism in International Relations; Positivism; Realism in International Relations; War and Peace

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A FIELD OF STUDY

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The field of international relations (commonly abbreviated IR) focuses on a variety of subjects. The many connotations that are usually associated with the term *relations* (one of the most under-specified terms in the field itself) and the aesthetic quality that accompanies relating the name of the field (IR) to a broad set of subjects subsumed under the same term in lowercase letters, “international

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*Note:* Due to limitations of space, the number of references had to be restricted. A fully referenced version of this article is available at <http://www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/hellmann/mat/IPSA.pdf>.

relations,” help explain why both *IR* and *international relations* are still widely accepted. Of course, this is not to say that there is consensus. Both the name of the field and the description of its subject matter(s) have always been contested. Different observers have argued that *international* ought to be replaced by *interstate*, *transnational*, or *global*—to name just a few. Others would like to see *relations* replaced by *studies* or *politics*. A brief look at some of these alternative combinations—for example, “interstate relations,” “transnational politics,” or “global studies”—would give any reader a quick idea as far as different emphases are concerned, even if he or she is not familiar with the normative and theoretical underpinnings that inform these alternative descriptions of the field of study and its subject matter(s). For this reason, conceptual contestation is unsurprising; it is already an expression of the inevitable and recurring ascertainment of the borders of a field of study by the community of scholars belonging to it and claiming it as their own.

In the case of *IR*, contestation extends well beyond the question of how a rather loosely defined field of study—or “fragmented ‘nonfield’” (James Rosenau, 1993)—is to be properly named. Especially in the English-speaking world, *IR* is sometimes defined in terms of an academic discipline of its own, separate from political science, or as a multidisciplinary field of study. On a global scale, however, this is not normally the case. Here, it is usually considered to be one of the major subfields (or subdisciplines) of political science. Even if the term *discipline* may sometimes be used interchangeably with *field of study*, it is meant in the sense of a more loosely defined field that keeps the outer borderlines both fairly fluid and permeable while, at the same time, emphasizing that its core is more clearly demarcated and in some ways also more stable. Of course, any such characterization of the field is in itself contestable. More specifically, two caveats need to be kept in mind with regard to any exercise in “mapping” a field of study. First, as Hilary Putnam put it, any such overview necessarily involves a particular “view from somewhere” that is shaped by specific individual and cultural formative experiences. Even if this view of *IR* is shaped by an environment that allows for pluralism with regard to normative commitments, theoretical orientations, and methodological preferences, it is

inevitably limited by what *IR* scholarship is actually accessible via particular languages and academic infrastructures. The academic infrastructure of *IR* is lacking in crucial respects when measured against the ideal of a global discipline that is living up to the spread, reach, and interconnections of its subject matter. Second, there is also an inevitable temporal dimension of contestation. Any overview of *IR* as a field of study necessarily resembles a snapshot of the field at a particular point in time and will, almost inevitably, be the view of how the discipline used to operate in the past. This notion of *IR* as an evolving and historically situated field becomes strikingly clear when one compares similar overviews of the field in approximately 10-year intervals from the early 1920s onward. Not only do descriptions of the subject matter change. Rather, change is ubiquitous with regard to the borderlines drawn to other (sub)fields and the names used to denote and demarcate the field’s most prominent theories. Therefore, this overview ought to be seen as a “disciplining” exercise in the dual sense of the word. It is supposed to provide a perspective on the structure of the discipline and familiarize the reader with some of the prominent conventions, theories, and practices of the field of *IR* as they are currently viewed in the field in terms of a history of the present. At the same time, it ought to be kept in mind that the very concept of scholarship points at moving beyond these conventions, theories, and practices. By de-emphasizing disciplinary stability in favor of an evolutionary perspective, this way of proceeding does not deny that a structural view of the discipline may be useful. As a matter of fact, it is—and such a structural perspective will be applied in the first section of this overview. However, looking at the discipline with a bird’s-eye perspective necessarily emphasizes the big picture and will thus almost inevitably appear fairly static. The second, shorter section of this entry therefore applies a more historical and dynamic perspective depicting the field as an expanding one along many frontiers simultaneously.

### The Structure of Global International Relations

What a field is made up of in terms of intellectual substance—that is, its conceptualization of the subject matter, its theories, and its understandings

of appropriate procedures in producing knowledge—is not dictated by the subject matter itself. Rather, it results from the interplay of specific social structures (such as institutional arrangements along disciplinary lines within universities or structures of communication in the form of journals, etc.) and intellectual structures (i.e., what counts as knowledge and how different bodies of knowledge connect to make up a discipline). Both are closely interconnected. As far as the social structure of IR is concerned, Ole Wæver (2007) has argued that it is best viewed as “a mix of a U.S./global system and national/regional ones with varying degrees of independence” (p. 296). Thus, two elements are characteristic of IR in terms of its global structure. First, IR in the United States is predominantly *North American IR* and *global IR*. Second, other IR communities show a great variety in terms of size and intellectual traditions. However, what is most noticeable from a global perspective is the extent to which they relate to IR in the United States. This is another way of saying that Stanley Hoffmann’s (1977) famous line about IR being “an American social science” reverberates until today. Yet although the dominance of American IR remains clearly visible, a broad-brush global perspective on disciplinary developments would stress the distinction between the West and the non-West rather than the United States versus the rest. One of the distinguishing marks of the current developmental stage of IR from a global and evolutionary perspective may well be its post-Western and its post-Westphalian character. However, from a bird’s-eye view of the structures of the discipline, the West seems very well entrenched.

### *Size and Power*

Admittedly, the IR community in the United States still plays in a league of its own. Just in terms of sheer size, it easily outdistances that of any other country by multiples. A 2009 survey by Richard Jordan, Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney counted more than 4,100 IR scholars in the United States with an active affiliation with a university, college, or professional school. (As of early 2009, the American Political Science Association listed close to 4,700 members who had identified IR as their “general field.”) Although similarly detailed figures are not

available for many countries, a very rough estimate based on a variety of sources would probably put the U.S. share of IR scholars around the world at approximately 25% to 30%. Another 15% to 25% could probably be added for Canada, Europe, Israel, and Australasia, putting the Western share of global IR production capacity at 40% to 55% overall.

Although the size of academic communities is an important structural feature, in and of itself it says little about the global structure of IR in terms of institutional, structural, and productive power. Yet even if one adds such a perspective, it is fairly clear that the United States occupies the most influential position at the center, with European IR communities plus Israel and Australasia forming an appendix to the core that tries to establish a somewhat more independent profile (and has partly succeeded in doing so). Three observations are noteworthy in this context. First, the institutional and structural power of U.S. IR is reflected in how IR scholars in other parts relate to it. For IR scholars in Western Europe, Israel, and South Asia, and to a lesser degree in East-Central Europe and some parts of Latin America, gaining recognition in the United States (i.e., in U.S.-based IR journals in particular) continues to be a crucial element for professional advancement compared with IR scholars elsewhere. Since the editors of key journals are drawn largely from the IR community in the United States, scholars aiming at being published in these journals have to address the concerns of this community. Yet as many studies have shown, the theoretical debates in the United States are largely driven by American foreign policy concerns, not broader global concerns. A 2009 survey by Tom Biersteker of the assigned or required readings for PhD candidates specializing in IR in the 10 leading U.S. departments of political science showed that, on average, 94% of the assigned readings were written by scholars who have spent most or all of their careers in the United States. As a result, the segment of global IR scholarship that aims at the most prestigious journals in the field will inevitably face editors whose academic careers have been largely shaped by U.S. concerns. Non-American Western IR scholars are more likely to be able to meet the expectations of these editors, and to the extent that their work is actually being published, it is therefore also more likely to speak

to an agenda shared by Western societies and states. The same applies vice versa for the increasing number of U.S. scholars being published in European peer-reviewed journals such as *European Journal of International Relations* and *Journal of International Relations and Development*. Although the differences between the United States, on the one hand, and Europe and Australasia, on the other, are noteworthy and have often been described, these differences fade away against the many similarities if one contrasts IR research practices and priorities in the West as a whole with those in the non-West.

The second observation extends the emphasis on disciplinary autonomy within largely national borders from the United States to the global level. Although the orientation toward the United States and its standards of IR scholarship in a fairly small (though influential) set of countries reinforces American dominance, it is by far not a universal phenomenon. A global structure dominated by Western standards of science and thematic agendas coexists with significant degrees of local autonomy in IR communities around the world, according to Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver. For a field focusing on phenomena that by their very nature transcend national boundaries, it is noteworthy how parochial (or detached from a truly global discourse) *all* IR communities are around the world. This is amply visible in an almost universal preoccupation with the foreign policy agendas of the respective countries. In the context of the United States and intellectually linked IR communities such as Europe, this concern is embedded in or dominated by an explicit theoretical framing of specific problems. In many other countries where the intellectual structure of the discipline is less dominated by the imperatives of theory production, these foreign policy agendas often translate quite directly into research agendas. Therefore, a certain parochialism seems to be an almost inevitable and universal characteristic of IR globally. In part, this is also due to the fact that the social structures of the academy have their own life and in many ways follow national patterns. Sometimes national IR communities may be clustered into regional groups with distinct characteristics, such as an “Anglo-American” way of doing IR or a “Continental” one. However, national profiles often remain clearly visible. For

instance, even a quick look at the social and intellectual structure of IR in Italy, France, Germany, and the Netherlands immediately reveals remarkable differences as well as similarities in the relatively narrow space of the European continent. In a longer historical perspective, however, the patterns of academic institutionalization and professionalization of IR during the 20th century have also converged, often following the American model of treating IR as a more or less integral part or subdiscipline of political science.

Third, it certainly matters whether one pursues (more or less parochial) IR concerns in the United States, Britain, Denmark, China, Thailand, Nigeria, or Brazil, to name just a few sites. Although this entry is not the place for a detailed analysis of the global social structure of IR (on this, see Tickner & Wæver, 2009), three layers of IR communities can be distinguished in terms of power, international connectedness, and international visibility.

### *International Relations as a Three-Tiered Discipline*

#### **The Dominance of U.S.–American IR**


As mentioned before, first, the IR community in the United States stands out in terms of size and power. In the United States, whether or not an IR scholar engages with or is knowledgeable about IR elsewhere has little influence with regard to professional advancement, and thus, U.S. scholars may neglect the rest of the IR world. Second, to the extent that other IR communities relate to U.S. discourses, many largely emulate or implicitly follow the U.S. model and the theories propagated there. This can be taken by some IR scholars as evidence of the institutional and productive power exercised by American IR or even as evidence that the American way of doing IR is the “right” way. Third, to the extent that IR communities in other countries are essentially decoupled from U.S. (and thus globally dominant) discourses, this is mostly due to the fact that local political concerns dominate research agendas and that theory (as defined in the U.S.-dominated discourse) is largely irrelevant. Therefore, IR scholars from the United States may find little incentive to investigate IR in such states. Against this background, it is worth emphasizing that the International Studies Association (ISA)—the most important professional organization of



IR/international studies around the globe that originated in the United States and still largely comprises U.S. scholars as members—has been quite supportive of efforts to build up professional structures of academic communication beyond it. Yet despite these efforts, ISA conventions—one of the premier sites of intellectual exchange about IR on the global stage—have largely remained intra-Western scholarly exchanges. Whereas a systematic analysis of attendance patterns at the ISA conventions in Toronto (1997), Portland (2003), and New York (2009), based on the institutional origin of the respective scholars attending, shows a noteworthy increase of European Union–European scholars (16% in 1997, 15% in 2003, and 25% in 2009) relative to North American scholars (United States plus Canada: 76% in 1997, 74% in 2003, and 62% in 2009), there was essentially no change if one compared attendance along a Western versus non-Western distinction (see Figure 1).

#### The Second Tier of Semivisible IR Communities

Compared with U.S. insularity, the situation is quite different if one looks at IR from a global



**Figure 1** Origin of Scholars Attending International Studies Association (ISA) Conferences

*Source:* Author's analysis based on the convention programs as they were made available via the ISA website: [http://www.isanet.org/conventions/2007/04/previous\\_isa\\_an.html](http://www.isanet.org/conventions/2007/04/previous_isa_an.html). Scholars were grouped according to the state of their institutional affiliation, not their nationality.

*Note:* "Western world" comprises OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) member countries (including Israel but excluding Japan and Turkey).

perspective with regard to a second category of IR communities, such as Britain, China, Denmark, or Canada. As different as these IR communities are in terms of university systems, professional incentive structures, and national traditions and as much as the American dominance may be resented in some quarters there, many of the influential IR scholars in these countries do (have to) relate to American IR in one way or another, if only by distancing themselves as to the way IR is done in the United States. Therefore, what distinguishes these communities from the U.S. IR community, on the one hand, and a third category of peripheral IR communities, on the other, is a medium level of international visibility. International visibility (defined in terms of a certain amount of recognition by other scholars around the world) may result from very different sources, such as the natural advantage of communicating in the lingua franca (as in the case of British IR) and/or the recognition by significant others that the work published in these communities matters, be it for purely academic reasons or due to other considerations.

a. Among the latter, one can single out the phenomenon of national "schools" of IR, which provide for a specific variant of this second type of IR communities with a medium level of international visibility. The so-called English School, for instance, represents a conscious effort on the part of scholars in the United Kingdom (UK) to establish the idea of an international "society of states" as a distinct theoretical concept synthesizing elements that have been assigned in American IR to competing (realist and liberal) schools of thought. In contrast to American IR, the English School scholarship exhibits a deep-seated skepticism vis-à-vis the "scientific" study of international relations and accordingly pays much more attention to historical processes. These substantive differences notwithstanding, insiders have argued that the English School essentially marks "a delayed response to Britain's loss of Empire and world status" (Richard Little, 2008, pp. 685–686). In forming such a school, however, Britain's IR community has not only tried to come to terms with the changed international role of the UK. It has also left a mark of distinction vis-à-vis the quasi-hegemonic U.S. discourse, thereby establishing a widely recognized corporate IR identity globally. IR communities in

other countries that are habitually ranked among the “great powers” (e.g., Russia, Japan, and China) are increasingly engaged in debates whether or not to establish national schools similar to the English School (even South Korea is contemplating such a strategic move). China is the most obvious and most noteworthy case, both because of the size of the country and due to the Eastern tradition. Influential Chinese scholars nowadays openly advocate the establishment of a “Chinese School of IR Theory” as an “inevitable” step in the maturation of Chinese IR (Yaquing Qin, 2007). Yet as in the case of the English School, the emphasis on building such a distinct Chinese school on a set of core assumptions about the “material world” and the “speculative world,” distinct from dominant IR theories in the West in general and the United States in particular, only reinforces the picture of the global preeminence of a particular U.S.-led type of theorizing centered on realist theory and its competitors as well as on rationalist and constructivist approaches to doing IR from an epistemological and/or methodological point of view. It is against this background that scholars from non-Western IR communities feel at least uncomfortable if not offended if they are asked why they have not yet come up with some IR theory of their own. A special issue of the journal *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* carried the question “Why is there no non-Western IR theory?” quite prominently in the title (Amitav Acharya & Barren Buzan, 2007). To be sure, the whole thrust of the project was based on the intention to stimulate a debate about and the development of non-Western IR theory in Asia. Yet the way the question was framed already carried a specific understanding as to what good IR is all about—that is, that it ought to put a premium on theory, that it is fairly obvious what distinguishes theory from nontheory, and that IR communities in states such as China are not (yet) doing enough good theory. Judging from recent trends, some segments in countries such as China appear willing to take up this challenge. In part, this is due to a spreading realization among IR scholars that IR theories (broadly defined) do not only structure our view of the world in a very basic sense but that they are also tools for governing the world. In this analysis, both the world and IR often appear as if governed by the United States. Empirical analyses by Chinese

scholars show that this power of disciplinary socialization via Western, especially U.S., theory discourses works even in a country such as China with a large IR community and a very distinct and old tradition of its own. For instance, with the exception of one book, all of the 86 IR books translated into Chinese by five leading publishers since 1990 were originally written in English, and the overwhelming majority of these books had American IR scholars as authors. Thus, even if a Chinese school of IR drawing heavily on distinctly Chinese traditions emerges eventually, it will have been mediated via theory as practiced in the English-speaking, mostly U.S.-dominated, Western world of IR.

b. A similar mixture of orientation toward American IR while tying IR scholarship back to local concerns and intellectual traditions is observable in a second variant of internationally more visible IR communities. Some IR communities in Western and East-Central Europe and in Israel belong to this group. What unites them in terms of institutional, structural, and productive power is that they can only draw in rather limited ways on the advantages that the British or the Chinese IR communities enjoy. While IR scholars in significant numbers in these communities publish in English, this is certainly not the case for all of them (as is the case in the UK). Also, in contrast to China, none of these states are expected to play a crucial role politically in the years to come in order to pay special attention to their possibly unique ways of doing IR research. Moreover, in contrast to the UK or China, most of these IR communities neither have the size nor the ambition to establish distinct national schools of IR. Still, in some countries, substantive research programs, such as the Copenhagen School of security studies, have gained international recognition as distinct approaches well beyond the regional context. In the case of the Copenhagen School’s “securitization” research program, distinction was achieved with a more focused approach (in terms of both the theoretical scope and the substantive ground covered as far as the subject matter was concerned) than what is usually subsumed under the much broader label of a “paradigm” in the U.S. context. Debates in such communities are similar to those in the United States in putting a premium on theoretical work. However, even though theory debates in the

United States are at least taken note of in most of these, they are not (or no longer) simply replicated. Rather, an increasing amount of IR in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, or Canada is by now often inspired by philosophical and/or social science traditions and research practices distinct from those present in IR debates in the United States. Here, they are increasingly dominated by rational choice and formal modeling. Since these are not easily exportable, dominant U.S. theory preferences entail a “de-Americanization of IR elsewhere” (Wæver, 1998). Another way to put this is to point to an ever-present, often largely ignored and now rediscovered, cultural specificity (e.g., in French IR); an intra-Anglo-Saxon divide between “post-Imperial ‘crimson’ locales,” on the one hand (made up essentially of Britain, Canada, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand), and the United States, on the other; and, more generally, the new-found “autonomy” in Europe of a specific “Continental” brand of Western IR or at least a claim of an “intrafamilial emancipation” (e.g., in Germany). To the extent that this type of work gains international recognition, this is seldom due to the size of the respective IR community, the respective country’s global political significance, or other such factors pointed to by science studies. Rather, genuine intellectual appeal and/or resonance appears to be more closely associated with quantitative as well as qualitative output resulting from comparative advantages in terms of sheer resources available and devoted to the task (as in the field of European studies) and the fact that some of the original theory products travel fairly easily to other regions (as in the case of securitization theory). Moreover, in the European context, in particular, the international visibility of European studies and distinct approaches such as the Copenhagen School has been enhanced by the establishment of several new journals (many of which are published in English). Some of these, such as the *European Journal of International Relations*, have quickly established themselves among the leading journals in the field globally. These successes and differences between the United States and other Western IR communities notwithstanding, it needs to be emphasized that the non-U.S. West offers a broad variety of intellectual profiles, not all of which are as much interested in connecting via English-language publications

internationally as are, for instance, IR scholars in the English-speaking world, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, or Germany. As a matter of fact, sizable communities with original theoretical work, such as the French, are quite detached from the rest of the West and have fairly little impact globally. Thus, geographical location is not necessarily a good indicator of whether an IR community may achieve international visibility.

In any case, from a power perspective, few non-Western IR communities can be counted to the semiperiphery of the second tier. Even Japan, with its sizable IR community and conscious institutional efforts at increasing its visibility globally—recently by establishing the peer-reviewed English-language journal *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*—neither has much of an impact globally nor has succeeded in establishing a distinct Japanese IR profile, according to Takashi Inoguchi. China currently seems to be the only serious candidate for such a rise to the semiperiphery, or to put it less pejoratively, only China appears able in the medium to long term to engage in competition with the West for productive power in actually “constructing the world” in a language and in theories that are distinctly Chinese. Yet even sympathetic observers remain somewhat skeptical about whether a distinct and globally visible Chinese school of IR might indeed be established.

#### The Third Tier: Sizable and (Self-)Marginalized

The third group of IR communities is both the largest (in terms of the number of national IR communities belonging to it) and the most isolated and marginalized (in terms of international visibility and power). As a matter of fact, one of the expressions of its marginalization is that much less “is known” about these IR communities compared with the two other groups. In part, this is because scholars from the other two groups, who are usually instrumental in producing such international visibility due to disciplinary power structures, normally pay little attention to the research conducted there. Indeed, one could easily turn the complaint (sometimes heard in the non-U.S. West) that American IR treats research originating in Europe, Canada, or Australasia with indifference against the plaintiffs themselves since the same pattern of ignorance may be observed in their relationship to

most IR communities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (many of which have, of course, suffered through European colonization). In part, however, marginalization also results from the self-conscious separation or self-reliance of IR communities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America or from these countries simply refraining from engaging in IR research. Some of the IR communities in this third group (such as the Indian or Brazilian) are fairly sizable, though not necessarily tightly organized professionally, as their counterparts are in the United States or Europe. Many others are tiny, with no professional organization whatsoever. In quite a few third-tier countries, IR as an academic (sub)discipline is not even present at universities or—to the extent that it actually is present—is largely characterized by the dominance of research questions that reflect the respective countries' foreign policy agenda. As a matter of fact, there is often a very close connection between the foreign policy establishments and official state institutions in these countries, on the one hand, and IR departments, on the other, since the latter often exist primarily because they are expected to supply future diplomats for the respective foreign services. Theory-oriented research as practiced and cherished in the West does not play much of a role here. Theory—conceived of in very general terms as a necessary precondition for reality-constituting observation—is ever present. Yet it transpires largely *implicitly* in empirical analyses. The prime research objective is seldom theorizing as such. Moreover, against the foil of Western theory discourses, this implicit form of theory application carries more realist than nonrealist themes. A similar observation can be made with regard to the role of methods. Where the role models of Western IR scholarship call for methodological reflection at a minimum (and often excel in offering highly sophisticated methods that are understood and applied by very small communities of scholars), the requirements for methodological rigor and metareflection in third-tier countries are much less stringent. Typically, academic publications display a combination of some form of institutional and/or historical analysis without engaging in a justificatory argument as to why a particular method or form of presentation has been chosen or rejected.

From a structural perspective, there is fairly little intellectual exchange both among third-tier

communities and between them and IR communities from the first and second tiers. Moreover, some of the interaction that can be observed is stimulated by foundations located in the West that (often unintentionally) tend to reproduce existing uneven global structures of knowledge production. For instance, as the volume by Tickner and Wæver (2009) has shown, the funding provided by Western foundations (such as Ford) in countries such as India, East-Central Europe, Latin America, or South Africa has often been very influential in developing local IR communities. One key reason was simply that state funding was limited. Yet since the type of research that was funded primarily addressed questions of more immediate local policy relevance, the overall effect was to reinforce the global intellectual division of labor whereby theory is “produced in the center and consumed and applied in and by the periphery” (p. 332). These effects are particularly surprising for countries (e.g., India) that have both a comparatively old and large IR community and a philosophical tradition of their own. As a matter of fact, the Indian political philosopher Chanakya (ca. 350–283 BCE), who is usually known in the West by the name Kautilya and who is sometimes claimed among Western scholars as one of the founders of realism, is apparently not even taught in any principal IR theory course in India itself, according to Navnita Behera (2007). Similar patterns of forgetfulness and/or neglect of homegrown traditions can be observed in Japan and recently also in China. From a postcolonial point of view, this devaluation of homegrown traditions is just one (often unreflected) expression of a “colonized” mind-set that stems from a discipline of IR that is at its very core an “expression of the Western theory of progress” (David Blaney & Naeem Inayatullah, 2008, p. 672). This postcolonial message starts to resonate even among scholars from third-tier countries who have been socialized into Western IR thinking.


### *The Social Structure of the Discipline*

The overall picture that emerges by looking at the social structure of IR from a global perspective is much more one of intellectual segmentation and stratification than one of intellectual integration, which one might think the subject matter itself to be suggesting. This impression of a three-tiered

system is reinforced if one examines another dimension of the social structure of the discipline—that is, its publication system in general and its hierarchy of journals in particular. If access limitations (as measured in terms of journal acceptance rates) are accepted as a measure of reputation, clearly the most competitive journals of the discipline are published in the United States and Europe. In the United States and several European countries, getting published in these top journals is of central importance to climb the academic career ladder. Most of the highest ranking journals are still published in the United States and/or controlled by American IR scholars. As a matter of fact, a recent survey in the IR communities of 10 English-speaking countries found that at least four tiers can be distinguished when IR scholars from these countries are called on to list those journals “that publish articles with the greatest influence on the way IR scholars think about international

relations” (Jordan et al., 2009, p. 49): (1) *International Organization* is in a league of its own and is mentioned by 73% of the scholars questioned; (2) the second group is made up of *International Security* (45%) and *International Studies Quarterly* (44%); (3) *American Political Science Review*, *World Politics*, and *Foreign Affairs*, mentioned by 28%, form the third group; and (4) *European Journal of International Relations* and *Review of International Studies* are the only non-American journals mentioned alongside *Journal of Conflict Resolution* with a mere 14% (for *European Journal of International Relations* in particular, the ranking is much better if one follows the Social Science Citation Index). Thus, interdependence structures are still quite asymmetrical within the West, with U.S. journals clearly outdistancing the top European journals.

In other parts of the world (including some parts of the West), publishing in internationally recognized



**Figure 2** Authorship in Western International Relations Journals

Source: Friedrichs, J., & Wæver, O. (2009). Western Europe: Structure and strategy at the national and regional levels. In A. B. Tickner & O. Wæver (Eds.), *International relations scholarship around the world* (pp. 260–285). London: Routledge.

Note: Solid bar is 2000; dotted bar is 2005.


journals is not as central for recruitment practices and academic success. At the same time, the “international” profile of non-Western IR journals is much more pronounced than in the West, as a survey of selected non-Western journals shows, in contrast to a similar survey conducted for Western journals. For instance, more than 80% of the articles published in *International Organization* or *International Studies Quarterly* in 2000 and 2005 have been published by authors located in the United States or Canada (see Figure 2).

For the Turkish IR journal *Alternatives*, the *South African Journal of International Relations*, and the journal *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, the number of national authors has often been lower than the number of international authors, even decreasing between 2000 and 2005 (see Figure 3). Also, the number of non-Western authors (including national authors) being published in these journals has been increasing in most of these journals recently. This is in stark contrast to Western IR journals, which largely remain outlets for scholarship from Western IR scholars in general and scholars from the United States in particular. In other words, whereas the West remains fairly closed

off from the rest of the world, there is much more of a balance between national and international authorship in non-Western IR journals.


### *The Intellectual Structure of the Discipline*

Another characteristic of the publication system of Western IR is the distinct profile of mixing theory and empirical analysis. All of the IR journals ranked among the top 20 of all political science journals in the Social Science Citation Index distinguish themselves as theory-oriented journals in this sense. As Kjell Goldmann (1996) pointed out in a comparison of Western IR journals from the early 1970s and early 1990s, as far as “methodological approaches” are concerned, ever more articles published in the 1990s combined some form of theorizing with empirical observation. If anything, this trend has been reinforced during the past decade. Again, the contrast with non-Western IR journals is noticeable: With the possible exception of the Japanese journal *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, all of these journals primarily publish articles that eschew explicit theoretical discussion (see Figure 4).



**Figure 3** Authorship in Non-Western International Relations Journals

Note: Solid bar is 2000; dotted bar is 2005.



**Figure 4** Methodological Approaches of Non-Western International Relations Journals

Note: Solid bar is 1997; dotted bar is 2007.

#### Paradigmatism and Great Debates

One of the oldest features of the intellectual structure of the discipline is paradigmaticism. In IR, it has come to be understood as a disciplinary preoccupation with and segregation into separate “metascientific constructs” with distinct ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies (Yosef Lapid, 1989). Although the allusion to Thomas Kuhn’s paradigmatic view of the evolutionary development of scientific disciplines only spread in IR in the 1970s, the phenomenon as such has been a core feature of the discipline’s intellectual structure (at least in its Western segment) since the mid-20th century. Realism, idealism, rationalism, and constructivism are usually mentioned as examples of such paradigms. Surpassed only by questions of epistemology and methodology, such “paradigmatic” differentiation continues to generate the most division among Western IR scholars (Jordan et al., 2009). What is more, IR scholars in 10 English-speaking countries, surveyed by Jordan and colleagues (2009), estimate that almost 90% of all IR literature is devoted to some form of paradigmatic analysis. Yet although one out of four considers his or her own work to be falling

outside any paradigmatic frame, more than three quarters of the time is devoted to IR paradigms in IR introductory courses taught by these scholars. In other words, the intellectual structure of discipline continues to be reproduced along paradigmatic lines even though many IR scholars do not believe that such a focus is particularly useful in their own research.

This gap in (Western) IR between the prominence of paradigmaticism in teaching and that in individual research reflects on what sociologists call “task uncertainty”—that is, the extent to which scholars in a discipline agree on what rules are to be followed and what work techniques are acceptable in producing knowledge (Wæver, 2007). In IR, the level of task uncertainty is quite high since there is fairly little agreement as to what the overarching disciplinary questions are or how one should go about tackling them. The TRIP survey found that two thirds of IR scholars questioned believe that methods and epistemology generate the most division in the discipline. Yet despite this diversity, there has at least been a widespread (if sometimes only implicit) understanding that paradigms *as such* are a key instrument for organizing

the discipline, especially as far as IR's recurring great debates are concerned. This not only shows in how the discipline's history is usually told or how IR is taught but is also evident in textbooks and handbooks—that is, in works that are supposed to introduce novices to the field or that provide summaries and syntheses of what is normally claimed to be disciplinary knowledge. Two recent examples are illustrative. As the subtitle of *International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity* (Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, & Steve Smith, 2007) indicates, the editors are keen to emphasize both the necessity of a certain disciplinary coherence and its diversity. Yet the organization of the book around nine “distinct theories of International relations—realism/structural realism, liberalism/neoliberalism, the English School, constructivism, Marxism and critical theory, feminism, poststructuralism, green theory, postcolonialism” (p. 3) shows that diversity is expressed not in the form of theoretical controversies over core substantive questions of international relations (e.g., what causes war, what causes poverty) or methods but through paradigms. The same understanding is reflected in a 2008 handbook by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, where the presentation of a somewhat different set of nine “major theoretical perspectives” takes up almost half the space of the volume (the theories discussed here include (1) realism, (2) Marxism, (3) neoliberal institutionalism, (4) the new liberalism, (5) the English School, (6) constructivism, (7) critical theory, (8) postmodernism, and (9) feminism). In other words, whereas IR scholars may disagree sharply as to the particular value of different paradigms, there at least seems to be widespread agreement that it is useful to conceive of the discipline in terms of paradigmatic differentiation and great debates.

However, from a longer historical perspective, the period during which paradigmaticism and great debates were widely acknowledged as dominant features of the discipline's intellectual structure may come to an end. Recent self-reflective observations of the historiography of the discipline have convincingly shown that even in Western IR, the focus on great debates may have been as much a reflection of the perceived need of a novel academic field to identify a disciplinary core as a reflection of a common tendency in the social sciences to delimit

the number of basic rival positions to a low number of macrolevel theories. As a matter of fact, the invocation of great debates as a typical characterization of overarching disciplinary divides did not begin until Hans Morgenthau introduced the term in the early 1950s to depict what soon came to be known as the debate between realism and idealism. Moreover, it reached its pinnacle with the announcement of a second great debate in the 1960s pitting traditionalists against behavioralists (or scientists) in a clash over what methods IR scholars ought to use in studying international phenomena. It was in this context that Kuhn's concept of a paradigm was first combined with the focus on great debates, most explicitly (if somewhat misleadingly) in an article by Arendt Lijphardt (1974) in which he identified the second great debate as “a dichotomous one between two opposing paradigms” (p. 18). Yet the third debate marked the end of agreement over how to describe what it was supposedly all about. Alternatively, it was framed as a debate between realism and globalism; between realism, pluralism, and structuralism; between positivists and post-positivists; or between “a broad body of interdisciplinary literature commonly (and often indiscriminately) labeled ‘critical theory,’ ‘post positivism,’ ‘discourse analysis,’ or ‘post-structuralism,’” on the one hand, and “the intellectual imperialism of the modern, post-Cartesian ‘scientific’ approach to knowledge and society,” on the other (Jim George, 1989, p. 270). Others suggested that the latter two descriptions marked the fourth debate, which in itself could be subdivided into two subdebates between reflectivists and rationalists, on the one hand, and between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, on the other. Thus, not only the intervals between debates have become longer since the first debate was invented, but after the second debate, there has also been ever more contention as to whether a third and/or fourth great debate actually took place and, if so, what it was all about. In any case, no fifth debate currently appears to be forthcoming.

Even if great debates were indeed a thing of the past, paradigmaticism appears to be more resilient. In Andrew Abbott's reading of “generational paradigms,” the emphasis on the economizing strategies of informational overload suggests a certain disciplinary immaturity in coming up with more sophisticated and adequate coping strategies. More



critical readings—such as Niklas Luhmann’s related lamentation about “multiple paradigmata-sis” in sociology—in contrast highlight the unforced ignorance vis-à-vis large segments of knowledge that necessarily accompanies paradigmatic self-restriction. This latter perspective has recently won more recognition. Two prominent representatives of rationalism and constructivism, for instance, have joined voices in rejecting the implicit offer to conduct another “battle of analytical paradigms,” since any such battle would “at the very least . . . encourage scholars to be method-driven rather than problem-driven in their research” (James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, 2002, p. 52). Rather than looking at the relationship between rationalism and constructivism in terms of a “debate,” they pleaded for looking at it in terms of a “conversation” between two approaches that, “when understood pragmatically, [are] largely either complementary or overlapping” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, p. 68). Similarly, the recent *Oxford Handbook of International Relations* prominently positioned the chapter “Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International Relations” at the very beginning of the section that presented the nine “major theoretical perspectives” referred to above (Peter Katzenstein & Rudra Sil, 2008). In it, the authors advocate analytic eclecticism, an approach to research in IR that replaces paradigm-driven research with a strategy drawing widely on seemingly divergent research traditions built on distinct concepts, methods, analytics, and empirics.

Thus, although the intellectual structure of the discipline continues to be shaped by distinctions drawn in terms of paradigms (or the equivalent major theoretical perspectives, etc.), paradigmaticism as such has been losing some of its grip. To the extent that there is an inherent tension between method-driven approaches or paradigmaticism, on the one hand, and a focus on a problem-driven approach, on the other, the shift toward the latter can be seen as a sign of maturation. To be sure, a loss of disciplinary coherence may loom as a downside if IR loses its traditional paradigmatic signposts, according to Wæver (2007). Yet the same development can also be interpreted as an advance toward a more self-confident academic profession that need no longer engage in stylized battles to distinguish itself from adjacent (and presumably

more reputable) disciplines such as history, law, economics, or sociology. Moreover, such a move can also be justified epistemologically since the earlier rationalization for paradigmatic separation—the usual reference to the idea of “incommensurability” in Kuhn’s theoretical vocabulary—has hence been problematized in the philosophy of science. For a long time, Kuhn’s term of incommensurability was understood to mean that the theoretical vocabularies of separate paradigms were not intertranslatable. Yet as Richard Rorty (1991), among others, has argued, “untranslatability does not entail unlearnability” and “learnability is all that is required to make discussability possible” (p. 48). Paradigmatic separation, therefore, is a disciplinary convention, not an epistemological necessity. Recently, this approach to “interparadigm” debates has been spreading in IR at least subliminally, if not explicitly, according to Colin Wight. Irrespective of whether one welcomes or criticizes such a development, it is yet another sign of a much broader development in the discipline: its expansion along many dimensions.

### The Expansion of International Relations

Thus far, the discipline has been examined largely in terms of its social and intellectual structures. This inevitably entails a rather static view that does not sufficiently acknowledge the tremendous dynamism of IR. Yet the dynamic development of the field is perhaps the most striking feature of the discipline. Ever since the early days of modern IR in the early 20th century, the discipline has been expanding. Although this intellectual expansion may resemble earlier colonial practices of the West in some respects (and may therefore also be described in diverse vocabularies), the phenomenon as such appears to be largely uncontroversial. Four dimensions of intellectual expansion can be distinguished:

1. territorial expansion (or spread) from a largely Western core to other countries;
2. disciplinary expansion within political science as measured in terms of chairs designated with denominations that are normally considered to be IR;

3. substantive expansion as measured in research problems being taken up by scholars identifying themselves as doing IR and in interaction with the latter; and
4. theoretical and methodological expansion.

Of course, none of these expanding moves ought to be imagined as linear or unidirectional. When knowledge travels, it always intermingles and, thereby, transforms. John Agnew notes refers to the image of a marketplace where Western IR is “exported” to non-Western regions and countries or where IR “imports” from other disciplines such as philosophy or where economics misconstrues knowledge as a commodity changing hands without being affected by the very transaction. If we take this transformational dimension into account, however, the metaphor of expansion quite cogently describes a phenomenon that is as familiar as a subject matter to the IR scholar as it is ubiquitous if one looks at the dynamic development of the discipline.

Given the limits of space and the earlier discussion of the global structure of IR, the territorial and disciplinary expansion can be kept short. As mentioned earlier, territorial expansion was for a long time characterized (and in many ways still is characterized) by the discipline’s failure to engage with the non-Western world. To the extent that such engagement did take place, it often followed general patterns of colonial interaction. Western IR presented its way of practicing the craft as exemplary, while scholars in non-Western regions would either emulate Western IR practices (thereby, perhaps, gaining some recognition from abroad) or keep to whatever local forms of scholarship were deemed suitable to study things “international” (and remain largely marginalized). In the late 20th century and early 21st century, there has been quite a bit of change with respect to the quantitative enlargement of IR communities outside the West and a much more self-conscious redefinition of what it may mean to conduct IR in places such as China, India, Kenya, or Mexico. This expansion has been aided by global shifts in power as well as theoretical innovation (e.g., postcolonialism). The World International Studies Committee (WISC), an organization of national International Studies associations that has been active since the turn of the

century, has certainly helped as well. Measured in terms of chairs in IR, the discipline even seems to be expanding much more rapidly in non-Western regions, Latin America, and Asia in particular (see the 2009 special issue of *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*). Nevertheless, even though almost no comparative data are available on the number of chairs in IR around the globe or relative to other disciplines in political science, Hans-Dieter Klingemann notes that IR appears to be growing numerically even in Europe and North America, if only at the expense of other subdisciplines.

### *The Expansion of the IR Research Agenda*

By most accounts (Western) IR is essentially an invention of the 20th century (for a contrasting perspective, see William Olson & John Groom, 1991). Even if some of its origins may have been romanticized in one way or another, it is widely accepted as common knowledge among IR scholars that the primary subjects of study in the first half of the 20th century were almost exclusively related to governmental activities crossing national boundaries. Against the background of the two World Wars, the question of war and peace loomed large. Accordingly, early (Western) IR framed its research agenda mainly in the vocabulary of international law and diplomatic history. The methods and approaches associated with these disciplines were thought to offer the best hope for “the problem of international governmental reorganization and practice” (Pitman Potter, 1923, p. 391), without necessarily succumbing to the sort of “idealist internationalism” for which the discipline was later chastised by realists in particular (Olson & Groom, 1991). In the middle of the 20th century, the agenda was broadened to include international economics and all those aspects of international relations that could be “described in terms of decision-making by identifiable individuals or groups of individuals” (Frederick Dunn, 1948, p. 145). More important, ever more scholars seemed ready to subscribe to the view that international politics rather than international organization constituted the core of a slowly maturing discipline. While the latter was said to have been approached predominantly with a constitutional frame, the image of an international system made up of states that were interacting “almost like

Leibnizian monads" (Morton Kaplan, 1961) and the accompanying clash of national interests and power were considered to be more properly dealt with in a political framework (William Fox, 1949). The first great debate was an expression of this shift.

The war experience (which had involved all those countries crucial for the discipline's development in the 1950s and 1960s) and the spreading realization that the advent of the nuclear age would not only revolutionize warfare but also affect the very survival of humankind pushed the expanding research agenda of IR scholarship into the field of strategic studies with its focus on state practices such as deterrence thinking and arms control negotiations. While essentially remaining in the classical IR domain of state-based international politics, the novel process of European integration at least offered a paradigmatic alternative to the traditional focus on great-power competition. It not only inspired a series of similar political projects in other parts of the world but also helped stimulate a new and vibrant field of study focused on comparative regional integration. In addition, the process of decolonization laid the foundation for expanding both the territorial reach of IR research beyond the confines of the Western world as well as the disciplinary focus on politics by intensifying the link with economics. Paradigmatically, though, the two major alternatives of the emerging development studies, modernization theory and dependency theory, continued to draw almost exclusively on the Western tradition. (Neo-)Marxist-inspired analyses of capitalism's contribution to the "underdevelopment" of non-Western regions by scholars such as André Gunder Frank, a University of Chicago-trained economist, helped pave the way for international political economy to fully establish itself as one of the major subfields of IR, starting in the 1970s. On a parallel track, the study of foreign policy, which had been one of the major sections in any North American IR/political science curriculum, continued to thrive as an ever more "scientific," increasingly separate and differentiating field. Foreign policy analysis (or FPA) was the prime subfield of IR, expanding into those neighboring disciplines (such as psychology and sociology) that were deemed useful in coming up with theoretical and methodological tools for making sense of group decision-making

processes under routine bureaucratic or crisis situations.

With the advent of the East–West détente and the 1973 oil crisis, the disciplinary horizon broadened further. Although the classical focus on "high-politics" security issues kept its prominent place, other issues gained in importance or were added anew to the IR research agenda. First, the introduction of the concept of "transnational politics" at the end of the 1960s contained an unveiled critique of the state centrism of classical IR. It also foreshadowed the broadening of the more narrowly circumscribed foreign policy perspective during the 1970s and 1980s by also looking at nonstate actors and their activities and interactions at the systemic level. Second, the Club of Rome's "The Limits to Growth" report of 1972, the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in the same year, and the oil crisis in the following year set the stage for environmental issues to be added to the IR research agenda. Third, transnational relations and environmental politics both fitted in neatly with perhaps the most prominent new theme in IR since the 1970s: the spreading interest in the phenomenon of interdependence and globalization. This image of an increasingly globalizing world that affected every corner of the globe and reached across all issue areas in turn helped push a final expansion of the research agenda: the inclusion of an ever-larger group of nonstate actors, to use the mainstream IR vocabulary. Alternatively, critical, postmodern, feminist, and/or postcolonial theories identified a huge, highly diverse, and often indistinguishable group that they called the marginalized: victims of war, poverty, or colonialism; women; or, more generally, all human beings who had become mere objects of structures and practices of power rather than being political subjects. At the beginning of the 21st century, there are, thus, few phenomena that cannot be framed in one way or another as legitimate objects of study under the heading of IR. Indeed, some even argue that the discipline has to rename itself in order to do justice to the causal and constitutive connections that link so many levels of political action in global society.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that both the structure of the most influential professional organization in the field of international studies, the International Studies Association, and the most

recent comprehensive survey of the major topics of the field appear to cover essentially any phenomenon of politically relevant social action transcending state borders. The book version of the ISA “compendium” encompasses 12 volumes and more than 8,000 pages of text (Robert Denmark, 2010). The open-ended online compendium is even more voluminous. The same applies as far as the structure of the ISA is concerned. The 24 sections are impressive not only for their breadth but also for the fact that paradigmaticism is much less visible at this level of organization. Section themes include professional and pedagogical concerns (as in the sections “Women’s Caucus” and “Active Learning in IS”) and epistemological and methodological concerns (as in the sections “Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies” and “Scientific Study of International Processes”), but most often, they cover a broad range of substantive issues (e.g., “Diplomatic Studies”; “Environmental Studies”; “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration Studies”; “Feminist Theory and Gender Studies”; “Foreign Policy Analysis”; “Global Development Studies”; “Human Rights; “Intelligence Studies”; “International Communication”; “International Education”; “International Ethics”; “International Law”; “International Organization”; “International Political Economy”; “International Political Sociology”; “International Security Studies”; “Peace Studies”; “Political Demography”; and “Post Communist States in International Relations”). The only exception as far as a paradigmatic orientation is concerned relates to the section “English School.”

### *Theoretical and Methodological Expansion*

Theoretical and methodological sophistication is almost universally accepted as a key criterion for judging the quality and status of a scholarly discipline. In both respects, IR has seen tremendous, sometimes even exponential, growth. If we concentrate on the 20th century, the formative period of IR up to the 1950s was largely marked by an understanding of theory and method common among the (usually much older) disciplines from which IR was drawing its new talents: (diplomatic) history, (international) law, economics, what is nowadays called area studies, and the study of (domestic) politics. Many of these were

considered to be part of the humanities rather than the (social) sciences. Accordingly, the distinction between the empirical and the normative, drawn in a particularly strong fashion in the course of the “behavioral revolution,” was mostly not deemed appropriate then. To be sure, “science” was already cherished among IR novices. Yet it was not yet as strongly associated with a notion of the natural sciences as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s.

The revolutionary shift to the new mantra of “applying scientific methods” was perhaps best captured in the transition from the 1st edition (published in 1961) to the 2nd edition of *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, a textbook edited by Rosenau (1969), who, perhaps along with Hayward Alker, is himself an exemplar of the shifting epistemological, theoretical, and methodological currents of the discipline over the past 50 years. In introducing the 57 chapters of the 2nd edition, Rosenau apologized for including “only 9 percent of the original selections” even though he himself had stated in 1961 that “articles were included ‘only if they seemed likely to be useful in twenty years.’” Yet rather than taking this to be a “cause for embarrassment,” he saw “cause for satisfaction” due to the “remarkable growth in the scope and pace of the theoretical enterprise” and the “increasingly sophisticated penetration of the mysteries of international life” (Rosenau, 1969, p. xvii). The book contained 25 articles on 14 different types of “theories and approaches” as well as 17 articles on different “research techniques and orientations.” For many older IR scholars, this was a misguided fixation on an ideal of science that was wholly inadequate for the subject matter of international politics. Yet Rosenau’s candid assessment and selections illustrate the predominant mood and trends in the 1960s and 1970s quite well. Although “classical” approaches and methods continued to have their followers—and actually benefitted themselves from the behavioral revolution—the wave of the future seemed to be an understanding of “science” that required “an articulated secondary language that permits reasonable precision and replicability” (Kaplan, 1966, p. 4) as well as sophisticated techniques for gathering and processing data.

Mere listing of all the new methods and techniques that were invented and/or imported in IR

during that phase could spread out over a couple of pages. Suffice it to say that such a list would include almost the whole range of tools applied in other academic disciplines—ranging all the way from some of the humanities to other social sciences and the natural sciences. Nevertheless, even some of its initial adherents later granted that “the promises of behavioralism were not fulfilled” (Rosenau, 1993, p. 459). Against this background, among others, the third (or fourth) debate in particular represented a move beyond methodology by digging deeper to address the underlying epistemological and ontological questions. Yet rather than shrinking the space, this debate enlarged it further through reinvigorating reflection on the reach and uses of qualitative methods and by problematizing the very basis of theory formation. In many ways, the qualitative label reinforced an encroaching dualistic conception of methodology—with a quantitative pole on the other side. Of course, some influential theories and/or methods (e.g., rational choice and other formal methods) that actually thrived during the 1980s and 1990s in American IR could not easily be subsumed under such a dualistic conception. However, influential publications that reached far beyond IR (e.g., Gary King, Robert Keohane, & Sydney Verba, 1994) actually tried to ease the tension by arguing that there is a unified logic of scientific inference across a large spectrum of different methodologies. While this proposition was hardly acceptable to everyone, it did mirror a widespread understanding of scientific analysis among IR scholars according to which the essence of scholarship lay in “linking theory to evidence.” In the 2002 *Handbook of International Relations*, this is the title of the single explicitly methodological chapter covering the whole spectrum from rationalist to constructivist theories, the latter even including critical theory. One set of methods that thrived in IR since the 1980s, the so-called case study methods—which were actually put at the center of qualitative methods by some more “scientifically” inclined scholars—actually expressed this understanding most clearly and, for many IR scholars, convincingly.

While it certainly mirrored “mainstream” understandings, the fixation on somehow linking theory and evidence with the help of certain methods had its critics—and increasingly so. As a matter of fact, since the early 1980s, an ever-larger number of

scholars subscribed to a variety of postpositivist approaches that all posited the mutual impregnation of theory, reality, and descriptions thereof (evidence). Most important, from a methodological point of view, theories such as feminism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, critical theory, pragmatism, and postcolonialism all questioned whether “social facts” could indeed be treated like “natural facts,” as implicitly assumed by the mainstream approaches (Friedrich Kratochwil, 2008). The answer was an outright “No.” Since nature did not “speak,” concepts and even whole vocabularies had to be invented in order to relate to “the world out there” when one wanted to describe and explain how even small parts of it (not to mention everything) actually hang together. In this view, the issue was not whether (and if so, how) one would come up with the “correct” description to work within the actual business of explanation. Rather, one of the key questions was how we came to describe the world in a particular vocabulary in the first place and what this description did to our being in and relating to the world.

This amounted to a radical critique of the whole enterprise of how the “science” of international relations was practiced by positivists. In a sense, the weight of the charge was equivalent to the one that scientists had leveled against traditionalists during the second debate: the charge of actually misconstruing what scholarship about the international was all about. Methods, however, were not relegated to the dustbin as charges about “anything goes” seemed to indicate. Indeed, if anything, the third (or fourth) debate helped further broaden the theoretical and methodological horizon of the discipline by opening it for a rediscovery of earlier roots in international law and normative theory and by more explicitly incorporating sociological perspectives (as illustrated by the founding of the journal *International Political Sociology* in 2007). To be sure, few of its adherents would claim that a switch to a postpositivist stance would be rewarded with any of the earlier promises of “cumulation of knowledge” or “progress” (the latter is at least kept as an option in a Lakatosian assessment of different IR research agendas). Yet leaving behind the straitjacket of “method-drivenness”—which has even become a dirty word for the self-proclaimed positivists (Fearon & Wendt, 2002)—seems to be enough in

terms of gratification for them. In sum, even if the discipline may not have advanced much on the path of cumulation and progress, it seems to have progressed steadily on the path of theoretical and methodological sophistication.

### Conclusion

The story of the field of international relations could be told in an analogous fashion to the story of “the expansion of international society.” It may well be that a casual reader of this entry 20 or 50 years from now might actually have precisely that impression—with all the critical undertones that a postcolonial perspective would want to add. Yet this probably is how “the state of the art” appears to a big group of practitioners of IR scholarship today. As has been discussed above, the discipline is in many ways not up to the task (yet?) of tackling, not to mention overcoming, its many awkward parochialisms. These are all the more glaring given the almost universal expression of an ever more globalizing world—irrespective of how one may define the phenomenon of globalization—and the fact that the discipline itself lays claim to actually analyzing these processes and features within its purview.

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*See also* International Law; International Political Economy; International Relations, History; International Relations, Theory; Normative Theory in International Relations

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relations analysis in Charles Manning's book *The Nature of International Society* (1962). Manning's younger colleague at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Martin Wight, produced a series of works that largely remained unpublished during his lifetime; in these, he elaborated on what he called a society of states, which he juxtaposed with a system of states. Besides Manning, with whom he remained at intellectual loggerheads, Wight was indebted to the deliberations of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, of which he was a founder member since 1958, for his ideas. These ideas found further fertile ground in the mind of Hedley Bull (1977), who juxtaposed Wight's two key concepts in a double definition, whereby "a system of states is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions to behave at least in some measure—as parts of a whole" (pp. 9–10). "A society of states (or international society)," on the other hand,

exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions. (p. 13)

These foundational definitions, along with a number of others, are to be found in what remains the major text on international society—namely, *The Anarchical Society*.

Indeed, Bull's concept of international society has since been given so much attention, particularly in Britain, Australia, and South Africa, but also in Scandinavia and Italy, that there has evolved a self-conscious tradition or school of thought that refers to itself as the English School of international relations or indeed the international society approach. The English School forms a separate section within the International Studies Association and has its own website. The question of who is in and who is out of this school has been discussed at narcissistic length. For an overview of this matter, the reader is referred to Chapter 2 of Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami's book *The English School of International Relations* (2006), a book that is also an excellent introduction. Timothy Dunne and Brunello Vigizzi are the school's own principal historians.

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## INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

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The concept of "international society" was first elaborated as a key concept for international

There has been extensive debate within the English School about whether the concept of international society may best be understood as a stylization of historical sequences or as a functional construct. James Mayall (1990) sees it as basically historical, Alan James would see it as basically theoretical, whereas Barry Buzan once saw it as a hybridization, arguing that the emergence of international society may be understood as an ideational process turning on a meaning that is inextricably tied up with the functional emergence of an international system. In a later work, however, Buzan (2004) did away with the distinction altogether. There is a strong case for doing so. As Max Weber had already pointed out, the most instrumental action is still imbued with meaning, and the most symbolic action also has some instrumentality. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that two polities would be aware of one another, let alone communicate, without a modicum of shared meaning and some regularity in the quality of interaction. Ontically, the difference between international system and international society seems unsustainable. As demonstrated by the output of the school, however, it has proven itself to be a nice analytical tool, which means that we may recognize it as an analytical concept on pragmatic grounds.

Bull was very interested in discussing different existing and possible world orders. Building on Wight's (1977) historical work, the school has evolved a body of work on the comparative sociology of status systems that includes a hypothesis that world history oscillates between periods of empire and periods of state systems, a study of interaction between different polities over a period of 60,000 years, and a study of how European international society expanded to the world at large (Bull & Watson, 1984).

If an international society exists when states are conscious of common interests and values and share in the working of common institutions, then the places to look for it are surely in people's thinking about international relations as well as in the patterned practices of states as they exist in specific fields. Note that international society should, therefore, seemingly be understood as a kind of structure that may only be studied through its effects and that is, by the same token, constituted by those effects. Dunne called his history of the school's origins *Inventing International Society*

to underline precisely this imagined nature of international society as well as the constitutive, and hence political, role played in its invention of imagination by those working within the confines of the school. The two following sections of this entry look at the institutions and the thinking that are said to be constitutive of international society. A final section discusses the significance of the school.

### The Institutions

To some scholars, it is clear that international society has the philosophical status of a structure. One of the characteristic traits of the English School, however, is its unwillingness to deal with the philosophy of science (see section on significance below). It is, therefore, far from clear what kind of status the several members of the school seem to give to the various phenomena that they discuss. To Wight, who offered a number of different lists detailing what kinds of institutions international relations were made of, institutions seem to be social practices, and so constitutive. Wight also insisted that diplomacy, understood as the system and the art of communication between powers, was the master institution of international relations. To Bull, who refined Wight's taxonomy and concentrated on five institutions—the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power (concert)—these institutions do not seem to be constitutive of international society but reflective of it. In his view, what constitutes order are the primary goals of states—security, the sanctity of agreements (*pacta sunt servanda*), and territorial property rights—and international society is no more than the form a particular order happens to take. In this way, diplomacy and international society are framed simply as ideational and reflective of international order and begin to take on an epiphenomenal hue.

There exist book-length studies of four of the five institutions postulated by Bull that are variously informed by the international society perspective. Richard Little traced the emergence of the concept of the balance of power and discussed its centrality for international society. His is the treatment that sticks closest to the concept of international society. Buzan's (2004) treatment of great powers focuses on the present time, giving pride of



place to the United States. James Der Derian's study of diplomacy breaks with previous work of the school by drawing extensively on continental social theory, arguing that the emergence of the institution of diplomacy may be alternatively understood as humankind's negotiation of alienation. Evan Luard's discussion of war in international society is more of a preliminary study that may serve as a platform for an international society-inspired analysis. Adam Roberts and others have conducted a number of international society-based shorter studies of how law constitutes international society.

### The Thinking and the Thinkers

It is another characteristic of the school that it is more concerned with the thinkers of international society than with the thinking of international society. Whether we should think of this as a consequence of methodological individualism is a moot question in the school's own terms, for on this point, as elsewhere, the school does not dwell on the status of the phenomena it discusses. In Bull and Watson's coedited *Expansion of International Society* (1984), Bull fruitfully uses the concept of an international political culture to discuss the diffusion of ideas and practices and in his evaluation of the extent to which "The Revolt Against the West" challenged world order at large. There exist important studies of how specific themes have been thought up against international society: for example, *Nationalism and International Society* (Mayall, 1990), which argues that mainstream liberal thinking over the past 200 years or so was both statist and nationalist, and *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society* (David Armstrong, 1993), which generalizes that revolutionary regimes will initially break with the idea of an international society, only to come back at some later point. John Vincent mapped the historical case for nonintervention, leaving Nick Wheeler to set out the case for humanitarian intervention.

These remain exceptions, however. The school has mainly preoccupied itself with how specific philosophers and statesmen have conceptualized global politics, particularly the degree to which and the way in which they have dwelled on the existence of a possible international society. Rather than following the

lead of Manning, who looked at patterns of thought, the school has followed Wight, whose interest was what he called traditions of thought. Wight (1966) contrasted political theory with what he refers to as international theory. Whereas the former consists of a succession of classics from Jean Bodin to John Mill, there is no succession of first-rate books about the states system and diplomacy. As pointed out by Suganami, inasmuch as "politics" concerns the working of the *polis*—that is, the working of a social collective that strives to maintain its boundaries toward the outside, there can be no such thing as international politics. As a response to this situation, Wight fastened on the concept of "diplomats" as a more accurate and more technically correct way of referring to his preferred object of study than "the international" of everyday speech. Everything that is not politics, then, is diplomacy, but by the same token, everything that has nothing to do with the internal life of the state and with the specific relations between states is ruled out as an object of study.

In a standard lecture course that has served as a template for many a later school lecturer, Wight (1991) postulated three traditions of diplomacy for all international intercourse, its purposes and objects, in times of peace. These were the Machiavellian (or, to Bull, Hobbesian), the Grotian, and the Kantian. As is evident from the use of the names of specific philosophers, these traditions were conceptualized as chains of specific philosophers and statesmen who shared an affinity for conceptualizing international in one of three ways. Sometimes a fourth is added to make room for the principle that he traced back to Guiseppe Mazzini—namely, that the world may be divided into national states. Since this is definitely a prescriptive idea of how global politics should be ordered, nationalism does in this sense give rise to an international doctrine—namely, that the subjects of global politics should be nation-states.

The school's three traditions—with Hobbesians arguing that covenants without the sword are but words, Grotians arguing that *pacta sunt servanda* (treaties should be observed), and Kantians arguing in favor of cosmopolitanism—clearly have heuristic value. Given the way discourse about the international realm is still set up, they also have a certain predictive value, since one may readily expect that debates about any problem that arises

(say, a humanitarian intervention or the setting up of a new international organization [IO]) will include voices growing out of these three broad representations of which duties, if any, transcend borders. As Wight himself acknowledged, however, it is also the great weakness of the scheme that it cannot be a proper categorization in terms of covering all possibilities. Specific dates will, by necessity, come with their own specific colorations. One may add that Wight's *historiosophy*, which saw what happened in the international realm as endless repetition, precluded him from thinking about more basic change.

International society is conceived as an anarchical society. As Émile Durkheim pointed out, however, societies are despotic, in the sense that they lay down what should count as normal behavior and so may be seen as a structure of power (systems are arrangements through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society, as David Easton would have it). The tension between anarchy, on the one hand, and society, on the other, is the constitutive tension of the school. By dint of an internal logic, then, the Grotian tradition seems to be the broad home for the school itself. According to the school, it comes in two variants: pluralist and solidarist. Pluralists celebrate the cultural pluralism displayed throughout international society, giving pride of place to the importance of systems maintenance. One recognizes an affinity to the prudence of the Hobbesian tradition. Solidarists, on the other hand, concentrate on how international society should be strengthened by forging ever new ties between its members, giving rise to new institutions and conventions that warrant the forging of minimum standards binding on all. Here, one recognizes an affinity to Kantian cosmopolitanism.

Note that these are self-reflective normative concerns; the school is tied together by the celebration of a real-existing international society and divided by debates about how far this celebration should be taken. Solidarist tendencies usually come with an interest in how international society, conceptualized as a society of states, is related to world society, conceptualized as a society of sundry agents. While maintaining that states make up the dominant system of units, the school has sought to incorporate the further complication of nonstate actors more fully within its theoretical schema—an aim it shares with the existing global

polity theory. Just as states make up a system, nonstate actors are theorized increasingly to make up a nonstate system of their own (although this, it is maintained, depends ultimately on the state system). This system is embedded in a nonstate set of norms, rules, values, and conventions—that is, a “world system” of nonstate actors is embedded in a “world society” of nonstate values, rules, institutions, and so on (Buzan, 2004).

### Significance

Much like the body of literature on geopolitics, the major significance of the literature on international society is to allow a wide-ranging investigation of some deeply pertinent questions that are key to the discipline of international relations at large. Again, like geopolitics, the claims that emerge from these investigations tend to be rather sweeping. Unlike geopolitics, however, the style is historical and empirical, and the methodology is implicit and commonsensical. The English School is English not least in its empiricism. Some scholars believe that Dunne is right in stressing that the invention of an interpretative approach to the history of ideas about international relations is a constitutive as well as a crowning achievement of the school. However, when compared with other and parallel attempts to invent such approaches in the social sciences, some think that the school comes up a bit short. In Germany, there emerged concurrently with the first English School writings, in the early 1960s, a tradition of conceptual history led by Reinhart Koselleck. This work has resulted in multivolume treatments of the German and French political languages. Meanwhile, in France, Michel Foucault initiated a number of studies where the history of ideas is paired to social history in a different but comparable manner. Finally, in the very same university where the British Committee met, at the same time, and out of the same broadly empirical Anglo-American tradition to which the English School itself belongs, there emerged an undertaking spearheaded by Cambridge historians such as Quentin Skinner to write the history of the past in terms of the ideas that animated it. This undertaking has resulted in a number of meticulously researched monographs as well as methodological essays. Alexander Wendt's work, where the school's concept of the

three traditions of thinking about international relations is modified and applied in his theorizing of how international society may mature, demonstrates how this body of work may be paired up with wider theorizing to produce new insights.

Nowhere is the historical bent of the international society tradition more on display than in a book with the telling title *The Expansion of International Society* (Bull & Watson, 1984). Suganami noted in his contribution on Japan's entry into international society how Admiral Perry used deliberate mistranslation of a key treaty to secure the United States permanent representation in Japan. Expansion is a power-laden process. This fact is not adequately on display in works on international society.

Expansion is also a process that is imagined as spreading outward from a center. Although there may be setbacks and even reversions, the conception is of a process where one party imposes its order on the other, with little or no residue and without being itself changed by the experience. It is of course true that European international society has expanded to cover the entire globe, so in terms of teleology, this perspective on history is not unwarranted. The problem is, however, that it is not relational. It does not invite scrutiny of the relations that went into producing the result of European expansion. This is scientifically problematic, for we want to know what kinds of tensions and conflicts gave rise to the consequences of European expansion. It is also politically problematic, for it invites a reading where an "us" expands at "their" expense rather than demonstrating the power asymmetries and hybridizations that marked the process.

Manning criticized Wight for not empathizing with his aim of establishing international relations as a social science. Similar critiques have accompanied the school at every turn since then. The school would have come off on an even better footing if it had followed Manning's aspiration to write works that were both studies of international relations and contributions that were explicitly dialogical in their relation to the (rest of the) literature on social phenomena. The school has followed Wight's lead and styled its work as a series of comments on the general flow of history, instead of Manning's competing vision of doing something more in the vein of the sociology of knowledge of international

relations. What the English School seems to need at the present juncture is to complement in many ways the unique historical and taxonomic work already carried out by sustained, theory-led studies that may bring the school closer to the general style of work in the social sciences.

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See also Balance of Power; International Relations, Theory; State

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## INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

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Solidarity is a type of social relation as old as the first societies. Whether based on family, friendship, religion, corporate bodies, or trade, solidarity takes multiple forms, but all forms have in common a relation in which groups and/or people bring, not necessarily reciprocally, a particular assistance. Every social order supposes a minimal level of solidarity between its elements and, conversely, every social relation acts as an indicator of a certain social order, according to Émile Durkheim. Therefore, there is no study of societies without considering the forms of solidarity they enclose. At an international level, the question is more delicate: The existence of solidarity is disputed given the fact that the very existence of a society is much debated.

In the tradition of international realism, the world is perceived as a general competition of powers, and solidarity is expressed only through military alliances. Actually, one should speak of functional policies oriented toward maintaining the balance of power—the only principle that is able to regulate the international anarchy—rather than of solidarity. Theoretical approaches competing with realism in international studies (liberalism, functionalism, transnationalism, and constructivism) are more attentive to demonstrations of solidarity in international relations. In highlighting what binds actors as much as what divides them, realists admit the existence of an international order that entails relations of cooperation and assistance. Among these approaches, the British school of international relations has contributed more than any other to the development of the concept of “international society.” The latter, mainly composed of states, is organized around norms and institutions that secure a minimal order for the common interest of its members and enable the pursuit of shared objectives. According to Hedley Bull, such a conceptualization of the international system supposes necessarily the existence of relations of solidarity and fully supports their analysis.

From a historic and empirical point of view, demonstrations of international solidarity are quite undisputable. Under various names—support, assistance, mutual aid, and so on—actors have always joined together to defend their interests and

promote their causes. These practices have involved states as well as nonstate actors. But the densification, that is, the increased number and complexity, of relationships between societies (what is called “interdependence”) has led to a new dynamic.

Three dimensions of international solidarity are considered here. The most traditional one refers to a political will to form alliances for mutual empowerment. Second, since the beginning of the 20th century, international solidarity has also been used as an instrument for building up an international order. International solidarity is in fact a doctrine of international peace. But, parallel with the development of the means of communication and the greater sensitivity of societies, international solidarity has also turned into a strong means of international contest of the global inequalities. Thus, there is a third dimension in which actors of international solidarity are nonstate actors that contest state policies. Each of these dimensions has its own characteristics and aims, but all speak for the fact that international solidarities are at the heart of the political, economic, and social history of international relations.

### A Rationale of Power

Let us consider the first dimension: mutual empowerment. In a context of partially competitive relations, the actors of the international system seek naturally to decrease their vulnerability to pressures from other nations and to enhance their strength and build on their assets. Solidarity therefore consists in appealing to presumed common ties and shared objectives to build a union that will reinforce the capacities of each of the parties and the strength of all. This classical function of international solidarity as a power multiplier may assume several shapes. The first one is that of military alliances that tend to maximize the security of their members through reciprocal assistance (e.g., Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] treaty) or through various means of bilateral cooperation. The creation of regional unions with multiple vocations illustrates a second form of mobilization of solidarity aimed at benefiting from the (economic and diplomatic) advantages of an actor of international scale (e.g., the European Union). Third, the organization of some economic lobbies also expresses a form of solidarity in the defense and the

promotion of sector-based interests at the service of the power of concerned states (e.g., Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]). Eventually, a fourth form of solidarity resides in the elaboration of political alliances, the aim of which is to promote a cause or a position on the international scene (e.g., the Non-Aligned Movement).

In all cases of solidarity in this first form, solidarity may be value grounded, but it is mainly an instrument of power and influence. If states usually are the main actors and benefactors, nonstate actors also know how to benefit from this type of mobilization to strengthen their capacity for action. The International Workingmen's Association, known as the First International, which was created to defend the workers and to reinforce their organizations, is a famous historical example of the way nonstate solidarity was invited to demonstrate its strength. Many other international mobilizations were to follow this path.

All these practices of solidarity result in a paradoxical situation: All solidarities are favorable to unity, but all define themselves in rivalry and confrontation. In this power rationale, solidarity is as much a factor of cooperation as one of conflict.

### A Doctrine of International Peace

Let us now turn to the second dimension of international solidarity: international order. A very different conception of solidarity emerges as early as the end of the 19th century. The "first globalization" (1860–1914), characterized by a spectacular development of trade relations and communication means, substantiates the idea that the world is becoming more and more interdependent. World War I and the 1929 economic crisis reinforce the same image of a shrinking world. No state, and specifically not in its economic and social development, appears to be able to act on its own; all seem more or less dependent on the others. Their interdependence is perceived as a reality that the first "technical" international organizations (telegraphs, post, transports, etc.) account for, and it is in part independent of the actors' own will. Thus, solidarity is no longer the result of an act willfully undertaken by states but has become a social fact perceived by actors as such. The interdependence hereby created reaches beyond the acts of solidarity undertaken.

Léon Bourgeois (1851–1925) was one of the first to transform this empirical recording into a political doctrine (solidarism). Conceived at the level of society as a third path between liberalism and collectivist socialism, solidarism calls for a certain degree of social intervention to guarantee a liberal and just order. At an international level, according to Bourgeois, this doctrine supports the resort to international organizations to ensure peace and justice. David Mitrany notes that many authors were to encourage this perspective, which consists in increasing and regulating interdependences between states to better pacify their relations, through the mediation of international organizations.

Parallel to the development of sector-based international organizations, the creation of the League of Nations and then the formation of the United Nations (UN) carries further the efforts and tends to ground international order in a global political solidarity. The tragic experience of the two World Wars acted as a determining factor. With various successes, multilateralism imposed itself as a method of negotiation between several parties and aimed at gathering states around shared values. After 1945, multilateralism spread to almost all fields (monetary, economic, trade, social, etc.) at the world as well as the regional (the European construction) levels. The mobilization of concrete solidarities in the service of a global solidarity from which all may benefit became the official doctrine of multilateralism. It was strengthened after decolonization and under the growing influence of countries from the Global South. However, just as at the time of the League of Nations and despite the reinforced authority of the UN Security Council, practices of solidarity remain limited. The assessment is incomplete regarding functional cooperation (technical cooperation, development aid, etc.). Such solidarity is limited with respect to political and military cooperation. The Cold War cannot be held as the only element responsible for these limitations. Collective security, as envisioned by the UN Charter, proved impossible to accomplish and therefore is considered a major failure with regard to international solidarity, which should have presided over the implementation of Security Council decisions. Another failure derives from an interstate conception of international solidarity within the UN. Solidarity is reduced to the interests of the most powerful states although, as phrased at the



beginning of the Charter (“We the People of the United Nations”), it was officially addressed to the societies of the member states. The UN, as it functions, consecrates an interstate order that favors powerful states instead of being an instrument of solidarity between societies.

### A Social Dynamic of Contest

Let us finally turn to the third dimension of international solidarity: the emergence of international social movements that contest the established interstate order. As early as the 19th century, international solidarity has been extended to the relations between societies in reaction to state policies: The actors of this form of international solidarity are nonstate actors. Taking advantage of the development of means of communication, many social groups grew conscious of the resources they could draw from their solidarity in the defense and the promotion of common causes. Mobilizations of solidarity multiplied (abolitionists, suffragettes, pacifists), for instance, the international movements of workers or the action of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in fields neglected by states. In parallel to rising multilateralism, a new form of solidarity was born on the international scene: both social and transnational. After a period, when it fell back at the eve of World War II (despite the singular episode of the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War), the dynamic strengthened itself globally through the creation of a growing number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) having an international vocation in domains as various as humanitarian emergency, human rights, development aid, environment, and so on. This activism of solidarity now adds up to that of transnational social movements, which inscribes itself even more clearly in a perspective of contesting state policies (as the action of groups claiming themselves as partisans of an alter-globalization and the brutal response of authorities in Seattle in 1999 or Genoa in 2001 have testified). Using various means (global campaigns, lobby, boycott, countersummits, etc.), the mobilized social bases have become more diversified while the organizations have transformed, thanks to the Internet, into broad networks of correspondents (even if they remain located mainly in the North), as noted by Marco Giugni and Florence Passy.

The acceleration of communications and the media exposure of international events have led to an intensification of relations between societies. However, transnational solidarities remain fragile. They are primarily anchored in local and national levels of action and therefore strive to embody global objectives. They often remain fragmented and virtual. They interfere in interstate relations but are no substitute for them.

Trapped between diverse conceptions and practices, international solidarity remains an ambivalent notion. It reveals a certain state of international order and also designates one of the elements of its transformation.

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*See also* Advocacy Networks, Transnational; International Organizations; International Society; Multilateralism; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Peace; Power

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## INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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The international system is made up of individual, constituent units and an ordering principle that arranges the structure of those units, together forming a whole toward an outside environment.

A third defining characteristic of the international system is the interaction that continuously occurs between the level of the individual units and the overall structural level. This notion, comprising three basic elements (units, structure, and unit–structure interaction), suffices to describe a limited, *structural* conceptualization of the international system. An alternative definition that also encompasses the connections between the units (units, structure, unit–structure interaction, and unit–unit relations) may be referred to as a broader, *relational* conceptualization of the international system. The use of the concept, in either version, is justified as soon as the system exhibits properties that individual units do not.

After a brief note on the intellectual heritage of the concept of the international system, this entry offers a discussion of four sets of issues found pertinent to the subject in contemporary political science and international relations scholarship. The four sets of issues that will help elucidate key aspects of the concept of the international system are (1) the properties of units and structure; (2) its origins and historical evolution; (3) understandings of change, transformation, and breakdown; and (4) the inherent potential and limitations of the concept.

When it comes to the basic figure of thought, it can be argued that some idea of an international system was envisaged in the Amarna letters of ancient Egypt during the Late Bronze Age and is implicit in the classical writings of Thucydides, Kautilya, Sun Tzu, and others who commented on the subjects of diplomacy, trade, and war. Several of these authors described periods of rather intense interaction between political units and a wider political or economic structure, outside of which there was significantly less such interaction. The international system, however, is a concept that emerged in the early-modern era in the treatises of prominent lawyers and philosophers. Following in the footsteps of Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes and their respective works on sovereignty, state equality, and political order, Samuel Pufendorf explicitly referred to *the states system* as several states that are connected as to seem to constitute one body but whose members retain sovereignty. During the 20th century, the rise of new academic disciplines made its mark on all concepts containing the component “system,”

and structuralist authors of organicist, process-oriented, or functionalist persuasion subsequently applied systems theories to virtually all branches of the nascent social sciences. Arguably, this intellectual trend had a profound effect on the academic field of international relations.

### Properties of Units and Structure

Relational concepts of the international system ascribe most importance and explanatory power to the units that together form a whole, as well as to the mutual bonds that are forged among them. Realist balance-of-power theories provide a good illustration of this, as do liberal theories that attribute significance to the internal organization of political units such as city-states, empires, or (modern) states. The idea inherent to the latter is that the internal organization of individual political entities affects the way in which they interact and conduct business with their peer entities.

Structural concepts of the international system assume that unit-level action is essentially shaped and conditioned by the overarching incentive structure, which is why causes are difficult to locate at lower levels of analysis (and abstraction). At the unit level, we merely find the attributes and interactions of the constituent parts. At the system level, a powerful structuring principle arranges the positions of the units and thereby predisposes the mode of interaction among them.

Depending on the characteristics of the particular theory, the international system is a concept infused with some ontological premise as to its purpose, function, or design. This aspect was underdeveloped in much realist theorizing during the post-1945 period but has received more attention in recent years. The same theoretical neglect long applied to the system/environment distinction and to the means of upholding that difference.

### Origins and Historical Evolution

The differentiation between the international system and its environment, the latter typically involving peripheral/nonrecognized units and asymmetric/low-density interaction, is critical to any account of the origins of that system. Some have argued that a trade relationship constitutes a prerequisite for other types of ties between political

entities (units). Others believe that political or strategic ambitions may be just as common as the first step toward creating a significant level of interaction and therefore toward a new unit joining the international system. Once established, many agree, the system is self-reproducing in that units sustain (boundaries between) themselves and fend off systemic intrusion.

Several important contributions regarding the origins and historical evolution of the international system were provided by scholars associated with the so-called English School of international relations. Informed by diplomatic history accounts of political relations, these scholars described how the international system arose in Renaissance Italy and then progressively expanded via Western Europe to North America, Turkey, and other Middle East countries and later to Asia, Australia, Africa, and South America.

Key protagonists of the English School nevertheless felt that the structural conception of the international system strongly downplays the social dimension of interaction and launched a relational notion called *international society*. They insisted that the latter reflects a more demanding level of political and diplomatic exchange than a “mere system,” in that states perceive that they are bound by a common set of rules and institutions.

Most of today’s scholars do not heed this distinction but appear to have subsumed part of the arguments forwarded by the English School into more nuanced understandings of the international system. Indeed, even structural realists who stress material factors and interests of powerful actors as explanatory variables operate with some notion of socialization and cognitive adaptation to the actions and preferences of other actors.

Another increasingly influential body of work highlights the constitutive role of legal precepts, interstate accords, international organizations, and jurisprudence in fashioning the institutional framework within which governments and other actors pursue interests and promote values. An older view of international law as little more than positive morality, akin to the dress code of a private club (as one philosopher put it), is thus giving way for a more comprehensive understanding that acknowledges the expanding body of private and public law in the international realm. It is further accepted that the United Nations, for all its flaws

and limitations, has played a constructive and at times crucial role in de-escalating conflicts between great powers.

### Theoretical Understandings of Change, Transformation, and Breakdown

One of the chief criticisms of structural conceptions of the international system concerns its weak explanation of change or major transformation. According to the most influential account, the international system is anarchic, lacking an institution of central authority, and can only shift to a hierarchical system if functional differentiation among political entities is greatly enhanced and the distribution of capabilities (powers) becomes more even.

That prospect, though, is theoretically implausible. Instead, the law of inertia perpetuates the existing international system, with minor fluctuations on the margins. New members are socialized into the system through learning and mimicking the practices of more successful peer entities. Even though the present international system is characterized by an unprecedented degree of interaction, trade, and communication, proponents of a structural conception of the former maintain that most signs are of continuity and incremental change, the latter induced by states or possibly by transnational advocacy networks and international organizations.

Advocates of relational concepts of international system, in contrast, are more open to the possibility of large-scale change induced by interacting units. Transformative processes, some say, have occurred in connection with the two World Wars of the 20th century and can ensue whenever major powers fundamentally alter the way in which they deal with each other. More radical perspectives project the eclipse of U.S. preeminence within the next 20 to 25 years and believe that a new constellation of powers led by China will become predominant by that time. In fact, some doubt that 21st-century citizens will remain loyal to a single state or nation and predict the onset of an era of cosmopolitanism or “new medievalism.”

A new medievalism with overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties would not necessarily be turbulent or violent, but the latter notion gently approaches the most dramatic type of scenario, that of a breakdown of the international system. Two alternative tragic visions of the future seem to

have gained currency in recent years, and inform the security and defense policies of many individual states (especially in the West). One is that of an epic confrontation along religious, cultural, and/or civilizational lines, pitting the Euro-American transatlantic community of countries against challengers predominantly in Asia and the Middle East.

The second tragic vision is that of ecological disaster on a scale not previously experienced. While this is a devastating prospect, the difference lies in the nonantagonistic character of the latter threat. A breakdown of the international system prompted by environmental damage could conceivably therefore help usher in a new era of global cooperation over and beyond previous political boundaries, jurisdictions, and mandates.

#### Inherent Potential and Limitations of the Concept

The international system is one of several theoretical notions that paved the way for studies with a global reach by playing down the importance of political borders and helping wind down the methodological nationalism characteristic of older social science. The structural conception of the international system, though subject to critique in this entry, was clearly instrumental in widening this research agenda to what used to be viewed as peripheral regions and issues. Relational conceptualizations, meanwhile, are less likely to reify structure or overemphasize the system level at the expense of explanations that account for unit-level actors and institutions.

The “international” element in the concept of international system, however, cannot reasonably transcend the state-oriented focus associated with either version of the argument. And just as states and governments are privileged as unit-level actors, both the structural and the relational conceptions typically rely on an implicit notion of the primacy of politics. In that sense, the international system is a concept that may not remain analytically relevant in the 21st century to the same degree as in the 20th, as the realities it was created to depict have altered substantively.

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*See also* Anarchy; Balance of Power; Diplomacy; International Society

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## INTERNATIONAL TRADE

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International trade is the exchange of goods and services across borders. However, the boundaries between trade and investment have become increasingly blurred. Many services can only be delivered across borders through a foreign commercial presence, implying foreign direct investment. An increasing share of world trade also takes place within multinational firms or through international production networks in which multinationals play a central role.

The political analysis of international trade has centered on two closely related issues: (1) the determinants of free trade and protection at the national level and (2) the determinants of international cooperation on trade issues, including through multilateral organizations. The first section of this entry provides an overview of models of free trade and protection at the domestic level, focusing first on interest-based approaches and then introducing collective action problems and the role of institutions. The second section examines some of the core issues in the international politics of trade, including the central features of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) regime and the growth of regional arrangements. Brief mention is also made of the long-standing literature linking trade to security considerations and conflict. The conclusion considers future research

directions that are emerging from new developments in trade theory, including the role of multinational firms, the enduring role of geography, and the political economy of agglomeration.

### Models of Free Trade and Protection

In their basic assumptions, political economy models of free trade and protection resemble other models of public policy and regulation. Voters and interest groups constitute the “demand side” of the political market with their preferences driven by the effects of trade and trade policy on income and assets. The extent of interest group organization and the willingness to expend resources to secure protection (so-called rent-seeking behavior) are key variables in many political economy models.

Politicians, in turn, supply trade policy in return for votes and campaign contributions (both legal and illegal). Bureaucratic agents can also play an independent role in trade policy where they exercise discretion; an example would be the bribery of a customs agent. The behavior of both politicians and bureaucrats will also be affected by the design of electoral and other political institutions.

### *The Role of Interests*

The early literature on the political economy of trade focused on the structure of protection at the national level, that is, the levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers across industries. Virtually all of this work was on advanced industrial states, and the United States in particular. Early empirical models explored a variety of factors that might be consequential, including the growth of output and employment and exposure to import competition at the industry level. However, the logical underpinning for this analysis was to use trade theory to identify the characteristics of industries (and ultimately investors and workers) that would make them more or less likely to support free trade.

Classic trade theory offered up two, quite different approaches in this regard. In the Heckscher-Ohlin setup, factors of production—capital and labor in the simplest two-factor variant—move costlessly across industries and returns to them therefore tend to equalize across the economy. Going back to David Ricardo’s classic formulation of comparative advantage, countries (and regions

within them) will export goods that intensively use abundant factors and will import goods intensive in the scarce factor. Trade thus benefits owners of abundant factors and harms the scarce factor. In capital-abundant economies, capital should therefore favor free trade while labor should oppose it; in labor-abundant economies, the opposite would be the case.

In a sweeping application of the Heckscher-Ohlin approach, Ronald Rogowski’s *Commerce and Coalitions* (1990) attempted to show how changes in the costs of trade in the late 19th century influenced not only the politics of trade but wider social cleavages in a number of countries. In recent years, studies of protection at the industry level using a Heckscher-Ohlin motivation have been supplemented by survey research that trace preferences down to the individual level. For example, Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter found that the level of education, taken as a proxy for skills, was positively correlated with individual preferences for free trade.

The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that the interests of factors will align; in a two-factor setup, capital and labor should have opposing trade policy interests. This model could not explain the anomaly that capital and labor frequently seemed allied with one another in opposing free trade in the advanced industrial states, for example, in declining sectors such as steel and textiles. In the specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model, factors are not mobile across alternative uses. Once investments are made in industry-specific physical and human capital, those investments are not easily redeployed. As a result, trade policy coalitions form not along factoral lines but by sector depending on the level of exposure to international trade. Export-oriented and import-competing industries constitute the dominant cleavage.

The interest group foundations underlying both the mobile and fixed factor models had an important limitation in not capturing the constraints on politicians in acceding to rent-seeking demands. Trade theory is useful in outlining the distributive consequences of policy, but it also underlines the distortions and welfare losses associated with protectionism. Indeed, if free trade is welfare enhancing, politicians responding to the median voter should consistently support free trade. In an influential article, Helen Milner and Keiko Kubota

show that democratic developing countries were more likely to liberalize trade beginning in the 1980s than their authoritarian counterparts.

In a highly influential synthesis, Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman model politicians as seeking to maximize their chances of election by balancing two considerations: (1) the political contributions coming from factor-specific lobbies and (2) the aggregate social welfare gains and losses associated with any trade policy choices, which should affect the support of voters at the margin. A core element of the Grossman-Helpman model is the extent of industry organization; protection increases with the extent to which sectors are organized.

### *Collective-Action Problems*

A central problem with both the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner approaches is that they are ultimately theories of trade policy preferences, not effective influence or outcomes. For preferences to be translated into policy, groups must be organized and politicians must respond to them.

Several early empirical studies found that organizational factors, proxied by measures of industry concentration, had a more powerful effect on trade policy than measures that capture preferences, such as the factor intensity of output. High levels of industry or geographic concentration may have influence by lowering the transaction costs of forming effective organizations and mobilizing support.

But high levels of industry and spatial concentration may reflect other factors, such as the specificity of assets, and can even dilute the electoral impact of an industry. An industry that is concentrated in a particular district commands the full attention of its political representatives. However, if the industry is spatially concentrated in a small number of districts, it is unlikely to command wider legislative support. Electorally dispersed industries are typically assumed to have more political clout since more legislators will care about the fate of such industries.

A more direct way to get at industry influence is to move beyond economic proxies such as concentration to more direct measures of organization and influence. Beginning in the 2000s, several studies exploited data on campaign contributions and found them to be positively correlated with protectionist outcomes at the sectoral level.

These studies still begged the question of why some groups are better organized than others. Moreover, there is a strong case that interest groups are endogenous. Anne Krueger's famous model of rent seeking argued not that rents were the result of lobbying but rather that rent seeking arose as a result of various forms of government intervention (and could presumably be reduced if governments credibly swore off such interventions).

To date, there has been surprisingly little work on the determinants of interest group organization around trade. It is commonly believed that protectionist interests enjoy advantages in solving collective-action problems because of the concentrated nature of the benefits they can realize when compared with the diffuse gains to highly dispersed consumers. However, importers of intermediate goods, firms engaged in intrafirm trade, and concentrated retailers, such as the American retail giant Walmart, do not have these organizational disabilities. The political strength of these "concentrated consumers" is undoubtedly a factor in the continuing liberalization of world trade.

### *Introducing Political Institutions*

The work by economists on the determinants of trade policy tended to be institution free, in part perhaps because these studies were often undertaken within the context of a given country in which institutions were invariant. However, the Milner and Kubota findings on regime type suggest that institutions matter; more competitive political systems are more responsive to the median voter than to special interests and thus have freer trade. This finding is consonant with the Grossman-Helpman model but underlines that institutions may affect the trade-off between securing campaign contributions and appealing to the median voter.

One line of research on institutions and trade policy in democracies looks at the effects of electoral rules. For example, proportional representation (PR) electoral rules are accompanied by larger electoral districts, which are more heterogeneous and thus less prone to capture by special interests. On the other hand, majoritarian systems have features that might induce free trade as well, including the tendency for parties to converge on median voter interests. In a useful synthesis, Fiona McGillivray notes that the empirical work on the

effects of electoral rules on protection has proven ambiguous and that their effects may be contingent on other factors such as the geographic concentration of industries. For example, a highly concentrated industry in a swing district that is crucial for winning the presidency or securing a parliamentary majority will have a clout that far exceeds what is predicted by its level of organization alone.

The effect of institutions on trade policy is by no means limited to their effect on legislative votes. Delegation also plays a crucial role in trade policy. In both the United States and the European Union (EU), legislatures have delegated substantial authority to executives (the president and the European Commission, respectively) to negotiate trade agreements. The means through which this delegation is structured can strongly influence policy outcomes. The literature on trade policy in the United States places particular weight on the liberalizing effect of delegation to the president under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and subsequent innovations, such as fast-track authority, that limit the ability of Congress to amend trade agreements once negotiated (legislators are constrained to vote them up or down).

Delegation also plays a role in the growth of administrative channels for securing protection. Prevailing international trade law permits countries to protect industries in response to unfair trade practices (subsidies and dumping) and in the face of fair trade practices that threaten significant disruption to the industry (the so-called escape clause). Relief under these provisions is typically not legislated on a case-by-case basis but through quasi-judicial processes that can be either more or less favorable to industries seeking protection. For example, these processes might allow standing to adversely affected interests, thus balancing protectionist claims. The ability to make filings may be more or less difficult, both substantively and administratively. A growing body of empirical literature, particularly on antidumping/countervailing duty cases, shows that administrative bodies are responsive to political pressures emanating from the legislature and interest groups. The details of administrative procedure have become a central issue in disciplining the growth of administrative protection.

### The International Politics of Trade

The Bretton Woods Conference (1944), which led to the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, also introduced the idea of creating the International Trade Organization (ITO). As governments engaged in the complex negotiations over the ITO, 15 states negotiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a forum to reduce tariffs in the short run. Once the ITO failed to secure ratification from the United States, only the GATT agreement—a very much thinner organization—was left in place. Not until 1995 was the GATT replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the interim, however, regional trade agreements—most notably the EU—as well as bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have proliferated rapidly, making them a central feature of the international politics of world trade.

#### *The GATT/WTO and the Logic of Multilateralism*

The role of the GATT and WTO in liberalizing trade is frequently misunderstood. As an organization, the GATT/WTO has very little authority in structuring the negotiating agenda or influencing outcomes. Nor does the organization seek to negotiate a common tariff structure across countries (harmonization) or vote on liberalization measures.

Rather, the GATT/WTO is primarily a forum in which countries trade “concessions”: Countries offer reductions in their own trade barriers in exchange for reductions in the barriers of others. The process of trading concessions has an important political effect at the domestic level. For export-oriented industries to secure advantages abroad, the country must be willing to make corresponding or reciprocal concessions. The very fact of negotiating a trade agreement thus changes the politics of trade; as export interests are politically mobilized to influence the course of trade talks, they constitute a counterweight to protectionist forces.

Although nominally a multilateral institution with a consensus decision-making structure, the GATT/WTO has in fact operated through bilateral deals among the major trading countries or among small groups of countries. This procedure dominates in part not only because of the difficulty of reaching a consensus among a growing number of

parties but also because power in the organization is effectively exercised through the ability to make concessions. As a result, the demands and concessions of the major trading powers typically drive the agenda and ultimate outcome of the negotiations.

A distinctive feature of the negotiations, however, is the concept of nondiscrimination, under which any concessions that are extended to any one party are multilateralized to all members of the organization through the most favored nation (MFN) principle. The nondiscrimination norm has been a significant institutional feature of the GATT/WTO system and has almost certainly contributed to the liberalization of world trade in the postwar period.

Nonetheless, as with the controversy over the governance of the international financial institutions, there has been significant debate about the extent to which the GATT/WTO also embodies biases of various sorts. On the one hand, the major trading partners effectively control the agenda by structuring the issues and products over which negotiations occur. In its early days, the organization focused overwhelmingly on trade in manufactures that were of interest at the time mainly to the developed economies. Products of primary interest to developing countries, including agriculture, received little attention.

On the other hand, the power of the advanced industrial states was also due to the fact that many developing countries opted out of the organization altogether or argued successfully that they should enjoy special and differential status within it, effectively exempted from making concessions. As the developing countries began to undertake reforms and as their industrial capability increased, they entered the organization in large numbers and began to change the nature of the negotiations.

During the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) and current Doha Round (launched in 2001), developing countries brought new issues onto the agenda. The advanced industrial states sought to push negotiations on issues in which they enjoyed comparative advantage, including trade in services, investment, and the protection of intellectual property. Developing countries, by contrast, sought concessions on trade in labor-intensive products (most notably textiles and apparel), agriculture, and a strengthening of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM).

The reform of the DSM was a major development of the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the creation of the WTO. Under the prior DSM structure, plaintiffs faced an uphill battle in securing relief because prevailing rules effectively gave the defendant the ability to veto investigations. The new DSM is much more legalized, with a highly structured process for the empowerment of review panels. Despite the fact that the ultimate enforcement mechanism is retaliation, and large countries should therefore continue to enjoy advantages over small countries, there is evidence that larger parties tend to comply with rulings that go against them. Current legal research on the DSM is considering the extent to which it may become the foundation for judicial lawmaking through the establishment of precedent, rather than a process that is limited to the interpretation of statute.

### *The Rise of Regionalism*

Regional trade arrangements got a bad name during the interwar period, as Japan and Germany sought to carve out exclusive trade zones. Britain and France also strengthened preferential trading zones with their colonies, contributing to the fragmentation of the international trading system. The strong commitment to the nondiscrimination norm in the GATT/WTO system was motivated in large part by the desire to avoid such outcomes in the future.

However, the dramatic economic success of the European Community raised the question of whether regional agreements were necessarily incompatible with liberalization at the international level. The negotiation of the Single European Act in 1985 and subsequent developments following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 set Europe on the course of deeper integration through completion of the common market and ultimately monetary union. The United States also pursued a regional option through the U.S.–Canada Free Trade Agreement (1988) and its extension to Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994). Beginning in the 1990s, regional arrangements and bilateral FTAs began to proliferate rapidly and became a major research topic in the political economy of trade.



On the one hand, a number of arguments suggested that regional agreements could be the building blocks of multilateral liberalization. Strong regional agreements could provide the template for deepening cooperation through the GATT/WTO and could even be used to leverage multilateral agreements. U.S. commitment to the NAFTA had an important effect on European participation in the Uruguay Round. A distinctive feature of U.S.-led FTAs has been the inclusion of environmental and labor standards, provisions that have also been mirrored in the web of agreements surrounding the EU.

On the other hand, there is increasing concern that the multiplication of regional agreements—now numbering more than 400—will increasingly complicate the politics of international trade. Almost by definition, free trade agreements are discriminatory; even if they do not raise trade barriers to outsiders, they nonetheless extend preferences that give insiders advantage. Once created, regional agreements have the result of creating vested interests that will resist expansion. In both the Western Hemisphere and particularly in East Asia, there have been growing debates about how existing arrangements—such as the NAFTA in North America and the Mercosur (centered on Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay)—might be reconciled.

#### *“Low” and “High” Politics: The Strategic Dimensions of International Trade*

The politics of international trade is by no means limited to economic issues narrowly conceived. Beginning with Albert Hirschmann’s *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, an important strand of research underlined how large powers could use asymmetric trade relations as an instrument of political influence. Such considerations played a role in the emergence of dependency theory in the 1960s, which not only questioned the economic benefits of international trade but also noted how trade and investment ties might lead to political influence in developing countries as well.

Strategic considerations were by no means limited to North–South trade relations. Another important strand of research has examined the extent to which foreign trade was related to broader political

relations, such as alliances. Alliance commitments were of obvious importance in structuring the post-war trading system, with its strong initial focus on the deepening of North Atlantic trade in conjunction with American commitments to Western Europe and the self-imposed exile of the Soviet bloc from the world trading system.

A final strand of research in this vein centers on the long-standing question of whether trade acts as a deterrent to military conflict; Etel Solingen has provided the most compelling recent synthesis of these arguments. Countries dominated by export-oriented coalitions are likely to favor conciliation and multilateral cooperation. Those with more closed economies are likely to be more hostile to international cooperation, in part because of the direct threat posed to vested interests in the closed economy. Isolating the effects of trade in such models is difficult, since more open economies also tend to be more democratic and democratic polities appear more pacific, at least toward one another. Nonetheless, these debates have strong policy implications as analysts consider the possible consequences of the rise of new powers such as China, which combine increasing economic openness with persistent elements of statism and authoritarian rule.

#### **New Directions**

The political economy of trade constitutes a very dynamic area of research, yet significant gaps are emerging between developments in the economics of trade and work in political economy. The Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models of trade had appeal because of their apparent ability to explain the protectionism associated with the rapid growth of North–South trade in manufactures beginning in the 1960s. Yet even with the rise of the China and other middle-income countries, the majority of world trade continues to take place among the advanced industrial states. As early as the 1970s, it was recognized that this trade could not be explained by standard models and that consideration had to be given to the effects of increasing returns, product differentiation, and the corresponding emergence of intra-industry trade patterns. This trade appeared to be less vulnerable to protection than the interindustry trade characteristic of North–South relations.

The remarkable growth of foreign direct investment since 1980 has also exercised a strong influence on the political economy of trade. In contrast to earlier expectations that North–South trade would necessarily generate protectionist pressures, the organization of international production networks controlled by lead firms from the advanced industrial states has probably had important countervailing effects.

More recently, the so-called new trade theory has focused attention on the geography of trade. Borders still create much larger barriers to trade than was previously appreciated; intracountry trade still dominates international trade by a large margin. Despite the revolutions in transport and communications, distance remains a serious deterrent to trade as well. These facts suggest that there are substantial fixed as well as marginal costs to entering international trade with important implications for the ability of developing countries to benefit from specialization. The new trade theory has also emphasized the way the benefits of trade, and production more generally, tend to cluster or agglomerate in particular locations raising important questions of how such clustering arises in the first place. These new issues—the role of multinational corporations, the enduring influence of borders and distance, and the role of agglomeration economies—constitute important frontiers for the political economy of trade.

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*See also* Dependency Theory; Developing World and International Relations; Domestic Politics and International Relations; Economic Statecraft; European Integration; Globalization; Governance, Global; International Political Economy; Multinational Corporations (MNCs); Regional Integration (Supranational); Regionalism; Trade Liberalization; World Trade Organization (WTO)

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## INTERVENTION

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An intervention is a coercive action taken by one international actor to affect the political authority of another. This entry examines the concept of intervention and then discusses the balance between the protection of human rights and respect for state sovereignty, the legal basis for humanitarian intervention, and the issues related to the strategies employed in humanitarian intervention.

The notion of intervention is notoriously elusive and controversial. In what remains the most relevant conceptual work on the issue, James Rosenau proposed to delimit the notion in two ways. First, an intervention is a coercive action, implying a sharp break from previous, conventional, behavior. This sudden interruption in the course of established relations between political units is finite and transitory. It has a beginning (the usual modes of behavior are abandoned) and an end (these modes of behavior are reestablished or, because they persist, they become conventional in turn). Military intervention—either directly or indirectly, such as the support of subversive or terrorist-armed activities—is an especially conspicuous and significant form of coercive action, but it is not the only one. There are other types of measures, either diplomatic or economic, that can constitute a forcible interference and provoke a sharp break in preestablished relations. Second, an

intervention is not just any type of break: It is directed at affecting (changing or preserving) the political authority of another actor. Political authority notably refers to the actors and the processes that enable a political community to choose its own political, economic, social, and cultural system as well as its foreign policy. The target is thus deprived, at least momentarily, of its capacity for self-determination.

Interventions are therefore different from the foreign policies that imply a continuous presence in the target society. For example, the presence since 1945 of U.S. troops in Europe and in Northeast Asia is not considered today as an intervention, a sharp break with long-standing relations. On the contrary, this military presence is integrated and largely taken for granted. The continuous exercise of regular diplomatic and economic influence is not considered as an intervention either. Similarly, colonialism and imperialism imply a long-standing presence of the colonizer and expand well beyond the notion of intervention. Interventions are also distinct from the numerous external actions that have as their main goal an influence that is not focused on structures of political authority. For example, measures favoring investment abroad, an international public relation campaign to promote the candidacy of a city to host the Olympic Games, the expulsion of diplomats, or the signing of an alliance all alter previous behavior. But the main goal of these actions is to affect the capacity of other international actors, not directly their authority structure (even if, in the long run, authority structures might be somewhat affected).

Both practically and theoretically, the notion of intervention is one of the most disputed in international relations for two main reasons. First, the phenomenon touches on some of the core issues, notably the imperatives of order and justice (sovereignty and individual rights), of a variety of legal, normative, political, and strategic/military perspectives. As a consequence, different practitioners of international politics (diplomats, soldiers, lawyers, human rights advocates, etc.) as well as several academic disciplines are simultaneously interested, which leads not only to a proliferation of studies and approaches but also to a disconnect between these relatively autonomous debates. Second, for international relations practitioners

and analysts, the notion of intervention is at the root of a key issue, the evolving divide between the domestic, especially the domestic politics that enable each person to work out his or her own destiny, and the international. The changing reach of international relations and the concerns that these changes generate are at the core of the debates on intervention, linked to states' sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) provides, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The UN Charter affirms the inviolability of state boundaries, but the content of the "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" has been continually disputed. What are the matters and concerns that are within the reach of the society of states and what are the matters and concerns (if any) that are off-limits, that is, for the political communities to decide?

Since the end of the Cold War, with the rise of human rights norms in international affairs, numerous crises brought back to the fore the issue of intervention, notably humanitarian intervention. The general context of a globalizing international system has favored porous borders and greater intrusions into what was considered as the domestic jurisdiction of states. On the one hand, these trends have been perceived as a unique opportunity to prevent, and to respond to, massive violations of human rights. On the other, however, they have posed a growing threat to the right of distinct political communities to work out their own political arrangements. Humanitarian military interventions have been at the forefront of debates about when military force should be used, and they have influenced local conflict, aid organizations, and military strategy. The tension between the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention to protect civilians from harm and the continued respect for state sovereignty as well as the recognition of the danger and cost of the enterprise have been at the center of controversial decisions and nondecisions about Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor, Sudan (Darfur), and many other places. In earlier cases, which might have been humanitarian interventions, the states justified their action primarily as

self-defense, notably the intervention of India in East Pakistan (1971), of Vietnam in Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot (1978), and of Tanzania in Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin (1979). Since the establishment of safe havens to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, the No-Fly Zones in Northern and Southern Iraq, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) Kosovo operation in 1999, the use of force to prevent humanitarian atrocities has been more frequent.

While, from an international law perspective, the notion that there is a right to intervene to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe remains disputable, there is a stronger legal and political basis for forcible humanitarian intervention with the authorization of the Security Council under Chapter VII or VIII of the UN Charter. Formulated in 2001, by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) set up by the Canadian government, the notion of responsibility to protect showed that international society has evolved to recognize the norm of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate exception to the principle of nonintervention. The ICISS also listed six criteria, inspired by just war principles, that would constitute a legitimate (but not necessarily legal) humanitarian intervention: (1) right cause, (2) right intention, (3) right authority, (4) last resort, (5) proportionate means, and (6) reasonable prospects. The responsibility to protect has been endorsed by the 2004 UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes. Its report, *Our Common Future*, noted that there is an emerging norm of collective international responsibility to protect,

exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (UN Department of Public Information, 2004)

In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the Heads of State and Government made a significant political commitment to take action, through the Security Council, in case of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. However, the opposition of Russia and China to

action against Myanmar and Zimbabwe indicate some of the potential limits of the responsibility to protect.

Legal and normative justifications are, however, not the only significant aspects of humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian interventions are an act of strategy, and it is important to examine their ends, means, operational practice, and effectiveness. As humanitarian claims become more widespread and, to an extent, more legitimate, they became part of the art of coercion. The emerging norm of humanitarian intervention affects the ways in which states commit themselves to intervention and persuade their adversaries and allies; it affects the manipulation of risk by local and international actors as well as the idiom of military action, that is, the specific ways in which force is used to fulfill the main goal of these interventions—saving the lives of civilians at risk. Humanitarian motives and the responsibility to protect can be, and actually are, strategically manipulated. Many governments, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, see the responsibility to protect as a legitimization of military intervention by strong states, using their technologically advanced weapons, against weak ones. While some of these concerns might be exaggerated, humanitarian and political objectives have been often blurred, for example, when the goal of UN-led operations in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was to alleviate human suffering as well as to promote a political resolution to the crisis. There is a thin line between the protection of fundamental human rights in extreme circumstances and the protection or promotion of civil and political rights. Moreover, by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect, the emerging norm has been criticized for unintentionally fostering rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. Convinced, rightly or wrongly, that they will get international support on humanitarian ground, vulnerable groups rebelled, triggering major retaliations and reinforcing the human suffering. The prospect of humanitarian intervention and the intervention itself can feed wars.

Moreover, as Taylor Seybolt pointed out, the strategy employed by the intervener under the appropriate circumstances is a central determinant of success, defined as saving lives by preventing or ending violent attacks on unarmed civilians

and/or assisting the delivery of aid. His analysis of 17 military operations in six conflict areas that were the defining cases of the 1990s—Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor—shows that the majority were successful. The intervening states employed four types of strategy: (1) helping deliver emergency aid, (2) protecting aid operations, (3) saving the victims of violence, and (4) defeating the perpetrators of violence. In sum, in the long history of legal and normative debates about interventions, in general, and humanitarian interventions, in particular, principles and strategies should be connected.

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*See also* Diplomacy; Normative Political Theory; Normative Theory in International Relations; Peace; Protectionism; Responsibility; Self-Determination; Sovereignty; Strategic (Security) Studies; Territory

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## INTERVENTION, HUMANITARIAN

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Humanitarian intervention refers to coercive action, involving the use of military force, in the affairs of one state by another state, group of states, or international organization with the express purpose of addressing massive human rights violations or widespread human suffering. Two aspects of this definition are worth noting. First, humanitarian intervention is distinct from the broader category of “humanitarian action,” which might include a range of activities (both military and nonmilitary) designed to address humanitarian emergencies. Second, the explicit and most prominent purpose of the military action must be humanitarian—even if additional objectives are achieved through the use of force.

There are alternative definitions of humanitarian intervention that attempt to narrow the concept still further. Most legal conceptions, for example, insist that the term *humanitarian intervention* encompasses only those coercive actions that do *not* involve the consent or invitation of the host country. However, in practice, this definition is difficult to maintain. In many cases where military force has been used for humanitarian purposes, consent from the government of the target state has been either coerced (as it was in the case of Indonesian consent for intervention in East Timor in 1999) or ambiguous (as it was in the case of Bosnia during the Balkan wars of the 1990s). In other instances, such as Somalia in 1992, the breakdown of order within a country makes it difficult to identify authorities who would provide consent for outside action.

Humanitarian intervention has been the subject of controversy, for both scholars and policymakers, because of two tensions that it invokes. The first is between international society's commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention and its commitment to upholding and promoting individual human rights. Both of these goals are enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter. The second tension is between the objective of protecting individuals from extreme persecution and violence and the use of coercive means (which can involve the death of soldiers and civilians) to achieve that goal. For many nongovernmental organizations involved in the delivery of aid and

humanitarian assistance, the very term *humanitarian intervention* is a contradiction in terms.

### Origins and Evolution of the Practice of Humanitarian Intervention

The origins of humanitarian intervention, and the tensions that it raises, date back to at least the 17th century and to the writings of the international jurist Hugo Grotius on the legality and morality of war. Grotius was attempting to reconcile his belief that war could be justly waged by one sovereign on behalf of peoples facing oppression by another with his wider concern to curtail the right of sovereigns to engage in conflict over religious differences. The latter notion became more deeply embedded in international society during the 18th century, largely through the writings of positivist international lawyers such as Emmerich de Vattel and Christian Wolff, who championed the principle of nonintervention as an essential component of state sovereignty. The objective of these jurists was to limit the causes of war that could be considered “just” and to sanction outside intervention only in situations of civil war where clear lines could be drawn between a ruler and his or her people.

In the 19th century, humanitarian intervention became more prominent as a political practice, as European states intervened in the internal affairs of other countries either to rescue their own citizens from harm or to protect religious and national minorities who were subject to persecution. Enshrining this practice as a right in international law, however, continued to be strongly opposed. By the time of the UN Charter, signed in the aftermath of World War II, a destructive global conflict, the overwhelming objective of state leaders was to outlaw aggression and to circumscribe the grounds on which armed force could be used. As a result, the Charter itself remains silent on the question of whether humanitarian intervention is a legitimate practice. Moreover, for most of the Cold War period, the UN Security Council proved unwilling to consider or discuss humanitarian crises as part of its remit for managing peace and security, and individual states were reluctant to accept humanitarian rationale as legitimate justifications for the use of force.

A series of developments during the latter part of the 20th century created a more permissive

context for intervention by outside actors in the face of grave humanitarian crises. These include, *inter alia*, the rise of international human rights instruments, the increased vulnerability of civilians in the context of civil conflict, the global and instantaneous access to information that heightened popular awareness of human suffering, and the greater willingness of the Security Council to define instances where mass atrocities are occurring as threats to international peace and security (as it did in Northern Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, and East Timor during the 1990s). In addition, the delayed and inadequate response of the international community to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 led many to argue that intervention for humanitarian purposes could be justified as part of the requirements of a more just international order.

### Opposition to Humanitarian Intervention

Despite this more permissive context, the assertion that there is a new right of humanitarian intervention has been opposed on both legal and moral grounds. The legal skeptics start with the basic presumption that the use of force is illegal as indicated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The only legitimate exceptions to this rule are military actions taken in the name of either self-defense (Article 51) or collective security (in which case the Security Council authorizes the use of force explicitly through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII). Those who favor a new right of humanitarian intervention make two kinds of claims. First, they suggest that exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force in the Charter should be widened to accommodate other important principles of the UN, such as the promotion and protection of human rights. Second, they assert that there is emerging customary law on humanitarian intervention that runs parallel to the Charter, based on a series of interventions carried out by Western governments during the 1990s and early years of the 21st century.

In reply, the skeptics have argued that neither treaty nor customary law supports a change in priorities between the different goals of the UN; while there have been significant developments in the measures designed to protect human rights over the past 50 years, these have not influenced the interpretation of Article 2(4) or the broader commitment

in international society to limiting the legitimate justifications for war. They also question whether the new customary law is developing, since much of non-Western legal opinion does not support the view that humanitarian intervention is becoming a more acceptable practice in international society. This opposition derives from a suspicion that humanitarian intervention would not operate in the way prescribed by its advocates but instead would legitimate self-interested intervention by the powerful under the guise of humanitarianism.

The ethical objections to humanitarian intervention fall broadly into two types. The first argument, best articulated by the political philosopher Michael Walzer, claims that sovereign states provide the protective shell for the process of self-determination and the exercise of human freedom. In fulfilling these functions, they become moral entities that should enjoy the presumptive right of nonintervention. While this norm of nonintervention is intended to apply to all communities equally, in practice it has had particular purchase for developing countries and former colonies. By emphasizing the connection of nonintervention with self-determination, such countries have sought to protect themselves from stronger powers seeking to further their own interests through intervention.

The second set of ethical objections to interventionism is consequentialist and emphasizes the negative outcomes (both anticipated and unanticipated) that can result from the use of military force. There are two main consequentialist arguments at work. First, those from the so-called realist school of international relations contend that intervention in the name of humanitarianism is likely to create more problems than it solves and could therefore compromise the more important goal of furthering the national interest. Opposition may be created on the ground in the course of engaging in military action, or expectations may be inflated among those suffering from oppression elsewhere, who will quickly accuse the international community of bias if there is no intervention to support their cause. Furthermore, it is impossible to know beforehand if intervention will succeed in meeting its humanitarian objectives or whether it will lead to an acceptable level of casualties. This has raised the larger question of how the success of humanitarian intervention should be determined: by the achievement of short-term

goals (such as the alleviation of hunger or suffering and the return of refugees to their homes) or by addressing the underlying causes of suffering through the reconstruction of stable and well-functioning states.

A second version of consequentialism alleges that any use of force, no matter how well intentioned, can undermine the broader goal of preserving international peace and stability. The international relations theorist Robert Jackson has argued that while states have a responsibility to pursue international justice where they can, they should not jeopardize other fundamental values in the process. In balancing these considerations, international peace should have particular weight, since it is in situations of war—particularly war between great powers—that humanitarian values are most likely to come under attack. The second position is a belief that the consensus that underpins international society is much more procedural than substantive. It is confined to agreements on how states should behave outside their borders and does not extend to a common view on deeper political or economic values. According to this view, sovereign states are unlikely to converge on what counts as injustice or oppression inside a state and hence unlikely to agree when interventions to address humanitarian crises would be justified.

### Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect

While a diversity of political and economic values continues to characterize international society in the 21st century, a consensus has emerged that certain actions against individuals and groups—such as the commission of genocide—are sufficiently grave to constitute “crimes against humanity” as a whole. In these extreme cases, those raising ethical objections to humanitarian intervention often allow for some suspension of the nonintervention rule. So, for example, Michael Walzer acknowledges that when the rights of people within a community are seriously threatened such that they can no longer be said to be truly self-determining, outside intervention to protect basic individual rights is morally defensible.

This kind of reasoning has inspired diplomatic efforts to enshrine a new principle in international society, known as the responsibility to protect. In

2005, at the World Summit commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the UN, heads of state unanimously agreed that all states have a responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. They went on to agree that when national authorities are “manifestly failing” to protect their populations from such atrocities, the international community—acting through the UN—can take action (including, if necessary, the use of force) to fulfill the responsibilities of protection. Although the concept of the responsibility to protect is closely related to humanitarian intervention, it differs in two core ways: First, the activities that protect populations are not restricted to the use of force and, second, the responsibility encompasses the need not just to respond to mass atrocities but also to prevent their occurrence.

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*See also* Genocide; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Human Rights in International Relations; Intervention; Realism in International Relations; Self-Determination; Sovereignty

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## INTERVIEWING

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Interviewing is a commonly used research method throughout the social sciences. Approaches vary, with some types of interviews conducted in an informal and open-ended manner and other types of interviews designed to be much more strictly structured and controlled. Regardless of the approach, interviews by definition always involve one person asking questions of another. The researchers (or staff members working for the researcher) seek information through conversation with their research participants. Although political scientists often use interviews to collect information about their topics, interviewing methods have been developed primarily within other disciplines—including anthropology, sociology, and journalism. Political scientists have taken these methods and adapted them to their own purposes. This entry provides an overview of the types of interviews most commonly used in political science and reviews some of the most important methodological issues associated with interviews as data sources for political scientists.

In the early 20th century, the study of political science was restricted mainly to the library, with analysis of legal rulings and of the structures of government that the primary methods used. The shift to a behavioral approach to politics—looking at what actually happens in government rather than simply what the laws say should happen—meant that political scientists would need to observe and collect information about the activities of government officials and the interactions of government officials and the public. Interviewing was one of the first ways in which this new information was collected, and in the 1920s, political scientists like Pendleton Herring and Elmer Eric



Schattschneider began conducting fieldwork in Washington, D.C., interviewing government officials and representatives from groups and businesses to be able to better describe the workings of government and how it interacted with organized interests. Today, interviewing remains a common data collection technique, especially for scholars who study political elites.

**Types of Interviews** There are several styles of interviewing, each appropriate for different informational needs. These styles exist along a continuum: At one end are interviewing techniques that use extremely directed, closed-ended questions, such as those in a survey, and at the other are interpretive techniques in which questions are extremely open-ended and subject to change depending on the guidance of those being interviewed.

When researchers do not know very much about the topic at hand, or when they want to capture an insider perspective on the topic, they often turn to an ethnographic style of interviewing. This approach, borrowed from anthropology, involves long interviews in which the interview subject (sometimes referred to as the interview consultant) helps direct the interviewer. The questions are open-ended. Rather than requiring the respondent to select an answer from a list written ahead of time and requiring the respondent to limit the answer to those options, an open-ended question may be answered in whatever way the respondent chooses. This often provides the researcher with an opportunity to learn about previously unknown aspects of a topic. The interview consultant is treated as the expert, as the guide, in this process. The goal of the interviewer is to guide the interview subject as little as possible, so as to elicit the unbiased views of the interview subject. Such unstructured interviewing techniques are often combined with participant observation, in which interviewers spend time in, and among those they wish to, study. Ethnographic interviews such as these often provide new and unexpected insights, but as a result of how open they are to new directions, they have a tendency to drift away from the researcher's original topic. Thus, they are not the best way to measure concepts reliably across multiple respondents or across multiple field settings, as each interview will be unique. This unique insight is both the

advantage and the disadvantage of this type of interviewing.

At the opposite extreme are closed-ended interviewing techniques in which the questions and the possible responses have been predetermined by the interviewer. Outside of political science, both journalists and courtroom litigators often use closed-ended questions. In the courtroom, respondents are often limited to responding "yes" or "no" to the questions posed to them. The trial lawyer seeks to control what information is put before the jury by keeping a tight rein on the questions posed to witnesses. Trial lawyers do this because they are not interviewing to collect new information—they are supposed to have learned the answers already during their depositions of the witnesses. Likewise, political scientists use closed-ended questions when they already know a great deal about the topic at hand. The most common application of this type of interview in political science is the mass opinion survey, such as those conducted biennially by the American National Election Studies. While some surveys are self-administered—that is, survey respondents fill out the questionnaires themselves, either on paper or online—survey interviews are conducted by an interviewer, either in person or on the phone. To write closed-ended questions, the political scientist must already know what the important issues are and what the possible responses could be. The only thing that remains to be learned from the interview is how many people will end up in each response category. This, of course, is an ideal type, and in practice, surveys that are conducted in person by an interviewer also include a number of open-ended questions. In general, however, control over possible responses is fairly tight, and the goal is to make the responses as easily comparable across respondents as possible. Data that result from interviewing using closed-ended questions are much more likely to be reliably compared across participants and across field settings. These data are often used for hypothesis testing, but the closed-ended nature of the questions means that answers will be limited to the answers the interviewer could imagine before the study began and is not likely to be the source of new ways of looking at political phenomena. Whatever errors exist in the researcher's theoretical approach at the beginning are likely to remain after the study is completed.

When political scientists today think about interviewing as used in political science, they most likely are talking about a form of interviewing that strikes a balance between these two extremes. Semistructured interviews with open-ended questions are designed to focus the interview on a particular research topic and to ensure that particular questions are answered, but the interviewee is allowed a great deal of latitude in how he or she responds. Interviews with members of a parliament or Congress, or staff members of those legislators, usually are conducted as semistructured interviews. Questions are aimed at getting the respondent to talk about a topic fairly naturally in order to help capture the specialized knowledge that the respondent has. "Describe to me what happened during the debate about proposal X" is an example of an open-ended question that might be used. What makes the semistructured interview different from the ethnographic interview, however, is how the interviewer works to control the interview once it has begun. While the ethnographic interviewer might allow the respondent to decide what is most important to relate about proposal X, the researcher conducting the semistructured interview will have a predetermined list (written or mental) of questions called "prompts." This type of semistructured interviewing is also sometimes referred to as "elite" interviewing because it is most often used to collect information from elected and appointed government officials and other highly educated, highly knowledgeable respondents (who might chafe at being forced to pigeonhole their responses into the preordained categories of a mass survey instrument).

### Methodological Concerns

Like all data collection methods, interviewing poses potential methodological pitfalls that must be avoided if the data are to be valid and reliable. Interviewers should remember that the order in which questions are asked, as well as the way in which they are asked, may affect the content of the answers. An early question about gun control, for example, may increase respondents' tendency to name "gun control" when asked later in an interview what they view as the most important issues facing the nation. Survey research has shown that small changes in question wording sometimes

create large changes in responses, and similar effects may result from changes in interview questions. The effects of question order and question wording are arguably not as severe in elite interviews as they are in mass surveys, however, since interview respondents answer in their own words and can be prompted for more information. Sticking to exact wording and question ordering does not always work in an elite interview. For instance, the interviewer needs to be willing to drop a question if the respondent has already volunteered that information in response to an earlier question. The interviewer can adapt the question, asking whether there is anything *else* besides what the respondent has already mentioned, but the interviewer needs to show that he or she is paying attention and heard the earlier response. Otherwise the interviewer risks losing rapport with the interviewee, and answers may become less candid and less complete. For the most part, exact wording and exact question order are less important than rapport and getting the respondent talking in an elite, semistructured interview. The idea is that the open-ended, semistructured nature of the questions will allow a more "true" and complete answer.

As is the case with surveys, the data one collects from interviews are only as good as the people being interviewed. People are fallible and may give incorrect or incomplete answers. People may seek to please the interviewer rather than answer honestly. Finally, even in the case of interview subjects who seem very reliable, the relationship between what they say and what they do may be tenuous. People are not always self-aware enough to be able to describe their behaviors with complete accuracy or to give true insight into the reasons why they do what they do. Nevertheless, it is often difficult or impossible to learn about political beliefs and attitudes in any way other than asking about them, and political elites often have firsthand knowledge of events that cannot be discovered in any other way. Some of the methodological shortcomings of interviews can be lessened by making sure to interview multiple sources and use multiple data collection methods (e.g., consulting historical documents or using experimental methods) whenever possible.

Despite the potential drawbacks, interviews provide an invaluable method of collecting information about a wide range of political phenomena, from political attitudes to political history.

What political scientists have learned through open-ended and semistructured interviews in particular has often led to new research hypotheses that then are tested using other research methods. Because interview-based research is labor-intensive and time-consuming, it is unlikely to become the dominant data collection method in political science, but it will remain an important one.

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*See also* Ethnographic Methods; Interviews, Elite; Interviews, Expert; Survey Research

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## INTERVIEWS, ELITE

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Elite interviews are a significant source of data in political science and sociology. The concept of the elite and, consequently, its empirical identification, however, lacks a clear consensus. Elites are typically thought to have more resources and influence than mass publics in whatever sphere they happen to be located. Sociologists sometimes define elites as a set of people with special credentials in society such as Nobel Prize winners. Political scientists are especially likely to define

elites in the context of political power and often as formal holders of institutional authority—typically public officeholders. Political sociologists may be more inclined to look for the powerful, whether or not they are holders of formal authority. Of course, the definition of who is powerful is highly contentious and, therefore, far from self-evident. In this entry, some specific features of interviewing elites are discussed.

There are many ways of procuring information from those plausibly described as elites. Background data are often available through documentation but are not always comparable across individuals. Sometimes written surveys are sent to elite populations. The rate of return on these may be spotty and, by definition, nonrandom. Thus, the response rate often leads to unrepresentative samples. It is also unclear who fills out the requested information when the respondent has staff personnel to deal with such matters. Consequently, elite interviews are taken here to mean some form of direct contact between an investigator (or a member of an investigator's staff) and targeted individuals drawn from an elite population.

#### Objectives of Elite Interviews

Elite interviews may be conducted to satisfy different objectives of inquiry. Broadly, one purpose of elite interviewing is to tell a story about a process, to relate how events or a set of events unfolded so as to ascertain proximate causality, or to ascertain influence relations among actors. These often produce case studies more likely to be predominantly qualitative in method. A second purpose of elite interviewing is to discover characteristics, perceptions, and opinions of the actors themselves. In this use, the members of the particular elite stratum become the units of analysis. Hence, the focus is on the actors themselves, their attitudes, perspectives, career paths, and backgrounds. Therefore, it becomes especially vital to have samples that are representative of the populations to which inferences are being made.

#### Case Studies

Typically, when the objectives of elite interviewing are to understand how a process or set of events has unfolded, the number of individuals to

be interviewed may be relatively small and conducted with the narrative as the foremost objective. One purpose is to evaluate different versions of an event from the various perches that elite actors occupy and to assess the extent to which a common or differentiated picture is being held by the various actors. In some instances, interviews may start out with the purpose of snowballing to find other actors whose perspectives or roles in events may be particularly important and who are thereby recommended by those whom the investigator starts off interviewing. Typically, each interview is somewhat unique as the investigator seeks to fill in elements of a process or event. Thus, these interviews are usually relatively unstructured as the interviewer adjusts to new information and cues as to possible new informants. It is not unusual in complex systems that the best informants about process may be the facilitators rather than the principals. Staff personnel may often be better informants than the principals themselves in the sense of knowing more of the actual details of what occurred. And they are typically more accessible as well.

#### *Elites as Units of Analysis*

An entirely different kind of study involves using individual members of an elite to assess its aggregate characteristics, show its coherence or divisions, and examine differences relevant to roles or to settings. In this case, sampling reliability, uniformity of stimuli (or at least cross-validation of the stimuli), and missing data issues are all pertinent. It is essential that samples be representative. In some instances, for example, a legislative chamber, one can know in advance many of the basic parameters of the population such as distributions by party, region, age, gender, and metropolitan-rural distinctions. Other populations may be less well defined, for example, business executives or even civil servants or political officials of the executive branch of government. Willingness on the part of the individuals to participate tends to be inversely related to their organizational status. The higher up they are, the harder they are to get.

Whereas interviews undertaken for the purposes of analyzing a case may be less systematic in design, in part because of the need to adjust in the field and follow leads supplied by elite informants,

interviews undertaken for the purposes of characterizing an elite population must be systematically designed at the outset with correspondingly less adjustment in the field. Adjustments that may seem sensible as the result of learning from the field experience, nevertheless, may introduce contaminating nonuniform stimuli that could induce unknown bias or error in responses.

#### *The Hybrid*

A few studies have made use of elite interviewing for the purposes of collecting information about a population's behavior as well as to flesh out information about particular cases so that each form of information gathering sheds light on the other. By providing independent sources of information, the particulars of a case study may be confirmed by the more general attitudes of the relevant elites. Equally, the expressed attitudes of elites may be assessed through the behavioral patterns manifested in the cases.

#### **Definitions of the Elite Universe**

Two definitions of an elite population exist—one defined by the power or influence of a set of individuals and the other by definitional or institutional roles. The problem with the first definition is that the influence any set of individuals or a group exercises is based either on reputation or on behavior. It is hard to disprove reputation since that is based on an assumption that repute is either equivalent to behavior or that it reduces the propensity for opposition to arise. By contrast, behavior may be shown only by the influence that some set of individuals' exercises over decisions that may vary depending on which individuals are involved regarding a specific set of decisions. Because such behavior can be assessed only after the fact, political scientists are especially likely to use formal institutional roles as a basis for defining a political elite and for analyzing them as a population. However, individual influence is likely to vary within a given institution. Party leaders, more senior members, and heads of committees are likely to play a more substantial role than backbenchers in a legislature, for example. Influence also may vary across institutions. Legislative bodies, for example, vary greatly across political systems in the

authority they are able to wield. They are not equally influential in decision making. Where the executive and legislative bodies are separated, as in the United States, the legislature typically is more directly influential in policy decisions. In parliamentary systems, the pool of people likely to become more influential, for example, cabinet ministers, will be drawn from the members of parliament even where the parliament itself may exert relatively little independent policy-making influence.

### Access to the Elites

Typically, it is helpful for the interviewer to have some institutional or personal credentials in order to gain access to elite populations. Sometimes, having an interlocutor to speak for the investigator's credentials can be an advantage, at least with some elements of the elite. Some elite populations are more willing to be interviewed than others and often look forward to the opportunity to express their views. Typically, these are underaccessed populations. Politicians, especially legislators, tend to be overaccessed, whereas, for example, civil servants traditionally have been underaccessed. For plenty of reasons, including busy schedules and security measures, top-level political elites are typically very hard to interview, at least while they are in office. The passage of time, however, frequently eases accessibility even when talking about controversial history and the subject's participation in it. Interviews with small numbers of primary actors in events long past, and with actors long past their prime in the public spotlight, become possible, impeded only by the mortality or decrepitude of the participants in those events.

Accessibility to governmental elites has become more complicated as a result of the security precautions that have become increasingly commonplace in public buildings. Therefore, proper introductory credentials are increasingly essential, and onsite interviews require that the interviewer's identification papers be in order.

### Structured and Nonstructured Interviews

Whether an investigator should have a high level of structure over the interview protocol or a looser structure depends greatly on the objectives of the inquiry. To the extent that the investigator is looking

to discover a process, it may be wise to begin with a relatively less structured interview protocol that allows different perspectives to be revealed. Those perspectives can then be used to narrow questions as more elements of the process become identified and the pathways of inquiry can be more clearly developed. This also, of course, assumes that the investigator begins the inquiry along lines that are more inductive than deductive.

Alternatively, if the investigator is seeking attitudinal responses, it is important that the interviews proceed along a relatively fixed course. There should be as well opportunities to assess convergent validation of attitudes by asking the same question in somewhat different forms across different places in the interview. Elites like to be treated as the sophisticated individuals they often are. A menu of fully closed-ended questions is likely to bore them and will possibly lead to a desire to end the interview. The interviewer must be alert to changes in mood, to signs of restlessness on the part of the respondent, to hyperinterest that may lead to an exhaustingly lengthy interview, and to a respondent's tendency to careen away from the subject matter the interviewer is focused on to a special topic that the respondent wants to discuss. Above all, the interviewer needs to be aware of time management during the course of the interview. Managing time is usually less of a problem in the unstructured interview than in the structured interview protocol. In adapting to problems of time management, the investigator may need to indicate to the interviewer, in instances where they are not one and the same, which sets of questions are fundamental and which are optional. In some instances, it may be necessary to tie questions together to present a logical follow-up to a respondent's prior answer. That is partly to maximize the efficient use of time and partly to treat the respondents as the elites they are, even though this may sporadically violate the canons of maintaining question placement.

In either case, unstructured or structured interviews, interviewer experience and adaptiveness (within limits) are key elements in creating a context where the respondent is comfortable with the interview situation and where the interviewer can be prepared for the multitude of possible interruptions that can eat into the time available for the interview, including the occasional need to bring a

respondent back on track when he or she goes off on a time-consuming tangent.

### Conclusion

It is likely becoming more difficult to obtain interviews with current officeholding elites than in decades past. Security measures have made it more difficult to roam through official buildings after one interview in order to set up another. Also, the use of electronic or digital recording equipment may be impermissible in some installations. Yet elite interviewing is an essential part of understanding events from the varied perspectives of the actors and intimate observers and of understanding the views of the elites themselves. Nevertheless, to a surprising degree, elites are often amenable to the entreaties of well-prepared researchers. And interviewing them is typically an illuminating exercise. But for these opportunities to be optimally rewarding, investigators must be well prepared.

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*See also* Elites; Interviewing; Interviews, Expert

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## INTERVIEWS, EXPERT

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An expert interview is a semistandardized interview by one or more interviewers with a person identified as a so-called expert and serves to generate data in a research context. This raises the following questions: What constitutes an expert? Why are experts of such particular interest in a social and/or political scientific research setting? The answer lies primarily in the knowledge that they have acquired in the course of their (professional) activities. Experts not only have (a) specialist professional or technical knowledge and (b) knowledge of organizational procedures and processes, but they also have (c) interpretative and background knowledge (“know-how” and “know-why”) in their particular field. Such professional/technical knowledge and process knowledge are generally explicit knowledge, which experts can usually communicate in a systematic and deliberate manner. Interpretive and background knowledge is predominantly tacit and draws on the relevant individual experiences, organizational social practices, or collective interpretive patterns encountered by an expert in professional practice. People with this kind of broad knowledge are usually to be found on the middle and upper—occasionally also on the lower—levels of the organizational hierarchy. Given their position in the organizational and functional context, experts often have at least a partial chance of putting their knowledge and action to practical use, that is, accomplishing their own interests and ideas and, thus, making a decisive contribution to what goes on both inside and outside the organization. This ability to assert themselves and shape events is generally linked to their position and permits experts to speak as a representative of an organization and be recognized as such. In this entry, the history, use, and specific problems of expert interviews are discussed in greater detail.

### The History of Expert Interviews

Expert interviews were first encountered primarily in German-speaking countries, where they have been used increasingly in social, economic, and political science research since the 1980s. However, it was not until the early 1990s that they slowly began to establish and distinguish themselves as a specific qualitative social research method. In the meantime, a number of books have been published on the methodology and methods of interviewing experts, and most pertinent, newer German-language books on qualitative research methods now also include expert interviews. The situation is quite different in their English-language counterparts, where—unlike interviews with the elite—expert interviews are rarely mentioned. In fact, there are many similarities between these two interview forms, from the sampling and difficulties of gaining access to the field through to the actual specifics of the interview process. However, the key difference lies in their target groups: the elite are the powerful, top echelon of a society. Indeed, the label “elite” is ascribed to a person or group/class of persons with high social, educational, and economic status and, thus, the power to make (or at least the possibility of making) a significant impact on society. From a sociology of knowledge perspective, the elite can also be seen as experts with expert knowledge, but more precisely as experts who have particular power. In essence, they are top company executives and members of corporate supervisory bodies, senior civil servants, or high-ranking government officials. The actual person who will be able to provide the best information for a particular research topic, the type of knowledge sought, and the position of the interviewees in their hierarchy will ultimately always depend on the specific research context.

### Using Expert Interviews

Depending on the research design and topic(s) being researched, expert interviews can be used for the following different purposes:

1. Exploratory expert interviews are used to obtain an overview of and access to a less familiar field.
2. Systematizing expert interviews serve to systematically reconstruct “objective,”

specialized technical and procedural knowledge in a particular field.

3. Theory-generating expert interviews focus not just on specialized expert knowledge but also on the tacit and subjective interpretative and background knowledge gained through (professional) experience.

Many research projects combine the use of expert interviews with other methods (mixed methods or triangulation of methods). In political science research, for example, expert interviews are often used in combination with document analysis to ascertain the history behind certain documents. This is usually done less with a view to validating the data and results but more often to establish a broad picture of social practices in a specific field.

### Sampling and Access Problems

Selecting the appropriate interviewees for a particular research project depends greatly on the actual research topic(s) and specific field of research. There are often only a limited number of experts in a given field. In such cases, it is best (where possible) to interview all relevant experts, particularly since they will often have their own networks. Such networks can help encourage experts to participate in an interview to ensure their views are included. Altruism, or even a desire to enhance their own status, can also be a possible motive for agreeing to an interview. The first step in the sampling process involves analyzing literature or media reports and talking to relevant sources—people who are familiar with the field—to identify the key experts. The original sample should then be extended in the interview phase by asking the interviewees themselves to recommend further experts.

Time restrictions and a general lack of willingness to provide information can frequently be a problem when seeking access to experts, so it is particularly important that the first contact—either in writing or by phone—is carefully prepared. To encourage experts to participate in an interview, the first contact with them should briefly outline the goals and relevance (e.g., innovativeness) of the research and explain how important it is that they participate. Interviews should be

calculated to last no longer than 45 minutes (even if they ultimately take longer in reality). If a face-to-face meeting cannot be arranged, an interview can also be conducted by phone. One problem with this option is the lack of control over the interview situation: The interviewee might, for example, be distracted by other tasks. Similarly, no account can be taken of body language or gestures.

### Interview Guidelines/Topic Guide

Drawing up a set of interview guidelines is an essential part of the preparation for an expert interview and familiarization with the relevant vocabulary and field of research. Such guidelines should structure the central topics in line with the expected course of the interview and can be sent to any experts who request information about the interview prior to the event. Nonetheless, to ensure that the interviews flow as authentically as possible, the guidelines should not be overly detailed. In the actual interview, they serve as an aide-mémoire and prevent the interviewer from overlooking any important questions. However, they should only be used as guidelines and not worked through rigidly point for point: Interviewees should be given the maximum opportunity to express their own opinions and ideas. The more an interviewer succeeds in getting an expert to talk, for example, through a narrative generating introductory questions and request for concrete examples the greater the chance that tacit knowledge (in the form of interpretive and background knowledge) will emerge in the interview. This knowledge is particularly relevant for reconstructing social practices in a particular field.

### Interaction Situations and Effects

Expert interviews are—like all interviews—a form of social interaction. The basic intent is to get the interviewees to say what they think needs to be said in a given situation. “What” they say and “how” they say it depends on many different elements of the interaction—from expectations and motives for participation to situational aspects such as time pressure, sympathy or antipathy, and trust or mistrust. The interviewee’s capacity to remember and the interviewer’s interviewing skills, way of asking questions, openness, inquisitiveness,

self-assurance, and so on will also influence the conversation. Gender relations can also play a twofold role in the interview. First, most of the experts are men, as there are relatively few women in management positions. Second, the probability of the participants “doing gender” (i.e., assuming gender-specific roles, particularly in a mixed-gender setting) becomes highly likely. Of particular relevance for interaction in an expert interview setting are the status and relationships the interviewee accords the interviewer. The latter is typically perceived as a co-expert, a potential critic, an accomplice, a controlling authority, or a layperson. These associations affect the interviewee’s behavior, willingness to communicate and manner of communication, attitude, and so on. Interview effects resulting from an individual interview constellation cannot be avoided and are not necessarily disadvantageous. They may even be of strategic benefit. For example, if they consider the interviewer a layperson, interviewees may well be more willing to provide information about their field of expertise and experience. Interviewers should also be aware that even research-related interviews are a form of social interaction and do not permit a “pure” or even objective gathering of data.

### Analysis

There is no standard procedure for analyzing expert interviews. In principle, all qualitative social research analysis methods can be used, for example, the code-based procedures common in grounded theory or qualitative content analysis, or the sequential analyses applied in hermeneutic sociology of knowledge or objective hermeneutics. A combination of different methods is also admissible. The most suitable form of analysis ultimately depends on the actual research project. Computer-assisted analysis using special qualitative data management programs can help but cannot automatically complete the data analysis. Even if computers are used to assist with data analysis, it remains the task of the researchers to interpret the data in a transparent, plausible, and comprehensible manner.

### Ethics

Given their prominent position in what is often a small and clear field, it can be difficult to keep the



identity of experts hidden. Consequently, the researcher should always clarify how much of the information obtained from the interviewee can be published in a nonanonymous form (e.g., as quotations). In some cases, it may be necessary to have the interviewee expressly authorize the use of the minutes or interview transcript for analysis or publication purposes. The expert should, in all cases, be given the assurance that all data will be treated in confidence.

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*See also* Elites; Grounded Theory; Interviewing; Interviews, Elite; Mixed Methods

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## IRREDENTISM

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The term *irredentism* is derived from the Italian word *irredenta* (unredeemed). It originally referred to an Italian political movement during the late 1800s and early 1900s that sought to detach predominantly Italian-speaking areas from Switzerland and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and incorporate these territories into the new Italian state, thus “redeeming” these territories. Modern usage denotes territorial claims based on a national, ethnic, or historical basis. In many

cases, an irredentist movement is referred to as creating a “Greater X,” with the “X” being the name of a nation or state—for example, the quest for a Greater Serbia was in part responsible for the Wars of Yugoslav Succession during the 1990s, and the Greater Romania project (*România Mare*) was partially responsible for Romania siding with the Axis powers during World War II. It is related to, but distinct from, secession: Irredentism is the process by which a part of an existing state breaks away and merges with another, whereas in secession merging does not take place. The importance of irredentism in international relations is based on the intersection between nationalism and the causes of war; because such a movement invariably means taking land from another state, irredentist claims have been known to provoke ethnic conflicts and territorial aggression. The continued discord between nations and states means that the potential for irredentist wars remains serious. This entry identifies some notable cases, provides examples of how irredentist claims are sometimes enshrined in state constitutions, and reviews the literature on this phenomenon.

Notable examples of irredentism include Nazi Germany’s claims on the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia; the “Megali Idea” that sought to create a Greater Greece; China’s desire to reincorporate the territories lost during periods of historical weakness; Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia during the Ogaden War of 1977–1978; the attempt by Hungary to reverse the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and reclaim territories in Slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia during World War II; and the continuing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh region. More questionable cases include those without a direct ethnic component but rather based solely on historical claims, such as Argentina’s invasion of the British-populated Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) in 1982 or Serbian claims to Kosovo, which was the birthplace of Serbian nationalism but is now populated overwhelmingly by ethnic Albanians. However, these territories could also be considered “unredeemed,” and therefore, these cases can fall under the category of irredentism.

In some instances, states have gone so far as to incorporate irredentist claims directly into their constitution. For example, Argentina claims that

recovering the Falkland Islands is “a permanent and unrelinquished goal of the Argentine people,” and China considers Taiwan to be part of the country’s “sacred territory.” The 1937 Irish constitution originally laid claim to the entire island of Ireland, but this was changed following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Despite the numerous potential cases of irredentism, and the long history of these claims sparking armed conflict, there has been surprisingly little scholarly research done on this topic, and no consensus position on its causes, dynamics, or resolution has emerged. However, five explanatory categories can be identified: (1) structural, (2) realist, (3) rational choice, (4) domestic, and (5) constructivist. Given the complexity of irredentism, there are likely multiple and overlapping explanations for any particular case.

Structural explanations argue that the international or regional context within which the potentially irredentist state operates will play a large role in determining whether such a project is initiated and the conditions under which it ends. In most cases, this focuses on the relative support in the international system for state sovereignty versus national self-determination. If the latter is emphasized, then nationalist claims will be allowed to override the inviolability of sovereign borders; if the former is emphasized, then the legitimacy of irredentist claims will be widely rejected. The dramatic increase in irredentist conflicts during periods of major international upheaval and normative reordering is seen as important evidence in favor of this position.

Realist arguments emphasize the relative balance of power between the irredentist state in question and either the target state or the international community. In the first case, military weakness vis-à-vis the target state will force the irredentist country to relinquish its claims; in contrast, relative military strength will precipitate such a project. A weak Albania had little chance of forcibly altering its border with Yugoslavia, but a strong Nazi Germany could pressure France and Great Britain to force territorial revisions on Czechoslovakia. The latter argument takes the balance of power to a higher level by examining the degree to which relevant international actors (states or international organizations) acquiesce in or tolerate the policies

of specific irredentist states. The more tolerant they are, the more an irredentist state can get away with; if they are less tolerant, then an irredentist state is forced to temper or restrict its policies. During the early years of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, the international community did little other than rhetorical condemnation to stop Croatia’s and Serbia’s irredentist projects. However, once key states (particularly the United States) adopted a more robust and muscular stance, then both countries recognized the prewar borders of the Yugoslav republics.

Rational choice accounts examine the decision-making processes of elites that initiate an irredentist conflict for instrumental purposes. Two arguments fall under this rubric: elite conflict and diversionary theory. Under the first explanation, leaders will attempt to use irredentism as a tool to counter challenges from other elites by appealing to the nationalist sentiments of the populace. For example, Slobodan Milošević used irredentist claims in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to rise to political preeminence in Serbia. According to the latter argument, decision makers will initiate an irredentist conflict to divert the attention of their population from domestic problems. Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands to prop up the military junta is often considered a classic case of diversionary war theory.

Domestic-level explanations also come in two forms: demographics and regime type. The first argument holds that ethnically homogeneous states are more likely to be irredentist because the populations of ethnically divided states will be unwilling to support a project that benefits only one group and might have the effect of altering the ethnic balance of the state if successful. For example, given the serious discordance between ethnicity and statehood in nearly all African states, it should not be surprising that the only substantial irredentist conflict was the one launched by ethnically homogeneous Somalia. The second explanation argues that democratic states are less likely to have irredentist-type conflicts between them because of increased institutional restraints on launching an irredentist project; enhanced protection for minority groups, which undermines the reasons for moving to protect one’s diaspora; membership or possible membership in international organizations that prohibit such claims (e.g., North Atlantic

Treaty Organization [NATO] or the European Union); and the dynamics of democratic peace theory, in which democratic states tend to resolve their disputes peacefully. The reduction in tensions between Hungary, on the one hand, and Romania and Slovakia, on the other, was associated with the consolidation of democracy in these countries, whereas nearly all irredentist conflicts were initiated by authoritarian regimes.

The final explanation for irredentism is derived from the insights of constructivism, which holds generally that the social construction of ideas and concepts is instrumental in determining political outcomes. When applied to the issue of irredentism, two arguments emerge. The first asserts that the type of national identity that is dominant in a particular state or nation will influence the degree to which it will become irredentist: An ethnic identity emphasizes the unity of the culturally based nation across political boundaries and lends itself to the promotion of altering borders to realize a physical union of the nation; a civic national identity is political in nature, usually tied to a preexisting state, and is therefore more easily limited to status quo boundaries. Some 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves as minorities scattered throughout the former Soviet Union on its collapse. However, despite the fact that many of these Russians were in territories contiguous to Russia itself, the association of the Russian Federation (*Rossiyskaya Federatsiya*) with the concept of *rossiiski* (civic) rather than *russskii* (ethnic) dampened the legitimacy of an irredentist project aimed at creating a Greater Russia in the 1990s. By contrast, ethnically based national identities, such as that found in Nazi Germany, more easily lend themselves toward a desire for unification. The second constructivist argument focuses on the ways in which the irredentist claims are justified in a society. This justification includes the arguments that assert the group's right and obligation to unify the nation and the proper means by which to achieve this goal. The potential for irredentism can be reduced if this justification is somehow undermined, perhaps by reconceptualizing the nation's history, the physical boundaries of the nation, or the place of the nation in the international community. The belief that Serbia was obligated to protect its fellow Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, when mixed with the conception of the Serb nation

as the defenders of Europe against Islam, helped fuel the quest for a Greater Serbia. By contrast, Germany's renunciation of aggression after World War II and the self-described role of facilitator of Pan-European cooperation precluded adjustments in the country's post-World War II borders.

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*See also* Diaspora; Ethnicity; Nationalism; War and Peace

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## ISLAM

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Why is Islam, which is a religious faith and a local culture, placed as an entry in an encyclopedia for political science? This discipline is not supposed to deal with religion and culture but instead with the polity and government. The subject matter is a religious faith that assembles nearly 1.6 billion people of humankind as an *umma* (community) that consists of a great variety of local Islamic cultures. These are, however, related to one another in terms of shared values and worldview. On these grounds, there is a resemblance that unites all Muslims to one civilization. Cultural diversity exists in Islam within the unity of one Islamic civilization. In view of this cultural diversity, there is no monolith named Islam.

The answer to the question concerning the legitimacy of this entry is that Islamic civilization matters

to politics since the great changes in the world around the end of the previous century, particularly with respect to decolonization and globalization. Islam at the beginning of the 21st century is a major factor in politics on two political levels. First, on the state level, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) unites 57 states with an Islamic majority population. Second, there are Islamic non-state actors (e.g., Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood) that engage on all levels of politics.

The politicization of the religion of Islam is connected with the claim that Islam is not only a faith but also a constructed system of government. The idea of an Islamic state is based on sharia law, believed to be the constitution legislated by Allah for a divine order. This political interpretation of Islam makes from this religion an ideology of Islamism that leads to inner conflicts within Islamic civilization. The political theorist John Breckman characterizes this issue as a “civil war” within Islam (e.g., the fight between the secular Kemalists and Islamists in Turkey). The spillover of this process to world politics assumes a geopolitical dimension with the related effects on world politics.

The politicization of Islam suggests a more complex relation between religion and politics on all three levels: local, regional, and international/global. The major issue is a return of Islam to politics that indicates the failure of the secularization process in contemporary Islamic civilization. This failure is, among other things, related to the crisis of the secular nation-state as a crisis of development.

### The Roots of Politics in Islam

At issue is political Islam, not the Islamic faith based on religious-cultural meaning inherent in a cultural system. In short, Islamic politics matter to political science. This politicized Islam serves as a political ideology often used as a device for political legitimacy. This is not a novelty to Islam, since it is a peculiarity of this religion to have had a close relation to politics and war from its birth onward. The novelty is, however, the recent phenomenon of Islamism and its idea of an Islamic state. To understand the distinction, one has first to look at the past. Islamic revelation started spiritually in Mecca in the year 610. It was not until the creation of the polity of the *umma* (i.e., community, not the Islamic state, as Islamists today wrongly contend)

in Medina in 622 that Islam was intermingled with politics. In that year Islamic history commences, and therefore, in their calendar, Muslims number 622 as the year 1. This is the Islamic *hijra* calendar. Therefore, *hijra* (migration) has a specific meaning in Islam: A Muslim is supposed to migrate in pursuit of the spread of Islam. In the year 622, Prophet Mohammed migrated from Mecca to Medina and engaged in political activity to spread Islam. For Muslims, this is a binding precedent. In his new location, the Prophet made political decisions and also fought wars. Therefore, the late French scholar of Islam, Maxime Rodinson, characterized Prophet Mohammed as a combination of Jesus and Charlemagne. However, neither the holy book of the Muslims, the Koran, nor the tradition of Prophet Mohammed, that is, the scripture of the *Hadith*, ever made provisions for how to rule the polity. It follows that there is no provisioned system of government in the authoritative scripture of Islam. In short, the idea of an Islamic rule is a construction made after the death of the Prophet. One has also to add that the system of the caliphate, established after the death of the Prophet (in 632), should not to be conflated with the Islamic state for which Islamists at present fight. These are distinctly different issues.

In 632, the aristocracy of Mecca, which was composed of elders of the Islamized tribe of Quraysh, established three tenets: (1) the Islamic ruler should be a successor, that is, a caliph, of the Prophet; (2) the caliph should be descended from the tribe of Quraysh—a requirement that contradicts the Islamic provision that all Muslims form one community that transcends tribes and creates a transtribal *umma* in which tribal affiliations are abolished; and (3) the caliph should be close to the Prophet and to the tradition he established. In this *khilafa* (meaning “caliphate”) system, selection of the caliph was based on merit and descent in the formative years of Islamic rule from 632 through 661. There were four Qurayshi leaders—Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali—who were selected to rule as caliphs. Three of these righteous (*rashidun*) caliphs, including the last one, Ali, were brutally assassinated. Despite this bloody feature, the *rashidun* age is considered to date to be the model for emulation with regard to political rule.

Following the assassination of Caliph Ali in 661, the Islamic *umma* experienced a violent

schism between the Sunnis and Shiites. The Omayyads usurped the caliphate and established dynastical rule. In so doing, they transformed the caliphate from selective to hereditary rule. They also shifted the capital of Islam from Medina/Mecca to Damascus. This first imperial rule of Islam, named the Omayyad caliphate, successfully led global jihad wars. This Islamic expansion resulted in an Islamic empire that stretched from China to Spain. In Islamic history, two other such imperial caliphates followed successively, namely, the Abasside of Baghdad and the Ottoman of Istanbul. In this imperial history, which lasted until 1924, Islam was not only a faith practiced in a great variety of local cultures but also the basis for a cross-cultural civilization and for the legitimacy of imperial rule (or caliphate). This rule is considered to be the Islamic system of government. Muslims fought jihad wars from the 7th through the 17th centuries in pursuit of an Islamic expansion envisioned to map the entire globe into *Dar al-Islam* (realm, or house, of Islam).

History did not follow this course prescribed by Islam. The world was mapped into another system, namely, the Westphalian one of sovereign states that was established in 1648. This system continues to be the basis of the modern international system.

### The End of Islamic Expansion and the International System

For Islam, the Peace of Westphalia matters with respect to both the past and the present. The roots for the launching of a competitive globalization project are related to the rise of the West with its “military revolution” (1500–1800), based on the industrialization of warfare. This rise interrupted the Islamic expansion and replaced it with its own European expansion, which is the crux of the relation between Islam and politics. In the past, the rise of the West halted Islamic expansion. At present, the Westphalian system of states maps the entire world of Islam. The Islamic revolt against the West is not only a revolt against this system but an attempt to reverse history.

After their failure to capture Vienna in 1683, the Muslim armies retreated and lost all the ensuing wars. The importation of European military practices into Muslim armies did not remedy the

existing deficiencies. European powers not only stopped Islam from further invading Europe and pushed it back from Europe, but they also invaded the world of Islam itself. The third and last global Islamic caliphate of the Ottoman Empire declined. After a successful revolution, Kemal Atatürk abolished the caliphate in 1924, following the declaration of the secular republic of Turkey. Turkey is the only secular republic in the world of Islam that enshrines secularism in its constitution. One year after the abolition of the caliphate, the Al-Azhar scholar Ali Abdel-Raziq (1888–1966) published his book *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm* (Islam and the Origins of Government), in which he argues that Islam was just a religious faith and was wrongly used to legitimate political rule. This depoliticization of Islam was strongly contested by Muslims. As punishment, Abdel-Raziq was fired from his position at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, and he died in poverty in 1966. Like Turkey, most Islamic states underwent various forms of secularization, without, however, a formal adoption of secularism. The transitory period of colonial rule in most of the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire ended in the building of independent, secular nation-states throughout the world of Islam. These states were mapped into the Westphalian system of sovereign states and became a part of the modern international system. This was the age of secular politics in the world of Islam, which lasted from 1924 to 1967. The Six-Day War of 1967 launched in its effects the return of Islam to politics. This process was facilitated by the fact that the new secular nation-states had a weak legitimacy and lacked political capacities. This weakness was emphasized by the 1967 defeat, and Arab states appeared as “nominal nation-states,” even as “tribes with national flags.” The lack of institutions that would have been shaped within the national cultures of these countries resulted in a dangerous lack of legitimacy.

### Islamic Politics and Islamic States

In the historical period between the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 and the Six-Day War of 1967, Islam receded by and large from the political arena. The Muslim Brotherhood movement was established in 1928 in Cairo, but despite their activity, such movements were by then mostly at

the fringe of politics. Secularism prevailed in a variety of forms in most Muslim countries—of course, not in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia but especially in the staunchly secular republic of Turkey. Also, the Pan-Arab Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser had a secular legitimacy, as did the largest nation of Islam in Southeast Asia—Indonesia—under the rule of the secular Ahmed Sukarno. The Arab defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 had repercussions that led to a delegitimation of secular regimes, first in the Middle East and then in the rest of the Islamic world. Among the consequences was the ascendancy of political Islam (Islamism), which moved from the fringe to the core of politics. For a number of reasons, the effects of this process spilled over from the Arab Middle East to the rest of the world of Islam. One of the factors that promoted the spillover effects is related to the Arab part of Islamic civilization being recognized as its core. It generates cultural-religious influence over the rest of the world of Islam. For instance, the Middle East influences Southeast Asia and not the other way around, even though Indonesia's population is about three times greater than that of Egypt.

The connection between Islam and politics is established today by the Islamist movements that reclaim an Islamic order (*nizam Islami*) following a global trend that gives a more important role to religion in politics. Today, it is Sunni Arab Islam and not the Shiite revolution in Iran that generates (a) jihad in the new understanding of an Islamic world revolution; (b) shariatization of politics, based on a new understanding of Islamic law; and (c) a call for the return to the golden age of Islam in a messianic perspective that appeals to people who feel frustrated and deprived after the breakdown of communism and the end of the East–West conflict. The uprising of 2011 against the existing authoritarian order of the state, which began in January in the Arab world, first in Tunisia and followed by Egypt and Libya, is to be placed in this context.

Islam's return to the forefront, in the shape of Islamism, creates a bipolarity between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds and is accompanied by Islam's conflicts with modernity. Islam is a civilization subjected to a politicization that is also—in terms of world politics—a politicization of what Raymond Aron called the “heterogeneity of civilizations.” This process leads to an intercivilizational

conflict. The reader is reminded of the distinction that a conflict is not a clash: A conflict can be peacefully resolved in a negotiation process that could assume the shape of a dialogue between civilizations, whereas a clash is based on an essentializing view and on the fault lines of polarization. The pertinence of Islam to political science and also to international relations is related to the fact that religion and politics have become intertwined in the countries of Islamic civilization. Religion is among the new sources of conflict. The articulation of needs in religious language first generates real cultural tensions, which later become political. There are many levels in this conflict. The first level is an inner-Islamic conflict over the secular nation-state. Under conditions of globalization, this conflict within Islam is then extended to an international one. The conflict escalates with the rise of powerful Islamist movements that challenge the existing nation-states in the world of Islam, with the aim of replacing them with an Islamic state. This claim leads to tensions and conflicts, first within Islam and then through spillover effects to the international and intercivilizational level. The inner-Islamic and international levels intermingle with one another.

The call for an Islamic state is not to be conflated with the aim of restoring the caliphate, as some pundits contend. There is a novelty, next to the fact that politics is becoming religionized and religion is subjected to politicization. This novelty is the idea of an Islamic order that incorporates the Islamic state. This particularism promotes tensions that ignite conflict. These are also related to images of the self and of the other. Of course, there are socioeconomic and political constraints underlying the political conflict articulated in religious terms. This articulation in religious terms matters to the analysis in the sense that political, social, and economic concerns become religionized. The reference to Islam is not merely a cover, nor does it happen instrumentally, as some Western pundits contend. The religionization of conflict gives politics a new shape. Conflict becomes intractable because beliefs are not negotiable. Some students of Islamic politics argue that these Islamist Muslims are virtually secular, because they use, or abuse, religion for nonreligious ends. However, fieldwork shows that Islamists act in good faith as believers. Their good faith is not to be confused with cynicism. Many

Westerners fail to understand the place of culture and religion in post-bipolar politics.

### Areas of Concern in Islam and Politics

The contemporary view of Islamism as an embodiment of religionized politics relates Islam to the areas of knowledge of politics and law and also human rights in a contestation of the secularization of the world of Islam. Political scientists are expected in their study of Islam to be wary of and to avoid the biased debate in which accusations of Orientalism replace scholarly analysis. Empirical evidence, however, has shown that cultural tensions related to Islam lead to political conflict.

The study of religion and politics covers all religions, but the pivotal place given to Islam in this analysis is related to the following assertions:

1. Islam as a religion invades the public sphere, teaching that the primary unit of society is the *umma*, the international brotherhood of believers.
2. Islam forces people to follow sharia laws. If this law is elevated to state law in a process of shariatization of politics, then conflicts based on a religious component are likely. These are much harder to solve than purely political conflicts. The involvement of religion in politics makes conflict intractable.
3. Political Islam is central to post-bipolar world politics through the transformation of Islamic universalism—in the course of a process of politicization—into a politics that leads to a religion-based internationalism. This contemporary Islamist internationalism should not be conflated with the Pan-Islamism of the 19th century's Islamic revival since from it emerges the claim of a new world order based on Islamic tenets, which may provide an explanation for "Islam's geopolitical war," which some political theorists posit in their linking of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to post-bipolar politics. Surely, this assertion is also a contested translation of the role of the jihad, which must be more exactly defined as the effort by believers to get closer to the will of God. Therefore, one needs to establish a distinction between traditional jihad and Islamist jihadism.

The contention that there is a model of an Islamist state matters to political science. In international relations of the post-bipolar politics, the competition among different cultural models generates political tensions that develop domestically, regionally, and internationally. Islam's problems with cultural modernity are central in this context. The ignited tensions occur not only among Muslims but also in their relations to the "non-Muslim other" in an international environment of crisis.

### Conclusion

Political scientists involved in peace studies and in mediation are challenged to relate civilizational encounters to the study of conflict from the point of view of conflict resolution. However, preventing the clash of civilizations cannot dispense with the study of intra- and intercivilizational conflict. Some political scientists have gone to the other extreme of a constructed *convergence of civilizations*. Western political science needs a better understanding of Islam and politics and the related conflicts. Again, one should remember that a conflict is not a clash.

The study of religion and violence in Islam also matters to political science in its reference to the place of jihad and jihadism in politics. Many believe that there can be a democratic response to terrorism to replace the war on terror pursued in the name of security. The political interpretation of jihad as a "world revolution," as advocated by Sayyid Qutb, allows—as jihadism—the resort to violence in an irregular war. This is also among the areas of concern in the study of Islam and politics.

The political theorist John Brenkman states that Islam is in the midst of a civil war. Then, he boldly ascertains that most of the dangers are emerging from the Muslim world. Today, such views are often qualified as an expression of Orientalism, but the concern articulated in the above statement matters to political scientists. The study of conflicts generated between radical Muslims themselves, on the one hand, and with the West, on the other, is a concern of political science. The cultural analysis of political conflict is not a culturalism. The conflict within Islam is ignited by political Islam that uses Islam not only to gain legitimacy in its Islamist movements but also as a concept of order. The study of issues such as the resolution of

intra- and intercivilizational conflicts and the combination of Islam and democracy is the business of political science. Another area of study is the history of political ideas. In medieval Hellenized Islam, there existed a rational political philosophy established by Farabi (870–950) that lasted until Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406). This Islamic humanism helps establish a bridge between the civilizations.

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*See also* Fundamentalism; Fundamentalist Movements, Islamic; Orientalism; Religion

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## ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

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In recent decades, Islamist movements have become an important social and (sometimes) political force in many Arab countries. They share three major characteristics:

1. Islamists are critical of prevailing societal conditions in Arab countries, which they describe interchangeably as decadent, underdeveloped, or unjust.
2. They blame authoritarian ruling establishments for these societal conditions and therefore consider political change as the first crucial step toward altering Arab reality. Islamist movements operating in the Arab world differ from missionary groups and Islamic charitable organizations, which see change as a long-term process of Islamizing societies that takes place outside of the realm of politics.
3. They legitimize their practices and create popular appeal for their movements by basing them on religious norms and values, which serve as the ultimate ideological frame of reference for society and politics.

Within the broad category of Islamist movements, groups can be differentiated by their attitudes toward violence and their perceptions of politics. Militant groups such as the Egyptian Jihad and the Algerian Islamic Group use violence and seek to establish theocratic states as the sole means of changing conditions in Islamic societies. Their sources of inspiration are either idealized interpretations of past moments in Islamic history or contemporary models of Islamic republics, be they in Iran, Sudan, or even Afghanistan. Mainstream



Islamists reject violence and endorse competition through pluralistic politics. They exclude radical strategies as options for political transformation and see gradual democratic openings as the only viable way to challenge repressive authoritarian regimes in the Islamic world.

This mainstream position is relatively new. In the 1980s and 1990s, mainstream movements still had not accepted the value of democratic governance. Caught in the iron grip of regime oppression and continuous radicalization at the outer edges of the Islamist spectrum, these movements were sometimes forced out of the official political sphere or violently banned and denied any public role. In a few countries such as Morocco, where Islamists were partly integrated in the political process, Islamists' preoccupation with rhetorically sound though politically unattainable goals—Islamization of legislative environments and educational systems—did not help them overcome general doubts about their real objectives. By the end of the 1990s, Arab Islamists had failed to change political realities in their homelands despite considerable popular support. This failure prompted various revisionist trends that gathered momentum in the past few years. As a result, mainstream Islamists have become increasingly receptive to democratic procedures.

### Three Paradigms of Islamist Participation

In this context, it is possible to identify three major modes of mainstream Islamist participation in politics. The first comprises the Iraqi, Lebanese, and Palestinian cases. While the Islamist movements in these instances operate with relative organizational freedom in the context of political party plurality, these experiences also take place in a climate of relative chaos, whether because foreign occupation has wrought the collapse of the institutions of government and public security or because an ongoing intractable crisis of internal discord so hampers the efficacy of government as to constantly threaten the stability of the political system and encourage the prevalence of monopolistic/exclusivist tendencies that conflict with the spirit and substance of peaceful participation.

The Islamist movements in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine are characterized by hierarchical internal structures, possession of the means to exercise

violence, and a tendency to resort to, or threaten to resort to, violence to resolve their political conflicts. The inclusion of such Islamist movements in plural politics, at a time when they have yet to develop a full commitment to peaceful participation and when such participation is perhaps only a tactic within the framework of a greater strategy, reduces or even eliminates the chances of propelling political plurality forward through a process of democratization.

In sharp contrast to these instances, the second mode of Islamist participation in politics adopts participation as its one and only strategic option. The campaign motto "participation comes first" typifies the attitude of these Islamists who are prominent in some Arab countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Whereas Islamists form small parts of the governments of Algeria and Kuwait, their counterparts in Morocco and Bahrain lead the opposition camps. More significantly, some of these movements have succeeded in formulating a functional separation between religious proselytizing activities and politics, thereby transforming themselves into solely political organizations guided by an Islamist code but run by professional politicians and the activities of which steer clear of the rhetoric and activities of a proselytizing movement.

In spite of qualitative differences between their movements, the Islamists who follow the motto "participation comes first" share several fundamental characteristics. Above all, they honor the legitimacy of the nation-state to which they belong, and they respect that state's governing institutions, the principle of equality among all citizens, and the pluralistic, competitive nature of political life. This attitude, which they have generally adopted as much in spirit as in form, has led to the decline in exclusionist rhetoric, whether directed toward ruling establishments or to the liberal and leftist opposition. It has also resulted in a gradual shift away from ideological diatribes and categorical judgments and toward the formulation of practical political platforms and constructive attempts to influence public policy, whether as minor partners in government or as members of the opposition.

The third mode of Islamist participation is epitomized by the cases of Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Yemen. In spite of the considerable differences between them, Islamist movements in these

countries have persisted in the face of a volatile political space and the fragility of their relationship with the ruling establishments. If in Egypt and Jordan, Islamists have been given some room to participate in pluralistic mechanisms, in legislative elections, in professional syndicates, and in other areas of civil society, the sword of the security forces is constantly hanging over their heads. By contrast, the Islamist movements in Sudan and Yemen throw into relief the danger of the nondemocratic accommodations Islamists have struck with paramilitary ruling establishments and the negative impact of such alliances on political life and on the internal dynamics of the Islamists themselves.

The motto of these Islamists may be described as “participation until further notice.” They may have adopted a strategy of peaceful participation, but it is no more than a strategy. In view of the perpetual fluctuation of their role in the political life of Egypt and Jordan or the swings in their positions from partners in authoritarian governments to antagonists, in the case of Sudan and Yemen, their leaders and followers continue to hover in the abstract heights of ideology, social narratives, and megapolicy (the role of religion in public life, the implementation of the Islamic Law, and the re-creation of the Muslim nation) while ignoring the need to evolve a culture that values consensus making and constructive mechanisms for influencing public policy.

### Challenges of Islamist Political Participation

When examining the three modes of Islamist participation in politics, special attention has to be given to the impact of participation on the organizational complexity of Islamist movements, the separation between religious proselytizing and civil-political components, and finally the balance between Islamist interest in public policy matters and in ideological and moral issues.

Essentially, the relatively stable experiences of Islamists in the political process, as in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain, contributed to the rapid development of the Islamists’ organizational units. They now have increasing functional specialization and variation, distinct institutional separation between religious and civil components, and a core emphasis on public policies. However, the volatile experiences of Islamists in Egypt,

Jordan, and Yemen have prevented the materialization of equally successful trajectories, despite the fact that some elements of progress can be noted.

The Islamists’ experience in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain testifies to the existence of a direct relationship between the stability of the available realm for political participation, as a result of the decline in the government’s recourse to the security pretext to exclude or repress them, and a relatively rapid rise in their resolve to respect and play by the rules of the game and to reach consensual agreements over the conduct of public affairs in a nonconfrontational manner. Nevertheless, these Islamists still face a number of tests of their intent. On the one hand, they have yet to demonstrate their unconditional commitment to the mechanisms of a pluralistic form of government, even if those mechanisms produce policies that do not conform to their religious beliefs. On the other, they must continue to convince their constituencies of the efficacy of peaceful participation at a time when authoritarian ruling establishments have yet to shed their suspicions of the Islamists and to accustom themselves fully to their participation in politics.

Notwithstanding the fact that mainstream Islamists have developed in general a strategic commitment to the peaceful participation option, the constant flux that defined their experiences in Egypt and Jordan or their shift from active participants in authoritarian governments to semi-opposition entities—as is the case in Sudan and Yemen—contributed to the erosion of their popular support or the emergence of a confused mentality among their leaders. Naturally, both of these consequences negatively affected the capacity of the Islamist movements to take meaningful advantage of the participation option.

Because their participation lacks the relative stability of Islamists’ experiences in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain, Egyptian and Jordanian Islamists have remained preoccupied with the traditional mix of normative, social, and political issues with no discernable evolutionary trajectory toward more pragmatism. Both movements have constantly demonstrated various signs of internal dissent and infighting between participation-friendly and participation-critical leaders and members.

And although participation-critical voices inside Egyptian and Jordanian Islamist movements have not been pushing for giving up their commitment to nonviolence, they have been putting forward two alternatives that are worth noting and bear potential risks: (1) retreat from politics to the social sphere and (2) increased confrontational attitudes toward the ruling establishments. The notion of retreating to the social sphere has never lost its appeal to Islamists, especially in moments of political exclusion and prosecution, as a temporary strategy to regroup and revitalize their movements. However, in Egypt and Jordan today, calls to leave politics and retreat to society are increasingly articulated in a definite way that attests to the internal fatigue and frustration of Islamists. In contrast, other voices have been pushing for assuming more hard-line stances toward official policies and for using whatever political space Islamists can sustain to confront the ruling establishments. Looking at the ongoing polarization of Egyptian and Jordanian politics, primarily driven by ruling establishment/Islamist conflicts, this is clearly a recipe for instability and reform freeze.

The current challenges facing Islamist movements are inextricably intertwined with the overall distortions that define the contemporary Arab political reality. The participation of Islamists in and of itself does not prolong the realization of a healthy democratic order, nor for that matter does it bring their polities closer to that order.

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*See also* Fundamentalism; Islam; Religious Movements; Social Movements

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## ITEM–RESPONSE (RASCH) MODELS

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Item–response models define a set of data reduction techniques that relate observed discrete variables to a much smaller set of unobserved latent variables. These models are primarily used in political science to relate observed votes on legislative roll calls to legislators' unobserved ideology. Originally developed in the context of educational testing, these models were designed to recover characteristics of test questions (items) and the “abilities” of student test takers. Consequently, much of the model description and interpretation retains education terminology. The data involves  $N$  test takers (indexed by  $i$ ) answering  $M$  test questions (indexed by  $j$ ), with an answer (response) by student  $i$  on question  $j$  ( $y_{ij}$ ) equal to one if correct, zero otherwise. In legislative voting, the “test takers” are the legislators, the “items” are the roll calls, and the “ability” is the legislator's ideology. The canonical model for the answers posits the following probability model:

$$\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \frac{\exp(x_i\beta_j - \alpha_j)}{1 + \exp(x_i\beta_j - \alpha_j)},$$

where  $x_i$  is the student's ability and parameters  $\beta_j$  and  $\alpha_j$  characterize the question. This is simply a logit model of a correct answer as a function of one independent variable, the ability measured by the test, with the additional complication that the independent variable is unobserved. Of course, other cumulative density functions can be used instead (e.g., the normal for a probit model). This is a latent variable model, similar to factor analysis. The test items are all observable indicators (manifest variables) of the unobservable common factor  $x$ , with  $\beta_j$  analogous to a factor loading. In the item–response case, all the indicators are binary, whereas they are continuous in factor analysis.

The probability model is frequently reformulated as

$$\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \frac{\exp(\beta_j(x_i - \kappa_j))}{1 + \exp(\beta_j(x_i - \kappa_j))},$$

with specific interpretations to each item parameter. The slope coefficients  $\beta_j$  are the *discrimination* parameters and the values of  $\kappa_j$  are *difficulty* parameters. Discrimination is the extent to which a test question separates students with higher and lower levels of abilities. If  $\beta_j = 0$ , then the test question does not measure the ability gauged by the test. Higher values of  $\kappa_j$  indicate a more difficult question.  $\kappa_j$  represents the ability level of a student who has a 50% probability of answering the question correctly and 50% answering incorrectly. Note,  $\kappa_j$  and  $x_i$  are on the same scale; if  $x_i = \kappa_j$ ,  $\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = .5$ .

#### Other Item–Response Models

A special case is the one-parameter model, known as the Rasch model (after Georg Rasch):

$$\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \frac{\exp(x_i - \kappa_j)}{1 + \exp(x_i - \kappa_j)}.$$

This model assumes that every item discriminates abilities equally well ( $\beta_j = 1$  for all questions  $j$ ). In this model, all the observed information is contained in the total score, the number of correct responses: an extremely desirable property for tests. This property is only true for the logistic one-parameter model though.

A generalization of the two-parameter model is the three-parameter model:

$$\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \gamma_j + (1 - \gamma_j) \frac{\exp(\beta_j(x_i - \kappa_j))}{1 + \exp(\beta_j(x_i - \kappa_j))},$$

where  $\gamma_j$  is a “pseudoguessing” parameter. It allows for the absolute worst student (with ability approaching negative infinity) to have a positive probability of answering a question correctly; that is, a student answers a question correctly, not

because of a higher level of ability but because he or she happened to mark the answer correctly. The “pseudo” aspect of guessing is that students do not necessarily guess but use reasoning processes unrelated to their ability (sometimes actually worse than pure guessing).

#### Political Science Applications

The original application of the model is educational testing, but the item–response model represents a general latent variable model for any application that posits an abstract, unobserved concept recoverable from observed manifest binary variables. One prominent application in political science is the estimation of legislator ideal points. In the spatial model of voting, legislators choose between “yea” and “nay” alternatives, with the “nay” alternative typically representing the status quo and “yea” a change to the status quo. The utility of each choice depends on how far each alternative is from the legislator’s “ideal” policy. The legislator votes for whichever is closer to the legislator’s ideal point. This model also applies to other actors who take announced positions, such as Supreme Court justices or members of the boards of independent agencies. Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers demonstrate that when assuming a particular functional form for this utility, the model for this decision reduces to the standard item–response model from educational tests. The discrimination parameter indicates the extent to which a particular vote relates to an underlying liberal–conservative dimension. In educational testing,  $\beta_j \geq 0$ , since test questions that students with lower ability have a higher probability of answering correctly than those with higher abilities are counterproductive to the purpose of the test. In the legislator context though, the sign of  $\beta_j$  indicates whether a “yea” vote is liberal (negative) or conservative (positive). The difficulty parameter is the “cut point” between the two choices, that is, the ideal point for a legislator who is completely indifferent between the alternatives.

While item–response models are frequently described as unidimensional, the model can also be multidimensional. Instead of a general liberal–conservative dimension, one could specify policy preferences over multiple areas (e.g., economic

policy, social policy, and foreign affairs). The rotational indeterminacy that affects factor analysis is also present in this model. To recover the parameters, some restrictions must be implemented. Specific legislators can be fixed to specific positions in the ideological space, with estimates of other parameters relative to these positions. More useful in these applications are restrictions on  $\beta_j$ , similar to those restrictions found in confirmatory factor analysis, such as restricting some votes to loading on only one of the policy areas (with the discrimination parameters of other issues restricted to zero).

### Estimation

Since  $\beta_j$ ,  $\kappa_i$ , and  $x_i$  are all unobserved, estimation can be tricky. An additional complication is the large number of parameters to estimate. For a one-dimensional model, there are  $2M + N$  parameters. In the legislative case, that can easily exceed 1,000 parameters. Maximizing the likelihood over all parameters is actually not recommended, since it does not provide consistent estimates of the parameters. In educational testing, the dominant approach estimates only the item parameters, which are used to calibrate standardized tests; estimates of the abilities are less consequential. Marginal maximum likelihood assumes that the latent variable parameter  $x$  is normally distributed and then “averages out” (integrates over) to produce a model with only the item parameters. Estimates of the ability parameters can be obtained a posteriori by calculating the expected value given the answers and item parameters.

In political science, recovering estimates of the latent variables is actually more important. To simultaneously estimate the item parameters and the latent variables, Bayesian approaches are used. Assuming a priori the parameters follow certain distributions (some of the same assumptions used in the marginal maximum likelihood approach) and the model of the data produces the joint distribution of item and ability parameters. These parameters can be summarized by simulating from this distribution using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. The Rasch model is much easier to estimate through maximum likelihood conditional on the total score. The three-parameter

model is estimated using the same methods as the two-parameter model, but the pseudoguessing parameter can be difficult to estimate. As a result, restrictions on  $\gamma_j$  in the three-parameter model are often implemented.

### Other Types of Data

While the standard item–response model is fitted to binary (correct/incorrect, yea/nay) responses, the model is extendable to polytomous data. One application involves nominal responses from multiple-choice tests. Instead of coding answers as merely correct or incorrect, responses to the separate correct and incorrect responses are modeled. The model is the same as the binary case, except that the probability function is analogous to a multinomial logit model for each multiple-choice question. While there have been political science applications of this model, political science researchers are more often confronted with ordered responses.

In educational testing, ordered models are used for the grading of short answers and essays or any question for which partial credit is granted. In most instances where political scientists use factor analysis, the ordered-item/response model will be a more appropriate choice, especially for the Likert-type scales found in most surveys. Applications include the estimation of survey respondent ideology, policy preferences, or political knowledge. The model is applicable to any circumstance where a latent variable of interest is measured using ordinal variables. For instance, when the unit of analysis is countries, one can recover from ordinal items the level of democracy in these countries, as well as numerous other characteristics of government and society, such as the economic development, corruption, or adherence to human rights.

There are also item–response models using non-multinomial probability models. For instance, the responses can be frequencies or relative frequencies. In political science, such models have been used to estimate the ideological positions of parties or legislators. For parties, the responses are relative word frequencies in party platforms; for legislators, relative word frequencies in speeches. The number of times observation  $i$  uses word  $j$  ( $y_{ij}$ ) follows a Poisson distribution, with mean number

of counts  $\lambda_{ij} = \exp(x_i\beta_j - \alpha_j)$ , which specifies a count regression model.

The item–response model also allows for some more unique data structures, such as multiple-rater data.  $J$  raters evaluate each of  $N$  observations based on  $M$  characteristics (items). The raters place the observations on each of the (typical ordered) items. The models produce estimates of the observations' latent quantity, as well as item- and rater-specific parameters. This approach allows researchers to incorporate evaluations from *multiple* experts to create more accurate measures. For example, researchers can collect through expert surveys the evaluations of scholars in bureaucracy to measure the ideology of agencies or ratings from comparative politics experts to estimate the ideology of political parties or the level of democracy of a country.

### Conclusion

The item–response model, while developed for educational testing, is a general measurement model for many different types of discrete data, with many potential extensions. It is particularly well suited for political science applications, which

use many abstract theoretical concepts measured with discrete-level data.

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*See also* Categorical Response Data; Factor Analysis; Logit and Probit Analyses; Measurement; Spatial Models of Politics

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## JOINT-DECISION TRAP

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The joint-decision trap is the name for a particular situation that arises in the making of public policy. It is relevant for systems that are divided into layers of government where decisions are made jointly by the central and lower levels. These systems may turn into traps, in the sense that changes from the status quo are difficult. Actors are caught in a deadlock. The joint-decision trap model has had the most impact on the understanding of politics in the European Union (EU) and the German federal system but is relevant for a wide range of multilevel systems.

The joint-decision trap was identified by the German scholar Fritz W. Scharpf, first in German federalism and later in policy making in the EU. Scharpf developed the thesis in the early 1980s on the basis of many years of studies of institutional rigidities in German federal politics. The German version of the thesis was published in the mid-1980s, and the English version followed a few years later. The thesis was notable for two reasons. First, it was one of the first neo-institutional analyses of policy making in the EU. As such, it helped pave the way for, or even spearheaded the breakthrough of the neo-institutional paradigm into, studies of the EU. Second, the thesis avoided the *sui generis* approach to the EU that until then had tended to isolate studies of European integration from mainstream social science. Scharpf's approach was comparative. He sought to understand policy dynamics in the EU by comparing it with German federalism.

The joint-decision trap is a designation for a specific, but far from uncommon, institutional setting for policy making. Two institutional conditions are specified: (1) central government decisions must be directly dependent on the agreement of constituent governments and (2) the agreement of constituent governments must be unanimous or nearly unanimous. These conditions fit the cases of German federal politics and the EU reasonably well, at least at the time when Scharpf was writing. A logic of action follows from these conditions that leads to a stalemate and a severe bias in favor of the status quo. Whenever a proposed change of policy has a negative impact on just one actor, this actor will want to oppose the change unless it is compensated for the loss. Since all actors possess (near-)veto rights and because adequate compensation is often difficult, policy changes will often be blocked. In most cases, existing policy cannot be changed as long as it is preferred even by one or a few participants. In a dynamic environment, this is critical. The quality of public policy will gradually worsen. The result will be the continuation of past policies in the face of a changing policy environment and policies that are suboptimal even by their own original criteria.

To make matters worse, the joint-decision trap is also a trap in another sense. It not only leads to pathological policy choices, but it also blocks its own further institutional evolution. The present institutional setup represents the local optimum in the actors' cost-benefit calculation. It is a Nash equilibrium. There is thus no way that joint-decision systems may transform themselves into institutional



arrangements of greater policy potential. Institutional change would require external intervention. All in all, the joint-decision trap paints a pessimistic picture of modern political systems and is close to structural determinism.

The joint-decision trap is an abstract analytical model that may be used in a variety of settings. Scharpf originally suggested that the logic might apply to settings as diverse as political coalitions, military alliances, and neo-corporatist arrangements. In the original version, however, the trap has had most resonance in studies within its own empirical field—namely, intergovernmental relations in modern political systems. It has been used to understand systems in several countries—for instance, Canada and Denmark. But its most profound influence has probably been within studies of German federalism, where it is used almost as a matter of routine today, and in studies of policy making in the EU, where it is standard material for textbooks.

The joint-decision trap's influence on EU studies may strike one as paradoxical. The trap was identified and the thesis developed after a long period of "eurosclerosis." According to many observers, the 1970s and early 1980s were a period of stagnation for the EU where the hopes from the 1950s and 1960s for further integration were strangled in a quagmire of stagnation and policy deadlocks. Scharpf's joint-decision trap was widely acknowledged as an explanation of this development. However, the 20 years that have passed since the publication of Scharpf's article in 1988 have been a period of unparalleled dynamism and creative policy making in the EU. Through a series of treaty changes, the EU has experienced several rounds of enlargement, the number of policy areas covered by the EU has increased, the Council of Ministers has changed its decision rule from one of unanimity to qualified majority voting in most areas, and the European Parliament has become a full legislator in most areas.

At first sight, these changes might be considered a refutation of the logic of the joint-decision trap. However, the development has spurred investigations into ways in which decision makers may avoid joint-decision traps. B. Guy Peters argues that segmentation of policy making at levels below the Council of Ministers and the influence of policy entrepreneurs may help actors avoid the trap.

Adrienne Heritier finds that actors in the EU system engage in politics of subterfuge and creatively use strategies of compensation, compromise, and package deals to avoid stalemates. Jens Blom-Hansen argues that traps need not be inherent in joint-decision systems. If the central government has an exit option in its relations with subcentral governments, it may switch between arenas and use both "exit" and "voice" options to pursue its interests. In this way, joint-decision systems may turn into an asset.

Scharpf, in a reevaluation of the joint-decision trap 20 years after it was first proposed, argues that such an exit option is in fact also available to the central decision maker in the EU. Rule making may follow the well-known community method according to which the Commission presents proposals, and the Council of Ministers and, in selected areas, the European Parliament enact them. This is the area where the joint-decision trap is operative. However, rule making may also follow the "supranational-hierarchical mode." This takes place in the judicial arena. To use it, the Commission exploits the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of European law. To make rules, the Commission only needs to assert that a particular rule should have direct effect and that certain laws or practices in member states are in violation of it. If these arguments are then upheld by the European Court of Justice, the interpretation will be the law of the land in all member states without any further action by governments or parliaments. In short, the Commission may strategically use both the traditional community method and the "supranational-hierarchical" way to change the status quo.

However, although the agenda-setting powers of the Commission and rule making by use of the European Court of Justice may reduce the impact of the joint-decision trap, it is still likely to be operative in EU politics. The number of member states has now increased to 27, and although unanimity is no longer necessary in the Council, qualified majority voting is still quite a demanding decision rule. As a result, decision making in the EU is still cumbersome, difficult to manage, and easily blocked. Scharpf's thesis on joint-decision traps helps us understand why.

More broadly, Scharpf's contribution highlights how easily two-level decision systems where the

central level is dependent on the (near-)unanimous agreement of the constituent levels fall prey to stalemate and institutional deadlock. Since almost all countries are divided into several layers of government, there is wide scope for empirical application of the thesis. Not only has the joint-decision trap increased our understanding of the empirical world, but it has also stimulated further theoretical development in the social sciences. This holds for both theorizing on institutional deadlock, such as veto player theory, and theorizing on circumventing deadlocks.

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*See also* Federalism; Institutional Theory; Intergovernmentalism; Veto Player

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## JUDAISM

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Judaism is the religion, philosophy, and culture of the Jewish people. This entry presents the basic beliefs and practices of the Jewish religion, its adaptation to exile, its relationships with other

religions, its Ashkenaz and Sepharad components, and the role of rabbis; then, following emancipation, new religious and secular developments; and, in conclusion, contemporary challenges.

Judaism is the first monotheistic religion. It appeared with the Hebrew Patriarchs—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—and the Matriarchs—Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah—some 3,500 years ago. Judaism crystallized with Moses, with emphasis on the exodus from Egypt, freedom from bondage, and the revelation of the Ten Commandments. In Judaism, God is transcendent—beyond representation—omnipotent, benevolent. He created the world, revealed himself, and will lead to redemption. The covenant between God and Abraham, renewed at Mount Sinai between God and the Children of Israel, is an eternal one: Jews exist as a representative of the deity (kingdom of priests, holy people: Exodus 19:5–6), God exists because Jews proclaim Him. Basic monotheistic beliefs are embodied in the commandments: 248 positive and 365 prohibitive or negative, for a total of 613. Gentiles, to share the world to come, must keep the Seven Noahide Laws (prohibition of idolatry, blasphemy, bloodshed, sexual sins, theft, and eating of flesh from a living animal and establishment of a fair legal system). From the conquest of Canaan, the establishment of a Jewish sovereignty, until the destruction of the Second Temple by Titus in 70 CE, Judaism is the religion of a specific people with a specific belief, monotheism.

This explains the savagery of the war between Rome and Jerusalem. The Roman Empire, to impose its rule on a defeated people, mandated that Caesar be worshipped as divine. Judeans could not accept a god other than the Only One. Wars continued for close to a century; Jerusalem was captured; the Temple destroyed; and the very name of the country, Judea, replaced by Palestine to erase any memory of a people and a religion so different from that of Rome.

Faced with a new situation, disappearance of its political and religious institutions, exile, and minority status, Judaism had no other choice but to adapt. The first innovation was to write down what had been until then the Oral Law, explanations and comments on the Written Law, Deuteronomy (the fifth book of the Torah, the Hebrew Bible). This massive effort gave birth to the Talmud, which would become the authoritative interpretation of

Judaism, its source of jurisprudence and education. The only group of Jews who had no knowledge of the Talmud was the group in Ethiopia. The second innovation was an increased value accorded to religion as compensation for lost sovereignty. Such reliance on religion has been the mark of other oppressed peoples (Poles, Irish, Thai, etc.).

Exilic Judaism, with its synagogues as substitutes for the Temple of Jerusalem and the Talmud as its basic source of knowledge, dominated the following 2,000 years. Halacha, Jewish Law, was the core of Judaism, a code of laws, practices, and observances. Based on the Pentateuch, Talmud, and the decisions of sages and rabbis until contemporary times, Halacha is binding for the Orthodox, though not for other groups within Judaism.

Relationship with the two other monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam, became crucial. Both have their origin in Judaism and believe that they have superseded Judaism. Most Jews were living either in Christian Europe or in Muslim North Africa and the Middle East. Both Christianity and Islam tried to impose conversion but eventually accepted the presence of Jews, if only as a despised minority, their inferior status presented as a proof that they were no longer the Chosen People of the Living God. With great differences according to varying times and places, Jews played a significant, even if usually not recognized, role in the development of Christian and Muslim cultures. Comparatively few Jews settled in nonmonotheistic countries such as India and China, where, although their religion seemed strange, they were not subjected to persecution or accorded any special status.

In exile, a distinction appeared between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews. Ashkenaz, who first settled along the Rhine River, circa 1000 CE, expanded toward Central and Eastern Europe, then to the New World. Sepharad, originally from Muslim Spain, formed new communities around the Mediterranean Sea after the 1492 expulsion. Today, Sephardim are usually linked with *Edot Hamizrah*, Oriental Jews (Iran, Yemen, Kurdistan, etc.). The major differences are historical—with most Ashkenaz living in Christian countries, most Sepharad in Muslim ones—and liturgical. In most places, for generations, down to the present day, as soon as Jews from a certain geographic area have constituted a critical mass, they have opened their own synagogues. Due to migrations, most

major communities have both Ashkenazi and Sephardi synagogues, but they are often united at the religious services level (Kosher food, rabbinical courts, etc.)

In Israel, the Chief Rabbinate is legally headed by two chief rabbis, one Ashkenazi and one Sephardi. The liturgical distinction has become politicized. From a strictly religious one, it has become a social one (Ashkenazi dominancy in the old elite, challenged by Sephardim) and eventually a political distinction. Of the three major religious parties, one is Ashkenazi, one is Sephardi, and one is mixed.

Around the 11th century, a new actor emerged in Judaism: the rabbi. The general custom had been to have a learned man, versed in Jewish law and engaged in worldly endeavors, to serve as a religious interpreter of the law. The new rabbis became experts in that field, engaged and paid by Jewish communities and recognized as the official religious leaders (*rabbi* means “my master”). They had to compete with *dayanim*, religious judges involved in judicial matters and not in community ones, and, later, with the directors of *yeshivot*, institutes of higher Talmudic studies. The modern trend, either on a voluntary basis or imposed by institutions, is to belong to a rabbinical association. They offer a common philosophical ground, following the various streams of Judaism, a consultation place, and services such as health insurance, pensions, and so on. In contemporary times, the rabbinate as an institution is more a professional association than a political force within the Jewish community.

Emancipation and democratization were the hallmarks of modernity for Jews. With emancipation, European Jewry underwent a transformation: Whereas previously there were structured, autonomous Jewish “nations,” recognized as such by the sovereign, with their social institutions and tribunals imposing norms on Jewish communities, now affiliation to any kind of Jewish institution, including religious ones, became a voluntary association. New forms of Judaism appeared. As for other people, nothing impeded Jews who did not want to follow the beliefs and practices of their religion. Some Jews wanted a Judaism with no national component, no dream of returning to Jerusalem to rebuild the Temple, and no customs too different from those of their Catholic and Protestant neighbors. Reform Judaism appeared in the 19th century

in Germany and flourished in the United States. To answer this new trend, neo-orthodoxy, also in Germany, offered a mixture of strict adherence to Jewish religious laws—hence “orthodoxy”—but within modern society, science, and democracy—hence “neo.” (In the United States, these congregations refer to themselves as Modern Orthodox.) Other Orthodox groups did not want to change anything in their approach to religion and the world and stressed strict adherence to Judaism alongside or outside modern society but not within. Both Hasidism, a new orthodox trend that emerged in the 19th century, with a rebbe, a charismatic leader, at the center of the group, and their opponents wanted a return to premodern times. Between Reform and Orthodox, a third group, Conservative, tried to amalgamate a respect for tradition and a will to adapt it to modern conditions. As there is no central authority in Judaism, anyone may offer a new vision and try to create a new form of Judaism.

Two ideologies threatened the centrality of religion in Jewish life, socialism and Zionism. Socialism, under the banner of Bund, was a Jewish component of the struggle for power by the proletariat. Based on Jewish ethics, favorable to the poor and the destitute, and on Jewish customs such as Yiddish, Bund became a force mostly in Central and Eastern Europe. Decimated by the Shoah (Holocaust), attacked by Stalin and his successors, Bund has, for all intents and purposes, disappeared. Zionism transformed the Return to Zion from an eschatological perspective to a political program. It relied on centuries of longing for Jerusalem omnipresent in liturgy, from everyday prayers “Bless be You who rebuilds Jerusalem” to the annual cycle of festivals, all of them centered on Jerusalem and culminating at the end of Yom Kippur, and during the Passover Seder with “Next year, in Jerusalem.” Throughout the life cycle, from birth to death, Jerusalem was evoked. What followed was a deeply ambivalent relationship between Judaism and political Zionism, inspired by the same set of beliefs and customs but differing in their modern implications. Some chose to combine both in Religious Zionism. Many religious leaders were reluctant to support, if not outright hostile to, the new nonreligious ideology that was making rapid headway among the Jewish masses. The non-Zionists and anti-Zionists were from both Reform Judaism, which did not recognize

Jews as a people but only as a religion, and Orthodox Judaism, which was opposed, like Catholicism, to any new secular philosophy. Eventually, following the Shoah and the creation of Israel, most religious opposition to Zionism disappeared. Approximately half of the surviving Hasidic leaders live in the United States, half in Israel; with a few exceptions, they participate in Israeli elections.

Judaism in the 21st century faces a number of challenges:

- to strengthen its leadership, which is scattered, its streams divided on both theological issues (Deuteronomy as divine revelation or human text) and practical ones (continuity through matrilineal descent for Orthodox and Conservative, through patrilineal descent for Reform), often marginalized by secular Jewish leaders;
- to create new scholarship and provide new answers in a domain not probed for centuries, regarding religious decisions linked to Jewish sovereignty and not limited to the Jewish community as a minority;
- to navigate between a Judaism that follows societal trends and a Judaism that rejects the modern world;
- to be sensitive to gender issues; Reform and Conservative streams have female rabbis and the Orthodox has none, but there is already a shift within Orthodox Judaism, such as *tohaniot bet din*, female specialists in divorce religious laws, being accepted as quasi advocates by Israeli rabbinical courts;
- to respond to an unprecedented situation in which, regardless of migrations, the Jewish population outside Israel is declining while within Israel it is growing; the absolute number and, even more, the proportion of Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox is on the increase everywhere, and it becomes necessary for the diminishing majority to accommodate Judaism in its Orthodox expressions and for religious authorities to offer leadership not only to their own limited communities but also to all those searching for Jewish values; and
- to offer, as a monotheistic religion, answers to scientific and biogenetic advances with ethical consequences.

In contemporary times, Judaism is an expression of Jewish identity, a privileged means to transmit it.

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*See also* Christianity; Diaspora; Ethics; Islam; Religion; Zionism

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## JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING

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While the executive and legislative branches are the most visible aspects of government, the third branch—the judicial branch—is in many ways more important. In many countries, it is the judiciary that rules on whether the actions of the other branches are constitutional and, thus, permissible. Thus, while judicial decision making (JDM) tends to occur in private settings, out of the spotlight, it would be a mistake to conclude that the decisions made by judges are not consequential.

This entry discusses two fundamental questions: (1) How do judges make decisions? (2) What impact do those decisions have on governments and societies? The latter question is especially important for individual rights as well as broader political issues. Most empirical research on courts and JDM has been done in the United States because of the unique role of the U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) in the American system of government; however, many recent studies examine courts comparatively. The theoretical perspectives and approaches used to study courts and judges

are normative, legal, behavioral, neo-institutional, based on rational choice, and sociological. This entry provides a broad introduction to these approaches, with a special emphasis on the USSC.

### Normative Legal Judicial Decision Making (The Legal Model)

Normative approaches to JDM focus on how law ought to be interpreted. Often emphasis is placed on purely legal factors, such as the language of the law passed by the legislature, the wording of constitutions or founding documents, and, in common law systems, precedent (previous cases decided by courts). The focus on normative jurisprudence is not what judges personally decide but what the law demands. Normative jurisprudence tends to think of the law as a puzzle to be unlocked and the correct answer revealed, not a malleable concept with many possible arguments and answers. A normative legal approach can be seen in the classic writings of William Blackstone, Learned Hand, and the founding fathers of the United States (especially James Madison and Alexander Hamilton), who were heavily influenced by enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Baron de Montesquieu.

Although the modern study of JDM has moved from a normative to a positivist approach, many scholars continue to recognize the importance of legal factors in explaining judicial decisions. These studies tend to focus on the importance of case facts on the outcomes of various types of cases. However, while it is clear that “the law” matters for some case outcomes, it is also clear that many judicial decisions are affected by nonnormative considerations. Indeed, it may be most useful to consider the normative as more prescriptive than descriptive. That is, it may explain what we think judges ought to do (more factors they should take into account when they decide cases), but it is less useful in describing what actually occurs (what factors actually matter to judges).

The level of court being studied also matters. For example, in trial courts, where judges have to rule on evidentiary matters, charge the jurors, and so on, it is likely that the normative/legal model is generally applicable. These judges are constrained by appellate judges above them, and if they were to make rulings inconsistent with the facts and the law, they

would likely be overruled. However, for judges in courts of last resort, the situation is quite different. First, these judges have no higher court that can overrule their decision. Second, these courts tend to hear cases that are much more difficult. By difficult, we mean that reasonable people can disagree as to the proper outcome. If the facts and the law could support both opposing outcomes, then it is not hard to see how judges can be constrained in this way.

### Behavioralism

Eventually, scholars began to notice that normative legal factors did not explain all judicial decisions. Not all legal decisions are clear-cut, and judicial preferences and ideologies help explain the formation of voting coalitions on courts, especially high-level appellate courts engaged in lower court review. The work of early behaviorists such as C. Herman Pritchett and Glendon Schubert was expanded on by others, most notably Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth in *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model*. Behavioralism takes into account the role of ideological preferences on the decision making of judges and has found considerable evidence that judges are influenced by their personal ideology, especially in the USSC context. Of course, to be able to explore the impact of preferences, reliable and accurate measures of judges' preferences must be available.

Measures of judicial ideology have been created for most judges in the United States. Measures of the ideology of U.S. Supreme Court justices include those developed by Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover (1989) and Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn (2002). Segal and Cover used newspaper articles written at the time of a justice's confirmation to have an independent indicator of voting. This allowed them to avoid the endogeneity problems that plagued other measures that used past votes to predict future votes. Martin and Quinn used Bayesian analysis to develop a dynamic model of the ideal point of judges using their votes on past cases. Other measures have been developed for federal appellate and state court judges in the United States.

### Neo-Institutionalism and Rational Choice

Judicial scholars also explore the impact that institutional configurations and other actors have on

JDM, in addition to the traditional legal and behavioral factors. Institutional influences can be either internal or external in nature. Internal structural factors, such as term length, docket control, and the like, affect judges' behavior, often allowing them (or requiring them) to be strategic when making decisions. Neo-institutional interpretations are also prominent in separation-of-powers studies, which focus on the external relationship between courts and other political actors. The neo-institutional orientation is often used when studying state courts in the United States because the diverse nature of institutional configurations lends itself well to such explanations, but it is also promising as an orientation for comparative research. Although institutionalism is a traditional theory of government, it is only since the 1990s or so that neo-institutionalism has been regularly applied to integrated research designs of contemporary legal studies. Current institutional and rational choice studies trace their theoretical roots to the early strategic work of Walter Murphy, who argued that judicial decisions were not always based purely on political preferences.

### Comparative Judicial Behavior

There are many possible ways to approach comparative judicial politics. Typically, studies focus on one of three aspects: (1) structural differences and sociological impacts, (2) judicial independence, and (3) judicial legitimacy. The study by Herbert Jacob, Erhard Blankenburg, Herbert Kritzer, Doris Marie Provine, and Joseph Sanders in 1996 is particularly comprehensive and examines the structures and impacts of eight different judicial systems. Such global studies are relatively rare as most studies focus on one country or area.

Charles Epp's *The Rights Revolution* is a particularly noteworthy work focusing on the sociological and practical political impact court decisions have on the rights of citizens. Epp's study examines the impact courts can have on individual rights in four different common law countries, including the United States, Britain, Canada, and India. It is an important addition to the literature on the sociological impact of court decisions as he makes a solid argument demonstrating the need for a group-driven support structure, in addition to basic constitutional, judicial, and structural factors.

Judicial independence is an important topic, particularly in countries with a long history of political instability or authoritarian regimes. Independence studies often focus on Latin America, Russia, Japan, or Italy. There is extensive evidence of the challenges facing courts in countries without a history of a strong rule of law and clear indications of fundamental differences in how citizens use courts in such countries.

Legitimacy is an important issue for courts the world over. All courts face obstacles to the implementation of their decisions, especially when the legitimacy of the court or of the decisions themselves is questioned. While scholars of American politics do not typically focus on legitimacy, given the unusually strong position enjoyed by the USSC, legitimacy is an important research topic for other courts. Prominent scholars include Vanessa Barid, Gregory Caldeira, and James Gibson. Much of the legitimacy research finds that courts outside the United States typically have little legitimacy, in large part due to a lack of information about courts. This raises serious concerns about compliance with judicial decisions. Interestingly, studies also find that courts have the potential to build institutional legitimacy through court rulings, even in countries (e.g., the former German Democratic Republic [East Germany]) that have had little experience with a professional judiciary.

#### **Supranational Judicial Behavior: The European Court of Justice**

As the European Union has evolved over time, so has the role of the union's highest court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Literature on the ECJ generally examines the role of the ECJ in promoting European integration as a unique supranational institution. Paralleling theoretical orientations in comparative politics generally, ECJ studies tend to be either intergovernmentalist or neo-functionalism in their orientation. Intergovernmentalists argue that the court is actually a weak actor in promoting the integration of European countries into a strong centralized supranational government. Neo-functionalists instead pointed to the court's role in enhancing loyalties to its decisions, thereby cementing its role in the integration process.

#### **Conclusion**

There is much more to say about courts and JDM than can be said in one brief essay, so this entry has limited its survey of the nature of JDM, both in the United States and in other countries. Most basically, the studies discussed here commonly try to determine what factors influence judges' decisions and how those decisions affect society. Most of this research has focused on courts in the United States because of their unprecedented influence as coequal third branches with expansive powers of judicial review; however, many recent studies have begun to examine courts comparatively. Indeed, the comparative study of courts and judges has been an area of rapid growth since the 1990s.

Moreover, while the studies cited above answer important questions, there are a host of other questions that have not been mentioned owing to space constraints, such as judicial selection, retirement, compliance with judicial decisions, and resource inequalities between litigants. In addition to the topics discussed above, scholars have been studying questions such as these, which are fundamental to an understanding of the judicial system.

Finally, it should be clear that the study of courts and judges is characterized by diversity. The theoretical approaches used by scholars were normative, legal, behavioral, neo-institutional, based on rational choice, and sociological. Scholars study courts of last resort as well as intermediate appellate courts, trial courts, and even transnational courts. Topics include the law, the preferences of judges, and the institutional arrangements under which decisions take place. While some may say that this diversity has hindered the development of general knowledge about the judiciary, the authors agree with scholars such as Lawrence Baum, who argue that such diversity in approaches is welcome because it is most likely to lead to a more complete understanding of judicial behavior.

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*See also* Judicial Independence; Judicial Review

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## JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

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Judicial independence is a notoriously difficult concept to define, to the point that some scholars have questioned whether the concept serves any useful analytical purpose. In a literal sense, judicial independence refers to the ability of courts and judges to perform their duties free of influence or control by other actors. However, the term is more often used in a normative sense to refer to the kind of independence that is considered desirable for courts and judges to possess. Consequently, there are two sources of confusion over its meaning. The first is conceptual, in the form of a lack of clarity regarding the kinds of independence that courts and judges are capable of possessing. The second is normative, in the form of disagreement over what kind of independence courts and judges ought to possess.

As a practical matter, the type of judicial independence that is widely considered both the most important and the most difficult to achieve is independence from other government actors. On the one hand, this type of judicial independence is highly valued among those who impute to courts a special responsibility for ensuring that individuals and minorities do not suffer illegal treatment at the hands of the government or a tyrannous majority.

On the other hand, this type is also considered especially difficult to achieve because the other branches of government ordinarily possess the power to disobey or thwart the enforcement of judicial decisions, if not also to retaliate against the courts for decisions that they oppose. In Alexander Hamilton's famous formulation, the judiciary is the "least dangerous" branch, having "no influence over either the sword or the purse" and is therefore least capable of defending itself against the other branches.

Formal guarantees of judicial independence from government control date back to at least as far as England's Act of Settlement of 1701, which gave judges explicit protection from unilateral removal by the Crown in the context of a larger shift of power toward the parliament and the courts. Today, the idea of judicial independence has such broad and powerful normative appeal that even states that do not honor it in practice are wont to profess a commitment to it. Two thirds of the world's current written constitutions contain some form of explicit protection for the independence of the judiciary, and the proportion of constitutional documents that contain such protections has been rising over time. Judicial independence has been formally endorsed at the international level as well, for example, in the form of the *Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary*, adopted by the United Nations in 1985. Empirical research suggests, however, that the existence of formal constitutional guarantees of judicial independence is poorly correlated with actual respect for judicial independence in practice.

Any comprehensive and coherent definition of judicial independence must address several questions. The first is the question of independence *for whom*; the second is the question of independence *from whom*; and the third is the question of independence *from what*. To supply satisfying answers to these questions, however, demands resorting to some normative theory, explicit or otherwise, of why judicial independence is valuable and what it is supposed to accomplish. In other words, it is also necessary to address the question of independence *for what purpose*.

### Independence for Whom?

Judicial independence can be defined as a characteristic of individual judges or as a characteristic of



the judiciary as a whole. Neither conception is indisputably preferable to the other as a practical matter. On the one hand, if judicial independence is guaranteed at the institutional level but not the individual level, individual judges can be forced to obey the wishes of the leadership of the judiciary, which may result in a less-than-wholehearted enforcement of the rule of law. In Chile and Japan, for example, the extent to which the judiciary as an institution commands obedience and conformity from its members has been blamed for producing timid judges who are unwilling or unable to rule against the government. On the other hand, if judicial independence is ensured at the individual level, individual judges will find themselves at liberty to pursue their individual preferences. Not only does unchecked discretion of this kind invite abuse, but it also raises the likelihood that judges will decide cases in inconsistent ways, with the potential effect of undermining the predictability and stability of the law.

### Independence From Whom?

The existence and adequacy of judicial independence become matters of practical concern only when a court decides a dispute involving the interests of some actor or institution with potential or actual power over the court. Generally speaking, the more powerful the actor whose interests are at stake, the greater is the need to protect the independence of the court from that actor. If both sides to the dispute are powerful, however, that symmetry of power may provide part or all of the necessary protection.

The three scenarios that a court may encounter are

1. disputes between private actors,
2. disputes between government actors, and
3. disputes between private actors and government actors.

In the first scenario, the court must strive to remain independent from the parties, who may attempt to undermine its independence by a variety of means, such as bribery or intimidation. In this situation, the government is a friend of judicial independence: It can be expected to defend the

independence of the court from the efforts of the parties.

In the second scenario, the prospects for judicial independence are again relatively favorable. The court is asked not to face down a powerful actor on behalf of a weak one but, rather, to choose sides between two powerful actors in an impartial way. Whichever side the court chooses, the result will be a two-against-one dynamic that ought to provide the court a degree of protection from retaliation. The government does not pose a meaningful threat to judicial independence in such cases because it is at war with itself.

In the third scenario, the government does pose a potent threat to judicial independence, but this threat may be either counteracted or compounded by the public. Suppose, for instance, that a ruler seeks to extend his or her own term of office in an illegal fashion. In this case, the court faces a threat to its independence from the government, but its ability to withstand this threat is greatly improved to the extent that it can count on public support if it rules against the government. As long as the court is in the position of siding with either the government or the public, its independence enjoys protection: Either should be capable of providing the court with the support that it needs to withstand attacks from the other. In other situations, however, the court may be asked to take a position that is antagonistic to that of both the government and the public, as in the case of illegal government discrimination against an unpopular minority. Here the prospects for judicial independence are at their nadir: The judiciary is called on to demonstrate independence from both the government and the public, yet it lacks the help of a powerful ally to withstand the pressures that it faces.

There are various ways to protect judicial independence in the face of such threats. Common strategies include limiting government discretion over judicial salaries, placing heavy restrictions on the removal of judges from office, fixing the minimum jurisdiction that courts are to possess, and relieving judges of personal liability for acts performed in the course of their duties. Less obviously, the internal organization of a judiciary can also have a profound effect on its susceptibility to external influence. The organization of the Japanese judiciary, for example, renders lower court judges highly obedient to an administrative bureaucracy

controlled by the chief justice, who in turn is invariably appointed close to mandatory retirement age. As a result, the government can influence the ideological direction of the entire judiciary simply by availing itself of the relatively frequent opportunity to replace a specific judge. A decentralized organizational structure that grants greater autonomy to individual judges, by contrast, may make it harder for the government to capture or co-opt the judiciary as a whole.

In the long run, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to create a perfectly independent judiciary that is completely insulated from all forms of political and popular influence. The relatively lengthy experience of the U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, suggests that even a highly independent court is likely over time both to be reshaped by political forces and to accommodate the wishes of a durable political majority. It is optimistic to think that a handful of judges, lacking the power of either the purse or the sword, can consistently defy more powerful actors and institutions without ever suffering any consequences, no matter what formal protections they may enjoy. There are limits to what can be accomplished simply by adjusting the institutional characteristics of the judiciary or enacting solemn declarations about the inviolability of judicial independence. Ultimately, the prospects for attaining even moderate levels of judicial independence are likely to depend on political and historical conditions that are exogenous to the judiciary and may lie beyond reach, such as the existence of a stable, competitive, multiparty democracy.

#### Independence From What?

Not all forms of influence over judicial decision making constitute threats to judicial independence. While some activities aimed at influencing courts, such as bribery and physical intimidation, may be inappropriate under any plausible conception of judicial independence, others can only be evaluated on the basis of a contestable normative judgment. Consider, for example, public protests in front of courthouses. One view might be that such protests should be privileged as a form of political expression and that judges in a democracy are permitted or even obligated to take public opinion into account. Alternatively, one might take the

view that judges should be shielded from such expressions of public opinion, much as jurors are sequestered, to ensure that their deliberations are not tainted by considerations that ought to be irrelevant. Likewise, a public campaign to deny a judge reelection because he or she has ruled in unpopular ways on controversial issues can be characterized as either a healthy manifestation of democracy or a threat to judicial independence.

Whether such efforts to influence judicial decision making are consistent with judicial independence cannot be answered by fiat. To define the requirements of judicial independence in such cases demands instead a normative theory of what courts are supposed to take into account when deciding cases, what judicial independence is supposed to achieve, and to what extent judicial independence can and should be balanced against other objectives and considerations.

#### Independence for What Purpose?

Judicial independence is generally considered a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. Most would probably agree that the ultimate goal can be described as the fair and impartial adjudication of disputes in accordance with law. If that is indeed the goal, however, then the pursuit of judicial independence is open to several objections.

One objection is that the goal itself is unattainable because it rests on a misconception of the nature of both law and adjudication. It is a commonly held view among legal theorists that the law is frequently indeterminate and that it is therefore impossible for judges to decide disputes simply by applying preexisting law. Rather, it is said, the act of adjudication requires judges to make the very law that they purport merely to apply. Yet if adjudication necessarily entails lawmaking, then, judicial independence does not simply protect the ability of judges to decide disputes in accordance with law but instead licenses them to make and impose whatever laws they see fit, which is a prospect that many consider incompatible with either the appropriate role of judges in a democracy or the idea of separation of powers.

Another objection is that judicial independence is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure impartial adjudication in accordance with law and may even undermine that goal if left unchecked. On the

one hand, it is possible for a judge who faces potential retaliation to nevertheless decide cases in an impartial manner. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that giving judges the freedom to decide cases as they wish means that they will choose to do so fairly and in accordance with law. Even if it were possible to create a judiciary that is completely free from both popular and political control, what would then prevent the judges from deciding cases on the basis of personal prejudice or self-interest? It is on the basis of such concerns that many consider it essential to balance judicial independence against judicial accountability and to distinguish appropriate forms of influence over the judiciary from inappropriate forms. However, any mechanism that might be devised for preventing or punishing judicial abuse of power is itself likely to prove susceptible to abuse. The resulting question of how to oversee the judges who are responsible for overseeing the government—*quis custodiet ipsos custodes*—has long vexed constitutional and political theorists and admits of no simple solution.

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*See also* Constitutionalism; Democracy, Theories of; Judicial Review; Rule of Law; Separation of Powers

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## JUDICIAL REVIEW

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The term *judicial review* refers to the practice of judges deciding whether or not to declare void a statute or an executive order on the grounds of conflict with a higher law. This entry first describes two sorts of judicial review and also the political logic by which the institution of judicial review is criticized and that by which it is defended. It then discusses the history of the adoption and spread of the practice of judicial review. Finally, it describes the kinds of judicial review that are now prevalent in the world.

When the judge declares void an order from an executive branch official on the grounds that the official has transgressed the bounds of his or her statutory authority, the practice of judicial review is not particularly controversial. It is necessitated by the idea that the rule of law is preferable to the unchecked rule of individual will. (This version is sometimes called *administrative review* to distinguish it from the review of the statutes themselves.) A judicial power to declare void the acts of elected legislatures, however, is more controversial, especially in systems where judges are not elected. The criticism of this sort of higher law judicial review is that it substitutes the will of non-electoral accountable persons for the will of the people's elected representatives. The defense of it relies on the premise that the legislators will not be inclined to police themselves to stay within the constitutional bounds of their authority and on the premise that persons independent of political pressures and incentives and trained in the law—judges—will be able to uphold better the legal limits on governmental power.

Judicial review began in the courts of American states under the Articles of Confederation, perhaps influenced by the fact that the British Privy Council had wielded a veto power over colonial legislation; at first, the practice aroused considerable opposition. At that time, most of the states had constitutions written and adopted by the legislature, so judges looked to natural law or the law of nations

or Anglo-American common law for the higher law to which they claimed statutes must conform. Some opposing attorneys argued that an appeal beyond statutes was illegitimate, and some judges on the bench made similar claims. It also provoked popular mass protest meetings, legislative censures, attempts to outlaw it, and serious efforts to impeach judges for engaging in it.

A man named Thomas Tudor Tucker, writing in 1784 under the pen name of Philodemus (friend of the people, in Greek), in a pamphlet titled "Conciliatory Hints," developed the idea that the legislatively adopted constitution of his state, South Carolina, should be replaced by one written by a constitutional convention specially elected by the people and that the people should ratify it in an election, thereby giving their express consent. Moreover, the constitution should state that it is paramount to ordinary legislation and not changeable merely by the legislature. Finally, and crucially, Tucker suggested that a peaceful rather than violent solution to abuses of power by legislatures would be to have the constitution state that no act of the legislature contravening it can be valid, and this declaration could be enforced in the courts of law. Thus was born the system of judicial review for safeguarding a popularly ratified constitution as higher law.

The idea spread quickly to other states, and members of the Constitutional Convention treated this power as something the federal courts would have. They did not explicitly characterize it as a power over law adopted by Congress but merely implied that federal courts would have such power (by including constitutional prohibitions on certain kinds of laws and allowing the courts to take cases "arising under the Constitution"). As to state laws, the U.S. Constitution was explicit. Article VI says plainly that the national constitution, national laws, and national treaties "shall be the supreme law of the land; and judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Therefore, judges in the United States were obliged to throw out any state-level law that conflicted with a federal-level higher law. The fourth U.S. Supreme Court chief justice, John Marshall, explicitly developed and applied the implied power to declare void a federal-level statute for the first time in 1803, in the case of *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137.

Switzerland's 1848 constitution also spelled out a power in its Supreme Tribunal to declare void cantonal law on grounds of conflict with the national constitution. On the other hand, it refrained from allowing judicial review over laws produced by the national parliament. Instead, such laws could be challenged by a process of national referendum.

The Argentina Constitution of 1853, closely modeled on the U.S. Constitution, and then also its amended version in 1860, allowed for judicial review of national-level law. The Argentine Supreme Court plainly so interpreted it in 1864, in the case *Fiscal v. Calvete*, 1 Fallos 340, and did declare void a congressional statute in 1888 (in *Municipalidad de la Capital v. Elortondo*, 33 Fallos 162). This court then implemented its power on a regular basis until 1930, but from 1930 to 1983, the country was frequently ruled by a military dictatorship that in some periods dominated the court.

Then in 1866, via judicial precedent, the judiciary of Norway acquired the power of judicial review over national legislation. As of World War I, then, the courts of the United States, Norway, and Argentina had this power. (Icelandic courts did strike down a royal decree in 1877 but did not strike down a national statute until 1943.) In the interwar period, the Weimar Republic, Austria, Spain, and some of the states of Central/Eastern Europe had specialized constitutional courts to exercise judicial review, but all these were ended by the wartime constitutions. The paucity of countries with judicial review changed after World War II, at first gradually and then quite rapidly.

During the 1940s and 1950s, there was a postwar wave of reconstruction constitutions that instituted judicial review; these included the constitutions of Austria, Italy, Germany, France, and Japan. The decolonization of Africa and Asia in the 1950s and 1960s brought judicial review in several of the newly independent constitutions in Africa and Asia. Democratization in Southern Europe brought judicial review to Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s and, then, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to new democracies in the Republic of South Africa and in several Latin American countries. Yet another wave came along in the 1990s, as the Soviet, Soviet bloc, and Yugoslavian republics adopted liberal democratic constitutions that

included judicial review. As part of no specific trend, several additional countries in the period between 1979 and 1994 adopted new constitutions or new constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights to be enforced via judicial review. These included Sweden (1979), Egypt (1980), Canada (1982), Belgium (1985), New Zealand (1990), Mexico (1994), and Israel (1992–1995). By 2004, 80 countries in the world had adopted a system of judicial review.

There are two basic types of intracountry judicial review. The first follows the U.S. model, allowing all judges to declare void a law that conflicts with the constitution. The second was designed by Hans Kelsen for Austria in the interwar years. This model sets aside a particular specialized court or council, the Constitutional Court, which is given a monopoly on the power of judicial review and which exists only to exercise that power. Until the late 1970s, the U.S. type of judicial review was the more prevalent, being used in about three fourths of the judicial review countries. Since that time, the more recent democracies have tended toward the Kelsenian approach, adopting a single constitutional court.

In the 1960s, yet another form of judicial review burst forth on the world—judicial review by a transnational court. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) had been established to enforce the three 1950s treaties that bound together the European Communities (since 1992, called the European Union [EU]): The European Coal and Steel Treaty of 1952 formed the European Coal and Steel Community; the Treaty of Rome of 1957 formed the European Economic Community; and the Euratom Treaty of 1957 formed the European Atomic Energy Community. This court, the ECJ, declared in the case *Costa v. ENEL* (1964) not only that the treaties had wiped out any prior conflicting legislation of the member countries but also that these treaties now would function as higher law, making void also any *subsequent* member country legislation contrary to them. In 1970, the case of *International Handelsgesellschaft v. EVGF* extended this principle even to member-country constitutional provisions that might conflict with any of the European Community treaties. According to these rulings of the ECJ, ordinary judges in the member countries, even in countries that did not previously allow judicial review of

statutes, were now obliged to give European-level law “precedence” over conflicting member-state law. And they did. As of 2008, there are 27 members in the EU.

Then, in 1998, the European Court of Human Rights, which is the court for upholding the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe (a 47-member body that stretches from the United Kingdom and Ireland to Azerbaijan and Russia, and from Norway to Greece and Turkey), was made a permanent court with compulsory jurisdiction over each member country and to whom individuals with human rights complaints were given direct access. Since that time, this court too has been exercising genuinely effective judicial review of a transnational variety with power to demand legislative remedies to Convention violations in the member countries as well as the power to insist that member governments issue financial compensation to litigants whose human rights have been violated.

These two European courts exercise most plainly the power of transnational judicial review, but there are some two dozen other international courts, many of whom, to one degree or another, exercise softer versions of judicial review. Judicial review on the world stage is a rapidly evolving phenomenon as of the 21st century and will warrant the attention of political scientists well into the future.

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*See also* Constitutionalism; Judicial Decision Making; Judicial Independence; Judicial Systems; Judicialization of International Relations; Judiciary; Rights; Rule of Law

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## JUDICIAL SYSTEMS

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Although the core of judicial systems is the trial, pretrial practices dispose of most potential litigation. Social, economic, or political pressures or lack of knowledge or resources will inhibit most aggrieved parties from bringing suits. Even among those suits seriously contemplated or filed, most will be resolved by voluntary settlement, plea bargaining, mediation, arbitration, consent decrees, administrative hearings, or decision by clan, guild, village, market, business, or religious “courts” that either operate parallel to or are embedded in the official judicial system.

Access to trial is also typically narrowed by “standing” (only those who can show that they have been directly and seriously injured may sue the alleged wrongdoer) and other rules, such as a requirement that those in dispute with the government exhaust their administrative remedies before resorting to the judiciary or that suits be filed within a certain time after the injury or offense (statutes of limitations). In some legal systems, under certain circumstances, however, standing rules may be relaxed or not applied at all, for instance, when a party alleges that a particular statute violates constitutionally protected individual rights or some action harms the environment.

The economic, social, and psychological costs to persons brought to criminal trials is so severe, even if they are not convicted, that many criminal justice systems provide for some kind of “trial before the trial” to determine whether actual prosecution is

justified, such as grand jury indictment, arraignment, or preliminary investigation by a judge.

Trial courts may consist of a moot or whole community sitting as judge, a single professional or lay judge, a panel of professional or lay judges, a mixture of professionals and lay persons, or a judge and jury. Practices may be designed to bring all factual and legal issues together at a single time and place to be resolved in an oral proceeding, or a trial may be a file of papers developed over an extended time period as written records of witness statements, investigative reports, and relevant documents such as deeds and contracts until final disposition occurs through the delivery of a judicial verdict in court.

Proceedings are typically governed by rules specifying who may participate in what order, rules of decorum, rules of evidence defining what testimony and documents will be admitted as sufficiently reliable, and relevant standards of proof such as the “beyond reasonable doubt” rule or the Islamic rule that conviction requires testimony of guilt by two witnesses. Confessions, either voluntary or induced by coercive practices, are a major feature of most criminal justice systems. Such systems are often classified as adversarial or inquisitorial depending on the degree to which the case is developed by the prosecutor and defense counsel or by the judges themselves. Both civil and criminal justice systems have historically varied enormously in the degree to which judges actively intervene in case development. In Imperial China, lawyers did not exist, and the magistrate was solely responsible for case development with even the parties playing little role except as severely coerced witnesses. In the United States, judges are expected to remain largely passive recipients of the lawyers’ presentations. In other systems such as the English, lawyers present the cases for each side, but judges intervene fairly actively.

Judicial systems are often organized in a single pyramid or hierarchy with many local trial courts, a certain number of which are clustered under an appeals court; these intermediate appeals courts are clustered under the highest appellate court. Sometimes there are separate hierarchical systems of civil, criminal, administrative, commercial, labor, and/or religious courts or separate trial courts, such as small-claims or juvenile courts, under the supervision of the general courts. In

some instances, there is a separate court with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional issues, and some higher courts also serve as trial courts for particularly important matters such as impeachment of government officials or suits between two member states of a federal system. Appellate courts almost always consist of a panel of three or more judges. One function of appeal is to protect parties against trial court errors. Another is to serve central political authorities by ensuring that laws made by them are effectively and uniformly enforced by the web of local trial courts.

The principal function of courts is often said to be the resolution of disputes between two parties, deciding that one party was right and the other wrong, according to preexisting legal rules. In reality, many cases really involve not simply two individuals but large clashing social, economic, or political interests; many are resolved by intermediate decisions under which both parties gain something and lose something, and some are resolved by rules that the judges have just constructed. Judicial discretion in the making of new legal rules is greatly constrained by many factors, including the need to explain their decisions in published "opinions," the existence of other more politically powerful lawmakers such as legislatures and executives, public opinion, courts' extremely limited means of enforcing their judgments, the degree of completeness and specificity of existing legal rules, and professional or craft standards of permissible legal reasoning and judicial creativity. Nevertheless, in many polities, judicial systems have been a significant source of new public policies and thus sometimes of political controversy.

Some degree of judicial law making characterizes all judicial systems, not necessarily because judges consciously seek law-making power but because acceptance of judicial decisions is most likely when they are purportedly the judicial application of preexisting legal rules rather than judicial *fiats*. Thus, in cases where there is no relevant preexisting law or that law is too general or unclear to prescribe the outcome, judges themselves will be moved to generate a decisive legal rule attributing its origin not to themselves but to judicial "interpretation" of the body of preexisting law.

Because courts are necessarily simultaneously dispute resolvers and lawmakers, judicial selection is difficult. Judicial neutrality and independence

would seem essential if courts are to successfully resolve disputes. Yet, as lawmakers, judges ought not to be independent but rather politically responsible to the people or their elected representatives in a democracy and to whoever holds political authority in nondemocracies. This insoluble paradox results in judicial selection processes that range from direct election for short terms of judicial candidates nominated by political parties to appointment and dismissal of judges at the pleasure of an authoritarian ruler or selection for life terms by an independent council consisting of incumbent judges and distinguished legal scholars, with every imaginable combination of independence leaning and political accountability devices in between.

It is often claimed that judicial systems are separate from political systems, but more realistically speaking, they are treated as subsystems of the political. While courts are frequently associated with the protection of individual rights, most political regimes, even those with little regard for such rights, have invested in judicial services. They do so not only because conflict resolution fosters economic activity and social peace but because courts serve as instruments of social control enforcing whatever policies the regime enacts into law. The appellate hierarchies described earlier are channels for transmitting to the localities and enforcing laws made by central political authorities. To the extent that judges themselves make law, they themselves are active participants in the public policy-making—that is, the political—process. There is a perennial argument over how active judges ought to be in policy making, but some level of judicial lawmaking, and thus judicial politics, is inevitable.

It is argued by some that judges engage in a unique and superior method of decision making. Because they proceed case by case with regard for stability, continuity, and consistency in the case law, their decisions are claimed to be pragmatically rooted in the particular, concrete realities presented in individual cases rather than generated by abstract and general prognostication not rooted in reality. Because they know that the rule they announce in one case will probably be used in subsequent cases and because most serve for relatively long terms, they are said, unlike politicians desperately concerned to survive the next election or crisis, to pursue long-term public values rather than their personal, immediate survival in office. Others

argue that case-by-case decision making is simply the judicial version of the incremental decision strategies used by all public policymakers, that precisely because judges know that the rule they make in one case today may be used in future, somewhat different, and somewhat unpredictable cases, they mix concrete, immediate considerations with more general, probabilistic considerations of how a current rule might work in the future just as legislators, administrators, and political executives do, and that even those judges who anticipate long terms are subject to the pressures of immediate events and current crises that play on other law-makers. There is certainly much empirical data indicating that judges' decision making is significantly influenced by their political ideologies and affiliations and their personal policy preferences, but such studies do not resolve the question of whether judges enjoy a decision method different from or superior to those of other lawmakers.

Effective judicial systems are often touted as routes to economic and political development because they provide security of expectations for investors and protect individual rights. Yet, under some circumstances, investment can be attracted by the expectation of high returns even in the absence of court-provided security, and authoritarian regimes can use judicial processes for repression rather than protection of individuals.

It is widely believed that, beginning in the latter half of the 20th century, the courts have played an increasingly active role in public policy making (the so-called judicialization of politics) through their powers of constitutional judicial review, review of the lawfulness of administrative actions, and general statutory interpretation, although it is not clear that courts were less active in earlier periods.

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*See also* International Law; Judicial Decision Making; Natural Law; Rule of Law; Soft Law; Voting Rules, Legislative

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## JUDICIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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The judicialization of international relations refers to the political reality that judicial actors are increasingly involved in defining what international agreements mean. Judicialization is an aspect of legalization of policy and politics in which politicians conceive of their policy and legislative options as bounded by what is legally allowed and where citizens, organizations, and firms see law as conferring on them rights that others may not abrogate. Judicialization occurs when courts gain authority to define what the law means. Where judges have the authority to say what the law means and where litigation becomes a useful way to reopen political agreements, judges become de facto lawmakers. Negotiations among actors become debates about what is legally permissible, and politics takes place in the shadow of courts with the lurking possibility of litigation shaping actor demands and political outcomes.

Most people used to think that law only existed where there was coercive power to enforce it, and thus, judicialization of politics was only possible within states. But increasingly, international relations have become both legalized and judicialized. This entry reviews how international relations came to be part of the domain of courts, discusses how the judicialization of international relations has changed international politics, and identifies where judicialized international relations are more and less prevalent.

### How Did International Relations Become Judicialized?

In the age of monarchies, what we today call international law consisted primarily of agreements among kings and queens, enforceable through reciprocity by state leaders. This old conception of international law still exists in public law theory



and in international relations approaches that see international law as mere contracts between states. This view of international law is still voiced by governments when they assert that they have absolute sovereignty. But these are old-fashioned conceptions of international law, relics of another time and place. This “old terrain” of international law started to recede around the turn of the 20th century when domestic courts began hearing cases of alleged violations of what were largely unwritten international rules and when countries started negotiating and ratifying more detailed international treaties.

Since the end of the Cold War, international law and judicialized politics have entered a fundamentally new terrain where international treaties create binding laws, creating duties, expectations, and rights that penetrate the surface of the state. The new terrain of international law is the result of a double shift that has accelerated since 1945. One force leading to this new terrain is the substantive expansion of international law to cover issues that were traditionally governed exclusively by states. This expansion has been fueled by the rights revolution and the rising trend of governments exerting an extraterritorial reach to domestic laws. The rights revolution, which took off in the post-World War II era, is based on the premise that individuals have certain rights even if domestic constitutions or statutes do not explicitly recognize these rights. The United Nations General Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 created an aspirational goal, as the declaration itself was nonbinding. Civil rights movements of the 1960s pushed forward the development of binding international laws and treaties explicitly addressed to individuals. These rights are universal; thus, they do not depend on national ratification to exist. Meanwhile, governments in a number of capitalist countries constructed a law-based global international trade regime, and they expanded the extraterritorial reach of domestic property and antitrust rules so as to protect domestic economic interests and shape the way global forces affect domestic markets. With powerful countries already asserting an international reach to their global and domestic economic rules, the idea of increasingly coordinated international rules became a least bad alternative, even if these rules touch on issues that in theory remained the exclusive prerogative of states.

The result of these trends is that international law increasingly speaks about how governments should treat their citizens, which goods are allowed into national markets and on what terms, how many environmentally destructive products states should allow their firms and people to create, and so on. While we count on governments to implement these rules, increasingly substate actors are going to the source of the rules, invoking international laws and regulations directly in national contexts. If individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and firms see governments as having duties and themselves as having rights based on international law, and if governments start to interact with substate actors as if they have rights under international law, then both domestic and international politics move into the new terrain of legalized international politics.

The second shift is a result of the growth of multilateral institutions. In very real and concrete ways, multilateral institutions have gained governance roles. As executive bodies, *multilateral* institutions propose legislation and convene meetings where representatives of states agree to collective rules that, once ratified, can become binding both on signatories and nonsignatories alike. Some multilateral institutions at the regional level (e.g., the European Union [EU]) have legislative abilities wherein councils of state representatives can pass legislation that does not require the traditional step of national ratification for the legal rule to be binding. Multilateral institutions also have been granted administrative roles, with an international secretariat issuing binding interpretations of rules and decisions related to implementing international rules. Combined with the first trend—the substantive expansion of national and international law—the trend of delegating a variety of powers to multilateral institutions means that increasingly there is governance that does not depend on national legislative consent for its authority and that exists largely outside of domestic judicial oversight.

These two factors have contributed to the growth of creating and using international courts (ICs). It used to be that domestic courts were the primary enforcers of international rules. Even with the rise of powerful and active constitutional courts in many countries, domestic enforcement remains uneven because national judges are

inclined to see international law as external to the national legal order and international relations as falling into the realm of executive prerogative. As multilateral institutions have gained more powers, states have turned to ICs to oversee the exercise of this power.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a revolution in the creation and use of ICs. It disrupted traditional alliances. Former Soviet satellites rushed to join the international institutions of Western states, and states that had relied on Soviet support had to seek new patrons. Around the world, states embraced the trappings of liberal democracy—free markets, human rights, and open trading systems. These changes led to the creation of a slew of new ICs, reforms to existing ICs, and an expansion of membership in a number of international legal institutions.

We can literally see the judicialization of international politics. In 1985, there were eight ICs that met the Project on International Courts and Tribunals' definition of an IC as

1. a permanent legal body,
2. composed of independent judges,
3. hearing legal cases in which one of the parties is a state actor or an international organization (IO),
4. deciding on the basis of predetermined rules, and
5. issuing binding legal rulings.

By 2009, there were 20 active ICs meeting this definition and 8 more in various stages of development. These "new" ICs are not only recent creations, but they are also qualitatively different entities. Newer ICs are more likely to have compulsory jurisdiction, meaning states do not need to consent to litigation for the case to proceed. They also tend to allow private access or access for international nonstate actors to initiate litigation, even though most observers agree that these design features make ICs more independent and more likely to make a ruling on cases in which a government is an unwilling participant. The new ICs are far more likely to be activated, which explains in part why IC usage has also increased. By 2007, ICs had issued more than 30,000 binding legal rulings

where an IO or state actor was the defendant. These rulings are not only mostly routine, but they also fill gaps in the law and, at times, radically reinterpret law on the books so that ICs end up as lawmakers with significant power to influence domestic and international outcomes.

The ingredients for judicialized international relations are now in place. We have an extensive body of binding and fairly precise international legal rules. We have state and nonstate actors who see these rules as conferring rights and duties on state actors. We have courts—both domestic and international—with the capacity to interpret and enforce these rules in cases raised by states, private firms, individuals, and international prosecutor-type actors.

#### **How Does the Judicialization of International Relations Affect International Politics?**

It is important to recognize that judicialized politics is not the same thing as courtroom politics. Legalized politics involves the extension of legal rhetoric and legal calculations into the larger realm of politics. When courts start to issue decisions that interpret rules, judicialized politics extends to politicking over new rules, actor decisions regarding different courses of law-compliant action, and negotiations to resolve disagreements about existing rules.

During treaty negotiations, judicialization of international relations mainly affects politics by creating a web of commitments that constrain new policy making. Certain international treaties exert a constitutional influence over bilateral and multilateral treaty negotiations and domestic policy making. For example, the World Trade Organization's framework for free trade casts a shadow over domestic and international negotiations regarding trade issues because any new agreement that conflicts with the rules of the World Trade Organization can give rise to a legal challenge. International human rights law also exerts a constitutional influence in that new international and domestic policies must respect what are seen as elemental individual rights.

Judicialized politics play an even larger role during the implementation stage, when actors are applying existing rules on a case-by-case basis.

Legalization's largest although least perceptible influence is in shaping how actors make choices. For most actors, the first step involves figuring out what the law allows or requires. People usually choose legal action because law provides a starting place to make decisions and because law-compliant behavior is safe. Following the law becomes the default condition; one usually needs a reason to choose a riskier illegal action over what the law prescribes. Even when actors choose to violate the law, they will attempt to bring legal understandings with them. For example, when the U.S. government under the leadership of President George W. Bush sought to escape well-understood legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions (1949) and the UN Convention Against Torture, it asked for legal briefs that suggested that its policy choices were actually consistent with what the law required.

Law also becomes a tool used by parties when disagreements arise. At this point, state discretion can be constrained by judges (domestic and international) interpreting and enforcing the law as they see it. Law becomes a framework that the parties use to figure out what arrangements are reasonable. Law prescribes the duties owed and the rights that can be claimed. Again, we see that judicialized politics are not per se courtroom politics. Litigation is meant to be a last resort and a fairly rare phenomenon. Instead, the prospect of litigating a disagreement casts a shadow over out-of-court negotiations regarding legal compliance. Actors are supposed to adjust their behaviors both because they prefer to be law-abiding (being law-abiding is seen as more legitimate) and to avoid a legal suit. Where legal violations exist, threatening litigation becomes a useful bargaining tactic, as most actors will prefer settlement rather than public legal sanction and with it a binding legal precedent. Judicialized politics is therefore present in the many debates and arguments over what the existing set of rules do and do not allow.

A proportionally small number of disputes will end up in front of legal enforcement bodies—international or domestic courts, monitoring and enforcement bodies, or arbitral bodies. Rising litigation rates involving international agreements suggest that litigation is a useful political tool, but it is hard to assess how effective litigation is. The effects of litigation cannot really be measured because the many suits that settle out of court are

systematically excluded in any examination of compliance with the law. The cases we can observe—those that reach the legal ruling stage in a court—tend to be the most difficult, those where the parties refuse a settlement, and thus where compliance with the law is the least likely. Studies on compliance with IC rulings find that a vast majority of IC rulings elicit full or partial compliance. Even if rulings do not elicit immediate or full compliance, IC actions cast a shadow over subsequent politics. The fact that an IC has declared one interpretation of the rules “legal” and another “illegal” affects perceptions regarding the rectitude of certain behaviors. State and nonstate actors may become less willing to abide by bargains and policies that have been named illegal. Over time, law-breakers may find that it is simply easier to create a legal solution to end a conflict. The legal solution may involve compliance with the law as interpreted by the IC, writing new legislation to create a new definition of what is “legal,” or creating a side bargain in which the victims of the legal breach are compensated in exchange for dropping their legal claims. All of these shifts from straight-out noncompliance—settlement, changing the law to unseat a court ruling, compensation, and compliance—reflect judicialized international relations.

#### Where Are Judicialized International Relations More and Less Likely?

A well-known saying is that “all's fair in love and war.” But with judicialized politics, actors who break a love contract or who engage in war can face costly litigation. This aphorism does, however, capture the reality that certain domains are more law constrained than others.

Judicialized politics are less prevalent with respect to new-issue areas where there are few existing legal rules. The Internet, for example, experienced a period of time without legal regulation where there were only norms of conduct but not legal rights and duties. While there is much discussion about international environmental accords, the environment remains another domain in which international legal obligations barely exist.

In tightly knit social settings where social mores matter more than law, and around the fringes of political life where social opprobrium counts for

little, social interactions tend to be less constrained by law. Thus, we find that in many areas of the world, local custom matters more than international human rights law. We also find that illegal realms, such as the black market or drug and human trafficking, operate largely outside the law and legalized discourse.

The realm of security has fewer rules limiting state discretion, although over time this policy domain has also become judicialized. State actors who indulge in violence across borders, who violate promises that have been codified via international agreements, or who commit atrocities against noncombatants may be recipients of legally authorized sanctions. Other states may refuse alleged war criminals, the citizens of states engaged in war, or the regular courtesies of international life, such as international travel, the landing of airplanes, and trade across borders. With the rise of universal jurisdiction and the creation of the International Criminal Court, perpetrators of war crimes can even find themselves being brought to court.

In international economic relations, interstate interaction is highly legalized and judicialized. The rules for creating barriers to the movement of goods and services are detailed and known. (World Trade Organization rules constituted a starting template for most international trade regimes.) A state that violates these rules will usually be confronted with legal claims, legal threats, and even litigation.

The final area of international politics that is increasingly judicialized is human rights. Nongovernmental actors increasingly monitor state actions, using legal claims and legalized strategies as they expose violations of individual and group rights. While activists may fail to sway a determined government, outside groups would have no right or leverage were it not for the existence of binding international duties and obligations. Meanwhile, domestic and ICs around the world are increasingly willing to help protect human rights.

This discussion reveals that judicialized politics is not defined by law obedience. Instead, judicialized politics is defined by legal politics, where the fights are about what constitutes obedience to the law. Where politics is judicialized, judges have political power because they have been given the final authority to say what the law means. Judges

do not, however, get to determine what the law ultimately becomes. If enough actors are unhappy with the state of the law, they will change the law. Judges will then get another chance to interpret what the new law means. Through a recursive interaction among judges, lawyers, policymakers, and the people ultimately called on to respect the law, the meaning of the law gets contested, defined, and reshaped. Judicialized politics means that judges have inserted themselves into this recursive political dynamic and that the political status quo can be destabilized by litigants making legal appeals to judges.

### Conclusion

Today international agreements are negotiated by executive branches, written down and registered, and then implemented by state bureaucracies. Bureaucracies usually apply existing rules in cases involving individuals. Following the law is nearly always the simplest and safest course of action, which is why bureaucracies will follow the law, unless there is a compelling reason not to.

Before courts were involved in interpreting international rules, bureaucracies had significant discretion to define what the law meant. By shaping bureaucratic behavior, governments controlled how international law affected domestic policy. The growing trend of having legal bodies—domestic and international—interpret and apply international rules has contributed to the judicialization of international politics. Government bureaucracies are increasingly swayed by the possibility of international review of their decisions; thus they are increasingly willing to follow IC interpretations of the law even if their government has not explicitly directed them to do so. Now that courts can pronounce on the law and even review the actions of state bureaucracies, state discretion has diminished.

Legal obligations exist where legal rules exist. Legislative bodies make legal rules, and where there are no rules, actors retain discretion. This means that through their legislation, legislative bodies drive where and when international relations become legalized. But when courts became involved in interpreting international law, judges start to create law to fill in lacunae that legal suits expose, and states begin to lose discretion and

control over how legal rules are understood. Political actors will need either to make codified law that is more to their liking or to let judges define the law. The ultimate import of the judicialization of international relations will depend on the interaction between existing laws, the willingness of litigants to invoke the law and pursue litigation, and the behavior of judges.

This realm of judicialized politics has been spreading in an accelerated fashion. Many factors account for its spread. Democracy and the growth of professional bureaucracy increase the number of actors who participate in policy making and who have a stake in the rule of law, both domestic and international. Technology aids in the dissemination of information and the coordination of actors across borders. A rising trend of delegating authority to international legal bodies increases the venues available for litigating. The increasing willingness of national courts to weigh in regarding international legal issues has also increased the prevalence of bargaining in the shadow of a court.

At this point, even if governments decided to stop using law and litigation as a tool of dispute resolution, there would still be judicialized international relations. Legal rights are hard to take back. International law provides a right for outsiders to peek over borders and to criticize what governments do in their own backyard, and judges have gained jurisdiction regarding international legal issues. At the same time, the rule of law—both domestic and international—is far from monolithic. There are always territories and issues where one finds social order that is not defined by law. The next challenge for students of judicialized international relations is to determine where and when law plays a greater role in everyday international relations and to better understand the factors that shape how judicialized international politics plays out.

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## JUDICIARY

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All modern societies tend to entrust the adjudication of disputes arising from the application of recognized norms to a specialized actor, the judge. Collectively, the judges are designed as the judiciary. In some countries—such as France and Italy—the judiciary also includes public prosecutors since they form a unitary organization together with judges.

Due to the significance of the adjudication, the judiciary tends to enjoy a special position in most political systems and especially so in constitutional democracies. In most political systems, since the

middle of the 20th century, the significance of the judiciary has increased, leading to the phenomenon defined as “the judicialization of politics.”

### The Judiciary in Constitutional States

The role of the judiciary in a political system cannot be analyzed without taking into consideration the institutional function of the judge: adjudication. Adjudication is a type of dispute resolution that relies on an externally appointed judge acting as the third party and where the parties to the dispute must comply with the judge’s decision, even though they have no control over the choice of judge, who is appointed by the state. Thus, judges are inherently placed in a difficult position. They must resolve cases without the main element that makes the triad an effective means of resolving disputes: the willingness of the participants to submit to both the proceedings and the involvement of the third party. To address this weakness, the judicial process tends to include a number of principles creating the appearance of and reinforcing judicial impartiality. More specifically, the need to guarantee judicial impartiality implies that judges must be independent from the parties in dispute and protected from interference by them. Such independence is a necessary condition as any judge who is dependent in some way on one of the parties cannot be, and cannot appear to be, impartial.

In the political development of Europe, the incorporation of judges into the machinery of the state and the superiority of government-appointed judges over other types of judges—for example, feudal or city judges—have largely guaranteed judicial independence from the parties in dispute. However, the incorporation of the judge into the state organization creates the need to redefine judicial impartiality when one of the parties is the state itself or one of its representatives. Only by defining judicial independence in relation to the state can the judge act as an impartial third party in disputes between the state and citizens (e.g., in criminal trials). Judges can then become an effective check on the way in which public functions are performed since guarantees of independence allow them to resolve such disputes and interpret the relevant laws without coming under pressure from the state. Thus, the protection of judicial

impartiality through strong guarantees of judicial independence has become one of the most important traits of constitutionalism since one of its main objectives is to limit the arbitrary exercise of political power and make it legally accountable.

The strength of the judiciary is influenced by whether it is in a civil law or common law country. In a civil law country, legislative law takes precedence over case law, and judges are bound by civil codes without regard to previous judicial decisions; in contrast, judicial rulings take precedence over civil law (legislation) in common law countries, and judges are bound by previous rulings issued by higher-level courts (*stare decisis*). Historically, judges in civil law countries have enjoyed less independence, and their role has tended to be less politically significant. Mistrust of the judiciary has always been high and judicial power considered an important power to be checked. Traditionally, continental judges tend to act in a subordinate way to the political branches and to the norms they enact. This reflects a historical interpretation of the “separation of powers” principle that assigns a privileged role to the legislature since it represents the popular will. Therefore, for a long period, any form of judicial review of legislation was ruled out.

The situation in England and many of the former British colonies, including the United States, is different. In England, the centralization of political authority resulted in the hegemony of one institution—Parliament—but in a more polycentric setting: The political branches do not monopolize the creation of legal norms. As a result, English judges have been able to maintain some autonomy in relation to parliamentary statutes, and common law principles developed by judges still remain one of the basic elements of English law. In the United States, a written constitution combined with judicial review of legislation has ensured from the outset that the judiciary would not be subordinate to the political branches.

Therefore, in any constitutional state whose main objective is to safeguard the rights of citizens, judicial independence is primarily aimed at guaranteeing and supporting judicial impartiality in the adjudication process. As a consequence, its main point of reference must be the state and its institutions, particularly the executive, which directly or

indirectly is most often a party to such adjudication, as in criminal trials where one of the parties is usually the public prosecutor. With the introduction of judicial review of legislation, the legislature also becomes a point of reference for judicial independence. The judiciary is considered a power on the same level as the legislative and the executive: It becomes a veritable third branch of government, as it is often defined in the United States.

This picture emerges even more clearly from a comparison of the status of judges in authoritarian states with that of judges in totalitarian states. As a rule, the judiciary in authoritarian regimes plays a minor role in the political system. Political repression is usually entrusted to special politically appointed courts or dealt with directly by the police or other security forces. The ordinary judiciary is only marginally involved in the policies of the regime and usually retains a modest degree of independence (as in Spain under Franco or in Portugal under Salazar). On the other hand, totalitarian regimes invariably try to enlist the judiciary in their attempts to implement deep social and political changes. In these regimes, judicial independence is extremely low if not nonexistent, with judges appointed and dismissed at the pleasure of the regime. These judges are part of the state apparatus, and the judiciary is usually a strong hierarchical organization made up of members of the totalitarian party. Judicial elections, when present, only ratify the choice of the political leadership. Hence, the judges are politicized, and their values necessarily mirror those of the regime.

### Bureaucratic and Professional Judiciaries

All democratic constitutional systems protect judicial independence, but differences emerge when considering the status that judges enjoy in practice. The most significant elements concern appointments, salary, transfers, disciplinary proceedings, and career patterns, with the last factor being the most important variable characterizing the organizational structure of the judiciary. All of them determine the position of individual judges in relation to their colleagues and those responsible for decisions affecting their professional lives. Taken as a whole, these elements can be used to assess the extent of both internal and external judicial independence. While external independence refers to

the relations between the judiciary and other branches of government, internal independence focuses on guarantees aimed at protecting individual judges from undue pressures from within the judiciary: fellow judges and, above all, superiors. The role played by organizational hierarchies is crucial for understanding the internal dynamics of the judiciary, which in turn affect the actual degree of judicial autonomy.

Broadly speaking, two types of judiciary can be distinguished: (1) bureaucratic, to which civil law judiciaries tend to belong, and (2) professional, characteristic of common law judiciaries. This is obviously an “ideal-typical” distinction since actual cases are more complex. But judiciaries in democratic countries can be placed on a continuum defined at either end by these two types. The French judiciary has traditionally represented the bureaucratic model, while the English judiciary has most closely reflected the professional model.

The defining elements of a bureaucratic judiciary include the following:

1. Selection of judges is made on a technical basis through examinations at a young age, usually immediately after university, with little or no emphasis placed on candidates' previous professional experience.
2. Training takes place primarily within the judiciary.
3. A hierarchy of ranks determines organizational roles. Advancement up the career ladder is competitive, and promotions are granted according to formal criteria combining seniority and merit. Hierarchical superiors have wide discretion in determining merit.
4. Judges are supposed to be capable of performing all organizational roles associated with their rank (e.g., to be able to adjudicate criminal, bankruptcy, family law, and fiscal cases, or to act as a public prosecutor). They are therefore recruited not for a specific position but for a wide set of roles and, in the course of their careers, will tend to change jobs often. This makes guarantees of independence more problematic because of the influence hierarchical superiors (or, in some cases, the government itself) have over these moves.

5. Judicial guarantees of independence tend to be weaker, especially because judges tend to enjoy a lower degree of internal independence.

On the other hand, the following are the defining elements of a professional judiciary:

1. Judges are appointed only after having acquired professional legal experience. In some instances, this experience is taken into account in recruitment for specific judicial positions.
2. This experience usually, but not always, involves being a legal advocate. In the United States, for example, legal academics are often appointed to the federal bench.
3. There are no formal provisions for advancement, although higher ranking judges (especially in England) often exert some influence in both the initial appointment process and the promotion of judges from the lower ranks.
4. Judges are recruited for specific positions. Promotions are not widespread, and on the whole, there are much weaker internal controls over judges by their higher ranking colleagues.
5. Stronger guarantees of both internal and external judicial independence exist.

Both civil and common law judiciaries have checks to ensure that their members pursue institutional goals, but the approaches are different. Since Anglo-American judiciaries tend to employ individuals with lengthy legal experience outside the judiciary, there is less emphasis on internal controls. In contrast, because continental judges are recruited without significant professional experience, young judges are placed at the bottom of the judicial pyramid, and their organizational socialization is constantly monitored through a career based on moving up a hierarchical ladder. The organizational setup also affects the “reference group” of judges—those individuals and groups judges take into account when reaching a decision. In bureaucratic judiciaries, the reference group lies mainly inside the judiciary, where judges tend to be professionally socialized. The hierarchical structure enables senior judges to influence the behavior of lower ranking judges since they control

promotions, transfers, and discipline. In professional or common law judiciaries, a similar type of hierarchy does not exist, and reference groups tend to lie outside the judiciary. However, there is a difference between the English judiciary, which traditionally had a small professional reference group (the Bar), and the American judiciary, which has a much more diverse composition and a recruitment process that incorporates different types of professional and political influences.

### Changes in the Judicial Organization

Since the mid-20th century, significant changes have characterized the judiciaries in several countries. In England, in 2006, the institution of a Judicial Appointing Commission—an independent body in charge of proposing appointments to the Lord Chancellor—has circumscribed the traditional powers of the executive. However, the most important change has been the creation of judicial councils in several civil law countries since it has considerably increased the political significance of the judiciary. Judicial councils are collegiate bodies—composed of judges and lay members—in charge of administering the status of judges. Their impact has been a more or less radical alteration of bureaucratic judiciaries by strengthening judicial independence and, at the same time, fostering new connections with the political system. In this process, the powers and composition of these bodies are critical factors. The more extensive their functions, the stronger their role will be, and judicial independence tends to be stronger when there is a higher ratio of members chosen directly by and from the judiciary.

One of the main consequences of creating judicial councils is to increase the *external* independence of the judiciary by decreasing the traditional power of the executive. But since no judicial council is composed solely of judges, an important role remains for the institution in charge of appointing the nonjudicial members. This is usually assigned to parliament, which allows political parties to bypass the minister of justice and influence the judiciary directly. The creation of a judicial council also has consequences for the *internal* independence of the judiciary. Entrusting the promotion and appointment of judges to a collegial body where normally all judicial ranks are represented



contradicts the traditional hierarchical principle, whereby only higher ranking judges are entitled to evaluate lower ranking colleagues. In this way, the lower ranks acquire a new power since they can participate in the process of choosing higher ranking judges. As a result, challenges to the very idea of a judicial career by the lower ranks have often been successful. It is not coincidental that in countries with judicial councils, the number of judicial ranks has been reduced, and the influence of senior judges' assessments of lower ranking judges seems to be declining.

The erosion of hierarchical links is particularly relevant to the general expansion of judicial power. With the creation of judicial councils, the reference group of judges has become more varied. Traditional members of the reference group, such as legal academics and senior judges, have decreased in importance since they no longer enjoy a monopoly over evaluations for judicial promotion. Thus, the professional criteria of the judiciary have also begun to shift: Technical legal knowledge (and ideological conformity) is no longer the determinative element in promotions. Views of others outside the judicial system (e.g., political parties in parliament and also unions and interest groups) have gained in importance. Similarly, the interests of the media and the judiciary increasingly overlap, as judicial actions provide the media with news. In return, the media are able to support and publicize the actions of judges (and prosecutors). Inside the judiciary itself, judicial councils have increased the role of judicial associations since they organize the electoral participation of judges. On the other hand, since the council is also composed of political appointees, their point of view also has to be taken into account. In fact, as judicial actions gain political significance, the council may become the main institution where the judiciary's elected representatives can meet political representatives. As the experience of Latin European countries suggests, the creation of judicial councils is capable of producing a radical change in the judiciary's traditional setting; this in turn can diversify the judiciary's reference group, which is becoming more horizontal and, at least in part, placed outside the judiciary. As a result, more activist conceptions of the judicial role tend to prevail.

The expansion of judicial guarantees of independence has also involved public prosecutors.

This process has been stronger in those countries in which judges and prosecutors form a single professional group. In Italy, prosecutors enjoy the same guarantees as judges and, together with judges, elect the majority of the members of the judicial council. Their autonomy is extremely high: The executive cannot in any way issue instructions to them. Also, in France, where the ministry of justice has been able, at least so far, to keep most of its traditional powers, the autonomy of public prosecutors is growing and the executive has often been unable to exert all its institutional powers on public prosecution.

While these changes have affected the position of the judiciary in several states of Latin and Eastern Europe, other countries have seen little alteration of their judicial setting. In Germany, judges and prosecutors remain organized along hierarchical lines that allow the minister of justice, higher ranking judges, and senior prosecutors to influence their careers. Although the 1949 Basic Law introduced judicial review—entrusted to a politically appointed Constitutional Court—judges still regard their relatively passive role as a professional barrier against possible political interference and carefully protect their reputation as guardians of the law. The role of judicial councils and judicial associations remains limited, at least in comparison with other countries.

### The Judiciary in the Political System

In the second part of the 20th century, a trend toward a general expansion of judicial power can be singled out in most democratic regimes, a development often described as the judicialization of politics. The rise of judicial power has involved both the civil and the common law worlds, although it has been stronger in some countries than in others. The reasons behind these developments are several. First of all, the antiauthoritarian backlash has supported a new constitutionalism with the institution of forms of judicial review of legislation as well as the strengthening of guarantees of judicial—and prosecutorial—independence. In this process, the supranational dimension of constitutionalism has to be taken into account: For instance, the increased activism of national judiciaries has often found support in the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.

An additional factor of judicialization can be found in the growth of welfare policies. The consequent proliferation of legislation increases judicial significance: Where a legal rule exists, sooner or later a judge will be asked to interpret and apply it. Gaps remain despite, and perhaps because of, the growing number of laws, and judges are called to fill them. Another supporting element has been changes in the legal culture. A new emphasis on citizens' rights and entitlements and the emergence of an instrumental approach to law—understood as a tool for advancing individual or collective goals—have become common traits of contemporary societies. Today, there is virtually no area of social life immune from public regulation, and thus, no area can be excluded from judicial intervention. Thus, the demand for individual and collective rights, fueled by the development of both constitutionalism and welfare policies, has meant that individuals and groups increasingly seek out the judicial system with the aim of obtaining an authoritative decision in their favor.

However, there are significant cross-national differences in the political prominence taken by the judiciary. Bureaucratic judiciaries, when freed from hierarchical and executive influence, have seen a significant increase of their role in the political process. As for the political context, fragmentation tends to support judicialization. In this case, the lower decisional effectiveness of political structures leads to interests having an incentive in putting pressure elsewhere, for instance, on courts. On the other hand, for fragmented political institutions, it is more difficult to confront judicialization—that is, to assemble the political majorities in order to curb judicial power, for example, by overruling unwelcome judicial decisions, reducing judicial independence, or appointing accommodating judges.

Political fragmentation is obviously related to a corresponding institutional setting. Strong separation of powers, making easier the advent of divided government, is a case in point, as is true bicameralism—leading to disalignments between the two chambers—or a proportional electoral law, making a multiparty governing coalition more likely. Also federalism, by pitting the central government against the states, supports fragmentation. In turn, a fragmented setting is likely to be the by-product of a political transition in which no

actor is able to impose its preferences, trust tends to be low, and the uncertainty about the future is high. In this case, judicial power offers an insurance policy for prospective losers in the electoral arena.

The judicialization of politics has given new life to the traditional debate on the democratic legitimacy of an independent judiciary. The increasing role of independent judges in the policy process has been criticized. Some critics argue that to the extent to which judges are no longer constrained by law, an irresponsible policymaker seems to emerge. To this view, a different interpretation of the judicial role has been opposed: In a constitutional state, judges are bound to follow the constitution rather than statutes. Sometimes, it has also been argued that judges have no discretion since there is always one right answer to the case they have to decide. In fact, discretion seems to be an unavoidable trait of judicial decision making. So political power results inevitably from increased judicial independence. However, the expansion of judicial power is also the by-product of specific decisions taken by democratically responsible bodies. The fact that judicial decisions can go against the will of political majorities is inherent in the institutional template of constitutionalism: It is an inevitable price to pay. However, it seems unlikely that the judiciary will remain out of step for long with the political branches. As long as courts become politically significant, politicians become interested in exerting influence on them through judicial appointments (especially in the highest courts), through jurisdictional reforms (e.g., removing politically significant cases from courts), or by influencing judicial careers—through the powers of the ministry of justice or of a politically influenced judicial council. However, although it is not certain whether long-term political influence on judges is likely to succeed, in the short run, the political role of the judiciary has become—and is likely to remain—significant.

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*See also* Constitutionalism; Judicial Decision Making; Judicial Independence; Judicial Review; Judicial Systems; Rule of Law

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## JUSTICE

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Justice constitutes a normative cornerstone of political society. Classical and contemporary philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to John Rawls, have seen it as the main guiding principle for regulating political power. They disagree about *what* counts as justice, but they agree that justice *counts* for much in shaping, maintaining, and improving political order. The asymmetry of wide agreement on its importance and deep disagreement on its content, however, creates difficulties with the idea of justice. To restore the credibility of this idea, its complicated structure must be elucidated. This entry attempts to provide such an elucidation by exploring the competing ideas of justice, comparing the various philosophical grounds that have been advanced for the universalization of justice, and analyzing the legitimation of political decisions in society.

### Is Justice an Empty Idea?

The deep and persistent disputes over what counts as justice have generated skepticism about the philosophical significance of the agreement that justice counts. Value relativism, which applies to values in general, including justice, is a part of this skepticism but not the whole of it. The distinctive skepticism that is evoked toward justice by the aforementioned asymmetry of its widely acknowledged importance and deeply disputed content is the suspicion that justice is an *empty* concept. Those who harbor this suspicion hold that the endless controversy about the nature of justice exists not because it is an unfathomably profound idea but because it is an empty magical formula that we can fill with whatever content we may think useful for rationalizing our claims to what we want and dismissing the competing claims made by others. Hans Kelsen, a representative positivist legal philosopher in the 20th century, is a notable example of such critics of justice.

To dispel this suspicion, attempts have been made to identify the common conceptual core of justice. The starting point is the distinction between *the concept* of justice and *conceptions* of justice. The concept of justice represents the *meaning* of justice, or what we mean by saying about something that "it is just." Conceptions of justice specify the *criteria* by which we can judge whether and when the adjective *just* is applicable to something. Each conception constructs a theory to defend its own distinctive criterion (or set of criteria) against other competing conceptions, which expound different criteria (or different sets of criteria). For example, utilitarianism and individual-rights theories are two competing groups of conceptions of justice, each with its own competing varieties, such as direct and indirect utilitarianism and libertarian- and egalitarian-rights theories, respectively. The chief purpose of this distinction is to stress the point that there can be genuine conflicts between competing conceptions of justice *because* and *only if* they present different (sets of) criteria for the *same* concept of justice. If they were expounding different (sets of) criteria for *different* concepts, they could not be conflicting but only at cross-purposes with each other.

This point can be supported by the general semantic thesis that criterial conflicts about a word are possible only if the same meaning is

attributed to it as well as by the hermeneutical thesis that interpretive conflicts are possible only if the same concept is interpreted in different ways. Whether the semantic and hermeneutic theses are generally applicable or not, however, the aforementioned point is hard to deny as far as justice is concerned. For example, there is a genuine conflict between *talio*, the ancient conception of retributive justice that stipulates “an eye for an eye,” and the modern utilitarian conception of corrective justice, which approves of less (or more) harmful punishments than the harms inflicted on victims by wrongdoers if such punishments are sufficient (or necessary) to bring about the optimum deterrence effect, which is calculated taking punishment costs into consideration. But suppose that while an advocate of *lex talionis* and a utilitarian were having a debate with each other, a devout Christian moralist said to both of them, “If someone slaps you on the cheek, turn your other cheek to him.” Has the Christian joined in the debate, adding a new view on the issue in question? Certainly she has not. Rather, she has changed the subject matter. Her standpoint is at cross-purposes with those of the *talio*-retributivist and the utilitarian. This is because her criterion for the appropriate response to the other person’s wrongdoing is one not for the concept of *justice* but for a different concept, *love*. What she has propounded is a Christian conception of love, not a conception of justice that competes with the other two. By changing the subject matter to love, she has gone beyond the conceptual space of justice. There is a genuine conflict between *talio*-retributivism and utilitarianism just because they belong to the same conceptual space of justice. This shows that justice has a conceptual core that delineates the range of competing conceptions of justice and makes their rivalry possible.

It is one thing to show that there must be some conceptual content that the conflicting conceptions of justice have in common. It is quite another to be able to tell what it is. How is it possible to identify the normative content of the concept of justice that underlies the conflicting conceptions of justice as their common matrix? There are two methodological approaches to this problem, each resulting in a distinctive view on the common normative content of the concept of justice. They may be called the inductive and negative approaches.

The following two sections provide an overview and comparison of the two approaches.

### The Inductive Approach: Justice as the Demand for Regularization

A paradigmatic form of the inductive approach can be found in the work of Chaim Perelman, a Belgian legal philosopher noted for his theory of rhetoric, who pioneered the development of philosophical awareness of the distinction between the concept and conceptions of justice in his article “*De la Justice*,” published in 1945.

According to this approach, the first step is to collect, as data for theory building, a variety of specific formulas of justice that were set forth by different political ideologies. Among them are “To each according to his merits,” “To each according to his works,” “To each according to his needs,” “To each according to his rank,” “To each according to his entitlements,” and so on. The second step is to abstract (or “induce”) the common formal structure from them. All the specific justice formulas share the form: To (or from) each according to  $x$ . Different conceptions of justice expressed in different justice formulas substitute different values for the variable  $x$ , which specify what type of attributes or situations of agents are relevant to the distribution of benefits and assignment of burdens and responsibilities to them. The constant part of the common form, especially “according to,” symbolizes the common concept of justice, which Perelman calls *the formal idea of justice*. It requires us to treat all agents not in an ad hoc way but in such a rule-governed way that the same treatment should be given to all agents if their attributes or situations belong to the same relevant type. The demand for regularization (treatment according to type features) is the core of the common concept of justice that the inductive approach identifies with the formal idea of justice, presented as its classic formulation, “Treat like cases alike,” called the Justinian principle because of its roots in the Code (*Corpus Juris Civilis*) issued by the Roman emperor Justinian.

The formal idea of justice in the above sense is not Perelman’s invention but a logical reconstruction of a widely shared understanding of the Justinian principle as a formulation of the common concept of justice. It seems to be free from the controversy that pervades competing conceptions of

justice, but this is because it does not give us any substantive guide for judging what norms are relevant to questions of justice. Consequently, positivist philosophers such as Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross criticized it as an empty formula that hides its emptiness. This criticism is not wholly fair. The formal idea of justice implies an important constraint on politics: Political power must be exercised in a rule-governed way that assures its subjects of its predictability. This constraint can hardly be rejected as trivial because without it, people would be unable to seek security by adjusting their conduct on the basis of prudential calculation of the interference of political power in their lives. The importance of the rule-governed exercise of power is fully appreciated and emphasized by Lon Fuller in his conception of the rule of law as *the internal morality of law*, which he derived from his concept of law as the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.

Although there is some basis for regarding the formal idea of justice as empty, it nevertheless has some element of truth. The formal idea of justice as a demand for regularization is too thin to capture the normative aspirations underlying the concept of justice. It does not provide a guide for distinguishing between the permissible and nonpermissible kinds of discrimination to which justice cannot be indifferent.

### The Negative Approach: Justice as the Demand for Universalization

The negative approach looks to our intuition about what is unjust for a key to answering the question “What is justice?” In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, for example, Aristotle recommended that if we want to understand what justice is, we should begin with the analysis of *unjust* people. This approach has had a persistent hold over many later thinkers who do not necessarily share Aristotle’s answer to the question of what is justice. At least three reasons underlie the appeal of Aristotle’s recommendation.

First, our sense of justice is more strongly aroused and more sharply focused when we react against the actual injustices that we experience than when we think abstractly about what justice is. We express our deep-felt sense of (in)justice when we exclaim, “That’s not fair!” Even a relativist philosopher who cynically asserts that there

is no right answer to the question of what justice is would vehemently object to an injustice done to him (e.g., another author’s plagiarism of his work), thereby betraying the presence of a sense of justice. Our sense of justice is basically revealed and exercised as our sense of injustice. Second, injustices invite our indignation not only when they are done to us or our family and friends but also when we see them inflicted on perfect strangers. Although the discourse on justice can be manipulated to rationalize our self-interest, our sense of injustice seems to be propelled more by our sense of fairness to others than by self-interested motivation. Third, and most important in the present context, there are examples of injustices such as killing and torturing innocent people that are commonly condemned as unjust by those who hold competing conceptions of justice. Our judgments seem to be more convergent when we react against injustices than when we try to define what is just.

If the negative approach is to be taken to the task of identifying the common concept of justice, the question to be asked is this: What is the common feature of the conduct that competing conceptions of justice concur in rejecting as unjust? The natural answer would be that it is egoism. No conception of justice can defend egoism *as such*. To be sure, there may be a conception of justice based on Bernard Mandeville’s doctrine of “private vices” as “public virtues,” which approves of egoism on the ground that it brings about the consequence that serves public interest. Likewise, utilitarians take the self-interested motives of individuals into account when they judge which institutional design would bring about the maximum utility. But even these conceptions of justice exclude egoism from their evaluative grounds and rely on some conception of public interest. Actually, utilitarianism does not hesitate to require severe self-sacrifice from individuals if such a measure is necessary to maximize the aggregate utility of the whole society.

It must be noted with haste here, however, that egoism in the sense relevant to this context is not simply the pursuit of self-interest; justice may well be said to constitute fair rules of the game among agents seeking their own interests. The egoism that justice excludes is rather the lack of disinterested impartial treatment of the other agents—that is, my self-centered discrimination against the other person, which is ultimately reduced to my claim that

my interests outweigh the other's interests because my interests are *mine* while the other person's interests are not. This means that the core of the concept of justice revealed by our shared sense of injustice is the prohibition of *nonuniversalizable* discrimination against others, which ultimately depends only on the difference in individual identity between *me* and the other person. In other words, our sense of injustice is rooted in the notion that if one is treated differently from someone else, there must be a morally relevant reason for the difference.

The Justinian principle that like cases should be treated alike, presented above as a classic formulation of justice as the demand for regularization, can also be interpreted as the demand for universalization. But it is necessary to emphasize here that demands for regularization and universalization are *not* equivalent. The demand for universalization is normatively *stronger* than the demand for regularization because it rejects as unjust those rules of type-differentiated treatment that are not justifiable in universalizable terms.

For example, the practices that involve *free riding*, *vested interests*, and *collective egoism* are rejected as unjust even if they can be set up to be following some rules for type differentiation. This is because they privilege some particular agent and discriminate against the others in a nonuniversalizable way. Free riding is unjust in that a free rider refuses to share with others the cost of maintaining a public resource benefiting all of them, simply because it is *he*, not the others, who is thereby advantaged. Vested interests are seen as unjust because they, too, privilege a particular agent and discriminate against others simply on the basis of one agent's personal stake in a given case. Collective egoism gives precedence to the collective interest over individual interests and thus seeks pseudo-public interests, but it is unjust because collective egoists seek their own special group interests at the expense of the wider society, even when there is no difference between their situations and those of the outsiders except for the fact that the advantaged group is *theirs* while the disadvantaged ones are not.

The universalization criterion allows us to judge social discrimination based on general classifications such as race and gender to be unjust even when they are just according to the regularization criterion. This is so because what universalization requires is not only that the discriminative practices

should follow some general patterns but also that they should be justified on universalizable grounds. Claims that are unjust according to the universalizable criterion are often based on incorrect empirical assumptions. For example, a manager may discriminate against female employees in promotions, believing that women are too easily swayed by emotion to be effective managers. Justifications for discrimination may also be based on circular assumptions, for example, about the kind of behavior to be preferred.

Since the demand for universalization offers a fundamental normative test for eliminating the privileges and discriminations that any conception of justice is bound to reject as unjust, it is a more appropriate representation of the common concept of justice than the demand for regularization, which is too formal to provide such a test. This point can be supported by the fact that many philosophers and thinkers have shown their appreciation of the basic importance of the demand for universalization, though they have given different theoretical expressions and scopes to this demand. There are important conceptions of justice that do not focus on universalization; for example, utilitarians suggest that justice ultimately consists in maximizing aggregate welfare, while libertarians focus on the importance of limiting state authority and maximizing the individual's freedom from coercion and governmental intervention. However, universalization seems to have a central role in our common understanding of what is fair and unfair, just and unjust. The remainder of this entry examines some notable examples of the analysis of the concept of justice in terms of universalization and then explores the implication of these theories for public morality and political legitimacy.

### Philosophical Expressions of the Demand for Universalization

#### *The General Will in Rousseau*

In the history of political thought, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's doctrine of the *general will*, advocated in his treatise on the social contract, is a precursor of the development of the concept of justice as the demand for universalization. He distinguishes the general will not only from the particular will but also from the will of all. This is intelligible only if attention is focused on his view that the general will is general with reference to its *object*. By this,

he means that the general will can pursue not *particular* interests but only *common* interests. Even the will of all is a particular will if it is a unanimous decision that all parties accept not as a result of deliberation about the common interest of the whole society but simply out of consideration for their own particular interests. But how can we distinguish the pursuit of the common interest from that of particular interests? Rousseau gave a revealing answer to this question by identifying a test to make this distinction. According to him, our will can be said to be the general will in the pursuit of the common interest only if it meets the following requirement: "Each necessarily subjects himself to the conditions that he imposes on the others." He holds that this requirement brings about what he calls "an admirable accord of justice and interest that gives a character of equity to common deliberations" (*The Social Contract*, Book 2, chap. 4). This means that we can pursue our interests in accordance with justice only if we do not exempt ourselves from the burdens and costs that we require the others to bear in the same situations that we are placed in. Here, Rousseau showed an insight into the conceptual core of justice as the prohibition of nonuniversalizable discrimination against others.

### *The Categorical Imperative in Kant*

Immanuel Kant restated Rousseau's test of justice for the general will with some of his well-known multiple formulations of the categorical imperative, which he set as the second-order requirement that our first-order practical judgments must meet if they are to be moral judgments. This can be clearly seen in his first formulation of the categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

What Kant meant by this is the following: You cannot exempt yourself from the universal laws that are applicable to everyone. Likewise, you cannot exempt yourself from the same duties that your maxims impose on others if they are to have the status of moral judgments that transcend prudential and technical norms (hypothetical imperatives) that merely show the means to advance your self-interest. Here, Kant gave an emphatic and solemn (though somewhat abstruse) expression to

the demand for universalization that Rousseau presented in plain and casual language in his doctrine of the general will.

It may be said, however, that Kant differs from Rousseau not only stylistically but also substantially. While Rousseau presented the demand for universalization as the demand of justice, Kant made it the fundamental criterion for moral action more generally, arguing that only when people act on the basis of laws that they can rationally will as universal laws are their actions morally right. If Kant's concept of morality is a broader and more generic one than the concept of justice as a distinctive value of political morality, this difference is certainly nonnegligible. But in fact, Kant elaborates the categorical imperative in a way that enables it to be a foundation of political morality, through his concept of the kingdom of ends. Kant holds that human beings belong to what he calls a kingdom of ends—that is, an idealized association of autonomous and rational agents who treat each other not merely as the means to their specific ends but as "the ends themselves" under the common law, which makes their exercise of rational autonomy compatible. So it is not impossible to interpret the Kantian concept of morality to be coextensive with justice as the underlying regulative principle for the public morality of political society.

It is useful here to distinguish contexts where justice is central from those in which it is out of place to demand universalization in nonpolitical, purely personal relationships such as love. In such relationships, we are not only allowed but are even required to make nonuniversalizable discriminations. To say, "I love you because you happen to meet better than anyone else the right kind of qualification that anyone must meet to deserve my love" is tantamount to saying, "I would love another person if he met that qualification better than you." This attitude may be "fair," but it would surely destroy love. What a genuine lover is supposed to say is "I love you because you are *you*, not the others." Love requires existential commitment to the loved individual, which involves nonuniversalizable discrimination against the others. The demand for universalization is appropriate only for the aspect of our life that justice is expected to govern, namely, our political relationships, in which we exercise power (governmental power and politically authorized private power,

such as rights, sheer violence, etc.) over others and are required to justify our exercise of power to the others who are affected by it. Rousseau is right in applying the demand for universalization to the political order that justice inherent in the general will is to govern.

### *The Veil of Ignorance in Rawls*

In his theory of justice as fairness, Rawls (2001, pp. 42–43) attempts to define a just distribution of benefits and burdens within a state by identifying the principles that would be chosen by a rational, self-interested person who has no knowledge of her personal situation. He argues that a such a person in this hypothetical decision-making situation would choose a society in which social and economic inequalities satisfy two conditions: First, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and, second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the difference principle).

To understand the role of the universalization demand in Rawls's theory correctly, care must be taken not to be misled by his terminology. In his theory, the demand for universalization as distinguished from regularization is implanted in the "veil of ignorance," which Rawls stipulated as the most crucial one of the conditions constitutive of "the original position," which is his contractarian model of the counterfactual setting for choosing the principles of justice to be applied to the basic structure of political society.

In the original position, all parties to the contractarian choice are indifferent to each other's interests and seek to advance their own interests. But their choice is constrained by the condition of the veil of ignorance, under which they are deprived of all information about themselves that would enable them to know their special situations. They do not know whether they are talented or disabled, whether they are rich or poor, to what race or ethnicity they belong, what their religious backgrounds and attitudes to religions are, what gender and what sexual orientation they have, and so on. This constraint has two implications. First, all parties can seek to optimize only their share of primary goods that are absolutely necessary for pursuing whatever conception of the good life they

have. They cannot seek the special goods that they would have wanted if they had known the special facts about themselves that the veil of ignorance hides from them. Second, since they do not know what circumstances they will find themselves in once the veil of ignorance is lifted, they cannot help choosing the principles of justice that they could accept irrespective of whatever lot might fall on them—that is, the principles that all can accept as fair irrespective of their different payoffs.

The veil of ignorance is a device for inducing self-interested individuals to choose a principle (or a set of principles) of justice that treats others as fairly as themselves. Although Rawls characterized his theory as an attempt to apply Kantian constructivism to political morality, his use of the veil of ignorance reflects a strong influence of Rousseau, who, as noted earlier, tried to bring about "an admirable accord of justice and interest" by imposing on the citizenry as the sovereign political ruler the requirement of the general will: "Each necessarily subjects himself to the conditions that he imposes on the others." The veil of ignorance can generate a similar accord between justice and the self-interested choice of the parties in the original position by virtue of the demand for universalization that it represents just as Rousseau's test for the general will does.

The aim of the veil of ignorance is to disable every party in the original position from choosing a principle in consideration of the fact that the chosen principle is in *her* favor because of *her* special situation. To achieve this aim, it is not necessary to deprive the parties of special information as such—namely, the special facts about the individual members of the political society to which the chosen principle is to be applied. All that is necessary is to deprive every party of the knowledge of the identity of the individuals in question—namely, the knowledge of which individual *she* is. Separated from the information about the individual identity, special information does not spoil the aforementioned aim of the veil of ignorance. Moreover, it may be the case that full special information about the distinctive urgent needs and particular vulnerabilities of the individual members of a political society is needed to elaborate the adequate-priority rule for the rights assigned to them by the principles of justice applied to that society. Whether the latter point can hold true or not, it can be said that the normative essence



of the veil of ignorance can be revealed most correctly if it is reformulated as the demand for universalization, which prohibits us from favoring ourselves and discriminating against others on the basis of differences between us and the others in terms of the individual identity.

### Further Demands of Justice: Reversibility and Public Reasons

The normative force of the requirement that the concept of justice be rooted in universalization can be more fully appreciated if light is thrown on its deeper implication: the demand for *reversibility*. Prohibition of nonuniversalizable discrimination implies that if my claim against another agent is to be just, I must recognize that the agent could justly make the same claim against me *if he were I* and *if I were he*. Otherwise I would discriminate against him because *he* is not *I*, that is, because he and I are different simply in individual identity. The claims about justice must be such that they would be acceptable even if the claimer and the claim addressee were reversed. This is the demand for reversibility. It applies not only to the claim itself but also to the reasons for the claim that the claimer advances to the claim addressee. The claims about justice must be justifiable for reasons that would be acceptable even if the roles of claimer and claim addressee were reversed. The aforementioned typical examples of injustice (free riding, vested interests, and collective egoism) are unjust because those who enjoy advantages in these examples all fail to pass the test of reversibility in some way or other.

The demand for reversibility is not a novel idea at all. It finds its classical expression in the Christian Golden Rule: "Do to others as you would be done by." The same idea is expressed by the Confucian maxim "Do not do to others what you would not like to be done to yourself." But the reversibility demand requires further refinement to forestall its distortion. Here, we can use it to examine a *reductio ad absurdum* argument that may be made against it. The argument goes as follows. Suppose, for example, that you are a masochist. The reversibility demand would require you to abuse others because that is what you would like to be done to yourself. This conclusion is absurd. Therefore, the reversibility demand must be rejected.

The fundamental problem with this argument is that it misinterprets the reversibility demand as the requirement that we should reverse only our circumstantial *positions* while keeping our *perspectives* unreversed. In the above example, you are supposed to reverse positions with others while carrying your masochist perspective with you into their positions. But the counterfactual conditional "if you *were* they" involved in the reversibility demand presupposes that they *are not* you. And the fact that they are not you implies that their perspectives are not necessarily the same as yours. To replace their distinct perspectives with your own is to give a privileged moral status to your perspective simply because it is *yours*. It runs counter to the prohibition of nonuniversalizable discrimination that underlies the demand for reversibility. In the moral thought-experiment of reversibility, therefore, you have to test not only the *positional reversibility* but also the *perspectival reversibility* of your claims against others. You have to ask whether your claim against others would be acceptable even if your perspective as well as your position were reversed with theirs. If you as a masochist conducted this moral experiment on yourself, you would not accept as just the abuse of other, nonmasochist persons. The *reductio ad absurdum* argument refutes not the reversibility demand itself but the misinterpretation of it as a mere positional reversibility demand.

The reversibility demand has a further important implication: the demand for *public reasons*. As discussed above, the reversibility test applies not only to our claims against others but also to the reasons that we give to justify our claims to them. Since the test requires perspectival reversibility, we have to justify our claims to our claim addressees with perspectivally reversible reasons—reasons that we could accept even if our perspectives were reversed with theirs. Such reasons can be called *public reasons* because they are reasons that would be acceptable not only from our own perspective but also from the different perspectives of others, thereby being distinguishable from *private reasons*, which are unacceptable or even unintelligible to those who do not share our idiosyncratic perspective. It may be objected that the perspectival reversibility test cannot screen public reasons because it requires that we should abandon our private reasons only to yield to the private

reasons of other agents to whom we are required to justify our claims. This objection fails to hold because the other agents are also required to conduct the test of perspectival reversibility on their counterclaims. The public reasons required by the perspectival reversibility test, to put it more precisely, are the reasons for our claims against others that would be acceptable even from their perspectives *provided* they seek and subject themselves to the reasons that would be acceptable even if their perspectives were reversed with ours.

A philosophically thornier objection against the demand for perspectival reversibility and public reasons is this. It is impossible for you to know the perspectives of others. When you imagine that you are adopting their perspectives, you are simply projecting your perspectives onto theirs. This objection can be a sobering warning against our tendency to make hasty, prejudiced, and self-deceptive presumptions about what others think and how they feel, but it is a half-truth whose negative implication should not be exaggerated. It is true that “other minds” are not transparent to me and that my perceptions about the thoughts and feelings of others are *mine*, not *theirs*. But it does not follow that it makes no moral difference for me to make an honest endeavor toward understanding and paying due attention to their perspectives. Certainly, the self-regarding perspective, from which I care only about myself, and the other-regarding perspective, from which I care about the perspectives of others as well as mine, are both *my* perspectives, but there is a big difference between these two perspectives in terms of their moral quality. Even if I cannot go beyond my perspective, I can bring about moral transformation of my perspective from within through the process of self-critical reflection to which I subject myself in the dialogue with others who challenge me about the justice of my claims.

This point was intimated by Rousseau in his distinction between the particular and the general will. If this distinction is to be intelligible, it must be interpreted to be concerned more with the moral status of the *object* of the will (to what purpose?) than with the *subject* of the will (whose will?) as was seen above. The particular and the general will are, in this interpretation, not the wills of ontologically differentiated agents (e.g., the individual and the collective agent, the parts and

the whole of society) but the two morally differentiated perspectives immanent and latent in each individual’s will. What Rousseau called “common deliberation” is expected to bring about the moral transformation of the perspective of each individual from the particular to the general will.

The problem of the cognitive opacity of others in morality was more consciously and explicitly addressed and solved by Adam Smith in his classic work *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Although the principle of sympathy constitutes a foundation for his moral theory, from the beginning of this work, Smith conceded with a surprising candidness that since “we have no immediate experience of what other men feel,” the sympathy we expect from others can be nothing more than the product of our imagination about “what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” (Pt. 1, sec. 1, chap. 1). Paradoxically enough, this concession did not prevent him from developing a moral theory in which the crucial test of the justice of our conduct is whether our conduct would be able to gain the sympathy of spectators. The paradox is dissolved when it is seen that he idealized the spectator as *impartial* and internalized him in our perspectives. While Smith regarded the sympathy of others as the product of our imagination, he distinguished this imagination of ours from our raw feelings and instinctive desires. Our imagination detaches us from such feelings and desires and generates the normative perspective of impartiality within us by subjecting us to critical self-examination. This is why he referred to the impartial spectator as “the imagined man within.” Although Smith was keenly aware that we cannot transcend ourselves to have an immediate experience of the perspectives of others, he realized that by exercising our imagination to care about their perspective, we can transform our perspective *from within* so that it will grow from the sheer self-centered one in the pre-imaginative stage into something morally higher that is open to the sense of impartiality and fairness to other persons.

### Justice and Legitimacy

Our moral imagination can transform our motivation so as to seek public reasons acceptable to others whose perspectives are different from ours. But it does not follow that we can reach a consensus

about which public reason should prevail. Even if our moral imagination is fostered through our common deliberation, there is no guarantee that our judgments about public reasons will converge. Actually, part of the condition of human life is the existence of persistent disagreements among those who sincerely seek the public reasons required by justice. This is not surprising. Judgments about public reasons are guided by different competing conceptions of justice, and the universalizability demand, which entails the demand for public reasons, imposes only negative constraints on admissible conceptions of justice without uniquely specifying which is the best conception. Furthermore, the more sincere our commitment to public reasons is, the more difficult it is for us to make nonprincipled strategic compromises.

Rousseau did not have to worry very much about the disagreement that remains even after all individuals have adopted the perspective of the general will. This is because the polity he had in mind was a small-scale, face-to-face homogeneous community where there is a solid consensus among the citizens, even though his favorite Greek polis, *Lacedaemon* (Sparta), may not be appropriate as a historical model of such a polity given the fact that it was not immune from internal strife. Whether Rousseau's ideal polity is sustainable or not, however, the divergence of public reasons raises a serious problem in contemporary large-scale pluralist societies. Contemporary advocates of deliberative democracy tend to make light of this problem because they are generally optimistic about the possibility of reaching a rational consensus through common deliberation. There is no ground for this optimism, however. There is every reason to think that free, rational, and mutually critical discussions will bring about a proliferation of divergent views rather than their convergence. Rawls located the common basis of public reason in the idea of an "overlapping consensus" on constitutional essentials and basic matters of justice among competing reasonable, "comprehensive doctrines" after he converted to political liberalism as distinguished from philosophical (or comprehensive) liberalism, but his attempt failed to attain his aim because he simply rejected the dissenting comprehensive doctrines as unreasonable by resorting to his own very controversial philosophical standpoint about what counts as reasonable.

The nature of this problem is well captured by Jeremy Waldron in his explication of what he calls *the circumstances of politics*, which have the following two features. First, the circumstances of politics are contrasted to what Rawls calls the subjective circumstances of justice, where our conceptions of the good life are so divergent that they must meet the condition of what he calls *the primacy of justice over the good*, which is the requirement that conceptions of justice, if they are to be the common principle of the basic structure of our political society, should be justifiable independently of any specific conception of the good life and should constrain the latter. In the circumstances of politics, there is a deeper conflict: Not only our conceptions of the good life but also our conceptions of justice are divided so that the primacy of justice over the good is not enough to sift out the common political principle that can govern the basic structure of our society.

Second, whereas it is possible to give a "let's agree to disagree" solution to the problem of the conflict in the conceptions of the good life by endowing individuals with the right to choose their conception of the good life autonomously, it is impossible to apply this solution to the conflict in the circumstances of politics. Since the conflicting conceptions of justice are competing to get control of the political order of the same society, conflict resolution in this case can be brought about only by a collective decision of the political society (hereafter referred to as political decision for short) that binds not only the supporters of its content but also the dissenters who object to it. As an example, although we can let each individual choose freely her religion according to her own conception of the good life, we cannot let each individual choose the tax system according to her own conception of distributive justice. We have to make a political decision about whether our tax system should be shaped along the utilitarian aggregate-welfare-maximization line, the libertarian primacy-of-property line, the Rawlsian difference-principle line, or the lines of some other conceptions of distributive justice, not despite but because of the absence of agreement on the matter.

The circumstances of politics as presented above raise the problem of legitimacy: How is it possible for us to respect as legitimately binding on us the political decision that we hold to be

wrong according to our conceptions of justice? The problem of legitimacy so stated may appear to imply that the idea of justice is totally irrelevant to it. But this is not the case. Although we cannot resort to any specific conception of justice as a criterion of legitimacy, the common concept of justice as the universalization demand can offer a guide for solving the problem of legitimacy. Because legitimacy is concerned with the fact that we have to respect whichever conception of justice we may consider the best, it can be illuminated by the concept of justice as the common normative constraint on competing conceptions of justice. The following two points are especially important in this connection.

First, the way democracy can give legitimacy to a political decision can be reconceived in light of the concept of justice. In his answer to the question of legitimacy, Waldron rejected constitutional constraints on democracy, such as judicial review, in favor of simple majoritarian democracy. This position is difficult to sustain. Democratic decisions can have legitimacy only when the *losers* (especially marginal minorities who cannot hope to be winners) in the political strife of the democratic process can respect the resultant decisions as the public decisions of their own political society instead of regarding them as mere products of the majority's private will, to which the minority acquiesces simply out of prudential considerations. This would be impossible unless losers are given some institutional guarantee against the danger of the winning majority's refusal to subject themselves to the test of reversibility, which requires them to examine sincerely whether the decisions that they succeeded in imposing on the losers could be justifiable *had they themselves been the losers*. Such an institutional guarantee can and should be embodied in constitutional arrangements for facilitating power change so as to secure actual reversibility of the positions of political winners and losers, compensating for the handicap of marginal minorities in their political resources for effective democratic participation, preventing the government from denying equal rights to politically powerless victims of social discrimination, and so on. This is the real significance of the distinction between the role and the holder of the role and the normative background of the political institutions.

Second, a further ground for legitimacy can be explained by reconstructing the fair-play argument for political obligation in the light of the concept of justice. By claiming that your conception of justice should be incorporated in the political decision binding on others who have competing conceptions of justice, you also claim that they should bear the *moral cost* of compromising their own conceptions of justice to sustain the political system of collective decision making. Therefore, you should bear the same moral cost when their conceptions, not yours, succeed in being incorporated in the political decision. You should acknowledge the legitimacy of the political decision that you hold wrong in the light of your conception of justice, thereby accepting the political obligation to defer to it. Otherwise, you would be a moral free rider who violates the demand for reversibility inherent in the concept of justice.

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*See also* Constitutionalism; Contract Theory; Deliberative Policy Making; Democracy, Theories of; Discrimination; Equality; Equality, Political; Ethics; Judicial Review; Kant, Immanuel; Legitimacy; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Rights; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Rule of Law; Social Choice Theory; Utilitarianism

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# K

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## KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804)

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Immanuel Kant (born in Eastern Prussia, now Kaliningrad) is one of the leading philosophers of the Enlightenment and has had a lasting impact on modern philosophy. His major works include *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*), first published in 1781, an attack on traditional metaphysics and epistemology; *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (*Critique of Practical Reason*), 1788, concerned with the philosophical foundations of ethics; and *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (*Critique of Judgment*), 1790, dealing with aesthetics and teleology. This entry discusses his “political philosophy,” even though none of his works has appeared under this title. His major work on political ethics and the international order is *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (*Perpetual Peace*), 1795.

Kant breaks with the Aristotelian tradition of political philosophy (*Politiká*), including his “political economy” (“Aristotle,” I 8–13) and deals with these subjects only under the perspective of Roman law and natural law, which he forms into a law of reason. Whereas for Aristotle politics means the realization of human beings as political beings (“zoon politikón”) and is oriented toward the nature (“phýsis”) of men, for Kant politics is always related to a system of law endowed with the power of physical force. Politicians and political acts are judged according to norms in the legal system. Politics is judged positively when it conforms as an executive power (“ausübende Rechtslehre,” VIII 370) to the standards of law.

The goal of political acts in “status civilis” is the realization of the ultimate political good, stable peace (VI 355, VIII 386). Peace only can be attained in a cosmopolitan order. With this idea, which is still very relevant today, Kant follows, on the one hand, stoicism, a Hellenistic school of philosophy, and, on the other, reflections on the French Revolution, leading to his conclusion that only republics with separation of powers are peaceful (VIII 341–386).

Political acts can be judged according to the criterion of “publicness” (VIII 381–386). The duty that a politician performs can, but need not, be of an ethical nature; it is founded on the special legal duty to lead an honest life (*honeste vive*) that all human beings have (VI 236). There is no external sanction, as with other legal duties, nor is there necessarily an internal motivation to act according to this duty. Even those who become politicians out of sheer vanity can (and should) fulfill these duties. Similarly, peace is a result of the ethical virtues of citizens. For this reason, the promotion of an appropriate infrastructure and education on which men are dependent to become ethical human beings is a part of politics. Therefore, politics must ensure that citizens receive the education they need to become ethical human beings and must create the infrastructure needed to support it.

The actions of politicians are judged negatively if they are not oriented toward the law but are based on interests of power and an alleged knowledge of human nature (VIII 374). Implicitly, Kant thus turns against Aristotle’s concept of politics,

which presupposes knowledge of human nature. Kant, like John Locke before him, denies the possibility of knowing human nature empirically. In his critical philosophy, neither an empirical nor a “rational” knowledge of human nature derived from “pure” reason can serve as a foundation of norms for political action and ethics, and the rule of law cannot be justified anthropologically. Only when both are perceived from pure reason can this knowledge be applied to human beings.

Kant’s image of politicians in a pejorative sense has been influenced by Niccolò Machiavelli’s *Principe* (1513):

Our politicians act, as far as they can, like [the Jewish prophets] and are as skilful in their prophecies. We must, they say, take human beings as they are, and not as some ignorant pedants or well-meaning phantasts dream what they should be. *As they are* then means: to what we have made them through unjust force and treacherous acts of the government, namely stubborn and rebellious. Then, of course, when the tight reins are loosened, sad things happen which fulfil the prophecies of these “wise statesmen.” (VII 80)

A politician who is not guided by law but by his alleged knowledge of human nature is incapable of realizing in certain phenomena, for example, the French Revolution, the signs of reason and a better future and to act accordingly. In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant calls the Machiavellist a “political moralist” and a person conscious of the law a “moral politician” (VIII 377).

So far, the definition of politics and law seems to be possible without any problem. This becomes more difficult when two specificities of the Kantian theory of law and philosophy of history are taken into account: In his theory of law (first part of *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* [*The Metaphysics of Morals*], 1797), the state does not implement the law of reason in its pure form, as demonstrated in the two sections on private law, but the state practices a version modified for its purposes. In the third section (VI 296ff.), it is shown that the perceptions of “law in itself” have to be restricted to be at all realized by a state. This is demonstrated by the example of some court decisions that deviate from the “law in itself” so that the court and, therefore, the

state can come to quick and solid decisions. This applies, for example, to the respect of property rights when products have been purchased in the market according to legal norms (VI 300–303), even if they are stolen items or (not mentioned by Kant) products from a slave plantation. The state also can apply “tortura spiritualis,” confessions under oath, even if this contradicts the “law in itself” (VI 303–305). Strictly speaking, politics here commits an injustice, because of the constraints of the state that lead to a restriction of the “law in itself” in its implementation. In the interpretation of Kantian legal and political philosophy, this antinomy has not sufficiently been taken into account so far.

In the philosophy of history, another peculiarity can be noted. Whereas political economy in the sense in which Aristotle used it takes the same nature, the *phýsis*, of men as the guiding principle (*Politiká I*), for Kant a negative anthropology is the real source of political and economic prosperity. Ethics and politics do not coincide, as already diagnosed by Bernard de Mandeville in his *The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits*. There, the result was that if politicians really take moral laws seriously, they would regress economically and would have to retreat from modernity into the woods!

Kant follows Mandeville and describes both in his philosophy of history and in his anthropology the moving forces of the common good as the unfettered instincts of greed, vanity, and power (VIII 21, VII 271). This triad is already a firm constellation for Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan I, II*: “Riches, Honour, Command”), and not by chance, because these are the moral vices that are opposed to the first three cardinal virtues in Plato’s *Politeia*. The “modestia” of peasants is opposed by their greed, the “fortitudo” of soldiers by their ambition for honor, and the “prudentia” of kings by their lust for power. Whereas in antiquity and the Middle Ages the naturally good *polis* or city was founded on the virtues (including the fourth one, justice) and the evil city (“città cattiva”) was subjected to the opposite vices, in modern times this judgment is turned around: The vices are now the necessary forces that maintain and foster the state economically and politically. This corresponds also to the view of Giambattista Vico, who considers it inevitable that a well-functioning society is based

on “ferocia, avarizià, ambizione,” the “tre vizi” that have accompanied mankind since its eviction from paradise (*La scienza nuova*, second edition, II 7). Kant’s diagnosis of historical and political reality is the same. What about this dilemma in Kant’s view of current politics? Must a politician for moral reasons introduce and maintain laws that will ruin the state, or does he or she have to tolerate vices or even promote them because of the “raison d’état”? This is, of course, a very topical question even in the present day. Kant himself has not addressed this dilemma. His solution may be as follows: A moral politician in a liberal society with an efficient economy in the sense of Adam Smith (*The Wealth of Nations*) would not interfere with the internal motives of actors and ban vices as long as the external frame of law is maintained. The rules of the law of reason restrict greedy, vain, and power-seeking actors but enable them to secure their profits. That private profits will lead to welfare for all lies not only for Adam Smith but also for Kant in the nature of things (“the invisible hand”). “As an old merchant said: create good roads, mint good money, exchange currencies quickly, etc. but apart from that ‘let us do!’” (VII 19–20). This “laissez-faire, laissez-aller” policy is the solution for Kantian economic policy. Politicians should not intervene in self-regulating trade. Johann Gottlieb Fichte as well as Karl Marx would have stood against this liberal economic policy; Kant closed his eyes to the devastating consequences of a liberated economy in Europe, internal exploitation, and exploitation of the economically weaker countries by the stronger ones in the colonial territories. Kant believed that these problems would resolve themselves in the long run.

Kant does not comment on the day-to-day politics of his time, neither in his publications nor in his notes or letters. The central event of his time is the French Revolution after 1789, which marked the turn from despotism to a republic (not the “Declaration of Independence” in Virginia in 1776) and which was seen by other authors as a parallel event to Kant’s own “Copernican Revolution” of breaking with ancient and medieval metaphysics (III 12, 14). For Kant, it is evident

that men legally can only pursue reforms, not a forceful revolution, but the French Revolution had demonstrated the feasibility of a republic—this event “will not be forgotten” (VII 88).

*Author’s note:* References to Kant’s works refer to the volumes and pagination of the Akademie edition, Berlin, Germany, 1990ff.

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*See also* Hobbes, Thomas; Justice; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Marx, Karl; Peace

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# L

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## LABOR MOVEMENT

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The concept of *labor movement* refers to the development of workers' organizations driven by collective mobilization. It consequently implies some degree of coexistence between two distinct processes subject to close analysis in political science: (1) interest representation and (2) social mobilization. Descriptions of labor movements that emphasize the former process usually focus on trade unions, these being associations that represent the labor force as well as organizations that play wider economic and political roles. By contrast, descriptions that emphasize the latter process concentrate on the dynamics of social movements and therefore center on the construction of a social identity, the forms assumed by collective mobilization, and its eventual institutionalization.

This entry first outlines the main "classical" theories concerning the labor movement. It then shows how the labor movement has evolved amid constant tension between collective mobilization and institutional forms of labor representation. Next, it discusses how trade unions work to represent workers' interests, as well as acting as partners to employers and the state in collective bargaining and tripartite concertation. A brief conclusion considers the role the labor movement may play in the near future.

### **In Search of a Theory of the Labor Movement**

Labor movements are phenomena both complex and, in a sense, contradictory. They first arose as

groups organized to improve conditions in capitalist industry. But they have often pursued the much more ambitious goal of changing society as a whole. Everywhere, they have bred organizations that gradually came to accept the rules applied by the economic and political systems in which they had to operate but still pursued long-term goals that frequently conflicted with those rules. Although these organizations manage industrial and social conflict, the integration of large masses of workers into the economic, social, and political systems of industrial democracies would have been very different in nature—and perhaps impossible—without them.

While contemporary social sciences have conducted detailed analyses of labor movements, more general discussions of them are still largely couched in conceptual terms drawn from theories developed several decades ago that may be termed *classic*. The explanatory capacity of these theories is dubious and erratic, but their continuing interest for social scientists stems from rather different factors. Each of them has been put forward as a general theory but has centered on only one of the different alternatives faced by labor movements across countries and historical periods. Yet it is precisely for this reason that these theories have become important as self-interpretations by different components of the international labor movement, thereby influencing the latter's perception of itself and its goals. Hence, these theories are simultaneously analytical instruments and ideologies.

From this point of view, Marxism—which developed the most powerful theoretical apparatus—also can be seen as the dominant ideology shaping

socialist positions within labor movements. Its contribution to the analysis of such movements, however, is still relevant in many respects. First, by framing labor movements in the context of a structurally divided class society, it helps remedy the shortcomings of merely psychological or behavioral explanations of their origins and goals. Second, by explaining industrial conflict in light of a theory of social change, Marxism suggests that analysis should extend beyond the short-term objectives of such conflict and consider the aspirations latent within it to achieve a different social order, which may cyclically orient collective action. Finally, by viewing unionism as one—albeit the most important—of the many different forms assumed historically by labor organization, it allows the latter to be seen in relation to other types of action available to workers rather than as the sole natural expression of their needs and culture.

While the Marxist socialist tradition—in its social-democratic and communist versions alike—has by far outweighed any others in the history of labor movements, a significant role has nevertheless been also played in several countries by the “revolutionary syndicalist” tradition. This tradition’s departure from Marxist theories has been evident ever since the early work of its major proponent, Georges Sorel, who envisaged workers’ autonomy embodied in trade unions as a “global society” with its own economy, organizational forms, and culture, which contrasted with the decaying bourgeois society. Sorel’s theory was based on a view of the social structure as sharply divided into two classes. It was the purpose of the general strike—the key form of action in the revolutionary syndicalist tradition—to expose this dichotomy. Sorel’s theory was also based on a simplistic view of political structures and institutions. Nevertheless, like Marxism, in late-19th- and early-20th-century Europe, it expressed the ambition of a rising working class to become the hegemonic class and therefore to go beyond its activity, confined to the labor market, to address more general societal problems.

From this point of view, theories of the labor movement developed in the Anglo-American countries stand in sharp contrast with those described above. Their differences notwithstanding, they have never proposed far-reaching projects for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society.

Their objectives have been more modest, in that they have concerned themselves with the analysis of the actual role performed by the labor movement in the existing society rather than with scenarios for social change. The major theoreticians of British trade unionism, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, developed what can be regarded as a functionalist approach. Trade unions were merely means to achieve specific goals. And they were so in a two-fold sense: (1) because their function was defined within the strict limits of workers’ defense against the workings of the market and (2) because such activity had to be compatible with the systemic imperatives of firm productivity and economic development. A more general implication was that the labor movement’s legitimacy should be assessed not only in terms of its utility to workers but also in terms of its contribution to creating a more democratic though efficient society.

Selig Perlman’s view—which can be considered the theoretical basis for North American “business unionism”—differed sharply from that of the Webbs. Perlman maintained that the mentality of workers and militants was dominated by their awareness of the scarcity of jobs. Far from being based on class consciousness, therefore, actual labor movements were based on the consciousness of the competitive nature of the job market. While intellectuals in trade unions sought to give them anticapitalist objectives, the main purpose of workers’ self-organization was to claim the collective ownership of available jobs so that they could be shared among the members of the union. Workers were uninterested in the endeavor to reform the capitalist system and in mass political action. Nevertheless, the long history of the labor movement demonstrates that Perlman’s theory, too, unduly generalized values dominant in specific periods and countries, besides assuming the existence of a universal “workers’ psychology,” which, as shown by a large body of research, is instead strictly determined by the specific culture and historical context.

None of the classic theories, therefore, addressed—let alone answered—the crucial question for a theory of the labor movement: Under what conditions are the different components of the working class and their organizations induced to behave as fragmented interest groups or, conversely, as unified collective actors pursuing economic and social goals? Despite

decades of comparative work in the social sciences, this question is still largely unanswered. A large amount of evidence has been collected to account for developments in individual countries, but a convincing theory with general explanatory power is still far from being developed.

### Collective Mobilization and Its Fate

In several countries, the origin of labor movements was twofold in nature: (1) as a form of solidarity and defense of workers and (2) as a revolt against the capitalist mode of production and society. The former tendency led to the creation of various types of friendly societies, cooperatives, and, later, trade unions. The outcomes of the latter ranged from Luddism to workers' councils, to different forms of political mobilization and organization for the achievement of citizenship rights. Both these tendencies sprang essentially from the exclusion of a young working class from the management of the economy and society in countries undergoing rapid industrialization and development. Both tendencies embodied contradictory aims: workers' rejection of the existing society and their endeavor to build an autonomous culture, on the one hand, and their aspirations to full industrial and political citizenship, on the other.

In the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, the more educated and resourceful skilled workers also acted as a politicized vanguard. They saw socialism as an opportunity to regain control over the means of production, which had been expropriated from craftsmen. However, technological innovations and the rationalization of production soon rendered obsolete the skills that gave those workers their market power. At the same time, because they increased the rigidity of production and interdependency among jobs, they endowed unskilled workers with unprecedented disruptive power. Moreover, just as technology and rationalization broke the monopolistic position of skilled workers and enabled the mass of workers to organize, so too did the peasant origin of the latter rupture the traditional political subcultures with their strong identities and revolutionary projects.

Generalizing and simplifying somewhat, it can be argued that the more a labor movement grows and expands its role in society, the more its ideological tension comes under severe strain. Its main

activity becomes collective bargaining, rather than political mobilization or expressive action. Besides enlarging their rank and file, this helps trade unions develop their organizational strength. Problems to do with bureaucratization arise, and more generally, organizational concerns tend to prevail over those typical of a social movement. Partly for this reason and partly because the political recognition of labor movements (first in the West and then in other, developing areas of the world) gives workers full political and social citizenship, the revolutionary impetus has dwindled. The economic action of labor movements is increasingly restricted to negotiation within a framework of shared rules, while political action takes the form of pressure politics or support for pro-labor reformist parties.

Of course, what has just been outlined is only a very general pattern that applies to a greater or lesser extent to labor movements in different countries. Today, the main differences among their behaviors are apparent in the diverse structures assumed by collective bargaining or in the relative importance of this form of action compared with political action. To some extent, all labor movements use both instruments. But some of them (e.g., in the United States) by tradition place overwhelming emphasis on the former. Through negotiation with companies, they seek to achieve the joint regulation of labor. Bargaining focuses principally on wages and working conditions, but it may extend to many other aspects of workers' lives—pensions, health insurance, and so on. By contrast, many European and Latin American labor movements have given greater priority to political action. Trade unions have long worked in close alliance with “brother” (socialist or labor) parties to support reformist programs, and they have a direct interest in labor and social legislation. In the post-World War II period, moreover, most of them also engaged, for shorter or longer periods, in concertation with governments to design economic and social policies.

Hence, the evolution of labor movements shows that a revolutionary and globalistic approach may prevail, especially when workers uprooted from their communities and not yet integrated in industrial society are rapidly introduced into modern production. When, conversely, workers are rather well integrated into society, labor movements are

less able to provide their members with identity incentives. They are more concerned to seek particularistic advantages than to strive after the ideal of an alternative society. This observation, however, should not be mistaken for an evolutionary theory. Even less should it be taken as the obituary for the labor movement that diverse theorists in different periods have been wont to write. Industrial societies may cyclically reproduce the phenomena described. They continue to generate new groups in the labor market and in society at large that lack adequate representation of their interests and therefore occupy marginal positions in the industrial relations and political systems. Moreover, as new countries set off along the road of rapid economic development, their labor movements are likely to exhibit similar patterns.

### Trade Unions as Representative Organizations

In several countries, trade unions became powerful organizations that entirely assimilated the requirements of capitalist systems and their workings but still appealed to a collective identity that often embodied long-term goals in conflict with those systems. Today, trade unions are widely regarded by companies as rent-seeking bodies. Nevertheless, they often perform key productive functions by providing workforce cooperation, participating in income policies, and more generally contributing to the regulation of work.

Research in the social sciences has identified three main dimensions of unionism. The first dimension consists in the role of trade unions as associations representing collective interests. The second comprises the problems and opportunities facing trade unions as organizations. The third dimension concerns their role as economic and political actors.

A trade union is an association of individual members whose functional interests it seeks to represent collectively. The drawback of the collective representation of functional interests is that rank-and-file demands are inevitably altered by the association that expresses them. In fact, any trade union association must first collect and interpret workforce demands, giving voice to what are often vaguely expressed needs or grievances. Second, the requirements of consistency,

organizational stability, and recognition prevent even highly representative associations from expressing demands that contrast with their long-term strategy. Third, if a trade union is to gain concrete benefits for its members, it must make such demands negotiable, and for this purpose it must transform expressive behavior into instrumental claims. Finally, to represent interests collectively, it must aggregate individual demands that are normally dispersed and potentially contradictory. It is these factors that explain why, regardless of the quality of a trade union's internal democracy and the responsiveness of its leadership, it inevitably filters, and even profoundly changes, the demands put forward by the employees that it seeks to represent. Furthermore, for a trade union to be considered a reliable partner by the companies or public institutions with which it reaches agreements, it must control and to some extent police its members to ensure that they comply with the rules agreed on.

This may give rise to "crises of representation," which unions must be able to control if they are to survive and maintain their role. The rate of unionization, or "union density"—that is, the percentage of union members in the workforce—is usually considered to be the best indicator of a trade union's ability to represent employees' interests, and indeed of its strength. However, a large body of research has shown that the variation in union density across countries is closely conditioned by several other factors, among them the role of trade unions as providers of services. Moreover, union density is strongly affected by the varying "coverage" of collective bargaining: In several countries, this is established by law, so that collective agreements apply to all employees irrespective of whether they are members of the unions signatory to those agreements.

Yet trade unions are not simply associations formed if and when employees feel a need for collective representation of their interests. After an initial formative period, they have everywhere grown into stable organizations, which pursue as much the goal of maintaining and enlarging their power vis-à-vis other organizations as the original one of representing their members' interests. This logic of action induces trade unions to try to optimize their resources whenever they must find solutions for the dilemmas they encounter.

The first of these dilemmas for a trade union is how to define its sphere of representation or, in other words, the boundaries of the interest group whose demands it intends to advance. Historically, the main options have been to act as an “associational” or as a “class” union. A union of the former kind chooses to restrict its sphere of representation to the members that it actually recruits. The latter kind of union claims to speak on behalf of all workers, whether or not they are its members. The second dilemma for a trade union is how to define its sphere of action: Should it give priority to action in the market, addressing demands to companies and negotiating with them, or should it give priority to action in the state, addressing public institutions as the main targets of its claims and its main partners? However a trade union may define whom it wants to represent and with whom it wants to interact, it still has several further choices to make. One such choice is among the instruments for action, which can range from conflict, to collective bargaining, to various forms of joint management, to tripartite concertation. Another concerns the level of action, which may be centralized at the industry or cross-industry level or decentralized to the company or territorial level.

In addition to acting as associations that represent collective interests and large-scale organizations, trade unions have grown into important actors in several political economies. Where they have moved beyond an exclusively distributive function, they have come to perform a wider role in economic development. On the one hand, in fact, they may be decisive factors in labor market rigidity and an excessively generous social expenditure that generates huge public deficits. On the other, they may perform positive functions for companies by organizing the workforce’s cooperation with the new modes of production and contributing to its skill formation. They can also help governments improve economic performance by coordinating wage dynamics in accordance with an income policy and by contributing to labor market and welfare reforms.

### Open Questions and Scenarios

Today, the issue that concerns all countries is the new meaning and scope of solidarity among workers

or, to put it bluntly, the capacity of the labor movement itself to construct social and political solidarity. If a labor movement decides to do no more than represent only traditional workers, it will continue to enjoy the advantages of participating in the economic and political systems. But it will do so at the cost of seeing its status reduced to that of just one interest group among others, and it will probably have to deal with the rise of new representative organizations in competition with it. It may alternatively decide to offer interest representation to newly formed social groups as well, although these often mobilize around nonnegotiable, or at least radical, demands. If it does so, it will probably extend its political influence and assume the features of a social movement but at the cost of losing some or most of the benefits stemming from its economic and political integration.

Whether we regard trade unions as primarily associations for interest representation, as organizations, or as economic and political actors, the importance that they acquired in most advanced economies in the latter part of the 20th century is increasingly challenged by various developments. The most important of these is perhaps the continuing fragmentation of employees’ interests and demands due to processes such as the reorganization of production, the search for flexibility, and the growth of the service sector and of nonmanual and atypical work. Trade unions may find it increasingly difficult to build their demands around key professional figures such as the assembly-line worker in the Fordist factory. Not only has it become more difficult to aggregate demands and identify “general class interests,” but as individual workers identify increasingly less with the “working class” as a whole—and with the projects for economic and political reform historically pursued by the labor movement—they also tend to identify more with the company or production unit to which they belong. In other words, the traditional endeavor by trade union organizations to impose uniform protection standards on employers is now regarded by many employees as an oversimplification of their needs and capabilities.

In conclusion, the labor movement in the new millennium seems to be faced with various difficulties but also with new opportunities. The former indubitably include the reduction of trade unions’ scope for action within the economic system due

to industrial restructuring and the greater precariousness of labor markets. Among the more general difficulties is the disappearance of a certain type of solidarity based on homogeneous working and living conditions, ideology, and the ability to standardize demands. On the other hand, the new opportunities open to labor movements seemingly depend above all on their capacity to interpret and mediate the need of management for closer workforce involvement in companies by qualifying the cooperation/involvement requested and subordinating it to the fulfillment of workers' general interests and objectives. From this point of view, it may become of great importance for labor movements to develop the ability to induce companies and institutions to relinquish market strategies based exclusively on costs and to adopt, instead, a competitiveness model based on product quality and a highly skilled workforce—that is, a model centered on the full development of human resources.

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*See also* Neocorporatism; Social Movements; Socialism; Socialist Parties

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## LANGUAGE AND POLITICS

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*See* Political Communication; Politics of Language

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## LEADERSHIP

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Given the essential and inescapable role of leaders in political life, the notion of political leadership has been a constant presence in the development of political thought. Historically, however, there has never been an agreed-on definition of political leadership, and even the political science literature developed during the second half of the 20th century has not modified the somewhat fuzzy nature of this concept.

It was the contribution of the modern elite theory—and particularly the work of Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, and Vilfredo Pareto—which overwhelmed the traditional Machiavellian associations between “leader” and “power,” as well as the vision of the “great man” theory of history. In the context of elite theory, leadership was conceived of as a behavioral concept: It is relatively easy to individuate leaders as persons who exercise control over the behavior of others, but their capabilities and their natures vary from one case to another. The new empiricism developed within the social sciences at the dawn of the 20th century brought about new efforts to study political leadership as a result of human interactions. Since then, political leadership has remained a core concept in political science, although not many works have explicitly addressed the notion.

Taking into consideration some selected works about the nature of political leadership developed in the 20th century, we can roughly describe the evolution of scientific reflection on this notion, identifying three historical phases: The first phase, developed during the intrawar period, was particularly fruitful in producing theoretical contemplations about the nature of leadership during the critical historical scenario of the so-called first democratization—that is, the process of changing to a democratic regime for the first time. The second phase—in the second half of the 20th century—was characterized by a significant

growth of behavioral studies, which put the transformation of political leadership at the core of the empirical analysis of politics. The current phase is dominated by attention being newly paid to the problem of the complexity of political leadership in a different geographical area.

### From Weber to Lasswell: Classic Reflections on the Nature of Political Leadership

All the theoretical assessments of political leadership refer to the well-known tripartite typology developed by Max Weber, which is very often labeled as an ideal-typical classification of political leadership—traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic rule. Actually, this celebrated piece of work is an analysis of legitimated rule—not of leadership. Indeed, Weber's influence is due to his intuition about the growing presence within modern leadership of peculiar elements, which determine the leader's capability to "change history." According to Weber, charismatic authority is that particular feature of leadership which explains the development of single figures and new styles of command, justifying exceptional changes in political life. Legal-rational rule, on the other hand, is the ideal type of continuity, constraining the behaviors of the innovators. Moving from this argument, the study of leadership within the democratic environment has been expanded all along the course of the 20th century, focusing on the causal links between democratization, crises, transitions, and types of legitimated rule.

If Weber's work is a crucial step in the analysis of the link between leaders and power, other classic social scientists of the 20th century have renovated the study of the link between political leadership and political personality. Probably the first modern attempt to define the qualities pertaining to political leadership can be found in the work of Robert Michels, who critiques and illuminates the characters of leaders from the Platonic tradition to the 19th century—initially focusing on the art of rhetoric. However, it was Harold Lasswell who provided an important basis for the empirical study of leadership behaviors. According to Lasswell, whose theories had been initially influenced by classic elite theorists and by Freud's psychoanalysis, personality is a crucial variable shaped by a

system of interactions between the values of the social and the political system at the macrolevel and the cultural and social/familial environment at the individual level. Although Lasswell was never concerned with the notion of leadership, his work had much influence on future reflections on such a notion, and his call for a more attentive study of biographies and social connections of political leaders was decisive in the development of behavioralism.

### Empirical Studies in Political Leadership

The impetus provided by Lasswell for an analytical study of political leadership has resulted in a significant growth of knowledge. Especially during the 1960s and the 1970s, the refinement of the comparative method and awareness that a nonparochial analysis of politics was necessary paved the way for accurate explorations of the manifold empirical dimensions of political leadership. The use of behavioral theories and support from research in various disciplines of the social sciences, including political psychology, sociology, and history, have enabled us to fathom the hidden dispositions of our rulers. The works of James MacGregor Burns (1978), grounded in the notion of transformational leadership, for instance, were fundamental in understanding the usefulness of intensive biographical studies aimed at creating taxonomies of leaders based on their different capabilities of interaction. In the same period, Glenn Paige (1977) put the notion of political leadership at the center of a complex multidisciplinary framework that explains the variance in the behavior of leaders by using a number of macro variables, including personality, role, organization, values, and capability of interaction.

A large number of studies were then undertaken in different disciplinary environments, focusing on different definitions of political leadership. In particular, the analytical dimensions of leader's ambition and leader's style gained immediate relevance for the new generation of political scientists. These dimensions of variation were at first studied above all in the United States. However, the seminal works of scholars like Arthur Schlesinger Jr., James Barber, and Lewis Edinger became a fundamental starting point for a discussion that soon spread to Europe, leading



to new important studies in a few years. More or less at the same time, institutional analysis considered the relevance of leadership positions in assessing the different nature and performance of political systems. One should mention here that many important theories were developed between the 1970s and the 1980s on the nature of chief executives and the institutional environments in which they act.

Later, works on political leadership were focusing on different aspects of the phenomenon, also including the relationships between leaders and public opinion. Jean Blondel provides a general assessment of the role and the impact of political leaders in the contemporary world. In terms of empirical analysis, this work suggests a new typology of political leaders based on two dimensions: the extent of their concern with maintenance or change in the society and the scope of the political message they want to introduce in the political system. Working within such a conceptual grid, it is possible to assess the role of a wide set of leaders, from the anonymous managers (specialized reformers aiming at maintenance, such as ministers who deal with day-to-day administration) to the famous ideologues of the 20th century—for instance Mao or Hitler—who carried out important societal changes with a strong political message.

### **Leader Democracy? Transforming the Link Between Representation and Leaders**

Decades of empirical studies have provided a significant understanding of the dynamics of contemporary political leadership. However, we still lack a comprehensive and agreed-on definition of what leadership is, and scholars are still divided about the correlation between (strong) leadership and (good) democracy. Moreover, the rapid transformation of democratic politics raises a number of new questions about the meaning of political leadership. The focus seems to have shifted away from the interpretation of classic puzzles, like the duration of leaders and measurement of their charisma, to the extent of a leader's role in policy making, communication, and electoral performance. Political theorists, in particular, have stressed the trade-off between the decline (transformation) of representative democracy and the emergence of a strong leadership influence in specific policy

sectors and processes. Bernard Manin (1997) argues that the partial independence of representatives has been reinforced—in what he calls audience democracy—by an electoral link built on images rather than programs. This would increase the capability of single leaders to conduct policy processes and shape political discourse.

The changing link between representatives and the represented is also seen as an element of a broader change, connected to an evolutionary phenomenon that involves political processes and the functions of democracy. According to Andras Köröseny, the meaning of political representation tends to be more and more differentiated from the two traditional images of deliberation and mirroring since what is at the core of political representation is “acting and supplying new policies, creating a new quality”—that is to say, leadership. The selection of leaders who would be really free to make changes is therefore the very function of democratic rule. Leaders are expected to represent the people in a qualitative rather than in a mechanical way. In empirical terms, a lot of implications can be derived from such a statement: They refer, respectively, to the spheres of democratic institutions and political discourse.

Concerning the effects of leadership in terms of institutional change, many recent studies have converged to support the argument that core executives or chief executives have been incrementally more motivated to turn specific policies in new directions. The thesis of presidentialization of politics is grounded in the development of the role of guidance and coordination among a number of policymakers who are much more evidently subordinated to the leader. In a similar way, the processes of vertical governance shift, which would determine phenomena such as globalization or the Europeanization of domestic politics, envisage the emergence of more room for maneuver for national leaders, who are therefore not only free to shape policy processes but also to have an impact on public opinion.

Finally, an open question that lies at the center of a vivid discussion concerns the influence of current political leaders on political discourse and electoral outcomes. Conventional wisdom suggests that such a role is growing due to the effects of less well-identified phenomena such as “leaderization” and/or personalization of politics. However, not

all the implications of this conventional view are true. According to Anthony King (2002), democratic polities are not necessarily personality oriented; partisan preferences and party politics still count—more than the personal features of a party's own leaders—although a great deal of variation can be seen if one observes the electoral outcomes of a number of political leaders in advanced democracies. Similarly, a high degree of variation has been noted by Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiebault (2009), who conducted research on 11 recent political leaders. According to them, the relevance of personality in political leadership has increased during the last 50 years, balancing the decline in importance of relevant variables such as social stratification, class, and religious affiliation. Personalization of leadership is therefore a real phenomenon, although its impact seems to be strongly influenced by historical and country-specific variables. Therefore, “personalized leadership” seems to differ from one case to another.

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*See also* Cabinets; Elites; Elitism; Executive; Parliaments; Parties

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world is its increasingly juridical character. This process of legalization refers to the transfer of public policy making to judicial institutions, the increasingly juridical and rule-governed processes of policy making, the central role of administrative law in the governance of public policy, and the growing importance of independent regulatory bodies in areas such as finance and health. The legalization of public policy is driven by an increasing fragmentation of interests and institutions within the state; a specific strategy of core executives and dominant social and political coalitions is to protect their interests, control subordinate authorities, and move contentious issues into nonpolitical arenas, which is often a strategy promoted by international organizations and agents. Legalization brings with it an array of new actors—courts, public interests lawyers, and regulatory institutions—using a wide array of new instruments of state authority such as contracts and audits.

What is intriguing is that this legalization has gone in tandem with programs of market reform across the developed and developing world. As noted by Kanishka Jayasuriya, market reforms have led to new forms of regulatory governance. It is clear that the credit crisis of 2008 will further accelerate the development of regulatory governance. One of the significant features of this regulatory governance is its increasingly juridical character, in that it is rule governed—relies on judicial, quasi-judicial, or independent agencies, for its implementation—and uses a range of regulatory techniques, which include the use of standard-establishing procedures for the operation of policy and the use of contractualism and audit.

#### Mechanisms of Legalization

Five main mechanisms of legalization of public policy can be identified:

1. Legalization has been driven by the increasing fragmentation of institutions as well as actors providing incentives for political elites to legalize various areas of public policy. It does this, in part, because by making public policy rule governed, it places the core executive at a distance from the competing interests of subordinate institutions and actors in areas as diverse as communications and agriculture. Even in authoritarian systems,

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## LEGALIZATION OF POLICY

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One of the significant elements of the transformation of governance and public policy across the

legalization has become a desired option: For example, the Chinese Communist Party now faces pressures from competing clients on issues such as environmental and economic regulation. In these circumstances, legalization becomes an attractive option because it moves the adjudication of contentious issues to a seemingly neutral arena.

2. Legalization, especially through the judicialization of politics and policy making, provides the basis on which the threatened élites and vested interests can protect their assets from encroachment by assertive political forces within the democratic political process. For example, the Thai Constitution of 2007, which further accelerated judicial policy making, reflected the desire of sections of the middle-class nongovernmental organizations, some professional groups, and the Thai monarchy to protect their interests from populist forces with majority electoral support.

3. Legalization facilitates a process of meta-governance that allows the core executive to control the structural process of governance rather than the actual conduct of policy. Hence, for example, the rules, actors, and issues of network governance—an important tool of public policy—are controlled by higher level public or even private agencies. As another example of meta-governance, take the case of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, which has been active in asserting control over various aspects of local political processes, such as electoral laws.

4. Legalization has been driven by the fact that symbolic and cultural political disputes cannot easily be resolved by the cut and thrust of electoral politics, which are amenable to distributive politics. For example, the protection and recognition of multiculturalism in the constitutionally enshrined Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been an important influence in both policy formulation and implementation.

5. Legalization has been driven by international forces, which increasingly work not through treaty of hard law but through soft forms of internal governmental regulation. Hence, for example, some bilateral trade agreements establish investor mechanisms that legalize what otherwise would be in the domestic arena of governance. Similarly, the

advent of global administrative law—that is, the rules and regulations of global governance located within national policy-making institutions—has served to legalize areas of domestic economic and social governance.

### Actors in the Legalization of Policy

Judicial organizations have taken on a key role in the legalization of public policy. These include constitutional or appellate courts that increasingly set the parameters of public policy, which in turn include regional courts such as the European Court of Justice but also courts such as the Supreme Court of India. All these have become assertive through the category of public interest litigation (PIL). PIL allows courts to dilute the requirements of *locus standi* and allow social activists, lawyers, and even letters of complaint as the basis for the investigation and resolution of policy and political disputes over environmental and other issues.

New institutions have been set up to oversee the legalization of public policy. For example, the regulation of sport has become increasingly juridical through the complex dispute settlement processes in the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS). This body adjudicates disputes over issues such as performance-enhancing drugs or the observance of criteria for team selections. In addition to international policies, legalization of policy has also occurred in many areas at the national level. For instance, in 1995, with the agreement of all Australian governments—federal, state, and territories—the National Competition Policy in Australia has articulated competitive principles to be applied to all legislation. These new rules were to be enforced by a new independent agency called the National Competition Council. In the case of the competition policy, legalization is designed to ensure economic order and competitiveness. In effect, this amounts to the subordination of regulatory rule making to economic imperatives, and what matters are not the specific rules as such but the justification of policy decisions framed in terms of economic criteria.

Legalization of public policy and the other actions of courts require the existence, mobilization, and support of a wide range of lawyers, activists, and other state actors. In China, the functioning of the administrative law regime requires the participation

of lawyers and other state officials to give the administrative court system some legitimacy. Legalization of public policy requires the embedding of judicial institutions within a complex set of relationships between those actors and the legal and nongovernmental organizations.

There has been a shift toward autonomous dependent state agencies that are independent of the political executive. This is best illustrated by the increased independence of central banks from political institutions. For example, the Bank of Korea (BOK) Act effectively entrenches the autonomy of the BOK from the Ministry of Finance. Although mechanisms of consultation between the ministry and the BOK have been established, the executive is unable to impose a particular course of monetary policy on the monetary board, thereby diminishing the capacity of central economic agencies to direct the kind of industry policies followed, which has been a marked feature of the developmental state.

### Instruments

#### *Rules Versus Discretionary Policy*

Increased independence for state agencies has been accompanied by a rule-based rather than a discretionary policy-making process—often in a juridical form. Economic governance has become increasingly focused on the implementation of rules (often with a legal basis) that govern economic policy. These rules are legalized to the extent that they stipulate more specifically the principles or standards to be applied, making the observance of these standards or rules mandatory, and delegate their enforcement to an independent agency or dispute resolution mechanism.

Even in what once was the paradigm case of discretionary policy making in East Asia, a more assertive legalism has emerged in public policy. The panoply of administrative guidance and executive discretionary power of the developmental state has given way to the flowering of a growing and assertive legalism and constitutionalism in economic and political decision making. One such important regulatory institution is the Financial Supervisory Commission, which operates autonomously and has been given considerable power to regulate and monitor the Korean financial system.

#### *Proceduralism*

Legalization is often directed not at specifically influencing the behavior or conduct of individuals or policy but rather at attempting to provide the framework or principles through which policy making is undertaken. In this respect, governance consists of a procedural regulation for setting the broad procedures and mandates for policy making. Through proceduralism, autonomous sites of governance come to be constituted not by direct application of state law, regulation, or authority but through more indirect means that enhance or generate the capacities of these sites of governance for self-regulation.

Consequently, these processes specify procedures to be followed by individuals or corporate bodies complying with regulatory rules. For example, a corporate regulator, such as the Australian Competition Council, will institute compliance processes within the corporate entities rather than directly intervene to enforce rules. The objective of the agency is to create a system of metagovernance to monitor the extent to which regulated entities have put in place a process of regulatory compliance.

#### *Contractualism and Audit*

A key instrument of legalization is through a contract-like relationship between public agents, the deliverers of policy (i.e., those who implement policies), and clients. The agents operating these frameworks—be they individuals or local/national government, civil society actors, or even transnational agencies—are required to meet certain standards of performance and conduct as a condition for the receipt of a grant or a benefit. What is more, the performances of these standards are monitored, and there are specified mechanisms of enforcement. For instance, employment and welfare programs in the UK provide an excellent illustration of contractualism. They exemplify governing through contracts either directly with individual welfare recipients or with private providers of public services. In fact, this enrollment of private individuals or agencies in a pervasive system of regulatory governance is one of the distinguishing elements of contractual governance of public policy.

One of the consequences of this contractualist governance is the proliferation of audits, such as quality assurance audits in public education and

health. Many of these audits and auditing agencies have statutory powers. As private agencies or public–private partnerships can take on enhanced governance functions, they are subject to increasingly stringent audit and inspections mechanisms. In other words, the firm or the university itself becomes the site of self-regulation. Far from being in retreat, this contractual governance reaches deeper into civil society than was the case during the peak of the postwar welfare state.

### Conclusion

The distinguishing feature of the emerging forms of regulatory governance is that that challenges our conventional understanding of public governance and accountability. This new governance turns away from the traditional command-and-control system of regulation by public administration agencies in favor of independent agencies and judicial authorities using new forms of regulatory techniques that are increasingly juridical in character. Political analysts are now obliged to pay greater attention to the ways in which politics are played out in these various regulatory arenas—be they in monetary policy or corporate governance. This highlights, above all, the need for a more rigorous analysis of the new kinds of actors, institutions, and arenas that have been unleashed by the legalization of public policy.

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*See also* Accountability; Central Banks; Compliance; Discretion; Judiciary; Policy Instruments

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## LEGITIMACY

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The legitimacy of any system of power, including that of its individual power holders, lies in the degree to which it is acknowledged as rightful, both by those involved with and subject to it and by third parties whose support and recognition it may depend on. Although the definition of legitimacy as rightful power or authority is a widely agreed-on one, much else about the subject is strongly contested:

How significant is legitimacy to the maintenance and effectiveness of power relations?

Who are the key audiences for legitimacy claims?

What exactly is it that makes power rightful?

How is legitimacy created and maintained?

What are the key features differentiating the legitimacy of different political systems, and what are their respective strengths and vulnerabilities?

This entry treats these main points of disagreement in turn.

A useful starting point is to distinguish between a philosophical and a social-scientific approach to the study of legitimacy. Throughout human history,

those occupying positions of power, and especially political power, have sought to ground their authority in a principle of legitimacy, which shows why their access to, and exercise of, power is rightful and why those subject to it have a corresponding duty to obey. These claims have been elaborated by apologists in narrative form and by iconographers in pictorial and artistic representations. However, where the possession or exercise of power has been challenged or contested, critical reflection and argument about what makes power rightful has taken place. It has usually been the task of philosophers to elaborate such reflection into a considered theory or theories and to test legitimacy claims against accepted standards of normative validity and discursive argument. From at least the time of the ancient Greeks onward, the study of legitimacy has been central to the practice of political philosophy, through its analysis of normative principles of the right and the good.

The study of legitimacy as a subject for political science, by contrast, is comparatively recent, dating from the early 20th century. In contrast to political philosophy, its focus is more empirical than normative, more on processes and outcomes than on abstract principles. Its concern is less with the reasoned validity of legitimacy claims than with the degree of their recognition by the relevant social agents and with the consequences that follow from that recognition for the stability of a system of power or rule and for the manner in which it is organized. It was the German sociologist Max Weber who was first responsible for elaborating a social-scientific account of legitimacy and for exploring its significance for power relations in his work *Economy and Society*. Most of the key debates in political science since then have stemmed from Weber's work, and this entry will return to it at a number of points.

### The Significance of Legitimacy for the Exercise of Power

According to Weber, wherever power holders are acknowledged as legitimate or rightful, they can count on those subordinate to them obeying their commands and following their instructions without the widespread use of coercion or the constant fear of disobedience or subversion. This is because people will recognize a duty to obey and not

merely an interest or advantage in doing so. As Weber argued, motives of personal advantage, solidarity, custom, or whatever are not a sufficiently reliable basis for power relations. In addition, there is normally a further element—the belief in legitimacy. Every system of power, therefore, attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy and to demonstrate a moral authority going beyond any purely coercive capacity.

While most later authors agree on the significance of legitimacy for the reliability and durability of a system of power, they are divided on the question of who constitutes the key audience for legitimacy claims. If we distinguish between the key power holders, their enforcement and administrative agents, and the wider population that is subordinate to them, then, one school of thought holds that a belief in legitimacy is necessary only for the first two of these. It is the powerful who most need to believe in their own rightfulness if they are to have the self-confidence to rule effectively, and their administrative staff must believe likewise if they are to be effective and reliable enforcers of their superiors' policies. In this view, it matters little what wider strata of the subordinate believe since it is primarily a recognition of their own impotence in the face of the powerful—a sense of “dull compulsion,” not any sense of duty—that typically keeps them in line. By the same token, it is only when those in power, or their administrative staff, come to lose confidence in their own legitimacy that the power structure comes to be critically weakened. And it is divisions within a ruling elite, not the loss of legitimacy among a wider public, that holds the key to the decline and fall of regimes.

Now, it is certainly true, and Weber acknowledged as much, that both historically and in the contemporary world, we can point to examples of power structures where the obedience of those subject to them has been maintained simply through coercion and a sense of their own impotence. However, to limit the significance of legitimacy merely to those who exercise power and administer it can be challenged on two grounds. First, where power over a population depends on coercion alone, it requires a costly apparatus of enforcement and surveillance to maintain it, extending to the agents of enforcement themselves, who may, as in the late Roman Empire, simply sell

themselves to the highest bidder. Moreover, the system of power now has only one line of defense—that of force—and it can therefore collapse very rapidly if the coercion is insufficient or if people believe that those in power have lost the capacity or the will to use it. Once Premier Mikhail Gorbachev made clear that the former USSR would no longer intervene militarily in Eastern Europe, the writing was on the wall for the Communist regimes there since their loss of internal legitimacy meant that they were only kept in place by the threat of Soviet invasion.

So first, then, a wider acknowledgment of legitimacy enhances the stability of a system of power, as well as its economy of operation, through the recognition of the subordinates that they have a corresponding duty to obey and cooperate with it and that they do not merely have a contingent interest in doing so. People expect power holders to meet certain moral or normative conditions in their access to and exercise of power, and the loss of moral authority consequent on their failure to meet these can lead to widespread disobedience or resistance, reaching into the coercive agencies themselves. It would be a mistake therefore to see a regime crisis as originating in divisions within the ruling apparatus alone and not in the attitudes and behavior of a wider population. The collapse of the Shah of Iran's regime in 1979 is a particularly spectacular example of the erosion of an army's loyalty in the face of repeated mass protests, resulting from the regime's loss of moral authority in the eyes of the population at large.

A second reason why acknowledgment of a power regime's legitimacy by those subordinate to it is important is that those in power are much more able to achieve their purposes when these depend on the willing cooperation of those subject to them. Once again, the exceptions or limiting cases prove the rule. For example, there have been purely coercive labor regimes, such as slave societies or early industrial capitalism, where the subordinates were regarded as objects (e.g., chattels, hands), readily dispensable for new recruits, and the quality of their cooperation did not greatly matter. In these cases, the elaborate justifications constructed to legitimate these arrangements were not intended for those subjected to them but for the wealthy and powerful themselves and for the other elite audiences whose cooperation they might need.

However, the more a power structure is dependent on a settled subordinate population for the achievement of its purposes, and especially where the quality of the performance matters, the more essential it is that the relationship is constructed according to an acknowledgment of reciprocal rights and duties, such as that that only a principle of legitimacy can provide. This entails that the power relation is defined as a normative and not just a *de facto* one and that this definition sets limits to the scope of the powerful as well as to the obligations of the subordinate. Where the legitimacy of the powerful is widely acknowledged, to that extent will the powerful be able to rely on the cooperation of the subordinate necessary to achieve their purposes. This issue is particularly pertinent to the modern state, which requires those subject to its authority not only to obey its laws but also to pay their taxes, cooperate with its policies, and even to fight in its defense.

Some simple examples will serve to demonstrate the point. No one likes paying taxes. But it makes an enormous difference to a system of tax collection if people acknowledge the right of the state to tax them and accept the system as broadly fair. Then, the vast majority will pay up without resistance. Naturally, the administrative arrangements will have to be efficient, and there will have to be compulsion at the margin to deal with backsliders and to convince the rest that there are no free riders. But a state where people recognize no duty to pay taxes will have to engage in enormously expensive systems of enforcement, which will substantially reduce the overall take and may even compromise the capacity to raise taxes altogether. It follows that the effectiveness and the legitimacy of a system of power are not unconnected features, as many writers have supposed. This is because the capacity of political authorities is also dependent on their moral authority or standing among those whose cooperation is required for them to achieve their purposes.

Another example we could take is that of policing. Where policing is based on consent, that is, where the police are recognized as broadly working for the benefit of the population as a whole, treating people fairly and with restraint, and where there is confidence in the system of complaint and redress in the event of abuse, then, people will cooperate with the police in the prevention, reporting, and

investigation of crime. To that extent, the police will be enabled to carry out their function effectively. Or take the mundane example of a classroom teacher. If pupils do not share a belief in the purpose or value of education, on which the justification of the teacher's authority is based, he or she will have to devote correspondingly greater energies to maintaining order than to teaching. To that extent, the purposes for which power is held will not be achieved, and this may lead in turn to a further erosion of legitimacy.

Enhanced order, stability, and effectiveness—these are the typical strengths of a legitimate system of power as a result of the obligations on subordinates that follow from their recognition of its legitimacy. As already mentioned, there may indeed be examples of power systems where the audience for legitimation claims is confined to the powerful themselves and their immediate associates, and legitimacy is needed only for their internal self-belief and cohesion in the face of a population compelled to brute obedience. Yet these are only limiting cases. More typically, legitimacy matters for both the rulers and the ruled, for power holders and those subordinate to them, and their relationship is constructed as a normative and not merely a *de facto* one, with legitimating norms establishing mutual ties of obligation and performance between them.

A final potential audience for legitimacy claims should be mentioned here—that is, third parties who stand outside a given system of power but on whose recognition and cooperation it may depend. It is difficult to generalize about these since contexts vary so widely. Yet it can happen that a refusal by an outside body to recognize a given power as legitimate can have significant repercussions for it internally, especially when withdrawal of necessary cooperation or some other sanction follows. For example, the international sanctions imposed on the apartheid regime in South Africa because of its violation of internationally established norms against race discrimination made their own contribution to the loss of self-confidence on the part of the regime and to the success of the internal liberation struggle. The role of internationally accepted norms in sustaining or eroding the legitimacy of states or their governments in the contemporary world will be discussed more fully later on.

### What Exactly Makes Power Legitimate?

According to Max Weber, what makes power legitimate in a social-scientific analysis is not what meets the political philosopher's independently validated principles of rightful authority but what is accepted by the relevant agents as legitimate in their context. Legitimacy for the social scientist is simply the belief in legitimacy since it is this that determines people's behavior. Moreover, legitimating beliefs will vary enormously from one historical period or societal type to another. We may regard the divine right of kings as philosophically groundless, but the task of the social scientist is to understand how people came to believe it, how the belief was reproduced and disseminated, and by whom and what followed from it for how a given system of rule was organized and for how people related to it. In other words, the critique of ideas has to give way to a sociology of knowledge if we are to explain the key features of any given system of power that we wish to study.

Some philosophers have objected to what they see as a completely reductionist definition of legitimacy, equating it with the purely subjective belief in legitimacy; to the dismissal of ideas as simply ideology, myth, ruling formula, and so on; and to the substitution of the study of the origin, reproduction, and dissemination of beliefs for a critical analysis of their content. The implication seems to be that people can be brought to believe almost anything, however preposterous, by those who control the production and dissemination of ideas. Should we then treat power as legitimate simply because enough people have by one means or another come to believe that it is?

Now, it is true that a social-scientific analysis of ideas has to start from a relativizing standpoint and that a historian or political scientist can only understand the ideas of a different age or society to the extent that he or she stands back from his or her own beliefs and the assumption of their self-evident truth. Yet such an understanding of a different set of beliefs is only possible through a careful analysis of their content and internal logic as well as of the circumstances of their production and dissemination. In the case of legitimacy, despite all the historical variability of legitimating ideas, it can be shown that they all share a common and distinctive threefold structure to their content. Power, and especially political power, is



recognized as legitimate to the extent that the following conditions are satisfied:

1. It is acquired and exercised according to established rules. This is the level of legality, whether or not the rules take an informal, conventional, or explicitly legal form. On its own, however, legality is insufficient since the rules have to be underpinned by normative principles that justify them. Hence, we also have the following.
2. The rules of power are justifiable according to accepted beliefs about (a) the rightful source of authority, which determines who is qualified to exercise power and how they are appointed and (b) the proper ends or purposes of power and standards in its exercise. This is the level of normative justifiability. There is a further dimension still, however, and that is the following.
3. Positions of authority are publicly acknowledged by relevant subordinates through actions that confirm their acceptance and recognition of it. This is the level of legitimation.

These three levels are not alternatives since all contribute to legitimacy; together they provide the subordinate with moral grounds for compliance or cooperation with authority. The fact that all are required can be shown by the different negative words used to express the different ways in which power may lack legitimacy. If there is a manifest breach of the rules, we use the term *illegitimacy*. If the rules are only weakly supported by societal beliefs or are deeply contested, we can talk of a legitimacy deficit. If consent or recognition is publicly withdrawn or withheld, we speak of delegitimation.

If we take the subject of political power, the most extreme example of illegitimacy is usurpation or coup d'état—power attained in violation of the rules. Examples of legitimacy deficit are enormously varied, from situations where changing societal beliefs leave existing institutional arrangements unsupported or where people have widely diverging beliefs—say, about which state they should belong to—to situations where government is chronically unable to meet the basic purposes,

such as welfare or security, which people expect it to. Legitimacy deficits usually only become critical when some performance failure of government exposes a fundamental doubt about its rightful source of authority. Examples of delegitimation include acts of widespread public opposition to a regime, of which revolutionary mobilization is the most extreme example. Revolutions follow a typical course from chronic legitimacy deficit of the regime (doubtful or disputed source of authority compounded by performance failure), through its delegitimation by mass oppositional mobilization, which splits the governing apparatus, to an illegitimate seizure of power, which heralds its reconstruction under a new set of legitimating rules and principles.

The different levels or dimensions of legitimacy outlined above constitute only the most general or abstract framework, the specific content of which has to be filled in, so to speak, for each historical society or example of rule. They provide a heuristic tool to guide analysis. Is political authority valid according to the rules? The relevant rules have to be identified, their conventional or legal form established, the mode of adjudication appropriate to them determined for the given context, and so on. Are the rules justifiable in terms of the beliefs and norms of the particular society, and are these norms relatively uncontested? We need to examine the specific beliefs current in the society about the rightful source of authority, on the one hand (divine approval, dynastic inheritance, privileged knowledge, ethnic membership, the people, etc.), and the proper ends of government, on the other (conquest, security, welfare, salvation, or whatever), all of which assume the fulfillment of a general interest beyond the narrow interests of those exercising power. Are there, finally, actions expressive of consent or public affirmation on the part of those qualified to give it? Who counts as qualified and what actions count as appropriate (e.g., oaths of allegiance, acclamation, and election) will be determined by the conventions of the given society or system of power. Underlying all these historical differences, there is a common structure to legitimacy to guide analysis.

This common structure of legitimacy is not arbitrary or accidental since each component relates to a different aspect of power that is socially problematic. All power over others, and especially

political power with its access to the means of violence, is potentially disruptive of and intrusive into people's lives and well-being. Therefore, its acquisition and exercise cries out to be rule governed and located in the most imposing source of authority acknowledged by the society. Since those who exercise power enjoy great status and privilege, they have to be shown to merit it and to use it to serve a more general interest than merely their own advantage. Finally, since power entails the capacity to get others to do what otherwise they would not choose to do, the loss of freedom involved is validated by public acts of acknowledgment, which serve to bind in subjects and subordinates to obedience. These are the elements, therefore, which combine to make power rightful or legitimate.

The recognition that legitimacy is multidimensional and a knowledge of what these dimensions are moves social science away from treating the subjective belief in legitimacy as if it were totally content free—that just any belief will do—and closer to the philosopher's discursive analysis of the content of ideas. In particular, it shows how social science and political philosophy share a common subject of enquiry, with recognizably common features. Yet a crucial difference remains between them, as already indicated. For the social and political scientist, legitimating ideas and practices derive their force from the beliefs, conventions, and procedures current in and specific to a given historical society or political system. And the focus of enquiry is always an empirical one: How are legitimating ideas reproduced and disseminated? Through what agency? What effects do they have and on whom? Above all, what makes them credible in the given social context, and why, if they do so, do they come to lose their credibility?

In answering these questions, we need to get away from the view that the only processes that require examination are those involving the ideologists, who develop and disseminate ideas, and the institutions that reproduce them. Of course these are important. But we also need to examine the way in which the very structuring of power makes certain legitimating ideas credible or believable. It is a notable feature of power relations that they are themselves capable of generating the evidence required for their own legitimation.

Two recurrent ways in which this occurs can be identified. One is the way in which the evidence of

superiority and inferiority, which justifies the difference of fates and inequalities of condition between dominant and subordinate, is itself largely the product of this condition. Those who are excluded from key positions, activities, or resources are thereby denied the opportunity to acquire or demonstrate the capacities and characteristics appropriate to their occupation and exercise, so justifying their subordinate position. Throughout history, the exclusion of women from privileged positions or activities monopolized by men has prevented them from acquiring the capacities necessary for their occupancy or exercise. Their inferiority thus appears naturally rather than socially constructed, serving to justify their exclusion in a self-fulfilling manner.

Second, there is the way in which the idea that the powerful serve a general interest gains credibility from the structuring of power itself. Once some necessary social resource or activity comes to be controlled by a particular group, it follows that the interests of society at large can only be met through satisfying the interests of that group and on terms acceptable to them. Those who have historically controlled the means of production or subsistence, by violence or administration, have been in a position to ensure that general needs for welfare, employment, or security could only be met through the power relations that simultaneously secured their own privileges. To this extent, their claims to serve the general interest have had an evidential basis deriving from the structure of power itself.

We could take today's international bankers as an example. To be sure, their claims to legitimacy have had an ideological basis, in the self-regulating market doctrine that has justified their activities becoming less and less rule governed—a doctrine with its exponents in the economics departments of universities and its disseminators among politicians as well as among the bankers themselves. Yet the very fact that the economy of every society depends on the credit that only banks supply has given credibility to the claim that their activities together serve an essential public interest. And the very complexity and global reach of their operations have reinforced the idea that they are uniquely qualified to understand and manage the processes involved and that their indispensability justifies the enormous salaries and bonuses to which they lay claim.

Of course, the near collapse of the banking system in the credit crunch of 2008 demonstrated that much of this legitimating fabric was illusory. The free market was exposed as far from self-regulating, many of the bankers' activities were shown to be not merely socially useless but also socially and economically damaging, and their claim to possess an esoteric knowledge available only to the initiated was punctured by the revelation that even they did not understand the complex instruments in which they were trading. They suffered a legitimacy crisis of epic proportions. What remains to be explained is why the active process of popular delegitimation that typically follows such a crisis did not fully materialize. Apart from a few broken windows, no bankers' houses were burnt down; nor were any bankers strung up from the lamp-posts. One reason may be that the institutions in which they work were difficult to penetrate. Another may be that the governments which, as third parties, endorsed the legitimacy of the bankers' activities and rewards, proved to be more accessible targets of popular anger, whether through mass mobilization, as in Iceland; through the sanction of electoral process, as in the United States; or through the public humiliation of parliament in an expenses scandal, as in the United Kingdom (UK). Yet the cost of the bankers' insulation from the full impact of popular anger and of their avoidance of a thorough-going process of delegitimation was shown in the all too rapid return to business as usual and in the displacement of the costs of the crisis from the financial to the political domain.

A social-scientific analysis of legitimacy, then, involves understanding the ideas and processes that legitimate a given system of power in its context; exploring the different dimensions of legality, normative justifiability, and legitimation that contribute to the acknowledgment of power as rightful by the relevant actors; identifying both the agents of ideological production and dissemination and the aspects of a power system that give legitimating ideas their credibility; and finally, exploring the processes that may lead to their erosion. The next section will use the framework developed here to delineate the legitimating principles and procedures of the main types of political systems of the 20th century and identify their typical points of vulnerability.

### The Legitimacy of Different Regime Types

A third issue that Weber's analysis of legitimacy initiated ongoing debate about was the relation between legitimating principles and the way systems of power are organized. He argued that the kind of legitimacy being claimed had a determining effect on the mode of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the manner of exercising authority, all of which would differ according to their different legitimating principles. It followed that types of power systems could be classified according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each. He then proceeded to differentiate between three types of legitimating claims and their respective grounds, which he termed *traditional* (belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions), *rational-legal* (belief in the legality of enacted and rationally justifiable law), and *charismatic* (belief in the exceptional qualities of an individual and the normative principles ordained by him). He used this typology to structure his political sociology and as the basis for detailed studies of patrimonial authority, bureaucracy, and religious movements, respectively.

There is no doubt that this threefold typology, and Weber's development of it, has proved historically illuminating. For example, in any study of the process of modernization, Weber's characterization of the shift from traditional to rational-legal modes of legitimation—from personal to impersonal relationships of rule, from status distinctions to rights-based authority, from dependency to citizenship, together with the separation of public finances from the private household of the ruler—has been indispensable. Weber's analysis of the appearance of charismatic figures in times of distress, social dislocation, or revolution and the routinization of their charisma in a subsequent order is also valuable. However, as a basis for constructing a typology of political regimes in the 20th century, Weber's types have proved something of a distraction for political scientists. It is not particularly useful to be told that both liberal democracy and fascism are different variants of charismatic authority, one more rule governed than the other, or that communist systems comprised a combination of the traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic modes of legitimacy.

At this point, the structure of legitimacy outlined in the previous section—comprising legality,

normative justifiability, and public affirmation—can be used to provide a more coherent basis for distinguishing between the different regime types of the 20th century: traditional, fascist, communist, liberal-democratic, and theocratic. For each, their distinctive form of law, source of authority and ends of government, and mode of public affirmation can be identified. These are shown in summary form in Table 1.

Military and other forms of dictatorship have been included as a limiting case of a nonlegitimate political order, born of illegitimacy and lacking both a rightful source of authority and any mode of expressed consent or public affirmation. Such legitimacy as military regimes have is based entirely on their purpose or mission—to save society from chaos or corruption—and is typically defined as transitional, to promote the restoration of a normal political order. Like all regimes whose legitimacy is limited to the dimension of performance, they are vulnerable once performance falters, and their failure exposes their lack of any valid source of authority. Legitimate political orders, in contrast, which are secure in their source of authority, are able to withstand shocks and performance failures and to effect routine changes of administration that do not threaten the legitimacy of the system itself.

The different political regimes in Table 1 are, like Weber's, constructed as pure or ideal types, and mixed forms combining more than one mode of legitimation can readily occur. For example, a number of recently established democracies, particularly in the South, have persisting elements of tradition-based legitimacy, whether in customary forms of law, chieftain- or clan-based authorities, or the persistence of personal favoritisms and dependencies within a formally rule-based democratic regime. Depending on the form these take, a traditional legitimacy may serve to strengthen the legitimacy of more recently established democratic institutions or come to weaken or undermine them. Of the theocratic systems, to take a different example, Iran has developed an electoral mode of legitimation, albeit flawed, while Saudi Arabia's system is based on the allegiance of a traditional and hereditary social elite. Such combinations and transitions are not uncommon but are best analyzed by starting with clearly defined types.

Table 1 provokes an obvious question: Why is it that the liberal democratic mode of legitimacy, and form of political system, has become globally prevalent by the start of the 21st century? This is partly for negative reasons—namely, that other forms of legitimate political order have proved to

**Table 1** Legitimizing Elements of Different 20th-Century Regime Types

<i>Regime Type</i>	<i>Form of Law</i>	<i>Source of Authority</i>	<i>Ends of Government</i>	<i>Mode of Public Affirmation</i>
Traditional	Custom/precedent	Heredity/the past	Well-being within traditional order	Assembly of social elite
Fascist	Sovereign decisionism	Leadership principle	National purity/expansion	Mass mobilization
Communist	Codification of the collective will	Party monopoly of truth and representation	Building communist future	Mass mobilization
Liberal-democratic	Constitutional rule of law	The people through competitive election	Individual rights protection and advancement	Electoral endorsement
Theocratic	Sacred texts and canons	Divine will interpreted by hierarchy	Purifying society's moral order	Various of the above
Dictatorial	Decree	None	Restore order and national unity	None

be ill adapted to some key aspect of contemporary economic and social conditions and have found their legitimacy to have been eroded. The hereditary monopoly of political authority characteristic of traditional systems has proved to be vulnerable to the modern requirement of a career open to talent and to popular demands for inclusion in the political process. The Communist Party's claim to represent workers' interests proved to be increasingly out of step with its members' own perceptions of them; its claim to exclusive truth lost credibility, and its goal of a realizable communist society came up against the limits of its system of economic planning. The fascist pursuit of expansionary national goals typically led to self-destructive wars, or, where these were avoided, an authority vested in the person of an individual leader proved unable to survive his death. Theocracies have proved vulnerable to fundamentalisms that have quickly forfeited popularity, or else they have provoked adherents of other faiths to open disaffection. Each system has had its own internal crisis tendencies, inherent in its legitimating principles and procedures, which have in most cases proved to be terminal.

The prevalence of liberal democracy, in contrast, is due to the fact that it has proved to be the only sustainable legitimate order compatible with the conditions of market capitalism, on the one hand, and with popular demands for freedom and full inclusion in the political process, on the other. Market capitalism's antipaternalist principles—individuals are the best judge of their own interests, are responsible for their own fate, and are sovereign in the consumer market—have over time led to the demand for people to be sovereign in the political sphere also and have undermined paternalist forms of legitimacy, especially as education has become more widespread. At the same time, the increasingly global dimensions of communication have made closed political systems, claiming a monopoly of information and ideology, unsustainable without levels of repression that provoke popular resistance. The People's Republic of China stands out, however, as a potential test of these assumptions. It remains an open question whether the post-Tiananmen combination of performance legitimacy through rapid economic growth and strenuous reinvention of the party's justifying ideology will carry conviction over time beyond the ranks of its own cadres.

This is not to say that liberal democracy does not have its own characteristic crisis tendencies, deriving from some of its legitimating principles and procedures. The electoral competition for power, with its winner-take-all outcome, gives ruling leaders and parties a powerful incentive to curtail basic rights and freedoms for opponents or to skew the registration and electoral process in their favor. Democracy's majoritarian principle can lead to the permanent exclusion of significant minorities from any share in power, provoking secessionist tendencies if not outright civil war. Also, the inescapable tension between the economic and social inequalities intrinsic to market capitalism and the equality of citizenship and political voice, which democracy promises, contains the potential for disruptive social conflict. Any of these challenges can lead to authoritarian and exclusionary deformations of democracy, in which democratic norms and procedures become more of a legitimating façade than a genuinely operative and regulating set of ideas.

However, the fact that even authoritarian regimes now claim the mantle of democratic legitimacy points to a striking feature of the international political landscape since the collapse of communist regimes in 1989. Democracy is now the only form of legitimate political order that has wide attractiveness across borders and whose norms have become endorsed at an international level. This endorsement provides a strong external legitimation to domestic political forces engaged in a struggle for democracy within a country. It is also given practical effect through positive measures of democracy support between countries and negative pressure where aid, trade, and debt interdependences are involved. Democracy promotion in one form or another on the part of established democracies in their dealings with recent or less secure ones has become a major enterprise since its inception in the early 1990s.

Yet it is also necessary to recognize the limits to democracy promotion and the point where it comes up against other legitimating ideas and norms. Most obvious of these is the force of nationalism and the principle of national sovereignty or autonomy. Since the late 18th century, the idea of nationhood, as solidarity between a people sharing key markers of identity, has inspired political movements for national unification across

borders, secession from within them, and independence from imperial powers alike. The principle of nationalism does not provide the specification for any one kind of political system but only its appropriate spatial reach. It can best be regarded as a background legitimating condition for the rulers of any and every regime in the modern world—that they should share the national identity of the ruled and should not act as agents of, or be subordinate to, an external power. Nationalism can also, of course, become foregrounded as a means to compensate for some significant legitimacy deficit in other aspects of a given regime.

Democracy promotion, then, comes up against one limit when it is perceived as an instrument for the national interests of the promoting power or powers and, above all, when its promotion infringes on national self-determination, as in attempts to impose democracy by force. Another limit, already mentioned, is set by the persisting legitimacy of traditional norms and practices, especially where democratic institutions are seen to displace or undermine these, rather than achieve an acceptable mode of coexistence with them. The transition from one type to the other is necessarily a gradual process, requiring a generational shift in the underlying beliefs supportive of a new order. In this context, it is worth noting that in the UK, it has taken until the 21st century for the hereditary component in the upper chamber of parliament, based on a traditional principle of legitimacy, to be finally abolished.

A further limit to the project of democracy promotion, specific to Islamic countries, lies in the attraction of a competing principle of legitimacy—that of a political order based on sharia law and interpreted by a religious hierarchy. Although the installation of such an order at state level has over time proved divisive and unpopular, the idea has been a potent source of support for opposition movements mobilizing against only weakly legitimated regimes in the Arab world and beyond.

All three of these alternative sources of legitimacy limiting the effectiveness of democracy promotion were combined in Afghanistan. The lengthy military occupation weakened the legitimacy of democratic institutions, already compromised by electoral fraud, with the taint of foreign imposition. These institutions were both distorted and challenged by clan-based forms of traditional

authority to which people owe their primary allegiance. And both these elements were used by the insurgent Taliban to gain support for its alternative theocratic agenda. Given such a combination, it is hard to imagine a more unfavorable terrain for a democratizing project.

### Legitimacy Beyond the State

Any analysis of the legitimating principles of contemporary regimes has to take into account the way in which forces beyond the nation-state act to constrain its decisional autonomy and compromise its claim to sovereignty. These forces may include the actions of other states, pressures from the financial and economic markets, or the rulings of international treaty bodies and other international organizations. Since the actions of the latter are becoming both more pervasive and more intrusive, for good and ill alike, the basis for their legitimacy is becoming an important subject of analysis and debate.

The legitimacy of the international organizations set up in the aftermath of World War II, and the decisions and resolutions taken by these bodies, has historically derived from the participation of member state governments and the process of agreement between them required for a binding decision. However, in more recent times, that legitimacy has increasingly been called into question on the grounds that voting rights have been skewed toward the major powers in the developed world and have not reflected either emerging powers or the weight of their populations. This is most obvious with the United Nations (UN) itself, whose permanent members of the Security Council with veto powers constitute a historical anomaly dating from the 1940s and 1950s. With similar effect, voting rights in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank depend on the amount of capital a country contributes not on equality of state membership. And even with a body like the World Trade Organization, whose members states are formally equal, decisions in practice were for a long time predetermined in so-called green room meetings of the larger trading nations and influenced by the much greater research capacity available to their delegations. The cumulative outcome of these procedural inequalities has been policies and agreements that have benefited the developed world more than the developing one.

In the changed conditions of the 21st century, it is now widely recognized that full legitimacy and the respect necessary for effective global cooperation can only be restored to these institutions by reform of their membership rules and procedures. However, there is considerable disagreement about what this should entail. If we take the UN itself, there are at least three contending views. The first holds that the basic idea of the Security Council, consisting of permanent members plus rotating temporary ones, is still necessary to ensure that the major powers have an incentive to take part in the organization rather than bypass it. From this viewpoint, what is needed is to extend the permanent membership to include states that better reflect today's configuration of power, such as Brazil, Germany, India, and South Africa.

A second view holds that the whole idea of privileged membership of the Security Council is anachronistic and can no longer be justified. Any criterion of fairness would require equal opportunity for states to participate in the Council, albeit with some adjustment mechanism to reflect differences in size. The latter principle could also be extended to the General Assembly by assigning differential voting power according to the size of a member state's population.

A third more radical view, associated with proponents of cosmopolitan democracy, holds that the legitimacy deficit of international organizations consists in the fact that they represent only states and their interests, not peoples. In this view, reformed intergovernmental organs of the UN should be complemented by a people's assembly, directly elected from all the peoples of the world. They point out that the UN has already begun moving in this direction by recognizing nongovernmental organizations and advocacy groups at its world conferences and as participants in international treaty negotiations. A move to a more formalized system of popular representation would constitute a more equitable and transparent extension of this practice.

These differences of view show that there are no agreed and settled criteria for establishing what counts as legitimacy in respect of international bodies. Nowhere has the issue been more contested than in debates about the legitimacy deficit or democratic deficit of the European Union (EU). All depends on what kind of political animal one

considers the EU to be. If one considers it as a quasi state, then its lack of any single decision-making institution as the focus for accountability and the lack of any developed "demos" with powers to hold it accountable through the electoral process are major legitimacy deficits. If one considers it primarily as an intergovernmental organization, then the lack of transparency in the decision making of the council of ministers and of adequate democratic oversight of these ministers through national parliaments are major deficits. If, finally, one argues that the EU is a *sui generis* construction, with careful balancing of powers and accountabilities between its different institutions, then, there is less evidence of a serious deficit than under the first two assumptions. Indeed, it can be pointed out that the EU already possesses all the features that the most radical reformers of the UN wish to see for that organization, including council voting weighted by population, a directly elected parliamentary assembly, and a powerful court to enforce legislative decisions.

One further position in the debate on the EU deserves mention here because it rests on a form of legitimacy that is quite generalized in modern societies, both within and beyond the political domain. This is the view that since the prime function of the EU is that of economic, social, and legal regulation, it is entirely appropriate that its decision making should be entrusted to a technocratic body such as the European Commission and the technical committees representing national bureaucracies that work for it. After all, in most political systems, regulatory activity is undertaken by independent bodies—courts of law, administrative tribunals, regulatory bodies of all kinds—whose judgments are more effective precisely because they are not subject to political or electoral pressure. Their source of legitimacy stems from the authority of professional expertise in a knowledge-based society and their ability to give reasoned justifications for their decisions, which can withstand the scrutiny of their professional peers.

Whatever the merits of this view in respect of the EU—and it is difficult to maintain that its functions are merely regulatory and not also redistributive and therefore highly political—the wider point about the legitimacy of professional expertise is an important one for understanding the

legitimizing basis of many familiar types of authority in contemporary society—doctors, lawyers, accountants, academics, and so on—and of the wider social authority of the institutions in which they work. However, in a democratic society, these professional institutions and activities have to meet certain criteria if they are to be fully legitimate, such as transparency, accountability, and accordance with fair procedures. Moreover, those independent bodies that have a high political salience—central banks, regulatory bodies of public utilities and the media, ombudsmen, and so on—need their terms of reference and membership to be endorsed by parliament, and to be accountable to it, if their decisions are to have full legitimacy, combining professional or technocratic and democratic authority.

### Conclusion

To speak of full legitimacy implies that legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing affair, such that a body exercising power either has it or does not, but is a matter of degree. The greater the acknowledged legitimacy of a system of power—deriving moral authority from a socially recognized source and serving the societal ends or purposes expected of it, according to accepted conventions or standards, whatever these happen to be—to that extent will those subordinate to it not have to be bribed or coerced into obedience and the more likely that they will cooperate in helping it achieve its purposes, where their cooperation is necessary to achieve these. In sum, legitimacy can be seen as a form of public good, which carries distinctive benefits for rulers and the ruled alike.

Research on legitimacy is now moving beyond the governmental sphere to areas of authority outside it—to economic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, criminal justice systems, international bodies of all kinds, and to other authority domains. Attempts are being made to quantify the degree of legitimacy of different regimes and to explore more deeply the psychological processes involved in legitimation. Moreover, with the check being experienced to the so-called third wave of democracy, interest is being revived in exploring the legitimizing bases of authoritarian regimes, on the assumption that they cannot be understood as either premature or failed democracies but need to be analyzed on

their own terms. All these developments promise an even richer research agenda for the study of legitimacy in the future.

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*See also* Communist Systems; Democratization; Dictatorship; European Integration; Fascism; International Organizations; Nationalism; Power; Revolution; Theocracy; Traditional Rule; Weber, Max

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## LIBERAL PARTIES

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Liberal parties (LPs) represent one of the major party “families,” such as the conservative, socialist, and nationalist parties originating from the 19th- and early-20th-century cleavages and party systems, in the context of which they have to be placed. The major characteristics of LPs include a social background in bourgeois groups, which advocate individual and property rights and the rule of law, in opposition to feudal and autocratic forms of the state. This entry discusses the historical roots, social bases, ideological orientations, and contemporary developments of LPs.

### Terminology

There are two kinds of terminological variety. In the first case, *liberal* can have rather different meanings concerning ideological orientations or a party’s position within the party system. Whereas in the European tradition *liberal* usually refers to parties in the middle of the political spectrum, in the North American context, *liberal* has a more left-wing, or social-democratic, meaning. In the second case, LPs come with many different names. Whereas in the 19th-century LP labels were more consistent with basic ideological features, after 1945, this clarity began to diminish. Basically, the term originated after the French Revolution, when the term *liberal* had first been used by Spanish constitutionalists around 1812. Only in the second half of the 19th century did larger parties in Britain (in the Whig tradition) and Canada call themselves the *Liberal Party*, whereas in France or Italy terms such as *republicans* or *radicals* were more prominent. In some countries *freedom* labels prevail (e.g., Free Democrats in Switzerland, and later in Germany, and Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands). Examples of democratic parties exist, for example, in Luxemburg, whereas the U.S. Democrats show a mix of liberal but also social-democratic ideology. In Denmark, the term *venstre* (Left) is still in current use. Some (agrarian) center parties, such as those in the Scandinavian countries, were also close to liberalism. By contrast, parties with a definitely conservative character labeling themselves *liberal party* must not be included in the LP family, such as the Liberal

Democratic Party in Japan or the Liberal Party in Australia, which for decades has been the conservative counterpart of Labour. After 1945, and particularly during the past decades, a stronger tendency can be observed to use *liberal* as a party label rather at random (e.g., the right-wing populist Liberal Democrats in Russia after 1991).

### History

Early liberal movements developed, between the mid-18th and mid-19th centuries, from the cleavage between feudal society and an autocratic state, on the one hand, and commercial economy and bourgeois property and liberty interests, on the other. Economic and personal liberties, the rule of law, and parliamentary representation were core goals in the unfolding party competition with conservative ideologies and organizations. A second “classical” period has been characterized by success in parliamentary elections, development of stronger party organization, and even governmental majorities in several countries of Europe (e.g., in Great Britain) and elsewhere in the last third of the 19th century up to World War I and until some time after. A third period of decline of LPs, after World War I and during the 1930s, saw the rise of socialist/labor parties on one side and populist/fascist forces and regimes on the other. In a fourth period, after 1945, political system values in Western liberal democracies converged with party ideology, which weakened the specific profile and function of LPs. In many countries, they could only secure a minor position in the party systems.

Liberalism and LPs had their primary origin and relevance in Europe and some other regions such as North America. While Russia and China were dominated by communism, large parts of other continents, particularly Africa and Asia, have mainly been concerned with liberation from colonial rule. Only some Latin American countries developed conditions for liberal or “radical” parties; since the 1930s, military and populist authoritarian regimes created cycles of suppression and revolt unfriendly to LPs.

### Ideology

Early liberal ideas focused on free, economically independent, enlightened individuals against an

autocratic state, a feudal social order, and the moral and intellectual authoritarianism of the Catholic Church. Political values evolved around republican or at least constitutional principles, the rule of law, and limited state functions and political representation, quite often with concepts of limited suffrage. Economic principles highlight market economy, property and commercial freedoms of independent producers, industrial progress, economic growth, and free trade. Capitalist development produced tensions between securing competition by antitrust laws and other means and accepting capital concentration and corporate firms. Trade unions as a counterforce have been accepted only reluctantly.

In social terms, formal equality often gave way to equal opportunity and accepting factual inequality, class polarization, and economic domination by corporations and the wealthy. Supporting equality by education, however, has become a continuous program feature of LPs. Welfare state institutions have long been neglected but finally seen as inevitable to a limited degree.

In the course of history, a growing “ambivalence of liberalism” and tensions inside LPs or between different LPs developed between the liberal-conservative and liberal-radical or social-liberal currents, with radicals or liberal-radicals advocating more republican, democratic, and secular values. These tensions intensified under the pressure of rising socialist or social-democratic parties before and after World War I, in the face of corporate capitalism, and within less polarized party systems after World War II, when LPs in many countries leaned toward liberal-conservative positions rather than liberal-radical or social-liberal ones.

### Party Organization

Traditionally, party organization in terms of membership and professional organization of LPs has been rather weak. While representing independent middle-class groups, a cadre, or elite, structure prevailed. Strong links with large special-interest organizations have been more scarce. In addition, a culture of individualistic attitudes has been prevalent in liberal circles, even more so in recent times of growing individualism. LPs rely heavily on members who are lawyers or doctors, independent businesspeople, and in the education services

and tend to be less member than voter parties. For party finances, they often depend on state sources or strong economic interests.

### Electoral Base, Government Participation

In the period after 1945, LPs had, at least in Europe, on the average, a minor electoral position. Their record of government participation, however, was considerably stronger in the form of coalition parties. Only in a few European countries could the LPs establish a strong government position such as in Luxemburg (Democratic Party), Denmark (Venstre), Switzerland (Free Democratic Party [Freie Demokratische Partei]), and for some time in France (Union for French Democracy [Union pour la Democratie Francaise, UDF], a merger party in the 1970s and 1980s). Medium-sized parties such as the Dutch People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD), the Belgian Party for Freedom and Progress (Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang, PVV/Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès, PLP), or small parties such as the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) in Germany, the Liberal Party in Norway, the Radicale Venstre in Denmark, and the Dutch D'66 could also participate in coalition governments for longer periods of time. Outside Europe, only the Liberal Party in Canada maintained itself as the most important national government party for decades, from the late 19th century and also after 1945.

The main factors for the structural weakness of most LPs are party systems dominated by conservative or Christian-democratic parties and social-democratic ones, with only moderate left/right polarization, in a context of declining ideologies. In addition, Western liberal democracies strongly integrated liberal values into their constitutional structure and weakened the ideological profile of LPs. In terms of the electoral base, problems arose from social structural changes: The decline of the old middle class of independent businesses necessitated moves toward the employed service class of middle-level employees against much external competition and internal tensions. Since the 1980s, Green parties have emerged as a new competitor for young, urban, and well-educated social groups. Thus, unless LPs could operate from a well-established governmental position (such as in

Canada and some European countries), structural conditions changed rather unfavorably in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1970s, ideological developments toward neoliberalism have moved LPs into a closer relationship and, at the same time, stronger competition with modernizing conservative parties.

### Contemporary Developments

In the context of the recent waves of democratization (1970s to 1990s), one would have expected that the LPs would play stronger roles owing to their affinity with liberal democracy. In fact, during these transformation periods, some parties with liberal ideology or name emerged, but they turned out to remain rather weak and often could not survive under a polarization between left-wing liberation movements and conservative or even reactionary forces.

The fall of military or other dictatorships in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s only restored small currents of liberal organizations, somewhat stronger in Argentina's radical tradition (Radical Civic Union). A special case developed in South Africa in the concluding phase of the apartheid regime (Democratic Alliance).

In Russia and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the fall of communist regimes finally opened up new opportunities for LPs, which, however, only materialized to a small degree. The double transformation toward liberal economic and political systems with their high economic and social costs for the population, in combination with increasing electoral barriers and missing structural traditions of an independent middle class, has been unfavorable for sustainable LPs. Thus, early offshoots soon reduced in size, such as Yabloko in Russia, or transformed ideologically (in a conservative direction, such as the Civic Union in the Czech Republic, or even to right-wing populism, such as FIDESZ in Hungary). Some potential developed in Slovenia and, after several electoral turnabouts, in Poland, where the Civic Union as a liberal-conservative governing party could emerge from the 2007 election.

Since the 1980s, globalized capitalism has converged with ideological currents of neoliberalism, which has led LPs in many countries to advocate deregulation, low taxes, and downgrading welfare state and public sector functions, with a stronger

affinity to conservative (neoconservative) parties and coalitions. The consequences of the dramatic worldwide financial and economic crisis of 2008 may, however, leave them entrapped and in need of strategic reorientation.

Apart from economic liberalism, currently, LPs are once again stressing the values of religious tolerance and secularism as well as protection of lifestyle minorities. In addition, the new technological capacities for surveillance put the limitation of state powers back on the agenda of LPs.

### Transnational Networks

In 1947, LPs formed the Liberal International (<http://www.liberal-international.org>) for fostering some ideological coherence, cooperation, and support for emerging parties. Their membership list, sometimes with new entries and expulsions, provides at least an indicator for identifying LPs in times of decreasing clarity of labels. On a regional basis, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe and its caucus in the European Parliament and in the Council of Europe represent a further step in transnational organization.

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*See also* Liberalism; Neoliberalism; Parties

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## LIBERALISM

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Liberalism offers a prescription of how the state is to deal with citizens: Loosely speaking, the state is

to address citizens as equal individuals. The rise of liberalism therefore requires the prior or more or less simultaneous development of a strong principle and practice of individualism. There is a considerable literature on the roles of individualism and of individualist Protestantism in the development of capitalism but a far less rich discussion of its role in the development of political liberalism. This is not a little odd, because political liberalism is defined specifically for a society of individuals, and it requires constitutional protections of individual citizens against intrusions by the state. These three concepts—individualism, constitutionalism, and liberalism—are closely related historically, causally, and conceptually. Before turning to the structure or content of liberalism, there are two major preliminary issues to discuss here: an explanation of why liberalism came to its central place in political theory and practice when and where it did and some account of how it can be protected or enforced.

### Individualism

Political liberalism is inherently a philosophy and practice of protecting individuals to live and act as they please, so long as they do not harm others; without individualism, therefore, it has no point. The central figure in the history of a vision of the place of individualism in political theory is Thomas Hobbes, who assumes individualism in his account of social order and the state. One might suppose that his assumption of individualism is normative or libertarian. But for him, in fact, it is much more explicitly a descriptive and causal issue just as Karl Marx's or Max Weber's account of economic motivation is causal. Descriptively, individualism is based on an assumption about human nature. Causally, therefore, it is a necessary part of the explanation of human behavior and, by implication, of political institutions that are designed to deal with individuals. We are self-interested; therefore, to explain our behavior, one must start from the assumption of self-interest.

Historians continue to debate when, where, and why individualism first arose. The most common view is that peasants in England were communally organized and held together by the fetters of the kinship group, and their land was collectively, not individually, owned. Economic progress required

what Weber calls "defamilization." Richard H. Tawney observes that most people in England in the 16th century "have never seen more than a hundred separate individuals in the course of their whole lives, where most households live by tilling their great-grandfather's fields with their great-grandfather's plough" (quoted in Alan Macfarlane, 1978/1979, pp. 53–54). In its Greek origin, *economy* means household management, and until recent centuries, that would still have been its apt meaning in most of Europe. For the overwhelming majority of people, there was little exchange and virtually no money or commerce; there was at best merely self-sufficiency in a subsistence agrarian society. In a society under these conditions, liberalism is irrelevant.

Major historians of the relevant periods, such as Thomas B. Macaulay, among the greatest of liberals, commonly do not include individualism in their indexes, whereas the idea runs through the work of the great liberal theorist Leonard T. Hobhouse. In reading the historians who frequently delve into political theory, one often wonders where Hobbes has gone. Not surprisingly, Friedrich A. Hayek makes a major issue of individualism and, implicitly, of Hobbesism. For many liberal theorists, the world of Hayek and Hobbes is in principle our world. In fairness, many other scholars address individualism, although somewhat obliquely, through discussions of Puritanism and Calvinism and the role of individualist Protestant religions more generally in the development of capitalism. While these individualist religions are surely causally important, secular aspects of social life in these centuries and even the secularizing tendencies of the individualist religious beliefs provide the final force for remaking English social and economic relations well ahead of continental Europe.

Liberalism is widely recognized as a magnificent social invention, perhaps the greatest political invention of modern history, not least because it effectively created political modernity. Its development required one of the greatest changes in social structure ever experienced. Elements of it or local instances of its elements precede modern times, but the real transformation begins in a big way only in the 17th-century era of the spectacular efflorescence of—especially—Anglo-Saxon political theory. Hobbes is arguably the most important figure

in this movement in part because he is the most insistent on the individualist focus. He is much less concerned with property than with social order. Indeed, he treats property and its protection as required for social order as well as for prosperity. One could rightly say that order must precede finer issues of wealth and prosperity, so that liberalism depends on order. And one should note that Hobbes wrote against the background of brutal wars that likely informed his vision. Later writers, such as John Locke and the grand economists in the line of Adam Smith, could focus on economic growth and “the wealth of nations.” Hobbes’s case shows that the two strains of liberalism—individualism and constitutional protections—can be separated in theory, and the English case shows that they can be at least piecemeal separated in the institutions that make them work in practice.

Why did liberalism come so late in history? Its appeal seems almost obvious. But social structures virtually blocked it through most of history. Pervasive, brutal poverty got in the way of concern for liberty, so much so that much of the vocabulary of liberalism is a late invention. Rather than a concern with liberty, which must have been hollow, with its implication of a right to starve a few centuries ago, rural families must sooner have focused on collective family welfare and fears of famine and sickness. The development of the transformative concern with individualism came first in England, and therefore, the idea of liberalism seems English, although it is soon followed by a somewhat different French conception.

Anarchists such as William Godwin might hold the optimistic view that individualism could drive a liberal society through the loosely coordinated individual efforts of large numbers of people without an overbearing government. But autocracy is a more likely form of government—the form that has controlled most lives historically. While continental monarchies, especially in France and Spain, increasingly passed into greater despotism, the English became more liberal over many centuries. There were retrograde moves, such as the proclamation of the doctrine of the divine right of kings and the introduction of the Star Chamber. The final reign of autocracy in England was the monarchy of the Stuart, Charles I, who, oddly, signed the strikingly liberal “Petition of Rights” but then went on to ignore its agreed constraints on his actions.

### Constitutionalism

The 1787 U.S. Constitution, one of the greatest liberal documents, written in light of English experience, ironically, did not include explicit statements of many of the protections that liberals and what would now be called constitutionalists wanted. Many of these, including freedoms of the press and of religious conscience, were added to the constitution in its first 10 amendments, the “Bill of Rights.” It may seem peculiar to create government in order, at least in part, to protect individuals against government when that government is implicitly enabled to act against individuals as readily as to act for them. There is no theoretical guarantee that a supposedly liberal state will or must rein itself in. Constitutionalism is therefore at best a pragmatic move that might work or that might fail. In the vocabulary of *The Federalist Papers*, a constitution is only a parchment barrier that is implicitly no barrier at all. In the history of this and many constitutions, such barriers have often been overridden, even trampled by powerful office holders. When constitutions succeed in regulating conduct, they do so for social psychological reasons and through James Madison’s device of countering ambition with ambition.

The rise of constitutionalism has been a long-drawn-out process. The set of liberties to be protected has grown, and support for protection of many of these is virtually universal in liberal states today. Historical struggles over protection of freedoms of the press and speech more generally are typical of several other protections of civil liberties and civil rights. Historically, the most important issue for initial constitutionalism is the protection of freedom of religious conscience and practice. This is the issue that tore societies apart and that still plays a fundamental role in the development of liberalism. Diverse Christian sects were the chief problem in the United States in 1787. Islam, especially militant Islam, is regarded as a problem in much of Europe and North America today. Hobbes noted the near impossibility of assessing or controlling variant religious beliefs in an era in which, for example, England and Holland were increasingly diverse in their religious commitments. Still, he allowed enforcement of religious practices as supposedly necessary for maintaining order. The wreckage caused by religious conflicts in England in his time arguably licenses his illiberal views on this issue.

### The Harm Principle

The harm principle says that I may do anything I please so long as I do not harm others. This principle, which has been stated over many centuries by many people in varied ways, has been elevated with its seductive and almost self-defining label by John Stuart Mill, who has perhaps, therefore, come to own the idea despite its common currency. One could say that this principle is the central commitment of liberalism: Do not interfere in the deliberate actions of others whose actions do no harm to us. Mill calls it a very simple principle, but the remarkably extensive commentary on it suggests, rightly, that it has subtle nuances and complex potential meanings. Mill argues against many state regulations, some of them offensively intrusive and some ostensibly beneficial. For example, to go back to the early foundation of liberalism, the state should not impose religious beliefs, qualifications, or practices on its citizens.

Strong defenders of the principle mean it to imply that, if you clearly know that what you are doing is harmful mainly to yourself alone, neither the state nor I should interfere; we should let you harm yourself. When this view is stated in the abstract, it offends many people because it seems to be cruel. But in actual fact, Mill is descriptively right: We commonly act on the strong form of the principle. For example, we do not prevent you from killing yourself through harmful or risky actions such as smoking, skydiving, and experimenting with powerful drugs. It is your life even if you wish to destroy it or to risk doing so. We might even be barred from interfering in your choice to commit suicide. Here, one of the difficult nuances pops up. We might suppose that your suicidal urge is somehow a mistake or a brief and aberrant psychological urge and that you would be grateful tomorrow for our interference today. If we confidently hold these views, what should we do?

### Rule of Law

It is hard to read the early history of England without stumbling into surprising, brutal issues of unequal treatment under the law and of high-handed actions by the powerful that are not grounded in law. What today would be legal matters were formerly matters to be resolved by politics, power, and even murder. If the monarch or a baron wanted

you out of the way, you had little recourse other than flight. Women, slaves, and serfs were often treated with brutality. In early medieval times, different status groups were subject to different laws and, especially, different punishments for the same offense. The rule of law includes a crude principle of fairness according to which all are subject to the same law and under which there can be no separate statuses for citizens.

In its first article, the 1789 version of the French revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen stipulates, "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights; social distinctions may be based only upon general usefulness." This vision may be taken as the ultimate guiding principle of the rule of law. The main target of such a principle is arbitrary government, and the main resolution of this principle is to guarantee that everyone will be treated in accordance with the law. To make this work, there must be general social order and institutions to control officers of the government.

Commitment to the rule of law is of a piece with concern to limit government, which is the main point of constitutionalism. Liberalism and constitutionalism are interdependent defining features of political modernity. If a constitution does not limit government, it is a failed constitution. In this respect, yet again, constitutionalism, liberalism, and individualism are joined together. Already at the height of concern with the rule of law and limited government, however, Jeremy Bentham concludes that government is a close corporation with a vested interest that is potentially hostile to the collective welfare of its society, a view echoed later by John C. Calhoun. Their view is that democracy in England and America is increasingly turning corporatist. As is often more generally true, Bentham is prescient on this development, which must have distressed him deeply because it must undermine his belief in democracy as essentially utilitarian. This conclusion casts a pall over modern democratic society. If democracy is not utilitarian, there is little hope for a generally good form of government. Bentham's great utilitarian book, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, virtually trumpets the association of democracy with utilitarianism. The book is unusual in the identification of its personal moral theory with its political theory: These do not live in separate

worlds, as they otherwise typically do in most of normative theory. Their separation is deplored by David Hume and Jeremy Bentham.

### Religion

Protection of religious freedom is the fundamental concern that has driven political theory since well before Hobbes. In the United States, the principal obstacle to government enforcement of particular beliefs has been the radical fractioning of beliefs, which nicely sets up a resolution of conflicts over religion in the United States, where the sheer numbers of sects fuels widespread opposition to selecting any sect as the national religion. The only workable compromise in 1787 was to rule out any official recognition of religion and especially to rule against establishing a state church. The problem of religion, which led to heated debates during the constitutional era in the United States, was virtually settled by this provision of the constitution. Indeed, the first Supreme Court case on religion, *Reynolds v. United States* (1878), came before the Court 90 years after the adoption of the constitution. This decision ruled against the Mormon practice of polygamy on pragmatic rather than on religious grounds. The judgment in *Reynolds* is that under religious freedom, one may believe whatever one may, but one cannot act in any way one chooses. It might seem to be hard to formulate an objection to polygamy from the harm principle, but many people do object that the practice of polygamy harms the status of women generally.

### Multiculturalism and Group Rights

Over the past few decades, a multiculturalist movement has grown. This is both a matter of claims of particular groups and claims of academic theorists who take themselves to be defending the cultural rights of various minority cultural groups. Liberalism has no resources for dealing with groups, especially large groups well beyond the scale of the family, except to treat them as individuals aggregated into groups. But the features of the aggregations or of the groups play no role in standard liberal treatment of them. Indeed, standard liberal theory often conflicts with claims by the advocates or actual members of the groups

themselves. Such theory has invariably been framed for individuals, and on the evidence of the weak, supposedly liberal arguments of academic defenders of the liberal nature of such groups, the liberal theory cannot easily be recast for groups. The greatest conflict commonly arises from certain groups' extremely illiberal treatment of their own children and of women in the groups.

Among the demands that such groups make is to limit their children's education, often so severely as to cripple any chances those children might have to survive outside the groups. In some cultures, girls are not educated at all, and boys are educated primarily in religious texts, such as the Talmud or the Koran. Another common demand is to have public agencies and schools speak in the native languages of the groups. Apart from Spanish, perhaps no other language is common enough across the United States for dual language policies to work at reasonable cost.

A liberal perspective on subgroups with which people are free to identify within a society is not strategically analogous to standard individualist political and economic liberalism. Such a "group liberalism" violates the strategic logic of liberalism. A policy to maintain a cultural group's autonomy and distinctive norms is not likely to motivate the most politically important groups in liberal societies. In particular, if a state attempts to maintain a cultural subgroup's autonomy, the state takes the risk of creating a politically influential class. Nor are resolutions of group problems likely to be self-enforcing, for example, in the ways in which the old liberalisms, once in place, are self-enforcing or a workable constitution is self-enforcing.

The greatest threat to the survival of an immigrant cultural subgroup's ways and norms is the next generation of the group itself. Their interests are often not served by the group's static values and norms. In this, group liberalism has failed. To preserve the group's character, the state would most likely have to intervene to coerce that generation into line. This coercion need not be so draconian as that of the Saudi Arabian morality enforcement squads (the *mutawa*), but it would be dispiriting for many people in the group. It would violate most aspects of liberalism, including the harm principle, and very likely, if the culture discriminates by gender, it would violate the rule of

law that requires equal treatment under law. In many of the cases argued in the recent explosion of multicultural arguments, it seems also likely to violate individualism and religious freedom.

At its worst, the violation of religious freedom is astonishing. For example, in the view of many Islamic clerics, apostasy from Islam is a capital offense. Therefore, Salman Rushdie was threatened with murder under a fatwa. It is a remarkable and distressing feature of claims for protecting culture or so-called group rights that they commonly do not address the reality of those claims and, in particular, their violation of the fundamental principles of liberalism. One can reject liberalism in defense of these claims, but it is perverse and wrong to suppose that these claims are or can be reformulated in liberal terms. They cannot be. There might be good moral defenses of various subcultural group practices, but liberalism cannot be distorted enough to provide a defense that merits the hallowed label *liberal*.

Incidentally, “group rights” is at least half an oxymoron. The individualism of rights collapses under the weight of a group. Moreover, groups of any numerical significance are sure to be very indistinct and poorly definable. Does Rushdie continue to be a member of the community of Muslims when he ceases to believe or when Islamic leaders target him for murder?

### Liberalism in Moral Theories

With its individualist focus, liberalism seems consonant with the two leading moral theories of our time: utilitarianism and Kantianism. Kantianism might require a lot of groundwork to fit it to what is rightly framed as a consequentialist theory. Immanuel Kant famously asserted that justification of actions from their consequences is immoral, but he was not consistent in this odd view that would virtually rule out any serious understanding or justification of political institutions, whose usual purpose is to effect good consequences.

Writers from Bentham to Hobhouse have argued for a strong connection between liberal and utilitarian principles. Indeed, Bentham essentially derives liberalism from utilitarianism. The harm principle is readily seen as utilitarian, as are the rule of law and freedom of religious conscience,

which are conceived of as individualist principles. Insofar as Kantian theories focus on the individual, they too must honor these principles.

Individualism and liberalism have often been associated with utilitarianism, perhaps merely because Mill and others took up all of these. But Mill would likely insist that they are logically coupled. Insofar as Kantian theory is individualist, it too tends to fit with liberalism through its implications for individual autonomy, which, with liberty, is an individual concern. Other moral theories generally do not seem to generalize straightforwardly to a political theory.

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See also Constitutionalism; Hobbes, Thomas; Individualism; Neoliberalism; Political Philosophy; Utilitarianism

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## LIBERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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This entry presents an overview of recent trends and developments in liberal international relations theory—both empirical and normative. An effort is made to highlight the link between contemporary liberal scholarship on international relations and the thought of classical liberal figures such as John Locke, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Giuseppe Mazzini, and John Stuart Mill. The first part of the essay introduces key liberal principles and ideas and identifies three different traditions of liberal thought on international relations. Thereafter, we discuss classical and contemporary theories on the relationship between liberal democracy and international peace, followed by an overview of related, recent scholarship on global governance and international cooperation among democracies. The final part of the essay briefly discusses two alternative liberal approaches to the ethics of military intervention and shows, in particular, how liberal theorists, while they all share a fundamental attachment to representative governance and human rights, can fundamentally differ in their support for coercive regime change.

### Basic Liberal Principles and Institutions

Liberalism resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—such as individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that all liberal democratic societies, by definition, share to some degree. Political theorists identify liberalism with an essential principle: the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects and not as objects or means only.

The ideal version of liberalism is marked by a shared commitment to four essential institutions. First, citizens possess juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights such as freedom of religion and the press. Second, the effective sovereigns of the state are representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and exercising their representative authority free

from all restraint apart from the requirement that basic civic rights be preserved. Most pertinent, for the impact of liberalism on foreign affairs, the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor the internal authority of special prerogatives held, for example, by monarchs or military bureaucracies over foreign policy. Third, the economy rests on a recognition of the rights of private property, including the ownership of means of production. Property is justified by individual acquisition (e.g., by labor) or by social agreement or social utility. This excludes state socialism or state capitalism, but it need not exclude market socialism or various forms of the mixed economy. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by bureaucracies.

### Locke, Smith, and Kant: Three Pillars of Liberal Internationalism

Liberal internationalism consists, at its most fundamental level, in the attempt to promote the aforementioned principles and institutions across national borders and apply variations thereof to international relations. The classical realists from Thucydides onward described an international state of war that could be mitigated, but not overcome, short of a world Leviathan. The classical liberals, with important variations, broke with this skeptical tradition and announced the possibility of a state of peace among independent, sovereign states.

Contemporary scholarship on liberalism and international relations looks back at three distinct traditions of liberalism, attributable to three groups of theorists: John Locke—the great founder of modern liberal individualism, who claimed that states have themselves rights derived from individual rights to life and liberty (political independence) and property (territorial integrity), thereby providing the liberal foundations of international law; Adam Smith, Baron de Montesquieu, and Joseph Schumpeter—brilliant explicators of commercial liberalism and what they saw as its natural result, liberal pacifism; and finally, Immanuel Kant and Giuseppe Mazzini—liberal republicans who theorized an internationalism that institutes peace among fellow liberal republics. The liberal republican tradition, while incorporating to some degree

both liberal individualism and commercial liberalism, has exerted the greatest influence on contemporary liberal international relations theory. It argues that liberal democracy leaves a coherent international legacy on foreign affairs: a separate peace. Liberal states are peaceful with each other, but they are also prone to make war on nonliberal states.

### A Separate Peace Among Liberal Democracies

The claim that liberal constitutional states behave differently in their foreign relations goes back at least as far as Immanuel Kant and Thomas Paine, but attempts to demonstrate it empirically are more recent. In the 20th century, Clarence Streit (1938) first pointed out the tendency of modern liberal democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and Dean V. Babst (1972) was the first to find statistical support for the hypothesis. Over the past 3 decades, scholars have found strong empirical evidence for the existence of a separate peace among liberal democracies but not between democracies and nondemocracies. Critiques of the separate-peace proposition have focused largely on the underlying causal argument, suggesting that the interdemocratic peace might be simply a by-product of bipolarity and related strategic alliance patterns during the Cold War (see, e.g., Henry Farber & Joanne Gowa, 1997).

Michael Doyle, in his 1997 book *Ways of War and Peace*, argues that two centuries of separate peace among liberal democracies cannot be dismissed as an epiphenomenon, or by-product, of strategic alliances; in fact, stable international alliance patterns among liberal democracies appear to be largely a consequence of shared liberal values and domestic institutions. Doyle develops an original explanation of the separate peace among liberal democracies based on Kant's essay "Perpetual Peace." In Doyle's interpretation, Kant's hypothetical peace treaty shows how liberal republics lead to a dichotomous international politics: peaceful relations—a pacific union—among similarly liberal states and a state of war between liberals and nonliberals.

First, Kant viewed the republic, based on constitutionalism and popular representation, as the ideal form of government; he understood that

republican governments would introduce various institutional restraints on foreign policy and ingrain the habit of respect for individual rights. Of course, we know today that domestic republican restraints do not automatically end war. (If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case.) Kant seems to have been well aware of this: He pointed out that institutional restraints merely introduce republican caution, or hesitation, in place of monarchical caprice. In line with this intuition, modern democratic liberalism does not need to assume either that public opinion directly rules foreign policy or that the entire governmental elite is liberal. It can instead assume that the elite typically manages public affairs but that potentially nonliberal members of the elite have reason to doubt that illiberal policies would be electorally sustained and endorsed by the majority of the democratic public. In other words, liberal states fight only for popular, ostensibly liberal purposes since elites need to be constantly concerned about domestic support for the war effort.

Second, Kant foresaw that liberal republics would progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific union described in his Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace. Kant probably had in mind a mutual nonaggression pact or perhaps a collective security agreement with a rudimentary court of arbitration. Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source—a pledge of peaceful respect. As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and the interests of the citizens they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples are essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends.

Kant's categorical imperative of course requires that all statesmen and liberal republics reject imperialism and international aggression on moral

grounds. But liberal republics cannot simply assume reciprocal peace with all other states; instead, they understand that states subject to international anarchy are potentially aggressive. Only republics tend to be consensual and constrained, and they are therefore presumed capable by other republics of reliable mutual accommodation. The experience of cooperation among republics helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate. Each, however, may in particular cases also be self-fulfilling.

Finally, Kant's cosmopolitan law, discussed in his "Third Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace," adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan law and the related right to hospitality permit the spirit of commerce to take hold of every nation sooner or later, thus creating incentives for states to promote peace and try to avert war. Building on this classical liberal intuition, modern economic theory holds that under a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage, each national economy is better off than it would have been under autarchy—hence, each participant acquires an incentive to solve disputes peacefully and avoid policies that would lead others to break mutually advantageous economic ties. Furthermore, the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. As a result, a foreign state does not appear to be directly responsible for unfavorable economic outcomes—states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. Finally, the interdependence of commerce and the related international contacts of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. The variety of ties among liberal states across numerous issue areas also ensures that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation.

In recent years, some scholars, such as Georg Cavallar and John MacMillan, have taken issue with Doyle's interpretation of Kant as the father of modern democratic peace theory. According to

these critics, Kant's pacific union, the *foedus pacificum* outlined in his second definitive article, was probably intended to include all states and not just liberal republics. Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (2009) go one step further and suggest that the first to explicitly anticipate the emergence of a separate peace among constitutional democracies, based on a defensive pact of alliance against despotic states, was not Kant but Giuseppe Mazzini, the 19th-century revolutionary thinker and democratic political activist.

Against these views, Doyle holds that there are good reasons to view Kant as the founding figure of modern democratic peace theory, and he interprets Kant as requiring that peace must be established by a rightful constitution involving all three definitive articles. Most current scholarship on the democratic peace focuses either exclusively on the role of liberal-democratic institutions, liberal norms, or economic interdependence. But Kantian liberal peace theory, as developed by Doyle, is neither solely institutional, nor solely ideological, nor solely economic: It is only together that the three specific strands of liberal institutions, liberal ideas, and the transnational ties that follow from them plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace among states that meet the three criteria embedded in the three definitive articles. Statistical data sets on the liberal peace do not adequately code for these three factors together. As noted by Bruce Russett and John Oneal, the most thorough recent empirical test of the liberal peace hypothesis confirms the separate positive effects of democratic institutions and international trade (as well as membership in international organizations), but it does not separately code for liberal norms and related interdemocratic trust, which may indeed be difficult to measure through quantitative analysis.

### Global Governance and Cooperation Among Democracies

Classical liberals such as Bentham, Kant, and Mazzini anticipated that international institutions (especially arbitration courts but also more advanced international federations with their own parliamentary assemblies) would reduce uncertainty and improve mutual trust among states,

thereby attenuating the security dilemma and actively promoting international cooperation and world peace. In recent decades, international relations theorists have systematically developed and corroborated this intuition.

Relying on new insights from game theory, scholars during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized that so-called international regimes, consisting of agreed-on international norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, can help states effectively coordinate their policies and collaborate in the production of international public goods, such as free trade, arms control, and environmental protection. Especially, if embedded in formal multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), regimes crucially improve the availability of information among states in a given issue area, thereby promoting reciprocity and enhancing the reputational costs of noncompliance. As noted by Robert Keohane, institutionalized multilateralism also reduces strategic competition over relative gains and thus further advances international cooperation.

Most international regime theorists accepted Kenneth Waltz's (1979) neorealist assumption of states as black boxes—that is, unitary and rational actors with given interests. Little or no attention was paid to the impact on international cooperation of domestic political processes and dynamics. Likewise, regime scholarship largely disregarded the arguably crucial question of whether prolonged interaction in an institutionalized international setting can fundamentally change states' interests or preferences over outcomes (as opposed to preferences over strategies), thus engendering positive feedback loops of increased overall cooperation. For these reasons, international regime theory is not, properly speaking, liberal, and the term *neoliberal institutionalism* frequently used to identify it is somewhat misleading.

It is only over the past decade or so that liberal international relations theorists have begun to systematically study the relationship between domestic politics and institutionalized international cooperation or global governance. This new scholarship seeks to explain in particular the close international cooperation among liberal democracies as well as higher-than-average levels of delegation by democracies to complex multilateral bodies, such as the

European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NAFTA, and the WTO (see, e.g., John Ikenberry, 2001; Helen Milner & Andrew Moravcsik, 2009). The reasons that make liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about international cooperation are manifold: First, transnational actors such as nongovernmental organizations and private corporations thrive in liberal democracies, and they frequently advocate increased international cooperation; second, elected democratic officials rely on delegation to multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to commit to a stable policy line and to internationally lock in fragile domestic policies and constitutional arrangements; and finally, powerful liberal democracies, such as the United States and its allies, voluntarily bind themselves into complex global governance arrangements to demonstrate strategic restraint and create incentives for other states to cooperate, thereby reducing the costs for maintaining international order.

Recent scholarship, such as that of Charles Boehmer and colleagues, has also confirmed the classical liberal intuition that formal international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO, independently contribute to peace, especially when they are endowed with sophisticated administrative structures and information-gathering capacities. In short, research on global governance and especially on the relationship between democracy and international cooperation is thriving, and it usefully complements liberal scholarship on the democratic peace.

### **The Ethics of Military Intervention: Should Liberal Democracy Be Imposed?**

Liberal thinkers on international relations have always displayed a keen interest in the ethical dimension of foreign policy, based on the assumption that ideas, as well as material interests, ultimately determine state behavior. Thus, questions about the admissibility and desirability of military intervention to spread or uphold liberal values abroad were central to the political thought of seminal figures, such as Kant, Mazzini, and Mill. The classical realists, for their part, did not necessarily dismiss normative concerns entirely (unlike their contemporary followers); yet they were skeptical about the possibility for moral behavior in an

anarchical environment where state survival was assumed to be constantly at stake.

Contemporary liberal theory on military intervention consciously builds on the classics. At the risk of oversimplification, one can identify two groups of liberal scholars in the ongoing normative debate on military intervention and regime change: cosmopolitan interventionists, on the one hand, and liberal internationalists, on the other.

Cosmopolitan interventionists typically build on Kant's moral theory, but they only loosely follow his political thought. They assert that everyone who has the ability to intervene militarily in the face of systematic human rights violations also has a moral duty to do so, subject to criteria of effectiveness and/or proportionality. For cosmopolitans, if a state is tyrannical and systematically oppresses its own population, it "forfeits any respect for its independence." As noted by Brian Barry (1998), by implication, "international [military] intervention to displace the government and, if necessary, place the country under international trusteeship" (p. 160) is always *prima facie* morally justified and indeed required, although prudential considerations might ultimately counsel against the use of force. (See also David Luban, 1980.)

Liberal internationalists, on the other hand, have tended to place greater value on state sovereignty and the attendant international duty of nonintervention. Kant favored absolute nonintervention as a matter of principle: He thought it necessary to stabilize international relations and to ensure that each political community could freely determine its own way of life. Mazzini and Mill were not categorically opposed to military intervention (e.g., they justified it to end protracted civil wars and to save helpless populations from outright slaughter); yet they vigorously opposed the use of force for the purpose of promoting liberty and democracy more generally. They sensed that unless tyranny was defeated domestically, with economic and diplomatic assistance from the outside but crucially without foreign military intervention, any liberty achieved would remain exceedingly fragile and could be hardly sustained in the long run.

Contemporary liberal internationalists such as Michael Walzer (1977) and John Rawls (1999) typically justify (but contrary to the cosmopolitan interventionists do not require) humanitarian

military intervention as a last resort in the face of the worst human rights violations, such as state-sponsored slaughter or genocide, suggesting that sovereignty can be disregarded under similar circumstances. But they crucially insist that military intervention ought to be multilaterally authorized and overseen, ideally by the UN Security Council, if it is to be legitimate. The underlying assumption is that collective authorization and oversight reduce the risk of usurpation by powerful states (Doyle, 2006). Most contemporary liberal internationalists follow their classical forebears and reject policies of forcible democratization on both principled and consequentialist grounds. Democratic transformation is best fostered peacefully and indirectly through trade, investment, and foreign aid. These can help diversify societies, and diversified, growing societies tend to demand responsive governance in the long run.

Finally, most contemporary liberals agree that becoming a democracy is hardly a cure-all. Research suggests that overall and on average, the diffusion and consolidation of liberal democracy within countries reduces the chances of both international and civil war. However, there is also evidence that transitions to democracy often produce political turmoil at the domestic level, unless they are carefully managed. Where the rule of law and public institutions are weak, political elites will be tempted to use nationalist rhetoric and violence to achieve and hold office, which may result in international or civil war. Furthermore, as Doyle (1983) pointed out, the very respect for individual rights and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal democracies may establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies. Evidence of this can be found today in relations between the United States and its liberal allies, on the one hand, and a resurgent Russia, emerging China, or defiant Iran, on the other. In short, liberal internationalism is no recipe: It merely offers a set of normative guidelines and empirical hypotheses—some of which are indeed supported by solid evidence—and it needs constant, prudent vigilance to avoid crusades and misguided interventions.

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## LIBERALIZATION

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Liberalization is a process that reduces state control over the lives of persons subject to the authority of a state. It may have both economic and political dimensions. Economic liberalization reduces state intervention in the marketplace. Political liberalization expands individual liberty and rights, including the right to speak freely against state authorities and to organize with others to oppose those authorities. Economic and political liberalization may or may not go together. Political liberalization may or may not lead to democratization, which also enables a broadly inclusive electorate to unseat an incumbent government.

The concept of liberalization must be understood in the context of liberalism, the dominant modern political philosophy. Liberalism first emerged in the 17th century as a challenge to the notion that monarchs had God-given, absolute authority. Thomas Hobbes defended absolute authority but grounded it not in divine will but rather in the hypothetical agreement of the subjects to yield entirely to a sovereign their natural rights to defend life and property.

John Locke rejected Hobbes's argument. While agreeing that governmental authority is indeed grounded in the consent of the governed, Locke held that people would leave the state of nature and set up a commonwealth only if they could thereby protect their natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Rather than cede their natural rights to a sovereign, the people became the sovereign by virtue of the social contract through which they established the commonwealth. Monarchs were no more than magistrates who could be removed by the sovereign people if they failed to protect natural rights.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in turn, rejected Locke's emphasis on individual rights, returning instead to the Hobbesian concept of ceding natural rights to an absolute sovereign. But Rousseau also rejected Hobbes's idea of a sovereign separate from the people. He envisioned the whole people, acting together, a radically democratic polity in which individual rights had no place. Locke's liberalism was thus bracketed by two absolutisms.

Liberalism after Locke remained committed to protecting individual liberty, but it left behind the

conventional device of the social contract. From the late 18th through the 19th centuries, liberals developed the idea of utility, or usefulness, as the central tool for discerning the good. Jeremy Bentham produced the most systematic formulation of utilitarianism as a means of judging what is good and bad. Adam Smith developed the quintessential defense of the free market as the best way to maximize productivity in the economic sphere. John Stuart Mill, the most influential liberal of the 19th century, elaborated utilitarianism as the foundation for a classic defense of individual liberty as well as for the enfranchisement of workers and women in a representative government.

Liberalism began with the project of defending individual liberties against encroachment by the state. The American Declaration of Independence is a classic statement of that sort of liberalism. Increasingly, though, liberalism was also concerned with the growing problem of democracy. The American Constitution, taking the form of an explicit contract among the people to set up a government, is just as concerned with protection from majority tyranny as it is with guarding against individual or oligarchic despotism. And John Stuart Mill, for all his advocacy of expanded suffrage, feared the tyranny of an unenlightened mass.

Liberalism thus betrays a fundamental tension. It denies God-given or traditional rank and privilege and posits the equality of all persons, yet enshrines a free marketplace that leads inexorably to capitalism and growing inequality of power and of wealth. Political liberalism presumes equality and opens the way to democracy but fears the threat to liberty posed by majority rule.

Liberalization, then, should be seen as movement toward liberalism, complete with the contradictions and tensions we have just explored. Its contemporary usage in political science may pertain either to the adoption of economic policies that reduce state intervention or to the opening of political processes to broader exercise of individual rights and liberties.

One major controversy concerns the extent of the association between economic and political liberalization. During the 1980s and 1990s, advocates of the Washington Consensus (the set of economic policies to be implemented by government in countries that are in a situation of economic crisis and recommended by international

institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both of them based in Washington, D.C.) expected that adoption of stringent economic liberalization (i.e., neoliberalism) would lead inevitably to political liberalization and democratization. This expectation was supported by the strong historical correlation between capitalist economic development and political democracy.

Nevertheless, recent evidence on this issue is far from conclusive. The heyday of the Washington Consensus did coincide with a substantial wave of democratization during the same period. On the other hand, a good case can be made that stringent economic liberalization imposes severe stresses on the society and thereby challenges the incumbent government. Many of those incumbent governments in the 1980s and 1990s were authoritarian; implementing economic liberalization tended to increase opposition and bring pressure for liberalization and eventual democratization. However, in other cases, such as the newly democratic Russia in the 1990s, economic liberalization promoted renewed movement in an authoritarian direction.

Two outstanding examples of rapid economic development strongly suggest that there is no association between economic and political liberalization. Singapore has had a vigorous capitalist economy since independence while maintaining an authoritarian regime with relatively low levels of repression but no serious challenge to the regime. And China, since the death of Mao Zedong in 1978, has seen a hugely successful economic liberalization coupled with maintenance of authoritarian control by the Chinese Communist Party, with no significant political liberalization.

A second issue concerns the relationship between liberalization and democratization. The earliest democracies (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) all went from political liberalization to democratization over decades. The same may be said about some later-emerging democracies, such as Costa Rica, South Korea, or Taiwan. Even in these cases of successful democratization, liberalization was sometimes used by incumbent rulers in attempts to reduce pressure for democratization, as in Costa Rica in the 1940s. Where democratization was successful, it was often in spite of such prophylactic liberalization.

There have also been successful cases of prophylactic liberalization—notably Mexico and Botswana. Mexico arguably had the most successful authoritarian regime of the 20th century, with one ruling party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) in power for more than 70 years. The regime used repression when it had to, but fundamentally, the party's survival depended on a façade of regular elections, which were invariably won by the PRI without egregiously obvious fraud, and substantial freedom of speech and press. Only toward the end of its rule, from 1988 to 2000, did it become obvious that the party had to use fraud and coercion to win. It was at that point that the PRI finally lost the presidency to an opposition candidate.

A similar pattern may be seen in Botswana, which was long cited as Africa's most successful democracy (until the South African transition to majority rule in 1996). As in Mexico, the same party has ruled the country for decades (since independence in 1966), but it operates through a regime with regular elections and substantial political liberties. In Botswana, the ruling party keeps winning because there is simply no viable opposition alternative. Fraud and repression play a smaller role here than in Mexico, but Botswana is still a one-party-dominant, liberalized regime and not a full-fledged democracy.

A final issue concerns the variables that promote or retard political liberalization. A substantial literature on transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes focuses on the conditions of liberalization. A key question is the balance between internal and external pressures. An authoritarian regime that faces no organized internal opposition is extremely unlikely to liberalize, much less democratize. On the other hand, an opposition that is strong and unwilling to compromise with the regime may lead the latter to dig in and refuse to liberalize. As Adam Przeworski formulated the problem, liberalization is most likely when there are powerful regime elements that incline toward liberalizing reforms as a means of keeping power, while powerful opposition elements favor negotiating with the regime for liberalization, hoping that greater political openness will lead to democratization. An inclination toward reform may result from deteriorating economic conditions or other chronic problems that render

the authoritarian regime less secure. In such a situation, regime reformers will favor liberalization as a prophylactic against democratization, while opposition moderates will see it as a step toward democratization. Each side may well think it has deceived and used the other, but they can nonetheless agree on moves toward liberalization.

Liberalization may also be a response to external pressures. Samuel Huntington showed that there have been three major global waves of democratization since the early 19th century, separated by periods in which democracy was in retreat. The waves were powered by great power policies in favor of democracy as well as political contagion from neighboring countries. For example, the Third Wave, running from the 1970s to the 1990s, saw the United States and its European allies strongly pushing for democratization of authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1980s and in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Facing such pressure, even authoritarian regimes that did not face powerful internal opposition were nonetheless constrained, at a minimum, to liberalize.

In conclusion, liberalization is a movement toward either economic or political liberalism, enacted by an incumbent government. Economic liberalization is typically enacted under outside pressure, with the hope that a relatively unfettered market will benefit all, even the least advantaged. Political liberalization may respond to internal pressure or external pressure and is typically enacted in hopes of heading off full-fledged democratization. More often than not, however, liberalization opens the way to democratization.

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*See also* Authoritarian Regimes; Democratization; Globalization; Liberalism; Locke, John; Military Rule; Neoliberalism; Opposition; Rights; State; Trade Liberalization; Utilitarianism

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## LIBERTARIANISM

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Libertarianism refers to a normative political theory that gives top priority to the value of freedom of choice over other competing political values; moreover, libertarianism understands a person to possess freedom of choice so long as no other agent coercively interferes with his or her choices. Since the state characteristically acts by defining laws and coercively enforcing them, libertarians' hostility to coercion typically leads them to conclude that only a very minimal state is legitimate—namely, a state whose only purposes are to protect citizens against acts of coercion (murder, assault, theft, and so on) and acts of fraud in a system of free enterprise. As a result, libertarians regard the modern welfare state to be illegitimate.

Defined in this way, libertarianism names a family of political theories rather than a single theory; diversity among libertarian political theories arises depending on just how strong a priority is given to the value of freedom of choice (a stronger priority tending to push libertarianism in the direction of anarchist political theories, such as anarcho-capitalism). Diversity among libertarian political theories also arises depending on the type of argument a libertarian uses to justify assigning this priority to freedom of choice. Some libertarians justify this priority in a consequentialist fashion—that is, by appealing to

the beneficial consequences (understood in terms of happiness or efficiency) of allowing individuals the freedom to act on their choices. By contrast, non-consequentialist libertarians adopt a rights-based approach to justifying libertarianism: Some regard a natural right to freedom of choice to be an intuitively obvious moral truth, whereas others purport to derive this right from an even more basic moral principle, such as a principle of self-ownership (i.e., full ownership of one's body and labor). These different foundational choices will in some cases lead to differences in practical recommendations (e.g., regarding how to treat economic monopolies, how to raise funds for legitimate government activities, and how to deal with pollution and other environmental issues).

Historically, many libertarians trace their roots back to the seminal writings of John Locke, in particular his *Second Treatise on Government* (1689), a founding text of liberalism, which from a principle of self-ownership argues in favor of strong rights to property and in favor of limited government (though it is a matter of scholarly dispute exactly how limited a Lockean state would be). In light of this claimed historical pedigree and further historical connections with past influential thinkers, such as Adam Smith, some libertarians prefer to call themselves *classical liberals*, as distinct from *egalitarian liberals*, who depart from classical liberalism's strong defense of free markets and property rights. Indeed, some libertarians refuse to apply the term *liberal* to anyone but classical liberals, regarding egalitarian liberal as a corruption of the term insofar as it envisions an expansive role for the state; meanwhile, some egalitarian liberals return the favor by refusing to consider libertarians as liberals, on the grounds that libertarianism in principle permits economic inequalities of such a size as to make a mockery of liberalism's core commitment to equal citizenship. What can be safely said is that libertarians and egalitarian liberals share both the core liberal commitment to constitutionalism, understood as government under the rule of law, and the core liberal commitment to the robust protection of civil liberties such as freedom of expression, religion, and association. In this sense, both libertarians and egalitarian liberals are heirs to the intellectual tradition that has its roots in thinkers such as Locke.

### Natural Rights Libertarianism

Perhaps reflecting libertarianism's Lockean heritage, the most familiar form of libertarianism is the form (mentioned above) that appeals to a natural right to freedom of choice grounded in a moral principle of self-ownership, according to which we have a property right to our body and labor. Those who accept such a principle of self-ownership find it appealing for its ability to explain, in one fell swoop, the wrongness of phenomena such as slavery, murder, rape, and other forms of bodily assault as well as the wrongness of horrifying hypothetical cases such as the forced harvesting of, say, kidneys and eyes in order to meet the need for donor organs. Indeed, this principle establishes an extremely strong moral presumption against any use of nonconsensual physical force, the one permissible exception being said to be the use of nonconsensual physical force to prevent or punish violations of the self-ownership principle itself. On this basis, libertarians conclude that governments must limit their functions exclusively to the prevention of force and fraud. (Fraud is understood as the breaking of a contract. Libertarians do not judge the coercion inherent in enforcing contracts to be objectionable since in making a contract, signatories have consented to be liable to coercion in case of noncompliance.) A government that adopts functions beyond the prevention of force and fraud violates the moral presumption against coercion. Thus, for instance, a government that bans the consumption of recreational drugs has violated the principle of self-ownership, which permits individuals to do to their bodies whatever they please, so long as they do not violate others' self-ownership rights.

Less obvious, but no less true, according to libertarians, is the claim that individuals' self-ownership rights are violated when a government builds a park or library or provides some other public good. For provision of these goods requires resources, and since a state acquires its resources via coercive taxation, libertarians argue that such state-supplied goods in effect conscript citizens into working to supply such goods, whether they desire them or not. Hence, the famous claim of Robert Locke, one of the 20th century's best known libertarians, that "taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor" (Robert Nozick, 1974, p. 169). Along similar lines, libertarians frequently

denounce taxation as a form of state-sponsored theft, at least when the taxes are used for ends other than the prevention of force and fraud.

This condemnation of taxation as a form of theft, however, presumes that a person has a natural property right to retain in full whatever he or she comes to possess as a result of economic transactions or gift giving—a right that is violated when a state appropriates a portion of these possessions for its own purposes. In response, critics of libertarianism argue that a natural property right to external possessions does not straightaway follow from rights of ownership to one's body and labor. And if in counterreply libertarians assert that owning one's labor entitles one to sell it in exchange for some external good (such as money), critics will insist that this merely pushes the question back a level, for it must be asked how the person from whom one acquired the external good came himself or herself to possess a property right to that good. Perhaps the answer is that this person acquired it in exchange with an even earlier possessor. But then the same question can be asked of the earlier possessor. And so on. It follows that a chain of economic and gift transactions must stretch back into time and at some point terminate in an act whereby a person comes to acquire some previously unowned resource (say, a hitherto uninhabited piece of land). According to critics of libertarianism, this act of original acquisition is left unexplained by a principle of self-ownership, for it is unclear how ownership of one's body and labor could create a title to some previously unowned external good distinct from one's body.

Undoubtedly, the most famous attempt to use the principle of self-ownership to justify the original acquisition of unowned resources is Locke's own attempt. In what has come to be known as the labor-mixing argument, Locke in essence argued that since you own your labor, it follows that when you mix your labor with some previously unowned resource (tilling the soil, say, or gathering apples from a tree), you come to own the resulting mixture (cultivated land, a bushel of apples, etc.). Well-known objections to this argument exist, however; Locke himself worried about excessive acquisition and insisted in response to this worry that an act of acquisition must leave "enough and as good" of unowned resources for others to acquire. Assessing the labor-mixing argument as

well as the more general challenge of justifying the original acquisition of unowned goods remains an active area of debate. Indeed, within this debate, a group of political theorists who call themselves *left-libertarians* has arisen. Such theorists accept the principle of self-ownership of one's body and labor but argue that external goods initially belong to everyone in an egalitarian manner. On this view, private appropriation is permissible, but individuals who appropriate more than their equal share of external goods owe others compensation. On these grounds, some left-libertarians have even endorsed a measure of income redistribution as a form of compensation for hitherto uncompensated past acts of appropriation.

### Consequentialist Libertarianism

As earlier indicated, not all libertarians base their theory on a principle of self-ownership or on any other principle from which a natural right to freedom of choice is said to flow. Instead of looking to an abstract principle of rights, these libertarians argue that a minimal government restricted to preventing force and fraud leads to better overall future consequences than do more expansive governments: Resources will be used more efficiently, markets will respond rationally to people's needs, people will do a better job of looking after themselves, and hence, the society will in general be more happy and prosperous. This style of reasoning is consequentialist in nature, *consequentialism* being the name for the moral doctrine according to which the right action to perform is the one with the best overall consequences. (Utilitarianism is the best known, but not the only, consequentialist moral theory.)

The main consequentialist arguments for libertarianism comprise arguments based on incentives and an argument based on the practical constraints faced by governments. Those who appeal to incentives argue that the public provision of goods found in welfare states dampens private incentives to work and to invest in one's skills; they argue that holding property in common reduces individual incentives to care for it (the so-called tragedy of the commons) and that, by contrast, a competitive free market (which entails both the promise of profit and the peril of being outdone by one's rivals) creates incentives for firms to use the most

efficient means to produce goods that consumers desire and creates incentives for individuals to acquire skills that are of use in this production.

A second, related consequentialist argument for libertarianism stresses the practical problems that governments face in gathering the information they need to make good decisions; this argument is most famously associated with Friedrich August Hayek. Hayek noted that prices in a competitive market function as signals, widely dispersing useful information to potential producers (e.g., a sharp rise in price means a valued product is undersupplied). Prices also give people an incentive to respond to this information by changing production patterns. For instance, a good that is undersupplied relative to demand can fetch a high price, thereby giving producers incentive to supply more of the good, whereas a good that is oversupplied will experience a drop in price, thereby giving producers of that good incentive to switch production to more desired goods. Hayek argued that no individual or group of individuals (such as the planning board of a socialist economy) could possibly replicate the informational and incentive effects of a free market system of competitively determined prices; he concluded from this that the free market was the most rational system of allocating goods.

These consequentialist arguments have been tremendously influential among mainstream economists, though most such economists do not end up endorsing as pure a form of laissez-faire capitalism as libertarians desire. For a large body of economic doctrine is devoted to the topic of market failures—situations in which the market fails to respond to need or fails to allocate resources efficiently—and many economists conclude on consequentialist grounds that such failures call for government intervention. Examples of market failure discussed in the literature include natural monopolies, externalities (a term that refers to costs of production that producers externalize, i.e., push off onto others—pollution being a key example), and public goods that are undersupplied by the free market owing to the free-rider problem (when the costs and benefits of common resources are not shared fairly). Consequentialist libertarians respond to these worries either by proposing market solutions to these issues (thereby denying that they are genuine cases of market failure) or by agreeing that

markets are less than wholly efficient in such cases but then arguing that government interventions would be even more wasteful (a line of argument most closely associated with the public choice school of economics).

### Criticisms of Libertarianism

Libertarians face criticism from both the Right and the Left. Right-leaning critics who are anarcho-capitalists object to libertarianism's willingness to endorse any state at all, whereas Left-leaning critics argue that libertarianism's case for the minimal state assumes a flawed account of freedom, fails to recognize competing values such as fairness and the meeting of basic needs, and ignores the social inputs that are a necessary part of any system of production, so that one's possessions are never purely the fruits of one's own labor. While of course these are not the only criticisms made of libertarianism, they are among the most prominent, and each will be discussed in turn.

#### *Anarcho-Capitalism*

Anarcho-capitalists such as Murray Rothbard argue that the functions performed by a libertarian minimal state can and ought to be performed instead by private firms operating in a capitalist free market system. Hence, instead of a public system of police, law, and courts, anarcho-capitalists envision a competitive market of private defense agencies, each offering potential customers its own code of protection, complete with its own security agents to enforce this code and its own courtlike procedures for interpreting and applying it. Nor, according to anarcho-capitalists, would there be need for a government to print and regulate currency; there would likewise be a competitive market of private currencies. And so on for the remaining functions typically associated with government. In short, anarcho-capitalists argue that insofar as libertarianism approves of a minimal state rather than trusting individuals to meet all their needs through a system of free exchange, it shows insufficient regard for freedom of choice.

Consequentialist libertarians have an easier time replying to the criticisms of anarcho-capitalists than do natural rights libertarians, for consequentialists can simply argue that a minimal state would

in fact do a better job of preventing violence than would private defensive agencies (who may end up fighting each other)—or at least, that it is not sufficiently clear that anarcho-capitalism would deliver better results to make it worth the risks of dismantling the state entirely. By contrast, natural rights libertarians must argue that the minimal state does not violate the economic rights of entrepreneurs who would like to set up their own private defense agency to compete with the public system of police and courts, but who are denied this opportunity by the minimal state's coercively enforced monopoly on the supply of protection. One celebrated libertarian argument in this regard was made by Nozick, who in his book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* argued that in a competitive market of private defense agencies, a dominant defense agency would eventually arise and establish a monopoly; hence, a minimal state would in essence naturally arise from within an anarcho-capitalist system.

#### *Criticisms of Libertarian Liberty*

Some critics from the Left argue against libertarians' account of freedom of choice. One form of this criticism argues that libertarianism's exclusive focus on physical coercion is too narrow, for concentrated economic power can itself be a form of coercive power: Monopolists can charge exorbitant prices for their goods, and business owners can wield their threat of firing to extort actions from desperate employees that the employees would never otherwise consent to perform. In this view, freedom does not necessarily increase as government shrinks, for without antitrust laws, employee protections, and other legal instruments, many individuals may find themselves the unfree victims of economic coercion.

Another criticism of the libertarian account of freedom of choice argues against libertarianism's definition of freedom exclusively in terms of the absence of coercive interference. Freedom so defined is referred to as negative liberty, and the critics in question argue that freedom is instead best understood as autonomy or positive liberty, where the autonomy or positive liberty to perform some action requires not just the absence of coercive interference blocking that action but also the presence of a genuine ability to perform that

action. On this definition, for instance, a person who is too poor to afford a university education is not free to attend university and a wheelchair-bound person is not free to work at a second-story business if there are no elevators. Accordingly, these nonlibertarians conclude that overall liberty is enhanced by a state that relieves poverty through redistributive taxation or that requires accommodations for the disabled.

Libertarians typically respond to these criticisms by denying that economic power amounts to a form of coercive power and by arguing that it is a mistake to define liberty in terms of ability. For instance, in support of this latter claim, a libertarian might argue that although most people lack the mental ability to become physics professors, it would be misleading to conclude (as proponents of positive liberty apparently must) that most people lack the freedom to become physics professors.

### *Competing Values*

Libertarianism is also criticized for assigning freedom of choice priority over all other values, it being argued instead that in some contexts values such as fairness or the meeting of basic needs ought to take priority over freedom. Regarding the value of fairness, for instance, critics point out that libertarians reject equal opportunity provisions, such as antidiscrimination employment laws and publicly financed primary and secondary schools; these critics then argue that without such provisions, one's life prospects could be unfairly diminished by accidents of birth, such as one's race or sex or one's family's socioeconomic class. Regarding the value of meeting basic needs, critics, for example, argue that the health needs of a large number of individuals would go unmet in a libertarian society since no health insurance firm can make a profit by insuring individuals with known chronic and serious health problems. A common libertarian reply to these charges is to argue that private charity is the best response to these problems of poverty and health care need.

### *Society as a Partner in Production*

Some critics of libertarianism defend the legitimacy of taxation by challenging the libertarian

claim that individuals have a right to retain in full whatever they come to possess by exchange in a market system. This challenge proceeds by arguing that a person's possessions are not the result of exclusively individual efforts but result instead from individual efforts conjoined with a set of social conditions that make the individual's prosperity possible. According to this view, one person's success is never wholly self-made but depends on factors such as the prevailing level of education in one's society, the prevailing level of technology, and the prevailing level of wealth; also crucial are the levels of government investment in infrastructure (e.g., highways and utilities), government stabilization of the economy (e.g., controlling the money supply), and more generally, the cultural capital of one's society (by which is meant the benign cultural practices and social institutions that ensure that the daily interactions of thousands, or millions, of one's fellow citizens are by and large peaceful). For these reasons, according to these critics, society should be viewed as a silent partner that is ever present alongside individual efforts of production; taxation thus represents society's due return on its contribution to production. If society (through its duly elected representatives in government) decides to spend this social wage on additional purposes over and above those of preventing force and fraud, such as the construction of parks and libraries and support for the arts, say, then according to these critics, that is its prerogative. Libertarians commonly respond that the notion of society employed in this argument is at best a vague and unhelpful generalization and at worst a collectivist illusion denying the moral primacy of the individual.

### **Conclusion**

Debates between libertarians and their critics were a vibrant part of 20th-century political theory, and the debate looks set to last throughout the 21st century and beyond, in part owing to developments such as an increasingly global economy. Many libertarians welcome this development, viewing a world of free economic agents as an appealing prospect. By contrast, many non-libertarians view economic globalization with alarm, seeing it as a threat to values such as fairness and autonomy. As such, the stage is set for

the development of new arguments and ideas in this long-running debate.

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*See also* Anarchy; Capitalism; Equality; Justice; Liberalism; Liberty; Locke, John; Market Failure; Normative Political Theory; Property; Rights; Utilitarianism; Welfare State

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## LIBERTY

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Two postulates encapsulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of particular instances of freedom and unfreedom, respectively:

F Postulate: A person is free to  $\varphi$  if and only if he is able to  $\varphi$ . (Alternative formulations of this postulate are “A person is free to  $\varphi$  if and only if it

is possible for him to  $\varphi$ ” and “A person is free to  $\varphi$  if and only if he is unprevented from  $\varphi$ -ing.)

U Postulate: A person is unfree to  $\varphi$  if and only if both of the following conditions obtain: (1) he would be able to  $\varphi$  in the absence of the second of these conditions and (2) irrespective of whether he actually endeavors to  $\varphi$ , he is directly or indirectly prevented from  $\varphi$ -ing by some action(s) or some disposition(s) to perform some action(s) on the part of some other person(s).

In each of these formulations, the Greek letter  $\varphi$  (which stands for any germane verb or set of verbs plus any accompanying words) can denote one’s performance of some action, one’s existence in some condition, or one’s undergoing of some process. Throughout this entry, incidentally, the terms *freedom* and *liberty* are used interchangeably.

These two postulates, which will be explicated further below, are associated with the idea of negative liberty. The principal concern of this entry is to distinguish negative liberty from certain other types of freedom. After an initial elaboration of the nature of negative liberty itself through some amplification of the F and U Postulates, this entry will draw four principal contrasts: between negative liberty and positive liberty, between negative liberty and moralized liberty, between negative liberty and republican liberty, and between physical freedom and deontic freedom.

### Negative Liberty: Two Postulates

The F Postulate distills the nature of negative liberty as it exists in particular instantiations. However, the U Postulate does not comprehend all the situations in which particular instances of negative liberty are absent. That is, the two postulates are not jointly exhaustive in their coverage. Apart from being free to  $\varphi$  or being unfree to  $\varphi$ , somebody can be simply not free to  $\varphi$ . In other words, *is not free* and *is unfree* are not equivalent; the latter predicate entails the former, but not vice versa. (What are equivalent are the predicates *is not free* and *is unable*.) Likewise, the predicates *is free* and *is not unfree* are not equivalent. The former entails the latter but not vice versa.

For example, although Joe is not able to run a mile under 3 minutes and is therefore not free to run a mile under 3 minutes, it is not the case that

he is unfree to run a mile in such a short span of time. His lack of freedom to run a mile so rapidly is a mere inability rather than an instance of unfreedom. It is a mere inability because it is not due to any action(s) or disposition(s) to perform some action(s) on the part of anyone else. Instead, it is a purely natural limitation.

Hence, the concept of freedom as explicated here is trivalent rather than bivalent. Instead of separating people's abilities and inabilities dichotomously into freedoms and unfreedoms, it separates them trichotomously into freedoms, unfreedoms, and mere inabilities. The mere inabilities are infinitely expansive in their scope, for most of the countless ways in which any person falls short of omnipotence are due to natural limitations rather than to the conduct of other people.

Why should a trivalent conception of freedom be favored over a bivalent conception? To glimpse the answer to this question, we have to take account of another feature of the F and U Postulates. Those postulates deal with particular instances of freedom and unfreedom, rather than with anyone's overall quantity of liberty. A particular freedom is an ability to engage in a certain mode of conduct, to be in a certain condition, or to alter one's situation in a certain way. Any particular freedom has a content that differentiates it from other particular freedoms. A person's overall level of liberty is a complicated aggregate of his or her myriad particular freedoms and also of his or her myriad particular unfreedoms. This entry will not concern itself with the details of the complex calculations by which each person's freedoms and unfreedoms (or, rather, each person's combinations of freedoms and combinations of unfreedoms) are aggregated. Rather, the key point for present purposes is that, although the F and U Postulates are concerned only with particular liberties and unfreedoms, they have been formulated with an eye toward the ultimate aggregation of those liberties and unfreedoms. That is, if an understanding of particular freedoms and unfreedoms is to be compatible with the aim of establishing that the overall liberty of each person is a measurable property, a trivalent conception of particular freedoms and unfreedoms is essential.

Given that this entry will not recount the intricacies of measuring people's levels of overall liberty, the unique suitability of a trivalent conception

of freedoms and unfreedoms cannot be fully substantiated here. Nonetheless, the gist of the matter resides in the fact that the calculation of the level of anyone's overall liberty proceeds through a complicated fraction. If mere inabilities were not distinguished from freedoms and unfreedoms, then the numerator or the denominator of the aforementioned fraction would be infinitely large, respectively. After all, as has been stated, anyone's natural inabilities are infinitely expansive in their scope. For example, each person is not only unable to fly around the Milky Way Galaxy once, but is also unable to fly around it twice or thrice or any other number of times. Mere inabilities are limitless. Thus, if those inabilities were to be classified as liberties, both the numerator and the denominator of the fraction for measuring each person's overall liberty would be infinitely large. If mere inabilities were instead to be classified as unfreedoms, the denominator of that fraction would be infinitely large. In either case, then, the project of measuring anyone's overall freedom would be fatally undermined in principle as well as in practice. To avoid such an upshot, a theory of liberty needs to distinguish mere inabilities both from freedoms and from unfreedoms. The requisite distinctions are in effect drawn by the F Postulate and the U Postulate together.

One other aspect of the U Postulate is in need of elucidation. What is meant by the notion that somebody's dispositions to perform actions can prevent other people from doing various things? Plainly, a sheer disposition, which will remain unmanifested if the circumstances that would activate it never arise, does not in itself prevent anything through the actual application of force or the actual introduction of material obstacles. Nevertheless, dispositions to perform actions can be preventive factors because they will lead to the actual application of force or the actual introduction of material obstacles in the event that certain triggering circumstances do materialize.

In other words, each person's freedom or unfreedom is affected not only by what other people in fact do but also by what those other people would have done if events had unfolded differently. Dispositions bear crucially on the freedom and unfreedom of each person since those dispositions play a key role in determining whether the abilities and inabilities of each person would

continue as such if the person's conduct or situation were altered in various respects. Only by asking how far those abilities and inabilities reach—past actual events into counterfactual events—can a theorist ascertain the extent of each person's overall liberty and the existence of many of his or her particular liberties. Until we know whether people would or would not have acted in certain ways if a given person had sought to do X, we cannot know whether that person was free to do X. Nor can we know whether the person was free to perform X in combination with manifold subsequent actions.

A simple example can serve to highlight the effects of people's dispositions on other people's freedoms and unfreedoms. Suppose that Jim is sitting in a room. Just outside the door of the room are four people with submachine guns who will shoot and kill him if he seeks to exit through the door. If Jim does not seek to leave the room, then the homicidal dispositions of the four people outside the door will not be activated. Let us suppose that he in fact does not leave the room and that there is consequently no occasion for the other four people to harm him. All the same, he is unfree to exit the room. If any theory of freedom were to lead to a contrary conclusion—that is, if any theory of freedom were to pretermitt the four people's unmanifested dispositions and conclude that Jim has not been prevented from exiting—it would *pro tanto* be defective. Opportunities get closed off to individuals not only because of the actual application of force or the actual erection of material barriers but also because of the readiness of other people to exert such force or to erect such barriers (even if no occasion arises for the activation of their readiness).

Of course, the explicit mention of dispositions in the U Postulate should not be taken to indicate that they are productive only of unfreedoms. Other people's dispositions are also centrally involved in the establishment and sustainment of countless freedoms. Suppose, for example, that Julia lives in a well-fortified apartment building in the middle of New York City. Whenever a resident of the building wishes to leave through the front doors—the only set of doors—a security guard has to release the computerized locks. Because no resident knows how to operate the locks, the guard's cooperativeness is essential for each resident's ability to leave

the building. Now, if Julia relaxes lazily in her apartment one morning and thus makes no attempt to go out before noon, the security guard during the morning will have no occasion to act on his disposition to release the locks for her. Nonetheless, if the guard would have released the locks in the event that Julia had indeed sought to exit from the building, then Julia has been free throughout the morning to leave via the front doors. Because of the guard's preparedness to open those doors if Julia should endeavor to depart—and only because of his preparedness—she is unprevented from departing. She is free in that respect. In this context, as in myriad other contexts, her particular freedoms are dependent on the inclinations of other people.

### Negative Versus Positive Liberty

Especially since the writings of Isaiah Berlin in the 1950s and 1960s, the most famous contrast pertaining to freedom lies between negative liberty and positive liberty. As is evident from what has been said so far, negative liberty consists in opportunities. To be negatively free to  $\varphi$  is to be able to  $\varphi$  and is thus to be unprevented from  $\varphi$ -ing. If somebody is negatively free to  $\varphi$ , then neither internal incapacities nor external impediments have made his  $\varphi$ -ing impossible. Hence, to be negatively free to  $\varphi$  is to have opportunities to  $\varphi$ , whether or not one avails oneself of those opportunities.

Positive liberty is very different. Instead of consisting in opportunities, it consists in the following of certain codes of conduct, the attainment of certain objectives, or the purification of one's motivations and outlook. Being presented with various opportunities is not sufficient for positive freedom; in addition, a person must take advantage of some of those opportunities in certain ways. Whereas negative liberty is a matter of unpreventedness, positive liberty is a matter of accomplishments.

As is suggested by the vagueness of these descriptions, numerous divergent accounts of positive liberty have been propounded from the time of Plato onward. Some theorists maintain that a person becomes truly free only when she or he has persistently exercised certain faculties, such as her capacity to reason and deliberate. Others contend that people are truly free only when they interact regularly in democratic institutions with their fellow



citizens. Still other proponents of positive liberty submit that people attain freedom only if they rid themselves of certain ignoble desires or only if they subject their sundry desires and inclinations to rational scrutiny and refinement. Many other varieties of positive-liberty theories have likewise emerged over the centuries.

Although negative-liberty theorists have sustainably criticized various doctrines of positive freedom, nobody should think that the very use of the terms *freedom* or *liberty* by the advocates of those doctrines is itself mistaken. Their errors are errors of substantive political philosophy rather than linguistic lapses. For example, it is not an abuse of language to declare that a person who achieves a high degree of autonomy has thereby become free in the sense of having liberated himself from the sway of the influences that might have kept him in a heteronomous condition. Such a characterization is not optimally clear and precise but is far from ridiculous or unintelligible. Similarly, it is hardly ridiculous or solecistic to assert that people who together shape their destiny through institutions of democratic decision making are thereby keeping themselves free by avoiding subjection to mandates that they have not themselves collectively fashioned. Though the conception of freedom that is operative in such a claim is plainly not equivalent to the negative-liberty conception, the classification of the democratic state of affairs as *freedom* is by no means an outlandish linguistic slip.

Still, although any accusations of linguistic errors would be misguided, doctrines of positive liberty are themselves misconceived in a number of respects. While a full exploration of the shortcomings of such doctrines as theories of freedom is not possible within the confines of this entry, two of those shortcomings should be noted here.

First, a key problem for any doctrine of positive liberty is that it generates untenable ascriptions of freedoms and unfreedoms. For example, suppose that one such doctrine (which can be labeled here as the Aesthetic Thesis) proclaims that each person becomes truly free only by developing his or her aesthetic abilities to the maximal degree. Suppose further that Kevin is a gifted pianist whose tendency to become distracted by nonaesthetic pursuits will thwart his development of his musical talents unless he is chained to his immobile instrument for several

hours every day. Now, according to the Aesthetic Thesis, any opportunities that do not facilitate the maximal development of a person's aesthetic abilities are not freedoms at all. Hence, the countless opportunities closed off to Kevin by his being shackled to his piano are not freedoms of which he has been deprived; they are not freedoms, period. Instead, according to the Aesthetic Thesis, they are obstacles to the realization of his true freedom—obstacles that his chains have enabled him to overcome. His shackles will have helped bring about his freedom without causing him to lose even the slightest instance of liberty. Because the severe curbs on his mobility involve no sacrifices of any particular freedoms, he has not been rendered unfree by those curbs in any respect. So the supporters of the Aesthetic Thesis must contend.

While the scenario of Kevin and his piano is contrivedly vivid, it well illustrates the far-fetched conclusions that are generated by any positive-liberty credo. Every such credo, which affirms that true freedom resides in a person's exertion of certain faculties, or his or her performance of certain actions or following of certain procedures, will commit its advocates to the view that any opportunities inconsistent with the relevant exertions or performances or procedures can be removed wholesale with no loss of any particular freedoms. Instead of characterizing the removal of those opportunities as the elimination of some of a person's liberties for the sake of increasing her overall liberty, the positive-freedom theorists are obliged to maintain that no liberties have been removed at all. Their position in that respect is not self-contradictory or unintelligible, but it is indefensibly sinister. It should be rejected, as a substantive matter of political philosophy. Although some of the objectives favored by positive-freedom theorists are undoubtedly worthy of pursuit, no one should pretend that sacrifices of liberties are not involved when various opportunities are closed off in furtherance of those objectives.

A second main shortcoming of positive-liberty theories pertains to the very objectives that they aim to promote. Whereas the phenomenon that the negative-liberty theorists designate as *freedom* or *liberty* cannot be recharacterized in an illuminating fashion, there are numerous more precise designations for the phenomenon that positive-liberty theorists label as *true freedom*. To denote the condition of negative liberty, some rather awkward

and uncommon terms such as *unpreventedness* and *unprecludedness* would be necessary as replacements for *freedom* and *liberty*. The only adequate common substitute would be *ability*, which is less effective than *liberty* or *freedom* in highlighting the relational character of the designated phenomenon (i.e., the fact that the designated phenomenon consists not only in a person's possession of capacities but also in his or her being unprevented from exercising those capacities). For discussions focused on the conceptual space carved out by the negative-liberty theorists, the language of liberty and freedom is singularly apposite.

A very different situation obtains when we turn our attention to positive liberty. While the sundry versions of the positive-liberty ideal will warrant the application of a variety of terms—most of which will be appropriate for only some of those versions—there are indeed many pertinent designations available. Terms and phrases such as *self-fulfillment*, *self-realization*, *self-expression*, *self-mastery*, *autonomy*, *self-reliance*, *self-control*, *self-determination*, *flourishing*, *self-development*, *self-direction*, *popular political participation*, and *active citizenship* can each figure saliently in one or more of the major positive-liberty credos. Moreover, when wielded aptly, each of those terms and phrases will typically be much more exact—and probably more vivid—than *freedom* or *liberty* as a means of pinpointing the state or process that is posited as a fundamental human desideratum. Hence, not only will little or nothing be lost if the positive uses of *freedom* and *liberty* are eschewed, but in addition, the avoidance of those terms as designations for the positive-liberty writers' objectives will promote theoretical precision. *Freedom* and *liberty* in their positive senses are superfluous since the potential replacements for them are myriad, and those replacements are generally superior in denoting the specificities of the ideals that the positive-liberty theorists extol.

Of course, as has been remarked above, nobody should doubt that many of the aforementioned ideals are worthy of pursuit. What is objectionable about positive-liberty doctrines is not (in many cases) the objectives that they uphold but instead their characterizing of those objectives as *true freedom*. For example, when theories of autonomy, democracy, or active citizenship present themselves as accounts of those desiderata

rather than of liberty, they may well be admirable. Whether they are indeed admirable is of course dependent on the specifics of their arguments and analyses; however, when they are not misleadingly packaged as theories of freedom, they at any rate stand a chance of being admirable.

Note that the comments in this section about the appropriate senses of the terms *freedom* and *liberty* are concerned with the employment of those designations in the rigorous theorizing that constitutes political philosophy. It would be quite foolish to aim to regiment the multifarious patterns of usage that occur in the much less rigorous discourses of everyday life. In many of those discourses, where consistency, subtlety, clarity, and precision are of far less importance than in philosophical writing, one's labeling of self-fulfillment as the attainment of true freedom might be apt. Plainly, as has already been remarked, there is nothing semantically illicit about the use of such terminology. Given that the language of freedom or liberty is intelligible and coherent and given that the inexactitude of its application does not greatly matter in the to-and-fro of quotidian deliberations and exhortations, there are no grounds for reining in the multiple senses that might attach to *freedom* and *liberty* in a host of ordinary contexts. Such an endeavor would be patently futile in any event.

Not at all futile or ridiculous, however, is an effort to enhance the rigor and precision of philosophical thinking about freedom. If the aim is to come up with a theory that carefully distinguishes the concept of freedom from other major political and moral concepts while capturing its myriad complexities, then some degree of terminological regimentation is inevitable. Some uses of *freedom* or *liberty* countenanced in day-to-day parlance have to fall by the wayside when a painstaking philosophical investigation of freedom seeks to elaborate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of any proposition "*P* is free to  $\varphi$ ." For the purposes of such an investigation, the inexactitude and misleadingness and inconsistency of many of those ordinary uses are to be shunned. Philosophical analysis proceeds by clarifying and refining the concepts that are invoked in relatively unreflective modes of thought and discourse, as it aspires to transcend the murkiness and looseness of those familiar modes of speaking. The tasks of conceptual clarification and purification can

scarcely go ahead without some notable tightening of everyday terminology. To insist as much, however, is not at all to insist that a similar tightening is advisable or feasible in everyday discourses themselves.

### Negative Versus Moralized Liberty

In some prominent respects—though by no means all respects—moralized conceptions of freedom are similar to positive-liberty theories. Although moralized conceptions of freedom are usually focused on opportunities rather than on achievements, every such conception affirms one or both of the following theses:

1. the preclusion of some action or some state of affairs does not eliminate any particular liberties unless the preclusion is illegitimate or
2. the preclusion of some action or some state of affairs does not eliminate any particular liberties unless the stymied action or state of affairs would have been legitimate.

Under the first of these two theses, the prevention of a person from  $\varphi$ -ing will count as a *pro tanto* curb on his freedom only if he had a moral right against the sort of interference that thwarted him from  $\varphi$ -ing. Under the second thesis, the prevention of a person from  $\varphi$ -ing will count as a *pro tanto* curb on his freedom only if he had no moral obligation to refrain from  $\varphi$ -ing. In either case, a moralized conception of freedom will decline to classify some eliminated liberties as eliminated liberties.

Thus, for example, if Alec's prevention of Susan from wantonly setting fire to a neighbor's house is morally legitimate, then Alec does not deprive Susan of any freedoms at all when he manages to avert the arson by grabbing and restraining her. If she struggles to reach the neighbor's premises so fiercely that he has to pin her to the ground and even bind her hands and feet, she will still not have been deprived of any freedoms. Such is the view taken by the proponents of moralized conceptions of freedom. Whereas the F Postulate and U Postulate explicate the concepts of freedom and unfreedom by reference to one's abilities and to the causes of one's inability, a moralized account explicates those concepts by reference to the moral status of the causes of one's inability or to the

moral status of one's exertions of one's abilities—that is, the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of the causes of one's inability or the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of one's exertions of one's abilities.

In other words, every moralized account of freedom insists that even the severest constraints on a person's latitude might not remove any of a person's freedoms. No such removal will have taken place unless the constraints are illegitimate or unless the prevented conduct would have been legitimate. Consequently, if the placement of a highly dangerous man in chains or a straitjacket is legitimate because of his uncontrollably violent behavior, neither of those means of immobilization will deprive him of any liberties. A theory that generates such a conclusion can hardly claim to be cogently illuminating.

Moreover, with reference to any situation in which some person *P* has been deprived of the freedom to  $\varphi$ , a moralized conception of freedom must submit either that any questions about the illegitimacy of the deprivation are pointlessly pleonastic or that any questions about the legitimacy of *P*'s  $\varphi$ -ing are pointlessly pleonastic. If the restrictions on *P*'s  $\varphi$ -ing are indeed restrictions on his liberty, then either ipso facto they are illegitimate or ipso facto his  $\varphi$ -ing would have been legitimate. So the proponents of moralized conceptions of freedom are logically committed to maintaining. Hence, any moralized conception whisks out of existence an array of perfectly ordinary inquiries.

Perhaps even more unsettling is that, when a moralized account is focused on the illegitimacy of preventive constraints, it strips freedom of any independence as a factor that can militate either in favor of various sociopolitical arrangements or against them. Because the only constraints on human conduct that will count as limitations on liberty are unjust constraints, a denunciation of certain institutions as restrictive of liberty will add nothing to a denunciation of them as unjust. Likewise, because such a moralized account construes freedom as nothing more than the absence of illegitimate constraints, a commendation of certain institutions as promotive of freedom will add nothing to a commendation of them as legitimate and fair. In short, the fostering or impairing of freedom (as understood by a moralized theory of this type) will have ceased to be a consideration that might carry some independent justificatory or

condemnatory weight. The redundancy of that fostering or impairing as a justificatory or condemnatory factor stems from the status of freedom as a mere facet of some substantive moral ideal—an ideal on which the whole burden of justification or condemnation rests. Though moralized approaches to liberty that are focused on the illegitimacy of obstacles might seem to elevate the status of liberty by imbuing it with a morally favorable tenor, they in fact eliminate liberty as an independent phenomenon by reducing all questions of greater or lesser freedom to questions of greater or lesser rectitude. For anyone who wishes to appraise sociopolitical arrangements not only on the basis of their justice or injustice but also (separately) on the basis of their conduciveness or inconduciveness to high levels of overall liberty, a moralized conception of freedom should be forsworn. For anyone who believes that liberty and justice can sometimes conflict—in a clash between liberty and equality, for example—a moralized conception of freedom should be forsworn.

### Negative Versus Republican Liberty

During the past couple of decades, the longstanding controversies between negative and positive conceptions of liberty have become somewhat overshadowed by controversies between negative-liberty theorists and civic-republican theorists. The latter theorists generally subscribe to the negative conception of freedom in opposition to positive-liberty doctrines, but they hold that the negative conception has been construed too narrowly by most of its exponents. In two chief respects, they take themselves to have gone salutarily beyond those exponents.

First, civic republicans are keenly alert to the role of public virtue and public service in bolstering institutions that provide high levels of freedom for individuals. They maintain that, in the absence of active civic participation on the part of all or most of the adult citizens in a country, the reigning government and its elite supporters will very likely amass autocratic powers that will extinguish many of the precious liberties that the citizens theretofore enjoyed. Individuals who wish to retain their freedoms must frequently put aside their private affairs to participate collaboratively in holding governmental leaders to account. Republican theorists

believe that their attentiveness to the crucial role of civic virtue in securing the enjoyment of freedoms is at variance with the perceived emphasis of modern negative-liberty theorists on the sanctity of the private spheres of individuals. Whereas the latter theorists are said to be primarily concerned with drawing clear limits past which any government cannot legitimately intrude into people's lives, republicans are principally concerned with stimulating people to engage robustly with the institutions that govern them.

The contrast just outlined between civic republicanism and modern negative-liberty theories has been advanced with considerable erudition by Quentin Skinner in his essays on liberty during the 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, the contrast is largely misconceived. After all, the positing of an instrumental connection between extensive popular political participation and the safeguarding of individuals' liberties is perfectly consistent with negative-liberty theories. Of course, what would be inconsistent with those theories is any claim that the extensive popular political participation is itself true freedom. Such a claim, envisaging a relationship of equivalence between civic involvement and liberty, would be expressive of one prominent positive-liberty doctrine. It would therefore clash in most respects with negative-liberty theories. However, as Skinner himself emphasizes, the civic-republican writers have not in fact embraced any doctrines of positive liberty. When they have highlighted the instrumental links between the political engagedness of citizens and the security of individuals' freedoms, they have been propounding a thesis about negative liberty rather than about positive liberty. Accordingly, they have not been affirming any propositions that are inconsistent with those affirmed by negative-liberty theorists. Indeed, their thesis about the aforementioned instrumental links is a commonplace among most modern political thinkers, including the exponents of negative liberty. Civic-republican theorists undoubtedly articulate that thesis adeptly, but they do not thereby establish any substantive difference between themselves and the negative-liberty philosophers.

A second respect in which civic republicanism supposedly goes beyond negative-liberty doctrines has been elaborated since the mid-1990s by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit (as well as by

others whom they have influenced). According to these modern civic-republican writers, their very conception of freedom is more capacious than the standard conception within the negative-liberty tradition. Instead of concentrating on freedom as the absence of the actual application of force, republicans concentrate on freedom as the absence of domination. Domination occurs through the actual application of force—by a government or by some other powerful party—but it also occurs through the maintenance of background conditions of intimidatory control that render any actual application of force unnecessary. Skinner and Pettit assert that unless a conception of freedom takes account of the full range of ways in which people can be hemmed in by domination, it will obscure more than it illuminates. It will fail to reveal all the debilitatingly confining effects of social and economic arrangements that subordinate some people to others.

As has been argued in response by contemporary negative-liberty theorists, all the insights of civic republicans are easily accommodated by a proper exposition of the notion of negative liberty. Perhaps some negative-liberty theorists in the past have believed that the only type of constraint on anyone's freedom is the actual application of force by others, but such a view does not pass muster among contemporary negative-liberty philosophers. Such philosophers recognize and indeed insist that the constraints on people's liberty include all the background conditions of domination identified by civic-republican writers. As is apparent from the U Postulate's inclusion of dispositions among the potential constraints on human freedom, the actual application of force is not a necessary condition for the curtailment of anybody's liberty. The freedom-limiting effects of the dispositions and actions that constitute situations of domination are all captured by the U Postulate.

A key point in support of what has just been said is that the units over which the modern negative-liberty theorists aggregate when they measure anyone's freedom are combinations of conjunctively exercisable options. (The aggregation also covers anyone's combinations of consistent unfreedoms. That element can be omitted in the present discussion.) A combination of conjunctively exercisable options is a set of liberties that can all be exercised together simultaneously or sequentially.

When a person is subject to domination by some other party, many of the combinations of conjunctively exercisable freedoms that would have been available to him or her are not available. For example, her liberty to act at odds with the directives of the dominant party will not be conjunctively exercisable with her liberty to do anything that the dominant party's punitive response to her disobedience would prevent her from doing. Because a relationship of domination removes many combinations of conjunctively exercisable freedoms that would otherwise have been available to the person(s) subordinated in that relationship, it *pro tanto* reduces the overall liberty of the person(s) in question. This insight into the freedom-constricting effects of domination has been expounded rigorously by contemporary negative-liberty theorists; an awareness of those effects is hardly unique to the civic-republican tradition.

Still, although the virtues of civic republicanism are also characteristic of modern negative-liberty theories, the republican conception of liberty and the negative conception of it are not identical. As negative-liberty philosophers have contended, the republican conception of freedom championed by Skinner and Pettit is plagued by a number of shortcomings that do not similarly afflict the negative conception. For one thing, Skinner appears to take the view that a person is unfree to  $\phi$  only if he or she knows that he or she has been prevented from  $\phi$ -ing. No such untenable restriction figures in the negative account of liberty. Pettit imposes another such restriction when he declares that unfreedom is caused only by conduct that is intended to produce such an effect. No similar insistence on intentionality or deliberateness is included in the U Postulate since the reasons invoked by Pettit in support of such an insistence are in fact supportive of a focus on any human conduct that gives rise to constraints (whether the constraints are imposed deliberately or unwittingly and whether they are imposed wrongly or innocently).

Even more important, the civic-republican approach mishandles any situation—however rare—in which someone strong enough to mistreat and exploit others is resolutely disinclined to do so. In any such set of circumstances, where the probability of serious encroachments by the dominant person on the overall liberty of his or her contemporaries is practically nil, the redoubtable

might of that person (whether bodily strength or some other form of power) does not lessen anyone else's overall liberty significantly. For example, their lineage or talents can make them someone to whom many other people would eagerly attach themselves as loyal subordinates if the former were to allow them to do so.

Because of his or her reclusive diffidence and, consequently, firm unwillingness to take advantage of his or her superiority, the dominant person does not oblige other people to adjust their behavior to his or her desires. Uncommon though such a situation may be, it is plainly possible. Civic republicans, who assert that anyone's sheer possession of the capacity to dominate is sufficient to deprive his or her contemporaries of their freedom, are committed to the view that the diffident recluse in the envisaged situation has severely curtailed the freedom enjoyed by the people in his or her vicinity. Such an analysis of the situation is distortive rather than illuminating.

Still more distortive is the republican approach in application to a scenario of a dominator who is subordinated by someone whom he himself could oppress. Suppose that Lennie is mightily capable of prodigious feats of strength, while George—who is much smaller and weaker than Lennie—is possessed of domineering tough mindedness that offsets his physical deficiencies. (Lennie and George bear a considerable resemblance, though not a perfect resemblance, to their namesakes in John Steinbeck's *Of Mice and Men*.) Although Lennie is physically much more powerful than George and although the intellectual disparity between the two men is not vast, the differences between their temperaments eventuate in the general domination of the more brawny man by the more diminutive. George continually browbeats Lennie into performing countless menial tasks that serve George's needs and comfort, and he insists on getting his way whenever Lennie forms intentions that are at odds with his own. He terrorizes Lennie with his fits of temper and his piercing insults; Lennie, thoroughly overmastered and intimidated by George, is his dutiful servant. Now, even if this scenario were to be moderated by the addition of some ties of friendship and protection between the two men, the basic point illustrated by it would remain prominent. Somebody fully capable of dominating another person—somebody, therefore, whom the

civic republicans will classify as a dominator—can turn out to be exploited and bullied by that other person. If we were to describe George as having been made unfree by Lennie's dominating strength, we would be distorting his situation markedly.

Admittedly, it might be that George's irascible and imperious behavior is itself necessary to ward off domination by Lennie. If George's aggressively tyrannical conduct is indeed a means of defending his own overall liberty, then that liberty has been diminished by Lennie's daunting presence. After all, were George to abstain from his domineering surliness under such circumstances, he would very quickly render himself unfree to undertake any projects or activities that will have been precluded by Lennie's assumption of the ascendant posture in their relationship. Under such circumstances, that is, Lennie's latent disposition to exert his might has extinguished the conjunctive exercisability of many of George's liberties. Nonetheless, this feature of the situation is purely contingent. A softening of George's demeanor might instead produce less dramatic effects. Perhaps, it would not induce any substantial changes at all in the subordinate posture of Lennie, who might be unshakably habituated to George's dominance. Or, what is slightly more plausible, the growing emollience of George might simply induce Lennie to become less dutiful and subservient without actually prompting him to act despotically toward George. Instead of inverting the previous relationship of mastery and submission, Lennie might simply opt to live alongside George as an equal or perhaps he would separate from George and go his own way. Whatever might be the precise outcome of a marked alteration in George's authoritarian mien, it would not necessarily involve any significant loss of liberty for George himself (especially if the baseline for measuring the loss is a situation in which neither of the two men dominates the other). In that case, his currently overbearing behavior is not a means of safeguarding his own freedom against the potential dominance of Lennie but is straightforwardly a means of coercing and manipulating the bulkier man. Such a state of affairs can obtain even though the civic republicans' analyses of unfreedom clearly generate the conclusion that Lennie is a dominator. Someone can qualify as a dominator—given how

that status is defined by the civic republicans—without significantly impairing the overall freedom of anyone else.

In short, in the rare circumstances where the capacity to dominate genuinely involves extremely low probabilities of nontrivial encroachments on the freedom of the people over whom that capacity could be exerted, the sheer susceptibility of those people to the exercise of that capacity is not to be classified as a state of wide-ranging unfreedom. Neither a diffidently reclusive mighty person nor Lennie in his relationship with George is significantly abridging the overall freedom of anyone to whom he is hugely superior in strength. Civic republicans, with their insistence that the capacity to dominate is itself sufficient to produce dependence and consequent unfreedom, do not provide satisfactory accounts of the situations discussed in the previous few paragraphs.

Most of these remarks about the curtailment or noncurtailment of overall freedom are applicable mutatis mutandis to the inexistence or existence of particular freedoms. If somebody with the capacity to dominate is firmly disposed to use his or her ascendancy to prevent a subordinate person *S* from  $\varphi$ -ing in the event that *S* endeavors to  $\varphi$ , then observers are warranted in saying that *S* is unfree to  $\varphi$ . For most purposes, any probabilistic qualification attached to such an ascription of unfreedom can be left implicit. By contrast, if the likelihood of the powerful person's prevention of *S* from  $\varphi$ -ing in the event of *S*'s endeavoring to  $\varphi$  is lower but still significant, then statements about *S*'s unfreedom to  $\varphi$  should be overtly probabilistic. Finally, if the likelihood of the powerful person's prevention of *S* from  $\varphi$ -ing in the event of *S*'s endeavoring to  $\varphi$  is exceedingly small, then observers are warranted in affirming that *S* is free to  $\varphi$  (vis-à-vis the powerful person). Once again, any probabilistic qualification can for most purposes be left implicit. In other words, with regard to the reduction or nonreduction of a person's overall freedom and with regard to the inexistence or existence of any of a person's particular freedoms, the basic focus of observers in any context marked by someone's dominant strength should be the same. The crucial consideration in such a context is not the sheer presence of the dominant strength but the probability that that strength will result in the prevention of sundry actions or sundry combinations of actions.

### Physical Versus Deontic Liberty

Both in the F Postulate and in the U Postulate, the chief concepts are modal rather than deontic. That is, they concern what can or cannot occur rather than what should or should not occur. They concern what each person is able or unable to do rather than what each person is permitted or forbidden to do. They, thus, pertain to physical freedoms and unfreedoms rather than to deontic freedoms and unfreedoms. Someone is physically free to  $\varphi$  if and only if he or she is physically unprevented from  $\varphi$ -ing, and he or she is physically unfree to  $\varphi$  if and only if he or she is physically prevented from  $\varphi$ -ing as a result of some actions or dispositions to perform actions on the part of some other person(s). Here, *physically* is not to be understood in contrast with *mentally* or *psychologically*; rather, the relevant contrast is between *physically* and *normatively*.

Deontic freedom, contrariwise, consists not in physical unpreventedness but instead in permittedness or unforbiddenness. If somebody is deontically free to  $\varphi$ , then he or she is allowed to  $\varphi$  by any applicable authoritative norms, such as legal mandates, moral principles, or institutional rules. Conversely, if somebody is deontically unfree to  $\varphi$ , then he or she is prohibited from  $\varphi$ -ing by one or more of those authoritative norms. When we ask whether somebody is deontically free to  $\varphi$ , we are not asking whether he or she is capable of  $\varphi$ -ing; we are asking whether he is entitled to  $\varphi$ .

Physical liberty and deontic liberty differ in a number of respects that derive in various ways from the basic modal/deontic difference just recounted. For one thing, the predicates "is deontically free" and "is deontically unfree" are contradictories rather than merely contraries, and thus the predicates "is deontically unfree" and "is not free deontically" are equivalent. In other words, the concept of deontic freedom is bivalent rather than trivalent. Someone is deontically free to  $\varphi$  if and only if he or she is not deontically unfree to  $\varphi$ . In regard to such freedom, there is no category that corresponds to the category of mere inabilities.

Perhaps the most obvious dissimilarity between the concept of physical freedom and the concept of deontic freedom is their extensional nonequivalence. That is, a person will often be deontically free to  $\varphi$  without being physically free to  $\varphi$ , and vice versa. For example, although Norma is both

legally and morally permitted to run a mile under 4 minutes, she is not physically able to do so; her deontic liberty to run at that speed is not accompanied by a corresponding physical liberty. Conversely, although she is physically able to assault unprovokedly the person standing directly ahead of her in a queue, she is neither legally nor morally permitted to do so. Her physical freedom to commit the assault is not accompanied by a corresponding deontic freedom. Permissibility and ability can coincide and very frequently do coincide, but they likewise frequently diverge.

A more subtle dissimilarity between physical liberty and deontic liberty pertains to the isolability of actions. The removal of someone's physical freedom to  $\varphi$  will often require the removal of his or her physical freedoms to do things that are crucially prerequisite to  $\varphi$ -ing, whereas the removal of his or her deontic freedom to  $\varphi$  (e.g., through the enactment of a legal ban on  $\varphi$ -ing) never requires the removal of any of his or her deontic freedoms to do things that are crucially prerequisite to  $\varphi$ -ing. If people remain physically free to take steps that would immediately antecede their  $\varphi$ -ing, then the prevention of their  $\varphi$ -ing will typically depend on monitoring and rapid interventions by other people. In connection with some activities, such monitoring and interventions will be feasible; in connection with many other activities, however, those last-minute preventive intrusions will not be realistically possible. An intervention at an earlier stage is sometimes essential if a person's physical freedom to  $\varphi$  is genuinely to be eliminated. Nothing similar is ever essential for the removal of someone's deontic liberty to  $\varphi$ . Precisely because the elimination of any person's deontic freedom to  $\varphi$  concerns what is impermissible rather than what is impossible, that elimination is perfectly consistent with a situation in which the person is deontically free to do virtually everything that is physically indispensable for his or her  $\varphi$ -ing.

A further difference between physical liberty and deontic liberty is centered on the avoidability of actions. A person whose mind has not been completely taken over by someone else in a science fiction scenario or by certain severe mental illnesses will retain the physical freedom to eschew any particular action. At the very least, such a person will always have the option of surrendering in a wholly passive manner to the operations of

external forces. Accordingly, there is no such thing as a physically unavoidable action. When we cross from the realm of the physical to the realm of the deontic, however, we encounter a very different situation. Anybody can be deontically unfree to forgo certain types or instances of conduct. For example, a person whose income is subject to taxation will typically be legally unfree—and probably also morally unfree—to abstain from writing his or her name on any income tax forms that require his or her signature. Though the person is physically free to refrain from signing those forms in a timely fashion, he or she is not deontically free to refrain and is legally obligated, and probably also morally obligated, to sign the relevant documents. In this case, as in multitudinous other cases, legal or moral requirements can make the performance of certain actions mandatory. In that respect, legal or moral mandatoriness differs from the material impediments that limit somebody's physical freedom.

Of course, these several divergences between physical liberty and deontic liberty should not induce anyone to overlook the many affinities between them. Liberty of each type consists in an absence of constraints. Though physical constraints differ from deontic constraints in the sundry ways that have just been recounted, unconstrainedness is the essence of deontic freedom just as it is of physical freedom. Freedom of either type is negative rather than positive.

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*See also* Liberalism; Libertarianism; Republicanism

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## LOBBYING

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Lobbying is the interaction of an individual, group, interest, or organization with government to influence current policy or create a situation conducive to shaping future policy. It is a fundamental and omnipresent aspect of all political systems, from liberal to elitist democracies, to authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes. Yet although there are common elements to lobbying across all political systems, the particular form that the lobbying process takes in a country, state, province, city, or even internationally, is shaped by several governmental, political, and cultural elements. Furthermore, lobbying is inextricably bound with the activities of lobbyists—that is, those representing individuals, collective interests, and interest groups to government.

This entry draws on research on lobbying across all political systems but focuses mainly on established liberal democracies and developing democracies. First, we look at the relationship between practical politics and political science work on lobbying, followed by the common denominators of lobbying and its ubiquitous nature. Next, the major theoretical explanations are discussed, followed by how institutional structure affects lobbying. Then, we consider the types and role of lobbyists in the United States and other

Western democracies, followed by the issue of lobby regulation. Finally, we look at some trends in lobbying across the world.

### Development of Lobbying Research and Theory

Even though lobbying has always been a fixture of virtually all groups and governments, only in the past 100 years has it been recognized by scholars as a fundamental, prominent, and crucial part of policy making. Studies of lobbying did not occupy a major place in American political science until after the work of David Truman (*The Governmental Process*, 1951). The increased academic interest in lobbying in the United States from the 1960s onward was also due to the advocacy explosion, first in Washington, D.C., and later in the American states, as more and more interests and interest groups began to lobby and expanded their range of lobbying techniques.

Yet as late as the mid-1950s, many scholars saw lobbying and lobbyists as a purely American phenomenon—a product of the separation-of-powers system and not an aspect of parliamentary systems. In *Anonymous Empire*, Samuel Finer showed this to be an erroneous view of British politics, and work on lobbying in other parliamentary systems followed. As late as the 1970s, however, many texts on the politics of countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and Australia did not include the terms *lobbying*, *lobbyist*, or even *interest groups* (or *pressure groups* as they were often called) in their indexes. Even today, these terms do not appear in many treatments of the politics of developing and reemerging democracies, such as those in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Despite the late development of academic interest in lobbying and lobbyists, extensive research and some theories now exist. The lessons and characteristics of this research can be summed up in the following six points:

1. While there are thousands of studies, mainly case studies, from around the world, there is no general theory of lobbying and lobbyists. Even so, there is general agreement among scholars on the other five points.
2. There are three interrelated factors, in particular, that shape the lobbying environment in a place: the degree of political pluralism or

authoritarianism, the structure of governmental institutions regarding centralization or fragmentation of the policy process, and the political culture.

3. Lobbyists exist in all political systems but take on different guises in different systems.
4. The last 40 years or so have seen the use of an increasing range of lobbying strategies and tactics, not only in developed pluralist democracies but also in developing democracies and even authoritarian systems.
5. Largely because of the popular belief that lobbying and lobbyists benefit existing powerful interests at the expense of the rest of society and because of corruption scandals associated with lobbying activity, lobbying and lobbyists are held in low regard around the world. Ironically, however, and especially in democracies, hundreds of millions of citizens belong to interest groups.
6. Because of the potential for abuse and for undermining the goals of authoritarian regimes, the regulation of lobbying and lobbyists has been an aspect of public policy around the world.

### The Nature of Lobbying

When two or more people get together, particularly in large groups and in countries, they want to influence others largely to secure economic, political, or other benefits for themselves, their group, or society as a whole. This is the motive for lobbying and why it has always been a central part of human society.

#### *Common Denominators of Lobbying*

The most fundamental processes involved in lobbying to achieve a benefit at any group, state, national, or international level consist of three interrelated activities. First, it requires getting access to the person or persons who can make the decision; second, it requires building a relationship with these people and, third, influencing them—exerting power.

Whether it is the Roman Empire, the court of Louis XIV of France, Stalin's Soviet Union, a modern liberal democracy such as the United States or New Zealand, an emerging democracy such as

Kenya or Vietnam, or a closed authoritarian regime such as North Korea or Myanmar, these three stages of lobbying occur in some form at various times. In nonpluralist systems, however, they may not occur in all policy situations and may not be very obvious.

#### *The Ubiquitousness of Lobbying*

If lobbying takes place in all groups and political systems, why is it that until recently, it was seen to occur in the United States only and was seen as virtually nonexistent in authoritarian political systems? The answer to this question lies in the difference between officially recognized and visible lobbying and unofficial and behind-the-scenes lobbying.

In the United States, much of the lobbying is open to view and officially sanctioned by the Constitution and various laws. Until recently, in most other democracies and in organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations, it was less public (which should not necessarily be equated with illegal or underhanded) and thus not seen to be performed by people called lobbyists. Nevertheless, lobbying and lobbyists have always been very much a part of these political systems. And even though in authoritarian regimes lobbying and related organizations were either banned (as under many military regimes in Latin America) or not seen to be necessary (as in communist countries), individuals close to the leaders, such as military personnel or their close friends and allies, engaged in lobbying to get their policies enacted or to block the political goals of their opponents.

#### *Explaining Variations in Lobbying Processes*

Thus, just because it appears that lobbying is not taking place in a particular government does not mean that lobbying is absent. The actual process of lobbying, however—namely, the avenues of access, forging relationships with policymakers, and influencing them—varies across political jurisdictions according to the three factors identified earlier.

First, the more pluralist the political system, and particularly the institutionalization and acceptance of political opposition, the more visible and formalized lobbying and the activities of lobbyists are

likely to be and, in most circumstances, the wider the range of strategies and tactics employed. In contrast, in a more authoritarian system, lobbying will include little more than personal contacts with the monarch or dictator.

Second, institutional structure determines the power or decision points that lobbyists need to focus on in their lobbying effort. This structure is usually very clear in authoritarian systems, but it can be more complex in pluralist democracies. In the U.S. separation-of-powers system, where there is often bipartisanship on some issues, power is fragmented between the three branches of government and also between the federal and state levels. In parliamentary systems with strong political parties, however, power is much more concentrated in the executive, even in federal systems such as Germany. Another factor is the extent of neo-corporatism or pluralism in liberal democracies, particularly those in Western Europe.

Third, while research on how political culture—the political values of the governed and those in government—affects lobbying is not extensive and rather inconclusive, a good case can still be made that this factor may be the most important determinant of the activity of lobbying and lobbyists. Broad acceptance of the existence of interest groups and the legitimacy of their activities, as in most liberal democracies, leads to mass group membership and the necessity, openness, and formalization of lobbying, albeit with some skepticism, in a pluralist democracy. In contrast, no or minimal public and policymaker legitimization of lobbying and lobbyists, as in authoritarian and many developing democracies, leads to low group membership and continued and less formalized and open lobbying processes.

### **Lobbying in the United States: An Aberrant Case**

An irony of the lobbying system in the United States is that, although it was once seen as the only place where lobbying took place and is often held as a benchmark for being the most advanced of lobbying systems, in many ways, it is an aberration compared with the lobbying systems in other liberal democracies. This is because its institutional structure and political culture have influenced lobbying in some unique ways.

The U.S. political system was designed to prevent precipitous actions such as the American colonies had experienced under George III of England. So the separation-of-powers system, in which the Congress and the President share legislative power, was born. Later, the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, also acquired a policy role by being able to interpret and strike down the acts of the other two branches. Add to this the federal system (i.e., the federal agencies that make up the “administrative state”) and the fact that ideology has never been as strong in the United States as in Europe, resulting in less disciplined political parties, and the product is a fragmented—very pluralistic—policy process with many power points. As more and more groups and interests got involved in lobbying from the 1960s onward, it led to hyperpluralism—that is, more and more lobbying forces competing for the attention of the same number of policymakers. In turn, this was an impetus to the development of new and indirect lobbying techniques, such as grassroots lobbying, media campaigns, and political action committees (organizations that contribute money to candidates’ election campaigns), in an effort to gain access to and influence policymakers.

While not all the processes of lobbying in other democracies are in contrast to those in the United States, there are some notable differences. With centralized policy-making processes shaped by the executive branch in most of these countries, there is much less political benefit from lobbying the parliament or using the courts. Plus, much lobbying is done through political parties and can be especially productive for those associated with the party or coalition in power. With various degrees of corporatist arrangements, from the very liberal democracies of Scandinavia to the reemerging democracies of Latin America, there is not the same degree of hyperpluralism in these countries and thus not the same need for the broad range of lobbying techniques used in the United States. For a combination of all these reasons and because lobbying was not seen as part of these systems until very recently, the U.S. lobbying profession has not developed in the same way as in other democracies.

### **Theories of Lobbying in Liberal Democracies**

Like the rest of political science, interest group studies from the 1960s onward were influenced by

the behaviorist and empirical approaches to research. Since then, even though no general theory of lobbying or one that integrates existing theoretical approaches has been developed, quantitative and qualitative techniques and a combination of the two have been used to produce theoretical explanations of lobbying. Virtually every major research approach in the social sciences has been used, including decision theory, rational choice theory, cost–benefit analysis, game theory, exchange theory, and new institutionalism.

One particularly enlightening theory is that developed by John R. Wright using communications theory. Although Wright's research focused on the U.S. Congress, it likely has general application for lobbying around the world. The assumption that lobbyists are primarily information providers is at the root of his theory. After Wright establishes that legislators generally have three overarching goals—reelection, the desire to make good public policy, and to exercise some power—he argues that legislators are forced to pursue these goals in a very uncertain and ever-changing environment. This is where lobbyists and lobbying come in with a mutual legislator–lobbyist benefit to the communication of information. On the one hand, this information will influence government officials to the benefit of the group or organization the lobbyist represents. On the other, this information reduces uncertainty and helps legislators learn how best to achieve their goals. This, to Wright, is not only the core of the lobbying process but the major form of influence.

This theory certainly hits on a key element in lobbying. Yet other research, especially on the 50 states in the United States by Clive Thomas and Ronald Hrebenar, argues that there are other key elements in the lobbying process and lobbying influence. The 2 major elements of the 12 that Thomas and Hrebenar identify are the extent to which policymakers need the group or organization lobbying them and lobbyist–policymaker relations. The more a policymaker needs a group—the more a group can build up a sense of need or obligation—because of votes, money, information, or whatever, the more likely the policymaker is to support the group and its cause. Good lobbyist–policymaker relations built on credibility and trust also appear to be key, and the longer the relationship, the more likely the lobbyist is to influence the

policymaker. Furthermore, this lobbyist–policymaker contact is the essence of lobbying and determines the ultimate success or failure of an issue. This has always been the case and likely always will be.

What is needed is an integration of various lobbying theories to provide a comprehensive understanding. This is inhibited, however, by the diverse nature of interest group studies and the fact that several scholars are wedded to one research method to the exclusion of others.

### Lobbyists in the United States and Around the World

Earlier, we defined a lobbyist as someone who represents individuals, collective interests, and interest groups to government. A more comprehensive definition, developed by Thomas, which embraces lobbyists around the world is as follows: A lobbyist is a person designated by an interest group to facilitate influencing public policy in that group's favor by performing one or more of the following for the group: (1) directly contacting public officials, (2) monitoring political and governmental activity, (3) advising on political strategies and tactics, and (4) developing and orchestrating the group's lobbying effort.

This definition succinctly embraces the four major roles that lobbyists perform. Not all lobbyists perform all four tasks. This depends on the organization and on the issue at hand.

#### *Types of Lobbyists and Alternative Designations*

The word *lobbyist* is often used as if all lobbyists were the same. In fact, there are different types of lobbyists from different backgrounds, which often affects their power base—their ability to be effective. Until recently, varying designations were used to distinguish between types of lobbyists, including *independent lobbyists* and *professional lobbyist*, both of which were sometimes also referred to as *hired guns* because they are paid specifically to lobby. These designations were sometimes contrasted with *amateur lobbyist*, though it was often unclear whether the term *amateur* meant unpaid or not well versed in lobbying techniques. In the United States, by the late 1980s, a standard terminology of types of lobbyists emerged among

scholars and political practitioners. There are now seen to be five types of lobbyists:

1. Contract lobbyists are hired on contract for a fee specifically to lobby. They often represent more than one client and are likely to be former elected officials or staffers who are purveying to their clients their contacts with decision makers built up over many years.
2. In-house lobbyists are employees of an association, organization, or business, who as part or all of their job act as lobbyists. They represent only one client—their employer—and are likely to have come from the business or profession they represent. Their major asset is unequalled knowledge in their field, such as education, the environment, or issues and laws affecting the disabled.
3. Legislative liaisons are employees of government agencies who represent their agency to the legislative and executive branches of government. They also represent only one client—their agency. They tend to be career bureaucrats or former legislative or executive staff and have an intimate knowledge of their policy area.
4. Volunteer or cause lobbyists are those who represent citizen and community organizations or informal groups. They rarely represent more than one interest and are usually not paid. Their power base, as much as they have one, is founded on their commitment to the cause and their tenacity.
5. Private individual lobbyists are those acting on their own behalf and not designated by any organization as an official representative. Unless these are prominent citizens, such as those who own sports teams, these will not have much of a power base.

Partly because of the negative attitude toward lobbyists and lobbying, lobbyists are often referred to by other euphemistic designations. These include political consultant, government affairs representative, public affairs representative, and so on. And because of the negative perception of lobbying in other Western democracies and because they have only recently recognized the role of

interest groups and lobbyists, there is no agreed-on nomenclature for lobbyists outside the United States. Euphemistic designations similar to those used in the United States are used for lobbyists in these countries.

One major difference between the United States and other democracies is the role of the hired or contract lobbyist (the term *contract lobbyist* is rarely used outside the United States, and they are sometimes referred to as commercial lobbyists). In most countries, including Australia, Canada, and those in the EU, these individuals are less likely to contact government officials directly but act as group advisors, monitor activity affecting the group, and act as facilitators arranging meetings of group officials with policymakers (hence the broader definition of a lobbyist set out above). In fact, in some cases, it is somewhat of a misnomer to call these individuals group “representatives” as some of them rarely advocate the group’s position directly to government. Nevertheless, these people are intimately involved in the process of lobbying as defined above and should be considered as part of the lobbyist community in their respective country.

In considering the types and role of lobbyists, the aberrant nature of the U.S. political system is once again evident. While lobbyists in the United States, particularly Washington, D.C. (where they are referred to as Washington representatives), have long had the most visibility and their role is often viewed as a benchmark, in several ways, they are not typical of lobbyists around the world.

### Regulation of Lobbying

Regarding liberal democracies, while the most extensive regulation has been developed in the United States, most liberal democracies have enacted some form of lobbying and lobbyist regulation. Such regulations have resulted from a combination of negative public attitudes toward lobbying and those who perform it, a populist desire to even up the political playing field against powerful special interests, and as the result of lobbying scandals involving corruption and illegality. It is the latter that is most often responsible for the enactment of regulation, such as what occurred in the 1990s in the United States, in several countries in Western Europe, and in the EU.

There are, however, several problems with lobby regulation, and its results have been mixed across liberal democracies. One is that regulation often runs up against the right of free speech and the right to petition government, as in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and this restricts the extent of regulation. A second problem is that the public and policymakers, often, are not clear on what the goals of regulation are: Some hope to even up the political playing field, while others want to publicize the actions of lobbying among other goals. A third point is that regulation cannot make hitherto weak groups powerful—only increased resources and political acumen can do that.

The most that regulation can do is to monitor the activities of lobbying organizations and lobbyists and put pressure on them and the policymakers they deal with not to engage in corrupt activities. However extensive regulation is or might become, it will never entirely root out corruption and nefarious activities in lobbying (and politics in general) as long as the stakes are so high, as they often are in many lobbying campaigns, with many peoples' livelihoods and futures at stake.

### Conclusion

While lobbying has always existed and probably always will, several recent trends can be detected regarding this most basic of political activities and the lobbyists who perform it. Three are particularly noteworthy and interrelated.

First, since the rise of the third wave of democracy in the mid-1980s, an internationalization or globalization of lobbying techniques has taken place. This is not to say that all the new techniques in the United States are appropriate to all other political systems, but these techniques are often used when expedient around the world. Second, a reduction of the role of the state in many countries, especially in Western Europe, has undermined the neo-corporatist approach to lobbying and increased the level of pluralism. The first two trends have produced what might be considered an "Americanization" of lobbying across advanced liberal democracies and increasingly in developing democracies. However, this is not because these systems are trying to emulate or mimic the U.S. model. It is due more to the U.S.

system exhibiting many characteristics of a highly pluralistic lobbying system.

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*See also* Accountability; Corporativism; Corruption; Democracy, Theories of; Interest Groups; Parliamentary Systems; Pluralism; Pluralist Interest Intermediation; Representation

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## LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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While intending to give a comprehensive introduction to local government, the entry will largely focus

on local government systems in Europe in its empirical references. Such focus seems justified and promising for two reasons. For one, it would be feasible, given the limited space, to give an account on local government in a global perspective and coverage. Second, because of the structure and variance which local governments in European countries exhibit they might provide insights into general issues and trends which may well relate and be “extrapolated” to local government developments in other regions of the world. Because a truly comprehensive account of the variations and trends in local governments throughout the world would require far more space than is available here, this entry provides an introduction to local government by focusing on the varieties and differences among local government systems in Europe. Such a review of variations in local governmental structure in European countries can offer insights into general issues and trends, which may then be extrapolated to developments in local government in other regions of the world.

Here, the term *local (self-)government*, which originated and is used in the English-speaking world, will also be applied to the other countries under consideration. The reader should keep in mind, however, that the variance in country-specific terminology, such as *kommunale Selbstverwaltung* (local self-administration) in Germany, *libre administration* (free/autonomous administration) in France, or *sälvtstyrelse* (self-steering) in Sweden, conveys not only linguistic but also the underlying country-specific conceptual and institutional differences.

### Intergovernmental Setting

A distinction between *decentralization* and *deconcentration* should be made with regard to the arrangement and distribution of powers, functions, and responsibilities in the intergovernmental setting. Decentralization is an intrinsically political concept as it revolves around the devolution of powers and responsibilities from the upper government level to a subnational level with democratically elected and politically accountable decision-making and administrative bodies of its own. By contrast, deconcentration is an essentially administrative concept as it aims at transferring administrative functions from an upper to a lower administrative level.

### Regionalization

Historically, in (unitary) countries, the intergovernmental architecture comprised two levels—the central government and the local government—with the exception of federal states where, historically, an intermediate/regional governmental level has been in place—in the German case, in fact, preceding the creation of the national state.

In recent years, in some hitherto unitary European countries, particularly the larger ones, the intergovernmental setting has been shaped by the formation of regions on the intermediary level—placed between the central government and the existing local government levels. Among continental European countries, the hitherto unitary (Napoleonic) states have shown remarkable variance in the degree of regionalization. The factually most advanced case is Spain where, when democratic government was reestablished after 1978, the regions (*comunidades autónomas*) were created with significant legislative powers and fiscal resources of their own. In Italy, the regions were given legislative and operative competences to a degree that has been termed *quasi-federal*. By contrast, in France, where as an element of decentralization in 1982 regions were introduced, it was decided to keep them at a simple, local government status (as a third level of *collectivités locales*).

The United Kingdom (UK), too, abandoned its path-dependent unitary trajectory in that, in 1998 and 1999, Scotland and Wales gained regional status (with elected regional assemblies of their own). Currently, however, the UK has also entered the “road towards quasi-federalism” (David Wilson & Chris Game, 2006), which has remained “asymmetrical,” though, as with England (which has 85% of the UK population), remaining (highly) centralized.

Whereas regionalization, particularly in its quasi-federal nuances, has strengthened the democratic as well as the operative potential of the intermediate/regional level, its implications for the local government levels have been somewhat problematic. The politically and functionally empowered regional level, while proclaiming decentralism vis-à-vis the central government level, may be disposed to take a centralist posture in relation to the local government levels. The somewhat hierarchical influence, which in Germany’s federal system the regional states (*Länder*) tend to exercise over the local level, hints at a paradox of decentralization.

Similarly Spain's regions (*comunidades autónomas*) have exhibited some dominant stand vis-à-vis the country's local level.

### *Local Government Level*

In most countries, the local government levels are historically made up of two tiers, called, for instance, *counties* and *boroughs* or *districts* in the UK, *Kreise* and *Gemeinden/Städte* in Germany, *départements* and *communes* in France, and *landsting kommuner* and *kommuner* in Sweden. In the following, the terms *counties* and *municipalities* will be generally applied.

In some countries (single tier) local authorities have been formed, which combine municipal and county responsibilities. The German–Austrian local government tradition has long since known such single-tier local authorities (called county free cities, *kreisfreie Städte*) as the organizational base particularly of larger cities. Similarly, in the English local government tradition, the scheme of single-tier county boroughs was in place until 1972 and was resumed, under the new label *unitary* authorities, particularly since the 1990s; by now, in most urban areas, including the major cities, single-tier unitaries have been formed. In central Eastern European countries also, such as in Poland and Hungary, the concept of single-tier local authorities has been put to work.

### *Intercommunal Bodies*

In countries in which, in the absence of territorial reforms, the territorial structure is marked by a multitude of small-scale municipalities, an additional layer of intercommunal bodies has been created or has come into existence, which are meant to provide the institutional frame and encouragement for intercommunal cooperation.

### **Territorial Organization**

The European countries show a conspicuous variance in the average size of their municipalities. On one end of the continuum, there is a group of countries with municipalities with populations averaging more than 30,000, such as the UK (with an average size of 139,000 inhabitants), Denmark (with 55,000), and Sweden (with 31,000). At the other end, there are countries with municipalities

having average populations of less than 10,000, particularly France (1,720), Hungary (3,170), Spain (5,400), and Italy (7,200) (see Dexia, 2008, p. 41).

### *Territorial Reforms*

The current territorial structure of municipalities largely depends on whether the countries have, in the past, carried out territorial reform and on the underlying political and cultural factors that shaped the decision to carry out or not to carry out territorial reforms.

In the first group of countries, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, territorial reforms were guided and driven by the goal, typical of the (rationalist) zeitgeist of that period, of massively redrawing the historically small-size boundaries of the municipalities in order to modernize them and make them administratively more amenable and operationally more effective in conducting the multiple tasks conveyed on the local government level by the (then expansive Welfare) State. Labeled by Alan Norton (1994) as the “North European pattern,” in view of the countries in question, this reform strategy was marked by the political determination of the governments concerned to carry out the reforms, possibly against the will of and in the face of protests by the local population, using coercive parliamentary legislation as a last resort. According to John Stewart (2000), particularly in England, the scale of amalgamation has been criticized as being oversized (“sizeism”), fostering political alienation of local citizens (as shown by the low voter turnout).

In other countries (with small municipalities), no territorial reforms have occurred. In France and Italy, in the early 1970s, the national governments attempted, in line with the zeitgeist of the era, to territorially reform the small municipalities (in the French case averaging 1,700 inhabitants). Yet these reform moves almost entirely failed because the governments, adhering to the country's political culture value of “voluntariness,” made amalgamation contingent on the approval of the local population, and such a local consensus was not reached.

In Central East European countries (and similarly in East German Länder), after the downfall of the Communist regimes, most postsocialist governments decided to do without amalgamation of the small municipalities in order not to impair the newly created (small) local democracies (in



Hungary, the number of municipalities even jumped after 1990, from 1,600 to 3,170).

### *Intercommunal Bodies (Inter-Communalité)*

In countries in which territorial reforms of the municipal level did not come to pass, different strategies and approaches were followed to institutionally encourage and enable the multitude of small-scale municipalities to engage in intercommunal cooperation, for instance, in the provision of services for the local population. Against the background of the very small size and very large number of municipalities (communes), France, not surprisingly, was the first and exemplary country to create the legal framework—the first as early as 1890—for a great number of such intercommunal bodies, called *inter-communalité*, at first in the form of *syndicats*, then, since the 1960s, in the form of communal unions (*communautés*), with the most important ones being the *communautés urbaines* (in the meantime) in 16 metropolitan areas. As a crucial institutional innovation, the communal unions have been provided with a taxing power of their own (*fiscalité propre*). In line with the traditional principle of voluntariness (*voluntariat*), most of these intercommunal bodies have been formed on a voluntary basis. In other countries (without territorial reforms), similar institutional developments have got under way, for instance, in Italy (with the formation of *consorzi*, in part by binding legislation) and in some German Länder (with the establishment of *Verwaltungsgemeinschaften* [administrative unions], formed also, last resort, by binding legislation). Most recently, a new round of territorial consolidation has gained momentum. Further, on the one hand, quite massive territorial amalgamation strategies have been inaugurated, such as in Denmark (2007) and Lithuania, both arriving at municipalities averaging 55,000 inhabitants. On the other hand, political initiatives have been undertaken to further consolidate the intercommunal networks.

## Political Institutions

### *Local Democracy*

Local self-government hinges on the idea and imperative that the local citizens govern themselves in all matters relevant to their local community. In

its purest form, local self-government is realized through institutions of direct democracy when the local citizens meet directly to make the relevant decisions. In Europe, the mother country of direct local democracy still is Switzerland, where in some cantons, and even in major cities, citizens meet periodically to make relevant decisions, including those on local taxation. For the rest, in all other European countries, the institutions and procedures of representative democracy prevail, according to which the key political right of citizens is to elect the local councilors, while the elected local council is the supreme and sole local decision-making body.

Political parties made their entry into local politics quite late, when national parties discovered the local level as a relevant political arena to mobilize political support and to recruit political leaders. Recently, however, as noted by Marion Reiser and Everhard Holtmann (2008), there are indications of a “farewell to the party model” in local politics.

In recent years, the dominance of representative local democracy and preponderance of the elected local council as the prime local decision maker has been challenged as, since the 1990s, in a number of countries (such as Germany and Italy), binding local referendums have been introduced as a complement and corrective to the elected local councils. Significant impulses came from Central Eastern European countries (including East German Länder) when, after the collapse of the communist systems, the introduction of direct democratic procedures were seen as a crucial step to move toward reestablishing and reinforcing democratic systems.

### *Local Political Systems*

Among the local institutional arrangements in European countries, two systems can historically be distinguished. For one, essentially in the UK and in Scandinavian countries, monistic local government systems have developed in which decision making (as well the direction of local administration) is ideally the collective responsibility of the elected council, which, in turn, has delegated this monistic responsibility to sector committees (government by committees). From this followed the notion that the executive function (which combines

decision making and executive functions) should be entrusted to (sectoral) committees formed by the (plenary) council (government by committee).

This monistic government by committee system is contrasted with the dualistic local government system, which has emerged in Continental European countries. It is premised on the (dualistic) distinction made between the local council as the prime local (local parliament type) decision-making body, on the one hand, and as an executive body with, as a rule, a mayor elected by the council, on the other hand, in a division-of-function scheme reminiscent of a (local) parliamentary system. In most countries, the mayor was elected by the council. Both local government "families" have seen significant institutional changes in recent years, which were triggered by mounting criticism.

In the UK, the traditional government-by-committee system was attacked for lacking clearly identifiable accountability and for fostering policy fragmentation. The Local Government Act of 2000 provided for a reform that was undertaken in England and is the option chosen by most councils. It amounts to a kind of "parliamentarization" of the local government system, in that most of the decision-making and executive powers are transferred to one of the committees (the "executive committee" with "executive councilors" as the local "parliamentary cabinet"); there is a (council elected) leader of the committee who serves as a kind of local "prime minister," while the plenary of the council and its councilors are assigned a scrutinizing function. Sweden, too, has moved toward a quasi parliamentarization of the local government system, stopping short, however, of abandoning the collective responsibility of sector committees.

In continental European countries, the existing dualistic system, with a council-elected executive mayor, was chiefly criticized for constraining the emergence of a local leadership and also because the mayor lacked democratic accountability. Since the 1990s, many European countries (German Länder, Italy, central Eastern European countries) have moved toward the direct election of the mayor, which is reminiscent of a local presidential system. To put a political check on the (possibly domineering) mayor, in most German Länder, a procedure to recall the sitting, directly elected mayor by way of local referendum has been installed.

## Functions

The local government levels have historically taken on an ever-broader multifunctional profile as local authorities, responding to mounting social and infrastructural needs, assumed responsibility for social services and public utilities (water, sewage, energy, etc.) in what conservatives sneered at as municipal socialism and which in fact amounted to a local embryonic version of the emergent welfare state. With the advances of national welfare states, which climaxed after 1945 well into the 1970s, local government levels were increasingly put in charge by central governments to implement national welfare state and interventionist policies.

In all countries, the local government levels have been responsible for the provision of social services, urban planning, and for the provision of utilities. Moreover, the concern for cultural and recreational matters ranked high on the local government agenda.

The most important intercountry functional variations are related to education and health services. While, for instance, in Sweden and England, the running of (primary and secondary) schools falls under the operational and financial responsibility of the local government levels, in continental European countries, education, by tradition, is firmly a state matter. In some countries, the local government levels (in Scandinavian countries) or the regions (in Italy) are operationally and financially involved in the public health system. Recently, in reaction to neoliberal (lean state) and marketization demands as well under budgetary pressure, the traditional public sector model and with it the multifunctional municipal sector profile have experienced significant retrenchment and cutbacks both in functions and in personnel, thus putting the traditional local government model at stake (see below).

The significant, in part preponderant, functional weight that the subnational levels, particularly the local government levels, have so far acquired in the respective countries is indicated by the high proportion of personnel at these levels compared with the total number of public sector personnel.

Among the unitary countries, the list is topped by Scandinavian countries, with local government personnel constituting up to 83% (in the case of Sweden) of the total number of public sector

employees (see Dexia, 2008, p. 64), and also by some Central East European countries (such as Hungary with 65%) and by the UK (with 56%). The percentage of state personnel is correspondingly small (e.g., 17% in Sweden). While in France the percentage of local government personnel has expanded (to 30%) since the beginning of decentralization in 1982, the share of state personnel continues to be surprisingly strong (some 50% with another 20% in public hospitals). In Italy, the central state continues, despite the decentralization since the 1990s, to employ 58% of the total public sector. Thus, notwithstanding decentralization in these two countries, the central state, hinting at some path-dependent continuity of the Napoleonic state tradition, continues to be organizationally present at the subnational levels.

The picture in federal or quasi-federal countries is somewhat more complex. While in Germany the portion of federal personnel is just 12% and in Spain 23% and the rest are employed by the subnational levels, the lion's share of public sector personnel is employed at the federal (53% in Germany) or the quasi-federal/regional levels (50% in Spain), with the local levels also showing considerable personnel strength (e.g., with 30% in Germany).

### Local Finances

The status and standing of the local government in the intergovernmental setting essentially depends, of course, on the degree of its financial and budgetary autonomy. A valid indicator of this could be the degree to which local authorities, in order to cover their expenditures, may draw on local taxes of their own as opposed to relying on grants assigned to them at the state level. Historically, the local governments financed their spending almost entirely from local taxes, the "rate" levied by English local authorities being a classical example. Signaling the current fiscal dependence of local authorities is the fall in percentage of "own" tax revenues as compared with the entire local revenues in most countries. Sweden is a lone exception, in that 67% of their local revenues still comes from the local (income) tax; France and Denmark are also remarkably close, with 49%. By contrast, in most other countries, the self-financing local tax margin is less than 20% (see the table in Dexia, 2008, p. 97). Correspondingly, the share of government grants

(which can quite easily be changed and manipulated and could also come with strings attached) from the central government has conspicuously risen, standing, for instance, at 49% in the UK and 47% in Italy and Poland.

### Local Organizational Structures

#### *Local Administration: Organization and Personnel*

Historically, in preindustrial times and in rural contexts, local matters were, as a rule, attended out by "laymen," that is, by the local citizens at large in what literally was local self-administration. The layman practice in local administration was pursued, for instance, in Sweden well into the early 20th century and still exists in Switzerland in certain forms.

However, in countries that underwent early industrialization and urbanization, such as in the UK, an industrial front-runner, and somewhat later in Germany, the local authorities built up regular administrative structures with professionalized staff. In continental European countries, within a state tradition geared to legal, rule-bound hierarchical administration (often identified as the Max Weber bureaucracy model), local administration also showed a Weberian stance. Reflecting the advanced welfare state and its public sector-centered implementation model in some countries, such as in the UK and in Sweden, social services came to be almost entirely rendered (in-house) by public—that is, local government—personnel. In some countries, for instance, in Germany and Italy, traditionally following a subsidiarity principle, social services continued to be provided largely by nonpublic, nonprofit organizations.

Spearheaded by new public management (NPM) concepts, the Weberian model of legal, rule-bound hierarchical public administration was criticized for its inherent inflexibility and its neglect of economic efficiency and was sought to be replaced with managerialist concepts and instruments that, borrowed from the private business sector, aimed at making municipal administration and its personnel more flexible and more cost conscious. The impact that the NPM message had on the administrative world varied from country to country, depending on country-specific cultural and institutional conditions and traditions. It was most

noticeable in English-speaking countries, which, as in their Common Law tradition a legally defined distinction between the public and the private sphere is not made, appeared more receptive to the private sector–derived principles. By contrast, NPM had a more difficult access in most continental European countries, in which, against the backdrop of their Roman Law and Rule of Law (*Rechtsstaat*) traditions, the traditional administrative model was culturally more firmly entrenched. In retaining elements of the traditional model and in—at the same time—adopting and “translating” NPM concepts, these countries have, in their administrative model, not least in local administration, moved toward what has been called a neo-Weberian model.

Under the combined onslaught of (neoliberal) welfare state critique and budgetary squeeze, local governments in most countries have resorted to making deep cuts in their personnel over the past 15 years. Perhaps the most conspicuous case is Germany where, between 1991 and 2004, the total local government staff was cut by 30% (in East German Länder, it was even higher at 53%) and in the UK by 5%. By contrast, in France, the local government staff increased by 24%, obviously in the wake of decentralization since 1982.

#### *Mounting Interorganizational Pluralization of Single-Purpose Actors*

In the (horizontal) interorganizational setting, the traditional multifunctional leading position of local government in the local arena has been challenged through a number of powerful currents, particularly through the neoliberal policy message, through the NPM message (both becoming rampant during the 1980s), and increasingly (since the 1990s) through the market liberalization drive of the European Union.

First, inasmuch as the previously dominant conception of local government as the public sector/municipal sector–centered providers of public services was challenged and shattered, the local authorities proceeded to “outsource” the conduct of local government activities and the provision of public services to outside providers. While outsourcing was not an entirely new concept in local government practice, it gained momentum when, in the 1980s, compulsory competitive tendering became

the battle cry of Britain’s Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher and almost irresistibly spilled over into the modernization agendas in other countries. The provision of social services has subsequently seen a pluralization of providers—public/municipal or semipublic, nonpublic, nonprofit, or, increasingly, private-commercial.

The other important field was the provision of public utilities, which, in some countries, has traditionally been the responsibility of local government and has often been carried out by them in an organizational in-house form. Under the market liberalization pressure, the local authorities have followed two options, which are described below.

First, they turned these activities, in what has been called formal (or organizational) privatization, over to newly created, still municipally owned, but organizationally and financially self-standing corporations. In some cases, such corporatization has been extended to a broad scope of local functions, sometimes with the intention of tailoring the entire administration to a private sector–derived holding (*Konzern*) scheme. Second, often beset by budgetary needs, the municipalities embarked on substantive (or asset) privatization by selling their local facilities (such as local energy or water companies) to outside providers, mostly of the large national or international corporation kind.

In sum, in the (horizontal) interorganizational setting of the local arena, public tasks, which, in the past, were attended by local government in-house or at arm’s length, have increasingly been taken over by, or outsourced to, local-level actors that operate outside the immediate realm and direct influence of local government in the local arena. They constitute the kind of actor networks that, in the currently dominant social science terminology, have been identified as *governance*. On the one hand, these local governance actors can be expected to bring their specific—financial, innovative, entrepreneurial, and so on—resources and skills to bear in the local arena. As they are typically single-purpose and specific-interest actors—that characteristically, first of all, seek to fulfill their own organizational goals and benefits possibly to the detriment and at the expense of other actors and their rivaling interests—their basically “private-regarding” action orientation is bound to pose a challenge to the role and mandate of the elected councils to be (ideally) the advocates and

guardians called on to ensure the “public-regarding” view and the best interests of the local community. To exercise its advocacy role and to coordinate the complicated interactions, the local authorities are called on to become active players in the local governance networks. It may well be that the reforms in local leadership could put them in the position of acting as key networker (reticulist) in the field. In conclusion, local government and local governance should not be seen as mutually exclusive but as complementary.

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*See also* Decentralization; Governance, Multilevel; Government; Organization Theory; Privatization; Regionalization

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## LOCKE, JOHN (1632–1704)

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As the father of modern empiricist epistemology, critic of innate ideas, and theorist of a conception of personal identity still very much in vogue in contemporary philosophy, Locke brings key concepts of constitutionalism and toleration to the modern political lexicon: individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law, the separation of powers and the division between private and public. Political power must justify its acts and choices and must practice the virtue of nonintervention in those areas of social life that possess some sort of internal and autonomous normativity, areas where the law of nature does not require the support of positive law. At the heart of Locke’s political theory lies a contractualist political model that opposes both the divine right of kings and the absolutist ramifications of Thomas Hobbes’s contractualism—a model that reconciles tradition and modernity and addresses both secular and religious concerns.

Between 1689 and 1690, as a troubled period in English history came to a close with the Glorious Revolution and the ascent of William of Orange to the throne, Locke published *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, the *Epistola de tolerantia*, and the *Two Treatises of Government*. In many respects, these three works represent an intellectual program begun nearly 30 years earlier, in his juvenile manuscripts on the law of nature—a

program that focused on the limits of human understanding, the foundations of political obligation, and the use of reason in discovering the principles of natural law. Belief in past habits and traditions or in opinions supported by custom and convention may lead a person into grave error. Both ancient historians and the authors of modern travel diaries have attested to the great variety of human moral convictions and the impossibility of reducing them to a single, coherent system. Neither history, nor innate principles, nor a general human consensus can help people determine universal rules and principles. The only trustworthy tool in this endeavor is one's own reason, by which one can discover the order that derives from God's supreme will and transcend the multiplicity of traditions and opinions.

Locke places himself within the modern individualist tradition. He needs individualism and equality to challenge the hierarchical and patriarchal structure of feudal society but, unlike Hobbes, he also relates to them as fundamental premises for the creation of a lawful political power, rooted in consensus. Hobbes's atomistic and competitive individualism make it impossible to imagine a social and political order that is not the product of artifice, in the absence of which there is only chaos, anarchy, and *bellum omnium contra omnes* (war of all against all), a precarious and dreary condition in which there is neither mine nor thine, justice nor injustice. According to Hobbes, only the absolute, unlimited, and illimitable positive law of a sovereign can end the state of war between men and guarantee order, peace, and property. Conversely, the author of the *Second Treatise of Government* distinguishes, at the very outset, the state of perfect freedom of man in the state of nature from license and the state of nature from the state of war. In the state of nature, people are not unrelated atoms moved by instrumental and calculating reason but moral persons who seek relationships of mutual recognition and harbor feelings of benevolence and mutual cooperation. Moral norms exist even in the absence of positive laws, as a result of natural human sociability and a sense of kinship—as members of the same species—and finally, as a result of the theological premise that all men are equal because they are all God's workmanship, all His creatures, and all equally dependent on their common Creator, and

called on to participate in his divine plan. This moral equality forbids their using one another in an instrumental fashion. Moreover, inasmuch as he is God's workmanship, man cannot take his own life or that of another but must strive for his survival and the survival of the entire species.

In the *First Treatise of Government*, in response to Filmer's *Patriarcha* (published posthumously in 1680, during the exclusion crisis), Locke denies that God's will, as expressed in the book of *Genesis*, mandates the reduction of men to a condition of natural slavery and subjection. God did not make Adam master of all men and sole owner of the Earth. He gave the Earth to Adam and Eve and, by extension, to all men, that they might multiply and improve the conditions of their lives. The necessity to improve the conditions of one's life and ensure one's survival justifies appropriation. God gave the world to all men in common, but they would die of starvation were each to await the consensus of the rest of humanity before consuming the fruits of nature. Property does not derive from consensus but from labor. Through their labor, men transform and improve nature, creating wealth. The law of nature does not allow natural resources to be used in a profligate manner. The inequalities that derive from the existence of private property and the accumulation of wealth, made possible by the introduction of money, are justified inasmuch as they constitute a general improvement in the human condition. If justice gives every man title to the product of his labor, charity gives one who is unable to support himself the right to assistance: The poor man is entitled to the surpluse of the rich.

The statement that every man is born free, equal, and independent—that is, capable of choosing his own destiny—entails many important consequences from a political perspective. Every man is responsible for his own actions: The sins of the fathers cannot be visited on the sons, no paternal act can deprive the son of life and liberty, and no pact undertaken by the father can be considered binding for future generations. Natural law and the moral equality of men make consent the only possible basis for lawful interaction between equals. The relationship between husband and wife is determined by a pact, which recognizes the legitimacy of divorce and even a woman's right to negotiate the terms of custody of her children and

other, similar issues. Voluntary pacts govern interaction between religious associations and their believers, between master and servant, and between magistrate and citizens. The political compact, however, unlike all other pacts, is irrevocable: When a citizen has given his express consent to be part of the political community, he can no longer abandon it; he has no right to emigrate and join another state.

In the state of nature, every man possesses the executive power of the law of nature, which affords him the power to judge and punish, in a commensurate fashion, those who break the law of nature. One who infringes on the life, liberty, or property of another thereby places himself in a state of war with the rest of humanity. Justice in the state of nature fails only as a result of men's passions, which may lead to excessive partiality in the application of sanctions. That is why men decide to abandon the state of nature and form a political community. In adhering to such a compact, they surrender to the state that executive power granted to them by the law of nature. The state's monopoly over lawful violence is thus constrained to respect the limits within which it was legitimately exercised by every individual in the state of nature. The ramifications of this are far-reaching and concern even the relationship between states: No state has the right to initiate a war as an aggressor because the executive power of the law of nature that has been delegated to the state can only be exercised for the purposes of reparation and restraint. Locke, unlike Hobbes, may thus distinguish between just and unjust wars, conceiving limits to the contenders' lawful conduct during a war, implicitly following Hugo Grotius' distinction between *ius ad bellum* (the right to go to war) and *ius in bello* (right conduct in war).

The creation of a single judge would not be an improvement on the state of nature, were it not accompanied by the separation of powers and were the principles of the law of nature not fixed in established and impartial laws decided by the community itself. The compact by which every man authorizes the political community to make laws may not, therefore, institute absolute sovereignty. An absolute sovereign, *legibus solutus* and sole master of all powers, is still in a state of nature with his subjects or rather in that degenerate form of the state of nature that is the state of war. No

man, Locke maintains, can be so foolish as to abandon the condition of perfect freedom of the state of nature in order to put himself under the absolute power of another man. In a civil society, legislative power and executive power derive from a fiduciary trust granted by the people. Since such power is founded on trust, it can be revoked by the very same people when its rulers systematically break the law. In response to repeated and widespread violations of individual rights by political power, when judiciary intervention is not feasible, there is always the so-called appeal to heaven. It is only in extreme cases, according to Locke, that people will have recourse to violence. The right of resistance may thus be seen more as a warning to those who govern, that they must obey the law, than as a real threat by the people.

In *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke resorts once again to the strategy of separation that would later become the legacy of the entire liberal tradition, separating the legitimate field of action of the state from that of the churches, conceived as voluntary associations. Care for the soul is a private affair, pertaining only to the individual. Men will never reach an agreement on religious issues but will continue to divide and adhere to different churches. Locke is one of the first philosophers to seriously address the persistence and inevitability of disagreement on religious issues. Each and every believer will continue to consider his church the sole representative of religious orthodoxy. As the magistrate has no greater knowledge of the path to salvation than any individual citizen, he cannot impose his will in religious matters. The state, however, has no reason to fear religious pluralism. Religious citizens in fact possess social and moral virtues that can be useful to the state. Furthermore, as it welcomes the existence, in the social space, of a plurality of civil, commercial, and scientific associations, so the state should admit the presence of a plurality of religious associations. They are no more dangerous than other associations, as long as they are allowed to compete freely. Competition might also improve the moral conduct of each church, both internally and in its relations with other churches. It is atheists who represent a threat to the social order: Their word cannot be trusted because they do not believe in the existence of a God who can see and judge us even in the dark. A church, such

as the Catholic Church, that strives to unite in itself both spiritual and temporal power, remains a grave threat to the state and to the public order, as does a church that promulgates beliefs detrimental to human society, such as the belief that it is justified not to keep a promise to one who espouses unorthodox religious doctrines.

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*See also* Constitutionalism; Contract Theory; Hobbes, Thomas; Liberalism; Natural Law; Tolerance

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## LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS

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James G. March defines the *logic of appropriateness* thus: Individuals and organizations fulfill or enact identities by following rules and procedures that they imagine to be appropriate to the situations they are facing. Following standard operating procedures, they act according to what is expected of them, whether they are politicians, civil servants, or citizens. Appropriateness is a concept taken from culturally oriented theory and is concerned with informal norms and values, but it is also related to structural theory and formal norms because formal structure influences the development of informal norms. A distinction is often made between the processes whereby appropriate modes of thought and action evolve and the

situations that call for appropriate action—generally termed *matching situations*.

In this entry, the main features of the logic of appropriateness are outlined and discussed, including the key concepts underlying it—identities and rules, and the relationship between them. Next, the entry will show that acting in an appropriate way involves matching situations that are potentially complex and ambiguous and that formal rules often heavily influence informal ones, which affects the logic of appropriateness. Finally, we will discuss how the logic of appropriateness differs from the logic of consequentiality, the logic most often connected with more rationally oriented theories. The examples used are mostly taken from studies of public organizations.

#### Main Features and Key Concepts

The three main questions constituting the logic of appropriateness are the following:

1. First, what kind of situation am I actually facing as an actor (individually or institutionally)? This is a question of recognition.
2. Second, what is the main identity of my institution and what is my own main identity?
3. Third, what am I and my organization expected to do in a situation like this? That is, what are the rules connecting the situation and our identities?

A crucial question is how actors set about answering such questions in matching situations. One way is to learn from experience—experiential learning—either by looking at how the matching has been done recently or by finding out how the institution traditionally does this matching. A second way is to react cognitively or through categorization based on mental maps or else through what Karl Weick labels “sense-making.” A third way is to use the experience of others to match, either by stressing that the context is exactly the same as the one others have experienced (contextualization) or by arguing that the context belongs to a broad category that is typical for many organizations (decontextualization).

According to James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, the logic of appropriateness deals with



what is essential in a role, not with what is instrumentally or arbitrarily defined. Faced with different kinds of stimuli, actors respond in complex, standardized, and almost intuitive ways, without any immediate comprehensive analysis, problem solving, or discretion—the latter being features that become part of the logic over time. Appropriateness presupposes that actors have multiple identities or a repertoire of identities—and hence multiple rule options—and these become relevant according to the different situations actors face. One implicit assumption is that these identities and rules exist in relatively consistent sets to further systematic behavior.

### Identities, Rules, and Situations

Identities are connected both to the individual actor and to institutions. For the individual, identity is a conceptualization of the self organized into rules in order to match action to situations. Identities are constructed by the individual actor, imposed by the environment, and influenced by a broader cultural context. Individual identities can be formed by two interwoven processes: a process of individualization, where the actor voluntarily chooses from self-imposed and self-selected roles and rules, and a process of socialization, where obligations, responsibilities, and commitment are learned and followed, not chosen.

Institutional identities are based on the evolution of common individual or group identities, resulting from the same type of experiences or from internal and external constraints, thereby creating similar attitudes, norms, and values. These are organized into broader social roles, and individual identities can be derived from them. Stephen Krasner describes the same phenomenon with his concept of “vertical depth” in the process of institutionalizing norms and values, referring to factors that are especially important for defining attitudes and activities.

The logic of appropriateness alludes more to informal than formal rules, but formal rules definitely influence informal ones, for example, concerning appropriateness in the civil service. Rules are defined independently of the individual actors who enact them, meaning that personal characteristics are of less importance and that different people in the same time period, position, and institution

will match situations, identities, and rules in some of the same ways. Rule following can be seen as a kind of implicit contract or pact; if an actor behaves appropriately, he or she will also be treated appropriately. Rules are codified and standardized to a certain extent, as a precondition for channeling ideas and behavior, and may sometimes be inconsistent. They are meant to organize and regularize behavior and to further standardization instead of individual discretionary behavior. But because rules can be violated, are sometimes too inflexible, may disregard consequences, or may function as socially constructed myths, they may potentially have problems fulfilling these functions.

The theory of the logic of appropriateness is little concerned with what types of situations actors face when trying to connect or match rules, identities, and situations. Appropriateness is often connected with familiar and routine situations, but there are, of course, also appropriate ways to behave in poorly defined situations, such as turbulent or crisis periods. Matching is not only about stability but also takes place when both rules and situations are changing. Philip Selznick emphasizes in his cultural theory that so-called critical decisions are what change public institutions the most and are different from routine decisions.

One starting point for elaborating the logic of appropriateness is to underscore that actors, for example, in public organizations, are probably seldom in unambiguous situations where identities are clear-cut and where one identity is dominant. They have multiple individual and institutional identities. Their environment is often turbulent, with complex dependences, creating a complex attention structure, especially when a number of identities are significant and possibly in conflict. A civil servant can, for example, have identities relating to the specialization of the formal structure and the complexity of its cultural history, to professional competence, and to gender. Identities are further connected with employment in a certain ministry, in a specialized division or in a smaller unit, or else with certain specialized tasks and functions. Another set of identities is related to the interpretation of the cultural history and traditions of a public institution. Some civil servants may have a long tenure related to a subculture in the organization, while others may have a short tenure during which they have become socialized into general cultural norms and values.

And actors differ according to their professional backgrounds and the professional contexts they work in. All this illustrates that identities are numerous and characterized by complexity and varying degrees of consistency.

Variety can lead to ambiguity concerning identities or to situations with possibly competing logics of appropriateness; what is appropriate for one actor, individually or institutionally, may be inappropriate for another. Selznick's analysis of cooptation in the Tennessee Valley Authority provides an example of this. When the leadership choose cooptation as a strategy to address business interests in the "task environment," this could be seen as appropriate from a developmental perspective. But had they favored another type of appropriateness, attending to a more conservationist point of view, they would have probably chosen another, less inclusive strategy.

A general question is, therefore, what type of conditions are important for bringing some identities or some aspects of identities to the forefront and keeping others in the background in an actor's allocation of attention. We would claim that identity related to the formal structure, role, and functions in public organizations is more dominant than culturally evolved identities inside organizations or external social status, which are subordinate to formal conditions and less relevant for decision making. Another answer points to the fact that organizations differ with respect to developing collective, institutional identities and, therefore, also with respect to the ease with which members can base their thoughts and actions on such identities. March and Olsen emphasize that some organizations can have strong integrative features, creating a feeling of common goals and destiny among citizens, politicians, or civil servants, while others are more aggregative and atomized.

One would expect the identities of most actors to be dominated by clear-cut formal rules but also to have informal rules or complex patterns of formal and informal rules, which are either consistent or inconsistent, as their main guidelines for action. But rules can also be said to evolve during the process of matching; the matching process also involves creating new rules and identities, not only selecting from preexisting ones. Sometimes rules and identities undergo a transformation or editing process when they are confronted with new or complex situations.

### Consequentiality and Appropriateness

The logic of consequentiality is based on a rational instrumental tradition, where utilitarian reasoning about cost and effects is an important part of the equation. The logic of consequentiality may be seen as competing with the logic of appropriateness, but it is more often seen as only one version of rule following; in other words, rationality is one rule that is connected to reasoning about consequences. In the logic of appropriateness, contrary to the logic of consequentiality, preferences and expectations about the consequences of action are not the most important consideration; the main thing is to identify what is appropriate. Rules can be followed even if the consequences are negative—with regard to self-interest, for example. But what is appropriate can also reflect a history of negotiations, consensus building, or winning coalitions.

Although analytically distinguishable, it is often difficult to separate arguments of appropriateness from arguments of consequentiality in concrete decision-making processes. The main reason for this is that the extensive application of rationality and the logic of consequentiality is a very strong ideology permeating modern organizations, to such an extent that behaving appropriately often means demonstrating clearly that one is acting in accordance with this logic. Some aspects of the puzzling mixture of arguments of appropriateness and consequentiality find expression in the creation of rationalized myths (i.e., popular ideas about how to build and change modern organizations) and in the interpretation of their effects.

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*See also* Civil Service; Governance, Informal; Institutional Theory; Leadership; Organization Theory; Path Dependence; Values

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## LOGIT AND PROBIT ANALYSES

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Logit and probit models are designed to analyze research questions where the dependent variable is binary. Examples of these kinds of problems are studies of voter turnout (where each individual might vote or abstain), legislative voting on a bill (where each legislator might vote yes or no), and war (where each country might choose to go to war or stay at peace). In practice, there is little difference between the logit and probit models, and these models are interchangeable in almost all research settings. Logit and probit models fall into the category of discrete choice models, so named because the political agents we are studying are making choices from among a finite set of distinct options. In this entry, the derivation and interpretation of such models are discussed.

### Deriving the Logit and Probit Models

Perhaps the most straightforward way to derive the logit and probit models is to assume that a political agent's choice is determined by some continuous underlying rating of a political item or a propensity to engage in some behavior known as a latent variable. Each political agent's position on this latent variable ( $y_i^*$ ) is assumed to be a linear function of a set of some observed variables and coefficients ( $X_i\beta$ ) and some unobserved stochastic influences ( $\varepsilon_i$ ). Thus, a political agent's latent choice preference is given by

$$y_i^* = X_i\beta + \varepsilon_i.$$

If  $y_i^*$  was observed, we could simply estimate this equation via linear regression. However, in a binary choice setting, the agent's position on this latent variable is unobserved. Instead, a choice threshold  $\tau$  divides the latent variable into two categories, and we only observe  $y$ , which indicates which choice category the agent selected. We

observe  $y_i = 0$  for agents who are at or below  $\tau$  and  $y_i = 1$  for agents above the threshold. For instance, a country might have an underlying propensity to fight with its neighbors, but we can only observe this country in one of two discrete choice categories: war or peace.

Since  $y_i^*$  is latent, we must make several identifying assumptions to estimate the probability that a political agent makes a particular choice. Although these identifying assumptions are arbitrary, they do not influence the estimate of the relationship between the  $X_i$ s and choice behavior. The first of these assumptions is to set  $\tau = 0$ . We make this assumption because we cannot obtain a unique estimate for both  $\tau$  and the constant term in the model: Since  $y^*$  is unobserved, we could add an arbitrary constant to both  $\tau$  and the constant term and still generate the same probability of an observed outcome. With this assumption, and noting that  $y_i^* = X_i\beta + \varepsilon_i$ , the probability that an agent selects the choice category represented by  $y = 1$  given the observed variables  $X_i$  is

$$\Pr(y_i = 1 \mid X_i) = \Pr(X_i\beta + \varepsilon_i > 0 \mid X_i).$$

This equation reveals that the probability that political agents select the choice category denoted by  $y = 1$  will depend in part on the unobserved error term  $\varepsilon_i$ . By subtracting  $X_i\beta$  from both sides of the inequality and assuming that the distribution of  $\varepsilon_i$  is symmetric, we can rearrange this equation to read as follows:

$$\Pr(y_i = 1 \mid X_i) = \Pr(\varepsilon_i \leq X_i\beta \mid X_i).$$

This equation is simply the evaluation of the cumulative density function (CDF) of  $\varepsilon_i$  at  $X_i\beta$ , which we can express as  $\Pr(y_i = 1 \mid X_i) = F(X_i\beta)$ .

The probability that we will observe  $y_i = 1$  given  $X_i$  can now be estimated once we make some identifying assumptions about the distribution and the variance of the error term  $\varepsilon_i$ . Almost any distribution can be assumed—for instance, we could assume that this error term follows a uniform distribution and derive a linear probability model. However, in practice, we typically assume one of two distributions.

One common assumption is that the error term is drawn from an independently and identically

distributed (IID) normal distribution. This results in the probit model:

$$\Pr(y_i = 1 | X_i) = \Phi(X_i\beta),$$

where  $\Phi$  is the CDF of the normal distribution. As  $y_i^*$  is unobserved, we cannot estimate the variance of the error term as we can with a linear regression. Thus, a standard assumption for probit models is that  $\text{Var}(\varepsilon_i) = 1$ .

Another common assumption is that the error term follows an IID logistic distribution. The logistic distribution is very similar to a normal distribution but with slightly more probability in the tails. This results in the logit model:

$$\Pr(y_i = 1 | X_i) = \exp(\mu X_i\beta) / [1 + \exp(\mu X_i\beta)],$$

where  $\exp$  indicates that we are taking the exponential of the term in parentheses, and  $\mu$  is a positive scale parameter. As with the probit model, we must make an assumption about the variance of this CDF: In this case, we assume  $\mu = 1$ , which is equivalent to assuming that  $\text{Var}(\varepsilon_i) = \pi^2/3$ . Thus, the estimation of a logit model will produce estimates of  $\beta$  that are approximately  $\sqrt{\pi^2/3} \approx 1.81$  times larger than the corresponding estimates from a probit model. This difference is due solely to the different assumptions made about the variance of the error term in the two models. In practice, there is almost never a substantive difference between the logit and probit models, and either choice is valid in virtually all cases.

Both the logit and probit models produce a nonlinear relationship between the  $X_i$ s and the choice probabilities. If the probability of observing  $y = 1$  increases as some variable  $X$  increases, then graphing  $\Pr(y = 1 | X)$  against  $X$  will produce the well-known S-shaped probability curve characteristic of these models (the mirror image of this curve is produced if the probability of observing  $y = 1$  decreases as the variable  $X$  increases).

### Estimation

Logit and probit models are not estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) due to the nonlinearity discussed above. Instead, these models are estimated through maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). This is done by first creating a likelihood

function and then taking the natural log of this function to create a log-likelihood function (we take the natural log of the likelihood function because it is easier to work with).

For instance, the log likelihood of the probit model is

$$\ln L = \sum_i y_i \ln \Phi(X_i\beta) + (1 - y_i) \ln [1 - \Phi(X_i\beta)].$$

Maximizing this log-likelihood means maximizing the sum of the predicted probabilities assigned to the choices that political agents in fact made. This is done by estimating  $\beta$  to have values such that  $X_i\beta$  tends to be large when  $y_i = 1$  and small when  $y_i = 0$ .

One difficulty that can arise in the estimation of logit and probit models is known as separation, which occurs when an independent variable perfectly predicts the binary dependent variable. In these cases, the coefficient and standard error on the independent variable will be infinite. For example, by many commonly used definitions of war, there are no instances where two nuclear states have gone to war with each other. Including a variable indicating that a state is a nuclear power in a logit or probit model with war as the dependent variable would create a separation problem as the nuclear power variable perfectly predicts peace. Researchers sometimes solve these kinds of separation problems by omitting the problematic independent variable, adding random noise to their data, or adopting a penalized likelihood estimation approach.

In general, however, the log-likelihood functions for both the logit and probit models are relatively easy to maximize, with most statistical software packages reaching the solution in seconds. However, note that the consistency, normality, and efficiency of MLE depends on asymptotic arguments—the small-sample properties of MLE are largely unknown. Thus, researchers should be cautious when estimating logit or probit models with small samples.

### Interpretation

A simple examination of the coefficients in logit and probit models reveals whether an independent variable had a positive or negative effect on the

probability of observing  $y = 1$  and whether that variable was statistically significant. However, interpretation of the substantive effect of an independent variable in these models is more difficult than the interpretation of linear regression models as the relationship between  $X_j\beta$  and the choice probabilities depends on a nonlinear function. The effect of a one-unit change in one independent variable on the choice probabilities will depend on the values of the other independent variables in the model. This means that we cannot interpret the  $\beta$ s in logit and probit models as we would interpret them in an OLS setting.

The most common method for interpreting the substantive effects of coefficients in logit and probit models in political science is through the use of a hypothetical observation. The researcher begins by selecting values for the independent variables in the model that are representative of some case of interest in the study. Setting variables to their mean or modal values is common, although this is not the only possibility. Often, the researcher will select values for the independent variables that reflect some case of substantive interest. Then, using the estimated values of  $\beta$  and the selected values of  $X$ , a baseline probability for  $y = 1$  is calculated. For instance, we would interpret the coefficients in a probit model by calculating  $\Pr(y = 1|\bar{X}) = \Phi(\bar{X}\beta)$ , where  $\bar{X}$  represents the selected values for the independent variables. The influence of a particular independent variable on the probability that  $y = 1$  can then be examined by changing the value of this variable while holding all other independent variables constant at  $\bar{X}$  and recalculating  $\Pr(y = 1|\bar{X})$ .

As these predicted probabilities are based on our model estimate and are thus themselves estimates, it is usually desirable to calculate standard errors for these probabilities. In political science, this is most commonly done through simulation. Hundreds or thousands of draws are taken from the multivariate normal distribution defined by the coefficients and covariance matrix estimated by the logit or probit model, a predicted probability is calculated for each draw, and the mean and

standard deviation of this set of predicted probabilities is reported.

### Related Discrete Choice Models

Ordered logit and ordered probit models are derived from the logit and probit models by adding additional choice thresholds to the latent variable and were developed for research questions where the dependent variable consists of more than two ordered categories. Multinomial logit and multinomial probit models have been developed to study research questions where the dependent variable consists of more than two unordered categories.

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*See also* Maximum Likelihood; Nonlinear Models; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Regression

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## LONGITUDINAL DATA

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*See* Panel Data Analysis; Time-Series Cross-Section Data and Methods

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## LOT, AS A SELECTION METHOD

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*See* Election by Lot

# M

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## MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÒ (1469–1527)

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Machiavellism commonly refers to a cynical, amoral view of power and human relations and also to a politics of force and of calculated arbitrariness. In his major works, *The Prince* and *Discourses on Livy*, the political philosopher and diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli took the scandalous liberty of speaking well of evil: namely, of cruelty, obscenity, treachery, lies, avarice, disbelief, irreligion, craftiness, and boldness. His name has been consequently charged with the abstract and moral notion of evil, particularly in politics. This was certainly a way to render his theories illicit and detestable; nonetheless, a strong interest in them has never diminished. Machiavelli remains one of the most widely published authors of the past 5 centuries and one of the rare ones, along with the Marquis de Sade and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, to have his name substantiated for describing scary and excessive behaviors. This entry presents, first, some of Machiavelli's most controversial concepts and, second, major events concerning his life.

### Machiavelli as Political Thinker

For political science, Machiavelli has symbolized the advent of a realist approach to politics and society. "Realist" means both the criticism of any utopian and transcendental conception of politics and a demystifying analysis of human history. One

could insist that medieval jurists, such as Bartolus of Sassoferrato who, in commenting on Aristotle's *Politics*, opposed the moral philosophers of his times, anticipated such an approach. But Machiavelli's oft-quoted formula, according to which it is more appropriate to go behind appearances to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination thereof (*The Prince*, 15), brought something different to the debate. Machiavelli proposed analytic tools for an evaluation of the political world as it is essentially and not as it appears to be superficially by immediate experience or by moral assumption. His realism, however, is not a skeptical submission to the existing state of things and to the authority of tradition and the powerful. It is based on a constant dialogue between his own experience of the events of his times and his continual study of antiquity. This is the condition for a theoretical understanding of what can and cannot be possible. The notion that humankind is the same throughout history does not imply that the order of things cannot be changed, nor does it imply that an invisible hand rules it. It makes possible, to the contrary, the intelligibility of political experience.

Philosophically trained by his early work on the ancient poet Lucretius's antireligious *On the Nature of Things*, Machiavelli aimed at rendering men the artisans of their own fortune (*The Prince*, 25). He was the first to propose to everyone, in a bold, clear style, a kind of knowledge about power that was previously reserved for an elite educated in thorny juridical casuistry and in the practice of political affairs. He has been both condemned and

praised for having unveiled the “mysteries of the state” and the tools of its authority, potentially acquainting the masses with the inner workings of politics. Until the advent of the age of revolutions, from Jean Bodin to John Adams, Machiavelli was reasonably considered as the founder of a plebeian political philosophy. He introduced the topic of political equality and the equal political ability of all men without consideration of rank, riches, and lineage at the same time as he introduced the concept of a class division of “desire” between the aristocracy (*grandi*) and the people. The aristocracy is moved by its desire to oppress the people and the people by their desire not to be oppressed by the aristocracy (*The Prince*, 9). Tyranny, in Machiavelli’s thinking, is set in motion by the ambition of the aristocracy, which considers itself above the laws and tends to weaken society in order to make it submit it to its own purposes (*Discourses*, I 40, III 28). According to his agonistic and dynamic vision of social institutions, which suggests that popular discord makes society free and powerful, the people appear to be the best guardians of liberty (*Discourses*, I 4–5, 58). By giving voice to even the most extremist discourse of the rebellious working classes (the *ciompi*) Machiavelli granted it a literary and political dignity (*Florentine Histories*, III 13). Added to his consideration that it may sometimes be necessary to extinguish the aristocracy in order to establish a republic (*Discourses*, I 55), the scandalous rupture this anti-elitist political stance introduced into political philosophy forced most successive political theorists to measure themselves, explicitly or not, against his thought. In spite of the censure exerted by the Catholic Church on his works and personal history, most of the great philosophical and political ideas of the past 5 centuries had their beginnings in Machiavelli. His works had a positive influence on Bodin, Montaigne, Bacon, Vanini, Spinoza, Sidney, Bayle, Montesquieu, the Encyclopedists, the Federalists, Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Gramsci, among many others.

### The Florentine World

The third son of an attorney and his wife, Niccolò Machiavelli was born in Florence, Tuscany, into a territorial state shaped by heavy political, social, and economic contradictions. The banking and

mercantile aristocracy of Florence, who controlled the state’s economic and financial organization, had built a fiscal system in which its contributions took the form of loans bearing interest. By contrast, the inhabitants of Florentine’s subject territories and the masses of the Florentine people carried the weight of taxes, from which a big part was absorbed by the service of the state debt. In 1494, with the beginning of the Italian Wars, the Medici regime, which had consolidated the financial system in favor of the aristocracy, collapsed. A popular government was established with one third of the Florentine householders qualifying to participate in the assembly of the Great Council. It had to face the disaggregation of the territories, which had rebelled against the previous forms of subjection. As Machiavelli asserted, the Florentine ruling class decided to disarm the people in order to enjoy the immediate usefulness of being able to plunder them (*Discourses*, II 30). The intimate link between public debt, the employment of mercenary troops, and aristocratic interests (whose tremendous negative social consequences appeared clearly when an external threat arose, as after 1494) is constitutive of Machiavelli’s political thought and activity. He directed most of his energy, both in practice and in theory, to “arm the people” for the independence of the republic.

### Machiavelli’s Life and Works

In June 1498, during a period of heavy political conflicts caused by a major financial and institutional crisis, Machiavelli, then 29 years old, was elected head of the Second Chancery of the Florentine government, in charge of administering the city’s territories; he was soon after nominated to serve the office for military affairs. Involved for the next 14 years in numerous diplomatic missions in Italy and abroad, he nonetheless dedicated most of his time to territorial affairs and to the organization of the militia. The institution of the militia, enacted in December 1506, drew strong opposition from the Florentine aristocracy. The militia’s major achievement was the defeat of the protracted Pisan rebellion (June 1509). Its major failure was its inefficiency in the face of the Spanish armies at Prato (August 1512). But internal conflicts within the Florentine republic and its incapacity to grant forms of citizenship to its territorial

subjects had already prevented the consolidation and development of the militia in Tuscany. Machiavelli emphasizes in the *Art of War* (published in 1521 and the most neutral among his major works) that his concept of the people in arms harbored broader ambitions than he could actualize or even express. The fall of Prato led to the overthrow of the republican regime and to the return of the Medici to Florence. In October 1512, Machiavelli attempted in vain to convince the Medici to build an alliance with the people against the aristocracy (*A Caution to the Medici*). In November 1512, he was one of the few members of the Chancery dismissed from his functions. A few months later, imprisoned under the accusation of conspiracy, he was tortured, but he confessed nothing and ultimately benefited from the amnesty that followed the election of Giovanni de Medici as Pope (Leo X).

Over the next years, Machiavelli seemed to play a kind of double game. In attempting to get closer to the Medici, he dedicated to one of them the manuscript of his *Prince*, apparently a satire of the literature directed at the moral instruction of princes, in which he maintained the central idea expressed in his *Caution to the Medici*. But he also frequented those who developed, under his teaching, a radical resistance to the new tyrants of Florence. His *Discourses on Livy*, composed of materials assembled over 20 years, conserves part of this teaching. Published posthumously in 1531, it appeared to be dedicated to one of these radical opponents. The attitudes of those opponents and of the Medici themselves toward Machiavelli, even after the failed anti-Medicean conspiracy of 1522 in which he was not directly involved, indicated that neither ever doubted Machiavelli's continuous attachment to the former republic. In 1521, in his *Discourse on Reforming the State of Florence*, Machiavelli had proposed to Leo X a constitutional reform, at that time considered eccentric, by which the dissolution of the Medici regime would be followed by the reconstruction of a popular state. Machiavelli was then commissioned by Cardinal Giulio de' Medici—later Pope Clement VII—to write the *Florentine Histories*, presented in 1525 and published posthumously (1532). This book draws a ferocious portrait of the rulers of late medieval Florence, the Medici included, in accord with Machiavelli's political

theory. In May 1527, with the Sack of Rome, the Medici lost Florence and the republic was restored. Machiavelli was not recalled to his old functions, as he and his republican friends had wanted. He died soon after. Nonetheless, his idea that the militia could strengthen solidarity among the people and also serve as a bit in the mouth of the aristocracy quickly became the official declaration of the last Florentine republic. After the republic's fall in 1530, Clement VII authorized the publication of Machiavelli's unpublished works. It is said that, while reading *The Prince* (published in 1532), he laughed about ideas of Machiavelli that were so contrary to the building of the Medicean hegemony.

Machiavelli's ensuing reputation followed along lines already established during his lifetime, even before he had written *The Prince* (1513–1514). While organizing the militia in 1505 to 1506, Machiavelli was accused by some members of the Florentine aristocracy of being a lower-class scoundrel and someone who wished to establish a tyranny in Florence. But he was also seen as a new Moses, an emancipator of the people, and a philosopher who was not for fools to understand.

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See also Class, Social; Conflicts; Equality, Political; Utopianism; Violence

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## MAOISM

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Maoism is a body of doctrine developed by Mao Zedong (formerly transliterated as “Mao Tse-Tung,”



1893–1976) and his associates in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for Chinese revolution and socialist construction from the 1920s until Mao's death in 1976. It is composed of many different kinds of ideas and ideology, and strategy and tactics and is believed to be the creative result of applying Marxism–Leninism to China, a semi-feudal and semicolonial country without modern industrial developments. Mao Zedong is the principal Chinese Marxist theorist, a Communist statesman who contributed to the founding of the CCP in 1921, the Communist Army in 1927, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 after a long period of military struggle. In contrast with Karl Marx spending his most of life in reading and writing as an editor, reporter, and scholar, Mao had taken part in almost all military struggles, political conflicts, and social movements during his time. He emerged as a supreme leader in 1935 in the CCP because his smart ideas and successful tactics were adopted by most of the CCP leaders. He was chairman of the PRC from 1949 to 1959 and chairman of the CCP until his death in 1976.

After a bloody split in April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, dismantled the united front with the Communist Party against the warlord government in Beijing and broke with his allies in the Communist Party. In the following campaigns, many communist organizations were destroyed, and a large number of communist leaders and members killed. Mao led several peasant uprisings in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces and established the communist military bases during the early 1930s. Based on these experiences, Mao realized the importance of Chinese peasantry in the Chinese communist revolution. In October 1934, Mao and the communists retreated from Jiangxi under the strong military attack by Chiang's Nationalist Army and started their epic Long March to the new base in Shanxi province. By making use of the second united front with the Nationalist Party against Japan, Mao and his communist comrades had not only consolidated their base and expanded their sphere of influence but also formulated a set of ideology and methodology for Chinese revolution, which was officially described as Maoism in 1945. In a new civil war between the Communists and Nationalists from 1946 to 1949, the Nationalist government ruled

by Chiang was defeated and retreated to Taiwan. As a result, the Communist Party ascended to power and Mao Zedong declared the founding of the PRC in Beijing on October 1, 1949.

According to the logic of Marxist socialism, socialism based on it would succeed only after the capitalist commodity economy developed fully and highly. After the communist revolution succeeded and the Communist Party came to power in 1949 in China, Mao Zedong and the communist leaders decided to implement and promote the socialist transformation of Chinese economy and society, ignoring the basic facts about underdevelopment and dreaming that their country would immediately leap forward into communism. Therefore, to build socialism and realize communism as soon as possible, they conducted radical and drastic reforms in socialist practice in the light of Marxist theory, especially Stalinist theory. They tried to eliminate private ownership and establish public ownership, reduced free competition, developed the planned economy, limited the role of capital in distribution of resources, and promoted egalitarianism to eradicate economic exploitation and suppression. To promote the socialist transformation and build a new socialist country, the Communist Party must always keep the power in the hand of the proletarian class, take the class struggle as basic line, and consolidate the central leadership. After 8 years of socialist transformation, Mao Zedong declared confidently in 1957 that China was building socialism, that the petty bourgeoisie in agriculture and handicrafts and the bourgeoisie in industry and commerce had both experienced changes, that the individual economy had been transformed into a collective economy, and that capitalist private ownership had been transformed into socialist public ownership.

In search of its own socialist model after Stalin was criticized on the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1956, China under Mao Zedong adopted many radical policies and launched mass movements one after another. The most important were the Great Leap Forward (GLF, 1958–1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). During the period of the GLF, in rural areas of China, 750,000 higher-stage cooperatives were merged into 25,000 people's communes with multifunction to transform the private farmers into collective peasants and to pursue

egalitarian ideals. A huge amount of labor power had been mobilized to build the famous backyard steel furnaces and irrigation works. China's leaders were eager to catch up with Britain, and eventually with the United States, and, at least for a brief moment, were willing to believe that utopian methods worked and would produce more steel and food. The GLF caused a great deal of waste in the development of socialist economy. Also, because this policy emphasized accumulation rather than consumption, the meager development of heavy industry came at the huge cost of little or no improvement in people's quality of life. The GLF caused an immense famine, and the death rate rose from 18.12 per thousand in 1957 to 44.60 per thousand in 1960—the consequence not only of declining harvests but also of excessive requisitioning of grain, based on false reports that far more grain had been produced than was actually the case. Many years later, official sources admitted that 8 million people had died of causes related to the GLF; unofficial sources estimated the figure at between 12 million and 20 million.

During the period of the Cultural Revolution, under the banner of a proletariat revolution, Mao took the class struggle as fundamental. He believed that the main goal of the Cultural Revolution was to save Chinese socialism from the threat of "revisionism" by purging his lieutenants who, as in the case of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, attached greater importance to economic efficiency than to ideological purity. The Cultural Revolution placed emphasis on purifying the superstructure rather than changing the economic conditions, because Maoists believed that purification would give a push to economic development in which the bureaucrats would engage directly and to which the masses, imbued with revolutionary ideals, would exert themselves on behalf of collective undertakings. Meanwhile, with the ideal of egalitarianism, a leftist "wind" swept through the country, resulting in the curtailing of private landholding, a free market, and other personal rights. As a result, however, Chinese society in 1976 was neither more efficient nor more equitable.

Although Maoism contains many different and sometime contradictory elements in the different stages of Chinese revolution and socialist construction, several salient features can be found in Mao's works and experiences. Primary is his emphasis on

the importance of peasant issues in Chinese revolution and socialist construction. The Marxist-Leninist tradition treated peasants as incapable of revolutionary initiative and only marginally useful in backing urban proletarian revolution. Based on his life experiences and his analysis of the rural situation in China, Mao came to recognize the potential power of China's hundreds of millions of peasants and decided to establish his base in rural areas instead of in big cities. The peasants constituted the vast majority of China's population, and most of them were the most hard-pressed of all citizens and lived in extreme poverty. According to Mao, they were very receptive to revolutionary agitation and could become a revolutionary force if fully mobilized and properly guided. Proceeding from this belief, Mao proposed to instill in them a revolutionary consciousness and make their force alone suffice for revolution. By so doing, Mao led the Chinese revolution to success and gradually formed a special attachment to peasants. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent many city workers, intellectuals, and bureaucrats to rural areas and forced them to receive reeducation through agricultural labor together with peasants because he believed that big cities were a corrupting influence for many.

In Mao Zedong's thinking, there were long-standing populist elements and continuous emphasis on the "mass line." The mass line means the emphasis on the interests and preferences of the common people and demands that the government be responsive to them. It was first created in the revolutionary period, based on the idea of class struggle. The idea of the disadvantaged classes overthrowing the privileged classes through inter-class struggle naturally entailed the idea of mobilizing the oppressed masses to fight for their own interests against those of the oppressing classes. Thus, the notion of class struggle led to Mao Zedong's stress on the importance of the masses and mass movements and to what Mao explicitly labeled as the "mass line" in the Yan'an period (late 1930s and early 1940s) and extolled as one of the vital traditions in Communist history. Therefore, it is common to assert that the mass line is a style of leadership, which is, at its best, a democratic style of leadership. Mao believed that even the vanguard party needed to be rectified and reformed through criticism from the people it led

and that the masses of China should be encouraged to become involved in even the highest affairs of state. In the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976, the masses had been mobilized so broadly and deeply that the country verged on anarchy.

In spite of political disorder and economic depression in China, Maoism developed into a worldwide movement in the 1960s and thereafter. All Maoists expressed fidelity to the thought of Mao Zedong. But at a practical level, self-identified Maoist political formations differed considerably. In parts of Asia where conditions were similar to those that prevailed in China before 1949, Maoism was largely a peasant movement, engaging in guerrilla warfare and establishing bases in rural areas, and, if successful, surrounding the cities and seizing state power. Elsewhere in the Third World, especially in Latin America, facing very different conditions, Maoists had to modify classical Maoist forms of revolutionary struggle. In the developed capitalist countries, Maoism meant something very different. Western Maoism was particularly attractive to young people during the 1960s only for its ostensible purity and populist nature. Although Maoism has been upheld as one of the major guiding principles in the CCP and other left-wing parties, it has gradually lost its appeal in China and other parts of the world since China adopted its new “Opening and Reform” policy in 1978.

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*See also* Communism; Marxism; Socialism

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## MARKET ECONOMY

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In the 1940s and 1950s, two types of economy were frequently contrasted: the *market* economy (sometimes also called the “free market” economy) and the *centrally planned* economy such as that of the former Soviet Union. Whereas in the latter, prices and production decisions were set by administrative decision, in the former, they emerged as a result of the interactions of myriad firms and individuals who negotiate, buy, sell, and set prices for goods and services.

However, since the 1960s, political science has developed a more sophisticated analysis than this simple dichotomy. It has perhaps returned to political economy traditions of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, with concerns about how institutions and norms create markets and indeed lead to different types of market economy. The starting point of analysis is the argument that markets are socially created, through formal institutions such as law, and informal institutions that govern exchanges, such as norms and trust, so that markets are in fact embedded in societies and marked by historical developments. Given this, the interesting questions become: Which kind of market economies exist? Why? How do they change and develop? What are the effects of different kinds of market economy?

Debates about these questions are frequently linked to broader normative questions about the distribution of power and wealth and indeed issues about democracy. At the same time, in practice, they have (with some delay) been influenced by events in markets and governance. Hence “market economy” is not only a complex concept but one intimately linked with both broader questions in political science and the evolution of markets in practice.

#### Debates in the 1960s and 1970s

Although many debates in the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by Marxism–pluralism conflicts,

at least two sets of analyses were undertaken that remain relevant today. The first concerned problems with “free markets” and was chiefly based in the United States. Political scientists began to study the effects of free markets on the distribution of power, both among social groups and classes and in the political arena. They worried that the power of business, especially large firms, was excessive. Business enjoyed not only great lobbying power but also systemic power: Politicians needed a well-functioning economy and, even without organized pressure, they would seek to protect business interests. The dangers of “capture” of regulators, especially by large concentrated suppliers, was underlined, as these firms could lobby and through votes and/or money could “buy” regulation that would distort the free market through entry restrictions and other protective measures that would allow them to earn rents.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the stark division between planned and market economies became blurred as political scientists mapped out both different forms of capitalism and also the ways in which governments structured markets. Thus, for instance, British and French state roles in markets differed—the latter’s ability to plan and intervene on matters from investment to prices was contrasted with the former’s more limited, arm’s-length role. Thereafter, work on corporatism examined the formal and informal linkages between governments, firms, and organized labor that were particularly strong in northern European countries and used to decide matters such as wage increases, the division of growth between capital and labor, or public spending. Corporatism was linked to the capacity of certain states to pursue high economic growth and a large welfare state. It was often heralded as a means of cooperation and negotiation between different interests that allowed them to shape and control markets.

### **Regulatory Reform and the Continuing Role of the State**

Just as political scientists were discovering non-market forms of control and the power of large firms, a major turn toward “the market” took place both in academic study and in policy making. Political science “rediscovered” the market, as it analyzed worldwide moves toward “regulatory

reform.” Many state-owned strategic industries were sold, such as network industries, banking, extraction industries, and suppliers in public ownership from the 19th century. Privatization was frequently accompanied by liberalization as, contrary to the predictions of the capture theorists, incumbent suppliers failed to prevent the ending of their legal monopolies. Instead, competition was permitted and indeed encouraged even in industries previously seen as “natural monopolies,” such as energy, telecommunications, and postal services.

The changes gave rise to vigorous debates. One concerned explanations for these “market reforms.” One argument was that they were driven by technological and economic developments, which made state ownership and monopolies untenable. However, such an explanation lacked political mechanisms and suffered from problems similar to those associated with the technological determinism of the 1950s and 1960s. Another framework of analysis underlined the interests of key actors—elected politicians in the proceeds of privatization, managers able to enjoy greater freedom and rewards, consultants, and lawyers—in promoting change. However, the spread of liberal ideas has been another argument, as changes needed to be accepted and legitimated. Finally, however, the reforms can be seen as part of a long cycle of reforms as the pendulum of policy swings between “state” and “market,” due to endogenous developments that undermine each. Hence, the post-1945 move to “collectivism” had engendered inefficiencies and dissatisfactions and thus pressures for more individualism.

However, the extent and nature of the changes were also contested. “Market-oriented” reforms were accompanied by the growth of organizations and rules governing competition. Governments created a series of economic regulators, often in the form of IRAs (independent regulatory authorities)—both sectoral regulators and general competition authorities—and delegated powers to them. In addition, “social regulation” (and regulators) concerning matters such as health and safety grew. Moreover, supranational regulation expanded, notably by the European Union and World Trade Organization. As a result, although U.S. scholars dubbed it “deregulation,” in fact, reform involved the creation of a “regulatory state,” as increased competition went hand in hand with reregulation.

### Globalization and Varieties of Capitalism

Liberalization was accompanied by startling increases in cross-border capital flows. Political scientists responded by looking at their effects on national economic policies and institutions. Some argued that these flows of capital reduced the power and autonomy of nation-states. Strong globalizationists indeed claimed that to attract “foot-loose capital,” and driven by economic efficiency, all countries would have to follow a neoliberal path toward a market economy with a smaller state, less powerful trade unions, and greater attention to the needs of international firms.

However, these claims were vigorously attacked by the “varieties of capitalism” literature, which pointed out that there were several different possible forms of markets and indeed of capitalism. It argues that market players, such as managers, investors, and workers, face coordination problems, which can be resolved through either competition or cooperation. Using the notion of *institutional complementarities*, whereby institutional arrangements in different spheres are linked, it claims that there are two models of a market economy—liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. Other work on models of capitalism has added further types, such as statist market economies, based on a leading role for the public sector. The literature on varieties of capitalism claims that a diversity of market economies can exist and indeed flourish in the face of globalization, as each has its distinct strengths and weaknesses and there is no single, most efficient market economy.

### Current Debates and Trends

Much political science work on “the market” has assumed that market institutions are largely static. Current debates largely center on changes in market institutions. One debate concerns the speed and extent of change. Whereas the varieties-of-capitalism literature, which was closely linked to historical institutionalism, largely claimed or assumed that national market economies remained stable, more recent work has suggested that major change does occur but incrementally and by building on existing institutions so that countries move toward liberalism while maintaining their distinctive heritages.

A further contribution concerns the role of international factors within domestic settings and their role in the spread of “liberal market” institutions such as privatization, liberalization, and independent regulatory agencies. One argument is that change has taken place through diffusion rather than rational choice and calculation. Owing to mechanisms of coercion and emulation, liberal market institutions have spread regardless of their efficacy. Another is that certain forms of internationalization lead to change in market institutions whereas others do not. Thus, for instance, transnational technological and economic developments may create pressures for change, but these can be resisted, whereas other international forces such as overseas reforms or supranational regulation may lead to the spread of “liberal” institutions because of their impact on policy making, notably legitimating change. A further line of development is to look at relationships as much as at formal institutions and hence to see whether, even if the latter change, enduring patterns of behavior remain that differ sharply across types of economy. Hence, the claim is that even if nations adopt similar “liberal” market institutions, these operate in very diverse ways due to informal institutions.

To many, the recent financial and economic crisis offers challenges to the supposed superiority of competition and hence to many normative underpinnings of the market economy. However, at least most political science work does not assume that only one type of market economy exists and does not neglect the crucial roles of the institutions, relationships, and the state in shaping market economies.

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*See also* Capitalism; Globalization; Regulation

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## MARKET FAILURE

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Market failure can be seen along a continuum. There is a wider and a narrower definition: the wider and imprecise one implying lack of output or even utter skepticism concerning the performance and functioning of markets and the narrower one limiting the term to deficiencies of the market. In this entry, the description of market failure and its basic model is followed by a discussion of market failures resulting from a wide variety of factors including asymmetrical information, monopolies, and external effects. Next, the entry examines public goods deficiencies as the narrower category of market failure. The last section discusses the distinction between market failure and economic crises.

With the worldwide financial and economic crisis that began in 2008, market failure has become a renewed focus of public discussion. Yet there is no need to let the state do what the market can do better—for example, organize free exchange relationships and produce consumer goods. Time-dependent public opinion creates shifts to and from more advocacy of state economic activities in creating an extended infrastructure for transport and goods such as public health and education and, nowadays, a heavy control and regulation of the financial sector. Irrespective of such tendencies, the “golden path”—apart from producing the “social goods proper” (see below)—is a combination of an effective judicial infrastructure respecting individual rights and property rights, market competition, the supervision of free access to markets, and avoidance of misuses by monopolies.


Market failure denotes situations where the result of market transactions is *not equivalent to a Pareto optimal allocation*. With such an allocation, no individual position could be improved while

diminishing that of another person. Market failure thus implies a nonoptimal use of scarce resources. In neoclassical theorizing, which focuses on allocation issues rather than issues of distribution, market failure as a pure deficit in allocation stems from factors such as lack of information, external effects, market power, or the character of public goods, also called *collective goods*.

A basic causal model of market failure is presented in Figure 1. Market power is a background factor to informational asymmetry (as are other factors omitted here). Market power has a direct effect on market failure and an indirect one via external effects. As argued by Richard Musgrave (1959), the failure to produce public goods is the key component of market failure. The first three factors are instances of market deficiencies that can be healed to some extent by appropriate institutional devices. Public goods, by definition, cannot be created in a market since citizens cannot be excluded from consumption and are thus not willing to pay, therefore private production fails to emerge. One could also argue that the lack of public goods production is a *cause* for market failure just as much as a *consequence*. We leave this debate unresolved here, with just a line between the two variables to indicate the different nature of the variable “public goods” compared with the other three causal variables, which, in turn, could also be consequences of market failure.

Public goods, just as much as “public bads,” are characterized by nonrivalry in consumption and by the lack of excludability—that is, the ability to exclude others from consuming a good (e.g., security of a country). Partially, this is a case of positive externality. Free riding is tempting when potential consumers cannot be excluded from consuming the good without paying. A lack of effective demand is the result. Here the state can organize the provision of such public goods, yet often without sufficient information as to the adequate amount of such a good. Gathering such information is costly, however. Also the limitation of public goods would in itself be Pareto inefficient. Neoclassical economists argue that the state should interfere only in cases of market failure but not beyond and not for political goals.

Following the specifications of Musgrave and thus opting for a more limited definition of market failure, allocation problems in a market economy can be either *market imperfections* (market power



**Figure 1** A Basic Causal Model of Market Failure

and external costs/effects) or *market failure* (insufficient supply of public goods).

Usually, market failure is limited to a specific market. Market failure calls for state intervention. The counterposition is that state interventionism could lead to state failure. With the state increasingly being engaged in the economy, information scarcity increases due to the absence of fungible markets. Individuals might be treated as if they all had the same preferences. The greater the differences in their preferences are, the greater the welfare losses become. Citizens might be confronted with package solutions they would not agree to in their entirety, or coalitions may go for solutions other than those initially proclaimed by individual parties.

Consequently, the Austrian school of economics (e.g., Friedrich Hayek, 1944; Murray Rothbard, 1962) even denies such a thing as market failure, since markets are instruments of individual discovery with no preassigned collective goals. According to Hayek, the market is a context of discovery, whereas planned state economies never make discoveries stemming from the spontaneous coordination of individual actors in a market. Yet on many occasions, Hayek does not question the standard theory of public goods.

### Instances of Market Failure

Among the factors that may bring about market failure are the ones related to asymmetrical information, monopolies, and external effects.

### *Asymmetrical Information*

Asymmetrical information occurs when the potential contract partners do not have equal information about the supplied goods, services, or risks to be insured. George Akerlof (1970) argues that uncertainty about the quality of goods on the part of consumers drives out good products (e.g., cars just as much as hard currencies in the case of Gresham's law) and leaves only the bad ones on the market. This "lemon" principle leaves only the poorest suppliers able to sell their cars. There is no market clearing, and a negative selection takes place.

Guarantees on the part of the suppliers or independent institutions monitoring the quality of goods as well as legal guarantees could help in mitigating this information asymmetry. The discipline of new institutional economics emphasizes the importance of appropriate incentives from and controls by institutions. The protection of patents is another instance of information asymmetry. Here the trade-off is between quickly disseminating new knowledge versus protecting research and the economic incentives that are derived from particular knowledge, at least for some time.

In addition to adverse selection, as in the "lemon" cases, asymmetrical information may also arise when a contract between partners provides that both should have symmetrical information, but, subsequently, one party is unable to observe the behavior of the other. When such a situation arises after contract formation, it creates

a moral hazard in which one partner may be tempted to cheat.

### *Monopolies*

Market power stems from three factors: unique technological inventions, the limitation of competition, and the indivisibility of the production apparatus. Under a monopoly, production is inefficient (a lower amount of goods is turned out at higher prices). A monopolist maximizing his or her market power is selling products at a price above the marginal costs (Cournot point) and not where the marginal returns equal those of the marginal production costs, as in a competitive market (a higher turnout of goods at lower prices).

Remedies against monopolistic markets are antitrust policies and, in cases of indivisibilities and natural monopolies, tax and subvention policies. The indivisibility of the production apparatus (e.g., networks for electric power and gas, the canal system railways) leads to scale effects and thus to lower average costs but also to larger sunk costs, that is, past costs that cannot be recovered when being confronted with new competitors. If only one supplier can do it efficiently, this is called a *natural monopoly*.

If there is a Pareto efficient situation, state intervention by necessity will violate that equilibrium, often for the sake of redistribution issues that are decided politically through majority voting. The median position of the voter in democracies with an interest in redistribution from the rich to the poor and the activities of lobby groups are key factors in such a view. The underlying factor is rent seeking—securing incomes above those in a free and competitive market—by private groups, government bureaucracies, and politicians. (The latter two entities point to the principal-agent problem.) Here, “market failure” is often defined in the reverse sense as an effect of state regulation and interference with otherwise free markets.

Adherents of public choice theorizing point to lack of causal evidence when bringing in the state to remedy situations of market failure. They argue that the costs of state failure could be even higher than those of market failure. Market failure can be closely linked to state failure, not just in case of the communist collapse but also in the market rule distortions created through the networks and

influence of the financial sector on politicians to loosen rules on the financial markets. Oliver Blanchard (2009) succinctly lists these failures of the past decade:

The underestimation of risk contained in newly issued assets; the opacity of the derived securities on the balance sheets of financial institutions; the interconnection of financial institutions, both within and across countries; and the high degree of leverage of the financial system as a whole . . . all combined to create the perfect (financial) storm. (pp. 38–39)

### *External Effects*

External effects occur in two variants. Negative external effects occur where the economic activities of two partners cause damage to a third one (e.g., toxic emissions into the air). Sometimes positive external effects—benefits (e.g., beautifying the environment)—are created by economic contractors. The internalization of external costs is theoretically possible, for example, via Coase negotiations. The Coase theorem states that, under clearly defined property rights, perfect rationality and no-transaction-costs bargaining may occur in such a way that external effects will be internalized by market participants. For future generations, such a condition is absent, however. By means of the Pigou tax, the state places a tax on the producer equal to the external costs. The latter must be known, however, and again transaction costs are not allowed.

Negative external effects (e.g., environmental degradation) are the most often quoted instances of market failure. Firms externalize their costs of production onto third parties (so that customers of respective firms do not have to pay directly) or, in the widest instance, onto the global environment, turning everyone into a victim.

Positive external effects occur in cases where a good is underproduced, because the supplier does not receive adequate compensation for the external rewards that would be provided if full production capacity were used. Other examples come from the health sector where a general vaccination could have external benefits for society at large, but costs for poor people might be too high, thus creating negative external effects of undersupply.



The educational sector offers another instance, in which the provision of a good education nationwide provides many additional advantages for society at large. The provision of subventions for an increasing demand for these goods may, however, be inefficient and create issues of moral hazard (e.g., downgrading one’s own private learning efforts since the education does not cost anything).

### Public Goods Provision

Deficiencies in producing public goods are often listed as further instances of market failure. Public goods, such as clean air, are ones from which individuals cannot be excluded. Therefore, unlike private goods, public goods cannot be produced effectively through the private market. Following the logic of Musgrave and thus requiring more precise argumentation, they comprise the second and narrower category of market failure, in which the market fails *entirely*. In the cases dealt with thus far, gradual deficiencies of markets occurred. While the market is functioning in principle, there is, however, too much or too little of goods produced. But in the more basic case of complete market failure, some goods are not produced at all, even though the optimal allocation of goods requires them. Goods with only external returns, those with returns only to consumers and not to producers, are heavily undersupplied. The lighthouse is a classic example. Although the lighthouse provides strong external benefits for seafaring, there is no individual incentive to build it. The lighthouse is a public or collective good that is characterized by two features: There is no rivalry in consumption and no excludability (that is, one person’s use of a good such as a lighthouse does not reduce the availability of the good to others). Free riding is a consequence of such a constellation. As long as individuals do not reveal how strong their preferences for public goods are, there will be no production of such goods unless the state steps in. The state monopoly of the legitimate use of force, external defense, levees, and the judicial institutional

framework are also examples of public goods (what Musgrave describes as “social goods proper”). According to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), the real task of the state is to protect property rights.

Crossing the two criteria of rivalry and exclusion in Figure 2, four types emerge.

The two pure types of goods—private goods (Case 1 in Figure 2) and public goods (Case 4 in Figure 2)—have already been discussed. With respect to the mixed goods in Case 2, consumers can be excluded by imposing fees on the consumption of these goods. Even though there is little or no rivalry in consumption (e.g., of streets, bridges, sports events, pipelines, or even cable TV—goods resembling the so-called toll goods), there is a tendency for underproduction of those goods (resulting in, e.g., traffic congestion). With decreasing average production costs, there is also an inherent tendency toward monopoly in such situations. Supervision of market tendencies by independent authorities and/or subsidies to consumers could counteract such tendencies toward underproduction.

With mixed goods in Case 3, where rivalry but no exclusion exists, the reverse instance of overusage emerges, as, for example, in the tragedy of the commons, described by Elinor Ostrom. By defining rights of usage for natural resources such free riding might be controlled. Other means of regulation could be mutual controls or by an agent, sanctions when violating rules, reciprocity, and mutual trust.

The mixed goods in Cases 2 and 3 show some resemblance to the cases of external effects

		<i>Rivalry</i>	
		yes	no
<i>Exclusion</i>	yes	1 <b>Private goods,</b> <i>e.g., bread</i>	2 <b>Mixed goods with tendency of underproduction,</b> <i>e.g., highways</i>
	no	3 <b>Mixed goods with tendency of overusing,</b> <i>e.g., the commons</i>	4 <b>Public goods</b> <i>e.g., external security</i>

**Figure 2** Exclusion and Rivalry With Public Goods, Mixed Goods, and Private Goods

discussed earlier. While external effects are market imperfections, (pure) public goods as such are not produced by the market at all.

With the state producing such goods on its own, at least two challenges arise. First, the state produces at costs that are too high (which can be counteracted by employing market means in the whole production process wherever possible). Second, consumers may waste resources because the state produces them at no cost to the consumers, creating an ethical issue. Also, consumer sovereignty can be limited through state production of the wrong goods or in wrong quantities (*crowding out*). The production of so-called *merit goods*, such as health, education, and high culture, is a fiat usually set by political/economic elites and rarely by majority opinion. In other markets, allocation of goods may suffer.

In the opposite cases of *demerit goods*, the state again could work with legal provisions and prohibitions, taxes, and subventions and with tradable certificates to introduce market elements—for example, in controlling environmental deterioration. Here economically inefficient and ecologically aberrant rules from the past create no incentives for technological progress. They can be substituted by technological progress the external costs of which are addressed better by auctions and by the selling of certificates. In the long run, overregulation of and by the state may be a crucial factor contributing to market failure, just as much as the lack of monopoly of violence and failure to guard property rights to begin with are.

### Economic Crises

Analytically and empirically, one has to distinguish an economic crisis from situations of market failure. Situations of market failure (lack of public goods production) and market imperfection can be the causes as well as the correlates and consequences of economic crises. Yet economic crises in terms of *supply shocks* (e.g., the oil shocks of 1973 and 1980), or simply the overproduction of goods (as, e.g., in the automotive industry today), as well as *demand shocks* (e.g., in cases of natural catastrophes and poor harvests) must be distinguished from the cases and analyses of market failures. In a sloppy colloquial sense, the term *market failure* is often applied here but for incorrect and inconsistent

theoretical reasons. An economic crisis basically means that producers have miscalculated the amount and type of goods consumers are willing to buy. The consequence is an uncleared market and, in case of a deepening crisis, a further extension of unsold products. This cumulative downward process (see Knut Wicksell, 1898) of overproduction and falling prices stops when consumers anticipate higher prices in the future and start buying again. Thus, a *normal* economic crisis has the character of a *cleansing crisis*, wiping out unproductive suppliers.

Such economic crises can be caused and intensified by financial crises (just as much as they can be alleviated through built-in stabilizers as in the European social market economies from 2008 onward; see Joseph Stiglitz, 2010). The Great Depression with the financial crises emerging in the early 1930s is a case in point. Institutional adjustments in the financial sector then included repealing the liberalization measures of the Glass-Steagall Act and separating commercial activities of banks from their investment activities, giving the Federal Bank a stronger leeway in raising liabilities for banks yet with very little Keynesian reflation of the economy. In the crisis after 2008, institutional adjustments included increased liability for banks and other financial agents, more transparency with hedge funds, better control of the stock exchanges and of rating agencies, elimination of speculative deals such as short sales, tax on financial transactions, higher taxing of banks, separation of investment banks from retail and commercial banks, breaking down banks that are “too big to fail,” and the socialization of private losses via a bailout through the taxpayer; these were intended to prevent financial bubbles (and the oversupply of goods such as housing) in the future. At the same time, from 2008 on there was a heavy reflation of the major economies to avoid the procyclical monetary and fiscal policies of the 1930s. Yet as noted by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2009), underlying factors such as human speculation and miscalculation as well as greed will always contribute to economic crises so that the very basic features of the next bubble will not be so different from those of previous ones. The economic fallout of both the Great Depression and the current crisis coming close to a breakdown of the financial engine of the free market system is

grave enough. It is, however, even in its magnified effects, an instance of absent or failing institutional regulations. Given human creativity and greed, one will have to reckon with further such imbalances. They are instances of far-reaching contractions of markets due to a lack of institutional safeguards. Market failure in a more theoretically strict sense has, however, to be distinguished from these grave challenges.

Nevertheless, the failure of the institutional framework (creation of a public bad in not containing the financial speculation and letting it transgress into the goods and services markets) is a clear case of de facto market failure in the present financial and economic crisis. At the global level, there are no adequate rules to allow for the separation of real growth effects of financial transactions from cases of gross overspeculation. (Some economists argue that there could never be such a separation between sound and unsound financial transactions since every speculator is always met by a countertrader.) Legitimacy for a market society has been strongly undermined, fortunately in the absence of other more repressive system alternatives as present and tried in the 1930s.

Given the high debt burdens, the global market power, informational asymmetries, the externalization of costs, environmental damages, moral risks, and rent seeking in all its varieties, market failures may become more likely. The market does better than the state in providing incentives and competition, in allocating scarce resources, and in controlling economic and, thus often, political power. For these functions, state activities cannot be a substitute for the market. With historically unseen market extensions in a fully globalized economy, however, it may become more difficult to establish rules of consent shared worldwide. There are always some externalities involved, be they only in the form of misperceptions of one's own long-term advantages with respect to, for example, issues of global warming and other climate changes. The failed Copenhagen Climate Change Conference of 2009, just as much as the current financial crisis with dramatic public debt, not only figures in European, American, and the majority of Asian states but also speaks just as dramatically to new (potential) mixtures of market failures cum failures of political systems, whether they are organized around autocratic principles or

around the preferences of the median voter, or occur in emergent systems such as the European Union and the eurozone. The temptations for free riding may have become higher under global economic markets, but so have external costs and burdens on future generations. There is a lag in ordered structures for global markets to function without creating excessive external costs.

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*See also* Market Economy; State Failure

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## MARX, KARL (1818–1883)

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Karl Marx is among the most famous and influential theorists of the modern age, from whom the socialist or communist movements derived their ideas. He is not only a political thinker but also a

social philosopher and economist, whose research ranged widely over many fields. Marx has had a profound impact on the thoughts and actions of people in many countries since the mid-19th century, and in the 21st century, he is still regarded as the greatest instructor by the political left, including the adherents of communist parties, and derided as a source of political and social chaos by the political right. The ideas and programs developed by Karl Marx in cooperation with Friedrich Engels have been generally called Marxism.

Born in Trier, Germany, into a Jewish family on May 5, 1818, Marx received a good education and displayed great potential as an outstanding student. At the universities of Bonn and Berlin, Marx studied history and philosophy, took a strong interest in the works of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and joined a student-professor group called the Young Hegelians. Marx submitted his doctoral thesis at the University of Jena in 1840 and received a doctoral degree the following year. After an initial and unsuccessful effort to establish an academic career, his liberal political views led him to find employment as an editor of a radical magazine in Cologne, *Rheinische Zeitung*. Because of his journalistic abilities and radical beliefs, Marx was well received in liberal circles in Germany and quickly promoted to editor of the magazine. This radical publication, under Marx's guidance, had to face the problem of censorship by the authoritative Prussian government and was finally suppressed after the printing of Marx's article on the poverty of farmers in the Mosel Valley.

In 1843, Marx married his girlfriend Jenny von Westphalen and emigrated to Paris with her to escape political persecution. There he made the acquaintance of French socialist thinkers and began to witness firsthand the living conditions of people in poverty by socializing with working-class people. More important, he came into contact for the first time and subsequently established his lifelong friendship with Engels, the author of the classical work *The Conditions of the Working Class in England* published in 1844. As a result of his economic and philosophical research, Marx wrote *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* in 1844, in which he showed great concern for the dignity and freedom of the individual. In February 1844, Marx started a new journal, the *Franco-German*

*Annals*, together with the philosopher and political writer Arnold Ruge, in which he published articles on a broad range of matters, such as philosophy, politics, and society.

Based on his experiences living among working-class people and his comprehensive researches on history, economics, politics, and philosophy, Marx became an ardent communist. He proposed his ideas about communism by criticizing the alienation of labor under capitalism. According to Marx, under capitalism, the working class invests its creative labor while the capitalist class appropriates the results of this labor in exchange for wages. This means that the human world created by the proletariat does not belong to them but is instead owned by a class of nonlaboring owners.

His radical ideas were not tolerated in France. When Marx published an article on capitalism in the *Franco-German Annals*, he upset his partner Ruge, and the journal was banned in France and Germany. In January 1845, Marx was expelled from Paris by Premier François Guizot at the instance of the Prussian government and moved to Brussels, Belgium. During his stay in Brussels, Marx exchanged polemics with the Hegelians, Feuerbach, Stirner, and the "True Socialists" and finished two important works, *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology*, in collaboration with Engels. In *The German Ideology*, Marx provided a historical and material basis for his radical views and insisted that the nature of individuals depended on the material conditions determining their own productions. According to his interpretations of history, the sum total of the relations of production forms the real basis of society, on which a legal and political superstructure is established. In 1847, Marx started another polemical exchange with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and wrote *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in which he developed the fundamental propositions of his economic interpretation of history.

By early 1846, Marx had established the Communist Correspondence Committee to connect all of Europe's socialist leaders. The following year, the socialists held a conference in London and established the Communist League. Marx went to attend the Communist League meeting and wrote *The Communist Manifesto* together with Engels, inspired by Engels's *The Principles of Communism*. *The Communist Manifesto*, originally written as

the platform of the Communist League, has become one of the most radical and influential books since it was first published on February 1848. It begins with the famous proposition "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle" and contains a summary of Marxist theory. For example, one of the major points is the need to abolish private property and implement public ownership of the economy. The theory of the Communists may perhaps be summed up in the single phrase: abolition of private property. Another aim is to bring the proletariat to power and annihilate the exploiting class, especially the bourgeoisie, in politics. According to Marx and Engels, the first step toward the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class in order to win the battle of democracy. The Communist Party as the avant-garde of the proletariat then comes to power after winning the struggle against the old classes, such as landowners and the bourgeoisie. The third is to envision a classless society in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. On its publication in 1848, *The Communist Manifesto* quickly became the credo of the poor and oppressed all over the world, which led to the greatest political upheavals of the 19th and 20th centuries and to the establishment of the communist governments that ruled half the globe for several decades.

After the *Manifesto* came to light, even the relatively tolerant Belgian government served Marx with an expulsion order. The revolutionary atmosphere in Germany in 1848 enabled him to return to Cologne where he persuaded some liberal industrialists to back a new version of his old journal, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. Under Marx's editorship, it became extremely radical and anti-government and was suppressed again by the authorities. Marx printed the last issue of the *Zeitung* in red ink. For this reason, he was arrested for press offenses and incitement to armed insurrection. But after a long and powerful speech at his trial, Marx was acquitted by a jury in Cologne. Faced with expulsion from Cologne and suppression of his journal, Marx visited Paris again as a representative of German democracy before the Paris National Assembly but was similarly served with an expulsion order from Paris.

In 1849, Marx moved to London, where he lived with his large and devoted family until his

death. Although Marx was a correspondent to the *New York Tribune* from 1852 to 1861, for the most part he was financially dependent on generous support from Engels. His typical workday, from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m., was spent in the reading room of the British Museum, where wrote many volumes on different subjects. Sometimes he lacked money for postage to send his manuscripts to the publishers. Afflicted with boils, eye and liver trouble, and a contentious and uncompromising temper, Marx was not a prepossessing sight during his last years. Although virtually unknown in England, he enjoyed great popularity on the Continent, especially in liberal circles and among the working people. In 1864, the International Workingmen's Association was founded at a meeting in St. Martin's Hall, London, and Marx was invited to draw up the inaugural address. In 1867, the first volume of Marx's greatest work, *Capital (Das Kapital)*, was published. The second, third, and incomplete fourth volumes did not come out until after Marx's death in 1883.

In *Capital*, Marx analyzed the secret of capitalist production by focusing on the concept of surplus value and formulated his revolutionary theory by revealing the injustice of the capitalist system. According to Marx, labor is a commodity like any other; therefore, following the labor theory of value, it must be valued by the man-hours devoted to its "production"—that is, to feeding, clothing, and sheltering the worker in order to maintain life at subsistence level. In the capitalist system, labor is bought just like any other commodity. But, unlike any other commodity, labor is not consumed in a clearly determined period of time. A laborer is bought for the price of sustaining him physically, prorated in hours or days or weeks. But he may produce the equivalent of the price in economic value in 6 or 8 hours of work, whereas the factories of Marx's day kept men going for 10, 12, or 14 hours a day. The difference between what the worker does and what he is paid is surplus value, the source of all capitalist profits. In the capitalist society that is divided into the capitalist class with the means of production and the proletariat without the means of production, the injustice heaped on the workers is not the result of bad men but of a particular system. Reform within the system, however well intentioned, is doomed to failure.

Only revolutionary overthrow of the whole capitalist system can succeed.

Marx died on March 14, 1883, and was buried in Highgate Cemetery, London, with a tombstone epitaph reading “Workers of all lands unite,” the last slogan in *The Communist Manifesto*. In the years following Marx’s death, Engels edited and translated his works and in many ways continued their friendship until his own death in 1895. Although Marx spent most of his life in reading and writing as a student and scholar, he has had a strong influence not only on modern ideas but also on political practices and social movements in many countries all over the world. Even today, his works are reprinted and read widely, and his ideas are discussed and debated in philosophy, sociology, and political science.

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*See also* Communism; Marxism; Socialism

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late 19th century and subsequently elaborated by their disciples from various backgrounds all over the world. Although there are inconsistencies and contradictions in Marx’s theory during the different periods of its development, and there are considerable debates and disputes over its nature and structure, some basic consensus can be reached based on the analysis of Marx’s works and studies on the subsequent evolution of the theory. A historic landmark in social and political thought, Marxism provided the foundation for the communist revolution and socialist reform that marked the 20th century, the influence of which continues to be felt worldwide.

#### Theoretical Sources

Marx developed his eponymous theoretical system from three major sources: German philosophy, French politics, and English economics. Marx showed great interest in law and philosophy in his early works; his later works were more concerned with political economy and political strategy.

The German philosophy on which Marx drew was primarily that of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel but also included the Young Hegelians and Ludwig Feuerbach’s materialism. During his student days at the universities of Bonn and Berlin, Marx studied history and philosophy, took a strong interest in the works of the philosopher Hegel, and joined a student–professor group called the Young Hegelians. Many of Marx’s basic ideas, such as his critique of civil society and private property, emerged when he was writing *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*. He asserts that religion is the “opium of the people” and calls for an “uprising of the proletariat” to realize the conceptions of philosophy, a point also made in *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845). Marx had been strongly influenced by Hegel’s *Logic* and dialectical method, and his great work *Capital* is imbued with intellectual categories derived from Hegel.

French politics and socialist movements played an important role in shaping Marx’s thoughts. Marx’s father-in-law, Baron von Westphalen, and his teachers were all strongly influenced by the French Enlightenment. Marx was also strongly influenced by the French Revolution and by French thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau. After he emigrated to Paris together with his wife to escape

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## MARXISM

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Marxism is the system of social and political theory about human life, historical development, the capitalist crisis, and the communist revolution developed by the German philosopher and economist Karl Marx along with his close friend and supporter Friedrich Engels during the middle and

political persecution by German authorities, Marx became acquainted with French socialist thinkers and began to witness the living conditions of people in poverty by socializing with working-class people. French socialism enabled Marx to break with Hegel's teleological approach to history, to develop a broad-ranging social economy, to understand the social and personal impact of modern industry, and to grasp the significance of socialism. After studying the development of Bonapartism and commenting on the nature and significance of the Paris Commune, Marx completed several political works (*Class Struggles in France* and *The Eighteenth Brumaire*) and expounded his major political ideas about the state and revolution.

The third major source of Marx's theory was English economics, exemplified by writers such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus. It was during his years in Paris that Marx began his study of English economics; from the early 1840s, he made an increasingly detailed study of the works of English economists. After moving to London, Marx undertook deep and systematic research on the development of the capitalist mode of production in England. In writing the 1844 *Manuscripts*, Marx relied extensively on the work of Adam Smith, especially his views on the division of labor, rent, subsistence wages, and the three stages of society. Once he became acquainted with Ricardo's work, *Principles of Political Economy*, Marx abandoned the economic theory developed in the 1844 *Manuscripts*. His critique of *The Poverty of Philosophy* was Ricardian in character. By absorbing the ideas in the works of classic political economists and analyzing the capitalist development in England, Marx established his own status as a political economist.

Although Marx drew on various sources, he did not merely combine them mechanically. A distinctive feature of Marx's theory is his creative synthesizing ability. A thorough study of German philosophy, French politics, and English economics allowed Marx to develop his own philosophical, economic, social, and political theory.

### Historical Materialism and Social Development

Marx's unique contribution to historical philosophy is his historical materialism and theory of

social development. According to his explanations in *The German Ideology* (1846) and *The Critique of Political Economy* (1859), the nature of individuals depends on the material conditions determining their productions. In the social production of their existence, people enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will. According to Marx,

These relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic foundation of society on which there arise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. (*Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Preface)

The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and intellectual processes of life:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production come eventually into conflict with the existing relations of production. [. . .] From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of economic foundation the entire immense superstructure [. . .] is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic condition of production [. . .] and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, philosophical, in short, ideological transformation. (*Critique of Political Economy*, Preface)

All ideological transformations "must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of productions" (*Critique of Political Economy*, Preface). Therefore, the legal relations as well as the forms of state could neither be understood by themselves nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human

mind; they are rooted in the material conditions of life.

Since every society is divided into various groups, a strong minority tends to use their economic power in order to exploit the mass population by appropriating the economic surplus for their own benefit. This inherently conflicting situation gives rise to a class struggle that centers on the ownership and control of the means of production. The social group that controls the means of production forms the ruling class, and the group without the means of production constitutes the ruled class. All political institutions and cultural beliefs are shaped by the ruling class so as to bolster the unequal distribution of resources. The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. According to Marx,

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted [. . .] fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society or in the common ruin of the contending classes. (Section I, *Communist Manifesto*)

Based on the conflict between the forces of production and the relations of production, the history of mankind progresses through revolutions to the next higher stage. In the Marxist view of history, the primitive agrarian society was followed by the slave society of the ancient world, the feudal society, the capitalist society, and finally the communist society. The progress is made by inevitable and ultimately uncontrollable material forces, rather than human thought and initiative. This is sometimes summarized as so-called economic determinism. In fact, while Marx emphasized the crucial role of material forces in social development, he also analyzed the important and strong influences of political superstructure and human initiative on history.

### Capitalist Crisis and Surplus Value

In February 1848, Marx and Engels published the well-known pamphlet, *Communist Manifesto*. It is usually regarded as a public statement of general theory and political principle of Marxism and a

call for general cooperation among different workers' organizations. According to their analysis, capitalism as a revolutionary mode of production was fundamentally changing the course of civilization. It introduced market relations and cash nexus into all spheres of society and throughout the world. The market kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication. The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. By continually modernizing the forces of production and promoting the division of labor, capitalism prepared the material conditions necessary for social cooperation and planned management in economic life. Despite the ever-increasing social character of capitalist production or socialization of the forces of production, the capitalist system was operated for private profit under private ownership. The search for private profit imposed fetters on the further development of production. The capitalist relations of production came finally into conflict with its forces of production. While a huge sum of wealth was accumulated in the hands of capitalists, its direct producers were impoverished. Lack of demand coexisting with unsold goods produced ever-worsening economic crises. This dynamic of capitalism created conditions of its own overthrow.

Moreover, capitalism was creating the industrial proletariat as its own grave diggers. As capitalism destroyed precapitalist modes of production at home and abroad, other classes were eliminated and the proletariat expanded. According to Marx,

With the development of industry the proletariat not only increased in number; it became concentrated in greater masses, its strength grew, and it felt that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat were more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterated all distinctions of labor, and nearly everywhere reduced wages to the same low level. (Section I, *Communist Manifesto*)

As individual workers, then groups of workers in a factory or trade, and eventually all workers in a



nation-state or even the world economy mobilized to resist capitalist exploitation, the proletariat would grow more conscious of their shared class position and their common interest in the overthrow of capitalism. When their economic struggles encountered resistance of the state as well as individual capitalists and groups of employers, the working class would develop a revolutionary consciousness and move from trade unionism to political party. With economic crisis deepening and the proletariat gaining in strength, revolution would be inevitable.

In 1867, the first volume of Marx's greatest work, *Capital (Das Kapital)*, was published. The second, third, and incomplete fourth volumes did not come out until after Marx's death in 1883. In *Capital*, Marx analyzed the secret of capitalist production by focusing on the concept of surplus value and formulated his revolutionary theory by revealing the injustice of capitalist system. According to Marx, labor is a commodity like any other commodity; therefore, following the labor theory of value, it must be valued by the man-hours devoted to its "production"—that is, to feeding, clothing, and sheltering the worker in order to maintain life at subsistence level. In the capitalist system, labor is bought just like any other commodity. But, unlike any other commodity, labor is not consumed in a clearly determined period of time. Labor is bought for the price of sustaining the laborer physically, prorated in hours or days or weeks. But he may produce the equivalent of the price in economic value in 6 or 8 hours of work, whereas the factories of Marx's day kept men going for 10, 12, or 14 hours a day. The difference between what the worker does and what he is paid is surplus value, the source of all capitalist profits. In the capitalist society that is divided into the capitalist class with the means of production and the proletariat without the means of production, the injustice heaped on the workers is not the result of bad men, but of a particular system. Reform within the system, however well intentioned, is doomed to failure. Only revolutionary overthrow of the whole capitalist system can succeed.

### Communist Revolution and Classless Society

Since the revolution is an inevitable historical product as the result of the conflict between the forces of

production and the relations of production, and especially class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalist society, neither Marx nor Engels paid attention to the means of revolution, especially political leadership and political strategy, which would be explained and expounded by their followers such as Lenin and Mao Zedong. They also said little about what would happen after the revolution. It was believed that it would be absurd to predict the future society in detail. Nonetheless, some major ideas about communism can be found in the classic works of Marx and Engels.

When revolution breaks out, the proletariat seizes the power of the state and transforms the means of production in the first instance into state property. As Marx and Engels suggested, the revolutionary measures in the most advanced countries would include abolition of private property, a heavy progressive or graduated income tax, abolition of all right of inheritance, confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels, centralization of credit in the hands of the state, centralization of the means of communication, and transport in the hands of the state. By doing so, it puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, and it puts an end to the state as state. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production. The state is not "abolished"; it withers away. But in a few places, Marx and Engels referred to the transitional stage as "the dictatorship of proletariat." The existence of classes is bound up with particular historic phases in the development of production; the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.

With regard to postrevolutionary politics, Marx cited the experience of the Paris Commune and talked about the possibility of bridging the gap between the state and civil society that had been opened up by capitalist democracy. As an instance of the abolition of the division of labor in politics, Marx welcomed the Commune's proposal to have all officials, including judges, elected by universal suffrage and revocable at any time; to pay officials the same wages as manual laborers; to replace the standing army by the armed people; and to divest the police and clergy of their political influence.

The initiative of the Commune could yield a decentralized, federal political structure and an economy based on cooperatives united by a common plan.

According to Marx's explanation and prediction, the fundamental features of communism include at least the following elements:

- The first is to eliminate the private property and implement the public ownership in economy. The theory of the Communists may be summed up in a single phrase: abolition of private property.
- The second is to limit free competition and carry out economic planning. The classic socialist believes that capitalist-free competition may lead to economic disorder and increasing inequality. Only after all economic activities are placed under the comprehensive economic plan can economic development be promoted and economic crisis avoided.
- The third is to distribute the economic surplus based on labor and need. In contrast to the capitalism in which capital plays the most important role in the process of distribution, the Communists insist that labor and need are the most important factors in distributing social wealth.
- Finally, the state as a tool of rule by the ruling class would wither away and would gradually be replaced by the administration of public affairs. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, there shall be an association, in which the conditions for the free development of one are the conditions for the free development of all.

### Marxism After Marx

The classic Marxist theory was expounded and elaborated based on the historical developments in the Western industrialized countries such as England, France, and Germany. After economic, social, and political changes took place, many social theorists and political leaders tried to redefine and develop Marxism based on the new situations.

#### *Revisionist Marxism*

During the period of economic depression and political repression in the 1880s, Marxism became dominant in the German Social Democratic Party.

Karl Kautsky explained and defended the theories of surplus value, class struggle, and capitalist crisis. His works defined Marxism for the generation after Marx and constituted the fundament of "orthodox Marxism." Another theorist, Eduard Bernstein, launched the revisionist attack on "orthodox Marxism" and directly refuted the theories of surplus value, impoverishment, capital concentration, and crisis. According to Bernstein, workers were not becoming poorer; the numbers of peasants was not declining; a new middle class was growing in size and importance; share ownership refuted the claim of capital concentration; and capitalism was developing mechanisms to reduce competition and remove recurrent economic crisis.

#### *Western Marxism*

The term *Western Marxism* normally excludes orthodox communists of strict Marxist obedience and is confined to the collection of thinkers that centered on the work of Georg Lukacs and Karl Korsch in Central Europe, Antonio Gramsci in Italy, and the Frankfurt school in Germany. Unlike the previous generation of Marxist theorists, most of the Western Marxist thinkers were not important figures in political parties. They tended to be academics rather than activists, writing in a period of declining working-class movements due to capitalist democratic and economic developments. Western Marxism is a philosophical meditation on the defeat of Marxism in the West. Although some people might question whether Western Marxism is real Marxism, the modes of thought in Western Marxism undoubtedly extended the horizons of Marxist discussion beyond the rather limited perspective of the Second International and Leninist orthodox. Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony and its consequences for political culture, the treatment of Sigmund Freud by Herbert Marcuse, the drastic critique of the Enlightenment by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, all these attempts to remedy weakness or gaps in the classical Marxist tradition have produced meaningful and insightful works on philosophy, politics, and society.

#### *Leninism*

Contrary to Marx's expectations, the socialist countries were not founded in the Western

advanced countries but in some underdeveloped countries such as Russia and China. After the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, the first socialist country was established in Russia under the strong leadership of Vladimir Lenin. To lead the proletarian revolution, Lenin contributed a lot to Marxist theory in his theory of the party and his concept of capitalistic imperialism. In the process of building the first socialist country, Lenin had been searching for several models of socialism, such as War Communism and the New Economic Policy, in the face of foreign invasion and domestic hardship. In comparison with the comprehensive state direction and management of the economy in War Communism, the New Economic Policy was the strategic retreat in which the state withdrew from the ownership and management of small and medium enterprises, retaining only the very large-scale, strategically important parts of industry and communications. Freedom for peasants and traders to market their goods was extended as the state withdrew. However, after Joseph Stalin ascended to the top of the party-state in Soviet Union, he proceeded to announce radical plans for the rapid industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture.

#### *Maoism and the Theory of Deng Xiaoping*

Mao Zedong, the principal Chinese Marxist theorist, was the Communist statesman who contributed to the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, the Communist Army in 1927, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 after a long period of military struggle. Maoism is composed of many different kinds of ideas and ideology and strategy and tactics and believed to be the creative results of applying Marxism–Leninism to China, a semifeudal and semicolonial country without modern industrial developments. The most salient feature of Maoism is his emphasis on the importance of the peasant issue in Chinese revolution and socialist construction. The Marxist–Leninist tradition treated peasants as incapable of revolutionary initiative and only marginally useful in backing urban proletarian revolution. Based on his living experiences and his analysis of the rural situation in China, Mao came to recognize the potential power of China's hundreds of millions of peasants and decided to establish his base

in rural areas instead of big cities. The peasants constituted the vast majority of China's population, but most of them were hard-pressed and lived in extreme poverty. According to Mao, they were very receptive to revolutionary agitation and could become a revolutionary force if fully mobilized and properly guided. Proceeding from this belief, Mao proposed to instill in them a revolutionary consciousness and make their force alone suffice for revolution. By so doing, Mao led Chinese revolution to succeed and gradually formed a special sentiment for peasants. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent many city workers, intellectuals, and bureaucrats to rural areas and forced them to receive reeducation through agricultural labor together with peasants because Mao believed that many of them began to become corrupt in the big cities.

After the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the new supreme leader and began to review and revise the basic line adopted by Mao. Deng Xiaoping thought it was imperative to give a new perspective on socialism and make a breakthrough on socialist theory under the banner of "emancipating the mind" and "seeking the truth from the facts." The new theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics has been expounded and enriched by Deng Xiaoping and other Communist leaders during the past 3 decades. At the beginning of 1992, Deng Xiaoping made a famous southern tour in which he talked a lot about the nature of socialism and redefined it as "liberating productivity, developing productivity, eradicating exploitation, getting rid of the polarization between rich and poor, and finally getting rich together." According to Deng, the planned economy is not equal to socialism, and there are plans also in capitalist countries. The market economy is not equal to capitalism, and there are markets also in socialist countries. The criteria for socialism or capitalism are not that there are more markets or more plans but whether it is helpful to develop productivity, enhance the comprehensive national power, and improve living standards for the common people. In contrast with the traditional socialist theory that rejected commodity economy and market mechanism, the new theory of socialist market economy insisted on the coexistence of socialism and market economy because socialism has been redefined as

the grandiose schemes for developing productivity and getting rich, and market has been regarded as the mere means to organize and regulate economic relations. Deng Xiaoping's theory has been called Marxism of contemporary China, the latest product of applying Marxism to China's socialist practice.

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*See also* Communism; Marx, Karl; Socialism; Maoism

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## MASSES

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The concept of *masses* is intricately interwoven with the concept of *elites*. Both concepts were introduced into the social sciences during the period of industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. With the demise of feudal society, new social categories emerged that defied the traditional classifications of the old corporative state. Just as modern elites do not coincide with traditional aristocracies, *masses* do not coincide with the *third estate*. Neither was the Marxist concept of class appropriate for grasping the socially heterogeneous composition of mass electorates and social movements. In this entry, the origins of this concept, its major proponents and critics, the respective empirical evidence, and its contemporary relevance are discussed.

Social philosophers and social scientists writing about masses have mostly referred to their large numbers and their lack of structure. The rise of masses was seen as a consequence of industrialization and urbanization. The German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies argued that the increasing division of labor would replace primary interpersonal relations with indirect, secondary relations, thus leading to an erosion of the traditional social bonds of family, kinship, and neighborhood. This development is aptly captured by his dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Since that period was also one of mass political mobilization and the political enfranchisement of ever larger parts of the population, the concept of masses also played a role in the political debate about the effects of universal suffrage. Earlier critics such as Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville had primarily raised concerns that this might impair the quality of political leadership and governance. The classic elite theorists Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels instead argued that democratization, rather than increasing the political influence of ordinary citizens, would lead to a centralization of political power in the hands of a small elite. Mosca and Michels explained this with the inability of large groups to organize for effective political action and the personal and organizational advantages enjoyed by the elites. During the first half of the 20th century, the rise of communist and fascist totalitarian mass movements showed that some of the concerns raised by the older authors were not unfounded. However, when the success of representative democracy proved that most of their dire predictions did not materialize, the preoccupation with the presumed dangers of mass politics gradually subsided. Today, the term *masses* is mostly used interchangeably with *ordinary citizens*, *mass publics*, or *nonelites*.

In his 2002 book *Against the Masses*, Joseph Femia analyzed three major lines of reasoning against mass democracy:

1. The *perverse thesis* holds that democratization is not capable of achieving its main objective of transferring political power from a small aristocracy to the majority of the people but will instead achieve the opposite—namely, a centralization of power that makes popularly

elected elites even more dominant than the old aristocracy ever was.

2. The *futility thesis* emphasizes the inevitability of elite rule and argues that the natural inequality of human beings and the functional necessities of organizations will thwart any attempt to empower the masses.
3. The *jeopardy thesis* finally points to the conflict between democracy on one side and other important social values, in particular liberty, social cohesion, and economic development, on the other.

While the proponents of the futility thesis shared a pessimistic view of human nature and expected that both democratic elites and masses pursued particularistic interests, proponents of the perversity and jeopardy theses were critical of the political changes brought about by democratization. They believed in the superiority of the traditional republican model of government by a deliberative representative assembly elected by limited suffrage, whose members are primarily motivated by the intention to serve their country. They were therefore afraid that universal suffrage would require the formation of organized political parties and interest groups that would primarily pursue their particularistic interests. The observed shortcomings of representative democracy were thus compared with an idealized model of a predemocratic political order that had rarely existed in reality.

The critics of mass democracy also emphasized the inability of masses to understand the complexities of political life as well as their lack of motivation to devote much time to public affairs. They argued that the classic conception of democracy as self-government by the people made unrealistic assumptions about the masses. Joseph Schumpeter and others took up these arguments and developed a more realistic theory of representative democracy that acknowledges the limited political role of ordinary citizens and instead relies on competitive elections and institutional constraints for enforcing the political accountability of elected leaders. Under these relaxed assumptions, most of the problems predicted by the critics of mass democracy turned out to be much less severe in practice than in theory.

While the simple dichotomy of elites and masses made by the classics of elite theory has given way to more differentiated analyses that treat neither elites nor masses as unitary actors, three basic theoretical questions raised by these writers are of continuing relevance. These are the motivation and qualification of mass publics to participate in public affairs, their susceptibility to manipulation by elites, and finally the ways in which citizen demands are transmitted into the political decision-making process.

### Political Involvement and Political Beliefs

Michels and Schumpeter were the first to provide an in-depth analysis of the division of labor between politicians and ordinary citizens in representative democracies. They argued that the overwhelming majority of citizens are only marginally involved in political affairs. While Michels tried to demonstrate the existence of an *iron law of oligarchy* governing all organizational life, Schumpeter developed a new model of democracy as electoral competition among political parties, thereby attempting to reconcile democracy and elite rule. Both assumed a division of labor among voters and elected representatives, thereby claiming an active role for politicians in determining the political agenda and a largely passive role for citizens.

Public opinion research has confirmed that the number of citizens who are continually involved in public affairs is relatively small. Philip Converse and others have repeatedly claimed that only about 10% to 20% of citizens possess a high level of political sophistication. However, empirical research has also demonstrated the existence of a large degree of variation in political interest and involvement among citizens, ranging from the politically apathetic to well-informed political activists. It is, therefore, more appropriate to assume the existence of a hierarchy of political involvement rather than a dichotomy of political elites and mass publics. Finally, public opinion surveys in consolidated democracies have also provided evidence on differences in political values and beliefs between political elites and mass publics. While both elites and citizens overwhelmingly support fundamental principles of democracy—such as general elections and free speech—support for minority rights, civil liberties, limits on governmental power, or the

right of due process are much lower among mass publics than among elites. These differences are especially large where respondents are confronted with a choice between those rights and other highly valued political goals such as public safety or economic well-being. As noted by Ian McAllister (1991), the political issue attitudes of elites are finally more polarized, especially when they are related to the traditional cleavage lines of a party system.

Based on the limited support of mass publics for democratic values, some political scientists, most notably Herbert McClosky, concluded that mass political culture is of only minor relevance for the consolidation and sustenance of democracy. However, libertarian value orientations are considerably higher among the highly educated and politically involved. It would therefore be wrong to assume that only elites can be considered as the *carriers of the democratic creed*, as McClosky concluded. Rather than relying on the existence of elite competition as a sufficient barrier against nondemocratic tendencies, the role of active citizens as political watchdogs against elite transgressions should not be underestimated. They provide the crucial link between political leaders and passive citizens and are therefore indispensable for enforcing political accountability.

### Psychological Characteristics of Masses

Cultural critics have frequently emphasized that modernization inevitably leads to an erosion of traditional social bonds of family, kinship, ethnicity, castes, and so on and will ultimately result in an atomization of society. Gustave Le Bon's still popular work on the psychology of crowds is an example of the dangers such critics have associated with the twin developments of modernization and democratization. Le Bon claimed that crowds—understood as large gatherings of individuals—are susceptible to persuasion by political agitators and therefore prone to participating in political actions that their individual members would never consider for themselves. He emphasized their lack of critical judgment and their potential for irresponsible and destructive behavior.

Some of Le Bon's observations have been partly confirmed by social psychological experiments dealing with the phenomenon of *risky shift* in

group decision making; in other words, a tendency for groups to engage in riskier decisions than individuals. While there is solid empirical evidence that risky shifts do indeed occur, this is not necessarily the case. Based on a review of several decades of social psychological research, Daniel Isenberg concluded that group decisions are influenced by a variety of factors, of which the most important were the initial preferences of the group members, the plausibility of the arguments brought forward for different courses of action, and the social status of the individuals advocating different solutions. Risky shifts can, therefore, only be considered as a special case of *choice shifts* and are by no means the inevitable result of collective decision making.

Moreover, although collective violence by crowds (e.g., lynchings) and political riots are not uncommon, such incidents are nothing peculiar to modern societies. Le Bon's assumption that even mass electorates and parliaments are susceptible to crowdlike behavior is especially vastly overdrawn and cannot be sustained empirically. Electoral research has instead shown that voters are exposed to a variety of contradictory influences by primary and secondary groups as well as the mass media. Moreover, although the relevance of short-term factors has increased, social structural (social class, religion, ethnicity) and psychological (party identification) commitments continue to be relevant determinants of voting behavior. Le Bon did not adequately take into account the persistence of such particularistic loyalties and even less so the capacity of individuals to form independent opinions.

### Theories of Mass Society

In his 1959 book *The Politics of Mass Society*, William Kornhauser attempted to integrate the assumptions of aristocratic and democratic critics of modern society into a comprehensive theory of society. Based on their patterns of elite-mass relations, Kornhauser distinguished four ideal types of society: communal (traditional), pluralist, mass, and totalitarian. The bottom-up perspective involves the accessibility of elites for mass demands, the top-down perspective the availability of non-elites for elite domination and manipulation. This yields a fourfold table (Table 1).

**Table 1** Four Ideal Types of Society

Accessibility of Elites	Availability of Nonelites	
	Low	High
Low	Communal society	Totalitarian society
High	Pluralist society	Mass society

Source: Adapted from Kornhauser, W. (1959). *The politics of mass society* (p. 40). Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Kornhauser argued that pluralist society is characterized by a high degree of responsiveness of elites to citizen demands as well as a high degree of elite autonomy from public pressures. Citizen demands are transmitted into the political decision-making arena through a dense web of intermediary associations (political parties, labor unions, etc.) via institutionalized channels of interest articulation rather than through direct mass action. Mass society is instead characterized by a lack of voluntary associations, which implies that elite and nonelite interactions become precarious. Elites are put under undue pressure to accede to mass demands articulated by direct political action, while citizens become objects of elite manipulation. Although Kornhauser emphasized the distinction between mass society and totalitarian society, he argued that mass society is vulnerable to totalitarianism because atomized individuals have no means of influencing politics other than through participation in direct political action.

Kornhauser's theory is but one example of a long-standing tradition of theories emphasizing the crucial function of intermediary associations for societal integration, ranging from theories of pluralism to more recent approaches such as communitarianism or theories of civil society or social capital. Many of these writers have also warned of the dangers associated with the demise of intermediary organizations. However, such diagnoses have frequently been preoccupied with the decline of specific associational types, without considering that new types of organizations may already be on the rise and that, rather than leading to social atomization, the eclipse of traditional organizations may simply indicate their historical obsolescence. In this vein, the abolition of compulsory guild membership in West European countries

during the period of industrialization paved the way for the formation of a wealth of business and professional associations as well as labor unions. Moreover, the expansion of the suffrage in the 19th century required the formation of political parties as instruments for mobilizing political support among newly enfranchised voters. As pluralist theorists later showed, rather than becoming atomized, industrial societies were characterized by the existence of an intense network of intermediary associations. Likewise, preoccupation with the current decline in membership among traditional mass membership organizations such as political parties and labor unions tends to neglect or underestimate the rise of new types of associations (e.g., nongovernmental organizations, third-sector organizations) that may serve as functional equivalents. The fact that they are different does not necessarily imply that they are incapable of fulfilling the functions of their older counterparts.

#### Continued Relevance or Obsolescence of the Concept?

In emphasizing the inevitability of power and elites, the classic elite theorists replaced the dichotomous class model of Marxism by an equally crude dichotomy between elites and masses. Nevertheless, some of their insights are of continuing relevance and have contributed to the development of a revised model of democratic politics. Representative democracy has institutionalized a pluralist elite structure with competing political parties, thus enforcing political accountability of elected representatives. Likewise, nonelites are not necessarily tantamount to atomized masses. Modern democracies are instead characterized by the existence of a multitude of voluntary associations and private interest groups performing a crucial linkage function between elites and nonelites. While their leaders belong to the elites, they are internally stratified according to the degree of involvement of their members.

Moreover, empirical research has demonstrated that the assumption that mass electorates are characterized by low levels of political sophistication and involvement in public affairs and susceptibility to manipulation by populist elites grossly misrepresents the reality of modern democracies, even though most voters may not live up to the classic

ideal of citizenship. Simply comparing elites and masses therefore provides a simplified portrait of modern democracies that disregards the complex structure of both elites and mass publics.

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*See also* Civil Society; Communitarianism; Elites; Pluralism; Political Culture; Representation; Social Capital

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## MATCHING

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Matching is a statistical method that can be used to estimate quantities of interest that depend on missing, that is, unobserved, values of some variable  $Y$ . (As is made clear later in this entry, the variables with missing values in causal inference applications are subtly different from the *observed* outcome variable, which is commonly referred to as  $Y$ .) Schematically, matching works as follows. For each observation with a missing value of  $Y$ , find another observation that does not have a missing  $Y$  value but that is otherwise maximally similar to the initial observation in question. This

similar observation is said to match the observation with the missing  $Y$  value. Now use the observed  $Y$  value from the matched observation to fill in the missing  $Y$  value. Matching can be done by selecting matching observations with or without replacement from the original dataset. It is also possible to match many observations to a single missing observation, in which case the mean of  $Y$  from the matching observations is typically used to fill in the missing  $Y$  value.

Matching can be applied to a variety of missing data problems—from estimating the population mean of  $Y$  to estimating causal effects. Examples below make this clearer. Matching is not a panacea. Matching methods rely on assumptions that can only be tested given auxiliary data and/or assumptions. The key assumptions of *conditional ignorability* and *overlap* are discussed later in this entry. There are a wide variety of ways that matching can be implemented by. A discussion of particular matching methods and their statistical properties is beyond the scope of this entry.

### Examples

The easiest way to begin to understand how matching works is to walk through some relatively simple examples.

#### *Estimating a Population Mean*

Consider a situation where we are interested in estimating the fraction of Republicans in a population. We sample 20 individuals from this population and administer a face-to-face survey. The pollster records the respondent's gender (0 = *male*, 1 = *female*), race (0 = *nonwhite*, 1 = *white*), and partisanship (0 = *non-Republican*, 1 = *Republican*). All respondents report their gender and race accurately; however, some respondents do not report their partisanship. Respondents who report their partisanship will be called *reporters* and those who do not report their partisanship will be called *nonreporters*. These data are summarized in Table 1.

We would like to use our sample data to estimate the fraction of individuals in the population who self-identify as Republicans. The simplest way to do this is to take the sample average of the partisanship variable among the reporters. Doing so,



**Table 1** Hypothetical Missing Data Example in Which One-to-One Matching With Replacement Is Used to Estimate Average Partisanship

<i>Observation</i>	<i>True Partisanship</i>	<i>Observed Partisanship</i>	<i>Imputed Partisanship</i>	<i>Race</i>	<i>Gender</i>
1	0		0	0	0
2	0		0	0	0
3	0		0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	1	0
6	0		1	1	0
7	1	1	1	1	0
8	1	1	1	1	0
9	1		0	1	0
10	1		1	1	0
11	0		0	0	1
12	0		0	0	1
13	0	0	0	0	1
14	0		0	0	1
15	0	0	0	1	1
16	0	0	0	1	1
17	0		1	1	1
18	1	1	1	1	1
19	1	1	1	1	1
20	1		0	1	1
Average	0.35	0.44	0.35		

*Note:* Sample average of observed partisanship is not equal to the sample average of true partisanship because of missing data. Using matching to impute partisanship produces a sample average that is correct.

we would estimate that 44% of the population are Republican identifiers. Note that if individuals who are more likely to be Republicans answer the partisanship question more often, this simple approach will generally yield estimates of Republican partisanship that are falsely high. Looking at the true (but partially unobserved) partisanship of each individual in Table 1 and the associated sample average, we see that the simple approach of ignoring the missing data yields an estimate that is 9 percentage points too high.

While it is clearly not the case that the average partisanship of reporters and nonreporters is equal—hence the 9-percentage-point difference—if it is the case that (a) the distribution of reporters’

partisanship is equal to that of nonreporters *within each race-gender combination* and (b) each race-gender combination that has nonreporters also has at least one reporter, then one can use matching to produce better estimates of partisanship. Condition (a) is sometimes called the *conditional ignorability* assumption, and condition (b) is sometimes called the *overlap* assumption.

Looking at Table 1, we see that we do not observe the partisanship variable for Observation 1. The only observation that has the same race and gender values as Observation 1 and that has an observed partisanship value is Observation 4. We can thus match Observation 4 to Observation 1 to impute Observation 1’s partisanship. Observation 4

is also matched to Observations 2 and 3. A more interesting situation lies in how to deal with the missing partisanship of Observation 6. Here, three other observations—5, 7, and 8—have the same race and gender values as Observation 6. Here, we would randomly pick one of these three observations to be the match for Observation 6. Doing this, we pick Observation 8, which implies that the imputed partisanship for Observation 6 is 1. Note that while this is not equal to Observation 6's true partisanship, randomly choosing matches from among the observations with  $1 = \text{race}$  and  $0 = \text{gender}$  and observed partisanship will be correct in expectation because of the conditional ignorability assumption. Thus, while individual-level values may be incorrect, sample averages will be correct in expectation. Imputing data in this way is sometimes referred to as *hot-deck imputation*. We continue to impute the partisanship variable in this way until it is completely filled in. After doing this, we see that the sample average of the imputed partisanship variable is equal to the true sample average of 0.35. In actual applications, the average based on the imputed partisanship variable will only equal the true sample average in expectation.

### *Estimating Average Treatment Effects*

Most recent applications of matching in the social sciences have been within the context of estimating average treatment—that is, causal—effects. To see how matching works in such situations, we consider a simple example. Let  $X = 0, 1$  denote the treatment variable,  $Z1$  and  $Z2$  denote the measured confounders, and  $Y$  denotes the outcome variable. We are interested in the average treatment effect (ATE), that is, the difference between the average value of  $Y$  in a world where all units get treatment ( $X = 1$ ) and the average value of  $Y$  in a world where all units do not get treatment (control) ( $X = 0$ ). To formalize this, let  $Y(1)$  denote the  $Y$  value of a randomly chosen unit if it were assigned treatment ( $X = 1$ ) and let  $Y(0)$  denote the  $Y$  value of a randomly chosen unit if it were assigned to the control condition ( $X = 0$ ). The ATE is  $E[Y(1) - Y(0)] = E[Y(1)] - E[Y(0)]$ . In an abuse of notation, we will, at some point below, refer to the  $Y(0)$  and/or  $Y(1)$  values of a particular unit without subscripting the potential outcomes.

If one is willing to make assumptions that ensure that the potential outcomes  $Y(1)$  and  $Y(0)$  are well-defined, then the estimation of the ATE requires solving two missing data problems that are analogous to the simple example of estimating a population mean in the presence of missing values. Note that we need to estimate  $E[Y(1)]$  and  $E[Y(0)]$  where the expectations are taken over all units in the population. We get to observe  $Y(1)$  for units that received treatment but we do not get to observe  $Y(0)$  for these units. Conversely, we get to observe  $Y(0)$  for units that were in the control group, but we do not get to observe  $Y(1)$  for these units. Table 2 presents a simple data set that makes this clearer. Column (a) displays the true, but unobserved, potential outcomes for all units in the study. Here, we see that the average value of  $Y$  under treatment is 0.85 and the average value of  $Y$  under control conditions is 0.70. Thus, the true ATE in this sample is 0.15. Life is complicated because we do not get to observe all of the information in Column (a). Instead, we only get to observe the information in Column (b). Again, we can match units that have maximally similar values of the measured confounders— $Z1$  and  $Z2$ —to impute the missing values of  $Y(0)$  and  $Y(1)$ .

To see how this works, look at Unit 11, which, having received treatment, is missing its  $Y(0)$  value. Units 7, 8, 9, and 10 received control and have the same  $Z1$  and  $Z2$  values as Unit 11. They are thus potential matches. Half of these units have  $Y(0) = 0$  and half have  $Y(0) = 1$ . There should thus be a 50% chance that Unit 11's value of  $Y(0)$  is 0 and a 50% chance it is 1. Suppose we match Unit 11 to Unit 9. Then  $Y(0)$  for Unit 11 is 0. This is reported in Column (c). Again, note that this is not equal to Unit 11's true value of  $Y(0)$  that we see in Column (a). However, the 50% chance of being matched to a  $Y(0) = 0$  unit is correct for all units with  $X = 1$ ,  $Z1 = 0$ , and  $Z2 = 1$  (Units 11 and 12), which keeps the sample average of  $Y(0)$  among the  $Z1 = 0$ ,  $Z2 = 1$  units correct in expectation. Using this same sort of matching procedure to fill in the remaining missing  $Y(0)$  values and the missing  $Y(1)$  values, we arrive at the imputed potential outcomes in Column (c). Taking the averages of these variables and then taking the difference of the averages gives us an estimate of ATE that is in line with the true value reported in Column (a).

**Table 2** Hypothetical Causal Inference Example Where One-to-One Matching Is Used to Estimate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE)

Unit	(a)		(b)		(c)		X	Z1	Z2
	True Y(0)	True Y(1)	Observed Y(0)	Observed Y(1)	Imputed Y(0)	Imputed Y(1)			
1	0	1	0		0	0	0	0	0
2	1	0	1		1	1	0	0	0
3	1	0	1		1	0	0	0	0
4	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	0
5	1	0		0	1	0	1	0	0
6	0	1		1	0	1	1	0	0
7	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	1
8	1	1	1		1	1	0	0	1
9	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	1
10	1	1	1		1	1	0	0	1
11	1	1		1	0	1	1	0	1
12	0	1		1	1	1	1	0	1
13	1	1	1		1	1	0	1	1
14	1	1	1		1	1	0	1	1
15	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
16	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
17	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
18	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
19	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
20	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
Average	0.70	0.85	0.60	0.90	0.70	0.85			
Estimated ATE	0.15		0.30		0.15				

*Note:* Because units with  $Y(0) = 0$  are more likely to be assigned to the control group than the treatment group and units with  $Y(1) = 0$  are also more likely to be in the control rather than the treatment group, the estimate of ATE in Column (b) is incorrect. Imputing data via matching on Z1 and Z2 solves this problem in Column (c).

### Why Does Matching Work?

As noted above, standard matching methods rely on two important assumptions—conditional ignorability and overlap. Each is briefly discussed as follows.

#### *Understanding the Conditional Ignorability Assumption*

There are multiple versions of the conditional ignorability assumption. Here we will focus on a

fairly weak version—conditional mean ignorability—that is relatively easy to understand. Conditional mean ignorability states that, among observations with the same values of measured covariates, the mean of the missing  $Y$  values is the same as the mean of the observed  $Y$  values. In causal inference applications similar to that represented in Table 2, missingness is completely determined by the treatment assignment  $X$ . Thus, conditional mean ignorability also implies that, among units with the same values of measured covariates, the mean of

the potential outcome  $Y(1)$ —the value of  $Y$  under a *hypothetical* assignment of a unit to the treatment ( $X = 1$ ) condition—does not depend on whether a unit *actually* received treatment or control. The same is true for the mean of the potential outcome  $Y(0)$ . Assuming conditional mean ignorability allows one to estimate the mean of  $Y$  when some  $Y$  values are missing because it states exactly how the expected value of the missing data relates to observed values of  $Y$ .

### Understanding the Overlap Assumption

Of course, for a conditional ignorability assumption to be useful, it must be the case that observations exist with observed  $Y$  values that are appropriate matches for observations with missing  $Y$  values. The overlap assumption is a formal statement of this need for good matches. While the examples above make use of exact matches, it is not necessary to obtain exact matches for the matching to be effective. For instance, it is possible to eliminate bias by matching on a unidimensional summary of the relationship between measured covariates and the missingness pattern. In situations where overlap does not hold, it is common—especially in causal inference applications—to change the quantity of interest to one for which there is good overlap.

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See also Causality; Data, Missing; Selection Bias

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## MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD

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Maximum likelihood is a general method for estimating parameters in a statistical model. Given a known probability distribution  $Y$  with known probability density function (pdf), assume that we have a random sample,  $y_1, \dots, y_n$  from  $Y$ , where  $\theta$  is an unknown population parameter associated with  $Y$ . The likelihood function  $L(\theta)$  is the product of the pdf for each value evaluated on the  $n$  sample points:

$$\begin{aligned} L(\theta) &= f(y_1, \dots, y_n | \theta) = f(y_1)f(y_2) \cdots f(y_n) | \theta \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^n f(y_i | \theta). \end{aligned}$$

Maximum likelihood chooses the estimate of the parameter  $\theta$  that maximizes the likelihood of the observed data. Joint pdfs and likelihoods appear to be quite similar, but the two differ in an important respect. A joint pdf is a function of the data where the parameter is assumed to be known, while the likelihood is assumed to be a function of the unknown parameter  $\theta$  and not the data. The value of  $\theta$  that maximizes the likelihood function is the maximum likelihood estimate for  $\theta$ . Common estimators such as ordinary least squares and the sample mean and proportion are in fact maximum likelihood estimators. Maximum likelihood possesses a number of desirable properties that account for its widespread use in statistical estimation. Maximum likelihood is widely used in political science to estimate logit and probit models, count models, and event history or survival models among others. In this entry, the origins, properties, and possible applications of this method are discussed.

### Origins

R. A. Fisher invented the method of maximum likelihood in a series of papers published early in the 20th century. Fisher's work on maximum

likelihood began with his derivation of the principle of “absolute criterion” in a paper he published as a third-year undergraduate. While this paper contains the origins of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), there is little in the paper that many readers would recognize as MLE. In later papers, he developed the concept of likelihood as distinct from probability. Then, in 1922, Fisher united several earlier streams of his research and was the first to use the term *maximum likelihood* for a class of estimators as an alternative to Bayesian or method of moments estimators. In the same paper, Fisher proposes that maximum likelihood estimators have properties of efficiency, sufficiency, and consistency. Later work by other statisticians would establish the properties of MLE more rigorously.

A simple example is helpful for understanding the principles of MLE. Let us say we wish to estimate the sample proportion for a set of data. Assume we have a random sample of data  $y_1, \dots, y_n$  with  $n$  observations randomly drawn from a binomial distribution with common parameter  $p$ , where  $0 < p < 1$  and each  $y$  is either 1 for success or 0 for failure. For these  $n$  independent and identically distributed variables  $y_1, \dots, y_n$ , the density of each observation is

$$\binom{n}{k} p^k (1-p)^{n-k}.$$

We next write the likelihood function, which is the density evaluated at the data as a function of the parameter  $p$ . However, because the binomial coefficient does not depend on the parameter of interest,  $p$ , we can omit it from our derivation of the maximum likelihood estimator. The likelihood function is the product of the individual densities for each observed data point:

$$L(p) = P(Y_1 = y_1, Y_2 = y_2, \dots, Y_n = y_n) \quad (1)$$

$$= p^{y_1} (1-p)^{1-y_1} \times p^{y_2} (1-p)^{1-y_2} \\ \times \dots \times p^{y_n} (1-p)^{1-y_n} \quad (2)$$

$$= \prod_{i=1}^n p^{y_i} (1-p)^{1-y_i}. \quad (3)$$

Due to the independence of observations, we can write the likelihood as the product of the  $n$  binomial densities. The maximum likelihood

estimate for  $p$  is the value of  $p$  that maximizes this likelihood function. To find the maximum, we take the first derivative of the likelihood function, set the derivative equal to zero, and solve for  $p$ . It is often easier to work with the logarithm of the likelihood function. Since the likelihood function is a monotonic function, taking the log of it will not affect the estimate of  $p$ . The log-likelihood function takes the following form:

$$\ln L(p) = \sum_{i=1}^n y \ln p + n - \sum_{i=1}^n y \ln(1-p).$$

Differentiating the log-likelihood with respect to  $p$  returns,

$$\frac{d}{dp} = \sum_{i=1}^n y \frac{1}{p} - n - \sum_{i=1}^n y \left( \frac{1}{1-p} \right).$$

We set the derivative of the log-likelihood equal to zero and solve:

$$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n y}{p} - \frac{n - \sum_{i=1}^n y}{1-p} = 0, \\ \hat{p} = \frac{\sum y_i}{n}.$$

The maximum likelihood estimate for  $p$  then is simply the proportion of successes we observe in the sample.

### Properties of Maximum Likelihood Estimators

Maximum likelihood estimators have a number of desirable properties. The properties were outlined by Fisher in an informal way but were not proven rigorously until later. The properties of maximum likelihood estimators require a set of regularity conditions.

These regularity conditions are as follows:

- The values of  $y$  for which  $f(y|\theta) > 0$  (i.e., the sample space) do not depend on  $\theta$ .
- $f(y|\theta)$  is twice differentiable with respect to  $\theta$ ,  $\forall \theta \in \Theta \subseteq R^k$ .
- The information matrix is positive definite and bounded.

- The first three partial derivatives of the likelihood function with respect to  $\theta$  are bounded, and the bounds on the third such derivative do not depend on  $\theta$ .

Subject to these regularity conditions, the properties of maximum likelihood estimators come in two forms: finite sample and asymptotic properties. The finite sample properties hold regardless of the sample size used for estimation. Asymptotic properties hold as the sample size increases. The finite sample properties of maximum likelihood estimators are the following:

- Maximum likelihood estimators are invariant to reparameterization. The invariance property ensures that the MLEs for  $\sigma^2$  are equal to the square root of the MLE for  $\sigma$ .
- In a finite sample, if a minimum variance unbiased estimator (MVUE) exists, then the method of MLE chooses it. For an MVUE, its variance is said to equal the Cramer-Rao lower bound. For example let  $\hat{\theta}$  be an unbiased estimator. If it is an MVUE, the following will be true for its variance:

$$\text{Var}(\hat{\theta}) \geq \left\{ -nE \left[ \frac{\partial^2 \ln f(y, \theta)}{\partial^2 \theta^2} \right] \right\}^{-1}.$$

The asymptotic properties of the MLE are as follows:

- It is consistent; that is,  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} P(|\hat{\theta}_n - \theta| < \varepsilon) = 1, \forall \varepsilon > 0$ . In other words, the sampling distribution for the MLE of  $\hat{\theta}$  collapses to a spike at  $\theta$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ .
- It is asymptotically normal. The sampling distribution of  $\theta$  converges to the normal distribution as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ .
- It is asymptotically efficient. For large  $n$ , the standardized distribution of  $\hat{\theta}_n$  has variance equal to the Cramer-Rao lower bound. Therefore, the maximum likelihood estimator, compared with any other consistent and asymptotically normal estimator, has a smaller asymptotic variance.

As an example, let us return to the maximum likelihood estimator for the sample proportion. One can easily prove that it is an unbiased

estimator for the sample proportion. One might ask whether it is a minimum variance unbiased estimator. We need to compare the relevant quantity from the MLE for the proportion with the Cramer-Rao lower bound. The second derivative of the log-likelihood for the sample proportion is

$$\frac{\partial^2 \ln f(y, p)}{\partial^2 p} = -\frac{y}{p^2} - \frac{1-y}{(1-p)^2}.$$

The expected value of this second derivative is the following quantity:

$$E \left[ \frac{\partial^2 \ln L(p)}{\partial^2 p} \right] = -\frac{p}{p^2} - \frac{1-p}{(1-p)^2} = -\frac{1}{p(1-p)}.$$

We next take the inverse and multiplying by  $-n$ :

$$\frac{1}{-n \left[ -\frac{1}{p(1-p)} \right]} = \frac{p(1-p)}{n}.$$

This quantity is equal to the variance for maximum likelihood estimator for the sample proportion. Therefore the maximum likelihood estimator for the sample proportion is not only unbiased but no other estimator for the proportion has a smaller variance.

Other than ordinary least squares, which is a special case of maximum likelihood, no other estimator is more widely used in political science. MLE is especially important for the analysis of categorical variables. For example, vote outcomes are quite often measured with nominal variables that record which candidate or political party receives an individual's vote. Such variables are analyzed with models where maximum likelihood is the usual estimation method. Other types of political variables typically analyzed with models that use maximum likelihood for estimation are counts of political conflict, length of political conflict, duration of governments, and voter turnout among others. In almost every area of political science, analysts will encounter categorical variables that are often analyzed with models estimated by maximum likelihood. Even for analysts that embrace the Bayesian tradition, the likelihood function remains a critical part of their analyses. Maximum likelihood is also used for the

estimation of propensity scores, which are important for matching estimators.

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*See also* Event History Analysis; Hierarchical/Multilevel Models; Logit and Probit Analyses; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

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## MEASUREMENT

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Measurement may be defined as the process that connects theoretical concepts with empirical indicator(s) designed to represent those concepts. As such, it is vitally important to social science research. This entry presents the most important properties of measurement, validity, and reliability, in their various forms. In addition, measurement levels, scales, indices, and related statistical techniques are briefly discussed.

It has been argued that inadequate measurement, more than mistaken concepts or faulty hypotheses, has hindered progress in the social sciences. The sources of inadequate measurement are complex but may be rooted in an oft-cited definition of measurement. In 1951, Stanley Smith Stevens characterized measurement as assigning

numbers to objects or events according to particular rules. This is in itself an inadequate conceptualization of the process. It presents measurement as an empirical, almost mechanistic process that overlooks the important role of theory in social science research. Until researchers have worked through their measurement problems, they may not really have a theory capable of generating testable hypotheses. The difficult process of measuring theoretical concepts can make theories clearer, richer, and more subject to empirical investigation. A fuller and more appropriate definition of measurement, then, is the representation of abstract, theoretical concepts with concrete, empirical indicators. This is accomplished through the process of construct building by linking abstract, theoretical, and unobservable concepts with empirical indicators for which researchers have direct observations. This definition involves both theoretical and empirical considerations. Empirically, the focus is on the observable response—answers on a questionnaire, observed behavior in an experiment, material from an archive. Theoretically, the interest is in the underlying unobservable (and not directly measurable) concept that is used in the explanation of some social phenomenon and is represented by the response.

When the relationship between the theoretical concept and the observable response is strong, analysis of empirical indicators can lead to useful inferences about the relationships among the underlying concepts and a greater understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. When the relationship between concept and indicator is weak or faulty, analysis of the indicators leads to incorrect inferences and misleading conclusions concerning the underlying concepts. From this perspective, the auxiliary theory specifying the relationship between concepts and indicators is as important to social research as the substantive theory linking concepts to one another.

Measurement issues arise in many contexts within political science. For example, when respondents are asked in public opinion surveys which party or candidate they voted for in the previous election, questions of measurement are immediately apparent. Do some of the respondents who voted for the losing party or candidate systematically misremember and claim that they voted for the winner? If so, then, as we will see below, this evidence

would raise serious questions about the validity of recall questions that purport to measure previous voting behavior. Other measurement issues arise with instruments such as that used in the Polity Project, which codes the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis. Coders are instructed to assign yearly scores to all major, independent states in the global system, measuring features of these regimes such as constraints on executive authority, openness of political competition, and peaceful changes in government. Obviously, a crucial concern in this project is the degree to which different coders assign identical or widely different scores when evaluating these characteristics of these countries, an issue of reliability as we will also see below. These examples illustrate the ubiquitous nature of measurement in the social sciences generally and political science in particular.

### Properties of Measurement

There are two key properties of measurement: validity and reliability. Validity is the most important property of measurement. Validity focuses on whether a measure represents the phenomenon it is claimed to measure. This is fundamental to any inferences that can be drawn about the relationships between the theoretical concepts. If empirical indicators do not measure the theoretical concept at issue, it is not a valid measure of that concept and any inferences concerning the relationships between concepts will be problematic if not downright wrong.

Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials. It is concerned with the consistency of a measure over repeated observations. Reliability focuses on random error—all of the chance factors that confound the measurement of any phenomenon. If, on the one hand, an indicator is a reliable indicator of a theoretical concept, that indicator will produce consistent results on repeated observations because the random error is not great enough to cause notable fluctuation from one observation to the next. On the other hand, an unreliable indicator will produce inconsistent readings from one measurement to another. Thus, the greater the random error, the less reliable is the measure. For example, if an

automobile speedometer registers the speed of the car at 3 kilometers more than the true speed on Monday, 6 kilometers less than the true speed on Tuesday, and 10 kilometers more than the true speed on Wednesday, the readings of the car's speed are being affected by random error and the reliability of the speedometer is low.

There is a second basic type of error that affects empirical measurements: nonrandom error. Nonrandom error, or systematic error, has no effect on a measure's reliability. For example, if an automobile speedometer always registers the speed of the auto as 5 kilometers per hour more than the true speed, it is a reliable or consistent indicator. The error in this case is not random, indeed, it is quite nonrandom—it is consistently 5 kilometers per hour too high every time. In this case, the measure is perfectly *reliable*, but it is not a *valid* measure. It does not measure the true speed of the automobile. The scale does not measure what it is intended to measure.

### Validity

Validity is the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what it purports to measure rather than reflecting some other phenomenon, some source of nonrandom measurement error. The use to which one puts the test must always be considered when assessing validity. That is, an eye examination may be valid for determining the quality of one's vision, but it will not be valid at all for determining one's body temperature. Validity is always an argument between competing theoretical claims. Because of this, what is validated is not the instrument itself but the instrument in relation to the purpose for which it is being used.

There are several types of validity that are appropriate in social science research. Each takes a slightly different approach in assessing the degree to which a measure is valid. One may find references in the literature to internal validity, statistical validity, construct validity, convergent validity, discriminant validity, cross-validation, face validity, concurrent validity, external validity, content validity, sampling validity, criterion validity, predictive validity, and empirical validity. Some of these types of validity overlap. Face validity is sometimes discussed as a separate type of validity and sometimes as a subtype of content validity.



Some are the same only with different names, for example, criterion-related and empirical validity are used to mean the same thing. Some are used to denote subtypes of a main type of validity. For example, both concurrent validity and predictive validity are subtypes of criterion-related validity. Convergent validity, discriminant validity, and cross-validation are used to denote types of construct validity. This discussion presents the three most basic types of validity—content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity—and their relevance to social science.

But before discussing these three types of validity, we first need to consider the difference between internal and external validity. *Internal validity* concerns the extent to which causal inferences from a given set of cases are correct for those cases. In experimental research, the question of internal validity relates to whether the experimental treatment made a difference in this specific experimental instance. In nonexperimental research, the question focuses on whether the independent variable causes a given change in the dependent variable. In both types of research, the fundamental issue related to internal validity is whether there is a strong logical and empirical basis for establishing causal inferences. *External validity*, by contrast, focuses on generalizability—that is, the extent to which causal inferences about a given set of cases can be applied to other cases. External validity concerns what populations, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables the established causal inference apply to. From the perspective of this distinction, all the three types of validity discussed below relate to internal validity.

### *Content Validity*

Content validity focuses on the extent to which a particular empirical measure reflects a specific domain of content. That is, does the set of items adequately and comprehensively represent what it is supposed to measure? The items are said to be content valid if they reflect this full domain of content. For example, a driver's test that consisted only of right turns and excluded left turns, parking, stopping, and an understanding of traffic signals would not be content valid.

Obtaining content validity involves two interrelated steps. First, the researcher must be able to

specify the entire domain of content that is relevant to a particular measurement situation. In the example of the driver's test, everything that one needs to know to operate an automobile safely and legally is contained in the state's driver's manual. This is the domain. It is much more difficult to demarcate the full domain of social science concepts. Take, for example, the concept of democracy. Minimally, the researcher would need to include an indicator that represents free, fair, and competitive elections. But it might also need to include an indicator of a free press, which is often considered fundamental to democratic rule.

The second step involves selecting, or constructing, the specific items that are used in the measure. For example, a written driver's test contains a sample of items from the driver's manual. In this example, specification and selection procedures are relatively straightforward. This is more complex in the social sciences. Specification of the domain of content for abstract concepts such as ideology or alienation is a formidable task. One would begin by consulting the literature on the subject to come to an understanding of the concept. Once the researcher has a general understanding, the researcher would then construct items that reflect the meaning of particular aspects of the phenomenon under study. It is impossible to state a general rule for the number of items that should be included to represent any particular domain of content. It is always preferable to include too many indicators because deficient items can be dropped, while it is much harder (and sometimes impossible) to add new or better items at a later stage in the research.

Establishing a content-valid measure of a concept used in social science such as ideology or alienation is a very difficult task, much more complex than developing a content-valid measure of driving proficiency. When dealing with abstract concepts, it is difficult to establish the domain of content relevant to the phenomenon, as most theoretical concepts in the social sciences have not been described with the required exactness. Further, when measuring most concepts in the social sciences, it is impossible to sample content. A researcher chooses one or a set of items that are intended to reflect the content of a given theoretical concept. Without a random sampling of content, however, it is impossible to ensure the representativeness of the particular chosen items.

Thus, there are two fundamental limitations of content validity as applied to the social sciences. First, the domain of content must define the variable of interest. But as easy as this may be to achieve with regard to some tests, such as proficiency tests, it is extremely difficult to accomplish for more abstract phenomena that tend to characterize the social sciences. The second limitation of content validity is the lack of agreed-on criteria for determining the extent to which a measure has attained content validity. This leaves the researcher with the task of having to provide a plausible rationale for accepting his or her version of what constitutes the domain of content and for believing that the items included in the measure have been satisfactorily sampled. Because of these limitations, content validity is not a fully satisfactory means of assessing the validity of social science measures.

### *Criterion-Related Validity*

Criterion-related validity is a second type of validity, and it is more closely related to what is usually meant in everyday usage of the term. This type of validity concerns the correlation between a measure and some criterion variable of interest. Using criterion-related validity, one can validate a driver's test by demonstrating that the test is a good predictor of the ability of a well-defined group of subjects to drive a car. Criterion-related validity is fully determined by the degree of correspondence between the measure, or test, and its criterion. If the correlation is high, the measure is valid for that criterion. If the test does not correlate significantly with the criterion, it is not valid for that criterion and thus useless for that particular purpose. The higher the correlation, the more valid is a measure for a specific criterion. For criterion-related validity, this is all that matters. It is the only evidence that is relevant. It does not matter if the test makes no theoretical sense as a predictor of the criterion. If the accuracy of one's horseshoe pitching is found to be highly correlated with college success, then horseshoe pitching would be a valid measure for predicting success using criterion-related validity. There is also no single validity coefficient. There are as many coefficients as there are criteria for a particular measure.

Criterion-related validity can be differentiated into two types. If the criterion exists in the present, then one can assess concurrent validity by correlating the measure and the criterion at the same point in time. For example, a verbal report of voting behavior could be correlated with participation in an election, as revealed by official voting records. Predictive validity, by contrast, concerns a future criterion that is correlated with the relevant measure. Using the (formerly known as) Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) as a predictor of success in college is an example. Scores on the SAT could be correlated with a student's subsequent performance in college to demonstrate the predictive validity of the SAT. The logic of concurrent and predictive validity is the same. The only difference between them concerns the current or future existence of the criterion variable.

What is sometimes overlooked in assessing criterion-related validation procedures is that the scientific and practical utility of criterion validity depends as much on the measurement of the criterion as it does on the quality of the measuring instrument itself. For example, in many different types of training programs, much effort and expense goes into the development of a test for predicting who will benefit from the program in terms of subsequent job performance. However, the measurement of subsequent performance, the criterion, is often given very little attention. Job performance is very difficult to assess. Thus, those using criterion-related validation procedures should provide independent evidence of the extent to which the measurement of the criterion is valid. While criterion validation is intuitively appealing, it has a major limitation with regard to the social sciences. For many if not most measures in the social sciences, no relevant criterion variables exist. It is not clear, for example, what an appropriate criterion variable would be for political ideology. Thus, criterion-related validation has limited usefulness in the social sciences. Further, the more abstract the concept, the more difficult it is to find an appropriate criterion.

### *Construct Validity*

The third basic type of validity is construct validity. Construct validity is concerned with the relationship between the measure under consideration and theoretical expectations about that measure.

Construct validity is important when there is no universally agreed-on domain of content for the phenomenon under investigation and no relevant criteria for its assessment. This is the typical situation in the social sciences. Thus, construct validity is theory driven. Using theory, the researcher formulates theoretical predictions, types, directions, and degrees of relationship that are used to validate the construct empirically. If the empirically observed outcomes are predicted by the theory, then the measure is said to be construct valid. This type of validity is more pertinent in the social sciences than either criterion-related validity or content validity.

There are three distinct steps involved in construct validation. First, the theoretical relationship between the concepts themselves must be specified. Second, the empirical relationship between the measures of the concepts must be examined. Finally, the empirical evidence must be interpreted in terms of how it clarifies the construct validity of the particular measure. A researcher might specify that political ideology is related to social class, such that those respondents with lower social status would more likely be leftist in political orientation, whereas those with higher status would more likely be on the right. If income was employed as the measure of social status, and attitudes toward the government provision of health care were used as the measure of political ideology, then the researcher could calculate the relationship between these variables. If the correlation between these variables was statistically significant in the expected direction, then this correlation would constitute one piece of evidence supporting the construct validity of the measure of political ideology.

Thus, the fundamental feature of construct validation is theory. There must be a theoretical framework that is relevant to the concept or it will be impossible to validate the measure. Without this theoretical framework, it is impossible to generate theoretical predictions that, in turn, lead directly to empirical tests involving a measure of the concept. What is required, then, is that the researcher must be able to investigate several theoretically derived hypotheses involving the particular concept. Construct validity is not established by confirming a single prediction on different occasions or confirming many predictions in a single study. Instead, construct validation ideally

requires a pattern of consistent findings involving different researchers across different studies involving a variety of diverse but theoretically relevant variables. Only if and when these conditions are met can one speak with confidence about the construct validity of a particular measure.

A problem exists if the theoretically derived predictions and the empirical relationships are inconsistent with each other—that is, the evidence relevant to construct validity is negative. This negative evidence typically indicates that the measure lacks construct validity. That is, the indicator does not measure what it purports to measure—the construct of interest. The accumulation of negative evidence leads to the conclusion that the measure is not construct valid and should not be used as an empirical representation of that concept in future research. Previous research using that particular measure of the concept is also called into doubt. There are, however, other conclusions that are consistent with this sort of negative evidence. One could interpret it as meaning that the theoretical framework used to generate the empirical predictions is incorrect, that is, the theory is wrong. Another interpretation is that the statistical method or technique used to test the theoretically derived hypotheses is faulty or inappropriate or that the researcher could be using it incorrectly. Finally, negative evidence could be interpreted as being due to the lack of construct validity or the unreliability of some other variable(s) in the analysis. It is a very subtle point, but when one assesses the construct validity of the measure of interest, one is also evaluating simultaneously the construct validity of measures of other theoretical concepts. Thus, it could be the case that the construct validity of the measure is quite high, but the measure hypothesized to correlate with that measure is invalid.

There is no foolproof procedure for determining which one (or more) of these interpretations of negative evidence is correct in any given instance. The first interpretation, that the measure lacks construct validity, becomes increasingly compelling as grounds for accepting the other interpretations become untenable. To the extent possible, one should assess the construct validity of a particular measure in situations characterized by the use of strong theory, appropriate methodological procedures, and other well-measured variables. Only in these situations can one confidently

conclude that negative evidence is probably due to the absence of construct validity of a particular measure of a given theoretical concept. One can see from this discussion that construct validity is the most appropriate and generally applicable type of validity used to assess measures in the social sciences. The researcher can assess the construct validity of an empirical measurement if the measure can be placed in theoretical context. That is, this type of validity, unlike other types, focuses on the extent to which a measure performs in accordance with theoretical expectations.

## Reliability

### *Classical Test Theory*

Classical test theory is used to assess random measurement error. By determining the amount of random error, one can estimate reliability. Random error is present in any measure. Indeed, estimating random error and eliminating it to the extent possible is fundamental to measurement. In classical test theory, the observed score is equal to the true score that would be obtained if there were no measurement error, and a random error component, or

$$X = t + e,$$

where  $X$  is the observed score,  $t$  is the true score, and  $e$  is the random error component, or random disturbance.

The true score is the unobservable quantity that cannot be directly measured. Theoretically, it is the average that would be obtained if a phenomenon were measured repeatedly over an infinite number of times. The random error component, or random disturbance, indicates the differences between observed score and the true score. For example, an individual's observed score may be a little above the true score on one observation and a little below on another.

We make the following assumptions about measurement error (Frederic Lord & Melvin Novick, 1968, p. 36):

Assumption 1: The expected error score is zero,  $E(e) = 0$ .

Assumption 2: The correlation between the true score and errors is zero,  $\rho_{(t,e)} = 0$ .

Assumption 3: The correlation between the errors on one measurement and the true score on a second measurement is zero,  $\rho_{(e_1,t_2)} = 0$ .

Assumption 4: The correlation between the errors on distinct measurements is zero,  $\rho_{(e_1,e_2)} = 0$ .

Next, using these assumptions, we see that the expected value of the observed score is equal to the expected value of the true score:  $E(X) = E(t) + E(e)$ . And following Assumption 1, the expected value of  $e$  is zero or  $E(e) = 0$ , then,  $E(X) = E(t)$ .

This formula applies to repeated measurements of a single variable for a single person. But reliability refers to the consistency of repeated measurements across persons and not within a single person, and, therefore, we make a simple transformation. We rewrite the equation for the observed score so that it applies to the variance of the single observed score, true score, and random error:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(X) &= \text{Var}(t + e) = \text{Var}(t) \\ &\quad + 2\text{Cov}(t, e) + \text{Var}(e). \end{aligned}$$

Since Assumption 2 above states that the correlation between the true score and error is zero, then  $2\text{Cov}(t, e) = 0$ , and  $\text{Var}(x) = \text{Var}(t) + \text{Var}(e)$ .

So the observed score variance equals the sum of the true score variance and the random error score variance. To calculate reliability, we compute the ratio of the true score variance to the observed score variance:

$$\rho_x = \text{Var}(t)/\text{Var}(X).$$

Thus,  $\rho_x$ , is the reliability of  $X$  as a measure of  $T$ . Alternatively, reliability can be expressed in terms of the error variance:

$$\rho_x = 1 - [\text{Var}(e)/\text{Var}(X)] = \text{reliability}.$$

### *Parallel Measurements*

One estimate of a measure's reliability can be obtained by correlating parallel measurements. Two measurements are defined as parallel if they have identical true scores and equal variances. Thus,  $X$  and  $X'$  are parallel if  $X = t + e$  and  $X' = t + e'$  where  $\text{Var}(e) = \text{Var}(e')$  and  $t = t$ . Parallel measures are functions of the same true score

where the differences between these measures result from purely random error.

### Assessing Reliability

There are four basic methods for estimating the reliability of empirical measurements. These are the retest method, the alternative-form method, the split-halves method, and the internal consistency method.

#### Retest Method

Perhaps the most common method of assessing reliability is to correlate the same measures administered at different points in time. Figure 1 shows a representation of the retest method.


The equations for the tests at Times 1 and 2 can be written thus:

$$X_1 = X_t + e_1,$$

$$X_2 = X_t + e_2.$$

Since in parallel measures  $t = t$  and  $\text{Var}(e_1) = \text{Var}(e_2)$ , and by Assumption 3,  $\rho_{(e_1, e_2)} = 0$  and by Assumption 4,  $\rho_{(e_1, e_2)} = 0$ , it follows that  $\rho_x = \rho_{x_1, x_2}$ .

So reliability in this case is the correlation between the scores on the same test obtained at two points in time. If the retest reliability coefficient is exactly 1.0, the results on the two administrations of the test are the same. However, because there is almost always random measurement error, the correlations across time will not be perfect.



**Figure 1** A Representation of the Retest Method for Estimating Reliability

Although the test–retest method is a simple and intuitively appealing way to assess reliability, it has some serious problems and limitations. First, often researchers can obtain a measure of a given theoretical concept at only a single point in time. It may be too expensive or impractical to measure some phenomenon at multiple points. And if the test–retest correlations are low, it may not indicate unreliability but the possibility that, in the interim between tests, the theoretical concept of interest has undergone a fundamental change. Another problem that affects test–retest correlations and lowers reliability estimates is reactivity. Sometimes the very act of measuring a phenomenon can induce change in the phenomenon itself. A person may become sensitized to the concept being measured and may answer the question on the second administration of the test based only on the earlier measurement. Lowered reliability estimates are not the only effects. If the period between Time 1 and Time 2 is short enough, the participant may remember his or her answer at Time 1 and appear more consistent than the he or she actually is. These memory effects can inflate reliability estimates.

#### Alternative-Form Method

Another method for assessing reliability is used widely in education to estimate the reliability of all types of tests. It is called the alternative-form method and is similar to the retest method in that it requires administering a test to the same people at different points in time. The difference between this method and the retest method is that an alternative form of the same test is given on the second testing. The two forms of the same test are intended to measure the same theoretical concept. The two forms should not differ systematically from each other. Using random procedures to select items for the different forms of the test can ensure that this does not happen. In this case, the reliability is the correlation between the alternative forms of the test. The two forms should be administered about 2 weeks apart to allow for day-to-day fluctuations in the individual to occur.

The alternative-form method for assessing reliability is superior to the retest method because it reduces the extent to which an individual's memory can inflate the reliability estimate. Like the

retest method, the alternative-form method, when used at only two points in time, does not allow the researcher to distinguish true change from the unreliability of the measure. Therefore, the results of alternative-form reliability studies are easier to interpret if the phenomenon being measured is relatively enduring and not subject to rapid and radical alteration. A limitation of this method is the impracticality of designing alternative forms of measures that are truly parallel. This is easier to do in education where achievement tests are widely employed but much more difficult to accomplish in other social sciences where researchers typically focus on measuring abstract theoretical concepts.

#### Split-Halves Method

Reliability estimated by using the split-halves method, unlike the retest or alternative-form methods, can be conducted on only one occasion. The total set of items is divided in half, and the scores on the halves are correlated to yield an estimate of reliability. The halves can be considered approximations to alternative forms. The correlations between the two halves would be the reliability for each half of the test and not for the total test. To estimate the reliability of the entire test, we must estimate a statistical correction, called the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula. Since the total test is twice as long as each half, the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula is

$$\rho_{xx''} = \frac{2\rho_{xx'}}{1 + \rho_{xx'}}$$

where  $\rho_{xx''}$  is the reliability coefficient for the whole test and  $\rho_{xx'}$  is the split-half correlation.

The more general version of the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula is

$$\rho_{x_n x_n''} = N\rho_{xx'}/[1 + (N - 1)\rho_{xx'}].$$

This general formula gives the reliability of a scale that is  $N$  times longer than the original scale.

A researcher can also use this Spearman–Brown prophecy formula to determine the number of items that would be needed to attain a given reliability

and test length. To estimate the number of items required to obtain a particular reliability, one uses the following formula:

$$N = \rho_{xx''}(1 - \rho_{xx'})/\rho_{xx'}(1 - \rho_{xx''}),$$

where  $\rho_{xx''}$  = the desired reliability,  $\rho_{xx'}$  = the reliability of the existing test, and  $N$  = the number of times the test would be lengthened to obtain reliability of  $\rho_{xx''}$ .

There is some degree of indeterminacy in using the split-halves technique to estimate reliability due to the different ways that the items can be grouped into halves. The most typical way to divide the items is to place the even-numbered items in one group and the odd-numbered items in the other group. But other ways of partitioning the total item set are also used including separately scoring the first and second halves of the items and randomly dividing the items into two groups. For a 10-item scale, there are 126 different splits, and each will probably result in a slightly different correlation between the two halves, which will lead to a different reliability estimate. It is therefore possible to obtain different reliability estimates even if the same items are administered to the same individuals.

#### Internal Consistency Methods

The aforementioned methods of estimating reliability require either the splitting or repeating of measures and thus have distinct theoretical and practical limitations. An alternative approach to estimating reliability focuses on the internal consistency of measurements. The most popular of these coefficients for assessing internal consistency is Cronbach's alpha. Cronbach's alpha is equal to the average of all possible split-half correlations for a composite scale  $2N$  items long and is calculated from the variance–covariance matrix as follows:

$$\alpha = \frac{N}{N - 1} \left[ 1 - \frac{\sum \text{Var}(Y_i)}{\text{Var}_x} \right],$$

where  $N$  = the number of items,  $\sum \text{Var}(Y_i)$  = the sum of the item variances, and  $\text{VAR}_x$  = the variance of the total composite.

If one is using the correlation matrix rather than the variance–covariance matrix, the formula becomes

$$\alpha = \frac{a}{a-1} \left[ 1 - \frac{a}{a+2b} \right],$$

where  $a$  = the number of items in the composite and  $b$  = the sum of the correlations among the items.

Coefficient alpha thus depends on the number of items in the scale and the intercorrelations among those items. Generally speaking, longer scales with higher intercorrelations are more reliable than comparable scales composed of fewer items that are less highly intercorrelated. Alpha is a lower bound to the reliability of a scale of  $N$  items where each item contributes equally to the scale. Representing a lower bound, the reliability of the scale is always equal to or greater than alpha. It is equal to the reliability if the items are parallel. The reliability of a scale can never be lower than alpha even if the items depart substantially from being parallel measurements. Thus, alpha is a conservative estimate of reliability.

Cronbach's alpha is a generalization of Kuder and Richardson's procedure designed to estimate the reliability of scales composed of dichotomously scored items. These items are scored either zero or one depending on whether the individual possesses the particular characteristic of interest. Because Cronbach's alpha can handle multiply scored or dichotomously scored items, because it encompasses the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula, because it makes use of all of the information contained in the items, and because it is easy to compute, it has become widely used as a measure of reliability.

### *Correction for Attenuation*

No matter which specific method a researcher uses to compute an estimate of reliability, one of the estimate's most important uses is to "correct" correlations for unreliability due to random measurement error. If we can estimate the reliability of each variable, we can use these estimates to determine what the correlation between the two variables would be if they were perfectly reliable. This

process is called correction for attenuation. The formula for the correction for attenuation is

$$\rho_{x_i y_i} = \frac{\rho_{x_i y_j}}{\sqrt{\rho_{xx'} \rho_{yy'}}},$$

where  $\rho_{x_i y_i}$  = the correlation corrected for attenuation,  $\rho_{x_i y_j}$  = the observed correlation,  $\rho_{xx'}$  = the reliability of  $X$ ,  $\rho_{yy'}$  = the reliability of  $Y$ .

The resulting correlation—the observed correlation purged of random measurement error—might be thought of as the correlation between theoretical concepts that have been measured with perfect reliability.

### **Levels of Measurement**

Because of the fundamental importance of measurement in making inferences, drawing conclusions, and formulating hypotheses about theoretical concepts, it is essential to be as precise in our measurement of these concepts as possible. The statistical techniques that a researcher can use in a particular analysis depend on the level of precision at which variables are measured. More precise measures allow the researcher to use more sophisticated and rigorous statistical techniques and to have more confidence in the results. The precision of an indicator depends on the level at which it is measured. Stevens identified four levels into which we can classify measures. In order from least precise to most precise, they are nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Each level has particular characteristics that set it apart from the others. By determining the level of the measures available, a researcher can determine which statistical techniques are appropriate for the analysis and which are not.

A variable measured at the nominal level represents a typology in which the attributes of a variable are classified into various categories. The categories of a nominal variable are mutually exclusive and together they exhaust the possibilities—that is, there is one and only one category for every possible attribute. Thus, a grandparent can be classified as either a grandmother or grandfather. This is the least precise of the levels of measurement, and for that reason, the researcher is limited in the quantitative techniques applicable to those appropriate to variables measured by

unordered categories, for example, frequency distributions and determining the mode.

The next most precise level of measurement is at the ordinal level. Ordinal-level variables possess the characteristics of the nominal-level variables and add the property that the attributes can be ordered from less of an attribute to more of that attribute. More sophisticated statistical procedures can be used with variables measured at the ordinal level. Determining the median, percentiles, Spearman's rho, and gamma are examples of statistical techniques that can be applied to variables measured at the ordinal level.

In our hierarchy of measurement, the next step toward more precision is the interval level. In addition to having all of the characteristics of nominal- and ordinal-level variables, the intervals between each of the categories are equal. This was not a requirement of the ordinal level. To move up from nominal to ordinal, a variable's categories had to have a logical order, but the distances between those categories did not have to be equal. Now, to move from ordinal to interval, those intervals must be equal. Statistical techniques that are appropriate for variables measured at the interval level are very sophisticated and include adding, subtracting, and computing the mean, standard deviation, and Pearson's product moment correlation. Finally, the most precise level of measurement is the ratio level. It differs from the interval level in that a ratio level variable contains a natural zero point. Because of this zero point, we can express categories as ratios, for example, someone who is in a particular category has twice as much of the attribute as someone who falls into another category.

### Multiple-Indicator Measures

As we have said, measurement involves a process whereby abstract, theoretical concepts are represented by concrete, empirical indicators. These complex concepts are more appropriately measured by using a composite of multiple indicators rather than a single indicator. Estimating reliability using a single indicator is almost always impossible without having some a priori information that is usually unavailable. And even if the reliability of a single indicator can be estimated, it will usually be affected by random error more than a composite

and thus have a lower estimated reliability. Multiple-indicator measures, or multiple-item measures, are indices made up of more than one item. They are ubiquitous in the social sciences. They are used to measure attitudes, opinions, emotions, personality, and many other social science concepts.

There are many reasons why a composite measure is preferable to a single item. First, many of the theoretical concepts being measured are complex, broad, and abstract and, as a result, cannot be adequately represented by a single item. This is a question of validity as discussed earlier. Does the empirical measure actually provide an adequate representation of the theoretical concept? As a simple example, no one would argue that an individual true/false question on an American government examination is a valid measure of the degree of knowledge of American government possessed by a student. If several questions concerning the subject are summed, we get a better estimate of the student's understanding of American government. To take another example, a person's level of anxiety cannot be measured adequately by a single item in a clinical evaluation but is routinely done so with a battery of questions.

Another reason to use multiple-item measures is accuracy. Single items lack precision because they may not distinguish subtle distinctions of an attribute. If the item is dichotomous, it will only recognize two levels of the attribute. The final reason for using multiple-item measures is reliability. Single items include more random error than multiple-item measures because the latter allow random error to cancel out because of the multiple measurements. Because they are constructed of more than one indicator of a particular phenomenon, multiple-item measures increase the reliability of an empirical representation of a concept that would be attainable if single indicators were used in analysis. In other words, combining several individual items into a single multiple-item composite indicator will generally decrease random error.

### Scale

A scale is a composite measure used to measure some underlying concept. Many phenomena in social science are theoretical constructs that cannot be directly measured by a single variable. To understand the causes, effects, and implications of



these phenomena, the researcher must develop a valid and reliable empirical indicator of these concepts. This empirical indicator is called a scale. In this sense, the scale is composed of a set of measurable items that capture empirically the essential meaning of the theoretical construct. Good scales are data reduction devices that simplify the information and, in one composite measure, articulate the direction and intensity of the concept. They are usually constructed at the ordinal level of measurement, although some can be at the interval level. Because they are constructed of more than one indicator of a particular phenomenon, they increase both the reliability and validity that would be attainable if the individual indicators were used in analysis.

There are three related but distinct purposes for scaling. In the first case, scaling may be intended to test a specific hypothesis, for example, that a single dimension, party identification, structures voters' choice of presidential candidates. In this case, the scaling model is used as a criterion to evaluate the relative fit of a given set of observed data to a specific model. Another purpose for scaling is to describe a data structure. For example, a political scientist might use a scale to discover the underlying social, economic, and cultural dimensions of the U.S. electoral system. This would be an exploratory analysis rather than a hypothesis-testing approach. Finally, scaling can be used to construct a measure on which individuals can be placed and their scores related on that scale to other measures of interest.

There are several possible models that can be used to combine items into a scale. These include Likert scaling, Thurstone scaling, and Guttman scaling. The method chosen depends on the purpose that the scale is intended to serve. Scaling models may be used to scale persons, stimuli, or both persons and stimuli.

The Likert scale is a scaling model that scales only subjects. Broadly, any scale obtained by summing the response scores of its constituent items is called a Likert or summative scale or a linear composite. An examination in a mathematics class is an example of a linear composite. The scale (test) score is found by adding the number of correct answers to the individual items (questions). The composite score on the scale (test) is a better indicator of the student's knowledge of the material than is any single item (question).

Louis Thurstone's interest lay in measuring and comparing stimuli when there is no evident logical structure. The Thurstone scaling model is an attempt to identify an empirical structure among the stimuli. To do this Thurstone scaling uses human judgments. Individuals are given multiple statements, maybe as many as 100. These "judges" order the statements along an underlying dimension. Those statements that produce the most agreement among the judges are selected as the items to be included in the scale. These remaining items (approximately 20) should cover the entire latent continuum. These items are then presented to subjects who are asked to identify those that they accept or agree with. The average scale value of those items chosen represents the person's attitude toward the object in question.

A unidimensional structure exists in those situations where a single, fundamental dimension underlies a set of observations. Examples of this condition are measures used to evaluate the qualifications of political candidates, a scale of political activism, or a measure designed to describe a single personality trait. The presumption is that there is a single common dimension on which the candidates, or citizens, or personality traits are arrayed. Many theoretical constructs used in the social sciences are quite complex. A single, homogeneous, underlying dimension may not be adequate to express these complex concepts. This complexity may require us to turn to more elaborate explanations of the variables' behavior in which more than one latent dimension underlies a set of empirical observations. This is multidimensionality. The task of the researcher is to uncover these multiple dimensions. We hypothesize their existence because theory suggests that they should exist, or we can predict these latent dimensions because of the variation in the empirical observations at hand. Almost all hypotheses in the social sciences concern relationships between concepts. The more abstract these concepts, the more likely they are to be multidimensional.

Louis Guttman developed a method of scaling as an alternative to other scaling methods that did not account for the dimensionality of the phenomena being measured. Using this method, one can establish that a series of items belong on a specifically unidimensional continuum. Guttman's method

orders both items and subjects with regard to some underlying cumulative dimension according to intensity. Guttman scaling, also known as scalogram analysis and cumulative scaling, is cumulative in the sense that if the researcher knows that a respondent's score is, for example, 3, the researcher knows not only that the respondent answered three items "correctly" but also knows that the items answered "correctly" were Items 1, 2, and 3. A perfect Guttman scale is rarely achieved in practice; indeed, scalogram analysis anticipates that this ideal model will be violated. It then becomes a question of the degree of deviation that one is willing to tolerate before conceding that the empirical data cannot be adequately represented by a single quantitative variable on an underlying unidimensional continuum.

There are two principal methods used to determine this degree of deviation from the ideal: minimization of error proposed by Guttman and deviation from perfect reproducibility based on work by Allen Edwards. According to the minimization-of-error technique, the number of errors is the least number of positive responses that must be changed to negative or negative responses that must be changed to positive for the observed response to be transformed into an ideal response pattern. The method of deviation from perfect reproducibility begins with a perfect model and counts the number of responses that are inconsistent with that pattern. Error counting based on deviations from perfect reproducibility will result in more errors than the minimization-of-error technique. It provides an accurate description of the data based on scalogram theory and for this reason is superior to the minimization-of-error method.

While agreeing that the Guttman scale is intuitively appealing, Jum Nunnally argues that it is impractical for several reasons. First, because it is a deterministic model, having no measurement error, there are very few, if any, sets of items that fit the model's requirements. Second, the perfect pattern of responses is a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing a scale's unidimensionality and therefore the items may not all belong to the same factor. Moreover, the fewer the number of items in the scale, the easier it is to manipulate the model to get the proper pattern of responses. Finally, the goal of the Guttman model is to develop only ordinal, not interval, scales.

## Index

An index is a measure in which the researcher combines more than one indicator of some abstract theoretical concept into a single summary score. In this regard, a scale is a type of index. Often, researchers use the terms *index* and *scale* interchangeably. But whereas scales arrange individuals on the basis of patterns in the data, an index is typically simply an additive composite of several indicators, called items. Unlike a scale, there is no theoretical specification of a measurement model in the construction of an index. For this reason, scales are more difficult to construct. While indexes, or indices, may generally seem valid and reliable, because of the lack of an underlying measurement model, these properties are not usually examined in depth.

Further, an index may not be unidimensional. For example, political scientists use a 7-point index to measure party identification in the United States. This index is arranged along a continuum as follows: strong Democrat, weak Democrat, Independent leaning toward Democrat, Independent, Independent leaning toward Republican, weak Republican, strong Republican. One can easily see that this index consists of two separate dimensions. The first is a directional dimension, from Democrat through Independent to Republican. However, there also exists an intensity dimension, going from strong through weak, independent, weak, and back to strong.

Frequently, governments use indexes of official statistics to measure aspects of the country. For example, the consumer price index is used as a measure of the level of prices that consumers pay for goods and services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's crime index is the sum of the seven so-called index crime rates and is used as an indicator of overall crime in the United States. Another example is the Human Development Index compiled annually by the United Nations Development Programme, which combines rates of average life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy for all United Nations member states.

## Multidimensional Scaling

Scaling models may differ with regard to several characteristics—the purpose for which the scale is being used, the phenomena being scaled, whether

the model is deterministic or probabilistic, the type of data used, and whether the model is unidimensional or multidimensional. Dimensionality is a complex issue and can take on different meanings for different scaling models. A unidimensional scale is appropriate in those situations where there exists a single, fundamental dimension that underlies a set of observations. Examples could include a scale to evaluate the qualifications of political candidates or a scale designed to measure a single personality trait. The presumption is that there is a single common dimension on which the candidates or personality traits are arrayed.

Many theoretical concepts used in the social sciences, however, are quite complex and may not be amenable to being expressed on a simple, homogeneous, unidimensional scale. Multidimensional scaling models are used when more than one dimension underlies a set of observations. Multidimensional scaling techniques are mathematical methods used to model the similarity (or dissimilarity) of a set of data points to uncover the underlying structure of those data. The objects under study are placed on a “map,” a representation of the points in a spatial, or geometric, form simultaneously along more than one dimension, which can then be interpreted by the researcher.

In multidimensional scaling, respondents judge the similarity or difference among a set of stimuli. In that regard, this is an extension of the unidimensional scaling of stimuli represented by the Thurstone scale. A subject must compare stimuli and determine which are more similar to each other. If a researcher wanted to measure the weight of different objects but did not possess a scale, he or she could present pairs of the objects to respondents and ask which of the two is heavier, then compare the heavier with another object in the set and so on until all of the objects are arrayed from lightest to heaviest. Construction of a multidimensional scale may proceed in the same manner except that the subject would be asked to make the judgment of similarity but would not be presented with a dimension along which to order the objects. Thus, some subjects may array the objects along a dimension of weight, while others may group them on a dimension of size. Multidimensional scaling can be used when the researcher does not know the structure of the observations—that is, the underlying dimensions may be unknown. These methods

can also be used when the researcher has developed and then tests specific hypotheses about what dimensions underlie the data.

A related method used to uncover the underlying dimensions of data is factor analysis. Factor analysis focuses on the measurement of latent variables. The technique attempts to statistically reduce the number of variables to a minimum number of underlying dimensions (latent variables or factors) that underlie the covariation among the observed variables. Each observed variable is linked to one or more unobserved factor. These links are called factor loadings and can be thought of as a correlation between the observed variable and the unobserved factor. There are two types of factor analysis: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).

When a researcher has no (or not much) a priori knowledge of the latent factors underlying a set of variables, EFA can be used to uncover that structure. The correlation between each observed variable and each unobserved factor is estimated and the observed variables that have high loadings are said to define the latent variable. Using the factor loadings as weights, the researcher can construct measures of the latent variables and use them in subsequent analyses. CFA is an inferential process that can be used to test specific hypotheses about the latent factors underlying a set of observed variables. That is, based on theory or prior empirical study, the hypothesis may be that Variables 1, 2, and 3 define a factor, Factor 1, and Variables 4, 5, and 6 define a second factor, Factor 2. The adequacy of this model's representation of the observed data can be assessed by a variety of goodness-of-fit indexes.

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See also Measurement, Levels; Measurement, Scales; Statistics: Overview; Variables, Latent

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## MEASUREMENT, LEVELS

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In its basic form, research is about the relationships between concepts measured as variables. Researchers make inferences, draw conclusions, and form new hypotheses based on the patterns they detect in these relationships. It is important, therefore, for researchers to be as precise in their measurement of concepts as possible. The statistical techniques that can be applied to a set of variables are contingent on the level of precision at which the variables are measured. The more precise a measure, the more sophisticated statistical techniques can be employed in the analysis, and the stronger the conclusions that can be drawn. In this entry, the major levels of measurement, the appropriate statistical procedures

based on them, and a few concrete examples are discussed.

Measurement is usually discussed in terms of four levels, as stated by S. S. Stevens (1946). Moving from least precise to most precise, they are nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Nominal measures simply classify members based on particular attributes. These must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. For example, gender is a nominal variable. It is made up of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of (a) *male* and (b) *female* or (a) *female* and (b) *male* (neglecting other possible distinctions). It makes no difference how numbers are assigned to the categories because there is no judgment made as to how much of a variable is possessed by an attribute. That is, male is not higher than female, or vice versa. It is simply a way to categorize a sample or population, and neither male nor female possess more of the quality of gender than the other.

For instance, suppose we have a population in which everyone belongs to one of four religions: Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, or Protestantism. Then, religion is a variable—that is, it is mutually exclusive and exhaustive (at least with reference to our example population). Everyone is classified into one of the four categories. However, none is higher on the scale. *Protestant* is not more or less religious than any of the others, nor is *Catholic*, *Jewish*, or *Muslim*. The only quantitative techniques we can use with nominal variables are those based on the categories—that is, frequency distributions and the mode. We cannot perform statistical procedures—for instance, take a mean or find a standard deviation—using this variable. We cannot add or subtract them. Statistical procedures must turn these variables into binary (“dummy”) variables to be able to use them; this is discussed below. Many examples of nominal variables exist in social science, such as race, ethnicity, region, marital status, and occupation.

The next level of measurement is the ordinal level. Ordinal variables, like nominal variables, allow the researcher to classify attributes into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, but, unlike nominal variables, the attributes categorized in ordinal variables can be ordered so that they run from less of an attribute to more of that attribute. Big, bigger, biggest is an example of a logical order. Ordinal variables are quite common

in social sciences. Agree/disagree questions measure on an ordinal scale. For example, "The world is flat. Do you (a) strongly disagree, (b) disagree, (c) neutral, (d) agree, or (e) strongly agree?" This answering scheme produces an ordinal measure because there is a logical ordering from *strongly agree* (with the statement) to *strongly disagree*. A "feeling thermometer" is an ordinal variable. For example, on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being *very cold* and 100 being *very warm*, one can ask, "How do you feel about Barack Obama? John McCain?" Statistical measures that one can use when the variables are measured at the ordinal level are the median, percentiles, Spearman's rho, and gamma. Other examples of ordinal variables used in social science are variables with answer patterns running from like to dislike and variables measuring attitudes.

Moving up the continuum of levels of measurement, the third level of measurement is the interval level. Interval-level variables allow one to classify attributes into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, like nominal and ordinal levels. Like ordinal variables, they possess a natural order. But, now, the intervals between the ordered categories are equal. In the earlier example of the variables with the categories, *strongly agree* through *strongly disagree*, the distances between each of these categories are not equal; indeed, they are not even known. One respondent may interpret them as equal, while another may interpret the distance between *strongly agree* and *agree* to be shorter than the distance between *agree* and *neutral*, or vice versa. There is no way to know. All that is known is that this is the order of the responses. If a variable is measured at the interval level, the distances are all equal. The usual example given of an interval variable is temperature. Every degree is equal to every other degree. For example, 30 degrees is 10 degrees colder than 40 degrees, and 80 degrees is 10 degrees colder than 90 degrees. Because of this property, the statistical techniques that can be used on variables measured at the interval level are some of the most sophisticated known. Analysts can add and subtract, determine the mean and standard deviation, and compute a Pearson's product-moment correlation or regression coefficient.

The property that interval-level measures lack is a natural zero point, or origin. Temperature, which we have already classified as an interval

scale, has a zero point—on the Celsius scale, it is the freezing point of water; on the Fahrenheit scale, it is 32 degrees below the freezing point of water. The fact that there are two scales with different points labeled 0 is illustrative of why temperature is not a ratio scale. Neither 0 degrees Celsius nor 0 degrees Fahrenheit means the absence of temperature. Zero in this case is simply an arbitrary point on the scale. We can measure temperature below zero. What matters in this case is the interval. Each interval is the same size. That is, any interval (degree) on the Fahrenheit scale is equal to every other interval (degree) on the Fahrenheit scale, and any interval on the Celsius scale is equal to every other interval on the Celsius scale. Of course, an interval on the Fahrenheit scale is not equal to an interval on the Celsius scale. But, a reading of 10 degrees on a Fahrenheit or Celsius scale is not twice as much as 5 degrees or half as much as 20 degrees. One cannot say that when the temperature is 100 degrees, the temperature is twice the temperature as when the temperature is 50 degrees. In the big, bigger, biggest example, one cannot say that big is half as big as bigger. These comparisons make no sense because there is no zero and no starting point. Examples of interval-level variables in social science are standardized tests such as IQ (intelligence quotient) tests or SATs (formerly known as Scholastic Assessment Tests), crime rates, and voter turnout.

A true zero point allows researchers to form ratios, and this leads to the most sophisticated level of measurement of all, the ratio scale. The ratio scale is classificatory, the categories can be ordered, the intervals between categories are equal, and the scale has a natural, or true, zero. Using ratio-level variables one can form ratios—for example, the amount of money in my bank account is half as much as it was yesterday. It can be described this way only because there is a zero, a starting point. One can say that family income is 4 times what it was in 1970 or that A is twice as tall as B. Money, income, and height are examples of ratio variables. There are many examples of ratio-level variables in social science, such as the number of children one has, the number of times one has been married, the number of years of education that one has had, the number of times one attends church in a week, and the number of murders that have occurred in a particular jurisdiction

in a year. With ratio-level variables, analysts can use statistics such as the geometric mean and the coefficient of variation, a ratio itself.

When designing research, it is desirable for researchers to give much thought to the kinds of conclusions they would like to draw and how they want to state them. The way findings are presented is a result of the level of measurement at which researchers collect their data. If they intend to give broad, general conclusions, nominal variables may be acceptable. Usually, however, researchers want to give specific, precise statements of their findings. This will probably entail collecting their data at the highest possible level.

It is possible to aggregate a higher-level variable into a lower-level variable. For example, we could measure age by asking how old the respondent is in calendar years. This would be a ratio scale because it classifies orders with equal intervals and has at least a theoretical zero. In our analysis, we may group the years into several groups, for example, less than 18 years old, from 18 to 21 years old, from 22 to 25 years old, and so on up to more than 65 years old. This would be an ordinal variable—the first and last groups are not equal to the others. The ordinal level may be exactly what we want in this case. However, we may want to address another hypothesis using the original variable in years. This is the sort of question to be addressed before data collection begins. It is a simple matter to group calendar years into groups; however, it is impossible to disaggregate data into finer grained categories if the data have been collected in groups in the first place. A rule of thumb is to collect data in the most disaggregated form that time and budget will permit.

It is also possible to transform nominal variables into variables that can be used as interval variables. These are called dummy variables. Dummy variables are binary variables in that they have two categories—presence of the attribute and absence of the attribute. In the nominal variable discussed earlier, religion, we classified our population into four groups—Catholic, Jew, Muslim, and Protestant. As a nominal variable, we can show a frequency distribution or report a mode, but that is about all. If we transform the variable, we may be able to use the resulting dummies in higher level statistical techniques. In this case, we would create four dummies—one for each

category. Our original variable was mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so all respondents are in one and only one category. We compute a dummy variable for the Catholic group—1 if Catholic and 0 if not. We do the same for the other three categories. When the process is completed, we have created four new variables that tell us whether someone is Catholic (yes/no), Jewish (yes/no), Muslim (yes/no), or Protestant (yes/no). We can then use these dummy variables in statistical procedures such as multiple regression analysis.

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*See also* Measurement, Scales; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistics: Overview

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## MEASUREMENT, SCALES

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In the natural sciences, scaling is usually very precise, and a single measure is often sufficient to describe a dimension—for example, when measuring temperature in Celsius, weight in grams, or

distances in meters. In these cases, the assignment is quite simple: Distances can be measured by a ruler, temperature by a thermometer, and weight by a scale. The situation in economics is somewhat different. One of the most important indicators in international finance is the purchasing-power parity. The validity of this measure depends on the choice of an appropriate “basket” of consumer goods, which is not the same in all countries. In 1986, *The Economist* magazine introduced “Burgernomics” and has been publishing since then annually the prices of McDonald’s Big Mac hamburgers in different countries. The advantage of the Big Mac is that it is produced and consumed around the world; the unique basket consists of prices for beef, cheese, lettuce, onions, and bread—and since the recipe is the same worldwide, there are (almost) no differences in the share of these five ingredients among countries. Note that the one-dimensional Big Mac Index consists of several indicators that have different weights—there is, for example, a higher share of beef than onions in a hamburger.

In the social sciences, scaling is the process of measuring or ordering entities with respect to quantitative attributes. While natural scientists use instruments that are as precise as possible, social and political scientists use survey research methods such as face-to-face or telephone interviews to evaluate the attitudes and beliefs of the population. In the following, some examples from large data sets such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the World Value Surveys (WVS), and the American Nationwide Election Studies (ANES) are shown to illustrate problems of frequently used measurement scales such as Likert or Guttman scales.

Typical research questions include the discussion of latent variables (dimensions, factors) such as the level of national identity or the level of political efficacy and trust. The validity of the measures depends on the quality of the instruments: It is not possible to measure the correct length with a broken ruler, and it is not possible to measure true attitudes and beliefs with poorly worded questions. Starting with a single question, closest to a metric variable might be a feeling barometer that runs from 0 to 100. The ANES 2004 provides the following question: “Where on that thermometer would you rate George W. Bush?” The problem

with this kind of question is that respondents are not able to differentiate between values such as 43 and 44; most are not even able to differentiate between scores such as 62 and 76. An alternative is to reduce the scale to values between 0 and 10 or, for getting an easy-to-catch midpoint, to values between  $-5$  and  $5$ , as is done, for example, in the German Politbarometer. Although it is probably easier to respond to an 11-point scale than to a 101-point scale, it is still difficult to differentiate between categories such as 2 and 3.

While it is possible to evaluate political parties and politicians by a single question, for estimating the level of a complex phenomenon such as political trust and efficacy, one has to use a larger set of items. In the ISSP 2004, participants were asked to grade the following six statements on a 5-point scale running from *strongly agree* to *strongly disagree*:

1. People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.
2. I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think.
3. I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing [country].
4. I think most people in [country] are better informed about politics and government than I am.
5. Most of the time, we can trust people in government to do what is right.
6. Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally.

A first approach to analyze this kind of items has been formulated by Rensis Likert (1932); his ideas are known under the terms *summative scaling*, *Likert scaling*, and *technique of summated ratings*. They can be summarized in three steps: First, collecting a large set (approximately 100) of positively and negatively formulated items, which are possible indicators of the dimension of interest, say political efficacy and trust; all of them running from *strongly agree* to *strongly disagree*. Second, rating the items: Respondents in a sample that is representative of the target population have to rate how strong they are in favor (disfavor) of each statement. Then, items are selected by excluding

those to which very different respondents gave the same answers and those to which very similar respondents gave very different responses, only keeping the items that differentiate most clearly between the top and bottom quarter of the respondents. The set of remaining items, say 10, should have high item–total correlations, that is, high correlations with the sum score of all items, and high discrimination values. In the third step, these finally selected items are used in the main survey. The mean values of the item scores reflect the level of political efficacy and trust of each respondent. Note that values of negatively/positively formulated items have to be reversed so that high values always refer to a high/low level of political efficacy and trust.

There are several drawbacks to just adding the scores of such items. Let us take a 5-point scale running from 1 to 5, from *strongly agree* to *strongly disagree*. First, the extreme points, say means that are greater than 4.5 and smaller than 1.5, are relatively easy to reconstruct, while other values can be the result of very different responses; for example (considering two variables only), giving a 3 two times produces the same mean as 2 and 4, 4 and 2, 1 and 5, and 5 and 1—that is, very different answers result in the same scale values. Second, in case of 5-point items, the mean categories, often verbalized as “neither–nor,” have two meanings: On the one hand, they are used as real “neither–nor” and, on the other hand, as a substitute for “I don’t know” (Jörg Blasius & Victor Thiessen, 2001). Third, there may be respondent-specific answer formats: While some people use the extreme categories quite often, others are more careful, for example, using *agree* more often than *strongly agree*. Fourth, all items have the same weight, for example, all items determine the latent variable to the same degree. All these problems are well known; applying principal component analysis (PCA) provides different values for the items and solves the fourth problem. Even better is applying categorical PCA, which provides different weights for the single-item categories, solving the first problem at least partly. For solving the second and third problem, dichotomized items are often used—with the drawback of receiving less information from the single indicators.

Before discussing dichotomous items, we introduce ordinal variables with categories that are not in symmetric order: for example,

There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. I am going to read you a short list of opinions. Please tell me which one of the opinions best agrees with your view? . . . :

1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger.
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. (ANES, 2004, <http://www.electionstudies.org>)

In this example, there is an implicit order of responses, but it includes four categories only. Considering an additional response such as “the law should permit abortion in cases when the child’s life is in danger” would pose the problem where to place it—between Categories 2 and 3 or between Categories 3 and 4? Another frequently discussed example is religious beliefs; here, as an example, are seven items from the WVS 1996 to which respondents could either agree or disagree: (1) Do you believe in God? (2) Do you believe people have a soul? (3) Do you believe in sin? (4) Do you believe in life after death? (5) Do you believe in heaven? (6) Do you believe the Devil exists? (7) Do you believe in hell?

In the 1940s, Louis Guttman (1944, 1950) developed a method based on a set of dichotomous variables as the one above, which is known as *scalogram analysis*, *cumulative scaling*, or *Guttman scaling*. His idea was to construct a set of items that has an inherent order, say, in religious beliefs. If the order of the items is perfect, every respondent should agree with the items as long as they are below their own level of difficulty. Thereby, difficulty is reflected by the share of agreements: The fewer agreements an item receives, the more difficult it is. With respect to the WVS 1996, Wijbrandt van Schuur and Jörg Blasius (2006) found for the Netherlands an empirical order of soul, God, sin, life after death, heaven, Devil, and hell; that is, it was most difficult for the respondents to believe in hell and easiest to believe in soul. In a perfect Guttman scale, nobody was expected, for example, to believe in God without believing in soul; and somebody who believes in hell should believe in all



the other religious items. The level of religious beliefs for all respondents is equal to their number of agreements, which are in case of a perfect Guttman scale the ranking places of their most difficult items. The measurement error of the scale is the share of misplaced zeros, for example, the share of neglected items between two accepted items.

The main problem of this scale is that all items receive the same weight; the respondent scores are equal to the number of agreements. An extension of this method is Rasch scaling where it is assumed that the items follow a probabilistic distribution instead of a deterministic one. In Rasch scaling, the distances between the items and their weights are not equal; they are estimated by using the logistic distribution.

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*See also* Interviewing; Measurement; Survey Research

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## MEDIA, ELECTRONIC

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The word *medium* denotes an intermediary agency that enables communication, by which is meant the production and transmission to other parties of messages, information, knowledge, discourses, and culture in the broad sense. Historically, the first electronic media—the telegraph and the telephone—arose at the height of the Industrial Revolution, together with the electrification that gradually came to replace steam power. These media had the capacity to restructure people’s perceptions of time and space. Electronic media today, in the fullest sense, are radio, television, and the so-called new media (in this entry designated as “online” media). These media have various features in common:

1. they transmit knowledge to a heterogeneous and potentially limitless audience,
2. they are typical products of late modernity,
3. they are important agents of socialization, and
4. they perform an essential role in democratic processes.

Only with the development of electronic media has it been possible to speak properly of the “rise of mass communication.” Communication media in early modernity disseminated knowledge, culture, and ideas—such as books, newspapers, the theatre, architecture, painting, and sculpture—but widespread illiteracy and generalized poverty prevented access to them for the bulk of the population. Although printing had been invented in the 15th century, books and newspapers could only find a “mass market” after political, social, and economic conditions had radically changed. Moreover, in the 20th century, cinema, radio, and then television also became more easily available and were associated with the leisure and entertainment that Europeans had attained through social struggles in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These characteristics ensured that mass media indeed became ubiquitous.

This entry first outlines the history of the electronic media, paying particular attention to the early development of radio, television, and the

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## MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION

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*See* Cross-Tabular Analysis

Internet. This is followed by a survey of some of the main theories espoused in research on mass communication—in particular, the mass communication research derived from studies on political communication conducted in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s and media studies in Great Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. Next, the role of the electronic media in the political dynamics of contemporary democracies is analyzed. This topic will be addressed from two points of view: The first concerns the influence and impact of electronic media on political attitudes and behavior—an issue explored by the first analyses in communication research and even today one of its main fields of inquiry. The second aspect deals with the effects of the electronic media on the political system, which are commonly identified with the “mediatization of politics.”

### The Rise of Electronic Media

#### Radio

From a technological point of view, the radio evolved out of the telegraph and the telephone. A decisive advance in the development of the radio as we know it today occurred in June 1896, when Guglielmo Marconi presented in Great Britain the progress achieved in the study of electromagnetic waves for the production, transmission, and reception of acoustic signals. The subsequent evolution of applied studies on radio broadcasting led to the medium's first application in business and public administration and subsequently to its use for military communications during World War I. The radio gradually entered private homes from the 1920s onward, first in the United States and then in Great Britain and the Netherlands. Beginning with the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) in 1922, followed by the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) in 1925 and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) in 1927, the institutionalization of companies able to organize and produce programs for a broad public transformed radio broadcasting into a full-fledged form of mass communication.

Political powers understood the potential of radio as early as the 1930s; from that period until the outbreak of World War II, the radio became a powerful instrument with which to manipulate the mass public. In that decade, in fact, authoritarian

regimes in Europe controlled and used radio broadcasting for the purposes of propaganda. The Soviet Union was the first regime to exploit the radio systematically so that its voice could penetrate homes in even the remotest regions. The same propaganda system was adopted in Nazi Germany, where Joseph Goebbels played a decisive role in its development, first as chief of Nazi propaganda and then as Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (*Volksaufklärung*). In fascist Italy, too, the radio became the voice of the regime, first with the creation of a central body for the control of information and propaganda and then with government measures to increase collective radio listening in public places. The radio was given the delegated power of amplification and persuasion. In democratic countries, American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt used the radio to deliver his “fireside chats”: talks that were broadcast every week throughout the country and in which Roosevelt directly addressed American citizens, his purpose also being to create and strengthen a favorable climate of public opinion during the Depression and subsequently to boost the nation's morale during World War II. From the end of the 1960s onward, radio lost its position as the principal mass medium as a result of the diffusion of television.

The massive use of radio in homes and public places, the growth of the organizations that produced its programs, and its use for political propaganda purposes also aroused strong interest among academic researchers. It was mainly in U.S. communication research that the first pioneering studies on radio were conducted, with the focus, in particular, on the effects produced on the audience. The political scientist Harold D. Lasswell also concentrated on the content of messages by analyzing key symbols in Radio Moscow's propaganda broadcasts. From a more sociological perspective, the social impact of radio broadcasting was studied as early as 1940. The Princeton Radio Project, for example, challenged beliefs concerning the medium's purportedly excessive power. These were market analyses of a quantitative type based mainly on opinion polls. One of the first and best known of these studies examined the public's reactions to Orson Welles's dramatization of *The War of the Worlds* broadcast as part of the CBS Mercury Theatre radio series. This program was

reported to have caused panic among its listeners, many of whom believed that the simulation of an invasion from Mars was real. However, research showed that these effects had been mediated by numerous other factors not dependent on the medium.

### *Television*

Like the radio, television as a means of communication first came into use in Great Britain and the United States and then spread through other European countries. The technological development of this medium is more difficult to reconstruct, because diverse research groups, countries, and companies already consolidated in other sectors (from photography to the cinema) contributed to its success. A decisive step in the diffusion of this new medium, with its combination of sounds and images, came during the mid-1930s in Great Britain, where this service began to be offered to a limited public and was resumed in 1946 after the interruption of World War II. In the meantime, television had also developed in the United States, where already in the early 1950s there were 10 million television sets in American homes. The linkage between radio and television services has been one of the distinctive features of the development of television. In fact, organizations such as the BBC in Great Britain, and CBS and NBC in the United States, have been the vehicles through which television has been strengthened, spread, and entrenched in the everyday habits of millions of consumers. In television's first decades of existence, while in the United States the development and production of television programs was immediately appropriated by the market, in Europe it was allocated to a public service: The organizations that produced and broadcasted programs were official institutions financed mainly by license fees. Only after the mid-1970s did private organizations in Europe, too, go into the business of television information and entertainment and obtained large market shares. In this way, the commercialization of television occurred, and advertising became the main source of financing. Some public service broadcasters also began to supplement their revenues by broadcasting commercial messages.

The advent of television brought about one of the greatest social, cultural, and political changes

of the 20th century. Academic studies on communication, which had already acquired strong legitimacy in pretelevision social research, were mobilized to examine the characteristics and effects of this change. The result was a large and diversified scientific output, with an abundance of theoretical perspectives and methodologies, as well as empirical data and interpretative paradigms. Now that television had grown into a global phenomenon, the study of mass communication became internationalized, and American communication research was supplemented by British media studies, French poststructuralist theories, and other, minor, schools of thought. In this period, moreover, media analysts began to examine the other actors involved in the communication process: not only the receiver but also the transmitter and the content that was transmitted. It was during the late 1970s and early 1980s that a large body of studies concerned with the routines and logics determining the production of information were conducted, which provided a detailed analysis of the content of television programs. As research extended to include the other components of the communication process, questions were raised as to the effect of television on its audience. The impact and ubiquity of the medium aroused fears that it influenced the public excessively in terms of voting behavior, consumption, lifestyle choices, and the construction of frames of meaning to interpret reality.

Not coincidentally, it was precisely in this period that "political communication"—a specific area of communication studies—acquired greater autonomy and further academic legitimacy, both in political science and sociology. The link between the development of electronic media and the practices of political communication has been well evidenced in the work of Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh, who have identified three phases in political communication since World War II. The first phase, which lasted until the 1950s, saw the dominance of the political scene by parties that fed on the social cleavages and dynamics typical of the reconstruction years. In that phase, political communication was subordinate to a system of institutions and solid political loyalties. Citizens responded to party-political communications by strengthening the opinions and attitudes already manifest in their strong political allegiances. The second phase, from the 1960s through the 1980s,

was marked by the spread of television. It was during this period that, albeit to a different extent in the existing democracies, traditional political loyalties increasingly faded. A weakening of the public's selection mechanisms exposed it to the messages of all political leaders, major and minor, whether during electoral campaigns or otherwise. Television, moreover, enabled politicians to reach sections of the electorate that had made scant use of the old media and had been consequently unaffected by party-political communication. Television formats and languages had an impact not only on the public but also on the time frames, languages, and forms of presentation of politics. The third phase began in the 1990s and, since then, has consisted of five main processes: (1) professionalization of the relationship with public opinion, (2) increased competition between media contents and political communication, (3) populism, (4) centrifugal communication, and (5) sporadic consumption of political communication. The growth and spread of online media, especially the Internet, have prompted academic studies to envisage the onset of a fourth phase of political communication, which is discussed in the following section.

In the second half of the 1990s, technological development also decisively altered the way in which television was conceived. The media scenario radically changed because traditional analogue terrestrial television was now supplemented by satellite and digital broadcasting. Today, digitization is having three major consequences: (1) growth in multimedia and convergent practices in production and consumption, (2) proliferation of mono/multimedia channels, and (3) the internationalization and globalization of content (with a small and well-identifiable group of media companies acting as global leaders).

### *The Internet*

The gestation and early development of the Internet were much slower than those of radio and television, but thereafter, technological progress meant that this new medium underwent rapid and tumultuous growth. It still harbors numerous surprises, especially in the applicative domain. The Internet came into being at the end of the 1950s, but for 20 years its use was restricted to military communications in the United States. During the

Cold War, the creation of the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) in 1958 to research and develop new technologies led to the setting up of Arpanet, a system that linked the agency's computers. With time, this network—which closely resembled telephony because it was designed for one-to-one communication, as opposed to the one-to-many system of radio and television—also created connections with civil and nonmilitary users (universities and research centers), giving rise to the network of networks today known as the Internet. The closure of Arpanet in 1989 enabled the expansion and commercialization of the Internet, so that users belonging to neither the armed forces nor research centers could access it. Thereafter, with the advent of the World Wide Web, the Internet underwent extremely rapid development, which definitively changed it from military to civil use and increasingly enlarged its boundaries. Since the 1990s, access to and use of the Internet has also been favored by technological upgrading. Greater speed of transmission and increased content have been followed by technologies that facilitate Internet access and connection (broadband, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth). These successive technological advances have given rise to phenomena that have radically changed not only Internet use but the entire media system as well. The process of multimedia convergence, which had already come about in television, was driven by the growth of quality and the contents transmissible via the Internet. Moreover, because of these technological changes, the use of the Internet is now becoming increasingly interactive.

Academic research in the field immediately grasped the importance of this new communication medium. But the interest of social research increased especially during the transition from the so-called Web 1.0 to the Web 2.0 and subsequently intensified with the further transition to Web 3.0. The term *Web 1.0* indicates merely passive use of the tool: access to use the contents offered by the Internet. *Web 2.0* denotes the evolution that led to greater interaction in the use of Internet content, with users being able to leave comments and provide feedback. The next development has been termed the *convergence culture* driven by the spread of Web logs (blogs) and the creation of social networks (Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, among others). Studies on the political implications

of these technological changes have suggested that a fourth phase of political communication can be added to the three already identified. This interpretation, however, is anything but unanimously held, and opinions have polarized between two extremes. On the one hand, there are those who maintain that this technological revolution is producing an electronic democracy in which grassroots practices create a public sphere in which citizens can advocate their own issues, build alternative frames for institutional political communication, mobilize public opinion on certain themes, and act as “watchdogs” on the public powers. On the other hand, there are those who argue that the development of the Internet and the opening of spaces in which users can express their opinions strengthens the power of those who already possess it, primarily because in this way disintermediation channels can be activated: Politics has preferential forms of communication with the electorate and can thus bypass mediation by the more traditional media (television and newspapers). The mass of content and opinions on the Internet makes it possible to monitor the mood of the electorate just as—and in certain cases better than—any type of quantitative survey can.

### Applied Research Versus Critical Theory

The principal theories employed in the study of media in general and the electronic media in particular—and especially their effects on the public—can be related to two particular periods: the 1940s onward with the development of the sociology of communication in the United States and the mid-1960s with the birth of “media studies” in Great Britain.

The first of these two periods was characterized by the distinction between “applied research” and “critical theory.” Applied research originated in U.S. communication research—which was the first of all contexts in which study began on the electronic media (which did not yet include television). As its founder Paul Lazarsfeld defined it, applied research was academic work in the service of external public or private customers, and it developed techniques to gather and analyze information on attitudes toward the mass media (especially radio, print media, and film). It is significant that the first research undertaken in this area started

from opposite questions and suggestions concerning the results obtained. During the 1940s, the electronic media were regarded as exercising an almost unlimited power over the public. The period between the two world wars, in fact, was dominated by an almost universal agreement as to the capacity of the media to exert influence. The literature that reconstructs the successive theories on media effects identifies this period as that of the “hypodermic needle” model: The media were viewed as needles able to penetrate directly the “skin” of their audiences. This theory—which had no specific founder but was more akin to a “mood” concerning how the mass public received and internalized media contents—was also partly motivated by the above-described intensive use made of the radio by the authoritarian regimes of Europe.

The applied strand of U.S. communication research has been distinguished by the work of the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University in New York—whence its name as the “Columbia school”—directed by Lazarsfeld. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between two different lines of inquiry, which collected complementary results but used different methodologies: the experimental psychology-based approach and the empirical sociology-based one. There were two main similarities between these two lines of inquiry: First, they were driven by a particular interest in how the media in general, and the electronic media in particular, operate during election campaigns (i.e., how they influence voters); second, both of them led to the definitive superseding of the behaviorist stimulus-response model typical of the hypodermic needle theory.

The experimental psychological approach must be considered as an autonomous sector of communication research. In this case, too, it was applied mainly in the area of political communication, where research showed that the audiences of the electronic and print media filter their contents selectively. This selectivity depends on several factors: the interest in acquiring information (indifference to certain themes creates impermeability to the messages received), selective exposure (the audience tends to expose itself to information congenial with its attitudes and to avoid messages that are not), selective perception (existing predispositions influence the way in which messages are

received), and selective retention (contents that match the audience's predispositions are remembered more easily). This type of inquiry did not focus solely on intermediary factors relative to the public; it also examined those relative to the message, seeking to understand the characteristics that a message must have to be effectively influential on its audience. The factors identified were, among others, the credibility of the communicator, the order of arguments (on some occasions the initial arguments are more effective and on others those expounded at the end are), the completeness of the overall argument, and the clarity of the conclusions. With the introduction of intermediary factors, therefore, it was established that the media constitute just one component of political persuasion and work in ways very different from that feared in keeping with the hypodermic needle theory.

The sociological approach definitively structured the history of communication research. The body of studies conducted in this area was, for the U.S. social and political context of the time, so exhaustive and convincing that in 1959 Bernard Berelson—one of the most prestigious members of the Columbia school, on par with Robert K. Merton and Elihu Katz—declared that analysis of media effects could be considered complete. This research had the merit of linking the processes of mass communication with the characteristics of the social context in which they occurred. For this reason, too, a further step forward was taken from the notion arising from psychological inquiry that the media are a source of persuasion. They, indeed, have an influence; but it is a limited influence always mediated by the context and the social relationships in which media users are embedded. The best known studies conducted by the Columbia school were *The People's Choice* (1944), *Voting* (1954), and *Personal Influence* (1955) (the first two dealt with communicative dynamics during the presidential election campaigns of 1940 and 1948, respectively). In the results of these studies, three theories embracing the sociological dimensions of the effects of media communication can be identified, which add to the *selectivity* of the psychological approach:

1. *Social determinism*: Social characteristics determine political preferences; voting is an individual behavior regulated by collective norms.
2. *The limited effect of election campaigns*: Change in voting intentions in response to messages received during the election campaign is restricted to a small group.
3. *Social influence*: Messages and ideas imparted by the mass media reach the "opinion leaders," who act as intermediaries for the less active members of the electorate.

In short, the media are dependent variables in the process of influence.

The first studies on television then, however, reversed this vision of the limited effects of the media. Using the theoretical framework developed within communication research, Jay G. Blumler and Denis McQuail studied the 1964 British election campaign, showing that voters/telev viewers did indeed expose themselves to messages to have their opinions confirmed. But, to a statistically very significant extent, they did so to know whom to vote for, to keep up with the campaign, and to gain an idea of how one party or the other was behaving.

The counterpoint to the empirical approach adopted by much U.S. research—and also typical of other schools, such as the "voting studies" carried out at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan—was critical theory. This theory, which sought to uncover power relations in cultural phenomena, is historically identified with the group of scholars at the Institut für Sozialforschung of Frankfurt—better known as the Frankfurt School—who greatly influenced culture and research in Europe and the United States. The advent of Nazism forced some members of the school to move to the United States, where they made contact with the Columbia school. A close intellectual relationship developed between Theodor Adorno and Paul Lazarsfeld, and they frequently engaged in joint research. The attention of the Frankfurt School in the United States at the New School of Social Research in New York shifted to the phenomenon of the "massification" of culture. The intention of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse was to bring social research back to a theory of society understood as a whole. They consequently criticized communication research for conducting what they regarded as spectral studies. They focused on the new dynamics characterizing society at that time: in particular the birth and growth of the culture industry, in which

the electronic media predominated. For the Frankfurt School, the mass market compelled standardization and uniformity: The tastes and needs of the public imposed stereotypes and poor quality. The logic of the production system that created and disseminated “mass culture” was that of ideological hegemony and manipulation of the public, which lost all its autonomy. The individual envisaged by critical theory was no longer able to select among media messages; rather, she or he was compelled to adjust uncritically to imposed values and consequently forced into a subordinate role.

Despite the numerous criticisms brought against critical theory—indeed, many of its contentions became obsolete owing to social changes and to other lines of inquiry—it had the merit of shifting the focus of attention among media analysts. Research no longer concentrated solely on media effects but extended its scope to include the role of the media in society. This approach was not new, however, for it had precedents in the U.S. functionalist branch of communication research developed by Merton in the 1960s, which originally sprang from the studies on the functions of the media conducted in the 1930s by Lasswell. The functionalist theory of the media had numerous proponents, and it had important consequences for communication studies. It showed that, although the media were not a sufficient cause for changes in people’s opinions and behavior, they nevertheless performed an important social role. One theoretical development that arose from this framework was the analysis conducted in the mid-1980s by Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz of “media events.” These are ceremonies (such as the Olympic Games or the Football World Cup) given solemn coverage by television and that interrupt normal schedules. The function of these important media events is ritual unification of the viewers’ experiences. They unite the individuals watching the event at home, so that the entire society is involved in a collective celebration. These events, therefore, affirm a shared identity.

The earlier hypotheses and suggestions concerning the strong influence of the media on their audiences had been abandoned in light of the findings of U.S. communication research. But they returned during the 1970s—by which time both the media and society had substantially changed. There were now two major differences: first, the apotheosis of television and second, the decline of the political

parties. Of particular interest are the two strands of analysis that addressed, with different outcomes, this changed situation. Both arose within British media studies during the 1970s: “cultural studies”—particularly the section devoted to audience studies—and the “political economy” of the media. Although these two strands sprang from a Marxist tradition, their respective research trajectories yielded very different results.

Starting from a more complex vision of the dynamics of mass communication, cultural studies analyzed a specific form of the social process: the one by which the public makes sense of reality through its use of media contents. The focus was, therefore, on shared social practices and on a common stock of meanings. It was assumed that the use of contents transmitted by the electronic media involved values, meanings, and practices and that the media were active elements in those constructs. Investigation was therefore made of the structures whereby the institutions of mass communication sustain and reproduce social and cultural stability. But for cultural studies, this process did not come about smoothly; rather, it was negotiated and contradictory because social and cultural stability had necessarily to adjust to constant conflicting pressures. Cultural studies developed in two different directions, analyzing, on the one hand, the production of media contents (paying special attention to news making and thus combining analysis of the electronic and the print media) and, on the other, media consumption as the locus of negotiation among diverse communicative practices. It was in the evolution of the latter research trajectory that, despite numerous differences in methodology and theory, the results matched those already obtained by U.S. communication research. Studies conducted in this area highlighted (a) the ambiguous and contradictory nature of media texts (especially televisual ones, although some studies also analyzed the cinema), which, although they are never completely overt, at least have a “structured polysemy,” and (b) the public reconceptualized as an active audience able to produce meanings through its use of media contents. These findings thus entailed a more cautious evaluation of the allegedly strong influence of the media.

The political economy theory was part of the “radical approach.” While cultural studies reevaluated the practices of the audience, the political

economy of the media scaled down the specificity of the cultural-ideological dimension. It regarded economic dynamics as furnishing the necessary explanation—in some cases sufficient—to understand the process of media effects. Here, the focus was on the *power* exerted by the owners of organizations on both the production process and consumers. This approach concentrated on two aspects in particular: ownership and the size of the market. The idea with regard to ownership was that the owners of communications media were able to control them, so that they also exerted strong influence on the public's habits and tastes. As regards the size of markets, the political economy approach highlighted the progressive concentration of the electronic media market, arguing that this diminished the plurality of supply. These economic variables, therefore, reduced the users of media content to subservience while strengthening the positions of those who already wielded power in society.

### Media and Political Behavior

As mentioned above, academic research on the media on the two sides of the Atlantic has often addressed themes and issues that concern the sphere of politics. Interest in the impact of the media with regard to the exercise of political power first arose when presidents and governments sought to know public opinion so that they could influence it or when political parties and candidates wanted to use the media effectively for propaganda purposes during election campaigns. Both the Columbia school and the field of voting studies investigated the role of not only the mass media but also social networks in the dynamics of influence on political attitudes, opinions, and behavior. This was the area of inquiry that analyzed the psychosocial effects of the media, as opposed to the systemic effects discussed below. Turning to the most recent period, that of the so-called third phase of political communication, the current state of scientific knowledge suggests that the least amount of influence attributable to the media is due to their being the principal sources of political knowledge and political information. However desirable it may be to reduce the influence of the media, it is indisputable that for citizens they are essential vehicles of knowledge about

political affairs. The media, in their twofold form as electronic and print media, often initiate processes of individual or interpersonal knowledge processing. Despite the massive growth of information and its delivery through new channels, to state that the media are the main sources of political knowledge is not to imply that the current phase of political communication has seen the advent of a rational citizen informed on all political facts. Numerous studies have shown that civic commitment in the mature democracies coincides with low knowledge gathering. The U.S. scholar Michael Schudson has introduced the notion of the "monitorial citizen." Such citizens are substantially uninterested in political information and action, they monitor events, and they mobilize when a problem of particular interest to them arises. The information used by monitorial citizens comes in small doses; it is the "soft news," which may be considered insufficient but is all that they feel they need.

With regard to political knowledge, a second level in the degree of influence exerted by the media is that at which they supply clues with which to interpret political reality. The media should not be considered merely as sources of knowledge and information but, on the contrary, as vehicles of meanings, emotions, and visions of the world. The frames through which the media treat events significantly influence people's attitudes, beliefs, and preferences. A third level is the one emphasized by the agenda-setting theory: The media are able to determine what people should know simply by giving coverage to some facts and ignoring others. The greater the exposure of the public to information, the more intense the agenda-setting effect becomes.

Studies more specifically concerned with the influence of the media on political behavior—be it participation or voting—can be divided between two opposing groups: those that are pessimistic and those that are optimistic. Lazarsfeld and Merton had already spoken in communication research of the "narcotizing effect" of the media. As already emphasized, their attitude toward the media did not consist of a preconceived and ideological aversion. Instead, their judgment arose from the observation that increasing doses of mass media content sap the energy that individuals reserve for active participation. These considerations still did



not take account of television, which would become a decisive factor—both in the United States and Europe—in reinvigorating the notion that the diffusion of the electronic media deflected political participation. It was Robert Putnam who argued that television privatizes civic activity and discourages social interaction and individual civic commitment.

Contrary to these pessimistic views are those that instead see the increased circulation of political information as an important stimulus to participation. This position has been bolstered by the spread of the online media and the consequent proliferation and fragmentation of information channels. The Internet, in fact, has on several occasions proved to be an important resource for mobilization, even on a global scale.

Research has not yet reached clear and firm conclusions with regard to media influence on voting choices. Although such influence cannot be ruled out, it is still difficult, if not impossible according to some authors, to produce clear-cut empirical evidence for it. The media share their influence with numerous other determinants of voting behavior, which international research has listed as follows: party identification, the positions of parties and candidates on issues, negative political preference, and the image of the party leader. In addition, this is connected with informal networks of social interaction.

A great deal of research has focused on television's influence on the outcomes of elections, but once again, the results have been contradictory because the forms of influence observed in one country are not directly applicable to others, given the differences in political culture, traditions of electoral behavior, media systems, and styles and habits of television consumption. Television certainly has a great capacity to shape visions of the world and therefore political opinions, but it is not clear whether this capacity operates in the brief period of an election campaign or in the long period of formation of political beliefs and attitudes. Sociological prudence à la Lazarsfeld requires distinctions to be drawn among these diverse effects according to the degrees of political conviction among citizen electors. The sections of the electorate that are either undecided or do not regularly consume television information seem more susceptible to the influence of television messages during election campaigns, while voters

with strong political allegiances are more resistant to the action of television. In short, television—like other media, electronic or otherwise—does not have magical powers that give omnipotence to those who use or control it—at least, not in a context of a healthy democracy and sufficient pluralism in information sources and media. In a situation where channels for the circulation of information and ideas proliferate by virtue of new technologies—digital television, satellite broadcasting, mobile telephony with its numerous and versatile uses, Internet applications (blogs, forums, social networks, and the like)—it is difficult to attribute influence precisely to any particular electronic medium. But what is certain is that all these media are today important tools of political communication.

### Media and the Political System

Although the media, and the electronic media in particular, have uncertain effects on the behavior of individuals, they have nonetheless produced significant changes in the political process. They have influenced political systems, the formation of leadership, and the ways in which politicians communicate to such an extent that it is difficult to describe the workings of a political system or the dynamics of a polity without considering their media-driven dimensions. Scientific analysis has highlighted what is termed the *mediatization of politics*, the contemporary process whereby public political action takes place within the media arena and that depends to a significant extent on the action of the media. The systemic perspective on the influence of the electronic media has generated a large body of studies mainly concerned with the effects of television. During the 1990s, fears were voiced that a “videocracy” was imminent—especially when the political success of the television mogul Silvio Berlusconi was analyzed. Among the theorists of this drift toward a videocracy is the leading Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori, who has argued that television has turned politics into a “videopolitics” that tends to replace, if not to destroy, the political parties, at least in their mass organized form. Videopolitics is, however, also an attitude: the “videodependency” of the political parties, which concern themselves increasingly less with genuine events and increasingly more with media events.

The effects exerted by the media on politics are generally grouped into two categories: media driven and political. The former concern the media aspects of political communication, the latter the nature and functions of the political system.

### *Media-Driven Effects*

For some years, research on the role of the media in civil society and politics has emphasized the changes that have taken place in political discourse and in the ways political messages are produced, expressed, and transmitted. Television especially, despite its control by certain governments (in Europe and elsewhere), has managed to exert influence on politics directly with more aggressive forms of investigative journalism and indirectly with the force of popular culture and the language of images.

Political actors have had to adjust to the invasive and uncontrollable presence of television. The predominant logic of this electronic medium is commercial: Television companies—including the public ones in Europe—respond to industrial imperatives in order to remain in the market. This means that they must cater to popular tastes and demands, producing political information intended to satisfy the needs of the audience rather than those of political leaders, or of a government. The scientific literature has often pointed to infotainment, “soft news,” “media populism,” and the popularization of politics (“pop politics”) as the responses by the televised representation of politics to the commercial logic of the electronic media.

There are three media-driven effects on political discourse. The first is the spectacularization of politics. Television has heightened the traditional tendency of politics to dramatization. Under its spotlights, political activity has come to lose its sacred aura and has been forced to adapt its traditional forms to the new languages and the new tastes of television. The rhetoric of mass mobilization has given way to the rhetoric of seduction. Today, no politician can communicate effectively without couching his or her message in the grammar of television. The spectacularization of political discourse is a circular process whereby the media dramatize politics, emphasizing its more marketable aspects, and the politicians—in search of consensus—obey the rules of the game by adopting communicative strategies that secure the attention of the media.

A second effect is that of “agenda shaping,” the ability of the media to select, and also to impose, the important issues in the public debate—those that politicians cannot ignore and on which they must take a stance. It is true, however, that not always and not everywhere are the media able to set the political agenda, for this depends on the type of power relations that exist between the political system and the information system. Where the relationship is that of subordination of the latter to the former, the agenda is more likely still firmly in the hands of the government and the parties.

The third media-driven effect in the relationship between media and politics is the fragmentation of political discourse. Television has reduced the public and political debate to its minimal terms, precisely because of the production constraints imposed by the media industry. American democracy of the mid-19th century was epitomized by the debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas. For the debate of August 21, 1858, the two contenders agreed that Douglas should first speak for an hour; Lincoln would then have an hour and a half to reply; and Douglas would finally have a further half hour to respond. This agreement was reached to drastically reduce the usual length of the debate! In the simultaneity offered by the electronic media, political discourse instead consists of sound bites and ready-made quotes perfectly suited to the urgent pace of television news or talk shows.

### *Political Effects*

As regards political effects, the most significant and evident of them in modern, and all the more so in postmodern, politics is the “personalization” or “individualization” of politics. As a medium that prefers to give faces to ideas and issues, television has changed the ways in which politics is conducted by politicians and perceived by citizens. The mediatization process has led to representation of the politician as no longer an exponent of a party or an ideology but as a person with his or her own personal, professional, and familial peculiarities. The private dimension is no longer disregarded by the media; rather, it forms a part, often a large one, of the narration of politics.

This effect cannot entirely be attributed to the electronic media alone. Personalization is also the result of the loss of centrality of party organizations.

The importance of *personae*—be they presidents, heads of government, leaders of parties, or election candidates—has increased in concomitance with the decline of the great ideologies and with the transformation of parties into electoral machines at the service of actions and programs linked with specific political personalities. The second political effect frequently reported by research on political communication is the personalization of leadership, which is often closely connected with the just discussed individualization of political representation. Democracy headed by a leader is the form best suited to modernization in the Western democracies, and especially to mass communication. The media, with their peculiar coverage of the political events and their celebrity-building processes, represent a crucial variable in the personalization of leadership that adds to the institutional variables (e.g., the constitutional order).

The third and final political effect of mediatization concerns the selection of political elites. As a result of the loss of importance by party organizations, the mechanisms for recruitment of the political class have been transferred from the party machines to agents external to the party-political system, which operate outside the control of the traditional party selectors. Often predominant among these external agents are the media, whose preference for telegenic personalities skilled in debate and with a ready wit has given rise to the so-called winnowing effect: the choice of candidates who perform best in the arenas constituted by the media. The news media seek to dramatize election campaigns, and they give intense coverage to the most mediagenic personalities, creating candidate-celebrities to the detriment of those left out of the spotlight. In this regard, the United States provides a good example of the power to select political elites exercised by the media in the political arena. This effect is becoming increasingly evident in other countries and political contexts as well.

### Conclusion

The electronic media, in their diverse forms as radio; television; terrestrial and satellite broadcasting networks, both analogue and digital; fiction; entertainment; journalism; online services; and systems of public and commercial media, are crucial determinants of modern and postmodern cultures

and societies, as well as important actors in political contexts and systems. The media–politics interaction characterizes political life, shapes the public debate, and conditions the actions of governments, leaders, parties, and movements. It is today impossible to imagine and study politics without considering the influence of the media and their contents on national political cultures and, in an increasingly globalized world, also on the policies and the communication strategies of the great international political actors. Since television's advent on the domestic and international political stage, it has often been (a) the co-protagonist, together with political actors of great historical events, from the Kennedy–Nixon debates to the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe; (b) the sometimes unwilling witness to dreadful events, from natural catastrophes to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; and (c) itself an agent of great and small changes, simply by being present in places and situations where it has conditioned the behavior of those using it as actors or spectators.

The current development of television, and the great popularity of the new interactive media with their constantly new technologies and modes of consumption, suggests that the electronic media will continue to be decisive actors in politics. In particular, the diffusive many-to-many nature of social networks resists attempts to control them by governments, especially those of an authoritarian and repressive type, and they can be viewed as vehicles for the democratic empowerment of citizens unimaginable in the age of one-to-many mass communication.

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*See also* Agenda Setting; Censorship; Information, Political; Leadership; Media, Print; Party Identification; Political Communication; Popular Culture; Public Opinion

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## MEDIA, PRINT

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The print media have long been key players in politics. Newspapers, periodicals, and individually produced publications engage the public and elites by providing information and analyses. In the process, they influence the decisions and perceptions of the entire range of political actors. The print media and their journalists and editors are engaged in all aspects of the political process, and the political institutions and players are occupied,

in different ways, in determining what appears in the media. The print media are also an economic force in societies, although they account for only a small percentage of media usage even in highly literate and wealthy countries. In this entry, their more general political impact and their role in different types of political systems are discussed.

The role of the print media in politics is determined by the political system in which they work, the initial ways in which the press worked in that system, the available technology, and the demographic and economic character of the state's population. That role has changed as new broadcasting technologies have developed. But the print media remain paramount in local news as well as in significant national discussions. They are also more likely than broadcast media to be focused on specific groups rather than aimed at a general audience. Within the print media, there are clear differences between media focused on drawing a mass readership and media aimed at the educated and the affluent. It is in the print media that the focus on the latter is most feasible and common, while the mass audience has shifted predominantly to television as its source of information and entertainment.

The print media, as they are traditionally known, normally consist of newspapers and periodicals, although other print media such as books and flyers also have played a role in politics. The traditional print media are produced by a staff of journalists and editors, who usually develop, edit, and place the articles on various issues in the publication and put it together. In addition, to reach a large audience, printing equipment and distribution channels are needed. To provide ongoing national and international information, most print media rely not only on their own staff but also on outside contributors and wire services, for instance, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) or Agence France Press, which are public, and private agencies such as Associated Press. The funding this requires ties the media to a sponsoring organization, to the state, or to private owners, to whom the print media are to give their profits. The simplicity of the production of the most basic print media also has allowed its use by opponents of a regime more readily than radio or television. Finally, in areas where the literacy level is low, print media are used to present images to the population and also as ways to increase literacy and, in turn, activate citizens.

The development of technology has been significant in the transformation of the print media in the political and social arena. Initially, getting information and then producing and distributing print media were very slow processes. As a result, they were used only for commercial purposes, to list the dates ships were due and their cargo, or to present ideas. After the telegraph was invented, the speed with which information could be transferred began to increase exponentially. Developments in photography and in printing technology also brought events and images to audiences increasingly rapidly and with greater emotional impact. Consequently, the role of the print media shifted from announcing what was planned to reporting on events that had happened and engaging people's interest.

Beginning after the 1920s (the "golden age" of the press in the United States), the development and increasing range of the broadcast media (radio and then television) resulted, over time, in a shift in the role of the print media away from being the prime source of information on events outside an individual's personal experiences. The pattern came to be that television news introduced and highlighted events and issues and the daily press and periodicals provided in-depth information. The print media became an agenda setter and a source of analysis. This function has been furthered by the ever-increasing speed and immediacy with which news can be reported on the broadcast media and by the development of the Internet and other technologies. In response, the print media first moved to provide both paper copies and Internet versions and then, to maintain readership levels that would bring in advertising revenues, shifted to continual updating of reports and analyses. Gradually, though, the print media, even in their online editions, have lost audiences and revenue as individuals and groups have been able to produce the news through blogs and special sites. This means that more information and opinion are not being filtered through professionals who are committed and have the resources to investigate and present a balanced analysis. Without the print media's editorial leadership, issues are increasingly presented on the Internet by unnamed or biased sources without market or professional controls on the accuracy of what is said or how it is presented. Unlike the print media, these broadcast and Internet sources reach across national boundaries

and can circulate far more rapidly while avoiding government control.

### Theories of the Relationship Between the Print Media and Government

The initial set of models of the relationship between the print media and government focused on the initial uses of the press by those in power. The models in Fred Seaton Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm's seminal 1963 work, *Four Theories of the Press*, were as follows:

1. the "authoritarian model" of the early European monarchies, in which the rulers controlled the print media to support and advance their policies;
2. the "libertarian model" of the American press and European democracies, in which the print media were a separate institution free from state influence and were engaged in informing and entertaining the public, with the profit-making incentive ensuring that the print media worked to provide "the truth";
3. the "social responsibility model" of the United States and European democracies in the 20th century, which includes all the roles of the "libertarian model" and in which the media deliberately serve as a forum for open discussions; and
4. the "Soviet-totalitarian model," in which the media were used by the rulers to mobilize and control their societies.

In the authoritarian model and the Soviet-totalitarian model, the print media are closely controlled and directed. In the libertarian and social responsibility models, the print media are self-directing, and "control" emerges through competition. Later theories of government-media relations have focused on the impact of the political processes themselves, how the print media influence politics, and the nature of the print media that emerges.

### Democratic Media Systems

Democratic media systems in the developed world differ in the nature of pluralism in the print media,

the role of the market versus the state in funding and directing the print media, and the nature of the journalism profession itself. The model developed by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini essentially divides the print media into three different categories:

1. In the Anglo-American “liberal model,” where there was early democratization and a more individualized system of representation, there is a long-established commercial press that seeks to appeal to the broadest audience by presenting neutral information oriented to the public interest. In this model, market mechanisms and commercial media dominate. Although party papers (those tied to a specific social or political group) are significant in Britain, most publications are deliberately less ideological in their coverage, often providing commentary across the political spectrum. In most cases, editorial opinion is distinct from news coverage. Journalism is highly professionalized and self-regulating.

2. In Central Europe and Scandinavia, where there was also early democratization, with a historic emphasis on consensus, pluralism, and social welfare, the “democratic corporatist model” holds. In this model, the print media have high circulations. Historically, particularly in the national press, party papers were strong; but there has also long been a more neutral commercial press. Journalists belong to powerful professional organizations. The state provides subsidies and regulates the work conditions for journalists. But freedom of the press is also well protected.

3. In France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the “politically pluralized model” holds. These states were marked by later democratization and strong roles for political parties, alternating with periods of authoritarianism. In this model, the print media have focused on the elites, not on mass circulation, and they are characterized by a high degree of political partisanship. Government intervention is greater, with press subsidies and periods of government censorship.

### Communist Media Systems

Communist media systems were based on the Leninist adage that the press should be a collective

organizer, agitator, and propagandist. Providing information and news was incidental to that role. These media systems were orchestrated, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the interests of the regime, by the Communist Party. In the Soviet and East European media systems, individual print media were aimed at specific audiences and interests. The themes to be covered were set out in advance by Communist Party authorities in both general and individual plans. They also controlled the resources, circulation, and coverage options of each publication. Reporting was to reflect positively on the system as a whole and also reveal individual problems. Control was exercised by the official censors’ review of what was to be printed; by the editors based on the directions they were given; or, after publication, by the Party’s press departments. Journalists sometimes used coded language to give more information or present a veiled critique. Readers also interpreted what was said in the print media by “reading between the lines” and looking for telling differences in what was said, as well as comparing what they read with what they experienced directly.

In times of weakness and division among the leadership, the print media have been the bellwether in these countries. Increasingly critical reporting and analyses, as well as different positions appearing in the press, signaled the possibility of more openness and triggered further public discussion. When the print media grew increasingly open and critical, there was increased dissension. By the end of the 1980s, the openness of the media and, in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, public action contributed to the dissension prior to the collapse of the communist systems. In the post-Stalin period, in some countries including the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, an independent *samizdat* (self-published) print media developed. While such publication and distribution of print materials without state approval was illegal and those involved were sanctioned, these materials provided an important outlet for the exchange of alternative views, information, and literature that could not be published in the legal media. They served as the central work of those opposed to the system.

The Chinese model under Mao Zedong was different from the Soviet model. It put even less emphasis on information and much more on the

press as a mobilizer. The traditional print media, in this period, had a far smaller role to play. Instead, banners, flyers, and publications of slogans and Maoist statements were considered important in stimulating people to get engaged in various campaigns and to attack the evils in the society as perceived by the regime.

In the transition from communism, the print media shifted to reporting the news and scandals not publishable earlier. There also remained a tendency on the part of journalists to try to direct people's thinking on political issues. Where separate parties emerged, they established their own print media organs. Where they did not, as in China, the media have diversified while remaining within the permissible boundaries. The journalism profession was also affected by the increasing financial pressures that came with privatization.

### Print Media in the Developing World

The print media play different roles in the developing nations, where wealth and literacy are more limited. They tend to be less significant for the vast majority of the population in these countries because of low literacy levels and the inability of people with marginal incomes to buy the published material. They also have tended to be weaker in their reporting and coverage simply because of the high cost of international or even national reporting. As a result, their political significance is limited largely to the educated classes and to government programs to educate the larger population.

### The Uses of the Print Media: Individuals, Elites, and Scholars

Research on the specific impact of the print media on political knowledge and behavior has been indicative rather than definitive. Those who use the print media tend to be more educated and affluent than television viewers. The influence of the print media on their attitudes and knowledge tends to be gradual and depends on their cognitive skills. In addition, research shows that individuals tend to expose themselves to media and subjects that reflect their preexisting beliefs. They interpret messages in a way that makes them consistent with those beliefs. And they are most likely to retain

information that fits with that belief set, often forgetting specific facts and remembering the broad principles. There is also some evidence that newspaper readers have higher levels of social capital than those not exposed to media reports. It also appears that regular exposure to negative reports about politicians and politics tend to result in more negative perceptions of politics and politicians than individuals would have otherwise.

The print media do play a major role in agenda setting by both politicians and the public. In evaluating what issues are politically salient, politicians often use highly respected print media not only to get their messages out but also to identify the people's concerns and make policy decisions based on them. Research also shows that the media's presentation of issues as social rather than personal, for example, unemployment, causes people to see their personal problems as larger societal problems. Finally, the context in which print media place an issue affects how seriously individuals consider the issue and how it is incorporated into their broader priorities and beliefs.

Exposure to any media gives individuals a greater sense of the world and their position in it. Although the print media were less easily accessible until they began to appear on the Internet, for the educated populace, the print media provide the most information and analysis. Exposure to international media, particularly broadcast media but also print, also allows people who do not have direct contact with the rest of the world to see how others live and make comparisons with their own lives. This can create a sense of relative deprivation, which stimulates popular demand for improvements in the system.

For scholars of politics, the print media are often the most accessible resource for looking at what has been said and how. Therefore, they are the most used source for research on what happened in a given case or what information people had access to at the time of a given political incident or on a given political topic.

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*See also* Censorship; Information, Political; Media, Electronic; Political Communication; Public Opinion

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## MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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The international environment of the 21st century, much more so than its predecessors, is experiencing conflict and violence both within states and between states. Such conflict is costly, destructive, and highly dangerous for individuals, communities, and regions of the world. In addition to conflicts between well-defined actors, other forms of violence (such as terrorism) and serious threats (such as environmental degradation) pose a major risk to the very viability of the international system. Clearly, these conflicts and issues have to be resolved. Mediation is fast becoming one of the most effective ways of responding to proliferating conflicts and the numerous threats that we face in international relations today.

The Charter of the United Nations (UN) is quite explicit on the diplomatic structures that can, and should, be used to deal with these problems. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter proscribes any form of violence and exhorts, "All member states shall settle their international disputes in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." The available methods of peaceful settlement of international conflicts are numerous and varied. They are listed in Article 33 of the UN Charter, which requests that

the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all,

seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice.

The UN Charter highlights three basic diplomatic structures to deal peacefully with international and other conflicts: (1) direct negotiation between parties to a conflict, (2) various forms of mediation, and (3) binding methods of third-party intervention (e.g., arbitration and adjudication). Each of these methods has its own characteristics, strengths, and disadvantages, and each has an important role in the practice of modern diplomacy. Whatever differences there may be between these methods, they all exemplify the peaceful nature of diplomacy and the desire to avoid the use of force. This entry discusses mediation, which is growing in popularity as a method for resolving such issues. Indeed, there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that mediation has been the most popular way of dealing with international conflicts since 1945. The following sections describe its unique features, explain what mediators actually do, and posit some conditions that may help or hinder the process of international mediation.

### Mediation: Definition and Features

For many years, the study of mediation has suffered from conceptual imprecision and a startling lack of information. Practitioners of mediation, formal or informal, in the domestic or international arena were keen to sustain its image as a mysterious practice, akin to some art form, taking place behind closed doors. Scholars of mediation, on the other hand, did not think their field of study was susceptible to a systematic analysis. In short, neither group believed that it could discern any pattern of behavior in mediation's various forms or that any generalizations could be made about the practice in general.

The prevalent agnosticism toward analysis and the desire to maintain the mystery and uniqueness of mediation acted like something of a ghost that haunted many scholars and practitioners for too long. There may be little consensus on how best to study or practice mediation. Mercifully, there is now a very broad agreement that this particular



ghost should be exorcised. Mediation can, should, and must be studied properly, and the lessons derived from such a study should serve as signposts in the quest for a better understanding of the process and more effective conflict management.

Etymologically, *mediation* comes from the Latin root for *to halve*, but different definitions of mediation purport to (a) capture the gist of what mediators do or hope to achieve, (b) distinguish between mediation and related processes of third-party intervention (i.e., arbitration), and (c) describe mediators' attributes. Some see mediation as purposeful action designed to remove any misunderstanding, others may see it as an extension of negotiation, and yet other scholars may prefer to emphasize the neutral and impartial nature of all mediators.

The many approaches to definition are simply indicative of the enormous scope of mediation. Mediation may take place in conflicts between states, within states, between groups of states or organizations, and between individuals. Mediators enter a conflict to help those involved achieve a better outcome than they would be able to achieve by themselves. Once involved in a conflict, mediators may use a wide variety of behaviors to achieve this objective. Some mediators make suggestions for a settlement, others refrain from doing so. Some mediators are interested in achieving a compromise, others are decidedly not. This is why a comprehensive definition of mediation is a prerequisite for understanding this complex reality. The following broad definition provides suitable criteria for inclusion (and exclusion) and serves as a basis for identifying differences and similarities. Mediation is here defined as a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.

This may be a broad definition, but it is one that can be generally and widely applied. It forces us to recognize, as surely we must, that any mediation situation comprises (a) parties in conflict, (b) a mediator, (c) a process of mediation, and (d) the context of mediation. All these elements are important in mediation. Together they determine its

nature, quality, and effectiveness, as well as why some mediation efforts succeed while others fail.

What, then, are the main features or characteristics of mediation across levels? A number of these are listed as follows:

- Mediation is an extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management.
- Mediation involves the intervention of an outsider—an individual, a group, or an organization—into a conflict between two or more states or other actors.
- Mediation is a noncoercive, nonviolent, and, ultimately, nonbinding form of intervention.
- Mediators enter a conflict, whether internal or international, to affect it, change it, resolve it, modify it, or influence it in some way.
- Mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators often have their own assumptions and agendas about the conflict in question.
- Mediation is a voluntary form of conflict management. The actors involved retain control over the outcome (if not always over the process) of their conflict, as well as the freedom to accept or reject mediation or mediators' proposals.
- Mediation operates on an ad hoc basis only.
- Mediation in international relations is particularly appropriate when a conflict is long-drawn-out and complex, when the parties' own efforts have failed or reached an impasse, and when both parties are prepared to cooperate to avoid further loss of life.

### Mediation Behavior

What is it that mediators do to achieve a cessation of violence and a political agreement? Considerable attention has been given to this subject, and it seems apt to suggest that in general mediators enter a conflict (whether they are invited or not) to change its structure, dynamics, and termination. They do so by first trying to understand the conflict (i.e., understand the issues involved, the history and causes of the conflict, and the parties involved in the conflict and their relationship); then arranging for some communication between the parties (directly or indirectly), establishing some protocol,

and delineating an agenda to discuss; and finally helping the parties save face by rewarding the concessions made by each party and recommending possible solutions. These types of behavior correspond roughly to three broad strategies that the literature suggests mediators may engage in—that is, facilitation-communication behavior, formulative behavior, and directive behavior.

As to the question of how involved a mediator can or should be, we can say that mediator behavior may range along a spectrum of increasing levels of intervention. In some cases, a mediator may engage only in facilitative behavior, while in others, a more radical intervention may be required if the parties are to be nudged from their inflexible positions. Thus, we may speak of a facilitative mediator, a formulative mediator, and a directive (or better still, a power) mediator, each of whom creates different circumstances and produces different outcomes.

The strategy mediators adopt, and the way they behave in each international conflict, is rarely random. Mediators do not just happen to choose a strategy. Mediator behavior is influenced by factors such as conflict intensity and fatalities (e.g., high-intensity conflicts may call for more active strategies), time pressure (when time is pressing, there is a higher need for more directive strategies), mediator rank (high-ranking mediators, such as heads of state, can use more resources and strategies), and previous relations between the parties (where parties have a history of friendly relations, facilitative strategies may be sufficient). The actual process of international mediation is one of reciprocal relationship between a mediator, the conflict itself, and the parties involved. At times, mediators can be quite active and use significant resources, at other times, all they can do is act as the go-between. Effective mediators know how best to identify actors in conflict, the nature of a conflict, which strategy to use, what resources to marshal, and just how much control to exercise over the parties.

Whichever strategy mediators use, their underlying objectives in any conflict are to change the following:

- a. the physical environment of conflict management (e.g., by maintaining secrecy or imposing time limits, as U.S. President Carter did at Camp David during Israeli–Palestinian negotiations);

- b. the perception of what is at stake (e.g., by structuring an agenda and/or identifying and packaging new issues); and
- c. the parties' motivation to reach a peaceful outcome by, for example, using subtle pressure.

Any international conflict presents opportunities for some form of mediation. To be effective, however, mediation strategies must reflect the reality of the conflict and the resources of the mediator. To that extent, international mediation is truly a contingent and reciprocal political activity. It depends on, and is shaped by, the parties, their conflict, and the conflict environment.

### **Success and Failure in International Mediation**

When is international mediation most likely to be successful? This is a question that practitioners and scholars have been asking for many years. Some guidelines may now be offered.

To be successful, international mediation must take place at the right, or the ripe, moment. By this we mean that a mediator must ensure that parties to a conflict are genuinely ready to tackle their conflict. This usually occurs when the parties find themselves in a situation that they both dislike and yet cannot escape from or when they recognize some opportunities for a mutually beneficial settlement. An experienced mediator can convince the parties that continuing to engage in violence will be futile and that the moment is ripe for resolution. The timing of mediation and a perception among the parties that opportunities may be lost if they fail to recognize their mutually hurting behavior is a crucial factor affecting mediation success in international relations.

Closely related to this is a strong and genuine motivation by each of the parties to engage in serious mediation. If the belligerents approach mediation merely in an attempt to buy time or forestall a possible defeat, then any mediation effort, whether undertaken by the UN or a state, will be doomed to failure. Mediation works best when both parties are willing, interested, and genuinely committed to the process. Here again, a mediator can create the conditions, in the early phases of a mediation, where both parties are optimistic about the process and truly committed to it.

Mediation also appears to work best in international relations where there are no major power disparities between the parties, when both states are small or medium powers (rather than superpowers), and when both states hold similar political values. Shared norms, political similarity, and relative equality in military and economic power enhance the likelihood of successful mediation.

In addition to these factors, we also note that certain kinds of mediators and mediator behavior are more likely to succeed. Although much is made of the potential of regional and international organizations, the reality is that the more successful mediators tend to be the larger states with more leverage and resources. Mediation is an attempt to change the parties' perception and/or behavior; hence, it stands to reason that more powerful countries, with more resources, prestige, and leverage possibilities, are more likely to succeed in this attempt. And, of course, related to that, we can see that mediators who can influence the parties through a wide range of interventions from the least directive to the most directive are the ones most likely to succeed.

Other factors may have an impact on the success or failure of international mediation (e.g., relationship between the parties, nature of conflict between them) and must be taken into account. What is important about international mediation is that it is part of the political process. It is a voluntary process, yet one in which states may use mediation as an extension of their foreign policy, or they may use it out of a genuinely altruistic desire to resolve a conflict. Whichever their motives, mediation is a powerful, important, and often successful tool in resolving international conflicts.

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*See also* Conflict Resolution; Conflicts; Negotiation; Peacekeeping; United Nations; War and Peace

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## MERCANTILISM

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The rise of early-modern states in the form of strong monarchies provided the historical context for economic writers who have been named *mercantilists*—members of a particular “mercantilism school” of political economy. Among them are writers between the late 16th and mid-18th centuries who published pamphlets and tracts on economic issues, especially regarding international trade, money, finance, and beneficial governance. They were state bureaucrats, merchants, and politicians from all over Europe, from Spain to northern Scandinavia, during the so-called early-modern period. They generally believed that economic wealth and income could be increased through the capture of foreign trade and commerce. Perhaps not all of them agreed that the creation of wealth was a zero-sum game, but many of them came quite close to believing so.

The concept of *système mercantile* was first used in print by the Marquis de Mirabeau in 1763. However, it was Adam Smith, who in his *Wealth of Nations* in 1776 called it the “mercantile system” and made it famous. Yet, to what extent mercantilism is really a “system” or “school” of economic thinking has been a hotly debated issue ever since. The bulk of what is commonly known as “mercantilist literature” appeared in Great Britain from the 1620s up until the middle of the 18th century. Perhaps the most well-known English mercantilists were Thomas Mun (1571–1641), writing in the 1620s, and James Steuart's (1713–1780) whose *Principles of Political Oeconomy* (1767) is regarded as perhaps the last major mercantilist

work. Other English economic writers regarded as belonging to the mercantilist school are Josiah Child (1630–1699), Charles Davenant (1656–1714), and Nicholas Barbon (1640–1698). According to the main inventor of the “mercantile system,” Adam Smith, the core of the “commercial” (mercantile) system consisted of the popular folly of confusing wealth with money. Hence, their suggestion that a country must export more than it imports leading to a net inflow of bullion, the “positive balance of trade” theory.

According to Smith, mercantilist theory and practice served as a cloak for a special interest that used the idea of a positive balance of trade to propagate a protective trade policy in general, including duties on imports, tariffs, and bounties. The mercantile system implied a giant conspiracy on the part of master manufacturers and merchants to skin the public and the consumers. From Smith onward, the view of the mercantile system as state dirigisme (particularly export and import protection) to support a special interest with the aid of the ideology of the positive balance of trade developed into its present status as the canonical interpretation of 17th- and 18th-century economic thinking and writing. David Hume had made his specie-flow theory public in 1750, arguing that the favorable-balance theory was an intellectual error (a net inflow of bullion must certainly mean a relative rise in prices, which, through the export and import mechanism, will tend to correct itself). Smith then drew the conclusion that the argument for protection and against free trade in general was based on a mere intellectual mistake.

Undoubtedly, the fixation of a mercantile system—or mercantilism—became an important part of the story that liberal political economy during the 19th century sought to explicate. Up until 1776—according to its stylized version—the thinking as well as the practical policy making of the 17th and 18th centuries was dominated by dirigiste and protectionist ideas. After this intervention by Smith, a new, more scientific version of economics developed that emphasized the role of the “invisible hand” and free trade as a motor of economic growth and prosperity. The overturn of the mercantilist school became part of a wider “Whiggish” interpretation of history, which used Great Britain as an ideal type for depicting the development of free trade and minimal government as a natural

force in history. Without doubt, such a simplistic version seldom receives enthusiastic applause today. On the contrary, it is most often argued nowadays that the step from “mercantilists” such as Steuart to the “liberal” Smith was not as big as it was once described. Hence, many scholars—for example, the English writers before 1776—were ready to admit the advantages of market liberalization, free trade, and even the existence of an invisible hand. Indeed, very few of them made the mistake of identifying wealth with gold and silver. Likewise, none of the members of the so-called classical political school in the beginning of the 19th century was a free trader or a libertarian in any modern sense of the world. Many of them admitted to the positive role of state intervention, and some, even, were reluctant to propagate for free trade as long as not all countries were ready to abolish their tariffs and duties.

Perhaps the most important concern with the Whig interpretation, however, is that it needs to be seen in its historical context. The world that economic writers during the 17th and 18th century contemplated was characterized by an often violent and competitive struggle for power and influence. From the late-medieval period, it had been well understood that the economic strength of a state required a powerful political and military position. One method to increase the wealth of a ruler was to conquer more land plowed by peasants who could pay taxes and land rents to the Crown. Exceedingly, however, it was perceived that more income could be gained by taxing profitable trading operations, to introduce indirect taxes and *accises* (excise duties). Against this background, competition over trade and trade routes became an ever more important princely occupation. It was generally believed that a country that could capture important trade routes as well as establish colonies, or “plantations,” would have an advantage in times of military conflict and political power struggles. Moreover, during the 17th century, a view increasingly emerged among rulers that it was most favorable to establish domestic industry in order to use up raw materials instead of exporting them. By encouraging manufactories, more hands could be employed while at the same time industrious manufacturers and merchants could earn more profits, which would lead to even more production and employment—resulting in

more taxes, of course. Hence, wealth creation could be cumulative and not only a consequence of zero-sum activities. However, without a strong state with an ability to keep up a trade monopoly, such gainful spirals of income creation were always threatened and insecure.

Certainly, the political economy of the relationship between economic means and power politics goes back at least to the Florentine political thinkers of the Renaissance period, including Niccolò Machiavelli. As is well-known, Florence's republicanism was a broad tradition that recognized the role of patriotism and other manly values in a well-governed and virtuous state. In England, during the 17th and early 18th century, such patriotic thinking focused strongly first on the Dutch republic and later, after 1660, on France. Holland, especially, was a showcase for those who wanted to emphasize the wealth-producing effects of capturing international commerce and establishing manufactories. It was on that basis that this tiny country was able to house such a plentiful population that was a cornerstone of political power and military strength. In the early years of the 17th century, the Dutch had snatched the Baltic fishing industry from under the nose of the English, as the mercantilist writer Thomas Mun wrote in the 1620s. It was time to take it back as well as to capture more of the international trade in grain and other products that flowed from East to West and from the Baltic to the North Sea.

Clearly, the position of a specific state in the international competitive struggle for power and influence is a key to understanding the writings of the mercantilists in their respective countries. Antonio Serra in Naples would ponder over how a small nation without domestic resources in silver and gold could be able to survive and even gain from this fact. In 1613, he suggested that Naples should export to cover both the importation of necessities and luxuries as well as the importation of money (silver). In turn, this meant that Naples had to develop a "favorable balance of trade." Pamphleteers in states that felt they were in the same position, such as England in the 1620s, lent a ear to Serra and themselves became proponents of a favorable balance of trade.

In Spain, on the other hand, a shortage of silver and gold was not a major disturbance during the 16th and 17th centuries. Such wealth in awesome

proportions was amply provided by the Spanish imperial forces and shipped over from the Americas protected by a potent navy. Already, by the end of the 16th century, it was well known that this bul- lion had not brought riches to Spain but, rather, poverty. Already, by 1556, Martin de Azpilcueta had formulated the famous so-called quantity theory of money (that a great influx of silver and gold implies that the value of money will fall). In fact, the so-called price revolution and its dire effects was a well-known phenomenon among contemporary Europeans. When the price level increased in Spain, domestic industries as well as agriculture suffered from cheap foreign competition. In the 1580s in Spain, Luis Ortiz, controller of the public finance, argued for a strict ban to prevent Spaniards from exporting their money and buying foreign goods—a policy that had been used by many states since the medieval period and that in England was called the Statute of Employment.

In France, a policy of economic nationalism was developed from the beginning of the 17th century onward. Around 1600, the *valet du chambre* to King Henry IV, Berthélemy Laffemas, published tracts in which he advocated the establishment of manufacturing in France to avoid "unnecessary" imports. In a highly aggressive tone some decades later, the message that foreign imports should be banned and the ugly face of foreigners forever deported from *la belle* France was reinforced by the writer Antoine de Montchretien (who was the first to use the concept "political economy"). His argument for strong protectionist measures taken by a dirigiste state became after 1660 the backbone of the so-called Colbert system, after Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV's minister of finance, who greatly provoked the English at the end of the same century.

Hence, the historical context in which the mercantilists wrote and advised was perhaps better understood by 19th-century German scholars such as Gustav Schmoller (belonging to the German historical school), who identified mercantilism as an expression of nation building during the early-modern period, than by 19th-century British liberalism. Nevertheless, Smith's definition of mercantilism as a specific school of economic theory building on flawed views of the true relationship between commerce and wealth is still widely acknowledged. To what extent the straw man of a

mercantilist school he produced corresponds to historical reality may be doubted, although it did serve to convince everybody of the revolutionary character of Smith's own contribution.

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*See also* Liberalism; Protectionism

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## META-ANALYSIS

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The meta-analysis research design involves analyzing many individual cases or research reports and looking for commonalities and discrepancies in the published findings. In this design, a group of previously researched cases is selected and subjected to comparative analysis. Gene V. Glass (1976) introduced the technique as a “rigorous alternative to the casual, narrative discussions of research studies which typify our attempts to make sense of the rapidly expanding research literature” (p. 3).

Meta-analysis is an observational technique used to summarize and compare the results of studies produced by other researchers. Objectives for meta case research include establishing the state of research findings on a subject and providing an overview of what others are saying about the subject. Referred to as an analysis of analyses, the method involves statistical analysis of a large

collection of individual case studies for the purpose of integrating the findings of the total set. Below, the advantages and disadvantages of meta-analysis and the requisite steps are discussed in greater detail.

Meta-analyses should only be applied to empirical research reports—that is, studies that have analyzed primary quantitative data collected by researchers who prepared the original reports. The findings of previously prepared research reports are compared or evaluated using such statistical processes as regression and correlation analyses. A recent example of the design is the Chris Doucouliagos and Mehmet Ali Ulabaşoğlu (2008) meta-analysis of 84 published studies of the hypothesized relationship between political democracy and economic growth. The individual results were spread across a continuum of positive, negative, and insignificant findings, leading them to conclude that while democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth, an inconclusive relationship is common across the studies. Their meta-analysis resulted in three key points:

1. It provided a comprehensive analysis of the democracy–growth research based on the entire body of published cases.
2. Their quantitative analysis made it possible to make inferences based on the significance of the democracy–growth relationship.
3. It revealed the heterogeneity of the results in previous individual studies.

#### Advantages and Disadvantages of Meta-Analysis

Measurement and statistics researchers at the University of Maryland identified what may be the single most important advantage of meta-analysis: The human mind may be unable to effectively process and evaluate a large number of alternatives; a meta-analysis resolves this issue. Individuals have a difficult time when asked to evaluate the results of, say, 20 similar studies. When the number of studies is increased to 200—a not untypical number in many meta-analyses—the mind reels. Fortunately, statistical methods and software are readily available for coping with the complexity inherent in large numbers of cases.

Mark W. Lipsey and David B. Wilson identified four additional advantages of a meta-analysis. First, the process of coding and establishing criteria for selecting studies (a *survey protocol*), reading the study reports, coding the material, and subjecting it to a rigid statistical analysis imposes a discipline on the researcher that is sometimes missing in qualitative summarizations and comparative analyses. Second, the summaries of research on similar topics may produce finer measurement gradations of themes that might have otherwise been missed with a design using only one or a few cases. The application of common statistical tests across all the studies can correct for wide differences in sample size. Third, because the meta-analysis examines many case studies, it may be possible to find effects or associations that one or a smaller number of other comparative case analyses may have missed. Fourth, the meta-analysis process provides a way to organize and structure diverse information from a wide variety of study findings.

Meta-analysis is not without its disadvantages. A few of the criticisms that have been identified for the method include the following:

1. The large amount of effort and expertise it requires is an often-cited disadvantage of the method. A meta-analysis takes considerably more time than a conventional research literature review and may require specialized knowledge of case information that the researcher may not have.
2. The original may have missed some important issues, including but not limited to the social context of the study, theoretical influences and implications, methodological quality, design issues, and procedures.
3. The mix of studies combined into larger groups may hide subtle differences seen in individual studies.
4. Inclusion of studies that are methodologically weak can detract from the findings in the strong studies included in the analysis.

### The Meta-Analysis Method

A meta-analysis follows the same system of procedures as single-case research. Researchers first identify a research question (the purpose for the

review) and establish their objectives for the study. Second, they select an organizational framework for the analysis—that is, they determine what variables they will measure across the entire sample of cases. Third, they select a sample of case studies and specify why the individual cases (sample elements) will be chosen for the meta-analysis. Fourth, researchers collect, code, and tabulate the data; this involves investigating and reporting on the relationships found between the studies included in the review. Reporting the findings involves connecting the findings back to the study question, purpose, and objectives of the analysis. The following describes the complete process in greater detail.

#### *Formulating the Problem*

The first step involves identifying the reason for doing the research: defining the research problem. In a meta-analytical study, the core task is deciding what questions or hypotheses should be examined and what evidence should be included in the review of the selected cases. Formulating the problem means deciding what research results should be examined.

#### *Criteria for Selecting Cases*

Criteria for selecting cases to be included in the analysis might include characteristics of the client population, geographic location, history and/or experience level of the delivering organization and/or its sponsoring government agency, or research method used by the case writer. Each selected case should add to the research question knowledge base. A good meta-analysis is not concerned with drawing a representative sample of the literature on the topic; rather, it seeks to include the entire population of published studies on the topic of interest.

#### *Standardizing the Points for Analysis*

Since the meta-analysis design involves analysis of analyses and all analyses are different in some way, this is one of the most problematic steps of meta-analysis. Glass referred to this as the “apples and oranges” problem. The cases selected are studies of different aspects of a phenomenon: They

involve different subjects, are done at different times by different researchers, and often involve different research methods. Therefore, they are not all studies of “apples” or studies of “oranges.” To get around the difficulties that these differences entail, the researcher must examine the same element in every case, ignoring findings peculiar to the one case alone.

#### *Standardizing the Analysis Procedure*

Here, the emphasis is on method rather than focus. The analysis procedure usually involves standard statistical techniques such as regression and correlation analysis. However, the techniques and procedures used in the individual cases studied are often specific to that research question or political science subdiscipline. The meta-analysis reviewer must differentiate between what the original report writer supposed and what the results of the study indicate.

#### *Selecting a Coding Scheme*

Coding of variables for comparison or tabulation must be consistent across the body of literature reviewed in the meta-analysis. There are few rules for coding, other than to retain consistency. Numeric coding is the preferred approach since most researchers will use computers and statistical software for their analysis.

#### *Describing the Statistical Processes Used*

A guide to follow in describing the statistical processes used in meta-analysis is to refer to the available statistical software. Much of this software has been available free. Meta-Stat, from the University of Maryland, is an example of meta-analysis software. Statistical analysis described in this software ranges from simple descriptive statistics and correlation analysis to regression analysis and analysis of variance, to name just a few of the popular tests included. Meta-analysis is facilitated using a meta-analytic schedule or cross-case table. Rows are cases; columns are the results of the analysis on the items or attributes of interest. Cell entries may be brief summaries of the findings or as simple as a check mark. The schedule makes it easy to record and communicate analysis results.

#### *Analyzing the Data and Writing the Report*

Data analysis is a product of the statistical software used by the researcher and, as such, is rather straightforward. Writing the report, however, introduces a subjective element to the study. The researcher must decide how much information to include and how much to leave out of the report. Care must be taken to control for issues of validity, although statistical inferences are generally not made with meta-analysis findings. Because meta-analysis involves the interpretation of materials written by others, great care is needed in preparing the final report of the analysis.

Meta-analysis analysis has been found to be facilitated by following the principles of *hermeneutic analysis*. Hermeneutics is a method of analyzing all types of data, but it is particularly relevant for the analysis of written material such as that found in case studies. Hermeneutics follows a set of principles that requires the analyst to (a) decipher the meaning in the texts through the eyes and intent of the writer or creator, (b) frame the meaning in the time period of the case research and writing (often referred to as the *context* within which the document was prepared), and (c) determine the meaning considering the political and social environments at the time of the creation of the text or artifact.

#### **A Final Caveat**

Although use of the meta-analysis technique has grown dramatically since its adoption in 1976, Glass suggested in 2000 that, despite this increasing popularity, it might be time to replace meta-analysis with an approach that reflects more closely the nature of modern research in social science.

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*Note:* This entry contains some material from D. E. McNabb's *Case Research in Public Management*, published by M. E. Sharpe, Inc.; it is used here with permission of the publisher.

*See also* Comparative Methods; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods



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## METAGOVERNANCE

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Metagovernance refers to the need of formal public organizations to exercise some control over devolved and decentralized decision-making organizations. In line with the common use of the prefix *meta-*, which means over and beyond, the shortest definition of the term *metagovernance* is the governance of governance. Just as the meaning of metaphysics is determined by the definition of physics, the meaning of metagovernance in practice depends on how the term *governance* is defined. It is generally accepted that three ideal-typical styles of governance can be distinguished, which usually form combinations: hierarchical, network, and market governance. When one style dominates, the other two often run in the background. Other forms of governance, such as public-private partnerships

and the European Union's open method of coordination, can be considered as hybrids of the three basic styles.

Each of the ideal types has a clear and distinct internal logic. The central value of hierarchical governance is authority; therefore an authoritative and legitimate form of governance is sought. The central values of network governance are empathy and trust, and therefore, the results are preferably based on consensus. Market governance is based on competition and price, which makes it logical that the best results are the most competitive and cheapest products.

This most used threefold concept of governance leads to defining metagovernance as the governance of hierarchies, networks, and markets. More precisely, metagovernance is that which produces some degree of coordinated governance, by designing and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, market, and network governance, to achieve the best possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those responsible for public sector performance. Metagovernance is not a supergovernance style but an attitude and an approach that is expected to help overcome some of the typical failures of each of the governance styles and of their combinations.

### Variations of Metagovernance

The term *metagovernance* was coined by Bob Jessop in 1997. He argued that the three ideal-typical governance styles can be mutually undermining and that they each have their typical failures. He proposed metagovernance as a required coordination mechanism. After having investigated reforms of the Australian public sector, Lynn Davis and Rod Rhodes (2000) confirmed this argument: Creating effective mixtures of the three styles if they undermine each other is an important challenge for the public sector. Another reason why the concept of metagovernance may be useful is that each of the three styles has such a distinct logic that it is quite tempting to consider it as a solution for everything—a panacea—while neglecting the inherent failures of the style and the mitigating characteristics of the other styles.

A last reason is that devising successful approaches to governance has become more difficult since our societies have become more complex. With the emergence of Manuel Castells's

network society and the acceptance of network governance as the third main style, the dilemma of dealing with two major approaches, hierarchy and market, evolved into a triple dilemma, or trilemma. The proponents of metagovernance argue that applying metagovernance as judiciously intervening in governance style mixtures, taking a bird's-eye perspective, increases the capability of public sector organizations to deal with complex societal problems or opportunities.

The three ideal types of governance are value laden. Using metagovernance implies deliberately taking a situational view: What is best is determined by the type of problem, the organizational culture, and the level of pressure of stakeholders, for example. The concept has a light normative dimension, because the underlying concept of governance has inherent assumptions, for example, that the intention is to solve collective problems, not for individual profit but for the common good.

Some scholars use the term *metagovernance* in the meaning of the governance of one specific governance style. This form of metagovernance can be called first-order metagovernance, compared with the then second-order metagovernance of hierarchies, networks, and markets. Following this line of thought, Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing (2007) define metagovernance as a way to enhance network governance, by use of hierarchical mechanisms or instruments, such as introducing house rules in a network or producing a legal framework in which network processes should occur. This makes sense when the field of research is democratic network governance, where the main tensions are between participative and bureaucratic forms of democracy. Others, such as Josie Kelly (2006), define metagovernance as an attempt to regain state control over new forms of governance. They observe that hierarchical governance emerges in a new form to coordinate network and market styles of governance. This secures governmental influence in the form of command and control within network and market style governance regimes. As Mark Whitehead (2002) notes, metagovernance is then a counterprocess to governance of networks.

### The Metagovernor's Rationale

The role of metagovernor can be taken up by any public manager or politician in charge of finding

solutions for societal problems or creating new societal opportunities. When such responsible agents design and intervene in governance style mixtures, they may have a specific logic of action or rationale. The question is how they can govern from the center while also maintaining enough autonomy (market governance) and involvement (network governance)? A comparative research showed that public managers used three metagovernance strategies:

1. The first strategy is combining styles. Combining the styles not only prevents conflicts but also creates synergy. Hierarchy brings structure and market governance enriches a network with efficiency and entrepreneurship. Network governance may secure just enough empathy in a new public management approach (which is a combination of the two rational ideal types—hierarchy and market).

2. The second strategy is switching between styles when the situation requires this. A policy project may start with a network approach and then introduce hierarchy by establishing rules, while the next phase may be dominated by market mechanisms such as efficiency-driven autonomous activities of the involved stakeholders. A hierarchical phase may be necessary to secure the results, after which a new network phase may start.

3. The third strategy is maintenance of situationally successful governance-style mixtures. This is a second-order strategy and complements the combining and switching of strategies. For example, conflicts are prevented by isolation—separating a team's approach to prevent it from being undermined by the characteristics of the other styles—or empowerment—giving the team a sufficient high degree of discretion. Maintenance requires awareness of the weaknesses of the three ideal types. During a crisis, for example, the almost unlimited discretion may lead to abuse.

Another dimension of the metagovernor's rationale is the understanding of five framework conditions that influence the feasibility of metagovernance:

1. The first condition concerns the culture, traditions, and history of the administrative and societal

system. National underlying preferences for a governance style influence the composition of governance mixtures to a certain extent but do not predict a specific style combination. However, they seem to predict the first style to be considered—the “default style”—which is, for example, market governance in the United Kingdom, network governance in the Netherlands, and hierarchical governance in Germany. The other styles are only applied when the default style turns out to be inappropriate.

2. The second condition is the personal affinity of the responsible politician with one of the ideal types.

3. The third condition regards societal expectations of the role(s) of governmental organizations. Civil society may lobby for network arrangements, whereas enterprises typically strive for a combination of market and hierarchical governance.

4. The fourth condition concerns organizational characteristics. The organizational culture may be open or closed, professional or task oriented, and the dominant style of leadership may be command and control, coaching, or enabling.

5. The fifth framework condition is the type of problem. This codetermines which style would serve best as the dominant one. If the policy problem is defined as an urgent matter, the rationale is to choose a hierarchical approach. If it is a routine issue that should be dealt with as efficiently as possible, market governance often works best, and for complex problems, network governance has a lot to offer.

Together the strategies and the framework conditions constitute the metagovernor’s rationale.

### Practical Implications and Feasibility

Metagovernance provides an analytical framework that enables discussions between professionals with different belief systems and can, to a certain extent, be used for the design and management of governance approaches. This applies to both policy making and organizational design.

In addition, the broad version of metagovernance may provide useful insights for the design of management development programs. Such programs

usually mirror the dominant style of an organization. The problem is that a hierarchical conception of management development implies training subordinates only to listen well and obey authority, a market-oriented training program promotes clients to become more entrepreneurial, and network training concentrates on helping colleagues create effective dialogues. Management development programs based on the concept of metagovernance would be based on different assumptions. They would teach managers to apply governance styles for which they feel no personal affinity. They would stimulate personal development toward being able to reflect on all governance styles and having enough self-insight to understand their own biases. In addition, they would include training in management techniques that are typical for the three styles: (1) line and project management for hierarchy, (2) business management for market governance, and (3) process management for network governance. They would also involve training in investigating and assessing the governance environment, to be able to deal with the framework conditions distinguished earlier.

Advocates of each of the three governance styles have different assessments of the feasibility of metagovernance. From a network perspective, metagovernance may seem a rational attempt to steer “unsteerable,” chaotic situations, which implies that the feasibility is low. Taking the more rational perspective of hierarchical and market governance, there is no fundamental reason to doubt whether metagovernance can be done; however, the problem may have a normative character. For those who take this perspective, introducing metagovernance implies that also the softer, nonrational network approach must be taken into consideration, which might make the governance system messy and slow. Metagovernance does not suggest a rational bias but a perspective over and beyond the rationality versus chaos discussion.

To conclude, metagovernance as mixing hierarchical, network, and market governance provides a bird’s-eye view of public issues. The concrete feasibility of metagovernance of the three ideal-typical styles depends on the (metagovern)ability of key people and on the framework conditions distinguished above. Scholars concentrating on this concept hope that such a reflexive, multiperspective

view may prevent the public sector from running into unnecessary problems.

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*See also* Governance; Hierarchical/Multilevel Models; Networks; New Public Management

### Further Readings

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## METHODOLOGY

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Political methodology deals with all issues related to empirical political research (nonempirical work, such as pure formal or normative theory, is excluded here). Methodology, as it is understood here, simply refers to the ways in which we acquire knowledge and comprises a multitude of specific methods and techniques. As such, it is embedded in an epistemological tradition of “critical rationalism” (Karl Popper) and “scientific realism.” This has been summarized as the “two-fold conviction that the world consists of causal mechanisms that exist independently of our study—or even awareness—of them, and that the methods of science hold our best possibility of our grasping their true character” (Ian Shapiro, 2005,

pp. 8–9). While it is often confused with narrower topics such as statistics, methodology is a broad area that deals with every aspect of political research, both quantitative and qualitative. While some methodological issues are more relevant to certain subfields or types of research, all political science is subject to similar standards and logic. While political methodology is related to more general social science methodology, there are specific issues that distinguish political methodology, while there is, of course, a shared logic and standards across the empirical social sciences. Since political science is itself defined by substantive questions, there is much importing of methods from other disciplines into political science. Questions of what is imported and the relevance of imported methods are important issues in political methodology. This entry discusses some of the major advances in this field.

While political methodology deals with empirical research, there cannot be any purely empirical research. Every empirical study involves some relationship between a theoretical concept and its empirical referent. Even very narrow empirical research, such as the measurement of electoral turnout in a given locality in a given period, requires a theoretical assessment of what is electoral turnout. For example, are people who are of legal age to vote but excluded from the process because of a prior felony (as some are in the United States) counted in the denominator? While empirical studies of voting turnout are less complex theoretically than studies of, say, whether being a democracy causes a nation to be more pacific, both studies involve a mix of theoretical and empirical analysis and both can be assessed using the same logic. Thus, issues of measurement are always critical; such issues have become even more critical as technology makes new forms of data (video, blogs) available, or it makes it possible to easily analyze data that we have always used but found hard to deal with (text). The ability to deal with new sources of very complicated data and, with modern computers, the ability to code massive amounts of nonquantitative data, as well as the ability to collect individual data via the Internet, are among the most exciting developments in political methodology. Along with this, there has been much progress on issues of measurement.

Similarly, there can be no difference in the underlying logic of qualitative and quantitative

research. While obviously the specific tools will be different, if the question of interest is why countries have differing regulatory systems, we may pursue this in a number of ways. But, in the end, all such studies must be able to answer whether the evidence used leads to the conclusion asserted. While process tracing through official papers of decision makers is different from regressing regulatory rules on political variables, both may use one type of quantitative method, while students of cross-national comparative politics may use another type; these subfields are also subject to the same fundamental logic. This point has been forcefully made in recent years in important books by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba and by Henry Brady and David Collier. The interrelationship (both similarities and dissimilarities) between quantitative and qualitative analysis, and how to combine both types to improve research, is another research area in political methodology that is seeing much discussion.

Some political science research is purely descriptive: how many people vote, whether more people voted the previous year than this year, and the like. As noted, even for this simple issue, serious measurement issues arise: What kind of people vote, and what does it mean to vote? Obviously, such issues are simpler than asking how many countries are democracies, but the methodological logic does not change. Most political science research, however, is not simply descriptive. While sometimes we care only about associations, much research uses causal language, metaphors, and ideas. Thus, while we might be interested only in whether there is a correlation between being a democracy and the amount of public goods provided, we are often more interested in whether there is a causal relationship, such that being a democracy leads to more public goods being provided. In purely associational studies, the variables are all treated symmetrically; when using the language of causality, there is always a variable that is being caused and one or more variables doing the causing. Issues of assessing causality are in the forefront of current discussions of political methodology, whether quantitative or qualitative. These issues can all be considered under the heading of research design.

Finally, when the above issues have been dealt with, there is the issue of how to get the data to speak clearly and how to assess what inferences

can be drawn from the data (be it qualitative or quantitative). This is the realm of statistics (for quantitative studies). Obviously, the use of sophisticated statistical methods has mushroomed in political science, at least partly as a function of the increased computer power that is now commonly available. But while this part of methodology is often seen as highly mathematical and complicated, it is usually the simplest part of political methodology. It is also the case that the most sophisticated statistics cannot save a poor research design or poor measurement; by contrast, good research design often leads to simple statistical analysis. This entry begins with developments in data and measurement, proceeds to research design and measurement, and concludes with a discussion of statistical methods.

### Data and Measurement

Empirical research, of course, deals with data (observations), and earliest empirical work, that of Aristotle on constitutions, took as data the various Greek constitutions. Data are gathered in a multitude of ways, ranging from reading diaries or internal records of decision making, to conducting field observations and (unstructured or semistructured) interviews with local leaders, to analyzing carefully collected economic statistics or a variety of highly structured survey data. Every type of research has certain types of data that are more commonly used, but all types of data are subject to the same standards and issues. There is a difference between journalism and political science, and much of that difference has to do with standards for data. Both journalists and political scientists may interview political leaders, but the way they collect and code that information is usually quite different.

Modern technological developments have had an enormous impact on political science data. Much of the data we use are textual (laws, party manifestos, records of debate and deliberation, court decisions, newspaper accounts, and minutes and records of administrative procedures, among many others). Our discipline has always used such data, but coding these data was extremely difficult and time-consuming, leading to such data being underused. Now, much of these data come in machine-readable form, and any data available in

hard copy can be scanned and put into such form. Thus, it is now relatively easy to code documents for the use of different types of words (or themes or tropes or whatever one likes). Machines can quickly search the records of various newspapers to code for various types of political events, a task that used to require a large team of graduate students and a very large budget. With modern computations, it is relatively easy for any investigator to code these textual data in a way that meets the needs of an individual research project. This is one of the most exciting advances in data collection in our discipline, an advance that is well under way. The possibilities for the analysis of textual data are almost limitless.

The analysis of surveys has been a mainstay in our discipline for the past half century or more. Until recently, analysts were at the mercy of the survey organization; conducting a survey was a multimillion-dollar task. Thus, electoral analysts in each country worked with the same standard survey collected by some national research organization; research could not go beyond the questions asked by that organization. With modern advances in communications and computers, it is now relatively easy for researchers to design their own surveys to suit the needs of a specific research project. We are also seeing more standardized surveys, so students of elections can now analyze a similar set of questions in almost any European country (and there are similar efforts in other parts of the world, with the Afrobarometer and the Latino-barómetro and the World Values Survey). At the same time, a researcher wanting to study a specific event can put a survey in the field in a short space of time and at a reasonable cost. Larger survey houses can monitor populations over the course of an election and even change or add questions as issues arise over the course of a campaign. Critical to this is the ability to monitor a survey on a day-to-day basis. In earlier times it would have been months or years until survey data became available; with the new technology such data are available on a daily basis. Thus, for example, it was possible to track changes in the British electorate in 2010 and their responses to the introduction of debates into the British campaign soon after or almost immediately.

Modern technology also makes it easy to embed experiments into a survey. Thus, one can

give different respondents different scenarios or different question wordings or whatever else one likes, and these different treatments can be chosen randomly. This technology has greatly increased the use of field experiments. The incredible growth of the Internet has been extremely important here. Various survey organizations in many countries give the researcher access to a huge pool of respondents, as well as the tools to quickly design a survey instrument and to allow the researcher to take advantage of experimental manipulation in the questions (subject only to ethical constraints on such manipulation). Internet surveys can be undertaken at very low cost and are within the budget even of students. While there are still many issues on the use of the Internet in this manner, we are clearly seeing more and more use of the Internet (both for reasons of cost and sample size and because other modes of interviewing are becoming more problematic).

Once data are collected, numbers must be assigned. This is the process of measurement, which relies both on concept formation and (for quantitative studies) various methods often associated with psychometrics. Qualitative scholars have paid much attention to concept formation, and, in conjunction with tools such as Charles Ragin's "Qualitative Comparative Analysis," much progress has been made. Students of comparative politics have paid much attention to how concepts generalize across geographic locations and to how we can generalize across locations without having too much "conceptual stretching."

At the same time, statistical and computing advances have allowed researchers to move beyond the psychometric techniques available 20 years ago. Today, there is vibrant activity in multidimensional analysis, and in recent years, scaling techniques, both uni- and multidimensional, have been put on a much firmer theoretical basis. The new textual data have brought to the forefront issues such as how to locate political parties in a multidimensional issue space, and new statistical methods have allowed for great advances in the location of individual legislators in such a space.

The past decade has seen a great increase in the amount of data sharing (largely through the impetus of funding agencies) as well as in journals requiring authors to make replication data sets available. While this works very well for quantitative data, it

is more problematic for qualitative data (interviews, field observation notebooks, and the like). However, as it becomes easier to either collect these data in digitized format, or to convert them to such format, it can be expected that it will be as easy to make qualitative data publicly available as it now is for quantitative data (though obviously there are more issues of confidentiality and the like).

### Research Design

Political scientists have relied heavily on observational studies (whether quantitative or qualitative). However, while there is some interest in pure description, there is usually more interest in making causal interpretations from the data. Thus, while we begin with simply observing that pairs of democracies usually do not go to war, we are more interested in the question of whether, as countries democratize, they become less likely to go to war. Finally, we try to deepen the explanation, asking what facet of democracy makes democracies less likely to fight each other.

The question of how we can infer causality from observational data has vexed philosophers as long as there have been philosophers. The meaning of causality is a vibrant topic in modern philosophy. Applied researchers have attempted to find ways to assess causality and, at a minimum, to attempt to rule out other, noncausal explanations for findings. In the above example, being a democracy may not really be the causal variable; perhaps, instead, the real causal variable is economic development and richer countries are simply more likely to be democracies. Thus, the observed association (correlation) between democracy and peacefulness could be artifactual or spurious. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers have devoted enormous attention to this issue.

On the purely qualitative side, researchers have paid great attention to J. S. Mill's methods. Thus, we see large numbers of comparative case studies, with researchers choosing the cases so as to obtain variation on the key dependent variable and the causal variable but little or no variation on other variables. Researchers also choose cases for theory testing based on the cases that are likely to prove hardest for the theory to explain. Researchers are also taking advantage of difference in designs where two cases are compared at two different

times: where the cases were originally similar but a key variable (and preferably only that key variable) has changed in one case but not in the other.

Moving to larger numbers of cases, researchers have used various configurational techniques to see how variables are related to each other and to study complicated causal paths. Great attention has been paid to necessary and sufficient conditions and to designs that can distinguish whether a condition is necessary, sufficient, or both or in some more complicated relationship to a variable of interest.

Qualitative researchers have often chosen their cases based on issues of research design or the importance of their cases; quantitative researchers, conversely, have often chosen cases to maximize generalizability, either via national surveys or via large cross-country analyses. But trends in quantitative research are tending to blur the difference between qualitative and quantitative designs (with both designs subject to similar standards about inferring causality). All of these are attempts to bring experimental insights into political science.

One relatively new development that shows the convergence of various approaches is the "analytic narrative." Here, researchers attempt to show how some important development in history can be explained by modern analytic theory. While these analytic narratives cannot test analytic theories, they can make such theories more or less plausible. There is much controversy about whether this tool can really be used to either help validate a theory or to explain an important historical event: can a clever user of the tool explain anything, or, as Jon Elster put it, are they simply "just so" stories? However, this joining of modern analytic (usually formal) theory and careful historical evidence shows how two very different traditions can be combined in a potentially fruitful manner.

Political science studies are most frequently observational. Other fields, such as medicine, rely more heavily (though far from exclusively) on experiments. In medicine, the gold standard is the clinical trial, where subjects in a selected pool are randomly assigned to either a "treatment" or "control" group and where, under appropriate conditions, one can infer whether the treatment causes a better outcome.

Experiments are much harder in political science. We cannot assign countries randomly to be

either democracies or not, nor can we assign voters to be randomly rich or poor. We can, however, set up a laboratory and then randomly assign participants in an experiment to a treatment or control condition. Thus, for example, we can study whether people prefer “fair outcomes” by having pairs of subjects bargain, where each pair is randomly assigned to some initial endowment or price system. While this is an exciting new area of political science, issues of generalizing from experiments to the real world (external validity) will always limit the use of laboratory experiments in our discipline. However, where experiments are possible, we can be much more certain about assessing whether some political treatment had a causal (and not spurious) effect on an outcome of interest. Experiments may be particularly useful for testing formal theories of politics, since those theories are themselves highly abstract representations of the political universe.

Experiments need not be limited to a laboratory; it is perfectly possible (and now with modern technology even easier) to conduct field experiments. The move from the laboratory to the field increases external validity at the cost of our being less certain about our causal inferences (internal validity). Perhaps the first examples of this came in conjunction with surveys, where different people could randomly receive different question wordings or question orders. It was easy to move beyond this to providing different people different information randomly (subject of course to ethical guidelines on dealing with human subjects, which do not permit, at a minimum, misleading them). Perhaps the most common field experiments have to do with the effect of various attempts to motivate people to vote and to what extent voting turnout can be influenced by various communications strategies.

Field experiments are now also common in the assessment of various interventions. Thus, if we want to know if certain types of political interventions (say national-level monitoring of local corruption) have an effect, and if the area of intervention is chosen randomly (because the state cannot monitor all localities), it is then relatively easy to study the impact of the anticorruption intervention. Of course, this depends on the willingness of the state to intervene randomly, something they are not always (or often) willing to do. On a simple

level, we can often study things such as educational reforms by comparing students who were randomly selected for the reform with those who applied but were not selected in a lottery. New programs that are oversubscribed often choose participants in this way. Of course, if we simply compare those in the program with those not in the program, we do not know if the program, or factors that led people to choose to be in the program, led to the observed outcome, and so no causal inference is possible. But there is more and more demand for careful evaluation of programs (such as aid programs sponsored by various large foundations), and so, this type of approach will become more and more common. This is a major step for applied researchers who want to see whether innovations actually work.

A somewhat different, but related, strategy is to keep laboratory control but move the laboratory from the research university to real-world settings. In a university laboratory, we can study how undergraduates in research universities bargain. In field laboratories (again made possible by technological innovations) we can study how a wider group of people bargains. Researchers can also embed more “real-world” features in these experiments. Thus, in some particularly exciting experiments on the role of ethnicity and trust, some people bargained with people of their own ethnic group, while others simply bargained with a randomly selected person. Thus, we can now make advances in studying group trust with studies that are both at least somewhat externally valid while still allowing for reliable causal inference.

Perhaps the strongest convergence of qualitative and quantitative thinking comes in what Donald T. Campbell and Julian Stanley called “quasi experiments” in their pathbreaking 1963 book on research design. Unlike experiments, some external force (political or natural) has “assigned” one group to a treatment and another to a control. Since this is not a true randomized experiment, researchers must show that the treatment was assigned in such a way that the assignment process was independent of the outcome. For example, the British drew boundaries in Africa as if they were random (i.e., following various geographical markers); thus, one ethnic group might be divided between two countries, and one can then see whether there are differences



in the behavior of the same ethnic group in the two countries. In the actual study of Daniel Posner, there were two ethnic groups split across two countries, with the division into countries being “as if” random; Posner could then see whether political and social rivalries between the two groups differed as a function of the larger political structures in each country. We are seeing more and more such designs. These research designs obviously have high external validity, though they lack the clear ability to show causal effects, since the assignment to groups was not totally random. But researchers are taking advantage of “almost random” natural assignments to study the effects of changing laws (with laws cutting natural labor markets artificially, the effect of, say, a change in the minimum wage law in half the labor market can be compared with what happened in the same labor market not subject to the change). This approach is very exciting, though of course one must work hard to show that the assignment process was effectively random. From a methodological standpoint, it does not matter whether the data collected from the two groups are quantitative or qualitative, and, in general, both types are collected. But even if the data from the two groups come from large surveys, we are still comparing only two groups.

A related research design that brings together both quantitative and qualitative researchers is the difference-in-difference design. In a simple before-and-after comparison, we do not know if the intervention between the observations caused the observed change. If we simply compare two units, one with an intervention and one without, we do not know if the intervention or something else caused the observed difference. The difference-in-difference design asks the researcher to find two similar units where one unit had an intervention (e.g., a change in a law) and the other did not. We need to be able to observe both units both before and after the intervention in one unit. If there is a bigger difference in the unit with the intervention, then we have evidence that the intervention had a causal impact. As before, this design has good external validity, but it does not rule out all other causal explanations. And, as before, we can compare many units, leading to a quantitative design (so long as the units were similar beforehand), or we can do a simpler two-cases difference-in-difference

design, allowing for more in-depth analysis of the two before-and-after cases.

The study of causality has also been a big issue in statistical analysis. But even without statistical innovations, all empirical researchers have clearly been affected by new thinking about using good research design to infer causality.

### Statistics

Multiple regression is clearly the workhorse of the quantitative political scientist. But political scientists have been quick to use related methods that better fit the data analyzed. A quarter of a century ago researchers still found methods such as logit and probit for dichotomous dependent variables to be either just at or just beyond their grasp. Today, these methods are commonplace. Similarly, researchers with ordered dependent variables, event count-dependent variables, or length-of-time-dependent variables, typically, know how to find the correct methods (and all commonly used software makes it easy to use these methods in practice). While the gains here are often, but not always, small, they usually come at no price, so there is no question that researchers should match their choice of method to the type of data being analyzed. These issues, typically important in cross-sectional research, are, by and large, now solved problems.

Similar strides have been made in the analysis of time series. While in the past the important issues of time series (which often have enormous consequences for results) were ignored, over the past quarter of a century the discipline has become much more sophisticated. Thus, most researchers analyzing time series get the technical details right. Econometricians, at the same time, have made great strides in studying data that are trending (or, more technically, nonstationary). Political scientists have been quick to pick up on this, and we see much fewer spurious regressions. So while the issues here are more complicated, and there are still open issues about trending series, as with cross-sectional analyses, time-series analyses in political science are now done reasonably well.

In comparative politics, we have data that consist of time series observed over a number of countries: time-series cross-sectional data. Many articles now analyze such data, and the discipline

has become good at analyzing such data. Similarly, we can have cross-sectional surveys with repeated observations on each individual: panel data. The analysis of such data has also become commonplace, with the appropriate methods often used. Finally, there have been great advances in data where individuals are observed over multiple units (e.g., common surveys in different countries): multilevel data. Again, there have been great strides recently in the analysis of such data, and the correct analysis of multilevel data has also become more common.

This is not to say that all statistical issues have been solved. Most current methods assume that observations in one unit are independent of observations in other units. But this assumption is clearly false for political science. What goes on in one country affects its neighbors and trading partners; a dyad going to war must have impacts on a large number of other dyads. Recently, political methodologists have been investigating methods for modeling spatially dependent data, and great strides are being made in this area.

Another active area of research is on ecological data, that is, data where interest is on individuals but only aggregate data are observed. Political science is rich with aggregate data, particularly voting data collected at the precinct level. But, often, interest is at the individual level. For example, who voted for the National Socialist Party in Germany in the 1930s? We have lots of data on aggregate vote at the precinct level and some knowledge of the social characteristics of such precincts. Obviously, we would like to do surveys, but these are impossible for events in the past. Since William Robinson's classic 1950 work on the "ecological fallacy," we have known that it is not simple to make inferences about individuals from data collected at a higher level of aggregation. However, recent advances have shown that we can use such data to gain insights into individual data (and also to show when the data cannot support such insights).

An important issue that is currently the subject of much discussion is how to interpret statistical results. Political science has been dominated by the null hypothesis-testing framework, where we calculate the probability of obtaining the data observed if the null hypothesis (almost always that two or more variables are unrelated) is correct. If

this probability is low enough, we "reject" the null hypothesis, otherwise we do not reject it. This approach is highly problematic, since rejecting the null hypothesis does not imply that there is a strong relationship between variables, and failing to reject the null hypothesis does not mean that there is no relationship between variables.

In the past few years, there has been much discussion of moving to a Bayesian paradigm. Much of this is driven by the computing power, rather than the interpretive possibilities, made possible by a Bayesian approach. Bayesian interpretation assumes we know something about the world, expressed as a statistical "prior distribution" on some parameters of interest. This prior distribution is combined with the information in the data—the "likelihood"—to produce a posterior distribution. Statements about the parameters of interest can be made based on this posterior distribution. There is much controversy on how to use prior information and on the issue of different scholars having different priors. But this is a very active area of current research, both in political methodology and beyond, and Bayesian ideas (as well as computational methods) are making strong inroads in political science.

### Statistics and Causality

Regression and its maximum likelihood cousins (limited dependent variables, event counts, event history, and time series) estimate a model of a dependent variable conditional on an observed set of independent variables; these independent variables are assumed to be exogenous—that is, they are determined outside the system being modeled and hence can be taken as given. For pure description, this is fine. But we generally want to make causal inferences. To take the simplest regression case (and all holds in the more complicated cases mentioned above), we believe the data were generated for unit  $i$  by the process

$$y_i = \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $x$  refers to either a single independent variable or a vector of such variables, and  $\varepsilon$  is a standard unknown error term. Clearly,  $\beta$  can be interpreted descriptively—that is, as the slope of a line (or plane) that best fits the points. But can it

be interpreted causally—that is, do we believe that if for a given unit  $x$  increases by one point, then  $y$  will increase by  $\beta$  points? (Obviously, we will have to use an estimate of  $\beta$ , but this discussion holds even if we know the value of  $\beta$  for sure. This is not an issue of estimation.)

There are a number of reasons why the relationship between  $x$  and  $y$  could be noncausal. The simplest is that there is some other variable,  $z$ , that causes both  $x$  and  $y$ . For example, there may be a good-sized  $\beta$  in a regression of spending on public goods on democracy, but it may be that it is really how rich a country is that is causing both spending on public goods and democracy; there may be no causal relationship between democracy and spending on public goods in the sense that simply making a country more democratic, but keeping everything else the same, may lead to no increase in spending on public goods.

Traditionally, this was dealt with by including  $z$  in the regression and seeing if the coefficient on  $x$  has changed. This is not an unreasonable way to proceed. However, it can be problematic. First, it assumes that the effect of  $x$  and  $z$  on  $y$  are linear and additive. For just the two variables, this means that we are assuming that

$$y_i = \gamma x_i + \delta z_i + \varepsilon_i,$$

where  $x$  and  $z$  are now scalars. While the details are a bit more complicated, this procedure estimates the effect of  $x$  on  $y$  by subtracting off from each observation  $\delta z_i$ . But if the effect of  $x$  on  $y$  varies with  $z$ , or if the linear additive model is otherwise incorrect, this correction is, alas, not correct.

This is not the only problem. Let us say  $x$  is binary (democracy/nondemocracy) and let  $z$  be national income. Can we make a poor autocracy comparable (in terms of public goods spending) with a rich democracy by simply adding  $\delta z$  ( $z$  is income) to its  $y$  (spending on public goods)? Given that there are few rich autocracies or poor democracies, this approach depends a lot on extrapolation well outside the data and so depends on a strong belief that the linear additive assumptions are correct.

Recently, researchers have proceeded in a different way, at least for the binary  $x$  case. For each democracy, they attempt to find one or more autocracies that are very close on various exogenous

variables that might influence  $x$  and  $z$  (what Judea Pearl has called backdoor paths between  $x$  and  $y$  and what Paul Rubin has called confounders). If one has eliminated all potential “confounders” by matching them, then the difference in means between the democracies and autocracies will give us the effect of democracy on  $y$ . Of course, this means that the various confounders must be observable and measured in the data set (and, of course, there are many technical issues that must be resolved by the researcher).

What if we cannot match all the democracies with autocracies? These unmatched cases are simply dropped from the analysis. Thus, we do not have to extrapolate well beyond the data, but this limits us to studying causal impacts in comparable cases; thus, for example, we cannot say what would happen if Denmark were to become an autocracy. This is almost certainly the right degree of modesty.

This matching literature is undergoing rapid development at the current time. Issues that must be studied include how to handle continuous (or multivalued)  $x$ s and how to deal with studies where we cannot focus solely on one independent variable of interest. There are also many technical issues that are continually being dealt with, such as what does it mean for two cases to match and how many and which cases should be dropped from an analysis because they do not match. But clearly, this approach is often superior to multiple regression (and when multiple regression is correct, it provides roughly the same answer).

Perhaps more important, even if one decides to continue to run regressions, the insights of the matching and causality literatures are of great value. There are two difficult issues in multiple regression on which statistics give few insights: which independent variables to include in the regression and which cases should be studied. The matching approach suggests that only variables that are on backdoor paths between the key independent variable and the dependent variable should be included in the regression. Equally important, variables on front door paths, where  $x$  causes  $z$  and  $y$ , should not be included in the regression. Thus, if some variable is a consequence of  $x$ , if we include it in the regression, we may incorrectly conclude that  $x$  has no causal impact on  $y$ .

In terms of which cases to include in a regression, the matching literature tells us that, for any given potential causal variable, some cases give us no leverage because it is impossible to match cases where the causal variable is present to those where it is absent. This is often not a problem in survey analysis but can be a major problem in the study of comparative and international politics. We often analyze a group of countries because they belong to a data-reporting organization; the matching approach gives a more principled way of starting to think about which cases should be included in an analysis. And, just as important, the cases to include vary with the causal variable being studied. But, as with simple matching, we then must remember that the causal effect that is estimated is a function of which cases are studied.

The matching approach (and multiple regression) assumes that we can observe the various confounders that impede causal inference. But what if they cannot be observed? There are several approaches that are promising, though, as with any method, they must be used with care. One is to model what is known as selection and the other is to use what are known as instrumental variables. These deal with issues of selection bias and endogeneity.

Selection bias is a critical empirical issue. In applied work, if we want to see if, say, some new type of school provides better outcomes, and we compare outcomes of those who attend the new school against a sample from other schools, we may find that the new type of school seems to work either because better students choose to go there or because students who have knowledge of themselves and who have good reason to believe that the new type of school will work for them choose the new school. The former problem is always critical, while the latter is critical if we wish to encourage everyone to use the new type of school.

This problem was formalized by the Nobel Prize-winning economist James Heckman in the 1980s. He was interested in the returns to education (in terms of wages) of women; we only observe the wages of women who choose to enter the labor market. This may lead to underestimating the effect of education on women's wages, since women with less education may only enter the labor market if they have some reason to know

that they will do well in that market. Alas, such reasons are usually not observable in a data set.

In political science, we may be interested in the effect of being involved in a scandal on the electoral success of incumbents running for reelection. But those who see little chance of reelection may choose not to run, and those who were involved in a scandal but chose to run anyway may have private reasons to know that they are likely to do well. Are campaign ads effective? Perhaps people who already like a candidate are more likely to see that candidate's ads.

Similarly, in international relations, if we only study the outcomes of wars, many nations that are militarily weak may simply choose not to fight; thus, the weak will fight only if they have some private information that they have a chance of winning, and so we may underestimate the effect of military strength on winning a war. Similarly, does international mediation actually help solve conflicts? Perhaps mediators only take on their task when they think success is likely. In comparative politics, autocrats who believe that they can remain in power if they liberalize are perhaps more likely to liberalize. These are just a few examples, but selection bias is pervasive in observational studies.

One solution is to match those who select some treatment (war, watching an ad, etc.) with those who chose not to do so. But if the data set does not contain enough information to match on critical variables (nations that are militarily weak but have other, unobserved, private reasons to believe that war is in their interest), this approach does not work. Heckman suggested a two-equation model, one for selection and one for the outcome-given selection, with the errors in the two equations correlated (so that nations that should not have gone to war but did for unobservable [error term] reasons will also be more likely to do better, again for reasons that are in the error term). Note also that the various research design issues (experiments, quasi experiments, and such) can also be a critical tool for dealing with selection bias. But even if there is no statistical solution available, and we are not lucky enough to observe a good quasi-experimental situation, understanding the nature of the problem is critical for causal inference.

The other issue is endogeneity. Does high income lead to good institutions or do good institutions

lead to high income? Do voters who like some candidate assume his or her position to be close to theirs or does closeness on issues lead voters to choose that candidate? Disentangling whether  $x$  causes  $y$  or  $y$  causes  $x$  is critical to political science; and observational data on cross-sections cannot help answer this question, since, as is well known, association tells us nothing about causation. For the above two examples, we would observe the same exact data regardless of the causal process. The research design tools discussed previously can sort out these issues; if  $x$  changed for some reason external to the system (perhaps because of some natural event), then we could study whether  $x$  causes  $y$  and is not simply associated with it.

In the 1950s, economists associated with the Cowles Foundation at Yale thought they could solve the problem by estimating a series of equations, one for  $x$  and one for  $y$ . Of course, these had to be estimated jointly, and this technique came to be known as the estimation of simultaneous equations. Interest in this approach waned as it became obvious that we simply lacked strong enough theory to allow the estimation of such equations. This theory, at a minimum, was necessary to tell us that there was some exogenous  $z$  that affected  $y$  and not  $x$  and some other exogenous  $w$  that affected  $x$  and not  $y$ . At least in political science, it seemed hard to find such exogenous variables with such asymmetrical effects.

Interest in part of this approach—instrumental variables—started to reappear in the 1990s and now has become an extremely active area of research. The basic idea is that we are interested in the causal impact of, say, economic growth on having a civil war. However, in a cross-sectional study, we would worry that civil wars hurt economic growth. The instrumental-variable approach is to find some exogenous variable that affects growth but only affects civil wars through its link with economic growth. In an ingenious study, Ted Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti decided that, for southern Africa, rainfall would be a good instrument. They had to convince themselves that rainfall affected the outbreak of civil war only through economic growth (since it is clear that rainfall is exogenous). The method of instrumental variables, in its simplest form, then regressed both civil wars and economic growth on rainfall (both regressions are fine since rainfall is

exogenous). Having the effect of rainfall on both variables, we can divide these effects and then obtain a good estimate of the impact of economic growth on civil wars without worrying about the reverse direction of causality.

Research on instrumental variables, both on the theory on when they are useful and also in various applications, is one of the most vibrant current research areas in political science. It is hard, but not impossible, to find good instruments. There is much current research on what properties a good instrument should possess and if and how empirical researchers can test whether a given instrument is a good one.

### Conclusion

Political methodology was not even considered a field for research 30 years ago. The world has changed remarkably. The American Political Science Association has subfield groups for both quantitative and qualitative methodology; these groups are among the largest such groups in the association. The past few years have seen a huge increase in specialized short courses in methodology, both quantitative and qualitative, worldwide. Almost all departments of political science now require methods training for all of their PhD students.

Thirty years ago, the focus was on statistical inference. While many still focus on that issue, the advances over the past 30 years have made the estimation of many complicated models quite easy. Today, there is an incredible revolution in data collection and measurement, and renewed interest in research design, especially as it relates to making causal inferences. There has been huge growth in thinking about experimental and quasi-experimental approaches to studying critical questions.

While qualitative and quantitative researchers often go their separate ways, there is surely renewed interest in what these two approaches have in common methodologically (and where they appropriately differ). In short, political methodology has been one of the great success stories of our discipline over the past 30 years.

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*See also* Causality; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Statistics: Overview

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factors contributed to create this delay, among which are the absence of a political theory of international migration, a lack of cohesion between macro- and microanalysis, and the fact that the problematics raised by migrations are constantly evolving.

The term *migration* refers to human mobility: A migrant is someone who has left his or her country of birth and who is living in another country. A *migrant* differs from a *foreigner*, the latter being defined juridically as a “nonnational.” There are internal and external migrations. Most international migrants are foreigners, and most foreigners are migrants, but not automatically so. Today, we are facing the second wave of world migration since the mid-19th century, when millions of Europeans left Europe for the New World to find work (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Latin America), to colonize and conquer (Asia and Africa), for trade, or as missionaries. The number of migrants (200 million, 3% of the world population) has tripled since 1970, and globalization, the transnationalization of networks, and push-and-pull factors have made individuals mobile internationally. Together, these factors challenge national borders, the sovereignty of states, and the notion of citizenship, which in turn affects international relations (IR) and political identities.

Most political science research that focuses on migration tends to deal with either the role of the nation-state in controlling its borders, the making of immigration policy, the impact of migration on sovereignty (including foreign and national security), or issues of citizenship (dissociation between nationality and citizenship, identity, allegiances, and political inclusion). Such research draws on several disciplines, including IR, public policies, and the sociology of political behavior. Research conducted within the field of migration studies takes two main directions: on the one hand, the study of flows (migration policies and comparative and international analysis), which focuses on macrolevel issues, and on the other hand, the study of stocks (on living together and political incorporation), which focuses mainly on micro-level issues. Placing emphasis on the existence/the study of social ties, some political scientists have proposed a “mesolevel” of analysis. Some problematics remain unexplored, and gaps in the

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## MIGRATION

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Migration is a topic that is characterized by an interdisciplinary approach, both theoretically and empirically. It crosses several disciplines, including demography, geography, sociology, anthropology, economy, history, and political science. Social scientists do not study migration from a shared paradigm but from a variety of competing theoretical viewpoints that are fragmented across disciplines. Migration emerged as a field of research in political science in the mid-20th century, and in the 1980s to 1990s, it had already become a major research topic. It is now one of the major political issues facing the 21st century. It has taken time for migration to acquire legitimacy as a research topic in the discipline. Several

research include topics such as emigration policies (rules of exit), the “diplomacy of migration” led by emigration countries, or the root causes of the establishment of regional or world migration systems. Many political scientists have studied the respective impact of political decision making and of other competing factors, such as economic liberalization and securitization, on the opening and closing of borders. Others have focused on the relation between citizenship and the political inclusion of migrants. However, only a few have analyzed the link between immigration flows, incorporation (integration) policies, and political behavior.

If migration has become an object of analysis encompassing local, regional, national, and international levels, it has also weakened the two central pillars of the international political system: (1) sovereignty and (2) citizenship. Migration brings anomie to the national and international realms, where the state would want to remain the exclusive actor. Nation-states are currently threatened from above by globalization and from below by multiculturalism. In the following sections, we will analyze to what extent migration, as it blurs the frontiers between sovereignty and citizenship, undermines the external and the internal political order.

### Migration and Sovereignty

#### *Difficulties of Border Control*

Despite the development of transnationalism, mainstream scholars have continued to view the state as a unitary and rational actor and to place it at the center of their analyses. The first question that is raised by migration in relation to the issue of sovereignty is linked to border control. Migration challenges the Weberian notion of sovereignty, in that it questions the relation between population, territorial space, and monopoly of power. In the past, many states viewed migration as a break of allegiances, and they fought against nomadism to control their territories. Today, several factors undermine state sovereignty, notably the inability of states to control the flow of illegal immigrants across their borders, the capacity of states to rule migrations through regional agreements and international rules, and the fact that heterogeneous populations and minorities now contribute to define national identity. In a context where the

vast majority of the world is sedentary, migration appears as an exception that has rapidly grown due to fluid exchanges (transportation, and information facilities and networks). The right to mobility is itself becoming a human value. The main difference between the first world migration wave of 1880–1920 and the second one of 1980–2000s lies in the border control of immigration and emigration countries. A century ago, it was as difficult for one to leave one’s own country (because borders were closed from inside) as it was easy for one to enter another country (because there were at that time only few controls and passports). The population was a state’s main resource, and its movement was either prohibited or strictly controlled. On the other hand, in countries of arrival, new populations were welcome to work and to settle. Now, the situation has reversed, even in countries such as the former USSR, China, and most Third World countries, where the change took longer to settle. Opened borders are now commonplace in countries of departure, which see emigration as a good thing for them. On the other hand, it has become very difficult to enter countries that are attempting to fight undesired immigration flows.

#### *Markets and Mobility Rights*

Liberal democracies in particular have difficulties in controlling immigration. The notion of sovereignty and its emphasis on upholding political order and a feeling of political community within borders is challenged by a liberal commitment to the free flow of goods, money, and people across borders. Migrations exacerbate the relations between states and markets: Sometimes the state is brought back in, and sometimes the gap between actual migration flows and migration policies deepens. James Hollifield has called this the “liberal paradox.” Pressure on immigration policy comes from numerous organized and contradictory interest groups such as political parties, trade unions, employers, associations of human rights, and countries of origin. However, it is difficult to conciliate control in democratic societies. Why, then, do states “risk” migration? They risk migration for economic, demographic, and human rights reasons (asylum). Why, on the contrary, do states close their borders? The states close their

borders to maintain internal political order and a welfare system as well as to accommodate public opinion. As noted by Myron Weiner, in a globalized world where states fail to fully manage migration and in which individuals are the main actors, the increase of international migration is viewed as a threat to security and stability. Although international and national rights set out a framework within which states control immigration, most democratic states eventually end up both failing to control borders and violating human rights principles and international conventions. At the European level, and through the use of buffer zones, states are developing regional migratory systems as well as externalized and remote controls of borders. Neighboring countries—which sometimes tend to serve as departure or transit countries—are becoming border guards. However, repression does not prove dissuasive, and states fail to fully control population movements. In fact, pull factors and networks are revealed to be stronger than the public policies of immigration countries. Some political scientists have formulated hypotheses about the political dimension of international migration. In particular, as they noticed that the “main gates” of entrance were closing and the “back doors” were opening to illegal immigrants, some, such as Aristide Zolberg and colleagues (1989), developed the idea that controlling the territory actually blurs the boundaries between the internal and the international political order. When migration for economic purposes is closed, illegal immigrants seek asylum, citing environmental concerns or family links as reasons for migration. As a result, they contribute to blur traditional categories of migrants. Such a mix-up is also caused by the fact that, depending on circumstances, illegal immigrants fit within various migrant categories. Even when poverty level and demographic pressure are high, they are able to build networks, without which there is no migration. They are also very active in campaigning for the recognition of the right to mobility as a “right to have rights,” as defined by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, and Zygmunt Bauman. Thereby, the right to mobility is seen as a human right in the process of being consecrated. An idea of migrations without borders is emerging that would be seen as a world public good and that could be managed through global governance on

the legal basis set out in international rules, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families of 1990. In such a system, multilateral decision making would guarantee well-balanced mobility. The human rights regime that is currently taking shape goes beyond states. It is a postnational regime within which international conventions will grant migrants an international legal status.

**Transnational Networks** Another factor that is currently challenging the sovereignty of the nation-state is the growing importance of social networks that link sending and receiving countries together. States are no longer the sole actors of international migrations: firms, individuals, and transnational communities bypass the regulatory authority of sovereign states. While the world is going through a process of individualization, states are experiencing deterritorialization. Transnational networks challenge the international order of nation-states. Not being able to control migrants, nation-states are not the most legitimate actors of IR anymore. The development of transnational economies led to the creation of transnational social links, and increased communications rendered national migration policies nearly obsolete. These policies are now challenged by networks and by migrants themselves. Alejandro Portes developed the notion of “transnational communities” to explain the logic of international migration flows and patterns of immigrant incorporation. While the international economy pushes for borders to be more open, internal policy pushes for their closure. As Saskia Sassen has observed, globalization has led to the rise of a structural demand for foreign labor and to a loss of border control. Demand for foreign labor is “structurally embedded” (Wayne Cornelius, 1994) in the more advanced industrial societies that cannot function without a cheap labor force. As a result, little space is left for states and national regulations, and the state is marginalized in its efforts to structure international migration. Transnational networks and transnational communities also contribute to strengthening economic globalization: Through remittances (\$300 billion in 2007), migrants become the main actors of development in their country of origin; ethnic entrepreneurship creates gray areas where goods, people, and money can circulate freely; family



reunification and transnational marriages represent half of the legal entries in most immigration countries, and ethnic minorities are a new factor of transnational citizenship. Diasporas and quasi diasporas collectively contribute to instill more fluidity in the world of nation-states and closed borders.

### *Blurred Boundaries Between Internal and External Political Order*

As Zolberg and his colleagues note, migration blurs the distinction between the internal and the external political order. The theory of globalization, which takes inspiration from the sociology of IR, introduces with migration a bottom-up analysis of the social texture of IR. It is well recognized that external factors may have an impact on internal political orders. For example, conflicts abroad affect refugees, displaced persons, and economic and demographic gaps; and environmental issues affect population movements. Receiving and sending countries often settle bilateral or multilateral agreements that can involve trading raw materials or labor force against legalization procedures, as was the case between Mexico and the United States. Along the same lines, France has been granting residence cards to elites of poor countries and promised development policies in exchange for the repatriation of illegal migrants. Some emigration countries such as Morocco, Turkey, and Mexico are now pursuing a “diplomacy of migration” with rich neighboring countries: Dual nationals, who became voters and were sometimes elected in immigration countries, are being used to influence and sometimes to intrude in some delicate matters such as the practice of Islam within host societies, plural allegiances, or multiple belongings of new citizens. The security approach to migration has contributed to an increasing mix of internal and external politics, leaving little space for state and national regulations while favoring regional agreements such as those addressing the security of European borders. Migration previously dealt with “low politics,” but it is now regulated through “high” IR politics, which traditionally deals with war and peace, national security, foreign policy, and regional equilibriums. However, pressures to put international migration higher on the IR agenda did not succeed before the late 1990s. Some IR theorists who were initially interested in

international security questions turned to issues related to population control and terrorism instead and began to assert that international population movements and transnational networks can have a dramatic impact on the security and sovereignty of states.

## Migration and Citizenship

### *Migrants as Political Actors in a Multidimensional Political Space*

With migration in the foreground, citizenship cannot be understood in its traditional context any more. Initial research introducing migration as a research object of political science focused on migrants as future citizens (from political acculturation to political participation); on migrants who were mostly concerned with politics in their country of origin, either because they were refugees or because, on the contrary, they hoped to return to their home country; or on migrants as politically alienated individuals, eventually involved in social mobilizations around housing issues or at work (politicization of nonpolitical matters). Such research was rooted altogether in sociology (theories of incorporation), economics (labor market analysis of migrants as short-term guest workers), and law (prohibition of any political expression for migrants coming from dictatorships or from former colonized territories). In the workplace, most migrants were integrated. They progressively gained equal representation in firms and trade unions, putting forward claims for freedom of association and for the right to political representation. In Northern European countries, where they were granted local political rights while still being denied full citizenship, migrants became, in Tomas Hammar’s term, *denizens*. Albert Hirschman’s (1970) treatise *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* illustrates this situation well.

### *Evolution of the Concept of Citizenship*

The notion of citizenship became part of the political analysis of migration in the 1980s. Since then, migration progressively altered the very content of citizenship, most notably through dissociating citizenship from nationality. Studies of the long-term settlement of immigrants in Canada and Australia, and, through comparative approaches,

in European countries, examined how far migration was altering the content of citizenship and to what extent citizenship was raising new issues in the field of migration. Field research showed that the emergence of migrants—mostly second-generation migrants—in the political sphere raised the questions of “membership” and “belonging” in immigration countries and of a “double presence” through immigration. Some years later, the idea of a “double presence” affecting citizenship (through double citizenship, multiple allegiances, and plural citizenship) could indeed be substituted for Abdelmalek Sayad’s concept of a “double absence” of migrant workers from both their home and host countries. As new nationals of immigrant origin take part in the local civic life, citizenship is seen more as a participative matter rather than being limited to the act of voting. This constitutes a return of the concept of citizenship as was understood during the French Revolution of 1789 (e.g., in the Constitution of 1793, participation in, and adherence to, the new ideals were considered more important than the question of whether one was or was not a national).

#### *Dissociation Between Nationality, Citizenship, and Dual Citizenship*

The dissociation between nationality and citizenship is the most important issue that has been raised by increasing migration and integration among European states. The granting of local voting rights to all foreigners in some Northern European countries followed by the granting of local voting rights to all European citizens living in a different European country (European citizenship) showed that one can be a citizen without being a national of a country, as a result of involvement in local political affairs. In the past, some nationals were not considered full citizens (colonial indigenous people, women, those condemned to prison or to death, the disabled, and soldiers). Approaches to citizenship have evolved through time, and citizenship and nationality have only recently been associated with the rise of the nation-state. The newly found importance of the local manifests itself through the emergence of the notion of “residence citizenship” and through the use of *jus soli* by immigration countries that needed to include the new citizens. In France, the “*beur*

movement” added meaning to the classical understanding of citizenship when it introduced the idea of “new citizenship.” “New citizenship” is a mix of localism, grassroots participation in inner-city communities, multiple allegiances, and respect for republican values while expressing collective claims to, and identification with, ethnicity and Islam. The idea is that one can be a citizen while being culturally different from other citizens. In the 1990s, most European countries faced widespread debates concerning the reform of their nationality codes. States reacted by introducing elements of *jus soli* into their nationality codes that traditionally rested on *jus sanguinis*. Rogers Brubaker theorized the relations between immigration and citizenship and showed that naturalization law and policies affect the rate at which newcomers are politically incorporated. *Jus sanguinis* immigration countries that were most reluctant to open their nationality codes to newcomers now offer some opportunities to include them as future citizens. In most cases, degrees of political rights and of incorporation can be pictured as a series of concentric circles: At the center are national citizens who are granted the whole range of political rights, and at the outskirts are illegal immigrants and asylum seekers who have no means of political action apart from holding hunger strikes or other protests on the streets. Even in a country such as Japan, which refuses to change its criteria for Japanese identity in order to preserve “racial purity,” the nationality code now includes various hierarchized categories of migrants. The transnational nature of migration has also led to situations of “dual citizenship,” with *jus sanguinis* being the rule in the country of origin of first-generation migrants and *jus soli* being applied in the country of birth of following generations. With such massive increases in migration, this concept of dual citizenship will develop throughout the world. New realities further stem from this context: Individuals now have plural allegiances to several political spheres; countries of origin attempt to increase their political power by using their own nationals who live abroad and who became citizens in the host country as a potential collective force; diasporic states use displaced persons and refugees living abroad as part of an “influence diplomacy.” New citizens (e.g., Latinos in the United States, Germans of Turkish origin in Germany, French from the so-called diversity in France, and

Commonwealth citizens in the United Kingdom) are cherished by most political parties, which are always in need of new voters to extend their political base. Indeed, these new citizens do not necessarily form a voting bloc based on ethnicity or other common identity. In that sense, Islam has somehow introduced new types of relationships between citizenship and religion, leading to a plural citizenship, related to two different nation-states, that created an alternative to voting on an ethnic or on a religious basis.

### *Multicultural and Transnational Citizenship*

Citizenship can no longer be understood in the traditional context of a unified culture. Some countries such as Canada and Australia, where citizenship used to be based on the myth of national homogeneity, have now included multiculturalism as part of the very definition of citizenship. As a result, ethnicity is now a constitutive part of the identity of host societies. In the same way as liberalism and multiculturalism are understood to be working hand in hand, citizenship is now necessarily linked to multiculturalism in countries with large immigrant populations. Over the past few decades, transnationalism has become an important conceptual approach, and, as noted by Rainer Bauböck, transnational citizenship is now accepted as characterizing most or all post-modern states. The nation-state is overwhelmed by such an expression of citizenship across borders: It is unable to both confront the political consequences of the world economy and respond to the challenge of ethnicity. As mobility becomes a way of life and as the free movement of people and cross-national relations intensify, new forms of transnational citizenship increasingly contribute to reshape traditional models of citizenship.

### *The Individual Migrant as an Actor*

At the international level, citizenship has also been transformed through the emergence of migrants as individual actors on the international scene. Migrants are at the cross-point between identities of states and blurred boundaries of territories. As they struggle to achieve their individual goals and to reshape their own life, they become "actors of the future" par excellence: They no longer feel doomed

just because they were born in a misgoverned and poor country. Through remittances, migrants also have an effect on the lives of individuals in their country of origin. Further, various transnational practices of migrants challenge the international order that was created by, and served to, nation-states with a large immigrant population.

At the internal level, the existence of discrimination and diversity complicate the issue of citizenship. Also, as noted above, Islam, which is a minority religion in most immigration countries, introduces a system of plural allegiances. This system differs from the former model of citizenship, which implied citizens' exclusive allegiance to the nation-state. Ethnic diversity breaks the myth of a homogeneous nation, in which citizenship would rest on a social contract and where cultural practices and values of citizens would only be expressed in a "private sphere," while the public sphere would be freed from such practices and values. Minority religions, poverty, and ethnicity often lead to discrimination. Discrimination in turn casts doubt on the effectiveness of declarative citizenship rights that neither question citizens' unequal access to rights nor their unequal treatment by institutions. Thanks to migration, diversity is seen as a value in itself that should be considered as an integral part of modern citizenship; and modern citizenship has become plural, transnational, multicultural, and antidiscriminative.

### **Migration and the Field of Political Science**

Migration, by nature, is multidisciplinary; thus, it took a long time for political scientists to include it as a legitimate political science object of study. Migration's main contribution to the field of political science lies in the way it challenges the state as the main actor that regulates borders, identity, and citizenship. Migration places individuals on the forefront: Through it, they become actors of IR. Transnational ties have become the most important networks, and migrants, who play an active role in managing mobility, have become multilateral decision makers. By creating new values for living together in a political community, migration enriches citizenship. Illegal immigrants are now campaigning for the consecration of a right to mobility as a human right. In a world of free movement and blurred borders, such a right

could be managed through global governance. Up until now, attempts to unify migration theories have failed because these theories rest on numerous and very dissimilar macro- and micro-approaches. When states failed to control borders and to prevent violence and religious extremism, they attempted to regulate migration through security approaches that came from the field of strategic studies. Migration, however, is an ordinary human phenomenon that has always existed and that should be studied through the lens of comparative approaches on “living together” in an interdependent and constantly changing world.

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*See also* Advocacy Networks, Transnational; Citizenship; Sovereignty

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## MILITARY RULE

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For most of human history, attaching “military” to “rule” would have been redundant, because almost all political regimes in large-scale societies of the premodern period fused military, religious, economic, and monarchical power. The separation of military and civilian powers and the development of professional, bureaucratic armed forces in European states in the 18th and 19th centuries gave birth to the contemporary understanding of military rule. The most useful definition of the term is a political regime in which the military as an organization holds a preponderance of power. Military rule in this definition is synonymous with military regime and refers to a subtype of authoritarian regime. Other definitions can be useful for exploring specific issues. For example, military rule is sometimes defined as a political regime in which the head of the executive is an active-duty member of the armed forces. Another definition restricts military rule to a regime in which the executive is ruled by a Latin American-style junta consisting of commanders of each of the branches of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the broad organizational definition given above is probably the most useful. It allows for the exploration of a form of rule that has been both common and—frequently—violently repressive. This entry discusses the following important issues related to military rule: the factors that lead to military rule; how militaries mobilize support and exercise power; why and how military rule comes to an end; and what sorts of political arrangements are most likely to diminish military rule, now and in the future.

Not all authoritarian regimes involve military rule. In the 20th century, the most repressive non-democratic regimes, most notably the Nazis in Germany and the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union, were party dictatorships in which civilian control of the military was well established. Other types of authoritarian rule distinct from military rule include traditional (e.g., absolutist monarchies) and personalistic or “sultanistic” regimes.

Military rule since the end of World War II has occurred almost exclusively in countries of the so-called developing world. Explanations of the phenomenon vary. Some scholars explain various

aspects of military rule largely in terms of political economy and specifically to the position of a given country in the global capitalist system as well as its domestic class structure. This is a hallmark, for example, of studies of “bureaucratic–authoritarian” military regimes or military rule marked by a high degree of state capacity both in managing the economy and demobilizing and repressing civil society. Other explanations rely more on geopolitical dynamics, including the international alliances within which military regimes are embedded. Studies of Cold War “clients” of the two superpowers, many of which were military regimes, are an example of this approach. A third perspective ascribes military rule to specific national and regional cultures. Finally, a fourth, institutionalist perspective sees military rule as an outcome of more or less rational and more or less historically conditioned responses to specific challenges of economic development and political legitimacy in the developing world.

### Origins of Military Rule

Militaries are part of the state apparatus but enjoy a high degree of relative autonomy because of their control over the means of coercion. (This control, while still significant in most places, does not necessarily represent a monopoly, owing to the prevalence of irregular armed forces in the developing world.) However, militaries do not constitute a monolithic, single actor. They are hierarchically divided between a high command, junior officers, and enlisted personnel, and horizontal competition and rivalry between the different service branches (typically the Army, Navy, and Air Force) can be intense. Further, they are often divided along class, regional, and gender lines (although militaries in most developing countries still allow very limited roles for women). In ethnically divided societies, variation in rates of military recruitment across the major ethnic groups can result in the armed forces being seen as constituted by, or representing, one ethnic group against others. All these divisions tend to be exacerbated when the military comes to power, and many military regimes have foundered due to their inability to manage them.

Modernization theorists, influential in the 1950s and 1960s, were initially confident that

the newly independent nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (as well as Latin America) would evolve into capitalist democracies, with civilian control over the military. These expectations were dashed by a wave of military coups d'état that reached its height in the 1960s and 1970s. The army was usually the most important actor in these actions. Uncovering the mechanisms of coups is difficult, since of course the necessity of surprise requires coup plotters to work in secret. Coups have been common in modern politics. One study claims that since 1945 there have been 345 successful military coups around the world (see Paul Collier, 2009, p. 8) on an average of more than five per year. But for each successful coup, there were several attempted coups and coup plots that were foiled before they could be carried out, making the phenomenon even more ubiquitous. Factors that have been associated with successful coups include acceptance of the coup by a hegemonic regional power, the military's cultivation of key civilian allies, the exploitation of the weakness or absence of the deposed leader, the speed and decisiveness of the coup, the seizure and use of the major means of communication to justify the coup and establish the new regime, and purges of opponents in the armed forces, the rest of the state, and civil society.

A key moment after a military coup is in the intervening weeks and months, when the new leaders establish their political regime. Military regimes are usually marked by one or more of the following characteristics:

- key political leadership held by military officers;
- the lack of central, civilian political control over the armed forces;
- the application of military law to civilians; and
- the threat or use of extrajudicial repression (such as torture, disappearances, and killings) by the state's security forces.

Military rule can be either temporary or long term. It can also revolve around a single strong man or woman and his or her followers or develop a more corporate and institutionalized ethos. The rise of military regimes elicited a reaction from modernization theorists, some of whom decried

the trend, while others identified the military as a preeminently “modernizing” institution and praised the armed forces’ allegedly unique capacity to achieve economic development and political stability. However, cross-national statistical work has not found a correlation between military rule and high economic growth rates. While examples of successful economic management, such as that of the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea (1961–1979) exist, there are also many examples of military regimes whose economic record is less than stellar.

Analyses of the rise of military rule in developing countries abound. Large-*n* empirical studies suggest that there is no direct correlation between the size of the military or its budget and its propensity to seize power. Further, the reasons for hierarchical coups (led by the high command) tend to be different from those for coups led by junior officers (those with the rank of, or equivalent to, Army captain or below). Rather more useful is the distinction between factors internal to the armed forces, domestic political variables, and international influences. In the first category, violations of military hierarchy by civilian politicians, an expansion of the military’s capacity and/or sense of mission, and a heightened sense of threat can all trigger coups. With regard to domestic politics, high degrees of political conflict (especially ethnic and religious conflict), economic crises, weak political parties (especially right-wing parties), and low-capacity state institutions have been observed to precede military takeovers. Significant in this category is also the image of the military in national politics and in particular the degree of popular identification of the military with certain positive national values. Internationally, the threat of or defeat in war, foreign political and military assistance, and an enabling international environment, including military rule in neighboring countries and international recognition of military regimes, can facilitate coups. A “cascade effect” has been observed in some regions, whereby military rule, first established in a single country, occurs elsewhere in subsequent years, leading to cooperation between military regimes. (For example, the 1964 coup in Brazil was followed by a coup in 1966 in Argentina, coups in 1973 in Chile and Uruguay, and again in Argentina in 1976.)

In general, there has been a shift in recent decades away from macrohistorical explanations of military rule to studies that emphasize the importance of contingency, strategic interaction, and short-term factors. Nevertheless, much recent work suggests that an important structural variable is causally connected to the rise and decline of military rule: superpower competition during the Cold War. Large amounts of military assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union strengthened military capacity within allied or “client” states. Within the U.S. sphere of influence, the increased emphasis on internal security threats in the wake of the Cuban Revolution (1959) contributed to an increase in direct military involvement in politics. Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, there has been a marked decline in the number of military regimes in the developing world. This decline had already begun during the so-called third wave of democratization that started in the mid-1970s, continued with the fading of the Cold War in the 1980s, and extended into the post-Cold War period of the 1990s and 2000s.

### Mechanisms and Impacts of Military Rule

Militaries are hierarchical organizations that specialize in the deployment of violence, so it is often assumed that militaries rule by force and force alone. However, military rule often involves complicated attempts to secure some measure of consent from the governed. Some military regimes, for example, have permitted elections to national and subnational representative bodies. Others have used judiciaries, of varying degrees of independence, to approximate or simulate the rule of law. Still others have promulgated, and sometimes actually adhered to, constitutions.

Unsurprisingly, empirical studies suggest that military regimes are likely to increase military budgets more than their civilian counterparts. Similarly, they tend to engage in more human rights abuses than do civilian regimes. Military rulers usually confront a “coercion problem,” in which they not only require security forces to engage in repression but also need to monitor those security forces, something they can do in

different ways, each of which has costs. When it comes to regime legitimation, most military rulers take pains to present their intervention in politics as being compelled by some sort of crisis (of corruption, economic instability, succession, or the like) and carried out strictly in the service of the nation. "Nation building" has often been a key goal of military rule in the developing world. In several instances, military regimes lacked a legitimating ideology of their own, describing their rule as a temporary interlude necessary for restoring "order" before restoring power to civilians. This led Juan Linz (1974) to call such instances of military rule "authoritarian situations" rather than "authoritarian regimes."

Military rule increases the probability of subsequent military coups and attempted coups. The rewards of direct rule often increase competition and conflict within the armed forces. Some military regimes attempt to manage this competition by, for example, allocating the spoils of office equitably between the different service branches. (This was true of the 1976–1983 military regime in Argentina.) Other military regimes carefully monitor and purge personnel within the armed forces and/or the state as a whole.

Military regimes have also been linked to militarism or the glorification of war and military prowess. Many military leaders see politics as a continuation of war by other means. This leads them to resort to force in the resolution of conflicts. Military rulers may also demand that civilian organizations develop hierarchical and disciplined configurations along military lines.

Such demands can backfire. Some military regimes have inadvertently stimulated a flowering of oppositional cultural and political activity, as artists, students, religious leaders, dissidents, and others express themselves in new ways in opposition to the authoritarianism inherent in military rule. The attempted imposition of martial standards of behavior on recalcitrant populations can produce rare moments of political electricity in which large numbers of people are united in defiance of the generals. The popularity of Fela Anikulapo Kuti (1938–1997), the outspoken musician and critic of military rule in Nigeria, or the participation of many of the most popular artists of the day in the "direct elections now" campaign (*diretas-já*) in Brazil in 1984 are cases in point.

Such groundswells of cohesive, broad-based opposition usually dissolve once military rule has ended, however.

### Transitions From Military Rule

Most military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s became civilian in subsequent decades. Analysts distinguish between regime liberalization, or the lifting of repression and the restoration of various civil liberties, and democratization, or the reestablishment of a civilian multiparty regime with accompanying democratic rights. There is some debate over whether the first process leads inevitably to the second. Regime transitions presided over by the military, in which democracy is the ostensible end goal, have been especially problematic because militaries have tended to periodically interfere in the process in order to produce their desired outcome. An example of this is Nigeria, where the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993) initially promised to return the country to civilian rule by 1990, pushed that deadline back to 1992 after a coup attempt, and then annulled the presidential elections of 1993. The Babangida "transition" ended in a coup led by General Sani Abacha in 1993.

Alfred Stepan (1988) makes the important distinction between the military as government (usually a president and his advisors), the security forces, and the military government (the chain of command of the active-duty military). He argues that the long, complicated transition to civilian rule overseen by the Brazilian military regime (1964–1985) involved a tacit pact between the first and third of those organizations with moderate opponents of the regime. Hardliners in the security forces and radical opponents of military rule were both marginalized in a transition marked by a high degree of institutional conservatism and continuity of political leadership.

Military regimes have ended in a variety of ways. Some have collapsed after a failed military adventure (e.g., Greece in 1974 and Argentina in 1983) while others managed to negotiate their way out of power through the use of formal or informal agreements (an example of the former is the 1984 Naval Club Pact in Uruguay). In an unusual example, the Chilean military regime (1973–1990) was voted out of office in a 1988 plebiscite scheduled

in its 1980 Constitution; this was followed by a 1989 election that restored civilian rule. The usual combination of mechanisms for establishing or reestablishing a civilian rule after a military regime is a collapse or insurrection, a pact, or holding of elections. Examples of all these mechanisms, including transitions that involved all three, can be found in the historical record. Not all transitions actually lead to civilian rule, of course. Military regimes are sometimes replaced by a new version of the same type of regime, as in Nigeria in 1993, when General Abacha replaced General Babangida.

Military prerogatives established under military rule can outlast the military regime itself. These prerogatives include army control over the police and/or a role for the military in internal public security; a special responsibility for “law and order” or the rule of law being bestowed on the armed forces in the constitution, giving it constitutional cover for political intervention; a fixed allotment of the national budget for the military; higher salaries for military officers than other state officials; control over the intelligence apparatus; control over civilian activities (such as civil aviation); economic privileges (such as special export–import licenses, direct control over state-owned firms, and the like); and military veto power over various decisions beyond national defense. An important question that can be asked of any civilian regime established after military rule is which of the state activities need military approval? The answer in some new democracies would comprise a lengthy list. Stable civilian rule is not synonymous with the reduction of military prerogatives, and indeed civil–military peace is sometimes purchased at the price of not reviewing or reforming any of these authoritarian enclaves or legacies of military rule.

### Politics and the Future of Military Rule

In recent decades, there have been strong international pressures to civilianize military regimes and to avert or roll back military coups. The end of the Cold War and economic globalization have created an environment in which overt military rule is less accepted than it was in the past and in which military interventions and military regimes are more likely to falter or fade than they would previously. “Failed” coup attempts in Guatemala in 1993, Paraguay in 1996, and Ecuador in 2000 are

cases in point (the degree of their failure is open to interpretation; in some instances, such as in Ecuador, coup participants did succeed in ousting an elected president). Similarly, the desire for admission into the European Union (EU) has led the Turkish military, which has engaged in frequent military interventions in the last few decades, to engage in a new kind of restraint in its interactions with civilian politicians. Another example is that of Pakistan where the regime of General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008) was eventually replaced by an elected civilian regime. Despite these trends, the increased emphasis on security in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attack in the United States has enhanced the possibilities for militaries to engage in authoritarian “solutions” to political problems around the world. The military may therefore remain a powerful force behind the scenes in many different regimes.

There are few overt military regimes today. Even in Burma (Myanmar), which has been ruled by a military junta since 1962, the generals spoke of the possibility of elections in 2010. Similarly, the Thai military coup of 2006 that toppled Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra did not lead to a long-standing military regime. Elections were held at the end of 2007, and the military rule lasted for only 16 months. Military rule established after a coup in the West African country of Guinea (Conakry) in December 2008 also appears destined to be replaced by a civilian regime.

Debates exist as to how best to institutionalize civilian control over the military, once military rule is over. Some scholars assert that limiting militaries to a classic external defense role is the best recipe for success. By forbidding the military to engage in internal roles such as drug interdiction, social welfare programs, the building of infrastructure, and the like, civilians will curb, the reasoning goes, the military’s temptation to abuse its power and intervene in politics. Others take the opposite view and argue that expanded internal missions for the armed forces are healthy for democracy, in that they enhance the military’s image, focus officers’ minds on the country’s problems, and diminish the chances of coups. Others go beyond this particular debate to point to the importance of the development of civilian expertise on defense matters—not only in the Ministry of Defense and parliament or Congress but also in civil society.



The recent discussion of “hybrid” regimes (regimes with mixed authoritarian and democratic characteristics) is relevant to the analysis of military rule. While coups and overt military rule are less prevalent now than in the past, military influence is more likely to be exerted in subtle and disguised ways, as civilian state institutions are “hollowed out” and military forces take their place. Protected democracies, with strong military prerogatives and effective military veto power over issues outside national defense, are more common today than conventional military regimes.

The recent diminution of military rule in the developing world has been a significant and welcome development. Nevertheless, the international and domestic political circumstances that helped foster this transformation are not necessarily permanent. If military rule has become a kind of political taboo in international circles, the military’s control over the means of coercion still gives it significant power. This power could become more overt than it is now in moments of crisis. It is therefore too early to write the obituary for this type of regime.

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*See also* Authoritarian Regimes; Democratization; Hybrid Regimes; Regime (Comparative Politics); Security Apparatus; Transition; Violence

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## MILITIAS

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The term *militia* can have multiple meanings ranging from the legal to the historical, but in general, it denotes a military force composed of ordinary citizens. A militia may be used to provide defense, law and order, or security during emergencies. It may be a way for the state to fulfill a legal obligation to provide defense activities to protect a community, its territory, property, or laws. In some countries or cultures, a militia may consist of volunteers who are able-bodied citizens, including women, whereas in other countries or cultures, it may be a reserve force composed of citizens/soldiers. It can also be a private, nonstate force with or without government sanction. The term *militia* can also refer to a national police force, as in Nazi Germany or in former communist states such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. This entry discusses the empirical meaning of the concept and the phenomenon and the role of public and private militias in a number of countries.

#### Definition and Early Examples

Etymologically, the term *militia* is derived from the Latin *miles*, implying soldiers; the suffix *itia*

denotes a state, activity, quality, or condition of being. Hence, the term *militia* (*miles* + *itia*) implies a military service. Although the classical Latin meaning of *militia* implied soldiers in service of a sovereign or a state, today it means “a military force raised from the civilian population of a country or region, especially to supplement regular army in an emergency, distinguished from mercenaries or professional soldiers” (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 2002). It is important to distinguish *militia* composed of professional soldiers in paid service from those made of persons giving voluntary or unpaid service on an ad hoc basis.

Its history can be traced back at least as far as the early colonial period in the United States, when there were many examples of groups of able-bodied males who were ready to fight in any emergency. In fact, the *militia* was the first permanent armed military force in the 13 colonies. George Washington, then adjutant general of the Virginia *militia*, called on the *militia* to respond to a frontier Indian attack. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation (1777) stated,

Every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined *militia*, sufficiently armed and accoutered and shall always provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.

Similarly, *militia* turned out with great alacrity in Maryland and Pennsylvania, where they performed the role of internal police and looked out for people with suspect allegiances. *Militias* continued to be raised following the Revolutionary War but often lacked traditional military values. Officers were commonly selected on the basis of popularity rather than their military training, experiences, or ethos. The public was also reluctant to support the *militia* through taxation. The *militia* was seen as a peacetime army outside civilian control. For instance, in 1794, a *militia* comprising about 13,000 people was raised by President George Washington to quell the Whiskey Rebellion in the state of Pennsylvania. In 1802, the federal academy at West Point was established to rectify some of the flaws in the training of the *militia* and to inculcate in them a greater sense of discipline.

After the end of the U.S. Civil War, the role of “policing the southern states” fell to provisional *militia*. A significant number of these troops were black, and constant tension prevailed between the official and unofficial, permanent and ad hoc, white and black, and male and female sections of the *militia*. In 1903, a *Militia Act* was passed that allowed various states to maintain a reserve military force known as the National Guard. Their primary job was to assist the soldiers and the military police. It was composed of able-bodied men in the age group of 17 to 45 years. Today, the age limit for enlistment with no prior service is 35 years for the Army National Guard and 40 years for the Air Force National Guard. For the Army and Air Force National Guards, the maximum age for enlistment for those with prior service is 59 years, as long as the member has enough years of prior service to be able to complete 20 years of creditable service for retirement by 60 years of age.

### Militias in the Contemporary World

The role of the modern *militia* can be seen both as a service and as a duty. It can be organized or unorganized. There are also private *militias* formed of nonorganized individuals based on their own concept of *militia*. In Austria, the multiple *militias* became affiliated with certain political parties after World War I. For instance, the Heimwehr (Home Defense) became affiliated with the Christian Socialist Party. In Canada, too, the term *militia* was associated with the reserve force of the Canadian Army in earlier times. Today, Canadian *militias* have no official standing but are essentially private armies. In China, there were *militias* of varying abilities. Their prime motto was to seek certain concessions from the British rulers during the colonial period, such as inheritance, property, or marriage rights for the indigenous peoples. In Denmark, the Danish *Militia* played a crucial role in repelling an attack from Sweden on Copenhagen in 1659. In Iran, the Basij *Militia* founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in November 1979, shortly after the removal of the Shah, was composed of 90,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 reservists. Today, it has more than 11 million members.

Similarly, in Iraq, we find several armed *militias* engaged in defending their respective cultures and

territories along with neighborhoods from any type of insurgency. They are like the vigilante groups functioning in underpoliced areas in some parts of the United States of America. In Sri Lanka, the militias were formed by the kings for military campaigns both within and outside the island. In 2004, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) claimed to establish an auxiliary force to help in rehabilitation, construction, forest conservation, and agriculture besides serving as a reserve force. However, with the defeat of the LTTE at the hands of the Sri Lankan Army, it ceased to exist in early 2009.

Quite surprisingly, the Swiss militia, at one time comprising 33% of the total population, had only 2.7% in 2004. It is composed of voluntary participants, including women. Article 59 of the Swiss constitution has a provision for militia known as *militardienst* in German, *militaire* in French, *servizio militare* in Italian, and *servetsch militar* in Rumantsch.

From service-oriented groups, militias have evolved into groups with the right to defend or protect. People engage in militias in response to a call-up by any person aware of the threat requiring the response. Even a single person or a group of people can take the responsibility of defending the community. As such, there cannot be any minimum size of the militia in this general sense.

### Private Militias

Private militias are armed groups of civilians not necessarily recognized by the federal or state governments. Today, about 50% of the states in the United States of America forbid private militias to parade and exercise in public, though the formation of private militias is not forbidden per se.

In the United States, some private militias participated in the tax protestor movement during the 1970s and 1980s. Today, the militias may support presidential candidates and oppose certain political parties or pressure groups. Other private militias in the United States have expressed sentiments against globalization and the “new world order” and are often right-wing extremist groups whose leaders consider the U.S. federal government illegitimate. It is difficult to estimate the number of U.S. militia groups; however, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a civil rights group that monitors hate

crimes, estimated that militia groups existed in 20 states in 1994, 42 states by late 1995, and all 50 states by 1996. The SPLC has also reported a resurgence in “patriot groups” or militias and other extremist groups that see the federal government as their enemy.

Even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan are said to be relying on illegal militia, often run by warlords responsible for human rights abuses and drug trafficking. NATO is said to be using private militias not only to guard their camps and convoys but also for “black ops.” These militias function outside Afghan law, which bans unlicensed armed groups. Many of them compete with the state authority and are usually run by former military commanders responsible for antisocial activities. Many governments are now financing private militias as alternative power structures to fulfill their short-term security needs, but this practice can have very bad repercussions in the long term. Once the private militias are financed and armed, it becomes difficult to disarm them, and those hired to provide security can become the very source of “new threats” to the state by indulging in antisocial activities.

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*See also* Military Rule; Police; Security Apparatus; Security Cooperation

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## MISSPECIFICATION

Misspecification is a fundamental problem in empirical modeling. The origins of this problem can be found in the theoretical exercise of using a statistical model from a sample to make inferences about an unobservable population of interest. Any deviation from the true population model in the sample model means that the sample model is misspecified. This, in turn, means that the inferences from the sample model about the population are suspect.

The importance of problems of misspecification is underscored by the amount of attention paid to different types of misspecification in introductory texts on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. As an example, consider Damodar Gujarati's widely used textbook, *Basic Econometrics*. Gujarati's treatment of OLS is centered around 10 assumptions of the linear regression model. Six of these 10 assumptions are statements that the model does not contain one or more types of misspecification.

Discussed throughout this entry is misspecification in OLS. The logic and importance of misspecification in OLS extends directly to other, more complicated types of models. Almost all such models contain some equation that indicates the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is dictated. Getting this equation wrong means that the model is misspecified.

As the Gujarati example shows, misspecification can take on many different forms. In the sections that follow are discussions of several of the most common forms of misspecification, the detection of statistical problems caused by misspecification, and strategies for avoiding misspecification.

### Types of Misspecification

The purpose of empirical model specification is to try to develop an accurate model of relationships in an unobservable population with observed sample data. In OLS, we can represent the population regression model as

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i$$

and the sample regression model as

$$Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \hat{\beta}_2 Z_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i,$$

where  $Y$  is the dependent variable;  $X$  and  $Z$  are the independent variables,  $\hat{\alpha}$ ,  $\hat{\beta}_1$ , and  $\hat{\beta}_2$  are sample estimates of the population parameters  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta_1$ , and  $\beta_2$ ; and  $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$  is the sample estimate of the population stochastic term  $\varepsilon_i$ .

If any element of the population model is not appropriately represented in the sample regression model, then the inferences about the population model from the sample model may be problematic. The entry now turns to more in-depth discussions of four of the most common forms of misspecification.

### Omitted Variable Bias

One of the most common critiques of empirical work is that the authors have left a relevant independent variable out of their model specification. This problem associated with this critique is known as "omitted variable bias." For example, if the population regression model is

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i$$

but the sample regression model is specified as

$$Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i,$$

then there is a strong possibility that the sample model is prone to omitted variable bias. To illustrate the nature of this problem, consider what happens to the parameter estimate for the effect of  $X$  on  $Y$ ,  $\hat{\beta}_1$ . In summation notation, the OLS formula for this parameter estimate is

$$\hat{\beta}_1 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X})(Y_i - \bar{Y})}{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X})^2},$$

and because one of the properties of OLS is that the resulting regression line (or plane in the case of a model with two independent variables) goes through the mean of each variable, we know that

$$(Y_i - \bar{Y}) = \beta_1 (X_i - \bar{X}) + \beta_2 (Z_i - \bar{Z}) + (\varepsilon_i - \bar{\varepsilon});$$

we can see that the expected value of  $\hat{\beta}_1, E(\hat{\beta}_1)$ , under these circumstances is

$$E(\hat{\beta}_1) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X})(Z_i - \bar{Z})}{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X})^2}.$$

Any time the expected value of the parameter estimate is not equal to the population value, we have a biased estimator. In this circumstance,  $E(\hat{\beta}_1) = \beta_1$  only if

$$\beta_2 \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X})(Z_i - \bar{Z})}{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X})^2} = 0,$$

and this will occur only if either one of two things is true:

1. The covariance between  $X$  and  $Z$  is equal to zero,

$$\text{COV}_{XZ} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X})(Z_i - \bar{Z})}{n} = 0.$$

2. The true impact of  $Z$  on  $Y$  is equal to zero,  $\beta_2 = 0$ .

If neither of these conditions holds, then the estimated impact of  $X$  on  $Y$  is biased due to the omission of  $Z$  from the model.

### Unnecessary Extra Variables

In the previous section, we saw the problems that can occur when a variable that should be in a model is left out. The problem of “unnecessary extra variables” is the reverse of the problem of omitted variable bias, in the sense that variables that are not in the unobservable population model have been included in the sample model. Note, however, that we do not call this problem a form of “bias.” This is because the presence of unnecessary extra variables does not bias the estimates of the parameters for variables that should be in the model. Instead, the impact of unnecessary extra variables is that they artificially drive up the model’s  $R$ -squared statistic and chew up extra degrees of freedom.

For example, if the population regression model is

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i$$

but the sample regression model is specified as

$$Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \beta_3 W_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i$$

the inclusion of the variable  $W_i$  in the model is unnecessary.

### Wrong Functional Form

Another common form of misspecification occurs when the model specification fails to properly take into account the underlying relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.

For example, if the population regression model is

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i^2 + \varepsilon_i$$

but the sample regression model is specified as

$$Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \hat{\beta}_2 Z_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i,$$

this model will not give us an accurate estimate of  $\beta_2$ .

### Failure to Include Interactions

Political scientists have increasingly become aware of interactive relationships. Although researchers frequently expressed their theoretical ideas about the relationships between variables in a way that implies interactive relationships, they have often failed to specify their models as such.

For example, if the population regression model is

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \beta_3 X_i Z_i + \varepsilon_i,$$

the sample regression model is specified as

$$Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i.$$

### Detecting Misspecification

Detecting misspecification is not an easy process. There is no direct way of testing for all types of model misspecification. Instead, there are a variety of different ways to test for specific symptoms of misspecification. Most of the procedures for doing this involve visual and/or statistical examinations

of the estimated stochastic components or residuals after the original model has been estimated. These tests amount to using residuals,  $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$ , to make inferences about the unobserved population stochastic components,  $\varepsilon_i$ .

*Tests for Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity*

The use of numerical tests for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity has become standard practice. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are often symptoms of model misspecification (although this is often overlooked). Consider, for instance, Gujarati’s discussion of the sources of heteroskedasticity (pp. 389–391) and autocorrelation (pp. 442–448). Each of the eight sources of heteroskedasticity (failure to account for learning processes, failure to account for income differences, failure to account for improvements in the measurement of data across settings, outliers, incorrect model specification, failure to account for skewness, incorrect data transformation, and incorrect functional form) and each of the eight sources of autocorrelation (inertia, excluded variables, incorrect functional form, the cobweb problem, failure to include lags, improper manipulation of data, improper transformation of data, and failure to account for nonstationarity) can be classified as a type of model misspecification.

The general logic of these tests is best seen through a discussion of the omega ( $\Omega$ ) matrix. The  $\Omega$  matrix contains the expected covariation between population stochastic components across observations,

$$E(uu') = \Omega = \begin{pmatrix} \text{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_1) & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_n) \\ \text{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_1) & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_n) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \text{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_1) & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_n) \end{pmatrix},$$

which can be rewritten as

$$E(uu') = \Omega = \begin{pmatrix} \text{var}(\varepsilon_1) & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_n) \\ \text{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_1) & \text{var}(\varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_n) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \text{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_1) & \text{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \text{var}(\varepsilon_n) \end{pmatrix}.$$

Two of the assumptions that are implicit in the use of OLS are that of no autocorrelation and that of no heteroskedasticity. A general expression of the assumption of no autocorrelation is

$$\text{cov}_{\varepsilon_i, \varepsilon_j} = 0 \quad \forall i \neq j,$$

which means that we do not expect to see evidence of covariation between any pair of population stochastic components. A general expression of the assumption of no heteroskedasticity is

$$\text{var}_{\varepsilon_i} = \sigma^2 \quad \forall i,$$

which means that we do not expect to see evidence of unequal variance across population stochastic components. If both of these assumptions hold, then

$$\Omega = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma^2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma^2 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & \sigma^2 \end{pmatrix},$$

which can be rewritten as  $\Omega = \sigma^2 I$ .

The  $\Omega$  matrix and the assumptions that we make about it are important because they are used to estimate the variance of OLS parameter estimates,

$$\text{var}(\hat{\beta}) = (X'X)^{-1}X'E(\Omega)X(X'X)^{-1}.$$

If we make the OLS assumptions about the stochastic component, then this means substituting in  $E(\Omega) = \sigma^2 I$ . We can then substitute in

$$\hat{\sigma}^2 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{\varepsilon}_i^2}{n - k}.$$

Because we use  $\text{var}(\hat{\beta})$  to test our theoretically derived hypotheses about the relationships between variables, if our assumptions about no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity are invalid, we run the risk of falsely accepting or falsely rejecting the null hypothesis and thereby arriving at faulty conclusions about our causal theories.

Because of the importance of knowing about the presence of evidence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, there are now a wide range of statistical tests that can be used to diagnose these problems. All of these tests, either implicitly or explicitly, use information from sample model residuals contained in  $\hat{\Omega}$  to make hypothesis-testing inferences about  $\Omega$ . Most of these tests do so by looking for specific forms of autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity.

For instance, tests for first-order serial autocorrelation in time-series data look for evidence that  $\varepsilon_t = \rho\varepsilon_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ , which would show up in an  $\hat{\Omega}$  matrix as

$$\hat{\Omega} = \sigma^2 \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho & \rho^2 & \dots & \rho^{n-1} \\ \rho & 1 & \rho & \dots & \rho^{n-2} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \rho^{n-1} & \rho^{n-2} & \dots & \rho & 1 \end{pmatrix},$$

while tests for spatial autocorrelation test the hypothesis that

$$\hat{\Omega} = \sigma^2 \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho_{12} & \dots & \rho_{1n} \\ \rho_{21} & 1 & \dots & \rho_{2n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \rho_{n1} & \rho_{n2} & \dots & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Tests for heteroskedasticity test the hypothesis that

$$\Omega = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma_2^2 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & \sigma_n^2 \end{pmatrix}.$$

**Tests for “Unnecessary” Variables**

There are a variety of different statistical tests that are designed to help researchers decide whether or not they should add one or more variables to their model specification. These tests follow the logic that if the new variable or group of variables does not significantly increase the explanatory power, then they are unnecessary

and therefore should not be added. While these tests can be helpful guides for keeping a model specification parsimonious, the discussion in the section “Omitted Variable Bias” should not be forgotten when considering the usefulness of these tests.

One of the most common tests along these lines is an *F* test, for which the null hypothesis is that the  $R^2$  statistic for a model is not improved when one or more new variables are added to the specification. This test statistic is calculated by going through the following steps:

1. Estimate the original model, which we’ll call Model 1, and obtain the  $R^2$  statistic from this model,  $R_1^2$ .
2. Estimate the original model with the new variable(s) included, which we’ll call Model 2, and obtain the  $R^2$  statistic from this model,  $R_2^2$ .
3. Using the  $R_1^2, R_2^2$  statistics, the number of degrees of freedom from Model 1 ( $k_1$ ) and from Model 2 ( $k_2$ ) to calculate

$$F_{k_1, k_2} = \frac{(R_2^2 - R_1^2)/(k_2 - k_1)}{(1 - R_2^2)/(n - k_2)}.$$

**Correcting for Misspecification**

As discussed above, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation get a lot of attention in books and classes that introduce OLS regression models. In practice, most empirical researchers tend to view heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as statistical diseases that can be cured by statistical procedures such as feasible generalized least squares (FGLS; discussed in the following section). This type of cookbook approach is popular, but it has come under attack in recent years. As noted above, most of the sources of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are one form or another of misspecification. When these symptoms of misspecification are “cured” by FGLS, opportunities may be missed.

**FGLS Procedures**

In the presence of evidence that  $E(\Omega) \neq \sigma^2 I$  many scholars turn to a set of procedures known as FGLS. The logic of FGLS procedures is to diagnose the specific type of violation of the OLS assumptions about  $\Omega$  by estimating  $\hat{\Omega}$  and then to

correct for them by using the estimated nature of the problem contained in  $\hat{\Omega}$ .

In regular OLS, the matrix algebra formula for the parameter estimates is  $\hat{\beta}_{OLS} = (X'X)^{-1}X'Y$ . With FGLS, this formula becomes

$$\hat{\beta}_{FGLS} = (X' \hat{\Omega}^{-1} X)^{-1} X' \hat{\Omega}^{-1} Y.$$

The formula for the variance of the parameter estimates is

$$\text{var}(\hat{\beta}) = (X'X)^{-1} X'E(\Omega)X(X'X)^{-1}$$

in both models, but  $E(\Omega) = \sigma^2 I$  in OLS.

It is worth noting that with real-world data, we never see  $\Omega$  but we make inferences from our OLS estimates of  $\hat{\Omega}$ . When we find evidence of violations in the OLS assumptions about  $\Omega$  in our estimated matrix  $\hat{\Omega}$ , we use FGLS to correct them. This is a leap of faith from  $\hat{\Omega}$  to  $\Omega$  and is worth keeping in mind as we use it to adjust our estimates.

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*See also* Interaction Effects; Logit and Probit Analyses; Model Specification; Nonlinear Models

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have been practiced since the beginnings of the social and related sciences and before the complex construct *mixed-methods research* was conceived. It could be argued that in the first half of the 20th century, the combination within one research project of what was subsequently referred to as qualitative and quantitative research was not unusual, at least for well-known studies such as Samuel A. Stouffer and colleagues' *American Soldier* (1949), Theodor Adorno and colleagues' *Authoritarian Personality* (1950), and most types of psychometric measurement and scaling procedures during this time. Only in the 1990s did researchers begin to systematize this research approach and design to the extent to which it became explicitly and systematically studied and applied. In this second wave of conceptualization and application, Abbas Tashakkori, Charles Teddlie, John Creswell, Julia Brannen, and Alan Bryman were most influential in establishing this type of research design. It is often proclaimed that a third generation of mixed-methods studies is about to emerge. Some optimistic predictions include the replacement of mono-method studies by mixed-methods studies, research becoming more ethical or democratic due to the integration of different methods and perspectives, the ability to access a phenomenon under investigation objectively due to the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, and new ways of conceiving, collecting, and analyzing data that are no longer identifiable as qualitative or quantitative in nature. The field of mixed-methods research is indeed changing, but the third generation is most likely to rectify some of the simplifications and misconceptions that have established themselves in the past 3 decades, due in part to various attempts to establish separate, that is, qualitative and quantitative "paradigms" and the resulting incompatibility thesis. This entry discusses definitions, forms, applications, and further developments of mixed-methods research.

### Nomenclature

Although now well established, the use of the term *mixed-methods design* is not ubiquitous. One contender is *methods triangulation*. A shortcoming of this term is that it implies only studies in which the results of the qualitative and quantitative parts

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## MIXED METHODS

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Variants of mixed-methods research design, that is, the combination of qualitative and quantitative components within one single research design,



converge or verify each other. Under certain circumstances, this may indeed be of interest, but there are other possibilities of mixing methods unrelated to triangulation. Another alternative is using words such as *combining*, *blending*, *synthesizing*, or *merging* instead of *mixing* because, strictly speaking, qualitative and quantitative methods are not mixed but rather combined in different ways and for different purposes. Despite these alternative proposals, *mixed-methods research design* is now the accepted nomenclature for this kind of design.

Two related designs should be mentioned briefly. Multimethod design is the label given to research designs that combine at least two different quantitative or two different qualitative methods within one research project. Accordingly, a multimethod quantitative design consists of at least two distinct quantitative components, while multimethod qualitative design consists of distinct qualitative components within one research design. Finally, mixed model design describes a research design that combines quantitative and qualitative components across all phases of the research process, where it ostensibly is no longer possible to clearly distinguish between the qualitative and quantitative contributions to the overall research results. However, it is questionable whether the research components that most authors refer to in this context can indeed be clearly attributed to the quantitative or qualitative component. Thus, mixed model design is best used for research designs where the quantitative and qualitative components are intertwined such that they are no longer clearly separable or where the line of demarcation between quantitative and qualitative research components becomes indistinguishable.

### Justifications

Among the many interrelated reasons listed in the literature on the improvement of mixed-methods research on mono-method research designs are that some research questions are better answered by using the strengths of qualitative and quantitative research approaches; mixed-methods designs may help control for a methods bias inherent in mono-method approaches, and results from different methods may cross-validate each other; a combination of methods may allow for a greater diversity

of theoretical and empirical approaches or it may contribute to a more holistic perspective on a given research problem; and mixed-methods designs may improve the ecological and external validity as well as the internal consistency of a study. Most reasons, however, can be summarized into three families: (1) convergence, (2) complementarity, and (3) holism.

### Convergence

The first set of justifications for a mixed-methods research design relates to the traditional idea of methods triangulation, where researchers use qualitative and quantitative approaches to cross-validate their findings. For instance, clinical interviews often aim at verifying whether the score of a formal psychometric test converges with clinicians' assessments. In voting participation studies, researchers may use semistructured interviews to assess the convergence of the interview data with the responses in a survey on various reasons for the types and degrees of political participation. Given that survey or test items are structured such that respondents merely take position to the researcher-generated items, and given that in a semistructured or clinical interview, interviewees are able to present their own perspective on a particular issue, a convergence of these two sets of data may indeed contribute to the triangulation and thus validation of research findings.

### Complementarity

The second set of justifications for employing mixed-methods research design relates to the idea that different methods may contribute additional insights into a phenomenon under investigation. In this sense, the qualitative and quantitative parts complement each other to produce a particular answer to a research question. In other words, the results would not have emerged from employing either a qualitative or a quantitative approach. For instance, before a standardized scale can be established, the phenomena underlying the scale may have to be explored in a nonstandardized, exploratory manner. This procedure is well established in measurement theory in psychometrics, and it is also often applied in question and questionnaire design. In this sense, political scientists

may want to first explore the way in which members of a population of interest think and behave in relation to political participation before selecting different survey items for their study. Alternatively, the same researchers may find interesting or surprising relations between variables during their statistical analysis. Rather than engaging in post hoc hypothesizing, it may be interesting to also conduct a few exploratory interviews to help generate explanations or hypotheses for future studies.

### *Holism*

A number of important texts on mixed-methods design go as far as to claim that the ultimate goal of mixed-methods research should be the examination of a particular phenomenon from all possible positions, be it all theories potentially suitable for the investigation of a phenomenon, all data available, or all possible analyses of these data. Starting from the argument that qualitative and quantitative methods have different strengths and weaknesses relating to ontology, epistemology, axiology, the ability to identify general causal laws, and so on, their combination may help draw from the strengths of one to offset the weaknesses of the other types of methods. Detailed analyses of all relevant data from all possible theoretical positions and with all possible analytic methods ostensibly produce many different pieces of information. Sometimes the metaphor of a puzzle is used in this context. If assembled correctly, the different results produce objective findings, that is, findings that are devoid of any form of bias. In this context, John Brewer and Albert Hunter refer to not only two kinds of principal research methods—qualitative and quantitative—but four: (1) fieldwork, (2) survey research, (3) experimentation, and (4) nonreactive research. Within this framework, fieldwork would provide ecologically valid and testable hypotheses relating to a phenomenon under investigation, survey research would examine the extent to which the phenomenon is generalizable, experiments would determine the causes of the phenomenon, and in the nonreactive portion of the research, investigators would examine “naturally occurring” data, that is, data unbiased by the data collection process. In the end, all theories, data, results from analyses, and different interpretations ought to converge. However, it is unlikely that collecting

many data sets, employing all possible methods, and subjecting data collection and analyses to all possible theoretical frameworks will lead to a single valid answer to a research question. Thus, this third family of reasons for employing a mixed-methods design is reminiscent of pre-Popperian positivism. Holism is unlikely to lead to successful research outcomes, because, among other reasons, research methods do not combine in the manner envisioned by their proponents and because such an undertaking would be impossibly complex, expensive, labor intensive, and unfocused.

### **Forms of Mixed-Methods Research Designs**

Creswell and his colleagues have specialized in the identification of various forms of mixed-methods design. For illustrative purposes, only three families of mixed-methods design are covered here.

#### *Sequential Mixed-Methods Design*

Sequential mixed-methods design includes at least one qualitative and one quantitative research component, which take place in a temporal sequence. For example, the exploratory investigation of appropriate wording or phrasing of survey questions in the form of semistructured interviews implies a sequence of data collection and analysis, that is, exploratory interviews, analysis of the interviews, wording and phrasing of survey questions using some of the findings of the interviews, and, finally, the survey research. It is also possible to use survey research and interviews in a reverse order, that is, analyze survey data and, based on some of the findings, conduct exploratory or semistructured interviews, which may help in interpreting some of the findings from the statistical analysis of the survey data. The findings from these interviews could lead to a further link in the sequence by, for instance, formally testing some of the hypotheses that emerge from the post hoc interviews.

#### *Concurrent or Parallel Mixed-Methods Research Design*

Concurrent or parallel mixed-methods research design describes a family of approaches, which include relatively separate qualitative and quantitative strands within one research project. Focus

groups or nonparticipant observations may produce data for qualitative analysis on political decision making with a given set of stakeholders. The link of these findings to their voting records or responses on surveys may be fruitfully explored in a convergent or complementary mixed-methods framework.

### *Nested Mixed-Methods Design*

Nested mixed-methods design describes a set of designs in which either the qualitative or the quantitative part of the research project is nested in the quantitative or qualitative part, respectively. For instance, the main part of a study may focus on a specific group of people who refuse to vote. A dominant, qualitative research design may focus on identifying the dimensionality of their justifications for nonvoting as well as alternative forms of political participation. The embedded quantitative part of the research may quantify the extent of the phenomenon under investigation as far as this is possible with available data, for example, nonvoting among a specific subgroup of a population and its relations to demographic characteristics.

### **Fields of Applications**

The uptake of mixed-methods research design varies tremendously between the social and related sciences as well as between the different fields of interest within the disciplines. Currently, the most frequent applications can be found in education, public health, nursing, sociology, media studies, management studies, and evaluation. Interestingly, political science and psychology are currently underrepresented in this emergent design, even though, in principle, both have well-developed qualitative and quantitative traditions. Other fields not represented due to a traditional preference for qualitative or quantitative methods are social anthropology, social work, gender studies, geography, and economics. It could be argued that these disciplines are still engaged in the oft-proclaimed paradigm war, where proponents on both sides are still attempting to argue the overall superiority of one type of method over another. With the rise of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research, however, more researchers are likely to embrace mixed-methods research designs within and across disciplines. The few published examples that can

be found on topics relating to political science include reception studies of political campaign messages, political alienation of voters, gender and political power, social justice in relation to action research, and appropriateness of welfare policy in different contexts.

### **Limitations and Misuses**

The mixed-methods research design has numerous limitations. First, it is a far more complicated research design than a mono-methods design. Not only do researchers have to engage in qualitative and quantitative research—and most empirical researchers are not specialized in more than one family of methods—but they also have to combine results in a convincing way. Even or especially when research teams work in groups divided by methods competence, the combination of results may turn out to be nearly impossible because of the lack of communication skills and understanding between them. Second, unfocused research often leads to different data collection and analysis possibilities. Rather than finding or deciding on a well-focused research question, many researchers and especially research teams prefer to leave options open and, thus, believe that a mixed-methods design gives them the justification and tools to pursue unfocused research. What often results from this is a number of disparate research results around a research theme. This, however, is not mixed-methods research. Third, it is often believed that a mixed-methods research design can bridge the gap between different epistemological and ontological positions. This, too, is not the case because it does not make sense to frame the qualitative part of the research in a constructivist framework and the quantitative part in a (post-) positivistic framework. At fault here are the problematic assumptions underlying qualitative and quantitative research, which were, in part, a result of the influence of French social theorists on qualitative research from the 1970s. Fourth, and connected to this point, is the claim that the mixed-methods research design is a third paradigm and separable from qualitative and quantitative paradigms. It is questionable whether the use of the term *paradigm* is suitable for the tremendous variability within the family of qualitative methods or quantitative methods. As, on closer

inspection, it is extremely difficult to describe the core characteristics of all qualitative methods, on the one hand, and of all quantitative methods, on the other, stating that mixed-methods research is systematically different due to its ability to deal with heterogeneous theoretical and empirical approaches is unconvincing to some researchers. Fifth, many texts on mixed-methods research inadvertently and often unintentionally defend the use of this design to obtain more valid (in the problematic sense of objective and positivistic) research results. Some of the better known forms of biases may indeed be detected, using different analysis methods. However, much of the current literature on this design subordinates qualitative exploratory research to quantitative research and formal hypothesis testing. It thus practically neglects the possibility of conducting mixed-methods research in a constructivist and exploratory framework.

### Conclusion

Mixed-methods research design is a label that applies to a large family of research designs that can integrate diverse theoretical and empirical approaches in empirical research and evaluation. It is suitable for all social and related sciences but not to all research questions. Some research questions will remain best answered with a well-focused mono-method design. The answers to other research questions will be enriched by the possibilities of linking qualitative and quantitative methods. But the mere application of a method that is both qualitative and quantitative to explore a research topic is a necessary but insufficient condition for mixed-methods research. In practice, the flexibility of this design leads many inexperienced researchers to conduct unfocused research. However, due to its flexibility and capacity to enrich both mono- and interdisciplinary research, it is not surprising that this type of research approach and design has enjoyed so much popularity throughout the history of the social and related sciences. Now, at the end of the second generation of mixed-methods research, which mainly aimed at incorporating assumptions about the possibilities and limits of mono-method approaches, documenting different types of mixed-methods design, and cataloguing good-practice

examples, the next generation of mixed-methods literature is likely to turn away from carrying baggage left over from the paradigm wars and attempting to address some of the inconsistencies by referring to a vague form of pragmatism. Instead, mixed-methods research is likely to become even more dominant in applied research within and between fields, playing out its strength particularly in inter- and transdisciplinary research.

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*See also* Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

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## MOBILIZATION, POLITICAL

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Political mobilization is the process of organizing groups, social networks, crowds, and social units for political goals. Challengers to the status quo mobilize to redress grievances and for reforms when conventional political institutions fail to

respond. Regimes mobilize to realize a political program, subdue adversaries, and counter mobilization by challengers when they need popular support. Resources for mobilization are manpower and funds (often from volunteers), commitment and solidarity of supporters, and shared beliefs and values. By mobilizing, a group gains power against an adversary. Political goals tend to be collective goods whose attainment in large groups entails organization costs and free-rider tendencies, as Mancur Olson (1965) theorized for interest groups and voluntary associations. When political mobilization is countered by the authorities with repression, obstacles are even higher. Nevertheless, in a 1990 empirical study of political mobilization by 53 challenging groups in the 19th- and 20th-century United States, William Gamson found that the Olson theory is a useful starting point for explaining both conventional lobbying and unconventional modes of collective action. Charles Tilly (1978), Anthony Oberschall (1993), Sidney Tarrow (1994), Bert Klandermans (1997), and Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (1987) have added key insights, terms, and processes to the theory that have increased its explanatory power.

There are hundreds of empirical studies of political mobilization in particular instances, many of ethnic and religious minorities around the world and many others of advocacy groups (e.g., environmentalist, feminist, and antiabortion). Two core dimensions that provide theoretical coherence to these studies are micromobilization and mobilizing structures.

### Micromobilization

Micromobilization explains participation with five pivotal variables:  $P$ ,  $V$ ,  $N$ ,  $S$ , and  $C$ :

$P$  is the expected probability of success for collective action;

$V$  is the value of the goal, collective good, or issue for the participant (e.g., justice for a minority);

$N$  is the expected number of participants or contributors;

$S$  is the selective incentive or personal benefit from participation; and

$C$  is the expected cost of participation.

The theory hypothesizes that for participants,  $P$  times  $V$  (value expectancy or benefit) plus  $S$  is greater than  $C$ ; that is,  $PV + S - C > 0$ .

$V$  is distributed in a population from the most positive values (true believers) to most negative (opponents).  $V$  is not necessarily a personal experience—for example, justice for a minority may be valued by some who are themselves not targets of injustice.  $V$  is fought over in the court of public opinion by adversaries who package issues in media frames for persuasive communication. Framing situates and connects events, people, and groups into a meaningful narrative in which beliefs and explanations are communicated persuasively using metaphors, catchphrases, and symbols. It colors judgment about the truth of beliefs and legitimacy of causes.

$N$ , the expected number of participants, enters the expression because both  $P(N)$  and  $C(N)$  are a function of  $N$ : Expectation of success increases and expected cost decreases (“safety in numbers”) with the number of participants.  $P$  and  $C$  functions, called production functions, are not linear with  $N$ . Their shape varies with the type of collective action and other circumstances, and they influence the strategies and tactics of confrontation used by the adversaries. Some tactics require only small numbers of participants for achieving what participants define as “success”—for example, a vigil by dissidents. Others require huge numbers, sometimes in the hundreds of thousands, to achieve success, as in the case of a petition drive or a demonstration. *Critical mass* is a number or range of turnout at which the participants and opponents judge the collective action to be successful. Turnout is therefore contested by the adversaries, who engage in a battle over numbers in the court of public opinion.

$S$  stands for rewards and benefits that are obtained by participation that free riders don’t get. For challengers,  $S$  tends to be social, moral, and ideological rewards of standing up for a cause.  $C$  is the cost in time and resources of contribution to collective action and expected cost due to social control such as arrest and marginalization. In contrast, regime mobilization is well placed to lower  $C$  and increase  $S$  with material and political benefits to supporters. At an extreme, repressive regimes target adversaries, with license to their followers to attack and loot ( $S$  is positive) adversaries without police interference ( $C$  is zero).

The five variables are socially constructed by the challengers and their adversaries during contention and confrontation. If  $V$  is a collective good such as nondiscrimination legislation, the motivation for  $V$  comes for varied social psychological reasons: anger at injustice, belief that justice for all is a moral imperative, solidarity with an oppressed group, personal experience of discrimination, and others. Activists argue and publicize their cause through moral and ideological appeals to increase  $V$ . Because social and political movements have limited resources to provide tangible, selective incentives for participants, they build a sense of community among kindred souls that makes participation itself a source of satisfaction (increase  $S$ ). Ritual, drama, and entertainment provided by rock bands and celebrities sharing the stage at mass gatherings build a sense of community and reward those who turned out with a memorable public spectacle that free riders don't get. Survey research on participants in diverse settings has found that such moral appeals and selective incentives overcome free riding and boost participation.

To apply micromobilization, consider dissidents in a repressive regime. There are few members ( $N$  is low). They mount a vigil or some other symbolic protest in a crowded square during rush hour. Only a few participants are needed to unfurl a banner or hold up signs before they are arrested ( $C$  is high). They define success as visibility to many people and the media:  $P$  as a function of  $N$  increases steeply and is close to 1 for small  $N$ . A dozen well-placed protesters can do it; two or three may not be enough; more than a dozen does not add to visibility and leads only to unnecessary arrests.  $V$ , the value for them of standing up for freedom or a cause, is very high.  $S$  consists principally of the respect and social standing earned among their peers for courage. Thus,  $PV$  plus  $S$  minus  $C$  for small  $N$  can be positive for the vigil. Contrast symbolic protest to a petition campaign in a democratic society. Signing the petition is close to cost free to the signer. For success,  $N$  has to be large (possibly tens of thousands) for a positive effect on the public, the media, and legislators.  $P$  as a function of  $N$  is a  $J$  curve. Because  $S$  for signing is low, organizers may give away a free pen or sticker with an icon as a token to boost  $S$ . Because many signers are needed, the organizers can't simply sign up the high- $V$  public but must

appeal to the mid- to low- $V$  sympathizers through advocacy and create high  $N$  expectations. Opponents will attempt to confuse the public by claiming that the petition has all sorts of hidden costs and undesired consequences:  $V$  is not what the advocates claim, and there are negative  $C$ . These are two quite different modes of political mobilization, in two very different political settings, for which micromobilization applies. Other types of collective action have their own production functions, such as for demonstrations, inclined  $S$  shape, and  $P$  increasing with  $N$ , then decreasing beyond a critical mass. Whether one analyzes petition drives, strikes, marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, building occupations, selective buying campaigns, contributions for a cause, or vigils, the same five-variable micromobilization model for participation in collective action is salient.

### Mobilizing Structure

Olson assumed that obtaining a collective good voluntarily in a large group requires considerable costs of organizing and that collective good incentives are not sufficient for participation. Coercion is needed for supplying collective goods. Coercive powers such as a state enjoys with compulsory taxation is, however, beyond the reach of voluntary groups.

The 1960s witnessed an outburst of social and political movements in the United States and Western Europe that succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of participants in large populations: the civil rights movement; the anti-Vietnam War and other peace movements; youth and counterculture movements; environmentalist, feminist, and ethnic minority movements, and so on. Empirical study of these movements discovered a variety of mobilizing structures that were omitted in Olson's theory. Large populations are not made up of isolated persons who had to be recruited at a considerable cost by a large organization. On the contrary, many populations are thick with associations, communities, groups, and networks. There exist structures with leaders, members, internal links, communication networks, and resources for collective action, such as African American churches and the student governments in historically black colleges in the South. The leadership and members of such groups committed to political goals in the

1960s (e.g., ending segregation) and joined local autonomous units such as churches or campus student associations into a federated overarching structure called a social movement organization (SMO), as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee became. Preexisting structures make federation into an SMO possible. "Bloc" recruitment takes place; that is, blocs of persons already networked and sharing an identity are recruited, instead of individuals one at a time. Shared identity activates a "grievance multiplier" ( $V$  increases) when a perceived injustice to a member of a group or category is experienced as a collective injustice by others as well. Resources such as funds for action campaigns, leadership training centers, volunteer programs, and the like are provided by nonbeneficiary "outsiders" who are moved by their values and conscience to support a cause. Federated structures, bloc recruitment, grievance multipliers, and nonbeneficiary support lower organization costs and weaken free-rider tendencies.

Other research on the anti-Vietnam war and New Left student and counterculture movements found that dynamic mobilization emerges during confrontations in a loose structure that adapts to opportunities against opposition. Loosely structured collective action characterizes a coalition of activists, part-timers, and sympathizers whose boundaries are ill-defined and shifting; who lack a shared, central leadership and organization; and who use the mass media as a tool for communicating to potential supporters in lieu of a strong grassroots base. In a loose structure, mobilization costs are kept low through a division of labor that links a small leadership cadre of full-time activists to a much larger pool of part-time teams who contribute their presence episodically in short-lived campaigns for a cause—for example, a campus sit-in. Supporting them is a larger "conscience constituency" that contributes funds and public opinion support. Beyond them is a much larger bystander public that is attentive to the issue but initially indifferent or nonpartisan. Loose structure makes for low-cost mobilization and flexible tactics as the leadership responds to its adversary's moves: shifting from confrontations with transitory teams to legislative lobbying, to fund raising for the next confrontation campaign, and peaking with a massive peaceful gathering for

which the conscience constituency and bystanders are mobilized in addition to the activists.

The effectiveness of political mobilization has been empirically studied, most completely in the Netherlands with respect to new social movements (NSM), such as the peace, women's, and environmental movements. Public opinion polls measure the sentiment pool for an issue and identify the sympathizers. When activists organize a campaign for a petition, a march, or other collective action, survey research measures what proportion of sympathizers was reached, was motivated to act, and actually participated. The overall effectiveness of the campaign can thus be measured as well as that of various targeting tactics such as door-to-door canvassing, telephoning, media appeals, and so on. Further statistical analysis clarifies the effects of  $V$ ,  $S$ ,  $C$ , and  $P$  and  $N$  on participation and which components of mobilizing structure are effective. Hanspeter Kriesi (1993) compared the effectiveness of mobilization across five NSMs and compared NSM mobilization with that of political parties and trade unions. Among his conclusions is that political values,  $V$ , are the crucial determinants of the level of mobilization.

### Diffusion

Large-scale collective action has taken place in autocratic regimes that curb opposition and has on occasion toppled regimes long thought to be powerful, as in Eastern Europe in 1989. How can tens of thousands of people coordinate their actions without a central organizing mechanism? Protests spontaneously spread from the capital to other cities and from one country to another, and the authorities were helpless to stop the diffusion. Diffusion was also typical in the 1960s movements of the United States, when students seized campus buildings at many universities after the initial Columbia University student protests in the spring of 1968, the Harvard protest a year later, and the diffusion of the African American sit-in movement in 1960 throughout the South.

To understand diffusion, further specification of underlying mechanisms for micromobilization and mobilizing structures are needed: focal point, repertoire of collective action, signaling, pacesetter-follower dynamics, political opportunity, and assurance or uncertainty reduction. Focal point is

the key to understanding coordination of action with only minimal communication and without leadership. It requires common knowledge embedded in political culture—for example, knowledge by citizens that in the past, for momentous political events, crowds gathered at a certain date in a historic square demanding freedom or reforms. They also know what flags, songs, and other symbols to carry and sing, signaling unity of commitment and purpose. The shared symbols and behavior codes that are embedded in the political culture and well known to participants is called the *repertoire of collective action*. The important matter is that not only do most people know the focal point and repertoire, but they also know that others know the same thing and will respond in the same way to “when and where we all assemble, and what we do there.”

The contemporary protest repertoire par excellence of large crowds is the demonstration and march that winds its way through the major avenues and landmarks of the capital city. Repertoires create expectations for the adversaries and bystander public and provide some predictability for action; yet some spontaneous actions also take place. New repertoires are invented and tailor-made for specific purposes.

Collective action depends on expectations for  $P$ ,  $C$ , and  $N$ , which are uncertain. To trigger convergence on a focal point and activate the repertoire, what is needed is a political opportunity signal to many people simultaneously that  $N$  is expected to be large,  $P$  is increasing, and  $C$  is decreasing. The signal might be a lack of support for a regime by an important ally, as when the Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev signaled in 1989 to East European communist regimes that they were on their own, or a successful challenge in neighbor states, as when Prague crowds witnessed the collapse next door of the East German regime. When political opportunity is judged to be favorable, a potential participant who estimates  $P$ ,  $C$ , and  $N$  has some assurance that he or she will not be at the demonstrations with only a few others. Research has shown that an assurance process takes place in neighborhood, peer, work, and civic groups whose members communicate with one another and build confidence and commitment to participation. The assurance process has also been conveyed in recent years on websites, through cell phones and e-mail,

text messaging, and other modes of electronic communication. Assurance reduces uncertainty, which inhibits collective action. Thus, the turnout is thousands, not just a few.

When protest starts at a focal point, it diffuses to other places and social units with pacesetter–follower dynamics. By virtue of history, culture, and geography, a mobilizing structure has a center–periphery structure: What happens in the capital is a wake-up call to provincial cities, and what happens at a prominent university campus triggers followers in peripheral colleges. Diffusion is explained by changing expectations about  $P$ ,  $C$ , and  $N$  by potential followers depending on the outcome of confrontations at the pacesetter and at other sites that have already acted. The diffusion dynamic explains the spatial and temporal sequence of collective action because proximity and similarity are salient signals for expectations. The waxing and waning of participation at a particular site, be it the center or periphery, can also be thus modeled.

### Violence Specialists

Much political mobilization researched in the 1960s through the 1980s was that of social and political movements using unconventional modes of collective action that were by and large nonviolent. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been many insurgencies for the overthrow of a government by violent means and terrorism. In response, regimes mobilized paramilitaries and special forces that not only fought armed enemies but assaulted the civilian population suspected of sympathy with the opposition. The issues at contention were state formation, secession, political autonomy, and power sharing in ethnically deeply divided societies. Research has found that micro-mobilization and mobilization structure models explain insurgent and regime mobilization in violent conflicts.

Ethnic and religious communities provide a mobilizing infrastructure of ethnic associations, kin networks, churches, mosques or temples, religious schools, funding and welfare organizations, an ideology, a shared culture, and leaders. Insurgents, fighters, and terrorists are recruited, trained, armed, and indoctrinated within this infrastructure, get social support, and are shielded from the authorities. Resources are obtained from



external sponsors, including states that provide weapons, funding, safe places, and bases across a border. Just as for peaceful movements, the Internet, websites, and electronic modes of communication have made loose mobilizing structures possible.

Studies of insurgents and terrorists cannot rely on survey research with participants and on other routine social science methods. Nevertheless, court records from trials, interrogations of captured militants, informers, captured data from computer hard drives, and confessions from those who give up insurgency enable one to piece together the contours of micromobilization and mobilizing structure. Marc Sageman (2004) reports that for more than 400 Al Qaeda terrorists, the conversion to jihad was not a solitary decision but came about through interpersonal relations and with social support. Jihadists formed links with others like themselves and congregated in the same mosques, students associations, neighborhood clubs, and Islamic bookshops and often lived together. In these local communities, they became radicalized militants who advocated the violent overthrow of corrupt Arab regimes and other Islamist causes. These findings are in line with existing models and theories.

Mobilization of regime by violence specialists for ethnic cleansing, mass purges, and killings rests on a four-legged structure: (1) a radical elite and cadres running a party-state, (2) bands of armed militants and paramilitaries, (3) core constituencies who vote for the regime and keep it in power, and (4) a bystander public swayed or confused by propaganda. The armed bands, who perpetrate much of the violence against civilians, are recruited, organized, financed, trained, and indoctrinated by political parties and state security forces. The pattern is top-down mobilization by the regime elites for violence specialists and bottom-up for the core constituency and bystander public. The armed bands become distinct and privileged formations that serve the regime more reliably and loyally than the regular police and army. Their members are attracted by the racist and extreme nationalist ideologies of leaders who manipulate perceived threats, fears, and hate against target groups, often minorities. Although opportunists are attracted by the prospects for loot (*S*), many are convinced by propaganda that

their cause is patriotic and morally justified (*V*) and that a preemptive strike against unarmed civilians of the target groups is actually saving their society from subversion and destruction. An example is the Interahamwe village militias organized by "Hutu Power" leaders in the Rwanda genocide. Similarly, paramilitary bands in the Yugoslav Wars were organized by political parties, criminal groups, local crisis committees, and the authorities and were responsible for much ethnic cleansing and massacres of civilians.

According to Donald Horowitz (2001), studies of ethnic, religious, and sectarian riots around the world (e.g., Hindu-Muslim riots in Indian cities) found a similar pattern of top-down, bottom-up mobilization as for insurgents and for regime mobilization. Political parties, factions, individual politicians, extremist organizations, and secret societies organize criminal gangs and train young men and women for fighting; these people are in the forefront of rioting, burning, and looting shops and attacking innocent people. These bands are joined by ordinary people who attack a target group, burn their homes and shops, and commit atrocities in passionate killings.

Elaborations of micromobilization and mobilizing structure models have to be made in these applications. The social psychology of motivation for a suicide attacker is going to be more complex than for a petition signer or a protest marcher. Clandestine insurgent organization is going to be different and more complex than a legal association that advocates a clean environment. Nevertheless, the five pivotal variables (*P*, *V*, *N*, *S*, and *C*), focal points, signaling, uncertainty reduction, diffusion dynamic, loose structure, external allies, and other key terms and processes in political mobilization are useful for theory development for all manner of mobilization, covering both democratic polities and autocratic regimes, by regimes and by opponents of the authorities, using unconventional modes of contention and confrontation, both nonviolent and violent.

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*See also* Collective Security; Common Goods; Participation; Parties; Social Movements; Violence

### Further Readings

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## MODEL SPECIFICATION

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Model specification refers to the process of expressing a theory in mathematical (functional) form. The choice of model specification affects the validity of causal inferences. Arguably, severe specification errors impede the validity of inferences more than the choice of a suboptimal estimator. Yet applied researchers rarely follow a strategy when trying to develop and potentially improve the specification of their model. Rather, the choice of a model specification usually depends on a crude mixture of what is common in the field of research, methodological fads, and individual intuition. Misspecification occurs when the assumptions underlying an empirical analysis deviate from the true data-generating process. Nonrandom sampling, measurement error, model uncertainty, and a lack of independence of observations rank most prominently among the sources

for model misspecification. Since researchers hardly, if ever, know the true model, most models analyzed in the social sciences will, necessarily, be misspecified. The most common misspecifications result from insufficient theoretical guidance. The resulting model uncertainty usually implies that researchers do not know the correct set of regressors (independent variables), their optimal operationalization, or the accurate functional form. This entry discusses the origins and types of specification problems and reviews the standard solutions to misspecification. The entry concludes with a discussion of the way in which researchers deal with specification issues.

### Model Uncertainty

Model uncertainty results from underspecified theories. In the social sciences, theories aim at simplifying reality, therefore making generous use of *ceteris paribus* clauses and of highly stylized assumptions. In other words, theories neither provide full guidance about model specification to applied researchers nor do they aim at providing such information. Usually, they do not say much about which variables to include in the list of regressors, which functional form relates the right-hand-side variables to the dependent variable, the existence of conditional effects, and the existence and correct specification of temporal and spatial dependence. This section discusses the resulting specification problems in turn.

#### *Model Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis*

Model uncertainty has multiple origins; it occurs when researchers do not know the correct set of right-hand-side variables, the correct functional form that relates the dependent to the independent variables, the correct structure of conditionality between exogenous variables (those whose values are independent of the states of other variables in the system under study), and/or the causal dependences between exogenous variables, to mention just a few model uncertainties. Logically, researchers need to start with identifying all exogenous factors that influence the variation of the dependent variable across observations. Both the inclusion of too few or too many regressors may cause bias and will render inferences potentially invalid.

Assume, as an example for the “too many” case, that researchers intend to estimate the effect of income on vote choice but include the vote intention into the model. Since vote intentions depend on structural factors such as income and education, the inclusion of the vote intention variable causes right-hand-side endogeneity (i.e., regressors may not be independent of the dependent variable or the error term; see below). If this endogeneity is not correctly modeled, it makes the correct interpretation of results impossible. Indeed, the vote intention variable will capture much of the influence of income and education on vote choice, but researchers cannot separate the two causal mechanisms unless they estimate a simultaneous equation model or unless they drop vote intention from the list of regressors, hoping that income and education fully determine vote intentions.

In the absence of perfect knowledge of the true set of explanatory variables, researchers may conduct a sensitivity analysis to validate inferences. A sensitivity analysis distinguishes three types of explanatory variables: (1) the variable(s) of interest, (2) consensual determinants, and (3) contested determinants. Researchers then follow a quasi-Monte Carlo approach in which they estimate a large number of models, which always include the first two sets of variables and randomly draw a fixed number of “contested determinants” (typically three) into each single model. While methodologists agree on the structure of these sensitivity tests, they disagree on the criterion under which an effect may be considered to be robust. Suggestions include the condition that an effect is robust if and only if the estimated coefficients of all iterations have the same sign and remain significantly different from zero. A more generous definition ignores the significance criterion. Finally, an even more relaxed definition of robustness in sensitivity tests accepts an effect as robust if it generates the same sign in 95% of the iterations. Unfortunately, none of these criteria are fully convincing since the estimation will almost certainly be misspecified in a large number of the iterations. For example, when (at least) two regressors are highly correlated, the parameter estimate will become inefficient, and the point estimate can produce almost any result. As a consequence, sensitivity analyses are telling when they bring about robust results, but they are not when they do not. If a hypothesis does not find

robust support, it is not necessarily wrong. There may just have been too many misspecified models among the iterations.

### *Functional Form and Conditionality*

Exceptions may exist, but the huge majority of social science theories do not predict the functional form of an effect. The absence of theoretical guidance stimulates empirical researchers to simply assume a linear function or to take the logarithm of either the independent variable alone or of both the independent and dependent variables. While this arbitrariness gives researchers some influence over estimation results, the true functional form can greatly differ from all the above standard assumptions. Curve fitting offers an obvious, but inherently a theoretical, way to deal with this problem. Adding the squared term and possibly the cubic term (and so on) of a variable to the list of regressors allows for a sufficiently unconstrained functional form that allows the right-hand-side variables to “fit” the variance of the dependent variable. Yet curve fitting not only leads to overconfidence because it shrinks standard errors, but it can also result in vastly wrong estimates if the functional form is not the only specification problem. In the presence of other misspecifications, the higher power terms will undoubtedly pick up some variance of the other specification problem, thereby vastly increasing the bias of the estimate.

Whether or not a variable influences the dependent variable often depends on certain conditions. For example, the response to international tax competition depends on the degree to which political institutions, other political actors, and the voters constrain the government. Failure to model conditionality has the same consequences as omitted variable bias and biases at least the conditional variables. Researchers can easily mistake a misspecified functional form or an omitted variable for conditionality, as these misspecifications have very similar consequences for the residuals. If researchers cannot distinguish between a misspecified functional form and an unmodeled conditionality, a semiparametric analysis of the potentially misspecified variables may help. In such an analysis, researchers estimate a model using dummies of different combinations of variables  $x$  and  $z$  rather

than including the two variables and their product separately. For example, if both variables  $x$  and  $z$  can be conveniently split into three categories (low, middle, and high) each, researchers either include these nine categories and estimate without intercept or include eight of the nine categories and estimate with intercept.

### *Incomplete Models and Unit Heterogeneity*

Omitted variables usually reveal their existence in the form of structure in the residuals, suggesting that the Gauss-Markov conditions have been violated. Panel data help detect structure in the residuals because errors must be simultaneously independent and identically distributed across both space and time, which is more demanding than the same assumption for either simple cross-sectional or single time-series data. While structure in the residuals indicates model misspecification, it reveals little about the true causes of model misspecification. For example, in panel data, the sum of residuals for a single unit often deviates from zero. Econometricians interpret this structure as unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity, which is but one of the possible reasons. However, this violation of Gauss-Markov conditions can result from most types of model misspecification, including omitted time-varying variables, a wrongly specified functional form, unmodeled conditionality, and so on.

Panel data textbooks suggest a radical “solution” to the problem of panel heteroskedasticity (i.e., unequal variance in the regression errors). When the estimated model does not fully explain the cross-sectional variation, econometricians suggest completely ignoring all cross-sectional variation (the so-called between variation). However, this common solution may lead to an improvement as well as a deterioration in the *ex ante* validity of causal inferences. In fact, inferences tend to become less reliable when the eliminated variation largely exceeds the remaining variation. In this case, the decline in analytical efficiency reduces the *ex ante* reliability of the analysis more than the potential decline in bias improves the validity of the analysis. In addition, when the model omits both time-varying and time-invariant variables, the elimination of all between-variation may actually increase the bias from the omitted time-varying variable.

### *Dependence*

Regression models assume independent observations. Yet strict independence appears illusory in the social sciences, where individual action usually depends on past actions (temporal dependence) and on what other actors do or have done in the past (spatial dependence). As a consequence, most social science data sets violate the assumption of independence. Fortunately, this problem can be solved or at least moderated. Solutions to the problem of dynamic misspecification require the existence of time series. To account for temporal dependence, researchers would usually need to observe at least 30 sufficiently independent periods per case. The more within-variation can be collected, the more reliable the results eventually will become. If it is possible to gather sufficient variation over time, temporal dependence can be modeled in numerous ways ranging from serially correlated errors through the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable or a Prais-Winsten transformation, distributed lags models to more demanding models involving panel co-integration. The choice of the optimal dynamic specification for solving this problem depends on the degree of serial correlation, whether researchers have a theoretical interest in short- or long-term adjustment (or both), and whether the dynamics of different included regressors are sufficiently similar to justify simple techniques.

Spatial misspecification can take three different forms. First, the dependent variable in the unit of analysis depends on the value of the dependent variable in other units of analysis (not necessarily in all other units of analysis). Second, the dependent variable can depend on the value of explanatory variables in other units. Finally, the errors may be spatially correlated due to some form of unobserved spatial heterogeneity such as common shocks or common trends. The standard solution to spatial dependence requires the inclusion of a correctly specified “spatial lag” in the empirical model, which often needs to be instrumented (or analyzed by spatial-ML methods [a markup scheme for representing places mentioned in text and their relationships]) to account for endogeneity (see below).

Yet the existence of numerous solutions to problems of temporal and spatial dependence creates a new, higher-order problem. Since applied researchers have very different solutions available—model

specifications that solve the problem of temporal and spatial dependence—the choice of the solution becomes a specification issue in itself. Econometric theory offers little guidance here, and different solutions may lead to substantively different results. Specifically, the impossibility of testing the weighting matrix independently from the spatial autoregressive term leaves applied researchers with important arbitrary decisions. Other issues, such as the choice of the correct functional form for the continuous weighting matrices, further add to these important specification problems.

### Sampling and Data Imperfections

Sampling usually attracts major attention in empirical research. Indeed, a sample is optimal if it represents the population and if, at the same time, it is large enough. When researchers are able to observe a sufficiently large number of observations, random sampling appears to be the ultimate strategy. Any possible selection bias should be carefully avoided or—if this proves to be impossible—be accounted for. The following sections discuss, first, the impossibility of perfect random sampling; second, they examine the specification issues and research designs in the presence of (systematic) data imperfections; and third, they discuss unit heterogeneity.

#### *Nonrandom Sampling*

While econometricians often assume that researchers analyze a random sample drawn from the population, applied researchers seldom analyze a sample that represents the population. This problem also occurs when researchers analyze a “random draw” from a preselected sample, which is unlikely to represent the population. However, the population consists of all cases about which a theory makes predictions. It is this population from which cases must be drawn to constitute a true random sample. For example, a random draw from the record of British telephone landlines in 2009 is not a random sample of the population of cases on which a voting theory makes predictions. First of all, this theory claims validity not just for the British electorate but certainly for all democracies. Second, the theory’s validity does not begin in 2009 and end in 2010.

Nonrandom sampling occurs frequently in comparative politics and international relations, where scholars have to deal with the mere existence of 24 typical Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, roughly 60 typical democracies, and a total of 120 countries for which reliable data are available. Standard samples cannot be drawn from a larger population of countries (which does not exist), but the existing country-years do not constitute the population about which a theory makes predictions. Nonrandom sampling limits the generalizability of findings and may invalidate inferences. Yet social scientists have to live with these consequences. Unless social scientists formulate theories of rather limited scope, samples will never be truly random. The consequence of the absence of true random samples is clear: external validity remains limited. Yet the positive message is that this validity varies with the quality of the research design and with the extent to which researchers take nonrandom sampling and model uncertainty seriously.

#### *Data Imperfections*

In the social sciences, the limited quality of measurement may lead to serious problems. Many phenomena that social scientists need to measure cannot be directly observed. Take, for example, the “measurement” of per capita income. First of all, per capita income is a composite measure that divides the gross domestic product by population size. Second, to compute the gross domestic product of a country, one would have to aggregate all economic transactions. Yet whether a transaction is economic or a gift exchange depends on social standards. Likewise, the relative share of black market and illegal transactions depends on the scope of market distortions. Third, in the absence of a common currency, conversion rates between countries can be arbitrary. Fourth, population measures result from census data. Population counts are imprecise in censuses, and between census years, they are simply estimates. Neither the census count nor the estimates in between can be precise because illegal immigrants and undisclosed emigrants cause measurement error. Neither part of the measurement error appears to be unsystematic. Rather, social, economic, political, and cultural factors influence the accuracy of measures of

per capita income heavily. As a consequence, a comparison of per capita income between countries gives an idea of per capita income in an international comparison, but analysts using this information need to understand that their data come with potentially significant measurement error.

Applied empirical research too often ignores measurement error. With the rise of Bayesian methods, however, attention to uncertainties became more common in the social sciences. Bayesian econometrics clearly paved the way, but frequentist approaches followed suit. Both methodological paradigms allow researchers to estimate models in a way that generates measures of the uncertainty of an estimate. For example, using standard econometric measures, scholars can repeatedly estimate a model with measurement error and randomly add this to the variable of interest that likely suffers from measurement error. This procedure gives a distribution of coefficients. If this distribution includes the zero, the measurement error is strong enough to influence inferences.

Yet the limits to observability lead not just to measurement error but also to censoring, truncation, and selection. Over the past decades, econometricians have developed a fine-grained set of estimation tools that help deal with very different kinds of sample selection issues. Censoring arises when the dependent variable is measured exactly only above (or below, or both) a certain threshold. As a consequence, researchers know only parts of the distribution. Income data, for example, may be measured exactly above the poverty line, while lower income is reported at the poverty line. Models for censored data deal with the problem of censoring by estimating a replacement for the censored observations.

Truncation arises when the dependent variable is observed only above (or below or both) a certain threshold. The information on both the dependent and the independent variables can be truncated. In this case, researchers may fit a regression model from the sample drawn from the restricted part of the population. Under the assumption that the error terms in the truncated regression have a truncated normal distribution, a correction for the truncation becomes possible.

Other conditions may limit the observability of the dependent variable in a subset of the population.

Not all countries report socioeconomic information to international organizations. Obviously, the sample of nonreporting countries deviates largely from the sample of reporting countries. Usually, governments in less democratic and poorer countries are significantly less likely to provide information. Nonresponse in survey studies creates similar problems for researchers. Heckman selection models correct for sample selection if researchers are able to specify a model that explains selection. The estimated nonselection hazard is then used in the final stage of the estimator to correct for the selection process.

More recently, econometricians modeled solutions for very specific selection processes. For example, selection may occur but cannot be directly observed. Fishing at a pond in a park provides the standard example. Since the number of fish caught is not observed reliably at the pond but only at the gate of the park, zeros can be caused by either not fishing or by failure to catch fish. The zero-inflated Poisson or negative binomial model generates most promising results in situations such as this. However, the model does not correct for the possibility that visitors spend a very different amount of time fishing. This problem cannot be solved by a zero-inflated model unless somehow miraculously the time visitors spend fishing can be observed through the number of fish caught. This problem should similarly apply in most applications of the zero-inflated Poisson model.

### Endogeneity and Simultaneity

In the social sciences, almost nothing is truly exogenous. Social sciences are concerned with choices. Actors choose between options by calculating the consequences of their options. The criteria on which actors base their decisions are often the consequence of other intentional actions. As a consequence, social interactions shape the basis on which decisions rest, but these decisions provide parts of the basis of other decisions. For example, participatory political institutions have a higher probability of survival in relatively affluent societies. At the same time, political institutions and political stability influence economic growth. Therefore, estimating the effects of political institutions on socioeconomic factors is hampered by endogeneity.

### *Classical Endogeneity*

Endogeneity is often defined in a narrow sense meaning that at least one of the regressors is not independent of the dependent variable. To use a famous example, simple estimates of the effect of political institutions on economic growth are likely to be biased by the fact that the choice of institutions depends to a certain degree on economic performance. At the very least, social conflict and cleavage structures codetermine political institutions and economic performance. In a broader sense, endogeneity is defined by its consequences: the correlation between the error term and one regressor. In this definition, omitted variables, measurement error, or a misspecified functional form exclude conditionality and so *cause* endogeneity.

This problem can be solved in three classical ways. First, researchers may be able to find an exogenous proxy for the endogenous right-hand-side variable. Of course, a good proxy often does not exist. A second, more popular solution requires the use of instruments for the endogenous variables. Instruments need to satisfy two criteria. They have to explain as much as possible of the endogenous right-hand-side variable (the instrumented variable) and need to be uncorrelated with the error term. Applied researchers often generously ignore the first condition and exclusively pay attention to the second. For example, political institutions have been instrumented by settler mortality rates, because settlers only invested in good political institutions where mortality was low. While the argument seems convincing, settler mortality data do not provide a good instrument for institutional quality. Institutions may change slowly, but they change. Using historic settler mortality data as the sole instrument, however, only captures the time-invariant exogenous part of political institutions. In addition, while settler mortality may influence the choice of institutions, economic growth and settler mortality are hardly the only influences on political institutions. Yet the choice of poor instruments largely reduces the efficiency of the parameter estimate, and it may easily result in unreliable point estimates. The use of poor instruments then leads to less reliable estimates than estimating a model that ignores existing endogeneity issues.

Endogeneity, thus, is a serious problem in the social sciences. “Solving” endogeneity problems with weak instruments generates an even more

serious problem. A weak instrument is a variable that is not correlated with the error term but only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. Estimates with weak instruments are always less efficient than estimates that ignore the endogeneity, and they can, at the same time, be even more biased. In these cases, the cure is worse than the disease. This result, though known since the early 1990s, contrasts starkly with claims that the instrumental variable (IV) model allows causal inferences in a nonexperimental setting.

### *Right-Hand-Side Endogeneity*

Misspecification also occurs when one regressor (partly) depends on at least one other regressor. In this case, estimates, first, suffer from inefficiency caused by multicollinearity. As a consequence, inferences become less reliable. Second, researchers may find it difficult to interpret the effects of the two correlated right-hand-side variables. When two or more regressors depend on each other, parts of the effect of one variable are captured by the other variable. If researchers are not aware of the dependence, serious misinterpretations become likely. To solve the problem of right-hand-side endogeneity, solutions that also deal with reversed causality are feasible. As before, using instruments for one of the right-hand-side endogenous variables or estimating a simultaneous equation model that explicitly models the endogeneity between the regressors provides a solution.

### **“Solving” Specification Issues: A Cautionary Note**

Though model misspecifications bias estimation results and may lead to invalid inferences, methodologists and applied researchers tend to take some specification issues more seriously than others. The extreme importance of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity relative to time-varying heterogeneity seems unreasonable unless one understands that methodologists believe that they have a solution to the former but not to the latter problem. Are solvable specification problems more common than unsolvable ones? Certainly not, but at least researchers can deal with them.

Specification problems are fads and deeply embedded in the cultures of various disciplines. A

serious problem for one discipline might easily be a nuisance for another discipline. To mention just another example, over the last decade, economists appeared to be obsessed with endogeneity and thus with instrumental variable models. At the same time, researchers working in other disciplines were much more likely to ignore endogeneity. Who is right? The answer is that it depends on the quality of the instruments, which is more an assumption than a known entity. Too many IV models are certainly not any better than too few. And this result is generalizable: Too much effort to solve even the most obscure potentially existing specification problem is as costly as the ignorance of specification problems. And often, this holds even if the solutions work in the desired direction. This is because these solutions come at a price. Currently, econometricians suggest two standard solutions, which can be defined as

1. removing “bad variation” and
2. removing “bad observations.”

Both standard solutions (which can of course be combined) and their costs are discussed in turn. Fixed effects models and instrumental equations are the most common techniques when researchers seek to eliminate parts of the variation to improve proper variable “identification.” Fixed effects models assume that a part of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by an unobserved factor, which is correlated with one of the regressors. If researchers do not find a way to account for the unobserved regressor, the existence of this unobserved omitted variable will bias the estimates of all correlated regressors. Similarly, instrumental equation models assume that the dependent variable explains an unknown but positive quantity of the variation of at least one of the regressors. In both cases, researchers would like to perfectly account for the problematic parts of the variation. Unfortunately, this is not what fixed effects models do, and instrumental variable models are, at best, unlikely to just strip the problematic variation of the instrumented variable. In fact, the fixed effects model does not use variation between units at all, and instruments typically explain less than the “unproblematic part” of the endogenous variable.

As a consequence, researchers live with what many think is the second best option: a model that

throws away too much variation. In the standard econometric textbook world, researchers pay an almost irrelevant price because econometricians are mainly interested in asymptotic properties; that is, they ask, “How do we get the optimal estimate when we have an infinite amount of information?” In this world, throwing away, say, half of the variation does not matter, because half of infinity still gives infinity. But applied researchers do not live in this convenient world. They have limited amounts of information at their disposal, and when they want to make the best of it (i.e., the most reliable causal inferences), throwing away more than necessary may really be costly.

More recently, methodologists have developed research designs that “solve” specification issues not by eliminating variation but by “intelligent” sampling techniques. For example, rather than estimating a fixed model, researchers could also sample observations that do not seem to have significant unobserved unit heterogeneity. Of course, both techniques should give relatively similar results—but this hardly ever happens with real data. In principle, however, by eliminating observations from the sample, researchers can account for the influence of some problematic regressors. In this case, researchers may use matching techniques to make the distribution of the problematic variable more similar across groups. This technique thus clearly accounts for misspecified functional forms, but it cannot reduce bias from a wrongly specified model, and it comes at the price of reduced efficiency and dubious external validity.

Experiments provide a more radical solution to the problem of model uncertainty. If researchers are able to design controlled situations in which all but one (potential) influence on a variable are held constant, they can get close to identifying the true effect of the variable. Yet in the social sciences, one usually cannot hold variables constant without losing external validity. For example, holding gender constant will reduce the extent to which the experiment’s results can be generalized to the true world in which different genders exist. However, experimental design can hold the distribution of variables stable between different groups. In experiments, researchers usually randomize the treatment and then hope that the distribution of confounding factors is identical in the treatment



and control groups. Whether this assumption holds depends on the number of independent experimental observations as well as the distribution of the potential confounding factors. The rarer a confounding factor is, the stronger its influence, and the larger the number of groups, the greater the number of experimental observations needed to guarantee a sufficient approximation to equal distribution.

To give but one example, assume that social scientists conduct a decision experiment with 1,000 participants—a number larger than what we usually see in the social science experiments. Five hundred participants receive a treatment, and the remaining 500 get a placebo (or some other non-treatment). Now, assume the existence of an important genetic property, which occurs in 1% of the population. This leads to two questions: First, what is the probability that 1% of the participants have this defect? And second, what is the probability that the defect occurs equally among the participants in both groups? The answer to the first question is that if the sample is drawn from the population, roughly  $100 \pm 10\%$  will have the defect. Of course, there is a roughly 5% probability that the sample includes fewer than 80 or more than 120 participants of this type. The second question proves to be more important. The probability that both the treated and the control group include the same number of participants of this type is only marginally above zero. On average, the difference will be 6.66. Accordingly, if the experimental design controls confounding factors by randomization, bias will be different from zero unless the sample size approaches infinity. Thus, experiments identify the “true effect” only asymptotically and fail to do so in all real-world experiments. However, experiments still have a clear advantage over estimation—namely, that the true model does not need to be known. The price researchers pay for this advantage is a sharp decline in external validity.

Robustness tests offer a radical alternative to the logic of removing variation or removing observations. Rather than solving specification problems, robustness tests seek to provide an estimate of the importance of specification issues for causal inference. Robustness tests identify areas in which the true specification remains unknown and then vary the model specification in a way that accounts

for the model uncertainty. For example, when measurement errors reduce the validity of point estimates, researchers can generate additional controlled measurement error (using Monte Carlo techniques) to analyze the influence of measurement error on parameter estimates. In this case, the parameters will vary across the iterations of this experiment, but this variation may not affect causal inferences and thus demonstrates the robustness of the results. Further robustness tests include groupwise jack-knives, bootstrapping, sensitivity analysis, semiparametric techniques, the choice of alternative estimators, and many more. Robustness tests do not try to solve specification problems when solutions appear to be too costly. And they do not claim to produce certainty where of course there can be none. After all, even the best solution to the most pressing specification problem can give unbiased results if and only if the model is otherwise perfectly specified.

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*See also* Causality; Data, Spatial; Experiments, Laboratory; Matching; Misspecification; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Robust Statistics; Selection Bias; Variables, Instrumental

#### Further Readings

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## MODELS, COMPUTATIONAL/ AGENT-BASED

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All models of politics are models in the colloquial sense of being simplified “miniature” artifacts that their creators believe represent some important aspect of the real world. The hope is that manipulating moving parts of the model gives useful intuitions about how the real world works. “Useful” in this sense means something that is a valid inference from the model, nonobvious, and, at least a priori, empirically plausible. *Theoretical* models are constructed from abstract statements about the real world. Useful general propositions about the real world may be derived *analytically* by “solving” the model using some form of logical manipulation. For example, if one knows the radius  $r$  of a circle and wants to know its area,  $A$ , he or she can make use of an ancient analytical result:  $A = \pi r^2$ . This result derives from a formal mathematical proof and is always and forever true in a Euclidean space.

The same result could be derived from a well-designed *computational* experiment:

1. Scatter  $p$  dots at random on a Euclidean plane, in a uniform distribution; every locus on the plane is equally likely to have a dot on it.
2. Randomly select a locus  $(x, y)$  on the plane; draw a circle with radius  $r$  centered on  $(x, y)$ , picking values of  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $r$  at random; count  $n$ , the number of scattered dots inside the circle;  $n$  is a computed estimate of  $A$ , the area of the circle.
3. Iterate (1) and (2) above  $m$  times.

Careful analysis of observations from this experiment would reveal, among other things, that  $n$  is completely uncorrelated to the values of  $x$  and  $y$ , the coordinates of the center of the circle; the best-fit prediction of  $n$  is  $n = \pi r^2$ . The *precision* of this estimate will depend on the number of dots scattered,  $d$ , and the number of times the scattering is done,  $m$ . In other words, it depends on the amount of computational resources deployed on the problem—the more the better. All this computation would be an utterly pointless waste of resources. It is known analytically that  $n \approx A = \pi r^2$ .

Very often, however, empirically plausible models of real-world processes that actually interest researchers are analytically “difficult” or “intractable,” leaving them unable to generate the formal proofs that they would very much like, because they cannot solve the model analytically. An intractable model is one that researchers know cannot be solved analytically. A difficult model is one that researchers do not know cannot be solved analytically, but they do know that it has not yet been solved, and they do not yet know how to solve. There are two basic solutions to this very common intellectual problem. The first is to make the model tractable by simplifying its representation of the real world. The resulting model looks less like the real world, but at least it can be solved analytically. The second solution is to use computational methods to investigate and in some sense “solve” difficult or intractable models. In this entry, the strengths and limitations of computational modeling and its possible applications in political science are discussed.

### Computation and Analysis

Consider a two-dimensional policy space in which voters’ preferences are described in terms of “ideal points.” Assume that these ideal points have a symmetric bivariate normal distribution with a mean at the origin of the space. We want to estimate the number of ideal points (dots) located within a circle of radius  $r$  from an arbitrary point  $(x, y)$  in the space—for example, the number of voters within distance  $r$  of some party policy position. This problem, while precisely specified, is at the very least difficult to solve analytically since we cannot use the analytical result  $n \approx A = \pi r^2$ . This is because, given the bivariate normal distribution of ideal points, the number of ideal points in a circle of given radius now depends critically on the locus of its center. Generalize the problem further to any arbitrary, or even unknown, distribution of voter ideal points. The problem becomes increasingly difficult, if not intractable, analytically. One solution is to simplify the model by assuming the arbitrary distribution of ideal points to be uniform, restoring access to the analytical result  $n \approx \pi r^2$ . The gain would be analytical rigor, in some odd sense, but the cost would be realism and thus empirically valid intuition. The “rigor” of the

result would depend on assuming something we knew for certain to be false. The other solution would be to run the very simple computational experiment outlined in Items 1 to 3 above, ridiculous with a uniform distribution of ideal points but now powerful in allowing us to estimate, in a transparent way, the number of points within a circle with radius  $r$  and center  $(x, y)$ , for any arbitrary distribution of ideal points. More generally, a computational experiment can be designed to retrieve any analytical result, but computational experiments can also be designed to retrieve results that can never, or cannot yet, be derived analytically.

Such computational work does not at all depend on using electronic computers; all computations could in theory be carried out by hand. In practice, the relatively low cost of electronic computers and the increasing sophistication of the programs that run on them mean that nearly all computational work is now done on computers. In the same way, analytical results are in practice not all derived using a pencil and paper. Computer programs may be used to solve difficult systems of equations. Unseen inside the program, these solutions may involve simulations, while program output, and thus computer-assisted formal “proofs,” may or may not be amenable to checking by the human analyst.

### Theoretical Intractability, Decision Heuristics, and Agent-Based Modeling

A famous and intensively studied intractable problem that is simply stated is the Traveling Salesmen Problem (TSP). Given  $n$  cities arbitrarily located on a map, find the shortest route that visits all of them and returns to the starting point. This cannot be solved analytically for the general case with an arbitrary number of cities at arbitrary locations. Any particular example of the TSP can in theory be “smashed” computationally by elaborating every possible route, computing the length of each, and picking the shortest route. However, the number of different possible routes between  $n$  cities is  $(n - 1)!/2$ , which expands at an explosive rate with the number of cities. The number of different routes between “only” 100 cities is about  $4.666 \times 10^{155}$ . This problem cannot in practice be smashed with feasible finite computing resources. Since the TSP is a real problem for

real humans, for example, when they devise travel itineraries or vehicle delivery routes, its analytical intractability has important implications, both for actual decision making by real humans and for the representation of real humans as agents in models. In the absence of a formally provable best solution to the problem, any analyst—including the decision-making agents whose behavior is being modeled—must rely on informal *decision heuristics* or *rules of thumb*. These are decision rules that have been generally found, through a process of experimentation and learning, to produce good solutions to the problem at hand but that cannot be proved to be optimal and may indeed be highly suboptimal in certain cases. One heuristic for attacking the TSP, for example, is “start with a random city; visit the closest unvisited city; iterate until all cities have been visited.” This is a “greedy algorithm,” doing what looks best at any given stage in the search and performs well in many circumstances. It often finds something “close” to the shortest route in easy cases where the shortest route is known from having smashed the problem. But particular examples can easily be constructed for which this algorithm produces disastrous results. Thus, the search for efficient heuristics for attacking the TSP is an important ongoing project in computer science.

Political science is, of its essence, concerned with many analytically intractable problems. One mainstream example concerns the search by party leaders for vote-maximizing party policy positions in a multidimensional policy space, in a setting where all voters support their closest party. This is a special case, in a political context, of the more general mathematical problem of competitive spatial location, a problem that has also been shown to be formally intractable in a space of more than one dimension. Despite formal intractability of this problem, party leaders must still set party policy positions. One response to this, very common in political science, is to simplify the model of party competition in ways that allow the derivation of an analytical result. A very common simplification is to assume, not  $n$  parties and  $m$  dimensions, but one dimension and a small number of parties, possibly even only two. This gives access to a portfolio of well-known analytical results, for example, about the role of the “median” voter on the solitary dimension. These results may


be considered intuitively useful if the empirical setting under investigation can plausibly be described as having only one policy dimension and a small number of parties. If researchers are intrinsically interested in competition in multi-party systems with multidimensional policy spaces, however, they will not find one-dimensional analytical results intuitively useful. Formal intractability of the problem of competitive spatial location in multidimensional spaces tells researchers, further, that these one-dimensional analytical results do not generalize and suggests the use of computational methods to attack the problem.

Moving beyond methods that might be used to attack interesting but intractable problems, a far deeper substantive implication of intractability concerns the behavior of real humans. In the absence of formally provable best-response strategies for setting party positions in multidimensional policy spaces, for example, and given that such positions must nonetheless be set, party leaders must use informal decision heuristics. This is a very good example of the type of problem that can usefully be analyzed using agent-based modeling. Agent-based models (ABMs) are bottom-up models that, typically, assume settings with a fairly large set of autonomous decision-making agents, each agent using some well-specified decision rule. The modeling exercise is to elaborate the patterns that emerge when these agents interact with each other. The essence of agent-based modeling is conveyed clearly in a simple but powerful model of spatial segregation put forward by Thomas Schelling in the 1970s. The original Schelling model was computational but was implemented with coins on a chessboard, not an electronic computer. Scatter some pennies and nickels, say 20 of each, at random on the chessboard; move each coin to the center of its closest square. Each coin has eight adjacent (neighboring) squares. (Coins on the edge squares are different but this does not affect the result.) Coins represent people, and people have two different colors. Assume that people have some view about the color of their neighbors. This is expressed by a preference parameter  $p$ , the minimum proportion of people on neighboring squares I would like to be the same color as me. This preference can be very mild. If  $p = .25$ , for example, I am unhappy only if less than a quarter of my neighbors are the same color

as me; if  $p = .5$ , I am unhappy if less than half of my neighbors are the same color. The modeled behavior is simply that unhappy agents move to a randomly chosen nearby empty square. A model run begins with agents scattered at random; agent behavior is then implemented iteratively using this rule until no unhappy agent wants to move.

Figure 1 shows an example of the surprisingly strong patterns of spatial segregation that emerge from this simple model, implemented on a computer using the agent-based modeling environment NetLogo. The left panel shows a starting configuration with 1,000 gray and 1,000 white agents scattered at random on a  $51 \times 51$  square “chessboard.” At the beginning of the run, given this particular scatter, on average, agents find that 50% of their neighbors are the same color. Agents in this model run were given a  $p$  of .50; those finding themselves in a location where less than 50% of their neighbors were the same color moved to a new location. The right panel of Figure 1 shows the steady-state configuration of agent locations that was the outcome of this particular run. The emergent pattern of spatial segregation can be seen very clearly. The surprising result is that, on average, 88% of each agent’s neighbors are now the same color. This social interaction generated a much more intense pattern of spatial segregation than any individual agent prefers. Even very mild preferences about neighbors can increase spatial segregation. From the same random start shown in Figure 1, setting  $p = .25$  increases the mean percentage of similar neighbors from 50% to about 60%. In other words, even if people only move when less than a quarter of their neighbors are the same as them, segregation will increase. This was an unexpected and counterintuitive result that continues to be debated.

The striking Schelling segregation results would be, at the very least, difficult to derive analytically; yet a simple computer program gives full access to them. A theorist approaching this problem with the tools of classical formal analysis, for example, would in essence have to model strategic location decisions made by each of 2,000 agents, each decision taking into account what each of the other 1,999 agents is likely to do. This, of course, would also be making a preposterous assumption about the behavior of real humans. The Schelling ABM in effect makes the “satisficing” behavioral



**Figure 1** Random Start and Steady-State Outcome of the Schelling Model of Spatial Segregation

assumption that people in such complex settings stay put if they are happy, defining happy in some precise way, and move if they are not. This is a classic example of a “win-stay lose-shift” decision rule that is a common behavioral assumption for ABMs. His computational model then systematically elaborates interactions between large numbers of agents using this rule. Thus, while ABMs do deploy decision heuristics as methodological devices to attack analytically intractable problems, the fundamental motivation for using ABMs is a behavioral assumption that, given the complex settings in which they find themselves forced to make decisions, real humans use rules of thumb when they must pick a course of action. ABMs are much better justified as plausible models of real behavior than as methodological responses to intractability.

#### **Trade-Offs Between Rigor, Realism, and Parsimony**

There are thus two quite distinct epistemological dimensions that distinguish agent-based modeling from classical formal analysis in political science. The first is methodological and contrasts formal analysis with carefully designed computational experiments as distinctive ways of deriving general results. The second is behavioral and contrasts the forward-looking strategic analysis that is assumed by formal game theorists to be performed by real humans, for example, with the deployment of simple decision rules, which is the typical behavioral

assumption of agent-based modelers. The complexity of the problem under investigation may well dictate the trade-offs that are made within this epistemological space. In a simple setting that is analytically tractable, formal analysis can yield easily accessible yet rigorous results. Given this, further, it may seem reasonable to assume, behaviorally, that real humans can perform the same analyses as the modeler. This convergence of method and behavioral assumption is pleasing, since a sophisticated analyst is then not assuming that real humans can do things that the analyst cannot do himself or herself. In such cases, there is little point in using computational methods or ABMs.

Typically, however, the real political problem under investigation is complex, and analysts face hard trade-offs. One response, as noted above, is to simplify the model to a point at which it is tractable, by making assumptions that are, inevitably, less realistic. (If they were more realistic, there would be no point in the more complex model.) Typically, though not inevitably, in the case of game theoretic models in political science, such simplifying assumptions concern the setting being modeled not the rationality of the agents. An intrinsically dynamic setting is assumed to be static—for example, the dimensionality of the preference space is reduced; only a very small subset of actors is modeled, and so on. Set against the benefits arising from analytical rigor, given the simplifying assumptions, the costs arise because the model is now less realistic. A contradiction

arises, further, if real agents are now assumed to apply a sophisticated strategic decision-making model to an assumed setting, which, if they were indeed sophisticated, they would know is far more complex than the one being modeled. In a nutshell, agents may be assumed to be smart enough to perform complex strategic calculations in a one-dimensional space, for example, but not smart enough to see that the real space is not one-dimensional, and their calculations are thus pointless. The pleasing conjunction of method and behavioral assumption has been lost in the search for rigorous analytical results in intractable complex settings.

In complex settings involving many agents, the desire to attack substantively interesting problems may more or less mandate computational methods if even a semblance of empirical realism is to be retained. Considering the spatial segregation problem illustrated in Figure 1, for example, most people would feel that the core intuition would be lost by simplifying this down to a fabulously rigorous formal model of strategic location decisions made by five agents in a one-dimensional space. The fundamental substantive interest of this problem is that it is at least two-dimensional and involves unintended consequences of interactions between large numbers of agents. Riots, revolutions, and indeed voting in large electorates are other examples of this type of problem. While we can easily specify a formal game played between “a rioter” and “a government,” most people would probably feel this misses the entire point about riots, which concerns how interactions between people in large groups are in some important sense different. The inevitable price paid for all computational work is that computation, of its essence, involves observing outcomes of particular model runs, conditional on particular parameter settings. An analytical result, if general, is good for all conceivable valid parameter settings. Strictly speaking, computational results are only valid for those points in a model’s parameter space that have actually been investigated. Inferences about parameter settings that have not been investigated are, in effect, interpolations.

This focuses attention on two matters of primary concern to those engaged in computational work that is carefully designed and rigorously

executed. The first concerns sampling from the model’s parameter space; the second concerns the techniques used to draw general inferences from particular observations. Computational work in essence generates simulated data about model outcomes, conditional on model parameter settings. Viewed in this way, it is closely analogous to empirical work, which collects “real” data about outcomes under investigation, together with associated values of independent variables of theoretical interest. In each case, collecting more (unbiased) data is always better, while it is vital to match techniques of statistical inference to the underlying data-generating process. In the case of computational analysis, therefore, analysts become more confident in their inferences, the more “data” they have, and this is achieved by having more model runs that investigate more points in the parameter space. A single model run tells researchers rather little—very much like an election study that interviews a single individual. One thousand model runs, sampling 1,000 points at random from the model’s parameter space would, in contrast, tell researchers quite a lot. Of course, there is always the possibility that there is an unsampled parameter vector that would generate a “peculiar” result, but two distinct things happen as the size of the sample is increased. First, the probability of failing to sample some peculiar point in the parameter space is driven down. Second, even if analysts do fail to sample some peculiar point, they become more confident that the inference drawn from their sample is in some sense a good representation of model outcomes and that the hypothetical unsampled peculiarity is an anomaly. If analysts really do worry about unsampled parameter points that might have blown up the inferences had the analysts only sampled them, the solution is simple—increase the size of the sample. Analysts can, if they wish to reduce the possibility of undiscovered anomalies, conduct a million model runs. The only matter at issue is the opportunity cost of doing something more productive with their time and computing resources. It is thus perfectly possible to design “heavy-duty” computational work, which, combined with rigorous statistical analysis of model outcomes, enables confident and replicable inferences to be drawn about the effects of all the model’s moving parts. At the end of the day, these are precisely the same

types of inference that emerge from classical analytical modeling.

Finally, it is important to note that the ability to derive intuitions from any model, computational or analytic, depends on the model being parsimonious, in the sense of having a transparent logic and relatively few parameters. Parsimonious models tend not only to be easier to analyze than complicated models, but also their substantive implications are typically much easier to interpret. To set against this, the price paid for a more parsimonious model is that it may be less realistic than a richer (more complicated) model of the same process. In the realm of classical analysis, parsimony is to a large extent self-policing. There are few incentives to complicate a parsimonious model that has been solved with some difficulty and seems to be doing a good job at explaining something of interest. It is typically very easy, by contrast, to take a computational model and graft on layer after layer of complication, each layer added in a quest for enhanced realism. Parsimony is not self-policing, and, if model outcomes do indeed seem more realistic as a result of the added complication, the trade-off between parsimonious but less realistic models, as opposed to complicated but more realistic ones, is drawn in much sharper relief. The matter of whether more realistic and complicated or more parsimonious but less realistic computational models provide better intuitions about real politics is to a large extent a matter of taste, however, since there is no gold standard for good intuition in political science.

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*See also* Formal Theory; Game Theory

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## MODERNIZATION THEORY

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The analysis of modernity—of the modern social order and civilization—has constituted a basic core in the modern intellectual discussion of the development of modernity in sociological, anthropological, and historical scholarship. In sociology, the analysis of modernity constituted the focus of the major early evolutionists, such as Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. In different ways, such analysis was also the central focus of the discussion of modernity in the works of Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and many others. This entry traces the evolution of modernity from the theories of the 1950s through the present time, focusing especially on the varied forms that modernity has taken and its relationship to changing concepts of power and the legitimacy of the nation-state. The entry concludes with a look at the impact of globalization and at the negative aspects of modernity.

#### Classical Theories

The “classical” theories of modernization of the 1950s have indeed identified the core characteristics of modernity and of modern society, such as the decomposition of older “closed” institutional frameworks; the development of new structural, institutional, and cultural features and formations; and, to use the terminology of Karl Deutsch, the growing potential for social mobilization. The most important structural dimension of modernity attesting to the decomposition of former relatively narrow formations was seen in the growing tendency for structural differentiation—manifested, for example, in growing urbanization; commodification of the economy; and in the continual development of distinctive channels of communication and agencies of education. On the institutional level, such decomposition gave rise to the development of new institutional formations—such as the modern state, modern national collectivities, and new market (especially capitalist) economies—that were perceived or defined to some extent at least as autonomous and that were indeed regulated by specific, distinct mechanisms—such as rules of the market, of bureaucratic organization, and the like.

In some later formulations, it was the development of such distinct autonomous spheres, each regulated by its own logic, that was very often defined in the essence of modern institutional formations. Concomitantly, modernity was seen as bearing a distinct cultural program and shaping a distinct type of personality characteristic.

These theories, as well as classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and to a large extent even of Weber (or at least one reading of him), have implicitly or explicitly conflated the structural and cultural major dimensions of modernity, as they saw it developing in the West. A very strong, even if implicit, assumption of the studies of modernization was that the cultural dimensions or aspects of modernization—the basic cultural premises of Western modernity, the “secular” rational worldview, including a strong individualistic orientation—are inherently and necessarily interwoven with the structural ones. Accordingly, most of the classics of sociology as well as the studies of modernization of the 1940s and 1950s and the closely related studies of convergence of industrial societies have assumed, even if only implicitly, that the basic institutional formations, the definitions of the institutional arenas, the modes of their regulation and integration that developed in European modernity, and the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West will “naturally” be ultimately taken over, with possibly local variations, in all—or at least in the “successful”—modernizing societies. It is further assumed that this project of modernity, with its hegemonic and homogenizing tendencies, will continue in the West and, with the expansion of modernity, will prevail throughout the world.

### Multiple Modernities

The reality that emerged proved to be radically different. Modernity has indeed spread to most of the world, but it did not give rise to a single institutional pattern or to a single modern civilization but, rather, led to the development of several continually changing modern civilizations or at least civilizational patterns—that is, of societies or civilizations that do indeed share some central core characteristics but that nevertheless tend to develop different, even if cognate, ideological and institutional dynamics. Moreover, far-reaching changes

that go beyond the original premises of modernity have been taking place also in Western societies.

At the same time, the institutional formations that developed in most societies of the world have been distinctively modern even if their dynamics have been greatly influenced by their own distinctive cultural premises, traditions, and historical experiences. This of course runs contrary to the view that the best way to understand the dynamics of different “modernizing” societies is to see them as continuations, even if in new ways, of their traditions and of their traditional institutional patterns and dynamics—a view that was to some extent revived in the context of the contemporary scene as the theory of the “clash of civilizations.” Of special importance in this context was the fact that the most important social and political movements that became predominant in these societies—such as the nationalistic ones and, later on, even the fundamentalistic ones, which often promulgated strong anti-Western or even antimodern ideas—were basically distinctively modern ones, promulgating distinctive interpretations of modernity.

Concomitantly with the growing recognition of the great complexity and variability of modern and contemporary societies, a much more complex picture of modernity emerged. From the very beginning of the discourse about modernity, there developed two opposing evaluations, attesting to the inherent contradictions of modernity: One such evaluation, implicit also in theories of modernization and those of “convergence and of industrial societies” of the 1950s and early 1960s, saw modernity as a positive, emancipating, progressive force epitomizing promises of a better, inclusive, emancipating world. The other such evaluation that developed first from within the very core of the first European societies and later found strong resonance in non-Western European societies espoused a negative or at least a highly ambivalent approach to modernity—seeing it as a morally destructive force—and emphasized the negative effects of some of its core characteristics, be it technology or the empowerment of egoistic and hedonistic attitudes and goals.

All these developments have yielded a continual reexamination of theories of modernization, giving rise to the idea or concept of multiple modernities as the best way to understand the contemporary world. Thus, to explain the history of modernity is to see it as a story of continual constitution and



reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs and cultural patterns of modernity.

One of the most important implications of the term *multiple modernities* is that modernity and Westernization are not identical; Western patterns of modernity are not the only “authentic” modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others.

This view of multiple modernities entails certain assumptions about the nature of modernity. The first such assumption is that modernity is to be viewed as a distinct civilization, with distinct institutional and cultural characteristics. According to this view, the core of modernity is the crystallization and development of a mode or modes of interpretation of the world or, to follow Cornelius Castoriadis’s terminology, of a distinct social “imaginaire,” indeed of the ontological vision, of a distinct cultural program, combined with the development of a set or sets of new institutional formations—the central core of both being an unprecedented “openness” and uncertainty.

This civilization, the distinct cultural program with its institutional implications, crystallized first in Western Europe and then expanded to other parts of Europe, to the Americas, and later on throughout the world, giving rise to continually changing cultural and institutional patterns, which constituted different responses to the challenges and possibilities inherent in the core characteristics of the distinct civilizational premises of modernity.

The core of this program has been that the premises and legitimation of the social, ontological, and political order were no longer taken for granted. Consequently, there developed an intensive reflexivity around the basic ontological premises as well as around the bases of social and political order of authority of society—a reflexivity that was shared even by the most radical critics of this program, who in principle denied the legitimacy of such reflexivity. Politics became a matter for discussion, even if it was then reputed to be based on rationality.

In conjunction with these conceptions, there developed the belief in the possibility of active formation of society by conscious human activity. Two basic complementary but also potentially contradictory tendencies about the best ways in

which such construction could take place developed within this program. The first such tendency was that the program, as it crystallized above all in the major revolutions in which people claimed to lead the political change, gave rise, perhaps for the first time in the history of humanity, to the belief in the possibility of bridging the gap between the transcendental and mundane orders, of realizing through conscious human actions in the mundane orders, in social life, some of the utopian, eschatological visions. The second tendency was rooted in the growing recognition of the legitimacy of multiple individual and group goals and interests and of multiple interpretations of the common good.

The modern program entailed also a radical transformation of the conceptions and premises of the major institutional arenas—the political and economic ones as well as those of collective identities, social hierarchy, and economy. The core of this transformation was the breakdown of traditional legitimation of the political and social order, the concomitant opening up of different possibilities of construction of such order, and the consequent contestation about the ways in which political order was to be constructed by human actors. A strong emphasis on at least the potential active participation of the periphery, of “society,” and of all its members in the political arena combined with orientations of rebellion and intellectual antinomianism, together with strong orientations to center formation and institution building, giving rise to social movements and movements of protest as a continual component of the political process.

Moreover, the concrete contours of the different cultural and institutional patterns of modernity as they crystallized in different societies have indeed been continually changing due to the combination of the tensions inherent in the cultural and political program of modernity and the continual institutional, social, political, and economic developments attendant on the development and expansion of modernity.

The institutional and cultural contours of modernity were continually changing because the very expansion of modernity, beginning in Europe, entailed a confrontation between the concrete premises and institutional formations as they developed

in Europe, later in the Americas, and then in Asia—in the Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Japanese civilizations. The manifestations of modernity were shaped, above all, by the internal dynamics of the technological, economic, political, and cultural arenas as they developed in different societies and expanded beyond them. Second, they were a result of the central struggle between different centers of political and economic power that constituted a continual component, first, of the formation of European modernity and, later, the continual expansion of European, American, and Japanese modernities. This struggle took place in a context of shifting hegemonies in the different international systems that developed in the wake of the continual developments in the economic, political, technological, and cultural arenas, and in centers thereof. The manifestation of modernity was shaped by these forces, along with the continual confrontations between interpretations promulgated by different centers, elites, and movements, and the concrete developments, conflicts, and displacements attendant on the institutionalization of these premises. Such confrontations developed already within Europe with the crystallization of the modern European state system and became further intensified with the crystallization of “world systems” from the 16th or 17th centuries onward.

### Modernity, Globalization, and the Nation-State

The multiple and divergent modernities of the “classical” age of modernity crystallized during the 19th century and above all during the first 6 or 7 decades of the 20th century in the different territorial nation-states and revolutionary states and in the social movements that developed in Europe, in the Americas, and in Asian and African societies after World War II. These contours—institutional, symbolic, and ideological contours of the modern national and revolutionary states and movements, which were seen as the epitome of modernity—have changed drastically on the contemporary scene with the intensification of tendencies to globalization, as manifest in growing movements of autonomy of world capitalist forces, intense movements of international migrations, and the concomitant development on an international scale of

social problems, such as prostitution and delinquency, all of which reduce the control of the nation-state over its own economic and political affairs, despite the continual strengthening of the “technocratic” rational secular policies in various arenas—be it in education or family planning. At the same time, the nation-states lost some of their—always only partial—monopoly of internal and international violence to many local and international groups of separatists or terrorists without any nation-state or the concerted activities of nation-states being able to control the continually recurring occurrences of such violence. Concomitantly, the processes of globalization were closely connected in the cultural arena, with the expansion especially through the major media in many countries around the world, including Western ones such as those of Europe or Canada, of what were seemingly uniform hegemonic American cultural programs or visions.

Above all, the ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation and revolutionary state, of its being perceived as the charismatic locus of the major components of the cultural program of modernity and of collective identity, became weakened, and new political, social, and civilizational visions and visions of collective identity developed. These new visions and identities were promulgated by several types of new social movements. Such “new” social movements, which developed in most Western countries (e.g., the women’s and ecological movements), were closely related to or rooted in the student and anti-Vietnam War movements of the late 1960s and 1970s.

These movements developed in tandem with the crystallization of new social settings and frameworks that also went beyond the “classical” model of the nation-state. Among these settings—new especially to the Muslim, Chinese, and Indian diasporas—were new types of ethnic minorities, such as the Russian ones, which emerged in many of the successor states of the Soviet Union. In these, and in many other settings, new types of collective identities emerged, often in movements whose focus was no longer the nation-state. Many of these hitherto seemingly “subdued” identities—ethnic, regional, local, and transnational alike—moved naturally, though in a highly reconstructed way, into the centers of their respective societies

and also often into the international arena. They contested the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs, claiming their own autonomous places in central institutional arenas—educational programs, public communications, or the media—and very often, they also made far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and the rights and entitlements connected with it. In these settings, local dimensions were often brought together in new ways beyond the model of the classical nation-state, with transnational ones, such as the European Union, or with broad religious identities—many of them rooted in the great religions, such as Islam, Buddhism, or different branches of Christianity, but reformulated in new modern ways.

In parallel fashion, continuous shifts occurred in the relative hegemony of different centers of modernity—first European and U.S. ones, moving to East Asia—shifts that became continually connected with the growing contestations between such centers around their presumed hegemonic standing.

### Destructive Dimensions of Modernity

Contrary to the optimistic views of modernity as progress, the development and expansion of modernity was not peaceful. It also bore within it very destructive possibilities—which were indeed voiced, and also often promulgated, by some of its most radical critics, who saw modernity as a morally destructive force and emphasized the negative effects of some of its core characteristics. The crystallization of the first and the development of later modernities were continually interwoven with internal conflicts and confrontations, rooted in the contradictions and tensions attendant on the development of capitalism and, in the political arena, the growing demands for democratization and with international conflicts in the framework of the modern state and imperialist systems. Above all, the evolution of modernity was closely interwoven with wars, and genocides, repressions, and exclusions constituted continual components thereof. Wars and genocide were not, of course, new in the history of mankind. But they became radically transformed and intensified, generating continuous tendencies to specifically modern barbarism, the most important manifestation of which was the ideologization of violence, terror,

and war—manifest most vividly first in the French Revolution. Such ideologization emerged out of the interweaving of wars with the basic constitutions of the nation-states, with those states becoming the most important agent—and arena—of constitution of citizenship and symbols of collective identity, with the crystallization of the modern European state system and of European expansion beyond Europe and with the intensification of the technologies of communication and of war.

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*See also* Functionalism; Development, Political; Political Theory; State

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## MONARCHY

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The *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* defines monarchy as a “state under monarchical government” where a monarch is a “sovereign with title of king, queen, emperor, empress or equivalent.” Although this definition has the merit of describing popular usage in the English language, it is readily apparent that it is indeterminate. It amounts to saying that monarchy is what monarchs do, and it leaves open what other titles might be equivalent (in the masculine forms) to king or emperor.

Etymology—and the classical Greek origin of the word—offers an approach that initially seems more determinate: Monarchy is the rule of a single person. This can be contrasted with aristocracy—the rule of the “best” or the “elite”—and democracy—variously the rule of all the people or the “ordinary” people. However, common usage in English and several other languages has come to invest the idea of monarchy with at least the additional criterion of hereditary acquisition. In fact, the hereditary principle lies at the heart of the popular image of monarchy, even though some of the most notable monarchies in history, including the Roman Empire and its supposed successor the Holy Roman Empire were, at least nominally, nonhereditary, the latter being elected by seven “Electors,” most of whom did acquire their right of franchise through the hereditary principle. The contemporary Malaysian monarchy is rotated among 12 provincial sultans, normally for a 5-year term, and each new incumbent must be ratified by parliament. It would be easy to argue that many modern monarchies, often incorrectly—or at least confusingly—called “constitutional” monarchies where the monarch is the head of state but does not wield executive power, are much less like monarchies in the Greek sense than is the papacy or a regime such as that of the Haitian dictator François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who caused himself to be declared “president for life” in 1964.

Thus, the question of how many monarchs have survived into the 21st century is not a straightforward, factual one as it might first appear. The answer depends partly on whether separate monarchical traditions within the same state are distinguished, the obvious example being England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Principality of

Wales, the Isle of Man, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, and the States of Jersey within the British Isles. Some dependent territories of the United Kingdom offer similar counting problems, and there is the comparable case of a federated multiple monarchy, such as the United Arab Emirates: Is it one monarchy or seven? The answer would also depend on whether you include nonstandard and nonhereditary forms of monarchy such as the papacy, lifetime dictators, or republics with a local monarchical element, such as acknowledged tribal leaders within some African states. It is not normally assumed that the answer depends on the extent to which a monarch has any executive power; the United Kingdom, where the monarch has possessed powers that have been small and diminishing since the 17th century, and Morocco, where King Mohamed VI determines much policy, are both considered to be monarchies to the same degree. Nor is it considered relevant that in many cases the continued existence of the monarchy is assumed to be dependent on the popular will. In most countries that are monarchies but have democratically elected governments, it would be accepted that a referendum on a transition to a republic might be held and that in the event of a vote for such a transition, it would occur peacefully. The Greek monarchy was finally abolished as the result of a plebiscite in 1974, while in Australia in 1999 the change was rejected. However, the assumption that such a change could occur “merely on account of the number of votes”—to borrow a phrase from a monarch (Queen Victoria in her *Diaries*)—might be thought to erode the nature of monarchy in its original sense.

The answer to the question of how many monarchies remain therefore varies from around 25 to 50. Either of these figures might come as a surprise to the many political observers who have, over the past 2 centuries, predicted the complete demise of monarchy. They might be less surprised to discover that about 25 states had the same monarch, Queen Elizabeth II of England. This entry discusses the debate about monarchy and its aftermath as well as the political science research on monarchy.

### The Early Modern Debate About Monarchy and Its Aftermath

Monarchy was at the heart of early modern debates about politics and government, which

were primarily normative debates. The issue was sometimes whether monarchy was a legitimate (or *the* legitimate) form of government, but more often, the debates were about the form monarchy should take, the rules of succession, the limits on monarchical authority, and the subjects' duties of obedience to monarchs and rights of rebellion against them. All this can be portrayed as a crisis of legitimacy in which states and their apologists desperately sought to establish their legitimacy and thus their right to govern. It would be wrong to portray this crisis as something new and "modern" in the sense of post-Renaissance or post-Reformation: One would only have to read the 10 plays of Shakespeare on English historical topics to realize that the nature of kingship and its succession were always contested. But there was a new element, insofar as there was no longer an accepted religious source of authority providing a natural counterbalance to the claims of monarchs.

It would also be an oversimplification to portray the debate about government in the 17th and 18th centuries as a contest between the ideas of sovereignty as vested in "the Lord's Anointed" versus its being vested in "the people." The main complication is the appearance of religion on both sides. In the English Civil War, for example, both sides referred ultimately to religious authority to justify their actions. The men who signed the death warrant of Charles I in 1649 were, for the most part, no more believers in popular sovereignty than he was, and they did go on to suppress those who did believe in it, including the "Levellers."

In this context, it is important to distinguish between the development of monarchy in France and in Great Britain, both in terms of the working of the institution and the justifications offered for it. In France, kings continued to claim executive power and to rule by "divine right," justified by apologists such as the prelate Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet. They increasingly ignored ancient representative institutions such as the *parlements* and the *états*. But in Britain, following the Civil War and the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the monarchy developed as a more limited institution with diminished and diminishing executive powers. This has often been referred to as "constitutional monarchy," but there is at least an element of paradox about the use of this phrase because it is also widely stated that Britain has not had a

constitution. This is true if what is meant by "constitution" is the sort of coherent, codified document that the United States of America and France (in several different versions) developed after their revolutions.

Proponents of the British monarchy tended to defend a more limited form of the institution and to put their case in a more secular mode. (Even after the French Revolution, defenders of monarchy such as Joseph de Maistre tended to remain religious and fundamentalist rather than consequentialist in their defense of the institution.) As an extreme case, one might cite Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* (1657). At first sight, it seems to be a fundamentalist case for monarchy written under a failing republic. Filmer argues that legitimate monarchs have a God-given right to rule comparable with—and an extension of—the God-given authority of husband-fathers as heads of households. Filmer's account of the proper order of things is overtly religious, but it has often been pointed out that his argument can easily be reproduced in a purely secular form as an account of the organic existence of society whose natural bonds give it stability and determine its proper leadership: The King is the father of the nation. This can also be seen as the forerunner of later defenses of a limited monarchy, including those by Edmund Burke and Walter Bagehot, in which the monarch is, respectively, the core of a system of institutions that cannot be radically changed without incurring disaster and is something that is necessary at the symbolic level of politics rather than the rational level.

In the 18th century, the commercial success and relative political stability of Great Britain—a parliamentary government under Hanoverian kings—attracted new defenses of limited monarchy. To the Baron de Montesquieu, it was an example of "mixed government," its different institutions being based on separate and even conflicting principles, relating to each other with a kind of creative tension. But his analysis of the working of British government as being based on a "separation of powers" was even more inaccurate than John Locke's 50 years earlier: The powers—as opposed to the forms and symbols—were now overwhelmingly on one side. But the most intellectually unencumbered and radical defense of the monarchical status quo came from the Scottish philosopher David Hume. In his essays, especially "Of the

Origin of Government,” “Of the Original Contract,” and “Of Passive Obedience,” Hume scornfully dismissed the rival Tory and Whig claims to explain political obligation and legitimacy. It was nonsense to claim that government was based on any form of “contract,” just as it was nonsense to claim that we had an absolute obligation to obey royal government. Hanoverian stability and prosperity, for which Hume was duly grateful, came about partly because the regime was incapable of providing a theoretical justification for its existence, and it should be judged on its consequences, not on its origins. In the final chapter of his *History of England* (Vol. 6, chap. 81), Hume contrasts William of Orange, who, in the name of his wife Mary, usurped the English throne in 1689, sending James II into exile. James was the more virtuous man of the two, remarks Hume, and his claim to the throne was a superior one. But the consequences of the usurpation were better than the alternative, because of certain negative virtues that William possessed: He was not a Catholic, and the very weakness of his claim was a strength in a limited monarchy. Of the “Glorious Revolution,” Hume concludes that “it gave such an ascendant to popular principles” and “this island, have ever since enjoyed . . . at least the most entire system of liberty.”

It should not be inferred that Hume favored the Hanoverian arrangements because they were popular government in disguise. Like many of those who devised the constitution of the United States, Hume was clearly of the view that popular sovereignty as an overriding principle was as dangerous as the divine right of kings. His necessary condition of liberty was that no principle be overriding and that monarchy must remain to ensure this, at least in Great Britain.

The French Revolution and the excesses it engendered advanced and renewed the arguments in favor of monarchy in Britain. Some Englishmen, including Tom Paine and Richard Price, were enthusiastic in wanting Britain to follow France in a republican direction. William Wordsworth expressed the enthusiasm of a generation: “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive” (*The Prelude*, Book 11). But this initial enthusiasm soon faded as France moved toward the Reign of Terror, and war broke out between the two countries. Edmund Burke argued in his *Reflections on the Revolution*

*in France* in 1790 that if “revolution” was taken to mean what the French seemed to mean by it—the radical reconstruction of society along lines suggested by abstract reason—then it was doomed to degenerate into failure and tyranny. This was not true of the more modest form of revolution that had occurred in England in 1789 and in America in 1776, both revolutions that Burke favored. He argued that the “real rights of men” existed only as properly recognized and developed systems of obligation in well-established and well-ordered societies. The liberties of the English were part of a slowly developing system of government and society of which monarchy was an integral part. Thus, liberty and monarchy were part of one another, and there was little chance of sustained liberty in a popular republic that was based on abstract principles. The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham was even more emphatic in his condemnation of the revolutionaries. In *Anarchical Fallacies*, he attacked the very nature of the French revolutionary doctrines such as “the natural rights of man,” arguing that they failed both ontological and ethical tests and were, therefore, “nonsense on stilts.” But Bentham was a very strict and self-conscious consequentialist, so his support for monarchy was necessarily more contingent and mutable than was Burke’s.

In short, the defenses of British monarchy by Montesquieu, Hume, Burke, and Bentham were different, but had in common the view that by combining parliamentary power with royal sovereignty British government was “limited,” “moderate,” or “mixed” in ways that were conducive to sustaining liberty. Such government was compared favorably with republican government in which there was no natural balance to the popular will or limit to abstract principles. All of them might argue that “natural rights” or “popular sovereignty” were, if anything, slightly less nonsensical than “the divine right of kings,” but in the circumstances they found themselves, the latter was the less dangerous doctrine.

The normative argument in favor of limited monarchy took a new turn with the publication of Walter Bagehot’s book *The English Constitution* in 1867. Bagehot attacked the idea that government could be understood only in terms of power and the making of decisions, arguing, in effect, that such accounts were one-dimensional:

In such constitutions there are two parts . . . first, those which excite and preserve the reverence of the population—the dignified parts, . . . ; and next, the efficient parts—those by which it, in fact, works and rules . . . every constitution must first gain authority, and then use authority; it must first win the loyalty and homage of mankind and then employ that homage in the work of government. . . . The dignified parts of the government are those which bring it force—which attract its native power. . . . The Queen is only at the head of the dignified part of the constitution. The prime minister is at the head of the efficient part. (pp. 3ff)

“Dignity,” in Bagehot’s sense, humanizes and personalizes our relationship with the state, allowing us to identify it with a family, a history, and a nation. This is unselfconsciously, but entirely, a functionalist account of the working of government, and its predecessors therefore include the accounts of “the body politic” going back to Plato and Aristotle while its successors include 20th-century systems analysts such as David Easton and Oran Young. It remains an important argument on several levels including the defense of monarchy and the general understanding of political systems.

### Monarchy and Political Science in the 20th Century

Bagehot’s theory of the working of a limited monarchy has been widely quoted, accepted, and taught. It has acquired some of the properties of a self-fulfilling prophecy, influencing both the way in which British monarchs have conducted themselves and the perception of monarchy in the population as a whole. For example, socialist politicians have been surprisingly easily persuaded that the existence of monarchy is compatible with their egalitarian principles—a compatibility that would seem unlikely *prima facie*. Moreover, they have often made the judgment that there are fewer obstacles to their policy proposals under a monarchy than there would be with a formal, written constitution. In any case, monarchy as a political issue would likely be highly emotive and distracting; like abortion, it would be an unlikely issue for a rational career politician to choose to be involved in. As a result, the existence of the monarchy has been kept

off the main political agenda in Britain, and it is only slightly less rare that the precise role of the monarchy has been debated.

Of course, what applies to Britain also applies to different degrees in a number of Commonwealth countries. It is interesting to note that monarchy has been more of an issue in Australia than it has in Canada, though in the Canadian version, the role of the monarchy is more circumscribed, and there has been no equivalent of the events in Australia in 1975 when the Queen’s representative, the Governor-General Sir John Kerr, played an active part in dismissing the government of the day during what has been described as the greatest constitutional crisis in Australian history. But it is also the case that Bagehot’s theory of the role of monarchy applies at least in part to other monarchies, because in these cases as well, the monarchy can be seen as located in a different dimension from normal politics. The Allied (principally American) decision to allow Emperor Hirohito of Japan to continue as head of state after the Japanese surrender in 1945 falls into this category and almost certainly facilitated the legitimate and peaceful postwar development of the country. In Spain, the restoration of the monarchy in 1975 also proved similarly to facilitate reconciliation and legitimation. In one sense, Spain had been a monarchy since the end of the Civil War in 1939, but it was a monarchy without a monarch, with Generalissimo Francisco Franco as “Caudillo” and acting head of state. To see the Spanish monarchy in this Bagehotian light is surprising, given that monarchy had remained an ideological issue in Spain, but King Juan Carlos I has proved adept at working with elected politicians of all persuasions in the British style. He enhanced his reputation considerably by acting decisively against an attempted military coup in 1981.

The case of Thailand is more difficult to assess. The country has had a constitutional monarch since 1932, and King Bhumibol (as it happens, a native of Massachusetts) has been in office since 1946. The monarchy is revered in Thailand, and the monarch has a religious status as the spiritual leader and highest level of being within the national form of Buddhism. But Thailand has not experienced political stability; it has had a cycle of military coups and democratic restorations with the longest period of sustained democratic government

being 1992 to 2006. Spain and Thailand can be seen as the inverse of each other: In Spain, the monarchy has helped provide the conditions for reconciliation and democratization despite the institution being initially divisive, whereas in Thailand, the monarchy is revered as “above” politics but has been unable to prevent political instability. But one could argue that without the monarchy Thailand’s divisions would have been expressed much more violently and its sense of national solidarity lost completely. Thus, it is not out of the question to argue for the Bagehotian functionalist role of monarchy even in the Thai case. It may be that without monarchy, Thailand would have experienced more bloodshed and less economic progress.

In all these cases, it is at least arguable that monarchy has been very important politically, principally by providing the context in which politics takes place. So it is surprising to report that there has been very little attention in the academic study of politics to the institution of monarchy. Bagehot’s account of the institution, though well known, has barely been refined or developed. The subject has been left to journalists and historians, and it is instructive to consider why this should have been so. It is even the case that most university courses on British politics do not discuss the monarchy as such.

First, there is the question of what James March called “the power of power.” The concept of power combines the appeal of “the glories of classical mechanics” with that of “the cynicism of *Realpolitik*.” And concern with it has been a defining condition of the modern study of politics. “Politics is about power” is the mantra, which appears to specifically exclude the study of “constitutional” monarchs. But the distinction between the powerful and the formal can never be completely impermeable as is shown by the incidents in Spain in 1981. It is possible to imagine a constitutional crisis in the United Kingdom in which the monarch would assume a similarly important role. In any case, in Bagehot’s account of monarchy, the monarch retains certain residual political rights—to warn, to advise, and to be consulted—which may generate influence, particularly when an experienced monarch is dealing with a relatively inexperienced politician.

Second, in the case of those monarchies that retain executive power, the methodological

constraints on research are considerable. To investigate the Moroccan monarchy or any of those in the Arabian peninsula would present a Western political researcher with obstacles of language, culture, access, censorship, and coercion. In any case, since there is only a limited set of monarchies, even effective research might appear contingent and anecdotal with little or nothing to say about monarchy *per se*.

Third, there is also the case of progressivism, whether in its Whig or Marxist forms. That is, although monarchy may exist and be thriving now, forms of developmental model relegate monarchy to the past. Research in the social sciences is naturally more oriented to the present and the future rather than the past. We could argue that 20th-century political science devoted too much attention to unanswerable and superficial questions about public opinion and too little to monarchy.

Fourth—and finally—there is the undeniable effect that research feeds on research and generates fashions. Monarchy is not studied partly because nobody ever makes an attempt to study it, and it would be a brave young researcher who announced that he or she was going to devote his or her career to studying monarchy.

The absence of a political science of monarchy is more complete at the microscopic level than at the macroscopic. At the broad level, some political scientists have accorded at least a curious attention to the effects of monarchy on political culture and thus on the working of political systems. In particular, Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) has contrasted the cultural condition of American republicanism with the more deferential and “governable” characteristics of Canada and European monarchies. Contemporary monarchists might argue, based on this research, that monarchies as a whole remain generally more stable and more prosperous than republics as a whole, but the obvious response would be to point out that this is a spurious correlation dependent on the further observation that most monarchies are either in Northern Europe or the Commonwealth. They would be on firmer ground in saying that the principal advantage of monarchy, especially when compared with executive presidencies, is that it furnishes a state with a head who did not seek the role and whose identity is



bound up with that of the society, rather than an ambitious politician with executive responsibilities whom at least a substantial minority of the population are likely to dislike.

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*See also* Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Republic; Traditional Rule

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## MONETARY RELATIONS

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International “monetary relations” refers to the efforts of sovereign states to influence the conditions of cross-border flows of money and other financial assets, especially money flows that are not the direct counterpart of real exchanges of goods and services. These conditions include but are not limited to exchange rate regimes and levels, capital and investment controls, foreign debt contracts, the use of reserve currencies, regulation of multinational banks and nonbank financial institutions, and balance-of-payments crisis management. After situating the topic in its theoretical and historical contexts, this entry discusses the relationship of monetary legitimacy to state power, the ambiguous nature of global monetary governance, and the contemporary monetary issues of greatest concern. A final section highlights the range of theoretical and methodological perspectives in use.

### Theory and History

Neoclassical economists typically make a number of assumptions when examining the international monetary system, among the most significant being that financial firms and investors act independently of one another, that multinational banks have little home bias in their lending and investing decisions, and that, under fully liberalized global capital markets, firms and countries with objectively similar economic profiles will face homogeneous credit, insurance, and bankruptcy conditions. These analysts model the global monetary system as a decentralized, self-equilibrating market. Within this cognitive framing, national decisions to depart from fully liberalized capital accounts appear suboptimal. Yet the neoclassical approach ignores the role played by states in constituting the rules and institutions within which market transactions occur.

Political scientists in contrast assume an international *political* economy. World markets are embedded in and permeated by social institutions, including formal international governmental organizations (IGOs; with membership limited to sovereign states) as well as informal clubs and processes, each associated with norms, laws, or rules,

and standardized procedures. Yet there is neither a world government nor a collective and authoritative enforcement mechanism for global market transactions. Those who defy the “rules” of exchange (honor contracts, represent merchandise honestly, don’t bribe, and don’t manipulate prices) may be punished by the market in the form of reputational losses. Powerful states also possess a host of additional punishments and inducements, particularly access to their home markets, that core country governments may deploy to get the rules, compliance from others, and occasional exceptions for themselves that they desire. Neoclassical economics does not model these non-trivial special privileges.

International monetary transactions over the past century and a half have occurred within four broad monetary eras. Three were characterized by sets of rules and social institutions designed and enforced by representatives of a dominant state or states, while the fourth period was an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to establish a durable regime.

During the classical gold standard era, roughly 1870 to 1914, the major trading states pegged their paper currencies (fiat monies) to gold, with incumbent governments promising to redeem this paper on demand. The system’s anchor was the credibility of the promises of key states, particularly Britain, to exchange intrinsically valueless paper for a preset quantity of precious metal.

The second period was the two interwar decades of unsuccessful attempts to reconstruct the prewar gold standard. With its industrial economy decimated by World War I, Britain especially tried to reestablish sterling convertibility at the prewar gold parity but gave up in 1931. Barry Eichengreen observes that the major industrial capitalist states, responding to pressure from demobilized soldiers, all quickly instituted universal male suffrage following World War I, subsequently making it politically very difficult to reimpose the rigid and harsh automatic-adjustment procedures built into the gold standard. In a contrasting explanation for the failure to establish a durable monetary regime, Charles Kindleberger famously contended that the crucial brake on interwar monetary stability was that the only state with sufficient economic and political resources to lead, the United States, was insufficiently committed to doing so. There was no solution until after World War II.

The key outlines of the postwar multilateral economic institutions negotiated by the soon-to-be victors reflected the generally liberal economic preferences of the United States, which emerged from the war even more relatively powerful than previously. The Bretton Woods regime, named after the New England resort where the conferees met in late 1944, had the goal of free currency convertibility on the current account of the balance of payments, so that the inability of would-be importers to get a license to purchase foreign exchange would not serve as an undeclared trade barrier. However, the Bretton Woods negotiators saw liberal convertibility for the capital account—corresponding to cross-border investment flows lacking a direct trade counterpart—as dangerous and destabilizing. Another key provision was the historically unprecedented creation of two multilateral banks offering loans to sovereign governments: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), providing foreign exchange to countries whose currency was under attack, and the World Bank, to extend longer-term credits for war reconstruction and infrastructure development. The final pillar of the postwar monetary regime was a mostly fixed exchange rate among major currencies. This was the adjustable peg, to be moved only through formal application to the IMF, which was hardly ever done in practice. Only the U.S. dollar, the system’s linchpin, was convertible into gold. The United States’ strong postwar economy meant that its business community initially accepted low import tariffs, even when trading partners did not reciprocate. But America’s postwar trade surplus eventually disappeared. In 1971, and without consultation with the United States’ European allies, U.S. President Richard Nixon ended convertibility and imposed a 10% across-the-board import surcharge, effectively devaluing the dollar by an equivalent amount. By the mid-1970s, all the major industrial democracies had responded by floating their currencies.

The post-Bretton Woods regime, or financial globalization era, extends from the mid-1970s to the present. Its dominant themes have been removal of capital controls and dismantling of a wide variety of financial regulatory barriers, such as U.S. legislation prohibiting commercial banks from operating in securities markets. Deregulation led to heightened integration of previously segmented

national financial markets and a dramatic expansion of the profits and size of the financial sector in the advanced economies. The period also has coincided with an increase in financial crises, often both balance-of-payments (exchange rate) crises and domestic banking crashes. Crises occurred most often in developing and transitional countries, with the notable exception of 1991–1992's large crisis in Western Europe's Exchange Rate Mechanism. Members of the European Union (EU) then sought to protect themselves from financial uncertainty by the dramatic step of adopting a common currency. Their Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) entered into full effect in January 2002, although without the participation of the United Kingdom and Sweden.

Until 2008, most expected the United States, the center of world financial innovation and possessor of the dominant global reserve currency, to remain immune from serious financial crisis. Yet the U.S. and worldwide financial crisis of 2008–2009 was the worst since the 1930s, leading the global economy to shrink by almost 3% in 2009. The neoliberal model of ever-freer global finance has been at least partially discredited. Robert Wade is hardly the only observer to ask whether a new era of international monetary relations is in the process of being born.

### Money and State Power

As recently as the late 19th century it was not uncommon for multiple currencies, including both coins (*specie*) and paper obligations of public and private entities, to circulate freely in a national territory. Yet from the early 20th century onward, possession of a unique national currency operating as sole legal tender within the geographical extent of the territory came to be seen as an indispensable component of sovereignty. Because fiat money depends on the public's trust of the issuer, currency strength is closely linked to state legitimacy and strength. Niall Ferguson claims that it was early-modern England's superior ability to construct effective public debt markets, encouraging voluntary loans to the state from wealthy private citizens, that allowed England to surpass France in military and political power. Rodney Bruce Hall investigates how national, and ultimately global, monetary credibility is socially constructed in the

contemporary world, locating central banks at the core of this process. Leonard Seabrooke emphasizes the critical role of mass publics in the wealthy democracies in sustaining belief in national money and finance. Key to this has been what John Gerard Ruggie baptized the compromise of "embedded liberalism" or support by the advanced capitalist democracies for comparatively open, liberal international economic relations coupled with buffering of their domestic populations from economic downturns via extensive welfare networks and capital controls.

National monetary strength in turn becomes a source of international influence, allowing states to employ financial levers to achieve both preferred global financial governance outcomes and unrelated foreign policy goals. David M. Andrews points to the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, in which the United States informed Britain that it would not lend its support to the sterling, then under market pressure, until the British and French changed their policy and agreed to withdraw from Egypt. Contributors brought together by Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner worry about the problem of global imbalances—specifically the United States' persistent and ever-growing current account deficit mirrored by the similarly "structural" surpluses of China and others—and what the gradual redistribution of monetary capabilities toward large emerging powers such as China might mean for the dollar-centric global economic governance system still managed by, and some would claim for, the major advanced industrial economies. In mid-2009, all the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) were among the 10 largest holders of official foreign exchange reserves. There were only two advanced industrial democracies on the list: Japan, number two after China, and Germany, number nine.

### The Amorphous Global Financial Architecture

Throughout the Bretton Woods and financial globalization eras the scope, goals, and membership of the international governance regimes for international money and finance have been, in Jacqueline Best's felicitous phrase, notably "ambiguous." One possibility raised by Benjamin J. Cohen is that today's sophisticated monetary relations are

qualitatively distinct from those in most other international arenas: It is the market itself that increasingly “governs,” limiting the actions of states. On the other hand, the monetary regime does possess formal organizations. The IMF and World Bank are official membership institutions with wide authority over their borrowers, although since the early 1980s, their borrowers have mostly been developing countries and post-centrally planned economies. In the years following the mid-1970s breakdown of fixed exchange rates among the major economies of the day, it has been the Group of Seven (G7, initially the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan, later joined by Italy and Canada) that has exercised real international monetary governance authority, managing sometimes acrimonious exchange rate negotiations among the dominant capitalist economies, coping with international financial crises, and promoting (or vetoing) multilateral and transnational innovations in collaborative financial and monetary regulation, irrespective of the formal venues for regulatory negotiations. As Andrew Baker explains, the G7 is a “process,” at present consisting of quarterly meetings of finance ministers and central bank presidents along with annual heads-of-state summits, rather than a formal organization with a headquarters building and permanent staff. Membership in this exclusive club is on the basis of power, in the dual senses of latent capabilities and realized influence, although whether this is overall global power or monetary regime-specific power is not always clear. Overall power is a necessary but not sufficient membership qualification, assisted by international assertiveness, yet underlying friendly relations, with the leading economies. Thus, Italy successfully demanded inclusion for itself in the mid-1980s by threatening to close American airbases. In the early 1990s, the newly independent Russia was invited to the heads-of-state summit process (the G8) but not for the technical monetary consultations, a move widely understood as a concession to Russia’s global importance and nuclear weapons status.

Even the G7 has been to some degree a fiction: In both the Latin American peso/“tequila” crisis of 1994–1995 and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, U.S. officials in the Treasury, White House, and Federal Reserve brushed aside the

preferences of their Western European and Japanese G7 partners. Moreover monetary governance in the sense of regulatory innovation and multilateral or collaborative supervision of cross-border financial flows takes place even further below the radar of public scrutiny, in technical committees associated with the Bank of International Settlements—an invitation-only membership association of the central banks of systemically important countries and other countries they choose to include—and in a host of public-private transnational bodies associated with various branches of the financial industry, such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the International Accounting Standards Board. By comparison, the global trade regime, which is often accused of being biased against developing countries in its operation, nonetheless is headed by a formal organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose members include a majority of countries. The WTO has democratic voting procedures, formal rules for trade agreements, a complaint and adjudication process, and ongoing negotiations over agreed-on agendas. The *de facto* global monetary governance regime lacks all these qualities.

### Monetary Relations of the Status Quo Powers

It may be that the combination of ambiguity and centralization in monetary relations has served the world well. There has been steady expansion in the world economy since the Bretton Woods system came into being, although the rate of world growth has been notably slower since the breakdown of its fixed exchange rate component. Prior to 2008–2009, there had been no truly systemic international financial crisis since the 1930s. The consensus of policymakers in the G7 countries as of late 2009 was that collaborative crisis management was working, and world growth would recover in 2010. A repeat of the Great Depression had been averted, at least in the core capitalist economies. As international monetary conditions apparently returned to normal, the attention of both policymakers and scholars in advanced industrial countries refocused on their traditional concerns, including exchange rate negotiations, the degree of autonomy from political oversight to

be accorded to central banks, financial regulation and supervision, and the desirability and feasibility of multilateral macroeconomic coordination.

Many of the theoretical contributions of political scientists are related to these topics. Eric Helleiner and Benjamin J. Cohen, respectively, have clarified the political economy of capital account liberalization (CAL) and that of the “unholy trinity” of CAL: exchange rate stability under a floating rate regime and autonomous domestic monetary policy. Jeffrey A. Frieden has been at the center of a group in pursuit of a parsimonious theory of domestic exchange rate preferences, employing, on the one hand, interest-group categories such as exporters versus importers, producers of tradables in contrast to producers of nontradables, liquid- or fixed-asset holders, and sectors with or without foreign debt, and on the other hand, political institution variables such as majoritarian versus plurality systems and measures of central bank independence. Explaining the decision of a majority of Western European states to yield up their national currencies by joining the EMU has been a dominant task for political scientists investigating exchange rate politics.

Other scholars analyze the negotiating strategies employed by major states and their use of international monetary power to achieve state goals. In general, countries prefer to have their trading partners make the necessary adjustments rather than having to intervene to move the level of their home currency. Thus, during the G7 negotiations in the mid-1980s known as the Plaza and Louvre Accords, all parties agreed that the U.S. dollar was objectively overvalued. But the Europeans wanted the United States to find a way to rein in government budget and trade deficits, while the Americans argued that, since their reserve currency position made it impractical for them to encourage the markets to let the dollar depreciate, it was up to the European and Japanese to push their currencies up. The United States and China had similar disagreements in 2008 to 2009.

#### **Additional Concerns of Emerging Powers and Peripheral States**

The world of the very early 21st century remains unipolar, with only a single superpower. But the trend is toward the emergence of new powers,

particularly China. Opinion on Europe splits sharply between observers who identify countries such as Britain, France, and even Germany as states of declining global significance and those who perceive the inevitability of the United States of Europe and thus anticipate future bipolarity or tripolarity with the United States and China. Japan's future status is similarly debated. What is clear is that since sometime in the 1990s, several emerging powers plausibly are approaching members of the G7 in global prominence, particularly if one employs economic size as the single most critical component of relative capabilities. New countries push to be included in global monetary deliberations. The U.S. President George W. Bush in the final months of his administration in late 2008 convened the first heads-of-state summit of the countries of the Group of Twenty (financial G20, not to be confused with the trade G20 of developing countries), until then a peripheral albeit multilateral process initially organized by the United States in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis. Besides the G7, G20 members included Australia and a geographically representative selection of larger emerging economies friendly to the United States. Meanwhile the BRICs countries, formally organized by Russia, had begun meeting at the heads-of-state level in early 2008, cognizant that their main common interest lay in joint pressure for inclusion in the more exclusive clubs for global governance but pragmatically seeking to develop other collective negotiating aims. From the initial summit of the financial G20 (or “larger economies group”) in November 2008 onward, the G20 swiftly moved to supplant the G7. Meanwhile the four BRICs countries have made increasingly bold, if still guarded, statements about the need to replace the dollar with a truly global currency, perhaps based on the IMF's Special Drawing Rights.

Global monetary and financial reform proposals important to developing countries, yet long brushed aside by G7 policymakers and academics, finally have entered the elite economic discourse. These include topics such as recognition that countries with prudent macroeconomic and financial regulatory policies may be victims of financial contagion, that there may be a legitimate role for the state in overcoming both national and global market failures in financial markets, that “host” rather

than “home” state regulation of multinational banks may better protect investor and borrower rights, and that multinational insurance and stabilization funds for commodity producers might be economically sound concepts. More generally, entirely free markets, particularly in money and securitized assets, may be neither self-equilibrating nor socially desirable. In the terminology of international relations, some states in the developing world, particularly those possessed of objective power resources or influence relevant to the global monetary governance regime, have begun to demand the extension of the protections of embedded liberalism to their citizens. Many of these themes were echoed in a 2009 international commission of experts put together at the behest of the president of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and headed by Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and fierce critic of the IMF. Interestingly, the UNGA documents criticize the financial G20 as insufficiently democratic and representative in its composition.

### Contending Political Perspectives on Global Money

The conceptual lenses through which political scientists analyze international monetary relations are extraordinarily heterogeneous. In one intellectual corner, associated with several of the most prestigious U.S.-based journals, are scholars who define their task as the application of the dominant methodology of contemporary neoclassical economics—sophisticated statistics—to explore, for example, the relationship between hourly electoral results in a wealthy democracy and the fluctuating value of benchmark global bonds. Elsewhere, students of philosophy, social trust, or of the psychology of panics are fascinated with the mystique of money, in its modern and nearly entirely electronic form—the epitome of accelerating globalization. Practitioners of traditional diplomatic history are finding monetary negotiations to be increasingly central to interstate security relations. Last but hardly least are Marx’s contemporary heirs: for example, authors in the volume edited by Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings make a compelling case that the current international financial architecture directly reflects the interests of the United States’ private financial sector. One almost might

conclude that money is as ubiquitous as power in international relations—or that the two are the same.

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*See also* Economic Statecraft; International Political Economy; International Trade; Multinational Corporations (MNCs); World Bank; World Trade Organization (WTO)

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## MONITORING

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Monitoring can be defined as a systematic and continuous surveillance of a series of events. Monitoring is practiced to secure that the activities inside an organization, or the outputs of an organization, are according to established goals. Monitoring thus refers to the control of organizations. In politics, monitoring takes place both between politicians (versus bureaucrats) and within the public administration; in the latter form, it deals with organizational control. Monitoring and evaluation are closely linked; both focus on examining the procedures and processes involved and gathering information about the level of performance. In government practice, the two concepts overlap, as when, for example, the follow-up of a government program can be called either monitoring or evaluation without a major difference. It is also possible to see monitoring as a basic form of evaluation when we add some “how and why” questions, such as why a given program is lagging behind its goals or how certain societal results can be explained by certain policy measures.

Some evaluation scholars do not make a distinction between monitoring and evaluation. Others argue that monitoring does not include judging the worth and value of performance, and hence, evaluation consists of more than monitoring or accounting. In addition, the focus on theory separates evaluation research from other forms of evaluation, such as monitoring. A central concept related to monitoring is accountability. Politico-administrative systems are built on a hierarchical structure, which gives the citizens the right to control the parliament; the parliament the right to control the government; the government, the public administration; and the upper levels of bureaucracy, the lower levels. Much has been written on

the possibilities and limitations of parliaments and cabinet members in controlling bureaucracy. Although bureaucrats may be subject to political surveillance, they know how to use their often long (at least in comparative terms) experience, expertise, and isolation from political battles to bypass and make strategic use of any monitoring efforts directed toward them. Whether monitoring reaches the ultimate points of delivery, where street-level bureaucrats deal with various sorts of clients, is an important issue as well, not least from the viewpoint of democracy. Finally, monitoring may be used when governments finance various external projects, as, for example, with development aid. Monitoring can even refer to the control of governmental outlays for typically outsourced projects.

The theory and methodology of monitoring are closely linked to organizational science. Organizations are collective efforts, and large organizations always need to control the unity of the organization. The theoretical issues around the concept thus deal with questions such as what kind of monitoring tools work in what kind of organizations, what motives underlie the use of monitoring, and to what extent governments are using similar or different kinds of monitoring tools and why. As noted earlier, monitoring is tied to characteristics of the organization in question. A small organization, a club, or an association can usually maintain order or homogeneity simply by exchanging communication through face-to-face interaction. Larger and more complex organizations, such as major hospitals, political parties, religious bodies such as the Catholic Church, or national bureaucracies, have a much greater need for ensuring that what the members of the organization do corresponds with the overall will of the leaders of the organization, be they outside or inside the organization.

### Alternative Organizational Models

The way the researchers conceptualize monitoring depends on the specific organization model, or metaphor, that they are using. Traditionally, in what we could call the old institutionalism, the politico-administrative system is seen as constituted of rules and organizational arrangements that aim to cement the tasks and responsibilities—the

division of labor—within the public administration. The pioneering sociologist Max Weber depicted bureaucracies as rational systems compared with the earlier historical forms of state. The prominent features of this system were specification of jobs with detailed rights, obligations, responsibilities, scope of authority, and a system of supervision and subordination. Monitoring in this context served to ensure that the rules were followed and malpractices would be discovered and stopped. Hierarchic and bureaucratic modes imply the use of coercion or threat to ensure compliance with authoritative rules. In some cases, this monitoring by rules and regulations may lead to an overemphasis on caution and slow, multifaceted processing of issues. Today, we also think of bureaucracies as inefficient, slow, and generally bad. Thus, the concept of bureaucracy has through the years been interpreted in a variety of ways.

Later on, however, the Weberian model of public administration was modified, if not replaced, by a number of other models.

First, a theory contrary to the Weberian rational model is that bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are significantly, though not solely, motivated by self-interest. This theory follows the tradition of economic thought from Adam Smith onward. One influential model in this area is the principal-agent model. The model treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal (e.g., parliament) hires an agent (government department). In this situation, the two may not have the same interests, even though the principal is presumably hiring the agent to its interests. While perhaps not fitting the public administration *per se*, the model seems to catch the problems embedded in contractual relationships, in which the public authority aims at defining in the form of a contract the liabilities and sanctions dealing with a private agent. The question is whether the agents, say individual bureaucrats, strive for selfish benefits or are servants of the public. Solving this question can be difficult because in reality, bureaucrats whose aim is to expand their organizations may serve both their own and the public interest. In any case, adding the possibility of selfish, individual interests to the picture increases and somewhat complicates the monitoring task.

Second, a (neo-)institutional approach would place the actors in context and predict, for example, that doctors have a particular, professional way of legitimizing their activities, and an outsider (the principal) demanding scrutiny may be in a frustrating or weak position. In addition, organizational change, such as adjusting to new forms of performance monitoring, may not depend on the deliberate decisions made by the organization's leaders but on the fit or misfit between the reform and the norms of the organization. It is well known that the various reforms originating from the new public management paradigm have been implemented in ways reflecting the specific historical, societal, and political culture of a country.

### Performance Management

Monitoring the Weberian rule of law emphasizes the avoidance of mistakes but does not emphasize or require results. Poor performance was not really a question in the fiscal accounting system. Now, however, monitoring has widened to include a program element, and likewise, researchers have shifted their focus to questions of performance management. A central issue in research concerns the possibilities and limitations of measuring performance within public administration. One debate focuses on the nature of public policies. It has been determined that performance targets are often quantitative, and this causes bureaucrats to neglect the qualitative, nonmeasured aspects of their performance. Public policies, further, are often services or societal interventions, which make it difficult to point out exactly what the influence of the output is. On top of that, so-called performance indicators often do not measure outcomes but outputs—as, for example, where the police aim at making as many arrests as possible, while the fundamental societal goal is to diminish criminality. In addition, performance indicators have been criticized because of their rigidity. The use of performance indicators can have dysfunctional effects on an organization's performance if it does not react to changes or surprising events. Finally, monitoring performance can be a complicated task. More and more public policies are produced not by single organizations but by several ones in concert. These policy networks or partnerships often follow their own situation-bound, autonomous norms but at



the same time form a part of the public authority. The question of accountability becomes more difficult the more actors are involved and can be more accurately called *multiple accountability*. In recent years, there has been a lively debate on governance—for example, concerning a new form, or account, of public policy making, which emphasizes the interaction between private actors and public authorities on various levels. The implications for monitoring are obvious: Instead of coercion and authority, concepts such as trust, custom, and solidarity play an important role.

At a deeper level, performance monitoring reflects questions of ethics and trust. In the Weberian system, it was widely accepted that malpractices need to be identified and omitted. Performance monitoring raises the question of why organizational rules, information from different sources, and professional education are not considered sufficient to guarantee a well-functioning public administration. It suggests that the organizational model in use assumes that bureaucrats are selfish and lazy. Devoted professionals prepared to further develop their policy areas may become disillusioned because of the straightforward simplification of progress into numeric indicators. The central question is how organizations function and to what extent their coherence is based on trust versus control. As mentioned earlier, excessive monitoring in the form of frequently demanded reports, control of communication, time limits for tasks, and so forth can also demand an excessive workload. Thus, one research task in this area is to find and argue for a healthy balance between trust and control, whether based on the organization's size and structure or the type of organization.

### Monitoring and Public Policy

Loosening top-down control, a strict way of monitoring, may raise questions of democratic accountability. Democracy is often seen from a narrow perspective as properly expressed only through aggregative representation. Flexible, interactive forms of public policy making can be justified with the help of democracy theory too. At the same time, the transformation of public policy making may radically change the overall opportunities of monitoring by upper levels of government. The move away from this traditional linear interpretation of

the policy cycle and toward a more nuanced conceptualization of the policy process reflects a general recent trend toward “post-positivist” modes of analysis in policy science as a whole. Research on monitoring cannot avoid the changes caused by the transformation of monitoring itself.

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*See also* Evaluation Research; Performance Management

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## MONTE CARLO METHODS

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Monte Carlo methods describe a set of computer simulation techniques that rely on random number generation to solve complex optimization and integration problems arising in statistics and its related fields. The term *Monte Carlo* is a reference to the probabilistic rules underlying casino games of chance, and though the theoretical underpinnings for their use emerged in the postwar period, it is the advent of inexpensive, modern computing that enabled their widespread adoption for practical problem solving.

Typically presented as an alternative to time-consuming analytical efforts, Monte Carlo methods allow researchers more freedom to posit models and make more subtle inferences from them—that is, they no longer need to rely on standard, but unrealistic, assumptions about complex (causal) processes that ensure a tractable solution exists.

This has proved particularly important in Bayesian analysis, where quantities of interest are available in principal by complex integration operations, yet can be (well) approximated via simulation. Precisely because such techniques have proved popular in political science, this integration aspect of Monte Carlo methods is the focus here. This entry begins with a discussion of the basic integration operation; then, it moves to the importance of random number generation and methods of sampling before considering Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. This latter set of techniques has proved extremely popular in political science over the past 10 years or so, especially for applying item–response models to obtain “ideal points” from roll call data. There are also large literatures dealing with optimization via Monte Carlo procedures and integration via (nonsimulation) deterministic numerical approaches; these are not discussed here.

### Classical Monte Carlo Integration

To keep matters simple, consider the evaluation of the following integral:

$$I = \int xg(x)dx, \tag{1}$$

where  $g(x)$  is a probability density function. As presented, the integral will yield the expectation of the random variable  $X$  denoted  $E(X)$ . But performing the operation may be difficult, perhaps because the integral has no closed form. A helpful alternative to this effort is to generate a sample of size  $m$  from the density  $g(x)$  and then to compute the empirical average,

$$\hat{I} = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m x_i. \tag{2}$$

As  $m$  increases, by the strong law of large numbers,  $\hat{I}$  converges almost surely to the true value of  $I$ —and thus, the true value of  $E(X)$ . Denoted the Monte Carlo method, the idea is more general. We can replace  $x$  in Equation 1 with some arbitrary function of  $x$ , denoted  $h(x)$ . This might be the median or some other percentile. And we can assess definite integrals so long as we can produce a sample of  $x$  values between the specified bounds.

The variance of  $\hat{I}$  is decreasing in  $m$ . When  $\text{var}(m)$  is finite, the central limit theorem applies as the sample size increases, and we can place bounds on our estimates. Moreover, asymptotically, it is possible to obtain quantities that can be used to assess convergence directly.

This simulated integration takes on an important role in Bayesian statistics, since we often want to perform a variant on Equation 1. In particular, we are concerned with characteristics—such as the mean or median—of the posterior distribution  $\pi(\theta|y)$ , where  $\theta$  is an unknown parameter and  $y$  the observations. In that case, we need

$$E(h(\theta)) = \int \pi(\theta|x)h(\theta)d\theta,$$

which we approximate as  $(1/m)\sum_{i=1}^m h(\theta)$ . For many regular cases, this simple approach works well, though more efficient alternatives typically exist that do not require being able to directly simulate samples from  $g(x)$ .

### Random Number Generation and Sampling

All methods of simulation necessitate the generation of random numbers; in the case of simple Monte Carlo integration, those random numbers were from some probability function  $g(x)$ . For a very broad range of functions (the  $g(x)$  and  $\pi(\theta|y)$  above), at base, the task requires the production of uniform random variables on the unit interval. We then obtain draws from  $g(x)$  via the inverse transform. Though there are some cases where nonuniform random number generation can be used, the techniques are difficult to generalize outside of specific distributions. What constitutes an optimal or efficient random number generator is debatable and often subjective.

The inverse transform may not be available, or may not work well, for many distributions. An alternative is to use accept–reject methods (also known as rejection methods or rejection sampling) that rely on a fundamental result involving the uniform distribution. Recall that we wish to generate variates from  $g(x)$ , which we will assume has bounded support. Imagine now that the random variable  $X$  is jointly distributed with an auxiliary variable  $U$  such that any hypothetical pair of values drawn will have an  $x$  component with some

corresponding  $g(x)$  and  $u$  component that is strictly less than the  $g(x)$  and yet nonzero. To obtain that  $u$  value, we simply generate from the uniform bounded by 0 and  $g(x)$ . Yet in doing this, we have, in fact, generated a draw from  $g(x)$ : For a given value of  $x$ , our uniform draw  $u$  must be “under the curve” described by  $g$ .

Clearly, we need an  $x$  value to evaluate  $g(x)$ , but this cannot be sampled directly from  $g(x)$  itself (since this is assumed unavailable to us). In practice then, for a one-dimensional density, we sample the  $x$  value from a uniform between zero and the maximum of  $g(x)$  and the  $u$  value from a uniform that has a range identical to (the relevant part of)  $g(x)$ . Notice that these two intervals draw a “box” around the density  $g(x)$ . It must be the case that some of these pairs are points in two-dimensional space that fall under the curve  $g(x)$ , and we will “accept” these. By contrast, some must fall elsewhere, and we will “reject” those.

The accept–reject approach can be used more generally for cases where neither the maximum nor the support of  $g$  are bounded, so long as simulating uniform variates over the implied larger space is possible. The key is to find another density function  $f(x)$  such that for every possible value of  $x$ ,  $g(x) \leq Mf(x)$ , where  $M$  is a constant greater than or equal to one. Now, we begin by generating  $x_i$  values from our “envelope” density  $f(x)$ . We then take a single draw  $u$  from a uniform  $U[0, 1]$ . If the value of  $u$  is less than  $g(x_i)/Mf(x_i)$ , the  $x_i$  is accepted as a sample from  $g(x)$ . If not, we reject the candidate  $x_i$ . This approach has an important implication for Bayesian analysis, because we do not need to know the normalizing constant for  $g$  to sample from it. Yet this is precisely the situation when dealing with a posterior that is proportional to the prior multiplied by the likelihood:  $\pi(\theta|x) \propto p(\theta)g(x|\theta)$ . Thus, we can draw samples from  $\pi(\theta|x)$  without calculating the normalizing constant.

For some problems, accept–reject sampling can be very inefficient. To reduce the variance in simulations, an alternative is to choose an approximate distribution  $f$  and then weight the resulting draws according to the probability that they represent a sampled point from the target distribution  $g$ . This idea is known as *importance sampling*. The beauty of this sampling scheme is that there is very little restriction on the choice of the

instrumental distribution  $f$ , and so it can be chosen such that it is easy to sample from (e.g., a multivariate normal).

### Markov Chain Monte Carlo

As described above, Monte Carlo methods produce independent draws from some density  $g(x)$ . By contrast, Markov chain Monte Carlo methods produce simulated values that are dependent on previous draws from the distribution in question. Recall that a Markov chain is a sequence of random variables with the Markov property, meaning that the present state  $\theta^{[t]}$  depends only on the immediately preceding one  $\theta^{[t-1]}$ . Note that the chain is defined with respect to a state space  $\Theta$  that constrains the possible values for the variables, and its moves around this space are probabilistically controlled by the chain’s kernel. So long as the chain possesses certain properties (among them ergodicity, recurrence, and irreducibility), it will eventually reach a stationary distribution  $\pi$  and stay there. That is, in this limiting distribution, every draw is from  $\pi$ . More important, analogous to Equation 2, the average converges to the expectation we seek.

Markov chain Monte Carlo methods are preferred to simple Monte Carlo methods, including importance sampling, because they are often more efficient, especially for complex problems that involve very high-dimensional integrals. With Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms, the researcher can spend less time finding the “right” instrumental distribution; rather, simulations from  $g$  can be generated from essentially any arbitrary distribution  $f$ . The most widespread procedure in use is the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm, which relies on a random walk. The basics are straightforward: Suppose we are interested in a single parameter  $\theta$  for which the posterior is thus  $\pi(\theta)$ . After some starting point, at each step  $t$  in the chain, we propose a candidate value of  $\theta$ , denoted  $\theta'$ . In practice,  $\theta'$  is a draw from a proposal (or jumping) distribution  $q(\theta|\theta^{[t-1]})$ , where  $\theta^{[t-1]}$  is the prevailing value of  $\theta$  from the previous step in the chain.

The restrictions on the proposal distribution are not especially onerous, and it is often chosen such that it is easy to sample from, with a normal distribution centered at  $\theta^{[t-1]}$  being a common choice.

We accept the proposal  $\theta'$  as the value for  $\theta^{[t]}$  if  $u$ , a draw from  $U[0, 1]$ , is less than the ratio of the posteriors evaluated at the different proposals (assuming  $q(\cdot)$  is symmetric). If the proposal is not accepted,  $\theta^{[t]}$  is simply  $\theta^{[t-1]}$ , and the process starts again.

The primary concern with Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques is that it is not obvious how many of these updating steps are needed. That is, although we are guaranteed that an ergodic chain will eventually reach its stationary state—and thus that we will be sampling from the posterior we seek—we cannot know beforehand how long this “mixing” will take. A large literature exists on diagnosing nonconvergence, and the methods therein generally rely on monitoring the chain over time, or monitoring the performance of chains with different starting points. Related to this endeavor, researchers typically dispose of early, nonstationary chain values as “burn-in.” A special case of the Metropolis–Hasting approach, popular in political science and elsewhere, is the Gibbs sampler. This requires that researchers have the relevant conditional distributions for the posterior  $\pi(\theta)$  available to sample from. When feasible, Gibbs sampling is more efficient than a more general Metropolis–Hasting approach since the candidate values are accepted with probability 1 every time. Free software for specifically fitting models using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods is widely available.

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*See also* Bayesian Analysis; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom

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## MULTICOLLINEARITY

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*See* Regression

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## MULTICULTURALISM

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Multiculturalism as a concept, principle, and policy has become, since the 1980s, one of the most controversial issues in social sciences and humanities. The term refers to countries with territorial and/or linguistic minorities and those formed as a result of the migration of religious or racial and/or ethnic groups. Minority claims for equality have given rise to what the philosopher Charles Taylor (1992) has called the politics of recognition, relating it to the “democratic defense of cultural diversity within a universalistic perspective.” Recognition policies along with differentiated group rights are at the core of a “multicultural citizenship” elaborated by Will Kymlicka. For defenders of the principle, multiculturalism matches with the public recognition of cultural identities, with equal rights for ethnic, racial, religious, or national minorities. It therefore constitutes the foundation of democracy. For those who oppose the principle, it leads, on the contrary, to the “disunion” of the nation and to isolated communities in the political arena, and it is therefore perceived as a challenge to the national unity guaranteed by the state. For some, it serves to thwart nationalism and for others, inversely, it serves as the basis of national sentiments and expressions.

The debates oppose those who defend a liberal vision against a republican vision of pluralist society that recognizes citizen identity only on the grounds of social justice. While liberal multiculturalism looks for a response to the management of cultural diversity as a means of equal inclusion of minorities in the political community, the republican view represents multiculturalism as politics, turning the society into a battleground where common values

are transformed into particular interests and where identities perceived as majority or minority compete with each other in search of public resources and representation. As a whole, multiculturalism is fundamentally concerned with both universalistic ideology and the idea of a common civic space of political participation for all groups; it questions how to reconcile the integration of minorities into a common civic culture with the protection of the most vulnerable groups. The process has transformed an anthropological perspective of cultural diversity into a normative vision of plural societies. Multiculturalism is thus systematically associated with the question of national unity and its integrative capacity.

Each state has its own understanding of minority and elaborates specific relations with its minorities. Progress in the judicial sphere now involves questions regarding the cultural and religious rights of minorities in their fight against all forms of discrimination. That does not resolve the issue of whether to define a minority in territorial or nonterritorial terms. Definitions continue to remain ambiguous and differ according to national experiences that define the relations between states and minorities. In Canada, the confrontation between the French and English languages, because of Quebec's status and the debates around a bilingual and bicultural society, defined as such by the Royal Commission on Multiculturalism, gave political legitimacy to the concept, thanks to the constitutional multiculturalism used in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacted by the British Parliament and signed by Queen Elizabeth II as part of the Canada Act in 1982, which was thus officially accepted as the fundamental characteristic of the Canadian state. In the United States, the concept has been grounded on the civil rights movement of the 1960s. It took a political and legal shape with the establishment of affirmative action starting in 1965, as a way of increasing the access of members of historically disadvantaged groups to benefits such as employment, college or university admission, and the granting of government contracts. These measures sought to reduce racial or ethnic inequalities and historical injustices by trying to repair the effect of past policies, notably slavery and racial segregation.

In Europe, the term *multiculturalism* is used to refer to various situations according to the structure

of the state and the recognition of regional and linguistic particularities and of the minorities. Some countries in continental Europe have institutionalized pluralism through the creation of regions granted limited power, as in Italy and Spain; others have built the state on linguistic pluralism, as in Belgium and Switzerland, where the linguistic and territorial communities each have their own institutions. In Eastern Europe, the presence of some populations on a border of the neighbor state has led to the elaboration of minority rights in kin states, such as for Hungarians in Romania. But in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the term *multiculturalism* refers to immigrant populations organized around a common nationality or religion (or both) and their demand for specific voices in the public sphere, as with ethnic minorities or Native Americans and African Americans in the United States.

To some extent, similar situations entail recourse to concepts that, used in different national contexts, require new definitions and different policies. In Western Europe, the use of the term *multiculturalism* marks the shift from temporary economic immigration to the permanent presence of immigrant populations and their political participations. From the state perspective, this implies the extension of the welfare state to a new realm—that of immigration and identity—with the establishment of social policies to guarantee integration of these minorities in the larger society. In Germany, the city of Frankfurt created a bureau of multicultural affairs, whose head advocated a “multicultural democracy” inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract. In France, too, during the same period, the media as a political class described French society as “multiracial,” “multicultural,” “plural,” and “pluri-cultural.” This terminology found legitimacy in a political discourse that privileged “the right to difference,” established in 1981. In Great Britain, the Commission for Racial Equality promulgated in 1976 the Race Relations Act. The main objectives were to fight racism, to eliminate discrimination, and to ensure equality of opportunity and thus establish good relations among different racial groups. The targeted discrimination against Muslims in Britain today has led sociologists to argue for the inclusion of religion—mainly Islam—in ethnic and racial policy and its consideration by antidiscrimination laws.

In the Netherlands in the 1980s, a minority policy took the objective of “promoting multiculturalism and the emancipation of ethnic communities.”

Whatever the discourse or the practice and whatever the definition of a minority, gradually all European countries have converged in a sort of “applied multiculturalism.” The question is then what are the cultures and groups entitled to recognition? What group rights would be legitimate to recognize? In Europe, multiculturalist policies refer mainly to Islam—the religion of the majority of postcolonial immigrants as new minorities—and to its institutional and legal recognition. The perception of Islam as not separating politics and religion challenges secularist European states, while not recognizing Muslims as a minority is an obstacle to equal inclusion of differences. Its legitimacy stems from equal representation of religions in liberal democratic societies; and, as Bhiku Parekh (2000) suggests, it comes as the extension of existing institutions in a way to include the newly emerging Islam and to promote at the same time a common membership and a common civic culture, allowing citizens to find adequate identification. Here is one of the paradoxes of multiculturalism: political and institutional integration of differences into democratic values to claim the recognition of some cultural particularities of groups that question their compatibility.

Critics of multiculturalism have emphasized the radicalization of Muslim minorities in Europe. Myths, claims, and discourses of such groups perceived as a threat to universal democratic values came to justify the retreat from multiculturalism in countries such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and even Canada, where, as Charles Joppke notes, the accommodation of minorities has been the core of the integration policy. Arguments are grounded on the effect of multiculturalism on the economic, cultural, and political isolation of communities; ethnic violence, perceived as a result of identity politics that have failed to ensure civic harmony; and a fear of the global transnational forces that penetrate national societies and create a competition between cultural-religious communities expanded beyond the borders and the territorially bounded national-secular community. In the Netherlands, the assassinations by extremist groups of politician Pim Fortuyn and filmmaker Theo van Gogh have engendered a radical change in politics and

opinions toward minorities, with an emphasis on the failure of the politics of difference that did not lead to the expected economic integration of migrants but, on the contrary, isolated them culturally and politically. Great Britain has also changed its policy after the terrorist attacks on London’s public transportation system in London on July 7, 2005, realizing that the society is getting away from Bhiku Parekh’s aspiration for a community of communities and a community of citizens at the same time. In Canada, the attempt to establish a sharia court in Ontario brought the debate to a legal and constitutional level and has created a dilemma on the search for equal justice and the limits of toleration.

Despite the retreat of liberal democracies from multiculturalism, the principle and the discourse are now diffused on international and supranational levels within European institutions and beyond. The question is associated with minority rights, more specifically with national minorities and indigenous populations; it does not concern immigrants and nonterritorial ethnic groups. As noted by Kymlicka (2007), the principle is interpreted as an extension of human rights. In 1966, Article 27 of the United Nations (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Human Rights Committee) stipulated that

in those states in which ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.

In 1992, the UN adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and began to debate in 2007 the rights of indigenous people. After the Cold War, at the first summit of the Council of Europe in Vienna in 1993, states seemed to rush things by advocating “to draft with minimum delay a framework convention specifying the principles which contracting States commit themselves to respect, in order to assure the protection of national minorities. This instrument would also be open for signature by non-member States.”

The establishment of minority rights as an international standard through normative institutions

as well as “policy networks”—the nongovernmental organizations, intellectuals, media, and actors themselves—is accepted on a discursive level by many states (Kymlicka, 2007). Their objective is to adopt effective policies in a timely manner regarding cultural diversity and ethnic and/or religious conflict in their respective societies. It becomes a sign of democratization for non-Western states. This does not mean, however, that states—Western or non-Western—accept multiculturalism as a principle or as a norm. Each state acts with regard to the complexity of situations, to the variety of minorities, and to their specific historical relations. At stake are peaceful coexistence of ethnically diverse populations, national security, and civic harmony.

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*See also* Identity, Social and Political; Racism; Tolerance

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## MULTILATERALISM

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In everyday language, the term *multilateralism* is often used synonymously with *international cooperation*. Among diplomats, it refers to certain

cooperative diplomatic practices, and, according to a common scholarly definition, multilateralism is simply international cooperation that includes three or more states. This minimalist conception is sometimes supplemented by a number of conditions, including the idea that cooperation between states should be based on generalized principles of behavior. Given this plethora of different meanings, it seems not unfair to say that the term *multilateralism* is a convenient yet potentially confusing shorthand “tip of the iceberg” concept, representing and connoting a multitude of phenomena. This entry reviews three major different ways of referring to multilateralism, for which reason it is introduced as an institutional system, a foreign policy strategy, and as political ideology.

### The Multilateral System

In a *longue durée* perspective—that is, a temporal perspective spanning centuries—we have seen the emergence of an increasingly dense network of multilateral institutions and agreements. This network is frequently called the multilateral system and has essentially developed through four main phases. During the first phase, reaching back to the early 19th century, the system was characterized by the first experiments in collective diplomacy. This form of diplomacy was a feature of the post-Napoleonic era and was cultivated by European diplomats and heads of state meeting in 1815 at the Vienna Congress to determine the future European order. Subsequently, a series of more than 30 conferences, called the Concert of Europe, constituted the first example of recurrent collective diplomacy. In this context, “collective” does not refer to all interested states—the Concert was characterized by special great-power roles and responsibilities. The first phase also included the introduction of international conflict resolution by means of legal instruments, especially arbitration and negotiation, essentially the precursor for the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Notably, the first phase also saw the creation of the first proper international organization, specifically the launch of the International Telegraphic Union in 1865. Subsequently, other specialized international organizations were initiated, and by 1900 about a dozen had been created. All these origins represent the beginning of a novel and

increasingly institutionalized feature being introduced to the international states system.

The second phase starts with the establishment of the multipurpose and, in principle, global League of Nations after World War I. Membership in the league consisted mainly of the European states, thereby reflecting the colonial times in which it was established, the eurocentrism of the international states system, and the reluctance of the United States to engage in international politics. The creation of the league was a deliberate attempt to avoid future major wars, for which reason a system of collective security was introduced. Apart from the league, some further specific organizations were created, including the International Labour Organization (1919). The League—and perhaps foremost its member states—clearly failed in the key objective of securing the peace, yet as failure is one source of experience and knowledge, the lessons learned were used when states designed the successor organization during and after World War II.

The third phase begins with the creation of the United Nations (UN) and an increasingly broad range of so-called functional agencies, including the World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). During this phase, not all intended organizational projects were feasible, as demonstrated by the aborted International Trade Organization (ITO; replaced by the less ambitious trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) and by the never fully ratified European Defence Community (EDC), which was substituted later by the Western European Union (WEU). In turn, the WEU never got to play a significant defense role, as this function was provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Similarly, the Cold War context did not allow the UN to function as intended, and the full potential of the organization never came to fruition. The third phase is also characterized by experiments in terms of regional integration and organizations, most significantly the European Community. Other examples include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Arab League, the Nordic Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the (failed) East African Common Market.

The fourth phase starts with the end of the Cold War and is characterized by a relaunch of the UN (now freed from the constraints of the Cold War), a new wave of international organizations (e.g., World Trade Organization [WTO], African Union [AU], Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], Common Market of the South [Mercado Común del Sur; MERCOSUR], Asia Pacific Economic Community [APEC]), and a series of reforms of the European Community, notably its transformation into the European Union (EU). Subsequently, the EU aims at playing a role *in* international organizations, not any longer wishing to *be* just an international organization among others. In summary, it is striking that each new phase of international organization begins as a more or less collective political response to fatal crossroads situations at the end of major wars. Combined, the many international organizations constitute an increasingly dense network of organizations, each based on treaties or agreements characterized by specified sets of principles, norms, and rules. Some analysts call the outcome *global governance*, whereas others prefer the concept of a fragmentary world state.

Formal organizations do not constitute the only feature of the multilateral system. To realize better the diversity of institutions, it is useful to make a distinction between international (governmental) organizations, international regimes, and international conventions. Whereas organizations are characterized by a postal address, employed bureaucrats, and budgets, international regimes can be seen as agreements, whether formal or informal, about very specific issues. Examples of such specific issues comprise the EU's regulation of the import of bananas, regimes concerning the export of missile technology control (MTCR), and the former trade regime, the GATT (being institutionalized in the mid-1990s and, thus, becoming the WTO). Regimes have always been an important part of the multilateral system, but their development is more difficult to categorize in phases. Concerning informal nonbinding agreements, states have a clear advantage in the sense of not being constrained by the agreement. The problem is that other states enjoy a similar advantage for which reason their future behavior becomes less predictable.



Finally, international norms or conventions (notably spelled with a small *c*) refer to implicit rules and tacit understandings. Such conventions are customs and habits, and both allow us to have expectations about likely behavior or interpretations of agreements. In this sense, conventions or norms are informal institutions that can exist for centuries without being codified. Often, international treaties and agreements are little more than codifications of previous conventional understandings. Hence, there is a complex and intimate interplay between conventions, regimes, and organizations. Often, these institutional forms are closely intertwined in reality, and their separation is foremost analytically convenient. This feature can be illustrated by the example of the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is a field characterized by a number of formal agreements—that is, treaties of nonproliferation, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. In addition, a group of states have created a handful of export control regimes, including the MTCR, which helps these states specify and reach the objective of nonproliferation. The number of contracting states is rather limited, yet many states adhere to the principles of the regimes as if they were members. Further, some international organizations have been assigned specific tasks in the field, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Finally, throughout most of the 20th century, there has been an international convention, a custom, not to use chemical weapons, and in 1997, a formal agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention, came into force.

In a wider international system perspective, the multilateral system can be seen as a historically new feature of the international states system or, differently conceptualized, as a fundamental institution of international society. The multilateral system is often said to be strongly state-centric; the reason being that states create, reproduce, and, sometimes, terminate the life of multilateral institutions. Further, states are usually exclusive members of such institutions; they negotiate and sign international agreements that materialize in international regimes. States also engage in reproducing the principles, norms, and rules underpinning both organizations and regimes, thereby securing that

they are alive and working and not just dead letters in a written agreement. Paradoxically, the multilateral system is so state-centric that the EU, not being a state, experiences severe difficulties in performing as an international actor pursuing European interests. However, while states might have been exclusive players in the past, transnational actors (TNAs) play an increasingly significant role in the contemporary multilateral system. TNAs frequently contribute to agenda setting, sometimes provide intellectual leadership, push for some international agreements, and campaign against other agreements. Prominent examples include the creation of the International Criminal Court and the international treaty banning landmines, both initiatives being sponsored by the EU and NGOs working in the field of human rights. The enduring significance of TNAs in global governance remains an empirical question, yet it is beyond discussion that they, even if not formal members, increasingly contribute to the politics of multilateralism.

### Multilateral Foreign Policy

Multilateral institutions have states as members and therefore need these states to engage in some political gardening to keep the institutions on track and on mission. Hence, the foreign policy of states requires a more or less prominent multilateral dimension. Multilateralism is one option among a range of foreign policy strategies. Multilateral foreign policy strategies prioritize the promotion of and commitment to international institutions, including the resources it takes to cultivate these multilateral institutions. The United States opted for this strategy after the end of World War II and also immediately after the end of the Cold War. At other times, the commitment to multilateral institutions has been more ambivalent. One of the stated strategic objectives of European foreign policy is to promote effective multilateralism. Other great powers have been more reluctant or simply unable to shape the multilateral system or its individual institutions. Thus, Russia, China, India, and Japan have had a modest impact on the development of the system. It is telling that the international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank thrived during the Cold War partly due to the fact that the

Soviet Union decided not to join. By contrast, middle powers such as Canada and the Nordic states have traditionally been keen supporters of multilateralism: In some cases, they almost fully comply with their international obligations; that is, they ratify the international treaties they sign and subsequently display few infringements against the treaties they have signed.

To further specify the meaning and characteristics of multilateral foreign policy, it is useful to proceed *ex negativo*, or to explain what it is not. The antonym to multilateralism is unilateralism, a “going-it-alone” foreign policy strategy. Application of the strategy implies that a given state essentially does what it wants to do, abandoning consultations, coordination, or cooperation with allies or third parties and employing an approach that is characterized by the absence of international legal or political constraints. However, proponents of a “going-it-alone” strategy sometimes advance their arguments on the basis of a narrow understanding of international customary law. Especially, great powers enjoy the option of unilateral action. During the George W. Bush administration, the United States was prone to unilateral action, diplomatically labeled *à la carte* multilateralism. Though having a preference for multilateral foreign policy, the EU is no stranger to unilateral action, as demonstrated by the rather frequent use of sanctions—that is, in cases where the EU acts like a unitary actor. However, the invasions of Kuwait by Iraq and the Falkland Islands by Argentina suggest that it is not only the great powers that enjoy the privilege or temptations of unilateral military action.

Like unilateralism, bilateralism is also not multilateralism as it only takes two to cultivate a bilateral relationship. An illustrative example is Japan and the United States cultivating a broad range of bilateral agreements, including defense and security. Sometimes bilateralism and multilateral arrangements are intertwined, for example, France and Germany cultivating a close bilateral relationship, yet within the context of the EU. Also the United States and the EU can be said to cultivate an exclusive bilateralism within the context of a multilateral WTO, in turn triggering opposition coalitions such as the Cairns Group.

The three strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Thus, unilateral diplomatic action can provide the necessary conditions for a major

breakthrough in otherwise stalled multilateral negotiations, and bilateral relations sometimes function as the innovative undergrowth, providing the leadership, coalition building, and preparatory work that secure an agreement within multilateral diplomacy, characterized by a large number of participants. Reaching international agreements by a select subgrouping of a larger multilateral organization or regime, which are subsequently adopted by other states, is known as minilateralism. Hence, minilateralism is characterized by an exclusive group of key states within a specific issue area reaching an agreement that is subsequently accepted within a larger multilateral setting. One example is the policy by France and the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, a policy that was accepted by partners within the EU and subsequently adopted by the UN Security Council. Minilateralism should not be conflated with plurilateral agreements being concluded by a small select grouping of states and subsequently adhered to by a larger segment of international society. A reference to the plurilateral instrument was made after the 2003 WTO Doha Round meltdown in Cancun, when the EU suggested that given the multilateral deadlock, perhaps a plurilateral approach would be a desirable, attractive, or, at least, possible alternative.

### Multilateralism as Political Ideology

In certain contexts, multilateralism should be seen as an ideology that exists in both positive and negative versions. These versions share the view that the qualities of multilateralism are a matter of belief or faith and therefore beyond debate and examination. In the first place, multilateralism is seen as morally superior to other foreign policy strategies. Further, multilateralism tends to be seen as an end in itself, for which reason the instrumental dimension is systematically downplayed. Being multilateral is what counts and, even if nothing can be achieved, it remains imperative to keep the multilateral machinery in place. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, this attitude characterized the European approach to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process. Finally, in some understandings, multilateralism and the UN are simply synonymous. Due to its global membership, only the UN is considered a

genuine example of multilateralism. Interestingly, the authors of the European Commission's annual report seem to take this stance. The positive version has also been called *globalism*, and adherents argue that global agreements should be prioritized even if the number of veto players almost guarantees that no agreement is the likely outcome. The alternative, in terms of an agreement concluded by the, say, 14 most important states for global climate, is dismissed and accompanied by references to problems of legitimacy. Similarly, plurilateral agreements are also dismissed because they are by their nature essentially exclusive.

According to the dystopian ideology of multilateralism, multilateral approaches are synonymous with inaction, unwarranted constraints on state action, or both. One argument is that it would be irresponsible to leave decisions concerning crucial issues to multilateral institutions as inaction and nondecision is often the likely outcome. If states nevertheless opt for multilateralism, it is because they use multilateral institutions instrumentally to cover for inaction. In this perspective, multilateral agreements function as window dressing—for example, the commitment to 0.7% gross domestic product (GDP) on development, a commitment that very few states seem to adhere to. By contrast, the Millennium Development Goals have not been met due to a wider set of failings, including donor shortfalls, recipient shortcomings, and organizational malfunction. A second argument is that powerful states should not constrain themselves by getting embroiled in a web of rules and obligations. A third argument, for instance, used by opponents of European integration, is that small states should not give up the formal and symbolic dimensions of independence or autonomous decision-making power. Finally, proponents of an exclusive league of democracies to replace the UN argue that universalism triggers a fundamental problem as nondemocratic states are given too much of a voice.

### Theoretical Reflections on Multilateralism

Major theoretical debates in the discipline of international relations concern the promise of international institutions and the multilateral system. Four issues constitute the backbone of these debates especially. In the first place, some theorists

claim that multilateral institutions should be seen as mere arenas on which (strong) states engage in international politics. Such arenas have no independent or significant impact on the script or on what is being played. In contrast, other analysts emphasize that the level of institutionalization in the international system has an impact on state behavior, that international organizations sometimes teach states about their interests, and that organizations can be seen as agents that are not entirely controlled by their principals. In various ways, all these approaches emphasize that the arena approach is most misleading and largely unfounded by evidence.

Second, there is an enduring issue concerning the instrumentality of international organizations. While some theorists are keen to theorize what international organizations can do and what difference they can possibly make to international politics, other theorists focus on instrumental action. As Inis Claude has famously emphasized, we should ask not what the UN can do but what the UN can be used for.

Third, some theorists claim that, at best, multilateral institutions reflect the changing distribution of power and, at worst, trigger naive and dangerous illusions about their potential, making us forget those few but important things that really make a difference in international politics. If, indeed, the impact of multilateral institutions is epiphenomenal to power politics, then why waste time analyzing something that essentially is derived from more powerful explanatory variables? By contrast, other theorists claim that the institutionalization of world politics mold international anarchy, thereby reducing the power of power politics and making a more peaceful world possible. These scholars emphasize that there is a linkage between the growth of multilateral institutions and the pronounced decline in interstate war.

Finally, many scholars tend to take the positive qualities of international institutions for granted, a tendency that is particularly strong among those theorists who regard multilateralism a means toward cooperation and peace. By contrast, other analysts claim that multilateral institutions frequently display an alarming degree of dysfunctional or, worse, pathological features—that is, characteristics that potentially undermine whatever legitimacy these institutions might have and, in

any case, provide significant obstacles to reaching global solutions to urgent global problems.

### Crises of Multilateralism

The development of the multilateral system and its international institutions has frequently been characterized by crises, ranging from the failure of the League of Nations to the less than perfect performance of the UN during the Cold War and the doldrums of the European Community during the 1970s. However, the contemporary crisis of multilateralism appears to be more profound than previous crises, and it seems to have several sources. Thus, several major multilateral institutions were created during the Cold War, and, as the world has subsequently changed, they are in severe need of more or less comprehensive reform. Further, the international institutions are characterized by an ever more present trade-off between inclusion, legitimacy, and effectiveness. As the number of participant state members increases, so does the number of veto players. At the same time, there is an increasing imbalance between the provision of leadership, which is lacking, and an ever-broader portfolio of global demands and tasks to handle. It does not help that several key states pay lip service to their obligations toward international institutions or act as custodians insisting on yesterday's arrangements, not necessarily because they are perfect or efficient but because they represent a certain distribution of power, pride, and prestige. In the UN, the Group of 77 (G77), controlling the budget and personnel, has shown little interest in administrative reform. Finally, multilateral institutions are characterized by an ever-wider expectation–investment gap, triggering, in turn, frustration, apathy, or cynicism concerning absent expected deliverables. Examples of the crisis abound, ranging from the stalled UN reform process, via the dire straits of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, to the stalled WTO Doha Round. It is clear that sustainable solutions to the crisis require some exquisite intellectual innovative thinking and strong political leadership and, it is hoped, not another calamitous external shock to the system to provoke change.

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*See also* European Integration; Foreign Policy Analysis; Governance, Global; International Institutions; Liberalism in International Relations; United Nations

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## MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

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Multilevel modeling is used in the analysis of data that have a clustered structure. Such data arise in various fields—for instance, in educational research, where pupils are nested in classes; in medical research, where patients are nested within hospitals; and also in political research, where individuals are nested in a social context. A crucial problem in the statistical analysis of clustered data is the dependencies between individual observations. For example, voters from the same city are not independent from one another, because they are all influenced by local policy. The statistical analysis performed on clustered data should account for this dependency. However, statistical analysis can also benefit from such dependency. The characteristics of different levels can be combined into one explanatory model and conclusions can be drawn about their effects, both at each level and in interaction. In the following sections,

the multilevel model is explained and illustrated by means of a political example.

The starting point for explaining the multilevel regression model is the idea that the dependent variable, allocated at the lowest level, is thought to be influenced by all distinguished levels. With respect to a two-level model, this principle can be seen in the following equation (the intercept-only model):

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}. \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable  $Y$  of an individual  $i$  in group  $j$  is decomposed into three different parts. Because there are no explanatory variables in the model yet, the explanatory part of the model consists only of the grand mean  $\gamma_{00}$ . The unexplained part of the model consists of two parts: an error at the highest level ( $u_{0j}$ ) and an error at the lowest level ( $e_{ij}$ ). This means that the total variance of the dependent variable is decomposed into two parts: the error variance at the lowest level ( $\sigma_e^2$ ) and the error variance at the second level ( $\sigma_{u_0}^2$ ). A good explanation of the dependent variable is therefore based on both levels. Of course, one should keep in mind that the division over both levels can differ per variable. The more error variance there is at the lowest level, the less important the second level will be.

Adding explanatory variables of both levels gives the following equation:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_p \gamma_{p0} X_{p ij} + \sum_q \gamma_{0q} Z_{qj} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}. \quad (2)$$

In this equation,  $p$  explanatory variables of the lower level and  $q$  explanatory variables of the second level are added to the model. Interactions between variables of the lowest level are also called  $p$ , and interactions between variables of the second level are called  $q$ . Because these variables will explain a part of the variance at both levels, the errors will become smaller and the explained variance in the dependent variable can be calculated.

Interactions between variables of different levels take up a special position in the model. The influence of a lower-level variable on the dependent variable may depend on a second-level variable. This is called a cross-level interaction (or moderator effect). Adding cross-level interactions to the

model, gives the final, and most elaborated, multilevel model:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_p \gamma_{p0} X_{p ij} + \sum_q \gamma_{0q} Z_{qj} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} + \sum_q \sum_p \gamma_{pq} Z_{qj} X_{p ij} + \sum_p u_{pj} X_{p ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}. \quad (3)$$

Looking at this equation, one can see that not only are the cross-level interactions added to the model but there also are  $p$  extra error terms in the model:  $u_{pj} X_{p ij}$ . The errors  $u_{pj}$ , the unexplained parts of the regression coefficients of the lowest level, are multiplied with the lowest-level variables and are therefore different for different values of the  $X$  variables. This is called heteroskedasticity. In ordinary regression analysis, homoskedasticity is assumed, which means that the variance of the errors is independent of the values of the explanatory variables. Therefore, analyzing the model presented in Equation 3 requires a multilevel analysis. The variance of the errors  $u_{pj}$  is  $\sigma_{u_p}^2$ .

The assumptions of the most commonly used multilevel regression model are that the residuals at the lowest level  $e_{ij}$  are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a common variance  $\sigma^2$  in all groups. The second-level residuals  $u_{0j}$  and  $u_{pj}$  are assumed to be independent from the lowest-level errors  $e_{ij}$  and to have a multivariate normal distribution with means of zero. Other assumptions, identical to the common assumptions of ordinary multiple regression analysis, are fixed predictors and linear relationships. Most multilevel software assumes by default that the variance of the residual errors  $e_{ij}$  is the same for all second-level units. However, certain forms of heteroskedasticity can be explicitly modeled.

Estimation of the parameters (regression coefficients and variance components) is generally done using maximum likelihood. The restricted maximum likelihood method maximizes a likelihood function that is invariant for the fixed effects and therefore leads, in theory, to better estimates of the variance components than the full maximum likelihood method in which both the regression coefficients and the variance components are included in the likelihood function. In practice, the differences between the two methods usually are not large.

Assume that we have data from a random sample of cities and also data from a random sample of


inhabitants of these cities. We are interested in explaining involvement of individuals with local policy, measured on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*extremely*). We use the variable *gender* as an explanatory variable at the lowest level, assuming that men are more interested in politics than women, and the variable *local political activities* (measured on a scale from 1 [*almost none*] to 7 [*very often*]) as an explanatory variable at the second level, assuming that, in cities with more local political activities, individuals are more interested and involved in political issues. We have data from 2000 individuals from 100 cities (see Table 1). The first model that is specified is the intercept-only model. The total variance of the dependent variable is decomposed into two independent parts: one at the individual level and one at the city level. Because there are no explanatory variables in the model, the variance found at each level is error variance. The percentage variance at the second

level, calculated by dividing the error variance of the second level by the total error variance, is 31.85%. This means that almost one third of the total variance in the political involvement of city members lies at the second level. Multilevel analysis is therefore used not only to account for dependency but also for building an explanatory model containing variables from both levels and their interactions.

In the second model, the explanatory variables *gender* and *local political activities* are added to the model. Both variables are significant. The regression coefficient of *gender* is .88. This means that men score almost 1 point higher on political involvement than women (controlling for local political activities). This is not only a significant but also a relevant result: almost 1 point on the 10-point scale of political involvement. The regression coefficient of *local political activities* is .22. The interquartile range of the local political activities

**Table 1** Multilevel Analysis on the Political Involvement of Individuals in Different Cities

	<i>Model 1: Intercept Only</i>	<i>Model 2: With Predictors</i>	<i>Model 3: With Random Slope Gender</i>	<i>Model 4: With Cross-Level Interaction</i>
<b>Fixed part</b>				
<b>Predictor</b>	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	4.92 (0.07)	4.48 (0.05)	4.47 (0.04)	4.47 (0.04)
Gender		0.88 (0.04)	0.86 (0.08)	0.85 (0.08)
Local political activities		0.22 (0.02)	0.20 (0.02)	0.18 (0.02)
Gender × local political activities				0.09 (0.04)
<b>Random part</b>				
$\sigma_e^2$	0.95 (0.03)	0.79 (0.03)	0.68 (0.02)	0.68 (0.02)
$\sigma_{\mu_0}^2$	0.44 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)
$\sigma_{\mu_1}^2$			0.47 (0.09)	0.43 (0.08)
$\sigma_{\mu_{01}}$			-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
<b>Deviance</b>	5802.67	53338.78	5145.00	5138.76



**Figure 1** Interaction Effect of Gender and Local Political Activities

variable is 4, meaning that for this range the maximum difference on political involvement is 4 times .22, which is .88. This also seems quite relevant. Another measure for relevance is the explained variance. The explained variance is calculated by subtracting the error variance of the model with the explanatory variables (Model 2) from the error variance of the model without explanatory variables (Model 1: the intercept-only model) and dividing by the total error variance of the intercept-only model. On the individual level, the explained variance is 17%; on the city level, 70% is explained. Both are really relevant.

In the third model, the question to be answered is whether the influence of gender is the same in all cities. The answer to this question is no; there is variation between cities for this effect (slope variance is 0.47). The next step is to explain this variation (Model 4). For the explanation, the interaction between gender and local political activities is included in the model. The effect is significant and positive. This means that men benefit more from local political activities than women (see Figure 1; for statistical reasons, the variable local political activities is centered on the grand mean). The explained slope variance is 10%. The

difference between political involvement of men and women is almost 2 times as large when there are a lot of local political activities—in comparison with when there are almost no local political activities.

The example discussed in the previous section shows that multilevel analysis is the appropriate way to answer research questions concerning data with a clustered structure. Multilevel analysis not only accounts for dependency in data, but it also takes advantage of the clustered structure. The individual political involvement is explained with an individual characteristic (gender), a city characteristic (local political activities), and the interaction between these two characteristics. Multilevel analysis provides an optimal use of all available information.

In this short introduction to multilevel analysis, many other possibilities have not been discussed. For instance, the model discussed assumes a continuous dependent variable and normally distributed residuals. The check of these assumptions is not discussed. Of course, this check should always be carried out, but it is beyond the scope of this entry. When the response variable is a dichotomous variable or a proportion, both the aforementioned assumptions of continuous scores and the normal distributed errors are violated. Multilevel logistic regression gives the solution to this problem. Other possibilities are, for instance, longitudinal multilevel analysis, the multilevel approach to meta-analysis, cross-classified models, and multilevel structural equation models.

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*See also* Aggregate Data Analysis; Inference, Ecological; Maximum Likelihood; Measurement, Levels

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## MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNCs)

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Multinational corporations fascinate many international political economy scholars. Scholars disagree about their significance and their impact but continue to analyze their dynamic evolution in the global economy. Multinational corporations are private firms that operate in multiple countries. Their primary motivation is economic profit. They may engage in investment, sales, production, services, extractive processes, or any combination of these. Multinational corporations' activities propel economic globalization. They may invest, set up shop, or even buy existing domestic firms as the multinational expands. This entry addresses first the broad views about multinational corporations and then the corporations' motivations to go abroad. The entry continues with a historical overview and concludes with controversies surrounding multinational corporations.

Multinational corporations are incorporated in a home country and are chartered according to the home country's laws and regulations. Analysts have debated the extent to which home country regulations shape multinational corporations' outward conduct. Some argue that such regulations make a major difference in corporations' behavior and standards abroad. Others see multinational corporations as footloose harbingers of global capitalism with no particular state-based allegiances. Realist scholars, who emphasize the supremacy of state power, emphasize corporations' subordination to state laws, jurisdiction, and policies. They tend to cite instances in which the state took actions against the wishes of particular corporate interests—for example, favoring national security over economic considerations. Other analysts

suggest that corporations can be more powerful than states and that states may be actually in retreat in the face of rapid economic integration and globalization. These analysts note the increase in the size and role of the private sector at the expense of the public sector. Beginning in the 1980s, many states delegated an ever-greater range of once publicly supported activities to private actors. Private companies have come to run schools, jails, hospitals, municipal water systems, and have even provided security in conflict zones.

### Why Firms Go Abroad

Given the risks and costs associated with initiating multinational operations, one must understand firms' motives to do so. In the case of extractive industries, the logic is quite straightforward. Natural resource firms need to establish themselves at the site of the resources—gold, oil, copper, diamonds, cobalt, and so on. Service firms may seek to be closer to customers and be able to adapt to and serve local markets better. Manufacturing firms may seek out highly skilled or, alternatively, low-cost labor. Manufacturing firms may seek to get behind tariff walls, producing and selling their goods within regions protected by high import taxes. These examples demonstrate firms' motivations to leverage *location-specific* advantages. Another class of motivations is *asset specific*. Often, asset-specific advantages are reputation based or trademark related. Obvious examples of firms seeking to leverage asset-specific advantages would be Coca-Cola and McDonald's, entertainment companies (e.g., Disney), and brand-name luxury goods producers and distributors.

### Historical Perspectives

While some analysts write about multinational corporations as if they were relatively recent phenomena, in fact, private companies engaged in economic activity abroad date back at least to the age of empires in the early 17th century. European countries competing for colonies often sent companies, which the rulers chartered, to distant shores to establish a presence and engage in economic activity. Charter companies such as the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company facilitated European expansion



beyond what the countries' militaries alone could accomplish. In this way, these companies and their governments participated in a symbiotic relationship that helped fuel both imperial expansion and economic growth. Historical appreciation of the age of mercantilism puts claims of the novelty of private sector power and the stark separation between states and markets into question. In the colonial era, power and wealth were inextricably bound together.

By the late 19th century, firms such as General Electric and Singer Sewing Machines were operating abroad. At the end of World War I, many more companies began to invest and build plants in war-ravaged Europe. Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African countries attracted investors in various extractive and natural resource industries. After World War II, manufacturing firms invested abroad and often set up turnkey plants (fully built and ready to operate with the turn of a key) for production, and service industries established branches abroad. The extractive natural resources industries would integrate their business operations vertically, exercising control over all stages of production and processing. They sought to reduce risk by maximizing control. By contrast, manufacturing and service firms tend to be horizontally integrated and replicate themselves across countries. Their subsidiaries produce the same products or provide the same service in plants and branches in different countries. They are motivated to expand or defend market shares by getting behind tariff walls (producing for or servicing the host country's domestic market) or following their competitors abroad.

In the wake of decolonization, until about 1960, foreign corporations were often the primary source of capital and technology in newly independent countries. Eager to promote industrialization in the face of, or to counterbalance, large numbers of imported goods, many newly independent countries welcomed foreign investment into their economies. Over time, however, foreign companies became a critical target; Marxist-inflected dependency theory took root in Latin American countries and highlighted some of the more exploitative aspects of multinational corporate operations. Critics of multinational corporations complained that they did very little to help develop the host economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, many countries in Central and Latin

America adopted measures designed to channel foreign investment into domestic capacity building. For example, governments could limit foreign ownership to less than 50% of a domestic firm or require foreign firms to hire a certain percentage of domestic labor or reinvest a set percentage of profits into the domestic economy.

The spread of multinational corporations heightened scholarly attention to their activities and the implications of their global reach. Political scientists began to examine whether the power and influence of multinational corporations was surpassing that of states. Economic interdependence and dependence on natural resources such as oil sharpened the focus on this question. In 1971, Raymond Vernon published *Sovereignty at Bay*; the title captured some observers' anxiety about multinational corporations. Political scientists recognized such corporations as important actors in international politics. Realists maintained that sovereign states were still the most important actors and pointed out that states could expropriate private property and eject foreign companies. Economic liberals celebrated the spread of multinational corporations as vehicles for deepening economic integration and interdependence. Liberals believed that interdependence could lead to peace. Assertive state efforts in developing countries to channel or control their activities and academic criticism of multinational corporations faded out over the course of the late 1970s and 1980s. High oil prices and a devastating debt crisis meant that bank lending was scarce. Multinational corporations became important sources of capital and investment, so formerly resistant countries rapidly dismantled restrictive foreign investment regimes in an effort to *attract* multinational investment.

### Controversies

Scholars analyzed the role of multinational corporations in the political process. A number of scholars highlighted their bargaining role as one leg of a tripod between home government, host government, and corporation. Other scholars adopted a more nuanced view, rejecting binary views of firms *versus* states, and instead focused on the mutual interaction between states' and firms' preferences. The globalization literature of the 1990s and 2000s has examined the exercise of private authority in

the global political economy, and particularly corporations, in standard setting, economic integration, and norm creation. One set of debates has addressed the so-called race to the bottom, in which multinational corporations seek the lowest cost or the least restrictive venues. Critics of multinational corporations focus on races to the bottom to highlight their contribution to environmental degradation, the creation of sweatshops, child labor, and gendered exploitation in export-processing zones. Critics of “race-to-the-bottom” arguments counter by demonstrating “races to the top,” in which firms export the more stringent or environmentally responsible standards when they establish operations abroad.

Many nongovernmental organizations have highlighted multinational corporations’ exploitative practices and have launched naming and shaming campaigns against sweatshops, child labor, and environmentally unsustainable production. These campaigns have targeted high-profile companies with easily recognizable brand names such as Nike, The Home Depot, and Starbucks. In response to these campaigns, multinational corporations have increasingly embraced a “corporate social responsibility” approach to dampen criticism and to improve their reputations. The United Nations launched the Global Compact—a voluntary reporting program in which multinational corporations pledge to uphold certain standards of good conduct. Corporate social responsibility initiatives are all voluntary. Critics have contended that they are ineffective in altering corporate conduct and only serve as public relations exercises

designed to prevent stricter government regulation. Supporters of corporate social responsibility initiatives argue that they are having a positive, albeit incremental, impact.

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See also Globalization; Interdependence; International Political Economy; Privatization; Sovereignty

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## NASH EQUILIBRIUM

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*See* Game Theory

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## NATION BUILDING

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Nation-states are mostly multiethnic and composed of various subnations. Nation building is a process of building a social community within a nation-state. It is closely related to the formation of states in postconflict situations after regime change, after decolonization, or after wars. The nation-building process is particularly important in multination states in Africa. African colonies were formed by the colonial powers without regarding their ethnic and linguistic cleavages. With independence, the process of state building had to be strengthened by social and cultural cohesion. National symbols such as national anthems, national flags, national holidays, and national myths were used to overcome tribalism and ethnic and social rivalries. Nation building of this kind is a cultural foundation for state building and is necessary for economic and social development. Processes of nation building also became important with the breakdown of the Socialist bloc and state and nation failure in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia. Nation building is primarily an indigenous process, and external assistance often fails. It is meant to reinforce states and prevent secession. Nation

building is related to sentiments of national identity, which internally have positive effects of social cohesion by bridging and bonding but which may have negative consequences in the form of xenophobia against noncitizens. Externally, the emphasis on national identity can also reinforce aggression against neighboring countries. This entry discusses the various forms of historical and contemporary nation building and its ongoing problems.

### **Nation Building: Etymology and Definition**

Etymologically, the word *nation* is derived from the Latin *natio*, which stands for “the act of being born.” So, a nation is usually defined as a set of people and tribes. *Natio* originally was strongly connected with a term such as *ethnos* (a people based on the idea of a common descent), in contrast to *demos* (a population defined by common citizenship). Nations are socially constructed, so it is unclear who is included and who is excluded. This unclear social cultural definition is expressed in Benedict Anderson’s concept of a nation as socially constructed “imagined communities.” The broader, “territorial” concept of the nation-state produces a clearer definition. Nation building is a process of collective identity formation to assert power in a certain territory. It refers to existing institutions, customs, and traditions, and it redefines national characteristics. The process of state building depends on this uniqueness and sovereignty. The building of a nation is based mostly on values and beliefs that enhance support for and the legitimacy of the (new) state.

Nation building as a process of developing a national identity can be seen as the cultural foundation for the nation-state and its supralocal power structure. If this cultural projection of a nation is no longer valid, the social contract between the state and individual citizens or groups of citizens may be destroyed and violence may be triggered. This can be seen in the breakup and collapse of a state such as Yugoslavia, leading to civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s.

The existence of nation-states can be seen as a safeguard for security and stability. Nation-states act as the basis for economic and social development. According to Eric Hobsbawm (1990), national identity and national pride are created by a feeling of one's supremacy, and they provide a basis for nation building. All forms of national identity (national pride, patriotism, etc.) can become problematic and are related to outgroup hostility.

### State Building

Interaction between different ethnic groups is a prerequisite for a successful and sustainable nation-building process. For this reason, the social, economic, and cultural aspects of nation building are important. New forms of cultural discourses representing the nation as a whole become significant. In this respect, aspects such as a common lingua franca, a common literature, sports events, and so on are relevant. Finally, a national infrastructure and national space and communication between different relevant groups have to be developed. Civic education programs and information strengthen the education of citizens and democratic nation building. Administratively, nation building also needs an effective state apparatus.

Nation failure can be seen as an aggravated form of state failure in multicomunity states. Different subnations define themselves by shared class, religion, language, or ethnicity. Too many cleavages will make it difficult to build a state and may even destroy the social contract between citizens and the state. This situation makes it unlikely that government decisions will be accepted or adhered to.

State failure is the breakdown of public institutions meant to deliver political goods to citizens.

This may undermine the legitimacy of the state and lead to failing states characterized by disharmony between communities, criminal violence, corrupt institutions, and a decaying infrastructure, as well as inability to control the borders.

State building is the establishment of political structure and policies in a territory. It is organized by sovereign actors as an expression of collective power without the use of coercive measures and physical force.

### Nationalism

Nation building needs an integrated ideology that derives from a national identity. National identity is one pattern of orientation within a set of multiple social identities that become relevant in different contexts. It concurs with other identity narratives. All are important for the cohesion of social groups and for the fostering of individual self-esteem. Identities are constructed, and they may be deconstructed as well. Identity may occur in the form of chauvinistic nationalism and outgroup hostility. It may also be defined and constructed as a kind of constitutional patriotism, as pride in the social welfare state or as pride in social-inclusion policies. In democracies, pride in democratic performance, in societal values, and in peaceful policies becomes important.

In his seminal work, Karl Deutsch (1954) highlights the construction of identities and nationalism as well as its latent problems: "A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of the neighbors" (p. 3). He defines nationalism as a doctrine whereby people believe that their culture, history, institutions, religion, or principles are distinct and aspire for self-rule under a political system that expresses and protects those distinct characteristics.

### Banal Nationalism

According to Michael Billig (1995), the usage of symbols and common narratives can be seen as a kind of banal nationalism. National identity can be related to national symbols such as flags, anthems, and other symbols. In the cultural field, a country's pride in its "achievement in the arts and literature" is significant, but more often banal nationalism is related to sports events. This "sportive nationalism"

is well-known in mega sport events such as soccer (football) world cups and the Olympics. In these events, national symbols such as anthems and flags are used. Pride in the country's "achievements in sports" is expressed as a form of patriotism. Nevertheless, as Hannah Arendt pointed out, banal nationalism is not necessarily harmless or benign. It is always only a small step from benign national identity to aggressive xenophobic nationalism.

National identity is also related to national performance and pride in different domains, such as "political nationalism." Pride in "the way democracy works," pride in the "social security system," and pride in a country's "fair and equal treatment of all groups in society" are other domains within democratic "patriotism." Pride in a country's "political influence in the world" and pride in "the armed forces" are more nationalistic. Pride in a country's "economic achievement" and pride in its "scientific and technological achievements" are more peaceful expressions of national pride.

Nation building is related to national identity. Identity is a complex phenomenon; in the setting of multiple identities, different forms of belongings compete. National identity competes with different local identities and, increasingly, with supranational identities (e.g., in the European Union). There is also the question of who is included and who is excluded.

Banal nationalism is strongly related to the state- and nation-building process, which is obvious in multiethnic states such as South Africa. South Africa has one of the most complex national identities. Currently, various identity narratives exist. The divisions between the "self" and the "other" are regarded as phenomena characterized by cleavages in ethnicity and race, as well as language and religion. Banal nationalism as a governmental strategy is obvious. Although group identities are strong, South Africa is a country with a very high level of nationalism, national pride, and sports patriotism. This development of national identity is strongly related to nation-building ideologies and strategies. In 1995, 1 year after the first democratic elections, the rugby World Cup victory produced slogans such as the Rainbow Nation and *Simunye* ("We are one"). The common support for the rugby team (in the past mainly a "White" sport) was seen as a triumph of national reconciliation between Blacks and Whites. During the 2010

football World Cup in South Africa, the use of national symbols was openly regarded as part of a broader nation-building strategy.

### History of Nation Building

Efforts of nation building are strong in times of regime change. In the different waves of democratization as well as with the winds of change accompanying the independence of African countries, nation building became a central aspect. But historically, nation-building processes are much older.

In traditional societies, political power structures were mostly oriented toward regional and local demands in relatively autonomous rural village structures. The process of nation building destroyed most of the existing local traditional systems of clientelism and personal rule. The centrifugal shift of power toward the regional or national level can be seen as a process of conflict. Cultural, social, political, and economic dominance have to be redefined.

In general, the birth of states and nations took place in conflict situations. As primordial traditional communities shared similar values and language, states existed before the nations themselves developed.

In the foundation phase of most multiethnic states, the ruling power reinforces the development of the national state by not only using oppression but also providing strong economic incentives and implementing cultural policies aimed at cultural homogeneity (language policy, religion, policies in primary and secondary education, etc.)

In the early phases of nation building, political leaders are often interested in financial extraction from their constituencies. They often impose a state apparatus. They also have to act against new social movements and groups agitating for more democratic rights and devolution and/or secession.

### Regional Characteristics

Stein Rokkan analyzed the territorial centralization and unification that took place during the period after the Thirty Years War ending in 1648 in Europe. He highlights the role of language mobilization in unification and centralization. In Europe, the large, old dynasties and monarchies encompassed different ethnic and regional entities and used oppression and personal clientelistic networks

to develop nation-states, often based on a common religion (*cuius regio, eius religio* [whose realm, his religion]). The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 can be seen as the beginning of the modern state. It redefined new regimes, although most remained monarchies. In this regard, the spatial and temporal contingency of the nation-state in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries was still significant. The Industrial Revolution reinforced centralization and the development of cultural harmonization and a common ideology. This was inculcated by nationwide school systems, the media, and so on. In the late 19th century and in the 20th century during the interwar period, many new states were formed after the breakdown of the former empires. In most countries, multiethnic states developed, which resulted in different nation-building processes, such as consensus-oriented strategies (e.g., in Switzerland and later also in the Netherlands). Some conflicts have, however, persisted (e.g., in Belgium or Spain). In the 1990s, after the breakdown of the Eastern bloc, new nations emerged. The breakup of Yugoslavia as well as of Czechoslovakia showed that nation building under socialist rule had not been successful either.

Most Asian states had been subjected to British, Dutch, or French colonial rule. After independence—mostly after World War II, with some exceptions such as the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan as well as the independence of some small island states—nation building was not seriously questioned. This is due to the fact that most of these countries became nondemocratic, authoritarian, or socialist states, suppressing any attempts at secession.

In South America, with the exception of Brazil (1880), countries achieved independence early in the 19th century. Local elites rebelled against the Spanish or Portuguese colonial powers. State formation mostly followed the previous colonial administrative divisions. With very few exceptions these were no longer questioned. In most countries relatively strong “national” identities emerged with some remaining ethnic, racial, and regional divisions. By contrast, African countries have experienced many problems with regard to state and nation building. At the Berlin Conference of 1884, the European powers agreed on a division of Africa. The African colonies were formed without any respect for existing ethnic or linguistic

cleavages. With independence, most African states inherited a very heterogeneous sociocultural and ethnic structure. The colonial state had been held together mostly by oppression of the colonial power. The democratic multiparty systems installed by the departing colonial powers were often immediately restructured after independence. Most African countries introduced strong presidential one-party systems in the name of national unity. Presidents often attempted to become lifetime presidents, and many considered themselves as father figures for disunited nations. This trend toward one-party systems was supported during the Cold War as the two blocs discouraged secessions and favored stability. Some authoritarian regimes, supported by the United States and its allies, as well as African socialist regimes, often supported by either the former USSR or China, used the ideology of one party/one nation-state to strengthen their power. In fact, the constitutional reforms toward centralization and a strong executive were seen as instruments against secession.

With the end of the Cold War and the wave of democracy that swept over the African continent in the early 1990s, some of these authoritarian and socialist regimes came to an end. Secession of some regions (e.g., Eritrea and Somaliland) and new waves of civil war (as in Rwanda and Sudan) made it obvious that the nation-building process was still not completed. The latest new state, which was formed after a referendum in 2011, is South Sudan. New forms of power sharing came into place, because many political groups would not accept defeat during elections, in which the winning party takes it all. National governments are often seen as a temporary solution while a new constitution is drawn up and elections are organized. But these are not quick-fix solutions for the lack of a national identity.

In Africa, in spite of the artificiality of state formation and the ethnic heterogeneity in many countries, the number of separatist movements has remained relatively small. Separatist movements base their claims on existing administrative divisions: in the former Eastern Nigeria (Biafra), Casamance in Senegal, Eritrea, Somaliland, the three separatist provinces in Sudan, Katanga in the Congo, and the Anglophone region of Cameroon. Separatist movements such as in the Comoros and

in Zanzibar have been reinvigorated in the new millennium. In many countries, ethnic groups also have become co-opted, incorporated, and included in the new political systems. Under certain rules and agreements, de-ethnicized territorial nationalism coexists quite harmoniously with ethnic politicization (see, e.g., South Africa [Zulu], Nigeria [Igbo and Yoruba], and Ethiopia [Oromo]).

### **Instruments of Nation Building and Constitutional Identity Building**

In democratic systems, constitutional identity building is an important factor for nation building. Constitutional processes are often seen as the enshrining of political values in a basic document. Jürgen Habermas as well as Francis Fukuyama championed the idea of constitutional patriotism, where the constitution itself becomes the center of strong collective loyalties. It is a base for identification and identity; older, authoritarian, traditional forms of identity are replaced and become less relevant.

Constitutional processes today are regarded as important steps in nation building; however, they often follow an unrealistic procedure. The constitutional process usually starts with the election of a national assembly by the people to “write” the constitution. The constitution will then be officially adopted by a referendum. This ideal type of constitutional process is often based on wrong assumptions. Nation building frequently happens in postconflict situations, where elections and referenda are neither feasible nor desirable. In many postconflict societies, the former undemocratic bureaucracy has to implement a referendum in a postauthoritarian situation. Early general elections may culminate in the marginalization and alienation of minority groups that had been neglected in the former regimes. This often triggers civil unrest and hinders the development of a broad acceptance of the new constitution. Postconflict situations require other forms of early nation-building processes with deadlock-breaking mechanisms as well as other instruments of reaffirmation and conflict resolution. An agreement on general constitutional principles or a referendum at the beginning of the process may have a reassuring effect.

States may consist of different nations, and there are also multination states. The drafting of

the constitution must reflect the diversity of existing traditional values and norms. Multinational fragmented societies should aim for a broad representation and a strong devolution of power to the local and regional levels.

The process of the constitutional discourse as well as the constitutional text itself should include traditional institutions, symbols, and values that highlight the deep collective identity to enhance constitutional patriotism in order to build the united nation.

In postwar societies with regime changes (e.g., Germany after World War II, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the 2000s), nation building often is regarded as a process that can be supported by external actors. This support can take place through development aid and investment in the form of resources, personal assistance, and economic contributions by the external power. Military support may also be given for the new state to maintain order in the transition period. Nation building is, however, basically an indigenous process of identity formation. The ability of outsiders to influence nation building is often overestimated. The idea of injecting certain values and concepts often fails because the development of a national identity is a long-term process. Both external hegemonies and supranational institutions such as the United Nations often fail in their overconfident search for a quick solution. The new states tend to fail before they are formed.

Nation building is more successful when the external power realizes that short-term strategies are unlikely to succeed in a country with strong religious, ethnic, and economic cleavages. In such cases, the intervening external power has to identify allies that support its ideas or ideology. This process of transformation and nation building has to be supported by institutional development and new political structures. Although it is often problematic, it is crucial to remove political leaders from key positions. Nevertheless, most postauthoritarian regimes are characterized by a “pacted transition” process, where the former regime’s state apparatus must be integrated in the formation process of the new nation. A strategy of acceptance of the values of the people instead of insensitive intervention seems to be more successful. National building is based on national identity as the cohesive force that holds nation-states together.



Internally, it can be used benignly and harmlessly in the nation-building process. But this ingroup solidarity encompasses the risk of outgroup hostility. In some cases, it may directly lead to external aggression. But strong nationalism also encompasses other problems. On the one hand, a strong national identity may be directed against migrants and noncitizens. On the other hand, nation building can be used as a form of repression by the majority ethnic group within the same community. This can lead to conflicts oriented toward secession. The politicization of national identities and ethnic conflicts remains a risk.

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*See also* Colonialism; Ethnicity; Identity, Social and Political; Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Patriotism; Secession; State Failure; State Formation

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## NATIONAL INTEREST

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The concept of the national interest has long been central to the conduct and the analysis of state action, and particularly of foreign policy. The concept is so central because it is assumed that the notion of interest captures the motives that drive

states, or their decision makers, to act. Calling it the national interest is, of course, something of a misnomer, as the interest in question belongs to the state—assumed to be a nation-state—in its interactions with other states. Governments, and specifically their foreign policy decision makers, determine the substantive content of the national interest. Although this content changes over time and varies across space, the term generally denotes the state's most important foreign policy aims, ones that require extensive resources and even, in the extreme case, the sacrifice of lives. Since World War II, national security has frequently been posited as the most salient national interest, which captures the idea that, ultimately, the primary interest of the state has to be the protection of its existence through the defense of its sovereignty and its territory.

#### How the Concept Is Deployed

As a concept, the national interest is both ubiquitous and divisive. It is ubiquitous because it is deployed in at least three important and overlapping ways, which serve distinct purposes. First, for scholars of international relations and foreign policy, the concept is understood to be explanatory. Scholars thus invoke the national interest to explain, for instance, why the United States entered World War II (e.g., it was in the U.S. national interest to prevent German expansion in Europe), why the United States fought the Vietnam war (e.g., it was contrary to U.S. national interests to allow South Vietnam to fall to communism), and why the Taliban had to be removed from power in Afghanistan in 2001 (e.g., it is in the U.S. national interest both to promote democracy and to fight terrorism). In this usage, the national interest is invoked causally, to explain policy decisions and the attendant state actions.

Second, the national interest can also be thought of as the language of foreign policy decision making or, more generally, of state action. It is through the notion of the national interest that foreign policy decision makers seek to determine what the aims of their foreign policies should be. The national interest thus forms the practical basis for state action in international politics. This adds a normative dimension to the concept, in that decision makers generally assume that they *ought* to

act in the national interest. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, Tony Blair's government in the United Kingdom (UK) determined that it was in the British national interest—that is, that Britain ought—to support the Bush administration's global war on terror, support the U.S. war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and participate in producing regime change in Iraq in 2003. In this second conception of the national interest, as defined by decision makers, it provides the practical aims or goals of state action.

Third, the national interest serves a prominent legitimating function. It is routinely deployed by both politicians and commentators to justify foreign policy decisions and state actions. The national interest is a powerful rhetorical tool, which, in addressing its audience as members of a nation, asks them to agree to policies in their own—that is, national—interest. Most starkly, when states require soldiers to put their lives in jeopardy in the service of foreign policy, this is done in the name of the national interest. The national interest, on this third, rhetorical usage, thus contributes to the creation of public consent to and support for foreign policy and state action.

As several of the examples above already indicate, in addition to being ubiquitous, claims to the national interest are often divisive. This is because the actual content of the national interest is inevitably political: It depends on and reproduces differential power relations and differentially affects diverse publics. As a result, the content of the national interest is both inevitably contestable in principle and often contested in practice. For instance, the prosecution of the U.S. war in Vietnam during the Cold War precipitated mass protest as diverse publics and elites in the United States challenged the claim that fighting communism in South Vietnam was actually in their national interest. Similarly, protests in the UK since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrate that many Britons, both among the public and among elites, question whether either the invasion of Iraq or the close alliance with the United States are in fact in their national interest.

Although a variety of different theoretical approaches can and do deploy the concept of the national interest, at least two broad and distinctly different approaches can be identified. The first treats national interests in a positivist manner as objective, as given by the international system and

by power relations among states. The second treats national interests in a postpositivist manner as social constructions, as socially constituted in relation to identity. These different understandings of the character of the national interest lead to divergent analyses of foreign policy and international politics.

### Comparison of Theoretical Approaches

Theoretical approaches to the study of foreign policy and international relations such as both realism (and its variants) and liberalism (and its variants) treat national interests as objective and as given. Political realism provides a good example of such a conceptualization. In this approach, it is assumed that an international system made up of sovereign states is anarchic, without overarching or legitimate authority. States must therefore provide for their own security. Uncertainty about the behavior of other states means that the fundamental interest of any state must be to amass enough power to protect itself from the threat potentially posed by other states. The most basic national interest—amassing power to ensure the state's survival—is thus objectively given by the nature of the international system. Since the actual survival of states is rarely at risk, more specific national interests are determined through—read off of—the realistic assessment of objective power relations and potential external threats. In the face of a threatening powerful neighbor, for example, a small state has a national interest in allying with other states. In the face of its objective geographical location, Russia has a national interest in access to warm-water ports. In the face of a relative decline in economic efficiency, the national interest in protectionist measures increases. And in the face of international terrorism, a global war on terror becomes the national interest. In each case, the concrete national interest is given; it is determined by objective external threats and conditions. Interests, therefore, are assumed to follow from external and objectively identifiable threats and are directly accessible to policy makers and analysts alike.

Theoretical approaches such as constructivism and poststructuralism, in contrast, take a fundamentally different approach. Rather than treating national interests as objective and given, they treat national interests as socially constructed in relation

to identity. One constructivist version of this argument begins with the understanding that the social world is constituted through discursive practices—that is, practices that produce social meaning, including identities, whether individual or collective. Foreign policy discourse, for example, constitutes the state as a *particular* state, constitutes the diverse identities of other states, and defines interests in relation to those identities. It was thus a particular U.S. state—constituted as democratic and freedom loving rather than, say, as aggressive and imperialist—that had the Cold War national interest in leading its allies in the free world in the grand strategy of containing the totalitarian Soviet threat. From this viewpoint, threats to states and the interests of states in the face of those threats are fundamentally matters of interpretation. Nuclear weapons provide an example. It is not the physical fact that nuclear weapons can vaporize cities that makes them threats. British, U.S., and Israeli nuclear capabilities are not interpreted in that way by many states. Nuclear weapons only become threats to, say, U.S. interests—necessitating their removal (e.g., from Cuba) or the prevention of their development (e.g., by Iran)—when their existence, or the possibility of their existence, is interpreted as dangerous because they are wielded by communists, by rogue states, or by other dangerous identities. That is, threats are socially constituted as such in discourse—they are not obvious or given. In this approach, the same is true of interests.

These two distinct approaches to the national interest issue result in divergent analyses of foreign policy and international politics. Contrasting them also highlights the inevitably political nature of the identification and deployment of the national interest within either perspective.

Briefly sketching the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 from within the first approach—of given, objective interests—highlights the deployment in Cuba of Soviet nuclear-capable missiles and the need for a U.S. policy response. On this view, the situation faced by the United States and its allies in October 1962 was one in which power relations had changed significantly. The initially secret Soviet deployment meant that the former Soviet Union now had at least 40 more nuclear weapons and that these weapons could strike targets in North and South America. These offensive missiles posed an objective threat to the United States for several

(albeit debated) reasons: They altered the strategic balance; they gave the Soviet Union a military bridgehead in the Caribbean; and they provided a bargaining chip to force a settlement in West Berlin and in Germany as a whole. The U.S. national interest in response to this changed situation was indisputable: The missiles had to be removed.

Briefly sketching the missile crisis from the second perspective—that of interests socially constructed in relation to identity—provides a different analysis. This approach asks: How was this particular national interest constructed and in relation to which identities? How did the removal of the missiles come to be understood as the U.S. national interest? It examines the construction in U.S. foreign policy discourse, by both foreign policy decision makers and analysts, of a democratic and freedom-loving United States leading the free world (its allied others) in the fight against the Soviet Union (the evil, totalitarian other). In Cold War discourse, U.S. leadership was always defensive: Whether in Berlin, Korea, Vietnam, or Cuba, it protected freedom from an aggressive and totalitarian international communism led by the Soviet Union. In this context, the missiles were interpreted as necessarily offensive and the interest in their removal confirmed. However, missiles are not inherently offensive or defensive; rather, they must be constructed as such. Moreover, interpreting them as offensive dismissed from the outset Soviet and Cuban claims that the missiles were deployed legally to defend Cuba from a second Bay of Pigs invasion. But other constructions—that the missiles were annoying but legal or that they were irrelevant as the United States did not intend to invade Cuba—were in fact possible. Within this approach, the U.S. national interest in response to the Soviet missile deployment was not indisputable and might have allowed the United States to make no policy response at all.

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*See also* Constructivism; Constructivism in International Relations; Foreign Policy Analysis; Liberalism in International Relations; Positivism; Power and International Politics; Realism in International Relations

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## NATIONALISM

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Nationalism is one of the most difficult and contested concepts in social science. There are fundamental disagreements on its definition, origins, historical location, and normative status. This entry examines the concept of nationalism and explores these disagreements on how it should be understood.

### Definition

In a very general sense, nationalism implies a strong attachment to the nation as a human collective. In the social sciences, however, it tends to be defined more strictly as the belief that the nation should form the basis for political order. At one time, it was common to define it as a movement in search of its own state or to extend the reach and power of an existing state. In recent years, it has been recognized that nationalists may pursue other forms of polity, including that of their own decentralized or federal region. Attention has also extended from nationalisms seeking to change the political order to nationalism as an everyday mechanism for sustaining the existing political order of the nation-state, as in Michael Billig's "banal nationalism."

This still leaves the question of how the nation itself is defined. For some, the nation is a politicized ethnicity, but this merely begs the equally

difficult question of what an ethnic group is. Besides, whatever definition of ethnic group we use, many of them are not organized as nations nor would their members recognize them as such. There appears to be no one single characteristic that would qualify a group as a nation, be it culture, institutions, territory, or history. In many cases, indeed, the idea that a particular group is a nation is contested. There are various ways out of this conundrum. One is to divide nationalisms into different types qualified with prefixes or adjectives, but this risks losing the central concept altogether. A second is to treat the nation as bearing resemblance to a family rather than one with a single core meaning. This allows us to cope with the complexity and variety of nationalisms and to compare aspects of each, rather than forcing them into the same mold. A third way is to see the nation as a subjective category, so that if people feel they are a nation, then, they are. A fourth is to treat nationhood as a claim made both as to the existence of a group and to a set of rights that pertain to nationality, rather than as a sociological category. These central definitional problems have made it impossible to arrive at a general theory of nationalism applicable in all contexts and at all times. Most of the literature therefore looks at particular nationalisms or tries to generalize from specific cases, with decidedly mixed results.

### Origins

The origins and causes of nationalism are equally disputed. It is common to place primordialists and perennialists at one extreme and constructivists and modernists at the other. A primordialist would believe that nations have their origins in essential features of humanity that are difficult if not impossible to change. Some nationalists themselves have subscribed to this view, especially in the late 19th century when biological theories of race were developing. Nationality is presented here as an essential characteristic bred into individuals. Very few nationalists and fewer social scientists nowadays would admit to being primordialists, although some sociobiologists seek to derive the nation from the human need for collectivities and the instinct for territory and mutual protection. Whatever the merits of this as a theory of human behavior, however, it can scarcely explain why communities

should take the form of nations in general or of specific nations in particular. It thus fails as a theory of nationalism. Perennialists are not primordialists, in that they do not believe that nations are part of the hardwiring of the human being and rather emphasize culture and deeply ingrained social habits. They insist that nations go back a long way in time and are not as easily manipulated or rebuilt as constructivists and, especially, instrumentalists would think. They will cite the existence of things looking very like nations in antiquity and locate the origins of European nations in premodern times.

Constructivists, on the other hand, see nations as the work of human volition and interaction. Although they could logically be constructivists and perennialists, locating the construction of nations in the past, they are almost invariably modernists, insisting that nations and nationalism are the product precisely of modernization and that it makes no sense to talk of them before, at the earliest, the late 18th century. Some modernists such as Ernest Gellner are sociological and functionalist in their approach, seeking the principle of the nation in the needs of modern industrial society for literacy, communication, and mobilization and the breaking down of old barriers to social and geographical mobility. Benedict Anderson is famous for the phrase “imagined communities,” by which he meant not that nations are imaginary and somehow false but that since members of a nation cannot know each other personally, they have to imagine the collectivity (in fact, the idea had earlier been suggested by Hans Kohn). This was not possible before the invention of print media. Sociological modernists have been criticized as teleological or functionalist, seeing the function that nationalism serves as somehow explaining why it came about without specifying the mechanism or the agent, although Anderson makes more of an effort. The timing and geography are also problematic, given that some nations and nationalisms appear to have emerged before industrialization and in nonindustrial societies.

More political approaches agree with John Breuilly that nationalism is essentially a form of politics, especially modern politics. Often it is linked to mass politics and democratization. A key legacy is that of the French Revolution, which proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. This made it

necessary to define the people in some way short of the entire human species, and the nation was the result. In exporting their revolution, the French invited other peoples to throw off their rulers and proclaim their own sovereignty, with the ironic result that they turned against their French liberators and forged national movements of their own.

Instrumentalists stress the role of elites, whether state rulers or their challengers, in creating nations to mobilize mass populations in the modern era. They insist that there is nothing natural about nations and that they are manufactured for specific purposes, although sometimes they take on a life of their own. While perennialists believe that it is nations that create states, instrumentalists will often stress the role of states in creating nations using the socialization tools that they possess, including control over education, the media, civic ceremonial military service, and the welfare state, to create shared identities and solidarities. Other scholars believe that either route is possible, so that we must distinguish between those cases where the nation created the state and those where the reverse occurred. Instrumentalists, in their turn, have been criticized on the grounds that nation builders need something preexisting to work with and cannot create communities of such power and durability *ex nihilo*.

In favor of the modernist argument is the fact that the 19th century was an era of marked nationalism. The French Revolution, which took a century to work itself out, was a profoundly national affair, and it is argued that it created Frenchmen out of the population of a dynastic state with no previous sense of popular unity. The message was taken up in Germany and Italy, where nationalism was harnessed by leaders seeking to enlarge their states and, for the first time, inviting the people into the enterprise. Across the great empires (German, Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian, and British), there was an “awakening of the nationalities” as movements emerged demanding self-government. Most of these sought a measure of autonomy within their imperial systems, but some wanted full independence; with the collapse of the empires in World War I, independent statehood seemed the only option. The problem, however, was that there were not, and could not be, enough states to satisfy all the demands being made, which were often focused on the same territories. So the nation-state

principle could triumph only in restricted parts of the European continent.

Against the modernist argument is the fact that many European nations can trace their origins back to an earlier period. Adrian Hastings and Liah Greenfeld cite England as an example of early nationhood, certainly by the 16th century. Scotland, having resisted incorporation into the English Crown, was another example, complete with an early doctrinal justification for its independence. We may rightly be skeptical of the claims of nationalist historians about the antiquity of France or its continuity with earlier polities in the same region, but the French state can trace a long lineage all the same. Probably the best way of resolving the question "When was the nation?" is to tie it to the question "What is the nation?" Then, we can accept that there were indeed proto-nations in premodern times while confining the meaning of the nation and of nationalism in its modern sense to the modern era.

An effort to bridge the primordialist/constructivist and perennialist/modernist divides is the ethno-symbolism of Anthony Smith. Nations, in this vision, are built on ethnic cores or *ethnies*, which themselves are rather ancient and hard but which expand to incorporate peripheral territories, usually through the agency of the state, so creating modern civic nations. The notion of an ethnic core, however, is problematic and difficult to operationalize. The center-periphery model of nation building is a common device in macro history, but endowing the center with an ethnic element is another matter. In the case of England and then Britain (one of Smith's examples), the core, in the southeast of England, was an ethnic melting pot of Anglo-Saxons, Norman-French, and Danes. Softening the concept of ethnic group by labeling it as an *ethnie* does not resolve the essential difficulties of this concept, which seems to have no core meaning but refers to a range of traits, including language, culture, kinship, and proximity, none of which is either necessary or sufficient. Showing that modern nations had earlier predecessors does not prove the case either since there were myriad collective identities in premodern times, the great majority of which did not evolve into nations. So, like the argument about the need for community and belonging, this does not explain the modern nation in general or in particular.

### Nationalist Doctrine

Nationalism has often been criticized for lacking a core doctrine or great thinkers. It is true that there have been few grand normative theories and that scholars writing about nationalism have often tended to be skeptical if not outright condemnatory, as is Elie Kedourie. It is also argued that an overall doctrine of nationalism is impossible since it is based essentially on a fiction (the existence of nations) and that it is not universalizable since nationalisms are by definition opposed to each other. There is an element of truth in this, but nationalism is no more or less constructed than other sociological concepts like class. Nineteenth-century nationalists such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Johann Gottfried von Herder did try to universalize their ideas, albeit with very limited success. The principle of national self-determination has enjoyed a measure of international support since the mid-20th century, recognized by the United Nations but tightly circumscribed to apply only to existing states or to colonial territories (by the "salt water doctrine" whereby colonies are by definition separated from the colonizer by a sea) and not to nationalist movements within consolidated states, especially when these are democracies. Beyond that, the view has prevailed that a universal doctrine right of self-determination would be unworkable, given the overlapping and competing claims and an invitation for opportunists to create their own national movements.

The doctrines employed by nationalist movements also adapt themselves to the times and to prevailing ideas of legitimacy. So in the 19th century, the concept of race was used rather freely, together with primordialist ideas since these were also being deployed by states. In recent years, many nationalist movements have sought to stress their liberal democratic credentials and the voluntarist conception of the nation as a union of citizens, in line with prevailing norms. With the collapse of the central empires in Europe, nationalism became a doctrine of separatism, inspired partly by Woodrow Wilson's apparent endorsement of the doctrine of self-determination. In the late 20th century, however, other movements adopted postsovereignist ideas about self-determination within larger entities like federations, confederations, or supranational orders such as the European Union.

### Classifying Nationalisms

Given the difficulties in identifying a core meaning or doctrine for nationalism, it is not surprising that scholars have sought to define nationalism according to different types. This enterprise has also proved frustrating for a number of reasons, not least that the concepts employed often have a strong normative loading. There is a practical distinction between the nationalism of established states and that of movements seeking to create their own states or otherwise advance self-determination claims. As noted, this underpins the international norm upholding the former but not the latter. It is less clear that this represents a difference in principle. Now that the nation-state has been demystified and its sovereignty curtailed by transnational integration, its moral and practical supremacy can no longer be taken for granted, and it must justify itself on the same principles as its challengers. A distinction is also drawn between aggressive nationalisms, seeking domination over other nations, and defensive nationalisms, seeking only to run their own affairs. This looks like both a practical and a normative distinction, but where nationality claims are entangled and overlapping, as in the Balkans, it does not always yield a definitive solution.

Perhaps the most enduring dichotomy is that between civic and ethnic nationalism. This originated in 19th-century comparisons of France and Spain and was articulated in Hans Kohn's distinction between Eastern and Western nationalisms. The former, which included Germany, were portrayed as inward looking and backward looking, defining the nation on narrowly ascriptive grounds and prone to xenophobia and aggression. Western nationalisms, by contrast, were built on the civic, territorial state, open to all within their borders and founded on democratic principles. John Plamenatz made a similar distinction between liberal nationalism developing in England and the nationalisms of continental Europe, although he mostly placed Germany on the civic side of the line. The geographical distinction has been criticized as questionable and as arising from stereotyping and is based on a border that changes with the various authors. It is easily used as an ideological justification for the Western powers to assert their superiority. The idea, however, keeps coming back. Recent authors have retained the

ethnic–civic distinction while seeing examples of both in all parts of Europe. Others, such as Maurizio Viroli, have reframed the distinction as that between nationalism and patriotism. The same distinction has been tapped by differentiating inclusive from exclusive nationalism and cultural from political nationalism or from territorial nationalism. While subtly different, these distinctions are similar in tendency, and all encompass both analytical and normative elements. They have been criticized in turn on the ground that there are no pure examples of either the civic or the ethnic (or their various approximations). This objection is beside the point if the categories are taken not as a taxonomy of real cases but as ideal types, or end points on a spectrum, to which real cases approximate to a greater or lesser degree. It is, however, necessary to specify the characteristics to which these labels refer, and here there is considerable confusion.

The central distinction in all of this is between a nationalism that defines the nation by strictly ascriptive criteria (which is what ethnicity means in this context) and one that is more open and in which nationality can be acquired. The most common ascriptive criterion is ancestry, so that it is not possible for somebody to join the nation. Citizenship laws, for example, are often seen as indicators for ethnic or civic conceptions of nationhood, with *ius sanguinis* (citizenship by descent) seen as ethnic and *ius soli* (by birth in the territory) as civic. Certainly *ius soli* is more inclusive, but one can argue that both are ascriptive criteria for membership. The real question is whether people satisfying neither of these criteria can join the nation legally through naturalization and, even if they can, whether they are accepted socially as conationals. Another mechanism is culture and language, with nationalisms insisting on a particular culture said to be exclusive and ethnic. This is also not clear in practice since languages can be acquired, and in some cases, such as the United States, insistence on a single language is defended as a mechanism for inclusion of immigrants rather than exclusion; the same argument is made in Québec and Catalonia. Rather than fix on particular mechanisms, then, it might be helpful to focus on the intent of specific practices and whether, how, and whom they tend to include or exclude, accepting that any nationalism by definition includes some people and excludes others. For all these difficulties, however, there

does seem to be a difference in nationalist practices in specific contexts between those that seek to unite the whole community within a given territorial boundary and subject to common institutions and those that seek to redraw boundaries and institutions to fit preexisting conceptions of community. Some national communities are open to incomers, at least in the second generation, while others are more restrictive.

Sometimes this distinction is mapped onto that between the nationalism of existing states, often assumed to be civic and inclusive, and the nationalism of component territories and groups, assumed to be ethnic and exclusive. There seems to be little justification for this other than a predisposition to existing order since nationalisms at both levels can be more or less exclusive.

The distinction is often given a strong normative charge, with civic nationalism seen as liberal and democratic and ethnic nationalism as antidemocratic. Civic nationalism is individualist and based on voluntary adhesion; ethnic nationalism is collectivist and forced. In practice, however, membership and exit from the nation is rarely a matter of individual choice, and Liah Greenfeld argues that civic nationalism itself may take individualist or collectivist forms. The concept of civic nationalism is sometimes further stretched to cover republicanism (an order based on political commitment of citizens toward the polity), Jürgen Habermas's constitutional patriotism (the idea that order can be based on support for constitutional values without an ethnic component), or even multiculturalism (the idea that the state should not impose a single culture). This is to miss the point that even civic nationalism is a form of nationalism, albeit shorn of ascriptive requirements. It may point to a single language, shared values, and socialization through state and society into a single identity, as long as these are available to all within the territory.

### The Ethics of Nationalism

Nationalism has historically been associated with liberalism and the advance of democracy through popular sovereignty and with totalitarianism. It has been a force for liberation from foreign domination and for conquest. In the 19th century, John Stuart Mill advocated nationally integrated societies (through socialization rather than ethnic exclusion)

as necessary for the trust that underpins liberal democracy. Lord Acton, in contrast, saw in the congruence between nation and state the potential for tyranny and preferred the multinational society with its balance of interests. The issue was reopened in the late 20th century with the debate on liberal nationalism, a concept first introduced by Yael Tamir. It was argued, in Millian fashion, that shared nationality could underpin democracy as long as it was not construed in a narrow ethnic fashion. Others noted that stateless nations could equally be the sites for liberal and civic nation building. David Miller and others have more recently rehabilitated nationality as a principle for social solidarity, so underpinning the social-democratic project and previous conceptions of socialism, which, in theory if not in practice, had been cosmopolitan. It was not clear in these writings what the exact link between nationality and nationalism is, but it was agreed that the state had a legitimate interest in promoting common identities. This idea has been widely taken up in Europe in the face of immigration and a questioning of the ideal of multiculturalism. As the state itself is challenged and demystified in the face of global change and transnational integration as well as challenges from internal communities (whether these are labeled as regions or stateless nations), it can no longer rely on the implicit normative supremacy it had in the past and, having to legitimate itself, has fallen back on the nationality principle.

Nationalist movements, whether at the state, the substate, or the transnational level, are still making incompatible claims about the proper boundaries of political community. In the present day, however, they tend to subscribe to the same principles, eschewing purely ethnic arguments and insisting on more political ones based on the right of democratic self-determination. They also tend to stress their democratic credentials, if only on the basis that they represent the "people." This is perhaps a form of ideological isomorphism as nationality claims reflect the normative principles regarded as legitimate at the time. So "race" is abandoned and "self-determination" comes in. The result, however, is once again a set of principles for defining political community that produce no determinate outcome since the claims are often competing and almost always overlapping. Some theorists seek to adjudicate among these claims



based on which of them have the best liberal democratic credentials. Others regard this as presumptuous and unrealistic since there is no supra-national authority to enforce such adjudications. Most observers have concluded that nationality issues can never be resolved by redrawing political boundaries. At best, they can be managed by recognizing different conceptions of the nation and of the division of political authority.

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*See also* Decentralization; Ethnicity; Federalism; Parties; Social Movements

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## NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

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Nationalist movements are (often utopian) political campaigns to “build” nations that correspond to state boundaries. “Nation” is notoriously difficult to define, and “nationalists” often attempt to

convince or force people to assume identities about which they were previously unaware of or with which they may be uncomfortable. Attempts to make nations congruent with state boundaries often fail; in many cases, such attempts result in efforts to claim national homogeneity by ignoring or oppressing other ethnic or national groups within the territory of the “nation-state.” This entry discusses problems of definition, varying historical conditions, and the continuing political relevance of nationalist movements.

#### Definition of Nationalism

The failure of most nation-building projects in modern history raises the question of why nationalist movements have long been so influential and, in many parts of the world, remain so today. The belief that every nation should have a state—and that every state should be a nation—has been the most widely accepted form of legitimation for modern states since the French Revolution. French nationalists themselves devoted much effort, particularly in the 19th century, to creating a common cultural and political identity, a process that Eugen Weber (1976) famously termed “turning peasants into Frenchmen.” Weber argued that popular consciousness of being part of the French nation was weakly developed in the rural areas, with elites using the school curriculum and also universal conscription to instill a strong sense of nationality in the country’s provinces.

Only a few other countries can be seen to have successfully imitated this French example of “successful” assimilation, among them Sweden and Japan. In the 20th century, this assimilationist project grew more difficult, even in venerable states like Spain. Here, substate nationalisms flourished, particularly among the Basques and the Catalans. Arguably, few nation-states were successfully created in the last century, with almost all developing countries that emerged from colonialism being multinational or at least multiethnic and multicultural states. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) have proposed that it would be more empirically accurate to speak of “state-nations” (multicultural and often multinational) that still manage to command the loyalty of their citizens despite the lack of a homogeneous nation underpinning the state. Among state-nations there are

those in which robustly politicized nationalist movements are active, such as in Belgium, Spain, or Sudan. Other state-nations, however, have managed to create a strong sense of common identity despite multiculturalism (such as Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States). Yet the belief in the necessity of nation-state building by nationalist movements persists, making the task of achieving legitimacy through the establishment of tolerant state-nations more difficult.

Nationalists mostly adhere to the “ideal” of state boundaries being or becoming congruent with the nation (for Ernest Gellner, 1983, this is *the* defining feature of nationalism). This means that from a nationalist perspective, many states are “too large,” that is multinational, or “too small,” so-called rump states that were formerly a part of larger states. In interwar Eastern Europe, examples of the former were the newly created states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Cases of the latter were Austria (many Austrians then considered themselves German, developing a separate identity only after World War II) and Hungary (where many ethnic Hungarians were living outside of the state boundaries). Nation building, the attempt to make national loyalties and state boundaries correspond, thus ran into the awkward problem of ethnic minorities. Either minorities within the state stood in the way of national homogeneity, or they lived outside the boundaries of the mother state with which they shared a common nationality. These two types of minorities often overlapped with an ethnic minority in a multinational state and often were of the same nationality that was the dominant group in an adjoining country. Attempts by oversized states in interwar Eastern Europe to strengthen national identity were often perceived as discriminatory by minorities; nationalism in undersized states led to irredentist claims against (or, in the case of Austria, hopes for merger with) a neighboring state or states.

Nationalism can, thus, play a major role in undermining and discrediting democracy when the logics of nation building and crafting democracies clash. Excessive emphasis by nationalist movements on nation building encourages the rise of extreme nationalism that can doom simultaneous efforts to craft democracies. Political democracy requires the acceptance of societal pluralism. Extreme nationalism, on the other hand, claims a common interest based on shared nationality that

overrides all other social divisions. When a nation-building project leads to a conflict with national minorities or with neighboring countries, it tends to create an environment in which all internal opposition is considered antinational and thus nothing less than treason. These developments break the original French connection between national identity and democratic government. When national unity is stressed at the expense of political pluralism, a democratic polity can be severely weakened or even undermined.

Stalin’s notorious effort to find a definition of a nation relied on supposedly objective criteria: a people’s common history, territory, language, economics, and culture. While there are nations that lack a common language (multilingual nationalities such as the Indians and the Swiss), a common religious or ethnic culture (such as the multiethnic and religiously diverse Singaporeans), or a common territory (such as those with a Kurdish identity who are spread across several states), this primordialist view remains influential among nationalists to the present day. Subjective interpretations of the nation are more plausible, at least from a scholarly point of view. Benedict Anderson famously claimed that nations are but “imagined communities” (1983/2006)—social constructions in which people imagine themselves to be part of a group. This view, in turn, has been criticized for not adequately specifying under what conditions people are likely to come to have this feeling of national commonality, which has led some scholars to combine the two perspectives.

In English and all languages derived from Latin the word *nation* is related to “being born” and “native.” But the word *natio* in Latin referred to units like tribes, clans, and families, not the territorial nations we think of today. The idea that “nation” should apply only to a specific territory and a particular people is a modern idea. Thus, although much recent research has pointed to the often ancient roots of recurring national traditions (influential perennialists are Armstrong, 1982; Smith, 1995), nationalist movements are a modern phenomenon.

### Nationalism and Modernity

The relationship between nationalist movements and modernity has been a source of controversy

among scholars. Ernest Gellner influentially argued that nationalism played a critical role in modernization. In the “agro-literate” stage of history, rulers had little reason to impose uniformity on their subjects. But with the division of labor in modern times, with work becoming increasingly technical, a need for cultural standardization and context-free communication arose. Nationalist movements helped provide the conditions necessary to create workforces suited to such industrial modernity, making peasants into moderns. In an age of industrialization and bureaucratization, territories became more precisely defined, with national identities used to justify state boundaries. The long conflict between Germany and France over Alsace-Lorraine saw the Germans and French each making claims on the territory based on different national narratives (the fact that the natives spoke a dialect of German was posed against the counterargument that the inhabitants identified themselves as French citizens). This national competition was also a battle over resources among rapidly industrializing neighbors.

Gellner’s approach has been criticized for being overly functionalist (modernity cannot work properly without the nation), failing to account for the rise of nationalism in preindustrial societies, and being unable to account for the passions that nationalism arouses (soldiers dying willingly for their nation). But the link between nationalism and modernity is undeniable, even if it is less direct than Gellner suggests. To criticize nationalist movements thus seems to involve criticizing modernity itself. Yet this should not lead the hardships caused by nationalist movements to minority groups to be relativized. Regular media reports about state-perpetuated violations of minority groups’ human rights (be it of the Uyghurs and Tibetans in China or Black, non-Muslims in southern Sudan, for example) can be linked to national movements using state power to enforce their vision of a nation-state.

By praising the nation as the most valuable identity (raising it above class, region, gender, or other identities), many nationalist movements in the 19th and 20th centuries became “secular religions.” They developed complex “theologies” that stressed supposed commonalities of the “nation” while overlooking or even ignoring the territorial, ethnic, religious, and other forms of diversity their

movement faced in realizing its goal of a homogeneous nation. By stressing the interest of their nation, they sacrificed the interests of other competing nationalities, leading to chauvinism, war, and often ethnic cleansing, which was seen in Europe as recently as 1990s in the Yugoslav wars.

Nationalist movements have not been ideologically exclusive, however. They have combined or formed hybrids with liberal, socialist, and conservative ideas and causes. Liberals were among the earliest advocates of nationalism in the 19th century. During the revolution of 1848, some delegates to St. Paul’s Church in Frankfurt argued that everyone who lived on German territory was a German and that national identity was not determined by one’s ethnic background or language but was a political organism defined through the state, making nationalism a political concept not an ethnic one. This soon became a minority position in Germany, in much of the rest of Europe, and in many other places in the world where ethnic, particularistic, and collective conceptions of the nation replaced humanistic, universalist, and individualistic ones.

Early socialist movements adopted the nationalist agenda only implicitly (but later ones, such as Mao in China and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, intertwined nationalism and socialism so closely that they cannot be separated in their thought and actions). Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argued that class conflict was more important than the differences between nations. Yet they still supported several nationalist movements against oppressive empires (particularly struggles against the Russian and the Habsburg empires but also the Irish independence fight against the British). But Engels, in particular, suggested that only “great, historic nations” would survive into the modern world, advancing the cause of socialism, while smaller nations would be counterrevolutionary, doomed to wither away. An important exception to the chauvinist orientation of many socialist thinkers behind a façade of internationalism was the Austro-Marxists. In 1907, Otto Bauer advocated a program of “cultural-national autonomy” to lessen tensions between nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a multinational territory under Habsburg rule while maintaining the solidarity of the working class. Rather than repudiating nationalism, he advocated that socialists

should embrace national differences and work to allow the flowering of each national culture in a socialist state. Bauer's tolerant, state-nation approach drew contempt from Lenin and other orthodox Marxists, foreshadowing the dogmatism and oppressiveness of the Soviet Union in regard to national minorities. Benito Mussolini was a socialist who became a fanatical nationalist during World War I. While he was disavowed by the socialist movement, he had exploited the chauvinist side of many socialist thinkers to create what became known as *fascism*. The fanaticism of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, who perpetrated one of the worst mass murders in the post-World War II period, was fueled by a deadly mixture of socialism and nativist nationalism.

Initially, conservatives were the slowest to recognize the potential power of nationalism for their political purposes, instinctively fearing the mobilization of the masses. But when they did make this discovery, the consequences were often terrifying. Militarist Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s is one well-known example. While Japanese propagandists justified their country's conquest of much of Asia through a vague notion of Pan-Asianism, a sense of national superiority and a corresponding contempt for other nations underlay this aggression, creating lasting bitterness toward Japan in the region, up to the present (not helped by the unwillingness of some Japanese conservatives to acknowledge the country's war crimes). National intolerance reached its pinnacle under Nazi rule in Germany and their conquest of much of the rest of Europe during World War II. Although the Holocaust has been attributed to the Nazis' racist ideology, nationalist appeals were key to mobilizing initial support for National Socialism in Germany.

Following the famous historian Friedrich Meinecke who distinguished between state and cultural nationalism, the great scholar of comparative nationalism Hans Kohn (1944) made a distinction between the earlier universalist French nationalism that was a product of the Enlightenment and the later particularistic German, Russian, and Eastern European nationalism that stressed cultural particularism. In a more recent effort that draws on Kohn's insights, Liah Greenfeld (1993) has argued that nationalist movements have followed different "routes to modernity." Individualist

and civic nationalism arose first in Britain and the United States; then, collective but civic nationalism took hold in France; and finally collective and ethnic nationalism shaped the politics of Russia and Germany. Ethnocollectivist types of nationalism tend to be authoritarian, with a high degree of inequality between nationalist elites and the disempowered masses. In short, efforts to create a nationally defined people have been compatible with democracy in the more individualistic, civic versions of nationalist movements. In other cases, however, nationalist movements that have appealed to collective, ethnic identities leave little room for individual rights, including those of ethnonational minorities.

### Contemporary Nationalist Movements

One disturbing recent development among nationalist movements has been the rise of citizen groups accusing the state of insufficiently upholding the national interest. Whether it be in China where nationalist "netizens" have used the Internet to attack the Communist Party's supposed weak pursuit of the national interest (particularly vs. Japan), in Thailand where for domestic political reasons "yellow shirt" protests reopened a border dispute with Cambodia that was long thought to be resolved, or among Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka demanding stronger action against Tamil rebels, such societal nationalism has increased internal and external conflicts and made nationalism more extremist. As discussed above, this is highly unfavorable for an existing democracy or for democratic transitions in the future. Such civil societal nationalism has also weakened government efforts to harness nationalism to issues such as national development as this risks allowing societal groups to seize on it to accuse the government of being insincere in its commitment to "genuine" nationalism.

The countries of the European Union (EU) have prided themselves on defusing the impact of rival nationalisms within their community. Post-World War II reconciliation between Germany and France, in which competing nationalisms led to a bloody rivalry between these two European powers, was a crucial milestone. But the postnationalist age that many European politicians have hoped for has yet to dawn. National interests still strongly

drive the behavior of European community countries; on the periphery of the EU, Greek nationalism continues to clash with Turkish national claims. Yet Western Europe has arguably come furthest in healing the old wounds inflicted by nationalist movements. By contrast, Eastern Europe (where the short war between Georgia and Russia in 2009 showed how such tensions can quickly erupt into war) remains a region full of nationalist conflicts despite the end of the Yugoslav war. In Black Africa and Latin America, by contrast, nationalist-based conflicts have subsided on the whole (with the exception of a continuing ethnic-based civil war in Sudan and recent nationalist tensions between Venezuela and Colombia). In the Middle East, the age of Pan-Arabism has passed (which reached its peak during the 1960s), with Arab nationalism now focused on the Palestine conflict with Israel. A series of Arab regimes originally legitimized by national movements that seized power, such as Nasserism in Egypt, have lost legitimacy as economic performance declined, with Islamist groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood replacing nationalists as the strongest source of opposition. In South Asia, nationalist tensions between Pakistan and India remain high, with the dispute over Kashmir a perennial source of conflict. In Sri Lanka, a decades-long civil war recently ended with the defeat of the Tamil Tiger rebel group, but reconciliation still seems far off as there is little indication that the victorious majority Sinhalese are willing to take the key steps necessary to make the country more tolerant toward the Tamil minority. In Northeast Asia, conflicts over disputed islands (as well as the wounds left from the experience of World War II) between China and Japan remain a major source of potential conflict as does the ongoing dispute between China and Taiwan, with the former warning that it will invade if the latter declares independence (as some Taiwanese nationalist activists nonetheless wish to do). In Southeast Asia, the military government in Burma/Myanmar has reached accords with most rebel groups representing non-Burman nationalities after a long-running civil war, but these were based on its own despotic rules, not a genuine spirit of accommodation. Indonesia appears to be a contrasting case: Releasing East Timor (Timor-Leste) into independence in 2002—and overcoming ethnic conflict in the immediate aftermath of

the overthrow of the long-ruling dictator Suharto in 1998—has helped this country, the world's largest archipelago state, to become the most stable democracy in the region.

But nationalist movements will continue to thrive in areas in which inhabitants feel oppressed. In this sense, nationalism retains its liberationist impulse that it so famously developed during the French Revolution but also, for example, in the Greek struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. One of the paradoxes of modern nationalism is how progressive causes in opposition to ruling empires often degenerate into new forms of political oppression once control over the state is achieved. Here, the experience of the countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is instructive. Nationalist movements were at the forefront of opposition to (post)totalitarian states. Once these multinational autocracies had collapsed, however, the new nation-states that replaced them often proved to be intolerant. The war in the former Yugoslavia along ethnonational lines is only the most extreme example, with Serbian nationalists justifying war in the name of greater Serbia (Croatian nationalism was less destructive only because its state power was weaker). But in the Soviet Union, even some of the most enlightened, democratic countries—the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia—have, sometimes openly but often covertly, discriminated against their ethnic Russian populations. Ethnic heterogeneity remains the specter that haunts many states claiming to be homogeneous nations.

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*See also* Citizenship; Ethnicity; Irredentism; Modernization Theory; Nation Building; Nationalism; State Failure; State Formation

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## NATURAL LAW

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The notion of “natural law” is a prime and enduring one in the Western philosophical and political tradition. In antiquity, the doctrine of natural law was based on a conception of nature as a primary ordering force in which every being was ascribed a place. In contemporary times, the doctrine has been reformulated under the guise of “natural rights,” meaning that laws should respect inherent human values. Such a multimillennium history could not but entail major variations over time in the meaning, the purpose, and the place of natural law. For this reason, any comprehensive approach to it must make room for the remarkable permanence of some traits of what is called natural law as well as for dramatic changes in its object and definition.

For the Greeks and then the Romans, who crafted the notion of natural law in a doctrine sometimes referred to as *jus naturalism* (from the Latin, *jus naturale*, which means natural law), the concept of law—*nomos* in Greek and *lex* in Latin—is grounded in a cosmological perspective according to which the universe is organized on a definite pattern that everyone has to follow. Such a conception extends its reach far beyond the realm of humanity and embraces animals and even the inanimate. In Aristotle’s perspective, for instance, the natural place of a stone is the ground where it stays naturally, while in any other place it would fall. Such is the case with human beings. The city is organized through natural ties of subordination and exchanges, and laws should respect

nature in the social bonds thus dispatched. The minutiae with which Plato in *The Republic* or in *The Laws* and Aristotle in his *Politics* describe under which conditions—of climate, population, relations between sexes, and so on—a successful city can thrive reflects a general preoccupation. This establishes the good law as the one respecting natural conditions, which range from the demography of a city to the actual ties of subordination between men and women, free citizens and slaves, and classes in society.

Despite pretensions to the contrary, ancient conceptions of natural law did not form an actual coherent body of doctrine. Authors were keen on disputing what was according to nature or against nature; while the principle of natural law was well established, what it tangibly meant was open to continual discussion. There is probably not a single law, rule, or moral obligation of the antique world that has not been submitted to critical scrutiny and challenged or reasserted on the grounds of what is natural or not: The precedence of family duties over city laws (as is the case in the famous Antigone myth, where Antigone refuses to obey her uncle, the local tyrant, who forbade the proper burial of her brother, but also as in Plato’s dialogue, *Euthyphro*, where Socrates critiques a son suing his father for the death of a murderer), the issue of slavery (whether it is natural or not, and under which circumstances, was a constant debate), the question of appropriate leadership (who is the natural leader in a city?), the separation of classes, or what it is proper to do or not do—all these could be subjected to dispute in the name of nature.

As Leo Strauss contended, these continuing and multiform disputes over what is against or according to nature supposed that nature was an object of inquiry in an exercise of reflection and dialogue akin to philosophy. Natural law, to that extent, favors the exercise of personal critical reason by insisting on the fact that human beings should not be forced to comply with rules that are repugnant to reason. As Cicero put it in a famous sentence of the third book of his *De Republica*:

There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions,

and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice.

Natural law conforms to reason because it is discovered by reason and satisfies the demands of reason, which, in its turn, is nothing else but the discovery of the preexisting order of nature.

Quite surprisingly, considering how intimately it was initially linked to a pagan conception of the world, the doctrine of natural law found its place among Christian conceptions. Theoretically, though, the development of Christianity constituted a deadly challenge to this doctrine. For Christians, nature is no more than a creation of God, who is the ultimate reason and sense of the world as the Gospel of John bears it: “All things were made by [God]; and without him was not any thing made that was made” (1:3). Nature as “all the things” is second to God’s decision to create it. Far from representing the achieved order of the world, nature is flawed with imperfection since only God is perfect. There is worse: This imperfection means that nature can be regarded as the source of sin. For thinkers like Augustine (354–430), the fact that nature in man is marked by the fate of death is a testimony to its corruption and sinful condition from which only redemption beyond the natural condition of humanity can save us.

Despite this potential tension, the cultural context in which the primitive church developed was so strongly influenced by classical theories that the reference to natural law was spontaneously maintained, as shown, for instance, in Paul’s Letter to the Romans: “Sometimes [Gentiles, i.e., non-Jews or pagans] do naturally what the law orders. So they have a law in themselves, although they do not have the law” (2:14). Obviously, the law of God may be followed out of a “natural,” inner sense of good and right, thus bridging the gap between revelation and natural law. Centuries later, in a major integration of natural law in Christian conceptions, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) develops the point in his *Theological Summa* (Part 1, Question 91): Natural law is the “participation” of the rational creature—man—in the law of God, and reason is thus the way to participate

in divine law through natural law. Far from disqualifying it as a model of law, creation establishes nature as God’s order in the world and must be followed by men.

The absorption of the conception of natural law inherited from the pagan past in Christian doctrines did not stabilize a consensual understanding of it but elicited new questions eventually provoking a divide sometimes referred to as the opposition between two conceptions of *jus naturalisms*: classic and modern. One key element has been a radical transformation of the meaning of “nature,” progressively denoting the inscription of nature in man and no more the insertion of man in the whole order of the universe. Illustrating the evolution in his *Spirit of the Laws*, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) states that “the laws of nature are the laws that derive from our constitution.” Natural law, which the ancients considered as part of a cosmology, has become the outcome of a new anthropology insisting on the value of the individual and his personal relation to nature.

Spanning centuries, the transformation of natural law eventually acquired a definition during the Enlightenment, when natural law slowly made room for a conception of individual natural rights, which led to the declarations of the American and French revolutions in 1776 and 1789. The causes and the forms of this revision of the sense of “natural law” are many. It has long been considered that the change occurred briskly in the 18th century. Modern historiography tends rather to agree on an evolutionary process originating in the Middle Ages, with William of Ockham (1285–1349) being often, though controversially, cited as the instigator of this development in the wake of the work of the French historian of law Michel Villey (1914–1988). But it is certain that in the 18th century, natural law eventually came to mean that laws must respect equality and freedom in men (the issue of women was debated), which are considered to be natural features of humanity. This is what the notion of “rights” grants, despite infinite variations over centuries in the definition of these rights among modern and contemporary authors—no less keen in the modern age on discussing natural rights than their ancient predecessors had been on disputing over what is natural or not.

Beyond historical fractures, *jus naturalism* rests today on a fundamental set of convictions regarding

the essence of law, the first one being that laws are not arbitrary. Opposing positivist juridical conceptions, which assert that a law is no more than a norm regarded as legal, *jus naturalism* is a reminder that masses could be massively unjust, and the will of the prince or the leader can be detached from any common sense of justice. The theme of natural law thus assumes a normative role as well as a critical one. On the normative side is the idea that nature commands certain actions and forbids others: The appeal to natural law can serve the purpose of justifying laws or justifying the call for new laws by considering them as requisites from nature. By the same token, the reference to natural law also represents a powerful critical tool to contest the validity of laws that would appear to go against nature. This is the basis of one of the most important features in *jus naturalist* conceptions: the distinction between natural law, which is the source of justice, and conventional laws—the laws of a collectivity—which, in the best cases, obey or translate natural law but in the worst situations may well violate any natural sense of justice.

In all its conceptions, natural law addresses the fundamental paradox in human laws, whether understood in a specifically legal or in a broader moral sense. On the one hand, norms vary greatly: What seems “natural” to one human group might well be considered deviant or even strictly forbidden in another one. On the other hand, rules are often felt to be “natural” by their followers, a fact that gives way to uncertainty or bewilderment when they are challenged by the existence of other potentially contradictory rules. To that extent, obedience to rules corresponds to a natural sense of justice. For centuries, the notion of natural law has translated this sense in the theory of law.

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See also Political Philosophy; Rights; Rule of Law

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## NATURAL RESOURCES

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A natural resource can be defined as a feature of the natural environment that has some sort of economic, cultural, aesthetic, ecological, or spiritual value. The study of natural resources in political science is ultimately about how such—often conflicting—values are managed and distributed by political actors, communities, organizations, bureaucracies, and countries. After a brief historical background, the remainder of the text reviews current research themes in the study of natural resource management. The concluding paragraph offers some thoughts about emerging research trends.

### The History of the Study of Natural Resource Management

Although natural resources and politics have been intimately connected throughout the history of human civilization, a politics of natural resource management in a modern sense did not appear until the 1960s. The “discovery” of a wider set of environmental problems brought with it a growing realization that many natural resources were being exploited in ways that rapidly undermined their future existence. Out of this realization came the perhaps single most influential article ever published in the field of natural resource management: Garrett Hardin’s 1968 *Science* article, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” has had a substantial and long-lasting impact on how problems of natural resource management are conceived of and theorized. By modeling the usage of jointly owned natural resources—the commons—as a collective



action problem, Hardin argued that finite natural resources that were jointly used would eventually be exhausted. Since no single resource user has an incentive to limit his or her outtake from the resource, the resource would soon suffer from overexploitation. Because most natural resources are collectively owned, Hardin's prediction was that the world's natural resources were on the brink of depletion, unless they could be brought under either private or governmental ownership.

The situation described in the "Tragedy of the Commons" continued to be the mainstream model for understanding interactions between society and natural systems until the next seminal work in natural resources management appeared in 1990. Elinor Ostrom's path-breaking classic *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* built on the fundamental problem of jointly used resources and the resulting overutilization assumed by Hardin but argued that the depletion of the resource was not an unavoidable outcome. One of Ostrom's core contributions is the conceptual distinction between common property (resources owned jointly) and common pool resources (CPRs—resources that are highly subtractable and have high exclusion costs associated with them). Relying on evidence from multiple case studies and game theoretical models, Ostrom pointed out that natural resource users may solve the commons dilemma through self-organizing institutions that regulate access and resource extraction activities. However, simply setting up an institution is not a panacea for the problem of sustainable natural resource management. Since the very act of constructing an institution is a collective action problem in itself, creating the institution in many cases poses an insurmountable challenge. Moreover, even with the institution in place there is still a large amount of variation in how well different types of institutional configurations are able to achieve sustainable resource use. Factors such as power asymmetries and levels of trust among users, the ability to control access to the resource, whether or not resource units are easily distinguishable, and the degree of volatility in the resource system itself are all highly influential factors for successful management.

The combined legacy of Hardin and Ostrom has securely placed the study of natural resource management in an overall theoretical and methodological framework of rational-choice institutionalism.

Most of the work that followed in the wake of *Governing the Commons* can be placed within this paradigm, as also a good deal of the policy recommendations that were based on the findings from CPR studies. Moreover, most contemporary work in natural resource studies has retained many of Ostrom's core notions, such as the pivotal role of institutions and the importance of considering the characteristics of the resource itself.

### Contemporary Directions in Natural Resource Management

At least two broad themes can be discerned in contemporary research on natural resource management. The first theme emphasizes the inherent complexity of natural resource systems and argues that this precludes any strong notions of actually governing natural resources. Complete and exhaustive knowledge about the dynamics of a given ecosystem is simply beyond the reach of scientific inquiry, and it is therefore not possible to govern resource systems based on rationalistic and exact templates such as sustainable yield or carrying capacity as these concepts can never be estimated in any precise sense. As a consequence, new management paradigms such as adaptive management or adaptive comanagement are put forward as necessary readjustments of how natural resources should be governed. Such management approaches typically stress the role of learning, innovation, local knowledge, stakeholder participation, and flexibility as core virtues of resource management. There is also a tendency to view policy making as trial and error or as a constantly ongoing experiment, rather than as the pursuit of specific predetermined goals. Critics argue that adaptive management and adaptive comanagement are built on overly optimistic assumptions about the effect of stakeholder involvement, self-organization, and participation in policy making, while downplaying problems such as power and resource asymmetries and the need for accountability and predictability of public policies.

The second theme problematizes the dichotomous conception of nature and society—in which the latter governs the former—by arguing that ecological systems and social and political systems in reality are highly interlinked, constituting so-called social-ecological systems. The social-ecological

systems view of natural resource management proposes that rather than studying the effects of social organization on natural resources, analyses must be based on the realization that society and nature are locked into coupled causal relationships, which means that they cannot be studied in isolation from each other. Closely linked to this approach are studies concerned with issues of adaptability and vulnerability. Against the backdrop of ongoing processes of global environmental change, such as biodiversity loss and climate change, scholars in this area seek to understand how the vulnerability of people situated in different social-ecological systems can be reduced through processes of adaptation to novel circumstances.

### Comparative and International Perspectives

Due to the strong emphasis on understanding linkages between institutional factors and natural systems, most empirical studies of natural resource management tend to take the form of comparative case studies of small or medium-sized CPRs. There is, however, a smaller subset of large-*N* comparative studies in which nation-level political factors are used to explain cross-national variation in natural resource management performance. An example of a widely discussed topic is the impact of corruption on natural resource management. Some studies have identified a negative effect of corruption on indicators of natural resource management, whereas other authors argue that corruption obstructs more effective resource exploitation.

Studies of the effect of democracy on natural resource management show a similar pattern: Some studies assert that stronger and more encompassing democratic regimes generally perform better in managing and protecting their natural resources, while other studies claim that democracy, due to its intimate relationship with market economies and the need for sustained economic growth, inevitably leads to mismanagement of natural resources.

The effect of decentralization has also been studied in a comparative perspective, focusing on the issue of a possible race-to-the-bottom effect of reforms aiming at a more decentralized management of natural resources. Some studies support the existence of such an effect, whereas others argue that there is a race to the top.

A further topic of comparative natural resource management has to do with the relationship between the market economy and nature. The key notion is that the relationship between market economy and resource degradation, when viewed over time, can be thought of as an inverted U-shaped curve. Economies in the early stages of industrialization rely heavily on the extraction of natural resources for growth generation and therefore have a large impact on ecological systems. This phase of economic development is also marked by the use of inefficient and crude technologies that contribute to further environmental damage. This relationship between nature and economy persists until a certain point of economic wealth is reached, beyond which the curve starts to slope downward. In this new phase, economic growth is increasingly generated through the production of services and the development of new technologies, which lessens the need for extraction of crude natural resources. In addition, some scholars have argued that people in more affluent societies start to value things other than material wealth, a process that again serves to weaken the relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation. The environmental Kuznets curve theory (according to which environmental degradation increases while a country is developing but decreases as the GDP rises) has not gone unchallenged, and some argue that it is only valid for a smaller class of end-of-pipe type of emissions, whereas other negative impacts on natural systems such as biodiversity loss, carbon dioxide emissions, and the spread of toxins follow the level of economic development in a roughly linear fashion. Another criticism holds that the environmental Kuznets curve theory might be less applicable to currently developing countries due to their access to already available clean technologies.

As many natural resources are located on regional or even global scales (e.g., migratory birds, sea mammals, and global fish stocks), the politics of natural resources is also to be found in the international arena. A central concept for many scholars studying international natural resource politics is that of environmental regimes. This concept is similar to the concept of institutions in CPR studies but is normally used in studies of how international treaties and organizations influence the behavior of actors in the international environmental arena.

Research in this field has focused on understanding mechanisms underlying regime effectiveness as well as on how regimes are constructed and evolve over time.

### Emerging Themes in Natural Resource Management Research

A number of significant themes are currently emerging in natural resource management research. An already ongoing shift is the gradual move away from the institution as the central unit of analysis. Instead, theoretical models and research designs are increasingly framed in terms of systems theory or, more specifically, in terms of socioecological systems. The heightened interest in how social–ecological systems are able to adapt to novel circumstances caused by global environmental change in turn tends to play down focus on action problems related to natural resource management. This redirection also signals a renewed interest in complex systems theory as well as in notions of resilience in social–ecological systems. Another topic of recent debate concerns methodologies in CPR research. The dominance of qualitative case study methods has recently been complemented with more quantitative methods, including systems modeling and social network analysis. A final emerging theme in natural resource management research relates to ongoing shifts toward more governance-oriented forms of policy making, which is likely to have wide-ranging repercussions for the way in which natural resources are governed.

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*See also* Complexity; Environmental Issues; Environmental Policy; Environmental Security Studies; Institutional Theory

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## NEGOTIATION

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*See* Diplomacy

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## NEO-CORPORATISM

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Corporatism is an idea that has been present in political and social life for at least 9 to 10 centuries. Its origins are indisputably European and related to differing conceptions of how the Roman Catholic Church and medieval cities should be governed. Its popularity, however, has had an erratic fate—both as a practice in political life and as a concept in political theory. It has been heralded as a novel and promising way of ensuring harmony between conflicting social groups, and it has also been condemned as a reactionary and antidemocratic formula for suppressing the demands of autonomous associations and movements. In other words, corporatism has always been politically controversial and conceptually ambiguous. There is no better evidence for this than the frequency with which it is so often preceded by contradictory qualifying adjectives or prefixes: state or societal, liberal or authoritarian, archeo- or neo-, Catholic or secular, macro- or meso-, voluntary or compulsory, social democratic or conservative, and, most recently, national or supranational.

### The Sites of Neo-Corporatism

After the defeat of fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany, and various other authoritarian regimes that flourished in Europe during the interwar period (1919–1939)—almost all of which claimed to be practicing some form of corporatism—the concept disappeared from the

lexicon of respectable political discourse, except in Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal, where the practice was left anachronistically on display until both countries transitioned to democracy in the mid-1970s.

At almost the same time, scholars from several countries and academic disciplines revived the concept to describe certain features of the politics of advanced democratic polities that did not seem adequately accounted for by the dominant model that had been applied to state-society relations—namely, pluralism. Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and tiny Luxembourg were singled out as archetypical “neo-corporatist” countries that had become deeply penetrated by this type of interest politics since the end of World War II. Important traces of its practice on a less centralized or more erratic basis have been observed in the politics of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and even in postauthoritarian Portugal and Spain. Great Britain and Australia have attempted to establish similar arrangements without success. Elsewhere among the advanced capitalist democracies, neo-corporatism seems confined to specific sectors (especially agriculture). The United States, Canada, and New Zealand, for example, have never even tried to practice it at the macro or national level; France has only resorted to it in exceptional circumstances, as an emergency (and short-lived) measure.

At the core of this variation in practice were two political prerequisites. Unless they were simultaneously present (and this was a relatively rare occurrence), neo-corporatism in its most centralized and effective form would not emerge: (a) a relative balance of class forces between capital and labor and (b) an active disposition by state agencies to promote it. War and its aftermath provided one favorable context, as did the proto-revolutionary situation induced by protracted economic depression. Social-democratic or socialist party dominance in government, especially without serious competition from far left communist parties, was another. Both of these contributed to overcoming a major impediment—namely, the reluctance of capitalists and their associations to participate in and to be bound by such arrangements. Only when the alternative pluralist course of action was not viable did they embrace neo-corporatism and even willingly seek to exploit it to their benefit. Once these

constraints waned, as both did in the 1970s and 1980s in Western Europe, so did neo-corporatist policy making—usually due to the defection of business interests. Neither the relative balance of class forces nor the simultaneous success of left-wing parties characterized North America or the countries of the White Commonwealth as much and, hence, its almost complete absence in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—except, interestingly enough, for a brief flirtation with something like it during the American New Deal.

### Definitions of Neo-Corporatism

While corporatism has been defined as an ideology, a variant of political culture, a type of state, a form of economy, or even as a kind of society, the most productive approach has been to consider it as one of several possible arrangements through which organized interests can intermeditate between their members (individuals, families, firms, communities, groups) and various interlocutors. Representatives of capital and labor were initially assigned the most prominent role, although more recent versions have extended participation to include representatives of other interests such as women, consumers, environmentalists, neighborhoods, youth, and so forth. Agents of the state or government are omnipresent in such arrangements but usually in a facilitative rather than a protagonistic role. They may or may not be overtly present at the table, but those who are there know that legitimate coercion may be necessary for implementing the agreements they reach and may be brought to bear if they fail to reach a consensus. Central to all these negotiating processes in the contemporary context is the role of class, sectoral, or professional associations, permanently established and staffed, that specialize in identifying, advancing, and defending the interests of their members by negotiating agreements directly with organized representatives of conflicting interests and/or by influencing and contesting the policies of public authorities. Unlike political parties—the other principle intermediaries in modern polities—these organizations neither present candidates for electoral approval nor accept overt responsibility for forming governments.

The definition of modern corporatism that initiated much of the contemporary discussion is that of Philippe Schmitter (1974):

A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. (pp. 93–94)

This approach emphasizes almost exclusively the input side, that is, the organizational structure of interest associations. Gerhard Lehmbruch (1979) defined what he called “liberal corporatism” more from the perspective of decisional outputs as

an institutionalized pattern of policy-formation in which large interest organizations cooperate with each other and with public authorities not only in the articulation (or even “intermediation”) of interests, but—in its developed forms—in the “authoritative allocation of values” and in the implementation of such policies. (p. 94)

As Alan Cawson (1986) and Peter Williamson (1985) note, subsequent definitions tended to combine both the input and output dimensions, and it became virtually axiomatic that successful neo-corporatism required their coincidence. Only where the interests involved were organized hierarchically into monopolistic and comprehensive associations was it thought to be possible to reach and to implement voluntary agreements on such crucial matters.

### **The Success and Failure of Neo-Corporatism**

Once the authoritarian-fascist-statist variety of corporatism had been virtually extinguished—first, by the post-World War II wave of democratizations and, later, by the post-1974 one—it became increasingly clear which were the polities most successful in practicing the “societal” version of neo-corporatism: small European countries with well-organized, relatively centralized class-based associations and highly vulnerable, internationalized economies. The tendency was all the more marked if they also had strong social-democratic

parties, stable electoral preferences and ruling coalitions, relative cultural homogeneity, and neutral foreign policies. Indeed, those that had the most difficulty sustaining such social pacts had weaker social democracies, more volatile electorates, and deeper divisions over military and security issues, for example, the Netherlands and Denmark. Belgium’s relative lack of success in reaching such voluntary macrosocial contracts could be traced to its division into rival linguistic groups.

In retrospect, it became clear that neo-corporatism had reached its apex more or less at the very same time when it was discovered and labeled as such by social scientists. During the rest of the 1970s, the 1980s, and well into the 1990s, its practice seemed to be in irrevocable decline. A number of knowledgeable scholars, such as Scott Lash and John Urry (1987) and Mark Gobeyn (1993), even declared it defunct on the grounds that “post-Fordist” systems of production, the decline in political commitment to full employment, the demise of Keynesian economics, the rise of neoliberal ideology, and the growing weakness of trade unions—not to mention the growing significance of globalization and Europeanization—all conspired against its viability. When Swedish capitalists noisily withdrew in 1991 from all policy-making instances they shared with organized labor, its death warrant was thought to have been issued. Prior to this—and for a period stretching back to the late 1930s—Sweden was rightfully regarded as the archetypal practitioner of neo-corporatism.

### **The Resurgence and Transformation of Neo-Corporatism**

And then, just as it was supposed to disappear altogether, neo-corporatism dramatically reemerged toward the end of the 1990s, leading at least two observers to predict that maybe neo-corporatism was a cyclical product related to the vicissitudes of capitalist performance and the public’s shifting involvement with public and private goods and, hence, destined to revive—Sisyphus like—every 20 to 25 years or so, only to fail again at the end of a similar period. European integration, which had been considered a negative factor because it tended to impose a neoliberal bias on policy making and reduced the degrees of freedom available to national

politicians, suddenly became a positive factor as a series of countries used neo-corporatist mechanisms to prepare themselves for entry into the Euro zone and to improve their competitive advantage when other policy alternatives had been eliminated. Scholars competed with each other to explain why policy concertation and tripartism had again become so appealing (Giuseppe Fajertag & Phillippe Pochet, 1997).

Closer observation of this revival would reveal some important differences. In a few cases, it involved reanimating tripartite bargaining arrangements that had existed in the recent past with the participation of more or less the same actors. The Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland were cases in point; even in the much trumpeted case of Sweden, elements of neo-corporatism seemed to have crept back into its policy practices at a lower and less visible level of aggregation, especially after the return of the Social Democrats to power. What was definitely novel, however, was its emergence in countries that had either not practiced it at all or done so on an erratic basis. Moreover, the participants in these cases (Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) were not organized "properly" according to prevailing theory. The associations representing capital and labor in these negotiations were often weak in membership density, poorly coordinated at the national level, fragmented into competing ideological units, and manifestly less capable of ensuring the compliance of the firms and individuals in their respective categories. And, in some instances, the old tripartite formula gave way to a multipartite one in which representatives of other social interests (and even passions) were allowed to sit at the table: agriculturists, feminists, consumers, environmentalists, local governments, youths, and other assorted groups of "policy takers." As if this was not enough, the subject matter being negotiated was less focused on inflation, wage contention, social peace, and redistributive side payments than with things such as restructuring welfare systems, introducing more flexible work procedures, reducing national budget deficits, improving competitiveness at the sectoral or plant level, meeting environmental standards, and ensuring gender equality. And agents of the state played a much more active and visible role in convoking these negotiations and pressuring the participants to reach agreement. Increasingly, they were even prepared to decree the results and make

them publicly binding when faced with dissent, especially by trade unions.

The change in policy content may explain why neo-corporatist policy making could produce results after the revival of the 1990s without the collaboration of neo-corporatist interest intermediaries. The growing imbalance of forces between capital and labor due to globalization had already put the latter on the defensive and, therefore, more likely to agree to negotiate in retreat in defense of existing jobs, wages, and benefits under the impending threat of "delocalization." It may also have lessened their opposition to including new participants on the grounds that farmers, consumers, and environmentalists might prove to be allies on specific issues. But the real difference has involved the increased role of firms and state agencies. The burden of implementing most of these "new" policies no longer rests on the autonomous capacity of class associations to deliver the compliance of their members. Many are only "recommended standards" or "voluntary guidelines" at the macro or meso levels, and their implementation is largely at the discretion of individual enterprises or plant-level works councils at the microlevel. Also, those that are intended to be binding on all those affected can be imposed by the government through "legitimate coercion." This has become much more credible since the convergence in programs and policies between Right and Left parties ensures that these policies will not vary with rotations in power. The former association of neo-corporatism with social-democratic or left-center governing coalitions has become less relevant. Indeed, analysts have argued that it has either become indifferent to the party in power or that it is the favored practice when weak, multiparty coalitions rule, on the grounds that, under such centrist governments, neither capital or labor can rely on especially favored treatment by the legislature or the executive, and therefore they have to resort to the second-best alternative of negotiating compromises.

So substantial have been these changes to the practice of neo-corporatism since the late 1990s that it is certainly legitimate to question whether the same label should be attached to it.

### The Performance of Neo-Corporatism

Protracted neo-corporatism at the national or macroeconomic level has been convincingly linked

to certain desirable outcomes during the post-war period until the mid-1970s: less unruliness of the citizenry, lower strike rates, more balanced budgets, greater fiscal effectiveness, lower rates of inflation, less unemployment, less income inequality, less instability at the level of political elites, and less of a tendency to exploit the “political business cycle”—all of which suggested that countries scoring high on this property were likely to be more governable. Subsequent econometric studies with more recent data have questioned these findings, and no one has ever been able to show that neo-corporatist systems have been capable of higher rates of economic growth. In the turbulent times at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of this century, as we have noted above, policy concentration among social classes, sectors, and professions has shifted toward matters such as improving productivity, encouraging worker flexibility, and reforming welfare systems.

Regardless of its effects on the economy and society, neo-corporatism has long had an ambiguous and contestable relation to the polity—especially with regard to democracy. From its rediscovery in the mid-1970s, corporatism has borne the burden of its past association with fascism and other forms of authoritarian rule. To describe a polity or practice as “corporatist” was practically synonymous with accusing it of being undemocratic. Moreover, some of its enduring features seemed to confirm this suspicion: Organizations replaced persons as the principal agents in political life; specialized professional representatives gained at the expense of generally interested citizens and broadly aggregative political parties; privileged (if not exclusive) access was accorded to particular associations; monopolies were recognized and even extolled at the expense of overlapping and competing intermediaries; organizational hierarchies reaching up to very comprehensive national peak associations diminished the autonomy of more local and specialized organizations; and decisions were made by secretive negotiations, rather than by public tallying of votes.

As inquiry into corporatism expanded, however, judgment about its impact on democracy shifted. For one thing, many of the countries that are manifestly corporatist are also obviously democratic in the sense that they protect the full range of civic freedoms, define citizenship in the broadest

fashion, hold regular competitive elections of uncertain outcome, render political authorities accountable for their actions, and pursue public policies that seem responsive to popular demands. Some of them, especially those in Scandinavia, have even been in the vanguard of experimentation, with such advanced democratic measures as worker participation in management, open disclosure of policy processes, ombudsman arrangements for hearing citizen complaints, public financing of political parties, and even wage-earner funds for extending popular ownership of the economy.

Also, it soon became apparent that corporatist arrangements have a substantial impact on the conditions under which competing interests can participate to influence the process. The spontaneous, voluntaristic, and episodic relations of pluralism seem freer in principle, but in practice they produce a greater inequality of access to those in power. Privileged groups with smaller numbers, concentrated resources, and more compact location have a natural advantage over larger and dispersed ones such as workers and consumers. Corporatism tends to even out the distribution of resources across more comprehensively organized categories and to guarantee at least a formal parity of access to the making of decisions. Moreover, the direct incorporation of associations into subsequent implementation processes may ensure greater responsiveness to group needs than the “arms length” relationship that separates the public and the private realm under pluralism.

Evaluating the impact of corporatism on democracy depends very much on which qualities of democracy one chooses to use. Seen from the classical perspective of encouraging the participation of individuals in the decisions that collectively affect them and of ensuring that all public authorities accord equal accessibility to citizen demands, these arrangements have a negative effect. But when viewed from a more output-oriented perspective that asks whether those in power can be held effectively accountable for their actions and whether these actions are likely to be responsive to citizen needs, the judgment of corporatism is bound to be more positive. Its impact on the central mechanism of democracy—competitiveness—is more ambiguous. On the one hand, this is diminished by eliminating the struggle between rival associations for membership and access. On the other hand, it is

enhanced by encouraging rival conceptions of common interest to express themselves within the same association. One can conclude that modern democracies are being transformed by the practice of modern corporatism. Organizations are becoming citizens alongside, if not in the place of, individuals. Accountability and responsiveness are increasing but at the expense of participation and access. Competitiveness is less interorganizational and more intraorganizational. The pace is uneven, the acceptance is unequal, and the outcome is by no means unequivocal, but democracy in almost all modern societies is becoming more interested, more organized, and more indirect.

### The Future of Neo-Corporatism

With the dramatic crash of late 2008, the conditions that have previously promoted or impeded neo-corporatism, tripartism, policy concentration, and social pacting, or whatever it should be called, have radically altered. After years of decline in the balance of forces between capital and labor in favor of the former, the terms of encounter are suddenly no longer the same. The hegemony of business interests has been seriously undermined by the collapse of neoliberal ideology as well as the revelations of fraud and misconduct by financial interests. Materially speaking, many enterprises have been devastated in their balance sheets, and their recovery to profitability will require the willing cooperation of labor. Whether mass unemployment will reach the levels of the 1930s and trigger a potentially disruptive collective response by workers and citizens has yet to be seen. Moreover, the initial reaction by state authorities—even in regimes dominated by conservative parties—demonstrates that they are not just disposed but anxious to intervene. So far, their emergency measures have involved distributing massive welfare to capitalists and no high-level negotiations with labor. There has simply not been sufficient time for tripartite policy concentration. But eventually—if the past scenario is any guide to the future—this combination of factors could well lead to yet another revival of it, especially in small, relatively homogeneous and internationally vulnerable countries. The only safe prediction, however, is that, if and when it returns, it will not be the same in either form or substance. Perhaps, then, we can finally

declare that neo-corporatism is dead and gone, and begin calling it something else.

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*See also* Corporativism; Interest Groups; Labor Movement; Representation

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## NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

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Neoliberal institutionalism (NLI) is an umbrella term for liberal research programs in the study of international relations (IR) that focus on the cooperative role of institutions. At its core, NLI argues that international cooperation is possible and most readily achievable, with the creation and



maintenance of international institutions broadly defined. Both formal and informal institutional arrangements are the subjects of NLI analysis. Formal institutions include multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the European Union (EU). States create and voluntarily submit to such institutions, which possess collective goals and establish mechanisms to achieve them. Informal institutional arrangements, or regimes, are also voluntarily created by states and constitute sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a particular issue area. A well-established regime exists in the issue area of capitalist free trade, for example, since both formal institutions and implicit, collectively shared principles, norms, rules, and procedures are foundational to such activity.

NLI argues that both formal institutions and regimes have the potential to create lasting bonds between nation-states. They do so by facilitating iterated interaction, diffusing information, heightening transparency, and lessening the ability of actors to defect from institutional agreements. By normalizing rules and regulations in this way, institutions promote an environment of trust in which nation-states can obtain a variety of collective gains that they would otherwise eschew. Thus, institutions aid in efficiently solving collective action dilemmas, particularly in areas that do not involve security issues.

As the term indicates, NLI is part of the larger theoretical category of IR liberalism, and it is premised on basic liberal assumptions about the importance of rationality, information, iteration, and institutional arrangements to cooperative outcomes in IR. NLI also constitutes a renewed confrontation with realism—hence its “neo” status. It emerged in the late 1970s as a theoretical competitor to neorealism, which argues that there are debilitating constraints on the efficacy of international cooperation in an anarchic world of self-interested, egocentric nation-states. In neorealist analyses, the anarchic international environment fosters uncertainty and suspicion, which then produce frequent security dilemmas, volatile alliances, and ongoing trade and military competition. In such an environment, international cooperation is difficult to obtain, even when both parties would

gain from the effort, due to fear that any relatively greater gains will be employed for competitive purposes. Thus, NLI's theoretical competitor tends to underscore the dangers of defection by highlighting the distrust between actors engaged in potential agreements with one another.

NLI challenges the pessimistic conclusions of neorealist analysis, but it does so by adopting many of the same analytical assumptions. It is for this reason that neorealism and NLI are sometimes categorized together epistemologically and why NLI can be distinguished from earlier liberal variants such as pluralism. Both NLI and neorealist scholars agree that the international system is anarchic, which means that there is no international authority or government to force states to comply with demands or cooperate with one another. As a result, states must help themselves and look out for their own individual survival. NLI concurs that international cooperation will be difficult to obtain in an anarchic international environment that induces fear and uncertainty. Both theories focus on the state as the main actor in international affairs. While NLI and neorealist scholars recognize that other international actors do exist and can influence international affairs, each theoretical lens views the state as the primary mover of international politics. And both perspectives view the state as a rational, utility-maximizing, and self-interested governing entity. In doing so, both are heavily indebted to the study of economics, and NLI is sometimes referred to as rational-choice institutionalism as a result.

NLI and neorealism differ, however, over whether the fear of relative gains is a primary inhibitor in international cooperation. NLI argues that states can be motivated to cooperate in order to achieve absolute gains (or the totality of gains achieved by an actor regardless of the relative gains of others) if their fears of being cheated by one another can be mitigated. This is where institutions play a key role in NLI analysis. NLI scholars argue that institutions mitigate the effects of anarchy, thereby making the realization of absolute gains, and hence the possibility of international cooperation, more likely. Institutions do so because they reflect mutually accepted rules and regulations that are created by the institutional actors themselves. Because actors have a say in what is allowed, and disapproved of, there is an

assumption that actors will not agree to terms that they cannot meet, thus making institutional agreements fairly straightforward and easy to uphold. Institutions also foster transparency and information sharing. They provide actors with access to data about other institutional partners to which the former would not normally be privy. The more information that actors possess the better, as this diminishes feelings of anxiety, apprehension, and distrust. And, because the rules of the game are well specified in institutional arrangements, actors are well aware of the institutional expectations that exist. The more information actors have, the better they feel about taking part in an international agreement that makes them dependent on other actors and, arguably, more vulnerable.

NLI also stresses the importance of long-term gains. NLI scholars note that institutions provide a forum for repeated interaction, and they argue that actors engaged in repeated, continuous interactions are less likely to defect from cooperative arrangements. In making this argument, NLI borrows from game theory and the multiple game scenarios (prisoners' dilemma, chicken, tit-for-tat) that materialize when actors seek to engage in bilateral and multilateral agreements. These can be distinguished from one-shot-only interactions, which, NLI argues, is the assumption of neorealist analysis. Alternatively, NLI argues that once actors submit to an institutional agreement, they become locked in. Actor interaction becomes more frequent and common.

Institutions are thus viewed as mechanisms that can create long-term and long-lasting benefits for states in areas related to security, human rights, health, and the international political economy. NLI views iterated interaction as a positive spillover effect of institutional agreements. The more actors interact, the more they come to trust one another and learn the preferences that others possess. Iterated interaction, therefore, catalyzes cooperation among divergent actors. Actors are less likely to engage in hostile interaction because they "know" one another. More important, institutional arrangements lead actors to depend on one another. This dependence lessens the desire among actors to defect or cheat because they too can be hurt—economically and politically—by this misbehavior. Consequently, defectors are left vulnerable because they can no longer depend on the

actions of others to fill the institutional needs that had been previously met.

Finally, NLI argues that institutions diminish the ability of actors to free ride. Free riding occurs when one actor benefits from the actions of other actors without paying the price or anteing up. Institutions not only spell out requirements that actors are expected to abide by and uphold but also delineate punishments for failing to comply with one's institutional mandate. This reduces the ability, or desire, of other actors to cheat or free ride in turn because there are known consequences for noncompliance, like sanctions or institutional shunning. Although it can be difficult to enforce institutional punishments, the mere fact that such mechanisms exist can dissuade some potential institutional dissenters.

For NLI scholars, institutional agreements do not impede state sovereignty because states still retain final authority over foreign and domestic policy decisions. Instead, NLI notes that institutions reduce the autonomy of states to act unilaterally, which means that states are forced to consider the needs and interests of other actors if they wish to obtain their own interests in turn. This creates a more pacifistic and harmonious international environment because states will not make irrational decisions based solely on their own desires and wants. Instead, they learn to compromise and take into account other actors while at the same time obtaining their own long-term interests.

Although institutions can mitigate the effects of anarchy in these ways, NLI acknowledges that IR prior to the 20th century conformed to neorealist expectations. Two historical developments created a window of opportunity for the spread of formal and informal institutions in the 20th century. The first was the development of complex interdependence. Thanks to modern technological and industrial advances, nation-states have become more entwined at almost every level and issue area. This has produced multiple channels of interaction between state and nonstate actors, and this allows actors to more easily identify their common interests, overcome barriers to collective action, and reach cooperative agreements to obtain common interests. It has also encouraged nonmilitary problem solving in areas such as environmental degradation, health crises, and human rights abuses.

The second historical development that encouraged the spread of international institutions was

that of the United States playing the role of a hegemon after World War II. Borrowing again from the study of international economics, NLI scholars argue that the support of a very powerful state is usually necessary for nation-states to have confidence in and engage with free trade. The United States created and promoted a variety of multilateral institutions, thereby producing a period of hegemonic stability in the latter half of the 20th century. While this promotion was driven by self-interest, it served as the necessary foundation for the subsequent growth of international institutions and regimes and the cooperative benefits they provide.

It is important to acknowledge that NLI does not posit that institutions always matter. This is because institutions are not infallible. Institutions can aid in achieving but do not guarantee collective gains. NLI scholars are cognizant of the fact that institutions can break down or fail to achieve a desired collective action outcome; therefore, how institutions are designed—or the rational design of institutions—is an important focus and research agenda within NLI. Another emerging branch of NLI, known as principal-agent theory, examines how nation-states delegate tasks and authority to international institutions and whether this achieves the desired objectives.

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*See also* Cooperation; Game Theory; Interdependence; International Organizations; International Regimes; International Relations, Theory; Liberalism in International Relations; Rational Choice; Realism in International Relations; World Trade Organization (WTO)

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## NEOLIBERALISM

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Neoliberalism, as the prefix *neo* suggests, is an old concept that reemerged as a policy response to the crisis of Keynesianism and was made popular by the political ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While neoliberalism has become a central concept in the social sciences describing the structural changes in the global economy since the 1970s, the concept is much contested. At the most fundamental level, neoliberalism builds on the classical liberal notion implying the triumph of market forces and individual autonomy over state power. But there is a considerable normative divergence between advocates of neoliberal ideas, who celebrate the ascendancy of the market, and those who suggest that the policies of neoliberalism are associated with global inequality, economic disparity, growth of unemployment, social exclusion, environmental destruction, and cultural homogeneity. Optimists stipulate that unfettered market forces will result in global prosperity, freedom, democracy, and peace. For pessimists, neoliberalism has become an ideological construct associated with radical market fundamentalism based on the universal imperatives of competitive deregulation, liberalization, and privatization. This latter interpretation is often used synonymously with the concept of an exploitative form of neoliberal economic globalization.

Defining neoliberalism is all the more difficult because the concept as it emerged first in the 1930s differs fundamentally from the form in which it reemerged in the 1970s. In fact, Andreas Renner, of the Walter Eucken Institute in Germany, suggests that there are two neoliberalisms. One is a

continental European (i.e., German) version and the other an Anglo-Saxon interpretation. Historically, the European concept of neoliberalism originated in the 1930s in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon *laissez-faire* liberalism of self-regulating markets. The best account of such a *laissez-faire* economic system is found in Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation*, in which he argues that the collapse of the international economic system in the 1930s was a direct consequence of the attempt to organize the economy on the basis of *laissez-faire* ideas influenced by the British and Austrian schools of liberal (*laissez-faire*) economics. In today's social sciences, the terms *laissez-faire* and *neoliberalism* are used interchangeably, referring to the ascendancy of the market over state authority. The historical origin of neoliberalism tells a different story. The next section explores the origin of this concept and its relations to *laissez-faire* liberalism of the 19th century before turning to the reemergence of neoliberalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

#### Historical Origin of Continental European Neoliberalism and Anglo-Saxon *Laissez-Faire* Liberalism

According to the German economist Wilhelm Röpke, the term *neoliberalism* was coined in Paris in 1938 at a Colloque Walter Lippmann, a symposium held to discuss Walter Lippmann's recently released book, *The Good Society*. The participants at the Paris meeting chose the term *neoliberalism* to signal the creation of a new liberal movement against the *laissez-faire* liberalism of the 19th century. The historical importance of this neoliberal circle—consisting of members such as Wilhelm Röpke, Alfred Müller-Armack, Alexander Rüstow, Walter Eucken, and Franz Böhm—is that these ideas and norms became the basis for the continental social market economy of the 1950s. While not all members endorsed the term *neoliberalism*, it nevertheless became an umbrella designation for different trends of liberalism developed under its roof, of which the *Freiburger school*, also referred to as Ordoliberalism, is the most well-known group with Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm as its most renowned representatives.

The exponents of this neoliberal circle united in rejecting the economic reductionism they perceived as central to the ideas of 19th-century *laissez-faire*

liberalism. Instead, they emphasized a normative-ethical foundation of economics, delineating an important role for governments to set the institutional parameters for economic competition in order to serve the larger interests of society. These intellectual proponents of neoliberalism combined economic efficiency with human decency to achieve a just and stable social order. As suggested by the term *social market economy*, which developed from the earlier neoliberal circle and is still used today to describe some of the continental European economic models, the belief in the self-regulatory capacity of the market was rejected.

In contrast to the continental European school of neoliberalism, Anglo-Saxon *laissez-faire* philosophers and economists—such as Jeremy Bentham, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, Edmund Burke, and, from the Austrian economic school, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek—developed the theoretical foundation for claiming the superiority of economic freedom over public intervention. Characteristic of *laissez-faire* liberalism as practiced in the early 20th century was a market system based on competitive labor markets, the automatic gold standard, and free trade. *Laissez-faire* intellectuals postulated that unfettered economic competition was superior to any form of state guidance in coordinating human efforts. But precisely the very belief in the naturalness of the market and the self-regulating power of market forces was disputed in Karl Polanyi's narrative of the historical transformation from a traditional socially embedded economy to a *laissez-faire* system during the 19th century. The introduction of a market economy necessitated deliberate state action and, contrary to the theories of *laissez-faire*, did not result from natural market forces.

In summary, the continental European development of neoliberalism in the 1930s was an outright challenge to the 19th-century Anglo-Saxon belief in self-regulating markets. In rejecting the *laissez-faire* liberalism with its emphasis on creating the largest possible space for the self-determination of individuals, the proponents of neoliberalism questioned the fundamental separation between the political spheres and economic spheres. Seen from this historical perspective, the later reemergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s has more in common with the belief system of *laissez-faire* liberalism of the 19th century than with the original meaning of

neoliberalism in the 1930s. In fact, when Anthony Giddens advocates a “third way” between a *laissez-faire* neoliberal orientation and a top-down bureaucratic state management, he in fact comes close to the norms, ideology, and practices championed by the original intellectuals of the 1930 continental European neoliberalism.

### The Reemergence of Neoliberalism in the 1970s

In contrast to the intellectuals of the 1930s who united under the umbrella of neoliberalism and identified themselves as part of a new neoliberal movement, the reemergence of neoliberalism in the latter part of the 20th century lacks any group affiliation or identity with a larger neoliberal movement. Intellectuals most closely identified with the new norms of market fundamentalism are Friedrich August von Hayek and his student Milton Friedman. However, Hayek’s teachings are much closer to the *laissez-faire* ideas of his teacher and mentor, Ludwig von Mises, than to the original meaning of neoliberalism and later the ordoliberalism of the Freiburg school in Germany. It is thus not surprising that Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman do not use the term *neoliberalism* in their writings, preferring instead the concept of *laissez-faire* liberalism.

Today the term *neoliberalism* is used to describe global economic processes of governance systems that fundamentally reconfigure contemporary economic and social systems around the globe. Neoliberal economic ideas emerged as a result of the economic stagflation of the 1970s. This in turn led to a rejection of the postwar consensus of Keynesian demand management. Most prominently, Margaret Thatcher and subsequently Ronald Reagan popularized a radical market-oriented system based on supply side economics and rejecting state intervention in the economy. The closest approximation today of a neoliberal socioeconomic model in the real world is the United States.

Twenty-five years later, there is still no shared consensus on the meanings of neoliberalism and neoliberal globalization. At the most fundamental level, these terms convey a rebalancing of state and market, tilting to the privatization of cross-border governance. But these processes are enormously contested. Proponents suggest that measures such as liberalization, deregulation, and privatization

remove barriers to trade and financial cross-border transactions and thereby unleash the productive forces of capitalism. In this context, liberalization is to allow the unfettered cross-border movements of capital, labor, services, and goods, while deregulation is geared to remove unwanted government control that interferes with market processes, and privatization transfers previously publicly provided services to the private sector. Critics of neoliberal discourse and practice, on the other hand, argue that the rise and power of global finance and mobile capital as the dominant force in this governance framework have a negative impact on state-societal relations. The diminished capacity of the state to sustain public policies has increased the progressive detachment of individuals from social networks. Since public authorities are faced with dwindling resources to fulfill their traditional mandates, welfare is increasingly provided through market mechanisms. The result is an increase in the individualization of risks.

One of the most contentious intellectual debates concerns the role of the state in neoliberalism. Earlier proponents of neoliberalism envisaged the retreat of the state since they assumed that the market was the most efficient allocator of resources. However, scholars from the Left pointed out that the state was a central actor in creating the emerging transnational governance system. In the process of acting as a supposed midwife to a new neoliberal order, the state also changed from a distributive to a more internationally competitive actor. Other key players who are identified with the norms and practices of market fundamentalism are the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. These organizations were maligned for imposing the Washington Consensus in developing countries facing liquidity problems. The policy doctrine of structural adjustment involves macroeconomic stabilization through fiscal austerity programs, trade liberalization, and removing barriers to capital movements. More than any other policy, the Structural Adjustment Programs of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank came to represent all that is wrong with neoliberal market fundamentalism. Critics from developing countries point to the damaging effects of neoliberal transformation, including the depletion

and destruction of the local ecological and biological systems that sustain life and nature. Studies have pointed out that many poor and low-skilled women in developing countries have borne the brunt of the negative effects of neoliberal global transformation.

Stephen Gill has gone the farthest to theorize the neoliberal transformation with its commitment to liberal governmental and market reforms as a shift from embedded liberalism to disciplinary neoliberalism. The change toward disciplinary neoliberalism points to the disciplinary social mechanism used to lock in the market-based commitments to prevent future governments from undoing the reforms. The result is a new constitutionalism as a means to consolidate the market-based governance framework. Whether the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s, spells the demise of the neoliberal norms, ideas, and practices dominant since the 1970s is an open question. It is true that even erstwhile proponents of neoliberal private governance have voted to “bring the state back in” in order to stabilize the global financial and banking systems. But whether this signals a shift from neoliberalism to postneoliberalism cannot be determined at this time.

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*See also* Globalization; Liberalism; Liberty; Political Philosophy

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## NEO-PATRIMONIALISM

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The term *neo-patrimonialism* refers to a hybrid mode of rule in which informal political ties and exchanges suffuse the management of a state. In a neo-patrimonial regime, the political chief executive and his agents exercise authority mainly through personal whim and material incentive rather than through ideology or the rule of law. Within the state, the distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred, and officials occupy bureaucratic posts less to deliver public goods and services than to acquire personal wealth and status. While elements of such self-serving practice can be found under various political regimes, neo-patrimonial rule is a defining characteristic of personal autocracies in the world's most underdeveloped states.

As with other building blocks of social science, the concept's origins lie in the ideas of great German sociologist Max Weber. In his opus *Economy and Society*, Weber sought to understand how political leaders justify the exercise of political power. He proposed a threefold classification of types of authority (*Herrschaft*) based on the sources of a leader's claim to political legitimacy: tradition, charisma, or legality. Implicit in the Weberian schema is the recognition that these types of authority are ideal constructs whose essential features are abstracted from empirical observation but unlikely to exist in pure forms in the real world. From the outset, therefore, Weber entertained the likelihood that, in practice, actual political systems would operate according to mixed, or hybrid, principles. While Weber never spoke of neo-patrimonialism—the concept is a late-20th-century one developed by Shmuel Eisenstadt in 1973, Jean-François Médard in 1982, and Christopher Clapham in 1985)—he did anticipate an acute form of bureaucratized patrimonial rule.

In short, neo-patrimonialism is an amalgam. It mixes traditional (specifically, patrimonial) and legal (or bureaucratic) authority. The first component—patrimonial authority—is based on a ruler's claim to exercise intimate personal control over members of society, much as a father does over a household. As a form of traditional authority, patrimonial rule is justified in terms of inherited customs that have

been sanctified since time immemorial. To the extent that patrimonial authority is vested in older males, it is also associated with gerontocracy and patriarchal command over women and children. The second component is legal authority, a form of governance based on written constitutional rules and the routines of bureaucratic organization. To Weber, this rational (i.e., knowledge driven) form of authority was quintessentially modern. Insofar as citizens owe obedience, they do so not to individual leaders but to professional office holders in a rule-governed political order. Administration is impersonal, and power is constrained by the rule of law.

Patrimonial and legal-rational forms of authority are commonly juxtaposed in postcolonial situations. On the one hand, agrarian societies—especially in sub-Saharan Africa but also in parts of Asia and Latin America—are governed by informal customary norms exercised by traditional chieftains or feudal landlords. On the other hand, newly independent countries possess the formal apparatus of statehood, even if the empirical coverage of the state's legal and bureaucratic rules constitutes little more than a thin veneer. One origin of such dualistic polities, as noted by Mahmood Mamdani, can be found in the colonial policy of indirect rule as practiced in South Asia and West Africa, in which imperial overlords whose resources were strained devolved local responsibilities to extant traditional authorities. In short, neo-patrimonial rule was born in the political encounter between industrial empires and agrarian societies and is manifest today in the uneasy coexistence of formal-legal and patrimonial modes of rule.

Patrimony and bureaucracy are both based on a principle of hierarchy but, when they coexist, the ultimate source of legitimacy becomes blurred and contested. Is the state the personal property of the ruler or is it an impersonal instrument of constitutional rule? Are citizens required to obey the supreme leader because they owe him political loyalty or because they are required to defer to a rule of law?

The resolution of such tensions gives rise to neo-patrimonial rule. The educated generation of nationalist leaders that rose to power in the mid-20th century with the dissolution of the European empires adapted to their surroundings. Unable or unwilling to satisfy mass demands for rapidly ending poverty, these leaders instead devised

forms of rule that aimed mainly at consolidating a hold on office. On the one hand, as pointed out by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1982), leaders claimed legal authority by virtue of the sovereign status of their countries under international law, and they greatly expanded the scope of state responsibilities by embarking on ambitious national development plans and increasing the size of the public bureaucracy. On the other hand, they treated the state as if it were a private preserve: They appropriated public resources for personal gain, to build political followings, and to establish "official" political parties. Some leaders even invested in a cult of personality, emphasizing themes such as "father of the nation." Characteristically, all neo-patrimonial leaders awarded loyal followers with special favors, both within the state (public sector jobs) and across society (licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for material benefits, clients mobilized political support and referred all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons.

This new (*neo*) form of rule differed from classic patrimonialism in that its venue and instrument was a modern state. But the process of constructing neo-patrimonial rule also distorted beyond recognition the classic features of Weberian bureaucracy. The top leader and his subordinate barons seldom make important decisions on the basis of written rules or objective knowledge, preferring instead to maximize their own subjective discretion. They routinely violate Weber's rule that officials should be separated from the ownership of the means of administration, instead turning public means to personal ends. Political loyalty more than technical qualification becomes the criterion for appointing office holders. And these appointees are compensated not only with fixed salaries but also with opportunities to secure illicit rents. Most important, the bureaucratic principle of equality of treatment for clients is narrowed and targeted to political favorites, often defined along lines of ethnic or other communal solidarities.

Indeed, the formal architecture of the state is thoroughly penetrated and often superseded by informal networks of power and privilege. The supremo appoints loyal cronies to strategic positions in key institutions and outlying regions, conceding to them the authority to deploy resources from their own fiefdoms. As long as these barons

contribute to the incumbent's goal of retaining political power, they are assured of impunity from charges of corruption. A pyramid of such local networks stretches down from the center to the locality through formal structures such as ruling parties and local governments and through informal links to traditional authorities and even youth militias. As Diana Cammack (2007) notes, to the extent that political loyalty is rewarded with material benefit, neo-patrimonial networks operate according to an informal logic that is resistant to well-meaning efforts at legal reform promoted by international donors, opposition parties, or civic organizations.

This is not to say that neo-patrimonial rulers never employ the formal powers of public law when it suits them to do so. Often lacking the capacity to govern all corners of their territories, such leaders insist vociferously on the international legal principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. They tend to retain restrictive colonial-era constitutions when these documents allow the concentration of powers in the hands of a political chief executive and offer instruments for suppressing political opposition. At the same time, bowing to the waves of democratization that have swept the non-Western world in recent decades, neo-patrimonial leaders seek to wrap themselves in the legitimating mantle of democracy. Even autocrats now subject themselves to election on regular cycles mandated in national constitutions. To be sure, they often use the powers of incumbency to manipulate such elections—through gerrymandering, intimidation, vote buying, or ballot stuffing—but they nonetheless recognize that, in a modern world, political legitimacy inexorably rests on seeming to abide by constitutional and electoral laws. In sum, neo-patrimonial rulers employ universal rules in defense of particular privilege.

This unorthodox fusion of governance strategies is found in differing degrees in various types of contemporary political regimes. Neo-patrimonialism is largely absent in liberal democracies but can serve as a governing strategy in electoral democracies; it is the core *modus operandi* in electoral autocracies, and it resembles original forms of patrimonialism in traditional monarchies and unreformed autocracies. Neo-patrimonial exchanges can be found in both civilian and military regimes, especially in one-party systems with a dominant leader who prefers adulatory plebiscites to genuinely competitive

elections. The model reached its zenith in the personalistic administrations of strongman presidents like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), 1965–1997; Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, 1965–1986; and Anastasio Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua, 1967–1979. Contemporary examples include the electoral authoritarian regimes of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela who, by 2011, had enjoyed an unbroken hold on power since 1980 and 1998, respectively.

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*See also* Authoritarian Regimes; Bureaucracy; Clientelism; Governance, Informal; Personalization of Politics; State

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## NEO-WEBERIAN STATE

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The term *neo-Weberian* has a variety of applications in the literature of political science, sociology, and organization theory as well as in public and business administration. In most cases, it is based on variants of the Weberian model and employs the methods of analysis used by the German sociologist



and economist Max Weber. The term *neo-Weberian* usually refers to the application of Weberian principles to a modern state or organization. The label neo-Weberian state (NWS) was introduced by Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert in 2004 in the second edition of their groundbreaking book, *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. NWS refers to traditional (Weberian) administrative systems that are in the process of modernization but retain distinctive public service qualities.

NWS was originally intended as a descriptive concept based on the empirical evidence of public management reforms. It was an attempt at finding common denominators in Continental European developments while acknowledging numerous variations within the region. Turning to a more explanatory mode, NWS could be interpreted as a political response to globalization and political de-alignment in the rich, strong liberal-democratic regimes of Western Europe. Thus, according to Pollitt, the pursuit of an NWS-like solution could be seen as an attempt to protect the “European social model” from the depredations of global markets and neoliberal ideology. Also, NWS appears to receive the attention of the European Commission. Having been originally set up according to the French model, it began to reform in the 1990s, aiming to make itself more externally oriented and consultative, more professional and more efficient, and yet at the same time refusing to abandon key Weberian principles.

NWS challenges the Anglo-American new public management (NPM) model, which aims to import business and market principles and management techniques from the private into the public sector and is based on a neoliberal understanding of the state. NPM, an initiative launched during the 1980s, envisaged an entrepreneurial, market-oriented society, with a tiny government on top, and is characterized by marketization and competition, including large-scale privatization and contracting out, contractual appointments, “client-orientedness,” and performance-related management tools. The American equivalent of these reforms was the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, a task force formed during the Clinton administration.

NWS was developed in a context of concerns about NPM shortcomings and other managerial reforms; it is, therefore, a post-NPM concept.

Meanwhile, NWS co-opts the positive characteristics of NPM on a Weberian foundation (rather than adding Weberian elements to NPM). Table 1 sums up the NWS model by incorporating the “neo” elements (NPM influence) and the characteristics of traditional public administration (“Weberian” foundation).

The purpose of NWS is not simply to criticize NPM but to present a coherent and up-to-date alternative, which appears to be the answer of continental European governments to the NPM paradigm. According to Pollitt, the ideas of political power and modernization are the two main dimensions of the original NWS concept. On the one hand, compared with Anglo-American governments, the continental Europeans hold a more optimistic attitude regarding the future role of the state. Thus, their objective is not the minimal state but a state that retains a strong steering and regulatory presence in society. The state is not seen as a burden on the economy and society or as a necessary evil. Rather, it is the guarantor and partner of both a strong economy and a socially cohesive society. It initiates or facilitates a range of democratic mechanisms, both representative and direct. Continental European governments continue to regard the state as the irreplaceable integrative force in society, with a legal personality and operational value system that cannot be reduced to the private sector discourse of efficiency, competitiveness, and client satisfaction.

On the other hand, the state is steadily modernizing, professionalizing, and improving its efficiency. Such changes typically include results-based budget reforms, more flexible personnel policies (which, however, do not amount to abandoning a distinctive career public service), extensive decentralization and devolution of authority from central ministries and agencies, a greater emphasis on strategic planning, selective and gradual privatization, and a strengthened commitment to improving the quality of public service provision. Yet it is far from an assumption that copying the private sector is the only way for governments to improve their efficiency, performance, and professionalism. Private sector methods may be adopted on some occasions, in certain types of organizations, and for specific policies, but they have no automatic priority or superiority. Consequently, NWS has led to some changes, whose effect, however, is often dampened by existing structures and traditions and which are

**Table I** Neo-Weberian State

<i>Neo-</i>	<i>Weberian</i>
Shift from an internal orientation toward bureaucratic rules to an external orientation toward meeting citizens' needs and wishes; the primary route to achieving this is not the employment of market mechanisms (although they may occasionally come in handy) but the creation of a professional culture of quality and service	[but:] Reaffirmation of the role of the state as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems of globalization, technological change, shifting demographics, and environmental threat
Supplementation (not replacement) of the role of representative democracy by a range of devices for consultation with, and direct representation of, citizens' views	[but:] Reaffirmation of the role of representative democracy (central, regional, and local) as the legitimating element within the state apparatus
In the management of resources within government, a modernization of the relevant laws to encourage a greater orientation on the achievements of results rather than merely the correct following of procedure; this is expressed partly in a shift from <i>ex ante</i> to <i>ex post</i> controls but not a complete abandonment of the former	[but:] Reaffirmation of administrative law—suitably modernized—in preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen–state relationship, including equality before the law, legal security, and the availability of specialized legal scrutiny of state actions
A professionalization of the public service, so that the bureaucrat becomes not simply an expert in the law relevant to his or her sphere of activity but also a professional manager, oriented to meeting the needs of his or her citizen/users	[but:] Preservation of the idea of a public service with a distinct status, culture, and terms and conditions

Source: Adapted from Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004, pp. 99–100).

more concerned with democratization and modernization than with entrepreneurial government or blindly copying private sector practices.

Although the NWS was originally intended as an empirical–analytical model and not as a normative one, in recent years the concept has also assumed a strong normative meaning, in particular, for new democracies (which, incidentally, were not the focus of Pollitt and Bouckaert's original analysis). It has often been proposed that the key for administrative development in new democracies is first to make sure that the Weberian foundation of the NWS model is present and only then to start gradually introducing the “neo” elements (modern management tools). Guy Peters argues that despite the appeal of the NPM ideas of deregulation and flexibility, governments attempting, at the same time, to build democracy and effective administration must place a much greater emphasis on formal requirements, rules, and strong ethical standards. The values of efficiency and effectiveness are

important, but in the short run they should take second place to fostering fairness and responsibility. The NWS paradigm also includes a reaffirmation of the role of administrative law. In addition to preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen–state relationship—such as equality before the law, legal security, and legal scrutiny of state actions—the law should be an anchor of predictability, reliability, and legitimacy in the chaotic political and administrative environment of new democracies. Of particular relevance for new democracies are the NWS's (Weberian) elements that promote the unity of public administration and common public service culture, such as the preservation (or first of all, the creation) of a public service with a distinct status, culture, and conditions as well as the recognition of the need for a strong state. This has significant policy implications for newly independent states (e.g., in Central and Eastern Europe) who may be easily attracted to NPM-like reform ideas without having a solid

Weberian foundation. This makes NWS a sound basis for reform strategies in these countries.

The NWS model presents interesting opportunities for both policy makers and researchers. For example, Lawrence Lynn has developed the NWS model further from a theoretical point of view by proposing NWS as either an independent variable or a dependent variable. While the NWS implies a positive synthesis of the new and the traditional, neo-Weberian administration has also been viewed critically by Lynn as a threat to liberal democracy, by which organizations could be subverted by informal and illegitimate patterns of authority and decision making, thus reducing their legitimacy. This is why some less democratic countries could also support the idea of a strong modernizing state that underlies the NWS model. Therefore, it could be argued that, normatively speaking, the implementation of NWS also presupposes, in addition to the Weberian bureaucracy, a viable liberal democracy.

The economic crisis has radically altered the context in which public administration operates: The state is again playing a part in the economy. The crisis thus casts public institutions as enablers of (rather than barriers to) growth and innovation. Peter Evans and James Rauch have demonstrated that there is a connection between Weberianism and sustained economic growth. Wolfgang Drechsler has developed the NWS model further by linking it to innovation, economic growth, and information technology. Effective public administration is seen as a sine qua non condition for economic growth and innovation, as innovation-based society draws on and requires a highly competent, long-term-oriented, and dedicated civil service to implement it—features aimed for by the NWS model. In addition, recent research has shown that information and communication technology (ICT), especially e-governance, which was long associated with NPM because of its parallel occurrence, is actually just as conducive (if not even more so) to the NWS and in turn is promoted by it as well. And beyond crisis and ICT, whatever the future leading technologies will be—nanotech, biotech, convergence, or something completely different—their setup will require a particularly capable state actor and a science and technology policy implemented by a civil service that is characterized by long-term thinking as well as by tolerance of mistakes—characteristics

that are not enabled by NPM. In other words, the period in history that we are now entering is bound to be more state friendly than the 1990s, and NWS seems to be one of the most interesting theoretical and normative answers to the question of how a complex innovation-based society should be governed.

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*See also* New Public Management; Weber, Max

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## NETWORK ANALYSIS

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Network analysis systematically quantifies and visualizes relationships between actors, such as knowledge transfer or resource flow. The underlying formal concepts of graph theory make network analysis both a theoretical approach and a toolkit of formal approaches. Social network analysis is an emerging field that combines contributions from different disciplines, such as sociology, anthropology, mathematics, statistics, and, recently, physics and biology. The research approach has recently

inspired several books, such as Duncan Watts's *Six Degrees of Separation*, Albert-László Barabási's *Linked*, and Nikolas Christakis and James Fowler's *Connected*. This entry first briefly describes the goals and historical developments of network analysis. Then, the research questions, research design strategies, data collection procedures, and basic formal data analysis mechanisms are discussed. The entry concludes with a look at recent and future developments of network analysis.

### Definition of Networks

Networks are social relational systems characterized by a set of actors and their social ties. They consist of a finite set of identifiable nodes; the relationships among these nodes (actors) are represented as ties (edges). Ties are dichotomous: present or absent, or unordered (undirected) or ordered (directed ties). The nodes represent a single entity that potentially may take part in the relationships under study. A network analysis takes the characteristics of nodes and the characteristics of the relations connecting the nodes into account. Attributes—additional information about the actors—are characteristics, such as the behavior, attitudes, or other properties of actors. Networks are represented as a (social) graph, which is defined by a set of nodes together with the set of pairwise relationships among them. Networks present an opportunity and constraint structure: on the one hand offering access to resources flowing through the ties and, on the other hand, restricting choices and controlling behavior.

### Definition and Goals of Network Analysis

Network analysis is an interdisciplinary field of research with a history in sociology and anthropology. It provides the formal mechanisms for representation, measurement, and modeling of relational structure and is based on the assumption that actions and decisions of actors are dependent on the context and the actions of other actors. The social structure is an area of (inter)action in which emergent patterns of behavior can be observed, and structural variables help analyze the resulting interactions. Generally, a network consists of actors (nodes) that are connected with each other through ties (edges). The actors can represent

people, organizations, countries, or other entities. The relations and ties are conduits for the flow of resources in the form of knowledge, finances, collaboration, and so on. The units of analysis are, therefore, the interactions between the actors.

In a network analytical approach different types of data can be distinguished:

- attributes, which are descriptors of the individual actors in the network, such as age, sex, profession, or political affiliation;
- relational data that are derived from the interactions of at least two actors, such as Country A imports Product x from Country B; and
- structural characteristics of the overall network that can be derived from the relational characteristics of all studied actors, such as density or centralization.

The main goal of network analysis is to understand the emergence of the network structure and its consequences by description, visualization, and statistical modeling. In more formal terms, network analysts analyze which independent variables have led to the observed structure and how the social structure influences other emerging social processes. In this form of “structural analysis,” the relationships among actors become the first priority, and individuals’ properties are secondary in the study of the flow of structural regularities that might influence actors’ choices and their resulting behavior. The result is an approximation to the structure of a more complex system for purposes of studying a particular property (such as the diffusion of a disease in a community). Ultimately, complex situations can be represented using multiple relationships (multiplexity), such as group membership, friendship, hate relationships within the group, hierarchy and reporting structure among the group, and the strengths and frequencies of interactions. There are different ways of looking at the social structure: The researcher can either look at the outcomes of the existing network structure, at the emergent behavioral patterns, or the characteristics of the overall structure.

### Brief History of Network Analysis

The first accounts of network analysis can be traced back to the 1930s when Jacob Moreno

used sociograms as a form of analysis to visualize the complex structure of social interactions. Sociograms are a method of mapping or graphically representing individuals' perceptions of a complex social structure. Matrix algebra and graph theory were used in the 1940s and 1950s as a mechanism of formalizing social structure. Alex Bavelas added new insights into the functioning of small groups by conducting experiments on communication networks. The experiments were used to understand the speed and accuracy of centralized and decentralized structures to find the shortest path a message can take through different forms of social structures. Stanley Milgram added his "Six degrees of separation" research and Harrison White looked at structural equivalence as a form of similar incoming and outgoing ties to form a new and reduced network in the 1970s. Mark Granovetter then developed his strength-of-weak-ties theory; he showed that strong contacts tend to have very similar information, whereas weak contacts could be the source of innovative information. Based on this theory, Ron Burt developed his notion of structural holes in the 1980s and 1990s and applied it to the benefits of bridging and bonding ties.

### Basic Assumptions of Network Analysis

The basic underlying assumption of a network analytical approach is based on the notion that different types of ties serve as conduits for flow of resources through the network. Ties are either absent or present. In most network research, an absent tie needs to be interpreted as this implies that resources are not flowing through the nonexistent tie. Moreover, ties can either be directed or undirected: Directed ties hint at asymmetric relationships between actors, with resources only flowing in one direction. Undirected ties are symmetric and represent either a confirmed relationship or a relationship in which both actors have to be present.

The common assumption of independent observations does not hold in networks. Multiple ties to and from actors are related, and so it cannot be assumed that the tie between A and B is independent of C. In addition, the assumption of continuous, normally distributed variables does not hold when tie variables are binary, nominal, ordinal, or count variables. Moreover, two observations are

usually available for each pair of actors (dyads) and are assumed to be correlated actor-wise.

There are two different forms of research questions. First, a network analytic approach can aim to use independent variables to explain the emergence of the social structure. Second, the social structure itself can also be used as an explanatory variable to understand specific outcomes, such as voting behavior. Generally, two research design strategies can be distinguished: The researcher needs to decide whether to use ego-centered personal networks or complete (whole) networks. In an ego-centered network approach, network data are usually collected from a sample of actors (egos) reporting on the ties with and between other people (alters). Here, it is important to obtain as complete a picture of the respondents' networks as possible. Name generators are used to collect ego-centered data by providing a clear definition of which persons known by ego qualify as a network member (or alter) of ego. The relational system is then assumed to be composed of the sampled egos and reported alters and their ties as well as possible additional actor and tie information. In a second phase, the alters will be asked about their relationships among each other and with ego. A complete or whole network approach includes a well-defined group of actors who report on their ties with all other actors in this preset group. A high response rate of actors is needed to get a close-to-complete picture of the interactions. It can be assumed that the ties reported by actors are not usually independent.

After defining the research question and framing the goal and empirical context of the network analysis, the next step is to define who should be included in the final network and from whom network data will be solicited. Simply said, this decision will set the limits on the social relations to be collected. While there are different schools of thoughts on this topic, two approaches seem to be dominant: realist and nominalist philosophies of boundary specifications highlighted by David Knoke. The realist approach assumes that the subjects identified by the researchers know best who should be nominated as part of the network. In comparison, a nominalist approach assumes an upfront theoretical or practical limit to the boundaries of a network. The researcher has either developed a set of theoretical hypotheses that define

clearly who is in and who is outside the network boundaries, or it is not practical or doable to collect network data from the whole universe. An example of a nominalist approach is to use defined roles in organizational hierarchical settings, such as all CEOs of Fortune 500 companies. Both strategies have advantages and disadvantages: Clearly, a too extensive inclusion will impose a burden on the data collection process, and a forced exclusiveness might omit important actors and therefore bias the results.

In addition, researchers distinguish between positional and relational boundary specification strategies that are closely linked to the previous decisions. A positional approach defines the network membership based on the formal position an actor assumes in a given social circle, such as the formal affiliation as a team member of a specific department. The relational approach—which is sometimes also called a snowball sampling approach—emerges similar to the realist approach based on nominations by already included subjects: Additional subjects are recovered by the current subject, and their relationships to the emerging network actors are taken into account. Moreover, a researcher might decide to look at participation of specific actors in an incident to answer a research question such as “Which organizations participated in the Iran election protests?” This event-based strategy is different from formal affiliations and memberships and can help identify relevant groups and subjects.

In a network analytical approach, four different data collection strategies are distinguished:

1. collection of the formal structure of the network,
2. collection of data on the content of the ties,
3. collection of data on the frequency or intensity of interactions, and
4. data collected that focus on the perceived connection.

Complete or whole networks are also called total personal networks. In this approach, the network boundaries are well defined, and it is assumed that all listed network actors either know each other or have at least heard of each other (e.g., all members of one department). This macrolevel of analysis

has the goal of using every type of relationship in a given network and of representing the network in its entirety. The special focus in whole networks is, therefore, mainly on the identification of specific roles and positions or on the similarities of these roles played by different actors.

There are several different ways in which network data of a whole network can be solicited:

- unrestricted choices (where the subjects are asked to list everyone they know in the network),
- ranking with respect to attractiveness (the subjects rank the most important contacts),
- paired comparison (a range of choices have to be compared),
- free recall rosters (where no names are provided, and the subjects have to nominate the actors they remember),
- fixed number of nominations (“name the five most important actors in this network”), and
- name roster with full network (where all actors are provided, and the subject can choose among the full list).

#### *Data Collection of Egocentric Networks*

Egocentric networks describe the relationship a focal subject (ego) has to third parties (alters). Egocentric networks of social relations around a particular individual are also called partial networks and focus on specific types of relationships. These relationships can be multiplex, where there are multiple overlapping relationships that can be used to describe the quality of the relationships. The standard approach to collecting egocentric network data focuses on the question of whom the focal person is connected to and results in a list of dyadic interactions. In addition, attribute data on each of the alters can be collected, and the ego can be asked to record his or her perceptions about the interactions among his or her alters to derive the cognitive structure of the network. Overlaps among different egocentric networks will result in larger networks than just the star formation of a single egocentric network. The goal of an egocentric network analysis is to understand the global features of the universe. Researchers have discovered the need to conceptualize specific aspects of the total network that resulted in ego-centered network research.

Data collection on egocentric networks is used to identify family structures or group compositions, such as friendship structures or problem-solving groups. The challenges of an egocentric approach are to (a) identify the appropriate egos that are representative so as to describe generalizable dimensions of the overall network and (b) delimit the number of alters at the right upper boundary without excluding too many potential alters and still receive meaningful results. Specific name generators are usually used in egocentric network analysis approaches to derive the perceived network structure but also to solicit information about the number of actors that have to be included in the analysis.

The most common method is to use name generators, where the names of the alters are elicited from the ego to understand from his or her perspective what the social structure around him or her looks like. In a second round based on the names collected with the help of a name generator instrument, a name interpreter is used, and the ego is asked to highlight details in the form of attributes about the alters (such as age and relationship type to ego). As opposed to asking who is connected to whom to explore the formal structure of networks, the content of ties can be identified by asking the following questions:

What are people talking about?

Why are they connected?

What is the nature of their relationship?

Table 1 shows the different qualities of interactions: Question 1 asks for the professional support network, Question 2 asks for the social support network, and Question 3 highlights the purely instrumental network.

Instead of asking which actors in a focal network are connected to each other, researchers might want to find out how intense these relationships are. The interaction is already established (1/0); in addition, it might be of interest what the quality of the interaction is, to understand whether an interaction constitutes a strong or weak tie. Table 2 shows an example of a questionnaire that includes the frequency of the interaction.

The result of each of the questions is usually a dichotomous matrix in which an existing or present tie is denoted by a 1 and a missing tie by a 0. The cells indicating the relationships between actors  $x$  and  $y$  can also be filled with a numerical value indicating the frequency or intensity of the relationship. In this symmetric adjacency matrix, the diagonal is not defined, indicating that actors do not have ties with themselves.

**Table 1** Examples of Questions About Content of Ties

	<i>Question 1</i>	<i>Question 2</i>	<i>Question 3</i>
	<i>We talk about problems at work</i>	<i>We talk about problems with our kids</i>	<i>We only exchange professional information</i>
Actor a			
Actor b			
Actor c			

**Table 2** Example of a Question About Frequency of Interactions

<i>How often do you talk to the following actors</i>	<i>At least once per day (3)</i>	<i>At least once per week (2)</i>	<i>Only once per month (1)</i>
Actor a			
Actor b			
Actor c			

### Network Analytical Concepts

The most prominent form of network analysis is descriptive, following Linton Freeman's approach to use analysis procedures often based on the decomposition of the adjacency matrix. An adjacency matrix is an  $n \times n$  representation of the nodes in a social graph that are next to each other. Actors are compared on the basis of their tie variables and by taking their actor characteristics (attributes) into account. The relationships—and even nonexisting ties—represent nomination patterns among actors in a network. The more often a focal actor is nominated by other actors in the network, the more central the actor becomes. Centrality is an indicator of prominence, importance, reputation, or power within the overall structure and generally describes the number of times an actor is chosen by other actors. Centrality shows the level of influence specific actors have in the network when it comes to power in the network. Some examples of network research questions that can be answered using centrality measures are the following: How are political opinions adopted, and how do they diffuse through social groups? or How are diseases spreading in a classroom, school, or other social circles?

Different forms of centrality can be distinguished. Degree centrality is the sum of the number of ties a node has. It can be distinguished into in-degree centrality (the number of incoming ties) and out-degree centrality (the number of times the actor itself nominates other actors). Closeness centrality represents the total distance of a node from all other nodes. A larger value indicates a less central actor, while a smaller value indicates a more central actor. On the whole network level, this measure is called centralization and is usually used as a comparative measure. The Freeman "betweenness centrality" measures the number of times a node needs a given node to reach another node—or in other words, the number of shortest paths that pass through a given node. This form of centrality shows how strategically important an actor is to connect different parts of the overall network that might otherwise be disconnected. It might also indicate the resource dependences and interdependences between individual actors.

The density of a network is represented by the number of links divided by the number of possible links. It is an indicator of the overall connectedness of the social graph. In a complete graph, every node

is connected with every other node, and the density is 1. Smaller numbers indicate a less well-connected network. Moreover, it might be interesting for a researcher to understand whether there are distinct subgroups within the overall network that restrict access or connectedness. Components in a network represent a subset of actors, with the characteristic that there is a path between any node and any other one in this subset. The whole graph forms one component and is therefore called totally connected. Cliques are subgraphs in which any node is directly connected to any other node of the subgraph.

### Sociograms

Another way to interpret the social structure is to use sociograms—a visual two-dimensional representation of the relationships between all actors in the network. A sociogram is a reduction of the complex relationships to a single dimension at one specific point in time, on a well-defined set of discrete components with strictly dyadic relationships. A sociogram represents the formal properties of the social configuration. Sociograms as a form of visual exploration of the social structure are one form of network analysis and help interpret the structure without necessarily using formal analytical methods. Figure 1 shows a sociogram, where nodes are connected to each other through ties.




Figure 1 Sociogram



### Applications of Network Analysis

Networks can be useful in different analytical settings. Policy networks explain outcomes such as policy decisions and the interactions between the different parties involved in the preparation and decision-making processes. Networks can also be used to explain the spread of political opinions and how these might result in specific voting behavior. The spread of diseases and also the most central hubs in a diffusion network can be identified, and measures can be targeted directly to the central node. Network analysis has recently become a method to fight terrorism and increase national security. The capture of Saddam Hussein is, for example, attributed to a network analytical approach. Recently, network analysis has also gained some momentum in resilience research to understand how well connected communities are and how they might rebuild or restructure when central nodes are removed.

In the future, network analysis will be used more and more to predict how the future structure of a network might develop based on the past interactions of its actors and what might influence the social structure. First models have been developed but are not widely accepted at the moment. Moreover, network analysis is used for new forms of networks found in online social networking services, mobile phone networks, or other forms of online networks, such as the link connections of the World Wide Web.

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*See also* Elites; Networks; Policy Network

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## NETWORKS

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Networks are about relations. Accordingly, rather than the properties and attributes held by actors, it is the ties connecting any two, three, or more individuals, organizations, or institutions that form the basic unit of analysis.

In the most general terms, the emergence of the network paradigm during recent decades can be attributed to the following:

- transformations in the reality of states, markets, and societies as perceived by competent observers (e.g., the emergence of organized society; the events of functional differentiation, decentralization, and fragmentation; and the growing interdependence and complexity of virtually all societal spheres);
- changes in conceptual and theoretical developments in the respective disciplines dealing with these systems of order (e.g., increasing attention drawn toward informal arrangements in politics, new modes of governance and public–private alliances, and a shift from hierarchical control toward horizontal coordination); and
- the development of a methodological apparatus for relational analysis as a result of a more pronounced structural approach in the social sciences (e.g., formal analysis of relational configurations, new statistical procedures, advancements in available software programs).

The boom in network research in sociology, organization theory, and political science must be understood as part of a general shift, beginning in the second half of the 20th century, away from individualist, essentialist, and atomistic explanations toward more relational, contextual, and systemic

understandings. This entry first presents the historical background of this trend in the social sciences and then discusses some of the methods used in that area of inquiry. Next, it turns to those disciplines that have embraced network approaches most often and successfully and addresses the use made of them in political science and policy analysis.

### Epistemological and Historical Background

In the history of science, there has been a shift from the analysis of substance and essence toward analysis of relations and connections. More than 60 years ago, in a series of papers on epistemology and logic, two eminent political philosophers/scientists, John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, outlined three historic levels of paradigmatic organization of the social sciences. In order of chronological appearance, these advancements, presented almost as a secular trend, underwent three major transformations in perspective—self-action, interaction, and transaction. The first two of these are labeled substantialist, while the latter could today be recast in terms of relational thinking. The perspective of self-action is described as a prescientific concept regarding humans and things as possessing powers of their own that initiate or cause their actions. It was most characteristic of ancient and medieval philosophy and of the Christian doctrine of the soul. In the second version of substantialism—interaction—the relevant action takes place among the entities themselves. Yet much like billiard balls or the particles in Newtonian mechanics, these entities remain fixed and unchanged throughout such interactions. It is only in the perspective of transactionalism, fundamentally opposed to both variants of substantialism, does scientific inquiry turn to aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to elements or other independent entities and without isolation of presumably detachable relations from such independent elements.

By reinterpreting and contextualizing this early contribution, its classificatory scheme was later refurbished by Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) in a manifesto for a relational sociology. In particular, the author draws attention to the units of analysis inherent in and dominating social science models of more recent derivations. Methodological individualism, norm-based approaches, and variants

of structuralism are all assigned to the paradigm of self-action. The first, in its rational-choice version, takes individual human action as the elementary unit of social life. In the game-theoretic version, pregiven entities are seen to generate self-action—that is, actors engage in games with others without their underlying interests and identities encountering substantial change. In norm-based approaches, individuals are depicted as self-propelling, self-subsistent entities pursuing internalized norms, with the latter actually forming the basic unit of analysis. Finally, structuralism does not posit individuals but self-subsistent societies, or social systems, as the exclusive sources of action. Accordingly, it is durable, coherent entities that constitute the starting point of inquiry. The second variant of substantialism—interaction—is present today in the form of conventional survey research and historical-comparative analysis. It is the so-called variable-centered approach, including methods such as multiple regression and factor analysis, that best represents this variant. Providing merely the empty settings within which causation occurs, it is not the substances or actors in question that do the acting according to this particular view but, rather, the very variable attributes themselves.

What Dewey and Bentley have called transactionalism actually represents the cornerstone for the type of relational perspective adopted and methodologically elaborated by various strands of network theory and analysis. These strands have a number of origins. The prehistory of the approach developed through a process of accumulation of knowledge over approximately 40 to 50 years. Some have detected its origins in the empirical and conceptual work of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), Georg Simmel (1858–1918), Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955), and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), while others refer to important methodological contributions in the tradition of Jacob Moreno (1889–1974). In any case, both the method and its theoretical underpinnings have emerged from the multidisciplinary efforts of a whole range of scholars in anthropology, social psychology, and sociology. Key advancements and topics addressed include structural functionalism, theories of social structure, gift giving, systems of specific and generalized forms of reciprocity, and social exchange

circuits (anthropology); Gestalt psychology, field theory, cognitive balance, and sociometry (social psychology); and *tertium gaudens* (“the third who benefits”), friendship and informal relations of assistance at the workplace, community research, and social exchange theory (sociology). This prehistory of today’s network analysis culminated in what some have called the Harvard breakthrough, achieved by scholars such as Harrison White and his associates in the late 1960s and early 1970s. White’s contribution to relational analysis is manifold both methodologically (structural equivalence, positional and role analysis, block modeling) and in terms of the imprints it has left on various disciplines, including sociology, political science, and economics.

#### Units of Analysis and Methodological Tools


Because network analysis is explicitly interested in the interrelatedness of social units, network data are stored in a rectangular matrix where the columns generally contain the same variables as the rows. These can be individual actors, such as directors occupying positions on different company boards, or organizations, such as government departments or private corporate actors. The dependences among them are measured using structural variables. Compared with conventional attribute-based measures, a focus on such variables opens up a different range of possibilities for, and constraints on, data analysis and model building. Leaning on specific mathematical and algebraic procedures, the methods employed provide explicit formal statements about structural phenomena that might otherwise be defined only in metaphorical terms. Metaphors, present in much of the qualitative literature, include phrases such as webs of relationships, closely knit networks of relations, social role, social position, group, clique, popularity, isolation, prestige, prominence, and so on. In social network analysis, these can be quantified and made subject to interpersonal verification. Analysis normally starts with delimiting a particular group of people or organizations according to what is called boundary specification—a procedure following either a realist (based on snowball sampling techniques or reputational analysis) or a nominalist (based on the researcher’s own conceptual framework and understanding) strategy.

Indices and procedures most frequently used include measures of degree and betweenness, centrality, density, clique analysis, structural equivalence and block modeling, multidimensional scaling, hierarchical cluster analysis, and so forth. The most useful and widely diffused handbooks of network analysis are the ones by John Scott (1991), and Stanley Wassermann and Katherine Faust (1994). Important software programs for the storing, processing, and visualization of relational data include Ucinet, Gradap, Krackplot, Netdraw, Visone, and Pajek.

#### Networks in Sociology and Organization Theory

Sociology, management, and organization theory are the disciplines where network models have been employed most successfully. The fields of application and the main topics addressed by that literature comprise a whole range of different dimensions. These include, among others, the impact of urbanization on individual well-being, the world political and economic system, community elite decision making, social support, communitarian forms of collective action, group problem solving, the role of strong versus weak ties for group and intergroup cohesion, diffusion and adoption of innovations, corporate interlocking, belief systems, cognition or social perception, interfirm alliances, trust among competitors, forms of social and political exchange and power, and consensus and social influence. The volume of social network research in these fields has increased radically and exponentially in recent years, as presented in Figure 1, which shows articles indexed by *Sociological Abstracts* containing the words “social network” in the abstract or title.

Political scientists and network analysts interested in gaining insights from adjacent disciplines, where relational thinking is both more pronounced and longer established, are advised to consult the handbook on organizations edited by Joel Baum (2002). Comprising the contributions of some 50 influential international scholars, the volume’s tour de force through intraorganizational, organizational, and interorganizational levels represents the state-of-the-art current research in that area. Networks figure prominently in this all-encompassing treatment where relations form the principal units of analysis throughout.



**Figure 1** Exponential Growth of Network-Analytic Literature in Organizational Sociology

Source: Stephen Borgatti and Pacey Foster (2003, p. 992).

### Political Networks and Policy Domain Networks

These developments have been noted relatively little in mainstream political science. Even scholars working on state–society relations and in international relations somehow remained unaffected by transactionalist thinking. In other words, although they were dealing with connections between entities and actors of different societal spheres, scholars treated these spheres separately. The reciprocal influence exerted by entities on relations and, vice versa, by relations on entities, has not formed an explicit part of these research programs for quite some time. A major breakthrough then occurred with the emergence of interorganizational research and the neo-corporatist paradigm in the late 1970s. Focusing on entities such as organized interests and the state, including the attributes of these entities, and on relations, especially in the form of interest intermediation and political exchange, neo-corporatist authors tended to adopt a transactional perspective. This was most obvious in their conceptualization of two logics to which associations of both capital and labor had to adhere in the interest of organizational reproduction and survival—the logic of influence and the logic of membership.

Not by chance, the first major attempt to empirically verify the relevance of large corporate actors in state policy making occurred at a time when the neo-corporatist debate reached its height toward the mid-1980s. It was Edward O. Laumann's and David Knoke's seminal study on *The Organizational State* (1987) that, for the first time, exposed the power of empirical network analysis to a wider public in political science and political sociology. The authors adopted a policy domain perspective—that is, they aggregated different policies and policy events in the health (e.g., drugs regulation, Medicare and Medicaid funding) and the energy domains (e.g., nuclear waste disposal, strip-mining control) to study the configuration, power, and behavior of diverse actors within these organizational fields. These actors' issue interests, monitoring resources, and influence reputation were treated as antecedent variables ultimately affecting positions in communication and resource exchange networks. Together, these five variables jointly affect the range of core organizations' efforts to influence the outcomes of policy events in the two domains. What was important was that the volume combined structural with dynamic analysis and took account of actors' beliefs, frame disputes, and reinterpretations, thus avoiding the indeterminacy present in much earlier work while at the same time anticipating parts of the research program of the advocacy coalition framework. The database used for these studies was impressive. After boundary specification and a reduction of the lists of resulting organizations to an empirically manageable number, the authors ended up with a total of 333 public and private actors, which were then approached with the help of questionnaires. The number of analyzed policy events was 166. Although interview schedules and lists comprised about 80 pages (see the appendix to the Laumann and Knoke volume), the overall response rate amounted to 92.3%. Figures like this remained unmatched by other attempts of comparing policy processes across domains and countries. At the same time, this also resulted in an initial reluctance of established types of research vis-à-vis network-analytic approaches. The sheer number of ties and relations, in terms of contacts and resource exchanges generated by such a high number of actors, together with the intricacy of analyzing them in algebraic terms led many scholars to question the benefit of and value added by such a painstaking

procedure. Overall, the study of political and policy domain networks considers state and society in their complexity and comprises the entire range of policies, politics, and the polity. Its focus is essentially on influence and domination as determinants of different types of power (coercive, authoritative, egalitarian, persuasive) and, in its most advanced form, on the role of power differentials in the predictions of future policy outcomes and courses of action (Knoke, 1990).

### Policy Network Analysis

Compared with the analysis of political networks in the broader sense, which share quite a number of questions and of terminology with organizational sociology, there is a considerably higher number of publications in the field of policy network analysis—a field that started to boom in the early 1990s. In logical terms, the latter actually represents a subcategory of the former. It also rests on a different research tradition, namely on public policy analysis. Beginning in the early 1990s, there has been a steady increase in the number of both qualitative and quantitative publications. Compared to the absolute figures of relevant publications in organizational sociology for the year 2000 (about 440), the development of policy network analysis (about 50) appears to be relatively modest. Within the narrower field of political science, however, its expansion is impressive.

In one of the first publications opening the debate on policy networks, a research program was sketched out that soon became a growth industry for the following two decades. It was most vigorously exposed in the contribution by Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider (1991) to an edited volume on policy networks that assembled theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions. The authors argued that policy analysis and network analysis possess an important potential for cross-fertilization. Network analysis was introduced as a technical tool applicable to any form of social or political exchange. At the same time, networks were also said to represent a kind of broad societal governance structure—that is, to reflect real changes in the way policy processes unfolded in highly modern settings. New modes of governance, characterized by an increasing blurring of boundaries dividing the public and the private

spheres in a number of advanced countries, have indeed emerged more or less simultaneously with the network paradigm. After 20 years, since that early observation about a simultaneous occurrence in advancements in methods and transformations in empirical reality, the question must be asked as to whether such a compound understanding of networks has really enriched the new subdiscipline. At least, it has given way to an endless debate on the actual meaning of networks in politics and on the usefulness of the concept's application to concrete cases.

Views by most scholars today converge on the image of a semisovereign state of increasing ungovernability, of demand overload, and of the subsequent emergence of public-private alliances and networks in agenda setting, decision making, and the implementation of policies. For most of the 1990s, nonetheless, a large fraction of the literature became entangled in attempts at categorizing existing approaches, mostly according to rather subjective criteria, rather than embarking on the empirical study of specific policies. Networks were thought of by many as reflecting properties alternative to established organizations and forms of organizing social life and, hence, were held to be empowering, enfranchising, and socially desirable, thus, ultimately undermining inflexible, deadlocked, and irresponsive authority structures. One of the issues frequently addressed was the relationship between the so-called issue networks, policy communities, and policy networks—all concepts differently characterized and classified according to personal taste and proclivity. Another schism was linked to an assumed dichotomy of vertically versus horizontally structured configurations. While the governance school claimed networks to be equalizing instruments for the pursuit of efficiency enhancement in the delivery of public services, empirical analysis all too often found relational structures exhibiting power differentials and vertical forms of subordination of all sorts. Some authors treated networks as quasi-organizations, with a sort of membership statute and a corporate identity of their own, deliberately built up and, therefore, subject to network management strategies. Conversely, others maintained that networks could only be identified by an outside observer with the help of boundary specification and other empirical tools since sample members were frequently not aware of forming part of a

network altogether. Finally, another view had it that policy networks would only emerge under very specific conditions most often linked to high degrees of societal modernization, while others claimed networks to be a ubiquitous phenomenon independent of any particular political environment.

Overall, no single review article has managed to structure the field in a coherent and empirically grounded way. This unsustainable condition has now been rectified. In a 2007 study, Leifeld takes both the extensive growth rates of the literature and the conceptual disorder characterizing the field as a rationale for presenting a systematic and empirically based classification. He draws on a structured bibliography of 1,014 publications related to political networks. With a view to empirical (nonconceptual) contributions alone (746 entries), the final analysis yields the following insights: In terms of decreasing relative frequency, the areas of inquiry most often addressed are governance/public policy; Europeanization; local, urban, and rural studies; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements; international relations; electoral systems and voting; civil society; elite networks; social capital; globalization; and democracy. Regarding the policy domains studied by policy network analysts, the rank ordering is as follows: environment, health, agriculture, social policy, labor, telecommunications, economy, regional policy, domestic affairs, energy, research and technology, industry, science and education, gender issues, chemicals, migration, and transport. The bulk of empirical research focuses on Europe rather than the United States, with Germany and the United Kingdom attracting the most attention. Both of these are closely followed by studies of policy processes at the level of the European Union. Considering only strictly quantitative contributions, the author has found that the following methods and indices are the ones that are most often used (decreasing relative frequency): centrality, density, multidimensional scaling, block modeling, cluster analysis, and clique analysis. Administration, governments, and parliaments lead the list in terms of main governmental targets under scrutiny, while trade associations, trade unions, companies, NGOs, political parties, think tanks, and social movements figure most prominently in the category of private actors. The most frequently analyzed types of relations are information exchange, contact, cooperation,

influence reputation, resource exchange, alliance, mutual issue interest, and conflict.

An extensive cocitation analysis of the quantitative policy-analytic literature, itself being pursued in a network-analytic fashion, reveals the existence of four clearly distinguished thematic clusters (i.e., epistemic communities or invisible colleges): first, political exchange in the organizational state; second, elite networks in North America and world systems theory; third, participation and social capital; and fourth, governance and interest intermediation. As Leifeld notes, a further and slowly emerging fifth cluster includes culture-based approaches essentially centered on the advocacy coalition framework.

### Conclusion

Even if there should be something like a secular trend pointing toward an increasing relevance of relational research, it is far too early to speak of a comprehensive paradigm shift with respect to the growing attractiveness of network analysis. Mainstream political science, at least, continues to be concerned with heuristics, being more traditional, and prefers working within clearly delimited disciplinary boundaries that can be traced back to the perspectives of self-action and interaction. Nonetheless, the current move toward the study of new forms of governance, in conjunction with network models and approaches, may lay the foundations for a relational political science—or structural “politology”—capable of addressing the evolution of complex organizational ecologies (intraorganizational, organizational, and interorganizational) and forms of societal order (state, market, and society) at the subnational, national, European, and international levels. The theoretical and methodological bridges and connections for the emergence of such a theory, at least, are ready for use. They just need to be picked up.

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*See also* Advocacy Coalition Framework; Advocacy Networks, Transnational; Interest Groups; Lobbying; Network Analysis; Organization Theory; Policy Network

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## NEUTRALITY

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Neutrality refers to a fundamental foreign and security policy orientation of a state: A neutral state will not take part either directly or indirectly in any forthcoming war between third-party states. Neutrality consists of a legal core—neutrality law—and political guidance notes—neutrality policy. It contains both realistic assumptions about state survival and idealistic commitments to nonviolent means of conflict resolution. Until the rise of collective security, neutrality was seen as the only viable security policy alternative to membership in a military alliance available to small states. This entry begins with a historical overview and an introduction to neutrality law and neutrality policy. This is followed by a comparison of neutrality and collective security as well as some final reflections on the

significance of neutrality in the modern era of globalization.

### Historical Origin

Taken literally, neutrality means neither-nor (from the Latin *ne-uter*). Its origin as a foreign and security policy orientation dates back to a time when European nation states were commonly fighting each other. The concept of state sovereignty emerged in the same period. The right to wage war was constitutive of that international order. Neutrality correlated to this right: it offered the possibility of abstaining from war in an environment in which not taking sides would otherwise be viewed as opportunism or even cowardice.

Neutrality was mainly a survival strategy for especially small states, which were in permanent danger of being overrun by larger ones. Smaller states were not usually primary targets, but conquering them was a way of preventing them from either falling to one side or freely siding with the other. Thus, neutrality's original purpose was to help states defend their interests in an international environment marked by interstate conflicts. Besides this realistic perspective, neutrality has also represented a traditionally idealistic approach to international relations; a neutral state's claim to abstain from war was also a commitment not to add violence to existing conflicts. Even though it was originally conceived of as a survival strategy, neutrality inspired ways of thinking linked to a non-violent approach to international conflicts. One example was the concept of neo-neutrality put forth by Georg Cohn in the period between World Wars I and II. It advocated active and collective disqualification of war parties by all neutral states, including the use of sanctions. Neutrals would stay outside the war, and it was stipulated that their sanctions should not be of a military nature.

This idealistic connotation of neutrality was reinforced through the tendency of neutral states to compensate for their military absenteeism by strengthening their political engagement to diminish the suffering caused by war. This engagement could take the form of humanitarian actions or attempts to end military conflicts. It was usually not pursued out of idealism or as a peace strategy but out of a perceived need to show solidarity with the war parties and the difficulties and costs they incurred.

### Neutrality Law

The legal rights and obligations of neutrality are rooted in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on international humanitarian law. Neutral states are required not to participate in war either directly or indirectly. They should not support war parties with military means nor should they make their territory available to such parties, supply them with weapons or funds, or restrict private weapon exports in a one-sided way. Neutrals are also required to defend themselves autonomously against violations of their neutrality. Neutrality excludes the right to belong to a military alliance since such a membership would entail the exact opposite of neutrality: While neutrality raises the expectation that a state will not participate in a future military conflict, participation in a military alliance includes the obligation that a state will support its fellow members in a potential military conflict. Thus, according to international law, neutrality is a clearly and narrowly defined status. If a state adopts an extensive neutrality policy, this occurs out of political considerations and not out of legal obligations.

### Neutrality Policy

To fulfill its function, neutrality demands acceptance by third parties. This leads to a minimum degree of credibility. Neutrality policy comprehends the measures a state takes to guarantee the efficiency and credibility of its neutrality. In contrast to neutrality law, neutrality policy is not legally regulated. Neutrality policy may be defined in line with the interests of each individual neutral state. States that qualify themselves as permanently neutral obligate themselves to conduct a foreign policy, even in peace time, that enables them to remain neutral in a potential conflict. This is based on what are called the pre-effects of neutrality.

Active neutrality refers to a policy stance that underscores that neutrality does not necessarily need to be equated with foreign policy abstention. Neutral states have often interpreted their neutrality as providing them with both an option of assuming and an obligation to assume specific tasks in international relations. Switzerland has followed a policy of so-called good offices since the end of the 19th century. Such offices attempt to bring parties in conflict closer together. They

exert no political influence or pressure, striving instead to assume protective power mandates, provide conference space, or offer arbitration assistance. Other West European neutrals such as Austria, Finland, Ireland, or Sweden have a long tradition of active engagement with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War, all neutral states played an important role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Together with the nonaligned states, they formed the so-called Neutral and Nonaligned group, which strived to be a third actor between the Western and Eastern blocs.

Neutrality policies have varied considerably across time and states. Switzerland has adopted a rather comprehensive neutrality policy. It did not even join the UN until 2002 because it saw the obligations of collective security as incompatible with its neutrality obligations. The other Western European neutrals, however, had no second thoughts about being members of that worldwide organization.

The situation was different in regard to the European integration process: With the exception of Ireland, no neutral Western European state joined the European Community (EC) during the Cold War. They considered this type of political and trade cooperation as incompatible with their neutrality policy. From a legal point of view, there would have been no obstacles as the EC was not a military alliance. After the Cold War had ended, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union in 1995.

### Neutrality and Collective Security

The core objectives of collective security and neutrality are similar: Both want to regulate and limit the use of force in interstate relations. But they differ in regard to the means: Whereas collective security builds on active commitment and participation of all states, neutrality is based on individual abstention.

Neutrality and collective security may be seen as concurrent concepts: If there were a perfectly working system of collective security, there would be no need for neutrality. The international community would deal with any international aggression. However, as no perfect collective security system has yet emerged, neutrality may be seen as



complementary to collective security: The better collective security works, the less neutrality is needed, and vice versa. In history, this has repeatedly confronted neutral states with difficult choices.

With the emergence of the League of Nations in 1920, neutral states had to decide whether to join the newly created organization of collective security. All of them opted for participation in the League. Switzerland distinguished between its readiness to participate in the League's economic sanctions and its reservations toward potential military sanctions, for which participation was excluded. The term *differential neutrality* was coined to cover this nuance. After the failure of the League, the country returned to its *integral neutrality*.

Today, all neutral states are members of the UN. Military interventions led or approved by the UN are not considered as traditional interstate wars but as supranational police actions in which the international community sanctions the transgression of international norms by one or several of its members. Such measures do not qualify as traditional wars and therefore neutrality law does not apply to them. However, neutrality remains relevant in the case of international interventions that are not decided by the UN. Examples of such interventions were the NATO-led intervention in Serbia/Kosovo in 1999 and the U.S. Iraq intervention in 2003.

### Neutrality and Globalization

Neutrality reflects an attitude toward military conflicts between third-party states. It does not apply to intrastate conflicts nor to transnational forms of conflicts such as terrorism. Neutrality is not relevant to global nonmilitary perils: It provides no answer regarding problems of global health, climate change, or international financial stability. Thus, neutrality has lost much of its traditional core significance in the era of globalization. It provides no guidance regarding some of the most relevant issues in international relations.

However, neutrality still qualifies as a foreign policy role conception: In countries with a neutrality tradition, it provides political legitimacy for the respective foreign policy inside the country. It also allows third parties to have certain expectations in regard to the country's foreign policy behavior: They may expect that a neutral state—compared

with other countries—will have a stronger tendency to refrain from the use of military means in international affairs. A neutral state will also show a natural inclination to promote international conflict resolution. Owing to their track records, neutral countries have comparative advantages as honest brokers.

These attributes of neutrality and also its contribution to a nation's political identity build on neutrality's political core and not on its legal dimension. Neutrality was at the origin of both realistic and idealistic role conceptions. The first emanated from neutral states' military absenteeism, the second from the basic commitment of neutral states to regulate and limit the use of force. The relative importance of both categories depends on the international structure in which neutral states operate. In a state system characterized by a clear reduction in interstate military conflicts, the idealistic role conception has gained significance compared with the realistic one. Neutrality's role as a foreign policy identity provider has become its most important function since the end of the Cold War. It is based on what used to be neutrality's secondary function—namely, its idealism or missionary belief. Neutral states used to be experts in compensating for their lack of military force and engagement with other power and activity dimensions. Neutrality may keep this function as long as neutral states actively contribute to the promotion of peaceful international relations. It should not be seen as encouraging passive contemplation of injustice, violence, and oppression. Nor was neutrality defined as a neutral attitude toward attempts to prevent military conflicts.

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*See also* Foreign Policy Analysis; International Law; Security Cooperation; War and Peace

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## NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

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New public management (NPM) is a general concept denoting a global wave of administrative reform that has had an impact on the public sectors of many countries for more than 2 decades. It is inspired by a broad neoliberal ideology and a particular set of normative values whose main focus is on increasing efficiency. In this sense, NPM is rather one dimensional and produces some tensions with other norms and values within the public sector.

The concept was launched by Christopher Hood in an article published in 1991. Most NPM reform efforts have had similar goals: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector, enhance the responsiveness of public agencies to their clients and customers, reduce public expenditure, and improve managerial accountability.

### Definition of NPM

One primary characteristic of NPM involves public organizations adopting the management and organizational forms used by private companies. It challenges two traditional doctrines of public administration: that public sector organizations are “insulated” from the private sector in terms of personnel, structure, and business methods and that they operate in accordance with a precise set of rules limiting the freedom of public officials in handling money, staff, contracts, and so on. In contrast, the NPM movement subscribes to the principle that the formal organization of the public and private sectors should be similar and that managers in public sector organizations should have discretion and leeway in their daily work, so as to make efficient use of allocated resources.

Even if NPM fundamentally espouses economic values and objectives, as a concept, it is loose and multifaceted and encompasses a range of different administrative doctrines. It offers a kind of “shopping basket” of different elements for reformers of public administration. The main components of NPM are hands-on professional management, which allows for active, visible, and discretionary control of an organization by people who are free to manage; explicit standards of performance; a greater emphasis on output control; disaggregation of units; and private sector management techniques. It also includes splitting up public organizations through horizontal specialization (single-purpose organizations) and vertical specialization (structural devolution); increased exposure to competition, contract management, and market orientation (contracting out, purchaser–provider models); increased emphasis on service orientation and user participation (citizen charters); and cost cutting and budgetary discipline. NPM is supposed to score high on managerial autonomy and *ex ante* control and low on policy autonomy and *ex post* control.

Ewan Ferlie distinguishes among four different NPM models: the efficiency drive, downsizing and decentralization, the search for excellence, and public service orientation. NPM promises to integrate these themes, linking efficiency and accountability. Other distinctions are between “hard NPM tools,” which address accounting, auditing, and performance measurement, and “soft NPM tools,” which include things such as human factors, user orientation, quality improvement, and individual development.

### NPM in a Theoretical Context

NPM reforms are not based on one theoretical foundation but are a collection of reform elements sharing several common characteristics. When NPM reforms are said to be typically theoretical, this often means that contractualism and economic theories dominate. Examples are public-choice theories, principal–agent models, and transaction-cost models. NPM, with its economic performance and market focus, sees other values and considerations embedded in the civil service as more or less unproblematic and not generally threatened or negatively affected by the efficiency and economy focus of NPM.

The second set of ideas comes from the managerialist school of thought, which focuses on the need to reestablish the primacy of managerial principles in the bureaucracy. This concentration on enhancing the capacity of managers to take action requires attention to decentralization, devolution, and delegation.

The tensions arising from the hybrid character of NPM, which combines economic organization theory and management theory, are well known. These tensions result from the contradiction between the centralizing tendencies inherent in contractualism and the devolutionary tendencies of managerialism. NPM is something of a hybrid, advocating both decentralization (let the managers manage) and centralization (make the managers manage). NPM thus prescribes both more autonomy and more central control at the same time.

Many of the most important and problematic reform elements, such as the relationship between public managers and elected officials, reflect the potential tensions in the way these reform elements are combined. Through devolution and contracting out, NPM has sought to separate policy making more clearly from policy administration and implementation. Policy makers make policy and then delegate its implementation to managers and hold them accountable by contract.

### Driving Forces Behind NPM

There is no one-factor explanation for the emergence of NPM. The driving forces behind such reforms are partly ideological, but they are also marked by administrative culture, characteristics of the political-administrative system, and the fiscal situation of the country in question. The institutional dynamics of reforms can best be interpreted as a complex mixture of environmental pressure, polity features, and historical-institutional context. These factors define how much leeway political leaders have in making choices about reforms—that is, they both further and hinder NPM reforms.

One school of thought regards NPM primarily as a response to external pressure. This environmental determinism can be of two kinds. In the first instance, a country may adopt internationally based norms and beliefs about how a civil service system should be organized and run, simply

because these have become the prevailing doctrine. NPM had its origins in certain English-speaking countries and international organizations, like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where a kind of reform myth took hold, became ideologically dominant, and diffused all over the world. This diffusion process implied isomorphic elements, creating pressure for similar reforms and structural changes in many countries.

In the second instance, NPM may be seen as the optimal solution to widespread technical problems—that is, it has been adopted to solve problems created by a lack of instrumental performance or by economic competition and market pressure. In this instance, NPM reforms were adopted not because of their ideological hegemony but because of their technical efficiency.

Another view holds that reforms are primarily a product of the national historical-institutional context. Different countries have different historical-cultural traditions, and their reforms are path dependent, meaning that national reforms have unique features. The reform roads taken reflect the main features of national institutional processes, where institutional “roots” determine the path followed in a gradual adaptation to internal and external pressure. This view stresses institutional autonomy and internal dynamics. The greater the consistency between the values underlying the reforms and the values on which the existing administrative system is based, the more likely that the reforms will be successful.

A third view emphasizes that different countries have different constitutional features and political-administrative structures and that these factors go some way in explaining how they handle national problems and reform processes. The main features of the polity, the form of government, and the formal structure of decision making within the political-administrative system may all affect a country’s capacity to realize administrative reforms. From a structural or instrumental point of view, the reforms may generally be seen as conscious organizational design. This perspective is based on the assumption that political and administrative leaders use the structural design of public entities as instruments to fulfill public goals. The major preconditions for this are that the leaders have a relatively large degree of control over change or

reform processes and that they score high on rational calculation or means–end thinking.

Thus, external reform components and programs are filtered, interpreted, and modified by a combination of two further nationally based features. One feature involves the national political-administrative history, culture, traditions, and style of government. The other involves national polity features, as expressed in constitutional and structural factors. Within these constraints political and managerial executives have varying amounts of leeway to launch NPM reforms via an active administrative policy.

### **NPM Diffusion: Convergence, Divergence, or Both?**

According to the OECD, NPM represents a global change of paradigm concerning the control and organization of public service. This convergence thesis is, however, contested. NPM has led to major changes in the public sector in many countries. However, the process of reform has not been the same everywhere. In some countries there might be a strong element of diffusion of NPM ideas from outside, whereas in others the reform process might be more a result of national or local initiatives that have subsequently acquired an NPM label. Thus, the spread of NPM is a complex process, going through different stages and packaged in different ways in different countries, with each country following its own reform trajectory within a broader framework. NPM is not a neat package of reform elements having a specific starting point and following a specific path toward a common destination.

NPM ideas have been implemented to different degrees, at different paces, and with differing emphases on the various elements of the reform package in different countries and sectors. A general finding is that the degree of variation between countries and also between policy areas increases when we move away from the world of ideas, discussion, and policy programs and look at specific decisions, and this increase is even more apparent when we consider the implementation and impact of the reforms. It is debatable whether NPM has led to the convergence of administrative systems in different countries, but there is much to suggest that ideas and policy programs resemble one another more than the corresponding practices do.

Even though countries to some extent present their reforms in similar terms and support some of the same general administrative doctrines, closer scrutiny reveals considerable variation. Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert distinguish among four groups of NPM reformers: the maintainers, the modernizers, the marketizers, and the minimal state category. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand fit the marketizer profile. Continental Europeans are more skeptical about NPM, except for the Scandinavian countries, which are somewhere in between.

Having begun in Britain, the reform wave has become strongest in Anglo-American countries. In Westminster-style parliamentary systems, NPM reforms fell on fertile ground and were therefore implemented early and had far-reaching effects. This was due, on the one hand, to strong external economic and institutional pressure and, on the other, to few constitutional and administrative obstacles, a compatible culture, and parliamentary conditions that favored a radical strategy and reform entrepreneurs. By contrast, the Scandinavian countries were reluctant to implement reforms. Environmental pressure was weaker, their Rechtsstaat culture and strong egalitarian norms were less compatible with the values of NPM, there were more obvious constitutional obstacles, and parliamentary conditions often characterized by minority coalition governments made a radical reform strategy difficult to pursue.

Thus, there is no consistent movement toward a new isomorphic model of civil service systems. Most governments still share some main elements of the traditional system of public administration. However, some strong common trends in modernizing public services have emerged across groups of countries. One of these is a reduction in the differences between the public and private sectors. Nevertheless, the story is not only one of convergence, meaning that all countries are moving in the same direction, nor is it a story only of divergence, whereby all countries follow their own trajectories constrained by their specific context, legacy, and tradition. Instead, what we are seeing is a complex mixture of robustness and flexibility and of reform paths that can hardly be explained by using a single-perspective approach.

Variations in reform practice from one country to another are the rule rather than the exception.

Different countries and governments face different contexts, risks, and problems and start out with different values and norms. In other words, they have different starting points, are at different stages of reform, and face different external and internal constraints. What we might see is two trajectories. One is represented by civil services that have been modernized within state traditions and are therefore rather closed and resistant to external pressure. Here, the reform process is more hesitant and does not involve major shifts. The other trajectory is represented by civil services that are more vulnerable to external pressure and more open to NPM concepts, resulting in more radical reforms. The first instance is typical of the Scandinavian welfare state; the second characterizes Australia and New Zealand.

### Effects of NPM Reforms

The main hypothesis of NPM reforms is that increased market orientation and management focus lead to increased efficiency, without causing negative side effects for other goals and concerns. But this hypothesis is far from having been confirmed as evidence-based knowledge. It might be right under specific conditions but not as a general characteristic of NPM reforms everywhere and at all times.

Effects are often assumed or promised, but there are few systematic and reliable studies of the effects of NPM reforms. Hard evidence is often lacking. Often strategies, plans, and selective success stories are the focus of attention rather than systematic analyses of results. Research has generally focused more on answering questions about why reform happens than on trying to reveal the effects of initiatives.

We know less about external political learning and societal effects than about internal administrative effects on efficiency. One finding is that vertical and horizontal specialization through structural devolution and the establishment of single-purpose organizations have led to fragmentation in public administration and thus increased coordination problems. Another finding is that NPM reforms in some cases can have positive effects on efficiency, but the efficiency gains also vary according to the tasks and services in question. Competition might bring savings on costs, more efficient production, and more flexible and user-friendly services. But

there might also be negative side effects in the form of increased social problems.

The effects on efficiency are usually less than what reform advocates have predicted. This is partly because transaction costs as well as administration and operational costs of the new arrangements may not have been taken into consideration. NPM reforms have led to increased efficiency in some public sector organizations, at least in the short term. Responsiveness to users tends to be improved by NPM reforms, but there are also clear indications of a reduction in equality. It appears that improved efficiency and responsiveness have been achieved at the expense of equal treatment. On the other hand, NPM reforms have had a positive effect on the freedom of choice of services.

A fundamental dilemma for many NPM reforms is the tension between autonomy and control. Organizations should have enough freedom to be run in an efficient way, yet not be so free that superior levels of leadership lose power and control. The aim is to achieve more freedom and greater control simultaneously. Whether or not NPM strengthens political control and leads to better political steering is an open question. Some claim that NPM reforms will reduce political steering and control and transfer power and influence to state-owned companies and autonomous agencies, and there is some evidence for that. But there are also studies indicating that NPM tools like performance management have improved top-level executive control. The new organizational forms have led to changes in how public organizations are controlled. The traditional, *ex ante*, informal, internal, collegial, and trust-based forms of control are waning, and the more *ex post*, formal, external, professional, and distrust-based forms of control are waxing.

One conclusion to be drawn is that the design of various NPM reforms may vary considerably across countries, tasks, sectors, and administrative levels and will have consequences for effects studies. The implication is that discussions of the effects of reform must strive for exceedingly precise terminology and must not be conducted at a general level.

In sum, it is hard to say unequivocally what the effects of NPM reforms are. NPM's results are disputed and uncertain. The paradox as stated by Pollitt and Bouckaert is that these kinds of reforms do not seem to need results to fuel their onward march.

### Future Development and Application

There is a need to look beyond NPM—what has been termed *transcending new public management*. The central question being asked is whether NPM is finished. While some, citing the crises that NPM has experienced, proclaim that it is indeed dead, others tend to support the view that this is by no means so. It has, however, been challenged: New types of reforms have been added to those already in place, and there have been some reversals, especially when it comes to the disaggregation components of NPM. The new reforms tend, however, not to replace the old. They represent readjustments, modifications, and supplements rather than radical change. Priorities have shifted from a drive to create agencies and autonomous bodies that enhance efficiency to a quest to find the right balance between accountability and autonomy by focusing on weak coordination devices, lack of governing capacity, and weak accountability mechanisms.

The reforms that were undertaken under the NPM label paved the way for further reforms and transformations in the post-NPM era. Market solutions and market ideology now seem to have become more or less institutionalized within the public sector, albeit without erasing major Weberian features of the Old System, and a certain amount of reregulation has taken place in recent years. The trend toward single-purpose organizations is another feature of NPM reforms that recent reforms have modified by introducing more coordination and collaboration across and within political-administrative systems. A third element of NPM was structural devolution, which resulted in the autonomization and agencification of public sector organizations. However, in recent years this has been countered by a reassertion of the center and a strengthening of central state capacity.

A main finding in the research in this area is that administrative reforms have not taken place along a single dimension. In practice, we face mixed models and increased complexity. It is fair to say that NPM is still very much alive in many countries and that NPM reforms have normally not been replaced by new reforms but rather revised or supplemented by post-NPM reforms. The pace and comprehensiveness of these trends has varied significantly from one country to another and from one policy area to another, and reform activities embrace a wide spectrum. Even though NPM in certain ways has been a

success, it is too early to conclude that the old public administration model is unsustainable. It has considerable capacity to adapt and is both robust and flexible, even after a long period of NPM reforms and emerging post-NPM reforms.

Typical for the NPM reforms was that the formal structural system changed from an integrated to a fragmented one. The formal levers of steering were weakened, the distance to the agencies grew, political signals became weaker, and horizontal specialization increased according to different principles. The second generation of reforms uses formal structures to regain control or modify the loss of political influence by making them more centralized, complex, and varied.

Formal structural instruments have been used to modify not only devolution and vertical specialization but also horizontal fragmentation and specialization, especially in Australia and New Zealand. Vertical control and levers of control are increasingly being applied, while a “whole-of-government” approach uses new coordination instruments and cross-sector programs and projects to modify horizontal fragmentation.

The spread and diffusion of agency or regulatory agency forms across countries in the first wave of reforms may be seen as an institutional standard, script, or prescription with symbolic value. This applies just as much to the second generation of modern reforms, where the fashion is now to have “whole-of-government” or “joined-up government” models that foster more coordination and control. The question is whether these trends are more about symbols than about reality and whether they really constitute a clear break with NPM.

What kind of further trends might we expect in countries that have implemented elements of NPM? A first scenario is the idea of a linear process toward more market, management, and efficiency. A second scenario is a cyclical development implying that, after a period of NPM, there will be a reaction to the norms and values that the reform is built on leading to a return to some of the main features of “old public management” and a rediscovery of the Weberian bureaucracy.

A third scenario is a more dialectical process under which public services become more complex. Institutional change is a sedimentation process in which new administrative reforms do not replace old forms but supplement them. There is a layering and mixture of old public administration, NPM, and

post-NPM reforms producing hybrid organizational forms. The changes we have seen in recent years tend to come closer to the third scenario than to the first.

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*See also* Accountability; Audit Society; Autonomy, Administrative; Deregulation; Empowerment

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## NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs)

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The origin of the term *nongovernmental organization* lies in the need for those drafting the United

Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 to make a distinction between the procedures for the UN's relations with other intergovernmental organizations linked to the UN as specialized agencies and its relations with international organizations that had not been established by intergovernmental agreement. Under Article 70, the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) was to make arrangements for representatives of the agencies "to participate, without vote, in its deliberations," whereas under Article 71 NGOs would have a secondary status:

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned. (Article 71 of the UN Charter)

Gradually the term *nongovernmental organization* passed from the diplomatic world into general usage. However, its meaning at the UN and its meaning in popular discourse are not the same.

At the UN, an NGO is any organization that has been granted consultative status by ECOSOC or, by extension, any organization that may be eligible for consultative status. In the early years of the UN, various criteria were adopted by the council to establish which organizations would be accredited and what participation rights they would have. The initial decisions were reviewed and consolidated into an NGO Statute by ECOSOC Resolution 288 B (X) of February 27, 1950. It was revised by Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of May 23, 1968, and again by Resolution 1996/31 of July 25, 1996. Most of the text of the current statute has remained unchanged since the first resolutions in 1946. The implied assumption in 1945 was that ECOSOC would accredit a small number of large, well-established global organizations. In particular, for 50 years, very few exceptions were made to the rule that only international NGOs rather than national NGOs should be accepted. Despite this restriction, it was soon apparent that many more NGOs than were initially expected would wish to participate in the UN's work. The numbers increased steadily from 197 in 1950, to 334 in

1960, and 419 in 1970. They then increased more substantially in the 1970s, reaching 608 in 1980 and 893 in 1990, and increased even more after 1990 to 1,995 in 2000 and 3,413 in 2010. As practice has evolved, it has become apparent that the official criteria are not applied and conversely some criteria not in the statute are consistently applied. Thus, with very few exceptions, any private organization will gain consultative status provided that it is not a commercial company, it does not use or advocate the use of violence, and it does not violate the diplomatic norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of individual countries. This norm finds one expression in not accepting a political party for accreditation as an NGO. The restrictions on companies and political parties do not prevent non-profit-making international associations representing commercial interests or international federations of political parties from being accepted.

The norm of noninterference was, until the 1970s, a severe restriction on the discussion of human rights in all bodies of the UN. A second expression of this norm was added to the NGO statute in 1968: Human rights NGOs "should have a general international concern with this matter, not restricted to the interests of a particular group of persons, a single nationality or the situation in a single State or restricted group of States" (ECOSOC Resolution 1296, para. 17). In 1996, this text was replaced by a more vague, general assertion that they should act "in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action." Despite this change, the 1968 principles are still invoked when any government attempts to block the accreditation of an NGO that is critical of their human rights record. As a result, the Indian government has been able to block the World Sikh Congress, and the Chinese government has blocked any NGO that focuses on Tibet. Nevertheless, such governments cannot prevent criticism in the UN from the large global human rights NGOs, who have consultative status. The accreditation of human rights NGOs has often been a matter of great controversy; even when they are initially rejected, however, they do eventually win a vote in their favor in ECOSOC, provided they conform to the statute, including the discarded text from 1968.

In all versions of the statute, there have been two vague general clauses specifying that an NGO must be concerned with questions within the competence of ECOSOC, and its aims "shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles" of the UN Charter. This might have been a basis for a process of prohibiting access to certain types of NGOs on specific political grounds. The only field in which such censorship has been applied is in the field of human sexuality. The International Planned Parenthood Federation was not able to gain access to the UN system until the mid-1960s, a decade after it was founded. Human Life International, an antiabortion organization, was rejected on the technical grounds that it was hostile to UNICEF, but a few antiabortion NGOs have now been accepted. Most dramatically of all, a special session of ECOSOC was convened in 1994 solely for the purpose of withdrawing consultative status from the International Lesbian and Gay Association, when it became public that one of their constituent organizations promoted pedophilia.

Since 1945, there has been a slow but consistent expansion in the role of NGOs in policy making within the UN system, to the point where the outcomes in all areas of multilateral diplomacy, including security questions, can no longer be explained without analyzing the influence exercised by NGOs. They have also greatly increased their status in international law, to the point where it can be argued that those with ECOSOC consultative status have international legal personality. Their most significant impact has been in the creation of the Internet. NGOs made two essential contributions to the conversion of communications technology from disparate unconnected private networks to the contemporary Internet as a global public communications system. In the 1980s, they established the first Internet service providers and linked them together to provide global coverage. Also, they were the first to create gateways to link all the diverse networks to each other.

In popular discourse, an NGO is often presumed to be a voluntary organization acting in the public interest. Sometimes, distinctions are made between operational NGOs, which raise money and spend it on projects to assist the needy and the vulnerable, and campaigning NGOs, which seek to articulate the concerns of disempowered and marginalized people. Such an approach brings to mind



NGOs concerned with development, humanitarian relief, women's rights, human rights, peace, and environmental questions. However, it is confusing and misleading to conceptualize NGOs in such a restricted manner. All these fields of global politics are also influenced by other NGOs that would not be primarily identified either as operational or campaigning NGOs in such fields. At the UN, the 3,000-plus organizations that have consultative status as NGOs include religious bodies, trade unions, business groups, scientific and technical bodies, professional associations, youth organizations, and parliamentarians. Many of these also make their own specialist contributions on global issues. Some, such as religious bodies (also calling themselves faith communities) and trade unions, actively object to being called NGOs. Nevertheless, within the UN, all legitimate nonstate actors gain access through becoming accredited as NGOs.

In the domestic politics of individual countries, NGOs are more commonly referred to as interest groups, pressure groups, lobbies, or private voluntary organizations. However, as noted above, the term NGO may still be used to refer to a more limited range of public interest groups and/or groups that engage in transnational activities. NGOs vary greatly in the geographical scope of their structure and their activities. Some may be highly local, community groups in which all those involved know each other personally. Others are organized in individual towns or cities, within a larger area, or over a whole country, while some cover a continent or have a presence throughout the world. The scope of their structure does not necessarily relate to the scope of their activities. Local groups may be completely parochial, or they may concern themselves with issues affecting the other side of the world—for example, when a small community decides to raise money for the victims of an earthquake. National NGOs often have a minimal organizational structure outside their home country but engage in extensive transnational cooperation with other NGOs around the world. One of the most important features of NGOs is that many of them break down the distinction between domestic and international politics by simultaneously operating at both levels. Initially, local and national NGOs could influence global politics only through the membership of international NGOs. With the expansion of global

communications, in particular the development of the World Wide Web since 1993, any NGO can now easily have a transnational impact. In addition, the only major amendment to the UN's NGO statute was the decision in 1996 to allow accreditation to national NGOs. The prime reason for this decision was to encourage participation by NGOs from developing countries.

There is great variety in the structures of NGOs. Some decide policy through democratic processes open to all their members, but others rely on supporters who merely have an indirect influence on policy, by increasing or reducing their level of support; some are formed by individual people, but some consist of separate independent NGOs who form an umbrella organization to cooperate; some relate to members and/or supporters directly through a centralized structure, but others have complex hierarchies or a federal structure. NGOs also have a diverse range of political roles. Some are altruistic, but others represent the interests of their members; some have charitable status and obtain tax concessions from governments, but others are not eligible; some represent a very small number of people, but others have an active membership measured in millions; some are highly specialized, but others are concerned with issues that affect a wide range of social, political, and economic questions; some have no public profile, but others obtain regular media coverage; some have no desire to engage in politics, but others are campaigning organizations; some are insiders in government policy making, but others are outsiders, concentrating on mass mobilization; some are progressive or Left wing, some identify themselves as being apolitical, and some are Right wing. It is impossible for any individual to support all NGOs, except by arbitrarily defining some as not being true NGOs. There is no such thing as a typical NGO.

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*See also* Advocacy Networks, Transnational; Civil Society; Constructivism in International Relations; Epistemic Communities; Governance, Global; Human Rights in International Relations; Interest Groups; Nonstate Actors; Social Movements; United Nations

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**NONLINEAR MODELS**

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In political science, as in many other disciplines, linear regression is the workhorse tool for statistical analysis. It is easy to interpret, and under many conditions the estimates it provides are unbiased and efficient. Unfortunately, many of the theories in the social sciences imply a nonlinear relationship between variables. In those cases, it is inappropriate to use a classic linear regression model because, at a minimum, one of the assumptions of the model would be violated.

This entry discusses two types of linear models: first, those that through a relatively simple process can be transformed in a way that allows running of a classical linear regression model; second, those that are essentially nonlinear, for which a transformation is not possible. In that situation, nonlinear least squares estimation is necessary.

The linear regression model specifies a linear relationship between a *response*—or dependent—variable and an *explanatory*—or independent—variable. It is assumed that a vector of response variables,  $y$ , can be approximated by a linear function of the vector of explanatory variables  $X$ :

$$y = X\beta + \varepsilon, \tag{1}$$

which can be expressed more generally as

$$y = F(X) + \varepsilon. \tag{2}$$

While in the linear model  $F$  is a linear function and the error is additive, in nonlinear models  $F$  can

take other functional forms such as exponential, logistic, or other, more complicated forms, though the setup still assumes that the error is additive.

It is perhaps easier to understand the difference between linear and nonlinear models if we think of a regression model, in scalar form, with only one explanatory variable and no disturbance:

$$y = \alpha + \beta x. \tag{3}$$

The marginal effect of the explanatory variable,  $x$ , on the response variable,  $y$ , or, in other words, the effect of a one-unit increase of  $x$  in  $y$ , can be estimated by taking the partial derivative with respect to  $x$ :

$$\frac{dy}{dx} = \beta. \tag{4}$$

In the classical linear model, when  $x$  increases by one unit, the effect on  $y$  is always a constant,  $\beta$ , regardless of the current level of  $x$ . In contrast, in a nonlinear model, the marginal impact of the explanatory variable,  $x$ , on the response variable,  $y$ , is dependent on the level of  $x$ . In other words,  $\beta$  is not necessarily a constant, but instead  $dy/dx$  is a function of  $x$ .

A more complicated model has  $y$  as a nonadditive function of the independent variables and the disturbances, that is,

$$y = F(X, \varepsilon). \tag{5}$$

While in general this can cause problems, there are some cases where this can be transformed away. For example, if we assume that the response function that describes  $y$  is,

$$y = \exp(\alpha + \beta x + \varepsilon), \tag{6}$$

we can linearize the model by first taking the logarithms obtaining a linear response function and rewrite the equation such that

$$\ln\left(\frac{y}{1-y}\right) = \alpha + \beta x + \varepsilon. \tag{7}$$

The response variable is now  $\ln(y/(1 - y))$ , a quantity known as the *logit*, and the response

function is linear. Note here that  $y$  is continuous; if it is binary, the standard logit model is not the same. The procedure is similar for other transformations that fall in the category of generalized linear models.

However, there are some models for which slightly more complicated procedures are necessary to make the linear model appropriate. One of the most common is the Box-Cox transformation, where transformations are indexed by  $\lambda$ , an unknown parameter, and all the parameters in the model are estimated by standard methods of inference. The transformation is

$$y^\lambda = \frac{y^\lambda - 1}{\lambda} \quad (8)$$

when  $\lambda \neq 0$  and

$$y^\lambda = \ln(y) \quad (9)$$

when  $\lambda = 0$ . It is assumed that for each  $\lambda$ ,  $y^\lambda$  is a monotonic function of  $y$  over the admissible range and that for some unknown  $\lambda$ , the transformed observations,  $y^\lambda$ , satisfy the linear model assumptions.

The Box-Cox transformation can also be used to discriminate among alternative functional forms (log linear, quadratic, etc.). The process works by estimating the values of the transformation parameters. If  $\lambda$  is one, a linear model is appropriate. If it is near zero, a logarithmic model is appropriate. And if it is near two, a quadratic model is appropriate. Thus, analysts no longer have to prespecify the nature of the nonlinear transformation since the Box-Cox model can be estimated using nonlinear squares.

Unfortunately, some of our theories lead us to models that cannot be made linear in parameters. In this case, it is appropriate to use nonlinear least squares (NLS) regression. With the exception of linearity, all the other assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression apply. Conceptually, the process is the same: to find the values of parameters that minimize the sum of squared residuals. Numerically, the process is much more intensive. If we assume the same model notation from Equation 1, then

$$\varepsilon = y - X\beta. \quad (10)$$

We estimate  $\beta$  by finding the  $\hat{\beta}$  values that minimize the sum-of-squares residuals:

$$S = \sum(y - X\hat{\beta}). \quad (11)$$

For any estimate of  $\beta$ , Equation 2 allows the calculation of a residual, and we can minimize the sum of squared residuals. While the maximization process is more complicated than for linear regression, the underlying process is similar, and the estimated coefficients have similar properties. In particular, they are consistent and asymptotically normal, so the usual testing procedures apply. This process is a part of most statistical packages used by social scientists.

There are some caveats about NLS. First, it is possible to get similarly good fits with very different-looking functions. Also, different models will produce different predictions when extrapolating, and multiple minima are possible.

As a general conclusion, for real-world data it is hard to believe that linear specifications can characterize the relationships between all variables in political science studies. However, through the transformation of variables—either to a generalized linear model or a Box-Cox transformation—or by using modified modeling strategies such as nonlinear least squares regression, it is possible to test many of the theories that do not easily fit a linear model.

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*See also* Model Specification; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Regression; Structural Equation Modeling

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
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## NONPARAMETRIC METHODS

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Nonparametric methods are a class of statistical techniques that use minimal assumptions for both testing and estimation. Here, standard statistical assumptions are often replaced with computationally intensive calculations. Nonparametric methods provide a valuable alternative to classical parametric techniques. They are often called weak assumption statistics because the assumptions required for validity are quite general compared with classical parametric techniques. In many cases, even the weak assumptions made can be further relaxed. As such, conclusions based on nonparametric techniques need not be tempered by qualifying statements about the underlying assumptions. Other advantages are that they (a) are often easy to understand and apply, (b) are especially good for small samples, (c) are frequently appropriate for discrete data, and (d) may be robust with incomplete or imprecise data. Nonparametric techniques date back to 1710 when John Arbuthnott introduced the sign test. More widespread development of nonparametric techniques did not occur until the 1940s when Frank Wilcoxon developed rank-based tests. Nonparametric statistical techniques come in many different forms. Below, three different types of nonparametric techniques are highlighted. The first is the bootstrap, a method for replacing distributional assumptions in statistical tests. The second is an example of a classical nonparametric test. The final technique is that of nonparametric regression.

### Bootstrap

The bootstrap relies on resampling. While it has many applications, it is often used when errors in a regression model are nonnormal. Assume that one estimates the following simple regression model:

$$y = \alpha + \beta x + \varepsilon.$$

In this model, we assume that the errors,  $\varepsilon$ , follow a normal distribution. We can relax this assumption using the bootstrap. The bootstrap simulates the sampling distribution for  $\beta$  through sampling from the original data with replacement. In short, we treat the sample as the population and then

sample from it. For example, assume that the sample size for this regression model is 100 cases. For the bootstrap, we would take a random sample of size 100 with replacement from the original data. Since we sample with replacement, some data points will appear in this sample more than once. We then reestimate the original model using this new sample and save the new estimate of  $\beta$ . We repeat this process a large number of times. Typically, we would resample and estimate the model from 1,000 to 5,000 times. This results in 1,000 to 5,000 estimates of  $\beta$ . This new set of  $\beta$  estimates serves as an empirical sampling distribution for this parameter. Percentiles of this distribution can serve as confidence intervals for the parameter. With minor adjustments, one can also calculate a  $p$  value to test hypotheses about  $\beta$ . The bootstrap is nonparametric since we use an empirical estimate for the sampling distribution instead of assuming that the test statistic is from a  $t$  distribution. One strength of the bootstrap stems from the fact that this basic algorithm can be used to provide inferences for a wide class of statistics.

### Classical Nonparametric Test

Another common nonparametric technique is the rank-sum test, which is an alternative to the classical two-sample  $t$  test of location. Consider an experiment where we select seven students to play a divide-the-dollar game with a computer program. Three of the students are randomly chosen to receive the treatment, a prime expected to make them more altruistic. If the treatment is effective, we would expect that the students who receive it would give away more of their money. If the treatment is without effect, we would expect no such difference across the two sets of students. Relying on the classical parametric techniques, we might translate these expectations into a  $t$  test, comparing the mean difference we observe with a null of no mean difference. We would then calculate a  $p$  value using the critical value from a  $t$  distribution with five degrees of freedom. For this inference, we must assume that the test statistic follows a parametric  $t$  distribution—a distribution that can be characterized with parameters for the mean, variance, and other higher moments. As an alternative, we can use the nonparametric rank-sum test to derive the test from the randomization of treatment assignment and avoid the parametric assumption.



Our expectation, again, is that treated students should give away more than nontreated students. The best evidence that the prime increases altruistic behavior would be obtained if the three students who received the treatment rank 1, 2, and 3 in terms of the amount given away. So we might ask: What is the probability that the three students in the treatment group would happen to rank 1, 2, and 3 in terms of the amount given away if the null hypothesis were true? To develop a probability statement about this hypothesis that hinges on the composition of the treatment and control groups—the feature that was assigned by a random process—we turn to basic combinatorics. Knowing that the number of ways of selecting  $r$  objects from a set of  $n$  is  $n!/r!(n-r)!$  tells us that there are 35 ways to select three students from a set of seven. If the treatment had no effect, and simple chance were the only factor governing which students were in the control group and which were in the treatment group, then each of these 35 combinations would be equally likely. Since only one of the 35 outcomes is congruent with ranks of 1, 2, and 3 in the treatment group, this tells us that there is a  $1/35$  or approximately a 0.0286 chance that we would observe the best evidence case if the null were true. That is, if the treatment has no effect, the chance that random assignment will produce this exact outcome is  $1/35$ . This  $p$  value indicates that the best evidence outcome indeed enables us to be fairly confident that the prime has an effect on student behavior in our divide-the-dollar game.

We can make this approach to hypothesis testing more general by introducing a summary statistic that enables us to translate ranks into a single measurement of the outcome among the treatment subjects. One possible statistic for this purpose is the sum of the ranks of the treated subjects. This statistic will be lower if the treated subjects are generally higher in their giving than the control subjects and higher if they are not. The subjects could just as easily be ranked in the opposite manner, and then higher rank sums would be associated with higher amounts given. Using this statistic, we can answer the question of what the chance is of observing an outcome of a specific degree (or smaller/larger) among the treatment subjects if the treatment actually has no effect. For example, suppose the outcome we observed among the treated subjects was the ranks 1, 2, and 7. Our summary

statistic would be 10 ( $= 1 + 2 + 7$ ). This seems close to the best evidence outcome we just considered, where the sum of the ranks would be  $1 + 2 + 3 = 6$ , but is it close enough to be convincing evidence of a treatment effect? To answer this question, we work out the probability of observing a rank sum of the same amount or less than the one we obtained under the null hypothesis—that the treatment had no effect on giving—by returning to our enumeration of all 35 possible combinations of the three ranks and calculating the rank sum for each combination. Four of the 35 possible rank combinations produce a sum of 10, 3 more produce a sum of 9, 2 result in a sum of 8, 1 set sums to 7, and another to 6. Thus, if the treatment had no effect, the chance of observing an outcome like the one we did or smaller would be  $p = 11/35$  or approximately 0.314. Put another way, if the prime has no effect, we could expect to see a value for the summed ranks as low as or lower than the one we observed 31 out of every 100 times we randomly assigned the treatment to these particular subjects. Using the traditional threshold of .05, the  $p$  value we calculated would not allow us to reject the null hypothesis; the observed outcome did not provide sufficient evidence that the prime had an effect on the behavior of our subjects. This demonstrates the logic of the rank-sum test and nonparametric methods more generally, where we are able to test a hypothesis about a treatment effect without the parametric assumption necessary for the  $t$  test.

### Nonparametric Regression

Smoothed regression is a common nonparametric estimation technique. This approach to regression is based on the belief that standard parametric regression models are often misspecified due to an incorrect functional form. Smoothing and nonparametric regression are generally interchangeable terms for a set of statistical techniques used to summarize bivariate relationships in scatterplots. With more commonly used parametric statistical techniques, the relationship between two variables,  $x$  and  $y$ , is summarized with a parameter such as a regression coefficient. With nonparametric regression, there is no single parameter; instead, the statistical relationship between  $x$  and  $y$  is summarized with a line drawing. Given that there is no

single parameter produced by the statistical model, these models are nonparametric. A more specific comparison between the parametric and nonparametric approaches to regression clarifies the differences between these methods.

Assume that we have  $y$  and  $x$ , two continuous variables, and we wish to estimate the mean of  $y$  conditional on the regressor  $x$ . We can write this relationship formally as

$$y|x = f(x) + \varepsilon.$$

The term  $f$  refers to the functional form for the relationship between  $y$  and  $x$ , and we assume that  $f$  is some function that is smooth. The familiar linear functional form is a special case where the following is true:

$$f = \alpha + \beta x.$$

Since a linear relationship is a smooth function, it is a part of the family of smooth functions that comprise  $f$ . The linear regression model is parametric because the parameter  $\beta$  summarizes the statistical dependence between  $x$  and  $y$ .

With nonparametric regression, we estimate the functional form  $f$  from the data. Therefore, the a priori assumption of linearity is replaced with the much weaker assumption of a smooth population function. The usual parametric estimate is considered global since a single parameter,  $\beta$ , based on all the data summarizes the statistical relationship. There are a number of methods for estimating nonparametric regression models. All of these methods use a series of local estimates, estimates based on a subset of the entire sample, to form a nonparametric estimate.

The following provides a simple example of one method for estimating nonparametric regression models. Say we are interested in estimating the association between incumbent vote share and incumbent spending. We suspect that the relationship is nonlinear and thus the usual linear regression model will be misspecified since the functional form is incorrect. One form of nonparametric regression we might use is the moving average smoother. First, the data must be sorted according to  $x$ —here incumbent spending. We can obtain the nonparametric estimate by calculating the mean of the incumbent vote share within ordered intervals

of spending. That is, we calculate the average incumbent vote share for a small range of  $x$ , perhaps the first 5% of the data. We repeat this across the range of incumbent spending. Once this process is complete we have a series of local averages.

Plotting these local averages in a line graph summarizes the statistical dependence between incumbent vote share and incumbent spending. These local averages may increase linearly. If so, the nonparametric estimate is nearly equivalent to an ordinary least squares estimate. What is important is, however, that these local averages are not constrained to be linear and can produce a highly nonlinear statistical estimate. Matching estimators, which have gained popularity as of late, are another form of nonparametric regression.

The local estimator need not be based on the mean. Least squares regression can replace the mean as the local estimator. Here, the predicted value from a regression model becomes the local point estimate. Nonparametric regression methods such as LOESS and LOWESS are based on local regression models. Basing the local estimate on a regression model produces a nonparametric estimate with less bias. Splines are another frequently used form of nonparametric estimators based on a series of joined local regression estimates.

Due to the weak assumptions needed for nonparametric tests, they are less efficient than classical parametric tests if the assumptions for the parametric tests hold. For example, the rank test will be less efficient than a  $t$  test if the data are normal. However, if the data are nonnormal, the nonparametric alternative will be more powerful. Nonparametric tests are common in the statistical literature on causal inference. For example, nonparametric statistics are critical to the development of sensitivity analyses for matching estimators. In the causal inference literature, close attention is paid to statistical assumptions, and the goal is to weaken assumptions where possible. Nonparametric statistics allow this to a great extent.

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*See also* Cross-Tabular Analysis; Hypothesis Testing; Matching; Robust Statistics; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

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## NONSTATE ACTORS

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The phrase *nonstate actors* arose in the study of world politics during the 1970s in the context of a transnationalist critique of the then prevailing realist orthodoxy. Realist theory of international relations holds that only states are and can be actors in politics beyond the national realm. In contrast, transnationalist analysis argues that other entities besides states—such as business enterprises, mass media organizations, civil society associations, and political parties—can also operate as actors in world politics.

An *actor* is a behavioral unit that can engage and influence its situation. A social actor can be either an individual person or a group of people assembled in a formal or informal collective body. Realism maintains that only one kind of actor—the state (i.e., a national-territorial government)—can affect relations between and among countries. Transnationalism affirms that multiple types of agents, including a variety of nonstate actors, can shape world politics. Some scholars therefore draw a distinction between international relations (among states) and transnational relations (involving a plurality of actors, both state and nonstate).

### Realism and Transnationalism

From a realist perspective, nongovernmental bodies are always subject to state power in world politics. Hence, on a realist premise, business corporations

cannot operate outside their base country except insofar as home and host states permit them to do so. Companies such as Coca-Cola, LUKOIL, and Microsoft would, on a realist understanding, always be subject to the full control of national governments. Likewise, for realists, civil society associations such as the human rights organization Amnesty International, the ecological lobby Greenpeace, and the religious movement Al Qaeda have no impact on world politics except when states allow it. Indeed, some realist analyses suggest that nonstate entities operate wholly and solely as tools of state policy. Thus, for example, a realist could argue that the humanitarian relief agency World Vision only acts inasmuch as it serves the interests of donor states in the Global North and recipient states in the Global South.

The realist (or “statist”) approach to action in world politics has never gained acceptance by all scholars. For example, from Karl Marx onward, historical materialists have maintained that states serve capital rather than the other way around and that workers need to unite across borders in order to achieve social transformation. Liberal internationalists, too, suggested already in the 19th and early 20th centuries that citizen movements (e.g., of feminists, pacifists, religious revivalists) could affect the course of interstate relations. In the 1920s and 1930s, political and sociological research on world affairs regularly considered nongovernmental as well as governmental actors.

Between the 1940s and the 1960s, however, most students of international relations took the realist position that nonstate actors play no autonomous role in world politics. In the context of World War II and the subsequent Cold War, it appeared—particularly to scholars in North America and Western Europe—that world affairs were reducible to state action. After all, entire societies were subordinated to state direction in World War II. Similarly, both sides in the Cold War marshaled their respective business sectors, mass media, political parties, and civil societies in the bipolar struggle.

Yet even during this period of heightened interstate conflict, it was not always evident that states were the sole actors in world politics. For example, many anticolonial movements at this time successfully exploited transnational links to promote their causes. Likewise, the continued global expansion

of major oil corporations in the third quarter of the 20th century was not merely a reflection of state policy. Indeed, then as now, firms sometimes used states to further their investments abroad. For instance, the U.S. government intervention in Guatemala in 1954 came largely at the behest of the United Fruit Company.

Such circumstances where nonstate entities exercised influence in world politics became increasingly visible as colonial empires receded and Cold War tensions eased. From the early 1970s, a number of scholars began to assert that the realist conception of actors was overly narrow. The term *transnational relations* gained popularity as a description of a situation where plural actors engage in world politics. Similarly, researchers who have since the 1980s adopted concepts of “global politics” and “globalization” usually argue that nonstate players figure importantly in world affairs.

Today, in the early 21st century, it seems incontrovertible that nonstate entities in world politics can have powers beyond those of national governments. Many companies, media organizations, civil society associations, political parties, and individuals can act on the world stage at least partly in their own right. If the statist premises of realist theory were questionable even at the height of the Cold War, they are certainly unsustainable in current world politics.

### Types of Nonstate Actors

According to the *World Investment Report 2008*, transnational corporations (TNCs) now number 79,000 (as against around 200 states). Between them, these companies own some 790,000 subsidiaries outside their base country. TNCs collectively hold about US\$15 trillion in foreign direct investment (FDI) and generate annual sales of US\$31 trillion. The largest TNCs have a yearly turnover that exceeds the GDP of a majority of countries. A substantial proportion of cross-border commerce (estimates range from a quarter to a third of the total) involves intrafirm trade within TNCs. In the light of this significance of TNCs, all states now, to one degree or another, adjust their policies on regulation and taxation with a view to attracting and retaining FDI. States also struggle to monitor—let alone manage—the several trillion dollars’ worth

of liquid financial flows that banks, securities firms, and hedge funds move (mostly electronically) around the globe each day. Moreover, some transnational companies are illicit traffickers of goods and people, and they make it their business to evade state laws altogether.

Mass media outlets, too, figure as important nonstate players in contemporary world politics. News agencies, such as Reuters and Inter Press Service, shape much of the information on world affairs that circulates in contemporary society. Certain newspapers and magazines, such as the *Financial Times* and *Cosmopolitan*, are distributed across the planet. World service radio stations have broadcast intercontinentally from the 1930s, while satellite television operators have, since their launch in the 1960s, reached hundreds of millions of households. Starting in 1992, the suitably named World Wide Web has offered a platform for countless online global information providers. Although states—and particularly stronger states—can exert substantial influence over transnationally operating mass media, it is hardly credible to argue on realist lines that CNN and YouTube are wholly subject to state control and nothing more than tools of foreign policy.

Likewise, civil society constitutes an important sphere of nonstate actors in world politics. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are associations of citizens that seek, from outside political parties, to shape the rules that govern society. Many CSOs are formally organized, legally registered, and professionally staffed advocacy bodies. Examples include business forums like the International Chamber of Commerce, consumer groups like Consumers International, democracy promoters like the Open Society Institute, development supporters like Oxfam, environmental activists like Friends of the Earth, faith assemblies like the Roman Catholic Church, farmer lobbies like Vía Campesina, health action networks like Médecins Sans Frontières, human rights advocates like the International Lesbian and Gay Association, labor unions like Public Services International, philanthropic foundations like the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and think tanks like the Club of Rome. Other civil society initiatives in world politics take shape as informal social movements, for instance, of anarchists, diaspora networks, indigenous peoples, peasants, religious revivalists, street vendors,

and youth. Indeed, some of the more prominent civil society actions in recent world politics have been ephemeral public demonstrations. Examples include street protests at the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999 and across the globe on February 15, 2003, against the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq.

In contrast to CSOs, who aim to influence politics from positions outside official circles, political parties have as their overriding goal the occupation of public office. Although these actors have traditionally centered their efforts on capturing state power (locally, provincially, and nationally), over recent decades, they have also held seats in several suprastate regional assemblies in Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Moreover, political parties with broadly shared visions have formed global associations such as the Socialist International (with origins in 1889), the Trotskyist Fourth International (founded in 1938), the Liberal International (created in 1947), the International Democrat Union (1983), and the Global Green Network (2001).

Other nonstate actors with influence in world politics operate as individuals rather than collective agents. For example, some persons such as Mahatma Gandhi, Che Guevara, and Wangari Maathai have shaped world affairs as charismatic visionaries from outside states. In addition, so-called celebrity diplomacy has figured with considerable prominence in several contemporary global campaigns regarding ecology, human rights, and poverty. Out of the limelight, countless other nonstate individuals have affected world politics as artists, athletes, bloggers, carers, entertainers, mercenaries, migrants, patients, pilgrims, programmers, scholars, terrorists, and tourists.

As the example of mercenaries indicates, nonstate actors can in some instances complement or even rival states in the execution of governance functions in world affairs. It is often assumed that governance (i.e., the formulation and implementation of societal rules) occurs only through the public sector of governments and intergovernmental agencies. However, in contemporary world politics, many regulatory processes are conducted at least partly through nonstate bodies. The many instances of private transnational governance include the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (for settlement of disputes involving

TNCs), the Wolfsberg Group (for guidelines to prevent money laundering), and the Forestry Stewardship Council (for certification of sustainable logging).

In numerous other cases, governance of world affairs transpires through multistakeholder combinations of state and nonstate actors. Thus, for example, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has since 1920 operated as a triangular collaboration among governments, employer federations, and trade unions. More recently, created multistakeholder governance bodies include the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, for corporate social responsibility schemes), the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN, for the regulation of domain names), and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In addition, most major interstate gatherings (such as United Nations conferences and Group of Eight summits) are nowadays accompanied by parallel meetings of nonstate actors.

### The Future of Nonstate Actors

To be sure, nothing in the preceding discussion points to an approaching irrelevance of states in world politics. Especially from the 1970s to the 1990s, certain transnationalists and globalists have suggested that the proliferation and growth of nonstate actors entail a decline or even a demise of the state. Yet the situation is clearly not a zero-sum game. As the example of multistakeholder forums illustrates, states and nonstate actors are often in relationships of cooperation and mutual reinforcement. Indeed, many states have expanded and gained increased capacities at the same time that nonstate actors have grown and become more prominent. Bigger states in particular continue to be great powers in world affairs. Although some analysts have highlighted the prospect of so-called failed states, thus far only a handful of countries have even temporarily experienced a comprehensive state collapse. On the whole, states remain highly robust in a world that is also populated by nonstate actors.

Hence the issue is less whether nonstate entities matter in world politics and whether states will survive but more how and why state and nonstate bodies interact in the ways that they do. Dispensing with unrealistic statism, as the above discussion

has done, is rather straightforward. However, determining more precisely how and why nonstate actors are relevant in world affairs is more problematic and controversial. Widely divergent answers to this question are available, depending on whether one adopts a liberalist, constructivist, Marxist, feminist, poststructuralist, or other theoretical perspective on world politics. In particular, the different approaches relate actors (both state and nonstate) to contrasting conceptions of social structure and structural power. However, debates about agent–structure relations go beyond the scope of the present entry. Suffice it to say here that establishing that nonstate actors matter is only one step in a much larger endeavor of building knowledge of world politics.

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*See also* Civil Society; Globalization; International Relations as a Field of Study; Multinational Corporations (MNCs); Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Realism in International Relations

#### Further Readings

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and the assessment of what the institutions do. Virtually by definition, assessment of institutions requires resolving issues in political theory and more or less simultaneously issues in social science. Although in our time the two streams seldom merge, both are essential to the task of political theory. Normative political theory offers a framework for the evaluative component of this assessment. This entry first reviews the modern origins of normative political theory and its explanatory basis and then examines its main issues: equality, civil society, civil liberties, justice, democracy, and constitutionalism. Because these issues are often discussed in substantial isolation from each other or with the principal focus on one major issue, as in John Rawls's book *A Theory of Justice*, one might conclude that there is no general normative theory that covers all of these. Most of them are often used purely descriptively without any normative weight. For example, democracy is a form of government that can be well described; or rather, it is several different forms, each of which can be described independently of its normative justification.

One could consider normative political thought in the classical era of Plato and Aristotle; in the medieval thought of Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua, and others; or in modern thought from Thomas Hobbes to the present. However, because of space limitations, this entry focuses on modern thought, which is the most relevant to an understanding of contemporary politics. Normative political theory must be empirically grounded if it is to have any bearing on the study of politics and political science; although classical and medieval theories may have been somewhat grounded in their own time, they are far less so today.

There are two overriding concerns in contemporary political theory: (1) that citizens be formally equal in various ways and (2) that government and collective decision making be democratic. These concerns are essentially modern. There is virtually universal agreement on these two normative positions, with one major exception: that the supposition of equality may not apply to economic status or resources, as is centrally at issue in theories of distributive justice and in economic libertarianism. There is, however, strong agreement that citizens should be formally equal in politics, as in the slogan "One person, one vote." John Stuart Mill

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## NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY

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Political theory deals with the creation of good governing institutions according to some principle

argued that more intellectually and educationally qualified citizens should have extra votes; however, virtually no political or democratic theorist would defend this view today.

There are further normative commitments, many of which are social libertarian constraints on government actions. Articulate social libertarianism, such as that of Mill, however, is on the wane, especially in the United States, whose constitution can rightly be characterized as one of the truly great social libertarian documents and one that has had a massive impact around the world. Social libertarianism was earlier very nearly the American creed, although it never dominated any major political party, other than perhaps the Republican Party with William Howard Taft and later Robert Taft. Its popular decline in the United States today is not reflected in the writings of political theorists.

The modern era of political theory continues to contribute to the growth of explanatory political science as well as normative political theory. Indeed, because of the issues it must address, it must take into account the social science enterprise of explanation. In the struggle to master more or less normative issues, especially church–state relations, there is no well-defined boundary between normative and causal explanatory issues.

Starting the discussion of modern theory with Hobbes has an analytic point, not merely a historical one. Hobbes is the first major theorist who deliberately and systematically assumes that we are motivated primarily by our individual interests. He is committed to the centrality of individualism and self-interest. Contrary to many common views, he assumes that the only values of concern are individual interests and that there are no collective interests other than those that can be seen as aggregations of individual interests. This individualism has since been the basis of many arguments and counterarguments, to such an extent that the pros and cons of the individualist vision often dominate discussion in political theory. No one, therefore, can fully understand any major contemporary position in normative political theory without addressing individualism. Rawls shares this view, although he phrases the assumption in his own distinctive way. He supposes that we are “mutually disinterested” in the welfare of each other. The main point of this claim is to rule out envy over others’ shares of the collective provision.

Although the religious vision of politics has been important in the past, today this perspective is found mainly in Islam and in the Catholic, not the Aristotelian, half of the natural-law tradition.

Ironically, the classical era arguably has greater relevance to contemporary thought than does medieval thought because the former is de facto secular and in it there is presumed to be no higher authority than man. Hobbes dismisses reliance on supernatural inspiration, arguing that faith comes by hearing—that is to say, by being taught. In a sentence, he convincingly dismisses several centuries of political theorizing. Political theory had to begin almost de novo after leaving religious justifications behind. Although there are forerunners, we may take Hobbes as the de novo creative thinker who puts us on the path to modern political theory.

Normative political theory is in some respects an odd endeavor in that it is often carried on at the strictly theoretical level with little or no serious reference to our political experience, as for example in Plato’s *Republic*. Some authors refer to their work as “ideal theory.” This is apparently meant to be a defense of their approach. At its strongest, they can say that their position is aspirational. For example, one could concede that widespread egalitarian dispositions are not likely in our world at this time but still hold that egalitarian theorists should push our understanding of how to make egalitarianism work and how to refine the theory.

### Modern Beginnings

Let us begin with two giants of social theory in the modern era: Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. Both Hobbes and Hume think that humans are primarily motivated by *self-interest*. Hume states this view with characteristic force in his *Treatise on Human Nature*: “Nothing is more certain, than that men are, in a great measure, governed by interest, and that even when they extend their concern beyond themselves, ’tis not to any great distance” (Pt. 2, sec. 7). This is Hume’s dominant claim about human nature in the *Treatise*. Holding this view seemingly must make his program to explain moral or mutually beneficial outcomes in the world of human and institutional action implausible. But that is his extraordinary program—to explain why it is that a large collection of substantially self-interested people could achieve justice and other

good social results, all without a primary or a religious commitment to acting morally.

Some moralists in Hume's time assumed that moral views, moral character, and moral commitments were God-given. Hume, however, believed that our nature is not fundamentally moral; he further doubts all arguments for the truth of religious claims. Book 3 of Hume's *Treatise* attempts to explain how we can act as though we were moral and how we can establish social rules, norms, and laws evidently without the necessary moral commitment to their working. A clue to his argument is that if we had characters such as the religious, moralistic, and pure-reason schools of thought suppose, we would not be much concerned with law because we would be well-ordered without its additional incentives. Hume argues that debate over law and moral issues is essentially proof that these visions are wrong and that we need tougher analysis.

Both Hobbes and Hume enunciate *laws of nature*, by which they both mean essentially sociological conclusions by which we must abide if we are to prosper. For example, both theorists hold that it is a law of nature that we should keep our promises (Hobbes more often speaks of covenants and contracts). Hobbes and, more clearly, Hume argue that it is in our interest to keep our promises. Why? Because if we do not, we will find it difficult to develop cooperative, promising relations with people whose cooperation would occasionally serve us well.

Both philosophers focus on the problem of *social order*, without which there will be turmoil, anarchy, and even violence, leading to a world in which all will be relatively destitute. Hume bases his own theory of social order on spontaneous coordination over centuries of social development. In essence, he invents and applies one of the greatest and most powerful theories in all of social theory: his theory of convention.

The most important difference between Hobbes and Hume is in how a sovereign is empowered *ab initio*. Hobbes recognizes that this is a difficult problem for him and his hypothetical account of the creation of government by collective agreement, or a "social contract." In his discussion of the metaphor of the social contract, Hobbes does not address the issue of how individuals would transfer their power as physical selves to an all-powerful

sovereign. Hume is notoriously hostile to the idea of a social contract, which he thinks is a philosopher's perversely unrealistic, false, and implausible device. Hobbes himself soon abandons his own social contract.

### Explanatory Theory

Hobbes does not present a general moral theory. He sees himself as the scientist of social order. John Locke, writing after Hobbes, assumes that people have natural rights, especially a right to own the property (land) with which they have mixed their labor. This intuitionist vision has had an enormous impact ever since, as in the work of Robert Nozick, although it has been repeatedly dismissed as ungrounded and irrelevant. It is a rare instance of intuitionism in political theory, although intuitionism is a major part of moral theory. On this score, political theory is far more solidly grounded. This account, however, cannot readily generalize into a fuller moral theory. Moreover, in a view that most of us might share, Hobbes and Hume reject any notion of property or ownership if there is no state to define and regulate them. Indeed, it is only by law that property is defined. In Locke's vision, when you mix your labor with a bit of unowned land, it becomes yours even before there is a state to define ownership. The idea of mixing one's labor may long predate Locke's account. In old English property law, when you sell your land to me, I must shovel some of its soil as though symbolically to acknowledge its being transformed into my property. Locke's theory elevates this odd English legal practice from a mere custom to the status of a moral principle. If the land has no prior owner, you may appropriate it according to the laws of the nation of which it is a part.

One of the great strengths of political philosophers such as Hobbes, Hume, Mill, and Rawls is that they take seriously and try to understand the world to which their theories are to apply, although Rawls largely passes on the burden of understanding the political and institutional world to others who, one hopes, wish to apply his theory of justice. Those others would have to include social scientists with deep understandings of institutions, how they work, and what they can be expected to accomplish. So far, those others have primarily been



moral philosophers who focus almost exclusively on the moral aspects of Rawls's theory and claims rather than on the workability of the theory as a system of justice.

Rawls recognizes that institutional analysis is based on a normative theory. He supposes that relevant institutions will manage redistribution and inculcate a commitment to justice in the population. But these institutions must first be designed. There is a circular quality to this hope because without the widespread commitment to a just distribution, relevant institutions are unlikely to arise or be created. What set of just institutions could push, say, the U.S. Congress or the British Parliament aside? Is there a living Republican or Tory in government who would support policies of redistribution at such a level as to achieve a high degree of equality in American or British society? Some revolutionary movements would achieve near equality by impoverishing everyone, as Winstanley and the Diggers argued for England in their time. So far, no one has proposed a serious way to achieve greater equality without massive negative trade-offs. The workability of Rawls's theory is therefore deeply in question. Suppose that the leadership of an advanced democratic industrial state tried to implement Rawls's theory of justice. Is there any chance at all that it would significantly advance the society toward justice as fairness? If this empirical question cannot be answered, the enterprise is in default.

Hobbes tries to ground his theory in an account of how individuals act and an explanation of why they act this way, and he assertively sees himself as a scientist. He uses his account of human incentives to explain how the world works. This is an astonishingly grand move on his part. On the other hand, he sets himself a very restricted purpose—to ground social order and then to leave individuals to make their own “investments” in their own prosperity once there is order. Stylized brief readings of Hobbes restrict his concern to survival, thereby trivializing his theory. In fact, he gives far more space to order as the necessary enabler of individual prosperity through protecting individuals' efforts on their own behalf against plundering and theft. In this vision, he foreshadows the later economic arguments of Adam Smith and others. His draconian dictator reduces the risks of planting our gardens or otherwise investing for our

future. Even today, we might see Hobbes's concern for order as an incontrovertible element of good government. People in the North Atlantic community, however, can typically take such an order for granted and may assume rather than explain it.

### Equality and Inequality

It is commonly presumed that equality is *prima facie* preferable to inequality (this is, of course, a moral claim) but that it should be balanced against other considerations that may causally trade-off with it (an explanatory or causal claim). Moral and explanatory theories therefore come sharply together in the analysis of distributive justice and egalitarianism. There are at least five standard arguments about the interaction between inequality and trade-offs with production. In some of these, inequality enhances production, either because unequal incentives (such as higher salaries) or unequal power (as in hierarchy) is needed to organize the production of beneficial goods, both personal and collective. These two arguments generalize to macrolevel arguments about the organization of society:

1. Equality entails reduced incentives to those who are especially productive and leads to a trade-off between equality and efficiency of production and therefore lower average welfare.
2. Hierarchy, and likely therefore inequality, is virtually necessary for achieving many desirable social goals.
3. Those who have greater resources than others can be trailblazers who support innovations that eventually benefit almost everyone.

These three relationships all involve direct trade-offs through increasing the overall welfare at the price of reduced equality, or vice versa. There are also trade-offs of greater equality with other considerations. Two that are well argued in extensive literatures are as follows:

4. The political power to attempt to achieve equality entails the power to do much else, including very undesirable things such as suppression of thought and dissent. In 1934, Joseph Stalin declared that socialist realism, a gross misnomer, was the only legitimate style for artists. After not

enjoying a performance of Shostakovich's music, he banned the gloriously patriotic composer for a while. Stalin's tastes ruled. Many artists died or ended in the Gulag, and many of the great painters and poets of the era were suppressed. The effort to achieve equality has often gone badly awry in similar ways even in supposedly humane places, such as Tanzania under its founding prime minister, Julius Nyerere. Nyerere's program of African socialism included an economic policy, *ujamaa*, that called for the collectivization of farms and forced relocation. Although the intention was to foster economic equality, the policy exacerbated poverty and proved to be unviable.

5. Equality in a single society requires autarky and risks the selective emigration of the especially productive individuals to nations where they can thrive better. The emigration is likely to be economically crippling for the society being abandoned, as it was in the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia under Soviet hegemony. In both these nations, as also in politically liberal India, deliberate policies of autarky hampered economic development. When India ended autarkic control of its economy in 1991, its economy exploded into very rapid growth. China's economy has similarly boomed since it turned to economic liberalism while maintaining political autocracy.

With respect to the first three arguments, inequality *de facto* can typically benefit people other than merely those who are better-off. The negative side of inequality in the last two cases comes from the side effects of attempting to achieve equality and not from a direct trade-off between equality and welfare. But these patterns are all potentially relevant for the institutional structures for achieving distributive justice. The last two are at the institutional or societal level and should therefore be especially interesting to political scientists. They are at the normative core of political theory.

Each of these relationships involves a trade-off of equality for something else: productivity, successful organization, freedom of expression, economic viability, or innovation. All of these involve productivity in some way. In each of the five cases, although there might be disagreements about the scale of the trade-off of equality that we should bear, there is not likely to be disagreement that some trade-off is desirable or even almost logically

necessary. These issues are especially important in the microcontexts of differential power of groups, such as those defined by gender and ethnicity, and in the macrocontexts of national and developing economies.

### Civil Society

It is a broadly held view that democracy and liberalism require civil society. Discussions of civil society are both normative and causal. The normative claims are that we will be better people and that we will constitute better polities or societies if we have civil society. This sometimes sounds like nothing more than a definitional claim, but it is also sometimes a causal claim, such as those John Stuart Mill, Carole Pateman, and others make for a connection between liberal democracy and personal autonomy and development. But the most challenging and potentially interesting of the claims of exponents of civil society is the grand causal claim that we need it if we are to cohere politically and socially. This is often accompanied by the claim that we need broad trust in government if government is to serve us well.

Against these theses, there is a long tradition of distrust in government, especially in the United States. Why distrust? Because the experiences both of England for centuries before the U.S. Constitution and of the 13 states during their brief union under the Articles of Confederation were rent by government attempts to control the economy in often destructive ways. Often there were identifiable beneficiaries of the controls. Hence, given the power to intervene, one can be fairly sure that governments will often do so. The straightforward incentives of government agents are to arrange benefits for themselves through impositions on others. Such incentives are a recipe for distrust in the sense that those on the wrong end of the interventions can see that their own interests are sacrificed for those of others merely because someone has the power to intervene. Distrust is therefore not merely a theoretical stance; it is a clear response to experience. One need not have a theory of why any kind of government exceeds its bounds when one has extensive evidence that it does. In the 20th century, technological innovations radically increased the scope of governmental excess to include massive, murderous brutality.

Even before James Madison's arguments for the U.S. Constitution, the recognition that governments were prone to abusing people in various ways was a central part of the development of liberal thought, especially in the work of Locke, Hume, and Smith. The original contributions of Madison to this long tradition were, first, to create a government that was self-regulated so that it could not easily overreach its authority and, second, to give that government very little authority while also diminishing the authority of the individual states. In Madison's view, the states were the principal threat to individual liberty, both economic and social.

### Civil Liberties

Liberty is the antithesis (and victim) of despotism. Securing civil liberties is the main point of constitutionalism and of court review of legislative and administrative acts. Historically, the defining issue in civil liberties in the nascent United States was the separation of church and state. One might even say that religion was the most important issue in English and U.S. political history and remains among the most important today, although apparently more in the United States than in the United Kingdom. England slowly followed the American solution despite having a state church that now has virtually no political role. The issue is perhaps most often cast as theoretical or normative. The principal issue on the ground for several centuries was, however, pragmatic. It was how to stop interference in politics and governance from the clergy, the church, and especially the Pope, all of whom acted as though they were hierarchically superior to secular political leaders, whom they even thought they had the God-given right to remove or force from office. Many English citizens and leaders long wanted such religious interference out of politics, and many were eventually willing to change their religious commitment in order to force the Catholic Church out of the political life of England.

Many thinkers also address the abuse of individuals by the church in its efforts to impose particular beliefs. Hobbes and Locke suppose that such efforts cannot succeed because they think that beliefs are not subject to choice, so that it is pointless to punish "wrong" beliefs. Hume would go

further to say there is no way to establish the truth of religious views. In any case, punishing beliefs as wrong is an epistemological sin. If you have not chosen your Catholic or Protestant beliefs, you cannot sensibly be held responsible for them.

If they are politically empowered, conflicting religious views get in the way of social order, as in the European wars of religion. They also complicate constitutional arrangements, as Madison and Thomas Jefferson recognized. With a multiplicity of religions seeking special status, the only sensible move is to deny recognition to all sects. This is both normatively and pragmatically a compelling move. In the views of Hobbes, Locke, and many others, it is also epistemologically compelling. Reaction to centuries of brutal treatment of people for holding wrong beliefs is one of the fundamental causes of the rise of liberalism, along with reaction to the frequent arrogance and arbitrariness of government officials, especially monarchs.

John Locke and Samuel von Pufendorf largely address theoretical issues of religion and governance, as opposed to pragmatic issues of actual problems on the ground. Many English thinkers before and after them have been far more concerned with the latter, especially with papal and clerical interference in domestic politics. After much bloodshed, the church was subdued enough to be transformed into the far less intrusive Anglican church. The first major move, on largely pragmatic grounds, to take government out of religious hands altogether was the separation of state and church implied in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. French constitutional provisions were even stronger after the revolution and have led to banning the hijab in public facilities, such as schools, and even in public. These policies have overwhelming support in France, in part because overt religious display is severely contentious and has been since the revolution, which was as anti-Catholic as anti-aristocratic.

Nations in which a particular religion is given substantial political influence generally tend to be illiberal, as in the cases of Iran under the ayatollahs and Saudi Arabia under Wahabbist hegemony. In the latter, possessing a Bible is a capital offense. Under both these regimes, the harshest principles of sharia law are imposed.

The substantial separation of church and state seems to be a necessary step for creating a liberal

society. This is likely not a theoretical but only a pragmatic claim, but it fits the contemporary situation in many nations. Again, philosophy must be informed by causal understandings if it is to be relevant to contemporary debate on theory or practice.

There is another pragmatic objection to state sanction of individual beliefs. The multiplicity of faiths in the United States and many other nations makes establishment of a state religion very conflictive, although this is not an issue for Locke, who would establish a state church but would not punish those who do not follow its beliefs. As though the issue were strictly a matter of normative theory, too much of what is written today still neglects pragmatic objections to state involvement in religion, especially Madison.

Given all the debate in the United States surrounding the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, debate that suggests that this is a severely fraught issue, it is remarkable that there was apparently no constitutional test of any law on religious grounds for nearly a century after the adoption of the constitution. The case that finally went to the Supreme Court to test the meaning and scope of the principle of the separation of church and state was *Reynolds v. United States* (1879), in which the court allowed the constitutionality of laws that penalized bigamy even for those men who claimed that multiple marriages were part of their Mormon religious duty. The court quoted Jefferson as holding that “the legitimate powers of the government reach actions only, and not beliefs.” Hence, the government could regulate behavior, including behavior motivated and even supposedly required by religious beliefs. This position is causally consonant with the view of Hobbes that the state can act against behavior but that it should not attempt to “correct” beliefs, which one perhaps cannot even know a person has and which one cannot force the person to change, even under threat from the Grand Inquisitor.

The constitutional protection of positive individual rights, perhaps of the freedom of religion foremost, has changed over the centuries, and therefore, the legal conception of the content of religion has changed and broadened. Naturally, this has been especially true after *Reynolds*. For example, the doctrine of separation of church and state stands uneasily behind conscientious objection to

military service. It is argued that one’s religious commitment to pacifism or objecting to killing on the battlefield is violated by requirements to serve in the military. Proof of one’s religious beliefs on this issue is prima facie demonstrated by membership in a church that has long preached pacifism, such as the Quakers and Jehovah’s Witnesses, but the idea has been broadened to include nonreligious moral objections.

### Distributive Justice

Hume famously, if too easily, dismisses the quest for “exact” equality. As Brian Barry argues in *Theories of Justice*, Rawls treats fairness as perhaps a secondary concern with welfare and its enhancement, as in his difference principle, which allows inequalities if they are produced by institutions that enhance the welfare of the worst-off class of people. Indeed, the issues in equality and its trade-offs with efficiency are at the core of Rawls’s theory. Thus, there are two parts of the theory: fairness and mutual advantage. The authors of the U.S. Constitution (1787) were worried that democracy would bring the majority, who were poor farmers, to power and that they would confiscate or tax away property to redistribute its value to themselves. In the most advanced nations, to which Rawls supposes his theory applies, there are virtually no remaining subsistence farmers, who a century ago still defined poverty for most people in many societies.

Recall Rawls’s theory of mutual disinterest in each other’s welfare. If the best distribution we can manage gives me fewer resources than it gives you, I am not concerned that you have done better than I have. If that is not true, we might degenerate into caring about how each of us ranks rather than our welfare per se.

If Rawls’s preferred social organization is to be achieved voluntarily rather than by forceful imposition, it seems implausible that anyone now living will see any significant progress toward it. Therefore, his theory seems at best to be an ideal theory in our time, and we can be morally certain that we will not see it put to work. Voluntary moves toward just distributions face a grand instance of the logic of collective action. The logic of collective action is devastating for the voluntary achievement of any large-scale provision. As Hume

says, it is impossible that people would contribute to a massive collective provision. *Impossible* is too strong a term, but only just barely so. That logic coupled with strong leanings toward self-interest implies that Rawls's theory could be put into effect only through coercion or through radically altering human nature to override self-interest.

### Representative Democracy

Democracy has taken many forms from its earliest rise as direct democracy with all citizens in the same forum, making decisions together. In contemporary societies, this is of course not feasible for national governance. Hence, the basic form that democracy must take is *representative* democracy, which is a new invention to handle large societies. Strictly speaking, only direct, face-to-face democracy is republican. The most important theorists of representative democracy are John Stuart Mill and Bernard Manin. Any ideal version of republicanism is doomed under modern conditions. Large size requires representative government with representatives who cannot possibly represent all of the diverse elements of their constituencies; frequent, short parliaments are desirable for republican values, with state and local elections every year. But all of this is impractical in our geographic and demographic conditions. Unfortunately, in a representative system, a strong parliament meeting frequently exacerbates the separation of the parliamentarians from the people, and representatives may come to resemble the rulers rather than the ruled.

Democratic practice is not without major flaws and serious failings. Briefly, let us consider a few problems in the working of representative democracy: First, deliberative democracy makes demands that go well beyond what is possible and at its worst descends to yelling and name calling when activists mobilize crowds to vent their ire at their opponents and elected officials. At its best, significant participation and deliberation beyond voting and talking with associates is restricted to proportionately very few people. Second, Anthony Downs argues convincingly that individuals generally have no interest in going to the trouble of voting. There is a vast literature both for and against his claims. Third, issues of equality and inequality suggest that the egalitarian core principle of democracy—one person, one vote—is de facto violated by massive

spending and by differential mobilization, as in the antidemocratic disruptions of vote counting in Florida's presidential election in 2000.

Finally, pause a moment to consider the perversion of the role of governors, as argued by John Calhoun. After leaving the national political stage a decade before the U.S. Civil War, Calhoun wrote *A Disquisition on Government*, which was an analysis of forces distorting the U.S. political system. In it, he stated that "those who exercise power and those subject to its exercise—the rulers and the ruled—stand in antagonistic relations to each other." Calhoun described the rulers and the ruled as two hostile classes: "The advantages of possessing the control of the powers of government, and, thereby, of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other considerations, ample to divide [any] community into two great hostile parties." The division here is not only one of status but also one of emoluments. In essence, Calhoun argues that political officeholders are separated from the rest of the community; they are a class apart. The supposed trustee becomes independent from the persons reposing their trust. The creature is stronger than the creator; hence, we suffer a lack of confidence in the representative system.

### Constitutionalism

The mechanical point of a constitution is to establish institutions of governance and to protect citizens from arbitrary state intrusions. In any given context, institutions could take many forms. Without prior order, a constitution cannot likely be made to work; indeed, without order, it might even be hard to engage some political body to write a constitution, although one might be promulgated by a current government, even an autocratic government. Having a prior history of successful government might be the best predictor of constitutional success. For example, the 13 American colonies had working governments and even, in some cases, articulate constitutions before the federal constitution of 1787. This prior experience, as well as the experience of living under a relatively orderly English government, enabled the constitutionalists of 1787 to write their constitution in relative quiet.

The main focuses of constitutionalism are to enable government and to constrain it. These

purposes sound contradictory, and they commonly are. Why create government to constrain government? As odd as the question sounds, it is easy to answer, so easy that its answers were likely taken for granted by the authors of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and by its ratifiers in subsequent state conventions. In this particular case, the federal constitution was needed to override state constitutions, especially in economic policy, with free trade among the states and exclusive federal regulation and taxing of international trade. Thereby, the constitution established a nation. In many other cases, extant governments have been altered or replaced by newly created constitutions. Many of these extant governments were autocracies, usually monarchical or military.

The main constraint on government action from a strong constitution is the rule of law. The rule of law against arbitrary government is the high dogma of 17th-century English constitutionalists. It essentially involves limitations on the exercise of official power. This is now often seen as the main point of a constitution and the central principle of Anglo-American law. Nonarbitrariness implies equal treatment, in part by blocking arbitrary action by monarchs and political office holders. It appears that the rule of law does not require a written constitution, because England has none and yet its rulers have generally followed the liberal principle. Moreover, from the earliest times, Saxons in Germany lived under an unwritten "constitution" of liberty, a fact that distinguishes English political developments.

There are two general strategic approaches to constitutionalism, treating the issue as primarily one of contracting or one of coordinating. That there could be varied forms that the constitution for a particular society could take already suggests that the problem is at least partly one of coordination. With only modest changes, the very brief and often vague U.S. Constitution or the massively detailed Indian Constitution might both work in the sense that they define institutions that, when put in place, successfully govern their societies.

Perhaps the dominant school of thought on how government may be morally justified has been contractarianism, to which an enormous array of philosophers have contributed, including classical thinkers as well as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and

countless others. There are subtle variations in contractarian arguments, but essentially they rely on a claim of consent that obligates us to obey the government to which we have consented. This is commonly framed as a moral argument. We are morally obligated by our prior consent. This is perhaps most clearly asserted by Locke, who is likely the most influential proponent of the social contract in the Anglo-Saxon world. Hobbes holds more simply that we collectively agree on election of a tyrant or dictator to coerce us into decent behavior. His is not an argument from ostensibly moral consent but from rational, self-interested consent. After taking this limited step of establishing government, there is no further project for the contractors to take on, and they have no further role in governing themselves.

Calling this contract theory can be seen as a grand instance of persuasive definition. If you and I contract legally, we commonly are morally bound to perform, unless we both agree not to do so. Hume mercilessly demolishes the implicit historical arguments of the development from a state of nature to a contracted government, as Hobbes posits while saying that such a state probably never existed. Hume notes simply that if we had contracted for or consented to our government, we would remember the event. Evidently none of us does remember, nor is there much of a record of our forebears having agreed. Worse still, many of us can hardly understand the contractarian claim. Contemporary constitutions are generally written by committees and voted into effect by some far less than unanimous part of the national population. Opponents of contractarians would argue that the masses cannot be morally obligated by such a process.

Having demolished the going theory in his time, Hume offers an alternative account, stating that government arises by convention. There was no start date, and there was most surely no conference room agreement. Our government evolves over time and may become dramatically different in form from one generation to the next. The form of the government is generally an unintended consequence of the disparate interests and inputs of the citizens, as portrayed in Charles McIlwain's history of constitutionalism.

In this view, the "contract" in the social contract is generally seen as morally binding by analogy

with a standard ordinary contract agreed to by the parties and backed by the law. Coordination as in Hume's theory is not morally binding; either it works or it does not. If there is a coordination convention, it might be immoral not to comply with it. For example, not driving on the right when there is a convention of driving on the right would be murderous and immoral as well as stupid. If I go to Australia, I will do my best to follow the Australian driving convention. But this choice does not turn on any prior agreement. My connection with the coordination is not a moral but a rational, self-interested commitment. We all act from our own interest by driving right in North America; without agreement or negotiation, we create a beneficial order for all. Similarly, Hume's convention account of the state is not normative, and any state that arises by convention is neither right nor wrong in principle. In Hume's vision, this is a plus. It is his great, persuasive move: creating collective benefits and good institutions from the self-interested motivations of individuals. Prior theorists almost uniformly think that self-interest is an obstacle to good government and social cooperation. In contrast, Hume sees it as central to the explanation of achieving good government.

In sum, a reason for or an appeal of social contractarianism is that it seemingly yields a moral reason to comply with its dictates. As François Guizot says, the hypothesis "of a primitive contract, as the only legitimate source of social law, rests upon an assumption that is necessarily false and impossible" (Pt. 1, Lecture 4). Unfortunately, on this issue, the theory fails. Its failure seems to be a source of nostalgia for many theorists who would like contractarianism to work and to cohere. Alas, it does neither. The vision of general consent is sweet but contrary to the possibilities of human nature in a world of scarcity of both status and goods. Again, Guizot states that the "necessary coexistence of society and government shows the absurdity of the hypothesis of the social contract" (Pt. 1, Lecture 6). It is astonishing that this cooperative vision is most famously argued by the nearly antisocial Rousseau. Guizot, who has done the massive work of cataloging the complicated, back-and-forth development, over more than a millennium, of constitutionalism and representative government in Europe, seems morally offended by the simplistic claims for a social contract as the standard of the right.

## Conclusion

We have only three major, broadly developed normative schools of thought on this question: the liberal, utilitarian, and egalitarian schools. There is also a developing fairness school that has been classified as a theory only recently in the Rawlsian theory of distributive justice. We have yet to see how it will stand the test of time. Rawls's followers often seem far more to fragment than to develop the theory. As noted above, what the theory most needs now is social-scientific analysis of institutions.

Utilitarianism is a general moral and political theory—in fact, the only one, Rawls says. Liberalism is a richly developed political theory that can live with almost any extant major moral theory; indeed, many of the great liberal writers, such as Mill, Hume, and Smith, generally brought individual morality and political theory together. In this combination seemingly across the two levels, utilitarianism and liberalism are especially richly developed. Many other, often ad hoc, arguments do not catch on to become genuine schools of thought. At its height, in the work of John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and Leonard T. Hobhouse, liberalism was generally seen as at one with utilitarianism. Libertarianism is a limited version of liberalism, which has many followers, such as Nozick. Alternative approaches make little headway. For example, variants of Kantian liberalism, as in the Victorian writings of Thomas Hill Green, have virtually no strong contributors today. The extraordinarily deep moral vision of Kant and his school does not readily carry over to the study of political institutions, which seem not to interest most Kantians. Marxism is a partial political theory that still has many proponents, but its main focus has been economic, and its economic theory largely fails. It has essentially no moral theory adjunct; indeed, many Marxists reject standard views of morality, as though to say that all social relations are caused by natural forces, not by choices of free agents. Hence, in their view, choice and morality are not relevant to our explanations.

It would hardly make sense to discuss some problems in our social world without the use of at least verbal game theory, strategic analysis, or economic models. Debates over how a constitution comes into being or how it works once it is enacted are unlikely to be fruitful without the clarity of the game-theoretic argument for dividing the two

main positions on this issue into contract and coordination. Hume had a nearly miraculous gift for grasping strategic interactions entirely verbally. Thomas Schelling says he is not a game theorist, meaning one who contributes to the theory. Rather, he is a practitioner, using game structures to help clarify patterns of social interaction. Political theory needs such practitioners.

The beginnings of liberalism and liberal society are in the resolution of the dreadful conflict between civil order and religious beliefs. The church's pervasive meddling in English politics provoked arguments that became general claims for further attaining civil liberties. Monarchs in England fought off the church, but they could not indefinitely fight off their own citizens. English history then informed debates in Philadelphia in 1787. Had the Church followed its own ideology, its minions would have rendered unto Caesar what was Caesar's. Instead, they hastened the growth of liberty and liberalism, which went far toward destroying the Church. The ultimate move was the separation of church and state, which we might justly call the necessary constitutional liberty.

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*See also* Democracy, Theories of; Equality; Justice; Liberalism; Liberty; Political Philosophy; Political Theory; Rights

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## NORMATIVE THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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The theory of international relations (IR) is subdivided into an analytical field, which describes and explains international events, and a normative field, which prescribes conduct and formulates moral judgments. This second field aims at producing ideals regarding what IR ought to be.

This entry first reviews the evolution of normative theory as technological advances and the emergence of nation-states created the need for new norms to govern IR. During the past 3 decades, norms in IR have undergone a second period of expansion, as a result of increased interest on the part of academics, along with factors outside academia, including globalization, the end of bipolarity, and terrorist attacks. After exploring this development, the entry examines the dilemmas associated with war, including the question of how to define war and issues related to decisions in the aftermath of war. Is a military intervention necessary to protect victims of genocide? Should innocents be killed in the name of political community? Should soldiers' duties end after victory? Next, problems arising in the context of global justice are discussed, with a focus on corrective, distributive, and environmental justice. The origin, the nature,

and the extent of obligations in humanitarian law and in social redistribution are discussed, as well as new realms such as protection of the environment and the use of international sanctions. The entry concludes with a look at the possibility of a global world order in which national identities can be transcended in a postnational, global community characterized by cosmopolitan democracy. There are various conceptions of the global political order regarding the creation of a cosmopolitan democracy: Is the disjunction between modern liberty (focused on the private sphere) and the republican public sphere in democratic states even greater in a cosmopolitan democracy? Is the political unity of the world possible despite the plurality of cultures and of ways of life?

In taking a philosophical approach to IR, normative IR plays several roles. The first function of normative theory is to argue for epistemological transparency. Any scientific theory expresses the more or less hidden normative preferences of the analyst, and this can give rise to the development of ideologies in the public sphere. For many, this first function often leads to a deadlock. The second function of normative theory, which this entry explores, is related to orientation. The philosopher Immanuel Kant, to illustrate what he means by "orientation in thinking," uses spatial indicators—the north, the south, the east, and then the west. Afterward, the same reasoning is applied to the world of logic. Orientation in thinking means to come of age, to be able to judge by oneself, to use one's common sense to make the right choice. To achieve this, shadow zones or *fault lines* have to be identified. This is a major purpose of political theory, according to John Dunn (1996). He insists that political theory should consist in indicating "a series of sharp, and as yet very poorly recognized disjunctions" (p. 33). The issues discussed in this entry reveal points of tension between the universal and the particular and among liberals, communarians, socialists, and pragmatists, with the aim of finding the right relationship among them.

### The Resurgence of Normative Theory

In the 1960s, Stanley Hoffmann insisted that political philosophy was in a lamentable state. According to him, this weakness was the result of philosophers' difficulties in applying their ideals at

the international level. Martin Wight emphasizes the same issue when he distinguishes between a theory of good life (*inside* political entities) and a theory of survival (*between* political entities). Today, the situation is quite different for philosophy, which appears as an “old thought” in IR.

### *An Old Thought*

The term *international* was first used by Jeremy Bentham in 1789. However, modern philosophies of IR were born in the Renaissance under the influence of two processes. The first corresponds to the transition from feudalism to the sovereign state. The question of resort to force became of great interest. Private wars conducted without the endorsement of the monarch were forbidden, and at the same time potestas was transferred from the Church to temporal power (through the creation of an interstate Law of War). The principle of sovereignty was built against foreign powers (the Pope and the Emperor), and rules were set up to implement a legitimate practice of war between states. The second process is related to the “great discoverers.” Galileo’s telescope, Copernicus’s astronomical system, and Columbus’s explorations led to a much broader understanding of human beings and their world. With this new recognition of human diversity came questions about the relationships among people. The entry into modernity was marked by a new awareness that the time of autarky was over.

Nevertheless, philosophy did exist before the construction of modern states. Even in ancient and medieval times, philosophers considered how to define otherness through the boundaries of churches, cities, and communities. Stoicism defended a moral universalism that transcended ethnic differences. In the Middle Ages, the concept of empire involved a pacific function that was theologically justified. Civic humanism, which first appeared in the Italian peninsula, would become one of the sources of foreign policies even in Great Britain and the United States. Thus, foreign relations came to be theorized by normative discourses, which reveal different ways of considering the boundaries between inside and outside.

With modernity and the rise of the nation-state, relations between states become a more complex issue that became visible through the constitution

of political science as a new discipline. In 1919, the birth of IR as a science brought back these normative orientations. The first debate opposed liberals and realists. Liberals promoted not only Aufklärung but also “*doux commerce*” (Baron de Montesquieu), historical progress through education, and the peaceful virtues of democracy. These were the target of realists’ criticism, which stressed the role of the sovereign states and their competition and overshadowed biological and spiritual factors. However, the moral dimension of liberal thought was acknowledged by Hans Morgenthau himself, who is known as the father of an approach that separates morality from politics. As observers and judges, political scientists have to denounce wrong choices (as Morgenthau did during the Vietnam War). As practitioner, the statesman must adopt an ethic of “lesser evil,” which breaks with an idealist perspective without opting for an ethic that claims the absolute good, which is inaccessible. Contrary to the English school (Martin Wight), the major part of the following generation was strongly influenced by positivism, which was at its peak from the 1980s; the behavioralist moment has departed from these normative trends.

### *Intra-Academic Factors in the Resurgence of Normative Theory*

The first intra-academic factor in favor of the development of normative theory lies at the heart of Western political theory. John Rawls’s opus magnum, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), gave to normative theory a second birth. Although Rawls did not directly tackle the issue of international justice in this early work, several commentators did, thus generating a broad consideration of the idea of global distributive justice.

The second factor lies within IR itself. In the 1980s, critics of new research on scientific realism (structural realism and neorealism) or liberalism broadened the basis of their critique and questioned the scientific authority of these works by means of philosophy. The return of norms, narrowly speaking (rules of international law) and in the wider sense (standards of conduct for public and private actors), is one of their best arguments. These approaches tended to explain the nature of international norms (their origin, implementation, and national integration and change) as well as

their impact on states' behavior. But above all, they produced an ethical discourse on what global regulation ought to be that nourishes several sectors of the field—for example, humanitarian interventions and strategic cultures. This is why they deserve the designation of *ideational turn*. Such tendencies can be considered as a return to the origin of the field, as the first interparadigmatic debate between liberals and realists was taking into consideration the issue of norms.

### *Extra-Academic Factors in the Resurgence of Normative Theory*

Three extra-academic factors are especially noteworthy in the resurgence of normative IR. First, the process of globalization became stronger. If the abolition of distances originates from the first phase of modernity (the Renaissance), wars and development in communication technologies have strengthened this process. In this regard, globalization is characterized by a density of networks, a greater velocity of information flows, and a complex interdependence that favors transnational participation. In such a context, at what level must the accurate meaning of political action be defined—at the national level or beyond?

Furthermore, the end of bipolarity, which had structured identities since 1917, strengthened the already existing uncertainties regarding the identity of human beings, and the delineation between self and other became increasingly ambiguous. David Boucher (1997) sums up this situation in his famous question “Who am I?” and adds, “the consequent politics of recognition, inclusion and exclusion bring into focus not only politics of the nation, state and cosmopolitanism, but also of gender, race, religion and ethnicity” (p. 173).

Finally, terrorist attacks brought a new urgency to normative IR. When an unpredictable event happens and seems to brutally interrupt the political and social processes, reflection is needed to find out to what extent “the thread of tradition has been broken,” to use Hannah Arendt's expression. The attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the terrorist assaults in Bali and Mombasa (2002) and Madrid (2004) are evidence of such a breakdown. Of course, it would be presumptuous to consider that the attacks in the United States have had the same consequences that Nazism and the Holocaust

had on a whole generation of intellectuals, such as Theodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt. However, the global media coverage of these events has confronted both analysts and citizens with something tragic that calls for a meaning. In Robert Keohane's view, the 9/11 attacks reemphasized the importance of integrating normative issues into political philosophy and research on IR. Keohane emphasizes that a basic function of a liberal state is to protect its citizens from the fear of cruelty and that helping people come to terms with terrorism is part of that task.

### **Dilemmas of War**

Contrary to pessimistic expectations, the bipolar system of the Cold War era ended without military struggle. However, the collective euphoria vanished, and fears regarding the feasibility of setting up a peaceful world order have appeared. Today, irregular wars, civil wars that evolved into ethnic cleansing, and increasing military interventions outside the United Nations (UN) Security Council's authorization all indicate a need for moral judgments. Thomas Hobbes's world is coming back, whereas it seemed that we were living in Kant's. But is war still the *ultima ratio legem* between political communities? We can distinguish three kinds of dilemmas regarding the nature, the justification, and the termination of war.

### *Defining War*

Modernity draws on a specific definition of war: a struggle between enemies conceived as political entities. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau gives a definition of war in his *Social Contract*: It is “a relation, not between man and man, but between state and state, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers” (Book 1, chap. 4). This definition is the opposite of current conceptions of war, which go far beyond its first usage. Today, one speaks of a war against terrorism, war against poverty, or war between civilizations. First, the number of violent actors has increased. The state is not the unique gladiator anymore. Moreover, some states, and even intergovernmental institutions, call on private military societies to provide security. Such a practice is ambiguous: Do private

actors benefit from a right to kill? Several libertarians subscribe to this possibility and are delighted to see that security is becoming a good, among others. They stand in opposition not only to classical liberals but also to radical anarcho-capitalists, who agree with Adam Smith on this point—that wealth alone cannot ensure peace because harmony of interests between states cannot be achieved. However, in Milton Friedman's opinion, states must develop their own defense posture in the nuclear era.

In addition, Clausewitzian logic, which subordinates the military to politics, would also be called into question. New actors would put aside negotiations and compromises and instead advocate an apocalyptic rhetoric. States, particularly Western states, would also resort to a new approach to war. They would act not to restrain their enemies' will but to socialize them by punishing them, with the aim of changing their values. These post-bipolar interventions are known as *policing wars*. The "war against terrorism" as well, which critics have called a false expression at a conceptual and an operational level alike, fits in with this logic of a "postnational war." The underlying goal would consist in achieving a global political homogeneity on the basis of the dominant parties' values. This debate on the nature of war has taken a critical aspect across the Atlantic with the multinational military campaign known as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Because this strategic action originated in a neoconservative ideology, some analysts have pointed out the influence of Leo Strauss. Such interpretation is based, however, on a misunderstanding of Strauss. His assessment of modern liberal democracy, especially in the United States, is deeply pessimistic, and this frame of mind is the opposite of the current neoconservatives' optimistic and demiurgic mood.

### *Justifying War*

When is a military intervention justified? Is it moral to resort to force in order to protect populations that are victims of oppression? A tension appears between the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and the principle of protection of human rights. This tension is all the more acute when resort to force in the name of universal values happens to be selective; for instance, the type of international intervention

considered in Bosnia will not be considered for Chechnya. How can the dilemma between universal principles and specific cases be resolved? Does the just war tradition, which refuses to separate ethics from politics, still provide accurate orientations?

Elaborated by Saint Augustine, the doctrine of just war sets up criteria regarding the beginning and the progress of military interventions: (a) *justa causa* (intervention should aim at protecting life), (b) *auctoritas principii* (only duly constituted authorities may wage war), and (c) *recta intentio* (rules of law must be observed). To adapt it to the 20th century, Michael Walzer undertook a revision of just war theory. First, he refocused *justa causa* on self-determination and resistance to aggression (against the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of an independent state). The highest purpose of a state—or of a community threatened by a metropolitan government—is to defend a territory and a way of life (shared values). Thus, Walzer subscribes to the British utilitarian ideals of the beginning of the 19th century, according to which democracy cannot be imposed from outside but arises out of particular experiences. Moreover, when a community is threatened and has no power to struggle, as in Kosovo in 1999, military intervention is required. This is the only type of just war acknowledged by Walzer. Humanitarian intervention should be a form of mutual help that occurs only after the identification of an "unbearable" aggression and sufficient inadequacies in self-defense.

Second, Walzer argues that only a "supreme emergency exemption" can justify aggression that violates moral norms such as the principle of discrimination between civilians and combatants. The best example of such justifiable but immoral action ("dirty hands") remains Winston Churchill's decision to bomb German towns in 1940 to 1941 in order to create intolerable conditions for the population. Neither absolutist nor utilitarian moral theories can explain such cases. Absolutist theories hold that moral rules or principles do not admit of any exceptions; hence, there can be no justification in the name of "innocent victims." Utilitarian theories deny the relevance of innocence applied to a part of a population as long as the consequences of an act can benefit the greatest number. Both approaches reveal weaknesses. The real question is "How can we support criminal

acts decided on by leaders without forgetting the ethical issues?" As long as the action is taken by duly elected political leaders and the survival of the community is at stake, such actions can be endorsed. However, this limits the application of the emergency exemption; it cannot be applied to terrorist practices and can be used only by duly elected political leaders. Even though terrorist movements may claim to be acting in the name of *justa causa*, they cannot endorse any legitimate authority or assume responsibility for actions that are morally unjustified. Thus, states have the monopoly on "dirty hands." This pro-state bias is one of the major criticisms formulated against this theory. Critics argue that Walzer is applying a double standard, denying to terrorists what is acceptable when done by political leaders. Thus, critics have questioned whether such an approach is based on too much confidence in the moral rectitude of our leaders.

After 9/11, just war and its underlying moral dilemmas reappeared at two different levels. The first one regards the interpretation of Operation Iraqi Freedom: Was this a humanitarian intervention to end a tyrannical form of government? Several analyses challenge this view on the ground that humanitarian interventions cannot be carried out to change the nature of a regime but only when great atrocities are committed. Beyond the question of the support brought by the other democratic states (desirable but not mandatory for those who hold that intervention to end tyranny is acceptable, necessary for those who believe that it is justified only in the case of great atrocities), what is called into question here is the goal of such intervention. Several interpreters have disagreed with the rhetoric of a crusade or crusading spirit to justify the Iraqi operation, invoking one of the main features of just war theory. The case of Iraq promotes in-depth discussion on the ethical aspects of the resort to force against an indirect threat. International law distinguishes between preemptive and preventive war. In moral philosophy, there is a similar debate on preventive war and anticipatory attack. According to Walzer, anticipatory attack would be morally acceptable only if three cumulative elements are present: (1) an intent to cause harm by a "determined enemy" (whether in the present or in the past), (2) a degree of active preparation that turns this intent into a positive

danger (e.g., building up offensive forces along the border), (3) and a situation in which waiting or doing anything other than fighting increases the risk of being attacked. Preventive war, on the contrary, is based on speculative arguments and is aimed at maintaining a balance of power. It cannot, therefore, rely on moral values.

The second level concerns the possibility of applying just war theory to the fight against terrorism. In the Augustinian tradition, some thinkers define terrorist actions as acts of war that justify resort to force against their authors. Again, the "dirty hands" issue arises. When a terrorist refuses to reveal information about an attack against a civilian population, the use of torture has been approved according to the paradigm of the "ticking bomb." It stands for an extreme case where torture is justified so as to prevent harm to citizens. This argument is consequentialist in its appeal to the prevention of an imminent catastrophe and its application of the principle of cost-benefit analysis. Such a procedure must be visible, and those responsible must be held accountable to minimize the frequency and the severity of the practice. However, despite these measures of control, the practice of "dirty hands" can be excessive or may favor double standards (discriminatory interpretation of torture by the actor).

The deployment of armed forces abroad and the struggle against terrorism in the name of just war are not instances of actions taken in accordance with consensual principles. Are we required to think on a "case-by-case" basis? Pragmatism argues that we must do so.

### *Ending War*

Kant argues that victory is not synonymous with moral superiority. Military victory changes the balance of power but not one's moral commitment. Kant adopts a symmetric reasoning: If rules of *jus bellum* are not respected at the beginning of a war, they will not be respected after the war either. However, just war theory is rather silent with respect to the end of war. What does the post-conflict situation require from the winner, and what kind of dilemmas are highlighted here?

Once a war has ended, five principles should be applied to avoid grievances leading to acts of revenge:

1. the proportionality (the fairness of the terms of a treaty) and the publication of peace agreements;
2. the recognition of civil rights;
3. discrimination among leaders, soldiers, and civilians when imposing sanctions;
4. compensation (financial restitution, material reconstruction, etc.); and
5. civil and military rehabilitation (demilitarization and disarmament, police and judicial retraining, and human rights education).

However, can these obligations guarantee a just peace and renew the reflection on positive peace? A just peace implies a “thin” recognition of the other, conceived as an autonomous entity from a liberal standpoint; a “thick” recognition of the cultural identity of the other; the renunciation of armed violence; and the establishment of rules, rights, and duties and their formalization in a legal document. The point is to create a new common language between different communities. Liberals have criticized this idea because they define peace in strictly legal terms. In other words, peace can only have a legal dimension in the framework of the existing international rules. This restrictive definition is grounded in the “cultural neutrality” of liberalism in the public sphere. Identity is therefore a concept that belongs to private life and is not acknowledged in the framework of diplomatic negotiations.

The danger of neocolonialism represents a second dilemma if the change of political system becomes the goal of the post–World War II era. Historical examples (the Japanese and the German experience) as well as consequentialist arguments (a government’s change is the best way to ensure security) may rule out this danger. However, this danger will always exist. The imposition of democracy by force appears to be a revolutionary practice, all the more dangerous since it is based on a strategy of exportation that excludes any other way of implementing democracy.

### Dilemmas of Global Justice

According to the Greco-Roman tradition, both corrective and distributive justice can flourish only

inside political entities. By integrating *jus post-bellum*, the just war theory has opened a new perspective in favor of international corrective justice, as the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) shows. The road to global justice gets wider as other directions (e.g., environment, sanctions) are being explored. Unfortunately, none of them have elaborated their own theory of justice.

### Corrective Justice

The 20th century underwent two World Wars, colonial wars, and a good deal of civil warfare. Perhaps the main consequence of this consists in the development of public international law to regulate the relationships between states (the Geneva Convention) and, after conflicts, to judge those responsible (e.g., the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, ad hoc tribunals, and the ICC). This process bears out Kantian views according to which the painful experience of war arouses the need for unity relying on a morally grounded system. In the opinion of the first president of the Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, Antonio Cassese, it is more and more shameful not to be involved in this corrective justice effort. However, this trend has been called into question. Behind this kind of justice lies a paradox that the German jurist Carl Schmitt was the first to criticize.

Modernity produced a *Jus Publicum Europaeum*, a set of European rules produced in the 16th century to put an end to the wars of the Middle Ages and regulate the resort to force. This transformation created a new humanized “nomos of earth”; that is, a permanent principle of space distribution that usually consists in seizing, dividing, and exploiting territories. Modernity does allow hostility in the acquisition of new territory, but this practice must be regulated. Thus, within the new international law of the 20th century, war becomes illegal as a method for resolving the competition among states. The enemy becomes a criminal: On the one hand, no negotiations can take place with him; on the other hand, he must be punished. The relation that Carl Schmitt sees is the exact opposite of the league of states described by Kant. This change within the law has given rise to total wars; the denial of hostility is the root of absolute hostility. The goal of war is not to fight an enemy but to annihilate it under the assumption that the enemy

is guilty. In this view, Schmitt sees a correlation between the criminalization of the enemy and the increasing resort to depersonalized aerial wars, which leads to the suppression of the Other. Corrective justice becomes, therefore, an ideology that promotes inhumanity on behalf of humanity.

### *Distributive Justice*

According to Dunn (1996), a sharp contrast can be seen

between a world of mutually recognizing Nation States and conscientious agencies of putative international beneficence, created, funded and defended by those states, and a world of brutally unequal suffering and enjoyment in which vast masses of the poor have little, if any, prospect of a happier existence even for their children's children. (p. 33)

Two bridges are conceived to fill up this gap and establish new transnational obligations toward the weakest states. The first one was conceived after the 1972 food crisis in Bangladesh by proponents of utilitarianism, who argued that responsibility is based not only on moral considerations but also on utilitarian ones. Passivity toward the pain of another moral agent involves a responsibility, which is identical to the pain we would feel if we had caused it ourselves. The pain of other moral agents creates a responsibility among others. This moral postulate is criticized because of its excessive requirements, which go far beyond "agent-centered prerogatives" and free consent. Yet such minimalist reactions define international aid as a question of charity rather than of justice. Other political analysts hold intermediary views and draw on Kant's concept of imperfect obligation: Helping people in foreign countries does not depend on an agent's arbitrary will, even though these agents decide the moment and conditions of its application. Once again, this third option entails imperfections: The decision to act is most of all individual here; hence, it will not necessarily meet the emergency. To tackle such issues, decisions must be taken by several actors.

The second bridge is proposed by left Rawlsians. They intend to overcome a weakness within the first postulate, which does not allow moral agents

to meet each other (e.g., those who give and those who get). The ground of the argument here is the application of the entire Rawlsian theory at the international level. In this view, states find themselves in an "original position" from which they must determine principles of justice between states in the same way that individuals are to choose principles of justice independently of their specific position in society (i.e., independent of whether states are rich, poor, etc.). However, the framework used in the theory of justice is too narrow and needs to be enlarged to include public actors. Moreover, the two Rawlsian principles of maximal equal freedom and the differences that would be allowed by individuals behind a "veil of ignorance" are transferred to the international level. This extension is demanded by the historical context and brings out the development of constraining institutional mechanisms. In light of the unfair economical inequalities to which they contribute, well-off states have to subscribe to a consequentialist posture that compels them to set up new rules, especially in the field of taxation.

These two last perspectives, both of which are part of the cosmopolitan standpoint, meet the same challenge: Can distributive justice emerge outside a specific political framework? Liberals and communitarians are cautious, and their answer is "No." Rawls attacks these views as misinterpretations: Distributive justice as defined in Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* must be experienced inside society; its setting cannot be global. Some communitarians share this point of view. They insist on the idea of *affective proximity*. No moral relationship can develop between agents without this element. They also stress that each mode of distribution depends on the community's identity. Therefore, international redistribution does not result from any obligation but relies on the goodwill of rich people.

### *New Frontiers*

Global justice enlarges its boundaries in three directions. The first means to integrate new dimensions, such as environmental justice, which is based on the "ecological footprint" principle. In this view, each of us leaves a footprint in the environment that is determined by the amount of resources we require and the pollution we contribute. This footprint may be very large in the case of

armed conflict, which is often very destructive of the environment. Understanding our moral obligation to the environment requires both deontological and consequentialist approaches. It strengthens Hans Jonas's "responsibility principle" regarding future environmental degradation and natural disasters resulting from the development of new techniques. Such a principle draws on a "heuristic of fear," which conveys moral awareness of anticipated human threats to the environment. Nevertheless, one source of environmental justice—political romanticism that promotes a "return to nature"—remains a major issue. Indeed, this doctrine is restricted to the damages caused by *human beings* only. Thus, this anthropocentric bias tends to emphasize human pain resulting from environmental degradation.

The second direction relies on a post-bipolar trend: the increasing use of sanctions against states and transnational actors. Must we resort to sanctions, such as embargos, to compel agents to respect the rules of international law? Sanctions represent a third way, which lies between not responding to violence and launching a military intervention. Morality speaks in favor of sanctions. According to Woodrow Wilson, a sanction embodies a virtuous foreign policy. It is the ideal tool for the censor, and it can have a deadly impact on the target. However, its detractors put forward three arguments based on classical moral doctrines. First, sanctions call into question the discrimination principle of just war theory because they cause pain (physically and psychologically) to innocents. Second, civilians are transformed into a means of exerting pressure to shape political decisions, which contradicts the deontological ethic because such pressure is coercive. Third, sanctions cause damages to humans while not achieving their political goals, which is incompatible with utilitarian logic. All these critics benefit from a large audience, which leads today to an "abolitionist" standpoint with respect to sanctions. Most of all, they express the vivacity of contemporary ethical reflections regarding international punishment measures.

The third dimension of the current analysis aims at enlarging the boundaries between caution and cosmopolitanism. Could these two postures meet regarding the concept of negative obligations? That is the aim of the "no-harm" proponents. In IR, "Do no harm or cause prejudice"

provides the basis for a moral consensus between cultures. These statements echo Judith Shklar's "liberalism of fear," which also involves universal features, as each of us can share an emotion that paralyzes the whole being in the face of cruelty. The do-no-harm principle is criticized because it is sometimes considered incomplete. It lacks positive obligations, such as the duty to rescue. Several of its defenders emphasize that no harm is a first step to building benevolence (positivity is therefore delayed but not ruled out). Besides, the fact of being aware of the vulnerability of "distant foreigners" helps develop an attachment to humanity. Thus, cosmopolitanism sets up a link between the principle of justice and the implementation of a world community, as discussed in the following section.

### Dilemmas of Global Political Order

Political theory of IR deals with the emergence of a world community: how a political community becomes more and more inclusive. Can it eventually embody the whole of humanity? As such, the very idea of a world community calls into question the Westphalian order as well as the international order defined by Hobbes. This theory also conveys to us a universalism that transcends the diversity of cultural expressions.

#### *Universum/Pluriversum: Two Emblematic Dualities*

When referring to a *civitas gentium maxima* in the 18th century, Christian Wolf had in mind a fiction gathering all human beings inside the same political unit. Three centuries later, his dream remains attractive. This emergence of a concrete world community gives rise to two main philosophical debates.

#### Kojève/Strauss

After Georg Hegel, Alexandre Kojève describes the "end of history," which means the end of politics, defined as a state of conflictual interaction between states. A universal and homogeneous state emerges, and individual states become its federated components. Public international law becomes domestic law for members who share the



same way of being and thinking. The wise man is involved in this centralization process. He becomes the prince's advisor because, historically, thinking is synonymous with improving efficiency. Leo Strauss challenges this idea in two ways. First, he tries to keep philosophy apart from history, especially from the instrumentalist deviation of political leaders. Indeed, the rulers of the universal state may attempt to provide wisdom to all and practice tyranny. Second, the idea of the universal state meets with two obstacles: (1) the irreducible plurality of *political systems* (they arise out of specific morals that cannot be imported) and (2) that an *ideal system* is not achievable at the world level (it remains a regulating idea).

#### Schmitt/Kelsen

These two lawyers often disagree regarding constitutional issues in modern states. They also have opposite views regarding IR. Hans Kelsen criticizes the "dogma of sovereignty," a concept doomed to be overshadowed by the history of justice. Kelsen's normativism draws a parallel between relationships among states and interindividual relationships. The creation of a third party in primitive tribes and of courts of law in states allowed the solving of disputes between individuals. These procedures stand for the foundation of the community. Likewise, the creation of international criminal justice mechanisms is the mainspring of the international community. The project proposed by Kelsen to the UN, therefore, gives precedence to a jurisdiction and not to the Security Council. Carl Schmitt states that such ideas draw on an Anglo-Saxon (belonging to English-speaking countries) framework that calls into question the *jus publicum Europaeum*. Theologically, the "one world" embodies the Antichrist. Indeed, *universum* means to achieve what cannot be achieved from a human standpoint. The Tower of Babel is an illusion, and we have to get rid of it. It is an expression of the secularization of the mind often pointed out by Carl Schmitt. Through *universum*, human beings try to put themselves in God's place. At a political level, Schmitt contends that it is impossible to create a federal state at a world level. Such federal state lacks the most important feature of a state: homogeneity. Moreover, this project of

unity forgets the underlying elements of politics: the struggle for power between small unities (empires in the 20th century).

These two approaches have nourished debates among political scientists and have given rise to a wide range of reactions, (e.g., Arendt). They also show how political views on universal and plurality can be different inside the same culture. These debates are still going on, especially regarding the idea of cosmopolitan democracy.

#### A Cosmopolitan Democracy

Cosmopolitan democracy's program aims at re-actualizing our understanding of Kant by inviting us to go beyond it. The Kantian project of perpetual peace consists of three articles. First, a civil constitution must be republican. Contrary to despotism, which imposes its political ideas and conception of happiness on everyone, the republic is synonymous with separation of powers, protection of freedom, and guarantees of peace, thanks to the general will of the people. The second article aims at implementing a peace treaty between states (mutual nonaggression through institutional means). Such a treaty does not lead to the creation of a supranational state but rather to the recognition by each state of the sovereignty of the others: in other words, a confederation of free states. The third and last article introduces the idea of a cosmopolitan law based on universal hospitality. Thus, Kant insists that foreigners have the right to be treated without hostility in another state.

In Jürgen Habermas's view, this project is contradictory, inconsequential, and inadequate. If Kant intends to create a cosmopolitan state, he does not call into question states' autonomy. Kant does not foresee the adoption of a constitution that would make rules legally binding. The inconsistency of the Kantian position results from the lack of coherence between the cosmopolitan state and the confederal architecture. Ultimately, the nature of the latter is quite different from what Kant had first in mind: a world citizenship. Individuals keep depending on the state. Kant does not remain faithful to his individualistic and liberal philosophy. Finally, according to Habermas, Kant's views are inadequate because they are mainly the expression of the conceptual and political reality of the 18th century.

Habermas revises this project in three ways: (1) he conducts a criticism of the nation-state, (2) he draws on the creation of a postnational identity, and (3) he transfers this identity to the global level. The nation-state is condemned as a political organization. It is unadapted to the globalization process and is a source of bloody conflicts. Moreover, the link between republic and nation is more sociopsychological than conceptual. It arises out of a historical process (a catalyst) and the individual's mentality (sacrifice to protect the homeland).

Habermas explores the link between republic and nationality. He compares the liberty of the state with individual freedom. The latter is a right that is separate from the national conscience, as modern natural law suggests it. This separation allows the formation of a new supranational identity that articulates national identity (culture without any political dimension) and constitutional patriotism (universalization of human rights and democracy). Habermas contends to transform this identity into an association of free and equal cosmopolitans. An ethics of discussion is developed beyond borders thanks to intersubjectivity. This ethics is based on concrete situations (to see and to manage the state of inequality and/or distress experienced by individuals). Influenced by these views, David Held aims at strengthening a "robust political cosmopolitanism" grounded on a multiscalar democracy, which occurs at two levels: decision taking on the one hand, citizenship on the other. So as to be legitimized but also efficient, public decisions must be taken at the more adapted level. Three criteria allow verification of (1) *expanse* (to assess the field of individuals whose life expectancy and chance of survival are affected by public choices), (2) *intensity* (to measure the impact of a public policy on a given group), and (3) *compared efficiency* (to determine the necessity of a regional or world intervention compared with an intervention at a local level). A concept of "differentiated sovereignty" emerges from Held's thought. The subsidiary principle must be called on to determine what level is the most accurate. Held also introduces the idea of a multilevel citizenship that relies not solely on territorial community. Voting is no longer the unique expression of citizenship. To carry weight on decisions and to practice accountability, for instance, are other ways of exerting

citizenship. Therefore, Held's cosmopolitanism maintains the nation-state but invites going beyond it through new public commitments.

### *Reserves and Alternative Conceptions*

Several criticisms have been formulated against this cosmopolitan democracy. These criticisms have not been limited to the utopian features underlying the latter and come from pluralistic traditions (liberal, communitarian, or socialist). From a practical standpoint, the deliberative activity characteristic of democracy arose out of a common political culture that has developed over time and has required many sacrifices. Considered in the light of the national construction process of the 19th century, it appears that a political culture results from the political institutions that produce culture and not the reverse. Outside this framework, citizenship is fragile and appears as an abstraction. In the second case, cosmopolitanism would hide imperial temptations.

Ontologically, society is synonymous with plurality. Rawls holds this view when he analyzes the extension of the justice principle outside liberal societies. He challenges the idea of a unity of the world. There will always be different peoples (e.g., liberal people, decent people), and rogue states will always exist. Therefore, a law of peoples could be implemented but not cosmopolitanism itself.

Alternative conceptions draw on other frameworks. Thus, Walzer claims a pluralism of high density that controls states' action through three kind of agents—international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and regional unions. This order is midway between a unified world state (unrealistic and dangerous in case of authoritarian deviation) and a state of savage international anarchy (as much a threat as the unification of the world). Departing from this conception, Amitai Etzioni states that the international order must be built on persuasion. In his opinion, the world dynamic will achieve what he calls a "community of communities," which is a source of order. Only imagined until now, this global community is likely to be effective. Indeed, states are adopting a new logic of responsibility and new diplomatic practices, which favor a transnational moral dialogue between individuals. Ultimately,

global safety authorities are called on: They share not only moral values and costs but also the power to struggle against traditional and nontraditional threats. However, such a trend has to cope with the U.S. leadership—often tempted by imperial adventures—and with the lack of power of the UN, characterized by Etzioni as the “old regime.”

Republicanism is at the source of another trend. The very idea of the republic challenges that of *dominium* (to possess the subjects’ or citizens’ bodies as the feudal lord did) and of *imperium* (the power of authority that relied on force). The republic aims at achieving civic liberty and at developing participation in the public sphere. This political model was associated with a defensive foreign policy by Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Montesquieu, and Rousseau in their description of a confederation of small republics. Too large, and republics are exposed to domestic discords. Too small, and they are threatened by their powerful neighbors. How can republics maintain their political unity? Through the restriction of their territory and the reinforcement of their military capacities, which are the main advantages of these confederations. Their foreign policies are reactive rather than aggressive. Thus, this ideal remains very close to the autarky of the Ancients. Moreover in Rousseau’s opinion, its transfer outside a specific setting—the Helvetic confederation—remains hazardous. Nevertheless, republicanism is still a source of inspiration today. In an economic globalization context, its critique of liberalism creates new interest. Overall, republicanism promotes values of public virtue and civic conscience that minimize the arbitrary exercise of power and the impacts on foreign policy, which becomes non-dominating. Thus, a global civic republicanism could provide new rules for interstate cooperation.

### Conclusion

Fault lines regarding war, justice, or global order nourish many debates. Nevertheless, two main trends have appeared: The first claims to revise major political and ethical issues, while the second aims to create new ideas regarding current challenges. Nowadays, a third trend consists in decentering our philosophical standpoint by integrating ideas from non-Western cultures. But all these

inquiries share the same questions and challenges: What is humanity? Does it stand for an idea that is becoming a norm, a set of concrete rules, or an ideal that influences action? Is it a source of bestiality or an appeal to mutual kindness? A group called to build a world political culture or a reduced community that must remain particular? Normative theories of IR will continue to provide different answers. Thus, these debates should not be tackled by Greek “garden philosophers,” withdrawn into the private sphere, but by philosophers open to the public sphere, who get to the heart of contemporary issues.

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See also Hobbes, Thomas; Idealism in International Relations; Intervention; Kant, Immanuel; Preemptive War; War and Peace

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
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## NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

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*See* Arms Race





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## OLIGARCHY

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The concept of oligarchy repeatedly appears in political and common discourse from ancient Greece and up through modern times. Practically all reference sources provide similar definitions of oligarchy—rule of the few in their own interests and not in the interest of the majority or the public good. Etymology confirms this connotation: *oligos* = few, *arche* = rule (ancient Greek). From Aristotle comes the initial meaning of oligarchy—it is a “degeneration” of aristocracy as the form of rule; oligarchy is an “incorrect” and “spoilt” aristocracy when the few rule exclusively in their own interests. The notion of oligarchy can be found in the writings of Plato, Polybius, and their contemporaries and later in Niccolò Machiavelli. It has been used in modern social science by Moisei Ostrogorsky, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, and others. The term *oligarchy* is applied in political and nonpolitical contexts—political regimes and political parties, trade unions, church organizations, educational establishments. This entry presents the contemporary and classic meanings of the concept, the main existing theory, and its further development in post-Communist countries.

### Who Are the “Few”?

From today’s point of view, one can say that the “few” who, according to the logic of the notion, form the backbone of oligarchy may actually

represent very different groups—slave owners, landlords, nobility, the rich and wealthy, the top brass of any kind, party bureaucracy, and so on. *Rule of the rich and wealthy* (“plutocracy”) may be only one of the meanings of the notion of oligarchy. In economic science, the closest analogue of oligarchy is oligopoly: a situation in which only a few large-scale “players” dominate an economy and are practically independent of others who cannot compete with them on an equal footing.

Oligarchic rule is not necessarily dictatorship and arbitrariness. While one of the major characteristics of oligarchy is nonaccountability of power, it may in a way rely on law (i.e., be legal); however, this law is in the interests of the few. Similar to monarchies, oligarchic regimes may even be considered by some as legitimate, although their legitimacy does not rest on popular consent and support. An oligarchic regime, unlike personal dictatorship, may be partly predictable; it defines the limits of the politically permissible and the forbidden in terms of the critique and opposition. It is usually said that the oligarchs “rule but not manage”—they would seldom occupy official positions in government, but their opinion is crucial because of their power and influence (economic and other). There may be internal tensions and conflicts within the oligarchic system; this points to the importance for the oligarchs of the existence of an external arbiter who is accepted as such by them.

The term *oligarchy* is used widely today: however, more likely not as an analytical concept but as a descriptive image. From the point of view of modern political science, it is a relatively vague

and amorphous notion with clear negative evaluative connotations. Many critics consider the notion of oligarchy to be too reductive or even too poor for effective political analysis, with insufficient theoretical base.

In modern social science and historical literature, this notion is often used to describe very different historical and political phenomena—such as medieval oligarchy in China; the Venice republic in the 13th to 16th centuries, ruled by a few patrician families; England from the Glorious Revolution until the middle of the 19th century, with the Magna Carta guaranteeing the rights of the nobility (i.e., the rights of the oligarchy); colonial America until the 1776 revolution as a combination of democratic and oligarchic elements; the Meiji Restoration in Japan, and so on. Some authors apply the notion of oligarchy to the political regime in the former USSR after Stalin (and especially under Brezhnev's so-called collective leadership), which was no longer a personal dictatorship but the rule of the privileged "nomenclatura." South Africa under the apartheid system provides an example of racial oligarchy based on the rule of the White minority—about 20% of the population. In Latin America, various military-latifundist political regimes are often described as oligarchic. Some neo-Marxists argue that the majority of Western democracies, especially the United States, are actually "oligarchic democracies" (or "representative oligarchies") where "big money" *de facto* determines the outcome of elections.

There are impressive case studies of political dynamics in various countries of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Hong Kong, South Korea) that demonstrate how oligarchic systems based on the economic power of several dozen families or corporate clans adapt to political change and economic reforms and reproduce themselves within a new context. The case of Indonesia after the collapse of Suharto's New Order at the end of the 1990s may be a good example of the survival and reproduction of some basic structures of the oligarchic system of rule and power relationships irrespective of the ongoing reforms. Some research has registered oligarchic trends in a variety of large-scale organizations—such as political parties, trade unions, professional associations, educational systems, and clerical organizations.

### The Existing Theories

To the extent that a "theory of oligarchy" exists, its classic form is that of Michels (1876–1936). In his analysis of the formation and evolution of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, he formulated the so-called iron law of oligarchy: "Who says organization, says oligarchy." According to Michels, oligarchy is an unavoidable consequence of the functioning of all and sundry large social and political organizations. His logic is as follows: For effective management of any large organization, a professional bureaucratic elite with special managerial competencies is needed; this elite acquires specific social status and interests and becomes estranged from the rank-and-file members and nonaccountable to them; this elite believes that it knows better what is good and what is bad for the masses. Even when elected, the bureaucratic elite will try to keep its position or will pass it only to other elites (the influence of Mosca and particularly Pareto with his "circulation of elites" is obvious here). Michels argues that even democratic organizations eventually degenerate into oligarchy since they cannot exist without bureaucratic structures of management that eventually turn oligarchic. This thesis actually questions the basic principle of democratic representation, since, according to Michels, any elected representative will sooner or later turn into a master estranged from the electors.

For Michels, the roots of the emergence of oligarchy are not in personal psychological motivation or ill will but in general organizational logic and managerial technology: Professionalism of management and administration requires specific skills; those who acquire them become estranged from the masses and strive for preservation of their status. Thus, according to Michels, any organization, due to its internal logic, will sooner or later degenerate into oligarchy.

Some of Michels's ideas were further developed by Maurice Duverger, who used a comparative approach to the analysis of different political parties in order to confirm the generic logic of "oligarchic degeneration"—leadership in all parties eventually becomes oligarchic; an isolated and closed "ruling strata" of professional bureaucrats emerges and tends to reproduce itself, irrespective of the ideological or political nature of the organization.

Today's academic community responds to Michels's theoretical heritage somewhat ambiguously. Some empirical research of large organizations seems to confirm his idea of oligarchic degeneration; other studies do not. However, even some empirically proved exceptions undermine the universal nature of the declared "iron law of oligarchy." It is hardly possible to falsify this "law," since it is based on the probabilistic assumption that any organization would "eventually" turn into oligarchy. Furthermore, today's criticism of Michels's theory underlines other vulnerable points, such as the amorphous nature of the notion of the "few" as a definition of the group of oligarchic leaders and the vagueness of the concept of "oligarchic tendencies" and its insufficiency for effective political analysis. Conceptual reevaluation of Michels in recent decades contributed to the growing interest in the theories of organizations, organizational logic, and organizational behavior and in the detailed analysis of mechanisms of influence, leadership, and submission.

### The Theory Updated in the Postcommunist Era

The notion of oligarchy has acquired new circulation and popularity in the early 1990s as applied to a description of economic and political dynamics in Russia and some other post-Soviet Union countries. Its connotation became not simply negative but even pejorative and abusive: History's largest predatory privatization of state property ("grabization") in Russia was made possible only through governmental channels because of the "appointments" of a few new oligarchs by President Boris Yeltsin's "clan" (the so-called family) and their merging with state power. The outcome of this process was the emergence in Russia of "oligarchic capitalism"—a common noun for the fusion of superbig capital with the machinery of the state. The peculiarity of the situation in Russia is emphasized by the fact that state power itself has created the opportunity for the oligarchic system to emerge, since it was the state that had given out its former property to a few "confidants," counting on their subsequent financial support. This support, indeed, became one of the important factors for the reelection of Yeltsin in 1996. Thus, the emergence of oligarchic capitalism in

Russia is often perceived as very specific: In the Russian case, you have not the supremacy of big capital over state power but the other way around—state power is creating the superbig private owners for the sake of its reproduction. Some analysts argue that the oligarchic system of patronage and clientelism in Russia at the federal and regional levels was created by the regime itself for the main purpose of securing financial support for its reproduction in democratic, even imitative, forms. Also, this was made possible in Russia during a period of economic recession, not during a time of economic growth, as in other contemporary cases of oligarchy coming into being. Various researches stress the absence of formal institutions and the informal character of ties between Russian oligarchs and state power. They also point to the fragmentary nature of Russian oligarchy with different and often conflicting interests, its noninstitutionalized character, and other aspects.

At the end of the 1990s, some political analysts even started to talk about the danger of the "oligarchic coup" in Russia. At least an important part of the massive support for Vladimir Putin in Russia in the early 2000s came from his "antioligarchic" rhetoric. However, many observers argue that the outcome of Putin's so-called antioligarchic revolution was the replacement of Yeltsin-era oligarchs by new ones—largely originating from the security services and other "power" structures (so-called *silogarchs*—from the Russian word *sila* = power—or *securocrats*, i.e., coming from various security agencies). Some argue that the paradigm of "oligarchic capitalism" that emerged under Boris Yeltsin is reproduced in Russia under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Be that as it may, one should note that this concept of "oligarchic capitalism" with reference to Russia and some other post-Soviet countries needs further theoretical and experimental study.

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*See also* Bureaucracy; Dictatorship; Elitism; Organization Theory; Parties; Regime (Comparative Politics)



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## ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE

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There is no consensus on what constitutes one-party dominance, but two features stand out. First, a party becomes dominant when, over time, it is much more successful in elections, in parliament, and in the government than any other party. How such success is measured and for how long the party needs to be successful in order to qualify as a dominant party is debated. The threshold for time ranges from two elections won in a row to never losing a single election. The threshold for electoral success ranges from a plurality of votes to a supermajority of seats. Second, it matters how dominance is established. Does the ruling party enjoy genuine support in the population, or does it maintain its hold on power through nondemocratic means? In other words, we need to distinguish between dominant parties and dominant *authoritarian* parties. In the classic definition of the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori, a dominant-party system exists when the same party wins at least three consecutive elections that are free, fair, and competitive. The dominant party needs to gain an absolute majority in parliament and govern alone. In case of a presidential system of government, the dominant party also needs to win the presidential elections. If the elections were not free, fair, or competitive, we are dealing with a dominant-authoritarian-party system.

Clearly, there are not many parties that manage to govern alone with a parliamentary majority behind them for more than 12 years. The classic case is the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, which has governed for almost the entire period after World War II. The Christian Democrats in Italy were the dominant force for 4 decades, always being in the government until the Second Republic ended in corruption scandals. However, these were coalition governments, so Italy is not a pure case of one-party dominance. Neither is Sweden, because the Socialists often had to form a minority government. The Canadian Liberals, although in power most of the time at the federal level, nonetheless lost at regular intervals. There are more cases of dominance at the regional level, for example, the Democratic South in the United States in the first half of the 20th century or the position of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria. Unfortunately, there are not many studies of sub-national one-party dominance.

Even this brief overview of the best known examples of dominant parties suggests that one-party dominance is uncommon, and sustained one-party dominance is even more rare. In comparison, it is easier for dominant authoritarian parties to prolong their rule. The classic case is the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, which managed to stay in power for most of the 20th century. When a dominant authoritarian party loses an election, it amounts to a democratic transition. Other recent examples are the Kuomintang in Taiwan and Kenya African National Union in Kenya.

The global spread of democracy since the mid-1970s has resulted in a proliferation of dominant parties, especially in Africa. Paradoxically, the (re)introduction of multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa has resulted in the dominance of dominant-party systems. The emblematic case is South Africa, where the African National Congress (ANC) has won all four elections since the end of apartheid with overwhelming victories, even to the point where it could change the constitution by itself. This has led observers to worry about the effect of one-party dominance on the prospects of democratic consolidation. Even in mature democracies, there are indications that domination by one party and the resulting lack of political competitiveness has consequences for the quality of

democracy. The dominant parties of Japan and Italy are/were notorious for their factionalism and corruption. If parties are in power for so long, the lines between party and state are blurred, complacency replaces responsiveness, and infighting overshadows competition with the often fragmented and powerless opposition. If this is true for mature democracies (there is in fact little systematic evidence to support these accusations), how much more damaging will the effects of one-party dominance be for new democracies?

However, while dominant-party systems exhibit a low level of competitiveness, they do not necessarily lack political competition, understood as potential competitiveness, and the frequent talk about dominant parties as “de facto one-party states” is often misleading. It is too simple to equate one-party dominance with lack of democracy as done by scholars who use election outcomes to measure democracy. The ruling party in Botswana, in power since independence, has never lost an election. One influential measure of democracy takes this lack of alternation in government as proof that the election results were manipulated by a nondemocratic regime. It considers dominant parties as undemocratic until they lose power. This coding scheme puts the ANC in South Africa and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe in the same category. Clearly, such a measure fails to distinguish between dominant parties and dominant *authoritarian* parties. While the ANC may be voted out of power at the next elections, Mugabe has shown that he will hang on to power by any means necessary.

There is some confusion about dominant parties and dominant-party *systems*. There is no doubt that the Italian Christian Democrats constituted a dominant party in the loose sense of a party that outdistances all others in popular support. However, Italy did not have a dominant-party *system*. The pattern of interactions between the political parties was shaped by the rivalry between the Christian Democrats and the Communists, who were regarded as an antisystem party. The Italian Communists always came in second place and were never invited to join the government but because of their sheer size forced other parties to form a coalition. The party system therefore has been characterized as “polarized pluralism.”

Likewise, even if the British Conservatives or Labour Party manage to win three elections in a row, as they have both done in the past 30 years, this does not change the character of the British two-party system. The key question, which has been insufficiently acknowledged and explored, is to what extent dominant parties create a dominant-party system. In other words: When and how do dominant parties come to shape the pattern of political competition?

No unified theory explains the emergence and longevity of dominant parties, but partial explanations have been offered, often tightly bound to a particular case or class of cases. First, access to state resources plays a role. This theory is especially helpful to explain the continued success of dominant authoritarian parties, such as the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico. Second, dominant parties may benefit from positioning themselves on key social cleavages. The ANC in South Africa would be a case in point. Third, political institutions, especially the electoral system, have an effect. The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan benefited from an unusual electoral system called the single nontransferable vote. Against this, dominant parties have thrived in a variety of electoral systems, from proportional representation (the ANC in South Africa and the SWAPO Party in Namibia) to plurality (the Botswana Democratic Party in Botswana). Fourth, there may be something special about dominant parties—an aura of invincibility, the sense of inevitably, an association with an epoch—that is hard to capture empirically but easily recognized by those familiar with the cases.

There is growing pluriformity in approaches to conceptualizing, measuring, and explaining one-party dominance. On the one hand, this analytical diversity may be regarded as disappointing after decades of theorizing and research on one-party dominance. On the other hand, the growing literature on this subject attests to the continuous development of our thinking and even a new vitality in the study of dominant parties. A particularly interesting development is the use of voting power indexes to measure the extent of dominance, especially when combined with the classic typologies. This innovation has the potential of bridging the divide between quantitative and qualitative

research on dominant parties and dominant-party systems.

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See also Party Linkage; Party Organization; Party System Fragmentation; Party Systems

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## OPPOSITION

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The term *opposition* comes from the Latin word *opponere*, meaning to put something in front of something else. An actor's opponents are those who want to block his way. Such a conflicting situation may be a game with established rules in which the opponent accepts defeat. Some opponents may, however, try to end the game and set up new rules that work for their (exclusive) advantage. When the rules of game allow everyone to enter and to compete under fair conditions, players with limited skill may lose repeatedly or be excluded for not abiding by the rules. In other cases, games may exclude players arbitrarily, or the rules may be unfair.

Against this background, we can distinguish four types of fighting against a competitor:

1. *Opposition* refers to those trying to defeat a so far victorious competitor but following all rules of the game.

2. *Extremists* are those wanting to overthrow a fair and inclusive game.
3. *Members of resistance* are those trying to overthrow an unfair or exclusive game in order to establish a fair and inclusive one.
4. *Rebels* are those fighting for victory in an unfair or exclusive game without desiring to replace it by an inclusive and fair one.

When "game" is understood as a polity and "rules of the game" as a constitution or set of laws, then opposition is a generic concept for those engaging in politics to fight against unwelcome policies and politicians and accepting the constitution and laws even in spite of possible defeat. This entry analyzes the context and the actors of opposition; it also discusses Robert Dahl's analytic framework, the functions of opposition, and finally, the most recent research developments.

### Contexts

It is not self-evident that one should fight for political goals while accepting defeat. Regimes with a loyal opposition are, therefore, an exception. Certainly political dissent and nonviolent opposition were common in Democratic Athens, in Republican Rome, in some republics of medieval Italy, and within European Estate assemblies. But most of that disappeared with the advent of strong monarchic power.

The exception was England. First, the principle of "king in parliament" allowed even conflicts between the Crown and parliament to be understood as competition for the best of one single "body politic." Second, the decline of monarchic power due to the civil war, the Glorious Revolution, and the specific relations of Sir Robert Walpole (1676–1745) with the two first kings of the Hanoverian dynasty led to the emergence of the new role of a "prime minister" with a personal power base in parliament. Patronage and benefits for allies were the central means to create support for the prime minister. Such "government by corruption" made parliament split: One side benefited from "their" prime minister and his policies; the other side advocated different policies and hoped to be part of the spoils system under a new prime minister.

In this situation, Walpole's political adversary Henry St. John 1st Viscount Bolingbroke

(1678–1751) presented a first theory of political opposition that was very influential. According to this theory, opposition serves liberty and the common good by continually criticizing selfish or incompetent politics of the government; opposing the government does not mean disloyalty to the Crown or the constitution but only the desire to replace bad policies or politicians with better ones. Actually it has been one of the most important inventions in human history to implement, and to acknowledge, the practice of a legitimate and loyal opposition. Unfortunately, the concept was subsequently narrowed to a form of parliamentary activity and did not encompass phenomena such as political pluralism and separation of power. Moreover, it was put in the context of “ethically better alternatives,” claiming counterfactually a superior moral status for oppositional parties.

### Who Is “the Opposition”?

Under the assumption that opposition proper is “parliamentary opposition,” typologies were created that distinguish parliamentary, extraparliamentary, and antiparliamentary opposition. But any split between opposition inside and outside parliament is artificial, and there is not even a clear line between the governing majority and the opposition in presidential systems. One more realistic typology was suggested by Philip Norton (2008). According to him, “the Opposition” means either the principle of opposition or the largest oppositional party in a parliamentary system. Opposition parties are, in a parliamentary system, parties that expressly do not support the government. Opposition covers different forms of conflicting relationships between the legislative and executive branches of government. Among them, as also noted by Norton, five “modes” can be distinguished, according to Anthony King (1976). In the *opposition* mode, cohesive parliamentary parties confront a governing party or coalition. In the *intraparty* mode, it comes to opposition within a (governing) party; that is, “faction building.” In the *nonparty* mode, parliamentarians cooperate outside party contexts, which allows for majority building while ignoring party lines. In the *cross-party* mode, governing and oppositional parties cooperate on some issues while disagreeing on others. *Extraparliamentary opposition* means all forms

of political dissent and government-opposing activities outside (a chamber of) parliament.

The last category is, however, quite overcrowded. First, there are extraparliamentary party structures. These cannot reasonably be detached from parliamentary party groups, because local and regional party organizations are often led by members of parliament and work, throughout the country, as their combat groups. Second, there may be “higher houses” that act as a “second opposition,” in particular, if elections to them are used for expressing dissatisfaction with the government. Third, constitutional courts perform like an opposition if oppositional parties get them ruling on politically controversial issues. Fourth, actors from other levels of government may impede, or veto, a cabinet’s policy making in federal systems. This gives even small parties with regional strongholds significant oppositional power at a superior level of government. Fifth, nongovernmental organizations can accumulate and exert very significant oppositional power in liberal societies. Sixth, there is even potential for oppositional power within the executive branch of government if it comes to implement policy programs that are not regarded as administrable by civil servants.

### Dahl’s Analytic Framework

Contemporary opposition theory started with Dahl (1966). Coining the concept of *polyarchy*, he put legitimate opposition, together with free political participation, at the center of liberal democracy. None of his analytical categories is restricted to parliamentary opposition (see Dahl, 1966, pp. 332–386). Going by his concept, the following questions must be asked to determine the nature of opposition:

1. How cohesively, or organizationally concentrated, do oppositional groups act?
2. How much loss of governmental power can be effectuated by how much increase in oppositional power?
3. What sites are available for encounters between the opposition and government? How fair is competition in which arena, and how important is which site for actual power politics?
4. How identifiable are, depending on those factors, oppositional groups in a political system?

5. What are the goals of which oppositional groups?
6. What are their strategies?

In addition, five “primary conditions” are claimed to explain which patterns of opposition will emerge:

1. constitutional structure and the electoral system;
2. widely shared cultural premises, in particular about cooperation and problem solving;
3. specific subcultures in a given society and its political culture (inclined toward violence and secession or toward proportional share of public goods);
4. the record of grievances against the government, out of which people learn about the regime’s responsiveness; and
5. the kind or extent of social and economic differences/cleavages in which the party system is rooted.

Two more specific factors intervene: a society’s individual pattern of cleavage, conflict, and agreement in attitudes and opinions and its extent of polarization. These primary conditions vary independently from each other, but not beyond certain limits; they may reinforce each other; and a big change in one of them will likely make an existing pattern of opposition change as well.

Based on similar considerations, Heinrich Oberreuter (1975, p. 20) has suggested a parsimonious typology of oppositional behavior patterns: issue-oriented ad hoc opposition, cooperative opposition, and competitive opposition, all of them possible inside or outside parliament.

### Oppositional Functions

A function is a service rendered by a system for its environment. Criticism of a government’s programs, policies, and actors is the first service of the opposition for its regime: Issues are brought to public attention, incentives for policy learning are set, and otherwise neglected problems are put on the agenda. The next function is control, unfolded both as scrutiny of single measures and as checking the government’s general

course. Effective control depends on the government’s responsibility before parliament and makes rational politicians avoid actions that might otherwise be undertaken. Offering alternatives encompasses different programs, policies, and persons to citizens and voters, thereby establishing pluralism. In this perspective, integration allows even those whose positions and leaders are minoritarian to identify with the polity and have the chance to become influential in the future. Without these advantages produced by an influential opposition, political systems will work less well than those with a legitimate and loyal opposition.

### Research on Opposition

A straightforward framework such as Dahl’s should have inspired a large body of comparative empirical research, providing us with reliable knowledge on how to establish effective opposition as a means for better governance. However, as Klaus von Beyme (1987) has shown, research on opposition was scarce for a long while, although “protest movements” (oppositional), “new social movements,” or minorities struggling for a better legal or social status have attracted much scholarly attention. In the 1960s and later, one reason for such neglect was the revival of the mistaken thesis of “declining parliamentary power,” in the perspective of which parliamentary opposition becomes uninteresting as well (pp. 30–31). As recalled by Ludger Helms (2008, p. 8), the “governance turn” in comparative politics came next, with its focus on cooperative and corporatist forms of interaction between state and society. In this perspective, opposition looks rather negligible. Finally, confining opposition to parliamentary opposition deprives this concept of comparative power beyond parliamentary systems of government. For all these reasons, a more comprehensive theory of opposition should be worked out, and broad-scope comparative empirical research on opposition, seen as an element of pluralism, division of power, and good governance, should be encouraged.

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*See also* Cabinets; Government; Parliaments; Parties; Pluralism; Political Integration; Presidentialism; Separation of Powers

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specializing in the study of organizational phenomena (both micro and macro) and used as a synonym for organization studies. After a brief overview of the development of organization theory as an academic field, this entry reviews some important phenomena and relationships being examined in contemporary organization theory. Some notes on the relationship between organization theory and political science are then made, and finally some thoughts on future developments are offered.

#### Historical Development

The design and management of specific types of organizations have been practiced for several thousands of years and studied for a couple of centuries. Nevertheless, generalizations about organizations and the development of organization theory as an academic field are restricted to the post-World War II period. The actual phrase *organization theory* was most actively promoted by Herbert Simon from 1950 onward, being seen as a broad category that included many existing approaches, such as scientific management and industrial psychology. However, while organizations in these approaches were primarily seen as settings within which work was carried out, they were now seen as units of interest in their own right and analyzed as distinctive social systems and collective actors.

In what has retrospectively become known as classical organization theory, the emphasis was on universal principles of administration and management that could lead to goal achievement. While produced about a hundred years ago, elements of contributions from people such as Frederick Taylor on scientific management, Herbert Fayol on administrative theory, and Max Weber on the theory of bureaucracy are still evident in today's organizations. However, since the 1950s, this rational- and closed-systems perspective on organizations has been supplemented by other types of perspectives. While classical organization theory indicated that there is one best way of organizational design and practice, contingency theory from the 1960s onward suggests that this depends on the characteristics of each situation. Thus, according to this kind of rational- and open-systems perspective, variations in the environments, tasks, and technologies of organizations

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## ORGANIZATION THEORY

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Organization theory is a field of study in which the phenomena of interest are related to organizations and organizing. The general aim is to understand what determines organizational forms and processes and the consequences of different types and aspects of organizational forms and processes. It is somewhat contested whether organization theory should be regarded as an academic discipline in its own right, since it draws heavily on concepts and ways of thinking from disciplines such as anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology. Nevertheless, organization theory may also contribute to the development of political science and other disciplines. In North America, a distinction is often made between organizational behavior and organization theory, roughly corresponding to an exploration of micro- and macro-organizational phenomena, respectively. Elsewhere, a broad notion of organization theory is more common, and it is also adopted here. Thus, organization theory is seen as the academic field (or discipline)

imply variations in organizational forms and processes.

The human relations approach from the 1930s onward represented a natural-systems perspective, where the emphasis was not primarily on achieving goals but on organizational survival. Here, too, since the 1960s, characteristics of the environments of organizations have become increasingly important, representing a turn from closed- to open-systems perspectives. Moreover, in this latest period, social constructionist approaches have become more prominent. According to these approaches, the organization and its forms and processes do not exist as objects separate from people but are created and maintained as organizational members talk about what they think is happening and what needs to be done. Recently, postmodern approaches have also become popular among some organizational researchers; for example, in the study of language games and discourses involving organizations and organizing.

### Phenomena and Relationships

Contemporary organization theory is characterized by a large variety of units of analysis, perspectives, and themes. Many researchers examine individual organizations, for example, how different organizational aspects affect performance. Some focus on organizations in a certain field, examining how they interact and affect each other. Moreover, population ecologists examine the dynamics of entire populations of organizations. In conferences, books, and journals in the field, there is a lively debate on the strengths and weaknesses of the various theoretical positions and the relevance of the various topics. Despite some disagreements, the phenomena and relationships reviewed here are commonly regarded as being among the most important ones.

### *Organizational Structure*

The importance of structure for organizational behavior has been a central topic in the study of organizations throughout the history of this academic field. Questions such as how a given structure may constrain and enable instrumental rational action in and by organizations, and how it is possible to affect actual organizational behavior

indirectly by structural design, have been discussed for a long time and remain highly relevant. According to the structural-instrumental perspective, organizations are regarded as tools for achieving certain goals. From this perspective, it is assumed that organizations and their members act with instrumental rationality in carrying out tasks and that the organizational structure is designed in accordance with means–ends assessments.

The formal structure of an organization consists of positions and rules that determine who shall or can do what and define how various tasks should be executed. Organizations are composed of a set of positions and subordinated units and can themselves fall under other larger units. In addition, organizational units can be divided up and coordinated in different ways. Vertical specialization concerns whether and how they consist of subordinate bodies, as well as how they are related to superior bodies. Horizontal specialization refers to how different tasks are thought to be allocated on a certain level by means of organizational structure. Thus, organizations may be based on certain principles of specialization, such as purpose, process, clientele, or geography. Through the superior–subordinate relationship between different levels in a hierarchy, there will be a great degree of vertical coordination within and between organizations. Hierarchy can also involve vertical specialization, in that different types of tasks are assigned to different levels in the organization or to organizations at different levels. Routines can constitute a form of coordination both vertically and horizontally. Procedural rules can be used as tools within an organization, but they can also be used to coordinate activities in a way that cuts across organizations.

A bureaucratic organizational form, as Max Weber described it, is marked by a high extent of hierarchy, horizontal specialization, and routines. Many types of organizational forms can be thought of as an alternative or as supplementary to a bureaucratic organizational form. At one extreme is a completely flat structure, that is, an organization without hierarchical ordering but with several positions and subunits at the same level. In a collegial structure, a board of directors or an advisory council can be set up instead of, or in addition to, the top leadership in the hierarchy. Another alternative is a matrix structure. Here, a position or subunit is subordinated to several superior units

simultaneously. These superior units usually operate according to different principles of specialization. In addition to arrangements such as these, which are without time limitations, organizations may have temporary arrangements that extend beyond the bounds of bureaucratic organizational forms, such as task forces and project organizations. Boards of directors, advisory councils, task forces, and project organizations are all various forms of network structure that supplement the bureaucratic organizational form. This is not merely the case within individual organizations but also applies to relationships between organizations.

### *Organizational Culture*

Organizational culture is concerned with the informal norms and values that are important for the activities of organizations. The emphasis is not on goals but on informal norms, values, and identities that develop gradually. The classic distinction made by Philip Selznick is between the organization, as an instrument for achieving goals, and the institution, whereby an organization, through the process of institutionalization, is “infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (1957, p. 17). Thus, in addition to solving tasks in an instrumental sense, an organization has then become a value-bearing institution with its own distinct identities and opinions about what the relevant problems and solutions are. This makes for a more complex organization, less flexible or adaptable to new demands but also one equipped with new and necessary qualities that will potentially help the organization to solve tasks more expediently and function well as a socially integrated unit. Thus, the organizational culture demarcates organizations from one another and, through mechanisms of socialization, strengthens cohesion and commitment among its members. Culture provides members of the organization with a sense of belonging to a community with a shared goal and mission.

### *Organizational Environments*

In the study of organizations and the development of open-systems perspectives, a distinction is commonly made between technical and institutional environments. Technical environments can

be defined either broadly as all aspects of the environment potentially relevant to goal setting and goal achievement or more narrowly as the sources for inputs and markets for outputs, competitors, and regulators. In the academic literature, several dimensions of technical environments affecting organizational uncertainty and dependence have been proposed and examined—for example, the degree of homogeneity/heterogeneity, the degree of stability/variability, and the degree of concentration/dispersion.

The technical environments of an organization are to a large extent determined by the type of tasks it performs. As with the case for the other aspects, the existing tasks may constrain and enable what an organization and its members are doing, and over time, tasks may be changed as a result of purposeful action.

Since the 1970s, an emphasis on what has been called the institutional environments has been added, stressing the importance of the symbolic aspects of environments. Institutional environments are characterized by the development of socially created norms to which individual organizations must conform in order to receive legitimacy and support. Thus, in institutional environments, organizations are rewarded for using what is seen as correct organizational forms and processes and not for the quantity and quality of their outputs, as in technical environments.

### *Organizational Decision Making*

Studies of decision-making behavior within and by organizations have traditionally emphasized purposeful choice in accordance with a logic of consequences. According to this logic of action, organizations and their members are seen as assessing their existing goals, the alternatives for actions, and the future consequences in relation to the goals that might follow from each alternative. The concept of full instrumental rationality refers to an organization’s having clear and consistent goals, a full overview of all the alternatives, and full insight into the consequences that these alternatives will bring in relation to its goals. From this, it often follows that the organization chooses the alternative that gives the maximal degree of goal achievement. Even so, many empirical studies of how organizations act show that this is realistic only to a certain



degree. This is expressed through the concept of *bounded rationality*, which implies that an organization's goals are diffuse, inconsistent, or unstable and that the problems it faces are complex. The concept also includes the idea that an organization has incomplete information about alternatives and consequences. From this, it follows that the organization chooses an alternative that yields a satisfactory degree of goal achievement.

Moreover, different individuals or groups within an organization can be committed to different goals and interests, and the organization or its individual parts must relate to other organizations that may have other goals and interests. Thus, organizations can be understood as coalitions. Every actor acts in a purposeful way, is motivated by interests, and can also enter into coalitions with actors outside the organization, who, according to their interests, act in similar ways. Interest distribution may be rooted in formal structures within and between organizations—for example, related to actors carrying out specialized tasks. Their resources for articulating their own interests may also be rooted in the formal structure, such as through superordination or subordination of actors and through horizontal coordination.

Conflicts of interest within and between organizations can be dealt with in different ways. First, a dominant coalition can choose between relevant alternatives of action and assert its own goals and interests. Second, the actors can negotiate a compromise between different interests, which in turn provides the basis for purposeful choice based on knowledge about alternatives and consequences. Third, the competing goals can be addressed sequentially, so as not to come into conflict with one another. Fourth, goals in different parts of an organization, or in different organizations, do not need to be viewed vis-à-vis each other but can be addressed independently. Conflicts of interest can also be dealt with by actors who come to an agreement on means.

More radical modifications of purposeful choice in organizational decision making are introduced in the garbage can model. Here, decisions are to a large extent seen as being produced by temporal linkages. Thus, time and attention are limited resources, and the arrival and coupling of independent, exogenous streams of problems, solutions,

decision makers, and opportunities for choice are important for determining how decisions are made and interpreted.

The importance of organizational culture for decision making is related to its impact on what is seen as appropriate behavior in and by organizations. Over time, organizations develop distinctive identities. Faced with a new situation, they have to recognize the nature of that situation and find a rule for action that is consistent with their identity. Organizational culture entails a relatively consistent set of rules and identities, so such links are simple to make. What makes an action appropriate in a certain organization may be highly divergent from what is found in other organizations, depending on how an organizational culture has evolved and what its dominant informal norms and values are.

### *Organizational Change*

In the academic literature on organizational change, a distinction is often made between change through adaptation and through selection and between the transformation and evolution of organizations. To a large extent, the perspectives on change being employed reflect the various theoretical positions for the study of organizations in general.

Most students of organizational change examine how individual organizations adapt in response to changing circumstances, but these adaptations may take different forms. For example, contingency theory focuses on the alignment between various situational features (e.g., technical environment) and structural features (e.g., horizontal and vertical specialization). Thus, organizational change is expected if changes in the technical environments imply a misalignment with organizational structure. Rational adaptation is also emphasized in purposeful action approaches where organizations are seen as having some capacity to handle their dependency on environments or even change the environments. Moreover, approaches that emphasize the importance of institutional environments focus on how organizations adapt their structures to prevailing normatively endorsed modes of organizing. This also leads to a large extent of isomorphism in an organizational

field. On the other hand, there may be a decoupling between organizational structures and organizational activities, where changes in organizational structures reflect the myths embedded in the institutional environments and are not meant to affect organizational activities.

Organizational change through selection is most central in *population ecology* theory. Here, the focus is on the development of organizational forms at the population level. While variation through the birth of new organizational forms may happen by chance, those that survive are selected by the environment, based on their ability to compete with others in a niche. Finally, retention refers to the forces that maintain and perpetuate certain organizational forms.

While some researchers applying rational-systems perspectives analyze whether and how change agents can accomplish radical transformations of organizations, others emphasize the evolutionary and incremental character of structural change due to bounded rationality or organizations as coalitions. Some also combine purposeful transformation and evolution of organizational structure through ideas of punctuated equilibrium, where long periods of convergent change are interrupted by short periods of abrupt divergent change. Stability and evolution of organization are also focused on by researchers emphasizing the importance of organizational culture and appropriate behavior. When an attempt is made to introduce new organizational solutions, they will often be revealed as incompatible and unsuitable. Thus, if they are seen as clashing with the values an organization cares about and is committed to, they risk being rejected. Here, too, there may be a combination of transformation and evolution through ideas of punctuated equilibrium, where long periods of stability are interrupted by abrupt change in the case of major critical events.

### Organization Theory and Political Science

Many of the most prominent early scholars in organization theory came from political science, and many of the earliest studies of organizations were studies of public administration. Thus, ideas of bounded rationality, pluralistic competition, muddling through, cooptation, resource dependence,

garbage can decision processes, and loose coupling all emerged from studies of organizations in the public sector. However, from the 1960s onward, political science and organization theory were mainly characterized by parallel agendas but mutual disregard. This may be related to developments in the study of organizations: Most scholars in organization theory were located in business schools, and most research was on private sector organizations. It may also be related to developments in political science and the study of public administration, where other topics and perspectives became more prominent.

Nevertheless, in recent years, there are some tendencies toward rediscovering a lost tradition in public administration that combines three commitments: (1) understanding administrative practice, (2) contributing to a general understanding of organizations, and (3) illuminating political philosophy. Moreover, it may be argued that an organization theory for the public sector should be delimited from general organization theory. First, an organization theory for the public sector should contribute to clarifying the key organizational forms that exist within public administration, as well as those that exist between the public administration and various groups in society. Second, an organization theory of this kind should help clarify the types of selection different organizations make. This means the extent to which they attend to, are neutral toward, or opposed to values, situations, or interests within society. Third, it should help explain the existence of different forms of organization, with an emphasis on examining to what extent such forms are determined by public policy. Seen from the vantage point of an organization theory rooted in political science, it is not enough to concentrate attention on economy and efficiency. The way the public sector operates must be described, analyzed, and evaluated from a democratic-political vantage point. This means directing the focus toward the sector's basis of values, knowledge, and power.

### Future Development

The academic field of organization theory is embedded in its times. Just as the significant features of the field have been molded by certain critical

events, future developments will also be affected by coming events. This makes it a bit difficult to formulate expectations of what will happen.

Nevertheless, based on recent trends in organization theory and actual organizational forms and processes, some ideas on future developments may be presented. First, the increase of networks, public–private partnerships, and other organizational forms crossing the boundaries between the public and private sectors may stimulate an understanding of organizations and organizing beyond markets and hierarchies. Second, the global spread of certain organizational forms—in public sector organizations related to new public management or post–new public management doctrines—may stimulate an understanding of the adaptation of these forms across countries and policy areas. Third, the development of more complex organizational forms may stimulate the development of more complex theories of how organizations change and of the consequences of organizational change. Thus, there may be a mutual interplay of structural, cultural, and environmental features and also a two-way dynamic between organizational forms and actions. Fourth, there may be a two-way relationship between the development of organization theory and the development of new organizational forms as well as the popular understandings of organizations and organizing.

Summing up, this means that organization theory and political science may benefit from increased cross-fertilization. Empirical studies of decision making and change in public sector organizations will provide some observations and theoretical ideas that may be useful to students of politics. Increased attention toward organizations from students of politics is also likely to change organization theory. By focusing on organizational characteristics of parliaments, public administration, political parties, interest organizations, and social movements, as well as on themes such as conflict, power, justice, and equality and the development of norms, goals, and meanings, the academic field of organization theory may expand in ways that are relevant for political scientists.

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See also Bureaucracy; Contingency Theory; Institutional Theory; Logic of Appropriateness; New Public Management; Rationality, Bounded

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## ORIENTALISM

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The word *orientalism* has several meanings. Specifically, it is the science that has for its subject matter “Oriental” languages and civilizations and, by extension, the taste for Oriental objects

and arts, as well as their use in Western artistic fields, particularly decoration, painting, and music. Orientalism was born in the 18th century, although the word was not commonly used before the 19th century. In the current, postcolonial era, the term *orientalism* and the concept of the Oriental have taken on pejorative connotations, especially among people of Asian and Middle Eastern descent. Recent scholarship, perhaps most notably that of the late Edward Said, points out the social psychological function of “Oriental” as a label whose use tacitly assumes the absolute primacy of a Eurocentric perspective, thereby categorically objectifying what is not European, rendering it exotic and essentially “other.” This entry examines the history of this concept, the different kinds of orientalism that must be taken into account, and the debates that have taken place around this concept.

### Origins of Orientalism

Orientalism originated as the extension of Renaissance humanism to Oriental fields, which were then Turkish, Arabic, and Persian. Its aim was to constitute a universal literature by merging European and Oriental contributions. Its tremendous success was the translation of *One Thousand and One Nights* at the beginning of the 18th century, thus creating the Oriental literary genre. Meanwhile, Catholic missionaries created the first sinology, while travelers described the power and organization of large bureaucratic Oriental states under the name of despotism.

The great novelty of the 18th century was a willingness to accept the possibility of a comparative universal history of all human societies. The Orientalists of the Enlightenment were first and foremost philologists and scholars, but their works were taken up and popularized by philosophers. The advent of social sciences at the end of the century introduced an increasingly critical aspect of Oriental realities. While they had a scientific foundation, they were also useful in legitimizing the calling into question of an Oriental despotism, which from then on was defined as a source of powerlessness and decadence.

Comparative studies were linked to the appearance of the idea of progress. It turned the past of Europe and of the East into landmarks according

to which one could define the movement of history. After 1750, the East was defined as a sort of “past in the present” insofar as it showed a bygone state of society compared with the new realities of Europe. As early as 1780, it was said that Europe was the future of the East. The former was now able to take over or dominate the big “Oriental” countries from the Mediterranean to India and soon to China and Japan. Its expansion was justified as being either a liberation or an improvement in the lot of the peoples subjected to Oriental despotism.

While the “practical” orientalism of the “dragomans”—translators and interpreters of Oriental realities—already existed, European expansion implied the management of Oriental populations and thus the constitution of a corpus of linguistic, legal, and social knowledge, crucial for European civil and military administrators.

### Types of Orientalism

#### *Classical Orientalism*

At the beginning of the 19th century, orientalism was divided into several distinct but closely intertwined types. The first one was “classical” orientalism, gathering scholarly, philological, and archaeological knowledge about ancient Oriental societies. It was the product of several phenomenal discoveries of lost languages and civilizations—deciphering Egyptian hieroglyphs and cuneiform; the archaeological discovery of Assyria, Sumer, and the Hittites; learning of Sanskrit; and the birth of modern sinology and then of Japan studies.

Universal history was endowed with a few more millennia. More than ever, the medieval idea of Egypt and the Near East as the birthplace of human culture prevailed. The history of human progress had several versions. According to the first one, the arts and sciences were born in Egypt; moved to the Near East, then to Greece and to Rome, and from there to the Arabs; and ended up in Europe. The second version started from the discovery of a kinship between European and Indian languages that served to define the presence of a group of peoples called Indo-German, Aryan, or Indo-European. Simultaneously, the existence of a “Semitic” group was constructed, followed by that of a “Touranian” group. Those definitions quickly took on a racial

nature since language was supposed to contain a whole definition of the world. The opposition between Semites and Indo-Europeans was thus used to explain both the history of religions and the superiority of modern Europe.

Though the peoples of the Far East were not included in this pattern of analysis, the existence of two large cultural areas was recognized—India and China—and within them, so was the existence of distinct national personalities. Thus, Vietnam was part of the Chinese sphere of civilization, and Cambodia was part of the Hindu one, but each had its respective specific identity. In the same way, French Orientalists discovered the wonders of Angkor and gave to Cambodians a sense of historical continuity that they did not have before.

### *Modern Orientalism*

The second type is modern orientalism, studying existing Oriental civilizations. Their precariousness was known, hence the necessity of describing them before their potential destruction caused by modernization/Westernization. Scholars rushed to take stock of the large corpus of texts already defined by those involved as “classics” and to turn them into the first printed scientific editions. If those texts were already known, they were given a more precise historical context, particularly thanks to philology and archaeology. This heritage-oriented form of orientalism ended in the setting up of museums for Oriental objects, first in Western countries and then in the countries where the works originated.

By successive waves, the Oriental literary and artistic heritage was massively introduced into 19th-century European and Western culture. It was one of the prime movers of major aesthetic transformations and artistic revolutions. The same applied a little later to the arts of Black Africa. Thus, artistic modernity will largely claim an Oriental element for itself.

### *Practical Orientalism*

The third type is the practical orientalism of colonial administrators. If the latter presented themselves as the modernizers of the societies they

dominated, they also sought to unify the traditional legal systems by resorting to the ancient sources, considered as the most authentic. Thus, the French limited the field of common laws and undertook the codification of a “Muslim” law that had never existed as such. In India, the British systematically used Sanskrit sources, which had been largely forgotten or neglected. More generally, practical Orientalists, for administrative convenience, tended to freeze realities that otherwise would have been naturally subject to continuing change, particularly religious and ethnic definitions. To do this, they relied on the works of modern Orientalists, while defining their superiority over the peoples they administered through the racial discourse stemming from classical orientalism.

This racial, philology-based discourse, also called linguistic ethnology, was first used to understand the origins of Europe and of Christianity. It was then used as a classifying tool so as to define the different ethnic groups as they were being reviewed—hence the quasi-indefinite extension of the Semitic group toward Black Africa and of the Touranian group toward Eastern Asia. A complete correspondence was established between linguistic subgroups and cultural entities, by finally endowing them with a history of their own. The prevailing scientism of the late 19th century added to it the measures established by physical anthropology, particularly by craniology. Some of the premises of craniology were pseudoscientific, making a simple equation between measures of cranial capacity and “intelligence,” with departures from cranial measurements of Europeans taken as evidence of racial primitivism or inferiority.

The racial discourse claimed to have a universal impact. It was first applied to Europe even if it was secondarily used to lay the foundations of the legitimacy of Western superiority over the rest of the world.

Nineteenth-century orientalism has since been reproached as having an “essentialist” vision of Oriental peoples, considered as unable to really change. By definition, orientalism is a “culturalist” approach, because it is founded on the literary and artistic heritage of the societies involved. At the same time, it sought to give the latter a meaning by

striving to historicize the contents of this heritage, thus redefining the historical paths of the societies involved. More often than not, those paths were defined along criteria borrowed from European history—religious tolerance, promotion of sciences, and so on. At the same time, it was also necessary to determine the causes of the “backwardness of the East” and European superiority, that is to say, contemporary deficits. The usual pattern was a combination of past golden age and present failings.

However absorbed in attaining a mastery of modern knowledge, the 19th-century Orientalist was also a creature of dialogue, constantly in contact with his informants, who were Oriental learned men, his partners in the reading of the ancient texts. He was the one who introduced and accompanied the “modernist” representatives of Oriental societies, particularly in the latter’s travels in the West.

### Current Issues

Facing the social sciences, Orientalists can hardly hide their uneasiness. They have the feeling that concepts that were elaborated to fit Western realities are almost mechanically applied without taking heed of Oriental specificities. Indeed, Orientalists tend to reproduce rather than criticize the discourses that Orientals make about themselves, which is inevitable in any culturalist approach.

While Orientalists have given all the required justifications to colonial expansion, they have also provided the arms to fight it. It is by starting from historical definitions produced by orientalism that Oriental nationalisms were constructed. Nationalisms, be they Arab, Indian, Turkish, Persian, or Indochinese, have largely borrowed their historical and national discourses from European Orientalists. The ancient golden ages were turned into hopes of renewal, and current failings served as the basis of governmental programs.

In the 20th century, the role of Orientalists constantly diminished. While classical orientalism still lived, it was mainly about heritage, and public access was largely limited to exhibitions, touristic travels, and translations of masterpieces of ancient literature. Today, many of its missions have been taken up by academics of the countries involved, and Westerners are only partners, even if they have

sometimes kept a training function. The most burning issue is the demand that museums and similar institutions in Western countries return objects of cultural significance to their countries of origin.

Modern orientalism is caught in a contradictory position. It continues its work of reassessment of historical paths, particularly that of the times directly preceding European domination, no longer defined as decadent. Historians broaden their concerns to economic and social fields and also integrate the research of anthropology and social sciences. It is no longer possible to talk about a purely philological and textual orientalism.

Decolonized countries were initially plunged into a premature and turbulent modernity, often with Marxist overtones. Orientalists had to reconsider their categories of analysis to be able to interpret these revolutionary ruptures. Newly independent nations came to see the moment of independence as the end of a long history and the promise of a new future.

A few years later, the majority discourses of the countries involved have shifted toward the defense of a largely imaginary cultural authenticity, with a discourse about the superiority of the endogenous over the exogenous, the restoration of Islamic, Indian, or Asian values. Islamist movements, through their willingness to go back to their roots, have reinvested fields that were formerly those of Islamologists. Often, Orientalists are faced with reified categories of their own knowledge, which they had judged to be obsolete and had abandoned. Faced with Orientals who themselves resort to essentialism, they tend either to remain silent or to practice contextualism so as to reject any continuity between the past and the present time. The word *orientalism* has become the equivalent of an insult. In its turn, it has become an ahistorical essence and a polemical accusation.

Practical orientalism disappeared with colonial administrators. It is not certain whether the experts working for the states and nongovernmental organizations as well as those responsible for development have a better knowledge of the societies involved. Globalization seems to bring peoples together, but the progress of communications reduces long-term stays and “immersions” “on the spot.” International English and its impoverished

vocabulary are not the equivalent of the former knowledge of “indigenous” languages.

In its lasting existence, orientalism has claimed to be a tool in the constitution of the universal. Comparative studies introduced the delicate question of the interpretation of what is different. Of course, Orientalists have served politicians, but they have also significantly shaped our vision of our globalized universe.

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*See also* Buddhism; Culturalism; Hinduism; Islam

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## PACIFISM

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Pacifism is both a political doctrine aimed at promoting or preserving peace and a political behavior adopted by opponents of violence and particularly of war as a means of settling disputes. The belief that violence is unacceptable and should be avoided has presumably existed throughout history and has been theorized over the past 2 millennia by diverse political, philosophical, and theological thinkers. Organized political opposition to violence has existed since the generalization of conscription during the 19th century and took place during both World Wars. The elaboration of the concept of pacifism dates back to the beginning of the 20th century and encompasses a variety of political thoughts and attitudes.

Pacifists differ on issues such as the inevitability and, more generally, the causes of war; the acceptability of violence as a suitable means toward peace; how to prevent war and resolve conflicts; and the very definition and conditions of peace itself. Those described as unconditional or absolute pacifists are committed to a principled rejection of violence, considered as deontologically wrong. Relative, conditional, contingent, or pragmatic pacifists—sometimes called pacificists—adopt a consequentialist view of pacifism; they consider violence to be counterproductive but believe that as a last resort, force is occasionally justified to advance the cause of peace. Besides the diversity of pacifist conceptions and behaviors, their historical evolutions, and their mutual

influences and intricacies, one can distinguish between thinkers who concentrate on the individual and conceive pacifism as an appeal to people's sense of fundamental human values and virtues and those who focus on pacifism as a goal for systemic, societal change, be it at a national, regional, or global level.

### The Appeal to Individual Morality

According to thinkers privileging an individual conception of peace, violence and war are inherent to human nature but are morally wrong and can be reduced by promoting individual virtues and morality. This conception is shared by many political and religious thinkers.

Major religions advocate peace and mutual respect among human beings. However, both historical circumstances and religious exclusiveness have exacerbated tensions between and within religious communities and greatly influenced theological dogmas. No religion has been exempted from violence justified by religious purpose, and their positions range from absolute pacifism and nonviolence to just and even holy war.

All dharmic religions promote nonviolence (*ahimsa*), embodied by Gandhi, but to different extents. Buddhism and Jainism condemn killing in any form, be it human or not, and Buddhism defends nonresistance through tolerance to the enemy. Hinduism—and later Sikhism—justify war in defense of good, justice, and righteousness. When order and law have failed to maintain peace and security, just war (*dharmya yuddha*) is to be



waged against those responsible, either Hindus or non-Hindus, in order to maintain peace and security within cosmic order. Warriors must belong to specific castes devoted to military action and have to respect the laws of war designed to ensure that warfare is conducted in a fair way. The use of weapons that cause unnecessary pain is prohibited, civilians shall not be harmed, and territory shall not be annexed.

Taoist religions do not rely on an absolute precept of nonviolence but rather consider violence to be a form of weakness that induces more violence and is thus counterproductive. Inaction (*wu wei*) is hence privileged, and if conflict cannot be avoided, one should try to resolve it without a direct confrontation. War can, however, be justified in self-defense or when a morally evil leader must be punished to deliver oppressed and exploited people.

Abrahamic religions praise peace while providing ambiguous answers to the question of violence, and they have developed the concept of just war as a major issue. The Hebrew Bible conveys an omnipresent violence sent by God and addressed in rituals and laws, as well as longings for peace. Judaism is committed to the ideal of peace and well-being (*shalom*) and provides containment rules such as the *lex talionis* of “an eye for an eye,” which aims at preventing escalation of violence, and prohibits murder (“You shall not kill,” Exodus 20:13). However, God sanctions and even commands holy wars (*milhemet mitzvah*) that shall lead to the annihilation of the enemy of the people of Israel (*herem*). Violence and war thus remain suitable options for self-defense and survival but should not be engaged in for proselytizing, revenge, or unprovoked aggression.

The New Testament emphasizes individual morality and relates the teachings of Jesus, such as those typified by the Sermon on the Mount (“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God,” Matthew 5:9). Early Christianity promoted nonviolent resistance and martyrdom until it became the official religion of the Roman Empire under Emperor Constantine. Theologians such as Saint Augustine and later Francisco de Vitoria developed the just war theory, which establishes the right to wage war in certain circumstances (*jus ad bellum*) and specifies acceptable forms of warfare (*jus in bello*). If defensive

wars are just wars by nature, offensive wars can be considered so if they are waged by legitimate authorities, for the righting of wrongs, and with common good intentions. This doctrine has been used to justify holy wars conducted to recover the Holy Land from Muslim domination during the Reconquista and the Crusades, persecutions of heretics during the Protestant Reformation, and imperial conquests. It has been contested by many reformed churches such as Brethren, Anabaptists, and Quakers, who advocate unconditional pacifism through conscientious objection and nonresistance. Over the past decades, the Roman Catholic Church has narrowed just war doctrine to the legitimation of defensive wars and the promotion of the right to interfere in case of human rights violations, but some theologians commend absolute pacifism on the grounds that modern technology, including nuclear weapons, prevents proportionate confrontations and generates intolerable casualties.

The Koran rests on the notion of effort (*jihad*). All Muslims must spiritually fight to overcome self-centeredness (*jihad akbar*, or greater *jihad*). They also have to extend the Islamic community through preaching and education, but holy war for, or in defense of, Islam (*jihad bis-saif*) must be carried out according to strict rules and is not recognized by some Muslim movements such as Sufism. Believers shall make every effort to ending conflict, including restorative justice and peacemaking (*sulh*).

The significance of individual morality in preserving and defending peace is shared by many Western political thinkers, but most of them, from Plato to Aristotle or later Kant and Baron de Montesquieu, include it in a broader reflection on natural law, society, state, or humanity. Writers such as Henry Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, and Romain Rolland laud individual nonviolence. Psychoanalysts like Sigmund Freud urge that aggressiveness be channeled through the development of emotional and most of all cultural links between individuals. Some absolute pacifists condemn all kinds of taking of life, including capital punishment, euthanasia, abortion, meat eating, animal cruelty, or killing in self-defense. On the other hand, philosophers such as Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argue that war can sometimes be useful, and a few

glorify it as a potential for exalting either the individual (Friedrich Nietzsche) or the nation and/or the state (Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel).

### The Need for Systemic Change

Many thinkers conceive of pacifism at a more systemic level and insist on the necessity of transforming society at various levels to alleviate or eliminate violence. They differ on the means to be used for such a transformation, with proposals ranging from free trade to political regime, federalism, international law, collective security, disarmament, class solidarity, or social mobilizations.

In opposition to mercantilists who argue that war can be necessary for the consolidation of states, utilitarian philosophers such as David Hume or Jeremy Bentham insist on the cost of war and associate virtue and interest to show how free trade is useful both for stimulating economic health and for pacifying behaviors, as exchanges promote a shared belonging to the same community.

As political systems, empires can ensure an enduring peace but are not considered to be pacifist political systems because they maintain a domination of their subjects. Kant grounds his project for a "perpetual peace" on three levels of action, as peace occurs from a moral individual choice, best guaranteed by a republican regime, which represents and respects people's choice, and at a more global level by a federation of republican states on a cosmopolitan basis.

This insistence on political regimes is shared by later advocates of the democratic peace theory, according to which democracies do not go to war with one another, unlike potentially warlike autocratic regimes driven by dynastic ambitions or power politics. However, some elitist thinkers regard democracies as potentially bellicose because their use of conscription and the irrationality of the masses can support nationalism and thus go beyond their recognition of a people's right to self-determination. Federalism is also seen by numerous political thinkers as an answer for preserving and promoting regional or universal peace through a federation of states that share executive, legislative, and judicial powers and in some cases a common army, giving rise to contemporary reflections that could ultimately lead to regional integration.

International law extends the just law doctrines of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* to establish common rules to prevent, reduce, or judge violence between international actors. Since the end of the 19th century, various strategies have been tested, such as arbitration, conciliation, mediation, treaties (e.g., the Briand-Kellogg Pact, signed in 1928, which forbids war), or international courts (e.g., the International Criminal Court). Pacifist associations from various countries actively supported the creation of the League of Nations (1919) and of the United Nations (1945), based on the principle of collective security, and incomplete disarmament initiatives.

Claims for solidarity among the people across state boundaries spread among leftist workers movements and trade unions throughout the 19th century. For most of them, war mainly constrains the working classes and benefits the dominant classes. Their pacifism therefore associates internationalism with antimilitarism, since they advocate general strike against militarism as conveyed by the lyrics of *The Internationale* anthem, written in 1871 ("The kings make us drunk with their fumes / Peace among ourselves, war to the tyrants! / Let the armies go on strike / Guns in the air, and break ranks"). However, Marxists believe that peace is a remote goal, as the working-class mobilization for a classless society will abolish war through the decline of the state, but only through the use of violence.

Since 1945, social mobilizations have developed new arguments for peace on the grounds of the existence of a nuclear threat endangering the very existence of humanity, be it through political mobilizations, some of them led by communist internationalism (World Peace Council) during the Cold War, or the creation of environmental nongovernmental organizations concerned with broader ecological purposes.

Rejection of violence may be considered as one of the most commonly shared political ideas throughout history, though it takes widely different shapes, which make its identification complex and probably contributes to its not playing a major role within political theory.

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*See also* Collective Security; International Law; International Solidarity; Natural Law; Peace; Political Integration; Violence; War and Peace

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## PANEL

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*See* Time-Series Cross-Section Data and Methods

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## PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

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Panel data consist of a cross-section of “individuals” for which there are repeated observations over time. Individuals can be any cross-sectional unit of analysis, such as states, dyads, or survey respondents. Panel data sets are typically dichotomized between long panels, which have many measurement occasions relative to the size of the cross section, and short panels, which have many individuals in the cross section relative to the number of repeated measurement occasions, or “waves.” In general, the methods associated with the term *panel data analysis* or *longitudinal analysis* focus on short panels, while methods under the *time-series cross section* umbrella focus more on analyzing long panels. The key advantage of panel data is that such data offer the opportunity to better evaluate causal propositions than strictly cross-sectional data. Whereas cross-sectional data only allow the researcher to observe covariances, panel data further allow the researcher to observe

whether a change in an input precedes a change in the outcome. In other words, since panel data consist of the same individuals over time, the analyst can observe a shift in responses as a reaction to an input. One example would be an evaluation of whether a state’s present behavior responds to the prior behavior of its neighbors. Another example might be using a survey panel, such as those often incorporated into the American National Election Studies, to assess how partisan strength influences campaign interest over time. Panel data have a number of features that can pose challenges to analysts. These issues include unit effects, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation. Panels also have special problems of missingness. The remainder of this entry focuses on these issues and some remedies for each.

#### Unit Effects

Whenever individuals’ mean responses differ, unit effects are present in the data. Unit effects can pose serious problems for inference as failure to account for them in some way can produce bias in estimates akin to omitted variable bias. If the mean response varies cross-sectionally via unobserved unique means, but this difference is not modeled (and thereby left in the error term), then any cross-sectionally varying covariate will correlate with the error term. Such a situation produces endogeneity bias, that is, the independent variable is correlated with the error term in the model’s coefficients.

In the econometric tradition, two approaches are widely used to handle unit effects. One is the fixed-effects model, typically estimated with least squares dummy variables (LSDV). This approach estimates the desired model using ordinary least squares (OLS), including dummy variables for each individual, save a reference individual. This approach has the advantage of being computationally simple and accounting for a known source of variance in the model specification. However, individual dummies are perfectly collinear with any variable that varies only cross-sectionally. Hence, LSDV precludes the inclusion of time-invariant variables in a model. An alternative that does allow time-invariant covariates is a generalized least squares (GLS) model with a compound symmetry covariance structure, known as a random-effects

model. This model recognizes that repeated observations will covary, so the estimator accounts for this structure by including a term that forces all repeated observations to correlate at a constant level with each other.

It should be noted that the terms *fixed* and *random effects* have multiple meanings. Econometricians typically call a LSDV model a fixed-effects model and a GLS compound symmetry model a random-effects model. These terms take a different meaning when analyzing data from the view of hierarchical modeling. Specifically, a fixed effect refers to any model quantity estimated in the fitting of a model (i.e., obtained via least squares or maximum likelihood), while a random effect refers to any parameter that is unique to the individual but can be predicted separately. Mixed-effects models contain both fixed and random effects. Confusion can arise because a random-effects model is a special case of a mixed-effects model. For example, the general form of a linear mixed-effects model is

$$Y_{ij} = \mathbf{X}'_{ij}\beta + \mathbf{Z}'_{ij}\mathbf{b}_i + e_{ij},$$

where  $Y_{ij}$  is the response value for individual  $i$  at time  $j$ ,  $\mathbf{X}_{ij}$  is the vector of all covariate values for individual  $i$  at time  $j$ ,  $\beta$  is a vector of fixed effects—coefficients that apply to all individuals,  $\mathbf{Z}_{ij}$  is a subset of  $X$  that may include any time-varying covariate or a constant,  $\mathbf{b}_i$  is a vector of random effects for individual  $i$ , and  $e_{ij}$  is the error term for individual  $i$  at time  $j$ . One special case would be a model in which there is only a random intercept, which becomes

$$Y_{ij} = \mathbf{X}'_{ij}\beta + b_i + e_{ij}.$$

Each  $b_i$  is not estimated directly in the fitting of the model but can be predicted using empirical Bayes techniques. By decomposing the unexplained variance into  $b_i$  and  $e_{ij}$ , which are independent of each other, the model successfully accounts for differences in the mean responses for individuals and the necessary correlation among observations. Hence, the random-effects model is seen as a special case of the more general mixed-effects model.

There are several practical considerations when deciding how to control for unit effects in a longitudinal model. Again, fixed-effects models cannot include time-invariant covariates. Further, when

the number of individuals is large, especially relative to the number of waves, then estimating a LSDV model is inefficient. An alternative fixed-effects estimator to LSDV is the within estimator, wherein the outcome variable and the covariates are all rescaled as deviations from an individual's mean of the variable. The within estimator avoids the inefficiency of estimating unique intercepts for each individual and yields the same coefficient estimates at LSDV; however, just like LSDV, it cannot accommodate time-invariant covariates.

The model of random effects for units allows for time-invariant covariates and avoids the inefficiency problem that could emerge from LSDV. Hence, with especially short panels or any model for which the effects of time-invariant covariates are to be estimated, random-effects models are probably the most practical option. However, this model assumes that unit effects are independent of all covariates. If the unit effects are correlated with any of the input variables, then the random-effects model is biased and inconsistent. Whether or not independent unit effects is a fair assumption can be evaluated with a Hausman test, under which the null hypothesis is that the unit effects are independent, implying that a random-effects model is consistent. Rejection of this null hypothesis implies that the random-effects model has problems of endogeneity bias. As a final, practical point on random-effects models, GLS models such as this require the analyst to specify how the errors of the model are correlated. However, the true correlation between the errors of individuals' repeated measurements is unknown, so feasible GLS must be used. Feasible GLS (FGLS) is estimated with a multistep procedure whereby residuals of an initial model are used to estimate the correlation of errors, which is then inserted into a GLS estimator. For instance, the Cochrane-Orcutt FGLS estimator repeats this iterative process until the estimate of correlation of errors ceases to improve. All of this suggests that analysts must carefully weigh the structure of their data and the goals of their model when choosing how best to handle unit effects.

### Serial Correlation, Heteroskedasticity, and Contemporaneous Correlation

Serial correlation refers to the fact that repeated observations on the same individual are highly

correlated. In general, this correlation tends to be large and positive but diminishes as the time between measurements increases. Serial correlation violates the OLS assumption of uncorrelated errors. The solutions to this problem resemble the fixes for unit effects. One solution is to include a lagged response as a covariate, as this term often accounts for serial correlation and makes the remaining errors independent. Lagged outcome variables are more commonly used for long panels because the first wave of observations cannot be modeled with this approach, which is more costly when repeated observations are scarce. (It should be noted that while many argue that a lagged response most effectively accounts for unit effects and serial correlation, others maintain that an endogeneity bias can occur if the lagged term does not filter all of the serial correlation.) Another solution is to estimate a GLS model that includes a covariance pattern matrix, which estimates the covariances between each pair of time waves: The matrix may be unstructured or defined by a clear pattern, such as first-order autoregressive. Finally, mixed-effects models produce correlation matrices based on the variances and covariances of the random effects. Thus, a pattern of correlation can also be captured by random effects. It should be noted that in particularly short panels (e.g., three waves), serial correlation can be hard to account for with any of these methods: A lagged dependent variable costs one wave of data, covariance pattern matrices more complex than a simple random-effects model can be difficult to estimate, and very short panels do not allow for a lot of random parameters.

The methods for covariance patterns and random effects also can be incorporated into the general linear model framework, which means that remedies for unit effects and serial correlation also can be used for limited dependent variables (e.g., counts or binary outcomes). Marginal models, estimated with the generalized estimating equations, require the analyst to specify how repeated observations are associated and thereby resemble the covariance pattern GLS model for continuous outcomes. General linear mixed-effects models incorporate random effects into the specification and account for the correlation of repeated observations through the random effects.

Heteroskedasticity can be present in panel data if the unmodeled variance in outcomes differs from

one individual to the next. This problem can be addressed through a GLS estimator that allows for unique variances among individuals, in addition to the correlation pattern. Contemporaneous correlation arises when individuals have similar errors at particular times. This may arise because some time-dependent factor is simultaneously influencing all individuals. In the presence of contemporaneous correlation, the error variance of linear coefficient estimates increases relative to the estimates of coefficients when Gauss-Markov assumptions hold. Regular standard errors do not account for this inefficiency, however. Rather, panel-corrected standard errors will better account for the larger error variance, thereby making statistical inference on coefficient estimates less prone to Type I errors (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true).

### Missing Data

With panel data, a key concern is that measuring each individual at every wave of observations may not be possible. One reason for this may be censoring that arises from the structure of the study. For example, if different individuals were recruited to participate in a study with staggered start times, but the study ended simultaneously for all, then late joiners would have fewer repeated observations. In this situation, the nonobservance of later waves for late joiners would be missing completely at random (MCAR), as qualities of the individuals had no bearing on how often they were observed. In this case, as with any panel data with observations MCAR, the data could be analyzed by complete-case analysis (analyzing only cases for which all waves are observed) or available-data analysis (i.e., methods that do not require response vectors of equal length).

Another, more serious cause of missing data in panels is attrition (also called dropout or panel mortality). Individuals who are part of the study may choose not to participate after a few observations, or the researcher may lose track of individuals and be unable to reach them for further study. Dropout specifically refers to the situation where, once an individual goes unobserved in one wave, he or she is not observed in any future wave. Whereas data that are missing due to censoring are nearly always MCAR, data missing due to dropout may not fit this criterion. If the data are at least

missing at random (MAR, meaning that the probability of missingness is conditional only on observable information), then imputation methods can yield unbiased estimates of model quantities. Many studies impute missing values from dropout by assuming all missing values of a response are equal to the last observed value. This method assumes, however, that the responses would not have changed since dropout, which is usually unrealistic.

A better alternative is multiple random imputation. One technique for multiple random imputation is to model the probability of missingness and match missing observations with observed observations that have similar probabilities of being missing, randomly drawing several observations with similar probabilities of being missing to impute the missing value. A second technique for multiple random imputation is to model the value of an observation at a particular time with the observed data and impute a value for the missing observation that is computed with known information about the subject plus a random disturbance. For individuals who later return to the study, observations at later waves—as well as early waves—should be used to impute missing middle values.

As a final consideration for attrition, a researcher may choose to refresh the sample by adding new observations toward the end of the study, these new observations being called a refreshment sample. Though this strategy does not directly remedy the problem of uneven panels, it does prevent the sample size from shrinking too much when constructing an overall response profile. Furthermore, refreshment allows the researcher to diagnose the severity of panel effects. This can be done by comparing variable means from the refreshment samples with the means of those still in the panel at a given wave to see how dropout is influencing the makeup of the sample. Furthermore, the process of being part of a panel study may influence an individual's response over time, a process called panel conditioning. Refreshment samples allow for the possibility of adjusting for panel effects through techniques such as fractional pooling or two-stage auxiliary instrumental variables.

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*See also* Regression; Time-Series Analysis; Time-Series Cross-Section Data and Methods

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## PARADIGMS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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A paradigm is a constellation of scientific theories, values, and methods shared by the members of the scientific community, forging a disciplinary matrix and excluding any other theory. The word is of Greek origin and emerged in philosophical literature in the 15th century. The concept of a paradigm was formulated by Thomas Kuhn in his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). Today, this concept is accepted in the history of natural sciences and in the sociology of science. It is also frequently used in political science as in all social sciences in spite of the fact that Kuhn explained in the preface of his book that its use is not justified in the social sciences. In 1965, three years after the publication of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, the American Political Science Association (APSA) president, David Truman, thought that the paradigmatic explanation of scientific progress was not applicable to political science. Since then, the concept of a paradigm has nonetheless seduced many political scientists but much less so among comparativists than among other scholars. The word has even spread to mass media. Today it may be too late to expel

this word from the lexicon, but it can be specified. The basic question is the following: In political science, are there sudden overturnings, scientific breakthroughs involving a *tabula rasa*, comparable with those engendered by Nicolaus Copernicus, Isaac Newton, Charles Darwin, or Louis Pasteur? For the following reasons, the answer to such a question cannot be affirmative. What is involved here is the identity of political science as a science focusing on social diversity, social change, and cumulative growth and knowledge.

In all sciences, the extent of the innovation that any individual can produce is necessarily limited, for each individual must employ in research the tools that he or she acquires and cannot in his or her own lifetime replace them all (Kuhn, 1970). Progress does not arise in a vacuum but develops out of the scientific patrimony. It is difficult to find in the social sciences a virgin domain. Every decade that passes adds layer on layer to the patrimony. New explanations supersede older interpretations. Many examples of cumulative progress can be given. Even giants rely on patrimony. Karl Marx refers to Adam Smith in his *Theory of Surplus Value*. In this book, he draws on the work of his predecessor in more than one page out of every six. Ralf Dahrendorf cites Marx 160 times in his book *Society and Democracy in Germany*. Max Weber does not cite Marx, but many of his writings were in response to the thesis of his predecessor. He once noted that he could not have accomplished crucial parts of his work without the contributions of Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. Darwin had recognized his debt to Thomas Robert Malthus; John Maynard Keynes would not have been able to write one of the most famous books of the 20th century without the incremental advances achieved by several generations of economists. The theory of development consists of a long chain of accumulated contributions in several disciplines. The literature on elites is a good example, among others, of cumulative knowledge. Many contributions emphasize the sedimentation of layers of knowledge. The work of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto on elitism has become consolidated groundwork, and since then, important books have built an impressive patrimony.

The scope of social sciences is rarely the discovery of laws with universal validity; rather, it is the

explanation of social diversity. In the social sciences, truth is not universal, it is contextual and plural. Social scientists do not make inventions and rarely make discoveries; what they do best is to observe regularities and exceptions (anomalies). It is for this reason that the most imaginative strategy in the social sciences is the comparative method. The patrimony is common property. Although every concept or theory or method has its creators and developers, they do not need to be cited every time the term is used. Even the identity of the originator may disappear into anonymity. We do not, and cannot, remember who used terms such as *role*, *revolution*, or *social mobility* for the first time. Given such a patrimony, scholars today can start their research at a much higher level than did their predecessors. Graduate students today know more than the founders of their field—even if they do not have the same capabilities of their forebears. Knowledge is largely acquired by accumulation.

Because the patrimony of political science results from progressively accumulated knowledge rather than from revolutionary leaps or bounds, because the discipline is deeply divided in specialties and in schools, and because one of its most productive research strategies is the comparative method, the mainstream of the discipline of political science cannot be labeled as paradigmatic. Other expressions are available: general framework, basic theories, encompassing synthesis, lasting postulates, and so on. None of the major trends in contemporary political science has the pretention of flying the paradigmatic flag. Many schools were and are innovative and seminal, but they directly contradict the concept of a paradigm dominating the entire discipline or its prominent domains.

There is a basic incompatibility between paradigmatic monoliths and comparative analyses. All great theories, concepts, and strategies in political science implicitly reject paradigmatic assumptions (except maybe the rational theory). The history of political science is a history of multiple competitive theories and methods: plural societies, behaviorism, structural functionalism, development, dependency, the role of the state and of civil society, the changing roles of institutions, electoral cleavages, religion and politics, civil culture, nationalism, social stratification, social class, alienation, legitimacy, trust, ethnocentrism, imperialism, hegemony, the clash of civilizations, and so on. The

thesaurus of the disciplines is impermeable to paradigmatic oversimplifications. The Kuhnian overview of the history of astronomy, physics, or biology cannot be extrapolated to the social sciences, according to Mattei Dogan and Robert Pahre (1990).

The borrowing and lending of concepts, theories, and methods from one discipline to another of the social sciences over generations also shows the continuous accumulation of knowledge. Using various encyclopedias and dictionaries, it is possible to compile an inventory of more than 200 concepts that political science “imported.”

- *From sociology:* accommodation, aggregate, assimilation, elite circulation, clique, cohesion, collective behavior, hierarchy, ideal type, individualism, legitimacy, mass media, mass society, militarism, nationalism, pattern variables, Protestant ethic, secular, segregation, social class, social control, social integration, social structure, socialization, status inconsistency, working class, *gemeinschaft*, *gesellschaft*
- *From psychology:* affect, alienation, ambivalence, aspiration, attitude, behavior, consciousness, dependency, empathy, personality, social movement, stereotype, gestalt
- *From economics:* allocation of resources, cartel, corporatism, diminishing returns, industrial revolution, industrialization, liberalism, mercantilism, gross national product, scarcity, undeveloped areas
- *From philosophy and Greek writers:* anarchism, aristocracy, consensus, democracy, faction, freedom, general will, idealism, monarchy, oligarchy, phratry, pluralism, tyranny, value, weltanschauung
- *From anthropology:* acculturation, affinity, caste, nepotism, patriarchy, plural society, rites of passage
- *From theology:* anomie, charisma
- *From journalists and politicians:* imperialism, internationalism, isolationism, the Left and the Right, lobbying, neutralism, nihilism, patronage, plebiscite, propaganda, socialism, syndicalism

In the process of adoption and adaptation the semantic meaning of many concepts has changed. Many concepts have multiple origins.

Authoritarianism has two roots, one psychological and one ideological. It is often inadvertently interchangeable with despotism, autocracy, absolutism, dictatorship, and so on. Authority has been analyzed from different disciplinary perspectives by Bronislaw Malinowski, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Harold Lasswell, Abraham Kaplan, Bertrand de Jouvenel, and Carl Friedrich, among others. The concept of culture (civic, political, and national) has many variants: cultural convergence, cultural configuration, cultural evolution, cultural integration, cultural lag, cultural parallelism, cultural pluralism, cultural relativity, cultural system, postmaterialist culture. In the past 2 decades, political scientists have been very productive in this subfield.

Paradigms do not dialogue, they are mortal enemies; new ones replace old ones entirely. Introductory textbooks in physics or chemistry published 40 years ago rest now in the cemetery of books. On the contrary, in political science, dozens of books published long ago are still inspiring contemporary scholars: Max Weber, Karl Marx, Adam Smith, Vilfredo Pareto, Anthony Downs, Kenneth J. Arrow, Harold Lasswell, John Stuart Mill, Joseph Schumpeter, and many others, even Aristotle and Machiavelli, are still preeminent in the patrimony of political science, which advances by a process of accumulation of work within subfields and develops out of the patrimony by the scientist’s own insights. The history of political science is not a history of breakthrough discoveries as in physics or chemistry. It is an uninterrupted chain of advances, with many competitive schools, controversies, temporary syntheses, predecessors and successors, and methodological disputes.

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*See also* Normative Political Theory; Political Philosophy; Political Theory

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## PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS

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Parliamentary government is a form of government where the executive derives its political legitimacy from the parliamentary representative body. From a historical point of view, it is a European invention and continues to be the most common form of government on this continent. Outside Europe, its diffusion has been limited, and presidential or semipresidential forms have often been preferred. This entry discusses the origins of parliamentary systems, the various forms they take, and current problems with respect to this form of government.

### The Origins of Parliamentary Government

Parliamentary government is one of the possible solutions to a crucial liberal and democratic problem—the problem of how to ensure both the political legitimacy of the executive and, at the same time, its accountability. The basic idea behind this form of government is that the parliamentary institution, as the highest representative body of the political community, should hold the keys to the life of the executive. This constitutional idea is essentially implemented by giving the parliament the power to express a vote of no confidence in the

executive if it does not approve its behavior and by obligating the executive to resign when faced with such a manifestation of political distrust.

The origins of this principle and of the institutional mechanisms used to implement it can be easily detected in European history of the past 2 centuries. Within the framework of limited monarchical government, that is, a political condition whereby the monarchy was balanced by a representative body, the increasingly strong political role of the latter has progressively produced a situation in which the executive nominated by the monarch could not survive without the political approval of the parliament. Criticisms, which the parliamentary body could not address against the king himself without getting into a situation of *lèse-majesté* and thus creating an unsolvable problem of political legitimacy, could be more freely directed against the government. In this case, a mutually acceptable solution could be for the king to dismiss the government, attributing to it all political responsibilities and thus preserving his own supremacy. On its side, the representative body could “obtain the head” of the prime minister and of his or her ministers while at the same leaving the authority of the king untouched. In this way, the executive, while originally chosen by the monarch and deriving from him its political legitimacy, could be gradually drawn into the sphere of the parliament until the monarchy ultimately lost every substantive political control over the executive and only retained a symbolic role.

With this transformation, the government and its components have been increasingly drawn into the sphere of electoral and party politics and have gained independence from the sphere of the court and of the state bureaucracy. The process leading to a full parliamentary control over the executive has been often difficult and nonlinear. The idea that the government should answer to elected politicians and become responsive to the opinions and passions of the populace was difficult to accept—both for the monarchy and for the state establishment that was loyal to the throne. For an extended period of time, in most European countries, the monarchs attempted to maintain some degree of political control over the formation of governments and over the selection of prime ministers and some ministers (particularly in the fields of foreign affairs and defense). They also sought to

influence some of the policy decisions. On a number of occasions, they even resorted to prematurely dissolving the parliament with the purpose of obtaining a more favorable position of the representatives with regard to their preferred cabinets. This resistance has delayed but not stopped the process of parliamentarization; in some cases, however, it has led to the downfall of the monarchy and to the (permanent or temporary) adoption of republican rule (e.g., in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Where the monarchy has more smoothly accepted the new developments, it has survived, although with a more limited role. In these cases, it has accompanied the consolidation of a stable parliamentary government (Belgium, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and the United Kingdom [UK] are good examples of such a development).

### The Basic Features of Parliamentary Government

As previously mentioned, the crucial and defining feature of a parliamentary government is the power of the parliament to express a vote of no confidence against the government. Corresponding to this power is the duty of the government to resign after such an event. As it had already been clearly noticed by Walter Bagehot in *The English Constitution* (1867), this produces a “close union of the executive and legislative powers.” The cabinet and the parliament, or more precisely the parliamentary majority, become closely interconnected. The other features of this form of government derive from the first feature. The second is that the executive does not have a fixed term of office. Its duration may coincide with a full parliamentary term, or even beyond, if a newly elected parliament continues to ensure its political support, but it may also be interrupted beforehand. The principle of collegial responsibility that typically characterizes parliamentary government is also strictly linked to the power of the parliament to express a vote of no confidence against the government. The government is a collective decision-making body and is collectively responsible in front of the parliament. This principle can, however, coexist with significant variations in the internal structure of the executive. The role and the authority of the head of the government can

vary, as well as the degree of autonomy of the other ministers. In most cases, the duration of parliament is not fixed: The parliament can be dissolved before its normal conclusion and early elections can be called. This possibility is generally viewed by constitution makers as an exit strategy in situations where providing the required parliamentary support for a cabinet has proven to be a difficult task. With regard to the dissolution of parliament, it is particularly relevant to establish who has the substantive power to decide this. A further institutional feature of this form of government is that the head of state is clearly separated from the head of the government and that it mainly has a representative and procedural role rather than a governing one. Parliamentary government is, however, compatible with a variety of possibilities with regard to the selection of the head of state. Especially in Europe, a good number of parliamentary monarchies survive where the head of state is designated by the monarchical principle of inheritance within an established dynasty. In most of the other cases, when a republican solution is adopted, a president is elected by the parliament. In a few cases, a popular election takes place but, as opposed to presidential or semipresidential forms, this does not attribute to the president a governing role.

A crucial aspect of the parliamentary form is the formation of the government; unlike the presidential form of government, it is not formally decided by elections and thus requires a more complex procedure. Typically, this procedure entails the nomination of the government so that the parliament can express its support either explicitly (if a confidence vote is required at its inception) or implicitly (when such a vote is not required and support is presumed until proof of the contrary). With few exceptions, the role of nominating is in the hands of the head of state, who is called to perform this function after an election or the resignation of the government in office. Constitutional rules are usually not very specific about what the head of state (or another authority endowed with this power) should do, but it is rather obvious that the designation must be oriented toward producing a cabinet capable of obtaining the support of the parliament. Otherwise, it could later be struck by a negative vote of the representative body and thus nullified. The task of the head of state is, therefore, to find out the will of the parliamentary

majority, in terms of both the composition of the majority itself and the identification of the person to lead the new government. Depending on the electoral system and the configuration of the party system in the parliament, this step may be more or less simple. In some cases, electoral results so clearly define which party or coalition of parties has won and to whom the task of cabinet leader should be assigned that the head of state has practically no need to conduct a search and can proceed immediately to the nomination of the prime minister. In other cases, especially in multiparty systems, the process is less clear. After new elections or after the fall of an existing government, it may not be immediately obvious which parliamentary majority will be formed that is able to sustain a new government. To establish which parties will compose it and which leader will be acceptable may require a long and complicated process of negotiation. The head of state will typically assist the process through consultations with the political forces until a viable solution emerges. Under special circumstances, this role of facilitator may acquire a somewhat greater political significance. When parties cannot come to an agreement, the intervention of the head of state may help guide the process by either favouring one solution or creating obstacles for another one.

### **Institutional Variations in Parliamentary Government**

Within this general scheme, there is great space for institutional variations. With regard to parliamentary confidence in the government, it has already been mentioned that while the power of the representative assembly to express a vote of no confidence is the common and defining feature of parliamentary governments, a positive confidence vote is not always required when a new government is formed. In many cases, the support is presumed unless proven otherwise. Other aspects deserve to be noted. When the parliament is bicameral, the power to provide or to deny the confidence to the government is generally reserved to only one of the chambers—the one with the broader democratic base. Only exceptionally, as in Italy under the constitution of 1948, is the positive confidence of both chambers required for a government to survive. Given its crucial influence on

the stability of the executive, the vote of no confidence has been regulated with variable degrees of restrictions. Some of these rules, such as the requirement of a temporal delay before a motion of no confidence is put to a vote, are directed at preventing parliamentary “ambushes.” A more strict mechanism is the one introduced with the German Basic Law of 1949, which has since found some imitations. The so-called constructive vote of no confidence prescribes that the vote by the parliament against the government in office should simultaneously designate a new head of government (the chancellor in the German version). The purpose is to prevent negative coalitions that are only united by the purpose of bringing down a government and do not possess the willingness to unite in the formation of a new one. Differences can also be found in the process of government formation. If the normal rule is that the head of state nominates the prime minister, this duty may be transferred, as in Sweden after the constitutional reform of 1974, to the parliament’s speaker. Another solution, adopted in the German Basic Law, is to have the chancellor individually elected by the parliament (in fact by the Bundestag) on the proposal of the head of state.

With regard to legislative matters, further variations may concern the powers of the government and the head of state. The head of state may have the power to send back to the legislature a piece of legislation approved by parliament (in most of the cases of governmental initiative). Governments may have, as, for instance, in Italy, the power to enact decrees that enjoy immediately the same authority as laws but that must be subsequently ratified by parliament within a given period of time. The role of the government within parliament may also vary, especially with regard to the governance of the lawmaking process. Of special interest are its agenda-setting powers and the control it has of the parliamentary calendar.

The most important dimension of variation concerns the relative power and roles of ministers and prime minister. Parliamentary governments may oscillate between an extreme where the prime minister has a dominant role in guiding the cabinet and another extreme where his or her authority is much more limited and he or she is confined to a role of mediation among powerful “cabinet barons” (Giovanni Sartori, 1994). This only partially

depends on formal constitutional rules; other factors that are essentially related to the electoral and party aspects of government formation have a much greater impact, and it is these factors that now need to be examined.

### The Working of Parliamentary Government

On the basis of the constitutional rules defining it, the parliamentary form of government can be interpreted as a fairly straightforward “chain of delegation and accountability” (Kaare Strøm, 2000). Through elections, citizens delegate the members of parliament; these in turn delegate the government, which then delegates the ministerial bureaucracies. Accountability runs in the opposite direction. Things, however, are a bit less simple and linear when political factors are introduced into this picture. Of crucial importance is the party variable with its two main dimensions: (1) the internal structure of parties and (2) the nature of the party system. The relationship between parliament and government can change significantly depending on these two aspects. The main reason is that the nature of the party system and the internal structure of parties have a direct bearing on the form and the cohesion of the parliamentary majority—the crucial linchpin in this form of government. The potential variations in the practical workings of the parliamentary government can be broad. At one extreme, we can find the situation, common in many countries at the origins of parliamentary government, in which parties were more or less nonexistent as organizations. In front of parliamentary aggregations with a weak degree of cohesion, the government (especially when backed by a monarch who had not yet abandoned the ambition to exert political influence) could easily manipulate majorities using the instruments of political patronage and, if needed, the threat of early elections. It is true that the government could also unexpectedly face a parliamentary ambush due to the volatility of parliamentary support. The consolidation of highly organized parties during the 20th century has deeply changed the relationship between executives and parliaments in most countries. Parties (and especially their extraparliamentary organizations and leadership) have become the crucial linchpin of this relationship. In practical terms, both the members of parliament

and the executive became the delegates of parties’ leaderships. Parliamentary government became truly “party government” (Richard Katz, 1986), whereby party leaders define to a large extent the policy platforms to be followed by the government and select the persons to occupy ministerial positions. In this context, the parliamentary connotation means essentially that it is the “parliamentary size” of parties resulting from their electoral performance that determines their weight in this process. Depending on the variety of party organization models, the degree of parliamentarization of the party leadership can also vary, and this also reflects on the parliamentarization of the cabinet members. The current decline of external party organizations is opening the way to a situation where the government less strictly depends on party orders and in fact influences internal party dynamics. Thus, there is more of a two-way relationship between parties and government.

The structure of the party system and electoral dynamics combine to produce other important effects. Particularly relevant is the impact that these elements can have on the relationship between the electoral and the parliamentary moment of the process of delegation. A good example is the British one. Normally, the existence of a (de facto) two-party system, combined with the fact that elections determine which party controls a parliamentary majority and the fact that the leader of a party is also in principle the candidate for head of government, produces a kind of short circuit in the process of delegation. Although voters in principle only select the members of parliament, they also determine de facto the party that will govern and its leader. A “popular investiture” of the government is thus produced and the parliament cannot do anything but ratify it. Of course, this does not detract from other aspects of the parliamentary model: The members of parliament maintain the power to renege on their support for the government (and the government knows that it must work toward maintaining this support). Electoral mandate and parliamentary support are thus combined. Changes in the configuration of the party system and electoral results may, however, negate the possibility of a one-party government “mandated” by the electoral result and thus open the way to a coalition negotiated among the parties/parliamentary groups. In fact, this happened in

2010 in the UK, and it is the “normal way” in multiparty systems. In such situations, elections are not decisive; a process of coalition making can only begin among the parties represented after the parliament is formed. In this case, the delegation from the parliament (the parties) to the government becomes more evident. The government will receive its policy mandate and derive its personal composition from this process. The relationship between the government and its supporting coalition is then crucial. The government can only last if its supporting coalition holds together. The instruments for stabilizing the majority and regulating its internal working acquire an obvious importance, according to Wolfgang Müller and Kaare Strøm (2000). Among them, the coalition agreement deserves special attention. It is a document that specifies the broad goals of the coalition, its specific policy objectives, the allocation of ministries, and the instruments and the rules for the solution of conflicts. Other instruments can also help solve coalition conflicts during the life of the cabinet, such as coalition committees—“summits” of party leaders that are held to interpret or renegotiate the original agreement.

Two further situations must be considered. The first is when a coalition is formed before the elections. The second is when the government, based on one or more parties, does not have in parliament the support of a stable coalition holding the majority of seats. The first case can be seen in some way as an intermediate situation between a single-party government and a normal coalition government. If a preelectoral coalition wins the majority required to govern, the formation of the cabinet will be much speedier than is the case with a postelectoral coalition. Most of the policy and distributional questions will have been solved in advance. Moreover, the coalition and its leader will enjoy a sort of “direct investiture” by the people. However, as with any coalition government, this one will also be faced with the problem of maintaining its cohesion. This problem may become more serious if, with the approaching of new elections, any of the coalition members fears that its participation may not be rewarded by the voters and sees its chances better served by pursuing a different political path. The second case derives from the fact that in a parliamentary government the cabinet must not necessarily rely on a

supporting majority. In fact, the most important thing is that there should not be a majority against it. This enables the creation of minority governments, made up of one or more parties that do not enjoy a majority in parliament but explicitly or implicitly receive the support of other parties either in a more stable way or on an ad hoc basis. The frequency of such governments is greater than expected: This suggests that participating in a cabinet with full ministerial responsibilities is sometimes more of a cost than a benefit.

Whenever a one-party government is not possible, the formation of (preelectoral or postelectoral) coalitions is obviously a crucial aspect in the working of parliamentary government. This has generated a whole sector of studies devoted to coalitions that, starting with the pathbreaking study of William Riker (1962), have analyzed the different types of coalitions with regard to their size (minimal winning, minority, oversize, etc.) and their ideological composition (connected/unconnected). Furthermore, these studies have explored different explanations (utilitarian calculus, ideological preferences, and policy orientations) for their formation and their ends.

### Advantages and Disadvantages

Is the parliamentary form of government a better or worse form than the others, in particular the presidential form? This question has recurrently been at the center of discussions and has received varying answers. This is partly explained by the different points of view adopted and by the changing criteria of evaluation. It has also been due to the lack of systematic comparative empirical evidence; only in recent times has this obstacle been gradually overcome. Governmental instability has traditionally been one of the main points of criticism for parliamentary governments. The experiences of a number of European countries between the two World Wars seemed to suggest that parliamentary cabinets tend to be unstable and weak and that heads of government may lack authority, thus creating a situation that could open the road to nondemocratic consequences. In contrast, a presidential or semipresidential form of government has often been presented as a better solution. Putting the selection of the head of the executive directly into the hands of the voters and establishing a

fixed term for its duration seemed, to many scholars and observers, to be a recipe for overcoming the failures of parliamentary government. More recent contributions have retorted that parliamentary government, rather than being responsible for creating these problems, reflects a situation existing at the level of parties that would be dangerous to ignore. Moreover, it can be said that in such situations the parliamentary form of government allows a flexibility in the formation and change of governments that may reduce personalized zero-sum conflicts and open the road to compromises. On the contrary, presidential forms of government often are characterized by a rigidity that cannot easily provide alternative solutions if the adopted one fails. Whatever the conclusions of this scholarly and political debate are, it is worth noting that recently established democracies have increasingly attempted to combine elements of the parliamentary and presidential forms of government, adopting some form of semipresidentialism (or semiparliamentarianism).

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*See also* Accountability; Cabinets; Coalitions; Constitutional Engineering; Democracy, Types of; Electoral Systems; Government; Legitimacy; Parliaments; Parties; Party Systems; Presidentialism; Representation; Semipresidentialism

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## PARLIAMENTS

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The notion of parliament has existed for almost as long as people have gathered to debate alternative viewpoints and take associated decisions. As the complexity and formality ascribed to these gatherings increased, the institution of parliament developed. It comes under a variety of names, from the most common assembly, legislature, or parliament to more regionally specific ones such as Storting or Diet. Parliaments are institutions that bring together formally recognized members to discuss and legitimize decisions on matters affecting the community at large. The level of formality and power credited to those discussions and decisions varies, as does the level of representation. This entry first describes how the role of parliaments has changed considerably since the 19th century. The factors affecting the role and power of parliaments are considered, and the key roles performed by these institutions are identified. Each of these roles—legislation, scrutiny, and representation—is assessed, and the organization of parliaments is described. The entry concludes by outlining the main areas on which research on parliaments has focused.

The history of parliaments is intrinsically linked to that of democracy. Each wave of democratization identified by Samuel Huntington has corresponded to stages in the development of parliaments. The first wave encompasses the spread of liberalism in 19th-century Europe. With this came the creation

of new parliamentary institutions, as well as the legitimization of their representative value and role in the decision-making process. As the value of representative democracy grew, parliaments became central institutions of political systems, particularly in Europe. With the 20th century came considerable changes that affected the power and role of parliaments. As democracy expanded with the emergence of newly independent countries (the second wave of democratization), so did its complexity. The changes affecting parliament were twofold. First was the development of mass parties; the expansion of the electoral franchise saw parties becoming key institutions in the representation process, acquiring an important role in the expression of policies and mediation of interests, which had been key roles of the original liberal parliaments. Second, there was an expansion of the state; the emergence of the welfare state saw legislation growing more complex, increasingly developing into a matter for the executive rather than parliament. By the mid-20th century, some parliamentary roles and powers had been transferred to other institutions. However, as the third wave of democratization started, in the 1970s, many authoritarian regimes turned to democracy, putting parliaments at the core of their transitions. Simultaneously, a wider range of parliamentary roles and powers started to be more fully recognized. This was a time when the paradigm of the decline of parliament gave way to the paradigm of the role of parliament. Besides representation and legislation, parliaments play a variety of other roles, from education to providing a safety valve, legitimization, and scrutiny. Never before have there been so many parliaments, not only at the national level but also locally, regionally, and supranationally. Since the end of the 20th century, parliaments have expanded considerably in number and in complexity.

The powers and roles of parliaments differ according to their political context—the type of political, electoral, and party systems. Being part of a parliamentary, hybrid, or presidential political system has implications for the separation of powers and the relationship between parliament and other institutions, especially the executive. Different electoral systems, and associated party systems, also affect parliaments by determining the number of parties present in parliament, the potential support

base for government, the strength of party discipline, the type of representative mandate, and the parliament's organization. Indeed, some parliaments are not elected at all and are not composed of party members. Therefore, parliaments have differing powers and roles according to the characteristics of these structural variables, though all, in varying degrees, make a link between citizens and governance.

The relationship with government is one of the key dimensions to understanding parliaments. Depending on the type of political system, parliament may have different tools with which to hold government to account, such as a motion of censure that could bring the government down if approved. But the relationship with the executive goes well beyond accountability. The main focus of that relationship usually revolves around the production of legislation, but it also concerns the scrutiny of government activity. It is generally accepted in the literature that the executive dominates this relationship, due to the support ensured through party discipline and governmental legislative powers. That said, the more checks and balances the system includes, the less likely it is that the executive will dominate parliament.

The main function traditionally associated with parliaments is legislation. However, most legislation produced today has little contact with parliament. Legislation has become so complex that parliaments have little capacity to deal with the detail and extent of today's regulatory frameworks. Notwithstanding, parliaments do still hold a role in the legislative process. This role varies according to structural characteristics, as explained above, resulting in varying degrees of power in the capacity to initiate, amend, approve, and/or reject legislation. Many parliaments only have a legitimizing role of the legislative process, with little power to introduce legislation, let alone change it. They often act as the final stamp of approval, which explains why authors refer to rubber-stamp parliaments. As David Olson has famously stated, there is a general 90% rule in the legislative process, whereby the executive proposes 90% of the legislation and gets 90% of what it wants. Within the 10% leeway, many parliaments have the capacity and ability to change legislation, through formally approving amendments or informally influencing the final outcome. Occasionally, parliaments have the ability to reject government

legislation. When parliament regularly rejects government legislation, the relationship between the two institutions can break down, leading to new elections (or even a regime change). Regardless of the percentage of legislation on which parliament can act, one must also consider the focus and level of legislation (primary, secondary, or delegated). Some parliaments reserve the right to legislate on specific matters, which means that the whole of the bill is introduced, discussed, and approved in parliament; while in other cases the government has areas of reserved legislation through which it can legislate without having to go through parliament. Additionally, other institutions can intervene in the legislative process, such as supranational parliaments.

Scrutiny is another of parliament's main functions. It comes under different names such as oversight or parliamentary control and expresses itself in a wide range of activities and tools. Scrutiny plays a key part in the relationship between parliament and government and has increased in importance as parliament's role in the legislative process has diminished. Scrutiny can focus on the application of legislation, on seeking information, or simply on keeping a check on governmental activity. Most parliaments have provision for asking questions of government, in writing and/or orally in the plenary chamber and/or in committee. The frequency of these questions and their response rate are key indicators to assess the effectiveness of these. Parliaments often provide for several formats for questions to the government according to the types of request and matters. Interpellations are another popular scrutiny tool. Usually more general in scope, these involve a small debate on the topic, with the participation of a wider number of representatives besides the proponent. Finally, committees of enquiry form the other main scrutiny tool used by parliaments. Despite exceptions, these tend to be set on an ad hoc basis when there is a serious matter to investigate. The ability to scrutinize and investigate government adequately depends greatly on parliament's power to request information from the government and to summon the presence of members of the government and of the public administration, as well as the degree to which the opposition can use these powers.

As a key function for most parliaments, representation takes many forms and is closely linked to

the type of electoral system through which the parliament is elected. Representation can be collective, where the party's parliamentary group is the main representative entity, or individual, through members of parliament (MPs, also called deputies, legislators, or senators). The representative mandate is often linked to constituencies but can have a national basis. The strength of the link between representatives and constituencies depends on these factors. Parliaments elected through a first-past-the-post electoral system tend to encourage a more individual and constituency-based type of representation. Besides this, representatives may also follow a trustee approach to their mandate or a delegate one. In the trustee model, representatives make decisions by following their own judgment, whereas in the delegate model, MPs act foremost on behalf of a particular group. The delegate model tends to dominate today, and the debate is mainly about which group should prevail in that representation—the party, the constituency, or the nation.

With respect to their organization, parliaments can be unicameral, with only one chamber, or bicameral, with two chambers. Bicameral parliaments tend to exist in countries with a large territory, a federation, and/or great ethnic diversity. Some countries do not fall in any of these categories but have a second chamber for historical reasons. The role and powers of second chambers vary considerably, but they tend to complement the first chamber and to act as a check and balance. A key consideration is whether the second chamber is nominated, directly elected, or indirectly elected. Often, parliamentary activity is divided between the plenum—a chamber—and committees. The plenum is usually reserved for larger debates and committees for more detailed review and scrutiny. Normally, plenum debates are public, whereas committees can hold meetings behind closed doors. Today, committee work plays a considerable part in parliamentary activity. One final point to consider in parliamentary organization is the level of resources and staffing. These affect parliaments' ability to play any of their roles.

Political scientists still know little about parliaments around the world. Most research focuses on a very few case studies, normally from Western democracies, and on limited dimensions of



parliamentary activity. The relationship between parliament and government, parliament's role in the legislative process, and parliamentary voting behavior constitutes the main areas of research.

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*See also* Electoral Systems; Executive; Parties; Political Systems, Types; Representation

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## PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

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Anyone doing empirical research into social activities and social reality has three basic options: (1) evaluating documents, (2) conducting a written or oral survey to gain information on the knowledge and the activities of subjects, or (3) participating in the everyday practices of the people of interest. The final method is called participant observation or ethnography. It has its roots in anthropology and ethnology; it is rarely used in political science. After a brief overview of the historical and theoretical development of participant observation, this entry demonstrates the opportunities and restrictions of participant observation as a research method in political science. It concludes with some advice on putting participant observation into practice.

### Historical Development

The methodological development of participant observation dates back to the 1920s with the

research of the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski as well as Robert Park, William Thomas, and Florian Znaniecki of the Chicago School of Sociology. Classics such as *Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community* (1933) by Marie Jahoda and Paul Lazarsfeld or *Street Corner Society* (1943) by William Whyte indicate that participant observation has been part of the methodological instruments used in the social sciences from the start. However, in the beginning of the 1950s, such observation methods fell out of favor due to the further development of survey research and standardized statistical methods. In the 1980s, when the discussion about the usefulness of a qualitative research approach increased, interest in participant observation was revived.

In comparison with other disciplines such as sociology or education, participant observation has until now been neglected in political science. Not only has it been rarely used in political science research, but political scientists have not been involved in its methodological development. The work of Richard Fenno is one of the few exceptions. His description of his research strategy as “soaking and poking” has become standard terminology. Fenno observed members of the U.S. House of Representatives in their constituencies and inductively developed a theory of their working styles. He later also accompanied U.S. senators on their campaigns, and in several of his works, he reflected on the experiences he had while observing politicians in Washington, D.C., and in their home districts.

### Theory of Scientific Observation

At the most basic level, observation orients us to our environment—it is something we do every day. It becomes *scientific* observation if it allows us to systematically examine certain assumptions with results that are repeatable and intersubjectively comprehensible. Scientific methods of observation can be divided into the following five categories:

1. covert versus open observation,
2. participant versus nonparticipant observation,
3. structured versus unstructured observation,

4. observation in the field versus laboratory observation, and
5. introspection versus external observation.

In political science, participant observation is the most common variant. In general, this type of research is conducted openly, in a natural environment, and in the form of external observation. The extent of participation can be thought of as a continuum, since it can take a variety of forms, and the influence of the observer on the field can vary. For example, as a guest in committee meetings the political scientist is a quiet listener, but as a passenger in a politician's car on the way to the next appointment he or she can also be asked for advice. Accordingly, participant observation is not to be understood only literally, since in many institutional contexts action primarily consists of verbal communication. Observing means communicating. In most cases, participant observation is therefore combined with other methods of data collection. Take, for example, the observation of a parliamentary committee. Here, observation does not only mean direct participation in the meeting for the purpose of describing its course and the actions of the legislators. Essential to the observation is researching background information on committee members or studying the agenda and the motions, informal conversations, as well as later interviews with representatives. After the meeting, the observations must be examined to determine whether they confirm previous assumptions and earlier observations or whether new hypotheses must be generated.

Participant observation is in many respects a *process*. On the one hand, the political scientist has to gain access to the field. On the other, the observation increasingly has to concentrate on those aspects that are essential to the research question. James Spradley distinguishes three phases: descriptive, focused, and selective observation. In the first phase, the researchers get their bearings and collect unspecific descriptions of the field. The complexity of the field is grasped as comprehensively as possible, and concrete research questions are developed. During focused observation, the perspective is narrowed and focused on the problems, processes, and persons that are of particular importance for the problem under investigation. At the end of the observation process, selective observation serves to

find further proof and further examples for the previously found behavior.

Participant observation aims to understand its research subject from within. Through participant observation, subjective views, and interpretations (symbolic interactionism), interactive processes in which social reality is constructed (ethnomethodology) or the cultural and social rules that shape the perception and construction of social reality (structuralism) can be understood. The research principle that underlies participant observation is understanding. Typically, the starting point of participant observation is a singular case, from which one progresses to general or comparative statements. First, the individual case is reconstructed. Then, the analyses and results from other cases are checked for comparison, and finally a typology is developed. What is understood as a singular case depends on the theoretical viewpoint: subjects and their points of view, interactions, or social and cultural contexts. In all these, one message is pervasive: Reality, as it presents itself to the observer, is never a given but is constructed by the various (individual or collective) players.

### **Advantages and Restrictions of Participant Observation**

The role of the observing political scientist is not very different from that of the ethnologist who works in alien cultures. By direct participation, the political scientist attempts to understand typical organizational conventions and the rules and everyday routines that form the cultural bases of functioning political institutions. The field researcher's aim is the understanding of political institutions from an endogenous perspective. Observations of legislators show that the social processes and rules guiding communicative processes or everyday behavior are difficult to research through interviews because something that is taken for granted often remains unconscious. If you ask politicians which rules guide their work or which strategies they pursue to achieve their goals, the answers are often nondescript. For example, many legislators are not aware of the informal rules of parliamentary business, and they have seldom reflected on "how it is done" to enforce their positions. Participant observation makes it possible to discover the behavioral patterns of everyday

actions in addition to what the subject of the observation reveals.

Examining the influence of informal rules is another advantage of participant observation. Politicians are used to formulating their positions with the public in mind; this behavior comes through in interviews, from which the observer often learns more about the ideas of the politician interviewed and about how something *ought* to be rather than about his or her actual behavior and how things *are*. This is particularly true when examining sensitive areas, including informal actions, because these may be considered to be synonymous with “fiddling” and “shady deals.” The combination of interviews and observations offers the advantage of being able to correlate and connect the sphere of perceptions with that of actions. The results of the observations can be contrasted and compared with those of the interviews. Participant observation makes it possible to experience social players as they actually behave in social and political reality.

Political scientists involved in field research are not immune from the danger described in ethnology as “going native”: a process in which the observer loses the outside perspective of the alien in his fieldwork and adopts the views of the subjects under observation. This makes the systematic evaluation of gained insights more difficult. However, if the researcher is self-consciously aware of this problem, the closeness to the research object is of immense value. No other method allows a researcher to come so close to the object of his or her enquiry as participant observation. The research process is not clouded by theories developed beforehand, traditional views, or standardized procedures. Participant observation makes it possible to see the progress and the contradictions of political processes and, as Fenno put it, to see the world the way the agents see it.

Participant observation also has its disadvantages, and this explains why only a few political scientists use it. First, the method is highly time-consuming and therefore costly. Second, restricted access to the field limits the opportunities for scientific political field research. Third, the formalization of participant observation methodology is only possible to a limited degree. The method of participant observation is difficult to divide into systematic steps and to teach

systematically. Because of this, it can be burdensome to researchers.

### Advice for Conducting Practical Research

In conducting participant observations, the following recommendations may be helpful.

1. Participant observation is not about the casual collection of impressions. Therefore, the implementation of theoretical research questions has to be done carefully. An observation guideline (but not a detailed, limiting observation scheme) sensitizes the observers to the observed situation, ensures concentration on the research questions, and facilitates coordination between various researchers.

2. Restrictions to field access are an everyday occurrence for political scientists using the participant observation method, due to the fact that political decisions are often taken behind closed doors. However, sample selection should not be done with the anticipation of potential access problems. A hybrid approach is recommended here—that is, taking a random sample based on theoretical criteria that ought to be flexible enough to be extended and modified in the research process. Here, Barney Glaser’s and Anselm Strauss’s idea of “theoretical sampling” is instructive. The following methods may increase access to the field:

- being perseverant and obstinate;
- identifying “gatekeepers,” using hierarchies and mediators to open doors;
- winning over members of institutions to function as mentors to mediate in the solution of problems that occur in the field;
- avoiding academic jargon, because politicians are not interested in the formulation of scientific theories, and instead communicating meaning by formulating the usefulness of the research results to be expected in the language of politics; and
- acting competently, sensitively, honestly, and neutrally because safe field access depends on how the researchers are perceived in the field.

3. Political scientists usually do research in contexts involving many documents and papers, so that drawing up field notes will go unnoticed. If the opportunity to write down extensive notes is not taken, one misses the chance to collect detailed

observation data, unadulterated by gaps in one's memory. To ensure data quality, explicit observation records have to be made from the notes close to the actual time of the events. If too much time is allowed to elapse, the records will be increasingly imprecise. Thus, spare time for recording data should already be set aside when planning the fieldwork. In the observation of institutional bodies, common behavioral patterns will be discovered, depending on the organizational context, from which a recording guideline can be derived, which will structure and simplify the following recording.

4. Observation by several researchers offers an opportunity to ensure the reliability of observation data. One observer compiles an initial record, which is then worked over by the second one. That way, information can be complemented, contradictions reconciled, and interpretations checked. With the help of pretests, coordination among the observers can be improved. Another possibility for validating the results is to get feedback from the persons observed in the field.

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*See also* Ethnographic Methods; Interviewing; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Thick Description; Triangulation

#### Further Readings

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members in the various domains of life that have resulted from processes of social differentiation and that, in toto, constitute societies and polities at large. This does not imply that every member of any given society has to be active in each domain. What it means, however, is that each domain encompasses individuals (the microlevel), an intermediary structure (the mesolevel) linking individuals and institutions in that domain, and systemic elements crystallized in rules and institutions regulating the particular domain in question (the macrolevel). Especially in modern times, these three levels are complemented by a fourth overarching level linking units in various ways (globalization is a particular phenomenon resulting from such linking processes). Notwithstanding the fact that presently there is an ongoing debate in political science on the shrinking role of the nation-state, the nearly 200 nation-states in existence are the major macro-units of analysis in comparative political science, whether they are considered in full or as subsets and whether the core emphasis in systematic analyses is on the micro-, the meso-, or the macrolevel or any combination of them. Below, first, a definition of various aspects of participation is provided. This is followed by a discussion of the underlying methods and theoretical concepts. The various dimensions of political participation are then discussed in greater detail. In conclusion, some of the major current developments and consequences for contemporary democracies are pointed out.

Participation refers, first, to activities by individual members of any given meso- or macro-unit of analysis. Second, in the core of participation is the action itself—that is, individual behavior—even if attitudes as the antecedents of such behavior, as obtained in survey research, may also be of interest. Third, individuals never act in a social void; therefore, to understand why people act at all and in the way they do, one has to consider the embeddedness of individuals in a context conducive to action. This context can be the institutional arrangements on the macrolevel (e.g., for voting, the electoral law in a given country) or the social environment that an individual is part of. Fourth, modern social science is not only about structure and persistence but also about dynamics and change, with obvious implications for research designs. Fifth, and returning to the concept of

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## PARTICIPATION

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No society, be it traditional or modern, can exist and survive without the active engagement of its

domains as subunits of sociopolitical systems resulting from processes of differentiation in contemporary societies, participation for the purpose of this entry is divided into a part on political participation and a—smaller—part on social participation (there are other fields worth looking at, e.g., cultural participation, but here the data situation is unsatisfactory, and to reach out beyond the two fields just alluded to would overstretch the scope of the entry).

### Methodology

As mentioned above, participation of individual, collective, or institutional actors is a constituent feature of any kind of sociopolitical structures and processes, including nation-states. To study participation empirically as an individual property requires a particular set of research instruments of an obtrusive or unobtrusive nature, and among those undoubtedly the most prominent one is the representative sample survey that acquires information from individual members of any given meso- or macro-unit. These individuals need to be selected at random based on probability theory in order to permit generalizations from the sample to the population from which the sample was drawn. By now, survey research can be regarded as a well-established research methodology and does not require any elaboration here, although using this methodology comparatively is a challenge. It is not by chance that the worldwide spread of this methodology, which started in the 1950s, has helped make individual political participation one of the best researched fields in political science.

But there are other important factors conducive to this state of affairs. The first is, on the macro-level, the economic growth and modernization that have contributed to the development of a survey research industry, both academic and commercial, that is an important tool for self-observation in societies. Second, surveys in the early days of this research, especially in the academic realm, were a rare and costly resource; this is not the least of the reasons for the establishment of academic data archives. This situation did not simply improve over time as survey studies became more numerous; a more important change was the transition from one-shot cross-sectional surveys to systematic replications over time to create longitudinal databases

capable of analyzing sociopolitical change, at least in the aggregate (panels that require the same individuals to be surveyed over time are a separate and more complicated issue and are therefore still quite rare). Third, starting in the 1980s, the scholarly community has conducted a broad set of comparative longitudinal academic cross-sectional surveys from which participation research has benefited enormously, such as the World Values Studies (WVS) and European Values Studies (EVS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Social Survey (ESS), and the Cross-National Study of Electoral Systems (CNES), data sets from which many of the current analyses and findings have originated. In addition to these academically driven surveys, other comparative surveys had already been established already in the 1970s, such as the Eurobarometer surveys funded by the European Commission, surveys that were later complemented by other Barometer surveys in Africa, South America, and Asia.

Fourth, with the establishment of social science data archives since the 1960s that now, organized in the International Federation of Data Archives (IFDO), cover large parts of the world, the collected data are increasingly becoming quickly available to the research community (in part already through the Internet) in a well-documented fashion and at little or no cost, with a major impact on research, publications, PhD dissertations, and student training in social science research methodology. Finally, as the outreach of comparative surveys covers more and more countries (e.g., the WVS, which is by now conducted in more than 70 countries), the theoretical and analytical scope of research is beginning to be extended substantially through so-called multilevel analyses that permit the systematic assessment of the impact of macrofactors on individual behavior.

### Participation and Theories of Democracy

The Austrian-born sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld escaped from the threat of fascism in the 1930s to the United States and became one of the major driving forces in the development of systematic theory-guided empirical social research. In addition to his work in media studies, he became interested in elections and conducted, at Columbia University, the first major election studies in the

United States. After World War II, a group of four political scientists at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan started a series of election studies that later developed into the still existing American National Election Studies (NES) project. Similar national longitudinal election study projects have come into being, especially in some parts of Europe and for studying elections to the European Parliament; these data are also freely available through the respective data archives. The Michigan scholars and their works paved the way for contextualizing them in empirical democratic theory and squared well with the variant of election-centered elite democratic theory formulated by Joseph Schumpeter in his classic book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. Basically, Schumpeter's notion was that voters' most important role was to choose, in general elections, among those elites who stood for political office. Thus, it is not by chance that research on political participation initially was very much related to the electoral process and the role citizens play in this process. In contemporary social science parlance, the key normative issues involved here for democracy are not only how responsive the political system is to the needs and requests of the people (Jan Teorell, 2006) but also which political institutions safeguard accountability for the citizens (Pippa Norris, 2007).

This clearly limited citizen role was challenged in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the wake of the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in the United States and student protests in many parts of the democratic world. Requests for an extended political role of the citizenry became louder; they culminated, at least in Europe, in expectations about the demise of the "late-capitalist state" (Max Kaase & Kenneth Newton, 1995). Thus, liberal-elitist democratic theory was extended in scope through the notion of participatory democracy, a notion that claimed direct political channels of influence for citizens going beyond the established modes of representative, indirect participation through parties and elections. In the seminal study *Political Action*, Samuel Barnes et al. (1979) spoke of an extended repertory of political action available to citizens and coined the terms *conventional* and *unconventional political participation* to combine elitist and participatory theories of democratic political participation.

The most recent variant of thinking about democracy and democratic participation comes under the label of deliberative democracy and owes much to the work of Jürgen Habermas and his followers as advocates of domination-free discourse. Teorell (2006) sums things up when he writes that deliberation is to be considered "as a process of opinion formation rather than a procedure for decision making" (p. 791). It is not by chance that one of the few viable instrumental efforts along such lines is the concept of deliberative polls, where a representative, randomly selected group of citizens gets together for a couple of days to deliberate, with pre- and postmeasurements, on critical issues to unfold the impact of a dynamic free political discourse on improving and legitimating political decision making.

Any normative theory of democracy has to be closely linked to the notions of equal representation and general accountability; this is why the liberal-elitist theory of democracy is attractive to many in politics and in political science. Moving beyond institutionalized political participation in the electoral process creates obvious theoretical and practical problems for participatory democracy on those two accounts, and this becomes ever more visible as politics is forced to overcome national barriers and to deal with various institutionalized (e.g., the United Nations, the World Bank) or noninstitutionalized transnational institutions and networks of action (e.g., nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]). On the international level, though, the actors or institutions as units of analysis are usually quite clear and easily identifiable. The same cannot be said for those involved in deliberative discourses, not to speak of the problems of legitimating who is represented in such discourses and in relating deliberative discourses to accountable political decision making.

Recently, in an interesting reflection on problems of deliberative democracy, another facet to this debate has been added. It is argued that in deliberation, not only individuals or groups but also the full array of discourses on a particular problematic should be represented, for instance, through a Chamber of Discourses, formal or informal. Obviously, a variety of important problems is involved here, such as authorization, accountability, and criteria for selecting representatives (who, as actors, have to satisfy criteria related to discursive democracy,

which cannot do without individual actors). The scholarly discussion on such ideas has at best just started; these ideas have not yet found entry into the debate on (political) participation and are, therefore, not yet represented in the empirical study of participation.

This discussion should make one thing clear: The empirical study of participation is closely linked to normative theories of democracy and has to be understood in such terms. The voluntary, free, and consequential political involvement of citizens is a minimal *conditio sine qua non* for any legitimate democratic political system, however developed it may be and however well it may satisfy the demands of particular strands of democratic theory. Needless to say, political and social participation also take place in authoritarian or totalitarian systems. But this is not the subject to be addressed in this entry, not the least because of the fact that scientific as well as commercial empirical social research in such systems, as historic examples have shown, is unlikely or even impossible when citizens cannot freely express their opinions.

### Political Involvement

For political scientists as well as for all others involved directly or indirectly in the political process, interest in political matters is a given. The same can, though, not be said for all citizens even in democratic polities. Surveys such as the 2002 Round of the ESS (see Miki Kittilson, 2007), comparing the relative importance of various life domains, have demonstrated time and again that politics ranks very low compared with domains such as family, work, health, or even leisure. This makes it even more interesting to look at those who show political involvement and what consequences this has for political participation as active acts of engagement. In normative democratic theory, political involvement is the *râison d'être* of a citizen; nevertheless, as was pointed out, such involvement cannot be taken for granted.

Participation research concentrates on acts of participation—that is, on concrete behavior directed toward having influence on various outcomes of the political process (see below). By contrast, political involvement must be regarded as an individual psychological predisposition, and it is

an empirical question to what extent and under which conditions such involvement precedes political action. In their political action study, Barnes et al. (1979) analyzed five out of the set of eight countries participating in the study and, in the concluding chapter, looked at those respondents who showed no political interest but showed a tendency to act politically anyway. This was called an expressive mode, and it was found that between 18% and 32% of the respondents fell into this category (p. 528). In their seminal study *Voice and Equality*, Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady (1995) also emphasize the impact of political engagement—as they call it—on participation in the sense of being mutually reinforcing, although they mention that the closeness of this relationship makes it less interesting for the study of participation.

In recent empirical studies, political involvement is operationalized in similar and fairly common ways, although standardization for the empirical assessment of this concept has not yet been established. Jan Van Deth (2008) proposes, based on 19 countries in Round 1 of the ESS, looking at four separate elements of the involvement concept: (1) political interest, (2) frequency of engaging in political discussions with friends and family, (3) the personal importance of politics, and (4) the saliency of politics (politics is the most important of the seven life domains). These four indicators are obviously more or less “demanding,” and it is not surprising that interest in politics is the least and saliency of politics the most demanding factor. One important finding is that the analyzed countries differ substantially in the degree of political involvement of their citizens, with Southern European countries (Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal) the least involved (van Deth, 2008, pp. 196–199). Such differences stimulate the search for macro and contextual factors as explanatory variables. However, “the attempts to account for cross-national differences in involvement with macro-level factors do not seem to be very promising . . . The multi-level models tested here underline the relevance of conventional individual-level factors,” such as education, age, gender, and external efficacy beliefs (van Deth, 2008, pp. 204–205, 215–216).

The Citizen, Involvement, Democracy (CID) survey conducted between 1999 and 2002 in

12 European countries (Germany for historical reasons was counted as two countries: West Germany and the area of the former German Democratic Republic) addresses a whole range of sociopolitical participatory activities (Jan van Deth, José Montero, & Anders Westholm, 2007). There also the topic of political involvement is covered, although in a slightly different vein as the analysis is only based on responses to two questions on political interest and political importance. First, four ideal types of citizenship based on democratic theory are developed: a decisionist, a liberal-representative, a participatory, and a unitary type. This typology is then operationalized by cross-tabulating the two involvement items of interest and importance: low importance and low interest make for the decisionist type, low importance and medium interest make for the liberal-representative type, high importance and high interest make for the participatory type, and high importance and low interest make for the unitary type. Whether this typological approach will survive the tides of time is an open question given the fact that the two involvement items are highly correlated, thereby challenging the empirical basis of the above typology. There are nevertheless two findings worth emphasizing: Looking at country clustering, the CID study, too, finds Southern European countries to be the least politicized (Newton & Montero, 2007), and the distinction between the liberal-representative type and the participatory type in terms of antecedents and level of participatory engagement is very clear-cut.

Both involvement studies fall short on one important dimension: changes over time. This is a very interesting problematic because the postwar period can be characterized not the least through the extension of educational systems to supply more and more people with a higher level of formal education, and it is well-known from all participation studies that political and social participation is positively related to higher levels of formal education. Russell Dalton (2008) brings the concept of increasing cognitive mobilization into play. His data for four countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States) indeed point to an increasing interest in politics from the 1950s onward. However, other analyses looking at levels of political discussion (which is, of course, a more demanding activity) in Europe for the 1973 to 1991

period based on Eurobarometer data no longer show an upward trend. In fact, there is no necessary relationship between rising levels of education and higher levels of political involvement because period effects may also interfere substantially.

### Political Participation

*Political* participation refers simply to activity that is intended to influence government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies. *Voluntary* activity means participation that is not obligatory—no one is forced to volunteer—and that receives no pay or only token financial compensation. This is an operationalization that is shared by a great deal of other, established participation studies. In this operationalization, the target of the activities covered is and remains policymakers, although by including protest activities such as participating in political demonstrations the authors extend the repertoire of activities. At this point, the scholars involved in the CID project propose an extension based on David Easton's classical notion of politics as the authoritative allocation of values. On this basis, political participation is conceptualized to also capture activities by ordinary citizens not targeted at political authorities. The innovation the study proposes is to go beyond voting, party activity, protest activity, and contacting and to include consumer participation as a new category in the form of boycotts—declining to buy certain products—and buycotts—buying certain products, although the concept of politics here appears to be ambiguous and not very precise.

In the following, the various dimensions of political participation are discussed in greater detail.

### Voting

In the spirit of liberal democratic theory, encompassing participation in free, equal, and secret political elections is the core legitimating mechanism by which representatives are chosen for a limited period of time to participate, in various functions, in accountable political decision making. Given the practical importance of elections for selecting those actors with the right to legitimately



exercise power and, therefore, the enormous public visibility of and interest in elections, it is not surprising that political sociology has early on studied electoral participation—election turnout and voting behavior. However, the early-20th-century studies usually concentrated on single elections, were based on aggregate voting statistics, and could, therefore, not contribute much to the understanding of why individual people voted or abstained in such elections and why they voted for a particular political party. This situation changed significantly with the establishment of the survey method, producing individual data that permitted a much better understanding of electoral participation and, as time went on, of the electoral process and its dynamics at large. Further enrichment came through international collaboration stimulated by American psephologists at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan since the 1960s, which over time helped create worldwide scholarly networks with integrated theoretical approaches.

An excellent documentation of the payoffs from a longitudinal comparative study of turnout is *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945* (Mark Franklin, 2004). This book addresses three major questions: (1) Why do people vote at all given that according to rational choice theory, individual votes have, for all practical purposes, no influence on the aggregate outcome of elections? (2) Is there a general decline in turnout, and, if so, what can one learn with respect to whether such a decline has happened because of changing civic virtues and political disaffection? (3) What are the major macro- and microfactors that influence variations in turnout within and across countries?

These questions cannot be answered here in any detail. A very important finding is that turnout in established democracies increased between 1950 and 1965 and then has gradually declined until the present period. André Blais (2007) calculates an 8-percentage-point decline for 106 countries and a 9-percentage-point decline for 29 established democracies. The statistically sophisticated analyses by Franklin shed a reliable light on the reasons for this decline in attributing it to three macrodevelopments: (1) changes in the size of the electorate through generational replacement with young cohorts less inclined to vote, (2) lowering of the

voting age in many countries in the late 1960s, and (3) the degree and nature of party competition. These are excellent examples of processes that happen at the macrolevel of societies and then trickle down to aspects of individual behavior. This, in turn, indicates that micronotions of declining trust in institutions, decreases in the civic mindedness of citizens, and disaffection with democracy do not contribute to the observed decline.

A different story can be told with respect to differing average levels of turnout for any given country and for within-country variations over time. Regarding levels of turnout, there is a lot of path dependency in the sense that major ad hoc variations in turnout are unlikely, due to stable institutional factors such as electoral laws, registration rules, or compulsory voting. By contrast, within-country turnout changes are greatly affected, especially by the competitiveness of any given election, which makes the “every vote counts” notion more plausible. That this effect is weaker for established than for young cohorts cannot come as a surprise given the fact that socialization into politics takes time and is especially difficult for younger people, for whom a lot of other priorities such as finishing an education and starting a family take precedence. To sum up, then, to understand voting participation along the time dimension requires modeling the complex interaction of individual and systemic factors, requires a longitudinal database, and benefits most strongly from a combination of micro- and macrolevel information.

#### *Other Dimensions of Political Participation*

Research on political participation going beyond turnout and party choice started in the 1960s with *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* (Lester Milbrath, 1965). Milbrath conceptualized political participation in the form of a unidimensional pyramid of electorally based attitudes, with the “easier,” more frequent items at the bottom and the more demanding ones toward the top. It is interesting to note that Milbrath already mentioned demonstrations but argued at the time that they “do not fit into the hierarchy of political involvement in the United States” (p. 18). In a later edition of the book, the reach has been extended to also include demonstrations.

A major step forward in the empirical analysis of political participation was a seven-nation study looking at the structure, antecedents, and consequences of political participation (Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, & Jae-On Kim, 1978). In this study, the concept of the unidimensionality of the participatory space was overcome, through factor analysis, by establishing four separate sets of activities: voting, campaign activity, (particularized) contacting of public officials, and communal activity. But this study did not yet cover the domain of protest politics; the authors state explicitly that “our concern is with activities ‘within the system’—ways of influencing politics that are generally recognized as legal and legitimate” (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 3).

The first large comparative survey study that explicitly reached out into the protest dimension was a political action study (Barnes et al., 1979) in eight Western democracies; of those, the Netherlands, (West) Germany, and the United States were revisited, in a panel study, between 1979 and 1981 (Kent Jennings & Jan van Deth, 1989). These studies were triggered by the rise in protest activities, in particular petitions and demonstrations, beginning in the mid-1960s especially in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. In the history of state building, protest—often violent in nature—was not unusual; however, political-democratic consolidation after World War II emphasized a “civic culture” and not a strongly participatory one (Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, 1963) until a protest culture began to build up in the 1960s.

The political meaning of this development in the beginning was not quite clear. A great theoretical and methodological difficulty for a survey study looking at cross sections of the voting-age population was the relative scarcity of activities beyond the electoral realm at the time of the survey. This was the reason for the approach by the political action group—an approach later criticized by other scholars—to not only concentrate on concrete activities but also look at attitudes toward the behavior the group was interested in, resulting in the concept of protest potential. But the major achievement of the project was to redefine the participatory space by adding a dimension of uninstitutionalized participation, thus juxtaposing the two dimensions of conventional and unconventional participation. One of the first

pertinent findings was that these two dimensions were positively correlated in all countries, thereby suggesting an increase in the political action repertoire of citizens and not the demise of liberal democracy. It is remarkable that this finding from 1974 was fully corroborated by other studies almost 3 decades later.

The second result was that the most important antecedents of protest potential were high levels of education and young age. In particular, the positive impact of education on protest attitudes squared well with the socioeconomic standard (SES) model developed by Verba and Nie (1972), which emphasized high levels of education, high income, and high social status as pertinent antecedents of political participation. Whether youthfulness was a permanent corollary of protest potential was impossible to assess at that time without the availability of longitudinal data. The second wave of the political action study (Jennings & van Deth, 1989) then corroborated the finding that education is a factor conducive to all modes of potential and real participation. However, the initial findings on the positive role of youthfulness had to be qualified in the sense that young age became less important as one moved from attitude closer to action, thereby pointing to the role of different elements in contextual mobilization. In a more recent study of participation in demonstrations in Belgium, the reduced role of youthfulness in protest participation was not confirmed, while the impact of education remained relevant. What is important to learn from the Belgian study is that the sociostructural and attitudinal participation profiles of demonstrators vary substantially depending on the event that triggered the demonstration.

The juxtaposition of conventional and unconventional participation in political action owed much to the relative scarcity of acts such as petitions, demonstrations, citizen initiatives, and boycotts at the time of the survey. However, in participation research there is now agreement that especially the term *unconventional participation* is no longer meaningful given the fact that through processes of sociopolitical change these acts have become a regular and legitimate part of citizens’ action repertoires. To overcome this problem, Norris (2007) proposes to introduce a distinction “between *citizen-oriented* actions, relating mainly

to elections and parties, and *cause-oriented* repertoires which focus attention upon specific issues and policy concerns” (p. 639). Edeltraud Roller and Tatjana Rudi (2008) speak of electoral and nonelectoral participation; Kaase prefers the distinction between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized forms of participation. Ronald Inglehart, already in 1977, suggested the terms of *elite-directed* action (related to elections and parties) and *elite-challenging* action. The most recent proposal for terminological innovation comes from the CID group, which, based on a factor analysis of their participation items, finds four participatory dimensions (contacting, party activity, protest activity, consumer participation) and adds voting as the fifth dimension and organizes these types in a fivefold table, distinguishing between mechanisms of influence (exit or voice) and channels of expression (representational or extrarepresentational). These are all terminological-conceptual efforts without greatly changing the dimensional structure of the participatory space known from many previous studies, except for finding a place for a new type of involvement no longer exclusively directed at political authorities: consumer participation measured as boycotts or boycotts. All in all, the famous saying by Mao Zedong, “let a hundred flowers bloom,” may be good for culture; in political science, greater continuity in theoretical approaches and empirical work would certainly be of advantage, leading to a cumulative growth of knowledge.

#### *Levels, Antecedents, and Consequences of Political Participation*

One of the charms of the liberal-elitist model of democracy is its emphasis on equal participatory rights through general voting. If everyone or at least a large part of the population does indeed exercise the right to vote, it is a logical consequence that no particular individual factors can be detected that influence participation. As soon as one goes beyond the electoral realm, though, the differences between modes of action within and between countries become very large. In the CID study, for example, between 4% and 21% of the citizenry around the year 2000 engaged in at least one act of contacting, between 1% and 6% in a party-related activity, between 1% and 8% in an

act of protest, and between 5% and 44% in at least one act of consumer boycott or boycott. A similar picture emerges, although with considerable differences due to the choice of indicators, with regard to both acts of participation and the countries of concern from the analysis of Round 1 of the ESS (Newton & Montero, 2007).

Concentrating first on individual-level factors, the initial SES model has now been replaced by a more sophisticated model: the civic voluntarism model (CVM). In a detailed step-by-step analysis, Verba et al. (1995) go beyond the SES model to analyze the explanatory links between SES and participation. The CVM includes the explanatory dimensions of education and language, income and time, civic skills and political engagement: “Political participation, then, is the result of political engagement *and* resources” (Verba et al., 1995, p. 354). The authors regard the CVM as a powerful instrument to predict political activity in general, and they further argue in favor of the strength and validity of the CVM because it applies to all modes of political activity and finds different weights for its predictors depending on the particular kind of activity to be explained.

As soon as one moves beyond the study of one individual country, however, one has the chance also to look at the impact of institutional (macro) variables and to study the effects of eventual interactions between micro- and macrovariables in a multilevel research design. Two such analyses are of interest here, both with data coming from the Round 1 of the ESS. In the first of these analyses, the authors have collected 22 macroproperties assessing the dimensions of political order, democratic effectiveness, wealth, government expenditure, and population and have regressed those against an encompassing composite country participation score. Of those macro indicators, rule of law (a complex measure provided by the World Bank) has turned out to be the most important variable for influencing levels of conventional political participation, whereas protest is most strongly related to a high level of economic development, according to Newton and Montero. Both findings are well in line with existing theoretical approaches to specify systemic conditions for the emergence and existence of various modes of participation.

The multilevel analysis by Roller and Rudi (2008) starts out with the individual variables of

the CVM plus measures of social capital to optimally exploit the potential for the micro explanation of electoral and nonelectoral participation. This analysis first confirms the findings of Verba et al. (1995) that the CVM can be used to explain both forms of participation, although the various components of the model do not equally contribute to explain the two forms. For the multilevel analysis, three macrofactors measured by eight indicators are introduced: (1) socioeconomic modernization, (2) the electoral system, and (3) measures of social capital composed from the aggregation of individual-level indicators. The findings for electoral and nonelectoral participation regarding the impact of systemic variables are, however, disappointing: The share of the total variance explained by contextual factors for electoral participation is just 8% and for nonelectoral participation, an even lower 6%, speaking again for the power of the individual CVM model. Nevertheless, modernization has the expected effect on levels of nonelectoral participation, while political-institutional factors have an impact on levels of electoral participation. These findings square well with the theoretical expectations.

Participatory theories of democracy emphasize the right and the need for citizens to have a direct and not only an indirect say in political decision making. One aspect derived from empirical participation studies, however, has been from the beginning that, other than the vote, citizen participation is biased along the lines of the CVM model; it is the most resourceful and engaged citizens who dominate involvement in acts of participation beyond the vote. Early on this has already created concerns about the fairness of the democratic process (Verba et al., 1978; Verba & Nie, 1972). What if the citizen and group voices heard most loudly in politics are biased against the needs and preferences of the population at large? In *Voice and Equality* (Verba et al., 1995), the authors address this problematic in a very detailed fashion. They conclude,

According to a liberal model of American democracy, the principal role of citizen participation is to transmit information to public authorities about activists' self-interested objectives. This chapter demonstrated a consistent pattern when it comes to the participatory

politics of self-interest. Whether we are considering attitudes on the economy, actual economic circumstances and needs, or opinions on government efforts to assist Blacks or Latinos, the process operates to bias participatory input in the direction of the needs and the preferences of the advantaged. (p. 506)

The question to be addressed next is to what extent the reported findings for the United States also pertain to a broader array of countries. Comparing the effect of education as a proxy for the command of resources for electoral and nonelectoral participation, the findings are very much in line with those for the United States: There is almost no effect of education on electoral participation, and a substantial effect on nonelectoral participation (Roller & Rudi, 2008). Moving to the multilevel analysis, contextual variables do not add much to explain the modes of participation studied. But there is one result that challenges traditional wisdom of political science: It is majority voting and majoritarian political institutions that reduce political inequality for both modes of participation (Roller & Rudi, 2008).

There are at least two weaknesses in participation research that need to be addressed. The first—a minor one—is the increasing use of the Internet as a means of political communication and mobilization, which will require more attention now. The second, more consequential one refers to the fact that inequality of participatory input into the political system does not per se justify the conclusion that the policy output suffers systematically from a similar bias. A further necessary differentiation concerns the levels of the political system to which participatory activities are directed. What will be necessary in the future, according to Norris, will be to assess reliably the relationship between participatory input from various groups of the citizenry and the policy output created by the institutionalized policy process on the various system levels.

There is, incidentally, one aspect in the analyses reported above that permits a friendlier interpretation of the observed inequalities. Since those citizens who are politically the most active are also well embedded in social networks and are highly resourceful, their engagement may help improve the overall quality of the democratic process, a

consideration leading back to aspects of deliberative democracy. This is another challenge for future research on political participation.

### *Changes in Preferences for Different Modes of Political Participation*

While participation research in general does not suffer from a paucity of data and findings, there is one aspect that is not covered sufficiently: the longitudinal comparative study of developments in preferences for the various acts and modes of participation (one exception is turnout, but this field profits from the availability of aggregate voting statistics). There are some longitudinal data, though, that relate to items of elite-challenging actions derived from the 1974 political action study and replicated in four waves of the WVS between 1981 and 2000 (for details, see Inglehart & Catterberg, 2003). These data point to a noticeable increase over the past 3 decades in elite-challenging action in the eight political action countries and France—all Western democracies—an increase the authors attribute to an ongoing process of economic modernization. Unfortunately, the data situation does not permit an analysis of possible replacement effects between the various dimensions of political engagement. In particular, it would have been very interesting to see whether nonelectoral activities may have grown at the expense of electoral activities.

### **Social Participation**

Other than political participation, social participation has not yet achieved the status of a well-defined social science subfield. Analogous to political participation, social participation can be defined as all activities by individual citizens in social contexts going beyond the inner circle of family and friendship relations that are not primarily directed toward influencing political outcomes. As such, social participation constitutes a core element of civil society. For a long time, in social research, the core representation of civil society was voluntary associations integrating individuals into the intermediary structures of society—the mesolevel. For example, the study of membership in organizations such as churches and trade unions was a normal part of electoral

research under the assumption that social cleavages had been translated into party systems through the constant interaction of group and party elites. However, the major breakthrough in making social participation an independent field of study—even if closely related to concerns about democratic governance—came through the study *Making Democracy Work* (Robert Putnam, 1993), which looked at conditions favoring or hindering the overall administrative and economic performance of Italian regions. In pointing especially to the organizational underpinning of high economic performance through established cultural and economic groups working together in an environment of mutual trust and solidarity, Putnam employed the term *social capital* (a term already previously used by Pierre Bourdieu and, later, James Coleman) to characterize the reasons for the diversity of regional performance.

The concept of social capital became a major incentive for political science when this was related to the observation that in the United States a decline in social bonding was occurring that—recalling the Tocquevillean tradition of American democracy—was a challenge to American democracy and democracy at large. Social capital can be regarded as a macroproperty of societies in the sense of systemic capital. The concept, however, has in the meantime also been transferred to microresearch through surveys. While there is no standard operationalization in empirical research, there is agreement that social capital has three major dimensions: (1) the degree to which people trust each other, (2) the acceptance of norms of reciprocity as cultural elements of social capital, and (3) the involvement in social networks, be it through voluntary associations or through other less formal regular contacts.

With regard to longitudinal comparative data sets reliably measuring social capital, the situation is not fully satisfactory, although information accumulated from a variety of data sources indicates that a general decline in social capital cannot be observed. In another study it is argued that elite-challenging participation is at least as important a constituent of social capital as is membership in voluntary associations. Longitudinal data from the WVS for 12 postindustrial societies support the argument that there is no measurable decrease in overall organizational membership between 1980

and 2000, although within this overall category sociotropic organizations have gained in membership, whereas membership in traditional organizations (e.g., trade unions) has slightly decreased or remained constant. Particularly interesting in the context of participation research, though, is the finding that good governance is much more strongly related to the level of elite-challenging action than to the level of associational membership.

One step away from the link between social participation and social capital is taken in the context of the CID study with the new concept of small-scale democracy in the sense of the potential option for citizens to control their own, personal life situation. There, small-scale (local) democracy is considered to be an important field because it offers insights into the overall state of any given society, including aspects of democratic governance; looks at trade-offs between small-scale and large-scale democracy; and pursues questions important also in social capital and participatory theory terms to what extent involvement in small-scale democracy activities enhances a sense of identity, self-esteem, and personal skills that may have payoffs also for large-scale democracy. To answer these questions, a broad roster of incentives, actions, and action consequences for the three fields of education, health care, and working life is looked at, fields that are highly relevant for the citizens' daily lives. It will remain to be seen whether along those lines in the future a new field of systematic research will develop given the finding that involvement in the three domains is quite frequent across the CID countries. Such efforts may be encouraged by the fact that participation in small-scale democracies and in large-scale democracies, especially in the fields of contacting and consumer participation, according to the CID data, are positively correlated. Thus, the conclusion may be justified that in contemporary societies social and political participation are indeed fields related by an underlying general tendency to become involved.

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*See also* Electoral Behavior; Electoral Turnout; Democracy, Theories of; Participation, Contentious; Political Culture; Social Capital

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## PARTICIPATION, CONTENTIOUS

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In the most conventional usage, *contentious participation* refers to forms of political participation that employ nonconventional, confrontational means of action in expressing collective interests, such as demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts. Contentious participation here represents an alternative to institutionalized channels of participation, such as election, interest group activities, and political parties. However, a growing number of scholars have been starting to use the concept of contentious participation to illustrate the contentious nature inherent in all forms of political action, which range from peaceful acts such as voting and lobbying to disruptive and oftentimes violent protest. This latter view highlights aspects of continuity in what have been conventionally understood to be categorically different forms of participation.

This changing interpretation of contentious participation mirrors the change in how the literature has come to understand protests and/or social movements. Previously, a social movement was commonly understood to be an action form carried out by outsiders of a political establishment—that is, those who lack power and resource and those who do not have regular access to the decision-making process. Those inside the system, many believed, would seek reform or policy change by expressing their voices through interest groups or political parties. Gradually, however, a new framework arose that drew attention to the fuzzy boundary dividing the two and to how social movements and institutionalized forms of participation are not mutually exclusive but complementary.

This latter view is predicated on the idea that, in essence, the basic principles of contentious participation and established forms of participatory institutions, such as elections, are not dissimilar. In fact, many established political parties, such as the Social Democratic parties in Western Europe, have had historical roots in social movements. Nowadays, many social movement groups employ conventional forms of action (e.g., lobbying and petitioning) in conjunction with their typical street repertoire, while many interest groups organize large public demonstrations to add leverage to their lobbying effort. They may look different on the surface, but in essence both contentious and institutionalized participation aim at getting the voices of the public to be heard and to be taken seriously by decision makers.

It seems as if there is a growing consensus over the overlap between contentious and institutionalized methods of participation. Still, it is important to note that not all societies are equipped with the same levels of institutionalized channels of participation. As a result, contentious participation may take different forms and carry different meanings across varying contexts. This is because forms of contentious participation are often mirror images of the political environment in which they operate.

### Varying Contexts of Contentious Participation

In authoritarian regimes where channels of participation barely exist, any attempts at expressing a collective voice in the public arena are often driven

underground. The violent forms many social movements take under these circumstances reflect the highly exclusive and repressive nature of authoritarian regimes. The risks are high, but when a social movement mobilizes significant support and grows stronger, it often leads to democratic change that opens up opportunity for more equal and broader participation. This was the case in South Africa and a number of Latin American countries in the 1980s.

Nowadays, many authoritarian regimes offer limited political space, if only because they cannot command absolute control over the flow of information and movement of people. This is particularly so in authoritarian regimes with a relatively large economy and a population that is relatively highly educated. In these contexts, ordinary people try to take advantage of the limited political spaces in various attempts to voice their concerns and influence important policies. For example, women, students, teachers, and workers in Iran have created organizations and have worked with sympathetic allies in various public sectors to defend and to proactively claim new rights since the death of the charismatic leader Khomeini in 1989, which led to small cracks within the ruling elites. In China, since the late 1990s, workers and peasants have also been taking advantage of the limited openings made available by the post-Maoist reforms, which allowed them to lodge complaints to higher level officials and stage various forms of collective action to draw the government's attention to local corruption and the hardships caused by the detrimental forces of the market economy.

In either case, participatory efforts were highly contentious but not to the extent of that of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. At the same time, these efforts were not submissive supplications asking the power holder for benign policies. On the contrary, they were meticulously designed campaigns to maximize the available political resources and were aimed at influencing the formation of crucial policies germane to their lives amid adverse political environments. These examples serve as the archetypes of contentious participation serving as an alternative to institutionalized channels, if only because such channels are highly limited. They also show that popular mobilization and institutionalized channels are not mutually exclusive means of

political participation. This becomes more evident in Western democracies.

One of the characteristics of liberal democracy is the institutionalization of conflict through guaranteeing various rights and access points to decision making. Citizens in liberal democracies are guaranteed the rights to choose their own leaders or run for office through elections, form associations that serve as an organizational vehicle for pursuing the common interests of like-minded fellows, and have the right to freely express their opinions through various venues, including, but not limited to, publications, the media, and the Internet. Contentious forms of participation, such as demonstration, are also protected by law and are also considered legitimate means of political participation as a way to publicly express political views. With the various means of political participation available, explicitly contentious forms of participation, often the only means of participation in more restricted political systems, are but one among the many options in liberal democracies.

As a result, various forms of contentious participation are often combined with the routine working of formal institutions, and a greater overlap between contentious and institutionalized politics is observed. For example, in lobbying and petitioning their representatives in seeking their interests, many interest groups organize large public demonstrations to display their commitment and power and pressure decision makers to take their demands seriously. Likewise, radical activist groups may also adopt interest group tactics and engage in lobbying or petitioning while mobilizing thousands of people on the street. As these action patterns become instituted, solid connections between political parties and social movements often emerge. In the United States, the steady alliance between the Democratic Party and various social movements, including the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the environmental movement, and between the Republican Party and the evangelical movement and prolife movements provide but a few examples. In many similar cases, various social groups and political parties enter an exchange relationship in which social groups provide the parties with votes and funds while the parties deliver on the policies these social groups favor.

The institutional devices and patterns of political participation in liberal democracies are meant



to absorb and neutralize the potentially harmful impacts of large-scale conflicts within the institutional setting by providing various ways for disgruntled groups to express their grievances and political demands. However, the use of institutional channels does not necessarily mean that the processes are peaceful and without conflict.

### Contentious Nature of Participation

Political participation is necessarily a contentious process because there are competing interests in any society and any claim made in public will bear on someone else's interest. It is extremely difficult to have a policy that everyone can agree on, and legislation often becomes a focal point of contention. The landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in *Roe v. Wade* acknowledging partial constitutional rights for abortion in 1973 and the subsequent contention over the issue of abortion in the United States represent a prime example. Despite the highly institutionalized court processes, the ruling was interpreted by many as a partial result of the strenuous campaigns by women activists who had voiced their demands for women's right to make decisions concerning their own bodies. This triggered a countermovement against abortion and ignited a new cycle of contention on the issue. The debate over the issue took place in various public forums and in Congress but often involved disruptive and violent clashes on the streets as well. When social groups of competing convictions make participatory efforts at the same time, the process can turn highly contentious.

Similarly, despite the original intention to channel participation in a peaceful and orderly way, elections too often become focal points of conflict, especially when many hold suspicion over the fairness of the process. This was the case in Kenya after the election in late 2007, where unprecedented violence followed accusations of a rigged election. Many nascent democracies have suffered from damaging conflicts related to elections, but contest over electoral results may also emerge in established democracies, as was the case in the United States after the presidential elections in 2000. The specific ways in which contention over electoral results materialized in the United States and in Kenya may have been different, but they both show how ostensibly peaceful

participatory mechanisms may be highly contentious in nature.

Another aspect that renders the nature of participation inherently contentious lies in the nature of democratic institutions, which are inclusive and exclusive at the same time. However inclusive they are at one point in time, democratic institutions tend to favor some actors over others and leave unheard some voices. In addition, as a society moves toward progress in democratic inclusion, there will always emerge new groups that will demand serious attention. The expansion of suffrage offers a good example. The expansion of voting rights to all males in Western Europe came only as a result of unrelenting contentious challenges to the order by those who were initially excluded, namely, the workers. When it happened, it left out women, who then started to organize campaigns to claim their rights. When women were allowed suffrage in most Western democracies by the early 19th century, many found that there were serious barriers for participation among groups along the lines of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. Even to this day, many of these groups engage in contentious politics, calling for an end to discrimination and for full participation in many parts of the Western world and beyond. Participation invites more participation, and whenever this happens, it first takes the form of a contentious challenge to the status quo.

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See also Election Research; Interest Groups; Participation; Parties; Social Movements

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## PARTIES

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The word *party* refers to one of the oldest concepts used in political science. Depending on the era chosen to determine the beginning of scientific analysis of political facts in the modern sense—for example, if one goes back to Arthur Bentley, James Bryce, Robert Lowell, or André Siegfried, that is, to the beginning of the 20th century—the concept of party can be older than that of political science. Its use in historical, philosophical, or polemical vocabulary appeared in the 17th century with the memoirs of Cardinal de Retz in France, Viscount Bolingbroke in England, and, above all, David Hume, who in the early 18th century initiated what was to become the analysis of parties. Nonetheless, the word has been used since the Middle Ages to refer to the opposite sides in a civil war, for example, York and Lancaster during the War of the Roses, and consequently has a strong connotation of conflict. Even the etymology of the word *party* is telling: *parti* in French, *Partei* in German, *partido* in Spanish, and even *partia* in Russian and Polish and in many other languages—derived from the verb *partir*, which in medieval French meant to split into parts or divide. All European languages, including Slavic ones that use other terms, such as *strana* in Czech or *stanka* in Croat or Serbian, use words meaning “side.” The idea is the same: to take sides or to choose one’s side, or one’s camp, in a political conflict. The definitions of the concept of party are, therefore, older and more numerous than for the concept of social class: There are more than 100 of them, provided by authors from Edmund Burke to Alan Ware, including Leon Epstein, Joseph LaPalombara, and Myron Weiner. All definitions can be grouped into three broad categories, which are sometimes combined. First of all, following Burke, parties can be defined according to the ideas that they convey. Then, following

Max Weber, Robert Michels, and Maurice Duverger, one can define parties as organizations. Finally, the trend since the end of the 20th century has been to use the criterion of elections and the existence of a representative, or at least democratic, regime. A remark attributed to Max Weber—“parties are the children of democracy and universal suffrage”—is put forward to support this thesis. One should not, nevertheless, forget the classic definition given during the reign of George III by Edmund Burke: “A party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.” This definition remains the best, even if the subsequent evolution of political systems has made it imprecise, as it is now incomplete. Here, we propose to use the term in the following way:

A party is an organization of individuals engaged in collective action, in order to mobilize as many individuals as possible against other equally mobilized individuals in order to accede, either alone or in coalition, to the exercise of government functions. This engagement and this claim for power are justified by a particular conception of the national interest.

Below, this entry first discusses this definition in greater detail, next it turns to the historical origins and conceptualization of the concept in the European context, and, finally, it discusses contemporary forms of party organization and recent developments.

### Definitional Elements

The above definition contains four major elements:

1. Parties are the product of a collective organized action that is permanent and continuous in time. It is therefore intended to outlive the action of its founders and continue throughout history as long as it is able to mobilize the supporters that keep it alive. As an institution, parties present characteristics common to all organizations studied by organizational theory. Parties are in the category of association-type organizations—that is, based on voluntary membership and the choice of the actors: members, militants, elected representatives, and

leaders. If membership is automatically granted on the basis of birth, family, or clan, it is not a party.

2. Any organization is structured according to an objective, which, in the case of a party, is to accede to the different functions of government: national, regional, and local. Parties can exist that are limited to one or more of these levels of government, as is often the case in Canada, for example. A political organization that does not strive for power but merely for influence is not a party.

3. Claiming power is not an end in itself; it is justified for the sake of the national interest that the party intends to defend or promote depending on the particular conception of the actors involved. Claiming power in the name of a particular conception of the national interest constitutes the *raison d'être* of a party and a condition *sine qua non* for a political organization to be a party.

4. The way to reach the objective of the party to which its organization is rationally conditioned is the mobilization of as many individuals as possible. The most frequently used means is electoral mobilization, and most parties were born with the establishment of more or less competitive representative political systems.

Democratization whether gradual (e.g., United Kingdom [UK]) or brutal (e.g., France) gave rise to the development of parties. By contrast, in authoritarian systems, nonelectoral modes of organization and mobilization exist. These can be peaceful (e.g., meetings, demonstrations, strikes, and petitions, e.g., Chartism in Great Britain, Solidarity in Poland, and the Civic Forum in former Czechoslovakia) or violent (e.g., uprisings, revolutions). The common objective shared by electoral mobilization and other forms of party mobilization is the need to appeal to the popular masses, that is, to strive for popular support, according to LaPalombara and Weiner. Partisan mobilization is carried out *against* individuals who are also organized with a view to acceding to government in the name of a different, often opposite, conception of national interest. As we have seen, *party* means “part” (division) and therefore implies conflict. Jean Blondel (1978) sees behind every party “a protracted social conflict.”

As a corollary, both conflict and competition are essential:

1. It can be said that there are no parties without conflicts; they always convey either a current, active conflict of which they are agents or a past conflict of which they are witnesses, for example, the opposition between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael in Ireland, which corresponds historically to the struggle between anti-Treaty and anti-Free State Republicans in the bloody civil war of 1921 to 1922. One of the major aspects of the seminal contribution by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) is to have assigned to parties the function that summarizes all the others: agents of conflict and instruments of integration. The dialectic is the following: By expressing conflict, parties thus allow negotiation and contribute at the end of a more or less long evolution to pacifying political life.

2. Conflict and integration as well as the name *party*—or *part*—imply ipso facto plurality and competition between parties. The term *parties* means a system of parties and consequently that there are at least two of them. A single party is a contradiction in terms: It is impossible to be at the same time a single entity and a part. This obvious fact was stated at the beginning of the last century by Max Weber. The contradictory concept of a single party or a one-party system was nonetheless used at the time of the Cold War by eminent political scientists such as Gabriel Almond and Jean Blondel. The latter speaks of a “party of mobilization,” while Almond distinguishes between parties that are “one-party pluralistic,” modeled on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) in Mexico before democratization, and those that are “one-party revolutionary, centralizing.” While contesting the logical pertinence of the concept of one-party system, Giovanni Sartori nonetheless admits this category as the first level of his seven-rank typology.

To clarify this debate, which has retained its historical pertinence, it is necessary to distinguish two totally different situations. On the one hand, there is the situation Max Weber described with the example of the Guelph party (*parte Guelfa*) in the medieval republic of Florence, where one party

eliminated its rivals to become incorporated in the apparatus of the state—the party changes and ceases to be a political party. It then falls under some other sociological concept. Raymond Aron, a disciple of Weber, applies this approach to the cases of fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism and speaks of “monopolistic parties,” which as soon as they come to power hasten to eliminate all the other parties and thus change their nature. Monopolistic parties that had changed their nature by eliminating their rivals have in most cases gone back to their original nature with the loss of power and the return to democracy. Thus today, Kuo Min Tang in Taiwan alternated in government with the independence movement, while the PRI in Mexico and the Communist Party in the Russian Federation embody the loyal opposition. Similarly, communist parties in Eastern Europe have been able to reconvert themselves.

On the other hand, there are so-called parties founded after a military or nonmilitary clique has taken over power. These are sham parties, such as those of certain totalitarian regimes formed to control the population, for example, the Popular Movement of Zaire at the time of President Mobutu (1967–1997). With the changes of regime and the return to democratic forms of power, these so-called single parties disappeared with the regimes that created them. This was not the case, however, with António de Oliveira Salazar’s National Union in Portugal or the National Movement created by Francisco Franco to support his dictatorship in Spain.

### History

The history of the appearance and development of parties corresponds to that of the scientific study of the phenomenon. Lipset and Rokkan note four thresholds in the evolution of a party: legitimization, incorporation, representation, and majority power. One can apply these to every party and to every stage of the party systems.

Parties were not always considered to be legitimate. As a sign of conflict in societies seeking balance and harmony, they were associated with a form of evil. Political modernity, which developed with the disintegration of the feudal order in the Renaissance, was embodied in absolutist states, and parties only emerged in times of crisis and during

civil or religious wars. Even with the establishment of a representative regime, the party was first perceived as something that divides and was equated with a faction. The timing of the legitimization of parties, the very idea of a party system, depends on the country. Thus, three men of action who were also political thinkers reflect the same perplexity toward parties in three countries during three different periods: Viscount Bolingbroke in early-18th-century England, James Madison at the time of the American Revolution, and Charles de Gaulle in France in the mid-20th century. All three of them in their own way were deeply concerned about parties and their struggles and advocated national unity against all the divisions, yet they finally became involved in the struggles of the parties themselves. As a necessary evil, the party is always the party of the other, and the temptation to find other democratic paths was present for a long time but was doomed to failure. This was the case of the “era of good feelings” desired by President James Monroe after 1816 to put an end to the opposition between the Federalists and the Republican–Democrats. For the United States, the American historian Richard Hofstadter situates the turning point between 1780 and 1840, after which the idea of legitimate opposition between parties was taken for granted. In Great Britain, the phenomenon appears earlier, and the writings of Hume bear witness to this fact, but here it remains within the elite, whereas in the United States it concerned the masses. The distinction between parties and factions is the determining criterion, and it is with Hume that this was clearly established.

The origin of parties and their existence before a representative regime depends on the definition. If we retain the three proposed criteria—a particular conception of the national interest, free organization, and mobilization—the Guelphs (13th century) were a party, even if their means of action were different from those of modern parties. Their fight against the Ghibellines, however, degenerated into a struggle between factions. The Cavaliers and the Roundheads, the Whigs and the Tories were also parties. Moreover, the process is not linear, and in the oligarchy that existed in England in the 18th century, as Sir Lewis Namier remarks, during the reign of George III a large number of members of parliament (MPs) were neither Whigs nor Tories. By contrast, “parties” at the time of the Ancient

Roman republic or those evoked by Niccolò Machiavelli in Florence at the time of the Medicis, and that existed in numerous other Italian cities during the Renaissance, were factions and family clans.

When they were still badly organized, parties were discovered and studied by social scientists at first as *carriers of ideas*. Then, with the extension of the electoral franchise and civil rights, they were studied as *organizations*: James Bryce, Robert Michels, Moisey Ostrogorsky, and, above all, Max Weber laid down the foundations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Finally, the study of parties as the mobilization of *actors* began in the 20th century with Siegfried on electoral geography and Duverger on circles of participation in partisan activity. It branched out in many directions—militants, members, sympathizers, and voters—and was favored by the development of the various forms of sociological survey research, from opinion polls to the deep analyses of political attitudes. These divergent approaches are necessary and have to converge if one is to understand a given political party, a national system of parties, or, in a comparative manner, the classification of parties.

### Raison d'Être and Identity of Parties

Devoted to the defense and the promotion of a particular conception of the national interest in Burke's sense, many 19th- and 20th-century historians likened parties to the great schools of political thought: conservatism, liberalism, socialism, Christian democracy, communism, fascism, and so on. The links between the two phenomena are obvious except that parties, agents of conflict but also instruments of integration, are led in majority governments to betray their initial ambition and adapt themselves to the constraints of the exercise of power, to become institutionalized, and to change their program and sometimes their ideology in order to become catchall parties, according to Otto Kirchheimer. One must, therefore, observe the social interests that are expressed through these ideas and justify the "particular conceptions of national interest."

### Socioeconomic Bases

Duverger saw in parties the translation of two successive class struggles: the conflict between the

land-owning nobility, expressed by the conservatives, and the capitalist bourgeoisie, represented by the liberals, on the one hand, and that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, organized by the socialists, social democrats, and labor parties, on the other. Liberals were confronted with the dilemma whether to ally themselves with their former conservative enemies against the peril represented by workers' parties or to accept alliances with the social democrats, which was the case with the so-called radical parties. Duverger notes that some Christian Democratic parties in Catholic Europe or agrarian ones in some Nordic countries remained outside these class struggles on which the dualism between left and right is founded. It is the superimposition of dualisms that generates multi-party systems. Duverger thinks that using the Anglo-American majority vote—"first past the post"—facilitates the establishment of a two-party system opposing conservative liberals and social democrats.

The same inspiration can be found in Lipset, who in *Political Man* sees in parties the expression of social classes of which, for him, there are three: (1) the upper class, supported by the Church, which is expressed in conservative parties; (2) the secular middle class, expressed in liberal parties; and (3) the working class, expressed in labor, socialist, and social-democratic parties. The right, center, and left form a democratic spectrum to which corresponds an antidemocratic, extremist spectrum, including the communist extreme left and the authoritarian monarchist, clerical, and reactionary extreme right as the expression of a refusal of change by a threatened upper class, of which António Salazar in Portugal, Miklos Horthy in Hungary, Engelbert Dollfuss in Austria, and Francisco Franco in Spain were illustrations. The originality of Lipset is to show that the middle class also engendered an extreme center with Italian fascism and German Nazism, which was opposed to the extreme left and extreme right. Today, the concept of extreme center is enlightening in the description of parties such as the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) in Austria or the National Front (Front National, FN) in France and in the definition of a clear relationship between fascism and the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) in Italy. It is more precise and more scientific than that of populism.

Lipset attenuated his position somewhat by remarking that certain traditional parties, such as Catholic parties, combine cultural conservatism with socioeconomic reformism and that new forces such as the green parties mix cultural liberalism and anti-industrialist reaction, thus constituting a neo-bourgeois ideology.

The approach exposed in *Political Man* remains the most fruitful but leaves aside the existence of interclass parties, which are nonetheless not catch-all parties. The most fitting example was the Italian Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), backed by a workers' union, the Italian Confederation of Trade Unions (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori, CISL), but there were also certain employers grouping people with nothing in common other than the defense of the interests and values of the Catholic community. This approach included as many as nine tendencies (*correnti*) spreading from the pro-Marxist left to the traditionalist extreme right. This party, which was born out of antifascist resistance and anticommunism after World War II, broke up in an interesting way in the 1990s: The right was recovered by Silvio Berlusconi; its center right refused to join the people's freedom party People of Liberty (Il Popolo della Libertà, PDL), created by Berlusconi in 2009; while its center-left and left merged with the former members of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) to found the Democratic Party in 2008. In fact, the DC met the same fate as the French Popular Republican Movement (Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP) 30 years earlier. The latter was also formed during the resistance and dispersed its forces to the right, the center, and the left. The Christian Democratic parties of the Benelux countries and Switzerland correspond to the same model as the Italian one. The same can be said about the German Zentrum party from 1871 to 1933 but not for the German Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU), which is no more clerical than Nicolas Sarkozy's Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un mouvement populaire, UMP) in France. By contrast, in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU) belonged to the tradition of classic, clerical conservatism, but clericalism also became contested within the party itself.

### *Historical Cleavages*

Finally—if only to understand multiparty systems with more than six parties—it is necessary to use a multidimensional space as in the systematic model of the origin of parties in Europe set up by Lipset and Rokkan. For them, cleavages are neither ephemeral oppositions nor contingent divisions but structural effects resulting from the political translation of profound traumatic changes that affected the history of a country or a group of countries. These conflicting effects are exerted along two axes: the functional axis and the territorial-cultural axis. In the particular case of Europe, originally marked by Catholic Christianity, two revolutions—national revolutions and the Industrial Revolution—engendered four cleavages. The former broke the unity between countries born of the Reformation and those marked by the Catholic Counter-Reformation. It engendered two cleavages: (1) along the unitary center/periphery axis, opposing modernization to the resistance of the subjected cultures from the provinces and peripheral areas, and (2) along the functional axis of Church versus State, opposing the modernizing, secular elite to the defense of the interests of the Church in the fields of education and values. The Industrial Revolution generated the following cleavages: (3) along the territorial axis, primary versus secondary economy opposing landed interests to the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs, and (4) along the functional axis of employers versus owners, opposing the interests of property, capital, and business to the labor union movement, which defended the interests of wage earners.

These four cleavages are conveyed in the short term through the issues that oppose the parties and in the long term through the party systems. In Catholic and Protestant Europe on both sides of each cleavage, there arose, according to the country, families of parties that became established with the extension of suffrage and democratization. Since then, these cleavage-based party systems had become “frozen” for a considerable time. Depending on the period, one may add that a cleavage can dominate electoral parliamentary debate: Church versus State in Catholic countries in the 19th century and the primary versus secondary sector in Sweden at the same time, and the center versus periphery cleavage in the Basque country or in Ireland. However, the most important cleavage in

Western Europe since the crisis of 1929, and even before, was owners versus workers, which, apart from the two cases cited previously, forms the axis of the most frequent parliamentary constellations.

At the beginning of the 21st century, a majority of parties are based on the functional-economic owners versus workers cleavage. In other words, on the one hand, there are *parties for the defense of owners* that have formal and/or informal links with employers, companies, and the business community in general but with a much broader electoral base that includes the middle classes. This family unites former, previously opposed parties such as conservatives and liberals in Protestant countries, Switzerland, and the Benelux countries. It also includes parties of other origins from former Christian Democratic groups such as CDU/CSU in Germany or former nationalists such as UMP (this party includes former Gaullists, conservatives, and liberals), as well as new parties such as the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD) in Portugal, the post-Franco People's Party (Partido Popular) in Spain, and Forward Italy (Forza Italia), which merged with the postfascist AN to form the people's freedom party, PDL, a unified right-wing party.

On the other hand, since the 19th century, there has been a systematic development of *parties for the defense of workers*, which, historically, constitute the labor movement and maintain special links with labor unions. Their voters are salaried employees, mainly working class but also some white-collar workers and civil servants. They were born in the wake of the Industrial Revolution from the convergence of four forces: two ideologies, (1) the Jacobinism of the French Revolution and radical philosophy and (2) social Christianity in Protestant countries, and two forms of political organization, (3) the labor unions and cooperative movements and (4) the internationalism of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and their disciples. The combination of these four ingredients, in variable proportions depending on the country, created three genetic models in the sense of Angelo Panebianco, which developed into four traditions that are very visible today:

1. The Labour tradition, born out of the failure of Chartism, was translated into parties of ideological and religious pluralism, dominated organically by the labor unions in which, ideologically,

social Christianity is slightly more important than radicalism, whereas the Socialist International and Marxism are in minority or even marginal.

2. The social-democratic tradition, in which trade unionism emanated from the party, was born in Germany and dominated by the Socialist International and Marxism. These parties have kept a controlled and solid organization that has particularly subsisted in the Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP) and in the Austrian SPÖ.

3. The social-democratic tradition of the French Revolution of 1848 was marked by Jacobin radicalism and the republican and anticlerical struggle. These parties from the start came up against the distrust of the anarcho-syndicalist movement, which was hostile to any collaboration with parties. The anarcho-syndicalists combined theoretical anarchism founded on the rejection of the state and electoral politics, advocating a mutual benefits system, self-management, and federalism with practical bread-and-butter reformism within companies. Moreover, the union movement was divided by a new Christian labor movement that was equally wary of party politics and a communist labor movement that would ultimately supplant anarcho-syndicalism. The socialist-democratic tradition became embodied in weaker, intellectual parties and was neither controlling the labor movement nor being controlled by it. These socialist parties—French, Italian, and Spanish—would practice ideological extremism and give more than their due to Marxism while practicing shortsighted reformism.

4. The communist tradition is, in fact, a variant of the social democracy that was implanted in France and Italy, where it failed. It is a kind of radical social democracy that has accentuated its specific features: orthodox Marxism; a centralized organization adapted to the political struggle in authoritarian regimes (“democratic centralism”); control over the unions, which had become the “driving belts”; and, above all, the primacy of the Socialist International. With the Komintern, communist parties were the only party with an international dimension, devoted for many years to the interests of the USSR and presented under Joseph Stalin as the fatherland of socialism. The social-democratic sociology of communist parties favored their

incorporation into party systems, their unofficial social democratization including membership of the Socialist International.

The PCI, the Italian Communist Party, was the first to take this path, soon to be joined with the dissolution of the former USSR by the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Lithuanians. The development of a Marxism *sui generis* adapted to Italy and the West thanks to Antonio Gramsci and to the strategic intelligence and political *savoir faire* of its leaders—Palmiro Togliatti and Enrico Berlinguer—eager to promote “a national path toward socialism” helped this transformation of the PCI first into the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, PDS) and then into the Democrats of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra, DS) and the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, or PD) with the gradual help of the Christian Democrats. The French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, PCF) remained Stalinist for a long time but was headed by leaders of no great stature—Maurice Thorez and Georges Marchais—and did not take the opportunity to return to social democracy. In the Scandinavian countries, where social democracy is strong, the extreme left is also of communist origin, with the Danish Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF), which broke off links with Moscow in 1956, and in Sweden the Communist Party became the Left Party. The situation has been the same in Finland since the end of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the left-wing socialists in Norway are a dissident movement of the Labor Party. The case of the Left (*Die Linke*) in Germany is more ambiguous: The former Communist Party of East Germany with its strong organization merged with social-democratic dissidents from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). The most original of all parties situated “on the left of the left” is the Dutch Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP), an anticapitalist protest party composed of former Maoists, which can win up to 10% of the votes.

### *Center–Periphery Cleavages*

Outside the dominant socioeconomic cleavage, the other important cleavage is center–periphery, composed of parties for territorial defense, which

is divided into two opposed families. On the one hand, there are the parties of centralized state nationalism corresponding historically to a unifying, imperialistic state nationalism that is economically protectionist and that, socially, carries policies that are favorable to a protective state. One is reminded of Bismarckism in Germany, which during the Weimar Republic became the German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP), and of Bonapartism in France, then the republican current from which Gaullism originated. These parties, concerned about the authority of the State, are inclined to deviate toward authoritarianism and have engendered some extreme versions: the total state that identifies nation, state, and leader in fascist totalitarianism in Italy and Nazism in Germany and has been emulated by many others. These extreme-center parties are wrongly assimilated to the extreme right and characteristically attract not only voters from the working class but also leaders from left-wing parties, such as Benito Mussolini, a former socialist in charge of the newspaper *Avanti!*; Jacques Doriot, a former communist deputy and the founder of the French Popular Party (Parti Populaire Français, PPF); as well as the less conventional Oswald Mosley, a former Labor MP and the founder of the British Union of Fascists. World War II, with its cortege of horror and crimes against humanity, has discredited fascism, which is no longer portrayed as such, except by marginal groups that are not considered as parties.

Nevertheless, the ideological ground has remained fertile and able to produce analogous parties that out of caution tone down their discourse. Globalization, immigration, and the crisis since the end of the 1970s have favored the rebirth of postfascism in places where a previous tradition existed: the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, the FPÖ (heir of the Pan-Germanic nationalist current) in Austria, and in some Länder in Germany, the National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD). We may add in Flanders Vlaams Belang, the new name of Vlaams Blok, heir of the pro-Nazi Flemish National Union (Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond, VNV), which existed between the two World Wars. In other countries where there was no fascist tradition before, new movements have emerged with a similar sociology and a



less articulate discourse than fascism. Their creed resides in a radical xenophobia enhanced since the beginning of the 21st century by anti-Islamism. The longest lasting case is the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), but the most spectacular is to be found in the Netherlands. The fact that the founder and leader of the DF is a woman—Pia Kjaersgaard—and her Dutch counterpart in the Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) was a millionaire and a militant homosexual (he was assassinated by an animal rights activist) constitutes a break with fascism. However, it is a mistake to consider them as new parties: Their organization is new, yet the issues that fuel them—xenophobia and racism—have political roots that go back to the 19th century. Whether moderate or extremist, democratic or authoritarian, state-nationalist parties are—or were—authentic catchall parties.

The historical opponents of centralism are parties for the defense of the periphery, sometimes regionalist and federalist, sometimes nationalist and separatist. They are the expression of ethnic or linguistic minorities and have a territory that is quite easily definable. Their existence is not recent and most often corresponds to countries with an imperial structure: Austria–Hungary before 1919 had many such parties. Today, the oldest party to defend the periphery is the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV), founded in 1895, which identified with the cause of the language, culture, and democratic traditions of the Basque country, where it is the main party. The Swedish Popular Party in Finland is also an old organization—early 20th century—that holds the monopoly of representation of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, and for this reason it has participated in almost all government coalitions. The Scottish National Party, founded in 1925, only managed to break through in the 1960s, when it became alternately the second or third party in Scotland. Wales also has its nationalist organization, which is less strong and has fewer seats in Westminster: Plaid Cymru. Two parties that were created after World War II enjoy a majority in their region, though they are insignificant on a national scale: the popular party of South Tyrol (South Tyrolean People's Party) in Alto Adige and the Val d'Aosta Union in Italy. In Flanders, the party defending the periphery,

People's Union (Volksunie), split in two, creating the more centrist New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, NVA) and SPIRIT, which is more social libertarian. Spain counts the largest number of parties of this type. In Euskadi as well as PNV, we must add the nationalist, left-wing Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna, EA). In Catalonia, both the autonomist–centrist democratic convergence of Catalonia and the left-wing separatists of the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC) can be included. Numerous Spanish regions have their autonomists. The periphery also has extremists, sometimes violent ones but that, unlike the terrorist movements of the 1970s, such as the Red Brigades, are endowed with a legal electoral voice that shows popular and even widespread support. This is the case in Northern Ireland, where the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is linked to Sinn Fein, and in the Basque country, where Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) was related with Batasuna until the party was prohibited by the Spanish courts. In Corsica, the situation is the same, but the nationalists are only represented at the regional and local levels. There is one special case: that of Northern League (Lega Nord) in Italy, which has gone from the defense of federalist positions to the instrumentalizing of xenophobia and from enthusiastic Europeanism to staunch Euroscepticism.

### *Church and State Cleavage*

By contrast to the center–periphery opposition, another cleavage resulting from national revolution as defined by Rokkan is the cleavage between Church and State, which used to be of prime importance but now belongs to history. The Christian Democratic parties whose role was essential for European integration are experiencing an existential crisis: The major one, in Italy, broke up and now only exists as the Center Democratic Union with a marginal role. Their area of strength is limited to the Netherlands and the Benelux countries, where the Christian Democrats have lost a great deal of electoral weight, whereas they have collapsed dramatically in Switzerland. They were and still remain the best examples of interclass, horizontal parties, that is, covering all the ground from the right to the left—from fundamentalism to

progress through centrism. In fact, they reflected the sociology as much as the ideological structure of the Catholic subculture. They are not catchall parties because, even when they are nonconfessional, they embody the political will of believers and citizens steeped in Catholic culture. Christian Democratic programs as a result of a dialogue between their bourgeois, agricultural, and working-class tendencies constitute a useful compromise for setting up government coalitions with either the liberals or the social democrats. The latter explains their unparalleled longevity in government: Democrazia Christiana participated in all the coalitions of the first Italian republic, but the record is held by the Luxemburg Christian Democrats, with more than a century in power, followed closely by the Belgians and the Dutch, with almost 100 years. They are the axis both of the center-right, so-called conservative coalitions in Belgium and the Roman Blue in the Netherlands and of the so-called labor center-left coalitions in Belgium and the Roman Red in the Netherlands. Even the most conservative party in Austria, the Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), has most often participated—since 1945—in so-called Red-Black governments along with the Social Democrats in spite of its questionable alliance with the xenophobic nationalists of the FPÖ. It is interesting to note that in the Czech Republic the only noncommunist party to have lived through the Soviet era is the Czech People's Party (Československá strana lidová, CSL), which participates in all coalition governments as it used to before 1938, its foundation dating back to the Austrian-Hungarian empire.

### *New Cleavages*

In addition to the large families of parties, there is one small one—the greens. One thesis by Thomas Poguntke claims that the greens are the embodiment of New Politics based on postmaterialist issues such as quality of life, protection of nature, and libertarian individualism—in opposition to the supporters of Old Politics, based on materialistic issues and values such as wage increases and bread-and-butter issues in general. This idea was influenced by the work of Ronald Inglehart, who developed his theory of postmaterialism based on the proposition that the generation

marked by the Great Depression followed by war and reconstruction was succeeded by a generation socialized in a context of prosperity, the “affluent society” of the “golden sixties.” The new post-Industrial Revolution era is said to have given rise to a new cleavage, that is, materialists versus post-materialists, with the Greens occupying the post-materialist side and the extreme right, the side of the materialists. The ecologists represent a new force, but the parties qualified as far right are as old as parliamentary democracy itself. In the 1980s, Lipset insisted on the importance of post-materialism and saw, on the one hand, the emergence of a libertarian-style, neo-bourgeois ideology that divided left-wing parties upheld by intellectual circles from the more authoritarian traditionalist, materialist workers who valued morals. The postmaterialism adopted by social-democratic parties partly explains the success of extreme-center parties among workers. On the other hand, Lipset noted that the ecologists' claims such as cultural liberalism are a luxury enjoyed by well-off citizens. In the same way, Lipset remarked that the Greens combine avant-garde themes opposed to traditional values with anti-industrialist themes for the defense of nature, which take part in a revolt against modernity that he qualifies as a “backlash.” Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair noted that the Greens participated in what the two authors called intrablock mobility within the left, that is, the workers' side of the owners-versus-workers cleavage. Later events seem to have proved them right, with the experiences of the Greens in government first in Finland, then in Belgium, and finally in Germany and France in coalitions with social democrats. In France, they owe the few seats they won in parliament to electoral alliances with the socialists. However, in Belgium and Germany, local coalitions with the right have occurred since the beginning of this century. An intermediary hypothesis could be put forward, namely, that the Greens stem from a restructuring of the territorial-economic cleavage—primary sector versus secondary sector—setting the industrialized world in opposition to nature, which explains the mixture of postmodern and traditionalist features in the discourse. Concerning their closeness to the left, it can be considered as the result of their hostility to capitalism, which destroys the balance of nature.

### Parties as Organizations

Parties are not biological organisms, nor do they have a lifetime association with a cleavage: They are autonomous forces. The German conservatives in the CDU are an excellent example of a change of cleavage and of realignment. It was created as a Christian Democratic Party and heir of the pre-1933 Catholic Zentrum. Its founding programs defined a third way between Marxist collectivism and liberal capitalism by a Christian socialism founded on personalism and a respect for property, the quest for the common good, and the principle of subsidiarity. The CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, had accepted anti-Nazi Protestant intellectuals from the “Confessing Church” (“Bekennende Kirche,” a Protestant anti-fascist movement). Under pressure from the Allies, who were concerned about the Soviet threat, and fearing the Marxism displayed by the SPD of 1945 to 1946, the CDU was forced to open its doors to Protestant conservatives who were not always former members of the Resistance. In the person of Konrad Adenauer, the former mayor of Cologne, a moderate, the CDU provided itself with a leader who turned out to be a true visionary both on the question of European integration and on the future of Germany. Certain that Germany would sooner or later be reunified and that in this context Catholics who were roughly equal in number to the Protestants in the West would once again become a minority, he reoriented the CDU along a more conservative line to take the place of the old Zentrum party and the German Right, which had been discredited for its support of Nazism. The party then allied itself with and later assimilated the conservatives of Lower Saxony in the German Party (Deutsche Partei, DP); it then did the same with the party representing refugees from former German territories in the east, the League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights (Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten, BHE). This was possible thanks to a moderate liberal program inspired by the new economic mentor of the CDU, Ludwig Erhard. This program, the social market economy, came up against the opposition of the social Christian Democrats. Adenauer won his bet, and the CDU/CSU became a party with a majority vocation, inspired by the catchall party defined by Otto Kirchheimer. As early as 1953, as Peter Merkl

noted, the CDU/CSU became a conservative party dedicated to defending the interests of industry, business, and agriculture, with its popular voters (blue- and white-collar workers) taking advantage of the spin-off from prosperity. As for Christian socialism, it became a mere memory, and to many of the party leaders, it was not a pleasant one. However, the CDU was the first example of political realignment where the logic of organization took precedence over ideological considerations and program. The CDU/CSU was able to increase considerably the number of its new voters, while to a great extent keeping its traditional electorate, and was not affected by the growing secularization of society. It increased its score from 31% in the 1949 elections to 50% in 1957. For the change to be successful, the cleavage had to be followed by lasting electoral alignment as defined by V. O. Key. This requires good partisan organization. When within a party the requirements of organization—and therefore accession to power—are in contradiction to the preservation of its principles and identity, it either undergoes a refoundation or changes its identity and undergoes realignment toward an electorally more beneficial cleavage.

The organization of parties, therefore, conveys a different logic than ideas and cleavages and needs to be studied separately. The concept most commonly used to classify partisan organization is the opposition between mass parties and cadre parties. It is often attributed to Duverger, but he borrowed it from Weber and developed it. Duverger’s great contribution was to distinguish between parties of inside creation and parties of outside creation, depending on whether the founders were in parliament—a typical example is that of Whigs and Tories—or were outsiders who had no access to power, not even to parliament. The groups that can exist before the organization of the party can be labor unions, associations, Masonic lodges, or leagues—including terrorist ones. The cadre parties are therefore parliamentary parties resulting from the widening of the electorate, aimed at inciting new voters to enroll on the electoral register and support the party and the electoral committees of the candidates. Mass parties are created outside the spheres of power, and their only means of access is to have the largest possible number of voluntary activists and regular financial contributors.

More than the number of members, it is the criterion of funding that distinguishes mass parties. The regularity and registration of contributions is very important in mass parties whose internal legitimacy is embodied by its members rather than its electorate. It is necessary to add a characteristic that Duverger does not mention: the stability of leadership indifferent to the vagaries of the economic situation. Thus, during the whole of the 20th century, the Swedish social democrats had only five leaders, whereas other parties had many more. The Industrial Revolution; the expansion of means of transport, communication, and propaganda leading to the development of inexpensive newspapers and enabling national electoral campaigns; and the running of centralized national bodies favored the action and development of mass parties until the 1960s. Some cadre parties adapted to their competition, often parties organized later, such as the British and Scandinavian conservatives, who were organized by penetration from the center to the periphery, becoming, according to Angelo Panebianco, electoral parties—with professionals endowed with strong leadership qualities, recruiting large numbers of members, and above all oriented toward the opinion of their potential voters. The difference with mass parties is threefold. First, and regardless of the number of members—under Harold Macmillan, the British Conservative party had almost 1 million members—the funding of the party depends on gifts from business or from rich contributors and not on the members, who sometimes do not pay their fees but are not excluded. Second, legitimacy and power belong to parliamentarians and are vested in them by the voters, whose opinions are more important than those of members. Finally, the survival of the leaders depends on their success in the general elections.

Some parties have kept a more archaic organization: a federation of electoral committees composed of local personalities, headed by a much more undisciplined parliamentary party and with a weak leadership. These less developed cadre parties are to be found in countries such as France, Spain, Portugal, and, to a lesser degree, Italy. Jean Charlot suggests calling them *partis de notables*. Originally, they were the earliest parties to be organized, which corresponds to a model of organization by diffusion, that is, they were created on

the initiative of constituency committees and by becoming closer and closer ultimately became federated from the bottom up. During the 100 years from 1860 to 1960, technical development favored mass parties that in certain cases—Catholic Zentrum and social democrats in Germany; Catholic and socialist parties in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands; French and Italian Communists—managed, in the words of Siegmund Neumann, to “take charge of voters from the cradle to the grave.” These “rigid mass parties,” to use Duverger’s terminology, had a very large membership involved in a network of parallel organizations for women, children, young people, cooperatives, travel agencies, sport clubs, choirs, not to mention a party press. According to Neumann, these are “social integration parties,” and in Germany during the Weimar republic, they were even qualified as *Sozialghettoparteien* (social ghetto parties).

Not all mass parties reached such organizational perfection, and several were content to live off the voluntary work of their militants and are what Duverger calls “flexible mass parties.” But, as Blondel remarks, not attaining a large membership is always a failure for a party. In fact, whereas parties of social integration have a strong organizational culture that generates party patriotism or the attachment of members, and even voters and are more concerned with the organization itself than the idea that it embodies, flexible mass parties are in a perpetual debate over ideas, a source of divisions, and this is unproductive from an electoral point of view. Since the 1960s and the development of political communication centered on television and now the Internet, mass parties, and especially the most powerful among them, have experienced a crisis of adaptation brought about by a decreasing membership that has hit all the large social and political organizations characterized by the omnipotence of image and entertainment, ensuring a domination of form and appearance over substance, style over ideas, and the personality of the leader over the political party. Duverger thought—rightly at the time—that cadre parties were doomed, but thanks to a ruse of history, it is the mass parties that are the dinosaurs, and hic et nunc, it is the professional electoral parties, according to Panebianco, that have the wind in their sails in Europe: They are more reactive to variations in public opinion and

more personalized, and while easily disposing of leaders who fail, they are on the same wavelength as the media. As they lose more and more members, the old parties of integration tend to be reduced, to the advantage of their functionaries, to a large, permanent staff paid by the party. The latter can be qualified by the concept of “bureaucratic mass party,” proposed by Panebianco.

Moreover, the increasingly high costs of election campaigns, along with the development of the media and particularly television, have provoked a change in the organization of parties. First, whatever the social organization, individuals are less engaged in long-term action but are more willing to commit themselves in a limited way to a precise objective: Parties lose members, but so do labor unions, and there are fewer practicing members of the Church. This poses a vital problem to mass parties confronted with a decrease in the number of their contributors on the one hand and with the increasing cost of electoral campaigns on the other. They resort increasingly to funding by private enterprises, as other parties did, which changes their nature. As the mass parties were often unpopular with the business community, they were driven to use practices that in some countries are considered as corrupt and condemned by law. Consequently, states not only developed their legislation on parties but also replaced or limited private funding with public funds. Last, as television does not lend itself to a deepening of political discourse or to nuances, parties are forced to put on performances, which they have done since the 19th century but now do for television. That is, they have to embody themselves in a leader, who has to build an image of a prime minister or of a president, as, for example, in France. Countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, or Italy, which were governed by coalitions of parties and appointed their prime minister by a process of negotiation and arbitration between parties and the currents within a party, have had to resign themselves to personalization. The leading German parties were the first to go down this path by designating their candidates for the chancellorship. In the UK, around 1965, the Conservative Party decided to have its leader elected by the members of parliament, whereas previously the appointment was the result of a secret process in which the outgoing leader played a substantial

role. From the 1970s and 1980s, more and more parties, which until then had had their leaders elected by delegates at their congress or party conference, changed to direct election by paid-up party members. In 1995, the French Socialist Party did the same to choose its candidate for the presidential election, and so did the British Conservatives. In Italy and France, the left-wing coalition and the socialists tried to import the American system of primaries. The model setup in Italy appears to be the closest to the original, with the center, left, and extreme left taking part—but the ballot was organized privately within the offices of the parties. For the French Socialist Party, it was an internal election enlarged to accommodate members admitted for the circumstance in return for a reduced financial contribution. In both cases, the analogy with the American primaries resides in the fact that there was an internal election and even debates between the candidates. The aim was to attract the attention of the media and thus favor the campaigns of the parties concerned. This way of functioning does not correspond to the ideal of mass parties.

The distinction between professional electoral parties on the one hand and bureaucratic mass parties on the other has become blurred in numerous countries. They have become publicly financed institutions oriented toward the media and, according to Peter Mair, could even manage without members. Mair suggests that the reasons for maintaining the role of members in certain parties are of a symbolic nature. He has proposed a new mode of partisan organization, the cartel party, which since the 1970s has succeeded the hegemony of catchall parties, which had taken over from mass parties after replacing the elitist parties. The fact is that what Mair calls “parties in opinion” have taken precedence over the “central apparatus of the party” in an arena of dialogue with the “party in public office”—leader, government, parliamentary group—all by political professionals. Are there any alternatives to cartel parties? There is one in Italy—Forza Italia, devoted to the promotion and the defense of the interests of its founder, Silvio Berlusconi. Such a phenomenon was only made possible thanks to two “accidents,” the deregulation of television, which opened the doors to the establishment by Berlusconi of a television empire, and the collapse of the

first Italian Republic, which freed some space on the right of the political spectrum, that is, on the side of the defense of liberal capitalism.

Both the right and the democrats in Italy as well as a large number of parties in Europe are greatly influenced by the organizational models of the United States. However, the latter remain different and are based on various autonomous strata, either for the Democrats or for the Republicans. Since the seminal contribution of Key, scholars have analyzed American parties as tripartite structures: (1) the party in the electorate, (2) the party organization, and (3) the party in government. The party in the electorate refers to the loyalty and identification of the voters, and the party in government refers to public office holders from the president to local councilors; the party organization is structured in a manner defined by Sam Eldersveld (1982) as a stratarchy, which “is an organization with layers, or strata of control, rather than centralized leadership from the top down” (p. 106). American party organizations are far older than the European ones, and in spite of the decline of party identification, they still remain adapted to the various and numerous changes and evolutions affecting the practice of democratic government. This is obviously not the case in Europe, where political scientists may speak of a “crisis of parties.”

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*See also* Cleavages, Social and Political; Democratization; Party Finance; Party Identification; Party Organization; Party Systems

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## PARTY FINANCE

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Parties need money if they are to be able to carry out their main political functions: to run election campaigns, to maintain organizations both within the legislature and outside it, and to carry out research into future policy. Party finance is a major component of political finance. The latter includes in addition the funding of lobby groups and of other aspects of political life. Party finance includes any costs of election campaigns that are the responsibility of party organizations. Where candidates run for public office independently of parties, election campaigns too are an aspect of political finance not covered by the term *party finance*. This entry discusses problems of party finance in terms of normative democratic criteria, current research, and attempts of regulation.

### Problems of Party Finance

Party finance raises problems for three main reasons. First, parties with access to disproportionately large amounts of money for their election

campaigns potentially have a large advantage over poorer rivals. Insofar as high expenditure enables parties to gain votes, money may create unfair electoral advantages for parties with rich supporters. In a considerable number of countries in the Third World (including Thailand, the Philippines, and countries in Latin America), vote buying is a common feature of elections. In Nigeria, electoral officials reportedly have been bribed to falsify voting results. In countries such as the United States, money is characteristically spent on buying advertising time on television. Studies on electoral results in congressional elections in the United States and in parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom (UK) have suggested a clear link between the amount spent and the number of votes obtained.

A second problem is that parties' need for money may make them reliant on donors who demand illegitimate benefits. Typically, these consist of public contracts, licenses, or legislation favorable to the givers. The demand for donations is a major cause of political corruption, both at the national and at the local level. Major scandals concerning party funding occur so regularly that any attempt to list them will soon be outdated. Scandals not only involve justified accusations against politicians and their aides but also unfounded but nevertheless powerful allegations.

Third, those desiring to become candidates for public office may need to spend considerable sums in obtaining party nominations. Primary elections and other internal party contests can be costly for those involved. The more expensive it is to gain a party nomination the lower will be the chances for persons without private resources to embark on political careers.

It is not only the demand for resources that affects political parties; the control of money has a significant impact on the structure of power within political parties. Robert Michels stressed in his classic study of the German Social Democrats in the early 20th century that party leaders tend to gain control of the purse strings of the party and that this has the effect of centralizing power. There is no single pattern of internal control over funding. In some countries, such as the United States, central party organizations do not have an overwhelming control where it comes to raising and spending money.

### Issues in the Academic Study of Party Finance

The study of party funding and of political finance generally has become an increasingly significant and popular field of political science. Members of the International Political Science Association's Research Committee on Political Finance and Political Corruption (RC 20) have carried out some of the most significant work in this field. Herbert Alexander devoted his professional life to a long series of studies of the funding of presidential and other election campaigns in the United States. Among the most significant works in the comparative study of party finance are those of Arnold Heidenheimer, Khayyam Paltiel, Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, and Kevin Casas-Zamora. Heidenheimer's pioneering study of 1963 attempted to compare the overall level of spending in a number of different countries. He then tried to explain why party politics costs so much more in some countries (e.g., the Philippines or Israel) than in others (e.g., the UK). In 2009, Nassmacher found that the pattern of high- and low-spending countries was largely unchanged. Like Casas-Zamora and Pinto-Duschinsky, he also cast doubts on the popular notion that the costs of politics have greatly risen as the result of spending by parties on modern campaigning techniques, in particular on television advertising.

However, the attempt to make reliable comparisons between the levels of spending in different countries has raised serious methodological and practical problems:

1. Though the financial accounts of parties are now published in many more countries than in the past, they often are inaccurate (works of fiction, as the French scholar Yves-Marie Doublet has called them). Moreover, accounts are drawn up in different ways, thereby making comparisons technically difficult.

2. The term *finance* needs to be considered carefully, for donations may come in the form of gifts in kind. Rather than supply money to enable a party to purchase vehicles or other forms of transport for electioneering by party leaders and candidates, donors may supply vehicles or the use of helicopters. Clearly, their value needs to be taken into account when reckoning the income and expenditures of a party.

In a large number of countries in the former Soviet Union, Africa, and elsewhere, in-kind donations to political parties come from the government. This is known in Eastern Europe as “administrative resources.” Typically, the government in office employs officials supposedly to carry out public duties but actually to provide political services to the party. Office facilities, telephones, and vehicles in government ministries, in the offices of legislators, or mayors’ offices are common forms of administrative resources.

The partisan use of public resources by political officeholders creates problems of research and measurement for political scientists. It also is a source of unfairness between governing parties and opposition parties. This imbalance is especially important in poor countries dependent on foreign assistance. Here the private sector of the economy frequently is very weak, and control of governmental resources is crucial.

3. Academic studies also confront the problem of definition of the term *political party*. In practice, there are “offshore islands” of parties: These are organizations that are legally independent of parties but are in practice linked to a party. An important example of organizations with such a status is the “political foundations” attached to each of the main parties in Germany. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation is “close to” the Christian Democrats, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation is “close to” the Social Democrats, and so on. Where newspapers are strongly connected to a political party, there arises the question of whether or not their incomes and expenditures are to be included in academic studies of party finance.

4. It is hard to measure the effects of expenditure on election results. In the case of spending by or on behalf of candidates for the legislature in countries that both have first-past-the-post electoral systems and require the disclosure of expenditures, it is possible to make statistical analyses of the relationship between spending and votes. The difficulties are that the official spending statistics may be incomplete or inaccurate and also that factors other than money need to be considered. For example, a local party organization with more members or more active members may raise relatively large sums of money. However, electoral success may stem from the work of the

local activists rather than from the amount of money spent.

As a result of these problems, the main progress by political scientists has been in studies of party funding in single countries (e.g., Marcin Walecki’s study of Poland) and in the study of political finance laws (e.g., by the Congressional Research Services of the U.S. Library of Congress and by the GRECO [Group of States Against Corruption] unit of the Council of Europe).

### Regulation and Subsidy

In recent decades, there has been a strong international tendency to increase legal regulation of both party funding and public subsidies. Arguably, there has been too much law and too little enforcement. This is partly because laws themselves are loosely worded and leave loopholes that can be exploited by donors and by political parties wishing to evade them. It is partly because electoral management bodies and law enforcement bodies have neither the technical capacity nor the will to challenge powerful political figures in major political parties. Where a body separate from the electoral management body, such as an anticorruption commission, is made responsible for the enforcement of laws relating to party funding, there may be a greater chance of active enforcement.

The main types of *regulation* include (a) requirements on parties and/or donors to declare financial accounts and donations to an electoral management authority; (b) requirements about the publication of such information (including, increasingly, publication on the World Wide Web); (c) requirements for disclosure of in-kind donations and of loans to parties; (d) requirements for elected politicians to declare their personal assets; (e) bans on particular sources of donations: for example, foreign donations and donations by companies, trade unions, or public contractors; (f) limits on permitted spending by parties or by candidates on election campaigns; (g) limits on the amounts that a donor is permitted to give—regulations concerning forms of disclosure are the most common around the world; and (h) bans on or regulation of party spending on advertising on television or radio.

The main forms of *subsidy* are (a) provision of free or subsidized time on television and radio



(and, more occasionally, free or subsidized newspaper advertising) for parties and candidates to convey their campaign messages to the electors, (b) direct financial subsidies to parties for election campaign expenses and/or for routine organizational expenses, (c) financial and in-kind allowances for party groups in the legislature or for individual legislators, and (d) in-kind electoral facilities for parties from public funds—for example, use of public halls for electoral meetings and/or postage for electoral communications without cost.

The most common form of subsidy is the provision of free broadcasting opportunities. More than half the countries have some form of direct public funding. Political parties debate the effects of such subsidies. One fear is that they create an incentive for rival political parties to unite in defense of their common financial privileges. In the words of Richard Katz and Peter Mair, this creates “cartel parties.” Another criticism is that public funding fails to stem the demand of political parties for money and thus fails to provide a cure for corrupt funding. Public funding is popular among professional politicians—its main beneficiaries—but is generally unpopular with ordinary electors. Supporters of public funding argue that it provides greater fairness. They argue also that, combined with improved regulation, public funding does help decrease corruption even if it does not eliminate it.

### International Standards

Several bodies, including the Council of Europe, have set out standards for the regulation and subsidy of political parties. Such standard-setting exercises present problems, though they may have their uses. There are essential differences of political philosophy between those who give priority to the need for fairness between parties and those whose main aim is to allow freedom of expression. Such freedom may mean allowing some parties to outspend others, thus creating a tension between the aims of freedom and fairness.

Even when the aim of transparency in party funding is considered, there are arguments in some circumstances for permitting donor privacy, especially in regimes where anyone known to give financial support to a party opposing the government

may be subjected to harassment and even to violence.

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*See also* Corruption; Electoral Campaign; Parties; Party Organization

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## PARTY IDENTIFICATION

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Parliamentary and presidential elections are regularly held every 3 to 5 years, and the behavior of the electorate is characterized by a certain inertia, sometimes more and sometimes less. This inertia at the aggregate level is the consequence of decisions of individual voters whose party attachments predispose them to elect candidates of the same party in a series of elections. Various terms are used as synonyms for this general idea of party attachment, such as *partisanship*, *party closeness*, *party loyalty*, and *party identification*. This type of enduring attachment has to be distinguished

from short-term party evaluations or from current party preference as the immediate, direct cause of voting behavior. Whereas party attachment is usually measured as attachment to one particular party, current party preference is sometimes operationalized as a preference order for a set of parties, from one's most to least preferred party.

As used in voting behavior research, party identification differs from the other terms because the general idea of party attachment is embedded in a special theoretical approach. Its definition is more specific, and its causes and consequences are theoretically grounded. Party identification as a theoretical concept was developed by the Michigan social psychological school of political behavior. This concept is introduced in the first section, followed by a section on an alternative, revisionist concept. In the third section, a new conceptualization in the classical spirit and new challenges are discussed. The entry concludes with a fourth section on the applicability of the concept outside the United States.

### The Michigan Social Psychological Concept

Party identification was originally defined in *The American Voter* by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (1960) as "the individual's affective orientation to an important group object in his environment" (p. 121). In U.S. politics, with its stable two-party system, the Republican and Democratic parties function as these "important group objects," offering political orientation to their supporters. Campbell et al. did not assume that this is self-evident but conceded that other groups are able to function as political reference groups as well, such as unions and religious or ethnic groups. Whether parties do indeed fulfill this orientation function for a large part of the national electorate is one of the questions that have to be answered when the original American concept is applied in other countries. The basic assumption of the Michigan approach is first of all that voters depend on such groups for political orientation, this being originally derived from reference group theory in mainstream social psychology of the 1940s and 1950s.

The classical Michigan concept of party identification became one of the cornerstones of voting research, first in the United States but to some extent also in Europe and Japan. Its standard

measure is asked in all American National Election Studies: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" The independents are then asked, whether they think of themselves as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party, leading to the support type of "leaners." The self-identified Republicans and Democrats are further categorized as strong or weak, depending on their answer as to whether they think of themselves as strong or not very strong Republicans or Democrats. The end result is a categorization of the American electorate into seven groups, running from strong to weak Republicans, to Independents leaning toward the Republican Party, to Independents, to the equivalent groups on the Democratic side. Much of the literature focuses on the reliability of this measurement, which combines direction and strength of attachment in one scale. Not denying the importance of the respective methodological controversy, the basic question concerns the concept validity of the directional component: Do the various measures of identification with a party measure what they are supposed to measure?

There are some easy conditions that these measures have to fulfill in cross-sectional surveys. Thus one expects that the political attitudes of party identifiers are more in line with their party than those of leaners and that party identification has a consistent impact on voting behavior. But party identification is only a predisposition to elect a Republican or a Democratic candidate, so that elections differ in terms of this impact. In the American context, with changing presidential candidate constellations, vote deviations of identifiers from their party occur more frequently than in European parliamentary systems, where under proportional representation the electorate often has only a choice between closed party lists. These deviations in the United States are seen not as a weakness but as a strength of the concept if voters return to the party they identify with in later elections.

The crucial test of concept validity is the exogenous status of party identification in relation to short-term electoral forces such as issue and candidate orientations. People become passively attached to a party during their primary political socialization in their teens, as a result of the overwhelming influence of their parents, and the ties to their party become strengthened by a continuous voting

record. Thus, younger voters tend to deviate more than older ones. But in general, the inertia of the electorate in the medium term should be quite large. The theory allows only two exceptions. The first is sudden changes in critical elections when many voters reorient themselves politically, reacting to important events such as the world economic crisis in the early 1930s, and the other concerns gradual readjustments in parts of the electorate as in the U.S. South since the late 1960s. Here the successful civil rights movement led to the enfranchisement of the African American population, which voted overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party; as a result, many traditional Southern White Democrats crossed the party divide to maintain a racial divide.

### The Revisionist Concept

In the U.S. context, the validity of the classical concept was well corroborated by empirical evidence collected by the Michigan school. Compared with other political attitudes, party identification proved to be more stable over time even at the individual level, as shown by long-wave panels spanning 4 years. But there remained doubts whether party identification was really the supposed unmoved mover, being stable and exogenous itself but influencing the evaluation of new political events, issues, and candidates. The finding that vote deviations from party identification weaken this predisposition and prevent it from returning to its former strength led to a slight revision of the concept. As soon as deviations are understood as more than mere episodes, the question arises as to what caused deviations in the first place. One possible answer was that there were retrospective evaluations of parties in government, rewarding them for good performance and punishing them for bad performance. Voters will remember parties' performance not only at the moment of voting but more permanently. This consideration led Morris Fiorina (1981) to the reinterpretation of party identification "as a running tally of retrospective evaluations" (p. 89). Party identification at time  $t$  influences identification at time  $t + 1$ ; this is the aspect of continuity, but identification at  $t + 1$  is also influenced by retrospective evaluations that are themselves not a simple consequence of the biased worldview of the

identifiers. As a process of Bayesian updating of beliefs about parties, the affective component of the concept is downgraded in favor of cognitive content and information that is not selectively perceived to confirm one's own attitudes. To what degree this is possible is a problem that is controversially discussed in the literature.

The implications of the revisionist concept for the aggregate level of the electorate are short-term fluctuations beyond sample errors that are not compatible with the classic version. As already mentioned, the latter does not postulate complete stability either but allows rare realigning elections or gradual movements due to generational turnover or reorientations in parts of the electorate such as the U.S. South. But fluctuations over time that correlate with performance indicators of the president or with the situation of the economy are definitely excluded. Not so by revisionist theory. Time-series analyses of the proportions of Republican and Democratic identifiers were introduced as studies of macropartisanship. Building on the revisionist concept, the task was to show, on the one hand, that its ups and downs were reduced compared with the performance indicators due to the stickiness of party identification and, on the other, that they correlated with the collective memory of the performance history of the parties' presidents and of the respective economic situation. Applying an error correction model, Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson (2002) showed for the United States not only that current changes in macropartisanship are the consequences of current changes of performance indicators but that macropartisanship returns to its medium-term equilibrium and that these equilibria are themselves changing over time. They interpret this latter change as "the enduring impact of political and economic performance" (p. 132). This result did not remain unchallenged, one argument being that medium-term changes are the consequences of classical realignment processes, such as those during the Reagan administration that favored the Republican Party.

### New Theoretical Foundations and New Challenges

Reference group theory being outdated in social psychology, the classic concept deserves a new

theoretical foundation that keeps its content as an affective party attachment. Such a new foundation is possible with social identity theory as developed by Henri Tajfel, who stresses that people bolster their self-esteem by membership in groups that they value positively and that are emotionally significant to them. Based on these assumptions, the social identity of a person is more than a mere cognitive self-categorization. A strong motivational content should guarantee selective perception of political events in favor of the respective political ingroup, accompanied by outgroup hostility. This theory fits well with the original concept of party identification, the only problem now being which party group people have in mind when “they think of themselves as Republicans, Democrats, etc.” or when they think of the party as an “important group object in their environment,” the party as an organization, or other identifiers of the same party. Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler (2002) argue for the latter interpretation and insist that it agrees best with the classic meaning. People are supposed to have an image of their fellow partisans, with whom they identify even if they have no contact whatsoever with the party organization or the party elite. Otherwise one could not explain the high percentages of regular voters who identify with parties.

This new theoretical foundation of the classical concept is important because it helps formulate adequate survey questions that tap the identity character of party identification. This is less a problem for the standard American question that qualifies well as an identity question than for the type of questions asked in some other countries. Questions asking whether one feels close to a party or whether one is an adherent of a party are less plausible as measures of identification with fellow partisans.

The identity approach is sometimes contrasted in the literature with the so-called attitudinal approach. John Bartle and Paolo Bellucci (2009) subsume the revisionist concept under this heading as well as strong party attitudes combining cognitive, emotional, and behavioral aspects of this positive—or negative—disposition toward a party as an attitude object. Indicators of the strength of an attitude are its durability and its impact on behavior or on other attitudes. These are the criteria that were also applied to check the construct

validity of the classic concept. Thus, the general idea holding various versions of party identification together is its function as a political predisposition influencing short-term political preferences and evaluations. In a funnel of causality leading from background characteristics such as religion or class membership to the final vote, political predispositions enter early, being influenced themselves only by the background characteristics. A more general version of partisanship such as the revisionist concept allows for regular updating caused by new information, but it also implies higher durability than short-term political evaluations and an impact on evaluations of current political cues. Larger permissiveness concerning long-term stability means at the same time fewer challenges from the research front. Thus, it makes sense to focus on the challenges the identity approach has to cope with since it is the continuation of the demanding classic version of party identification.

From the beginning, the stability of party identification over time was the most demanding presupposition of the classic concept. Only durable identifications are able to function as unmoved movers for short-term evaluations and issue preferences. Compared with other political attitudes, party identification turned out to be indeed relatively stable in the United States, and the stability is about at the same high level as for various ethnic, religious, or social class identities. The autocorrelations of identities over panel waves can be made even higher if one takes measurement error into account. An answer to a survey question is a mixture of the true value and an error term due to inattention, lack of understanding, coding mistakes, and so on. Multiwave panel data allow the identification of these errors and therefore the computation of correlations that are not attenuated by errors. Such autocorrelations reach values well above .90 for party identification in the United States.

A new challenge in this situation is posed by competing political predispositions, which can be as stable as party identification once measurement errors are taken into account for them, too. Such competing predispositions are ideological self-categorizations or policy-relevant value orientations. These concepts are more abstract than social identifications but are often measured in mass surveys with simple questions, one item for

each concept. State-of-the-art measurement would demand multiple items. There exist first results showing that issue preferences can be very stable over time if one can construct indices based on multiple items and if one takes measurement errors into account. Such results challenge the monopoly of party identification as the only promising candidate for the function of a political predisposition.

Another challenge related to this are doubts about the applicability and fruitfulness of the identity concept outside the United States. The best answer to this question can be given by acknowledging, first, the importance of political predispositions for opinion formation and voting behavior and by finding out, second, which type of predisposition has the best explanatory power in a specific country, given its political history and party system. Once more candidates for the predisposition part of the funnel of causality are available, there arises, of course, the new challenge of deciphering the mutual influences among them.

### Party Identification Outside the United States

The most serious challenge of the classic or the identity concept of party identification accrues from research results on European party systems and voting behavior. After early attempts to transfer the core concept of the Michigan school to Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other European countries in the 1960s, one conclusion was that the concept, successful as it is in the United States, is less powerful or even nonapplicable in Europe. Some authors argue that it is indistinguishable from vote choice or is much less stable over time than in the United States or that there exist better alternatives that European voters can use for political orientation. Other researchers strongly disagree, coming to the opposite conclusion that, depending on certain conditions, the concept passed critical tests of construct validity.

A first condition is, of course, to come up with an equivalent question that taps the affective identification or the identity aspect. Richard Johnston (2006) compiled an overview of the questions used in various countries and found that only the questions in the English-speaking countries and in Japan fall back on the phrase whether one thinks

of oneself as “Conservative, Labor, Liberal, or what,” as the British question is formulated. In other countries respondents are asked whether they consider themselves as adherents of a party (Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands), feel close to a party (France), or lean toward a party (Germany). The identity aspect decreases in this sequence. In most countries, researchers have agreed on a standard formulation that is asked regularly in national election studies.

For the crucial validity check of stability, panel studies are necessary, and in this respect most of the early results were disappointing compared with the stability of party identification in the United States. For the Netherlands, Jacques Thomassen even reported a higher stability of the vote than of party identification and corroborated this finding, together with Martin Rosema, recently (cited in Bartle & Belluci, 2009). But taking measurement error into account and applying statistical models appropriate for the respective measurement level of the data can change the overall impression of instability. Thus, Green and Schickler (cited in Bartle & Belluci, 2009) concluded that many of the reports on the instability of party identification in Europe are grossly exaggerated. They note at the same time that the identity concept does not imply stability under all circumstances. As one would expect, the party identifications of the Italian electorate became fluid in the 1990s, due to major changes in the Italian party system. A final conclusion concerning the stability of party identification in Europe, however, is not yet reached. The answers given depend on the methods used to measure stability. Error term corrections rely on classical measurement theory, which postulates random errors in an otherwise homogeneous population. Alternatively, one can assume a heterogeneous population consisting of movers and stayers that can be tested by latent class analysis. Such analyses show substantial dynamics and a class of movers in Britain, for example, of one third to two fifths of the electorate. These results do confirm the revisionist concept that Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley call valenced partisanship (2004, p. 211). The transition probabilities between British parties are not random but show trends parallel to the “accumulated party and party leader performance evaluations.”

A condition at the macrolevel of the political system that may have an impact on partisanship, especially if some voters have multiple party identifications, is the coalition situation in a country. In some countries, there exist rather stable options for government formation. In Germany, for example, a left-wing government coalition is an option, but one can also have a grand coalition between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, a government of the Social Democrats and the Liberals, or finally the option of a bourgeois (*bürgerlich*) government of Christian Democrats and Liberals. These types of coalition also serve as attitude objects competing with parties in their importance for the electorate.

The most discussed alternative of party identification as a political predisposition is ideology, often asked as ideological self-categorization as conservative or liberal in the United States or as left or right leaning in Europe. European voters have few problems in classifying parties as well as themselves on self-anchoring left–right scales. In some countries such as France, parties either change their names from time to time or enter and leave the party system altogether, so ideology can serve as a more stable orientation device than party identification. Both party identification and ideological self-categorization exist in France, the question being their reciprocal influences and their comparative impact on the vote. Recent research results based on panel surveys show that ideology influences the legislative vote (first round) more than party identification.

Such country-specific findings are sometimes criticized as distractions from a general theory of party identification. This critique is unjustified if the goal is to identify the conditions, especially at the macrolevel, that strengthen or dilute party identification as a political predisposition. The identity concept is based on firm theoretical grounds postulating the predispositional character of party identification, which is challenged empirically by findings on the dynamics of identification. Valenced partisanship, by contrast, is always in danger of crossing the divide between predispositions and short-term political attitudes.

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*See also* Attitudes, Political; Electoral Behavior; Identity, Social and Political; Ideology; Political Socialization

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## PARTY LINKAGE

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The concept of party linkage refers to the ways in which political parties provide linkage to the state. In democratic theory, parties link citizens to the state, but linkage theory encompasses as well how parties link specific entities such as special interests and campaign donors to the state and how they sometimes develop stronger linkages to the state for themselves alone rather than for any other entities. Depending on what kind of linkage they provide, parties contribute to participatory democracy, responsive democracy, responsive oligarchic government, or coercive authoritarian government. They may also serve as agencies of prerevolutionary linkage or of market linkage. It is often possible to find various kinds of linkage by party within the same nation-state. This entry briefly examines each form of linkage by party in

turn and then examines work that helps explain why certain forms have become increasingly common while others seem to be falling into decline.

The use of the term *party linkage* is relatively new but is in fact an elaboration of the older concept of the party as a *broker* between citizens and the state, capable of aggregating specific interests, forming programs, and, when successful in electoral competition, placing representatives in office to carry them out. A similar approach conceived of parties as *transmission belts*, moving ideas through the body politic, transforming them into proposals for legislation and eventually into laws for implementation in the halls of governance.

These early metaphors, drawn from the boisterous world of industrial finance and production in the heyday of the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath, presented a uniquely positive and American point of view. It was not until after World War II that the term *linkage* was developed to extend the idea of parties as connectors to the state and to make it possible to consider the wider range of the kinds of connections that can be made by parties. The first effort to do so systematically was made in 1980 and identified four kinds of linkage by party: (1) participatory linkage, in which parties serve as agencies through which citizens can participate in government; (2) responsive linkage, in which parties serve as agencies that strive to ensure that government officials will be responsive to the views of rank-and-file voters; (3) clientelistic linkage, in which parties serve as channels for the exchange of votes for favors; and (4) coercive linkage, where parties help authoritarian governments maintain coercive control over their subjects.

Over time, research on parties as agencies of linkage has explored the applicability of this typology, often concentrating on the extent to which either participatory or responsive linkage is in fact being provided. Other studies have elaborated the typology, pointing out, for example, that parties may engage in selective linkage rather than collective linkage, may offer representative linkage to other organizations in exchange for electoral support, and may develop different forms and processes of linkage within complex and multilayered polities.

A particularly modern form of these kinds of linkage is *market linkage*. Market linkage is linkage for sale. In one sense, it is not new: Once in

power, parties in government have always favored those who helped them to office and rewarded them for doing so. What makes market linkage different today is the overwhelming power of advertising and the consequent need for vast sums of money to win votes. In this form of linkage, parties link groups to the state by collecting funds and waging campaigns on behalf of the candidates selected by those groups; they seek to place their patrons' candidates in office and thus become indispensable partners in power. Ordinary citizens are encouraged to believe that they will be the beneficiaries of responsive linkage, but their hopes and needs will be attended to, if at all, only after those of the patrons have been met. Their only hope in a system where market linkage is well entrenched is to form well-financed mass movements, that is, for citizens to become patrons themselves and for movements to take the place of parties as agencies of linkage (although movements never themselves move into positions of governance as parties successfully in elections do).

The forms of linkage discussed so far focus, by and large, on contemporary parties in established democracies. More recent studies examining the relationship between parties and democracy in the past as well as in nondemocratic states have revealed another form of linkage by party, *revolutionary linkage*. Such linkage takes place in nations where there is neither democratic governance nor a legal party system, and citizens who find the autocratic rule intolerable join parties that have been outlawed or are forced to go underground or else form new, embryonic parties. The linkage the party provides in such a case is not to a state *per se* but to an imagined one, one that is seen as embodied in the words and deeds of its leader. For the followers, linkage to a legitimate state is the dream, but linkage to a charismatic leader and his or her entourage is the presently available reward for joining the battle for liberty.

Revolutionary linkage is found throughout history, including at the present time. A period of organized struggle for liberty is found in the history of every currently democratic state except those on whom democracy has been imposed by external conquest. As a contemporary phenomenon, it appears in states where democracy has not yet been established or where it has fallen and must be fought for all over again. In the latter case,

the illegal movements pursuing the dream may be parties that have been outlawed.

The six forms of linkage identified can readily be divided into those that foster democracy and those that work against it. Parties building linkage in prerevolutionary settings and those fostering participatory and responsive linkage in established democracies all offer prodemocracy forms of linkage (or at least purport to be doing so), whereas those that link only by clientelistic rewards, abetting agencies of oppression, or favoring their most generous contributors, use antidemocratic methods of creating linkage.

Recent studies of the relationship between parties and democracy suggest that the latter types of linkage are on the rise and that the former are weakening. Throughout the world, in long-established democracies, in new democracies, and in nations still only partially or not at all democratized, opportunities for participatory linkage via parties have diminished, responsive linkage has weakened, new forms of clientelistic and directive linkage have evolved, struggles for liberation via prerevolutionary linkage have been baffled and stalled, and market linkage has become ever more common.

External forces such as market globalization and the rising costs of effective campaigning with modern forms of communication, as well as stronger and more sophisticated oppression by dictatorial regimes, have provided pressure on parties to shift to (or continue to limit themselves to) the less democratic forms of linkage, and parties have responded. Recent studies of this process of de-democratization by party have identified many of the steps taken to move in this direction. (Specific examples, some of which are noted below, have been found in 46 nations, in the parties of North and Latin America, West and Eastern Europe, post-Soviet states, Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East.)

In nondictatorial regimes, the shift by parties from participatory or at least responsive linkage to less democratic forms of linkage is often difficult to isolate and identify, because the role parties play in de-democratization is frequently combined with other activities by the same parties that contribute to the maintenance of democratic forms of linkage. In such hybrid systems, parties are routinely considered accountable to a democratic electorate and

may in fact still be so to a considerable extent. In addition, only a portion of a party's leadership and supporters may engage in de-democratizing behavior, and its deleterious effects on democracy may be difficult to recognize. However, certain easily recognizable de-democratizing forms of party behavior, augmenting clientelistic and market forms of linkage within established democracies, have been pointed out and have been categorized, according to whether their effect is direct or indirect, as proactive and complicit. Examples of proactive linkage-changing behavior by parties include deliberately reducing the powers of the party base, overtly sponsoring or supporting legislation or judicial decisions that eliminate regulations protecting rights of political participation, and campaigning dishonestly, with no intention of implementing the promises made to the majority of supportive voters.

Parties are *complicit* in facilitating de-democratization when they aid those who proactively seek its accomplishment by seeking other goals. There are three subtypes of complicity: unconscious, venal, and ideological. *Unconscious complicity* refers to failure to recognize the likely de-democratizing effect of the proposals one supports. A legislator who votes for a new electoral law without recognizing that the implementation of one of its clauses will lead to the effective disenfranchisement of a portion of the population provides an example of unconscious complicity. *Venal complicity* is manifest in the behavior of party representatives who accept roles and rewards for themselves and in exchange engage in no actions contrary to the wishes of those who grant such perquisites. It is also seen in the behavior of those who vote strictly according to the wishes of their largest donors (a form more difficult to identify, as such votes may in fact be in accordance with the legislator's own opinions). *Ideological complicity* takes place when a party rejects fundamental precepts of representation and accountability on principle. Extremist and racist parties preaching the exclusion of minority populations can be, without ever winning office, ideologically complicit in facilitating the shift to nondemocratic forms of linkage.

In dictatorial regimes, parties reduce the possibility of establishing democratic forms of linkage when they engage in venal complicity, accepting personal rewards for not pursuing the interests of



their supporters; offer clientelistic rewards in exchange for votes; or assist the regime in tactics of oppression (coercive linkage). They may also contribute to the entrenchment of nondemocratic forms of linkage with *retreative* behavior, as when parties that support democracy disband when defeated, heavily oppressed, or outlawed, behavior that may appear thoroughly reasonable and justified but nonetheless weakens the struggle to initiate democratic governance or maintain any progress made in that direction. All these forms of behavior have been clearly identified in many states in the contemporary Arab world but have also been noted throughout the world at various points in time.

These recent efforts to combine the study of de-democratization with the study of party linkage offer new perspectives on the nature of linkage today, a rich field of study for students of party as well as students of democracy.

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*See also* Clientelism; Democratization; Parties; Party Finance; Representation; Responsiveness; Revolution

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## PARTY MANIFESTO

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A party manifesto or platform is the authoritative statement of party policy at the time of a general election. Many other pamphlets and policy

documents may be issued by leaders, candidates, or different party organs around this time. However, the manifesto is unique in that it is the *authoritative* statement of the party position for that election, usually endorsed by a representative conference of party members, according to recognized procedures. This has implications for its content and presentation: Otherwise, they might not have been approved as authoritative. Manifestos are not, therefore, just an arbitrarily selected policy document out of many available at that time. They are the documents that have been crafted for, and received, official approval. In the following, the significance of such documents is assessed for elections and the formation of coalitions, of party policies, and of democratic theory as a whole. In a few cases, this authoritative election statement of policy is made verbally by an authorized spokesman—party chair or leader—sometimes as a radio or TV speech (in Australia) or an interview for a leading newspaper (in Japan). In Scandinavia, the document may not be published as a whole; instead, different sections may be distributed to different groups. However, all these processes of transmission are carried out by designated spokespersons or party bodies. Fundamental programs—statements of party principle—are also approved from time to time by some parties but should not be confused with the action program or campaign platform endorsed for an election.

Usually issued as a booklet or pamphlet, the manifesto is normally presented at the beginning of the election campaign at a press conference designed to publicize its leading concerns. Not many electors read it; its influence is felt mainly through press and TV discussions where party representatives will be confronted with its statements. The manifesto thus functions as an equilibrium point around which party policy oscillates and to which it returns during the campaign.

Parties are the only organizations that issue such comprehensive medium-term programs for the whole of society. Until the middle of the post-war period, conventional wisdom was that manifestos did not count for much, as electors did not read them and parties, once elected, forgot about them and certainly did not wish to be bound by them. Were this critique true, it would constitute a devastating critique of representative democracy,

defined as a political system that makes a necessary connection between popular preferences and public policy. This is because party policies as outlined in their manifestos are what voters are asked to choose between. If manifestos do not get their message through, then the expression of popular preferences in the vote will be wayward and ill informed. Similarly, if parties ignore them once they are in office, popular preferences will not shape public policy.

A more positive evaluation of manifestos has emerged over the past 30 years. The mass media need them to structure their election discussions so that their main features and concerns get through to electors. Parties too need a basis for policy coordination and innovation once they get into government, which they are generally too busy to generate once they are there. They have, therefore, to fall back on the manifesto as a readily available and authoritative basis for action.

This is true even where coalition governments are formed. Either each party has *carte blanche* to do as it wishes inside the ministries and policy sectors assigned to it (in which case its manifesto serves as a basis for action there) or an overall coalition agreement is developed from the constituent party manifestos. Either way, the latter feed into government policy.

These reevaluations of the role of the manifesto have come about partly through the work of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and its successor project, the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), based at the Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin. The MRG, a grouping of about 20 mainly European political scientists, counted the (quasi) sentences of the manifestos of all significant parties in 25 countries in 56 categories covering the full range of party policy. Quasi sentences are defined as arguments or phrases that are the verbal expression of one idea or meaning. Where they do not coincide with a natural sentence, they are often marked off by bullet points, commas, or semicolons. Raw counts of these for each election manifesto are expressed as percentages to allow comparison of documents of varying lengths. These percentages can then be used to compare the policy concerns of different parties, to distinguish them ideologically, or to trace the evolution of their thinking over time.

Statistical analyses of these manifesto-derived data have also been useful for giving credibility

and substance to the idea of a basic left–right division underlying democratic politics. This has emerged from several different types of analysis applied to the data. The MRG-CMP Left-Right scale contrasts policy concerns of the Left (intervention, welfare, and peace) with those of the Right (freedom, traditional values, and military strength). By subtracting the summed references to Left topics from those to Right topics, party positions and movements can be mapped across 54 countries for the postwar period (Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, & Ian Budge, 2007).

Quantifying manifesto texts in this way has also been essential in establishing relationships between party election programs and subsequent government action. Emphases in the manifestos can be linked to government expenditure to see if they get carried through. The answer is clearly that they do, thus upholding the validity of election results as a guide for government action.

For a more limited range of countries, other studies have examined the extent to which specific pledges made in the manifesto are actually fulfilled by governments. Again it appears that a substantial number support the idea of a party mandate from the electorate based on the manifesto.

Manifestos and the data describing them are very important for the development of systematic political science because they are the main source of information on the preferences of the main political actors across countries and over time. The ability to measure such preferences in a fully comparable way enables political scientists to check the major theories and models of representation and party competition systematically in a way that was never conceived of before. Rational choice theories in particular, which depends crucially on assumptions about, and measurement of, preferences, can now be put directly to the test. Derived measures from the manifestos can be used to estimate government intentions and the preference of the median voter (Hee-Min Kim & Richard Fording, chap. 8, in Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, & Eric Tanenbaum, 2001). It is particularly useful to have the latter where direct survey evidence is lacking. Since manifestos state the party's position in its own words and from its own point of view, they provide more direct evidence on its position than

experts' judgments or electors' perceptions of party positions do.

So far, the only quantified data from manifestos have been the MRG-CMP time series, based on manual coding of the documents. Because of their research importance, increasing efforts have been made to develop computerized analyses of the texts. Indeed, manifestos have become the focus and growth point for computerized analyses of political texts, not the least because the efforts of the MRG-CMP in collecting, storing, and scanning them make them easily accessible for all users. Clearly, therefore, manifestos offer a major source for political analyses of the central democratic processes, particularly for representational processes. Political parties are so crucial to these (both in organizing election choices for voters and in effecting the majority-supported preference in government) that the authoritative policy document they issue must be of central interest in studying both elections and governments. The combination of its major importance to the democratic political process and the fact that it can be relatively easily quantified using modern techniques gives it a key role in the future development of systematic political science. Central concepts and relationships that can be measured using the policy positions conveyed by manifestos in combination with other data (bracketed) include

- the median voter (party votes),
- congruence between popular preferences and government intentions (cabinet posts),
- long-term bias in government intentions compared with popular preferences, and
- the relationship between settled popular preferences and enacted government policy.

As indicated, representational processes are strongly shaped by the way parties behave in policy terms. Here again, manifestos, particularly in their quantified form, are important in systematically tracing policy movement over time and in relation to other parties. Particularly important in this regard have been the maps of left–right movement produced by the MRG-CMP published in recent years. Generally, these show little sign of party policy convergence on the center or on the median elector as predicted by some influential models of party behavior. Rather, they show

parties as sticking fairly consistently to their own ideological space and thus maintaining the policy differentiation that is important in offering voters the kind of choice between alternative programs envisaged in the theory of the party mandate (Michael McDonald & Ian Budge, 2005). Some strategic or other forms of variation also occur in their positions over time. This has the effect of varying the policy options offered from election to election, another important element in democratic choice. It is paradoxical that political science, as opposed to normative political theory, has for so long neglected the systematic study of texts. Both the main inputs and the major outputs of political science are textual—reports, loans, budgets, circulars, and declarations. Central on the input side is the election program or manifesto. Perhaps the manifesto research described above will spill over into the analysis of other political texts in the not too distant future.

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*See also* Coalitions; Democracy, Theories of; Electoral Behavior; Parties

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## PARTY ORGANIZATION

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To study party organizations it is essential to draw all necessary analytical suggestions from organization theory and to adapt them to the special case of parties. Of course, this is not the only way of studying political parties. Many different points of view can be adopted. But this particular way provides the opportunity to explore the different ways in which the internal rules of the game, that is, the system of organizational incentives and opportunities, influence the actions of party members at the top levels, at the grassroots levels, and at the intermediate hierarchical levels.

An innovative definition of party organization is not needed. Political parties are *formal organizations*. Therefore, we can begin with a standard definition of formal organization as

a group of people formally constituted and endowed with an official mission, a hierarchy (more or less elaborated), as well as a structure of internal coordination, boundaries (more or less open), and some kind of task specialization (more or less developed).

A political party is a formal organization specialized in the presentation of candidates in local and/or national elections. In this perspective, the first and most important difference, according to Giovanni Sartori, is among parties operating in a competitive, namely, democratic environment and parties operating in a noncompetitive environment—that is, some modern authoritarian single-party system.

This entry investigates some aspects of the complex question of party organizations. It begins with some general suggestions about the historical evolution of political parties: their formation, their institutionalization, and path dependency effects. Next, it considers parties' organizational structures (different kinds of hierarchies, different kinds of power structure) and the linkages between a party's official goals and its organizational structure, the relations between parties' organizations and their external environment, and the causal mechanisms at work when political parties experiment with organizational changes. Finally, this entry briefly examines some typologies of

parties, summarizing the most relevant features of recent developments in party organization.

### Historical Evolution

In a historical-institutionalist perspective, understanding party organization requires an analytical reconstruction of each political party's origin and specific institutionalization. The features of parties' organizations depend on past history: how the organizations originated and how they consolidated. Path dependency rules explain why every organization, and political parties too, bears the mark of its origin and consolidation (institutionalization) even several decades later. Reconstructing the genetic model (Angelo Panebianco, 1988) of political parties means considering three elements:

1. *The organizational development:* The birth of a party can be due to territorial penetration or territorial diffusion, or their combination. Penetration means that a "center" organizes, controls, and directs the development of a territorial "periphery." Diffusion means that party organization is the product of the aggregation/federation of previous local groups and elites. In the first case, the party will probably become a strong, centralized organization controlled by a unified central oligarchy. In the second case, the party will be a decentralized organization with many diversified and competing groups: a stratarchy, as described by Samuel Eldersveld in 1964, in which every subgroup fights for power, making precarious and instable compromises with other subgroups.

2. *The presence or absence of an external sponsor of an institution (a church, trade unions, the Comintern) as actual founder of the party:* If an external sponsor exists, the party is its "political weapon." The external sponsor is the main center of loyalties and identifications for party followers and members as well as the source of legitimation for party leaders. Therefore, externally legitimated parties (confessional parties, labor parties, communist parties) and internally legitimated parties can be distinguished. This circumstance will influence all aspects of the future organizational developments.

3. *The presence or absence of a charismatic leader as founder of parties:* Charismatic parties have very special features. The leader holds the full

control of the party's dominant coalition. He or she is the de facto owner of the party.

The characteristics of the genetic model influence the manner of institutionalization, the process of structural consolidation of parties. Institutionalization is the process by which an organization incorporates its founder's values and aims, by which it becomes an institution—develops boundaries, an internal career system, a consolidated hierarchy, and a professionalized leadership. Two ideal types can be distinguished: strong institutionalization and weak institutionalization. Strong institutionalization means high autonomy from the environment and high interdependencies and coherence among its internal components. Weak institutionalization means low external autonomy and a low degree of internal interdependence. In the first case, the party will be a centralized, bureaucratic, organization led by a strong central oligarchy. It will hold the control of many external organizations (unions, interest groups, etc.), and it will adopt an aggressive, expansionist, policy toward the external environment.

In the second case, the party will be a decentralized organization, controlled by external groups (external organizations) and/or local notables, with a poorly developed internal administration system. It usually will be unable to develop aggressive policies toward the external environment.

Genetic model and institutionalization are related. A strong institution is mainly associated with territorial penetration and the absence of an external sponsor (with the notable exception of the communist parties in the 20th century). Weak institutionalization is mainly related to territorial diffusion and the existence of external sponsors. Finally, the presence of charismatic leaders as party founders is rarely associated with institutionalization (the *routinization of charisma*, in Max Weber's terms). Only a few charismatic parties become institutions (e.g., the Gaullist party in the French Fifth Republic). The majority of them disappear with the end of the human and political journey of the leader.

### Physiognomy of Party Organizations

The official mission comprises the ideological goals, the organizational constitution, and the power

structure, which are the three (related) aspects that define the physiognomy of party organizations.

The official mission of the party, its manifest ideological goals, influences both its organizational structure and its culture (and its relations with the environment too). Many formal and informal rules depend on the features of the official mission. But the official mission is also too vague an indicator of the characteristics of party organizations. Moreover, the original official mission is usually transformed during the process of institutionalization and after. Robert Michels's (1911) idea of "substitution of goals" may be exaggerated, given that a complete process of substitution of goals in a party is a rare occurrence. But usually, in the course of time, an "adaptation of goals" takes place: The goals are adjusted to the environmental circumstances, and as a consequence, they become vaguer.

Party members need to believe in those goals, and the capability of mobilization of followers by party leaders depends on their capacity to demonstrate themselves as zealous defenders of the ideological goals (as well as their capacity to distribute or promise material incentives and resources). But the role of the official mission will vary. For example, when parties are in power, there is less need of mobilizing members and followers and the official mission becomes less important. On the contrary, when parties are in the opposition, there is a greater urgency to mobilize people. In this case, the official mission, the ideological goals, will be emphatically affirmed.

The second aspect is the organizational constitution. The constitution defines the rules of the game: the distribution of formal authority in the party, the ways of coordination among the official party roles, the type of task specialization, and the organizational boundaries (who is a member and who is not). Sometimes, students of party organizations reduce the organizational analysis of parties to the description of their formal constitutions. But the constitution is only a fragment of a complex organizational whole.

The third aspect regards the power structure. In every party, there is a dominant coalition, a group of leaders who control the organization. The physiognomy of the dominant coalition is an essential defining feature of party organizations. In the case of the internally legitimated party, the dominant coalition comprises only party members.

In the case of externally legitimated parties, it includes the leaders of the external sponsor organizations: For example, the top officials of the British trade unions were, for a long time, members of the Labour Party's dominant coalition.

Moreover, the dominant coalition leaders can hold positions of authority in the party (the general secretary, the members of the party national central committee, etc.), or they can be parliamentarians. Finally, the dominant coalition, in some cases, can include not only national leaders but also regional or local leaders (e.g., the secretaries of some important local federations).

Dominant coalitions can also be classified on the basis of their levels of cohesion/division and stability/instability. Both aspects are related to the power competition within the dominant coalition. If the subgroups of the dominant coalition are not organized, if they are only tendencies, as Richard Rose put it, the level of cohesion of the dominant coalition will be high. If the subgroups are strongly organized (factions), the level of cohesion will be low, and the dominant coalition will be divided.

The level of stability/instability refers to the capacity of members and subgroups of the dominant coalition to stipulate durable compromises among them. Therefore, cohesive-stable dominant coalitions (e.g., the communist parties), divided-stable dominant coalitions (the French socialist party of the time of Jean Jaurés and Léon Blum, the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] under Konrad Adenauer), and divided-instable dominant coalitions (the Italian Christian Democracy, 1953–1993) can be distinguished.

Furthermore, dominant coalitions can be *oligarchies* (cohesive and stable, without a single prominent leader), *monocracies* (a single leader, usually of the charismatic type, controlling the dominant coalition and, by consequence, the party), or *poliarchies* (divided and instable, usually a collection of factions).

### Parties and Their External Environment

Like all other formal organizations, political parties interact; that is, they exchange vital resources with their external environment. The portions of the environment that are relevant for the party are its “task environment” or domain. First of all, there is a special portion of a party's environment that

the party identifies as its “hunting ground,” its privileged *classe gardée*, or reserved territory; it is that portion comprising the electors of the party and from which the party draws the majority of its members. The party's official mission identifies the domain. Middle-class parties, manual workers' parties, ethno-regional parties, and confessional parties are all denominations that make reference to those portions of the social territory that the official mission identifies as the privileged *classe gardée* of the organization. Changes and transformations of the social territory usually cause changes and transformations in the party. Alternatively, the leaders can deliberately manipulate and change the original official mission of the party to enlarge or change its domain.

The traditional sociology of political parties is usually concentrated on these aspects of the relations between parties and the environment. But the identification of the *classe gardée* does not entirely cover the topic. We should examine the question of the relations among parties and environments from a different perspective. In the case of parties operating in democratic, competitive regimes, it can be useful to divide the party environment into three main (interconnected) arenas: the electoral, the parliamentary, and the interorganizational (the set of relations between the party and interest groups, unions, etc.).

Different levels of complexity and different levels of stability/turbulence can be identified in each arena. On complexity, organization theory assumes that there are isomorphic pressures: The more complex the environment, the more complex the organization becomes. An increase in the complexity of the environment forces the organization to increase its internal specialization. In a complex arena (electoral, parliamentary, or interorganizational), the party is obliged to specialize its internal offices in order to face the different external pressures and threats.

As regards stability/turbulence, organization theory predicts (*ceteris paribus*) more decentralization in a stable environment and more centralization in a turbulent environment. In a stable, predictable environment, there are few external dangers: Parties adapt to the environment, the different subsections of the party have stable exchanges with different portions of the environment, and concentration of power is not a necessity. In a turbulent

environment, unpredictability is very high, and there are many external dangers: The organization must concentrate power at the top of the hierarchy to survive.

During the period from 1920 to 1960, the electoral arenas of Western Europe were highly stable. In consequence, party organizations too were stable or changed very slowly. By the late 1960s, the picture had changed: The European electoral arenas became more volatile and turbulent, and party organizations underwent important changes. Above all, concentration of power at the top level of the hierarchy became a necessity for all parties. For instance, the so-called personalization of party politics, the new relations between party leaders and the public, was not only brought about by the new role of the mass media but was also an aspect of power concentration processes in turbulent electoral environments. The theory predicts decadence (in the case of parties, severe, permanent, electoral losses) if the organization fails to adapt itself to the new environmental conditions.

### Organizational Changes

Every organization can experience two different kinds of changes: (1) continuous, small, and incremental changes that do not modify the essential features of the organization (official mission, organizational constitution, power structure) and (2) rare and extraordinarily big transformations that happen suddenly, deeply modifying those features. The punctuated equilibrium model is a stylized representation of the process.

Major transformations of political parties are rare but do happen. The process can be broken down into three phases. The first phase is the rise of an organizational crisis. The crisis is usually the effect of environmental pressures. In the case of parties, a severe electoral defeat is the most frequent external challenge that can give rise to the organizational crisis. The second phase is a change in the composition of the dominant coalition: Old leaders are discredited and removed, and new leaders enter the coalition. There is a more or less brisk "circulation of elites." The third phase sees a simultaneous change in the organizational constitution and the official mission. The (partially) changed dominant coalition must consolidate itself. Usually, it will introduce change in the

physiognomy of the organizational structure and (partially) modify the official mission. A succession of ends (partial substitution of the old goals with new ones) is a consequence of the change in the composition of the dominant coalition. The final effect of the process will be a more or less deep transformation of the relations between the party and its task environments.

Two (related) regularities can be identified: (1) the stronger the environmental pressure, that is, the more dangerous the external threat, the more severe is the organizational crisis, and (2) the more severe the organizational crisis the deeper is the change in the composition of the dominant coalition and the transformations of both the organizational structure and the official mission as well. This ideal-typical, highly stylized representation of parties' changes may be assumed as a quite useful analytical tool for empirically observing the transformations that parties sometimes experiment with.

### Typologies

In his classic *Political Parties* (1951), Maurice Duverger proposed a famous classification of party organizations. In the Western historical experience, he identified four fundamental types: (1) the cadre party, (2) the mass party, (3) the cell party, and (4) the militia party. The first two types were the most important and diffuse. But Duverger's analysis was not original. It followed the classical works of Moisey Ostrogorski, Robert Michels, Max Weber, and James Bryce.

The cadre party is the traditional bourgeois party: a loose electoral organization, without party discipline, financed by notables and controlled by the parliamentary elite. The mass party is a very strong organization. It is a membership party. Its organizational "inventions" are the territorial section, the membership card, the party bureaucracy, and the periodical congresses in which the leaders are officially selected and the political strategy is approved. An "inner circle" (the general secretary, the party headquarters) controls the mass party. Usually, the parliamentarians are dependent on the inner circle. The mass party is the organization that is able to proselytize among the popular classes of the society: manual workers, peasants, and artisans.

Duverger's prophecy is well-known: The mass party would become the dominant type of party in

the mature Western democracies. Like Michels 40 years earlier, Duverger was influenced by the history of the European socialist parties. Sixteen years later, Otto Kirchheimer (1966) reversed the perspective. A new form of party was emerging: the catchall party. The catchall party was different from the mass party of the past. Its communicative style was pragmatic, not ideological, and its linkages with the traditional *classe gardée* (the manual workers, the religious voters) were declining. The transformation of the mass party into a catchall party was an effect of the social and political transformations of European societies: the economic development, the rise of mass education levels, the new role of the mass media, and so on.

Party organizations were changed too. New types of professional figures slowly took over the old mass party bureaucracy: mass media experts and marketing and fund-raising specialists, among others. The traditional role of the membership, so important in the old mass party, was declining. From an organizational viewpoint, the passage from the mass party to the catchall party has been synthesized as the transformation of the bureaucratic party into the professional electoral party (Panebianco, 1988).

After Duverger and Kirchheimer, there have been many attempts to identify the recent transformations of Western parties. The cartel party model (Richard Katz & Peter Mair, 1995) is one of these. In this perspective, the most important change is with regard to the "statization" of parties, their new symbiotic relationship with state agencies and its impact on the traditional party organization. Some empirical analyses confirm that cartelization is one of the possible transformations of Western political parties (Klaus Detterbeck, 2005).

In another interpretation, the Western political parties are becoming franchise systems: A central organization provides ideological arguments and material services to a lot of autonomous subparty organizations. The franchise model implies the end of the traditional internal party hierarchy. Stratarchies are everywhere replacing the traditional oligarchies (R. Kenneth Carty, 2004).

All these attempts to analyze contemporary trends and transformations are useful, but prudence is needed. It is inaccurate to imagine (like Duverger or Kirchheimer) that some type of party organization is becoming the dominant type and

that all the existing parties will imitate that type. On the contrary, a plurality of very different party organizations always coexists in democracies. As we have seen, parties are influenced by their original missions, by the personality and roles of their founding leaders, and by the crucial organizational decisions that accompanied their birth and institutionalization. After the institutionalization, path dependency processes reduce both the leaders' menu of choices and the probability of radical changes in the organization. Moreover, political parties are born in different historical moments, and all organizations are strongly influenced by the cultural models prevailing in those moments.

A second reason for prudence has to do with new political parties' organizations in the new democracies. The picture is very differentiated, and a lot of empirical and comparative work is needed to understand the features and the evolutions of these new political organizations.

In the case of Europe, there is a third prudential consideration. The European integration process exerts pressures on national party organizations, but the effect is still largely unknown.

The organizational analysis of political parties is a "structural" kind of analysis. The assumption is that the organizational structure influences the behavior of actors (leaders, members, and followers). This assumption is common to the traditional organization theory and to the most recent neo-institutional theory. In any case, despite its correctness, this perspective tells only a part of the story. One must also take into consideration the freedom of action of the organizational actors.

An organization is a system of roles equipped with incentive and punishment mechanisms that influence actors' behavior. It is also an arena in which actors compete for power, and the rules of competition depend on the arena characteristics. But "to influence" is not "to determine": In real life, different actors can react differently to the same incentives. The organizational analysis is a useful starting point, but "structures" (including organizational structures) do not substitute for social actions. A theory of action is the indispensable complement of any analysis of a party's organization.

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*See also* One-Party Dominance; Organization Theory; Parties; Party Finance; Party Identification; Party Linkage; Party Manifesto; Party System Fragmentation; Party Systems; Path Dependence

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## PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION

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A party system is fragmented if it contains more than two parties, none of which comes close to obtaining an absolute majority in the representative assembly. Party system fragmentation thus has two aspects: the number of parties in the system and their relative size. A pure two-party system fails to meet both of these defining criteria. A system with many parties of which one is large enough to approach an absolute majority on its own also cannot be considered fragmented. In empirical terms, fragmentation in practice refers to

those parties that gain representation. Parties without official representation are often difficult to observe and document. Moreover, most theories of the causes and consequences of party system fragmentation deal with parties with seats in a representative body. If the representative assembly of a country contains many fairly small parties and no party approaching majority status, the party system of that country can be considered fragmented. Several measures are available to determine varying degrees of fragmentation; they are strongly intercorrelated and can therefore be used interchangeably. The Laakso-Taagepera Index of the Effective Number of Parties is the most widely used measure. It is calculated as follows:

$$N = 1/\sum p_i^2,$$

where  $N$  stands for the effective number of parties and  $p_i$  denotes the fraction of the seats held by each party  $i$  in the assembly. All parties are accorded some weight, but the index weights the largest parties most. Theoretically, if there are 2 parties of exactly the same size, the effective number of parties is 2.0. Three parties of equal size render the index value 3.0, 10 such parties 10.0, and so on. The party systems of the United States, Sweden, and Finland can be used as empirical illustrations. The mean value of the Laakso-Taagepera Index for the U.S. House of Representatives since 1960 is 1.9. For Sweden, with a multiparty system where the Social Democrats have held around or more than 40% of the *Riksdag* seats, the corresponding figure is 3.6. In Finland, no party normally wins more than a quarter of the parliamentary seats; the mean effective number of parties is 5.2. The three cases represent a two-party system, a moderately fragmented multiparty system, and a highly fragmented system, respectively.

The numerical aspects of party systems have always been an important factor in the comparative literature on political parties. Claims that systems with many parties were less governable than two-party systems were presented already in the 19th century. As the interwar years saw the demise of democracy in a large number of European states, the criticism against multiparty government gained in prominence. Nevertheless, it is only with the emergence of comprehensive comparative

databases during recent decades that robust empirical generalizations have become possible.

The dynamics of electoral systems go a long way toward explaining why some countries have fragmented party systems while others do not. Single-member plurality (SMP) systems effectively reduce the number of parties that gain representation, while proportional (PR) list systems are conducive to fragmentation, especially when electoral districts are large. Among democratic countries with SMP systems, the mean effective number of parties since 1960 is 2.1, while the corresponding figure for democracies with PR list systems is 3.9. Countries with other electoral formulas, including mixed-member systems, usually attain values between these extremes. It is very difficult for parties other than the two largest ones to win seats in SMP systems, while proportional systems frequently allow even quite small parties to gain representation. Voters' awareness of this mechanism reinforces its effect. If voters deem it highly unlikely that a vote for a minor party will result in the party's winning a seat—as is the case in SMP systems—their propensity to vote for it becomes smaller. By the same token, a higher probability of a small party's winning representation in PR systems will mean that voters are more likely to stay with their preferred party even if it is a minor one.

The number of politically relevant social cleavages is another important determinant of party system fragmentation. In most democracies, political parties can readily be placed on a left–right scale; this scale frequently coincides with the major socioeconomic divisions in the population. These divisions may give rise to, for example, conservative, left-wing, and centrist parties. If, however, other cleavages such as religion, language, or region cut across the left–right dimension, the result may be a considerably higher degree of party system fragmentation. The effect of multiple cleavages is particularly pronounced if the electoral system permits numerous parties to gain representation. A good example of this is Belgium, where the division between French and Flemish speakers cuts right across the left–right divide and where the PR list system presents few obstacles to minor parties' gaining parliamentary seats. The mean effective number of parties in Belgium since 1960 is as high as 6.3.

The size of countries and other political units, whether measured by population or by geographic

area, has an independent effect on party system fragmentation even after the effects of electoral systems, socioeconomic diversification, and cultural heterogeneity have been controlled for. This rule seems to apply at both the cross-national and the subnational levels. Large size is related to greater social distances, functional specialization, as well as organizational diversity and complexity. All these factors are conducive to greater attitudinal diversity, which in turn may enhance party system fragmentation.

Several other factors have been proposed as explanations of the variation in party system fragmentation. It has been suggested that bicameralism fosters party system fragmentation. The timing of elections at various governmental levels may also have an effect. If parliamentary, presidential, regional, and local elections are held at different points in time, the variety of issues and interests at stake in these elections may foster partly separate sets of political parties. Moreover, it has been proposed that strong presidential executives may reduce the incentive to maintain large, unified parties. On all these points, the empirical evidence cannot be considered conclusive yet.

The effects of party system fragmentation are particularly related to government formation and stability. While the winning party in a two-party system can form the postelection government based on a majority of its own, this alternative is not available in fragmented party systems. Instead, the choice must be made between a coalition of several parties or a minority cabinet. The incidence of both minority governments and coalition cabinets is positively associated with the degree of party system fragmentation; the latter association is particularly strong. Thus, although ideological and political factors naturally influence the way parties cooperate and interact with each other, the numerical criterion is an important general determinant of government type.

The internal functioning and prospects of a government are strongly affected by its type and status and are thus linked to party system fragmentation. One-party majorities are, *ceteris paribus*, the strongest government type. They have the necessary strength to get their agreed-on policies enacted and implemented; at the same time, they are not as frequently plagued by major internal differences like other types of governments. As fragmented

systems present the choice between minority status or coalition government (or both), the combination of strength and political unity is much rarer in these systems. While internally unified, one-party minorities are at all times at the mercy of the political majority outside the government. Coalition cabinets may find it difficult to reconcile the differences between the government parties, which frequently results in government crises. Consequently, cabinets in countries with fragmented party systems tend on the whole to be more short-lived than cabinets in countries where one-party majorities are the rule.

From the point of view of the citizen, party system fragmentation creates a problem when it comes to holding parties and politicians accountable for their accomplishments and failures. When governments are coalitions of several parties, it is not easy for voters to know whom to punish or reward for government policy. All government parties tend to claim credit for popular policies, while failures or unpopular decisions are claimed to be the fault of their partners in government. In fact, alternative coalitions are not always available in fragmented systems. If attaining majority status requires the participation of several parties, the chances are that at least some of the parties from the preceding coalition will be present in the next one as well. On the other hand, fragmented party systems present the voters with a wide range of partisan choices in elections. In these systems, voters can support the parties that they genuinely prefer without risking a large number of wasted votes—that is, votes for parties that do not gain any seats at all. In terms of democratic qualities, fragmented systems tend to perform poorly on accountability but well on representativeness.

Due to their tendency toward cabinet crises and short-lived governments, fragmented systems are often claimed to be vulnerable to pressures from nondemocratic political forces. Besides the feebleness of governments as such, the fact that anti-system parties easily gain representation in fragmented systems is sometimes mentioned as a risk from the point of view of democratic viability. In connection with the economic and political crisis between the World Wars, party system fragmentation was among those factors that made it more difficult to sustain democracy in the face of pressure from extreme political movements. To be

sure, examples of long-standing democratic stability despite a high degree of party system fragmentation are not difficult to find: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. Still, countries where the democratic form of government is not yet entirely consolidated would be well advised to design their electoral institutions so as to discourage excessive party fragmentation, especially if there are numerous deeply entrenched social and cultural cleavages to be overcome.

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*See also* Cleavages, Social and Political; Coalitions; Electoral Systems; One-Party Dominance; Party Systems

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## PARTY SYSTEMS

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Approaches to the study of party systems are multiple, as are their definitions. In its simplest form, the party system is conceived of as a set of patterned relationships between political parties competing for power in a given political system. Such a notion assumes the existence of rules, norms, and regularities in party interactions, concerning mainly coalition-building efforts and electoral competition. This implies also that a party system is composed,

as any other system, of distinguishable parts and the empirically testable quality of its “systemness.” Below, some major features of such systems, for example, the kinds and numbers of parties involved, their evolution and organization over time, their social bases and dynamic processes, and their relationship to institutional aspects of electoral systems and government formation, are discussed.

An ambitious understanding of a system assumes that it displays features that do not belong to a single entity, that is, to one element alone of the system, and that the system exists only if it hinges on the patterned relationships of its component parts, hence creating systemic boundaries, clearly indicating what belongs to it and what is located outside it. A system is always composed of interacting participant units, in which the action of each and every participant affects the actions of all other participants. A systemic approach reveals how everything at the level of the system and its structural properties differs from the level of the interacting units. Systemic traits structure the interactions between parties and the games that parties play. These interactions hinge on party resources, preferences, and the constraints they face. Moreover, this implies that the interdependence of the units or their attributes is ordered, in the sense that developments are predictable and that not just anything can happen. This order tends toward self-maintenance, which supports the delineation and freezing of the boundaries of the system within which patterned relationships take place. Consequently, parties create a system only when their component parts interact in a patterned systematic way. The system works when parties within the system are dependent on each other and each party, as Giovanni Sartori’s (1976) classic work puts it, “is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts competitively or otherwise, to the other parties” (p. 44). In short, a party system is a system of interactions resulting from interparty competition.

Analyses of parties have been made prior to deliberations on party systems. Parties as political institutions began to draw the attention of the social sciences from the second half of the 19th century, whereas interest in party systems increased in the second half of the 20th century. Without an understanding of the ontology of parties, the systemic features of their interactions cannot be depicted.

Three aspects of party systems should be mentioned. First, behind almost every classification of a party system is the idea that they are structures of representation. Second, an equally frequent proposal submits that they are institutionalized channels of articulation. Finally, they are conceived as means of governability. In other words, the three most important functions are (1) to recruit and present candidates for public office who are likely to be accepted by voters; (2) to offer distinguishable policy packages, programmatic and ideological alternatives that take into account the preferences and values of citizens; and (3) to implement policies effectively and contribute to the overall stability of the system. The composite units of party systems are the most influential manifestation of popular organizations that articulate and press demands and deliver support to those who govern in contemporary democracies. These diverse functions offer challenges as often they are in conflict with one another. Achieving quality representation calls for a large number of parties satisfying the aspirations of even small social groups with clearly defined narrow issue profiles and specific aspirations. The more parties there are, the better the policy fit between groups of voters and their institutional representatives. At the same time, such a party system contributes to polarization, divisiveness, and ultimately to poor governability. If, in turn, we wish to achieve effective governability, we should opt for one-party dominance, with a consensus-driven, pragmatic party oriented toward the mobilization of resources to satisfy the needs of the majority. Such a solution, with a single-party monopoly, would satisfy the needs of political effectiveness but at the same time violate other important democratic values: plurality, choice, and open competition. Consequently, in reality, party systems ought to compromise on maximizing each of their basic functions and adopt more moderate, optimal solutions guaranteeing the accomplishment of different goals.

### Number and Size of Parties

Descriptions of party systems rely on their widely accepted, numerous attributes. One finds a rich array of proposals concerning these attributes and their relevance and importance for party systems, depicting at the same time both the essence and the

dynamics of a given party system. The most popular describe a party system with reference to the number and the size of parties considered relevant. Which parties should be considered relevant and/or successful enough for inclusion into the system is the single most important question students of party systems seek to answer. This is important because it has a direct effect on other significant systemic features, such as the relative size of parties and consequently the dominant logic and mechanisms of competition, the nature and durability of cooperation and alliances, the degree of polarization of the system, its center of ideological gravity, its stability and thus its predictability, and the way social strata and important social groups are represented in the overall political system.

Most scholars distinguish between one-party, two-party, and multiparty systems. The first type is questionable; for many it is an oxymoron, although scores of political systems of the world are still based on the existence of a single party, because other parties and representative organizations are legally forbidden. There exist, however, systems, in which one-party hegemony over a prolonged period of time is the rule, although legally opposition parties are not banned. Their permanent marginalization is determined by a combination of discriminatory practices, the harassment of citizens, and clientelistic relationships. Furthermore, several countries with clearly democratic credentials (e.g., Japan and Sweden) and a multiparty system design in reality experience a system in which one party dominates for a long period of time, even though the functioning of opposition parties is not constrained legally or in practice.

A fundamental distinction was made in the mid-20th century between two-party and multiparty systems, their causes, and consequences. The major cause was seen in the respective electoral laws: Simple plurality rules (first-past-the-post) applied in single-member districts tend to produce two-party systems, while two-round majoritarian and proportional rules favor the creation of multiparty constellations. The consequences, it was assumed, were essential as well: A two-party system was believed to create a stable political system, with moderate centripetal competition, based on clarity of responsibility and accurate attribution of accountability. Multiparty systems, by contrast, were believed to enhance extremism, centrifugal

competition, limited alternation of governing parties, unclear accountability due to complex coalition formation procedures, and vague responsibility for the policies implemented.

This simple numerical criterion used in distinguishing party systems faces many problems, the crucial one being how parties should be counted. It is, and always has been, obvious that parties cannot be treated equally, mainly because of their divergent electoral support, legislative strength, and potential for entering coalitions, and the peculiarities of their social following. Scholars dealing with this problem are aware of the difficulty in finding adequate criteria by which to include or exclude parties or, alternatively, assign them a proper "weight." In the mid-1970s, a solution seemed to be found; Giovanni Sartori offered the criterion of *relevance* of parties. To be relevant, a party had to disclose its *coalition* and/or *blackmail* potential. The first feature, the coalition potential, depends on whether a party is attractive enough, because of its size or a unique, pivotal position in the space of political competition, to effectively join governmental coalitions and share executive responsibility. The second, party blackmail potential, is less obvious as it refers to a specific factor that depends on our interpretations: A party exerts blackmail potential if it can influence the behavior of other systemic and relevant parties, despite the fact that it cannot itself participate in a coalition government. This applies to systems in which sizeable parties are excluded from mainstream politics by the other parties because of alleged antisystemic features or traits pointing to their radicalism and destabilizing potential. Good examples of such parties are the former Italian Communists or the contemporary Czech/Moravian Communist Party (Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy, KSCM). In both instances, the parties enjoyed substantial, double-digit percentages of social support but were never allowed to participate in any executive responsibility at the national level.

Irrespective of how important the relevance criterion is, Sartori's proposal still focuses on the number of parties and their respective ideological and programmatic distance as the main features of a party system. Combining these two criteria, the proposal allows us to distinguish between, what he calls, *moderate (limited) pluralism* and *polarized (extreme) pluralism*. In the first instance, a party

system consists usually of three to five parties and reveals relatively little ideological distance between them. In the second case (of polarized pluralism), the party system is usually composed of six or more parties and manifests significant ideological distance between the parties. The clear virtue of this proposal is its dynamic nature. The variables used interact with each other, allowing one to predict more or less accurately the development of a system in practice. For instance, moderate pluralism not only reveals a smaller number of relevant parties and lesser ideological distance, but it is also very likely to develop a centripetal direction of systemic competition between two clearly distinguishable blocs, whereas polarized pluralism is most likely to develop centrifugal competition with various opposition parties, leading to their irresponsible behavior, poor accountability mechanisms, and destabilizing effects.

### Policies, Programs, Ideological Divisions

Party systems are frequently depicted using spatial metaphors, indicative of policy or ideological dimensions and divisions: Among them the left-right dimension is the most popular one. It is precisely this aspect of party systems that distinguishes one from another: the substance of policy and the number of salient dimensions that need to be taken into account in understanding and interpreting the logic of party system structure, development, and change.

Many scholars define the party system not only by referring to the number of parties and their patterned relationship but also by indicating their belonging to, or leaning toward, a particular *party family*. The latter, in turn, is defined as a group of parties in different countries that have similar ideologies and party programs. Each country has a unique party system: a unique combination of parties, ideological and programmatic profiles, size of electoral support, and coalitions. Nevertheless, certain patterns across countries are discernable.

The description of party systems from this point of view uses the language of *social divisions*, *dimensions of competition*, *political divides*, and *cleavages*. The terminological universe is complex and blurred by the inconsistent way scholars use these notions. At this point, let us reiterate that indeed society is differentiated by many factors

and that these distinctions are more or less salient and durable and/or conflicting. If in addition to this salience and durability, they are politicized, one can speak of cleavages. Cleavages are a relatively stable product of social conflicts, but not all conflicts generate cleavages; the ones that do are intense and prolonged. For cleavages to exert structuring power over political developments, party formations, their stability, and patterned interactions, political camps have to be established on the basis of strong identifications and a visionary leadership that is able both to attract public attention with the appeals of their manifesto and to maintain the effective functioning of the party organization.

Only certain social divisions become politicized, where parties represent opposite sides. Parties concentrate on divisions and policy areas that show electoral volatility, that is, where voters, for different reasons, are responsive to party appeals. Other divides are, however, frozen; that is, voters are entrapped within a social relationship where there is no room for individual rationality and free choice. In such instances, cleavage mechanisms, group membership ties, and partisanship determine party support.

One of the crucial, though still unresolved, issues is the relationship between the number of parties and the number of societal divides or cleavages. In principle, the higher the number of salient divisions, the more room there is for the existence of divergent parties. This relationship, however, is far from universal; its fluidity hinges on the extent to which these divisions overlap and on the ability of parties to simplify the multidimensionality of the space of competition by reducing its number to two or three of the most salient ones. The limited cognitive abilities of citizens to process complex information create the necessity for such simplifications, and only those parties that effectively reduce the number of articulated policy alternatives enjoy an electoral advantage. Policy simplification arises also because of certain macrosocietal processes, that is, the growing middle class and/or redistributive successes of the welfare state, which allow for the simpler, one-dimensional appeal of a party manifesto.

Another essential distinction for understanding the different modes of party competition is the one between valence and positional issues. The

former concerns universally prized values or goods that most politicians and citizens agree on. The latter assumes clear differences between groups of people in policy stances and value orientations. Due to this, parties may offer divergent policies concerning some substantive issues, for example, taxes, health services, and welfare benefits. The relationship of the dominance of valence or positional modes of political competition with quality of representation and accountability as well as with clientelistic or programmatic politician–voter linkages is still vague and underscrutinized. Nevertheless, some claim that “candidate appeals play out in most instances into valence competition and only rarely as positional competition. Clientelistic accountability works mostly as valence competition among parties” (Herbert Kitschelt, 2009, p. 623).

### Party System Institutionalization

The well-known saying “No parties, no democracy” has strong empirical support. So far, no example of a working modern democracy without parties exists. Contemporary global developments, since new Third Wave democracies in large numbers increased the family of democratic polities, call for more scrutiny and clear-cut indicators of what counts as a consolidated system of political parties. One of the most widely accepted proposals was introduced in the mid-1990s by scholars comparing the development of Latin American polities. Currently, the idea is widely shared by scholars focusing on other newly democratized countries and their inchoate party systems. At the most abstract level, institutionalization is a process by which organizations and procedures acquire value, stability, and consequently predictability. There are several major features of an institutionalized party system:

1. stability in interparty competition,
2. the existence of parties that have stable roots in society,
3. broad acceptance of elections and parties as legitimate institutions deciding who governs, and
4. the existence of parties as organizations governed by stable rules and structures.

A more detailed portrait of an institutionalized party system ought to emphasize the fact that the stability of interparty competition signifies relative stability and does not amount to a stagnant, frozen relationship. The stable roots of parties in society imply that some parties enjoy overproportional support from certain social strata, the labor market, and social or ethnic groups and that this support is stable from election to election. Parties differ in the extent to which voters identify with them as well as in the quality of the linkage between citizens and parties. Apart from this, parties still have to manifest firm and enduring ideological, programmatic, or policy positions for citizens to understand what they stand for. The broad acceptance of elections and the decisions taken by parties after the election (concerning, e.g., the formation of coalitions) as the only legitimate means of taking responsibility for governing and controlled access to power concerns mainly political elites and their attitudes and preferences. Finally, the stability of rules and structures points to the importance of the autonomy of parties, both from populist leaders and from other organizations or powerful groups, even those that might have historically been instrumental in their creation (e.g., the churches, trade unions, and businesses). Parties also have to be independent financially and to operate on the basis of highly routinized norms and procedures.

In short, this approach emphasizes party interactions that reveal stability, based on a well-developed connection between politicians and their voters; it also considers electoral volatility to be a fundamental indicator of the systemic nature of the party system.

There is, however, another approach to the structuring of the party system that concentrates on its most important attribute, namely, the competition for power. It comprises the core element and the main criterion for evaluating the mode of patterns of competition, that is, its open or closed nature. Whether a party system reveals stable and predictable party competition depends on several easily observable, empirical factors. *Alternation in government* is one, and it takes three forms: (1) *wholesale alternation*, when a governmental party is totally replaced by an opposition; (2) *partial alternation*, when the newly established government includes at least one party of the outgoing

government; and (3) *nonalternation*, when there is no change at all. The second factor is *familiarity with government or innovation*. This could indicate the degree to which parties tend to be in government in the same configurations, which signifies *familiarity*; or their combinations are new every time, which indicates *innovation*. *Access to government* is the third crucial factor; it focuses on whether all relevant parties in the system, over a long time period, had access to executive offices or whether there are some parties permanently excluded from power. It indicates whether access to government is widely or narrowly distributed. Based on these criteria, we arrive at two fundamental types of party competition. The first is the *open* structure, where alternations of governments take place and no stable governmental coalitions exist, accompanied by a highly dispersed and easy access to governmental positions for all or most relevant parties. The second type is the *closed* structure, which is in place when the reverse pattern occurs—that is, either there are no alternations or durable coalitions remain in power, with some relevant parties being permanently excluded.

### Party System Change

Analyzing system change calls for terminological precision. The first problem concerns the distinction between changes *within* the system as opposed to a change *of* the system. The second problem, related to the first, pertains to the scope and level of change; in this regard, four abstract manifestations can be distinguished: (1) incidental swings, (2) limited change, (3) general change, and (4) alternation of the system. Incidental swings are usually temporary distortions in the patterned way a party system operates; this might have to do with the occurrence of a new (small) party, a change in the polarization of the system, the appearance of new salient issues, and similar factors. The particular trait of such a change is that it is minor in its effects; it does not alter the traditional logic of party competition and coalition formation. These swings are indeed incidental and short-lived, having a negligible effect on the main actors of the system.

Limited change is prolonged or even permanent; the change is nevertheless restricted either to one area or confined to the emergence of a party that replaces another one. Sometimes a party simply

disappears; nevertheless, a new one is created simultaneously, which serves as its functional equivalent. Limited change might also mean a modification in the dynamic features of the system, for instance, an increase in its net, gross, or within-block volatility. Or the system may become more polarized. Nevertheless, all these “limited” changes do not alter the previous logic and stability of the system as a whole; it still falls into the same category.

General change is more serious and relates to several aspects, that is, the fact that changes are multifaceted, deep, and prolonged and that they concern salient features of the system. Moreover, these changes indicate the destabilization of the system and problems in achieving a (new) equilibrium. Such a change can lead to a significant shift in the relative strength of parties, the shape of coalitions, their fragmentation, and their polarization. Overall, such general changes raise the question of whether the system can still be categorized as before. Finally, the alternation of the system signifies a dramatic change in most of its aspects: the party composition; its strength, alliances, and leadership; and all other mechanisms by which it was governed before the alternation occurred. Transformations of this sort may also concern the nature of parties themselves (mass to catchall or catchall to cartel). Total alternations happen rarely and are usually related to extraordinary conditions or events (wars, revolutions, a new constitution, new electoral laws, a severe economic crisis, the forming of an international alliance, and fundamental changes in social structure or similar occurrences).

Consequently, party system change may take a variety of forms, from marginal change to the alternation of essential features, necessitating its reclassification. In other words, change of the original nucleus of the party system can be seen as party system change, while marginal changes (usually) are not. Empirically, such a change signifies alternation of the direction of competition, major changes in structured alliances and cooperation, or the occurrence of a new governing formula.

Party systems also change their format due to long-term social and economic developments. The processes of dealignment or realignment of party affiliations result from structural demographic changes, accompanied by culture shifts. Previously excluded voters, new generations, and newly created sectors of the labor force come, at some point,



to decide on public policies and general values as well as lifestyle preferences. These processes affect parties; their programs, policy stances, and profiles; the nature of their leadership; and ultimately the nature and format of the entire party system.

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*See also* Cleavages, Social and Political; Electoral Systems; Parties; Party Organization; Party System Fragmentation

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## PATH DEPENDENCE

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Path dependence, a highly popular concept in social science, simply refers to a dynamic pattern or continuity that evolves as a result of its own past. As a historically sensitive approach, path dependence emphasizes the role of the *timing* and *sequence* of events in the social and political world. Small, accidental, or random occurrences happening at a certain time are expected to have long-lasting, self-reproducing patterns or paths. In other words, *when* things happen in a chain of

events affects *how* they take place. Below, the importance and also some of the limitations of this concept are discussed.

Although path dependence simply asserts that particular choices and events that occur in the past mold the unfolding sequence of events (i.e., history matters), any continuity or sequence of events may not constitute a path-dependent process. Path emergence, maintenance, and breaking in a path-dependent process should have specific features. Regarding path emergence, contingent, accidental, brief occurrences or nonoccurrences launch event chains. In other words, initial conditions are treated as stochastic. Otherwise, path dependence would be nonfalsifiable because one can easily link any event to an antecedent or a temporarily distant cause. As a result, any outcome might be marked as path dependent. To avoid such a problem of endless flow of causally connected events (i.e., the trap of infinite regress), the historical event that launches the path is expected to have properties of contingency.

Once historical contingencies or junctures set into motion certain patterns or sequences, they lock themselves in, leading to inertia. In other words, paths become inflexible or rigid over time, making it difficult to shift to another path or return to the initial conditions. The processes or mechanisms that reproduce a path might be rather different from the processes producing the path. Although stochastic factors start a path, certain causal mechanisms reproduce it. A highly emphasized mechanism of path reproduction is increasing returns, defined as *self-reinforcing positive feedback processes*. The idea of increasing returns suggests that the growing benefits that a certain path cultivates with its continued adoption create further incentives for path maintenance, leading to dormancy over time. Learning and coordination effects, adaptive expectations, and large setup or fixed costs constitute some sources of positive feedback processes. Thus, a path may reproduce itself even in the absence of the dynamics and factors responsible for its creation.

With respect to change, path dependence expects it to be incremental and evolutionary (i.e., path following or change within a path). Substantial, pathbreaking changes (i.e., change to a new path) rarely happen after long periods of continuity. Such major changes require critical junctures or periods (also known as branching

points) in which some externally driven contingent events, such as wars, economic crises, dramatic technological developments, natural disasters, or epidemics, make the extant path less attractive to follow. Thus, critical junctures unlock the existing path or equilibrium and generate a new one, leading to a new stasis (also referred to as punctuated equilibrium).

Pólya urn process, a simplified mathematical illustration, delineates the logic of path dependence quite well. Imagine an urn containing two colored balls, one yellow and one red. Let us draw one ball and then return it to the urn with an additional ball of the same color. If we repeat this process until we fill the urn completely, which balls will be the most frequent ones in the urn? Obviously, to a great extent this depends on the outcome of the initial draws (i.e., initial conditions). If we draw the red ball in the first round, then the likelihood of drawing a red ball increases in the following draw. Over time, the distribution would settle down to a majority of red balls. In other words, the ratio will eventually reach an equilibrium (i.e., the red one). This process indicates that sequence matters. In the beginning, we cannot say with certainty which color will lock itself in. We, however, know that the results of early draws in the sequence will have a substantial impact on which of the balls will be the dominant one at the end. Thus, early developments or events not only involve a substantial degree of randomness but also produce a large, determinative impact on subsequent developments. In other words, the impact of random occurrences early in a sequence of events does not cancel out. Instead, they exert a long-lasting influence on the evolution of the sequence of events (also known as *nonergodicity*).

It is important to indicate at this point that actors may not always follow the most efficient or beneficial path. In other words, despite conventional economic models in which rational actors are assumed to make efficient decisions and maximize profits, suboptimal outcomes or paths might also lock themselves in. A classical example of path inefficiency is the story of the QWERTY keyboard layout. Although it is widely acknowledged that this keyboard is less efficient than the one developed by August Dvorak, it was able to lock itself in. Why? It is put forward that the dominance of QWERTY was simply due to a historical

accident. This keyboard layout was introduced in the late 19th century, while Dvorak's simplified keyboard was initiated in the 1930s. Due to technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and the quasi irreversibility of investment, it became difficult to switch from the previously introduced keyboard to the new one, regardless of its relative efficiency. This case, too, indicates that the timing and sequence of events matter.

The idea of path dependence is a popular yet highly questioned notion on many accounts. Several studies, for instance, draw attention to its weaknesses in dealing with change. It is observed that path dependence has a bias toward stability. Other than that, it relies on an exogenous *deus ex machina* to explain substantial, pathbreaking change. In other words, change is explained by exogenously induced variation. This understanding is based on the assumption that institutions have self-reinforcing features, and changes in such structures should be driven by exogenous factors and dynamics. Critiques contend that such an understanding remains limited in accounting for the timing, direction, and mechanisms of the change process. For instance, it is asserted that the source of change may also be endogenous to institutions or sometimes both endogenous and exogenous. It is further argued that path dependence underestimates the role of incremental changes. Critiques propose that minor, small changes might be quite important because they may accumulate over time and create a sudden pathbreaking change. As a remedy for such weaknesses, path dependence is advised to have a stronger sense of *agency*.

This approach is also criticized for its materialist propensity. Although path dependence acknowledges that it is not always guaranteed to reach and maintain Pareto optimality (i.e., a state in which no one can be made better off without making someone worse off), it treats the cost-benefit calculus (i.e., increasing returns, positive feedback) as the main dynamic behind the continuation or the persistence of a path. The utilitarian, materialist bias, however, substantially limits the explanatory power of path dependence because there are also several cases in the institutional world where non-material factors and considerations (i.e., ideas, values, and legitimacy concerns) constitute a path. It is suggested that once successfully institutionalized (i.e., taken for granted by actors), ideas shape

actors' perceptions, goals, behaviors, and consequently political outcomes. As a result, some choices will be regarded as more favorable or appropriate than others. This process, in the long run, would lock in certain actions or policies while locking out others (also referred to as *cognitive locking*). Thus, actors may maintain a certain path not because of an expected utility down the path but because of simply believing in the appropriateness of certain ideas and values. Put differently, the main mechanism of self-reinforcement or path reproduction in such ideational continuities becomes taken for granted or legitimate rather than being due to cost-benefit assessments (i.e., increasing returns).

In response to these criticisms, recent studies employing path dependence have paid more attention to incremental, endogenous changes and the role of agency in path emergence, path maintenance, and path-breaking processes. Despite its shortcomings, it is important that a researcher have path dependence in his or her tool kit. The synchronic approaches, which are concerned with the impact of variance in current variables on political outcomes, provide us a "snapshot" view of political life. For a much better understanding, however, these approaches should be complemented with diachronic approaches, which are more sensitive to historical causes or conditions, triggering particular self-reproducing sequences of events.

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*See also* Historical Sociology; Institutional Theory; Policy Analysis

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## PATRIOTISM

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As Maurizio Viroli notes, patriotism (love of country) and nationalism (loyalty to one's nation) are often taken to be synonymous. Indeed, for writers such as Ernest Geller, nationalism constitutes a distinctive expression of patriotism. Yet the origin of the concept can be traced back to the notion of *patria* in Greek and especially Roman antiquity, which links patriotism with the preservation of *res publica* and the protection of common liberty. It is only with the rise of nationalism in the 19th century that patriotism becomes associated with the exclusive attachment to a prepolitical, homogeneous, national community. Because of this association, patriotism has been frequently regarded as incompatible with a typically liberal commitment to universal human rights. However, recent scholarship has sought to disassociate patriotism from nationalism by emphasizing new forms of loyalty compatible with universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences, giving rise to concepts such as constitutional or cosmopolitan patriotism as well as contemporary restatements of the classical republican tradition.

Greek and especially Roman antiquity provide the roots for a political patriotism that conceives of political loyalty to the *patria* as loyalty to a political conception of the republic and is associated with the love of law and common liberty, the search for the common good, and the duty to behave justly toward one's country. This classical Roman meaning of *patria* reemerges in the context of the Italian city republics of the 15th century. Here, *patria* stands for the common liberty of the

city, which can only be safeguarded by the citizens' civic spirit. For Niccolò Machiavelli, the love of common liberty enables citizens to see their private and particular interests as part of the common good and helps them to resist corruption and tyranny and, if necessary, to fight to protect and preserve the political community. While this love of the city is typically intermixed with pride in her military strength and cultural superiority, it is the political institutions and way of life of the city that form the distinctive focal point of this kind of patriotic attachment. To love the city is to be willing to sacrifice one's own good—including one's life and, if need be, one's soul—for the protection of common liberty.

In contrast to the classical republican conception of patriotism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "Considerations on the Government of Poland" can be seen as an early example of the link between nationalism and patriotism. Yet while Rousseau advocates the love of the nation and the celebration of national culture, he believes that national culture is valuable primarily because it helps foster loyalty to the political fatherland. Thus, Rousseau's nationalism stems from and serves his typically republican emphasis on securing citizens' loyalty to their political institutions. A more explicit link between nationalism and patriotism can be found in the work of Johann Gottfried Herder. In Herder's work, patriotism refers not to a political virtue but to a spiritual attachment to the nation. In this context, fatherland becomes synonymous with the nation and its distinct language and culture, which give it unity and coherence. Thus, instead of linking patriotism to the preservation of political liberty, Herder associates love of one's country with the preservation of a common culture and the spiritual unity of a people. While in the classical republican tradition, "fatherland" is synonymous with political institutions, for Herder, the nation is prepolitical and love of one's national culture is a natural inclination that allows a people to express their distinctive character. On this account, patriotism is associated with the exclusive attachment to one's own culture and thus stands in opposition to cosmopolitanism and cultural assimilation. Freedom is equated not with the fight against political oppression but with the preservation of a unique people and patriotic sacrifice with the desire to secure the long-term survival of the nation.

This association between patriotism and the exclusive attachment to one's nation has led critics like Martha Nussbaum to view the sentiment of patriotic pride as morally dangerous, giving rise to a chauvinism that is incompatible with cosmopolitan aspirations and the recognition of the equal moral worth of all human beings. Yet recent approaches to patriotism have sought to ground patriotism in new forms of loyalty that are compatible with universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences. At the heart of this renewed interest in patriotism lies the belief that to be stable, democratic societies require a strong sense of allegiance on the part of their citizens. Not only does the high degree of pluralism that characterizes contemporary societies potentially give rise to tensions and disagreements among citizens that may destabilize the polity, modern democratic states committed to a degree of equality rely on the willingness of citizens to make sacrifices for the common good, be it in terms of the everyday redistribution of income to meet welfare needs or the provision of collective goods and services such as education or health care. Hence, in the eyes of advocates of new forms of patriotism, stable democratic societies require a strong sense of solidarity.

The most prominent example of this search for new forms of solidarity is Jürgen Habermas's notion of constitutional patriotism (*Verfassungspatriotismus*), which seeks to ground the loyalty of citizens not in the idea of a prepolitical, homogeneous community but in a commitment to universal liberal principles as enshrined in the constitution of the modern liberal state. To ensure that citizens who subscribe to different cultural, ethnic, and religious forms of life can coexist in and identify with their own country on equal terms, Habermas argues that the modern constitutional state must ensure that its political culture does not favor or discriminate against any particular subculture. To achieve this, it is vital to differentiate the majority culture from a shared political culture grounded in respect for fundamental constitutional principles and basic law. On this account, membership of a nation of citizens no longer rests on an appeal to a shared language or a common ethical and cultural origin but merely reflects a shared political culture based on standard liberal constitutional principles.

Habermas's attempt to ground patriotism in an attachment to universal liberal principles is also associated with what is at times referred to as cosmopolitan patriotism, which seeks to construct a postnational identity based on the recognition of democratic values and human rights as conceptualized within a particular constitutional tradition. Such cosmopolitan patriotism is said by advocates such as Kwame Anthony Appiah to give rise to a rooted cosmopolitanism that couples attachment to one's homeland and cultural particularities with an appreciation of different places and different people and a robust respect for the equal moral worth of all human beings. Advocates of forms of constitutional patriotism often cite the United States as an example of a nonnational polity held together by an expressly political patriotism. John Schaar, for instance, refers to American patriotism as "covenanted patriotism," a form of patriotic attachment characterized by a commitment to the principles and goals set out in the founding covenant and the duty to carry on the work of the Founding Fathers. Another strand of contemporary thought appeals to the classical republican principles of love of liberty, active citizenship, and self-sacrifice for the common good in their attempt to formulate new forms of solidarity that do not depend on the idea of a prepolitical, ethnically homogeneous nation. Maurizio Viroli writes in this tradition when he advocates a republican patriotism characterized by a political culture of liberty that emphasizes active citizenship and civic virtue and gives rise to a reflexive, self-critical love of country that aims to ensure that the polity lives up to its highest traditions and ideals.

However, critics of such attempts to generate new, nonexclusionary forms of solidarity have expressed doubts about the extent to which patriotic sentiments can be reconciled with a commitment to universal principles. While critics of constitutional patriotism have questioned the feasibility of Habermas's attempt to decouple the political culture from the wider majority culture, pointing to the extent to which the political culture of even as culturally diverse a society as America draws on national symbols and myths that are laden with prepolitical meanings, commentators like Margaret Canovan have argued that classical republican patriotism was much more illiberal and hostile to

outsiders than modern proponents of the republican tradition suggest. According to Canovan, not only is the patriotic virtue celebrated in the classical republican tradition primarily a military virtue, the republican preoccupation with the education and socialization of citizens to systematically instill loyalty and commitment to the state is liable to be seen by many contemporary liberals as an unacceptable form of manipulation and indoctrination. Furthermore, advocates of both constitutional and modern republican patriotism typically presuppose the existence of established political boundaries and common political institutions that have their origins in the rise and consolidation of the nation-state. Thus, the extent to which patriotism can be reconciled with a commitment to universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences remains contested.

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*See also* Liberalism; Nationalism; Republicanism

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## PAY FOR PERFORMANCE

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Pay for performance (PFP; also known as merit pay or performance-related pay) involves the provision of a financial reward contingent on some indicator of individual (or less frequently, group) success. PFP has been a consistent reform in government since the 1980s and remains popular.

In an era when elected officials call for evidence-based policy and rigorous evaluations of program performance, PFP represents both an affirmation and an uncomfortable anomaly. On the one hand, it perfectly captures basic themes of the current era: Public actors should be held accountable for performance, rewarded for success, and punished for failure. At the same time, however, there is considerable evidence that PFP as implemented thus far has been ineffective. For example, the U.S. federal government has tried multiple iterations of PFP since 1978. New variations of PFP are proposed but with little effort to fix the fundamental problems that undermined the previous version.

### Reasons for Failure

There are a variety of reasons why PFP systems have struggled in the public setting:

*Attribution difficulty:* For any moderately complex task, outcomes are generally the result of group effort, and the relative contribution of a single individual is difficult to discern.

*Measurement difficulty:* Attribution difficulty makes it difficult to come up with individual-level performance measures that connect well with organizational goals. As a result, PFP systems generally rely on subjective ratings of performance as determined by a supervisor. It is often unclear to employees how to do well on such scales beyond staying on the good side of their supervisor. From the supervisors' perspective, they often lack the information necessary to provide an informed assessment.

*Grade inflation:* Employee ratings generally follow a fixed scale, for example, 1 is *excellent* and 5 is *below expectations*. The subjectivity of these scales, the lack of an incentive to critically differentiate between good and bad performers, and the

discomfort of critically rating an individual result in the vast majority being graded as above average.

*Resources:* PFP systems have generally been underfunded. It seems that although politicians argue for high risk and high reward, in practice they cannot tolerate the potential media scrutiny that might arise if public servants earn genuinely high rewards. Public service unions, generally critical of PFP systems, also work to keep the size of the rewards small in order to ensure that members do not actually lose out under new systems. As a result, the rewards associated by PFP systems are generally too small to be effective motivators.

*Incorrect assumptions:* PFP systems are based on the assumption that individuals are motivated by financial rewards. But there is a substantial literature documenting the relatively high prevalence of intrinsic motivation among public sector workers. At the very least, it seems reasonable to assume that there will be heterogeneity in reward preferences among public employees and PFP systems will not be a strong motivator for many.

At a broader level, the poor record of PFP in the public sector may be the result of (a) failure to implement it properly, (b) a poor fit with the public setting, or (c) the fact that the theory simply does not work well in any setting. While some of the problems outlined above might be remedied with better implementation (e.g., better measurement systems or more resources), the nature of the public setting often makes such changes unlikely. Most public services are complex and hard to measure, and a reluctance to provide appropriate resources is tied to the political context of public services. There is also evidence that the presumed success of PFP in the private setting is overstated, which questions the basic validity of the theory behind PFP. The empirical evidence on PFP in the private setting is quite mixed, with success generally contingent on the factors—ease of measurement and attribution, resource adequacy—that make it difficult to implement in the public sector.

### Costs of Pay for Performance

In addition to evidence that PFP tends to work only under some fairly specific circumstances that

are unusual in the public sector, there is also evidence that it generates costs. The most obvious are the *transaction costs* involved in creating and implementing an individualized performance appraisal system.

There are also unanticipated costs. One is distrust and conflict. In a standard salary system, supervisors have limited financial rewards to offer, which reduces the potential for complaints about favoritism or abuse of power. But in PFP systems, the reliance on subjective assessments, the limited availability of rewards, and the general belief among employees that they deserve rewards create the conditions where some employees will feel that favoritism is employed and that neither appraisal systems nor pay reflect their effort. PFP systems may also create tension between employees who view themselves as competing for a limited number of rewards.

Another potential cost is the crowding-out effect, which is centered on evidence that financial incentives can undermine intrinsic motivations. As individuals lose their sense of self-determination, and find that public service performance is monetized, some may become discouraged and withdraw effort. Over time, a reliance on extrinsic incentives also creates a selection process that reinforces crowding out, as those driven by intrinsic motivation become less likely to join or stay in contexts where PFP is dominant.

The final potential cost of PFP is that it can encourage perverse behavior, in the form of gaming and goal displacement. Faced with high-powered incentives, individuals may seek to manipulate performance measures (gaming) or to improve metrics at the expense of some unmeasured but important value (goal displacement). For example, many of the studies of PFP that show positive results are set in health care settings that allowed piece-rate compensation programs, where providers were rewarded for the number of services provided. While health care providers may approve of such system, it has been criticized as creating broader social costs, since it encourages the provision of unnecessary services and increases the overall cost of health care.

As awareness of unanticipated consequences grows, the tendency to underresource PFP systems identified above may not be a weakness but an unintended protection against the type of misbehavior that is encouraged by high-powered incentives.

And some have argued that lower-powered incentives are actually optimal for individuals in the public sector.

### Reasons for Adoption

Given its poor record of success, why does PFP remain durable? PFP has high intuitive and symbolic appeal. It is easy to understand, is believed to be successful in the private sector, and is assumed to provide an element of risk and competition that runs contrary to the image of bureaucracies. It communicates a desire to hold inefficient bureaucrats accountable for performance. Past failures of PFP can be dismissed as implementation failures. Of course, if the primary motivation is symbolic, concern about the actual success of the system is of little consequence.

PFP may also be viewed as a means by which political principals control agents. There is some circumstantial evidence to support this argument. PFP systems are more likely to be found in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries where there is no tradition of crossover between politics and bureaucracy, and political appointees tend to be supportive of PFP systems. But the functional utility of PFP as a means of control is limited when information asymmetry and measurement problems pervade conditions that underpin principal-agent problems in the first place.

As PFP has matured, it appears to have found greater application in performance contracts with third-party providers. In such settings, government principals do not face the same constraints in terms of civil service rules or bonus size, and so can create high-powered incentives. As with PFP systems in government, much of the success of such systems depends on the capacity to measure and specify complete contracts, with objectives that tie to reward. When contracts are incomplete, third-party providers have stronger incentives to engage in gaming and goal displacement, and fewer constraints to stop them.

As we look to the future, it is tempting to categorize PFP as an example of what H. L. Henry Mencken observed: "There is always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong." It is an appealing and durable idea, despite its record of failure. There will always be a

market for such ideas. If the conditions are right, PFP might even work, though such conditions are not generally conducive to the public setting.

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*See also* Accountability; Administration; Performance Management; Principal–Agent Theory; Reform

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characterized as “negative peace” as opposed to “positive peace,” with the latter denoting not just the absence of direct violence but also the absence of indirect or structural violence, sometimes described as the presence of justice. This entry surveys the religious and normative context within which peace came to be understood, the various ways in which peace has been seen as a subject of research, and the diverse explanations offered by political science on the conditions for peace.

Given the implicit link between peace and war, peace was long understood largely through the lens of conflict and its management. During the Cold War, however, the “management” of conflict through mutually assured destruction and détente led to research on peace that meant more than just the avoidance of annihilation. This often embraced a constructivist perspective on peace, while realists tended to conceive of peace in terms of the interests of states, and idealists emphasized the role that norms and institutions could play.

### Norms and Religion

Rules governing the conduct of war have existed in virtually every culture. The Aztecs, for example, developed elaborate rituals that preceded conflict, including dispatching ambassadors, providing an opportunity for a prospective foe to submit peacefully to Aztec rule. (Failure to accept three such offers was required before military operations could commence—even though the process meant abandoning all possibility of surprise and, since the ambassadors traditionally brought gifts of weapons, the opponent’s military capacity was increased.) War itself, however, was typically regarded as a natural state. Early Western philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato gave relatively little thought to war as an atypical phenomenon. The seeds of what is now the just war tradition, limiting not only the conduct of war but the recourse to war itself, lay in the transformed perception of war from being the norm to being an exceptional state that required justification.

Christian theology contributed much of the content of the just war tradition but only after literal interpretations of Christ’s injunction to “turn the other cheek”—on its face a doctrine of radical pacifism—could be rationalized by St. Ambrose and St. Augustine into a dualistic framework that

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## PEACE

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Peace has long been understood in political science in two quite distinct ways. The dominant conception of peace has been the absence of war. The very word *peace* (and the French *paix*) derives from the Latin *pax*, meaning an agreement—a pact—to refrain from hostilities. This is sometimes



separated inward disposition from outward action. This dualism lives on today in the principles of double-effect, right intention, and proportionality, each important to the modern legal framework for the use of force.

Religion has been significant at both ends of the spectrum of peace and war. Gandhi, among others, stuck to the utopian position of extreme nonviolence—adopted as a way of life rather than simply a tactic. Similar pacifist tendencies continue to inform much research on peace, despite some views relegating it to the margins of international affairs. At the other extreme, radical Islam has elevated the traditional Muslim notion of jihad (literally “struggle”) to a holy war against all infidels and any Muslim who collaborates with them.

The role of norms in constraining or shaping behavior is a contested area of political science. Yet in the area of war and peace, the most important normative transformation of the 20th century was the outlawing of war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 “condemn[ed] recourse to war.” The United Nations (UN) Charter of 1945 more explicitly prohibited the “threat or use of force,” allowing exceptions only in the case of self-defense against an armed attack or authorization by the UN Security Council to deal with a threat to or breach of “the peace.” Though this manifestly did not end war, it is noteworthy that states attempted to justify virtually every use of force from 1945 under one of these exceptions.

The late 20th and early 21st centuries saw the UN Security Council expanding its understanding of “threats to international peace and security” as not merely embracing traditional interstate conflict but in some circumstances extending to internal disputes that might spill over into other states or are of such gravity in their humanitarian consequences that they warrant international intervention. This expansive interpretation of the role of supranational institutions was accompanied by the emergence of “human security” and the “responsibility to protect”—doctrines that further advanced the notion of peace as meaning much more than merely the absence of traditional interstate conflict.

Human security was an attempt to challenge traditional conceptions of security by arguing that the proper referent for security was the individual rather than the state. Building on the UN Development Programme’s *Human Development Report*, first

published in 1994, human security argues that conflict and deprivation are linked; addressing insecurity thus requires addressing freedom from fear as well as freedom from want. In more elaborate formulations, this is said to include protection as well as empowerment strategies. Critics of human security challenge this approach on the basis that the concept is vague and not helpful in understanding the causes of conflict or formulating responses.

Responsibility to protect (frequently abbreviated to R2P) was the product of long-standing efforts to get beyond the humanitarian intervention debates of the 1990s. First coined by an International Commission in 2001, the doctrine was later adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 2005—a remarkably swift endorsement of a once controversial subject. In its watered-down form, it merely affirms that a state has the primary responsibility for protecting its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The failure of a state to act on this responsibility might be grounds for the Security Council to act, in exceptional circumstances, in the name of the international community—something the Council has already done on a handful of occasions.

### Peace as a Subject of Research

Though war and peace had long been central to the study of international relations, the idea of studying peace as such gained traction only during the Cold War. This was not only driven by the unique security threats posed by nuclear weapons but also found encouragement in U.S. universities, in particular by opposition to the Vietnam War. Much early research took place in or was funded by Scandinavia: Norway’s International Peace Research Institute in Oslo was founded in 1959 and began publishing the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964; the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute was established in 1966. Peace studies became more popular in the 1980s, and today there are hundreds of such programs in universities and think tanks around the world.

The relevant literature encompasses much work on positive peace, with the dominant questions tending to remain those connected with explaining the conditions necessary to prevent conflict. As conflicts from the 1990s were increasingly internal rather than international, the distinction between

positive and negative peace has to some extent been elided by the finding that half of all countries emerging from civil war fall back into it within 5 years of a peace agreement being signed. The question of resolving one conflict has therefore become linked with the question of preventing another.

This in turn led to an expansive literature on *peace building*, an imprecise term that at times is used to describe virtually all forms of international assistance to countries that have experienced or are at risk of armed conflict. *State building* (sometimes rendered as *nation building* in the United States) more narrowly refers to the construction or reconstruction of institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security. Most often conducted as part of UN peace operations, such activities have included many quasi-governmental activities ranging from electoral assistance and technical assistance to maintain human rights and the rule of law to the actual administration of territory in Kosovo and Timor-Leste.

### Explanations of the Conditions for Peace

Despite increased attention to positive peace, a disproportionate amount of the literature focuses on conditions for peace in the narrow sense of avoiding war. The most important and widely debated tends to be the democratic peace thesis, but much has also been written on economic factors and their link with conflict. The shift from international to internal conflict as a major preoccupation has reduced the prominence of strategic considerations, though the “post–post–Cold War” era and the rise of militarily powerful China and Russia may suggest a return to strategic studies and great-power politics in the near future. Finally, the growing importance attributed to asymmetric threats such as those from terrorists groups of global reach has raised the question of what “peace” means when dealing with nonstate groups that may or may not behave as rational actors.

### Democratic Peace

Much quantitative energy has been spent on the democratic peace thesis, which holds that democracies are statistically less likely to go to war than states that are undemocratic. Overemphasis on this empirical argument (which has itself been

contested) obscures a secondary finding in the literature that an autocratic state in the process of democratization may in fact be *more* likely to descend into conflict, especially internal conflict. The more robust explanations of what scholars such as Michael Doyle term the *liberal peace theory* link it to three pillars: republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights, and transnational interdependence. These correspond to the arguments first made by Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.”

### Economics

There is a long tradition of attributing economic causes to conflict. One of the most direct linkages that is often made is between the economic impositions on Germany following World War I and the planting of the seeds of World War II. Marxist theories of international relations drew more systematically on economics to explain the unfolding of historical stages, certain inevitable conflicts, influencing dependency theorists in particular. More recent work on civil wars offered counterintuitive suggestions that an abundance of natural resources may *increase* the probability and duration of conflict.

In the context of international armed conflict, economic activity in the form of cross-border economic flows has also been linked to peace—either because it raises the costs of severing those links or because it offers a more efficient path to growth than conquest. An early advocate of trade as a path to peace was the 19th-century British statesman Richard Cobden, though it has subsequently been discussed in the context of interdependence and, more recently, globalization.

The link between economics and peace is now well accepted. Since 1997, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been at the forefront of efforts to “mainstream” conflict prevention into donor development policies. What is now termed *structural prevention* (as opposed to *operational prevention*) seeks to bring development perspectives to bear on what were traditionally regarded as political and security problems.

Nevertheless, the “greed” versus “grievance” debates in the empirical literature revealed the dangers of reductive theories of conflict prevention. One-dimensional analysis has now largely given way

to more nuanced accounts that acknowledge a mix of economic, political, ethnic, and security dynamics.

### Strategic Studies

Though much of the focus on peace today concerns positive peace and the problem of civil wars, strategic studies was a fertile area of research in the Cold War. Doctrines such as mutual assured destruction relied on the presumed rationality of one's opponent and maintained the peace through a balance of terror.

Such perspectives enjoyed less prominence after the end of the Cold War, but with the rise of China and Russia as military powers and the potential for conflict over diminishing natural resources, such fields might experience a resurgence.

### Asymmetric Threats

A phenomenon that is not new, but that has come to dominate discussion of conflict in many circles, is terrorism. The question of whether terrorist threats are appropriately addressed as a military rather than criminal matter is the subject of significant division in the literature and, indeed, the practice of states. The "war on terror" of the Bush administration in the United States was at times presented as an intergenerational conflict. Such language was subsequently dropped, among other reasons because of the difficulty of determining when such a "war" has been "won."

### Conclusion

One of the most important factors affecting the study of war and peace across historical periods has been whether war or peace was in fact the "normal" state of human affairs. It is perhaps ironic that the century that rendered meaningless the formal legal category of "war"—indicating a state of affairs where two sides may lawfully use force against one another—was the bloodiest in human history. At the beginning of a century that threatens to be no less bloody, this is a disquietingly uncertain conclusion.

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*See also* Democratic Peace; Interdependence; Nation Building; Pacifism; Positive Peace; Violence; War and Peace

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## PEACE RESEARCH

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*See* War and Peace

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## PEACEKEEPING

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Theories of war try to explain why war occurs, given that it is often an inefficient way to resolve disputes. Scholars have proposed several explanations, among them the lack of information about relative capabilities or resolve and the inability of the parties to reach a credible commitment to end their dispute without resorting to violence. Some

argue that, once war occurs, the only way to end it and ensure that there is no recurrence of violence is to have a decisive victory of one side as most negotiated settlements generate credible commitment problems. This is an argument of particular relevance to civil (or intrastate) wars, which are today the most common form of large-scale armed conflict. One of the striking stylized facts emerging from the literature on civil wars is that these wars last a long time, and when they end, they frequently restart. These insights from rationalist theories of interstate and intrastate war point to an important role for third parties in mediating and resolving disputes. Third-party intervention can help defuse conflicts before they become violent by providing information or external-security guarantees. When wars do occur, security guarantees to help support a transition to peace often take the form of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is how the international community, through its multilateral organizations, can reduce the risk that conflicts will escalate.

Today, peacekeeping is the multidimensional management of a complex peace operation, usually in a post-civil war context. Peacekeeping, authorized under Chapter VI of the United Nations (UN) Charter, is designed to provide interim security and assist parties to make those institutional, material, and ideational transformations that are essential to make a peace sustainable. It was not always this way. The record of UN peacekeeping begins during the Cold War with a limited activity, monitoring the performance of a truce by two hostile parties.

Contemporary peacekeeping doctrine is embodied in the *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations* (2000; also known as the *Brahimi Report*) and the *Report of the Secretary-General on "No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations"* (2001; also known as the *"No Exit Without Strategy" Report*), which expanded on Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report *Agenda for Peace* and its 1995 *Supplement*. The goal of peacekeeping today is to help parties achieve sustainable peace. This goal can be achieved by addressing the underlying root causes of hostility and by enhancing local capacities for institutional change and economic development. But peacekeeping

requires the cooperation of the parties, which must realize that they cannot win a quick and decisive military victory. Once the parties have reached a settlement that defines the contours of a postwar political system, there is still danger that the implementation of the peace will fail. It is at that point that international capacities—a multidimensional peacekeeping force with a UN mandate and resources to help implement the settlement—can help allay the parties' concerns by providing transparency on the peace-building process and each other's observance of the terms of the settlement, by policing violations of the settlement by noncooperative parties or spoilers, and by helping jump-start the economy and offering technical expertise in the design of transformational postwar political institutions.

These goals represent a significant expansion of the scope of UN intervention in the post-1990 world. The *Agenda for Peace* envisioned a role for the UN in preventive diplomacy, to engage the parties before they get to war; peacemaking, to help warring parties reach an agreement; peacekeeping, to help police an agreement once it is in place; peace enforcement, to convince reticent parties to stop fighting through an application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and postconflict reconstruction, to help parties rebuild their economies when the war ends. In the early years of UN peace operations, the UN mainly aimed to separate combatants through the establishment of a buffer zone that it policed in what is now called a traditional peacekeeping mandate. Traditional peacekeeping referred to a UN presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce while diplomats negotiated a comprehensive peace. Peacekeeping was therefore designed as an interim arrangement where there was no formal determination of aggression, and it was frequently used to monitor a truce, establish and police a buffer zone, and assist the negotiation of a peace. Typically, it involved less well-armed troops, and it often resulted in freezing conflict in time rather than helping resolve the underlying causes.

Today, following a process of evolution of UN mandates and new strategic thinking about UN intervention, the model peace operation combines elements of diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, postconflict reconstruction, and at times also

peace enforcement, aiming to help build long-term foundations for stable, legitimate government (see Table 1). To do this, UN peace missions have a multidimensional role, which ranges from disarming noncooperative parties and repatriating refugees to monitoring elections and designing school curricula. Between 1987 and 1994, the Security Council quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorized, and multiplied by seven the number of economic sanctions it imposed per

year. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than 10,000 to more than 70,000. The annual peacekeeping budget skyrocketed correspondingly from \$230 million to \$3.6 billion in the same period, thus reaching about 3 times the UN's regular operating budget of \$1.2 billion. Yet even these high costs represent a fraction of the economic costs of a failed peace or a long war. Peacekeeping is not only potentially lifesaving, but it is also cost-effective.

**Table 1** Principal United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, 1947–2003

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Peak Force Size</i>	<i>Function</i>
UNSCOB	1947–1952	36	Monitor violations of Greek border
UNCI	1947–1951	63	Observe Indonesian ceasefire and Dutch troop withdrawal
UNTSO	1948–present	572	Report on Arab–Israeli ceasefire and armistice violations
UNMOGIP	1949–present	102	Observe Kashmir ceasefire
UNEF 1	1956–1967	6,073	Observe, supervise troop withdrawal, and provide buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces
UNOGIL	1958	591	Check on clandestine aid from Syria to Lebanon rebels
ONUC	1960–1964	19,828	Maintain order in the Congo, expel foreign forces, and prevent secession and outside intervention
UNSF	1962–1963	1,576	Maintain order during transfer of authority in New Guinea from Netherlands and Indonesia
UNYOM	1963–1964	189	Supervise military disengagement in Yemen
UNFICYP	1964–present	6,411	Prevent internal conflict in Cyprus and avert outside intervention
DOMREP	1965–1966	2	Report ceasefire between domestic factions
UNIPOM	1965–1966	96	Observe India–Pakistan border
UNEF II	1973–1979	6,973	Supervise ceasefire and troop disengagement and control buffer zone between Egypt and Israel
UNDOF	1974–present	1,450	Patrol Syria–Israel border
UNIFIL	1978–present	7,000	Supervise Israeli troop withdrawal, maintain order, and help restore authority of Lebanese government
UNGOMAP	1988–1990	50	Monitor Geneva Accords on Afghanistan and supervise Soviet withdrawal

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Peak Force Size</i>	<i>Function</i>
UNIMOG	1988–1991	399	Supervise ceasefire and mutual withdrawal of forces by Iran and Iraq
UNAVEM I	1989–1991	70	Verify withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola
UNTAG	1989–1990	4,493	Assist Namibia's transition to independence and ensure free and fair elections
ONUVEN	1989–1990	120	Monitor Nicaraguan elections
ONUCA	1989–1992	1,098	Verify compliance by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua with agreement to disarm and neutralize irregular forces in the area
ONUVEH	1990–1991	260	Observe elections in Haiti
UNIKOM	1991–2003	1,440	Monitor demilitarized zone between Kuwait and Iraq, removed with the occupation of Iraq by an American-led coalition (small observer group remains but technically nonfunctioning and awaiting Security Council action)
UNAVEM II	1991–1995	476	Verify compliance with Peace Accord to end civil strife in Angola
ONUSAL	1991–1995	1,003	Monitor ceasefire and human rights agreements in El Salvador's civil war
MINURSO	1991–present	375	Conduct referendum in Western Sahara on independence or union with Morocco
UNAMIC	1991–1992	380	Assist Cambodian factions to keep ceasefire agreement
UNPROFOR	1992–1995	21,980	Encourage ceasefire in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and protect relief programs
UNTAC	1992–1993	19,500	Demobilize armed forces of Cambodian factions, supervise interim government, and conduct free elections
UNOSOM I	1992–1993	550	Monitor ceasefire between Somali parties and protect shipments of relief supplies
ONUMOZ	1992–1994	7,500	Supervise internal peace accord in Mozambique, disarm combatants, establish a nonpartisan army, hold national elections, and conduct humanitarian program
UNOMIG	1993–present	120	Verify ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia and observe CIS peacekeeping force
UNOMUR	1993–1994	100	Observer mission in Uganda–Rwanda and monitoring arms shipments
UNOSOM II	1993–1995		UN mission in Somalia and peacemaking operations

(Continued)

**Table I** (Continued)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Peak Force Size</i>	<i>Function</i>
UNAMIR	1993–1996	5,500	Stop the massacre of the defenseless population of Rwanda, assist refugees, and report atrocities
UNMIH	1993–1996	900	Mission in Haiti, pacification, and monitoring elections
UNOMIL	1993–1997	91	Observer group in Liberia and monitoring OAS peacekeeping
UNASOG	1994	25	Observer group in Aouzou Strip and Libya–Chad border
UNMOT	1994–2000	24	Investigate ceasefire violations and work with OSCE and CIS missions in Tajikistan
UNMIBH	1995–2002	1,584	Monitor law enforcement in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNPREDEP	1995–1999	1,150	Preventive deployment force for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
UNCRO	1995–1996	20	Confidence restoration in Croatia
UNAVEM III	1995–1997	5,560	Angola verification in Mission of the Peace Accords (1991), the Lusaka Protocol (1994), and relevant Security Council resolutions
UNMOP	1996–2002	28	Monitor demilitarization in Prevlaka Peninsula, Croatia
UNTAES	1996–1998	5,257	Facilitate demilitarization in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia)
UNSMIH	1996–1997	1,549	Support Mission in Haiti
UNTMIH	1997	300	Transition Mission in Haiti
MINUGUA	1997	155	Verification Mission in Guatemala
MIPONUH	1997–2000	290	Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUA	1997–1999	5,560	Observer Mission in Angola and a follow-on to UNAVEM III
MINURCA	1998–2000	1,350	Help maintain and enhance security and stability in the Central African Republic
UNAMSIL	1998–present	109	Observe and report to the Security Council the military conditions in Sierra Leone
MONUC	1999–present	5,537	Monitor ceasefire agreement and provide humanitarian assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo
UNMIK Kosovo	1999–present	40,000 (KFOR)	Combine efforts in pacification of Kosovo with KFOR/NATO forces (essentially a humanitarian assistance)
UNMEE Ethiopia and Eritrea	2000–present	4,300	Monitor cessation of hostilities

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Peak Force Size</i>	<i>Function</i>
UNAMA Afghanistan	2002–present	450	Work with International Security Assistance Force and provide humanitarian aid (not technically a peacekeeping mission)
UNMISET East Timor (Timor Leste)	2002–present	5,000	Transitional security for the new Timor Leste government
MINUCI	2003–present	0	Oversee implementation of Linas-Marcoussis Agreement with ECOWAS and French troops
UNMIL	2003–present	15,000	Oversee implementation of ceasefire and peace agreement, provide police training, and assist in formation of a new restructured military

*Sources:* Compiled by author from data in Ziring, L., Riggs, R., & Plano, J. (2005). *The United Nations* (pp. 216–219). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth; United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, *Police, Troops and Military Observers—Contributors by Mission and Country*, UN Peacekeeping home page, December 2002; Center for International Relations, *Current UN Peace-Keeping Operations*, Zurich, Switzerland, PKO webmaster, January 1998.

The UN has a commendable record of success in multidimensional peace operations as diverse as those in Namibia (UNTAG [United Nations Transition Assistance Group]), El Salvador (ONUSAL [United Nations Observation Mission in El Salvador]), Cambodia (UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia]), Mozambique (ONUMOZ [The United Nations Operations in Mozambique]), and Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES [United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium]). Success is of course an ambiguous and contested term, and here, it implies an end to large-scale violence, undivided sovereignty for the government of the host state, and a modest degree of political openness. Using this standard, the best available evidence suggests that UN multidimensional, second-generation missions have been successful in helping countries transition from war to peace. The UN has been less successful in fighting wars, however. Enforcement operations, which draw on the authority of Charter Article 42, present a challenge for the UN, and the experiences in Bosnia and Somalia in the 1990s exposed the practical limitations that a multilateral organization such as the UN faces in peace enforcement. An international organization without an army must rely on the ongoing cooperation of troop-contributing states and donors for financing. This makes the organization too

inflexible and underresourced to fight wars. The UN's comparative advantage lies with the peace-enhancing role of its multidimensional missions. On average, these have been more successful than peacekeeping missions by other agencies and smaller regional organizations. Regional organizations (with the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) may lack the technical expertise or resources for such complex missions, or they may be perceived as biased mediators by the parties.

If political conflict reaches the level of war, and if the war causes high numbers of deaths and extensive physical and economic destruction, and if parties to the war are many and incoherent, unable to implement a negotiated peace settlement, then UN peacekeeping may help shore up support for a lasting peace that is based on a mutually acceptable compromise.

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*Author's Note:* This chapter draws on Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis's *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

*See also* Peace; United Nations; War and Peace



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## PEASANTS' MOVEMENTS

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Peasants' movements have been important expressions of the formation of the modern world, and they still are. Whether resisting colonization of the commons, protesting capture of their granaries by merchants and rulers, disputing land claims, contending with centralizing states over the unequal terms of their incorporation, or joining millenarian struggles, peasants have been compelled to respond to the array of forces attending the development of capitalist property relations. Why should this not be the case today? Conventional wisdom would have it that the world's peasantries are destined to disappear in the face of competitive pressures from capital-intensive agriculture, expelling them into burgeoning urban labor forces. This development scenario embodies a modernity trope that modern civilization is centered on the city, as an escape from parochialism and the drudgery of rural life. Peasants, here understood in a wider sense as agricultural smallholders or laborers, but also including pastoralists or fishermen, are still a social force to reckon with. In the following, some of the regional and transnational forms are discussed that have gained a voice addressing major issues such as food security, ecological sustainability, and biodiversity.

While certainly the demographic composition of the world's population is now majority urban, and peasant agriculture is evidently increasingly marginal in global-market terms, each of these indicators is deeply problematic. And it has taken the rise and consolidation of a contemporary peasants' movement to underline the shortcomings of such seemingly commonsense observations. At present, there are more than 1 billion slum dwellers across

the world, accounting for one in six of the world's population. While many of these seemingly redundant people do work in sweatshops at the extreme end of corporate supply chains, or recycle urban waste, they are not absorbed by the urban-industrial jobs predicted by the development paradigm. Furthermore, the displacement of peasant agriculture is largely due to the withdrawal of protections and the opening up of domestic markets to cheap, subsidized (at below production cost) foodstuffs from the cereal-exporting regions of the global North and the role of Southern states in diverting land use for agro-exporting as a condition of debt rescheduling.

The role of agro-exporting has shaped agricultural policy in a neoliberal world, where food security has been redefined from a social-contract function to a global-market function. The shortcoming of this policy shift became clear during the 2007–2008 food crisis, when governments found national food security compromised by the interruption of their food import dependence. But the transnational peasants' movement had already identified this problem, opposing neoliberal arguments for food security provided by food traders with the concept of food sovereignty, which proclaimed hunger as a problem of rights not of means. Initially, food sovereignty was defined as a territorial right to produce food premised on the notion that food is a source of nutrition first and only secondarily a trade item. This intervention underlined the vulnerability of agricultural producers to subsidy schemes favoring corporate agriculture in a highly uneven global market, maintaining that neoliberal multilateral and national policies privilege the rights of food traders and agribusiness over peasants and low-income consumers. And it made visible the dramatic dispossession of smallholders everywhere by the liberalization of agricultural trade.

The transnational peasant (pastoralist, fisherfolk, and rural workers) movement, *La Vía Campesina*, or the Peasants' Way, articulated the concept of food sovereignty in the 1996 Rome World Food Summit, proclaiming the right of nations to self-sufficiency, and respect of cultural and productive diversity, as a direct critique of the market-driven definition of food security and its unrealized claim to feed the world with Northern food surpluses. Representing millions of farmers

through more than 150 organizations across more than 50 countries, *La Vía Campesina* is the prominent voice of a social force advocating for the survival of small producers claiming the right to produce staple foods, to reproduce society, and to manage local resources. In making these claims, the peasants' movement calls into question a market episteme that governs the development vision. From the movement's perspective, it is an episteme that assumes scale efficiency on questionable grounds: highly subsidized energy-intensive industrial agriculture that externalizes environmental costs (e.g., soil and genetic erosion, greenhouse gas emissions, and chemical pollution) and social impacts (e.g., displaced populations, food dependence, and pesticide contamination), supported by asymmetrical trade rules. In contrast, the United Nations (UN)-sponsored International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) Report (2008) noted, for example, that a half-hectare plot in Thailand produces 70 species of vegetables, fruits, and herbs, improving nutrition and feeding more people than a half-hectare plot of a high-yielding rice variety, and such biodiverse farming is far less energy intensive, replenishing soil and water nutrients and cycles and sustaining farming as a culture rather than supporting a remote business. This ontological distinction is central to the vision of *La Vía Campesina*, arguably the most politicized of the peasants' movements today.

While highly diverse (respecting locally specific social and ecological projects), *La Vía Campesina* nevertheless has forged a historic and common politics of resistance to the commodification of land, seed, and food and to a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade regime premised on the efficiency calculus. As a transnational coalition, for example, it ranges from Brazil's Landless Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST), with its emphasis on resettling displaced rural people and *favela* dwellers in landed cooperatives; through the movement of rich farmers: the Karnataka State Farmers' association (Karnataka Rajya Raita Sangha, KRRS) in India, opposed to biotechnology and global agribusiness as well as land reform, and the foundational Peasant Movement of the Philippines (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, KMP) in the Philippines; to the European Farmer Co-ordination (Coordination Paysanne Européenne, CPE), dedicated to

preserving seed sovereignty as the basis of farmer autonomy. The coalition is dedicated to respecting the different needs and conditions of its chapters, even as it unites on global campaigns. For example, the Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform (GCAR) has directly challenged the World Bank's Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) development strategy, with some success in reshaping debates in the development institutions and maintaining pressure through land occupations, urban protests, and anti-genetically modified (anti-GM) crop activities. Networking allies such as the Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN), focusing on land rights, and the Land Research and Action Network (LRAN) constitute a combined mobilization around land and food sovereignty.

The principle of food sovereignty, while appealing to a Westphalian concept as a strategic intervention, arguably forms a vision of a different future. First, it politicizes the global food system, revealing its capture by corporations for which food is just another investment portfolio. Second, it challenges the ontology of economism, which erases the viability of small producers, physically expelling them from their territories and epistemologically removing them from history. By linking the food trade with dispossession, the peasants' movement reveals the relationship between de-peasantization and the formation of a flexible surplus labor force for global industry. Third, the ontology of the food sovereignty movement encourages the revaluation of agriculture, rurality, and food as foundational to general social and ecological sustainability. And fourth, the social force leading this charge is a politicized peasantry—not simply reviving “tradition” but drawing on tacit knowledge of ecological relations and customary principles of social cooperation as the bedrock of human survival in an era of climatic and environmental emergency.

Of course, the transnational peasants' movement cannot change the world on its own. But this movement is changing the way we think about the world, and its future possibilities. By giving voice to the world's remaining peasants, the movement denaturalizes the vision of food security via agro-industrialization. This in turn resonates with growing concern over food safety, food miles, and the environmental degradation associated with energy-intensive agriculture. The peasants' movement

thus connects with new social movements concerned with reconfiguring societies around reducing social distance and carbon emissions, eco-agriculture, and renaturalizing food. Here, the alternative political coordinates of the bioregion concept depends on reducing the social and physical divide between urban and rural and reconnecting social reproduction with its natural foundations. Food sovereignty, as a political slogan and platform, reasserts both the self-organizing capacity of communities of people and the centrality of agriculture to human survival.

The transnational peasants' movement is uneven and differentiated. Its strongest regions are Latin America and Southeast Asia, whereas African farmers are still developing organizational capacity. Organizations rise and fall—for example, the Central American Peasant Coalition (Asociación de Organizaciones Campesinas de Centroamérica para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo, ASOCODE) was a powerful regional coalition in the 1990s, funded by European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and dedicated to forming indigenous peasant networks and coordinating activities with the Central American Farmer to Farmer (Campesino a Campesino) Movement (peasant-based extension). La Vía Campesina emerged in this context, its durability depending on its political autonomy and its distrust of NGO alliances. This stemmed from the need for self-representation in an environment of skepticism toward smallholders—reinforced by the conservative, rich-farmer organization, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, which has until now monopolized access to organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and its branch, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The slogan “not about us without us” became essential to the insertion of a peasant voice in global civil society, especially as neoliberal development projects impinged on peasant futures. Thus, the recent Plan Puebla-Panamá, an industrial corridor linking southern Mexico to Panama to mobilize indigenous labor, spawned two quite different peasant networks (representing various peasant unions) to negotiate or contest it, respectively: the Mesoamerican Initiative for Trade, Integration and Sustainable Development and the Mesoamerican Peasant Platform.

Farther south, in Brazil, the Movement of Small Farmers (Movimiento de Pequeños Agricultores), a peasant union, has mobilized more than 10,000 families in more than a dozen states to oppose agribusiness plantations of soy, sugar, and eucalyptus works, while the more substantial and iconic Landless Rural Workers' Movement (Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST) in Brazil has managed to settle roughly half a million peasants and landless workers on seized, unused land to produce food for Brazil's working poor and broaden the meaning of citizenship to agrarian social projects. Meanwhile, in Africa, the Network of Farmers' and Agricultural Producers' Organisations of West Africa (Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs Agricoles de L'Afrique de Le'Ouest, ROPPA) is developing methods of documenting flexible seed selection by farming women in West Africa as a form of drought management (with climate change), and the Agriculture Peasant and Modernisation Network—Mondial (Réseau Mondial Agricultures, Paysannes, Alimentation et Mondialisation, APM Mondial), formerly a regional network in Africa and now organizationally transnational, is developing ties with the Chinese peasantry, the last of the peasantries to be drawn into the movement.

Under pressure everywhere, peasants are self-organizing to protect their rights and, with allies, are building networks and consolidating a voice in global development fora, including demanding a reformed UN and alternative multilateral institutions such as a Convention on Food Sovereignty and Trade in Food and Agriculture and a World Commission on Sustainable Agriculture and Food Sovereignty. Today, peasants' movements are strengthening through mobilization as well as a public realization of environmental limits. In this sense, the significance of peasants' movements lies in the recentering of agriculture as a process of reterritorializing modernity—that is, reversing the marginalization of land-based culture and directing the world's attention to securing its ecological nest as a survival strategy.

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*See also* Social Movements; Tragedy of the Commons

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## PERFORMANCE

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At the most general level, performance refers to two dimensions of an action: the doing of it (descriptive aspect) and how well or badly the actor is doing something (evaluative aspect). In political science literature, *political performance* is defined in broad and narrow ways, both building on the general definition outlined above. Broadly defined, political performance comprises the activities of political actors (descriptive) as well as the evaluation of these activities and their outcomes. Hence, it concerns the description of particular activities such as passing bills and spending money as well as the assessment of whether political actors make public policies (the activity), for example, in efficient ways and whether they achieve intended goals (outcomes) such as wealth or liberty. Narrowly understood, political performance is only an evaluative concept, referring to the evaluation of what political actors do and what the outcomes of their actions are. This narrow definition, dominating in scientific research, is the one adopted here. Some authors suggest a further narrowing of the concept by focusing on the evaluation of governments or, more specifically, on the evaluation of democratic governments. In this case, the terms *quality of government* or *good government* are synonyms for *political performance*. Here, such a specification is renounced in favor of a more comprehensive understanding of the concept applicable to all political actors.

This entry outlines the different theoretical and historical contexts of research on political performance, classifies criteria for evaluating

political performance, discusses issues of measurement, reviews theories and research explaining political performance, and, finally, suggests future research perspectives.

### Theoretical and Historical Contexts

The idea of evaluating political systems is a core concern in classical political science literature. Criteria of political performance such as liberty and equality dominated the writings of classical political theorists (e.g., Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau) in their search for good types of government. Additionally, performance criteria such as the common good and stability served as central yardsticks for scholars of comparative government, from Aristotle to Karl Loewenstein, in describing and comparing different nondemocratic and democratic regimes. This preliminary stage in the debate on political performance, however, is characterized by the fact that its protagonists did not make explicit use of the term *political performance*. Furthermore, they mainly relied on theoretical arguments and unsystematic empirical observations to assess the merits of different systems.

The first systematic theoretical and empirical work on political performance was not presented until the 1970s. At this point, two crucial obstacles had been overcome. The first obstacle concerns the availability of cross-national data. It became less of an obstacle with the collection and documentation of a wide range of social and political indicators for many independent countries of the world. First editions of several data handbooks appeared during the 1960s (e.g., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*). The second obstacle concerns the deliberate avoidance of evaluation by empirically oriented political scientists. This was revised when political scientists dared to make explicit and systematic appraisals of concrete political systems on the basis of empirical data. The outset of this phase can be dated to 1971, when Harry Eckstein developed and justified theoretical criteria for evaluating political systems and when Ted Gurr with Muriel McClelland made a first systematic attempt to empirically translate and apply these criteria to a sample of democratic and nondemocratic countries. In 1978, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell developed the most influential

and lasting concept of political performance emerging from this phase. In the context of systems theory, they suggested their concept of political productivity, enclosing eight different political goods: (1) system maintenance, (2) system adaptation, (3) participation, (4) compliance and support, (5) procedural justice, (6) welfare, (7) security, and (8) liberty. Additionally, they empirically studied the attainment of some of these goods in several democratic and nondemocratic countries. This first and early stage of performance research, however, provoked only a few isolated studies. These studies mainly used systems theory as a frame of reference and analyzed empirically democratic and nondemocratic systems.

In the aftermath, research on political performance advanced significantly and resulted in the establishment of an independent research area in the 1990s. At least two reasons account for this advancement—one historical, the other theoretical. Historically, the collapse of the state socialist systems in Central and Eastern Europe, resulting in the abolition of the most important alternative to democracy, turned the attention of comparative politics to quality differences within democracies, more specifically to quality differences between various types of democratic governments. Theoretically, the rise of *new institutionalism* in the 1980s, with its central premise that different institutional arrangements produce different results (institutions matter), directed the attention to political performance. Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993) and Arend Lijphart's *Patterns of Democracy* (1999) are among the most important and influential works in this period. Putnam suggested responsiveness and effectiveness as central criteria in evaluating the performance of democratic government; he, furthermore, introduced social capital in addition to the already existing factors explaining political performance—namely, political institutions and socioeconomic modernity. Lijphart, on the other hand, is interested in the performance of so-called majoritarian and consensus democracy. He asks which type works best, and he offers the most comprehensive empirical analysis, covering 36 democracies and 32 performance indicators categorized into four areas (macroeconomic management, control of violence, quality of government, and kinder and gentler policy areas: welfare state, environmental policy, criminal justice, and foreign aid).

While these and other studies mainly focus on the policy performance of democracies, the issue of democratic quality or the quality of democracy itself gained interest since 2000. Since then, democratic criteria such as accountability, responsiveness, freedom, and equality are increasingly considered and studied empirically in the research on political performance.

Presently, political performance is an established field of research in political science. It is mainly concerned with evaluating different types of democratic governments such as majoritarian and consensus democracies or presidential and parliamentary democracies, on the one hand, and in evaluating specific democratic institutions such as electoral systems, party systems, and federalism, on the other. At first sight, this focus on evaluating political institutions seems to contradict the adopted definition of political performance referring to political actors. This definition, however, is consistent with new institutional theory. According to this theory, only actors—not political institutions—can act. Political institutions exert an influence on individual or collective actors by constituting constraints on their actions.

### A Typology of Criteria of Political Performance

Normative criteria are essential for an explicit and systematic evaluation of political performance; they function as yardsticks against which the activities of political actors can be assessed. To be able to evaluate different political systems, these normative criteria should represent universal values. Furthermore, there should be consensus that these values embody legitimate obligations of political systems, which means, on the one hand, that these values guide what political actors do and, on the other hand, that citizens demand from government the attainment of these values. Finally, these universal values should be justified theoretically.

Most authors propose individual concepts of performance consisting of a list of criteria without referring to those of others. As a result, a multiplicity of heterogeneous criteria of political performance exists, and there is little convergence between the different lists proposed by different authors. With the help of a typology of performance criteria suggested by Edeltraud Roller (2005), the most

important types of criteria can be identified. The typology refers to the performance of liberal democracies and is based on two dimensions:

- The first dimension distinguishes between goal-oriented and general performance. *Goal-oriented* or substantive performance aims at the attainment of particular goals such as welfare or liberty. *General* or procedural performance is independent of these particular goals; it helps promote the attainment of any particular goals. Examples are stability or efficient use of resources.
- The second dimension differentiates between systemic and democratic performance. It conceptualizes different normative expectations that exist with regard to political systems in general and with regard to democratic systems in particular. *Systemic* performance refers to achievements every political system must generate for society, such as economic growth and stability. *Democratic* performance refers to specific criteria that are to be ensured by democratic systems, such as liberty, responsiveness, and accountability.

By combining these two dimensions, four types of performance criteria can be established. Both goal-oriented and general political performance can be distinguished according to whether they are to be provided by democracies either in their function as political system in general or in their function as democratic system in particular. Examples for goal-oriented, systemic criteria are security and welfare; examples for goal-oriented, democratic criteria are liberty and equality; examples for general, systemic criteria are efficiency and stability; and examples for general, democratic criteria are accountability and participation.

Applying this typology, one-dimensional and multidimensional concepts of political performance can be distinguished. While one-dimensional concepts rely on a single type of performance criteria, multidimensional concepts combine different types of criteria. For example, Harry Eckstein suggested a one-dimensional concept of general performance valid for all political systems. It includes durability, civil order, legitimacy, and decisional efficacy. Roller's normative model of political effectiveness is also a one-dimensional concept

aiming at a complete list of goal-related, systemic performance criteria. It covers international security, domestic security, wealth, socioeconomic security and socioeconomic equality, and environmental protection. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005) developed a two-dimensional concept of quality of democracy covering two general (rule of law and accountability) and three goal-oriented (responsiveness, liberty, and equality) criteria. Finally, Almond and Powells's concept of political productivity (1978) is a truly multidimensional concept covering all four types of criteria: (1) goal-related, systemic criteria (welfare and security); (2) goal-related, democratic criteria (liberty); (3) general, systemic criteria (system maintenance, system adaptation, compliance, and support); and (4) general, democratic criteria (participation and procedural justice).

These and other suggested concepts of political performance share the assumption that different values cannot be attained simultaneously. They assume trade-offs or conflictual relationships, meaning that one value can be attained only at the cost of another value. Trade-offs are proposed between different types of performance criteria (e.g., policy performance and democratic quality) as well as within types of performance criteria (e.g., wealth and socioeconomic equality). Authors differ, however, with respect to the proposed trade-offs. Their ideological position often determines whether specific performance criteria are seen as incompatible or mutually compatible. Irrespective of the assumed type of relationship, any assessment of performance should entail an analysis of the trade-offs between different values.

Finally, as far as the theoretical justification of performance criteria is concerned, most authors tend to select their criteria arbitrarily. If they justify them at all, they refer to different theories depending on the type of performance criteria. In the case of democratic criteria, whether goal oriented or general, normative democratic theory (e.g., liberal democracy) is used. In the case of systemic criteria, especially goal-oriented criteria such as security, wealth, and environmental protection, empirical political theories, especially theories on the development of policies or the expansion of the role of government, are used to justify performance criteria.

### Measurement

The measurement of political performance necessarily requires a comparative approach. Political performance is either assessed in relation to theoretically defined normative criteria (e.g., a literacy rate of 100%) or in comparison with empirically defined maximum or minimum values (e.g., relative to the country with the best and/or the worst literacy rate). Most often, the second type of comparison is used in empirical research.

In general, the measurement of political performance raises several issues, which are discussed as follows.

#### *Structure Versus Process*

Although authors agree that political performance refers to the evaluation of the political process—that is, what political actors actually do—some authors measure political performance at the level of political structure. This is especially true in the case of democratic performance. While measures of democratic structure identify whether a democratic structure exists and is actually working in a country or not (e.g., universal suffrage and competitive elections), measures of democratic quality presuppose such a democratic structure and assess to what extent democratic performance is given (e.g., responsiveness and accountability). Obviously, there is a fundamental theoretical difference between structure and process, and valid measures of political performance should refer to the political process. Nevertheless, while the difference is clear in conceptual terms, it is rather difficult to separate between both dimensions empirically.

#### *Outputs Versus Outcomes*

Conceptually, performance does not refer to actions or efforts to reach goals, whether in the form of laws, personal spending, or state spending, but to the outcomes or actual results of these actions. Rather than using output indicators (e.g., the degree of redistribution measured on the basis of social expenditures), outcome indicators should be used (e.g., poverty rate). While outcomes are the real test as to whether the outputs have produced the intended results or not, usually they cannot be directly controlled by political actors. Hence, the question has been raised whether one

can speak of political performance here at all. To avoid this problem, some authors consciously decide to use outputs rather than outcomes as measure for political performance. For example, Putnam's Index of Institutional Performance primarily measures outputs such as the number of day care centers and health expenditures rather than, say, mortality rates. This is convincing only on condition that outputs could serve as valid proxies for outcomes. But this is a much disputed assumption. In their attempts to measure performance, other scholars deliberately focus on actual results or outcomes rather than mere efforts to reach goals. For example, Roller's Index of Effectiveness of Democracies is designed as a pure measure of outcomes covering indicators such as poverty, infant mortality, and unemployment rate.

#### *Objective Versus Subjective Measures*

In principle, political performance can be measured either on the basis of objective measures (e.g., the rate of unemployment and the extent of congruence between voters' policy preferences and government's ideological stances) or on the basis of subjective evaluations of citizens (e.g., citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and citizens' perception of the degree of government's responsiveness to people's demands). Whether objective or subjective measures should be used is a theoretical decision depending on the research question. It is equally valid to ask for the quality of government on the basis of objective criteria and to ask for citizens' evaluation of the quality of government. Due to the substantial difference between both dimensions, however, objective measures of political performance cannot be used as proxies for subjective measures and vice versa.

#### *Single Versus Composite Measures*

Normally, studies on political performance are interested not only in the assessment of several specific criteria (e.g., unemployment rate and poverty) but also in the overall level of performance of political actors. The most efficient method to gauge the overall level of political performance is to construct a composite measure integrating and summarizing evaluations of several performance dimensions. The available composite measures

mainly refer to policy performance. The well-known Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) represents one example for such a measure. It subsumes three dimensions of welfare—a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living—and relies on four indicators (life expectancy, adult literacy rate, gross enrollment in school, and gross domestic product). It assesses the average achievements in a country in these dimensions of welfare. Roller's Index of Effectiveness of Democracies represents another composite measure aiming at the policy level. It takes a broad view, encompassing effectiveness in all domestic policy areas: domestic security policy, economic policy, social policy, and environmental policy. Each policy area is measured by a composite measure, and these four measures are integrated into an overall Index of Effectiveness. Altogether, it is composed of 14 indicators (e.g., murder and manslaughter, gross domestic product, infant mortality, emissions of sulfur oxides, etc.). Examples of composite measures aiming at general or procedural performance are the *good governance* indicators of the World Bank. These indicators cover composite measures for six performance dimensions—(1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption—and an overall composite measure comprising these six dimensions. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance by experts and ordinary citizens as well (e.g., press freedom index, risk of political instability, quality of bureaucracy, foreign investment, violent crime, frequency of corruption, etc.). Constructing composite measures implies decisions about the techniques of standardization, weighting, and aggregation of individual values. Different statistical procedures of standardization (e.g., *z*-score transformation and indexing), weighting (e.g., equal and unequal), and aggregation (e.g., arithmetic mean and unobserved-components model) are used, and their relative merits are discussed intensively.

### Explaining Political Performance

Research on political performance also aims to explain differences between countries and why

some governments are more successful than others. National political institutions take center stage with regard to this question. This is for two different reasons, one theoretical and the other practical. Knowledge about the effect of political institutions is of theoretical interest because the idea that institutions matter is the central premise of the new institutionalism paradigm. This knowledge is also of great practical importance. If political institutions reveal a direct and unidirectional effect on political performance, recommendations can be made as to which kinds of constitutions should be implemented in new democracies (constitutional engineering) and what kind of institutional reforms should be conducted in established democracies to enhance political performance. Besides political institutions, cultural factors (e.g., social capital), socioeconomic modernity (e.g., wealth), globalization (e.g., foreign trade), and, particularly, preferences of political actors (e.g., the ideological orientation of governmental parties) are suggested as other factors explaining political performance.

Empirical research focuses on the effect of democratic institutions, either on the effect of types of democracies (e.g., majoritarian or consensus democracies, presidential or parliamentary democracies) or on the effect of specific democratic institutions (e.g., majoritarian or proportional electoral systems, federal or unitary states). The core question is whether diffusion or concentration of power results in higher levels of political performance. Numerous studies dealt with the performance of consensus and majoritarian democracies. Empirical analyses of Lijphart indicate that consensus democracies enjoy higher levels of political performance than majoritarian democracies and that these institutional settings themselves display a direct and unidirectional effect on political performance. Replications and additional studies can also show that democratic institutions indeed matter for political performance (e.g., Roller, 2005). But they matter only sometimes and to a limited degree, and their effect is less direct and less unidirectional than assumed so far. It seems that political institutions interact with other factors, especially with the preferences of political actors such as governments. Therefore, the theoretically and practically attractive hypothesis stating direct and unidirectional effects of political institutions on political performance is open to challenge.



### Research Perspectives

Although we are able to now witness an established research area of political performance, its achievements are far from being solid, comprehensive, and cumulative. This is true for several reasons. First, the available studies refer to a multiplicity of heterogeneous criteria of political performance; a consensus on relevant criteria is still to evolve. Second, theoretical work and empirical work on political performance are only loosely coupled. Theoretical work focusing on the deduction and justification of criteria of performance tends to ignore the task of specifying empirical indicators that could flow from its normative criteria. In turn, empirical work tends to disregard theoretical reasoning on performance criteria. Third, empirical research is mainly devoted to the evaluation of democracies, especially to Western democracies. It rarely pays attention to the performance of Asian, African, and Latin American democracies. Fourth, systematic comparisons of contemporary democratic and non-democratic systems are still in a very early stage.

To make progress, it might be helpful to focus on the four types of performance criteria presented above. This could open up the possibility of developing common theoretical, methodological, and empirical foundations for each of these four types, and this could provide a basis for cumulative knowledge. Additionally, one question should be investigated more in depth in future: How political institutions exert their influence on political performance and how they interact with other factors, political actors in particular. Up to now, theoretical and empirical knowledge about this central question is too provisional and incomplete.

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*See also* Democracy, Types of; Electoral Systems; Globalization; Government; Institutional Theory; Institutions and Institutionalism; Modernization Theory; Parliamentary Systems; Parties; Party Systems; Political Culture; Presidentialism; Social Capital

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## PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

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Performance management involves managing organizations as well as managing the entire machinery of government. More precisely, it is a process of establishing goals and regularly checking the progress made toward achieving those goals. It incorporates continual feedback and is based on the principle of management by contract rather than by command. This entry examines the concept of performance management, its theoretical context, and related developments and applications.

### Conceptual Overview

Performance management includes activities to ensure that goals are being met in an effective and efficient manner; thus, it becomes a mechanism for

accountability. The managerial tradition of the past several decades has focused on performance as a part of management practice in the public sector of Western countries. Governments have supported administrative reforms from old public administration rules and procedures to modern managerial models, within the framework of the new public management doctrine.

As public values, efficiency, productivity, and service orientation have become more important. Bureaucrats have been forced to transform from their traditional roles into more managerial roles and to become more concerned with performance.

Generally speaking, many ideas concerning reform have been borrowed from the private sector. Evaluation has focused more on economic issues than on political ones. Egoistic interests, competition and contracting, cost-effectiveness, and the role of customers are discussed more and more in the core of public domain.

Performance management is important in both the private and the public sectors. By using performance management, governments are searching for better performance in their public sector organizations. The use of market mechanisms in public administration is one means of increasing competition with the private sector and improving the efficiency of public services. Service delivery is expected to be more transparent and accountable. In the redefined and new governance, administrative control is transformed from traditional action controls to modern output controls.

However, performance management is currently faced with many challenges. Sometimes it is difficult to implement in the public sector due to politically unstable and multiple goals, vague outputs, and complexity of services. These challenges raise the question of whether performance management is more a myth than a reality in modernizing public organizations. Another issue is how to reform performance measurement, which should be more than simply accounting exercises. As John Halligan and Geert Bouckaert (2009) ask, is there a gap between rhetoric and practice with respect to performance management?

In the performance management debate, warnings are given about the dysfunctions and unintended consequences of performance management practices that may result in a decline rather than an improvement in the performance of organizations.

According to Frank Verbeeten (2008, p. 430), such effects may include the following:

- a. growth of internal bureaucracy,
- b. lack of innovation,
- c. reduction of system or process responsibility,
- d. tunnel vision,
- e. suboptimization,
- f. gaming of performance measures, and
- g. measure fixation.

How should we understand performance management? In performance management, targets are defined, expectations are set, processes are measured and evaluated, and, if all these are fulfilled, top management is rewarded. Performance management is both a management tool and an umbrella for a variety of different management techniques. Performance management is connected to several other management techniques, such as the stakeholder approach, a balanced scorecard, and even quality management. In national applications, performance management is called management for results or management by objectives and results. In some cases, the separate nature of steering and managing is being emphasized.

As Zoe Radnor and Mary McGuire (2004) note, the two terms *performance measurement* and *performance management* are often used interchangeably. The basic idea in performance management is measuring performance and defining aims and goals. Through the management process, strategies are selected to achieve the goals in an efficient way. Performance-related pay for groups or individuals is also used in performance management.

In the process of performance management, an agency involves its employees, as individuals and members of a group, in improving organizational effectiveness in the accomplishment of the agency mission. According to John Mwita (2000), the factors that affect performance are personal factors (e.g., motivation and commitment), leadership factors (encouragement, guidance, and support), team factors (support of colleagues), system factors (instruments of labor), and contextual factors (changes of internal and external environment).

Performance management is basically a control system as well, with both the process and the outputs being controlled. Different opinions are

presented about the nature of the control function. For example, the control function is considered to be either a universal and highly general or a detailed, highly specialized function.

### Theoretical Context

In public administration literature, the doctrine of performance management is referred to by several theorists, such as Amitai Etzioni, Herbert Simon, James March, and Henry Mintzberg. For instance, Max Weber's model of bureaucracy is considered as a machine organization. A bureaucratic organization is efficient, routinized, and predictable. Sometimes customer organizations, both in the public and the private sector, are designed like machines, and their employees are expected to behave as if they were components of machines. Thus, currently, key concerns in performance management are the change from measuring performance to managing performance and expanding the performance management from an economic perspective to others, such as social and citizen perspectives.

In a politico-administrative process, governance and management are broader, including different stakeholders in the democratic system, such as elected officials and citizens. Commonly shared values are based on the public interest and political accountability. If the engagement of citizens is very limited in performance processes, performance management as a system will not know what people care about in their different roles as voters, taxpayers, customers, and so on.

As Amber Wichowsky and Donald Moynihan state, in a well-functioning democracy, citizens are capable of self-governance, they are treated with equal respect and dignity, and they are responsible to their communities and participate actively in political life.

According to Paul Epstein, Lyle Wray, and Courtney Harding (2006), in a performance management process, potential citizen roles are, for instance, framing issues and setting the agenda (planning and setting goals and performance targeting), as stakeholders and collaborators (implementing policies), and as evaluators (measuring and reporting results).

Public sector leaders encounter numerous requirements in managing the performance measurement of government services. These include

(a) understanding better the real nature of service delivery systems; (b) having the capability of agreeing on strategic objectives, providing incentives, and evaluating programs; and (c) collecting, analyzing, and presenting performance management data.

In the workplaces of public organizations, personnel are aware of the purposes of performance management. By measuring and managing performance, it is expected that managers and employees are learning to improve their performance. Citizens also want to know for what purposes their money is spent. Besides, in large-scale branches of administration, massive amounts of performance data are collected. Effective exploitation of performance information is a challenge because expectations might be very high. Effective ways of implementing and rational decisions on improving performance are both needed.

### Development and Application

An example of the development of performance management is the system existing in Finland, which is in line with practices in other Western countries. Within the public administration establishment in Finland, reform began in the late 1980s. These public sector reforms were mainly influenced by administrative and management reforms in other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Steering and budgetary systems, including laws, rules, and procedures, were reformed. New management techniques were implemented in the central, regional, and local government.

According to the definition in the Finnish *Handbook on Performance Management* (2006), performance management is an agreement-based interactive control model. Its operational core lies in the ability of the involved parties to find the appropriate balance between the available resources and the results to be attained using them. The basic idea of performance management in operations is to balance resources and targets, on the one hand, and efficiency and quality, on the other, and to ensure that the desired effects are achieved in a cost-effective manner.

In formal performance management systems, performance targets are discussed, agreed on, and set between the ministry and the subordinate

agency. The performance criteria are used in setting targets and in reporting operations. If the system is to have legitimacy, the targets must be measurable, clear, and based on systematic and reliable evaluation. Performance criteria consist of policy effectiveness, operational efficiency, outputs, quality management, and management of human resources.

Another challenge for performance applications is the use of performance criteria. Performance criteria should be developed by applying incentive systems. In other words, who receives praise or criticism? If the criteria are determined for evaluating the performance of lower level public servants in their daily interactions with users of public services, the decision process will be much easier than it is for higher level officials.

In Finland, performance management is implemented through performance agreements between the ministry and the agency. The agreement is a control tool in the interaction of the parties involved. Because performance is reported, there are consequences for both good and poor performance. For instance, in the Finnish university sector, the Ministry of Education and all 20 state-run universities sign a performance agreement defining the objectives: the number of degrees to be awarded, the development projects, and the level of funding. The agreement is signed for 3 years but is reviewed in the yearly negotiations between the ministry and a single university. In line with the ministry–university negotiations, each university arranges its own performance negotiations between the rector and the faculties.

The example of Finnish universities illustrates the fundamental character of performance management. Despite the problems of measurement and implementation, this approach to management has developed as a major method for management and accountability.

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*See also* Evaluation Research; New Public Management

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## PERSONALIZATION OF POLITICS

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Personalization of politics refers to a shift from collective to individual actors and institutions. Its scope and degree can vary according to regime type, national and cultural environments, and the time span under consideration. However, personalization is commonly considered as an emerging trait in a number of relevant arenas: from voting behavior to governmental steering and from electoral campaigning to party organization. Most studies emphasize the role of leadership and media as the key determinants of political personalization, though it certainly partakes of the more general trend toward an individualized society. This entry discusses recent trends and major implications for contemporary democracies.

The most visible aspect of political personalization concerns the transformation of electoral campaigning, with the rise of candidate-centered politics. This transformation affects the whole consent mobilization process. The media, in the first place, have become the main intermediary channel between candidates and their constituencies. With

traditional party structures losing their grip on the electorate, candidates tend to rely on old as well as new media to spell out their programs and contact potential voters, especially in large-scale elections—for governors, prime ministers, or presidents—where TV and the Internet offer invaluable shortcuts to reaching mass audiences. To best exploit the media, candidates use media language and logic, which put a premium on individual personality.

This has led to a thorough reorganization of campaign strategies and funding, with the main focus on the media image and performance of the candidates. In the wake of the famous TV debate in 1960 between U.S. presidential candidates Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, which was held responsible for the victory of Kennedy, the Democratic nominee, the media have become the key investment of all major electoral campaigns. Several empirical studies have questioned whether the actual impact of personalized politics fully matches the vision and aims of campaign managers and spin doctors. However, while issues have remained important and party identification still plays a role in voting behavior, it is a widespread opinion that voters, today, are more heavily influenced by the personality factor than they were 20 years ago.

Though less visible and less debated than the personalization of elections, a no less important area of political personalization is the strengthening of monocratic government. Whether in presidential, semipresidential, or parliamentary regimes, the chief executive has gained more power and authority with respect to three arenas: (1) the government as a whole, (2) the party, and (3) the wider public. Personalization in government has been described as a process of presidentialization. That is, prime ministers in old as well as new democracies are now stronger with respect to the collegial bodies they chair, performing several functions that were once the prerogative of the U.S. presidential model. Increase in prime ministerial power concerns the normative as well as the organizational sphere. With the expansion of delegated legislation and emergency regulation, a large share of legislative activity has shifted from parliament to the executive and, within the executive, to the prime ministerial office. This, in turn, has grown both in human resources and in the scope of intervention, a trend that in many ways

resembles the transformation of the U.S. presidency following Franklin D. Roosevelt's reforms. Prime ministers have also gained better control over the governmental agenda and the overall decision-making process, thus taking more direct responsibility for their electoral mandate.

In only a few instances, the emerging of prime ministerial dominance is the result of outright constitutional changes. In most cases, the transformation has occurred through new rules and procedures regulating the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch, as well as through the adoption of laws providing for an overall reorganization of the prime minister's office. As a consequence, the traditional constitutional divide between presidential and parliamentary regimes has been to some extent blurred by what could be considered a silent institutional revolution.

A major contribution to this end has come from the personalization of party control. Parties have long been the stronghold of collective decision making and responsibility, largely concurring with the preeminence of legislatures as collegial bodies. In many Western democracies as well as in the Soviet bloc, the prevalent form of party rule has been oligarchic, by a system of elite cooptation. In the past 2 decades, party leadership has become more associated with individual personalities. The change has been heralded by countries as different as Margaret Thatcher's United Kingdom and Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union, soon to become the format of most political regimes.

Party personalization can vary according to several factors. In old, established parties, the process is contrasted by the entrenched nomenclature. It took 12 years for Tony Blair to successfully take over the Labour party in the United Kingdom and impress his own brand on the New Labour. Helmut Kohl's primacy in the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU) in Germany was mainly related to the extraordinary opportunities of Germany's reunification. On the whole, the German party system, also as a legacy of the Nazi era, remains a hostile environment to one-man rule. Yet whenever new parties are formed, there is a diffused tendency that they be promoted and controlled by individual leaders. The ideal-typical case is Silvio Berlusconi's Forward Italy (Forza Italia). Banking

on the favorable conditions created by the collapse of the governing parties, Berlusconi immensely benefited from his corporate empire to found his own personal party. As a media tycoon and one of the wealthiest men in the world, he could rely on a highly skilled professional apparatus as well as on huge financial means to set up, within less than 6 months, a vote-generating machine.

A key aspect of Berlusconi's success was his extensive use of TV, with the new infomercial techniques he borrowed from Ross Perot's 1992 presidential campaign in the United States, thus bypassing journalists' intermediation and directly targeting his audiences. Direct appeal to the masses, together with a constant focus on charismatic leadership, is the main trait of the so-called media populism, a phenomenon strongly associated with party personalization. From Hugo Chavez's Venezuela to Vladimir Putin's Russia, political and/or economic control of the media has become a decisive factor for the rise of one-man-dominated parties with a large popular following.

The Internet, too, has greatly contributed to political personalization. While the broadcasting media, such as radio and TV, require big budgets and complex scheduling and cannot be aimed at specific population segments, creating one's own website, blog, and direct mailing system is a much easier and less costly undertaking. More and more politicians use the Internet to promote their message and interact with their constituencies on a personal basis, thus contributing to rendering party channels obsolete. In most cases, Internet personalization operates on a smaller scale than the TV-based marketing of political leadership. However, the two media can be used to feed and reinforce one another, as in Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaign. Thanks to the web, Obama's organization reached millions of supporters with daily updates on the most controversial issues and invitations to join virtual or real-life debates, thus motivating participation and spurring donations. The money raised through the Internet was, in turn, devoted to a massive use of TV advertising.

In spite of its overwhelming presence in contemporary politics, measuring the real impact of political personalization on strictly empirical grounds is not easy. Research frameworks have been slow to adapt to a phenomenon that affects so many arenas. With a few relevant exceptions, there is a lack

of comparative and longitudinal studies, the more so as the most striking trait of political personalization consists of its cutting across different disciplinary subdomains. Studies of electoral behavior rarely venture into the analysis of the transformation of party organizations, and most accounts of the rise of stronger executives only focus on the governmental institutional setting.

This is not to say that empirical investigation is not possible or necessary. The relevance of this topic looms even larger in a wider theoretical and historical perspective. In what has become the mainstream definition of political power, Max Weber distinguished three types of legitimate authority. Two types, the traditional and the charismatic, were grounded in personal resources. Yet Weber considered the third type of legal-rational authority, with its emphasis on bureaucratic procedures and collective decision making, as the pillar of modern society, both in the political and in the economic realms. Traditional and charismatic power was mainly treated as a remnant of the past, inevitably bound to be superseded by the advent of legal-rational authority. Moreover, in dealing with traditional and charismatic power, Weber's tendency was to present these two patterns as separate, occurring in different historical and cultural contexts. Quite to the contrary, one of the major characteristics of contemporary personal power is the interaction and cumulation of these two elements. The modern process of personalization of politics results, to a large extent, from the combination of patrimonial and charismatic resources. This combination becomes all the more stronger when it can use—and possibly merge into—the key central institutions of a democratic regime.

Political personalization thus appears as a mix of old and new forces. The main novelty consists in the role of the media and their natural focus on individuals and their personality. This has led to a revival of charisma in an electronic form. Media charisma may have little if any of the extraordinary gift of grace that characterized charismatic leaders in the past, with their mass religious followings. Yet on various occasions, media charisma has proved to be a key factor in the rise of powerful leaders. The comeback of personal power also reflects the resilience, in industrialized societies, of cultural traits long considered bygone. The tendency to rely once again on personal rather than collective

and impersonal attributes is a sign of weaker social cohesion and increased instability. On the positive side, one may consider that the process of political personalization, today, largely falls within the routines, discourse, and boundaries of democratic politics. The nightmare of personal power getting out of control seems to belong to the past.

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*See also* Charisma; Electoral Campaigns; Executive; Power; Presidentialism

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political systems emerged in a limited number of cases only and strongly correlate with a specific type of parliamentary democracy: “consociational” systems (Arend Lijphart) in which agreements among the elites of the respective pillars bridge their divisions. In the following sections, the characteristics of such pillars as they occur in the major cases, their political relevance, and recent tendencies of depillarization are discussed.

#### Characteristics and Political Relevance

The term *pillar* (*verzuiling* in Dutch and Flemish and *Lager* in German) is sociologically defined as strong political-cultural submilieus based on ethnic-linguistic, religious, or similar cleavages with a strong internal organization and a relatively high level of external autonomy. Under such circumstances, you can spend much of your life within the networks of such pillars, often including schools, media, political parties, and so on. These organized submilieus are politically relevant for understanding the stability and survival of democracy in (deeply) divided societies. Lijphart mentions five criteria to measure the degree of pillarization:

1. the role of ideology (more often than not cleavage related) within the pillar,
2. the size and density of the organized network representing the pillar,
3. the (institutionalized) cohesiveness of the pillar’s network,
4. the extent of “enclosure” of the pillar (or the absence of cross-cultural relations), and
5. the extent to which pillarized behavior is encouraged and directed by its elites.

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## PILLARIZATION

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Pillarization of society means the *vertical* integration of a subcultural community in a system of political representation. More often than not, this kind of integration is considered as necessary for a minority to politically participate and survive when democratization of a polity is under way or more or less completed by means of electoral rights (e.g., universal suffrage) and the establishment of a party system (at the national level). Pillarized

The application of these criteria to West European democracies shows that there are four polities that indeed qualify as being pillarized: Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The last is seen as the least pillarized. Others, for example, Gerhard Lehbruch, have claimed that the Federal Republic of Germany belongs to the pillarized community, too. This is questionable because Lehbruch focused on the organization of the German postwar party system and its ramifications for decision making at the federal level. His explanation rested more

on the cleavage-related mechanisms and the complexities of organizing representation in a federation. Hence, the working of the German polity showed some of the features of a pillarized system.

Switzerland can also be considered as a borderline case. Rather than being the well-organized and cohesive pillars (as defined here), the extant cleavages in Swiss politics—religious/secular, language-cum-territory divisions, and the rural/urban divide—accounted for the development of consociational practices through the mechanisms of the party system dynamics. For example, Pascal Sciarini and Simon Hug claim that pillarization in Switzerland is weak because it only plays a role in finding amicable agreement based on cleavages and by means of proportionality on the federal level. Pillarized networks are not the main agents but rather national political parties that are in turn checked and balanced by institutional safeguards through cantonal representation and the referendum instrument.

The other cases mentioned also show differences. Belgium is complex in terms of its pillarization because it is strongly influenced by two cleavages. One is secular/religious and the other is language/territory. While the former is not more relevant than in many other (European) party systems, the latter is: Since the 1960s, this conflict is rising high on the political agenda; it has been conducive to the federalization of the Belgian state and was preceded by the bifurcation of the nationwide party system.

Austria and the Netherlands stand out as the strongest examples of politicized pillarization. This can be explained by two factors: One, the minorities are not geographically concentrated, but their “members” reside throughout the entire territory. Precisely for this reason, a socially cohesive network reinforcing the control of membership was deemed necessary. Two, only by means of elite politics and the proportional-representation (PR) electoral system—registering the relative strength of each pillar—was it feasible to establish accommodation between the pillarized communities.

Other cases of pillarization have been mentioned, but mostly defined post hoc, to explain the relative stability of the emerging political system. Examples are Czechoslovakia (1989–1993), Lebanon (during the 1960s), and Colombia.

Pillarization, as it has emerged and existed, is strongly correlated to a particular form of

democracy: consociationalism. This can explain the paradox of the occurrence of stable democracies with strong political divisions between minorities. A consociational democratic system is characterized by the fact that there is no majority party but only minority parties that are by and large representing pillarized communities. In contrast to the theory of pluralism that predicts political instability under such circumstances, many (but not all) democracies appear capable of consensual and effective decision making. This paradox was solved by developing institutional mechanisms and conventions that allowed for cooperation between elites (representing the various pillars): (a) the introduction of a proportional electoral system that secured access for each pillarized party; (b) securing the autonomy of each pillar within society (often by means of basic laws, as is the case in Austria and the Netherlands, or by carefully describing the degrees of self-regulation by subnational territories, as in Germany and Switzerland as well as in Belgium of late); and (c) a careful but often complex procedure regarding the formation of government coalitions (which were often all-inclusive or at least broad in composition). These mechanisms enabled elites to find agreement and to avoid open conflict over substantial issues that directly concerned the ideology or subcultural differences that had led to pillarization. Hence, the political consequences of pillarization—that is, deep-seated conflict—could be overcome by means of elite appeasement and (often secret) agreements, proportional payoffs, and (often) depoliticization of contested policy issues.

It should be noticed, however, that consociational democracy cannot be considered as a universal recipe. Lijphart, for instance, showed that in other cases, primarily outside Western Europe, this type of democracy did not develop or last long under the same circumstances (e.g., Lebanon, Colombia, and perhaps contemporary Belgium). Furthermore, critics of the consociational model have pointed to certain flaws, namely, the fact that the minorities had to be roughly of the same size or that these subcultural groups were insufficiently organized and therefore less loyal to their political elites. Finally, the political practice often depended on other factors such as social and economic development (e.g., the effective equalization of resources across segments of the population). Finally, the



question arose whether or not consociational success—that is, a stable and effective government for all communities—did in fact produce its own disappearance over time. This last argument seems to be correct, for consociationalism can be considered as a historical phenomenon for the simple reason that most pillarized political systems have indeed faded away or failed.

### Depillarization

Depillarization is a sociological process that has taken place since the 1970s and is considered, first of all, as a result of modernization (e.g., in terms of developments in communication such as information and communication technologies [ICT], which impair forms of social control), secularization (e.g., de-confessionalization, which weakens the loyalty of members of a pillar), globalization (e.g., due to de-industrialization being conducive to a changing class composition), and changes in elite behavior—all resulting in less cohesiveness and relaxing organizational ties within the pillars.

Politically, this process can be observed in terms of high degrees of electoral volatility, indicating changing behavior and a willingness to vote on the basis of motives other than being a member of a pillar. It is illustrative that during the 1960s the cross-European level of electoral volatility was 8%, but in pillarized countries, this was 3.3% lower. Yet from 1990 onward, this has changed dramatically: On average, electoral volatility increased by 3 points in Europe, but in the five pillarized countries, it rose to an unprecedented level of 22.3%, a growth of 16.8% (Peter Mair, 2008).

Second, the emergence of new parties that challenge pillarized parties and are mainly nonpillarized has contributed to these developments. Examples are the Greens and right-wing parties: Both party families have become particularly strong in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. During the 1960s, electoral support for all new parties in pillarized societies was below the cross-European average, being around 4.4%, whereas their support grew to 10% above the cross-European level in 2000. Third, the politics of accommodation as indicated *inter alia* by the type of government coalitions has also changed: Instead of broad coalitions, one finds more often than not

minimal winning coalitions (apart from Switzerland, due to its magic formula, which is, however, under pressure), with parties included in government coalitions that had not been participating before, such as in Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany.

All this points to a process of depillarization affecting a changing profile of organizational cohesiveness, electoral representation, and traditional cleavage politics. Finally, the impact of (party) elites diminished as well. Pillarization, taken in its political-sociological meaning, seems to have faded away and with it the typical features of consociational democracy.

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*See also* Cleavages, Social and Political; Democracy, Consociational; Elections, Volatility; Electoral Systems

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## PLANNING

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Planning is deciding about future decisions, either in the sense of defining what has to be decided or in the sense of deciding how to decide. This entry discusses alternative conceptions of planning, its place in social science theories, and some of the applications of planning in governing. After a consideration of planning as a fundamental human activity, the entry explains the rational-comprehensive model of planning and its limitations and then examines alternative approaches to planning, including procedural models, systems theory, and strategic planning. It then discusses the place of planning in social-scientific theories and some of the applications of planning to governance.

### The Activity of Planning

Planning is a very common activity. We plan courses of action so that we can achieve goals. However, it is important to distinguish between the concept of decision—the choice between different courses of actions whose consequences it is possible to forecast—and the notion of planning. The latter concept, in fact, encompasses several elements, namely, that

- to reach the goal or purpose of the activity, the decision maker has to take into consideration a set (and possibly a sequence) of different decisions;
- usually there is the need to allocate scarce resources between different goals; and
- central to the notion of planning is the concept of public policy, alternatively defined as the set of actions linked to the solution of a collective problem, a program of action, or a system of goals.

Planning, then, can be defined as the attempt to secure the coherence of a set or a sequence of decisions in relation to a specific problem—that is, a public policy. Therefore, even if we often find a plan or a program—that is, a document spelling out, in more or less detail, the content of the decisions to be taken and/or the procedures to adopt to this end—planning in itself cannot be identified with the decision to approve the said document; rather, it is a continuous activity, a process through which the future actions are organized and described.

The theory and practice of planning affect a plurality of different policy fields. For instance, the first university chair of urban planning was created in Liverpool in the United Kingdom in 1909, thus recognizing the existence of a specific discipline, distinct from architecture, geography, and the social sciences. But the socialist and communist movements in the 1920 to 1940 period gave popularity to the concept and practice of economic planning—that is, the adoption by the political power of a detailed and binding blueprint of the way in which the economic life has to be organized, by prescribing the type and quantity of goods and services to be produced in a given society in a given period of time. In the years following World War II, planning became widespread and was equated with rational and “scientific” decision making. This was also a consequence of the development of new methodologies of analysis (from cost-benefit analysis to operation research and linear programming) holding the promise of being able to inform public decision making. The meteoric rise of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) in the U.S. federal government in the 1960s (and the subsequent demise of the PPBS program in the U.S. military in the early 1970s) is a good example of the importance of this approach in that period. Even today, planning is sometimes still presented as the true answer to all policy problems, as the “right way” to organize the exercise of political power in public policies.

It is interesting to note that even politicians and scholars who share a common belief in the virtues of market and democracy, and consequently strongly oppose any form of socialism and planned economy, seem to advocate more planning when it comes to public policy making, possibly as a way to constrain political and administrative discretion

and certainly to increase the level of coherence and predictability of governmental interventions. This basically means that the value of planning is seen as a way to improve the content of the decisions by making them more “rational.”

### Alternative Conceptions of Planning

#### *The Rational-Comprehensive Model*

The starting point of the whole debate on the virtues of planning in policy making and policy implementation is therefore the idea that it is possible, indeed desirable, to base all decisions on a scientific analysis of the consequences of the available alternatives. This implies the following postulates:

1. It is possible to analyze the costs and benefits of all the different courses of action open to the public decision maker.
2. It is possible in a democratic society to use intellectual abilities in order to identify a system of goals related to the public interest or the common good.

It is clear that these two elements represent the basis of what Charles Lindblom has called the rational-comprehensive or rational-synoptic model of decision making, whose ideological roots are to be traced back to the 18th-century Enlightenment and 19th-century positivist philosophy, with their faith in the reason and in the intellectual capacities of the citizens or at least of the elites.

The two aforementioned postulates, however, have been widely criticized. Starting from the first postulate, as early as 1947, Herbert Simon has pointed out how the idea that all alternatives and all their consequences are known is highly unrealistic. No decision maker (and no planner) has all the time, the information, and the cognitive abilities required by the rational model of decision making. The consequence is that the maximum that can be achieved is to strive for a limited form of rationality, organizing the decision through a sequential search of the different alternatives and choosing the solution that is considered “good enough”—that is, that meets the “satisficing” criterion. Often this implies the necessity of not taking into consideration the consequences of the

preferred alternative for all the desirable goals, and therefore, it contravenes one of the basic requirements of rational planning—that is, the idea that everything should be coordinated. But even if the subjective aspect of the postulate is satisfied (i.e., the decision makers have all the relevant knowledge), one has to remember that because planning is about future decisions and behaviors, an inherent level of uncertainty exists, as external shocks can alter some basic elements and forecasts can prove radically wrong. And finally, especially in contemporary welfare states, citizens have the tendency to raise issues or problems for which there is no clear-cut solution available (e.g., drug addiction or long-term unemployment). In such cases, it is obvious that a process of rational choice is not possible and that the attempt of the planners to allocate the “right” amount of resources required for the achievement of the goals is particularly difficult.

#### *Preferences-Guided Decision Making*

These examples of intractable problems call into question the second postulate mentioned above—that it is possible to use the knowledge and the intellectual skills of the ruling elite in order to identify a set of goals able to maximize the common good. The objection here has to do with the distinction, again introduced by Lindblom, between two different views of the society: the intellectually driven society and the preferences-guided society. In the first type of society, the faith in human intellect is such that a theory of social change is shared, there is no conflict between the needs of the individuals composing the society, and therefore synoptic planning is possible and indeed necessary to secure progress. In the second type of society, the recognition of the limitation of human intellect and the fact that conflicts are not only inevitable but also valuable in securing progress makes it impossible to use the same type of approach. In the latter type of societies, the poliarchies, the solution of the collective problems can be informed by analysis but is eventually determined through the processes of social interaction, based on the preferences expressed by the members of the society. In the preferences-guided society, in which political power is shared by a plurality of actors and institutions, the basic criterion for policy choice is the agreement between the relevant actors—in Lindblom’s

words, the mutual adjustment between them—and therefore, planning as described above is virtually impossible. Not only is reliable knowledge about the expected and likely outcomes of the decisions absent, but even more fundamentally, there is not necessarily agreement on the very purpose(s) of the planning exercise(s)—that is, the goals and priorities to be attained through public actions. Actually, Lindblom contends that this does not mean that in the preferences-guided society there is no planning but that a different form of planning, labeled strategic planning, is needed. However, from the examples he proposes, it is apparent that the ability to unequivocally shape future choices—a basic element of the definition of planning proposed above—is drastically limited. According to his vision, policy making in pluralistic societies is necessarily incremental, each decision departing only slightly from the status quo. To steer the process of decision making in the desired direction, the “planner” can only try to anticipate the reactions of the other actors, adapting his or her own choices, possibly by adopting a piecemeal approach to complex problems. In this way, it will be possible to minimize the oppositions in the short run and reach a more advanced equilibrium from which to start the construction of the next stage of policy development. As one Dutch minister once said—and one has to remember that in the Netherlands a highly sophisticated machinery for policy planning has been in operation for a long time—the true definition of a plan is “what we can agree upon”—the task of political power consisting in the ability to pave the road toward the next plan. Therefore, even if Lindblom’s strategic planning is fundamentally different from what is generally understood as planning, from its proponent point of view, it is far from being a useless exercise. This style of policy making, as shown in Lindblom’s *The Intelligence of Democracy*, is not only considered more desirable from the normative point of view but also is seen as being more effective in securing progress and development than any other alternative, since it is more adaptable to the complexities of contemporary society.

### *Systems Theory*

An even more radical critique of rational planning—albeit developed at a different and

higher level of abstraction—is the one put forward by Niklas Luhmann (1995) in the context of his systems theory. Basically, says Luhmann, planning will never work as intended because “in planning the system reacts not only to the conditions that are attained, to the success or failure of planning, but also to the planning itself” (p. 470). The mere existence of planning modifies the behaviors that it was aiming to shape by establishing their premises and, therefore, is structurally unable to reach its goals. Furthermore, planning introduces a necessarily simplified model of the complexity of the system into the system itself.

Considering these devastating critiques, one could be tempted to simply give in and abandon the very idea of planning defined as the attempt to secure the coherence of a set or a sequence of decisions in relation to a public policy, following the conclusion, reached by Aaron Wildavsky already at the beginning of the 1970s that “if planning is everything, may be it’s nothing.” The problem, however, remains: As already pointed out, planning is a very common activity, but it is also somewhat necessary because of the need to give a meaning to the present activities by shaping future choices. Hence, several attempts have been made to propose alternative forms of planning that are able to overcome the previous objections.

### *Procedural Approaches to Planning*

One set of ideas is linked to the possibility of focusing the planning exercises not so much on the content of the future decisions but on the way(s) in which they should be reached, by prescribing the procedures of the decision-making process. This can be done with two different purposes in mind. In the first place, and more in line with tradition, the prescribed procedures might try to force the participants to consider more carefully the likely consequences of their preferred choices through, for instance, cost-benefit analysis or similar techniques. Using such tools in a multi-actor context, it is assumed, can have the effect of decreasing the danger of negative externalities, improving policy coordination, and, in general, reaching more “rational” decisions. Unfortunately, as Fritz Scharpf (1986) remarked more than 20 years ago, the “improvement of the policy making through better meta-policy . . . is littered with the skeletons of too

many practical failures of perfectly logical improvements of policy making institutions and procedures" (p. 182). The reason, he contends, quoting Wildavsky, is that "no amount of procedural innovation [is] able to exorcise the inherently political character of public policy choices" (p. 182).

### Applications of Planning in Governing

The second purpose of a procedural approach to planning is more subtle. Bearing in mind the observation made by Lindblom that procedures are highly valuable in pluralistic political systems, as a way of preserving personal liberties and popular control, Melvin Webber has redefined the effectiveness of planning by saying that it does not lie in the fact that the plan gives the "right answers" to policy problems but rather in its ability to improve the process of public debate and public decision. Its purpose is therefore to help poliarchies make policy choices in an acceptable (and accepted) way. The value of planning as a set of procedural rules adapted to the problematic situations they have to tackle is therefore also an end in itself, as it enhances the democratic character of a given society. This approach has been influential in recent years—in its different versions variously labeled as communicative planning, participatory planning, collaborative planning, and deliberative planning—and has gained widespread acceptance in the urban and territorial planners community. However, even the most enthusiastic supporters of this approach cannot deny that this opening up of the planning process might actually entail the danger of powerful self-interested actors being able to influence the process away from the pursuit of common good in order to maximize their own short-term goals, thus frustrating the democratic value of the entire exercise.

### Strategic Planning

At a different level, an attempt to revive the discourse on planning as a way of shaping future choice is the notion of strategic planning recently proposed in organizational theory and in territorial planning. This proposal is rather different from the one put forward by Lindblom, being basically centered on the concept of framing. Frames are, according to Donald Schon and Martin Rein,

systems of meaning that organize what we know and provide conceptual coherence, direction of action, and a basis of persuasion. Strategies, therefore, are emergent social products and conscious attempts to create and discover such frames and are able to shape future actions through the persuasive power of their core concepts, as pointed out by Patsy Healey, following the work of Henry Mintzberg in organizational theory.

Planning, in its original meaning of deciding about future decisions, becomes again possible, taking into consideration both the problem of insufficient knowledge and the complexity of contemporary political systems. The clearest application of this line of reasoning is likely found in the practice of strategic planning at the metropolitan level as it emerged in the past 20 years. By and large, and with some variation across the cities, strategic plans are exercises based on the mobilization of all relevant actors in a given urban area, on the production of a shared long-term vision of the desirable future, and on an action plan for immediate action. The idea is that cities are not able to innovate and, therefore, run the risk of decline, both because they lack a clear direction and because of diffuse veto powers and a lack of trust between the relevant actors. The ability to produce a shared vision—that is, a sufficiently precise and distinctive image of the desirable future, whose value is immediately tested in the preparation of the action plan (i.e., a list of projects coherent with the vision and needing the cooperation of the main institutional, economic, and social actors)—can overcome the inertia and solve at the same time the knowledge problem (the uncertainty about consequences) and the political problem (the need to make the decision). The value of linking long-term vision with short-term projects, in fact, lies not only in testing the viability of a coherent and distinctive idea of a desirable future but also in the projects of the action plan that can represent quick wins that are able to show the value of cooperation and, therefore, to overcome distrust and increase social capital.

This reemergence of planning in the context of modern complex governance systems should not be overemphasized. These attempts are very difficult, certainly fragile because of unanticipated external shocks, and necessarily based on a segmentation of the problems either by policy sector

or territorially, as in the case of urban plans. The strategic-framing approach, according to its proponents and followers, is in no way devoid of risk and uncertainty, and its practitioners should therefore act with modesty and prudence.

But the idea of the rational, comprehensive plan that is able to allocate scarce resources in the most efficient way to the relevant societal priorities has been shown as what it is, a mythological notion, impossible to achieve, dangerous in its consequences, and, if one has to follow the postmodernist school of thought, a mere way of suffocating conflict by concealing the all-pervasiveness of political power and special interests.

### The Future of Planning

However, like the mythological phoenix, planning in its more top-down, synoptic, and comprehensive version is perpetually reborn from its ashes, as one can easily see in business studies, new public management discourse, and political rhetoric. Despite more than 50 years of accumulation of knowledge, and the very apparent failures of those exercises, the myth of the “intellectually driven society,” to use Lindblom’s terms, in which comprehensiveness and perfect coordination of policy efforts can and indeed should be achieved, continues. This possibly means that, on the one hand, the “desirable imperfections” of democracy in contemporary complex governance systems have not been fully appreciated and, on the other, that the quest for neutral guidance through science and technology is deeply embedded in modern society and cannot be exorcized by any amount of social and political inquiry.

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*See also* Coordination; Participation; Public Budgeting; Rationality, Bounded

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## PLURALISM

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*Pluralism*, a term first used by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant, gained currency as a philosophical view of the universe in the early 20th century. American pragmatism, developed by William James, conceived the world in pluralistic rather than in monistic terms: interconnected but irreducible to unity, its parts self-governed, not a “block universe” but rather a “federal republic.” Philosophical pluralism, as John Dewey had observed earlier, acknowledged the possibilities of variety, of freedom, and of change. The concept’s applicability to political and cultural contexts was rapidly noticed by English and American thinkers: James’s pluralistic universe could be construed as a polity where groups, possessing inherent rights not conceded by the state, elicited individual loyalties and pursued social ends. The approach came to assume central significance both for Harold Laski’s pluralistic theory of the state and for Horace Kallen’s vision of a commonwealth of different ethnic groups and their cultures. Pluralism offered an analytical and a normative notion that responded to

the increasingly associative character of society, the rise of governmental interventionism, the lobbying activities of organized groups, the nascence of immigrant subcultures, and the maldistribution of political resources. This entry explains the concept of pluralism as it is used in political and cultural contexts. It then considers alternative conceptions that lead further into the theory of interest representation. The entry concludes with a look at the relevance of pluralism in the 21st century, particularly with respect to ethno-cultural groups and to all forms of inequality.

Positively, the concept establishes, first, the existence of a plurality of interests and corresponding social groups that, as latent centers of power, may organize into associations and, second, the transformation of this diversity into public policies through pressure exerted on each other and on governments. Normatively, the concept endorses the process of individuals turning to organization, the resulting formation of interest groups as subjects of democratic politics, and the sequence of group conflict, bargaining, and compromise that characterizes the shaping of public policies, on condition that basic rights and the principles of justice remain respected and protected.

Pluralism may thus be defined as both a descriptive and a prescriptive theory of individual participation by social association in the political process. Groups, in other words, are envisaged to operate as instruments, representing individuals rather than replacing them in the political process, thereby enhancing their chances for individual-centered democracy in a world of increasingly complex sociopolitical interaction. Political man acting through and in control of his freely established associations: That has been pluralism's normative vision.

As with every representative arrangement, however, inbuilt tensions remain between the original individual interests and eventual group (i.e., leadership) action. To the extent that such group action today has come to be treated as a substitute for individual action in reaching political outcomes, the chances for individual-centered democracy are diminished. This inference is especially relevant because political resources enter the picture as a second pivotal element. Their grossly unequal distribution skews the political process in favor of powerful minorities. More often than not, from the viewpoint of the theory and practice of democracy,

noncommitted or indoctrinated citizens who are caught in a web of hierarchical organizations are indicative of a less than satisfactory reality.

Over time, pluralism has vacillated between diagnosing severe democratic deficits in the political process and accepting the ongoing results of that process. Discussions of ethno-cultural pluralism have evolved largely separately from the debate on political pluralism and have raised additional thorny problems, which are discussed below.

### Political Pluralism

Borrowed from James's pragmatist philosophy, the term *pluralism* was first introduced into political science by the British Labour Party intellectual Harold Laski in a 1915 lecture delivered at Columbia University. Even before World War I, business corporations and industrial combines—the first multinationals among them—had risen to prominence, underscoring the unequal distribution of power between labor and capital. However, if continuing entrepreneurial hegemony seemed assured, a labor movement had, after bitter struggles, also emerged. Unions had been organized, and in most industrialized countries, the right to strike had been won.

Concurrently, the 19th century's rigid class structure had started to dissolve. The working class was segmenting into numerous blue- and white-collar strata—groups, in fact—differentiated by vocation and attitude, by income and education, and, again, by grossly unequal influence and control both economically and politically.

The intellectual climate seemed to be ready for a “new” political concept, reformulating the notions of freedom and democracy in a determined attempt to attain the “good society” in the context provided by organized capitalism and the large nation-state. The answer was a theory of groups and associations; of positive, interventionist government; and of industrial democracy as a complement of political democracy, which Laski put forward between 1915 and 1925.

Laski's thinking was considerably influenced by the ideas of the Fabian Society, an intellectual circle of “respectable” socialists—established, among others, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb and George Bernard Shaw—that had taken part in the formation of the British Labour Party. Another significant

influence was the argument of the guild socialists (“young rebels” in the Fabian ranks, building on French anarcho-syndicalism), particularly George D. H. Cole, who held that associations sprang up in society according to the logic of functional differentiation and that self-government, consequently, was identical with functional representation on every social level. That definitely included the workplace, the factory, the enterprise; in a nutshell, it represented the control of production by worker organizations, since individuals (having, by steps, been enfranchised in the political sphere) had remained “enslaved” by industrial autocracy in the economic sector.

Like Cole, Laski remained convinced that no political democracy could be real without being underpinned by an economic democracy. His concept focused on control (rather than on ownership) of the means of production and on the enfranchisement of the citizens (blue- and white-collar employees) of the political body that was and is the modern enterprise—its proper “stakeholders,” in today’s parlance. Nationalizations would leave the position of these employees unchanged. What they needed was a share in the actual decision making.

It required the Great Depression of 1929 and the circumstances of the formation of the British National Government in 1931 for Laski to move more clearly in a Marxist direction, without, however, as has been erroneously suggested, “rejecting” pluralism. Rather, by combining pluralism and Marxism, he proposed in 1937 to transcend the capitalist system, envisaging not violent action but, in a term Laski (1948) was to coin during World War II, a *revolution by consent*. Only in a classless society, he now contended, could authority be “pluralistic both in form and expression” (p. xii).

### Cultural Pluralism

Likewise inspired by James’s philosophy, Kallen introduced the term *cultural pluralism* into the American debate in 1924. Immigrant subcultures were by then flourishing in the eastern United States, after nearly 15 million immigrants—mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe—had been admitted to the country between 1901 and 1920. Writing—not unlike Laski—between 1915 and 1924 and arguing against assimilating pressures and melting pot conformity, Kallen offered his vision of

a federated republic of different nationalities. Convinced that self-government was impossible without self-realization, that the latter—in the sense of personal identity—hinged on the assertion of ethnic differences, and that society’s creativity would benefit from such heterogeneous strains, he proposed granting equal treatment to each ethno-cultural tradition.

Both Kallen’s and Laski’s agendas favored a politics of inclusion, in the sense that policy making in pluralist democracies should embrace, on an equitable basis, as many societal interests as possible. Both were rediscovered—in substance, if not through explicit recourse—after World War II. Laski’s was rediscovered by the American political scientist Robert Dahl, who in his later works returned to pluralism the democratizing dimension that the British thinker had first supplied (industrial self-government—an employee-controlled economy—as the main prerequisite of a more participatory democracy). Kallen’s ideas were rediscovered by a succession of theorists, such as Tariq Modood in Britain and Will Kymlicka in Canada, who supported progressing toward multicultural acceptance, avoiding both fragmentation and conformity (a plural state, informed by a “politics of recognition,” as the vehicle for achieving true multicultural citizenship).

Even before Laski and Kallen, Arthur Bentley had presented an approach that essentially reduced human behavior to group action. Describing his effort as “strictly empirical,” rejecting both individualism and institutionalism, Bentley in his 1908 treatise *The Process of Government* aimed at introducing the group as the central analytical category. If the immediate impact of his book was negligible, that situation would change after a considerable number of pressure group studies had been published in the United States between World War I and World War II and after the New Deal reform period had finally established organized labor and organized agriculture as political players alongside business in bargaining for political benefits. Bentley’s work was resuscitated in the early 1950s by David Truman, Earl Latham, and other group theorists who judged that organized interest groups made up the principal ingredient of present-day government.

At the same time, against the backdrop of the Cold War, the need was felt for a “legitimizing discourse,” according to Richard Merelman,



designed to explain and justify the political systems of the free world, meaning the United States and Western Europe. Stripped of most of its prescriptive implications, elevated to the status of an antitotalitarian (rather than antimunist) public philosophy, the concept of pluralism seemed to serve the purpose perfectly. The 1950s to 1970s were the heyday of the academic and political discourse on pluralist democracy.

In its entirety, the approach resembled nothing more than a modified marketplace model (“interest-group liberalism,” in Theodore Lowi’s designation), with the individual replaced by organizational competition. Such “liberal” pluralism, while claiming to disregard considerations of a normative kind (and thus contrasting with Laski’s “radical” variety), was admittedly biased toward group leadership. It was, in fact, an elite concept, according to which leaders of associations conducted the process of organized pressure and bargaining, thereby controlling each other. Control *among* leaders, however, provided but one significant attribute of the political process. A second was control *of* leaders by means of periodic elections, holding them accountable to party or interest-group members and to the electorate at large.

Both Truman and Dahl (even in his early works) conceded that control of group leaders and access to government were determined, to a considerable extent, by income, education, and status. Cross-pressures, resulting from conflicting group loyalties, might lead to political apathy. Political resources were unequally distributed, most conspicuously between business and labor. Capitalist democracies offered extensive opportunities for “pyramiding” such resources into structures of social power and political influence.

### Conceptual Alternatives

In view of these limitations, two avenues for further theorizing suggested themselves. Both were pursued from the mid-1970s. One was to unequivocally embrace “realistic” Schumpeterianism—that is, fitting groups into a model of elitist democracy where governments would explicitly privilege the organizations of capital and labor as “partners” in policy formulation and implementation over associations with weaker political resources. Group leaders would manufacture consent for policies

resulting from institutionalized “interest intermediation,” by which group leaders are able to reshape social interests in order to make them compatible with public policies. Group members would consequently be mobilized and controlled in a top-down process. Such conceptions of liberal (or neo-) corporatism, as they came to be labeled, were particularly developed in, and focused on, Western Europe, with Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehbruch in the forefront of neo-corporatist writers.

Consequently, the neo-corporatist school of thought has insisted that the socioeconomic attributes around which interests organize are indeed unequally distributed; that existing inequalities are further reinforced by the politics of interest associations, not the least because certain associations, particularly organized business and organized labor, are granted privileged access to governmental decision making; and that political processes typically take the form of oligarchically structured interest intermediation through bargaining among leaders.

Proponents of corporatism and liberal pluralism alike have usually conceded that, more often than not, pluralist and corporatist arrangements may be found in mixed combinations (Germany provides a typical example). Both varieties may, in fact, not perform too differently, considering what liberal pluralism had to say about bargaining among leaders and about the possible pyramiding of unequally distributed political resources.

Because trade unions typically have difficulty in gaining the support of their members on agreements, the involvement of social-democratic parties as predominant players, able to secure trade union support, has been considered a salient requirement of corporatist structures. To the extent that governments led by social-democratic parties, accepting the notion of international competitiveness as the new social and economic orthodoxy, have joined conservative administrations in attempts at mediating the consequences of globalization by the pursuit of deregulatory and privatization policies, the social-democratic/trade union alliance has been eroded.

Neo-corporatism, moreover, always remained very much a Europeanist concept. With regard to the United States, observers continued to note that because of the political strength of corporate

business and the corresponding weakness of labor, no genuine interest in such an arrangement existed on the part of the American business elite.

The second conceptual alternative, according to Dahl, consisted in raising the normative question of how one might remedy the defects of pluralism. This meant conceiving pluralism in terms of a normative concept of democratic transformation as it had earlier emerged in England. Looking for possible solutions to what “authority in a good society” might be like, Dahl—ever more critical of institutional rigidity, social inequality, and political apathy—suggested a radical alternative to the present status quo. The large business corporation and the politically privileged position of corporate executives—the latter, as held by Dahl and his fellow critic Charles Lindblom, being subject to neither effective internal control by stockholders nor effective external control by governments and markets—became the major targets for the proposed participatory reforms. In a way reminiscent of Laski’s earlier efforts, but more systematically, Dahl argued that control over the political body, which the modern business enterprise has in fact become, should no longer rest with investors or managers but rather with blue- and white-collar employees. Starting from the premise that unequal social resources will translate into unequal political resources, Dahl’s program focused on diminishing the discretionary exercise of organizational power by the economically privileged minorities.

### Ethno-Cultural Pluralism

Such radical pluralist propositions have been merging into the larger, more comprehensive debate on democratization, a spillover of democratic norms onto economy and society. The attribute “political” has thus been reconceptualized, now relating to any form of group decision making, whose democratization would be intended (as Amitai Etzioni has emphasized) to make all sectors of society more responsive to their members. As a caveat, it should be added, however, that the extent to which such visions of increased citizen competence and control might be accepted, internalized, and practiced by increasing segments of present-day consumption-oriented societies is far from clear.

On top of that, neoliberal maxims have become firmly entrenched with the progress of financial

and economic globalization. Bent on cutting business regulation and welfare expenditure, and opting for the privatization of public services, governmental and market players alike have worked at reducing the size of government. The “reform” label has been put to service as a facade for such programs. Ongoing globalization has not simply diminished governance capabilities due to the pressure of multinational investors and foreign competition—it is governments themselves that have determinedly been restricting their performance. Such promarket state intervention urgently calls for institutional and attitudinal changes that would again reinforce political pluralism.

Concurrently, the migration component, which the process of globalization involves, has been further pluralizing and diversifying Western-type societies along ethno-cultural lines. Once again, the pattern of societal cleavages and linkages has been changing. The fragmentation of interests is being advanced, and traditional institutional loyalties are put in jeopardy. Socioeconomic inequalities and insecurities rank high among the factors that have been fueling the rediscovery of ethnic-based identification as a source of belonging among these increasingly multicultural populations.

When Kallen proclaimed a “democracy of nationalities” as the desired goal of cultural pluralism, he wanted individuals in every ethnic group to realize their inherent possibilities according to that group’s cultural traditions rather than being discriminated against by culturally privileged majorities. Two generations later, Giovanni Sartori stressed that pluralism, because it considered diversity a pivotal value, should first and foremost focus on cultural diversity, aiming at a “cross-fertilized” rather than a “tribalized” culture. Pluralist policies should accept (recognize) the cultural, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity of different ethnic groups, without inviting further societal segmentalization.

Strategies of differentiated group treatment (e.g., affirmative action procedures in employment and education, introduction of official multilingualism, a composition of political bodies reflecting the existence of various ethnic groups) may work to reinforce cultural pluralism. However, these policies do not maintain neutrality toward ethno-cultural differences. Remaining neutral would imply that discrimination on ethnic grounds

is legally prohibited while benefits are solely provided according to individual eligibility.

Most of the relevant debate has centered on the controversial question of how to balance individual against group rights. Might not any determined movement in the direction of group rights work to endanger individual autonomy and to bar individuals from opting out of their group if they wish to adopt ideas and practices running counter to their ethno-cultural heritage? To be effective, need not policies of differentiated group treatment show an awareness of the connection between economic and cultural power? A more equitable distribution of social and political resources might help individuals make meaningful choices, including the choice to exit a group perceived as confining.

A pluralist politics informed by a spirit of both political participation and social justice clearly would concede ethno-cultural groups some political standing and legal rights—but to what extent? Available options for overcoming ethnic cleavages include legal protection and public funding for the expression of cultural peculiarities, federalism as a form of self-government, and finally, group-based political representation, up to the complex arrangements of consociationalism (in which representatives of varied groups share decision-making power). However, consociational government has been shown to favor elite (group leader) predominance, arcane negotiations, and political immobilism rather than a more vibrant pluralist democracy.

### Pluralism in the 21st Century

Persisting inequalities of socioeconomic (and, in addition, ethno-cultural) influence and control, equivalent to so many embedded participatory barriers, have kept resurfacing during this overview of research on pluralism and democracy. Resulting in unequal chances for the organized representation of interests and, hence, in limits to more robust redistributive and regulatory public policies, they will remain among the major issues bedeviling 21st-century democracy. As a powerful approach to inquiring into these issues, pluralism will be of continuing relevance, provided it retains the role of a critical political theory—critical, as it sporadically has been, of the status quo of concentrated economic, political, and cultural power. This, in turn, requires that two problems remain foremost

among the concerns addressed by political science: first, securing broader societal participation—and thus, again, a more equitable representation of social interests—in the shaping of public policies and, second, reducing disparities in control over political resources to ensure the accessibility, accountability, and (in the final instance) legitimacy of a representative democratic government.

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*See also* Corporativism; Multiculturalism; Participation

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## PLURALIST INTEREST INTERMEDIATION

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Modern democracies are determined by a great number of diverse interests. That is why structures and actors that show and assert individual social interests are necessary. Nevertheless, although

interests can be articulated individually, a collective and organized representation of interests, called interest intermediation, promises greater success. Because of this, organized interest intermediation plays an increasingly decisive role in the political process. It belongs to democracy “like the piston belongs to the cylinder” (Ralf Kleinfeld, 2007, p. 7), because without organized aggregation and articulation of interests, modern societies and democratic forms of government would not be able to act. Modern democracies show very different structures of interest intermediation. Corporate and pluralistic systems of interest intermediation can be distinguished. The interest of political science in this process lies, in particular, in the identification of regular patterns of interest intermediation and conflict resolution. However, before the process of interest intermediation is dealt with in more detail, the concept of interest must first be defined. This is followed by a discussion of major actors, their patterns of interaction, and the respective concepts in political science.

According to Carola Schulz (1984), interests can be defined as “action-relevant consolidations of needs which arise from the subjective perception of situations where a distinct feeling of want is present” (p. 15). For citizens’ needs to find their way into the political system, they must be articulated and organized. It is exactly here that political interest intermediation applies. Since political systems are social systems that make collectively binding decisions, it is helpful to bring in a theoretical perspective from systems theory in order to illustrate the process of interest intermediation more closely. Here, the classic model developed by David Easton can serve as a basis. To be sure, Easton’s model expresses a concept of democratic ideals, but it facilitates a brief representation of the procedural character of interest intermediation. For Easton, the decisive actors of the political system are the parties and interest groups, on the one hand, and government and the administration, on the other. Interactions between these actors are aimed at generating collectively binding decisions. Demands for such decisions are brought into the political system as inputs, processed where appropriate, and converted into outputs. At best, these outputs result in the fulfillment of these demands and thus enhance the legitimization of the political actors and therefore the political system itself. In turn, this may lead

to new demands being brought into the political system in a feedback cycle. For this reason, Easton places both political demands and political support on the input side. In this context, politics can be defined as the process of the production and enforcement of obligatory cross-societal decisions.

Political demands are the necessary raw material for the political process. During their processing, however, problems can occur since, on the one hand, not all demands can be integrated and, on the other, not each demand for a collectively binding decision can be fulfilled. Demands can contradict each other, and a state’s resources are limited. According to Easton, for demands to enter the political system at all, structural mechanisms such as parties and organized interest groups are necessary. As such, they have an intermediate function between the political system and society at large.

#### Actors of Political Interest Intermediation

In modern democracies, various actors apart from political parties assume the task of aggregating and articulating the interests of the population. In this way, it can be ensured that the political system remains stable and can adapt to new tasks at the same time. Modern democracies rely on highly effective forms of interest intermediation from both a normative and a functional point of view. The high complexity of political interests and social demands makes the work of specialized actors of interest intermediation indispensable. An efficient system of political interest intermediation is the central precondition for the legitimacy of collectively binding decisions. Ideally, political interest intermediation, therefore, connects the contents of politics to the will of the sovereign and facilitates political decision making by reducing complexity.

Political parties continuously fulfill the function of interest intermediation since they are the only ones to work on cross-societal problems; but associations, churches, unions, social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other groups also represent important interests—even more so if they succeed in representing the total interest of their organized members. While individual interest associations usually attempt to influence the political process through lobbying, social movements attempt to prevent or reverse decisions or create social change through unconventional

actions. In addition, since the 1990s, in many countries, NGOs have played an increasingly stronger role in the intermediation of social interests. Similar to social movements, many NGOs claim to be committed to broader social values, but they also can be distinguished from social movements by their higher degree of organization.

The conditions of political interest intermediation have been changing more recently, however. Both exogenous and endogenous changes are responsible for this. On the one hand, the number of political-administrative actors has expanded (and thus the possibility for influence) through the formation of supranational institutions, such as the European Union. On the other hand, individualization and pluralization of social interests complicate their integration and organization. Thus, it is no surprise that a pluralization of the representations of interests can be observed, which is accompanied by a certain loss of importance of major traditional intermediate actors such as unions or employers' associations.

### Political Interest Intermediation as a Subject of Political Science

If we want to abstract from the actors and analyze interest intermediation from a political science point of view, it is useful to distinguish aspects of policy, polity, and politics. Since the intermediation of interests can be regarded as a permanent political process, it falls into the procedural dimension of *politics*. Yet the basis for interest intermediation lies in the principle of a liberal political order—the *polity* dimension. In this respect, basic freedoms are the freedoms of expression and association as well as the right to vote. The *policy* dimension is equally affected by social interest intermediation since government policies are strongly influenced by the interests of society (Ulrich von Alemann, 1987).

Due to the variety and conflicting nature of interests and the scarcity of resources, a pluralist democratic political process is continuously antagonistic. Although the disputes concerning the distribution of benefits, the satisfaction of needs, or the pursuit of ideals thus mean permanent conflicts, these must, however, not be conducted in violent ways, endangering the system as a whole.

This is an essential task of political interest intermediation. Thus, in political science, a conflict-regulating function is ascribed to the process of interest intermediation from which stability and legitimacy in Easton's sense can arise.

### Pluralist Interest Intermediation

A general distinction in political science is made between pluralism and corporatism as the two essential strategies of political interest intermediation. The concept of pluralism regards interest articulation, aggregation, and the fulfillment of demands as a continuous process. In the long run, this dynamic process leads, in the view of the protagonists of such concepts, to the achievement and maintenance of the common good for society. Pluralism in this sense can be defined according to Philippe Schmitter (1974) as

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchical, ordered and self-determined (as to type of scope of interest) categories (and), which are not subsidized, specially licensed, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories. (p. 96)

On the one hand, Schmitter thus emphasizes the structure of interest intermediation determined by competition. On the other hand, he stresses the fact that such actors are neither supported nor controlled by the state. Pluralistic interest intermediation is, therefore, characterized by the voluntarism, spontaneity, and autonomy of the interest groups. Unlike corporatism, pluralist interest intermediation is not based on the agreed-on forms of negotiation between interest groups and the political-administrative bodies but rather on competition and conflict. From a pluralistic point of view, politics can therefore be regarded as resulting from social interests and the respective power of the mediating interest groups. In this process, the actors can compete relatively autonomously for the enforcement of their interests and take advantage of the resources available to them.

In this respect, interests that are capable of dealing with conflict and easy to organize have an advantage. This in turn leads to a decisive problem from the point of view of a normative theory of democracy: Interests that are difficult to organize and the interests of groups of lower significance have only a small chance of representation and intermediation. So, due to real existing pluralistic structures, capital and labor interests are favored in particular, and interests are not represented according to their importance for society as a whole. As opposed to the thesis of balanced interest implementation as a basis of the pluralist theory of democracy proposed by Robert Dahl, in particular, the fact remains that representation of interests in modern democracies is not balanced—and cannot be balanced due to their complexity and variety. Thus, it is not possible in the process of collective decision making for every citizen to have the same opportunity to express his or her interests. Such a representation (as complete as is possible) of interests of different social groups is, however, a condition of pluralist interest intermediation. Considerable legitimization problems can, therefore, result from the unbalanced interest representation of pluralistic structures. So the possibility exists that, on the one hand, the results of political decision making are no longer accepted and, on the other, that this disappointment can lead to the refusal of established forms of participation and intermediation mechanisms.

Here, it must be considered that the greater success of interests that are well organized is not necessarily a dysfunction of the political system but is rather the product of a pluralistic competitive democracy. The political administrative addressees of pluralistic interest intermediation have themselves the ability to guarantee, however, by means of law, a minimum of fairness in this competition for influence. Conditions of action for interest groups can be legally regulated, for instance, in the procedure of consultation in Switzerland. This procedure is part of the legislative process in which all important interest groups are to be consulted independently of their negotiating power.

For functional reasons, a corporate interest intermediation also can fulfill only a selective consideration of interests and thus perform only an inadequate representation. Here, the negotiation

process is also determined by those interest groups having the strongest influence. The difference lies only in the mutual cooperation of interest organizations with the political-administrative actors. The problem of underrepresentation of certain interests, therefore, remains not only unsolved in this way but would moreover become firmly institutionalized.

The difference with regard to the pluralist interest intermediation lies rather in the enforcement of interests between the actors—which has less potential for conflict due to lack of competition. Because of this, an integrative effect for society can also be achieved by corporate interest intermediation, which is not subject to majority decisions. Furthermore, this mode of interest intermediation succeeds in providing a peaceful solution to class conflicts via collective negotiations between the state, employers, and trade unions. By contrast, the sluggishness, inflexibility, and status quo orientation of corporate interest intermediation is often criticized since it can lead to a blocking of reforms with many veto players. Corporate structures are, however, only partially possible in situations where social interests can be integrated on a high organizational level. As a result, the available corporate structures are often part of a more comprehensive pluralist system of mediation. In the literature, pluralism is usually regarded as a strategy superior to corporatism for the overcoming of socioeconomic crises and as a relative stability guarantee for democratic governments.

Since pluralism and corporatism are not only procedural strategies but are integrated into a country's political culture via the context of ideological acceptance, a concrete form of interest intermediation cannot be imposed without consideration of the political culture. Yet the guiding values of compromise and consensus anchored in the political culture, and thus also in political socialization, further complicate interest intermediation in the sense of pluralistic competition.

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*See also* Corporativism; Interest Groups; Pluralism; Social Movements; Systems Theory

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## POLICE

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The police is the institution in charge of protecting public order and repressing crime, and it is entitled to use physical force in order to meet these functions. Police institutions are the product of a long-term historical trend toward *differentiation* and *specialization*. Before the beginning of the 19th century, differentiation as a contemporary function of policing (e.g., keeping peace and combating crime and disorder) was in the hands of watchmen appointed from households or by family or tribal constables. This “private” policing occurred in several areas (e.g., China, main parts of Africa, and South America) before the European colonization process. Autonomous, professional, permanent—and in most cases local—police forces arose in the wake of urban growth and urban disorders, industrial disputes and riots, and crime fears. This institutionalization process

accompanies a specialization process in the countries of continental Europe, where police imposed an ensemble of norms, rules, and measures to regulate the entire urban existence, from public hygiene to passport control, from milk inspection to supervision of libraries, and so on. If not in the hands of watchmen or private forces, such as dock bosses’ militia, the control of crime and disorder was only a small part of the duties of what then constituted the police. During the 19th century in continental Europe, police could specialize only in these functions because administrative law and jurisdiction regulated other aspects of social life at that time. This entry discusses the main distinctive features of police, especially in connection with the use of force; the trend toward specialization, especially with relation to efficiency; some of the most recent transformations; and the organizational differences between a central organization and a local organization.

### Key Distinctive Features

From a more theoretical point of view, the police institution has two distinctive features. First, it is wholly instrumental: It is meant to perform a definite task, linked to crime and disorder, under civil supervision (i.e., the functional dimension of the police). Second, it is defined by its capacity to use physical force (i.e., the substantive dimension of the police). A crucial dimension of police relies therefore on its intimate relationship with the monopoly on physical force that Max Weber sees as the distinctive feature of the state. But this crucial dimension is at the same time oxymoronic, since (contrary to the military use of force), police force is expected to be legitimate (i.e., reasonable, proportionate, and based on consent). Robert Reiner (2000) asserts that, with respect to police action, the two terms *consent* and *force* are antagonists. The police can use force either in the context of a local breach of order (a contested arrest, an unlawful strike, or a riot) or in the context of a broader social or political breakdown resulting in great hostility against the regime in place. However, police legitimacy relies on consent from the public and/or the ruling regime.

On a more sociological level, the substantial affinity between force and the police has been questioned. Empirical evidence clearly shows that

the actual use of force is rather rare. Some police officers never use physical force throughout their career. On the other hand, trying to list and rationalize all the tasks ever performed by police officers is nearly impossible. Therefore, some theorists like John-Paul Brodeur (2007) are inclined to define the police as the only public organization aimed at "doing everything." To do so, they use means that are illegal or unlawful if taken by ordinary citizens (from driving the wrong way on a one-way street to bugging phone devices).

Nevertheless, use of physical force is a central issue in police organizations because cases of abuse of force weaken the political legitimacy of the police. The beating of the African American motorist Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 by White police officers (and their acquittal on charges of excessive force 1 year later) led to urban riots in the United States. The death of two minority youths in France in 2005, who allegedly fled from the police into a power substation, where they were accidentally electrocuted, led to a 3-week-long period of urban unrest. Abusive arrests and stops-and-searches in London, Birmingham, and Liverpool also led to urban riots in British cities from the end of the 1970s to the mid-1980s. It is difficult to assess if substantial changes occurred as a result of these episodes of scandal and protest. Nevertheless, police organizations faced a legitimization crisis in the course of the 1970s, due to the emergence of urban disorders and/or race riots (in the United States, England, and France), on the one hand, and to the rise of property crime, on the other.

### Specialization Versus Efficiency?

Contemporary evolutions of police organizations contribute to the empirical and theoretical dispute over the accurate definition of police. First, from the initial wave of modernization and professionalization (from the early 1970s onward), police institutions have experienced both an increased specialization and a commodification of the services they are expected to deliver. Both phenomena are closely linked with a legitimization crisis that occurred during the 1970s. Overspecialization has been implemented to cope with different aspects of crime and delinquency, leading police organizations to become an archipelago of diverse and

isolated occupations (from drug squads to environmental crime enforcement and from juvenile delinquency units to transnational police experts). The increased use of surveillance devices and technologies has played a major role in this process. This evolution toward more segmentation into specialized operations and the increased importance of surveillance and proactive activities tend to make physical force a secondary if not purely metaphorical aspect of police work. Some analysts have underlined this phenomenon in stating that police are not violence workers but "knowledge workers," noting the massive amount of data and information police officers are expected to sort out and analyze in order to conduct their tasks.

This trend toward an overspecialization, specifically in the most diverse domains of crime fighting, has not prevented a decline of police efficiency. Therefore, police organizations have communalized a certain amount of tasks, the implementation of which may differ among nations. Since the 1990s, there has been a trend toward a kind of network policing in which diverse private and public institutions or agencies are brought together to combat and prevent crime and urban disorder. Police officers are now civil servants confronted with private and public agents in different kinds of negotiation arenas. Several labels have been employed to describe these evolutions. The notion of "problem-solving policing" was first introduced at the beginning of the 1980s to encourage the police to tackle daily local problems such as loitering or drinking in public spaces, domestic violence, noise disturbances, and so on. Thus, police institutions began to focus on broader social issues rather than solely on major crimes. Facing the difficulty of implementing internal police reforms, local or (more rarely) central governments developed programs such as community policing and neighborhood policing, aimed at integrating police organizations into larger institutional structures and, therefore, at resisting police organizations' tendency toward insularity and self-agenda. Moreover, the increasing pluralization of policing (the growth of private security forces, informal policing, vigilantism, the introduction of local police forces competing with state police forces, etc.) threatens the monopoly of the police in the prevention and repression of disorder. Network policing programs, such as community policing, provide an opportunity for the police



to become an integral part of the larger institutional structures and to work collaboratively within these structures to combat crime.

### Recent Transformations

Other transformations have cropped up in the course of these evolutions. The first has been the introduction of regulations and guidelines issued from the new public management perspective into police organizations during the 1990s, in the wake of the broader public policy reforms initiated by the Clinton administration in the United States and the government of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom. A major focus has been control over police officers, the stress of individual accountability, and the diffusion of “better with less” management policies. As a result, police chiefs and captains devote a major part of their time to crime and activity statistics to comply with political and public expectations. Such management systems, whose real ability to cope with crime and security has been widely discussed in the literature on policing, have been exported throughout the world and adopted by countries and cities in very different ways. As in other agencies, one effect of this management system is the development of strategies that may lead to an increase in the bureaucratic insularity of police organizations and to a further public concern with the ability of police organizations to cope with real crime.

The second trend is the rising importance of law-and-order policies in the political agenda of many Western countries. Proving one’s ability to deal with crime and lead police forces tends to be a major personal asset in the political game. The fight against terrorism and international crime is vital to this trend. In combination with the gaming strategies developed within police organizations, this tendency sheds light on the fact that the police have a symbolic role that seems more and more important in today’s political systems.

### Central and Local Organization

Police are in fact a part of the political system, in which they help consolidate the political legitimacy and resources of the (local or national) government. One must distinguish here between regimes in which police organizations are centralized under

the direct command of the government (as in France) and countries in which police forces are essentially municipal (as in United States) or regional forces (as in Germany and Great Britain), with some specialized forces devoted to federal issues (e.g., organized crime, terrorism, and intelligence). Contrary to a widespread assumption in political science, the degree of centralization of forces is not correlated to the degree of corruption of the police by political forces. The Napoleonic model in France offers a striking example of police organizations heading numerous and opulent political intelligence and antiriot sections under the immediate leadership of the Ministry of Interior, which is always devoted to the political tasks of repressing protests, preventing public disorder, and influencing or shaping the political landscape. Municipal police systems in the United States, on the other hand, are characterized by a high level of what the U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham Commission) in 1931 called “lawlessness in law enforcement,” because such police forces are considered to be part of the local political system and are under the direction of the mayor or supervisors of the municipality. The wave of reform of police forces during the 1950s resulted in a high level of “professionalism”—that is, quasi-military police departments with high standards of integrity. As it appears, the nature of the political involvement of police organizations is strongly linked to the organization of the political system.

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*See also* Bureaucracy, Street-Level; Governance, Urban; Institutionalization; Judiciary; Legitimacy; New Public Management; Performance Management; Rights; Violence

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## POLICY, CONSTRUCTIVIST MODELS

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Social constructivists depart from the assumption that reality is what Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann call *social reality*. To say that reality is socially constructed is to say that social reality is the product of human ways of knowing and communicating. Social constructivists, therefore, draw attention to the processes and ways through which the world is represented in language. They feel that the access we have to a reality outside human symbol systems is highly problematic. This entry describes the relevance of this perspective for understanding public policy.

Language, to take the most obvious symbol system, does not simply report facts. Things get their meanings through language, irrespective of whether they exist outside language. And the meaning of anything always exists in particular social contexts; meaning is always contextual, contingent, and historical. Since human beings always depend on their symbol systems—and the theoretical frames they build with the help of these—to make sense of the world that surrounds them, the way they interact with the world is the result of socialization and, more generally, of human history. We act toward things on the basis of the meaning they have to us. We tend to forget the contingencies of the social constructs and the forces that shaped them. Therefore, constructivists remind us that social reality is always in flux, even if the processes through which change comes about might be slow at times.

### Kinds of Social Constructivism

Social constructivist thinking started from the sociology of knowledge and has spread through the social sciences. Since the 1960s, it has flourished and has been further elaborated on with the help of a wide variety of (sometimes conflicting) insights

from—among others—Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistics, the phenomenology and hermeneutics of Edmund Husserl and Hans-Georg Gadamer, the poststructuralist thinking of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, and the pragmatism of Richard Rorty. There are "stronger" and "weaker" forms of constructivism, differing in their theories on realities beyond the social. Strong constructivism claims that a reality beyond the socially constructed ones might exist but that it is not relevant to talk about it in terms of an objective reality because we cannot have direct, unmediated access to it; it believes in "multiple truths." A weaker form of constructivism holds on to the idea of an objective reality (of brute facts and/or of "one truth") that is within reach of human knowing. It is important to keep in mind that it is not the (material) world, as such, that is referred to when we talk about social constructions but the *perceptions* of this (material) world. Material objects, including all of nature and human artifacts, are assigned a certain place in the social process of the construction of meaning.

Social constructivism can also be situated in terms of the position of the subject who knows and the object that can be known. If one claims that the knower and knowledge are somehow separable, one takes a dualist position. Social constructivists often take a monistic position. That is, they argue that the knower and the world that the knower tries to understand are part of the same. Put differently, the findings are the result of an interaction between the knower and what there is to be known. Crucial in this interaction is the process through which the knower crafts observations into meaningful fact with the help of a theoretical framework. This leads social constructivists to suggest that there is no Archimedean point, "no view from nowhere," from which we could see the essence of the things that make up our social realities. We can only see reality from a cultural, social, political, historical, or other perspective. This is why we encounter multiple social realities, each of which is created and sustained with the help of a particular set of values and shared only by the members of a certain interpretive community.

### Social Constructivist Research

Various kinds of constructivism are in use in policy science. The most well-known are frame analysis,

narrative analysis, and discourse analysis. Although the levels of analysis vary, all three have a common focus on sense making and a special interest in language. Their aim is to uncover, understand, and possibly explain sense-making practices (e.g., voting and warfare), processes (e.g., crises), and institutions (e.g., agencies, governments, and nations) in political life.

Framing is the effort of drawing attention to some parts of situations while ignoring others. As such, it becomes a central part of the political act of problem setting. Problem definitions inevitably predispose certain solutions, and vice versa. Narrative analysis, often inspired by literary theory and philosophers like Mark Johnson and Alasdair MacIntyre and historians like William Whyte, starts from the idea that sense making is often done with the help of storytelling; through stories, people enact themselves and their context. In stories, *characters* who engage in *actions* in a certain *setting* can be identified. Some characters might be given the role of villains, while others are depicted as heroes, victims, or innocent bystanders. At the same time, acts are attributed to human beings or other entities. The depiction of the relevant setting, for instance, a crisis situation, also helps shape the story. The way the various elements of a story are ordered creates a *plot* that can help the audience grasp what is going on. With the help of frames and narratives, political actors describe and explain reality in conflicting ways, arguing for often opposite courses of action. In policy analysis, scholars like Emery Roe and Michel van Eeten designed and used tools (e.g., reframing problems and creating metanarratives) that help actors in the policy process to set new agendas, create understanding of other actors, and overcome conflicts and intractable policy issues.

Discourse analysts, often building on poststructuralist efforts such as that of Foucault or on post-Marxism versions developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, have engaged in critical analyses of political practices, often at a more abstract level than those using frames or narrative. A discourse can be defined as a set of ideas, concepts, or categories that is produced in certain social practices. A discourse analysis shows which discursive objects and subjects emerge in social practices and which conceptualizations are used. Consequently, what is left out in social practices

also emerges. Since it is not the purpose of discourse analysis to retrieve what actors exactly meant or felt when writing or speaking but more to focus on the *effects* of texts on other texts, there is usually not much space for agency; this is called decentering of the subject. Many discourse analyses are historical, like Foucault's archaeological and genealogical studies. There are also social constructivists who have worked on metaphor analysis and category analysis—for instance, in the deconstruction of ethnicity categories in policy making.

### Social Constructivist Policy Making

Social constructivism, nowadays, plays a role in various social science disciplines, such as political science, public administration, and policy studies. In public administration, it was fueled by postmodernism, which was introduced in 1988 by a group of scholars who were members of Public Administration Theory Network (PAT-Net) and published in the journal *Administrative Theory and Praxis*. Feminist thinking has also been a strong stand in constructivist thinking. The rise of social constructivism in the policy sciences can be traced to roughly the same period. While Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln introduced a constructivist approach to evaluation, Deborah Stone and Giandomenico Majone kicked off the “argumentative turn” in policy sciences in their books on the role of rhetoric in policy. This perspective was further elaborated on in a volume edited by Frank Fischer and John Forester and has been developing ever since.

But how does one put a social constructivist view on policy making into practice? John Dryzek was one of the first to answer that question. In a seminal contribution to the field, he opposed instrumental rationality (i.e., the belief that it is possible to find the right means to the just ends) and the related objectivism (i.e., the belief that neutral standards exist for doing so). Instrumental rationality and objectivism not only lead to Max Weber's iron cage and Jürgen Habermas's colonization of the lifeworld but are also unable to supply usable policy analyses, and they actually obstruct progress in the social sciences, in Dryzek's view. The alternative method of policy making is what Dryzek calls *discursive and democratic rationality* based on practical reason instead of on power. Participatory democracy should make this possible.

Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram think that “degenerate policy making” is the root of all evil. Degenerate policy making is the manipulation of images for the politician’s personal interests. It leads to the construction and punishing/rewarding of ingroups and outgroups and to the abuse of science for political reasons. Invoking science also leads to apathy and alienation among the citizens, as the experts come to monopolize the debate. Schneider and Ingram’s own approach, which they called *policy design*, is based on seven principles that should mend these faults.

Also concerned with the dysfunctional role of the expert in the policy process is Fischer. Based on John Dewey’s argument, Fischer argues that the role of the expert is to help the citizen decide and not to decide in his or her place. The expert should try to design deliberative forums in which citizens, with the help of experts, can participate in constructing policy. More recent contributions to deliberative policy analysis argue for a “decentered governance” by networks of stakeholders. Those engaged in this project strive to map such policy making in all its varieties, analyzing it without looking for general laws or essences.

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*See also* Constructivism; Deliberative Policy Making; Discourse Analysis; Policy, Discourse Models; Policy Framing

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## POLICY, DISCOURSE MODELS

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Discourse analysis draws on central insights from post-Marxism, poststructuralism, and radical versions of interpretative analysis and pragmatist philosophy. Discourse analysis aims to transcend the objectivist, reductionist, and rationalist bias in mainstream social science theory by emphasizing the role of discourse in shaping social, political, and economic relations. Discourse is commonly defined as a more or less stable and well-defined system of rules, norms, and significant differences that is produced in and through political struggles and provides a contingent horizon for the construction of any meaningful subject, object, or action. Many discourse theorists have been preoccupied with developing a sophisticated theoretical framework, but a growing number of discourse analysts have become interested in applying the concepts and arguments of discourse theory in problem-driven empirical analysis, and the study of policy and policy making is at the top of the agenda.

A discourse approach to policy analysis can help us better understand the discursive conditions of possibility for formulating particular policies, and it draws our attention to the role of identity construction and the negotiation of meaning in policy implementation. In contrast to mainstream policy analysis, discourse analysis highlights the semantic, performative, and rhetorical aspects of public policy making. Moreover, it insists that policy problems, policy solutions, and governmental rationalities are discursively constructed and therefore contingent. Finally, it aims to uncover the power struggles and political conflicts that shape the discursive conditions for the formulation and implementation of public policy. Whereas discourse models inspired by the works of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas tend to focus on the role of public deliberation and tend to see power and conflict as a source of distorted communication,

discourse models inspired by the French philosopher Michel Foucault tend to view power and conflicts as constitutive of policy discourse.

Traditional approaches to policy analysis hold that interests and institutional constraints provide the key to understanding the formulation and implementation of policy. As such, it is often assumed that policy can be explained in terms of the interests of rational and resourceful actors and the institutional rules, norms, and procedures that constrain the choice of rational actors. Discourse models of policy take a different approach in arguing that interests are incomplete, ambiguous, and shaped by the contingent discourses in which they are embedded. Likewise, discourse models tend to define institutions not only as a recursively validated system of regulative and normative constraints but also as a broad set of values, symbols, rituals, forms of knowledge, codes, and vocabularies that facilitate and guide action. This means that interests cannot be taken for granted and that institutions are not only *staging* the choice and interaction of the relevant policy actors but also seem to be *scripting* their actions.

There are several important precursors to the development of a constructivist discourse approach to policy analysis. Some rational choice theorists have relaxed the classical assumptions about full information and unlimited cognitive capacities and have elaborated the traditional model of individual choice subject to institutional constraints. Douglas North, for example, has introduced the notion of "mental models" to explain the choice and action of the entrepreneurs who are responsible for constructing and changing institutions. The feasible options and their payoffs are determined not only by institutional rules and norms but also by the subjective perceptions (mental models) of the institutional entrepreneurs. Mental models are acquired through processes of socialization and learning, and they help rational actors interpret and explain their changing environment. However, the relation between the objective interest of rational actors and their subjective perceptions remains unclear, and if the latter is constitutive of the former, it becomes difficult to maintain the basic assumption that choice is derived from interests. Moreover, if the mental models are shaped by collective ideas and ideologies, the methodological individualism

at the heart of rational choice institutionalism is undermined.

While most rational choice institutionalists are reluctant to embrace the idea of objective interests being shaped by subjective perceptions, Paul Sabatier (1988) goes all the way in viewing policy output as a result of political decisions informed by competing advocacy coalitions that are composed of public and private actors sharing a set of normative and causal beliefs. The value priorities and causal assumptions that unify a particular advocacy coalition are transformed by policy learning, which is instrumental for generating new insights that will only be incorporated into the core beliefs of an advocacy coalition if they further its main policy objectives. Although the notion of advocacy coalitions clearly emphasizes the role of ideas and beliefs in interactive policy making, there is hardly any account of the discursive construction of the ideas and beliefs. Hence, there is no explanation of what regulates the production and advancement of particular ideas and beliefs.

Historical institutionalists have also emphasized the role of ideas in public policy. Ideas tend to replace interests as drivers of political action, and institutions are seen as a constraint on the impact of ideas on policy making. New ideas are adopted to the extent that they respond to concrete policy problems, resonate with the interest and ideas of key actors, and are brought to the attention of relevant public agencies that can implement new ideas. As such, the reception of new ideas is explained with reference to objective socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions. However, the discursive embeddedness of new policy ideas, the struggles about the content of the new ideas, and their rhetorical and argumentative framing are not really taken into account.

Sociological, or organizational, institutionalism breaks with the idea that social and political action is driven by the actors' calculation of the consequences of alternative options and offers a cultural approach that emphasizes the role of normative and cognitive frames and meaning systems in defining appropriate action. Policy change is seen as a result of a *bricolage*, through which concepts, rituals, scripts, and values are recombined. In the development of new policies, legitimacy plays a pivotal role. The basic assertion that interests, rationality, and information are socially constructed within a

particular institutional context is shared with the new discourse models of policy, but a major difference is that whereas sociological institutionalism tends to treat cultural conditions of action as a static equilibrium, the discourse approach to policy analysis is more interested in accounting for the formation and transformation of discursive structures through conflicts.

Ideational institutionalism is a new branch of institutionalism that focuses on the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes through which these ideas are generated and communicated to the public (Colin Hay, 2001). Rather than seeing ideas as constituted by specific cultures, ideational institutionalists view ideas in relation to the discourses that provide the resources for legitimizing particular ideas. Ideas are shaped by discourses, which are in turn shaped by institutions that determine who talks to whom about what, when, and where. In state-centered polities, ideas and discourses are communicated to the public to secure support, whereas in decentered polities the relevant actors must first establish consensus about the content of the policy discourse and its embedded ideas. By placing ideas within a broader discourse, ideational institutionalism provides a crucial stepping stone to discourse models of policy. However, foregrounding singular ideas and the conception of institutions as an extradiscursive constraint separates ideational institutionalism from a discourse theoretical approach that focuses on the impact of discourses constructed through hegemonic struggles, which take place in a sedimented institutional context that is dislocated by new events.

Discourse models of policy focus on the structural power exercised when the formulation and implementation of policy are conditioned by hegemonic discourses that are shaped and contested by political strategies. Foucault's governmentality theory provides a good starting point for analyzing the discursive conditions for policy making. Governmentality theory aims to answer the key question of "how to govern and be governed" by studying how government, in the sense of the "the conduct of conduct," has been problematized in modern society and how successive problematizations have transformed the collective and institutionalized mentalities, rationalities, and technologies. Governmentality defines a particular "art of government" that conditions the concrete "acts of government."

The object of regulation, the regulating and regulated subjectivities, the implicit telos of regulation, and the available governance techniques are formed by the ruling governmentality (Mitchell Dean, 1999). Foucauldians use the archaeological method to analyze governmental discourse and deploy the genealogical method to analyze how governmentalities are constructed in and through myriad struggles that include and exclude particular concepts, identities, and practices.

Another important discourse approach to policy analysis is provided by critical discourse analysis (CDA), which has been used in studies of policy responses to globalization and the politics of New Labour in Britain. According to Norman Fairclough (2001), CDA aims to address social and political issues and problems by conducting a close study of texts, interactions, and other forms of semiotic material in order to detect the changes taking place around key issues. CDA emphasizes the role and impact of ideology in policy making. Ideology is not defined in terms of the comprehensive and coherent worldviews but in terms of a discursive naturalization of contingently constructed meanings and identities. Particular groups and elites may have an interest in reproducing and propagating particular ideologies as they might help them maintain, or even enhance, their political power.

Whereas Foucault's governmentality theory and Fairclough's ideology analysis study affect the discursive contexts of policies, the theories associated with the "argumentative turn" in policy analysis focus on discursive strategies that shape the form and content of public policy and guide its implementation. Discourse frames policy problems and policy solutions, and the political actors struggle to include and exclude particular themes, concepts, and ideas. In the discursive battle, institutionally situated actors advance particular arguments and aim for acceptance of these arguments from other actors by mobilizing their ability to argue a persuasive case (*logos*), their reputation and credibility as speakers (*ethos*), and the rhetorical skills that arouse particular emotions (*pathos*). A hegemonic policy discourse can structure the context in which particular phenomena are understood and defined ("discourse structuration"). Over time, the hegemonic discourse may become sedimented into a set of concepts and organizational practices that are taken for granted by social and political actors

(“discourse institutionalization”). The crux of the argument is that hegemonic discourses often hinge on the construction of a story line that provides a short, condensed, and often metaphorical expression of how the policy discourse defines problems and solutions. A story line simplifies the discursive space and helps bring about discursive closure. Social and political actors who subscribe to a particular story line form a discourse coalition. Adherence to a particular story line tends to facilitate mutual learning and compromises while excluding competing problem definitions and alternative policy solutions.

Poststructuralist discourse theory, synthesized by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and summarized by Jacob Torfing (1999), offers a conceptual and argumentative framework that further develops the ideas implicit to the argumentative turn. First, the notion of “floating signifiers” helps analyze instances of conceptual ambiguity where an expression has different contents and meanings and therefore enables policy actors to use the same vocabulary to talk about different things. Second, the notion of “articulation” provides an understanding of how meaning is partially fixed within discourse through practices that establish a relation between elements such that their identity is mutually modified. Finally, the concept of “social antagonism” identifies how policy discourses are unified with reference to a threatening otherness that both tends to stabilize the discursive system and provides a source of potential disruption.

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*See also* Advocacy Coalition Framework; Policy Analysis

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## POLICY, EMPLOYMENT

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The realm of employment policy includes a diverse set of public programs and regulations that seek to improve a population’s employment experience. In particular, employment policy attempts to reduce employment-related risks for the population, to improve the overall quantity of employment opportunities available, and to promote the quality of established employment relationships. Within employment policy, one commonly distinguishes between “passive” and “active” labor market policies: While passive policies focus on attenuating the consequences of market rule, for example, through offering unemployment insurance that guarantees income support during periods of unemployment, active policies intervene in the labor market to help the unemployed gain employment. Conceptually in between, labor laws regulate diverse aspects of the employment relationship, including issues such as nondiscrimination and unfair dismissal.

Seen through a sociological lens, employment policies are an integral part of any stable labor market. Given the strong empirical and conceptual links of employment policies with education and social security policies, as well as with the regulation of industrial–labor relations, the boundaries between these policy realms are quite fluid. This entry first reviews the functional needs for employment policy in theoretical terms and then describes the evolution of employment policy making in the advanced industrialized countries from its early beginnings in the 19th century through the tumultuous interwar period, the golden age of welfare capitalism in the 1960s, the stagflation of the 1970s, and, finally, the contemporary period.

### Functional Needs for Employment Policy

In contrast to simple product markets, the labor market requires special employment policies that help sustain the market's legitimacy in the eyes of the population and produce a high level of economic performance. Indeed, while standard products can easily be allocated as commodities through market mechanisms, this is far more difficult in the case of labor. The units of the labor market neither are created for the purpose of exchange nor can they be treated as disembodied from their social surroundings; instead, they are human beings with social and physical needs. As such, labor is a rather imperfect "commodity," with a supply function that is very different from standard, less socially embedded commodities. For instance, at both ends of the supply spectrum, labor supply tends to show a negative correlation between prices and quantity, which is the opposite of the standard relationship: At the bottom end, wage reductions can prompt workers to work longer hours in pursuit of the particular income level necessary for a desired living standard; at the higher end, wage increases can induce workers to choose more leisure. But such behavior is not the only deviation from standard commodity markets. Equally crucial for policy making and unusual compared with other commodities, employers cannot autonomously decide how to use their purchased labor; instead, they always depend on the repeated and active collaboration of their workers.

Given these characteristics, all advanced capitalist countries have created social protection mechanisms in their labor markets to reduce the dislocations associated with market allocation, safeguard the stability of society at large, and thus support the long-term viability of the labor market as an allocation device. Moreover, governments have also tended to allow for the formation of unions as workers' collective organizations, the establishment of collective wage-bargaining systems, and the creation of mechanisms for exercising stakeholder voice within the firm. Such measures have reduced the frequency and scale of worker revolts, which were once common.

In capitalist democracies, the functional requirements for employment policy are particularly high, because employment policy plays an important role in "decontesting" the organizing principles of capitalism and those of democracy: Employment

policy serves as a means to make compatible (a) employers' attempts to effectively and efficiently use human resources and (b) the upholding of civil and social rights that democracies guarantee to all their citizen. At times, policy solutions can be found that simultaneously serve both democratic and capitalist logics, such as with governments' recent attempts to broaden access to higher education, which serves to increase the equality of citizens' opportunity as well as to provide companies with more much needed human capital. However, in other instances, democratic goals have taken clear precedence, such as when some countries sought to promote "workplace democracy" and the "humanization of work" or when citizens are unconditionally guaranteed basic income support that might undercut work incentives.

Finally, employment policies have an important role to play in improving economic performance. Consider, for example, workers' investments in the acquisition of skills that can only be used in particular economic activities. The success of individual companies and whole sectors depends on the availability of such specific skills; however, without institutional guarantees by companies or governments that reduce the risks associated with specific-skill investments, specific skills might be undersupplied, and workers might choose to invest in general skills instead. Institutional guarantees that can encourage specific-skill investments include employment protection rules supporting long-term employment, a collective wage-bargaining system buttressing real-wage stability, and an unemployment insurance system providing workers with wage-related unemployment benefits in case of job loss and releasing them from the need to accept *any* available job.

In summary, by helping the population deal with employment-related risks, employment policies are the basis for a stable labor market, and if designed well, they can contribute to the effective and efficient employment of the population.

### A Short History of Employment Policy

Public employment policies have their roots in the establishment of large-scale labor markets during industrialization. The goals and content of these policies have since then evolved, driven by the development of new political answers to changing



socioeconomic challenges. As such, the evolution of employment policies has been at the center of the changing character of statehood and the shifting regulation of large parts of social life. Importantly, even though individual countries' responses to common challenges have always included similar features, each country has traveled on a distinct and contingent national developmental trajectory, in which feedback from earlier policies has tended to bound policy innovations in later periods. The next section highlights both common trends and national particularities.

### *Building Welfare States*

Industrialization during the 19th century gave rise to the "social question" of how economic progress could be maintained in the face of the political and ethical threats emanating from the abysmal conditions under which the working class was employed. The answer was the progressive development of welfare states, with employment policy being a core part of a new active form of statehood. Over time, and framed around the nation as the community of fate, prudent political leaders set up social protection institutions to provide collective mechanisms for covering the costs of progress and to manage employment-related risks. The first labor market regulations and social insurance programs were set up before the end of the 19th century; by the 1930s, unemployment insurance and the first active labor market policies were established.

Some governments addressed new social needs more quickly and some more slowly, some to preempt pressure from below, some in reaction to such pressure, and some out of ethical conviction. A leader in the expansion of suffrage, Britain had established labor market regulations, such as on working conditions in certain industries, maximum working hours, and age thresholds for legal employment by the later part of the century. At the same time, Germany's monarchist government sought to calm revolutionary impulses through carrot-and-stick policies that included both the outlawing of the Social Democratic Party's activities (1878–1890) and the introduction of statutory social insurance schemes for health (1883), accidents (1884), and disability and old age (1889).

The establishment of national unemployment insurance systems took a little longer. In the

United Kingdom, a mandatory public unemployment scheme was established in 1911. In Germany, an unemployment insurance scheme was introduced in 1927, replacing a system of income support set up in 1911. In the United States, national unemployment insurance was established in the mid-1930s as part of the Social Security Act, a piece of legislation conceived to limit what were seen as the dangers of modern American life. But the eligibility and disbursement of unemployment benefits can also be organized in another way: Named after the Belgian city where it was first implemented, the Ghent system is a voluntary scheme that grants unions the responsibility to administer unemployment benefits. With the exception of Norway, the Scandinavian countries run Ghent unemployment insurance systems to this day, although the regulation and financing of these systems has changed over the years, with the countries' national governments regulating and subsidizing union-administered funds.

Active labor market policies were introduced on a larger scale in the interwar years, prompted by widespread unemployment in the wake of the Great Depression. For instance, in the United States, several New Deal agencies were set up to provide employment until the economy improved. One of these agencies, the Works Progress Administration (WPA), became the nation's largest employer. Offering almost 8 million jobs between 1935 and 1943, the WPA carried out public works projects all over the country, from constructing new public buildings and roads to running arts and literacy projects. Only the country's entry into World War II brought an end to the efforts of the WPA and other agencies.

Parallel developments were under way in Europe, albeit under very different political auspices. In Germany, a democratic government introduced a voluntary labor service in 1931 as a means to reduce unemployment. A few years later, the National Socialists established a 6-month mandatory scheme that all young men, and after 1939 also all women, had to join. Finally, facing totalitarian threats from both the East and the South, the Scandinavian countries completely reoriented their national economic policy regimes around a more interventionist state during the 1930s. Based on explicit political deals between Social Democrats and agricultural parties, policy solutions were

developed that served both the struggling working class and farmers. For instance, in Denmark, the so-called Kanslergade Agreement laid the foundation for extending the length of collective agreements for currently employed workers without wage reductions, initiating public works programs and winter relief for the unemployed and their families, granting farmers both an export-stimulating currency devaluation and agricultural price supports, and consolidating the existing social insurance and poverty relief measures into a comprehensive program of old-age pensions and health, unemployment, and accident insurance.

### *The Golden Age*

The postwar period brought a 30-year-long economic boom and the golden age of welfare capitalism. Nurtured by a broad discourse about social rights, of which the 1944 Beveridge Report in Britain was just one example, and sustained by system competition with communism, the workers in Western democracies received their peace dividend in the consolidation of the mixed-economy welfare state, which sought to combine economic growth, full employment, social partnership between capital and labor, and universal welfare programs. Based on the efficiency increases and employment opportunities provided by the widespread adoption of Fordist mass production techniques within industry and supported by political commitments to wage compression in the economy more generally, the pleasures of middle-class life became accessible to broad majorities of the population, even for those workers without higher levels of education.

Within the realm of employment policy, macroeconomic Keynesian demand management was put into the service of guaranteeing the full employment of all willing man power. This was feasible because the newly founded international economic regime around the Bretton Woods institutions tolerated policy making geared toward domestic concerns and allowed for cheap public borrowing at rates of interest below those of economic growth. Moreover, in part, Keynesian demand management was also necessary: Having replaced the traditional craft organizations with Taylorist principles internally, companies recast themselves as vertically integrated corporations, geared to

making use of economies of scale and “pushing” standardized products into the market over long production runs. Such large-scale manufacturing came with a degree of rigidity in the economy, with drops in demand being difficult to absorb for companies, leaving the potential for initial downturns in demand to accumulate into bigger crises.

### *Reacting to Stagflation*

With the collapse of the international financial regime and simultaneous increases in unemployment and inflation, the 1970s heralded the end of the Keynesian era. A series of increases in oil prices provided the advanced economies with negative supply shocks, which traditional methods of economic policy making could not effectively address. Keen to get wage-push inflation under control, many governments experimented with income policy that sought to provide a ceiling for wage increases. Moreover, in exchange for wage moderation in the short term, some governments offered increased pension levels that would provide workers with delayed benefits in the long term. In these quests, countries’ relative success depended very much on how much their macroeconomic institutions facilitated strategic coordination between the government, organized labor, and capital, as well as the country’s interest rate-setting central bank. Here, countries with strong macrocorporatist institutions had certain advantages.

Particularly, in the pluralist English-speaking countries, which were institutionally least equipped for effective tripartite coordination between the government and the organized social partners, conservatives’ ideas about how to proceed became increasingly popular. Conservatives located the source of current economic problems in welfare states’ institutions themselves. Moreover, the advanced democracies’ populations were increasingly tired of shouldering the tax increases associated with states’ weakening finances, and tax revolts occurred in places as far apart as California and Denmark. Talk about sclerotic institutions and the problems of bureaucracy eventually became mainstream. On that basis, government action was increasingly seen as the problem rather than the solution; moreover, rather than being perceived as positive agents for increasing worker welfare, unions came to be seen as self-interested,

rent-seeking, and, ultimately, harmful lobbies. These ideas helped bring Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan to power; in moderated form, they animated the election victories of the political center-right in other countries.

Breaking with demand-side-oriented policies during the postwar period, the advanced democracies' governments sought to improve their economies' supply sides through deregulation throughout the 1980s. Often, however, liberating market forces and retrenching the welfare state proved to be a more difficult undertaking than imagined, because electorates continued to support many social insurance programs. In this context, it was symptomatic that the U.S. Social Security retirement program in the United States became known as the "third rail of American politics," promising certain political death to those who would seek to reduce it. While cuts were eventually made even in Social Security, these remained comparatively moderate in contrast to the cuts in employment policy programs that primarily benefited the poorer and politically less vocal strata of the population. Labor market programs that were linked to the U.S. War on Poverty during the 1960s and to the public employment initiatives launched in the 1970s fared particularly badly, as they came to be easy targets for politicians who framed the former as special-interest policies for racial minorities and the latter as vehicles for corruption.

While it was broadly agreed that welfare states had grown to their limits, countries diverged in how staunchly they walked the deregulation walk. For instance, the policy record of Germany's center-right government at the time was quite different from that of Thatcher or Reagan. In line with some other countries, Germany strongly embraced early-retirement policies as a means to reduce long-term unemployment and to buy peace in labor relations. In the early 1980s, policymakers introduced the possibility for people aged 60-plus to claim a full pension, as long as they had been unemployed for more than a year. Helped by such regulations, overall employment in Germany declined by an average of 0.3% annually from 1980 to 1990; by 1988, less than one out of every three German men between the ages of 60 and 64 still worked. Finally, when hit by the seismic shock of unification in 1990, the government followed a familiar adjustment pattern, unburdening the East

German labor market of excess labor through early retirement, job creation, and training schemes that brought down the official East German unemployment rate to half of what it would otherwise have been.

### *Increasing Labor Market Flexibility*

Driven by the continued deepening of economic globalization, economies' turn toward services, and—maybe above all other reasons—persistent long-term unemployment, the debates about necessary reforms of employment policies further intensified throughout the 1990s. Inspired by neo-classical economic analysis that saw labor market rigidities at the root of Europe's unemployment problems, international experts—including those from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—recommended increasing the flexibility of labor markets. Given that the future of economic growth depended strongly on further increases in labor productivity, some analysts called for the removal of regulations that stood in the way of the most efficient employment of labor resources, including employment protection rules. Others stressed the importance of increasing labor market participation, partially as a means to support economic growth but also to increase the ratio of the active to the inactive population. The latter was seen as necessary to sustain the working population's continued ability to finance social security benefits and services for those unable to work in the context of rapid population aging. Finally, while most discussions about flexibility tended to stress the importance of expanding employers' choice sets, changing employment patterns had also prompted workers to demand employment regulations that offered increased flexibility for themselves: For instance, with double-earner households having replaced male-breadwinner arrangements as the norm, parents have been looking for innovative ways to combine work and family life.

These discussions prompted a series of complex changes, the breadth of which is probably best illustrated in the European Employment Strategy: Through a continued monitoring and benchmarking process, the European Union seeks to encourage its member states to increase the role of preventive labor market policy, put in place measures that

strengthen workers' employability and adaptability, equalize employment opportunities for men and women, as well as invest in education and lifelong learning.

The biggest change in employment policy across all rich countries has occurred in how states treat their unemployed workers, with governments of all colors having embraced new measures that seek to activate the unemployed and reduce the time they spend in unemployment. Moreover, the changes have been so far-reaching that many sociologists see them as heralding a lasting transformation in the character of the state, that is, one in which the state withdraws from its commitment to guarantee comprehensive welfare *independent of* the market and moves toward a commitment to support individuals' attempts to succeed *in* the market.

Emphasizing that citizens do not only have rights to claim but also responsibilities to fulfill, politicians strengthened job search requirements for the unemployed and introduced stronger penalties for the repeated rejection of job offers. In many countries, unemployment benefits have become less of an entitlement geared toward sustaining a family's lifestyle and ever more a basic *job seeker's allowance* (to use the official British term). Finally, workers on benefits are increasingly expected to quickly accept job offers that pay below—or offer fewer responsibilities than—what former employment positions had provided. This is an important change from earlier practices that gave workers more time to look for employment appropriate to their professional status and level or focus of education.

Importantly, the implementation of activation policies differs strongly between countries. While activation in some countries can often be quite punitive, more progressive versions of “workfare” policies seek to empower individuals through providing extensive placement services, setting up individual action plans, and offering training opportunities. For instance, in the United States with its (neo)liberal institutions, the welfare-to-work regime set up in 1996 has strong elements of control and punishment, which some critics view as being harsh on benefit claimants. In contrast, running a workfare policy regime within the context of a social democratic universal welfare state, Denmark seeks to reach all potential workers, not just benefit claimants; moreover, caseworkers are supposed to

offer activation options that can increase individuals' capabilities. Finally, Germany as a Christian democratic country falls probably somewhere in the middle, offering more substantial income support than the U.S. system but having strongly cut back on training offers for the long-term unemployed. Common to activation approaches in all countries is the adoption of new public management techniques in the public employment services that administer activation policies.

As this overview about employment policy has sought to show, the history of employment policy has been both long and full of changes. Cutting-edge political science work on employment policy seeks to uncover the political drivers of diverging national developments and to conceptualize the links between the neighboring policy realms of employment, welfare, and education.

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*See also* Neo-Corporatism; Welfare Policies; Welfare State

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## POLICY ADVICE

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Policy advice does not exist in a vacuum. If it did, it would be irrelevant to political affairs, of only abstract interest. Instead, policy advice can only be understood in relational terms. It is offered by some to others. Therefore, a number of central—and closely interrelated—questions can be asked:

1. What is public policy advice?
2. To whom is such advice provided and why?
3. Who offers policy advice?
4. Why is policy advice needed?
5. How is policy advice provided?
6. What constitutes “good” policy advice?

### What Is Public Policy Advice?

*Policy advice* is a generic term referring to a wide range of activities within the processes of government policy making. These include research, both formal and informal; the writing and presentation of policy memoranda laying out policy choices and options; discussions and negotiations on public policy issues; and the monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of policies.

Policy advice may usefully be distinguished from political advice, though there is no clear and unambiguous distinction but rather shades of gray. Whereas policy advice relates to the content of public policy, and may often address complex technical issues, political advice comprises counsel that addresses considerations of political costs and benefits that may be borne by those policymakers who hold elected office in liberal democratic societies. All high-level policy advisers are usually required to be sensitive to the political context of the advice they provide.

For heuristic purposes, the so-called public policy process is often depicted as a policy cycle moving sequentially from problem definition, to policy formulation, to policy implementation, to policy evaluation, and then perhaps back to problem redefinition and policy reformulation, and so on. In reality, the process is usually not that tidy, and various stages of the cycle can occur simultaneously rather than sequentially. As the American political scientist Carl Friedrich (1940) famously put it, “Public policy is being formed as it is being executed, and it is likewise being executed as it is being formed” (p. 6). Nevertheless, policy advice can be directed at one or all of these stages of public policy making, and advisers may be specialists in particular areas, most notably perhaps in policy formulation, in policy implementation, or in policy evaluation.

### To Whom Is Policy Advice Provided?

The principal answer is that policy advice is provided to those whose formal responsibility it is to make public policy. Generally speaking, in parliamentary systems, this is the main function of the political executive, headed by a prime minister whose government must enjoy the confidence of the legislature, from which it is drawn; and in republican constitutional systems, in which the executive and legislative arms of government are formally separate, it is the president and his or her top executives. It also includes members of the legislature in both types of system, whose role is to scrutinize and debate public policy and to pass the laws that enact it.

Again, as indicated by Friedrich’s observation, some policy advisers may simultaneously be the recipients of advice, especially those who hold senior bureaucratic offices. They themselves will often be receiving policy advice from their organizational subordinates.

### Who Offers Policy Advice?

In Western democracies, just about anyone can offer policy advice. A policy advice continuum could show that at one extreme are citizens who make their views known to governments on public policy issues and at the other extreme are those who earn their living by offering policy advice to

governments. The former may have no expertise in a policy field except—and it can be an important exception—the “expertise” embodied in their own understanding of their interests and aspirations and their personal familiarity with a particular policy’s effect on them. The latter is dominated by bureaucratic officials and policy analysts and advisers working in government agencies.

Between these two loosely defined extremities can be found a wide range of people who offer policy advice to government decision makers. These people include, in particular, academics in tertiary education institutions, researchers in various nongovernmental policy think tanks, analysts and lobbyists working for interest groups, and independent private consultants. In the case of academic researchers, those most likely to offer policy advice to governmental authorities are those who engage in what James Coleman (1972) calls “decision-oriented,” as distinct from “conclusion-oriented,” research. The former is an explicit guide to action, attempting to connect the academic world with the world of political action. This is often a fraught endeavor for both parties.

### Why Is Policy Advice Needed?

The total absence of public policy advice in any political system would imply the existence of a single dictator dependent solely on his or her own counsel for the decisions that he or she takes. That has probably never been the case anywhere.

Instead, policy advice is needed to better inform the policy decisions taken and to try to ensure that the prospects for policy effectiveness are maximized and the risk of policy failure minimized. This is because public policy is purposive in nature, at least in its most explicit form, rationally designed to attain intended and finite outcomes or to achieve, modify, or maintain certain standards of performance over time. Governments universally are required to formulate public policies, often in the face of high levels of technical complexity and uncertainty, and in doing so, they must depend heavily—but by no means exclusively—on often sophisticated bodies of theoretical knowledge, much of which will be generated by technological and scientific research. For these reasons, there has been a huge growth over the past several decades in most Western democracies, particularly in the

United States, of what might be called the “policy analysis industry”—producing rapidly increasing numbers of policy analysts and advisers in public organizations who have been trained and educated in public policy and associated disciplines in tertiary education institutions. Whereas before World War II the study of public policy focused largely on why and how governments made policy, analysis *of* policy, since then the focus has become much more normative and prescriptive, analysis *for* policy.

### How Is Policy Advice Offered?

Policy advice can be offered formally or informally. Most of what has been said above refers to the formal offering of policy advice through established and managed institutional arrangements, such as those between, in parliamentary systems, cabinet ministers and their senior bureaucratic advisers, or in a republican system, such as that of the United States, between the president and his or her top appointees in executive agencies. Advice can be offered in formal memoranda or verbally (which has perhaps become a more common practice because what was once considered confidential advice is now more publicly accessible through official disclosure legislation).

Decision makers seeking policy advice can, however, do so outside the formal institutional arrangements, at their discretion (and with sensitivity to political risk). The bureaucratic reforms that took place in several Westminster parliamentary systems in the 1980s and 1990s—such as New Zealand and Australia—were intended, among other things, to render policy advice more “contestable,” that is, to ensure that cabinet ministers were less dependent on the counsel provided by their top bureaucratic advisers.

### What Is “Good” Policy Advice?

Policy advice in liberal democracies ideally aspires to satisfy two main criteria: to be open and politically contestable, on the one hand, and to be rational, on the other. The two are not necessarily always compatible. In his seminal article, “The Science of Muddling Through,” Charles Lindblom (1959) recognized this tension in arguing that the test of “good” policy itself can be that it achieves its objectives or that those contributing to

its formulation can agree to act together, even though they may not agree on the objectives a policy is intended to achieve.

Thus, good policy advice can be demonstrably instrumental in shaping “successful” policy, in that the desired objectives are achieved; or in securing political coalitions of the “policy willing” to ensure that action itself takes place; or in achieving some combination of both. Policy advice may be seen to be good in political terms—by a government, by a cabinet member, or by a minister—but not by others, whether they be policy analytical peers or people affected by or who have an interest in the particular policy.

As Lindblom (1977) shrewdly observed, “A good defense for a bad policy will be that it is the result of a process in which everyone was heard” (p. 256). This insight speaks to the importance of genuine consultation in democratic policy processes, in the interests of effective coalition building. Consultation can itself be an important form of research, involving the interviewing and surveying of interested and affected parties, carried out by policy analysts and advisers.

The word *policy* itself may suggest that in contradistinction to politics, policy is apolitical. But such a claim cannot be sustained. Peter Jackson (2007) forcefully argues that “policy advice and its knowledge bases are ideological in nature and it is pure obscurantism, pretence and conceit to suggest that it is ‘objective’ knowledge, that it is independent of political or social interests and without moral considerations” (p. 263). While this assertion may be seen by those of a more technocratic, or antipolitical, disposition as extravagant, it is not difficult to defend.

The clients of policy advisers more often than not have to march to the beat of a political drum, which is not always well understood by those who find it difficult to understand the inevitable tensions between the norms of democracy and rationality. Often politicians may be less inclined to hear arguments that run counter to what they “know” to be true or desirable, even when those arguments are supported by logical reasoning and impeccable evidence. These latter qualities, as desirable as they are in themselves, cannot always carry the day.

Policy making is generally based as much on beliefs as it is on evidence. The politicians who are held publicly responsible for it are required to act,

more often than not, rather than to reflect and may—for reasons perfectly rational in themselves—bemoan what they see as “paralysis by analysis.” For their part, policy advisers soon learn that their craft demands a willingness to make acceptable trade-offs between the need to be technically dispassionate and objective and the requirement that they also be politically relevant. They may not always admire politicians, but they must learn to understand them. The converse is equally true.

Neither quantitative nor qualitative methods of analysis and research have any monopoly on the quality of policy advice. Rigorous analysis that can form the basis of sound policy advice, however assessed, is not confined to the application of quantitative techniques. Disciplined and rigorous thinking is also a central requirement in qualitative research—for example, in applying the “lessons” of history to current policy issues (Richard Neustadt & Ernest May, 1986). In any event, good policy advice will depend on grounded experience, discerning judgment, and intuitional wisdom as much as on rigorous analysis.

Finally, policy advice must be kept open to revision in the light of changing circumstances, unfounded assumptions, and poor judgment. It should embody a capacity for ongoing learning, resisting any tendency to become self-fulfilling in its effects. And while it may aspire to wisdom, as a category that transcends data, information, and knowledge, it may also reflect some understanding that wisdom itself inheres in an intuitive sense of the interconnectedness of things in the complex and uncertain world of public policy making.

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*See also* Constitutionalism; Historical Memory; Ideology; Interest Groups; Judicial Decision Making; Parliamentary Systems; Policy Analysis; Policy Cycle; Policy Evaluation; Policy Formulation; Policy Process, Models of

#### Further Readings

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## POLICY ANALYSIS

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*Policy analysis* is a term that is applied to a wide variety of practices and intellectual approaches and that cannot be reduced to a neat definition. The relationship between intellectual approaches and practice is not clear. Certainly, there is a dominant paradigm that sees policy analysis as an exercise in applied social science, in which the analytic method of the social sciences is mobilized to enable governments to make the optimal choice, and graduate programs in policy (particularly in North America) elaborate and refine the knowledge and skills required for policy analysis in this sense. But even those who are trained and employed as policy analysts find a disjunction between the methodology in which they have been trained and the demands of the job, and there is an undercurrent of anxiety among analysts about the extent to which their analysis is used and uncertainty about whether, and in what way, they should involve themselves in policy practice. So it is difficult to give an unambiguous definition of *policy analysis* as a field of study or of practice. It is conventional to distinguish between analysis *for* policy and the analysis *of* policy, and we will begin with this distinction. But it will become clear that the diversity of perceptions of policy analysis reflects the different ways in which we think about policy, mobilizing multiple and overlapping frameworks of meaning to make sense of what we see and what we do, so we will need to dig deeper to get a fuller understanding of policy analysis. Working through these various usages of the term will be like peeling an onion, though we hope to do it without too many tears.

### Analysis of Policy or for Policy?

The distinction between analysis *of* and analysis *for* reflects an attempt to separate observation from practice and, in particular, to distinguish policy analysis as a specific form of applied social science from the broader field of the study of government. Analysis *of* has tended to be the less significant branch, perhaps because its focus on the analysis of process made it hard to distinguish from traditional political science. At one point, there was a tendency for the study of government to be renamed “public policy,” with the work of government being seen as the production of policy and the study of the process being “policy analysis.” This rested on a perception of policy as a process of official problem solving, which was widely shared but which later came under scrutiny from what was called the critical or interpretive approach to policy analysis (which is discussed further in this entry). It was also challenged (less directly) by the governmentality approach deriving from the work of Michel Foucault, which looked beyond the implied question of “what is the best way for the government to solve this problem” to ask how situations became problems, who could or should address them, what modes of practice are seen as appropriate responses, and in what way these situations recede from the ranks of problems that claim public attention.

### Policy Fields

Much of the analysis *of* was focused on specific policy fields: health policy, transportation policy, environment policy, and so on. This interpretation of policy analysis shares the assumption that government is a process of official problem solving, and the task of policy analysis is to identify the problems, the participants, the responses, and the outcomes. The analyst is seen as the source of expert knowledge on what has been done and could be done, and the focus is on what is described as the “substance” of policy—problems and putative solutions—rather than on the process. Here, the distinction between analysis *of* and analysis *for* has tended to fade, as the outside observers who become expert in what has been done are often seen as sources of advice about what should be done (and in any case, tend to have strong views on this topic whether they are asked or not). At the same time, those employed as policy analysts tend



to become more specialized, experts in a particular field (and increasingly, engaged in it and committed to particular approaches) rather than detached technicians used to compare policy alternatives with one another and concerned to give an “objective” answer. This perception of policy analysis as “knowing about” a particular policy field is widely shared—among academics, practitioners, and the wider public—and underlies much of the writing with *policy* in the title.

### The Call for a Policy Science

But the main game in policy analysis has not been about the subject matter but about method. The origins of policy analysis as an intellectual approach and a field of practice are often traced back to the United States in the aftermath of World War II, when Harold Lasswell called for a “policy science” that would be problem focused, interdisciplinary, and explicitly normative. The focus on policy and analysis would, it was felt, “lift the game” of the American political system so that it would be driven by a focus on problems and outcomes rather than by techno-bureaucratic inertia and partisan allocation and become both more transparent and effectively democratic. The policy analyst, by applying the social sciences, would produce expert and objective advice on the questions confronting government. At the same time, the existence of this technology of critique would empower the “outsiders” in government, strengthening their ability to challenge the operations of government by creating a discourse of instrumental rationality in relatively transparent terms.

### Policy Analysis as a Field of Study

Through the 1950s and 1960s, policy analysis took root in the United States, both as a body of knowledge and as a field of practice. The early policy analysts were likely to have PhDs in economics or operations research and to come from institutions such as RAND in California. But soon graduate schools of public policy emerged, offering master’s degrees (comparable with MBA). These graduate programs were more oriented to political science, but the core courses in policy analysis that they usually offered elaborated a technology of choice grounded in economics, with the task of the policy

analysis being to identify a number of options; to estimate their feasibility, cost, and likely impact; and by making the appropriate calculations, to determine the optimal course of action. The methodology was grounded in (usually unspoken) assumptions—that policy activity consists of dealing with discrete and context-free problems, that government is composed of “decision makers” who are recognized as being responsible for any given problem, that their sole concern is to solve the problem, and that calculations from welfare economics are recognized as determinant in arguments about the best course of action. The work of the policy analyst was to use this methodology to determine the optimal course of action and to communicate this to the “policymakers”—“speaking truth to power,” as Aaron Wildavsky, the founding dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, put it. The teaching of these institutions was supplemented by conferences, journals, and the formation of a professional association, the Association for Public Policy and Management (APPAM). APPAM conferences became major meeting places for the intersection of policy analysis as a field of study with policy analysis as a field of practice, and its journal has been a showcase for exercises in the systematic evaluation of options. By the turn of the century, it was confidently claimed that policy analysis in the United States had “come of age.”

### Policy Analysis as a Field of Practice

What was less clear, though, was just what it was that these policy analysts were doing. The initial perception had been that they would be detached scientific experts who could be called in when required, or if they were to have a permanent presence, it would be in a small unit close to the top, where they would be “advising the Prince.” This was the way Robert McNamara sought to use policy analysis as U.S. Secretary of Defense in the 1960s, seeing it as offering a systematic and impartial appraisal of the ambitions of the military chiefs. But this could set in motion a dispersal of policy analysis through the wider world of governing: If chief executives were using policy analysis as the basis for their choices, it would be only sensible for executives at the next lower level to employ their own policy analysts to try to negotiate with the

top-level analysts or at least to second-guess them. For this reason, policy analysts became common at lower levels in the organization, and in business associations and nonprofit organizations, to facilitate their dealings with government. Increasingly, policy analysts found themselves not so much advising the prince as negotiating with policy analysts from other organizations. Rather than being experts in choosing between courses of action, they became experts in particular fields of action, such as child care or urban mass transportation, and, increasingly, advocates of particular approaches to these areas of concern. The technologies of choice in which they had been trained became not recognized ways of identifying the optimal course of action but “dueling swords” to be used as resources in encounters with policy analysts and others from other organizations. And the work of policy analysts was often only loosely connected to advising decision makers, covering everything from background research for legislators to public education campaigns to lobbying for particular public policies.

### Policy Analysis and Policy Advising

In the development of policy analysis, the focus was on the application of the canons of the social sciences to generate the basis for a decision maker to make the optimal choice. It was assumed that this would be what the decision maker wanted, and policy analysts expressed frustration when their carefully crafted solution was not adopted. But leaders in government found that “problems” were not neatly set up for them to address like a golf ball on a tee but were part of a continuing flow of activity involving a range of participants who might have divergent perceptions of the nature of the problem, its significance, and what response would be appropriate and whose responses were in any case shaped by their experience of past dealings with the other participants and their expectations about future dealings. These leaders might feel that the knowledge that they needed was not so much a calculation of the optimal outcome as guidance about the best way to manage an ambiguous, contested, and continuing field of activity. Policy workers found that they were concerned as much with the strategic management of the policy issue as with the systematic comparison of options, and in many cases, their work was described as “policy

advising.” Some writers have stressed the importance of distinguishing between analysis (seen as detached and scientific) and advising (seen as more engaged, experiential, and judgmental). Others built the diversity and conflict into the analysis, looking for formulae that would incorporate the divergent perceptions and agendas of the participants into the calculations in the hope that they would accept the outcome because their views had been “taken into account,” although it was commonly found that trying to resolve conflict through formulae was not successful because the conflicting parties simply used the data from the analysis as ammunition in the continuing conflict. But this extension of policy analysis into the management of policy conflict was done through formulae or advising based on criteria drawn from experience: It raised for policy workers the question of whether they saw policy analysis as a technical input into the policy process or as a continuing and committed engagement with it.

For some policy workers (and writers), the technical skill of policy analysis is seen in terms of the analyst’s understanding of the process—the situation as well as the problem—and the task for analysis as “in these circumstances, how can we achieve the most satisfactory outcome?” Policy analysis becomes less the selection of the optimal outcomes and more an exercise in skilful maneuvering in a crowded terrain, involving an understanding of the participants, stances, and structured processes as well as the substance of the policy issue, with policy analysis as a more or less formal exercise that might be mobilized in support. In this perspective, books on policy analysis are less concerned with analytic method than with street-smart guidance for the practitioner, though recently there has been more research (particularly in Europe) on how policy workers approach the task of making these strategic appreciations of the question and the extent to which this generates an experience-based analysis that might counter the instrumental calculations and projects of traditional American policy analysis.

### Evaluation: The Policy Analysis That Got Away

The first generation of policy analysts in the United States was trained in the expert appraisal of

alternative courses of action, and the methodology for making these appraisals became a standard part of the graduate programs in policy that emerged in the United States. It was essentially based on welfare economics and sought to calculate the net utility gain from each of a limited number of alternatives—usually before the event (*ex ante*) and sometimes after it (*ex post*). This developed into a distinct field of knowledge and practice called evaluation. It can be argued that this had its origins in the assessment of educational practice, but it gained its impetus in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the United States, as the instrumental use of grants by governments (particularly central governments) became more common and was increasingly accompanied by requirements that the performance of the grantee agency be subject to independent evaluation. This reflected the increasing appeal of principal-agent theory in government. It had been common for governments to give financial support in various ways to, for instance, religious or community bodies carrying out charitable works, but in the later years of the 20th century, this support was seen as the means for government to contract with agents to achieve known and specified outcomes. The charitable bodies were defined as the agents of government, and evaluation was seen as the means whereby governments could check that what they had paid for had been delivered. The methodology of these evaluations drew broadly on the research methods of the social sciences, applied in a framework of instrumental rationality: What were the objectives of the program? How could these be measured? Were the specified outcomes achieved? In this way, it was argued, the systematic analysis of the social sciences could be mobilized in support of the pursuit of policy goals.

But as with policy analysis, beneath the development of methodologies for evaluation lay the tension between detachment and engagement: Is the evaluator to be an inspector (a detached part of the apparatus of control) or a coach (a committed part of the team)? The central officials who commission evaluation may see it as a means of exercising control over the evaluated, but on the ground, inspectors tend to enter into trading relationships and develop shared understandings with the subjects of their scrutiny. Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln (1989) have argued that there has

been a shift over time, from a detached inspectorial form of evaluation, which they called “third-generation evaluation,” to a more supportive and negotiated “fourth-generation” type, but while there is some evidence to support this argument, it is challenged by the increased use of quasi-contractual relationships in government and the demand for “objective” measures of performance, which suggest that the inspectorial evaluation is alive and well. The explanation seems to be that there is an inherent tension between inspection and collaboration, but both have their part to play in the action, with the internal logic pointing to practices of collaboration and the external logic calling for the presentation of evaluation in terms of detached inspection.

### Policy Analysis as Applied Knowledge

The last subcategory of analysis *for* might be called applied knowledge—that is, where policy analysis is seen as generating the sort of knowledge that is needed for decision making. Certainly, there are often research bureaus established within government in specific areas such as health policy, industry policy, or agriculture policy, and this can be seen as evidence of a need for specialized analysis of policy areas. In some cases, though, there seems to be a tendency to wind down specialist units within government and rely more on the ad hoc use of consultants. Also, the evidence that political leaders seek the advice of the subject experts within the tent, or that it constitutes a distinct form of analysis, is not very strong, and institutional analysts like James March and Johan Olsen would argue that this sort of explicit gathering of knowledge is not so much to inform the decision makers as to reassure the audience that the decision was appropriately made.

Perhaps more significant is policy analysis as oversight: the mobilization of analysis for a more comprehensive and overarching interrogation of the work of government. Sometimes high-level policy analysis and review units are established in government, such as the United Kingdom (UK)’s Central Policy Review Staff in the 1970s. The argument is that a small unit, not involved in the operations of government and reporting to the top-level leaders, will be able to generate an analysis that takes in the whole of government activity, identifies

the interconnections, and focuses on outcomes and alternatives. This may be so, but there are not many examples of these units, they tend not to be very long-lived, and it is difficult to discern a distinctive mode of analysis emerging from them. Often, governments prefer to commission a one-off independent review of a policy area (to which they can pay as much or as little attention as they like) rather than to have systematic review built into the normal expectations of government. It can also be argued that now the claims for the merits of overarching policy analysis carried out ad hoc by high-level special units have been supplanted by the broader based advocacy of evidence-based policy as part of normal expectations.

### Practicing Analysis, Analyzing Practice

Clearly, *policy analysis* is a term applied to a diversity of intellectual approaches and forms of practice. Because it is a concept that is mobilized in practice, its meaning will reflect its utility in facilitating practice as well as in its contribution to the analysis of practice. The *idea* of policy analysis is important in validating the activity of government, part of a set of rituals by which society assures itself that human existence is built around intelligent choice. But the forms of practice that count as policy analysis vary, reflecting the fact that “policy” itself is made up of a complex overlap of meanings that are manifest in an interplay of accounts. Hal Colebatch argues (2009) that it is helpful to see policy in terms of the interplay of accounts of *authoritative choice*, *structured interaction*, and *social construction*. Authoritative choice accounts present policy in terms of governments making decisions, structured interaction accounts see it more as the outcome of continuing interaction by stakeholders, and social construction accounts focus on the “collective puzzling” about what is normal and what is problematic, what demands action, and what sorts of action are appropriate. Each of these accounts of policy makes meaningful and legitimate a distinct array of practices, to all of which the term *policy analysis* can legitimately be applied. To make sense of this diversity of practices, then, we need to consider the nature of these accounts and the sort of policy analysis that they validate.

### *Policy Analysis in an Authoritative Choice Account*

The dominant account of policy is that it is an exercise in authoritative choice: It is whatever government decides to do or not to do. This focuses on the episodes of attention in governing that give rise to rituals of choice—making decisions, authorizing programs, allocating resources, and so on—and underpins the perception of policy analysis as a technology of intelligent choice: gathering data on the problem, identifying alternative ways of responding to it, calculating the costs and benefits of these alternatives, systematically comparing options, and advising the decision makers of this information to enable them to make the optimal choice. Once the choice has been made, the same technology can be applied to assess whether the action solved the problem—evaluation.

In general, policy analysis is seen as an activity that precedes the choice (or that, in the case of evaluation, follows closely in its footsteps). Its knowledge base is the technology of selection, and its focus is on the decision process, not on the functional knowledge of the operational staff that tends to be relegated to a secondary place: The functional experts may propose, but the policy analyst is needed to evaluate their proposals, drawing on skills of selection and choice. But the separation of the technology of choice from operational knowledge can never be complete, and the demand for evidence-based policy links the field knowledge of the functional expert to the choice expertise of the specialist policy analyst, imposing on the functional specialist a requirement to demonstrate the instrumental efficacy of the proposed course of action and on the analyst a demand to identify the optimal course of action. The complexity of government also gives rise to a supporting role in policy analysis for the “process manager,” the expert in procedure who can identify the steps that need to be taken in order to translate a decision to act into a correctly formulated and approved act of state.

### *Policy Analysis in a Structured Interaction Account*

The authoritative choice account sees the task for analysis as enabling the policymakers (unspecified) to make the optimal informed decision. The

structured interaction account, though, focuses on the variety of participants, all of whom contribute to the process, but few can bring it to a close with a “decision.” These participants are likely to have distinct perceptions of the nature of the problem being addressed, what could be done about it, and how important it is. In this account, the task for analysis is to identify the participants and their stances, discover the extent of shared meanings and understandings and divergent and conflicting ones, and explore the discourses, practices, and locations through which mutually acceptable outcomes could be pursued. It is more like diplomacy than laboratory science, seeking to discover a basis for concerted action among participants who are not necessarily seeking to solve the same problem. It is concerned to facilitate consultation and negotiation, and here it overlaps with the process work of inter-organizational communication, which has in many cases become a cottage industry in its own right, with consulting firms becoming adept at organizing “public consultation” exercises in which policy concerns or (more commonly) proposals are subject to structured discussion by nonofficials.

Here, we can see that the cognitive and the social element of policy analysis are closely related to one another: Sharing an understanding of the policy problem makes it easier to work together toward an agreed outcome, and people who are accustomed to working together are likely to develop shared understandings. In the 1970s, scientific concern about the climatic implications of the emerging hole in the earth’s ozone layer led, extremely quickly, to international agreements to prohibit the use of chlorofluorocarbons in refrigerators. Peter Haas argued that this remarkable piece of policy development was due to the policy activity of an international network of scientists who shared an understanding of the problem and were all able to convince their home governments to act in concert with the rest of the world; he called this an “epistemic community” (from the Greek *episteme*—“knowledge”): The knowledge defined the community. But we can also see that in any policy area, there will be a range of participants who are all interested in the policy area but from diverse perspectives and knowledge bases. In agriculture policy, for instance, there will be agriculture bureaucrats, farmers’ organizations, unions of agricultural workers, transporters, marketers,

journalists, academics, and so on. Groupings such as this are not *epistemic* communities in Haas’s terms, because they do not start from a common body of knowledge, but the more they work together over time, the more they develop shared understandings about who should be involved in the policy field, how to talk about it, and what sorts of action can be contemplated, and as this happens, they come to form a “policy community” of participants who recognize one another’s legitimate expectation of a place at the table and who share an interest in securing a mutually acceptable outcome and a form of discourse that is likely to lead to this. In cases such as this, the forces for social cohesion lead to the development of modes of discourse that in turn strengthen the cohesion.

The recognition of the importance in the policy process of shared understandings has sparked a distinct school of interpretive or discursive policy analysis, which argues that much of the work of policy analysis is concerned with the negotiation of meaning, often in contested and ambiguous situations, and focuses attention on the way that meaning is constructed and communicated in policy work. Studies of relatively low-level workers (e.g., town planners, police, or social workers) find them engaged in constructing the links and negotiating the meaning through which governing is accomplished and argue that this communication and meaning construction is an integral part of policy making. Beryl Radin found that while U.S. policy analysts tend to define their role as “advising the Secretary,” they often spend most of their time negotiating with policy analysts from other agencies, with the policy analysis techniques they learned in graduate school being deployed as “dueling swords” in these encounters, and she argues that policy analysis has moved from an ambition to “speak truth to power” to developing the capacity to speak truths to multiple powers.

#### *Policy Analysis in a Social Construction Account*

Policy cannot be reduced to decisions by “the authorities” (authoritative choice) or deals between stakeholders (structured interaction) but rests on shared perceptions of what is normal and what demands action, who can speak with authority, what sorts of action are appropriate, and who can be held responsible—that is, it rests on a bed of

socially constructed problematization. The development of policy on climate change, for instance, has not been a matter of governments simply recognizing a problem but of an extended process of argumentation among scientists, activists, officials, industrialists, and commentators about how to interpret phenomena and to relate them to patterns of governing. It has been a continuing and contested process across constitutional and national boundaries, a pattern of meaning construction to which government players could contribute but that they cannot control. Indeed, when the former U.S. Vice President Al Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in raising the public consciousness on climate change, there was a demand for him to return to politics as a candidate for the presidency, but he resisted this, and it was suggested that he had come to realize that even the president could not change U.S. policy on climate change until public opinion had come to accept both the policy problem and the implications for corporate and individual practice.

In this context, then, policy analysis (both *of* and *for* policy) has to do with the construction and maintenance of the problematic. Analysis *for* is concerned with the development of an account of practice that focuses attention on a problem, validates ways of thinking about it and appropriate responses, and allocates responsibility for action. In this respect, the work of policy analysis is more like that of a lawyer than a laboratory scientist: It is finding good reasons for doing things. When Tony Blair was prime minister of the UK, there was in his press office an official called the Head of Story Development, whose task was to ensure that what was being done in government made “a good story.”

But to say that policy analysis is concerned with framing the action suggests that there may be more than one way of doing this and that the analysis will have to contend with competing frameworks of meaning. Policy workers in health, for instance, recognizing that the available resources—hospitals and doctors—are preempted by the ever-expanding claims of “illness response” at the expense of activities that would contribute more to health, try to strengthen the discourses on health maintenance and self-care (rather than illness treatment) and the position of the participants who engage in these discourses. Policy workers closely analyze the

wording in official discourse and try to make sure that the words used will bear the interpretation that they want to put on them and, if not, will seek to replace them with words that are more convenient. And the framing is not only done with words: Titles, uniforms, and the architecture of buildings can be powerful symbols that convey the meaning of policy.

So from a social construction perspective, analysis for policy is not a technical exercise conducted in advance but part of the continuing strategic judgment of the participants, as they frame the world (and react to the framings of others) in a way that makes sense both to themselves and to other participants. This means that they must be sensitive to the different framings that are in use at any point and make the appropriate responses. Tim Tenbensen, drawing on Aristotle, argues that within the one policy context, there are likely to be discourses grounded in knowledge from study (Aristotle’s *episteme*), in knowledge from practice (*techne*), and in ethical-practical judgment (*phronesis*) and shows that an important skill in policy work is the ability to analyze the policy setting, discern the nature of the discourse in use, and engage in it with the appropriate language. This brings us back to a recurring theme in the discussion of analysis for policy: Is the task to do the analysis or to bring it into use in the shaping of policy outcomes?

### Conclusion

Policy analysis is a concept in practice, and what it means reflects the way in which it is used. The intellectual foundations of the concept lay not only in political science but also in economics and operations research, and as it developed as a conceptual field, concerns about organizational dynamics, problematization, and the construction of meaning were added. As a component of practice, it is used to describe a wide variety of activities. The question is not so much “What does policy analysis mean?” as “How is the term *policy analysis* used to characterize and validate activity?”

Initially, it was seen as a distinct and prior stage in the process of governing, a form of intellectual activity that would precede the exercise of authority. This presentation was part of a modernist account of government as a form of systematic

collective instrumentality, in which the government identified problems and decided what to do about them. The argument ran that by hitching the investigative techniques of social science to the operational capacity of government, governments would be better informed about the nature of the problem and the likely outcomes of alternative responses open to government. Its advocates saw it as a source of scientific and unbiased answers to contested questions in government.

In this respect, the experience was somewhat disappointing. Formal modes of the identification and comparison of alternative courses of action were elaborated, taught in graduate programs, and reported in the literature (e.g., "Optimal Compensating Wages for Military Personnel" or "The Impact of State Tax Credits in Stimulating R&D"). But often, those doing the analysis felt that it had little impact on the decision process and that sometimes the decision had been made before the analysis was called for. One response sees this as a "two-cultures" problem and calls for policy analysts to be more "user-friendly," less concerned with adding to the systematic body of academic knowledge, and more concerned with the quick delivery of answers to urgent policy questions, even if this means ignoring the methodological canons of good social science: Analysis that is "quick and dirty" might be what is needed in policy. This response also calls for policy analysts to pay more attention to the communication of their findings, writing shorter and more accessible texts that focus on the immediate implications for policy. This raises the question of the extent to which policy analysts should involve themselves in "marketing" their analysis to increase the likelihood of it being used in the policy process. Should they be advocates for their own findings? Should they, in carrying out their analysis, cultivate relationships that are likely to strengthen the chances of its acceptance or to neutralize potential opposition? In other words, are they to be detached scientists or active participants in the policy process?

This has not been a topic for abstract debate but has reflected the way in which policy analysis became institutionalized in and around government, particularly in the United States. Radin, who has been both a participant in and an observer of this process, found that policy workers tended to become specialists in particular policy fields rather

than general-purpose analysts and that while they have been trained in the systematic comparison of policy alternatives and see this as the real work of policy analysis, they find that they are likely to be spending more of their time talking not to policymakers looking for guidance but to policy analysts in other organizations, each primarily concerned with protecting the interests of his or her own organization. She argues that in practice, policy analysis has moved from being a purportedly objective judgment that could resolve policy arguments to being the vehicle through which they could be continued. It has become a mode of discourse mediating relations between the various participants in the policy process—not simply between policy analysts from different agencies but also between elected leaders, officials, and activists. Officials call for analysis to question and delegitimize the projects of elected leaders, leaders commission analysis to defend these projects against bureaucratic scrutiny, and activists table analysis to support their demands and to establish their credibility as serious players in the policy process. Policy participants were interested in policy analysis not because it would deliver the self-evidently correct answer to a policy problem but because it could facilitate interaction by giving the contending participants a shared language.

This evident development in policy practice (analysis *for*) has been paralleled by a growing interest in interpretive modes of policy analysis (analysis *of*), which focus attention on the construction of meaning and the way it is related to patterns of interaction. The relationship is (as Anthony Giddens puts it) "recursive": The accepted construction of meaning indicates who the appropriate participants are and how they should act and interact, and who participates and how they interact determines the meaning of the question. Interpretive policy analysis directs attention to the ways in which meaning is constructed from the competing interpretations (story lines) available: What is the policy about? Is policy on child care, for instance, about the reconstruction of gender relations, increasing workforce participation, promoting socialization, or the education of the young? These are all valid policy aspirations, but how significant they are in any specific context is likely to depend on which participants are involved, and the various participants are all concerned with ensuring that their perception of the problem is

reflected in the policy statement. Interpretive policy analysis draws attention to the way in which participation and meaning interact with one another.

At the same time that analysis of policy has been broadening its gaze and recognizing the ambiguity of purpose in policy, there has been among some practitioners a strong move in the other direction, back in search of more clarity and a policy analysis that will identify the right policy to choose—in a sense, returning to the spirit of Lasswell's 1951 call for a policy science and the American graduate programs that it inspired. This perspective on the function of analysis has been boosted by the application of principal-agent theory in government, which underlies the enthusiasm for purchaser-provider splits, the contracting out of functions, and quasi-market relations between the center and the operational arms of government. In this context, the function of policy analysis was to clarify what it was that the center should be seeking and to verify whether the operational arms were delivering it.

By the turn of the century, this model of arm's-length trading was being supplanted by discourses of partnership and governance, but there was a growing demand for evidence-based policy, which also looked to policy analysis to reduce uncertainty in the policy process. This followed pressure in the health sector for evidence-based medicine, stemming from a realization that while systematic comparison of alternatives had played a large part in the advance of medical science, there was little comparative evaluation of the standard operating procedures of medical practice. This concern resulted in the formation of the Cochrane Collaboration as a forum for scrutinizing the evidence on the efficacy of different forms of treatment, with the randomized controlled trial as the gold standard of analytic methods. This movement was paralleled in policy analysis by the establishment of the Campbell Collaboration, which aimed to establish definitively what works in policy, and this gave new life to traditional American policy analysis, with its focus on the definition of the problem, the identification of options, and the systematic comparison of alternatives.

So policy analysis is characterized by two major tensions. One is the tension between scholarship and practice: To what extent is policy analysis the generation of scientific knowledge, and to what

extent is it a contribution to governmental practice? The second tension is between the two divergent paradigms of policy on which it draws. One is the paradigm of instrumental rationality from which policy analysis emerged, which portrays a world in which the problem is clear and there is a single decision maker, a known hierarchy of values and objectives, and certainty of outcomes. In this world, the role of the policy analyst is to calculate which course of action will best achieve the values of the policymaker. This is countered by an alternative paradigm that sees policy as emerging from a world characterized by diversity: multiple participants, conflicting agendas, dispute over values and objectives, and uncertainty about the outcomes that might be achieved or how these would be evaluated. In this paradigm, policy analysis is a part of the game, mobilized by the participants as part of the continuing struggle for support. These two paradigms are not entirely separate; rather, one tends to assume the other. There is an awareness of diversity and also a yearning for cohesion. Policy participants recognize the multiple voices in the process of governing but at the same time find it difficult not to use a single-voiced narrative in which an actor called the government makes decisions that resolve conflicts by the creation of policy. The question for participants is to what extent policy analysis is seen as a vehicle for accomplishing the purposes of the government and to what extent it operates as a device for facilitating the achievement of some degree of concerted action among the diverse and fractious players in the game, with statements of objectives (or about the problem itself) being means for the achievement of collaboration rather than evidence of its existence. And for the academic observers, the question is how much they take policy analysis on its own terms, as the careful documentation of an exercise in instrumental rationality, and how much they see it as a part of the process that they are attempting to analyze.

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*See also* Causality; Concept Formation; Evidence-Based Policy; Governance; Paradigms in Political Science; Policy, Discourse Models



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## POLICY COMMUNITY

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In current conversational use, *policy community* refers to the population of organizations with a stake in an area of public policy. In its more technical sense, it refers to interorganizational structures exhibiting a close, stable, cooperative relationship between a limited number of, mainly self-selected, interest groups and “partnering” elements of the governmental machinery. This entry describes the development of this term and also discusses the numerous critiques that have been made concerning it.

### Developments

The term *policy community* appeared in the literature independently in several sources in the 1970s (e.g., Jeremy John Richardson & A. Grant Jordan, 1979), and this timing reflected the shift in focus in political science away from formal legal and

legislature-based study to tracking empirical policy biography. Empirical research found that the effective locus of decision making was not the legislature, cabinets, or politician-led committees but group/bureaucrat arenas. The term recorded the conclusion that much policy evolution was not the result of ideological struggle between conflicting political parties with distinctive ideologies and agendas but of apolitical (or at least nonpartisan) discussion and information exchange.

It was thus one of a family of concepts capturing segmented policy-making features—for example, group subgovernment, corporate pluralism, and iron triangles. The characteristics of a generic subsystem approach include the following: the expectation of bargaining in stable (sectoral) environments, the evolution of stable coalitions, the low visibility of decisions, well-defined and uncontested policy jurisdiction, the narrow and low scope of conflict, a small number of participants, and some restriction of access to the process.

In real-life settings, policy communities are not black-and-white arrangements with gatekeepers and badges of admission. The policy community was not intended as a one-size-fits-all policy explanation. What it intended to capture was a sense of surprise (reflecting a wave of case study research) that policy making was to a substantial degree the result of non-legislature-based bargaining.

Whereas in party and parliamentary venues policy differences are exaggerated in adversarial fashion for political advantage, in policy subsystems, there is a premium on minimizing differences and underplaying the apparent significance of the outcome. Participants resolve issues within the network in the belief that it is counterproductive to highlight grievances (attracting other competing perspectives). The suppression of competing interests is reinforced by presenting issues as humdrum or technical. Trumpeting the importance of one’s concerns might just attract attention. So it would be difficult to get an impression of the number and importance of these arrangements from, say, a sampling of press articles or ministerial speeches. The policy community premium is in avoiding such attention.

### The Main Critiques

The concept has found little empirical application and instead has generated debate about what it

implies rather than demonstrations of its usefulness or otherwise.

Its original usage in the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) was remarkably congruent. In the UK, Richardson and Jordan's *Governing Under Pressure* sought to reorient attention in policy-making studies toward a

special type of stable network which has advantages in encouraging bargaining in policy resolution . . . where there are effective shared "community" views on the problem. *Where there are no such shared attitudes no policy community exists.* (Jordan, 1990, p. 327)

However, while the policy community was seen as being a set of participants with shared understandings, this did not mean a lack of conflict: *Community* deliberately implied a sort of "circumscribed conflict," not its absence.

Its usage in the UK stood as an implicit rejection of Arendt Lijphart's majoritarianism that suggested that British policy making was top-down—using stable parliamentary majorities to drive through manifesto-based policy. It suggested instead that policy is normally built up through agreement in constituencies of affected interests. A theoretical capacity for policy imposition is actually marginalized by the political benefits of building consensus and implementing them through cooperation.

The general assumption in these sources is that much policy making is in effect subcontracted to informal institutions of the relevant civil servants and affected interests. For example, Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, writing about the United States, observed that most of the policy making with which subgovernments engage consists of routine matters resolved in fairly restricted and consensual settings. Thus, an assumption underpinning these policy resolution "institutions" is that the breadth and complexity of the government agenda require the disaggregation of policy into more manageable subissues involving a smaller number of relevant and knowledgeable participants. The fragmentation of policy takes decisions to a level of particularity where few are interested enough to mobilize or have the time or resources to become involved. Those with an interest look for acceptable outcomes.

As suggested by Keith Dowding, the original concept was no more than metaphorical, useful in signaling as important a particular set of (nonparty political) participants and suggesting a community-like quality to these relationships. Others have been more ambitious for the concept—but mainly those exaggerating its ambitions to prove a weakness. Critics have generated a caricaturing process. Martin Smith criticized as being "too vague" Richardson and Jordan's assertion that policy communities developed in response to complexity in the wider political system. Smith's claim fails to distinguish between a definition that is vague and a reasonably precise definition of uncertainty.

The attention by politicians to a handful of high-profile areas (not necessarily the most vital) implies that they have to neglect the vast majority of the policy mix. It is argued in the policy community literature that many (but by no means all) of the numerous remaining areas fall to policy community-type resolution. There is, however, a preliminary assumption that it makes sense for participants to try to deal with matters in the milieu of consultation rather than electoral politics. It is not a deficiency of a model of routine decision making that it does not very well accommodate nonroutine decisions.

Another criticism of the policy community model is that it fails to account for change. For example, Wyn Grant (2005) cites Richardson to the effect that the main weakness of the concept is the implication of stable policies, relationships, and membership. This does not seem a particularly strong criticism—akin to complaining that a map of Washington is a poor guide to Montreal: The policy community sketch was not meant to account for change but to explain enduring stability.

Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993, p. 6) used the term *policy monopoly* to label informal policy structures very similar to policy communities. Their term referred to the "monopoly on political understandings," that is, the ability of certain groups to maintain a dominant policy framing. The policy community is in essence the venue or institutional arrangement that reflects and reinforces the dominant understandings of which Baumgartner and Jones wrote in their work on agenda. They suggested that policy making is often unlike the pluralist idea of mobilization and countermobilization, and instead monopoly/community arrangements

are seen primarily as instruments of mutual noninterference in the “absence of serious opposing voices” (p. 14).

Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech supplied a sense of scale about what they call “policy bandwagons”—political issues generating widespread group interest. These they proved to be atypical. They identified a random sample of 137 cases of lobbying and looked at high- and low-conflict proportions. They found extreme polarization, with the top four issues accounting for more than a third of all interest-group activity. Twenty-six issues out of 137 captured 81% of the lobbying. The reverse is of course that 111 cases reflected 19%. This confirms two things: (1) that not all lobbying events are the same and (2) that many of them are low profile, with few people participating. It would be a leap to say that all the cases with a small number of participants were examples of policy communities, but the data at least underline that much political processing is low-participant activity.

As argued by Grant Jordan and William Maloney, the arrangements exist because there is a “logic” to building cooperation about delivery by preconsulting relevant interests. Organizations trade or exchange information/advice to secure access to, and influence within, decision procedures. The logic of this relationship holds, regardless of the political persuasion controlling the government. Therefore, radical policy shift is rare and does not routinely follow a change of government.

Critics tend to define the policy community concept in a comprehensive, rigid way that can be demonstrated as not fitting real-life cases. In fact, the articulation may have itself overencouraged ideas about institutional formality. In real-life policy development, participants are not clearly identified. It is conspicuous and significant that propolicy community authors fail to give definitive lists of their examples. This may not be because the concept is vague but because it tries to capture a phenomenon that lacks formality and certainty about a list of participants. Policy community “structures” may be less important than the “logic of accommodation” procedures that they exhibit but do not monopolize. Even where the policy-making arrangements do not make a policy community description appropriate, the process “borrows” some of the conflict reduction features because

policy communities are part of the search for policy resolution but not the only aspect.

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*See also* Policy Analysis; Policy Formulation; Policy Framing; Policy Instruments; Policy Process, Models of

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## POLICY CYCLE

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Policy cycle refers to the process whereby political actors attempt to shape the definition of problems, the setting of a policy agenda, the formulation of policy alternatives, the adoption and implementation of policy decisions, and the evaluation of policy outcomes. This perspective is underpinned by a linear, problem-oriented, rationalist, and systemic view of the policy process. In the conventional conception of the policy cycle, policy problems are identified by policy advocates and other political actors and then put onto the policy agenda; politicians and officials then develop policy measures to address these problems and adopt the best possible alternative to tackle the problems after considering the likely impact of these alternatives; and evaluation would be done after the policy is implemented, and the responses and reactions to

such evaluation would be fed back into the policy process.

### Policy Process

The emphasis of the policy cycle perspective is on the *process* of policy actions and interactions involving many different political and bureaucratic players. Hence, it has gone beyond the study of formal political institutions or the input side of politics, such as interest-group activities and political participation, which were once the main concerns of political science. The conception of the policy cycle could be traced to Harold Lasswell's seven prescriptive steps in policy making, namely, (1) intelligence, (2) promotion, (3) prescription, (4) invocation, (5) application, (6) termination, and (7) appraisal. Nonetheless, his prescriptive conception focuses mainly on policy making within government, without taking into account the impact of other political actors and the external environment. Major texts published in the 1970s and 1980s by Garry Brewer and Peter DeLeon, Charles O. Jones, and James E. Anderson have further contributed to the policy cycle framework. While the most commonly recognized stages of the policy cycle include problem definition and agenda setting, policy making, implementation, and evaluation, other formulations have proposed somewhat different, but still largely similar, stages, such as initiation, estimation, selection, adoption, legitimation, implementation, evaluation, and termination. The terms *policy cycle* and *policy stage* are often used interchangeably in the literature, hence this is also called the stages approach to the policy process. The cyclical metaphor, however, highlights the role of feedback in linking the input and output phases of policy making, as in David Easton's system model, and hence emphasizes the continuous evolution of the policy process.

### Criticisms of the Policy Cycle Concept

The policy cycle perspective is perhaps the most widely adopted and long-standing framework used in organizing major texts on policy making and policy analysis because it simplifies the complicated, amorphous processes into distinct and easily identifiable stages. Its contribution to the conceptual organization of the policy process should not be

underestimated. However, despite its widespread usage, it has come under criticism from various angles, ranging from critique of its empirical relevance to its promise as a policy theory. First, one key criticism is that the policy cycle is not a causal theory or model. It does not offer an explanation of the entire policy process, even though the perspective encompasses the most prominent aspects of public policy making. It fails to clearly identify a set of key variables that explains the process, which is considered not conducive to the further development of policy theory. Nor does it specify the relationship between these variables or generate a hypothesis for testing its claims. In the eyes of the critics, the policy cycle at best provides a descriptive account and an analytical framework of the policy process rather than a theoretical explanation of how the policy process proceeds in the way suggested by its proponents. Hank Jenkins-Smith and Paul Sabatier prefer to call it the "stages heuristic," namely, just a learning device.

Second, another major criticism argues that the policy cycle presumes a linear, unidirectional conception of the policy process, as if one stage will lead to another, which does not resemble the real political world. In reality, interactions among different stages of the policy process often take place, and the interplay of politics and the influence of the external environment are critical in shaping the twists and turns of the policy process. Third, the sequence of stages in the policy cycle is often considered as empirically inaccurate because different phases of the cycle may take place at the same time and policies do not always proceed as suggested in the framework. For instance, the evaluation of existing policies affects agenda setting and policy making, and the unintended outcome of one policy may pose a problem that needs to be addressed by another policy. While the different phases or stages of the policy cycle are conceived as discrete steps clearly differentiated from each other, it is often not easy to delineate the different phases neatly in reality. Policies are proposed in the context of other existing policies, and they are usually amended or revised continuously.

Fourth, the policy cycle takes into account policy evaluation but not policy learning, although many studies have studied how policy analysis and policy learning can be integrated into the policy process. Fifth, some critics further argue that the

framework may incorrectly highlight the policy cycle as the unit of analysis. Instead of having only one cycle, many different, interacting policy cycles concerning a multitude of diverse policy measures initiated at different governmental levels may be proposed at the same time, especially in big, federal political systems such as the United States.

Sixth, a top-down, legalistic bias is also implicit in the policy cycle because its focus is on the adoption, promulgation, and implementation of government legislation rather than the interactions between different aspects of the policy process or the politics between governmental and societal players. Politics, whether within the government in the form of bureaucratic politics or in the community at large, however, are often powerful determinants of the dynamics of the policy process. Such a deficiency was later explicitly addressed in other competing theoretical frameworks of the policy process.

Last but not least, the policy cycle cannot fully capture the multifaceted political dynamics of the policy process, which is more critical than the rational calculus in determining policy outputs and outcomes. The seminal contribution on agenda setting by John Kingdon (1984), for instance, aptly emphasizes the importance of the coupling of the three streams, namely, the problem, the policy, and political streams, in shaping the policy process. According to Kingdon, the problem stream refers to the perception and definition of problems as worthy of further attention and action by policy actors; the policy stream refers to the ongoing policy deliberation among the policy actors and the emergence of policy proposals within the policy community; and the political stream refers to the major developments in the political arena, such as the changes in the national mood, turnovers in administration, and personnel reshuffling. The combination of these three forces constitutes a powerful factor in opening the policy window that will usher in policy decisions or policy change. By emphasizing the interplay of political as well as ideational factors, Kingdon's view contrasts sharply with the more ideal-typical, simplified procession of stages in the policy cycle perspective.

### Contributions to the Study of Public Policy

The policy cycle framework is clearly not embedded in a casual theory, but is it completely inadequate as

an important scholarly contribution to the study of public policy except in its service as a learning device? On balance, the framework has helped organize research by highlighting significant, generic features of the policy process, even though it has not postulated a policy theory. Indeed, the specification of the key stages of the policy process in this framework is both a strength and a weakness. If a sound theoretical explanation of policy evolution is to be formulated, there is a need to put the framework within specific institutional contexts in order to take into account the impact of political structures, the multiple layers of government and their interactions, or the specific constitutional arrangements in shaping policy politics in different national contexts. At the same time, the overarching concepts of the policy cycle do highlight comparable features of the policy process that can be easily identified in different political systems, even though the actual characteristics of each phase vary across nations. Such a conceptual space is especially critical in fostering comparative research, particularly because the literature on public policy primarily focuses on the United States and other developed democracies.

Most major scholarly works on public policy in the 1990s do not attempt to develop a theory of the entire policy process; rather, they tend to examine the dynamics of each of the constituent phases of the policy cycle in much greater depth and with increasing methodological sophistication. For instance, many studies investigate how problems come to the attention of policymakers (e.g., John Kingdon), how political systems process information and prioritize problems (e.g., Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner), and how policy agendas have evolved and changed over time (e.g., Jones and Baumgartner). Others have analyzed how competing advocacy coalitions sharing basic policy beliefs within a policy subsystem have organized to change policies (e.g., Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith) and how public policies are implemented (e.g., Michael Hill and Peter Hupe). Scholars have also studied how policy design has affected the behavior and interests of target clients of policies (e.g., Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram). Moreover, while investigating one policy phase involving a piece of policy legislation may require a relatively shorter period of time, some major studies have taken a long view of the policy cycle

to take into account the effects of implementation and policy learning. For instance, research on the advocacy coalition framework has studied policy change and learning over a decade (researchers include Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier), and the punctuated equilibrium theory studies changes in the American policy agenda over many decades (researchers include Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner). The duration of a policy cycle is critical if a more thorough analysis of the entire policy cycle is to be attempted.

Since the actual policy process concerns highly complex, fluid, and strategic interactions between many political actors over time, the simplicity of the policy cycle continues to offer not only a sound heuristic device but also a very effective framework to stimulate thinking and organize research on public policy. In fact, disaggregating the policy process into stages constitutes a critical first step that facilitates further conceptual refinement, theoretical inquiry, and empirical research. Research hypotheses within specific stages of the policy cycle, such as agenda setting and policy making, or across these stages, for instance, could be generated for further theory building. Such hypotheses would then be made amenable for empirical testing or refutation. Therefore, in spite of the lack of a core theoretical argument, the policy cycle perspective has not limited the conceptual and methodological advancement in the study of the policy process.

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*See also* Advocacy Coalition Framework; Agenda Setting; Implementation; Policy Evaluation; Policy Formulation; Policy Framing; Policy Network; Policy Process, Models of

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## POLICY EVALUATION

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Policy evaluation concerns the estimation of the effectiveness of public policies, programs, or projects and their management and implementation. Because policy is about change, policy evaluation should explain what factors or determinants led citizens or groups to do things or take actions that otherwise they would not do (e.g., quit smoking, recycle products, practice sustainable behavior, end domestic violence, retain students in school, attract investments, reduce unemployment). To implement such policies, governments have created programs with specific achievement goals. The role of policy evaluators is to give educated estimates of the effects of changes in government policies. From a public administration perspective, program evaluation is a scientific activity that entails the use of scientific methods to measure the outputs, implementation, and outcomes of programs for decision-making purposes. But beyond all this, the key question in policy evaluation is the following: What does government do to improve the quality of life of individuals-citizens? It is also important for policy evaluators to decide if it is better to do something than do nothing to resolve a problem. This entry examines approaches to policy evaluation, the political role of evaluation, and some of the techniques used for policy evaluation.

Historically, the role of social scientists and program evaluators in governments has been at the forefront of the debate on the relevance of normative versus empirical research in the decision-making process. The opposition between those who favor the “scientification” of politics and those for the “politicization” of science has created two classes of program evaluators: those who think that we can bring social changes by looking at and comparing the action taken by several governmental entities to resolve social problems and those who believe that everything remains normative and the support of

stakeholders is essential for the implementation purposes. Looking back on the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Beveridge Report, the Coleman Report of education, and the War on Poverty, all these policy initiatives led to several actions and new programs to respond to social issues.

Therefore, policy evaluation refers also to the broad idea of social engineering, meaning the capacity of evaluators to resolve social problems and to find superior solutions. The evaluators' role in governing is also to suggest the best policy alternatives to resolve a social problem. Decision makers need to understand the impact of their actions; therefore, policy, program, and project evaluations as a knowledge activity contribute to the rationalization of decision making by determining the best course of action and the limitations of governmental interventions (Lee Sechrest & Aurelio Figueredo, 1993; Evert Vedung, 1997). Thus, evaluators are not mere technicians measuring what government has been doing but also are intimately connected to making and improving public policies.

### **The Role of Policy/Program Evaluators in a Changing Environment**

The concept of "experimenting societies," that is, trying to test social theories and hypotheses in our social environment, in many ways poses a challenge and a burden on program evaluators (Donald Campbell & Jean Russo, 1999). How can program evaluators improve the well-being of citizens? How can they reduce the social risks associated with unemployment and slow economic growth, poverty, and income inequalities? How can they improve the social status of unprivileged groups? To bring about such changes, evaluators realized that the state is only one of many sources of power in society. Governments have to compete with many actors—interest groups, social groups, nongovernmental organizations—who want to participate in the policy process. Furthermore, in addition to competition, the public sector also now engages in extensive cooperation with actors in the private sector in the provision of public services.

One difficult task for program evaluators is to convince decision makers that the social and political risks of inaction are often more costly than taking action to provide a remedy to a problem.

Evaluators have to tell politicians not only what they are supposed to do but also what they ought to do. If governments wait too long to repair bridges, the lives of citizens can be threatened and important economic and social consequences may ensue. Evaluators have to establish clearly the consequences of change or no change—which are often the cause of fear, inertia, and conservatism—on the future of society. Social changes or policy/program changes cannot be implemented without an overall social or organizational consensus about the necessity of such a transformation. The determination of the appropriate change criteria based on the goals and objectives of programs is at the heart of establishing the indicators of performance and both the economic and the political feasibility of programs.

From a methodological viewpoint, a discussion about the "best" research protocol or research design and the use of reliable measuring instruments are essential elements of any evaluation to establish either the success or the failure of any governmental program. The task of evaluators is to operationalize the program goals, to specify the indicators to measure the social changes associated with the program, and to suggest the appropriate policy instruments to achieve the programs goals. Evaluators are concerned not only with outcomes measurement but also with the implementation process. Therefore, putting in place within governments or organizations a monitoring-tracking system—to evaluate regularly changes in the program outcomes and the processes through which results are supposed to be obtained—is also a crucial element of the evaluation function.

Thus, evaluators are first of all researchers, with policy evaluation remaining a scientific activity. However, some scholars have suggested that evaluators can also become "agents" of social change and, in some cases, policy advisers do devise the most effective strategies for achieving program goals. From this perspective, evaluators constitute a class of "new social scientists" who understand what governments do (governance), what are the key determinants of the decision-making process (public administration), what are the best policy instruments to use, and how to evaluate the impact or outcomes of decisions (public policy). The task of evaluators therefore is enormous and focuses on the multifaceted nature of governmental activities.

### Governance and Policy Evaluation Processes

If in the United States, program evaluation was developed largely outside government, being firmly rooted in the experimental tradition of the social sciences and at the border between public policy and public administration, this was not the case in most industrial countries. In the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, the evaluation function has developed and evolved within governmental institutions, departments, and agencies. In other countries, such as France and Germany, program evaluation is still perceived as a means of administrative control, and the line between program evaluation and audit remains fuzzy. Therefore, the policy evaluation processes have followed different paths and have been carried out by different stakeholders.

Sometimes, program evaluation is perceived not as a part of the field of public policy or of public administration but simply as a function within the government management and monitoring system. It is a means used by decision makers to move toward good governance. The development of policy evaluation was also perceived as a part of the budgetary process since the implementation of the Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System (PPBS) by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration in the United States; it is also considered as an element of the accountability of government. That led to confusion between the functions of evaluation and audit and between cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis. If program evaluation is a careful assessment of government interventions, internal audit is more concerned about the use of the financial resources of the public sector. Nevertheless, both can play complementary roles in determining the criteria leading to good governance and improve the delivery of programs to citizens.

In recent years, program evaluation as a field of research has been under heavy criticism, with several scholars arguing that over the years no substantive knowledge has been attached to program evaluation. The main reason for a situation of this kind to have developed was that program evaluation operates in a highly politicized context and has become part of the political process where program evaluators are embedded in the program itself (Eleanor Chelimsky, 1997). Therefore, it was proposed to distinguish formative from summative evaluation, the former leading to managerial change in the delivery of programs while the latter

looks at the factors leading to the success of programs. Furthermore, when new governments take over, the origins and outcomes of the public programs of the previous government are forgotten.

### The Science of Program Evaluation

Policy evaluation was clearly an outgrowth of the development of the welfare state and one of its principal consequences: the increase of governmental expenditures. Even if there are several theoretical elements beyond policy evaluation, the central theory is to model governmental change (Marvin Alkin, 2004). In 1959, when Charles Lindblom wrote his seminal article "The Science of Muddling Through," he suggested that in any incremental analysis, social scientists should distinguish small budgetary changes (simple incremental analysis) from the complex (disjointed incrementalism) and very complex situations (strategic analysis). For Lindblom, incrementalism is simply a method of analysis and action—the most effective way is to respond to bureaucrats' and voters' demands. From his perspective, nonincremental policies are simply irrational and politically irrelevant because their consequences are unforeseeable for any political system. Leaders who want to stay in power will be wiser to bring small budgetary changes and introduce small adjustments. In some ways, incrementalism can be perceived as an outbreak of rational decision making.

Therefore, incrementalism became a central concept of public policy and decision-making processes, and it was defined as a mutual adjustment process that may produce small ranges of budgetary outputs. If this concept is widely accepted among scholars, it is, however, inadequate to explain policy changes, especially in periods of rapid political and social transformations. The study of incremental change also led several studies to determine if the type of political and party system influences the budgetary process. Also, questions related to the impact of newly elected governments and the increase of departments', ministries', or agencies' budgets as a factor leading to changes in public policies (Niskanen theory on bureaucracies) became part of the task of explaining governmental growth. Thus, with the election of new leaders and political parties, some policy adjustments and some partisan mutual adjustment processes in the policy goals and objectives can be expected. If the traditional incrementalist school



suggests that political elites have a small influence on the policy process and its outputs, some scholars, on the contrary, think that to measure the impact of policy, political analysts should look beyond the “muddling through” process. Therefore, the purpose of policy evaluation is, basically, to understand the role and functions of governments in our societies.

### *Incrementalism and Social Transformations*

The postulate of incrementalism is that the observed policy change in a given time period is determined by the preceding time period. In other words, a good part of the change observed is highly dependent on the existing situation. In the case of budgetary change, annual budgets represent incremental decisions because political leaders, bureaucrats, and appropriate committees are concerned only with small changes in the budget year after year. Therefore, governmental policies, programs, and budgets are never completely reviewed as a whole because of the incremental calculations from the actors, and the value of all programs is never completely compared with other policy alternatives. In the case of the budgetary process, the previous year’s budget is the main reference to fix the appropriations of the next year. The incrementalists do not assume that cuts and reductions in budgets and programs are impossible from year to year but that decision makers are only interested in the increments—small increases or decreases. Then, it is possible to observe some incremental cuts in departmental budgets or programs.

From a public administration perspective, the increment approach refers to the difference between what the administrators of a department or program request in a specific year and what they actually received in the prior year. If a department or program receives less than it had in the previous year, policy analysts talk about a *decrement* instead of an increment. However, such decrements are rarely observed directly and in some ways represent deviant cases in public administration. In other words, since most policies and program budgets are rarely controversial, the budgetary base does not really change from one budget to the successive ones. However, if the budget of a program remains the same over time, one can argue that there are actually incremental cuts because program expenses

are not following the normal inflation growth pattern. Aaron Wildavsky, for example, gives another definition of the *budgetary base*. For him, the policy analyst should take into account the expectations of the stakeholders. Rarely, decision makers will ask for a decrease of their program budgets, and therefore the base represents “the commonly held expectations among participants in budgeting that programs will be carried out at close to the going level of expenditures” (Wildavsky, 1986, p. 11).

If these concepts (e.g., incremental change, increment–decrement, budgetary base) are accepted among policy analysts, it is more their applicability for decision-making purposes that is challenged. Some authors have criticized the normative character of the incrementalist theory because of the perceived conservative trend in this approach and the absence of any reflection about the policy implementation process of new policies. The theory and the models proposed are essentially too stochastic. Also, because changes are only marginally different from the status quo, the hypothesis that policy administrators and politicians will adopt incremental behavior is merely descriptive. It should also be proven that the base actually represents the status quo. In other words, measuring change is not easy and depends on the evaluators’ reference standards before the evaluators can establish the size of the change observed.

The last issue concerning incrementalism is to define it empirically. It is difficult to determine what an incremental (small) change is. At which level can budgetary changes be considered significant—5%, 10%, or 30% of the program budget? And what are the characteristics of such changes? It is suggested that policy evaluation should be able to make the distinction between *mandatory requests*—the new expenditures needed to keep a program operating at the same level—and *programmatic requests* for initiating new programs. The first type of budgetary change is perceived as incremental but not the second one. It is also suggested that in any budget, there is a part that is controllable and a part that is uncontrollable and includes all expenditures not regulated by the legislation.

### *Policy Processes and Bureaucratic Changes*

According to Lindblom (1959), “democracies change their policies almost entirely through

incremental adjustments” (p. 84). In democracies, it is easier for political leaders to focus just on incremental changes. The effect of such behavior is that the value of the status quo is constantly reinforced. A high degree of social stability and continuity is necessary in any political system to allow bureaucrats to follow the muddling through approach; in periods of rapid social changes, this method becomes inadequate. If incrementalism confines the bureaucrats in the day-to-day routine and reduces their motivation and their capacity to innovate, then incrementalism is a way to reinforce the pro-inertia ideology and support the tendency of organizations to resist change. Therefore, the central question is how to define the status quo (the baseline measurement) and how to measure small changes from the status quo. Also, do small changes really reinforce the status quo?

However, Lindblom remains skeptical about the argument that his policy model supports the antimotivation forces existing in any organization. If the rational-comprehensive model seeks to stimulate the administrators and bureaucrats, he cannot foresee how his model can be seen as a tactic for conservatism. He argued that fast-moving sequences of small changes can bring about policy changes more rapidly than can only infrequent redefinition of policies. Lindblom argues that in periods of political crises, the value of incremental changes is that they can be implemented rapidly and that decision makers and bureaucrats are in general less ideologically oriented since their main goal is to serve the public interest. Consequently, one important element of the incrementalist theory is that the bureaucracy is relatively autonomous within the political system and immune to pressure coming from interest groups and stakeholders.

Therefore, incremental politics offers to democratic societies the best way to introduce the changes requested by citizens. The model proposed by Lindblom and others suggests that governmental budgets and the changes observed (reductions, increases) are the result of incrementalism. For stakeholders, when the decisions made are only incrementally, it is not only easy for them to anticipate the policy direction, but they can also develop their own strategy accordingly. In the case of complex social problems, when opposite values are at

stake, decision makers and bureaucrats will focus mainly on the feasible changes in the short run. A strategic policy approach will imply the development of the best possible alternatives to respond to the stakeholders' expectations through a mutual adjustment process. It then can be argued that incrementalism is an outgrowth of pluralism.

As some critics have mentioned, the incremental approach does not describe the policy evaluation process by which public policies or programs are modified and implemented. Several authors have also argued that one difficulty with incrementalism is that it detaches administrative concepts from the context of constitutional and political theory. With regard to budget appropriations, it is clear that over the years this function has become much more specialized, and in many countries, the budgetary process has become more isolated within governments and in some way removed from political and judicial controls. Policy evaluation becomes a complex enterprise in light of the different programs and activities developed within each governmental entity. It was also noted that national priorities have often been determined, based on evaluations, analyses, and reports, by bureaucrats, who are isolated from the political sphere. This has raised several important questions about good governance and the accountability of governments.

### Performance Measurement

The issue of how to measure the effect of a policy, a program, or a social intervention has been a recurrent methodological question in policy evaluation. In 1963, Chester Harris published a seminal work titled *Problems in Measuring Change*, where contributors propose several approaches on how to study change. By definition, the study of change involves two or more measurements of the same variable over time to provide the basis for inferring whether change has or has not taken place. The general principle is to predict status in the absence of policy intervention and to calculate the added value of such action. In practice, the idea of policy modeling is to offer policy-making elements for judging the nature and expected impact of policy intervention. This also raises the question about the linear, curvilinear, or exponential nature of the expected impact. Fundamentally,

any decision should be based on real observations and data.

One of the first problems identified was related to the lack of valid and reliable sources of data. If measurement is defined as the “process of linking abstract concepts to empirical indicators,” the first task of policy evaluators is to provide policymakers accurate representation of the concepts used. If the goals of programs are to reduce poverty and inequalities, increase productivity, improve students’ performance, improve quality of life, and so on, then all these abstract notions should be translated into questions that reflect a domain of content. Over time, several critics have asserted that theoretical concepts in policy analysis have not been described with the required exactness. This issue, which has been termed *construct validity*, refers to the efforts by evaluators to use impact indicators that can provide an accurate measure of the effect of a policy. The measure of the true social attitude or policy impact can also be affected by the social or political desirability of an intervention. Therefore, the choice of the right criteria for determining the success or failure of a policy intervention is also at the heart of policy evaluation.

In the field of policy performance measurement, which is the regular measurement of performance indicators, many issues/problems have been identified that might lead to faulty conclusions in policy evaluation (Carolyn Heinrich, 2007). The inadequate definition of a concept, the sensitivity of measures, and the use of a single measure (mono-operationalization) or a single line of evidence (monomethod bias) are all threats to conclusion validity. In recent years, governments have made efforts to put in place some results-based measurement frameworks by asking departments to develop their own indicators of performance and to establish what they judge to be a successful intervention. In other words, research protocol should be sufficiently precise and powerful to be able to detect the effects of policies, programs, and/or projects. To put it simply, policy evaluation can be a risky business, especially if evaluators conclude that a program has some tangible effect when in fact it does not (Type I error) or conclude that a program effect does not exist when it does (Type II error). The reliability of performance indicators is also crucial. Do the research design and

the methods used yield the same results on repeated interventions? Is it possible that the measurement instruments (indicators, scales) used have some systematic biases, underestimating or overestimating the net impact of a policy? To assess the reliability of the observed results, evaluators should compare evaluation results with the results of similar studies. Measurement is a key element in policy evaluation, and systematic effort to define the concepts and develop the appropriate performance indicators remains at the heart of evaluation.

Since the early works on measuring changes, the field of policy evaluation has seen an increase in the number of books and articles on methods and approaches. In general, three methods have been suggested. The first approach is to randomize participants between experimental and control groups in order to be able to differentiate the expected normal growth patterns from the net impact of a policy/program. Second, some baseline measurements can be taken prior to a policy/program intervention to evaluate if there are, for example, age or income variations and to be able to determine the value added of an intervention over specific groups. A third approach is to use reference standards such as health statistics. For example, it is known that growth patterns differ for boys and girls. If a child has a growth deficiency, doctors are able to compare the individual situation with what is known as the “normal” growth pattern. The challenge for a policy evaluator is therefore to differentiate what is “normal” change over time and to see if a governmental intervention can accelerate or decelerate the patterns of change.

Finally, many social and environmental phenomena do not occur in a linear way. In general, people expect change to occur in a linear fashion. A well-known example of this point was the study of governmental expenditures. Contrary to expectations, especially in the postwar period, the growth of governmental expenditure follows a nonlinear pattern. Data should be properly analyzed, otherwise there may be a systematic bias that policy evaluators’ statistical methods will not be able to capture. In recent years, this became even more evident in the case of environmental policy because many patterns of growth are exponential. It is essential to know the exact pattern of change before conducting an evaluation.

## Measuring the Impact of Government Policies

### *Policy Evaluation Design and Research Strategy*

The purpose of policy/program evaluation is to develop research tools to be able to measure the relationships between the objectives of a program, its activities, and its impact. Of the issues related to the development of systematic approaches or analytical procedures, the evolution of program evaluation as a scientific activity has been critical. For an evaluator, it is essential to distinguish between the condition that led to the implementation of a program, the type of activities proposed to achieve the program goals, and the particular factors or threats that might limit the evaluator's capacity to get an unbiased estimate of the "real" versus the "observed" impact of a program (Richard Hurteau, Vincent Lachapelle, & Guillaume Houle, 2006).

The first step before conducting any policy evaluation is to have a clear indication of the policy goals. Over the years, evaluators have complained about governmental officials and their inability to define precisely the goals and expected impact of their policies. Imprecise and diffuse goals—some of which may not even be stated—make evaluators' work extremely difficult. Governments might want to reduce the level of poverty or put in place a minimum-income policy without specific achievement goals to indicate whether the policy has attained its objectives. Before any evaluation is conducted, evaluators have to communicate with administrators to establish the expected effects of the policy/program.

The second step before deciding what type of research design should be used is to have a clear knowledge about the definition of a particular concept and the conceptual universe related to it (Richard Bingham & Claire Felbinger, 1989; John Owen & Patricia Rogers, 1999). If the goal of a program is to reduce inequalities, to measure policy innovation, or to improve participants' abilities, a clear and undisputed definition of the concepts as well as general acceptance of the idea (content and construct validity) are prerequisites for conducting any fieldwork. Issues such as measure sensitivity and the relationship between concepts and measurement lead to this fundamental question: Does the measurement tool measure what it was intended

to measure? Extraneous sources of error might result in biased estimates.

The third step is to look at plausible rival hypotheses or explanations of the observed impacts of a program. This is never an easy task; it is quite often difficult to determine cause-and-effect relationships or how societal change has been caused by policy action. Several outside explanations—which evaluators have described as "validity threats"—should be studied to determine how they can affect or have affected the conduct of the evaluation. The evaluation design should minimize the impact of these threats to validity to be able to conclude that the statistical association observed between the program intervention and its measured impact can reasonably be considered a causal relationship. As Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell (1979) have emphasized, the evaluator has to systematically think through how each of the internal validity threats may have influenced the data and to test which threats can be ruled out. Threats such as history, maturation, and selection have been well documented as factors that might affect the outcome measurement. Sometimes, pre-evaluation or the pretest experience (the halo effect) of participants may produce attitudinal or behavioral changes that can be confounded with the policy/program impact.

Nevertheless, different strategies can be used in policy evaluation. This entry now describes the four main approaches or research strategies generally used in policy evaluation: (1) observational study, (2) strategic management and meta-analysis, (3) experimental and quasi-experimental studies, and (4) postevaluation and monitoring studies. Each of these four has some real advantages and also some potential costs that should be considered when choosing strategies for evaluation as well as for policy interventions.

#### **Level 1 Evaluation: Observational Study**

The goal of observational study is to evaluate the policy objectives and means among a small number of citizens, usually up to 30 participants. As Lawrence Mohr (1995) pointed out, observational study is defined as one in which "no central authority decides which subjects are to receive the treatment and which are not, or what intensity of treatment each is to receive" (p. 229). The goal of such Level 1 evaluation is to determine if the course

of action is appropriate, that the policy/program does not harm participants in any way (socially, politically, morally, or physically), how they react with the policy tools used, and if the relative impact of a policy/program project can be estimated. At this stage, evaluators might want to measure the effects of different policy instruments (e.g., level of taxation, financial incentives, and training methods) on the policy goals or to look over the “best” case study. Methods such as benchmarking can be used to assess why some programs were successful while others were unable to reach their objectives.

The evaluator can observe and record the reaction of different cohorts or use case-control to study and determine the expected benefits for participants. At this point, evaluators are interested in observing the associations/correlations between the policy/program effects on participants and the outcome measures. Evaluators can then propose to relevant decision makers the appropriate course of action to be followed. In such a situation, there are two key questions: (1) Are there better ways to resolve and/or prevent a policy problem? (2) What approaches should be implemented?

*Participatory evaluation* can certainly be used as a means to gather information from the stakeholders—the key social and political actors who should be involved in a policy/program. For several authors, policy evaluation can be a means to improve the democratic debate about governmental decisions, with the goal of achieving social consensus and offering new perspectives and solutions.

#### **Level 2 Evaluation: Strategic Management and Meta-Analysis**

As soon as decision makers have chosen a strategy to follow and have determined the type of policy/program (treatments) that will be implemented, evaluators have the task of assessing its implementation. At this point, it is important to determine whether various types of policy interventions are working or not, and why. For this type of study, evaluators usually look for larger groups of respondents.

Probabilistic measures are often employed at this stage to measure the potential effects and consequences of programs. As such, feasibility studies seek to determine if a policy/program is capable of achieving its goals and which factors can impede the

achievement of the goals. Once a tentative policy/program plan has been developed, decision makers will often invest in this type of evaluation to ensure that the assumptions underlying the program plan are correct and that there are no unforeseen issues that might affect the program outcomes. Economic feasibility studies can provide a clear assessment of the capacity of a program to achieve its desired outcomes given the resources available to the program. Is the allocated budget sufficient to allow the program to function as intended? For example, if governments want to launch a vaccination campaign to respond rapidly to the challenges of the H1N1 virus epidemic, this would mean ascertaining the cost and availability of the vaccine and the required medical equipment, the cost of hiring personnel (doctors and nurses), and any other costs. The public safety authorities may implement the vaccination program on a small scale to evaluate the most efficient strategy and to identify unexpected expenses. Another type of study is risk analysis, the identification and measurement of factors that could potentially prevent a program from achieving its goals. Risk involves the possibility of harm/loss and uncertainty. The conduct of risk analysis requires the prioritization of policy/program goals, identification of the potential risks of the adopted strategy, and measurement of such risk.

Finally, one useful research method for policy evaluation is a meta-evaluation or meta-analysis of all relevant randomized evaluation (John Chang et al., 2004). Evaluators might judge that a review of all the studies pertinent to a specific policy problem is necessary for a clear appreciation of the solutions to a social problem. One strategy is to look at all successful programs and measure the “effectiveness factor” of each strategy on specific groups or cohorts. This type of approach provides additional insight about the effect of a policy by applying a global multivariate model, allowing for assessment of the relative effectiveness of each intervention component while controlling for the effect of other components in multifactor interventions across all studies.

#### **Level 3 Evaluation: Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Studies**

The use of experimental protocol or randomized controlled trial remains the ideal in evaluation

methodology. Participants are randomly assigned to an experimental group (those who participate in the program) or to a control group (those who do not participate in the program). To be able to assess the observed change due to the program (treatment), the two groups should be comparable throughout the evaluation experimentation. What have been described as validity threats are the plausible rival hypotheses or explanations of the observed impacts of a program that can explain the change observed between participants (experimental group) and nonparticipants (control group) in the program. For this type of study, evaluators usually perform multicenter analysis, comparing outcomes in different settings (e.g., schools, hospitals, and communities) on larger groups of respondents.

The purpose of an evaluation design is to minimize the threats to validity to be able to assess the real impact of the program. This type of design has an advantage in political terms: It is scientifically approved and therefore can be justified to the public. Research protocols or *terms of references* describe in general the objectives of the evaluation study, the research designs that will be employed—the use of multiple lines of evidence strategy—the methodology, and other organizational aspects concerning the timing of the policy/program evaluation. Several strategies can be employed in designing the evaluation protocol. Research design such as randomized controlled evaluation, double-blind study, or placebo-controlled evaluation can be used to measure the policy/program impact. The goal is to compare the recipients of a program (treatment group) with a comparable group (control group) to be able to measure the changes that occur due to the intervention.

In the case of quasi experimentation, policy/program evaluators want to approximate the experimental method by trying to identify the consequences of social changes, to provide controls for confounding variables, and then to probe for causal dependencies. There are several types of research designs that can be used to infer the impact of policy and programs on society. Among them are the nonequivalent control group design, the field experiment design, and the interrupted or multiple-time-series design. In these cases, policy researchers manipulate the independent variables to identify the main determinants and to look for patterns of causality. Policy research, however,

always is conducted in a politicized environment, in which it is difficult to control many of the factors that threaten validity.

In addition to these results from evaluation studies, the evaluator has to consider the unintended consequences of policy interventions. Most evaluation research does not consider these unintended consequences, although they are certainly significant for the politics of policy. There are, however, relatively few effective means for combining the intended and unintended consequences of programs, except for economic instruments that combine costs and benefits. The political consequences of programs may be more significant than even the intended ones if they are more visible and more immediate, so the politics of evaluation requires careful consideration of the full range of outcomes.

#### **Level 4 Evaluation: Postevaluation Study and the Implementation of a Policy/Program Monitoring System**

At this level, evaluators can conduct a summative evaluation, which is a comprehensive assessment of the degree of success or failure achieved by policies—programs, to discuss the overall benefits of the program in light of its initial goals. At this point, evaluators should be more concerned about the impacts of a program on its stakeholders. The evaluators should also be able to conduct a formative evaluation assessing whether the program has been implemented and whether improvements, radical change, or termination is required (Peter DeLeon & Linda DeLeon, 2002). The focus of such comprehensive evaluation is on the four Es of any policy/program—efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and equality—in comparison with alternative strategies to those being implemented. Such an evaluation should also provide additional information and periodic and continuous feedback concerning the implementation of the program.

#### ***Program Monitoring: The Short- and Long-Term Impact of Policies—Programs***

This analysis of evaluation also raises an important question about the short- versus long-term impact of a policy/program. Fundamentally, policymakers need to know how to answer the following question often asked by politicians, journalists,

and the public: How long will it take to find out if a program has achieved its objectives? First of all, some policy initiatives have an immediate impact—for example, increases in consumer taxes and university tuition fees—while some policy initiatives may take several years before significant change is observed. The impact of free trade policies or environmental policies (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) is difficult to measure in the short term because such policies imply a multi-action strategy over a longer period of time to achieve their goals. Some people may condemn such policies because they do not see their immediate effects or because the political benefits cannot be identified during an electoral mandate. Governments may choose to focus on policies that have rapid outcomes since they are seeking reelection in the short term. Nevertheless, the role of policy evaluators is not to predict but to offer an educated analysis of the short-, medium-, and long-term benefits of any policy intervention. Therefore, several governments have decided that all policies or interventions be revised at least once every 5 years. The external validity of the policy research refers to the idea that the strategy adopted to resolve a social problem can be used in different settings and is replicable and that observations can be generalized to other policies or programs.

Finally, at this level, it is essential for future evaluations to have some periodic collection of data about the policy/program's processes and outcomes. Program monitoring involves not only collecting data during and after the implementation of a program but also providing basic facts about the services provided and its participants (Huey-Tsyh Chen, 2005). The main objective of program monitoring is to determine whether the participants' well-being has improved, deteriorated, or remained the same after the implementation of the program. However, it can hardly explain why this happens or if the observed results should be essentially attributed to the policy/program's intervention. Monitoring also implies a more or less continuous collection of data about the programs in question so that feedback and adjustments can also be relatively rapid.

Two main methods are suggested to monitor government programs: (1) process monitoring and (2) outcome monitoring. *Process monitoring* involves the collection of data about the basic elements of the program's implementation, such as

the participants' age and socioeconomic status, risk factors, and the services delivered. The objective for decision makers is to determine whether the program considers the targeted population, their needs, and their success rates in completing the expected tasks. Based on this information, decision makers can decide about the future of a policy/program. In the case of *outcome monitoring*, the goal is to assess the state of the participants before and after the program and if they are doing better, worse, or the same after receiving the services provided by a program.

These tasks, to regularly collect information about the processes and outcomes of programs, should normally be given to a monitoring board and be institutionalized within the evaluation branch of the government or department. The functions of such boards are first to see if within an organization the appropriate measures have been implemented, and in the case of an evaluation if all the fundamental research principles have been followed by the policy/program evaluators. Collecting input from participants, stakeholders, and decision makers may also be judged to be important for determining future policy action.

### Conclusion

Evaluation is a difficult and demanding enterprise. It calls for substantial imagination, tenacity, a systematic research protocol, and the development of research skills and ability. Effective evaluation also involves a good deal of political skill because evaluation involves working within the political system to improve the programs. Even if different applied research strategies or frameworks can be employed for policy evaluation, the central function of evaluators is to keep citizens and governments informed about how well programs are working. They should also suggest ways of improving the existing programs. Policy evaluation has become a means and a tool for decision makers not only to respond to citizens' demands for greater accountability but also to support the action of those who are involved in their own social environment (Frank Fischer, 2003). Citizens want governments to offer better programs, to be more effective in their social interventions, and to not waste resources from the public purse. For all these reasons, policy evaluation is a tool for both

policymakers and the public to understand what governments do.

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*See also* Evaluation Research; Monitoring; Policy Process, Models of

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## POLICY FORMULATION

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In plain language, a policy is a statement of intent or goal, or simply a decision to act. The crucial questions in public policy making are as follows: Who make(s) policy and how? Where does power lie in the policy process? What interests and demands are taken into account? Who ultimately benefits from policy decisions and outcomes?

Different policy models and theories capture the understanding and reality of policy formulation differently. Some doubt whether policy occurs entirely prior to action or, at times, is a post hoc rationalization of action already taken. Others question the scientific rationality of policy formulation. Aaron



Wildavsky considers policy analysis an art: While seeking to delineate a field of discipline for policy science, public policy needs to incorporate more awareness of the human aspect of policy making, emphasizing the political choices made in a competitive environment and the social relations that sustain them. In practice, policy formulation has to be both a science and an art. It has to pay attention to a genuine process of identifying problems and issues, looking for cost-effective solutions, and formulating deliverable implementation measures to get things done. At the same time, it needs to recognize the reality that public policy is an interactive process among political actors in the selection of goals and the means to achieve them within institutional, resource, and power constraints. Policy actors and institutions are both important and so are the agenda-setting processes of incorporating problems and ideas into policy formulation and the subsequent implementation of decisions by the bureaucracy.

### Scope of Policy Process

The study of policy varies from the analysis of policy (to understand its nature and content, how it is made and implemented, and policy as a political process) to the analysis *for* policy (i.e., policy research, information and advice that can lead to a case for action to be taken). The identification and recognition of problems in the policy formulation process can be conceptualized as a predecision, as agenda setting serves to limit the number of subjects attracting attention and getting on the decision makers' agenda. Exclusion of a subject from the agenda is in itself a negative decision as far as the subject is concerned, since agenda setting is as important as, if not more important than, decision making itself.

Conceptually, policy formulation can be separated from policy execution or implementation, but there is a growing literature that sees the two as highly intermingled and being part of a policy continuum. The rationalist approach sees policy as an outcome of a rational—even scientific, technical, and nonproblematic—decision-making process within a relatively controlled environment based on an instrumental “means–ends” causality, leading problems to their solutions and decisions to their implementation. Implementation is similarly

taken as nonproblematic, technical, and highly directed and controlled. In contrast, the realist or political approach sees policy as essentially an outcome of negotiation among political actors and institutions based on their competing values, interests, agendas, strategies, and power resources within an uncertain, conflictual, and, at times, turbulent environment. In the real world, the actual process of policy formulation is shaped and defined by the policy institutions and bound by the external policy-making environment and prevailing trends—local, national, regional, as well as global. Policy formulation is triggered by the need to either formulate new policy or change existing policy in order to deal with newly identified or redefined problems. Policy change thus captures a spectrum of types from policy innovation and succession to maintenance and termination. Sometimes policy learning, diffusion, and transformation also generate the need for policy formulation.

Policy analysts also study the policy capacity of any polity, government, and public institution, which refers to its ability or competence to bring together information and decision-making power to make intelligent choices and set strategic directions. Choices are related to values. In the formulation of public policy, apart from the necessity to find solutions to solve problems, it is often argued that it has to adhere to some core values that are relevant to *all* public policies, such as the five Es (economy, efficiency, effectiveness, efficacy, and equity); some would add a sixth E (electability) to indicate the need for any policy to respond to public demands and hence secure the support of the electorate. These values may conflict with one another; achieving the best balance tests the political skills as well as priorities of policymakers. Hence, policy formulation is not an exact science or purely a matter of economic rationality.

### Policy Models

Broadly speaking, there are two diverse ways of interpreting decision making: (1) the rationalist versus (2) the realist understanding of policy making and implementation. The former sees policy as intention, while the latter considers policy more as outcome. The former sees policy formulation as a linear process, whereas the latter considers it as an interactive process. The former confines policy

formulation to policy choice in response to a problem, but the latter also includes problem recognition and agenda setting, as well as policy implementation, which delivers the real impact of the policy decision made. Within this spectrum, four major approaches to policy formulation have been developed in the policy literature over the past several decades, namely, (1) the rational model, (2) the incrementalist model, (3) the garbage can model, and (4) the institutionalist model.

### *Rational Model*

The purest form of rationalism is the rational comprehensive model, which assumes some “perfect” conditions for rational policy making to be scientific, somewhat akin to rational choice in economic theory. Such conditions are premised on a clearly instrumental logic and sequence of reasoning—namely, defining and ranking values, specifying objectives and subobjectives with regard to the problem, identifying alternative means or options for solving the problem, calculating all the consequences of adopting each option, ranking the various options according to set criteria consistent with specified values and objectives, and finally, choosing the most effective option that maximizes benefits and minimizes costs. The rational model possesses attractive theoretical clarity but lacks behavioral realism. Its comprehensive form suffers from cognitive limitations (lack of knowledge, imagination, and skills), psychological limitations (fear of uncertainty, selective perceptions), organizational limitations (limited goals and horizons due to fixed jurisdictions and standard operating procedures), and resource limitations (lack of resources and time).

Herbert Simon and others argue that these shortcomings could not be made up by more diligent and comprehensive analysis. Decision makers are limited in computational capacity and can only search very selectively through large volumes of possibilities to discover what alternatives of action are available and what the consequences of each of these alternatives are. The search is bound to be incomplete and inadequate, based on uncertain information and partial ignorance, and is usually terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses of action. Hence, they should go for the bounded rationality of *homo psychologicus*

in place of the full rational choice of *homo economicus* and seek to “satisfice” rather than to “maximize.”

### *Incrementalist Model*

The opposite of the rationalist policy model is the incrementalist model, made famous by Charles Lindblom’s science of muddling through. This model sees decision making as interaction among actors, hence it is a political rather than a rational process per se. It regards the future as a linear function of the past, somewhat similar to path dependence theory. According to Lindblom, goals and values are rarely clear or predetermined. They change according to available resources and as we learn about the problem through analysis. Hence, in practice, we do not review and analyze all possible options but make successive limited comparisons with current policy and situation. Lindblom’s theory, sometimes known as disjointed incrementalism, seeks not only to describe the reality of policy making but also to prescribe incrementalism as a better science. Problem solving is seen as iterative (step by step). His pragmatic advice is to avoid being comprehensive and exhaustive but to look after your part of the problem and let others look after those parts that are assigned to them. Policymakers are urged to define and redefine values and objectives in light of experience and to deal only with solvable problems; they should look at solutions only marginally different from the status quo, apply “feasibility” as the key decision criterion, and adopt a remedial approach (to fix what is wrong with current policy).

Critics of incrementalism contend that it is inherently conservative and pro status quo, so it can cope only with stable, not changing, situations or crises and is ill equipped to help with new, unfamiliar problems or to define problems or solutions that are unconventional or that fall outside the circle of proximate policymakers. Some even accuse it of accurately *describing* the “worst practice” but not *prescribing* the “best practice” and being at best applicable to policy succession instead of policy innovation activities.

Between the utopian and realist poles, some have sought to find a middle ground to embrace both the innovative side of the rational model and the pragmatic side of incrementalism. For example,

Amitai Etzioni argues for a third approach in the form of mixed scanning. Scanning refers to the search, collection, processing, and evaluation of information, as well as the drawing of conclusions. In mixed scanning, policy making takes place at two levels—a broad, high-level overview of problems and directions (the “fundamental” problems, which call for the rational approach) and a detailed examination of specific problem areas (the “incremental” problems, which call for the incrementalist approach). This approach has the benefit of both a comprehensive overview that requires full-range and in-depth analysis (back to first principles) and taking incremental steps, which requires incremental and low-level adaptations and “fixing up.” It is less demanding than the full search for all possible options under rationalism but more strategic and innovative than incrementalism. While it seems to have an intuitive appeal, even Etzioni himself admits that the merit of mixed scanning remains to be empirically substantiated.

#### *Garbage Can Model*

The garbage can model—advanced by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen (1972)—is sometimes known as the temporary sorting model. It is premised on certain assumptions about the ambiguity of goals and values, the uncertainty in knowledge and technology, and the political symbolism of policy making, such as political rules and procedures. It emphasizes organizational irrationality or what Cohen et al. call organized anarchies. According to them, an organization is a loose collection of ideas rather than a coherent structure. It discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the basis of preset preferences, as implied in linear rational planning. In the process, it is often choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations, and solutions looking for issues, rather than the other way around. In this model, four variables are presumed to be interacting in a rather complex or even random manner: (1) a stream of choices, (2) a stream of problems, (3) a rate flow of solutions, and (4) a stream of energy from participants. The garbage can process is one in which problems, solutions, and participants move from one choice opportunity or situation to another. Such conception of policy formulation may well score high on

model realism and applicability; however, it is weak in terms of deductive power.

#### *Institutionalist Model*

Finally, the institutionalist model tries to steer a more independent role for political institutions in policy making without playing down the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives and active intervention of individual actors. It sees organizational change as a contested process involving accidental outcomes and random activity, suggesting that results cannot be predicted and change cannot be controlled by fiat, thus claiming institutional coherence and autonomy. Institutions matter not only because they dispose authority and power but also because they provide the physical, cognitive, and moral frames for joint action, as well as the capacity for intervention. At the same time, institutions also represent certain collective conceptions of interpretation, agenda, memory, rights and duties, and even values, symbolism, and justice. As such, there is a relevant degree of institutional consistency and continuity that affects the process and outcome of policy formulation.

#### **Policy and Polity**

Different theories of the state (or polity) provide different interpretations of the power dimension of the policy process. The pluralist theory sees society as made up of diverse individual and group interests, some organized and others more diffused. Government decisions are an outcome of competition and bargained compromise or consensus among competing demands and interests operating within a liberal democratic system. Policy making is thus incremental and a process of mutual accommodation of interests. Most would agree that the political real world is more elitist and less inclusive than is implied or advocated by the pluralist doctrine. The elitist theory sees modern industrial society as built around large, hierarchical, and usually corporate interests. Politics operate in the form of an oligarchy; political or policy elites exist who engage in the actual bargaining and policy making.

As a particular form of elitist theory popular in the 1980s, the corporatist theory sees the state as

part of a structure of interest group representation, where it accords exclusive corporate groups (usually peak employers and employee associations) a monopoly over representing dominant social interests (viz., capital and labor, and sometimes also agriculture), resulting in a de facto arrangement existing alongside a constitutional system of representative government. Decision making and consent building take place through consultation, negotiation, and coordination among such peak bodies. Government boards and commissions, and “iron triangles” in the case of the United States (i.e., the nexus existing among congressional committees, government departments, and major interest bodies), would provide the formal channels for the processing and intermediation of corporate interests to reach a collective decision or a consensus. The success of corporatist policy making depends on voluntary cooperation between elites who are capable of withdrawing from any bargains struck. Norms and informal rules emerge from such voluntary bargaining that ought to be observed by the corporate interests concerned.

Opposed to the liberal democratic political tradition is the Marxist theory, which was popular in the 1960s and 1970s but has since waned. It is premised on class-based rationality and argues that the capitalist state exists to serve the interest of capital (though not necessarily the interests of individual capitalists) by creating the conditions for capital accumulation through support for markets and social control (the instrumentalist model). Neo-Marxists have added that the capitalist state also supplies goods and services for collective consumption so as to manufacture the “legitimation” of the capitalist order (the functionalist model). The state autonomy model, on the other hand, presumes a state-independent policy-making approach, where state officials act on their own preferences with regard to what is best for society, based on technocratic and bureaucratic rationality. This may depict a more authoritarian form of polity of either the extreme right (fascist, military dictatorship) or the extreme left (communist) of the ideological divide.

### From Problems and Ideas to Policy

According to John Kingdon, problems, politics, and participants all contribute to agenda setting.

Not all adverse conditions get recognized as problems that warrant something be done about them. Problem identification is about perception and interpretation. It entails political competition among various interests seeking their “preferred” condition to be recognized and defined as a problem. The act of translating a condition into a problem makes use of the changing values in society (the degree of mismatch between the observed conditions and one’s conception of an ideal state), comparisons (the relative gap or disparity as compared with others, such as cross-national comparisons and international benchmarking, to give it a sense of legitimacy), and recategorization (so that the previously unrecognized condition can be reconstituted to structure people’s perception of it). Problems may arise as a result of a focusing event (e.g., a major disaster or crisis), social indicators, change of government or leadership, or a combination of these factors. However, there is a limit to the span of attention of the public as well as policymakers, which is normally short-lived. Like fashion, problems come and go. If there is a failure to address the problem, the result may be frustration, and after a while, people would tend to shift their focus to other competing issues and problems.

Ideas are important in policy formulation because they provide new ways of looking at the existing situation (e.g., making some conditions previously considered acceptable as unacceptable according to the new standards) as well as innovative solutions to problems. A good example is the rise of privatization policies in the 1980s due to new economic rationalist ideas and the work of neoliberal think tanks that operated actively on governments and parties. The real world of politics abounds in policy entrepreneurs of all kinds—consultants, politicians, campaigners, policy advocates, and think tanks. These people engage in idea promotion and problem redefinition all the time through publicity, advocacy, persuasion, and bargaining. To the extent that a condition only gets recognized as a problem if a solution is available, policy entrepreneurs who come up with ready solutions help facilitate building the consensus needed for problem recognition. Policy advising is becoming a booming activity in modern-day policy making, but it is effective only if the policy climate is conducive and receptive policymakers are willing to take up external advice and prescriptions.

### The Politics of Decision

The garbage can model suggests that policy formulation very often takes the form of solutions chasing the problems; unless solutions are readily available, policymakers would be reluctant to recognize conditions as problems. Kingdon, too, argues that policy making depends on the coupling of problems and policy solutions and of problems and politics.

Problems are recognized and defined according to the processes that are different from the ways policies are developed or political events unfold. Policy proposals emerge according to their own incentives and selection criteria, irrespective of whether they are solutions to problems or responsive to particular political consideration. On the other hand, political events move on their own schedule and according to their own rules and dynamics, with no necessary or even logical relationship to problems or proposals. The three streams (problem, policy, and politics) run parallel and independently of each other until a window of opportunity occurs in a situation where they are joined or coupled—a pressing problem demands attention and a policy proposal is somehow around that is coupled to the problem as a solution; or an event in the political stream (e.g., a change of government or a major focusing event in the form of a calamity) calls for different direction. At that point, proposals that fit with that political event come to be recognized and are coupled with the ripe political climate. Similarly, problems that fit available policies are acknowledged, while others remain to be neglected politically.

Given that policy formulation is an interactive process, the policy demanders (i.e., clients and the interest groups), policy entrepreneurs/advocates, and policy implementors (i.e., the bureaucracy) have a role to play in shaping the policy process and its outcome. Contemporary policy discourse recognizes the strong influence of pressure groups, policy communities, policy and issue networks, and what are known as iron triangles or subgovernments in the United States. A policy community can be either a formal structure or informal network characterized by restricted membership, stable relationships, vertical interdependence, and insulation from other networks and institutions. Policy and issue networks, on the other hand, comprise a larger number of participants with varying degrees of mutual commitment or dependence on

others in their environment. Most policy issues and disputes are resolved in the relatively private and specialized worlds of the policy sectors through the relevant policy “professionals” from both government agencies and interest groups. In other words, there has been a bureaucratization or professionalization of policy formulation, whereby civil servants and interest group officials work together as policy elite to produce mutually satisfactory outcomes.

The notion of iron triangles and subgovernments presumes a stable and largely autonomous set of participants, coalesced to control fairly narrow policy programs and operating to further the direct economic interest of each party to the alliance of this small circle. A related model is the advocacy coalition framework, which recognizes two to four advocacy coalitions, typically active in a particular policy domain where groups coalesce around a shared set of values and interests. Policy brokers would mediate the competition among these coalitions within relatively stable systems and based on certain ground rules. Similar to corporatist policy making, decisions tend to be reached through a process of negotiation, by accommodating established interests and reaching a consensus, while maintaining existing forms of relations between interest groups and government agencies within the particular policy community. Hence, as A. Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson observe, changes in policy are always marginal, and decision making is essentially incremental.

State managers (whether general or professional bureaucracies) are a key party to such an alliance, because without their involvement, it would be difficult to secure any problem recognition in the agenda-setting process. They are also the ones who eventually implement policy decisions and are thus in a position to influence policy formulation in a backward-mapping manner. For these state actors, entering into formal or informal alliance/network with other stakeholders helps ensure that the policy process is managed and within control, giving them greater clout when advising their political masters. As well documented in the literature on bureaucracy, state managers are not just passive instruments of implementation. They seek to influence policy making through defining the problems and the range of policy options, determining what can be done and what cannot be implemented for

various technical and administrative reasons, and in general tendering policy advice in anonymity.

Finally, the recent rise of civil society activists and new Internet platforms such as Facebook and Twitter has brought about large numbers of unconventional and unorganized participants, breaking down the existing rules and norms that govern policy communities and networks. This makes the policy scene more diverse and overcrowded and poses an unexpected challenge to the hitherto corporatist nature of policy making.

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*See also* Advocacy Coalition Framework; Agenda Setting; Implementation; Policy Advice; Policy Analysis; Policy Community; Policy Cycle; Policy Evaluation; Policy Instruments; Policy Learning; Policy Network; Policy Process, Models of; Rationalism, Critical; Rationality, Bounded; Think Tanks

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## POLICY FRAMING

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Policy framing is a concept used in public policy and social movement theory to explain the process by which actors seek to understand and act on complex situations. The policy framing process involves policy actors (a) confronting a situation where the understanding is problematic and uncertain, (b) creating an understanding or story that helps analyze and make sense of the situation, and (c) then acting (and persuading others to act) on it. Its basic premise refutes the notion that different individuals can observe the same social and natural phenomena and *necessarily* arrive at the same conclusions. Because the framing of the situation requires the assessment of the potential roles of other policy actors, framing will define the degree to which other potential actors are included and benefit from the policy process and policy decisions. Marginalized groups are more likely to contest a particular frame and promote a counterframe.

Policy framing is a midrange ideational concept that focuses on how humans conceptualize the world and how the elements of the world engage with each other and the policy actors themselves. It captures a notion of ideas that is more focused on the intersubjective understanding by a group of policy actors as compared with ideas, observations, and arguments held and posed by individuals. It is also focused on particular policy problems and situations when compared with the more encompassing focus on wider ideologies and philosophies.

Policy framing is a concept that places an emphasis on the dynamics of change and the constantly changing and contested notion of policy reality. In this, it contrasts strongly with policy concepts such as institutions, which tend to emphasize rules and norms that are slow to change over

time. Conflicting policy frames mobilize policy actors to contest the status quo. Policy frame analysis also has a fundamentally different set of assumptions from the rational choice perspectives that tend to assume that while circumstances may change, how actors calculate their interest will not. The framing approach would not dismiss the importance of interest calculation, as will be explained below, but it would emphasize how actors may “key” on different core elements at different times.

Framing has been used in a wide range of disciplines, including psychiatry and psychology. The concept of framing has attracted considerable interest in public policy analysis as well as social movement studies in sociology and politics because it incorporates constructivist understandings of how actors shape the meanings of their experiences. At the same time, it operates on a level that is not much distant from more positivist methodologies and approaches to political and social action. Thus, some scholars have used the frame approach in combination with other, more constructivist or positivist approaches, such as institutionalism and advocacy coalitions, as well as positivist methodologies. For example, there is a tradition in the study of political behavior of examining framing, focusing on topics such as quantitative studies of how the media shape public opinion.

In the public policy field, scholars have used the framing concept to study efforts by decision makers to shape understanding and courses of action in areas where knowledge is uncertain and/or where there are substantial differences and conflicts over interpretation and action. Thus, policy framing has featured significantly in studies of environmental policy, contested social policies such as refugee and women’s rights, economic policy, knowledge-intensive areas, media and public opinion, health policy, racial policy, foreign policy, agricultural policy, poverty and education, and so forth.

This entry examines the two key strands of the framing approach (the public policy and social movement conceptualization of framing), focusing on the key intellectual propositions and methodologies. While not strictly devoted to policy analysis, the social movement research provides a number of insights on how politics and policy are shaped by groups in contestation. Because of the focus on essentially the same concept, these two literatures

provide insights for each other. At the same time, scholars from both communities sometimes can speak past each other because their main reference points are in their own groups, so it is helpful to understand the development and arguments of both approaches.

### The Evolution of the Framing Concept

John Noakes and Hank Johnston give credit to Gregory Bateson for first using the term in a discussion of epistemology and animal behavior. Erving Goffman’s 1974 monograph first brought the concept of framing onto the social science agenda. For Goffman, frames were cognitive structures that humans generated to explain events and their involvement in them. Frame approaches have evolved in analytical depth and focus since Goffman’s original statement of the concept. This formulation assumed that humans were for the most part unconscious of the framing process, which was constituted by rituals of everyday life that defined individuals and their relations to others. Much analysis focuses on how individuals key on specific elements of an event to understand what is going on and how they should behave; it nevertheless also emphasizes that humans have the ability to transform their realities.

Both in sociology and political science, the emphasis has moved toward understanding how actors actively and consciously seek to build and defend frames and how they project their frames onto others. This enables the policy frame analysis to be used as a critical theory, highlighting actors’ efforts to refute a particular representation of social reality.

### *Social Movement Framing*

Arguably, the academics using this sociological approach, when compared with public policy scholars, have made earlier advances in developing a more systematic elaboration of the concepts of framing. Social movement theorists use the frame concept to explain how actors in a movement define what is happening in a situation to mobilize collective action by the movement. This approach supplanted much of the rationalist and organizational approaches in the 1980s and became one of the core approaches to social movements in the

1990s. Noakes and Johnston credit William Gamson, David Snow, Robert Benford and their various collaborators who have sought to systematize this process.

In their 1988 statement on framing, Snow and Benford provided the most prevalent typology of frames. To mobilize individuals to act in a social movement, the framing process involves three framing activities. First, there must be a diagnostic framing of current events that seeks to discredit the prevailing framing and offer a new interpretation. Second, prognostic framing involves the creation of a solution to the problem/situation that the movement can take forward. Finally, motivational framing focuses on the conceptualization that actually triggers people to join the social movement, making the assumption that such communication and persuasion are necessary beyond the first two framing actions.

Using such conceptual tools, social movement scholars expect entrepreneurial leaders to take on such framing roles to arouse the wider public. In doing so, these leaders will seek to link particular actions and events as evidence of injustice or some other unsatisfactory reality and to frame an appropriate response. The leadership will also endeavor to highlight particular aspects of the frames to make them resonate more with the potential followers of the movement. This notion of social movement framing resonating with the followers depends on a number of different elements, including, for example, how credible the arguments and linkage seem to the potential membership and how closely this social movement frame chimes with the belief systems of the targeted audience.

Various kinds of research have been undertaken to study the framing processes at work. The work has tended to take the form of case studies of particular social movements at particular junctures. The overall tendency reflects the epistemological assumptions of much of this field, with its attempt to understand collective beliefs about reality, as well as the ambiguity inherent in such assumptions.

Accordingly, there has been a general concern to push for a more systematic examination of processes while acknowledging the tendency toward proliferation of concepts, often used in a largely descriptive fashion. Nevertheless, in the early 21st century, a significant body of literature on political

behavior sought to empirically isolate these frames and processes and determine their impact through quantitative analysis of data from surveys or experiments.

### *Policy Framing*

#### Concepts

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Martin Rein and Donald Schön provided many of the key statements that triggered the interest in policy analysis for framing. The context of their effort was a belief that the more rationalist orientation of policy studies was unable to get at core aspects of policy decision making. A core puzzle for them was the intractable policy controversy that no presentation of facts and evidence could reconcile.

Rein and Schön attribute this inability to reconcile such policy positions to the existence of conflicting policy frames. These frames involve stories or structures of understanding defined by human belief and perception. Faced with a contested or uncertain policy problem, different actors will seize on different elements and linkages between these elements to construct very different views of reality. Part of the difficulty in inducing a reconciliation of such frames is their tacit nature, which prevents them from being actively scrutinized and assessed by both their proponents and opponents. Furthermore, because the frames will view different events and observations as central, there appears to be no objective reality and, therefore, no potential for falsifying a particular frame in favor of another. This reality gives one insight into the difficulty that climate change policy activists face in persuading climate change “deniers” to accept the evidence of the anthropogenic changes to Earth’s atmosphere and the difficulty the deniers face in winning over the activists. Actors tend to take such frames for granted and are unaware of how they define the policy position they adopt.

Of course this notion of contesting realities existed long before in policy analysis under a different terminology. Since the 1970s, researchers on agenda setting, such as Robert Cobb and Charles Elder, have emphasized the importance of understanding how the definition of a problem shapes the subsequent policy outcome. In the 1990s, a number of scholars found a window of opportunity for the policy frame concept as a way to



bridge the constructivist and positivist divide, an approach that was furthered by Rein and Schön's incorporation of notions of discourse.

Delving into Rein and Schön's 1994 conceptualization more deeply, the authors accept that there is an important role for actor interests and how they relate to actor frames; this inherent ambiguity, the relationship between interests and ideas, is an enduring question for all policy analysis. Rein and Schön do not assume that these concepts are identical, but they accept that frames may help define interests and that frames may be undertaken to benefit particular interests. Nevertheless, the core reality is that the frames will be instrumental to defining what is in the interest of the actors. Institutions and other organizations push a particular frame or set of frames because individual members sponsor those frames.

Policy discourse is the mechanism by which frames contest the understanding of a policy problem within any policy forum. Rein and Schön define this as essentially the dialogue that exists between different parties over a particular issue. They differentiate two forms of policy discourse and two associated frames. The first discourse involves the policy debate in which the different policy contestants seek to prevail with their policy stories and frames through various rhetorical efforts involving persuasion, evidence, and symbols. Rhetorical frames will underpin the arguments in the policy debate. The second discourse involves the debate over policy practice in which the actors argue and develop policy stories that influence the creation of procedures, particular policy instruments, and so forth to deliver the policy. Action frames inform this discourse.

Within action frames, Rein and Schön differentiate three types: (1) policy frames, (2) institutional action frames, and (3) metacultural frames. Policy frames are those created by institutional actors to define the problem in a particular policy situation. Institutional action frames represent the more general action frame used by institutional actors to structure a wide range of policy situations—this institutional action frame concept bears some resemblance to policy styles and even standard operating procedures. The institution has characteristic ways of addressing policy problems that the public can anticipate. A metacultural frame, the broadest concept, is essentially the worldview

adopted by a particular culture or community. These metacultural frames shape the policy stories that inform both the rhetorical and the action frames.

Rein and Schön view the key policy act as individuals becoming aware of their rhetorical and action frames, a process they defined in 1994 as the "construction" of the frame. They urge policy actors to develop a higher degree of reflection, seeking to learn more about their actions during the process of making decisions. This should lead actors to a process of reframing in which they use reflection and discourse in a manner that leads to a resolution of policy controversies and conflict. When actors engage with their situation and with each other through discourse, they may recognize incongruities, creating a situation that forces people to reflect on their beliefs and frames.

As Falk Daviter has noted, this emphasis on the potential for rational consensus building contrasts with policy approaches that focus on the policy outcomes occurring through conflict and competition. Rein and Schön do not take this rational process of frame reflection for granted. They expect it to be extremely difficult and recognize that frame reflection may not lead to reframing, nor will reframing necessarily require it. The authors formulate the possibility that academics can aid practitioners in developing reciprocal frame reflective processes as well as the mutual trust required for practitioners to expose themselves to such processes.

### Methods

The core of understanding in any given frame involves deconstructing key elements from the policy rhetoric and actual policy documents and instruments as well as accounts of individual players (and also the characteristics and interests of these players). In these sources, students can discern the policy stories that the various actors use to analyze particular policy situations and isolate the frames accordingly. Because any given policy frame and policy situation (particularly conflictual ones) are too complex to be understood by one individual and are subject to multiple interpretations, researchers must develop an account of the policy situation from a number of perspectives. As one would expect, the inherent difficulty of isolating

intersubjective constructions of reality by its very nature poses enormous practical problems for the researcher. How does one, for instance, differentiate a dissembling rhetorical frame from the core action frame when the actors themselves may come to believe their own rhetorical devices? What happens when frames are translated and reshaped at various different levels of a policy system—or when there are conflicts between those who operate within a particular frame? An overarching frame does not have to be uniform and indeed is unlikely to be so. Perhaps equally significant, the researchers themselves necessarily bring their own frames, which shape how they perceive and analyze these phenomena, into such a research endeavor.

The basic policy approach that scholars have taken involves isolating both the policy rhetoric and policy actions over time and across all the relevant levels of governance. These demands for policy detail and nuance have led to the bulk of the policy research using the qualitative method of a detailed case study. Given the effort involved in studying such processes over time and multiple levels, the research in this area has generally taken the form of a very limited number of case studies, which are also in evidence in the social movement research. Much of this research is clear in its view that framing indeed matters and drives policy.

However, as also witnessed in the social movement research, a substantial body of literature tends to use the framing terminology to express a basic metaphor, much in the same way that some scholars use the concept of networks as descriptive shorthand to refer to people who interact over time in a particular political setting. As noted earlier, numerous scholars tend to use framing as part of a larger analytical construct, such as institutional analysis, advocacy coalitions, garbage can models, and so forth. This entry emphatically does not dismiss such efforts as, for instance, framing and reframing seem to require more theorizing about intersubjective activity between like-minded parties and more conflicting actors. How are frames inserted into institutional processes by various actors and groups of actors? Whether this takes the form of discourse coalitions, epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, or some other concept, some form of networking processes is required.

While the descriptive and the multiconceptual approaches can enhance our insights about

particular policy problems, there is a danger that the elaboration and evaluation of the concept will remain largely at a general conceptual stage. Systematic studies of multiple cases seem to be the next step to isolate key elements of the framing process and determine how particular conditions shape their evolution.

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*See also* Agenda Setting; Constructivism; Discursive Policy Analysis; Ideology; Policy, Constructivist Models; Policy, Discourse Models; Policy Analysis; Policy Formulation; Social Movements

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## POLICY INSTRUMENTS

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The study of policy instruments dates from the early 1970s, though much had been written previously, especially in economics, about government intervention in relation to market imperfections. A policy instrument refers to the means of government intervention in markets or, from a broader perspective, society to accomplish goals or to solve problems. The behavioral assumption underlying a policy instrument is that it attempts to get people do things that they might not otherwise have done. Since the 1960s, there has been a transformation not only in the scope and scale of the role of the government but also in the proliferation of tools that it has at its disposal for public action. In retrospect, a distinction can be made between three partly overlapping arenas in the study of policy instruments.

This entry starts with a discussion of several approaches to defining what policy instruments are. Policy instruments are not isolated but exist in relationship to objectives as well as resources; taking this into account, the next section of the entry considers theories about how a policy instrument should be chosen. A classification of policy instruments is presented, differentiating between three families of policy instruments. Next, the entry examines the choice of policy tools (policy design), the application of policy tools (policy implementation), and the second generation of less coercive and more indirect policy instruments inspired by the limited impact of earlier policy tools. The assessment of the impact of policy instruments (policy evaluation) is complicated by the fact that they often come as part of a policy mix; the entry describes policy evaluation, noting that effectiveness is just one of the many criteria by which to measure performance. The entry concludes with a look at the way ahead.

### Approaches to Policy Instruments

The *classical* approach to defining policy instruments (1970–1985), rooted in the instrumentalist school of thought, has been largely supplanted because of its top-down and mechanical view of the world. It put quite some effort into a rather semantic discussion about the definition of a policy

instrument, the risk of metaphors and reification, and the classification of policy instruments on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics. It claimed that the selection and consequently the application of instruments are made mainly on the basis of the characteristics of a specific instrument and its effects in terms of goal attainment. Soon it became clear that goal attainment cannot be attributed solely to the characteristics of instruments but that the characteristics of the context should also be taken into account.

The *instrument–context* approach (1985–1995) focused on the development of a theory of policy instruments that would enable policymakers to select the appropriate policy instrument for the problem at hand. The basis for selection of a policy instrument is not only the “logic of consequence” but also the “logic of appropriateness,” which includes “goodness of fit.” The attention for the context has led to what may be labeled “refined instrumentalism.”

Finally, instruments are considered one of the many variables in the *contextual* approach (1995–present) that takes policy implementation as a point of departure. The study of policy instruments merges with the study of implementation. The study of policy instruments has been affected as such by the developments in the field of implementation, notably the shift from implementation to governance.

### Policy Theory

A policy instrument comes not in isolation but as part of intervention theory. It can be further specified by identifying the form of the intervention, that is, a policy, a program, or a reform. In this context, attention is paid to a policy theory, that is, the set of assumptions underlying a policy instrument. A policy theory, following Andries Hoogerwerf, consists of assumptions about three kinds of relations:

1. normative relations between what “is” and what “ought to be,”
2. relations between the objectives and means to accomplish these objectives, and
3. more in-depth relations between causes and effects.

The study of policy considers the causal relationship between a policy instrument and the purpose for which it is used. To put it differently, goal attainment is considered to be the dependent variable while instruments are seen as one of the independent variables. It should be underscored, though, that a policy theory does not reflect a scientific theory in the traditional sense of a universal law that has been empirically tested. The external validity of the findings of a policy theory is fairly low. A policy theory provides guidelines for action and is, as such, ideographic rather than nomologic in nature. As they are often in conflict, a policy theory is often the outcome of a trade-off and consequently suboptimal in nature. The quality of a policy theory—coherence, reliability, validity—is an important source of a policy fiasco.

### Shapes and Sizes

The means of tackling policy problems are often called *policy instruments* or *policy solutions*. The labels are not without risks. A comparison of a policy instrument with a hammer, a pair of pliers, or a screwdriver may be misleading because it attributes qualities to means that they do not have in reality. Consequently, it may lead to unintended and unforeseen problems that may even overshadow the original problems. The same applies for the term *policy solutions* as it gives the wrong impression that problems may be solved once and for all. In reality, problems are solved at best partly and temporarily. Moreover, the solution of one problem may create another problem, as Aaron Wildavsky has argued: Policies deal less with events in society than with the consequences of policies from the past. Instead of permanent solutions, one should think of permanent problems in the sense that one problem always succeeds and replaces another. A policy is, according to Deborah Stone, more like an endless game of Monopoly than a bicycle repair.

### Three Families of Instruments

The study of policy instruments has been long dominated by efforts to put together a classification of policy instruments on the basis of their characteristics. One of the first is a typology by Christopher Hood that makes a distinction between

instruments for the collection of information (detectors) and instruments directed to influence development in society (effectors). A quick scan of the literature reveals that the study of policy instruments is almost exclusively focused on the latter. A survey provided by Frans van der Doelen identifies three *families* of policy instruments, also referred to as “sticks, carrots and sermons.” The first family consists of *regulatory instruments*, such as orders and prohibitions (licenses, permits, and regulations). Rules may also establish rights. Rights must rest on authoritative rules from the state, but they are distinctive in their reliance on citizens for enforcement. The second family embraces *financial means*, providing incentives. They may be positive (grants, subsidies) as well as negative (taxes, user charges) from a consumer’s perspective. The third family includes *communicative tools*, the development of which has received a boost with the advance of the digital age. Such tools may be directed at increasing as well as decreasing the amount of information on the other party.

In addition, a fourth family, *organizations*, can be distinguished, referring to direct government, that is, the provision of goods and services including treatment. The classification of policy instruments is further elaborated by Michael Howlett in a spectrum of “substantive” policy instruments on the basis of the level of state provision, with direct provision of goods and services by the state at one end of the continuum and provision of goods and services by the family and community with no state involvement at the other. In addition, “procedural” instruments can be distinguished that are primarily intended to alter the policy process

**Table 1** Three Families of Policy Instruments

<i>Policy Instrument</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>
Regulatory	Prescriptions	Prohibitions
Economic	Grants, subsidies	Taxes, user charges
Communicative	Information	Propaganda

*Source:* Adapted from Bemelmans-Videc, M. L., Rist, R. C., & Vedung, E. (Eds.). (1998). *Carrots, sticks and sermons: Policy instruments and their evaluation*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

rather than the mix of goods and services provided to society.

The typology of policy instruments is not without controversy; for instance, the use of symbols as policy instruments—“words that succeed and policies that fail” to quote the subtitle of Murray Edelman’s book *Political Language*—does not fit into the typology. In most cases, hardly any attention is paid to the internal instruments used to influence administrative processes, even though they might be preferable from a control or management perspective. The focus is almost exclusively on external instruments geared to a change of the environment of the government—that is, the developments in society. Besides, there is no place for informal instruments to shape a policy according to a government’s preferences for changes in the membership or size of the decision-making body, through bargaining and negotiation, and by mobilization of political support. In response to these and other drawbacks, several other typologies have been offered in the literature, for instance, on the basis of the degree of the following:

- *Coercion*: The extent to which a policy tool restricts behavior as opposed to being merely encouraging or discouraging
- *Directness*: The extent to which a public agency is involved in all stages of the policy process
- *Automaticity*: The extent to which a policy tool uses the existing administrative structure
- *Visibility*: The extent to which the resources attributed to a policy tool show up in the budget-end program review

The degree of coercion is considered to be the main criterion; according to Lester Salamon, a variety of factors have put a premium on tools that are automatic but indirect and invisible. Unfortunately, no criterion is completely exhaustive or mutually exclusive.

Last but not least, policy instruments rarely appear in a pure form. They come bundled in programs combining various tools, each being a package containing a type of good or activity, a vehicle for the delivery of this good or activity, and a delivery system. A prohibition, for instance, may be delivered by a public agency in the form of a rule.

The diversity of policy instruments should be considered as a benefit rather than a drawback, according to Ross Ashby’s law of requisite variety—the greater the variety within a system, the greater is its ability to absorb differences without system failure; in this case, variety in policy instruments increases the effectiveness of government intervention by enabling it to address a greater variety of environmental situations.

### Policy Design: The Selection

The selection of policy instruments is often associated with a tool kit from which the government is free to choose a policy instrument. In practice, there is no such tool kit, and at the same time, the government is not always free to choose. On the contrary, a subsidy is not simply a “bag of money” but represents an organizational unit, too. A third party may have preferences of its own. A specific policy instrument, for instance, may provide discretionary power and, therefore, room to maneuver. The same applies for the target group, because interest groups that oppose the implementation of a policy have tools at their disposal that may frustrate a potentially effective policy instrument.

The choice of policy tools, according to B. Guy Peters, is driven by what he calls the Five I’s, which combine together to constitute a checklist of factors that should be taken into consideration:

1. ideas and ideologies that may shape the selection of policy instruments, giving preference to a specific tool above other tools;
2. interests that refer to the assumption that individuals try to maximize their personal utilities;
3. institutions that may have preferences for instruments over which they have control and with which they are familiar;
4. individuals pointing at the role of political entrepreneurs to win support for a new policy; and
5. international environment as shown by the consequences of the process of globalization.

In reality, policy instruments are often chosen for all but rational arguments, that is, the assessment of their positive and negative effects (impact

assessment). A policy instrument is often chosen because of extrarational arguments. The following are two such arguments:

*The normative or political dimension of a policy instrument:* A policy instrument is not just a tool. Contrary to the well-known statement by Niccolò Machiavelli, the ends do not justify the means, as Arthur Ringeling has argued correctly. The choice of a policy instrument is not value free as it may reflect an ideological stance. Besides, a policy instrument may strengthen or weaken the position of an actor.

*Path dependency:* The institutionalization of policy instruments as the selection of a policy instrument may be subject to path dependency. A policy instrument that works is also adopted in other fields. The bias a policymaker has toward a specific policy instrument may even go so far that the problem at hand is shaped in such a way that it can be solved, at least potentially, by the policy instruments of his or her choice.

Last but not least, a policy instrument may be chosen because it is in vogue, as illustrated by the deregulation movement of the 1980s, which seems to have been more an expression of a prejudice against the government or a preference for the market than the outcome of a careful scrutiny of the pros and cons of regulation. Rules and standards have been abolished in favor of financial incentives. Only recently has there been a movement backward in favor of re-regulation.

### Policy Implementation: The Application

The application of instruments, often referred to as policy implementation, has been long directed by what Herman van Gunsteren calls the rational central-rule approach, based on the superior analytical insights of an elite and on centrally controlled implementation. It assumes that actors who are involved in the enforcement of a rule are puppets on strings. In reality, they are neither will-less nor powerless, as illustrated by the famous study by Jeffrey Pressmann and Aaron Wildavsky on the implementation of a program to hire the hardcore unemployed minorities of Oakland,

titled “Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; or Why It’s Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes.”

The study of policy instruments has been affected by developments in the field of policy implementation. The confrontation between the top-down and the bottom-up approach has induced a more horizontal mode of policy implementation often referred to as governance. The shift from hierarchy to markets and networks has substantially changed the role of the government. The government is just one of the actors, though a prominent one—the government has a monopoly on the utilization of power and more resources at its disposal and often serves as network manager—each pursuing its own interests and strategy. Being dependent on each other for the accomplishment of their objectives, actors are involved in a multi-actor game of wheeling and dealing. A policy is, as such, a compromise, the outcome of the interaction between these actors or, to put it differently, the result of the coproduction of various actors rather than something imposed by one single actor—that is, the government.

### The Second Generation of Policy Instruments

The shift in governance from hierarchy to markets and networks gave birth to what De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof have called the second generation of policy instruments. A multi-actor game requires other features beyond the conventional tools, notably multilateral instruments such as covenants, public–private partnerships, and voluntary agreements. Contrary to the first generation of policy instruments, the second generation of policy instruments anticipates the potential resistance of the stakeholders by taking into account the characteristics of a network, notably the autonomy or isolation of the target group and the interdependency of the actors, as well as the pluriformity of society.

With the second generation of policy instruments, the government takes a more remote stance. Instead of directing, the government facilitates

development in society (steering from a distance). The new tools are highly indirect and rely heavily on a wide assortment of third parties for the implementation of a policy. In addition, they are characterized by a high degree of relativism and voluntarism. It is left to the target group to take action and to change its behavior.

The development of a second generation of policy instruments does not mean that the first generation of policy instruments suddenly becomes obsolete. To the contrary, second-generation instruments supplement rather than replace the first-generation ones. In many cases, vertical instruments are still appropriate, even in a network setting. The introduction of more horizontal instruments may be seen as fine-tuning for a new situation. In practice, the difference is not that great. The “new” policy instruments often go under the same label as the “old” ones, although the emphasis is more on the bilateral or even multilateral aspect than on the unilateral aspect of governance.

### Policy Evaluation

The performance of the government is often measured in terms of goal attainment and effectiveness. The effectiveness of tools—the contribution of policy instrument to goal attainment—may be blurred by external or intervening variables, such as the financial crisis, that are beyond the control of the government. Consequently, an effective tool may not lead to goal attainment, whereas goal attainment may conceal an ineffective tool.

The review of policy instruments is further complicated by a number of circumstances that make it difficult to be conclusive:

1. Goals are not set once and for all but may be subject to goal displacement. The assessment of a policy instrument in terms of the original goals may be methodologically sound but not of much practical relevance.

2. It may be hard to measure the effect of a policy instrument as they often come and go as part of a policy mix. A subsidy, for instance, is often shaped as a regulation containing additional conditions. A regulation is usually backed up by sanctions, and inducements are predicated on rules

for handing out rewards or punishments. The packaging could be threefold:

- *horizontal* packaging, which is used if two or more policy instruments are directed simultaneously at the same agent;
- *vertical* packaging, which refers to the application of a policy instrument to facilitate the implementation of another policy instrument; and
- *chronological* packaging, which implies a sequence in the selection or application of diverse policy tools.

The packaging of instruments makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sort out the precise effects of an individual policy instrument and, therefore, its contribution to the accomplishment of objectives.

3. The effect of a policy instrument may be “hollowed-out,” according to Roeland in ’t Veld, by the law of diminishing effectiveness, which states that a policy instrument may become obsolete after some time because stakeholders learn how to cope with its negative or unwelcome effects.

4. Last but not least, it should be noted that the effectiveness of a policy instrument is just one of the many criteria that may be used to evaluate a policy. The call for improvement in the efficiency of the public sector in the past few years has been at the expense of equity in the distribution of goods and services. Lately, the accountability, legitimacy, and responsiveness of government have become issues.

### The Way Ahead: Old Wine in New Bottles?

The reinvention of government not only has put the government back in the spotlight but also has induced other changes (steering, not rowing, is the device). Borrowing insight from the new public management movement, attention has shifted away from the primary toward the secondary process in public organizations. Public management has replaced public policy at the heart of public administration. It has induced a change in vocabulary. In today’s jargon, instruments are referred to as outputs, underscoring that the provision of goods and services may also be considered a policy

instrument. A lot of effort is now put into the development of indicators to measure performance. The purpose is twofold. On the one hand, allocation and efficiency may be fostered by linking inputs to outputs. On the other hand, effectiveness may be promoted by relating outputs and outcomes. It is still too early to judge the performance movement, but the focus on the development and utilization of indicators may cause a “performance paradox,” that is, contrary or even perverse effects generated by, *inter alia*, focusing on what we can measure and leaving out what we cannot measure. The results, therefore, should be treated with care.

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*See also* Governance; Implementation; Performance; Policy Evaluation; Policy Network

#### Further Readings

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new information, knowledge, and experiences. The various levels at which learning happens are individual, organizational, governmental, and even societal. Policy learning involves all these levels, but it is typically focused on governmental or societal learning about specific policy issues or broad conceptual frameworks that guide government action in different policy fields. There is a vast literature on the psychology of individual learning, as well as a management literature on the dynamics of organizational learning. The literature on policy learning started in the 1960s, with the growing realization that policy making was not simply about power but also about collective puzzling under conditions of uncertainty.

#### Learning in Public Policy

Learning is a preoccupation in the study of public policy for several reasons. First, there is a presumption that policy making is not entirely a matter of self-interested politics or power. Obviously, the policy process involves interest groups, political parties, social movements, classes, and other forces—and they battle for the supremacy of their agendas and their interests. But there is also the sense that policy making is about pursuing—in some large measure—the public interest. This means that policy is intended to contribute to the public good and that therefore it should be monitored (evaluated) regularly as conditions and information change, and improved if possible. This requires learning. Second, every model of the policy process assumes that policies (and their constituent programs) are intended to deal with public problems and therefore require a careful definition of exactly what the key features of the problem are, as well as its underlying causal factors. This requires reflection, research, and learning. Third, every model of the policy process also assumes a stage of evaluation, where policies are assessed for their effectiveness and efficiency and are modified and improved if possible. Evaluation is intrinsically a learning function.

The successful avoidance, or at least minimization, of mistakes is crucial for public policy and requires a capacity to learn. Part of the challenge of policy learning is that capacity is often blocked by a combination of factors. Uncertainty marks all policy fields, some more than others. Climate change science, for example, is enormously complicated

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## POLICY LEARNING

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Learning is a process whereby cognitive frameworks or behavior changes occur as a result of



and was being seriously debated even into the 1990s. When governments around the world began massive bailouts and spending programs in 2009 to deal with the global financial crisis, no one was entirely sure what the impacts would actually be. Sometimes the evidence to assess policy interventions takes years to appear (e.g., poverty reduction programs in developing countries). Other policy fields, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, are driven more by moral or ethical perspectives than by scientific research and data. For these and other reasons, policy actors have to rely on policy issue frames or belief systems that consist of a reasonably consistent mix of data, information, research, values, interests, and deeply held assumptions or beliefs. These can operate in various ways, as broadly consistent worldviews of competing players in the policy process (e.g., environmental vs. economic development groups), as paradigms that are broadly accepted by most stakeholders in a policy field, or even broadly at the societal level (e.g., the reality and danger of global warming). So policy learning is not simply a matter of processing clear information or unambiguous experiences. Belief systems and paradigms are often deeply embedded among social actors or institutions and are internally consistent enough that they can resist contradictory evidence.

### Organizational Learning

This raises the question of whether organizations can actually learn, as distinct from the individuals that make them up. It is important not to anthropomorphize institutions—they do not exist as separate entities. However, enormous efforts take place in almost all institutions to provide both collective memory and learning. Policy manuals and standard operating procedures (SOPs) mark almost every organization. Organizations—from local day care centers to the military—have retreats and special meetings to breathe, get focused, and act as one. The larger the organization, the more challenging is the learning process. Can states—possibly the largest organizations we know—learn, and can they learn policy lessons? The current record is mixed. The financial crisis of 2008–2009 had the U.S. Federal Reserve and other national banks intervene to keep their economies afloat. Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal

Reserve, who was a student of the Great Depression of the 1930s, learned those lessons and was in a position to apply them with a massive stimulus package. He was an individual in charge of an organization, and the organization and the state absorbed the lesson to a degree. By 2010, the new challenge was deficits, and various state organizations—primarily central banks and finance departments—were attempting to shift from stimulus to cuts. Learning is not a static condition—it requires adaptation, shift, and change. That is why it is difficult.

So can states learn? In principle, yes, if we de-anthropomorphize the organizations, ministries, and offices that make them up and see leaders who look dispassionately at the evidence and move on. On the other hand, policy-making systems and the states within which they are embedded face at least six impediments to learning. First, while making mistakes is the best path to learning how to do better, mistakes are often political suicide. Second, the larger the organization, the more reliant it is on SOPs. States are big—SOPs are important and often helpful, but they become impediments to fresh thinking. Third, stakeholders fight for and cling grimly to the status quo. They are not necessarily the enemies of learning, but they are stalwart defenders of any conventional wisdom that serves their interests. Fourth, many political systems do not have well-developed “cognitive capacities” (e.g., think tanks, foundations, and university departments of political science or public policy). Fifth, there is the invisible human dimension of state organizations (ministries)—the fluid companionship of experienced seniors and enthusiastic recruits. Mentorship—much understudied in the literature—is a crucial mechanism of organizational learning, but it often happens haphazardly. Sixth, in policy areas that concern the safety or security of the public, if things go wrong, there is almost unbearable pressure to “do something.” In other words, agencies have to react immediately rather than learn from the experience—terrorist attacks are a perfect illustration. The policy reactions to the attempt to blow up a plane destined to the United States from Amsterdam on Christmas Day in 2009 were clearly designed to “tighten security,” even if that was largely meaningless in terms of a real capacity to stop terrorists.

However, at the same time, the Obama administration ordered a review of agency practices in

light of the fact that there had not been an intelligence failure but instead a failure to “connect the dots” of existing information. Interestingly, the first response by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was defensive—the “system had worked.” In subsequent days, the administration made it clear that it wanted to know (to learn) what had gone wrong.

### Theoretical Approaches

Since learning and policy change evidently take place, various theoretical approaches to understanding policy learning have emphasized the idea of “levels” of belief systems or paradigms that are more or less susceptible to alteration. At the most microscopic level, there is a steady stream of indicators and data that wash through the policy system and trigger attention if they seem anomalous or unexpected. This represents learning from the environment, from feedback signals, and may not generate substantial changes in policy but simply intensified responses based on preexisting policy (e.g., new cases of avian flu). Another approach sees social learning composed of three orders. First-order learning absorbs new information as a basis for making changes in policy settings, such as incremental adjustments in tax rates if the economy seems to be slowing down. Second-order learning occurs when it appears that the policy environment has changed in a substantial way, when it seems that existing policy interventions are not achieving their objectives. In this case, governments will change the kinds of policy instruments that they use—for example, from direct welfare payments to vouchers. Third-order learning is the deepest and most challenging and reflects such an accumulation of anomalies and unexplained or unexpected events and circumstances that an entire policy paradigm—a combination of deep assumptions and the policy instruments that express them—collapses and is replaced by another. A key example is the ascendancy of monetarism over Keynesianism in the 1980s. A more recent example is the global financial crisis of late 2008. Governments around the world that had favored markets and had been skeptical of state intervention suddenly championed massive public spending, nationalization, and effectively state-managed capitalist economies.

The most elaborate version of this multilayered learning model is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). The ACF oversees policy change and policy learning usually requiring a decade or more and views change and learning in terms of “policy subsystems,” which are dominated by competing advocacy coalitions that share causal and normative beliefs. Most important, it interprets policies and programs as belief systems consisting of value priorities and causal assumptions. A distinctive feature of the ACF is its emphasis on the role of ideas and values in the policy process. The ACF assumes that both policy actors and the policies themselves can be understood in terms of the structure of their belief systems. These systems have three key elements. The first is the deep or normative core, which consists of fundamental axioms about human nature, justice, and priorities among values such as security, health, and life. These ideas are very difficult to change through policy arguments. The second set of ideas is the near (policy) core, and it comprises notions about the proper scope of government activity, distributions of power and authority, orientations on substantive policy conflicts, and basic choices about policy instruments. These are difficult to change but can be altered if experience seriously differs from theory. The final set contains secondary aspects and consists of instrumental decisions needed to implement the policy core, such as decisions about administrative rules, budgetary allocations, and statutory interpretation. These are comparatively easy to shift or change and constitute the bulk of technical policy argumentation.

The ACF also has several distinct hypotheses about how policy subsystems operate. Among them are the following: (a) in any subsystem, the lineup of allies and opponents is stable over periods of a decade or so; (b) there is more consensus within coalitions on core beliefs than on secondary ones; (c) government policies rarely change if the original sponsoring coalition is still in power; (d) policies for which there are quantitative data are more amenable to policy learning than areas distinguished by qualitative data; and (e) policy learning across belief systems is more likely when there exists a prestigious forum that forces professionals from all sides to participate. This highlights the way in which policy learning can take place at different rates and intensity, depending on the characteristics of policy subsystems.

The approaches above focused on policy learning and change within a single political system. In the 1990s, research began to focus on policy learning between and among different political jurisdictions (also referred to as policy transfer and policy diffusion). There are varieties of diffusion and learning: lesson drawing (where governments see a problem and borrow an existing solution), legitimation (referring to other international examples to satisfy domestic critics), and harmonization. The latter is facilitated by international governmental institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank. Researchers have emphasized that “borrowing” or “learning” can be voluntary but sometimes can be imposed if third parties have financial or other forms of leverage (such as the International Monetary Fund). Moreover, in a globalized and competitive world, countries increasingly aspire to meet or exceed common governance or policy standards. The OECD is a distinctive example. Even without any coercive powers over its 30 member states, it establishes through its research and publications a variety of policy gold standards (e.g., in educational performance or science and technology policy), which countries study and then often use as guides for their own policy development.

More recent work in critical policy studies has emphasized the microdynamics of policy diffusion and learning. The original diffusion literature thought of policies as “things” or “packages” that were transported and implemented in different regimes. But policies are complex constructs, and their penetration and adoption involves a process of “translation” and epistemic recalibration. The transfer of a “model,” for example (whatever it might be—education, city transport, or refuse collection), involves persuasion, coalition building, organizational development, and mobilization. Diffusion, from this perspective, is much more fluid, episodic, fragmented, discursive, and contingent. It is not as much about “learning” as it is about active, social recognition and realignment.

### Effective Policy Learning in a Globalized World

A final issue is a more practical one: how to enhance effective policy learning? One of the best

ways to learn is by making mistakes, but this is hardly politically attractive, and governments are naturally reluctant to publicize their errors. Consequently, it is important to institutionalize transparency and challenge functions within a political system and within policy-making organizations. Policy-making institutions are made up of people, and learning will be enhanced if those people are encouraged to exchange information and be continually learning at the individual level. Within policy subsystems, accessibility to outside actors, standards of open discussion and debate, and the development of reasonably consensual policy measures and indicators will enhance learning. Generally speaking, in both organizations and subsystems, network structures, flexibility, and adaptability are key ingredients in effective learning. Hierarchy in the face of a crisis, stress, or emergency is inferior to network structures that both push decision making down and keep information flow open. Modern armies, for example, are increasingly functioning this way to enhance the collective capacity to respond to threats on the ground and learn from accumulated information.

Policy learning remains hugely difficult. At the human, individual level, people seem to make mistakes all the time and hardly seem capable of learning from them. Organizations struggle constantly to induce their members to learn, in the face of inertia and SOPs. States and their policy-making systems are riven with politics and all the forces that encourage routine and stasis. The international system is pressing more and more countries to “learn,” but the transfer process is complicated. Many “receiving” states are doing so only to cash in on development aid. Most others are “translating” rather than simply transferring. Most important, many states—developed and developing—are engaged in a global conversation that engages them collectively in both learning and transferring ideas. The Copenhagen Climate Change conference is a case in point—it did not achieve an “agreement” in any meaningful sense, but it contributed to a messy and disjointed conversation that will continue for decades.

Policy learning is a key factor in effective policy change and program improvement in democracies. While it is constrained by both politics and the limits of human cognition, it is becoming increasingly important in a globalized world where

stresses coming from the environment—natural, social, economic—are mounting and demand a reasoned response.

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*See also* Policy Network

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## POLICY NETWORK

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Policy networks comprise international and national governmental and nongovernmental interconnected actors in a given policy space. The climate change policy network, for example, would include United Nations (UN) agencies, government departments of the environment, Greenpeace, Al Gore (founder and current chair of the Alliance for Climate Protection), and David Suzuki (Japanese Canadian academic, science broadcaster, environmental activist, and founder of David Suzuki Foundation). Network members need not agree with each other. They share a common language and a set of reference points and so can argue or disagree within a consensual frame of discourse.

The backdrop to the origins of network analyses is a concern with understanding the relationship between state and society and, in particular,

the organization of interests in society. The early postwar history of political science and public policy wrestled with the best way to theorize the connections. While the Marxist literature addressed itself to the importance of class, the non-Marxist literature eventually settled on the notion of interest group pluralism. Work in the 1950s focused on the limitless array of interests that could mobilize around the equally limitless range of policy issues. If people shared interests, they would likely form groups. If policy issues arose that affected those interests, then the groups would politicize and lobby government. The pluralist tradition de-emphasizes the state or policy-making institutions and stresses the influence of lobbies and interest-groups politics.

There are four major sources of inspiration for the concept of networks in political science. One of the first breaks with pluralism was over its portrait of the associational system. Empirical studies in that period showed that associational patterns were much more stable and relationships far more closed than the pluralists had suggested. Policy making took place not in the legislature or the executive but in “iron triangles,” which truly were subgovernments in that they might all be operating according to different principles, with different rhythms and often conflicting outcomes. By the mid-1970s, the notion of iron triangles seemed like a caricature too, and a new concept of “issue networks” arose.

A second important source of work on networks came from comparative research on industrial performance and economic policy. A key conditioning factor of foreign policy was the structure of domestic interests and institutions. This branch of research had offshoots that remain highly relevant to the work on policy networks today. Work on state structures argued that states had a clear pattern of associational and state institutions. For example, corporatist states had highly centralized associational systems, working in tandem with governments to develop and implement policy.

A third source of inspiration for network analysis was the growing work on new social movements and public interest groups. Social movement organizations rarely act alone, and they connect through various types of networks. The distinction between the movement and the organizations built

on it is important and gives a clue as to why the network idea spontaneously arose in this field of research. Any movement (e.g., environmental, consumers', women's) is bound to spawn a variety of organizations that address different aspects of its agenda, but those organizations will have a common cause and will seek to cooperate in order to maximize their policy impact.

A final source of inspiration for the network concept has been modernity itself. Policy domains are increasingly crowded with organizations, and they spontaneously connect to each other, both as antagonists and as allies. The line between public and private is increasingly blurred, particularly since the global financial crisis of 2009. Domestic politics increasingly is leveraged to the international plane, from whaling to the environment. The result is that states increasingly rely on networks of external actors that are not under their control.

### Policy Network/Community Analysis

Early models of policy communities/networks divided them into subgovernments and the attentive public. Actual decision making takes place in the subgovernment, which is dominated by large institutions, groups, and core government agencies. Players in the subgovernment often try to limit participation from outsiders. The attentive public is the outsiders, whose main influence on the process is to generate ideas and discussion through conferences, publications, and occasional lobbying. There are several limitations to this way of thinking about policy communities: It is largely static and does not travel well across policy fields. Some areas are indeed dominated by government agencies. But many others are increasingly open to pressure from the attentive public, and that public is not prepared to be polite. In social and educational policy, and increasingly in municipal policy, for example, fundamental assumptions about the role of governments are constantly being posed.

Some of these limitations have been addressed in more recent models of policy networks. There is a structural approach to network analysis, for example, that focuses on patterns of relations among actors, patterns that can be mapped and are to some degree distinct from the beliefs or ideas of policy actors. The degree of organization here means analytic capacity, access to important data

and information, the ability to act unilaterally, coordination, focus on long- or short-term issues, and a reactive or anticipatory policy stance. This depiction of policy network types has the advantage of variety.

Most of the policy network literature has been applied to economic policy fields and assumes that concentration plus organization equals policy-capable systems. While this makes some intuitive sense, it needs to be treated cautiously. For one thing, it has a vaguely undemocratic flavor. The more hierarchical, coordinated, and tidy the policy sector, the fewer opportunities there will be for the attentive public to get into the act. Current policy thinking is that the wider the networks and the more competition among players, the better policy outcomes will be. For another, as policy sectors get more complex and more globalized, the demand for information from all sectors and connections among the players rises exponentially. The tightly coordinated policy networks recommended in this literature may not be adequate to the new dynamics of modern policy process.

### Practical Applications

The network idea itself can be seen as a response to changing political realities. Concepts related to policy communities and networks began to multiply and develop around the time that associational systems were becoming more complex. The idea of issue networks was designed to capture the idea of a more fluid, information-based policy system in which government departments and industry players were no longer dominant. While there are no reliable data on broad trends in the past decade, there is no doubt that groups continue to multiply across most sectors.

The range of global policy actors is increasing exponentially. The most visible are international governmental organizations such as the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Trade Organization. Yet another layer consists of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active on the global level but connected to domestic concerns (the environment, human rights). The result is a diffuse system of transnational networks of loosely coordinated governance, as well as of networks of protest and opposition to that governance.

Technology makes these networks possible—the technology of travel, of communications, or of the transfer and circulation of information. Before the advent of cell phones, laptops, PDAs, Google, Blackberrys, Twitter, and e-mail, NGO activists attending UN conferences would have had to queue at the phones to make long-distance calls to their colleagues at home. That has all obviously changed, and the next wave will build on these platforms and create even more empowered network capabilities.

Policy networks are important today not only because they represent interests that have to be integrated into the policy process or information that is crucial to analysis but because they are important sinews for implementation and delivery. The concept of working partnerships for the development and delivery of services implies a very different set of relationships than is typically envisaged in the communities/networks literature. That literature focuses more on the political dynamics of interest representation, whereas the challenges of partnerships focus more on the logistics of joint action to achieve common goals.

The preceding suggests a somewhat confusing array of forces that serve to make policy communities and networks—domestic and global—even more important than they have been in the past but also perhaps more challenging to integrate into the policy process. The associational system shows no signs of shrinking, and some elements of it, such as those involved in the delivery of public services, may face considerable pressure to expand. Information technologies make possible even wider, global connections of interests and communities. Movements such as human rights, environment, and women's issues are truly global in scope. At the same time, some policy issues get driven further down, and so some networks that would have had their center of gravity at the national level now become truly local or regional.

The contemporary importance of policy networks and communities has not diminished; indeed, it has grown. However, the realities of the policy process continue to change the nature and dynamic of those communities and networks, posing challenges for policymakers. A core responsibility for any public manager is the improvement of learning and adaptive capacities, leading to higher levels of policy debate and relevant policy

expertise. What this entails in practice depends on the type of policy community or network in question and its specific needs. Capacity building for intellectual communities may mean enhancing informational resources and communication abilities. For communities involved in policy delivery, it may mean development of organizational capacity through training. The governance dynamics of small, dense networks will be different from the dynamics of networks with a large number of members. Thinking about the policy networks and communities relevant to one's policy responsibilities should be a key focus for public managers.

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*See also* Policy Learning

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## POLICY PROCESS, MODELS OF

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The term *model* has multiple meanings. This being so in general, in political science the varying use of the term reflects the diversity of stances on philosophical and methodological issues in this discipline. In its most narrow definition, the term

*model* stands for a mathematical formula. More broadly conceived, the term involves some kind of metaphor used to picture a phenomenon in social reality. In the study of government, both sorts of definitions occur, in several variants. All share the aim of offering a cognitive representation of real-world phenomena.

The stages model of the policy process structures analytically the range of activities involved in the collective endeavors to turn public intentions into public achievements. In both the theory and the practice of modern government, this model—as it is called—has been widely adopted. Because of its prevalence, the stages model of the policy process is the point of departure in this entry. The outline of the latter can be summarized as follows. First, questions are explored about which variants of the stages model can be distinguished and what kind of functions these fulfill. Next, the methodological status of the stages model as a representation of the policy process is addressed. In a more narrow definition, it turns out to be a metatheoretical heuristic. It is an analytical framework, rather than a causal model. However, other ways of studying the policy process can be identified. Under the heading of governance research, analytical frameworks are available that can serve as metatheoretical alternatives to the stages model. What the frameworks addressed in the governance section have in common is that they enable the systematic study of government in action. Two of them stem from the field called policy studies, policy science, or the policy sciences, itself. In particular, the *multiple stages* and *multiple governance* frameworks have been developed as a critique to the stages model. The other two frameworks come from institutionally different parts of the study of government, particularly public management (*nested games* and *the logic of governance*) and institutional rational choice (*institutional analysis* and *development*). These alternative frameworks allow the decomposition of the policy process into different elements rather than in stages and in a greater variety rather than as just sets of activities. In fact, the four metatheoretical frameworks provide other ways of structuring the multiplicity of aspects in the analysis of the practice of modern government. The conclusion then is that such an analysis has evolved beyond the stages model of the policy process.

## The Stages Model

### Variants

The term *stages* implies a picture of the process of public policy making as a chronological sequence of distinct sets of activities. First, problems in society are brought to governments for solution. Next, governmental institutions conceptualize the problems, formulate alternatives, and select policy solutions. Accordingly, those solutions are implemented. When finally evaluated, they may be revised. These are the successive elements Paul Sabatier distinguishes when describing the stages model. The first element concerns agenda setting. Then, policy design and decision making take place, together usually addressed as policy formation. What follows is implementation. The sequence is concluded by evaluation. Each of these nouns refers to an identifiable cluster of activities. The nouns are the common nominators for the major stages in what since Harold Lasswell has been labeled as the policy process. As the founding father of policy studies, Lasswell uses the term *phases* or *stages* while indicating a range of separate and successive steps. Policy is thought of as being made, in principle, in a chronological order. That order starts with initiative and goes via formulation and decision on to evaluation and possibly termination. Lasswell distinguishes between seven stages of what he calls the decision process. As such, he identifies (1) intelligence, (2) promotion, (3) prescription, (4) invocation, (5) application, (6) termination, and (7) appraisal. The last stage offering feedback inputs to the process again indicates a cyclical character of the latter. Therefore, the terms *policy process* and *policy cycle* are synonyms.

Lasswell speaks of a conceptual map, meant to provide a guide to obtaining a generalized image of the major phases of any collective act. Since Lasswell's sevenfold distinction, there have been many variants of the stages model of the policy process. Each specifies the separate stages and/or their number a little differently. In fact, all these definitions concern variants of what James Anderson views as a sequential pattern of action involving a number of functional categories of activity that can be analytically distinguished. In his and in many other textbooks, the stages model has been used to structure the range of accounts on the study of the policy process. Given the complexities

of the object, the contemporary study of the policy process appears to go in various directions. Wayne Parsons calls the field rich, both in academic disciplines and in approaches. It is wealthy in models (heuristic and causal) as well as in metaphors and maps. The stages model then offers a structure to bring analytical order to this wealth.

### *Characteristics*

The succession of steps thought of in a chronological order as implied by the stages model has aspects that can be called universal. As such, the stages notion has occurred before and beyond the study of public policy. For instance, Herbert Simon distinguished intelligence, design, and choice as the successive stages in the way people in general reach decisions. What, however, makes the stages model of the policy process more than a reference to a chronological or logical order, thought of as universal, is its connection with the modern state and its institutions. Policy implementation is supposed to follow policy formation. Means are chosen, while ends are given. Administration takes care of those means, after politics has spoken. Woodrow Wilson was once president of the United States. He is also seen as founder of the modern study of public administration, having coined the classic politics/administration dichotomy. In this context, that dichotomy can be seen as a stagist model *avant la lettre*. Despite the cyclical logic, normatively, a hierarchy is at stake. It embodies a view about the primacy of politics.

The policy orientation was introduced by Lasswell in the 1950s. Policy is directed on what John Dewey once described as the combination of the public and its problems. This problem focus distinguishes the public policy perspective from that of public administration or public management. Connected with the problem-solving objectives of the welfare state, this orientation implies both a rational view on knowledge and an instrumental use of it. In the policy orientation, knowledge from social science can be used to improve society. It also should be used, via public policies, as a form of social engineering. Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh show how the separate stages in the policy cycle each refer to a part of applied problem solving. Agenda setting then corresponds with problem recognition. Policy formulation

stands for the proposal of a solution. Decision making means the choice of a specific solution. Policy implementation implies putting the chosen solution into effect; and policy evaluation refers to monitoring results. Policy making thus means problem processing. Deborah Stone speaks of a policy process as a production process. Public policy is the result of what happens in what may be likened to an assembly line.

Its widespread use makes the stages model of the policy process universal as well as modern. Especially during the period of growth of welfare states after World War II, the notion of stages has accompanied the term *public policy* like a shadow. It has since been adopted widely, both in theory and in practice. An element of that widespread adoption is what Michael Hill and Peter Hupe call the primacy of policy on paper. The assumption is that once one knows the good intentions as laid down in a law or official policy document, one can infer the results from it to be realized in the real world in a one-to-one relationship. This assumption forms part of the explanation of the functions the stages model of the policy process fulfils.

### *Functions*

As a comprehensive picture of the policy process, the stages model is the most prevalent one. It fulfils societal, practical, analytical, and programmatic functions. In the public debate and in society in general, the stages model of the policy process stands for an orientation toward problem solving, or at least problem processing. Linking the public and its problems, as Dewey indicated, in the public discourse, it has an enduring normative appeal. In political-administrative practice, the stages model invites and legitimizes a certain division of labor. This particularly involves the relation between two categories of actors. The first category concerns the actors and institutions formulating and legitimately deciding on public intentions. The second category comprises the ones responsible for turning those intentions into factual public achievements. When the problem has been stated and the decisions on necessary measures have been taken, the rest is implementation. That implementation is expected to follow the policy as documented in a one-to-one relationship. If things turn out to be different, the logical distinction between the stages



appears to be reified. Especially in situations of a crisis or disaster, the stages model in the practice of public administration may function as a way of shifting the blame. Journalists revealing what they label as policy fiascos mirror this labor division. For instance, in the case of an employment policy, the results of the implementation stage may be obviously disappointing. Journalists may relate these results to the policy intentions concerning job growth as laid down in the policy statutory concerned—the result of the policy formation stage. In the practice of public administration, now and then, such politics of blaming can be observed. Actually, the stages are logical constructions. In situations such as these, however, the stages have become reified.

With its (chrono)logical character, the stages model fulfils an analytical function. It provides a way of rationally ordering the complexities of the reality of government. This being so for political-administrative actors and the public in general, in academia, the functionality of the stages model primarily is a didactic one. In teaching modules and handbooks, it functions as a way to structure the presentation of insights on the policy process. Because of this use, the model is called the textbook approach. The stages model also has a function in academic research. Similar to its function in the practice of public administration, the stages model enables a labor division in academic work. Each of the stages, from agenda setting to evaluation, has grown into a scholarly theme of its own. With its programmatic function, the stages model has set the agenda for research, leading to a variety of classic texts on each of these themes. One could think, for example, of the studies of John Kingdon on agenda setting, Charles Lindblom on policy formation and William Dunn on methods of policy analysis, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky on implementation, Michael Lipsky on the related theme of street-level bureaucracy, and Frank Fischer on evaluation. The stages model enhanced the development of distinguished approaches such as the advocacy coalition framework developed by Paul Sabatier, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and others. Focusing on the analysis of what is happening in a specific stage of the policy process, theoretical approaches such as these are not an alternative to the stages model. The advocacy coalition model, for instance, instead concerns theory formation on

what happens particularly in one stage—in this case, agenda setting.

### *Limitations*

The functions the stages model of the policy process fulfils involve a broad usage of the term *model*. That usage goes beyond the more narrow methodological requirements the term *model* in science may imply. It is exactly this that has invited severe criticism from scholars. Peter John, for instance, is positive about the functions the stages model fulfils in society. Where public policy is often justified in rational terms, the metaphor of stages is helpful. Journalists and citizens try to make sense of the complexities of public policies. They expect the policy process to work in stages. John also acknowledges that the stages model still can be used as a heuristic or learning device. At the same time, however, John sees serious constraints in using the stages metaphor in research. There the stages idea confuses more than it illuminates. There are no neat divisions between different types of activities; policy is continuous. For analysis, John sees the stages metaphor as too simplified to capture enough of reality.

In several publications, Sabatier has expressed similar criticisms. It made him prefer the term *stages heuristic* as proposed by himself and Jenkins-Smith. Those criticisms entail the following. First, the stages model is not a causal theory. It does not enable the causal explanation of empirical variation. Second, the assumed sequence of stages is inadequate in a descriptive sense. Implementing ambiguous laws, for instance, may imply actual policy formulation and even decision making. Third, the stages model has a top-down bias and focuses on major pieces of legislation. It neglects the interaction among a variety of such pieces, including smaller ones. Fourth, the focus on the cycle of one policy-making process shows indifference to actual empirical reality. Within a given policy domain, multiple interacting cycles can be observed. This complexity involves, as Sabatier stresses, numerous policy proposals and statutes emerging from multiple layers of government.

It is in theoretical-empirical research that a model is ultimately put to the test. In the case of the stages model, then, some methodological limitations appear to be inherent. The first one was

already indicated previously: the reification of each separate stage. Instead of empirically observing that policy making in fact goes on in the subsequent stages, and of investigating how, the separation between the stages is taken for granted on normative grounds. Furthermore, a certain stage as a specific set of activities is automatically treated as connected with a specific spot—the second methodological limitation. When, for instance, the legitimate formulation of a specific policy has taken place on the layer of the ministry concerned, the subsequent implementation of that policy is seen as consequentially taking place on the layer of local government under it. It may be the case, however, that on the latter layer policy formation (formulation plus decision making) can be observed. This concerns an empirical question. The stages model induces research in which what actors do and where they do it, a priori, are supposed as coinciding. In such instances, Hill and Hupe speak of the methodological fallacy of the wrong layer. Instead, activities (focus) and layers (locus) could be observed independently.

As a third methodological limitation of the stages model, the same authors speak of the control trap. With that label, they highlight a specific implication of the stages model, the inducement of quick judgments on implementation failures and policy fiascos. The stages discourse implies a normative hierarchy. To what extent empirically observed action can be judged as legitimate is as a normative matter. Researchers may not always reflect on the methodological consequences of the top-down bias stemming from that fact. This may be the case, for example, when seeking to do contract research. The implicit adoption of a view from the top may lead to confusing the normative and the empirical. Observations of behavior are treated as judgments on deviance from the standard norm. Instead, an open observation of what happens is to be distinguished from a judgment on the legitimacy of what is observed. After all, for public servants and other practitioners, there is always a necessity to interpret ambiguous legislation. Also, in circumstances that may have been unforeseen by the legislator, there is a need to act. Hupe and Hill speak of an action imperative here. In the research of policy processes, it calls for distinguishing between clinical observation and normative judgments.

## Representations of the Policy Process

### *A Model*

The *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* provides three main categories of meanings for the noun *model*. The term can refer to a representation of structure, a type of design, and an object of imitation. Within a range of, in total, 13 definitions, the ones standing for both the narrow and the broad meanings, as referred to above, can be found. In a narrow sense, the term *model* is defined as a set of entities that satisfies all the formulae of a given formal or axiomatic system. In the broad sense, the term *model* is used as a conceptual or mental representation of something. The *Dictionary* speaks of a simplified description of a system, process, and so on, put forward as a basis for theoretical or empirical understanding.

In his textbook on public policy, Parsons addresses the variety of meanings of the term *model* and other related terms as an issue in itself. He states that in a complex world, people need to simplify. They seek to organize their ideas and concepts. Models, maps, and metaphors—as the title of the section expresses—provide ways to do so. Parsons calls them frameworks, which enable people to think and explain. The activity of theorizing about public policy is like drawing a map. People need such a map, but it must in some respect distort their impression of the territory it represents. Parsons stresses that the way people see and interpret the world of public policy depends on the kinds of models and frameworks they employ. A map may claim to explain but may at the same time be heavily normative and prescriptive.

Parsons refers to the way Graham Allison analyzed American decision making in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In *Essence of Decision* (1971), the latter uses three models or lenses. Allison analyzes this one decision-making process in terms of the rational actor, in terms of organizational processes, and in terms of bureaucratic politics. Each provides a very different kind of interpretation of the same events in reality. Allison's study shows how the analysis of decision making involves an awareness of the different frames that can be employed to interpret events. Such awareness concerns the way the observed object of study exists in the context of a variety of contending interpretations.

### *Models, Theories, and Frameworks*

The most important criticism of the stages model is that it is not a causal theory. It is also necessary to ask what it means to call it a model. Like Parsons, Elinor Ostrom has addressed this issue of the meaning of the term *model*. Parsons makes a point of the constructivist effect of using specific lenses—reality is not just out there. He treats the labels for such lenses largely as synonyms. Ostrom, however, makes a plea for distinguishing explicitly between models, theories, and frameworks. Speaking of an often overlooked distinction, she positions these three in a specific way. In her view, models make precise assumptions about a limited set of parameters and variables. Theories, according to Ostrom, enable the analyst to specify which elements of a broader framework are particularly relevant to certain kinds of questions. A framework helps identify the elements needed for more systematic analysis. It provides a list of variables and a vocabulary that can be used to compare theories. Several theories are usually compatible with any framework.

Models, theories, and frameworks vary on the generality scale. Models are the least comprehensive but the most specified. They entail particular sets of expected relationships between limited variables. Frameworks are the most robust but substantively are rather empty. They enable theory formation and model building by providing a metatheoretical language. Theories are in between. They address a certain phenomenon in empirical reality with a more-or-less universal character. Inviting assumptions to be made about elements of that phenomenon, theories enable the analyst to diagnose a phenomenon, explain its processes, and predict outcomes.

By positioning the stages model in this threefold classification, some of the criticisms mentioned above can be tested. First, regarding treatment as a model, in the narrow sense, critics are surely right that it is not. The stages model may fulfill functions as a heuristic device, but for acting as a causal model, it is too general. It leaves too many parameters implicit. At the same time, the stages model is not a theory. To meet Ostrom's definition, it would need more explanatory power. The stages model does enhance the identification of certain elements and variables relevant for the study of public policy. Therefore, it can be called an analytical framework.

At a metatheoretical level, the stages model in research functions as a map. Around it, theory formation and model building may take place. We

then need to ask for the requirements for an adequate framework. Comprehensiveness, enhancing middle-range theory formation, and empirical openness can be identified as relevant criteria here. First, an analytical framework must have the capacity to encompass conceptually the multidimensional character of public policy processes. It must enable the identification of the variety of actors, actions, and interactions involved. The stages model indeed aims at comprehensiveness. It claims to conceptualize an entire policy process. However, the focus is singularly on activities, while the locus of a specific set of such activities (e.g., implementation) correspondingly is presupposed. Second, not being a theory itself, the stages model as a heuristic tends to be seen as inviting theory formation. The classic texts on each of the stages are proofs of that function. Third, meeting the criterion of empirical openness for the stages model is difficult. Policy implementation, for instance, is addressed as normatively subordinate to policy formation. Such a hierarchical view may prevent the analyst from observing what happens and explaining why, before expressing judgments on the legitimacy of what is recorded. An analysis normatively biased in this way may lead to less than well-grounded advice to practitioners. To the extent this is the case, it may be counterproductive in the end. Neither the scientific nor the normative goals may then be achieved.

Thus, the stages model meets the criteria of comprehensiveness, to a certain degree, and of enhancing theory formation. It has difficulty, however, in meeting the criterion of empirical openness. The conclusion is that it is a general framework in Ostrom's sense, albeit one with shortcomings. It is this character that lies at the basis of its functioning in academia. The so-called model functions as a robust, rather empty, framework and heuristic device facilitating teaching and research. As a general map for the analysis of policy processes, it is conceptually neither multidimensional nor empirically open enough to do much more than provide a starting point for systematic theoretical-empirical research.

### *Theoretical Approaches*

Public policy scholars have sought to develop various forms of representations of phenomena in and around public policy. Some of those, such as the advocacy coalition framework mentioned above, imply theoretical approaches. They focus

on aspects of one particular stage rather than providing an alternative to the stages model as an analytical framework at the metatheoretical level.

Sabatier searched for alternatives to the stages model. In *Theories of the Policy Process*, he collected eight contributions he calls “more promising.” This edited volume contains chapters on (1) the institutional analysis and development framework, (2) the multiple streams framework, (3) social construction and policy design, (4) the networks approach, (5) punctuated-equilibrium theory, (6) the advocacy coalition framework, (7) innovation and diffusion models, and (8) the policy process and large-*N* comparative studies. What the the contributions pictured in the eight chapters have in common is that they aim at (causal) explanation, in particular by relating elements of policy processes to other elements. Besides, all have led to subsequent empirical research. This being so, the contributions show differences. First, there is variety in what is seen as needing explanation. For some contributions, this *explanandum* regards policy change; for others, it regards variation in policy outputs. The innovation and diffusion models look at policy adoption. Second, the level or unit of analysis differs in a range going from that of a single policy, via a policy domain, to that of a (nation-)state. Third, and most important here, the eight contributions, collected as theories, are labeled differently. One of them is called a *theory* (punctuated equilibrium) and four a *framework* (institutional rational choice, multiple streams, social construction and policy design, and advocacy coalition). The heading of one chapter includes the term *models*, that of another one the term *studies*, while there is also a chapter with the term *approach* in its title.

The variety of labels for these contributions as expressed in the chapter titles do not preclude similarities. At the same time, however, there is a difference between the common denominator of theories, on the one hand, and the variety of contribution headings, on the other. This does underline Ostrom’s plea for precision. A systematic application of her requirements for each type of academic work would specify the particular characteristics of these collected theoretical contributions. Some of them then might appear to involve the elaboration of a framework in Ostrom’s sense—like the one developed by herself—and some to provide a model. For several contributions, the term *theoretical*

*approaches* or *conceptual lenses* would seem appropriate. These are steps toward the formation of a theory. In any case, all the contributions in Sabatier’s volume differ from the stages model, assessed as it is above as a metatheoretical framework with shortcomings.

### *Governance Research*

Relatively early in research on the policy process Jon Pierre and Guy Peters have explored the consequences of the concept of governance. Related to the Latin verb *gubernare* (steering), the origins of the term lay in the past. In the last decade of the 20th century, however, the concept moved to the forefront of both public discourse and the study of government. Public tasks today are being fulfilled in a broader variety of forms than before. As Pierre and Peters indicate, the term *governance* covers the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing. Nevertheless, in a democracy, the rule of law is working. Therefore, it is still government that normatively has the appropriate legitimacy to steer society. Providing direction to society, whether directly or indirectly, is what Pierre and Peters consider to be the activity of central governance.

Looking at shared sets of problem definitions and proposed solutions, Hill and Hupe speak of a current *governance paradigm*. This is seen as being different from previous ones, including the policy implementation paradigm, as prevalent particularly in the 1970s. As characteristics of the governance paradigm, the authors distinguish an awareness of context, a reassessment of traditional public values, a rehabilitation of the hierarchical mode of governing, and a renewed attention to issues of accountability. Perhaps the most prevalent feature of the governance paradigm is the attention to action. Public officials do not just rely on the intentions stated by agents and other actors in the public domain. Rather, they want to secure a view on what those actors are actually doing and on what works.

To a certain extent, labels such as governance imply the use of different lenses to look at the world. The term *governance* is meant to capture the reality of government in the beginning of the 3rd millennium. *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management* and similar publications reflect the state of the art in the study of government. It is there that authors try to assess changes in the object of

study, different ways of looking at that object, and the implications of relating the two. In particular, scholars like Geert Bouckaert, George Frederickson, Christopher Hood, Laurence Lynn, and Christopher Pollitt have addressed the issue of positioning paradigmatic concepts such as new public management and governance in the actual study of government. Their assessments are attempts to position new developments in the field of study overall.

Next to this, several academics have reflected on the operational implications the concept of governance might have for theoretical-empirical research. As in the present practice of public administration, researchers, too, are inclined to search behind the policy on paper. This may certainly be the case when using an empirical research design aimed at causal explanation. In the view of Laurence O'Toole, the distinguishing feature of the concept of governance is that it incorporates a more complete understanding of the multiple levels of action and kinds of variables that can be expected to influence governmental performance. As a consequence, the analysis of government in action becomes multidimensional. Such an analysis fundamentally comprises both perceived action and rhetorical justification. It looks at unintended consequences as well as official documents. The focus is on both observed actual situations and original good intentions. Almost by definition, levels of analysis different from the one looked at play a role. Hence, the study of government in action implicates governance research, with its multidimensional perspective.

The consequence then is that researchers see themselves confronted with an overwhelming array of factors. Each of these can be expected to contribute, one way or another, to the explanation of what is observed as happening. Therefore, the aim to explain empirical variation implies a need to structure the vast range of candidate explanatory variables. This is a characteristic of multiple multidimensionality in particular. It seems to make social science at least as complex as natural science. In research, the isolation of a few variables, necessary and unavoidable, goes hand in hand with leaving aside the impact of factors held constant under a *ceteris paribus* clause. Studying government in action entails, by definition, more than one level of analysis. In a nested configuration, factors play a role from different scales of aggregation. In a given

research, focus may be on explaining the relations between only a few variables. Even then, explicitly or implicitly, the impact of a vast range of intermediary factors on various dimensions is presupposed. This variety may be nominated as contextual factors. They may have, however, a possible influence reaching far beyond that general label, and it is often difficult to treat them as held constant.

Aiming at enhancing scientific rigor, analysts of government in action explore various options. In implementation theory and research, authors tried to close the top-down/bottom-up controversy by making a case for developing synthesizing approaches. The sources for identifying relevant factors were no longer to be confined to either the top or the bottom of the policy process. Scholars like O'Toole and Kenneth Meier have pointed to the fact that the number of such variables hence grew to unmanageable proportions. Their plea for parsimony made them develop a formal model of public management containing hypotheses on relations between a limited number of variables. Since then, Meier and O'Toole have been testing this model successfully on large aggregates of data.

### Studying the Policy Process as Governance Research

#### *The Study of Government in Action*

The concept of governance can be seen as an umbrella concept aimed at capturing the complexities of public policy beyond the rationalist assumptions of the stages model. If that stance is adopted, the study of the policy process in the contemporary world can be conceived as governance research.

In addressing the question of what is needed for such research, the three criteria for an analytical framework, mentioned above, need to be elaborated. Comprehensiveness then refers to an orientation toward capturing the whole range of elements involved in the collective endeavors to turn public intentions into public achievements. The shortcomings of the stages model have been identified above. Serving as an alternative, an analytical framework should provide the possibility of categorizing and positioning relevant factors that both influence and are influenced by actions taken by actors involved in governmental affairs. Parsons speaks of the need to deal in research with multi-framed activity while mapping the wider contexts

of problems, social processes, values, and institutions in which policy making takes place.

Enhancing theory formation, the second criterion for an analytical framework, means the pursuit of scientific rigor by grounding and testing theoretical suppositions while explaining causal relations. The third criterion, empirical openness, implies specification and differentiation regarding all aspects of the empirical cycle. Most analysts in social science will concur with the normative principles of the rule of law, democracy, and perhaps also the welfare state. Also, many analysts will underline the necessity of observing and explaining social reality in academic research, in a way as normatively unbiased as possible. After all, improving the world can benefit from understanding it.

Both in practice and in theory, the notion of stages may remain prevalent. It is a metaphorical picture fitted to sketch the range of activities actors in governmental affairs engage in. Nevertheless, some authors have attempted to provide alternative general frameworks. With those frameworks, questions for research can be asked and answered while enabling the systematic study of government in action. When put alongside the criteria mentioned above, four of such alternative frameworks can be identified. The contributions to be addressed here come from different scholarly backgrounds. In particular, these include the study of public management (Laurence Lynn, Carolyn Heinrich, and Carolyn Hill), public choice (Ostrom), and public policy (Parsons, Hill, and Hupe).

### *Multiple Stages*

Parsons divides his almost 700-page textbook *Public Policy* into four parts. He calls them meta-analysis, meso-analysis, decision analysis, and delivery analysis. The first part is on analyzing analysis (meta-analysis). After that, Parsons distinguishes three levels or dimensions of analysis, both broad and partly overlapping. Meso-analysis deals with the way in which issues and problems are defined and policy agendas are set; theoretical approaches categorized as meso link the input side and output side of the policy-making process. Decision analysis refers to approaches looking at how decisions are taken, policies are formed, and analysis is used. In Parsons's conceptualization, delivery analysis refers to how policies are administered, managed,

implemented, evaluated, and possibly terminated. The author stresses that the parts of the book are not to be read as a set of stages. There is no sequence, because in the real world there are no defined or distinct phases. Parsons suggests reading his textbook in an iterative rather than linear way, by going backward and forward.

### *Nested Games and the Logic of Governance*

In *The Power Elite*, C. Wright Mills (1956) distinguishes between the top, the middle, and the bottom levels of power. Characterizing governmental activity, Lynn refers to that insight while distinguishing three different elements he calls policy games. They relate to each other in a nested configuration. The high game involves deciding whether there is a role for government in a given situation. In the middle game, the direction of the policy is determined. The low game concerns the practical side of policy making, where implementation is central.

More recently, Lynn has related these levels of the game to governance. With Carolyn Heinrich and Carolyn Hill, he provides what they call a logic for governance research. The authors have developed an aggregated framework, aimed at directing attention to the dynamic relations within and between the institutional, managerial, and operational levels of governance. Lynn and his colleagues argue that the logic of governance involves a hierarchy of relationships that carry over from one level to the next: those between (a) citizen preferences and legislative choice; (b) legislative preferences and formal structures and processes of public agencies; (c) formal authority and the organization and management of agencies, programs, and administrative activities; (d) organization, management, and administration and the core technologies and primary work of public agencies; (e) primary work and consequences, outputs, or results; (f) outputs or results and stakeholder assessments of agency or program performance; and (g) stakeholder assessments and political preferences and interests. The results of governmental activity mentioned in (f) are measured in terms of the availability, quality, and cost of publicly sponsored goods and services. Lynn et al. stress that this is a heuristic framework. It enables the identification of relationships potentially influencing governmental performance. When the authors first presented the framework, they

explicitly stated that it should not be called a unified theory of governance. They stressed that making statements about the actual influence of the identified relationships requires theory, models, and data.

### *Institutional Analysis and Development*

In a lifelong career, Ostrom has been interested in how institutions affect the incentives confronting individuals and their resultant behavior. Standing in the tradition of institutional analysis from a microeconomic perspective, in an article written with Larry Kiser, she presented the institutional analysis and development framework. Kiser and Ostrom speak of a multitier conceptual map. Indeed, it is a metatheoretical framework meant to order various sorts of institutional analysis. The authors refer to three tiers of decision making: constitutional choice, collective choice, and operational decisions. Together, these form what is addressed as the three worlds of action. The constitutional level explains the design of mechanisms of collective choice. At the level of collective choice itself, collective decisions are made by officials, including citizens acting as officials. These decisions are aimed at influencing actions in one way or another. The decision making at this level includes the authority to impose sanctions. At the operational level, individuals take direct action, sometimes without prior agreement with other individuals. This framework has a nested structure. Decisions at one level are linked to those at the other levels. Constitutional decisions establish institutional arrangements. Within given institutional arrangements, collective choices regarding specific issues are made. These decisions are meant to guide individual action, in particular at the operational level. Collective decisions are enforceable against nonconforming individuals.

### *Multiple Governance*

The distinction between the three tiers of decision making refers to different sets of actions. It leaves open, however, where and by whom this action is performed. This characteristic of the institutional analysis and development framework was adopted by Hill and Hupe and applied to the study of governance. Seeking to develop an analytical framework as an alternative to the stages model,

they propose the following metaquestion to precede governance research: Who acts where, doing what, on which scale, and how? A policy process is viewed as positioned in a multidimensional setting of government in action. Each part of the question refers to an element of that setting. Successively—although not in a chronological order—these elements concern actors (who), administrative layers (where), sets of activities (what), action situations and action scales (on which scale), and political-administrative craftsmanship (how). Thus, the authors frame the policy process in terms of governance. They do so taking their lead from both the three worlds of action as conceptualized by Kiser and Ostrom and the governance perspective of Pierre and Peters. In the meaning of government in action, governance consists of three broad sets of activities called constitutive, directional, and operational governance. Constitutive governance concerns the fundamental decisions about the creation of institutional settings. Within given settings, actors provide direction. Directional governance stands for the formulation of and decision making about collectively desired outcomes. Operational governance concerns the actual managing of the realization of those outcomes. Hence, the multiple governance framework gives attention to dimensions of structure, content, and process. The distinction between creating settings, giving direction, and getting things done is addressed as the trinity of governing, or *trias gubernandi*.

The multidimensional character of the framework implies that in research, the specific focus and locus are to be expressed separately. The position of and relations between the sets of activities comprising government in action are neither hierarchically nor chronologically predetermined. Those activities can be performed at any spot in the public domain. A series of empirical questions follows: Who are the actors, looked at on which scale (individuals, organizations, aggregate systems), acting on which administrative layer, de facto engaged in what kind of activities here and now, and with which degree of craftsmanship? When implementation is conceived of as operational governance, research, for instance, entails the question whether the concretely observed action concerns rule application or, rather, rule setting. Thus, factual policy formation may be traced where policy implementation was expected.

### *Alternatives to the Stages Model*

Above, the theoretical approaches of the policy process were addressed that Sabatier characterized as more promising than the stages model. All show a sophisticated level of elaboration and have been applied in several research projects. As such, they meet the requirements for being included in the edited volume. Ostrom's contribution appears to meet her own criteria for a general analytical framework. That is why her institutional analysis and development framework were included above, as well. Also, the logic of governance framework and the multiple governance framework show the characteristics of general analytical frameworks. Parsons's distinction, labeled as multiple stages, seems to have been primarily intended to function in a didactic setting. Aiming at comprehensiveness (the first criterion), the four frameworks share a metatheoretical character rather than providing a substantive grand theory themselves. At the same time, they may function as a heuristic toward the formation of such theories (the second criterion). As far as empirical openness, the third criterion, is concerned, the frameworks invite specifying what needs explanation. All four enable the identification and differentiation of different sorts of actors, activities or actions, layers, and other elements (comprehensiveness). In particular, the frameworks metatheoretically specify the relations between those elements, even if they are thought of as a hierarchy (theory formation). Finally, the frameworks make it possible to structure the multiple dimensions of social reality in an analytical rather than a prescribing way (empirical openness). In research, understanding implementation deficits prevails over condemning them. In any case, the observation and explanation of specified behavior precede judgments on general shortcomings.

### **Conclusion**

O'Toole described the subject matter of implementation studies as what happens between the establishment of policy and its impact in the world of action. He did so in an assessment of research on policy implementation. In a certain sense, this description goes for the object of what has been

presented earlier as governance research, overall. Thus, describing the object of the study of government in action in general presupposes a specific conceptualization of governance. In the O'Toole definition, the latter concept is designed to incorporate a more complete understanding of the multiple levels of action and kinds of variables that can be expected to influence performance. When governance is conceptualized in this way, it has consequences for research. Among others, it opens the view on perspectives beyond policy studies in the narrow sense.

In the realm of "what happens," so many factors and mechanisms are active that a device is needed to structure the multiple varieties of dimensions of the research object. This being true in general, it is even more applicable inasmuch as analysts of government aim at enhancing scientific rigor. Against that background, the analytical frameworks identified here can function as alternatives to the stages model. They enable researchers to explore more systematically what they want to know, how to frame that, and which accumulated insights can be deemed relevant to incorporate. The orientation in such research may shift away from merely a vertical one. Confronting public achievements with the public intentions as laid down in the concerned official policy document will not always be the research objective. Governance research implies explaining variation in actual behavior and its impact on all sorts of governmental performance. Questions aimed at explanation will be at the forefront. They will not replace judgments on public policy results as disappointing but may sometimes postpone them. At least, answering such questions will provide a more solid ground for any judgment.

Analytical frameworks such as the ones presented earlier may not immediately appeal to practitioners as broadly as the stages model has done thus far. At the same time, the frameworks respond to the criticisms of that model concerning its usefulness in research. The alternative frameworks may enhance the formation of (middle range) theories and the development and testing of causal models. Then, they would contribute to making the study of government more theory driven. In that perspective, the discovery of the nested character of the study of government in action can be welcomed as an important insight. The gain of explanatory power particularly will be greater to the degree



researchers succeed in the coweighting of factors from more than one level of analysis.

The range of activities involved in the collective is structured analytically with the intention of turning public intentions into public achievements. Thus, the stages model of the policy process was defined at the beginning of this entry. That so-called model appears to fulfill functions going far beyond causal explanation. In fact, this academic function proved to be the least developed. At the same time, alternatives appeared to be available.

A pertinent element in the notion of the stages model regards the wish to have complexity reduced to linearity. Since Lasswell introduced the policy orientation, particularly in the 1990s, the multidimensional character of action in government has been acknowledged. This is the case not only in policy studies but also in institutionally different parts of social science. The aim for methodical rigor is now more widely embraced. Multidimensionality-cum-nonlinearity seems to have become the leading principle in governance research.

Both Dewey's focus on the public and its problems and Lasswell's policy orientation seek to help government in dealing with societal issues. The current developments in research stress academic specificities. Therefore, the wish to contribute to those practical aims seems to have been put aside. In fact, this is not the case. The gains can be deduced not only scientifically but from a normative perspective as well. Society looks to becoming ever more complex. In such a context, improving government needs a better understanding of that government in action. Although partly perhaps under different headings, the best years for the study of the policy process are likely still to come.

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*See also* Advocacy Coalition Framework; Europeanization of Policy; Governance, Administration Policies; Policy Community; Policy Cycle; Stages Model of Policy Making; State

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## POLITICAL CLASS

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The concept of political class is based on the idea that politicians constitute a group with special characteristics that distinguish them from other

social groups. It also contends that the members of this group share common views and interests and act with a relatively high degree of cohesiveness. The theory of the political class posits the study of this phenomenon as a crucial instrument for the understanding of political life. The main questions that have been developed within this broad theoretical field are as follows: Who are the members of the political class? What determines their special status? How and on what bases are they recruited? What are the links that keep them united? What are the forces that drive their behavior? And what determines the decline of a political class and its substitution by another one? In this entry, the origins, definitions, empirical studies, and contemporary relevance of the concept of political class are discussed.

### Origin of the Theory of Political Class

The concept of political class has acquired a well-established status among crucial concepts of modern political science since Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941). In his first major work, *Teorica Dei Governi E Governo Parlamentare* (the title can be literally translated as “A Theory of Political Regimes and the Parliamentary Government”), published in 1883 when he was only 24 years old, the Italian scholar proposed the concept of political class as the key to a new innovative approach to the study of political phenomena. Mosca’s ambitions were not only of a substantive nature—to explore a political phenomenon that supposedly was not yet well understood—but also epistemological and methodological. An admirer of the extraordinary developments of the natural sciences during the 19th century, he aimed to overcome the unsatisfactory state of political studies and to attain a more scientific level that would put them on the same level with the more established disciplines. The key to this was to be found first in the development of a sound base of empirical observations to support the formulation of scientific propositions and then in the ability to capture the true substance of the political phenomena and move beyond the mere appearances that often mislead the observers.

To achieve the first objective, Mosca set out to exploit the rich treasures of historical knowledge that in the course of the 19th century had made enormous advances and to draw from them the

empirical materials for a comparative analysis of political phenomena. With regard to the second objective, which was to become the focal point of his research, the proposal he advanced was to go beyond the images of politics currently offered by the dominant ideologies (both democratic and traditionalist) and to look for the real power holders, that is, the small minorities, or what he defined as the “political class.” That power is always in the hands of small groups of people was the fundamental postulate of Mosca’s theory of the political class. According to his analysis, neither large numbers of people, such as a democratic demos, nor single individuals, such as monarchs, who are often described by current interpretations of politics (and especially by ideologies) as the rulers of different political regimes, are the real power holders. They always need a relatively small number of organized people to conduct (in their name) the business of government.

The concept of class, which Mosca sought to adapt to the analysis of political reality, had become a frequently used instrument for the analysis of society in the 19th century, thanks to the works of sociologists and economists. Among them, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) had gained special prominence because of their intellectual influence on the socialist movement and because of the enormous political impact of some of their ideas. The same had happened to their theory, which centered on the idea of class as a social group based on the relationship between individuals and the economic processes of production but also stressed the role played in defining such a group by the consciousness achieved by its members of their specific condition. Marx and Engels were not the only scholars working with this concept. Two other important figures of modern sociology, Henri de Saint Simon (1760–1825) and Auguste Comte (1798–1857), had already given the concept of class an important place in their social theories. The attention of the two French authors was directed toward the new upper strata of the industrializing society, which were viewed as being in the process of taking the place of the old aristocratic and clerical ruling classes. In particular, they considered the technical and managerial skills developing with the modern model of industrial production to be the crucial features of the new ruling class. As these

two authors focused their attention on the role in society of relatively small groups in the top positions, they contributed even more than Marx and Engels to paving the way for the theory of the political class as developed by Mosca and other social scientists of his time. However, similar to Marx's theory, their interpretation left little room for the political dimension and was fundamentally inspired by a reductionism of politics to economics.

Other authors had paid more attention to the political dimension and, often combining the descriptive and the prescriptive perspective, had made use of similar concepts as instruments for understanding (and evaluating) politics. Among them, one might recall Edmund Burke (1729–1797) and his analysis of “natural aristocracies”; Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890), who not only theorized but also promoted the reform of the governing elites of Prussia; or Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893), with his criticism of professional politicians and of their corruption and the exaltation of a class of natural leaders. With his discussion of the party machine and the role of the political managers, the American scholar and politician John Calhoun (1782–1850) anticipated many future analyses of the new democratic elites. One may remember also the *American Commonwealth* (1888) by the British scholar James Bryce (1838–1922), who began to systematically analyze the new type of professional politicians operating in the American parties and saw their role as not incompatible with the principles of democracy. The writings of these and other authors suggest that the idea was starting to gain ground; none of them, however, gave to this theme such a central place as Mosca did and as Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels would do later on. While scholars such as Saint Simon, Comte, and Marx looked at society in general, in his first work, Mosca was already focusing his analysis on the specific developments of the political system. His attention was particularly attracted to the development of parliamentary government in Italy as in many other European countries and to the striking contradictions between the (democratic) theory of the regime and the (oligarchic) practice it displayed. At the same time, a central preoccupation of Mosca, when he started developing his theory of the political class, was to establish the study of politics on more solid grounds. Writing at the time of great advances in the natural sciences

and when economics was well on its way to becoming an increasingly professionalized discipline, Mosca deplored the underdevelopment of a true science of politics. On the one hand, he criticized the predominant weight of “vulgar beliefs”: a priori judgments based on prejudices and non-systematic evidence. On the other hand, he expressed his disapproval of the excessive influence of the legal disciplines, with their attention on the purely formal dimension of rules, or of ideologies (in particular the democratic ones). In his view, the scientific study of politics needed a profound renewal and should aim at identifying the general laws of political phenomena. This would require a rich empirical basis of observations as well as more sophisticated conceptual and theoretical tools. With regard to the problem of empirical evidence, Mosca thought that the great advances made by historical studies during the 19th century could be instrumental in providing a systematic source of data. The idea that political science could directly produce its own data was not yet in his mind. The problem was to make good use of these empirical materials, and the key to accomplishing this was to discover behind appearances and purely legal schemes what the true mechanisms of political life were.

Starting from a criticism of the traditional Aristotelian classification of regimes based on the number of rulers, Mosca formulated a sort of iron law of politics. According to this “law,” all regimes, in spite of their variable legal formulations and institutional arrangements, were ruled by a “political class.” What characterized the political class was the relatively small number of its members, the superiority of their moral resources, and, in particular, the organizational factor that enabled a cohesive minority to prevail over the “great numbers” who were lacking the organizational instruments needed to act purposively and cohesively (*Teorica dei Governi*, chap. 1). Having affirmed that these were the common features of all political classes, Mosca then specified that variations were essentially determined by the peculiar qualities of each political class. If membership to a political class is always motivated by a natural passion for power, the special resources or qualities that enable an individual to be a part of that class vary according to the stages of civilization. Different types of political classes are

defined by the specific resources—military force, economic wealth, family ties, personal merit, and ability to win the support of the voters—that characterize them. In his first work, Mosca developed also another important theme for the theory of the political class, what he called the “political formula” (*formula politica*). With this concept, he designated the specific discourse that any political class uses to justify its political power and to establish its legitimacy. Mosca was keen to affirm that, contrary to commonly held beliefs, these legal, moral, and political arguments were not the real bases of political power. In fact, they served more as instruments for disguising the real source of power. At the same time, they played a far from negligible role in promoting broader bases of consent for an existing power arrangement.

These original ideas were further developed by Mosca in his later work (*Elementi di Scienza Politica* [The Ruling Class], 1895/1923) but without many fundamental changes. There, he more clearly stated his criticism against traditional classifications of regimes such as those that consider the possibility that one person (monarchy) or the majority of the people (democracy) rule a country. In both cases, this is only the appearance, while the reality is that of a government by a small group that either enables the monarch to actually govern a country or takes the place of the people in the real conduct of decisions (Pt. 1, chap. 2). The circulation of political classes is another important topic in the theory of the political class. If old political classes decline and new ones take their place, how is this process to be explained? According to Mosca’s perspective, this discussion hinges on the analysis of the specific resources that characterize each political class. The crucial factor for the continuity of a political class is the ability of the ruling class to maintain its control over critical resources. Conversely, what determines its substitution is the ruling class’s inability to face the challenge of a new class, which in turn proves more able to exploit new, more effective resources. Political classes tend to close themselves to external influences and thus run the risk of a progressive impoverishment; this leaves space for the rise of new groups that control the new resources that have become more important following the changes in the state of civilization. In this discussion, the temporal perspective adopted is grandiose: It

stretches from the antiquity of Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans to the feudal ages, to recent developments of representative democracy. It is not the small changes taking place over the years or decades but the macrotransformations developing over centuries that stimulated the interest of Mosca.

In the second part of his later and more mature work, the *Elementi di Scienza Politica*, Mosca addressed a possible criticism of his theory of the political class—that is, that it was based on an extreme level of generalization. If every political system is, by definition, ruled by a political class that also determines its life and death, the risk of ending up in a circular and dogmatic reasoning may indeed be significant. To avoid this, Mosca suggested that further systematic studies be done to analyze both the constant and the variable features of political classes. Mosca felt that such studies would have highlighted the differences among political classes and would have revealed the reasons for their duration or their downfall (*Elementi*, Pt. 2, chap. 1). In the chapters that followed, Mosca started to explore the development of different political classes but still on a very broad historical scale. In his analysis, Mosca used four conceptual categories (autocratic, liberal, aristocratic, and democratic) and proposed two pairs of alternatives (autocratic/liberal and aristocratic/democratic). With the first pair, Mosca distinguished between a regime based on power originating from above (autocracy) and one based on power originating from below (liberalism); with the second pair, he distinguished between regimes based on the tendency of the ruling class to be closed toward the outside (the aristocratic principle) or to be open to new entrants (the democratic principle).

In about the same period, another Italian scholar proposed a not too different version of the theory of the political class. The sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), a former business manager with a scientific background, developed an ambitious general theory of society in his *Trattato di Sociologia Generale* (The Mind and Society; 1916). Some of the basic points had been already anticipated by him in a 1903 book, *Les systèmes socialistes* (The Socialist Systems), as well as in other articles, and he and Mosca contended rather polemically about the original authorship of

the idea. Pareto, who preferred the term *elite* to that of *political class*, attempted a more formalized and systematic theory of societies and of the corresponding elites. His theory started from an analysis of individual behavior and incorporated many elements of a psychology of social action. Yet, in spite of all the differences, he shared with Mosca (and with some of his contemporaries) some central features and themes, such as the need to distinguish between reality and the ideological embellishment of it, the “grand theory” approach embracing the whole known history of mankind as a source of evidence, and many ideas about the circulation of elites/political classes. While Mosca had stressed the significance of the organizational factor for the predominance of the political class, Pareto was keener to discuss the different types of qualities (*residui* as he defined them) that different elites would share. Not very dissimilar from Mosca, he too developed the theme of the instruments of justification (which he called *derivazioni*) that elites use to manipulate the masses and to strengthen their domination over them.

The grand theory approach adopted by both Mosca and Pareto was indeed fascinating and probably contributed to the appeal of their concepts. However, it also produced some significant shortcomings that reduced the final impact of their contribution to contemporary political science. Probably the most important one is that the level of abstraction of their analysis was such that a true empirical testing and refutation of their “laws” proved almost impossible. Moreover, the evidence used by the two authors was essentially secondary and was drawn from historical researches of a very broad range. Their analysis thus depended essentially on “data” that had not been collected with their specific purpose in mind and therefore were not always really suitable for offering a sound empirical support to their theories. This lack of empirical data collected explicitly for the analysis of the political class was a particularly serious handicap for a correct interpretation of the new developments of political life that were taking place as a result of the processes of democratization and parliamentarization (which both Mosca and Pareto observed with a high degree of skepticism). It must also be added that their theory, which started from a well-grounded criticism of the legalistic analysis of institutions, went too far

in the opposite direction and therefore missed a crucial element for the understanding of the new democratic regimes: the interrelationships between institutions and political actors. The seminal importance of their ideas remains, however, unaffected by these shortcomings, and the theory of the political class contributed to producing a true revolution in the study of politics.

Around the same time, other authors were applying their basic ideas to a more middle-range level of analysis and thus brought the theory of the political class closer to empirical reality. Moisei Ostrogorski (*La Democratie Et Les Partis Politiques* [Democracy and Political Parties], 1902) and Robert Michels (*Soziologie des Parteiwesens* [On the Sociology of Political Parties], 1911) most significantly contributed to the development of a systematic analysis of the new phenomenon of the organized mass parties that were beginning to leave a strong mark on political life in the United States and in some countries of Europe. In the analysis of these new political actors, these authors paid special attention to the “political class” that was produced within the parties and to the novel features it displayed. Michels’s contribution had a particularly significant impact on the growing debate about the nature and working of modern democracy and the role within it of one of its crucial actors, the party. His book on the sociology of the political party was a work drawing on the direct observation of real parties and thus based on empirical evidence that was much closer to real-life politics than that used by Mosca and Pareto. Taking the socialist parties and in particular the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) as the main source of his evidence, the German Italian author sought to demonstrate that even in the most apparently democratic parties, the predominance of a small group of more powerful people could not be avoided. He thus found a sounder empirical support for Mosca’s and Pareto’s ideas. Michels highlighted that while “in theory” the whole governing process in the socialist parties was regulated according to democratic principles, in practice the elected officials who ruled these large organizations were “driving” the democratic process of selection and, thanks to their resources and position, could manipulate the choices of the great mass of party members. Organization and its logic were, in fact,

prevailing over democracy in the real working of the party. Michels, then, making good use of his deep insider's knowledge of the working of the socialist parties of Europe, could show the concrete mechanisms that were offering the leaders an overwhelming position of advantage vis-à-vis the common members. Elements such as duration in office, better education, and technical competence all contributed to the creation of a strong power differential between the party professionals and the rank and file.

Some of the consequences for democracy that Michels had inferred from his findings have been since then seriously questioned. In particular, the skeptical conclusions about the possibility of democracy that he derived on the basis of his observation of the inner life of parties have been found to be insufficiently grounded (e.g., by Seymour Lipset in his 1962 introduction to the American translation of Michels's book). An important stream of reflections on the working mechanisms of contemporary democracy, developed in the wake of Joseph Schumpeter by Robert Dahl, Giovanni Sartori, and Juan Linz, have highlighted the need to distinguish between "democracy within a party" and "democracy among the parties." If democracy within the parties may indeed be contradicted by the existence of an internal oligarchy, democracy as a system of responsible and responsive government, instead, depends on the existence of healthy competition among parties, which makes them responsive to the demands of the electorate. The theory of competitive democracy can therefore incorporate the existence of elites/political classes, provided that their pluralism is ensured and that all the institutional mechanisms of electoral competition are fully working. Whatever the shortcomings of his analysis, it can be rightly said that Michels's work has made a crucial contribution to the empirical study of parties and of their organization, a field that has become one of the major areas of contemporary political science.

Along not too dissimilar lines and around the same time, in his lecture at the University of Munich on *Politik als Beruf* (*Politics as a Vocation*, 1918), Max Weber (1864–1920) was bringing into light the role of the professional politician. In his view, both the modern state and representative government increasingly needed a stratum of politicians

fully dedicated to the performance of public functions. In modern representative systems, to count on "rentiers" and "amateurs" as the preferential recruitment pool of politicians, as had been common in the past, was for a number of reasons becoming both impossible and unacceptable. The situation required the development of a class of professional politicians living not only "for politics" but also "off politics"—drawing their economic resources from paid public office. In the requirements of the large organizations of modern times, Weber saw the development of a new class of politicians who would find in politics not only their main engagement but also a very concrete economic interest. Politics was, in many ways, becoming a profession, thus coming to share some of the typical features of any other professional career.

#### After the "Classics"

In Europe, these early developments of a new political science and of themes crucial for the understanding of modern political regimes were to a large extent stymied by the advent of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, which made the life of this scientific discipline increasingly difficult. In the United States, however, the development of political science could continue uninterrupted, and some of the stimuli of the theories of the political class could find a fertile terrain. Harold Lasswell's book *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (1936) and James Burnham's *The Machiavellians* (1943) were very much under this influence. After World War II, a rediscovery of the "elitists," as they were sometimes collectively called, also became possible in Europe. This rediscovery had to overcome some not entirely unfounded criticisms about their alleged sympathies for authoritarian leaders and their more well-documented skepticism about democracy. But the themes they had addressed soon regained the foreground in contemporary political science.

The new developments of what we may call the "postclassic studies of the political class" took two different directions. On the one hand, there was a continuation of macropolitical analyses of contemporary societies guided by the aspiration to detect which were their "ruling minorities" and to discuss how much this phenomenon could be seen as compatible with democracy. This line of research

has had important spillovers on the scientific debate about the interpretation of contemporary democracy and the understanding of its central mechanisms. On the other hand, a new stream of micropolitical analyses of the components of the political classes of democratic regimes (but also of some nondemocratic regimes) and of their distinguishing features began to burgeon. This second stream could take advantage of the behavioral revolution and of its program of quantitatively oriented empirical analysis conducted on the individual level.

In the first direction, a series of studies flourished in the 1950s and 1960s that were intent on detecting who were the real rulers of Western societies behind the appearances of democracy. C. Wright Mills's book *The Power Elite* (1956) had a special influence on this perspective. Contrary to the pluralist theories describing an equilibrium among a broad range of interests, Mills tried to demonstrate that a coalition of top managers of economic firms, high-level military officers, and government politicians, closely linked by similar social backgrounds and institutional proximity, was creating a new "superelite" that was able to dominate the political life of the United States. This type of studies had to face criticisms that are not too dissimilar from those addressed to the classics of elitism. Among them, particularly relevant is the criticism pointing at the difficulty of empirically validating or invalidating the central hypothesis of these studies—that is, the existence of a united group of rulers acting cohesively. Other works have tried to challenge Mills's theory by way of a more empirical analysis of concrete political situations. An example of special importance was the book *Who Governs?* by Dahl (1961), which moved the analysis more clearly toward the empirical ground and could be seen as a response to Mills. Other books (e.g., *Who Rules America?* by G. William Domhoff, 1967) and discussions followed, but this stream of studies has progressively exhausted itself.

Partially linked to this discussion is the debate about the nature of contemporary democracy that developed after World War II. The central theme of the debate has concerned the defining elements of this political regime and the compatibility between the existence of a relatively small number of individuals (elite/political class) who occupy the positions of power and thus rule over the greatest

mass of people and the deontological tenets of the democratic idea. Against the positions of those who see in the existence of elites a denial of the principles of equality and popular government and consequently of democracy itself, there emerges the theory of "competitive democracy." This theory argues for the need to reformulate the concept of democracy from that of "a government of the people" to that of "a government controlled by the people," wherein the existence of a political class is not an obstacle provided that it has a plural character. When these conditions are satisfied, competition among the components of the political class enables the citizens to have a choice and thus to trigger the mechanism of responsiveness by which the rulers are compelled to respond to the demands of the people. The activation of this response mechanism becomes the real substance of modern democracy. This new concept of democracy, which finds its foundations in Schumpeter's original formulation (*Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 1942) and is further developed by, among others, Sartori (*Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 1987), has become the predominant paradigm in contemporary political science and has originated a large stream of theoretical and empirical research elaborating on the relationship between rulers and the ruled.

On a somewhat less general level of analysis, we must also highlight the persisting exchanges between the theory of the political class and the study of parties. This is not new, as the two domains of research have shown a significant degree of proximity since Ostrogorski and Michels. The reasons are rather evident: Parties as crucial actors in contemporary democracies contribute significantly to the formation, selection, and structuring of the political class. While Michels concentrated his attention on the (oligarchic) structure that party elites acquired in the mass parties, other approaches have focused on the variable features that the leading party personnel display. These approaches have used this facet as a crucial element for identifying different party types. Starting with Weber and his analysis of the party of notables (the *Honoratioren Partei*), a stream of political scientists from Maurice Duverger to Otto Kirchheimer, Angelo Panebianco, and finally Richard Katz and Peter Mair have highlighted the parallels between changes in the modes of electoral representation, patterns of social

embeddedness, and linkages with democratic institutions that characterize the different types of parties (the parliamentary party, the organized mass party, the catchall party, the electoral-professional party, and the cartel party) and the types of politicians they produce (notables, party bureaucrats, professionals of electoral and media techniques, politicians entrenched in public office, etc.). Such typological exercises have opened the way to interesting explorations on the mutable resources, constraints, perspectives, and goals that characterize the different types of party politicians and contribute to explaining their behavior and that of their parties.

### Empirical Studies of the Political Class

In a more strictly empirical direction, the theory of the political class has stimulated a large stream of studies that have engaged in the analysis of the components of the stratum of politicians who occupy the top places of democracies and other regimes. From the high peaks of the grand theory of the "classics," these studies have descended to explore the terrain of the specific individuals who compose the political class and of their observable features. The highly abstract hypotheses and generalizations of Mosca and Pareto have been translated into empirical puzzles. For understandable reasons and particularly for their greater openness to public scrutiny, the political classes of democratic regimes have received a comparatively greater coverage. But some important studies of the communist elites, or of military rulers, have also been conducted.

A crucial problem that empirical studies of the political class have had to face is that of the identification of its components. Who are the members of the political class? Where are the borders to be drawn between those who belong to it and those who do not? How large is its membership? These questions have an obvious methodological dimension: When we want to study the political class of a country and analyze its specific features, how can we identify its components? To solve these dilemmas, empirical studies have typically adopted one of three methods: the positional, the reputational, and the decisional one. According to the first method, members of the political class are essentially defined by the position(s) they hold: a seat in parliament, a ministerial office, membership of a

party executive committee, and so on. According to the second, the reputation is the best way to ascertain who are the members of the political class: By asking people who are knowledgeable and close to the top to indicate those who exert the greatest influence in a given country and by selecting the names that obtain the greatest numbers of nominations, it is possible to identify the members of the ruling elite. The third method identifies the members of the political class by looking at the decision-making processes and finding out who takes a dominant part in it. The three approaches are based on somewhat different theoretical interpretations of politics itself, and each of them has practical advantages and shortcomings. The positional method is based on the idea that political power in advanced societies is typically embedded in institutions and that institutional positions are thus fairly dependable indicators of a powerful role. An obvious advantage of this method is that, in general, it is fairly easy to identify the positions and the persons occupying them. This method, however, underestimates the potential relevance of noninstitutional positions, of informal power, and may then run the risk of overestimating the importance of some formal positions. The reputational method rests on the assumption that influence is based on an informal relational system rather than on the holding of formal positions of authority and that its reality is well perceived by informed observers. This method seems better suited to catch the "real" dimension of power and to avoid some of the pitfalls of the other method; it enables the observer to go beyond the formal appearances that exist in every regime and get to the true substance of power. However, it is much more laborious than the positional method, and the quality of its results obviously depends on the good selection of those asked to nominate the elite members. Reputations can also be inflated and may not always fully correspond to the reality of power. As for the decisional method, it is based on the idea that power is best evidenced by the ability to take part in decisions and to influence them. A careful analysis of decision-making processes generally enables us to identify, with sufficient precision, those who play a leading role. The main problem with this method is that the number of decisions taken in any political system is high and scrutinizing all of them (or even a sample) is a very demanding



task. In the end, in spite of some of its weaknesses, the positional approach has in fact dominated the empirical studies of the political class, particularly when they are applied on a large, comparative, and diachronic scale. The other methods have found greater usefulness for studies of an intensive nature conducted on a smaller scale, such as community studies or policy studies.

When concerned with democratic political systems, empirical studies have predominantly, although not exclusively, concentrated their attention on the holders of positions in elected assemblies. Because of their seats in the highest democratic institution, endowed with functions of representation, lawmaking, and executive oversight, and because of their role in the electoral process, members of parliaments are quite obviously an interesting target for the study of the political class. At the same time, because of the public role of parliamentary institutions, information about the backgrounds, careers, personal features, and preferences of members is generally quite abundant and easy to exploit for the purpose of large-scale studies. As a consequence, in most of the advanced democracies, systematic studies of legislators have been conducted from the 1960s onward. These studies have typically explored the variables pertaining to personal information and the social lives of politicians, such as age, gender, education, professional background, regional origin, and religious affiliation, or to aspects of their political professionalization, such as party affiliation, steps in the local and national political career, seniority in office, and so on (Robert Putnam, 1976). The availability of a rich series of comparative and longitudinal studies of members of parliament has enabled us to discover the existence of significant variations in the features of the members of the political class across countries and political parties over time. The empirical data derived from these studies can be used to identify and explore the factors at work in the recruitment process through which the political class is reproduced (Pippa Norris, 1997) as well as its degree of stability and change. In a more general sense, they provide useful indicators for exploring the transformations of political representation and of the relationships between citizens and rulers (Maurizio Cotta & Heinrich Best, 2007).

Whereas studies adopting what we may call the "input perspective" (who are the members of the

political class and to what extent do they represent/mirror society) have been numerous and systematic, at least for established democracies, the empirical coverage of the "output perspective" (what they think and how they behave) has been much less complete. The attitudes and preferences of elected politicians have been the object of empirical research but typically on a single-country basis and without longitudinal continuity: Such studies are obviously more costly as they require interviews or content analysis. Studies systematically comparing attitudes across countries are much rarer. The same can be said about the attempts to explicitly study the output side and to analyze the consequences in the field of policy making of the variable features of the parliamentary elites. At this level, our knowledge is still extremely limited, but some interesting advances have been made recently with regard to the effects of the presence of women in parliamentary assemblies on policy making.

Empirical studies have also explored the features of other groups that may be legitimately included in the concept of political class, for instance, party leaders and party cadres that do not have parliamentary positions or the high strata of public bureaucracies (Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, & Bert Rockman, 1981). Such studies, however, have typically been less comprehensive than those dealing with parliamentarians as the information about these categories is much less handy and systematic.

### Conclusion

A comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the concept and theory of the political class on the study of politics would require specific and systematic research, which is yet to be done. Some tentative remarks can, however, be advanced here. There are not many doubts that the basic idea that "the men [and increasingly the women] at the top" are a crucial object of study for anyone who wants to understand the functioning of political life has been a milestone in political science. And the same can be said about the contention that we cannot be happy with the study of the legal definition of governing institutions alone and that we must look at the individuals who make them work. In this sense, the classical theorists of the political class have anticipated some of what, half a century later,

has been among the central components of the “manifesto” of the behavioral revolution of the 1950s. The aspiration of Mosca and Pareto to build a general theory of politics based on the concept of political class has, however, proven less easy to attain than expected. To move from the high level of generality of the basic proposition that the “organized few” are able to prevail over the “nonorganized many” to a set of interconnected propositions, establishing the relationships between the features of the political class and the different models of political life, has proven much more exacting than anticipated. We do not have yet a general empirical theory of politics based on this idea. However, thanks to this stimulus, we have gained a much wider knowledge about who the members of the political class are, where they come from, how they are recruited, what their views and ambitions are, and how they behave. We have also gained a much better view of the degree of variation in the basic features of the political classes across different periods, countries, and regimes. We know also a lot more about the internal dynamics of pluralist political classes. Moreover, important elements of a theory of the political class have been incorporated into the predominant interpretation of contemporary democracy as a regime based on competition among the elites.

Finally, and with regard to more recent theoretical developments in political science, it is not completely unwarranted to draw some significant connections between the theory of the political class and the rational choice approach, which in the past decades has acquired an increasing importance in political science. This may not be immediately clear, but a closer look at some of the crucial aspects of the rational choice theory can show some of the connections between this more recent development in political science and the “old theory” of the political class. On a rather general level, we can observe that in both cases there is the ambition of building an encompassing theoretical paradigm for the understanding of political life. Moreover, rational choice also prescribes that we should probe beyond the formal crust of political entities to analyze the motives and objectives of the concrete individuals existing behind them. On a more specific point, we can add that rational choice theory has in fact found its greatest successes when applied to the sphere of politicians, of those who

live for politics—that is, the political class—rather than for the common people. This has to do with the basic assumption on which this theory has been built, that of rational action: The general (but in itself empty) principle that the behavior of individuals is guided by the choice of the means that will maximize utility becomes much more relevant when the preferences (and the goals) of the individuals can be well specified and when it is possible to assume that the individuals will have a sufficient knowledge of the situation (i.e., of the constraints, the means that can produce the expected ends, etc.). This is clearly a much more realistic description of the situation of the political class (i.e., of the most professionalized section of the political system) than that of the great mass of other individuals who devote much more limited attention to the political processes and have much lower levels of purposiveness in their actions. The theory of rational choice is then particularly interesting for interpreting the games the political class plays: the coalition-making games in parliamentary governments with multiparty systems and the lawmaking games within legislatures or, on the international scene, the strategic games between countries. If this is true, the relevance of the theory of the political class is still alive.

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*See also* Accountability; Democracy, Theories of; Elites; Elitism; Interviews, Elite; Masses; Parties; Party Organization; Pluralism; Pluralist Interest Intermediation; Representation; Responsiveness

#### Further Readings

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## POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

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It is not easy to define the boundaries of the field of political communication. The existing literature tries to limit the field as being characterized by the interaction of three main actors: political actors, the mass media, and the public. A fourth dimension is usually added to better define the field: The subjects of the exchange that takes place in political communication are related to matters of general interest. But even with this last addition, the field remains uncertain and difficult to be captured within a single definition. Indeed, all the different dimensions that are used remain vague and ambiguous and may be the subjects of different approaches and theoretical fields: How do we define political actors? Who are they? Are union leaders political actors? And what about interest group spokespersons? Are they political actors? Does what these actors accomplish concern the field of political communication? Or does it belong to the field of public relations? Similar questions may be raised with regard to each of the other defining dimensions. This entry discusses the development of

political communication as a subfield of political science, its relationship to neighboring disciplines, and recent tendencies with regard to technological changes and their impact on different spheres of political life.

Because of the vagueness of the dimensions that have been mentioned above, very often political communication is defined, even if with different words in relation to the specific approaches that are chosen, as a field placed at the intersection of the four dimensions just listed: That is, political communication regards the exchange of contents on matters of public interest that involve citizens, social actors, and the mass media. The components of this tentative definition are not self-exclusive—that is, even if one of these components is missing, we can still be facing “a political communication event.” Citizens can be absent in a particular event, and notwithstanding that, media and political actors may interact on issues of general interest. Similarly, political actors may be involved in an exchange with citizens on issues of general interest, but this interaction may take place without the mass media.

In spite of its general character that, as we shall see later, leaves the field open to different interpretations that may include a plurality of social events and situations, this definition is marked by a characteristic that seems to be more important than that of the others: Political communication deals with issues of general interest or at least with issues that may gain some sort of relevance in public interest. It may be too easy to state that political communication deals with “ruling the community,” but this seems to be its inner nature. Affairs of general interest can be treated by different actors and in different ways so that the other defining components may be useful as they help restrict and define better the field of pertinence.

*The Nerves of Government* is the title of a seminal work by Karl Deutsch published in 1963. This book clearly shows the importance of communication in government, not just as an expression of conflicting interests but as an essential instrument to rule the community, to produce an informed citizenry, and to reach a higher level of social efficiency. Even if some scholars do not see this book as such, *The Nerves of Government* can be viewed as a text of political communication that without any doubt demonstrates the narrow links

existing between political communication and themes of general interest: Ruling the community implies necessarily a continuous activity of communication either when it implies conflict or when it is aimed at a better level of social efficiency. Government needs an appropriate communication strategy that may help in solving the problems of the society. *The Nerves of Government* may have a dubious placement within the field of political communication as the matters it deals with do not imply conflict. Indeed, for most scholars, political communication presents another important feature: It deals with controversial issues about which there are different and conflicting views and positions. For some scholars, this is what differentiates political communication from other forms of communication and specifically from what is defined to be "public communication": Political communication deals with controversial issues about which conflicting views exist, whereas public or institutional communication regards issues about which there is a wider general agreement.

To conclude this defining attempt, political communication is about power. It deals with the distribution of power among different competing views, actors, and interests. Power is what mostly differentiates political communication from other forms of communications: Advertising is about goods and audience, journalism is about news (even if with many overlaps with political communication), and so on. Political communication is about power in society. The narrow relationship of political communication with power implies either a struggle or, as happens mostly in democracies, some sort of negotiation and reciprocal adjustment between competing needs, requests, and interests. Therefore, political communication always implies an exchange: Either it prepares the ground for possible negotiations or its final product is an agreement that comes out of a process of negotiation that takes place through different means of communication.

This brief discussion highlights one main point: Political communication is a very broad field that can be dealt with from different points of view and that may involve different aspects. From a scholarly point of view (i.e., from the point of view of those who study political communication), there are three main areas within the broader field: communication processes, structural tendencies, and production aspects. The area of *communication*

*processes* represents the most traditional and deeply rooted area as it deals with the analysis of communicative exchanges. Indeed, it is possible to include here all those exchanges that take place between the three actors mentioned at the beginning: political actors, citizens, and mass media, even if all of them do not necessarily have to be included at the same time in each exchange situation.

The result of each communication event may influence the allocation of power in society, and this is why this specific area has always been the core of every political communication approach. Indeed, it is possible to include within this area all the most prominent aspects of the field, from political socialization to election campaigns, from persuasion to rhetoric, and from interpersonal communication to chat groups on the Internet. In particular, two main domains seem to constitute the core of this area: (1) the study of the content and (2) the study of the effects. Both these domains have featured most prominently in political communication research since its inception following different approaches: The forms, structures, and content of political communication have been the main subjects of many scholars. The research by Harold Lasswell on the symbols and the language of politics has strongly contributed to establish the field of political science as such. More recently, Murray Edelman has further developed this kind of research on the importance of symbols in politics, while other scholars have focused their interest on quantitative content analysis of political messages.

The study of the effects of messages has occasioned the establishment of a new discipline: communication studies. The effects of political communication were among the fields most covered by those who contributed to establishing the new discipline: Paul Lazarsfeld, for example, is a prominent figure in the history of the social sciences. His works largely focused on political communication: *The People's Choice*, written with Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet in 1944, and *Personal Influence*, written with Elihu Katz in 1955, are milestones not just in political communication research but in media studies and sociology in general. In the first book, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet point out the essentially confirmatory role that mass communication has on voters' behavior, while the second book contributed to

overcoming the previous view of the so-called powerful media, pointing out how the mass media were acting in a more complicated way than was previously thought: The message does not reach the citizen directly but involves other figures as well, in particular the so-called opinion leaders.

Under the label *structural tendencies*, it is possible to list all the research that focuses on the changes that political communication is undergoing. The main tendency appears to be toward the so-called mediatization of politics: The logic of the mass media strongly affects the structures and the discourse of politics in a way that is even changing political participation. In the view of Gianpetro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schultz, mediatized politics is politics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media.

In the most recent period, scholars have stressed different evolutions related to the mediatization of politics: Political communication is changing because a process of *professionalization* is taking place. This is a very dramatic change because it stresses also an even more important change in the way in which social interests are organized and represented. Indeed, professionalization of political communication is taking place as the traditional mass parties are weakening and almost disappearing in some cases: Politics itself is changing. Political parties often are no longer able to support candidates during election campaigns, and they are not linked any more to citizens/voters through the "affiliation vote," which established solid and long-lasting channels of communication between mass parties and citizens. Angelo Panebianco summarized this shift under the label "electoral-professional party": Progressively, the most traditional, Western-type mass parties were losing ground in the face of a new form of political aggregation, the electoral-professional party. The intervention of professionals particularly skilled in communication and polling is required to reach the citizen/voter, who acts and decides to no longer be bound to mass parties through stable links but to essentially be placed in a situation that many define as a "market," in which the traditional instruments of the market are required and used. Marketing strategies and professionals able to apply these strategies are required.

Other tendencies emerge as well. First of all, there is general agreement about the increasing *personalization of politics*. Individual politicians are taking the place so far occupied by political parties. This tendency, too, highlights the process of transformation of mass parties: Their weakening leaves room for the personalization of politics, which is enhanced also by the increasing role of the mass media, and particularly of television, as agents of political socialization. This process of personalization of politics is said to be a part of the so-called *Americanization of politics*, which affects different political communication activities linked to the electoral choice. Together with the process of personalization of politics, many scholars have devoted their attention to a similar process taking place in the equilibrium of political power: The process of *presidentialization* highlights how powers are shifting from parliament and government to the single figure of the president. Beyond the reasons related to the structural transformations in government, many scholars stress the increasing role of the mass media that allows the president to talk and interact directly with the people, which, in turn, focuses the main attention of the mass media on the president.

*Production aspects* include all research that looks at how political communication is conceived and produced. Production aspects concern mainly, but not exclusively, the area of journalism and its relationship with the political system. News gathering and news processing are important moments in the production of political news: the moment of the interaction with sources of information (news gathering) and the moment in which news items are selected and become stories for the print and electronic media (news processing).

Many other studies have been conducted on how election campaigns are run: which communication strategies are adopted, how decisions are taken, which kinds of professionals are involved, and how the messages are decided, conceived, and passed on to the public. Much of this research has a very important comparative focus, trying to stress the differences and similarities among countries. In this area as well, Americanization seems to be a very widespread interpretive hypothesis: Election campaigns worldwide seem to have become more and more similar as they are applying all the strategies and procedures already used in the United States.

### The Approaches

From what has been said so far, it may appear clear that political communication research represents an interdisciplinary endeavor as it deals with different areas of society and with more general processes of change. Since its beginnings, scholars from different disciplines had devoted their attention to the field that today is called political communication. Indeed, the first look at this field was by psychologists and students of propaganda. The seminal study by Sergei Tchackhotine originally published in 1938 may be considered as the first work entirely devoted to the analysis of propaganda techniques; it was strongly affected by behaviorism, an approach that in those years was influencing the entire field of psychology. Many works by other psychologists were then devoted to what in those years was not yet called political communication. The propaganda label was indeed coming from the perception, very diffuse in those years, of the enormous power of the new propaganda techniques that political structures and systems in different countries were developing. This perception was the fruit of both the behaviorist approach that was used to observe this phenomenon (which stressed the causal relationship between a single stimulus and its consequence) and the experience that the entire world was passing through in those years. Indeed, the works by Tchackhotine and those by many other scholars were devoting a lot of attention to the propaganda machines of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. To many observers, these experiences seemed to stress the enormous power of persuasion reached through the use of new techniques such as cinema and radio, with the support of suggestions coming from developments in psychology.

In those first years, persuasion and propaganda were the catchall words used to designate what today is called political communication. Of course, there were differences both in the way in which these phenomena were observed and studied and in the way the communication process itself was taking place. Psychologists were among the first scholars to study how political power was trying to influence the life of citizens, and for many years, psychology was the main approach employed to observe communication processes in government and politics. The sociological approach to political communication was born out of psychology. As

already mentioned, the founding fathers of the discipline themselves were deeply affected by psychology: Paul Lazarsfeld in his first works was influenced by the works of the psychologists Harold Lasswell and Carl Howland. All of them devoted great attention to political communication while studying other forms of communication as well. Both psychology and sociology look at the interactions between single persons and between persons and means of communication, but from different points of view: Psychology is interested in looking at the inner motives that push single persons and groups to react in a particular way to the message; sociology gives to these processes a more cumulative view, looking for the variables existing in the social structure that may affect a particular reaction. Moreover, sociology looks at the consequences and the transformations produced by political communication in the society at large.

Political scientists, too, devote great attention to political communication. In a way, it can be said that the field of political communication research itself, as we know it today, was established by political scientists. Indeed, their focus has been on the relationship between political institutions and communication: They have been interested in the consequences produced by political communication on political institutions and in the way in which political institutions communicate and organize to communicate. While sociologists studying political communication look at variables derived from the observation of society at large, including political variables, political scientists give communication a more focused attention: They look essentially at the way in which communication affects the distribution of power in society.

Semiotics and linguistics also have paid attention to political communication. In particular, both these approaches have been interested in looking at the content and structure of political messages, developing specific methods, such as discourse analysis, aimed at the analysis of these kinds of messages. While both these approaches have been able to highlight specific features of political communication, their interaction with other scientific domains has been limited in spite of the fact that their results could be very useful to integrate and complete the outcome of other approaches. Indeed, political communication is undoubtedly an interdisciplinary field placed at the

intersection of different social forces and activities producing consequences that relate to different scientific domains.

### Three Phases of Political Communication

Political communication has dramatically changed over the years. This change has become even more rapid following the introduction of new technologies. In 1999, Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh proposed a distinction between three main phases in the evolution of political communication that has been adopted by many other scholars and that can also illustrate the more recent tendencies in the field even if the original Blumler and Kavanagh formulation was not able to take into account the dramatic and fast changes created by the Internet. The first phase covers the first 2 decades after World War II, which many political scientists also define as “the golden age of mass parties.” Indeed, this period was characterized by the important role played by mass parties: These were organizational machines with thousands of employees and activists, with offices spread all over the national territory. These organizations also performed important communication functions: publishing newspapers, organizing meetings and demonstrations, and carrying out general networking. During this period, interpersonal communication was the main way to reach citizens and party activists, and party employees played the main role in diffusing the ideas of political parties and in mobilizing consensus. Even if other means of communication (e.g., radio or newspapers, very often bound to the party organizations themselves) existed, nevertheless, local circuits of relationships were very important and interpersonal relations represented the main channel to reach citizens who were linked to party organizations by deep-rooted and well-established ideological and cultural affiliations. Party offices and meetings and organizations in charge of a wide range of activities, from sports to culture and from leisure organizations to educational structures, represented the occasions for establishing and reinforcing networks that were mostly based on interpersonal knowledge and recognition. In these instances, communication was mostly aimed at reinforcing the existing links and opinions as voters rarely changed their electoral decisions. Messages had little innovative content: They were limited to repeating what citizens

already knew and shared; they also attacked and painted in the worst possible manner the competitors, reinforcing the already existing feelings and opinions.

In spite of the widespread use of what today is called “negative campaigning” and determined by this continuous attempt to reinforce preexisting feelings, political institutions, both government and political parties, enjoyed a high level of confidence and trust. They were not just important organizational machines but also represented trustworthy organizations to which citizens turned for support in a plurality of different situations. Voter volatility was limited, and ideological changes were not very frequent: Political values were quite stable and well rooted in political imagery.

Just as the first phase has been termed *the golden age of mass parties*, the second one may be called “the age of television.” While progressively the mass media have replaced interpersonal communication as the principal sources of political socialization, television has achieved prominence among these sources. Structures and forms of political communication change dramatically because society is changing as well: The process of secularization and greater social mobility weaken the role of mass parties that transfer to the mass media, and particularly to television, the communication and socialization functions they were performing previously. This has a major consequence: The existing links between citizens and party organizations lose ground, and therefore, communication strategies that up to that moment were basically aimed at reinforcement change direction. Now, the main aim of communication is to reach and persuade voters who are no longer firmly linked to a particular party. The notion of a voters’ market enters the political arena: Citizens become willing to buy, among a number of similar products, the best “political offers” in the same way as they buy goods. Communication strategies follow this change: Messages are essentially aimed at conquering a “buyer” who is linked to particular information sources.

This change is not limited to elections, but the entire political life and government activities are affected by this change; the intrusiveness of the mass media forces many organizations to be better equipped to face the competition from other institutions and the mass media. The first consequence is the process of professionalization of political

communication: The traditional figures of political activists and party bureaucrats are now substituted by professionals who are trained in different communication branches. Their expertise is no longer political; their links with political and government institutions are not based on their own political preferences. They are hired because they possess those skills and expertise that party machines are no longer able to offer to candidates competing for public positions. Government and public institutions, too, look for professionals to support their desire to win public support. This tendency is greatly enhanced by technological developments that make possible many new activities but that require specific skills that are no longer provided by traditional political organizations. Words such as *political consultant*, *pollster*, *fund-raiser*, *spin doctor*, and so on become common in political communication as political parties lose ground and single candidates need to be supported by their own electoral machines. Scholars have described this as a shift from "labor-intensive campaigns" to "capital-intensive campaigns"; while in the first phase, the support of party members and activists was essential to run a campaign, in the second phase, money becomes essential to pay all those professionals who are able to get the best possible result out of new technologies and media communication. Most important, money becomes essential to buy airtime for political advertisements.

These changes do not concern election campaigns alone, but the entire spectrum of political and government institutions is deeply affected by the increasing role of mass media and particularly of television. At the same time, the idea of "permanent campaign" emphasizes that the new media environment does not allow communication strategies to be limited to the electoral momentum: candidates, political and government institutions, and public administrations are placed under the control of mass media at all times and not just when they are competing for public offices. The continuous flow of opinion polls also represents an instrument through which all those who are interested in gaining public support can gauge how they are perceived by the people and then take the appropriate initiatives. Permanent campaigning indicates that support building is a continuous process that cannot be limited just to specific moments in time, such as elections.

The word *Americanization* has often been used to indicate these changes. Americanization can have a double meaning: On the one hand, it indicates that these changes took place first in the American political scene and that they have then been adopted in other social contexts; on the other hand, it indicates that there is some kind of influence either explicitly or implicitly played by the United States in exporting their cultural and political practices to other parts of the world, thus changing local cultures. Many studies have been carried out on the adoption of "American" techniques abroad and mostly on the involvement of American political consultants in other parts of the world, essentially in countries that are culturally and politically close to the United States.

Another tendency that emerged in the second phase of political communication and that becomes even more important in the third one is personalization. The progressive weakening of mass parties pushes the focus of political communication toward individual politicians. The ideological links that existed between party apparatuses and citizens are now replaced by the emotional and sympathetic feelings that leaders may establish with the citizens. The entire political life becomes organized around the figures of individual politicians: Political communication reinforces this tendency, which moves the focus of the political debate from ideology and programs to the individual features of those who animate public life. The existing borders between private and public life become blurred, and the electoral decision seems to be moved essentially by personal leadership characteristics. Political candidates are no longer judged on the basis of their political competencies and skills and on their leadership in running the government but, essentially, on their ability to meet the requirements of television discourse.

There are different reasons for this change: Institutionally, personalization is fostered by the changes taking place in electoral systems that in many countries place political figures at the center of electoral choice. For many scholars, mass communication plays a major role in this shift: The development of televised political advertisements makes it possible for individual candidates to enter the electoral arena even without the support of political parties. Candidates with their own money or with money coming from their supporters can



buy directly from the networks the airtime that is necessary to reach the voters, and in this way, they can talk directly to them without the intermediation of party organizations. In many cases, candidates are even competing against the choices made by their own parties. In this way, the role of political parties is undermined, and the road toward personalization is fostered. The market-driven logic that moves the mass media system is another reason for the personalization of politics, as they are able to reach a wider audience. Personalization represents another component of the Americanization of politics and more precisely the Americanization of political communication. Indeed, while in Europe political parties still play a major role in influencing citizens' behavior and choice, weak political parties are a particular feature of the American political system, influencing the evolution of other political systems worldwide. All communication strategies are built around single political figures in a way that was first experienced in the United States.

For Blumler and Kavanagh, the third phase of political communication is characterized by the fragmentation of both the means of communication and the audiences. First of all, television offers many more channels: Everywhere, satellite TV, cable TV, and other forms of television come alongside the traditional terrestrial networks. There is also an increase in the television formats within which political communication takes place: Talk shows, infotainment, and docudramas offer politicians new opportunities to address their audience. For politicians, it is just a matter of choosing in which transmissions to appear, but at the same time, the opportunity to exercise control over other politicians also increases. It is essentially the development of the Internet that characterizes the third phase and that offers citizens many more opportunities to receive news and get in touch with other people. The increase in the number of sources of information determines the fragmentation of the audience with the development of different "publics" either interested in specific topics, attitudes, and problems or particularly linked to specific sources of information. The idea and the practice of a coherent mass audience that already during the second phase had undergone a process of fragmentation into different target groups are now almost completely disappearing: There are

many publics in relationship to the increasing number of communication outlets. Each of these has different messages, producing an even more dramatic volatility of party affiliation and ideological and symbolical constructions.

### Is Everything Alright With Political Communication Today?

In liberal theory, the major goal of political communication is to construct an informed citizenry that is able to consciously take the decisions regarding the ruling of the community. Is political communication able to accomplish this task? Political communication research demonstrates that there exist several problems in reaching this goal. An initial problem arises from the abundance of sources of information: There are too many messages in circulation that compete with each other to gain the attention of the citizens. In many cases, the consequence is a "lost" citizen unable to select among the plurality of messages that he or she gets every day. Very frequently, these messages are contradictory; they do not just compete with each other as is necessary in a democracy. Citizens are lost and confused because they are flooded with a very large number of messages from which they are not able to select the proper one or judge their reliability. The problem becomes even more serious with the Internet, which increases the number of sources of information whose reliability is even less verifiable.

To be noticed among this enormous quantity, each message tends to be increasingly simple and, at the same time, emotional: *Amusing Ourselves to Death* was the title of a book by Neil Postman that has become one of the most important reference books in all communication sciences. Even if Postman was not dealing just with political communication, his book gave a very valuable insight on how the tendency toward entertainment, derived from the increasingly important role of the mass media, and particularly television, was changing the entire society. Following this line, other scholars have stressed the tendency toward dramatization and spectacularization of political communication. Citizens are transformed into spectators: Progressively they lose any active role, instead being transformed into passive spectators of something staged in front of them by political competitors. Political

argumentation becomes simpler, shorter, and more and more filled with emotional discourse now made available by the electronic media.

Negative campaigning is another tendency that in the view of many scholars undermines the role of political communication in fostering democracy. Very often, political competitors find it much easier to denigrate the opponent than to propose programs or solutions for existing problems. Denigration is not just more emotionally involving, but it can catch the attention of the news media very easily and therefore get a wider attention from the general public. Tom Patterson clearly demonstrated how negative campaigning meets the needs of the media to reach a wider audience. At the same time, the mass media should exercise their control function, which is supposed to be among the founding principles of liberal democracy. At the end, because of this wave of negativism, this control function is “out of work”; it does not support the development of a more mature democracy.

Jürgen Habermas, in his seminal work *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, has opened a field for scholars of political communication, directing their attention to the way the public sphere is organized in each society and the way in which it may foster democracy. Today, a great deal of political communication research is focused on his concept of the public sphere. At the same time, Habermas has clearly shown that the commercialization of the public sphere can undermine a rational debate on affairs of public interest, and this seems to be the most important challenge that political communication faces today.

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*See also* Democracy, Quality; Electoral Campaigns; Media, Electronic; Media, Print; Party Identification; Personalization of Politics

#### Further Readings

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## POLITICAL CULTURE

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Political culture consists of a relatively coherent repertoire of cognitive and evaluative models that enable members of a political community to give sense to their role as political actors, to other political actors, to the community they belong to, and to the institutional structure in which they live. Thanks to this framework, they can decide which objectives to pursue and shape their actions and behaviors accordingly. Political culture has the following features:

- a. it is a shared legacy accumulated over time;
- b. it consists of a collection of solutions that have proved, with experience, to be effective in solving problems concerning human survival, adaptation to the external environment, and internal integration; and
- c. it is transmitted to new members of the political community through socialization.

Political culture has two fundamental constituents:

1. *Cognitive models*—that is, a population of concepts enabling the imposition of an order on the world through a rational process of critical objectivization—and
2. *Evaluative models*, which make it possible to attribute meaning to the world through identification with particular values that separate what is good, right, and desirable from what is bad, wrong, and to be avoided.

The first section of this entry deals with the scientific context in which the concept of political culture was introduced into political science, the questions it seeks to answer, and the operational definitions used in empirical studies. In the second section, there is a description of the main theoretical and empirical developments in comparative studies on political culture, conducted by means of representative sample surveys in an increasing number of countries. This is followed by a section devoted to a discussion of such research design and the methodological and epistemological presuppositions that are involved. The fourth and fifth sections cover different research designs regarding political culture and related concepts. A critical discussion of the analogies and differences between various research designs is presented in the final section, where emphasis is placed on the need to consider the depth of the historic roots of every cultural pattern and, thus, of each political culture.

Like broader cultural orientations, political culture is largely experienced unconsciously by individuals, who are first and foremost carriers and users. To put it in another way, the set of cognitive and evaluative models that make up political culture are, according to Edgar Schein's definition, "assumptions taken for granted." Individuals who share a specific political culture consider such cognitive and evaluative models to be common sense—the obvious and natural way to give meaning to the political sphere, to its actors and institutions, as well as to its boundaries—what is politics and what is not. As anthropologists have observed in relation to cultural models in general, there is nothing objective or natural in the way in which the content of political culture is defined. It has a pragmatic basis and depends on the challenges and problems that human beings have to handle. So political culture is not just a mental construction of assumptions that are taken for granted. These assumptions form the background and the basis for the political behavior of actors—that is, the framework within which individuals act in what is considered a politically appropriate way. This involves excluding actions considered to be inappropriate or deplorable and deciding whether or not to take part in elections, to cooperate with institutions or act in a clandestine fashion, or to organize peaceful demonstrations or take part in violent protests.

Political culture is, therefore, molded by the accumulated experience of a political community and is a constraint that is very durable over time. There is debate among scholars as to how far one must go back to find the roots of today's political culture. This problem is discussed in more detail below. However, there is a general consensus that change in political culture, as in all forms of cultural change, is a slower and more difficult process than institutional, economic, and social change. This is the reason why political culture is characterized by a certain amount of ambiguity. On the one hand, it is a valuable collective resource in that it makes perceptions, beliefs, and individual attitudes toward political institutions and actors relatively homogeneous. On the other hand, it represents an obstacle in the face of social and economic changes. In such cases, political culture may offer solutions that prove ineffective when coping with problems of adaptation to new challenges from outside or from within a given society.

Special consideration is given to the analytic, methodological, and empirical contribution made by studies of social capital, a concept that in the past 2 decades has prompted extensive research into the relationship of norms, beliefs, and social organization with the effectiveness of democracy and economic development. The concept of political culture is also compared with that of nation building, as used in comparative studies of European political development, according to a research design that is complementary in many respects to the one based on representative sample surveys. Finally, this entry discusses the concept that in a political culture that is adequate for an effective democracy, there needs to be a balance between two different components—on the one hand, an emphasis on individual well-being and self-realization and, on the other, a commitment and fairness toward institutions and a moral obligation toward one's local community and nation.

### **A New Scientific Concept and Its Operational Definitions**

Unlike conceptual innovations in everyday life, in the field of scientific research, each conceptual innovation is carefully recorded due to the complete institutionalization of science. The concept of political culture was introduced by Gabriel Almond

and Sidney Verba at the beginning of the 1960s in their book *The Civic Culture*. This work was part of an extensive program of theoretical discussion and empirical research into the major processes of political development that had started in the 1950s. The tragedy of the two World Wars and of the totalitarianisms in Europe, the birth of new democracies in the three nations defeated in World War II (Germany, Italy, and Japan), the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the founding of new states in Africa and Asia following the end of the French and British colonial empires—all these gave rise to a series of important research issues regarding the stability of the new political regimes, in particular the new democracies. According to the new functionalist and behaviorist approaches of this period, it was imperative for political science to study the cultural orientations of individuals, especially their attitudes to democracy, as these are crucial for the stability of democratic political systems.

*The Civic Culture* stressed the importance of political culture as a dimension capable of influencing, if not determining, the stability and performance of democratic regimes. The new concept built on an illustrious tradition. In the history of political thought, many authors have emphasized the importance of the cultural and moral orientations of citizens for the prosperity and power of states. The terms may vary, but the meanings are similar: civic virtues (Aristotle), values and feelings of identity and commitment (Niccolò Machiavelli), morality and customs (Jean-Jacques Rousseau), and above all the “habits of the heart,” which, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, animated the citizens of the United States in the first few decades after independence and were the foundation of American democracy.

To shed light on the subjective components of politics, the new concept of political culture drew on these classic contributions, producing a new paradigm for empirical research in political science that still underpins the majority of studies in political culture. This new paradigm is based on four of the most significant theoretical and analytic sources for the social sciences in the first half of the 20th century:

1. *The contributions of Max Weber’s sociology in the theory of action and in defining a typology*

*of criteria according to which individuals consider political authority legitimate and agree to comply with its rules:* On the one hand, the importance of values in orienting individual behavior is stressed by Weber’s distinction between goal rationality—that is, decisions based on a calculation of possible individual benefits—and value rationality, namely, decisions based on value orientations, irrespective of, or contrary to, one’s own interests. On the other hand, Weber defines three ideal types of political authority: traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic. Each is supported by different beliefs: the belief in its conformity to the past, the belief in its conformity to established rules, and the belief in the particular personal qualities of a leader. In other words, legitimation depends on one of three different values: tradition, the institutional structure in use, or a single, extraordinary person. The first two values support political continuity, while the latter can contribute to political change.

2. *The four conceptual pairs (the so-called pattern variables) defined by Talcott Parsons in relation to the theoretical foundations of his functionalist approach: universalism versus particularism, achievement motivation versus ascriptiveness, specificity versus diffuseness, and affective neutrality versus affectivity:* The first term in each pair is considered a typical trait of modernity, while the second is a feature of traditional orientations. This set of opposing categories is the basis for all subsequent studies of modernization processes in both the political and the economic realm.

3. *The empirical analysis of attitudes developed by social psychologists such as Louis Guttman, Rensis Likert, and Charles Osgood in the context of the new behavioral approach:* Different attitude scales were designed to collect systematic and comparable data on mass opinions, beliefs, and value orientations through face-to-face interviews.

4. *The influence of Freudian theories on American psycho-anthropology, with the notion of the “basic personality structure,” and the importance attributed to socialization processes not only in childhood but throughout the life cycle.*

These four analytic contributions were then combined with the new methodology of public opinion polls, which make it possible to collect data on opinions and attitudes in representative

samples of citizens. Indeed, the research design of *The Civic Culture* applies the operational definition of political culture in sample surveys in five democracies: the United States, Mexico, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy.

According to the new paradigm established in *The Civic Culture*, political culture has four characteristics: (1) it consists of the set of subjective orientations toward politics of the individual citizens of a nation; (2) it consists of knowledge and beliefs about politics and a commitment to certain political values; (3) it is the result both of a socialization process that begins in childhood and continues through one's education and exposure to the mass media and also of direct experience acquired during adulthood with regard to the performance of political institutions and actors; and (4) it has an influence on, even if it does not determine, the performance of political institutions, due to a two-way causal link between culture and institutional performance. In general, political culture has an impact on the quality of democracy, but the latter also contributes to orienting the political culture of a nation's citizens.

The study revealed the existence of three different types of political culture: parochial, subject, and participant. Parochial culture is characterized by a prevalence of attitudes based on particularism, localism, short-range trust, and a subjective separation from the state and politics. The main features of the second ideal type are compliance and confidence in the legal authority of the state, its administrative order, and its decisions—the output, according to a systemic view. Participant political culture is based on the active political engagement of citizens who fuel the input side through the creation of free associations, in keeping with Tocqueville's classic reflections.

"Civic culture," which consists of a balance between these ideal types, is considered to be the most suitable cultural foundation for a stable democracy. Of the five political systems taken into consideration, the United States and Great Britain had a civic culture, while Germany and Italy were considered democracies with a high risk of instability at the time when the data for the *The Civic Culture* had been collected toward the end of the 1950s. Germany was deemed to have a predominantly subject-based political culture, while Italy was largely parochial.

### Changes in Political Culture: The Rise of Postmaterialist Values

Some of the most important findings of *The Civic Culture* were reviewed and criticized 20 years later by Almond and Verba themselves. They pointed to the growth of a participatory culture in Germany, the reduction of subject attitudes, and an increase in the levels of dissatisfaction and distrust in Britain and the United States. In the meantime, a host of other investigations had been conducted, revealing a drop in the degree of confidence in democratic institutions and increasing disaffection and political protest in Western democracies and Japan.

The observed changes in value orientations are of particular interest. On the basis of a comparative study of six European nations carried out in 1970, Ronald Inglehart noted that the youth protest movements were primarily concerned with issues neglected by the traditional political parties, for instance, environmental conservation, disarmament, and needs associated with individual self-fulfillment rather than economic improvement. Inglehart considered these value orientations to be the effects of the situation of economic well-being in which the socialization of young people had taken place in Western European countries, which had reached an unprecedented level of wealth since World War II. With the modification of political priorities, cultural change was fueled by the demographic replacement of the population due to the arrival of generations with more postmaterialist orientations than the older ones, which gradually disappeared from the scene.

Inglehart based his thesis on the theory of motivation developed by the psychologist Abraham Maslow, who considers the gratification of needs to be as decisive for human action as the classic principle of deprivation. According to this theory, the fundamental needs of human beings are organized into a hierarchy consisting of four ascending levels: (1) basic physiological needs; (2) the need for safety and stability; (3) the need for affection, self-esteem, and a sense of belonging; and at the highest level (4) the need for self-realization. Satisfaction of a need pertaining to a lower level brings to the fore the one relating to the next level. According to Maslow, this framework is an organizational model of the individual personality.

Inglehart turned it into an explanatory model of the changes in political culture: The older

generations, who grew up amid the poverty and insecurity generated before and during the two World Wars, were oriented toward the materialist values induced by survival and safety needs. By contrast, young Europeans born after World War II are oriented toward postmaterialist values—that is, values such as belonging, self-esteem, and self-realization. Having grown up in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity, they tend to take a certain level of material comfort for granted and therefore develop the value priorities typical of higher levels of prosperity. As a result, they are more oriented toward themes such as personal fulfillment, individual freedom, and the conservation of nature. This difference between young people's values and those of their parents leads to cultural change since, according to the Freudian concept of the "basic personality structure" developed by Ralph Linton and Abraham Kardiner, individuals tend to maintain in the course of their adult life the value priorities adopted in a deep sense during the formative phases of their childhood and youth.

The operational definition used by Inglehart to collect data on materialist and postmaterialist value priorities is an inventory of 12 possible political goals. Representative samples from Western countries were asked to choose the most important political goals from the following items:

*Material goals:* maintain order in the nation; fight rising prices; maintain a high rate of economic growth; make sure the country has strong defense forces; maintain a stable economy; and fight against crime

*Postmaterial goals:* give people more say in the decisions of government; protect freedom of speech; give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their community; try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful; move toward a friendlier, less impersonal society; and move toward a society where ideas count more than money

Respondents were then classified as materialists or postmaterialists depending on whether they favor one of the two kinds of goals consistently.

### A Worldwide Research Program

The operational definition used by Inglehart to measure value change has become a standard tool

in the proliferating studies of political culture, along with questions aimed at surveying interpersonal and institutional trust, preference for democracy or autocracy, life satisfaction, and other similar issues. This series of studies followed the research design originally adopted in *The Civic Culture*. The design has three main characteristics: (1) *a sample survey*: data collection on political opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and values conducted by means of structured interviews with representative samples of citizens; (2) *a comparative design*: the same questionnaire is applied in different political systems in the same period. In other words, the same operational definitions are used in different countries, favoring comparability of data and permitting the testing of hypotheses at an individual as well as a national level; and (3) *a longitudinal design*: if possible, the same questionnaires—or the same subsets of closed questions—are applied in the same countries in different years, creating a rising number of time series for many political culture variables, such as levels of institutional trust, satisfaction with democratic performance, support for leaders, national pride, and so on.

A number of agencies have been established in recent decades to monitor public opinion orientations and political attitudes. The Eurobarometer program of the European Union was set up in 1973 and since 1974 has supplied twice-yearly data on opinions and attitudes for each member or candidate-member of the Union. Similar survey programs have recently been set up. The New Democracies Barometer, established in 1991, covers 12 East European countries; the Latinobarometer covers 19 countries from 1996 onward; while Afrobarometer covers more than 12 states since 1999. Cooperation between different research centers around the world has led to an increase in the number of nations for which data on political culture indicators are available. Increasingly, extensive networks have been built up, making it possible to conduct the same research project at the same time in an ever greater number of nations. In particular, the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey have conducted five waves in a steadily rising number of countries. After the first wave in 1981, successive waves of data collection were carried out in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, covering countries on all continents (with more than 100 in the most recent wave). A further advantage has


been the setting up of efficient data archives. Coupled with new data transmission tools, these archives facilitate secondary analyses—that is, the research and empirical testing of hypotheses by researchers who have not taken part in gathering and analysing the original data.

All these developments have resulted in a strong growth in the degree of institutionalization and standardization of research into mass orientations. One of the most recent, and ambitious, findings of this research programme is illustrated in Figure 1. It was produced by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel on the basis of data collected in the first four waves of the World Values Survey.

Figure 1 shows the position of 80 states with respect to two variables. The vertical axis is an index of the quality of democracy in the different countries and takes into account not only the existence or

otherwise of free elections but also the moral integrity of the political elites as measured by the “control of corruption” scores provided by the World Bank and other organizations. Corruption among elites is in fact the main factor preventing respect for the equality of rights and the law and therefore for an effective democracy. The lower values on the scale relate to nondemocratic countries with corrupt elites, while the higher scores are obtained by democracies with political elites that guarantee the rule of law and equal rights.

The horizontal axis shows the average values for each country on an index that measures the spread of a cultural orientation based on the predominance of values associated with individual self-realization and self well-being. It is a direct evolution of Inglehart’s first postmaterialism scale. This new cultural syndrome is surveyed by five indicators:



**Figure 1** The Impact of Self-Expression Values on Effective Democracy, Controlling for Each Country’s Percentage of Solid Democrats

Source: Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

1. postmaterialist liberty aspirations (give people more say in the decisions of government, protect freedom of speech, and give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their community);
2. forms of political protest, such as signing petitions;
3. tolerance of homosexuality and sexual liberty;
4. interpersonal trust; and
5. life satisfaction.

The relation between the two variables in Figure 1 is measured controlling for the percentage of respondents who prefer democracy over autocracy, to exclude spurious effects due to merely instrumental prodemocratic motives. Countries where self-expression values are relatively less widespread than mere support for democracy would suggest are those where the political regime violates the rule of law and equal rights more than levels of mere support for democracy would suggest (see bottom left-hand corner). In the opposite corner, countries where self-expression values are relatively more widespread than mere support for democracy would suggest are those where democracy is more effective than mere support for democracy would suggest.

In short, Figure 1 shows the strong linkage between a peculiar syndrome of political culture—self-expression values—and the level of effective democracy: Near the top right-hand corner are the small democracies of Protestant Northern Europe, with England and the English-speaking democracies (the United States, Canada, and Australia). Near the opposite corner are some African and Asian states, with Yugoslavia (at the time formed by Serbia and Montenegro) ranking as the lowest European country on both variables.

### The Limits of the Comparative Survey Approach

The application and extension of the research design of *The Civic Culture* in the 40-year period since it was first published has enabled the international political science community to build up a large number of comparable data sets on a growing number of nations. The availability of statistical packages and powerful, low-cost computers, combined with the

Internet infrastructure, has facilitated the empirical testing of many hypotheses by means of complex multivariate models. Important changes in political attitudes and beliefs have been monitored over time and compared in different countries. Like any scientific method, technique, or decision, this research design also has certain limitations. As with all research tools, the capacity of sample surveys to achieve objectives depends on the degree to which they offer a simplification of the world, the complexity of which cannot be grasped by any one tool.

The sample survey research design in the comparative study of political culture is no exception to this rule. In particular, it tends to emphasize the orientations of mass political culture rather than those of the elites. Similarly, the wide-ranging comparative design makes it easier to concentrate on mass attitudes relating to the polity and politics levels instead of the policy level, which is more context dependent. Scholars have stressed these limits together with others that stem largely from the basic assumptions of the two main approaches that gave rise to this paradigm: functionalism and behaviorism.

The functionalist approach has two limits. On the one hand, there is a tendency to regard politics as a clearly defined sphere with respect to society and the economy, which is easily recognizable even in very different social systems. On the other hand, functionalism tends to favor a synchronic perspective, with a consequent reduction in the attention devoted to the diachronic dimension and in piecing together the historic origins of the observed processes. As seen above, in the paradigm of the comparative research survey, the temporal dimension is only taken into account through the collection of successive “snapshots”—that is, the various waves of sample surveys.

The behaviorist approach, whose roots lie in experimental psychology, has greatly stimulated the operational definition of citizens' opinions, attitudes, and value orientations. However, it is based on the individualist and atomist assumption that the whole equals the sum of its individual parts. The critical point is, therefore, the link between the microlevel (a sample of individuals interviewed) and the macrolevel. The political culture of a country is viewed as a statistical aggregation of the opinions and attitudes of individual citizens.



In addition to these limitations, which derive from the epistemological features of functionalism and behaviorism, representative sample surveys also have several methodological limitations:

- Actual behaviors, which are the overt output of cultural orientations, are not observed but only inferred by verbal answers to questions.
- It is assumed that the meanings of questions and answers are the same in different countries and languages—a necessary assumption if one is to consider the answers of interviewees to be comparable.
- The number of interviews in national samples is usually too small to guarantee the statistical representativeness of subnational samples. This makes it impossible to explore the regional differences in political culture within a given country.
- Surveys also often have difficulties of grasping the unconscious and “things taken for granted,” as pointed out above.

The following sections deal with two different contributions to the study of political culture that can be regarded as complementary to the paradigm established by *The Civic Culture*, in that they pursue different research designs or strategies of inquiry, each of which overcomes some of the limits described above, though in different ways.

### Social Capital and Democracy

One of the principal conceptual innovations in political science and sociology over the past 20 years is the notion of social capital, introduced in the 1960s by the economists Gary Becker and James Loury. The concept of social capital became popular in political science as a result of the analytic work of James Coleman, who related it to social networks, and the research of Robert Putnam into the institutional performance of Italian regional governments in *Making Democracy Work*. According to Putnam’s definition, social capital “refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 167).

In other words, social capital is a collective resource and has some of the features of a public

good: It offers advantages to all the members of a group, but no one can appropriate it in an exclusive way. If one person benefits from social capital, this does not reduce its availability for others. On the contrary, social capital has a radically anti-economic feature: The more it is used, the more of it becomes available for the entire community. Social capital, therefore, offers a solution to the dilemmas of collective action posed by scholars such as Mancur Olson and Elinor Ostrom. As a form of social organization, social capital also has positive effects on economic development in that it contributes to creating a favorable environment for market exchanges thanks to cooperation, trustworthiness, honesty, and compliance with formal and informal rules. The notion of social capital is closely related to that of civic culture. They have a common ancestor, Tocqueville, who attributed great importance to the trustworthiness of citizens and the significance of free associations. The two concepts also share concern about the relation between culture and effective democracy.

Putnam’s research on Italian regions exploited the opportunity to apply an experimental design. In the 1970s, the newly introduced regional institutions began to operate within the same nation-state. The research question was which variables explain the *differences* in the output of the new regional governments in the common context. According to Putnam’s findings, the marked differences in the economic development of the Northern and Southern regions tend to coincide with great differences in institutional efficiency. However, this turned out to be a spurious correlation. The independent variable, when introduced as a control variable that, in fact, explains the differences in both economic development and institutional performance is the amount of social capital present in the various Italian regions at the end of the 19th century. The Northern regions had the same level of poverty as the Southern regions but appreciably higher levels of social capital. Seventy years later, in postwar Italy, social capital or the “civic community” (Figure 2) explains both the difference in economic development and the difference in institutional performance. The well-known economic cleavage between the North and South (i.e., the *Mezzogiorno*) is only one aspect of a multifaceted divide that sets regions with a high social capital and high institutional performance apart from

regions with limited social capital and inefficient local institutions.

As Figure 2 suggests, Putnam's point of departure is similar to Inglehart and Welzel's, but the research design differs on many significant points:

1. There is no comparison between different nations but an analysis of a single nation, Italy, with various research techniques. The comparative design regards the Italian regions, thereby emphasizing within-state differences and reducing the risk of comparing cases that are too heterogeneous.
2. The nature of the civic community is measured not only by means of elite and mass surveys but also by gathering data on observable and documentable behavior (involvement in voluntary or other associations, newspaper circulation figures, and election turnout).
3. Data gathered from official documents and historical archives also make it possible to make intertemporal comparisons during almost a century.
4. Differences within the same country are highlighted and their historic origins reconstructed


using data and findings relating to the Italian tradition of electoral studies.

5. By conducting a comparative analysis within a single nation, it is possible to make reliable predictions on the basis of dynamic models. The differences between the Northern and Southern regions are not only significant but above all are hard to eliminate, in that they tend to create two opposing conditions of equilibrium. Regions with civic communities display virtuous circles of trust, participation, effective institutions, and economic development. By contrast, regions with uncivic communities are entrapped in a vicious circle of distrust, defection, inefficient institutions, and economic stagnation.

### Political Culture, Nation Building, and State Formation

Putnam's conclusions confirm, on the one hand, the importance of political culture for the quality of democracy and, on the other hand, specify the particularity of Italy, as had been observed in the 1950s and 1960s not only in *The Civic Culture* but also in the contemporary ethnographic fieldwork of Edward Banfield in *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (referring to a community in Southern Italy), which shed light on the syndrome of "amoral familism." Italy is a case of a divided political culture in which the divisions are to a large extent geographical. In Northern Italy, the civic community, which corresponds to a participant political culture, tends to prevail. In the Southern regions, there tends to be a prevalence of parochialism characterized by localist and familistic loyalties—that is, the vicious circle of the uncivic community.

This latter set of concepts emphasizes a further aspect of political culture, namely, that political culture also consists of beliefs and attitudes that do not have an explicit political content. The political meaning and consequences of familism and parochialism are implicit and embedded. Nonetheless, they are just as important as the explicit political content of participant and subject cultures. More specifically, it can be said that parochial culture is the consequence of historic processes marked by limited social and political mobilization on the part of the elites.



**Figure 2** The Civic Community and Institutional Performance

Source: Putnam, R. (with Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R.). (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy* (p. 98). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

As Karl Deutsch argued, mobilization is a process of change that involves, entirely or partially, the population of countries that are undergoing modernization. In the early stages, this tends to lead to changes in the employment and residence of individuals while, subsequently, it also radically modifies their perceptions, expectations, beliefs, memories, and sense of identity. In other words, the process of mobilization changes the assumptions that people take for granted, in that it changes behavior and the problems that need to be coped with. Sectors of the population that are less affected by this process maintain to a greater degree the traditional set of assumptions and beliefs that political scientists label as parochialism or familism.

Social and political mobilization also lies at the heart of Stein Rokkan's study of state formation and nation-building processes in Europe, starting from the collapse of the Roman Empire. In general, the political development of Western Europe has taken place in four phases, which can be summed up as follows: (1) *state formation*, which involves the establishment of politically centralized control over a given territory, which is defended from external or internal attack and administered in a uniform way by civil and military bureaucracies; (2) *nation building*, promoted through a process of cultural standardization with the imposition of a common language, a single religion, and rituals and myths that lend legitimacy to the power of the monarch or elites; (3) *democratization*, through the granting of suffrage to increasingly large portions of the population; and (4) *the creation of the welfare state*—that is, a state that looks after its citizens, guaranteeing them health care, education, and protection against the risks of poverty.

The ways in which this occurred and the time it has taken for different states to meet these four challenges has had a lasting effect on the quality and stability of democratic regimes. The older states, formed prior to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), have proved to be the most stable democracies in the 20th century. Typical cases are England, Sweden, and Denmark. At the opposite extreme, there is the case of Italy and, to a lesser extent, Germany, which only became unified states in the 1860s and 1870s, after the beginning of a process of social, political, and economic mobilization fueled throughout the continent by the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. These

new states have had to overcome the four challenges in less than a century. In both cases, the liberal and democratic state collapsed in the period between the two World Wars, with the rise of the fascist and Nazi regimes.

According to this line of research, in Europe, the culture of a country derives from the interaction between three fundamental components: ethnic-linguistic identity, religious faith, and the outcome of processes of cultural standardization activated by nation builders through the education system, compulsory military service, and so on. Political culture is, therefore, profoundly influenced by the timing and the modalities of state formation and nation-building processes. Moreover, the outcomes of these two processes create the patterns that define a feature of political culture that Weber had already considered as decisive for the stability of a regime: the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by political institutions. These may in fact be regarded as positive values—symbols with which to identify as members of a nation—or negative values—that is, symbols of a political regime that has little legitimacy and arouses distrust and suspicion. This top-down schema of the relationship between political culture and institutional architecture assigns a fundamental role to the elites of nation builders and places the origins of modern-day political cultures much farther back in the past.

Rokkan's schema of political development also highlights cases of countries with nonuniform political cultures. This lack of uniformity may be due to resistance on the part of some peripheral areas to the process of cultural standardization promoted by the center or to shortcomings or delays in the state formation process. Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy are three examples of countries that have experienced nation-building difficulties as a result of cultural differences within their frontiers. Spain is a case of early state formation, but it has been unable to overcome the resistance of peripheral areas with considerable economic resources, which have managed to maintain linguistic and cultural autonomy. After the transition to democracy in the 1970s, the new constitution, introduced in 1978, recognizes the existence of a plurality of nations within the Kingdom of Spain.

The Netherlands are an example of a country with different subcultures resulting from linguistic or religious cleavages. These cultural cleavages

have been successfully bridged by the concept of consociational democracy founded on “pillarization,” involving cooperation of the elites across cleavages. This institutional accommodation is effective to the extent that it recognizes, confirms, and reassures each of the different cultural identities (Catholic, Protestant, and secular). Incidentally, the dramatic developments following the collapse of the Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s testify that this accommodation is very difficult to adopt, even within 21st-century Europe, if the countries involved do not have a democratic political culture.

Italy is an example of late state formation carried out by a secularized elite of nation builders that was weak and isolated with respect to the twofold opposition of the Catholic and socialist movements. These movements created strong anti-state subcultures, thus contributing to the democratic breakdown in 1922. Here, too, there is a general lesson to be learned: The historic legacy of an element of weakness—strong antistate subcultures—can become a resource once the political and institutional framework and the international context have changed. In postwar Italy, it was the networks of these two subcultures—the unions, cooperatives, voluntary associations, religious groups, and local savings banks—that provided the organizational basis of the civic community of Northern Italy as described by Putnam.

### Two Necessary Components of Political Culture

The question about the relationship between political culture and democracy has been answered in many ways over the past few decades and has opened up various research perspectives. Three different research strategies, among the most influential and well-known, have been presented in detail. Of the three, the paradigm of comparative survey research into political culture orientations adopts methods and techniques that differ greatly from those used by Rokkan in his theory about the conditions and processes that led to the birth of democracy in Western Europe. There are four main differences:

1. With each new wave, the World Values Survey has tended to enlarge the number of countries covered by the representative sample surveys,

without, however, taking into account the growing variance in the level of economic development, the literacy of the population, and the duration of the democratic regime. By contrast, Rokkan focused on a more limited area that is relatively homogeneous in terms of historical, cultural, political, and economic development.

2. The first paradigm seeks to explain the differences in opinions, beliefs, and values by resorting to multivariate models capable of producing high correlation coefficients. The second pieces together the complex, centuries-old web of social, political, economic, and cultural processes with typologies that can explain the individual national versions of European democracy.

3. The first paradigm alternates between individual- and state-level analyses. The second is interested in detecting the existence of specific territorial cultures within states, interpreting them as aspects of a peculiar path of state formation and national building.

4. The first paradigm recognizes the two-way relation between political culture and the effectiveness of democracy. However, the rising number of countries considered under a synchronic perspective tends to privilege the spread of civic and self-expression values as the causal factor that makes democracy work, according to a bottom-up schema. The second paradigm tends instead to emphasize a top-down schema, analyzing the different nation-building capacities of state institutions—that is, their ability to define political culture.

On all four points, the work of Putnam and his colleagues lies in an intermediate position, resorting as it does to a comparative approach limited to a homogeneous area, stressing the historical roots of the differences between the cases considered and recognizing virtuous or vicious circles between effective institutions and civic community.

Almost paradoxically, the two most distant paradigms yield analogous results. The countries that the series of World Values Surveys have shown to be characterized by the greatest democratic effectiveness and a more self-expression-oriented political culture include the European countries that, on the basis of Rokkan’s analysis, were the first to achieve a stable democracy, having concluded the

state formation and nation-building phases prior to the French Revolution. These are the two oldest and most powerful Protestant monarchies of Northern Europe (England and Sweden), and the consociational democracies are situated at the source and the estuary of the Rhine in Switzerland and the Netherlands, respectively. More generally, the West European nations reveal a greater presence of postmaterialist values and more democratic effectiveness than the East European countries. Rokkan's schema, which in the 1970s aimed to explain the historical process of democratization in Europe, is therefore a good predictor of the results obtained by Inglehart and Welzel in sample surveys conducted over the past 2 decades to measure the current content of political culture and recent changes. This convergence of results suggests that the two research strategies, though they differ greatly, are not alternatives but are supplementary with regard to the characteristics required of a political culture in terms of democratic effectiveness. There is a continuity between early and successful state formation and nation building and the rise of postmaterialist and self-expression values.

Such a convergence is by no means obvious, because the process of nation building involves the spread of altruistic values and the subordination of individual interests to those of the community—which runs counter to the emphasis placed by postmaterialist values on the primacy of individual liberty and self-expression.

Analytically, the opposition between the cultural outcomes of successful nation building and the syndrome of self-expression values becomes evident if one bears in mind the process that led to the expansion of citizenship rights, as charted by Thomas Marshall. According to a cumulative schema, citizens' rights first saw the light of day in the 18th century with the establishment of the rule of law, whereby the civil rights of all citizens were recognized and guaranteed by impartial courts. The following century saw the development of political rights, quintessentially symbolized by the increasing role of independent parliaments. The 20th century was marked by the introduction of a new family of rights: social rights, with the establishment of compulsory education, public health, and so on.

This threefold typology corresponds, significantly but partially, to the four stages of political

development defined by Rokkan, as shown in Table 1.

The succession of the three types of rights corresponds to three of Rokkan's four phases, with the lower row corresponding to the institutional structure of Western European democracies after World War II: a generous welfare state that guarantees social rights and satisfies the material and security needs of its citizens. There is an empty box alongside the nation-building phase, for which there is no corresponding family of rights. In fact, nation building does not presuppose the recognition of citizenship rights. On the contrary, individuals have duties and obligations toward the nation. There is, then, a shift from the preeminence of individuals to that of the community as a whole. The establishment of individual rights is a fundamental feature of European political identity. The concept of the nation relates not so much to an individualistic as to a holistic perspective, according to which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, as is well expressed by the value of *fraternité* (fraternity) in the motto of the French Revolution.

The United States does not lend itself to comparison with Western Europe. But even in the case of American political culture, scholars have found a similar equilibrium between opposing values: individual freedom on the one hand and communitarian bonds, loyalty, and commitment to institutions on the other. As Robert Bellah has observed, Americans consider individualism to be the preeminent and distinguishing value of their culture. However, this individualism is counterbalanced by

**Table 1** European Political Stages and Citizenship Rights

<i>Stages of European Political Development (Stein Rokkan)</i>		<i>Citizenship Rights (Thomas Marshall)</i>	
State formation (rule of law)		Civil rights (courts)	
Nation building		—	
Democratization		Political rights (parliaments)	
Welfare state		Social rights (schools)	

Source: Cartocci, R. (2007). *Mappe del tesoro* [Treasure maps] (p. 121). Bologna, Italy: Mulino.

two opposing moral orientations: civic republicanism and the Biblical tradition. Both value sets relate to the holistic nature of the community—respect for the dignity of all human beings and an invocation of the moral goals that guided the Founding Fathers, which place on each citizen responsibility for the common good.

In both Western Europe and the United States, freedom and individual rights are accompanied by solidarity values and subordination to the common good. A political culture in which just one of these components prevails becomes a risk for democratic stability. An effective democracy needs a political culture with a balance between postmaterialist values, which stress the participation, tolerance, and self-expression of individuals, and the values of successful nation building, such as loyalty toward institutions, considered an effective means of guaranteeing the safety and well-being of citizens.

Participant postmaterialist citizens stimulate the renewal of democracies and prompt them to find effective institutional solutions to deal with new forms of inequality relating to gender, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, and so on. However, these value orientations are associated with the privileged sectors of society, especially educated young people. Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin have recently observed that an excessive number of participant citizens create the risk of provoking a dangerous overload of political demands, thereby generating zero-sum conflicts. By contrast, scholars such as Robert Putnam, Theda Skocpol, and Russell Dalton have stressed the decline of civic engagement in Western democracies, even in younger cohorts.

Democracies have to find a way to adapt to the new attitudes and behavior of Western citizens, who are more critical and less confident than before. Democracies owe their legitimacy to their ability to simultaneously guarantee both the self-fulfilment needs of the more educated, secularized, and postmaterialist sectors of society and the safety and physical needs of the majority of citizens, who share the more traditional and materialist values and are unwilling to engage in stronger forms of political commitment.

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*See also* Democratization; Nation Building; Path Dependence; Pillarization; Political Socialization; Public Opinion; Social Capital; State Formation; Survey Research; Values

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## POLITICAL ECONOMY

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Political economy can be understood in numerous ways, depending on the discipline of study. Economists and, more recently, some political scientists define political economy as the study of politics using economics. Yet within political science, it is

more commonly understood as the study of the relationship between states and markets. The two approaches are not conflicting but can be quite dissimilar. Here, political economy is understood as the study of the interdependency of economics and politics, as this is the approach used by the majority of political scientists. This entry emphasizes the interdependency of politics and economics and its impact on several aspects of political performance.

How economics and politics determine each other has been a driving question in political economy for centuries. According to John Roemer, Adam Smith was well aware of the mutual interdependency of economics and politics. In *The Wealth of Nations*, he discusses how politically determined tax mixes (a range of sources of income, with a mix of part-time jobs, self-employment, and full-time jobs) on wages and goods have diverse economic effects. The political causes of tax mixes, and of economic and social welfare policies, in general, are still at the heart of the study of political economy, especially as the provision of public services and goods has reached unprecedented levels. Scholars within the field of political economy study the impact of political competition on economic outcomes and in turn on how underlying economic conditions, such as income and skill distribution or the generosity of social insurance, affect political behavior and political competition. Common questions raised within the field of political economy are as follows: Why do taxes, state pensions, or levels of public debt vary between countries? Do political parties deliver distinguishable economic policies? Under what conditions do politicians raise taxes? In turn, how do economic policies and the underlying economic relations affect preferences for redistribution and institutional change, such as electoral system reforms?

Theoretical models and empirical research have come a long way in answering these questions. However, controversies still exist, primarily due to the lack of extensive data outside the relatively small group of the rich Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. In the rest of this entry, major theoretical and empirical contributions in the field of political economy are reviewed. The first part looks at how the economy shapes policy preferences. The second part is an examination of how the institutional

characteristics of polities (their electoral and party systems) aggregate preferences into political action. Third, distribution and redistribution as direct outcomes of political competition are described. Finally, in the last part, causation from economics to politics is reversed to explain the origins of electoral institutions on the grounds of underlying economic relations.

### Economic Preferences

Voters' or political parties' policy preferences are the starting point of formal political economy models. Relying on the assumption of self-interested actors who wish to maximize the utility they get from consumption and leisure, political economists commonly assume that voters with higher incomes prefer less redistribution than citizens with lower incomes. Similarly, personal income endowments determine voters' preferences over macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and unemployment. Kenneth Scheve has shown that those who have more savings prefer lower inflation, even at the cost of higher unemployment, in contrast to those who do not have savings.

Thus, the distribution of income in a society is a determining factor of fiscal, monetary, and tax policies. For example, the Meltzer-Richard model predicts that in societies with high levels of income inequality, taxes and, thus, redistribution should be higher than in societies with low-income inequality. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels relied on similar assumptions since they believed that once workers were given the right to vote, dramatic redistribution would be achieved.

Yet reality is more complex than that. Among the economically developed countries, income inequality is highest in the United States and redistribution is among the lowest. Why is there not more pressure from voters to redistribute more? To start with, it is possible that some societies value economic equality more than other societies. Indeed, Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote show that there is a strong correlation between a nation's belief that luck determines income and the levels of social spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). In countries where people believe that the poor have been unlucky, social spending (and thus taxes) is higher. Thus, assuming that voters simply

want to maximize their utility from consumption is too simplistic.

Similarly simplistic is the assumption that one's vote is solely driven by financial position. Often voters care about other issues than redistribution, such as abortion, the environment, the role of women in the economy, and so on. If this is the case, then one's income does not determine one's vote, and in fact, it is possible that redistribution is not placed highly on the policy agenda of competing political parties. Another complication is that in unequal societies, rich voters are likely to have more political influence on political parties than poorer voters. For example, it is established that voter turnout is higher among high-income earners than among low-income earners.

Things get even more complicated when we take into account the underlying economic relations in a polity. Production systems can shape economic preferences independently of the distribution of income. Not all holders of capital prefer low redistribution, and not all workers prefer more redistribution. Redistribution preferences, and particularly preferences for social protection, are rather formed by the type of economic production. The varieties of capitalism approaches have moved the discipline forward by showing that preference formation among economic actors and citizens is not universal across different economic systems. The type of the economy and, particularly, the mode of production in an economy largely determine policy preferences.

In economies where workers are required to invest in firm- or industry-specific skills, employers have incentives to lobby for higher social protection and thus side with the trade unions. In contrast, in economies where workers have general skills and employers do not invest in their training, employers tend to lobby for lower social protection than the trade unions. More generally, it has been shown that distinguishing between general and special skills helps explain variations in the levels and type of social protection. For example, Torben Iversen and David Soskice show that citizens who have specific skills favor more generous unemployment insurance than do those who have general skills, as the latter can more easily switch and find jobs.

To recap, the discipline has made tremendous progress in identifying the factors that shape voters' preferences. Yet this is only the beginning of putting

together all the constitutive parts of a political-economic model. One still needs to study the conditions under which political parties are responsive to the existing distribution of preferences.

### Formal Models of Political Party Competition in Two-Party Systems

Do citizens' economic preferences affect policy outcomes? According to a view of democracy where the majority rules, economic outcomes should reflect the will of the electoral majority. In other words, if the majority of voters demands lower taxes, politicians should deliver lower taxes. However, one cannot assume this straightforward association; a number of issues need to be clarified, and most important, the role of political parties must be considered. Assumptions about the nature of political parties, whether they represent particular economic classes, interest groups, or simply their own interests, need to be made. Moreover, other characteristics of the political party system are also critical: How many political parties compete for office? Is political competition centered only on the question of taxes? And how are votes translated into parliamentary seats? Without taking all these matters into account, one cannot reliably predict policy outcomes given a certain distribution of preferences within the electorate.

Formal models of political party competition are relatively recent. Erik Lindahl was the first to show that the supply of public goods is determined by the relative power of political parties in a polity where two political parties represent two classes of citizens with heterogeneous marginal utilities over a public good. In his seminal paper, he briefly mentions the possibility of partisan policy outcomes as power shifts from one political party to the other. Nonetheless, Lindahl's work did not lead to further development of bargaining models on the distribution of public goods until much later.

Instead, the most well-known formal model in political science is the median voter theorem. The theorem, popularized by Anthony Downs in his *Economic Theory of Democracy*, predicts that when two parties compete on a single policy dimension, they will both converge to the median voter's most ideal policy point. If the policy under question is the level of income tax rate, then both parties will propose the tax rate that is preferred by the median



voter. The result is easily explained: Parties are office seeking (which means that they are primarily driven by their objective to win office rather than by their ideology) and thus adopt whichever policy will win them the majority of votes. When voters' preferences are normally distributed, the only reasonable position for parties to move to is the median.

The median voter theorem initiated a new era of research in political economy. For example, the Meltzer-Richard model of redistribution and theories of electoral business cycles rely on the median voter theorem. In practice, however, parties tend to diverge in their policy choices rather than converge. To start with, it is rare that parties will propose similar tax rates at elections. If anything, when elections are contested primarily on economic issues, social-democratic parties propose higher taxes for the delivery of better public services, while parties on the right propose lower taxes and smaller governments. Similarly, public opinion research testifies that voters identify with parties on the grounds of personal characteristics, such as their socioeconomic status, religion, and so on. For example, those with savings who prefer lower inflation tend to self-identify with right-wing parties, while those who prioritize employment over low inflation tend to identify with left-wing parties.

Donald Wittman proposed a model of party competition where parties are solely policy seeking: They compete on the premise of distinguishable policies. His model then predicts that parties will diverge in their policies as long as there is some level of uncertainty as to who the winner in the next election will be. While Wittman assumes that parties are exogenous (i.e., they are not the agents of citizens), his model has been the main alternative to the median voter theorem. Empirically, the literature has found evidence of partisan policy outcomes, for example, with respect to inflation and social spending, but these findings remain contested. It has been shown that policies are often conditioned by other economic and political institutions as well as by the underlying economic conditions, both domestically and abroad.

#### **Formal Models of Political Party Competition in Multiparty Systems**

While the median and partisan models of two-party competition discussed above have made the

largest impact in the discipline with respect to party competition, the majority of democracies are multiparty systems. This means that the two most well-known models of political competition are not suitable for the analysis of party competition in the majority of cases. More recently, new models of political party competition have been developed to include three political parties competing at elections. For example, David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey Banks developed a model where three office-seeking parties compete and coalition governments are formed after elections. Their model predicts that parties take divergent policy positions to attract votes, and as a result, governments consisting of a large and a small party deliver partisan policies. Another notable example is David Baron's model of electoral competition of three policy-seeking parties. Baron's model is a two-stage model: In the first stage, parties compete at elections, and in the second, postelectoral stage, they bargain over policy. The coalition governments that form as a result of this two-stage process deliver ideologically partisan policies.

Postelectoral bargaining in parliamentary democracies is of critical significance in policy outcomes in multiparty governments. Given that the majority of parliamentary countries do not form single-party governments, postelectoral bargaining delivers to a great extent the government's future policy program. Models of government formation are prominent in the field of political economy. Not only do they address the important theoretical and empirical question of which government we should expect to form after elections have failed to provide a clear winner, they also provide predictions on the policy outcomes that one should expect in a given government, as the Austin-Smith and Banks and Baron models illustrate.

One of the most well-known models of government formation in multiparty systems is the Laver-Shepsle model, based on the concept of the core within the tradition of cooperative game theory. The Laver-Shepsle model predicts that policies will reflect the policy preferences of the ministers who hold the specific ministerial departments and who represent the median voter's preference in that specific dimension. In other words, if the policy space is multidimensional, the party that represents the median voter in each dimension will control the relevant ministry; thus, policy will be located at the multidimensional median.

The Laver-Shepsle model was a breakthrough in the study of parliamentary democracies as it offered a unified framework of analysis of government formation, duration, and policy implementation. Yet it has its limitations, both on the theoretical front (since it relies on the restrictive concept of the core, which can be found only in a three-party, two-dimensional space) and on the empirical front (since the model assumes that ministers and parties do not negotiate prior to or during the government's life). Alternative models of government formation based on noncooperative game theory prove that when parties are policy and office seeking, different governments can form as a result of bargaining over policy and side payments. Yet they do not make any specific claims about the portfolio allocation process, like Laver and Shepsle do. As a result, most of our knowledge regarding portfolio allocation and its impact on policy comes from empirical studies conducted by scholars who study coalition governments.

#### **The Electoral System: A Critical Intervening Factor Between Preferences and Policies**

The electoral system is another intervening factor that significantly determines the distribution of political power and thus indirectly determines economic policies. The main direct effect of the electoral system on policy is via its effect on electoral competition at the district level. In single-member district plurality (SMDP) electoral systems, elections are won over marginal districts because parties do not have to worry about safe districts. This motivates parties to target voters and interest groups in these districts. In contrast, in proportional electoral systems where electoral districts are large and can be as few as one (e.g., in the Netherlands), political parties have incentives to target groups of voters instead of districts. As a result, in SMDP systems, there is less social spending but more public spending in the form of targeted goods, such as roads and hospitals.

The effects of electoral system on spending go beyond the district level. Since, as Maurice Duverger showed, the electoral system largely determines the number of parties in the political system, the electoral system has an indirect effect on policy preference aggregation via the number of parties elected in the parliament and in government. In more

proportional electoral systems, more voices are represented in the government via multiparty governments as well as via strong parliamentary committees. G. Bingham Powell shows that the median voter is better represented in countries with proportional electoral systems, which have multiparty governments and give a voice to opposition parties in the parliament.

Another important empirical finding is that multiparty governments are larger governments (having higher public spending) simply because they represent more social groups than single-party governments. For this reason, some researchers have argued that multiparty governments are less economically efficient than single-party governments. In multiparty governments, every party has an incentive to spend on its own voters as much as it can since everyone draws from the same pool of money. Yet other researchers, such as Peter Katzenstein or Arend Lijphart, have argued that multiparty governments can more successfully undertake unpopular economic reforms because they can better achieve political and societal consensus.

The work briefly reviewed in the preceding paragraphs is certainly not exhaustive of the rich literature on the role of formal political and electoral institutions in the aggregation of interests and in policy outcomes. It is rather indicative of the complexity and interdependence of the processes that take place at the economic and political spheres. The following section of this entry focuses on how economic conditions affect the choice of formal political institutions.

#### **Types of Economy and the Origins of Formal Political Institutions**

One of the growing areas of research investigates the source of electoral institutions. Currently, it is believed that political parties, primarily of the right, chose the electoral institutions that would best ensure their continued power, based on their knowledge of the effects of electoral institutions on electoral behavior and government formation. The best known argument, made by Stein Rokkan and, more recently, by Carles Boix, purports that when the ruling right-wing parties were united and/or confronted with a weak opposition, they chose to keep the existing plurality electoral systems. This favored single-party governments. On the contrary, right-wing

parties that were afraid that they would be ousted out of power due to growing socialist dominance chose proportional representation (PR). Under PR systems, the Left would not be able to form strong majority single-party governments, and thus the Right would still have power in the political system. These arguments then suggest that the underlying social cleavages and political parties' survival strategies determined the choice of electoral institutions.

More recently, alternative theories of the origins of electoral systems have been put forward. Here, we focus on a theoretical account that links the underlying production and labor relations with the origins of electoral systems. According to this account, advanced by Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, the ruling right-wing parties acted as agents of the groups they represented, which were employers' organizations. In economies where employers' organizations had already established networks of cooperation and coordination with trade unions, the ruling right-wing parties chose PR electoral systems. The reason was that since PR systems encourage coalition governments and consensus building between the government and the opposition, both employers and trade unions would be guaranteed representation in the policy-making process. Only under a PR system could the existing cooperation between the holders of capital and workers be further fostered. Thus, in countries that had established coordinated forms of capitalism (corporatist systems), the ruling parties chose PR electoral systems. In contrast, where unions and employers did not cooperate, the ruling right-wing parties chose to retain the existing plurality electoral systems.

### Other and Future Research in Political Economy

The debate on the origins of formal political institutions is likely to continue in the future. In the meantime, other important questions still need to be addressed within the field of political economy. Questions of the democratic legitimacy of economic and political institutions that make up our contemporary expert democracies (such as central banks and various regulatory agencies) have not been addressed sufficiently. Does economic efficiency legitimize reducing democratic rights to vote on the economy? This question is becoming particularly

relevant as economic globalization empowers transnational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund or the European Central Bank. Scholars of political economy will have to seriously study the role of such institutions in domestic politics as they are becoming relevant players and even "partners" in governments' policy decisions in areas such as taxation and social welfare.

If the conduct of economic policy is changing thanks to economic globalization, do voters' preferences and evaluations change as well, or do they remain strongly determined by their local and national realities? How do voters evaluate their leaders when they implement policies that have been "imposed" on them? Do we see a new cosmopolitan versus national cleavage in electoral politics? Such questions cannot be adequately answered until the role of international actors is integrated into the study of domestic economic decision making.

Scholars who work primarily within the field of international political economy have looked at how domestic politics affect foreign economic policy (e.g., Beth Simmons) or the international financial architecture (e.g., Barry Eichengreen). In addition, important work has been done by scholars who work in the intersection of international and comparative political economy, such as Bill Clark or Ronald Rogowski, who study how the global economy constrains national economic policy making. Unfortunately, there is no space here to present this important work. The challenge for political economy in the 21st century is to devise models that capture the tension between global economics and national politics and, particularly, the tension between global market forces and domestic political competition.

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*See also* Development, Political; International Political Economy; Mercantilism; Power and International Politics; Public Office, Rewards

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## POLITICAL INTEGRATION

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Political integration refers to the integration of components within political systems; the integration of political systems with economic, social, and other human systems; and the political processes by which social, economic, and political systems become integrated. The context in which the term *political integration* is used indicates which of these three dimensions of political integration is being referenced. A country may have a highly integrated political system and yet have little control over its economic, social, and regional systems. Dictatorships often have tightly controlled political elites but cannot dominate the economy and society. Regions made up of several countries engaged in political processes of creating common institutions for both security and trade are often poorly integrated as political systems. The Southern Common Market of four countries

of Latin America (Mercado Común del Sur [Mercosur]: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, founded in 1991) is in the process of strengthening by electing a parliament and expanding membership, while the North American Free Trade Association of three countries (NAFTA; Canada, Mexico, and the United States, formed in 1993) is stagnating or weakening.

The core meaning of integration is *connectedness*. The theoretical context is systems and the integration of its components. Integration is a general characteristic of the relationships among the components of all systems: physical, living, and social.

Human systems have dynamic processes of becoming more or less integrated, and that happens not only through political processes but also through social and economic ones accompanied by patterns of stabilization and destabilization. More than 80% of human societies identified by archaeological research have disintegrated. Integration is part of discussions of the decline and fall of empires, states, and civilizations.

Connectedness of components refers to the *strength* of the relationships among the components, the *inclusiveness* of each of the component's relationships, and the *proportion* of the properties of each component that is affected by those relationships. At one extreme are systems where a change in any characteristic of any component will change all characteristics of all other components with near certainty. An example is a finely tooled clock. At the other extreme are disconnected components where each component behaves independently of the others. This is a set of random elements. In the first case, the system is nearly "perfectly" integrated, and in the second case, there is a random collection of items, not a system. The integration of systems along these three dimensions can be assessed as a probability ranging from 0, or randomness, no relationships at all, to 1, a totally determined system.

### A 20th-Century Concept

The idea of political integration is old, but its "modern" conceptual foundations were established in the 20th century. Before then, the concept of political integration referred to several kinds of strengthening political systems. Empire building

through force from a center to the peripheries was a dominant form of political organization for around 8,000 years. Empires remain shadows of a past since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Versions of European states with “parliaments” and “bureaucracies” pervade the world, using threats, rewards, communications, and nationalism to enhance their control. Federations are as old as our knowledge about political entities attempting to expand beyond assemblies of families, clans, and villages. They persist into the 21st century, if only in a symbolic form of sharing authority between localities and a central government. Some of the most influential countries of this century are federations—Russia, Australia, Canada, the United States, and so on, the United States being among the oldest.

The concept of political systems had taken over from that of states as the defining subject matter of modern political science by the 1950s. The idea of political integration referred to cities, countries, transnational regions, and “security” communities, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Political systems were more general than states, and most social systems had political systems—families, schools, universities, churches—that were marked by identifiable hierarchies that could make binding, authoritative-collective, decisions. The concept of a political system raised the question of the level and the dynamics of its integration. This shift to general theories of political systems was set back in the 1970s by efforts “to bring the state back in” political science rather than seeing the state as one kind of a variety of political systems.

### Hierarchical Systems and Democracy

Political integration is theoretically challenging because political systems are hierarchical and can never be highly integrated systems as though they were finely tooled machines or highly cohesive societies. All hierarchical systems cut and direct relations with the structural principle of subordination and superordination, at the minimum the rulers (fewer) and the ruled (more), attenuating information through vertical flows and controls through intermediaries. The component at the top of the hierarchy has access to all other components through intermediaries, while those at the bottom have only one or two connections, just a level

above them. The challenge is democracy, in which information and control should be nonhierarchical but in which reliance on administrative hierarchies to pursue democratic decisions effectively is also required. The democratic aspiration of “self-governing societies,” “participatory democracy,” and elections of governmental officials have not successfully addressed the issues of complexity and efficiencies of scale necessary for the responsiveness of institutions of governance to democratic political participation.

### Political, Economic, and Social Integration

Since the 16th century, the conceptual distinction between the society, the polity, and the economy has advanced to near permanence in the social sciences. This tripartite separation of political systems of countries is the definition of the liberal or liberal-democratic state, distinguished from totalitarian states with their asserted monolithic control of all individual and groups and from socialist states with government ownership and control of the economy but not the society.

Social integration is the oldest of the modern concepts of integration attributed to the “father” of modern sociology, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). He distinguished between two basic types of social integration: mechanical and organic solidarity. The first is based on similarities in outlook, belief, and characteristics, exemplified by feudal, peasant societies. The second derives from a modern society with division of labor and “functional interdependence” among groups, classes, and individuals. In both cases, social integration is *social cohesion*. The relationships among the components of a society in which each is dependent on others in ways that become more complex constitute social development.

Economic integration, like political integration, does not appear in writings on economics until the 1950s. Unlike political and social integration, it has a clear operational meaning in that it is defined as the absence of barriers, primarily political, to exchange and trade and is tantamount to the world becoming a single economic system with an unencumbered open market.

The term *political integration* is not found in writings on nationalism or state formation until the middle of the 1950s. Nationalism was, however,

one of the major forces for political integration in the 150 years or so before the end of World War II, after which it spread throughout the processes of decolonization in Africa and Asia. It was also a strong force for disintegration under the principle of “self-determination of peoples” directed against the polyethnic empires, the Soviet Union being the last of the large ones. The idea of political integration was that it would be the dominant process for creating larger, perhaps more viable, effective, and, indeed, more peaceful political entities out of thousands of localities and feuding language and ethnic. States would emerge through persuasion rather than conquest, which defined empires that provided peace and prosperity in the past.

Political integration confronts more complex phenomena than either social cohesion or open economic systems. Political systems are defined by a string of several characteristics, at least one of which must be present—the principle of superordination and subordination—in a modern context: hierarchy with authority. For theoretical reasons, additional characteristics may include legitimacy, collective decision capacity, and rules of withdrawal. Nevertheless, political systems must have hierarchy, and hierarchies have limits to their degree of integration by the very presence of intermediaries. As political systems expand or are involved in social and economic changes, their level of integration decreases. In addition, as the economy and society become more integrated and more responsive to each other, the political system will lose its relative control over them. That is, the appeal of the short-term maxim for political leaders to “divide and rule.” Changes as well as social and economic integration diminish the core logic of hierarchical control of a political system to select and pursue collective goals.

### Political Development and the European Union

One of the two main projects of political science to promote political integration was the political development of the newly independent states to establish the post-World War II order of a decolonized world. Political development became the focus for inducing change to establish political systems in newly independent states that could command and control processes of economic and

social development. Political integration was taken as one of the conditions of political development. The instruments of political integration were a common political culture, political institutions, and “modern” values. These instrumentalities were applied to authoritarian, military, as well as democratic systems. Nation building, however, took time and patterns of success were mixed, especially in parts of Africa and Asia. Political development lost its theoretical prominence in political science in the late 1960s as the tensions of the Cold War intensified. It might regain that position as a challenge conceived as the democratic political development of all political systems and not just of new democracies.

The second political integration project was European integration to create a common security zone both among European countries and between them and an ascendant, threatening Soviet Union. That project attracted a variety of theories about political integration, one of the better known of which was the spillover theory of learning cooperation from narrow sectors, such as steel production, that could expand to other areas and, eventually, to common political institutions. The European Union, although its trajectory of political integration may have peaked in the first decade of the 21st century, stands as one of the triumphs of political thinking and theory in changing the world. That knowledge is engaged in addressing the problems of global political integration.

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*See also* Democracy, Theories of; Development, Political; European Integration; Political Systems, Types; Regime (Comparative Politics)

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## POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Political philosophy is the part of philosophy dealing with politics and government, that unstable mix of war and *foedus* (treaty), conflictual division, and authoritative union. As “philosophy,” it is part of the *vita contemplativa*, which is pure thinking; as “political,” it has to do with *vita activa*, which is action and praxis in a world that exists with its own rules and language games before any philosophical attempt is made to make that world the embodiment of a theory, as did Plato. Philosophy, like science, is about truth, whereas politics is about power or, in a more sophisticated view, the *constrained* use of social power that reintroduces truth into the possible constraints alongside rhetoric, persuasion, compromise, and negotiation. *Vita activa* may be viewed either as a part of the philosophical activity, the “theory of *praxis*,” until philosophy disappears only to be “realized” in politics, itself bound to wither away in a completely new age, as in Marx’s construction, or, more commonly, as a necessary topic of political philosophy (Michael Walzer, 2007). It has also been held that political philosophy is concerned with the core concepts that issue from both the human condition and the cultural models whose change is beyond the scope of conscious collective choices, whereas political theory, closer to *vita activa*, should deal with what is the object, at least partially, of choice and willful collective action. In any case, the “real talk” in politics is far away from the “ideal speech” in philosophy as well as from the “crucial experiment” in science; it is endless and never stops (Walzer, 2007) and, in fact, even concludes with an “evaluation,” unless a stronger power, whether it is a dictator, a majority, or the “judgment of history,” decides to put an end to it for a time. After defining

the field, this entry examines how political philosophy got its autonomy and its professionalization and then describes its epistemological background. Finally, this entry deals with the challenges to an universalist political philosophy represented by the claims of identities and the slow emergence of non-Western political philosophies.

### The Domains of Political Philosophy

However important the tensions between the respective requirements of *vita contemplativa* and *vita activa*, political philosophy is now thriving in political science as “thought,” “theory,” or “philosophy.” Textbooks, collections, encyclopedias, treatises, and essays about political philosophy flourish, suggesting a need for connecting the knowledge gained through political science to a concern for a better life and human emancipation. This work suggests, too, that political scientists were definitely convinced that the scientific study of politics is far from providing a sufficient and adequate knowledge of politics and that critical theorists, and especially Jürgen Habermas, had been right at least in stating that a mere cognitive interest in objective “facts” divorced from any concern for a better life and human emancipation produced a deeply flawed “science.” Political philosophies, which are historically variable, share in the common endeavor to elaborate, make explicit, and assess the taken-for-granted conceptions of an age, with political philosophy being viewed by Michael Oakeshott as an “abridgment of a tradition.” The historicists hold that philosophies are never above the political battles but are part and parcel of them. Admittedly, such a view, albeit dominant, gives rise to many debates, even among historians. It may also be claimed that a philosopher can and must reject historicism, escape from the confines of a historical context, and interpret all historical realities by taking as a starting point the rejection of violence and the liberty of each one within the confines of the satisfaction of all. The “good” is not to be considered as a social construction but as an objective reality, thus putting some rigorous order in the messy state of political opinions, however thoughtful (Leo Strauss, 1959; Eric Weil, 1971). In any case, philosophy, pertaining to *episteme*, is not the servant of the *doxa* of opinions, endowed with the status of objective

reality through the intensive use of scientific surveys, since its aim is to convince people that they can and must change their opinion, an arduous and sometimes very perilous task (Strauss, 1959). The combat of liberal political philosophy can be taken as an example, including Muslim philosophy's criticism of the widely popular use of the most rigid interpretations of Islamic shariah in political, criminal, and family matters. Even the Straussian brand of Islamic philosophy goes through the same predicament (Charles Butterworth, 2002).

These are some, among many, troubling problems confronting contemporary political philosophy in its quest for the relations between the realm of well-grounded principles and the realms of actual institutions and behaviors. Political philosophy, like empirical political science, deals with what John Searle names "institutional reality." Yet that does not mean that institutional reality depends on our linguistic fancies. It has, as Max Weber put it, a "cultural arbitrary nature," but that means only that other political arrangements are possible and the current ones may become unreal, not that language is simply a way to take our beliefs, intentions, or desires and broadcast them aloud. Once the ontological categories are created by, and accepted in, the language, the reality they show becomes analogous to the noninstitutional reality, and the Fregean distinction between meaning and reference applies. That is why political philosophy cannot be the ideal construction of a well-meaning solitary philosopher.

Since the 1970s, political philosophy has been considered as the part of political theory that, being neither empirical nor formal ("positive"), is not scientific. Bhikhu Parekh (1968) sorts out its three domains: (1) political ontology (e.g., Aristotle's *polis*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's general will, and Oakeshott's modes of experience), (2) political epistemology (political knowledge's structure, instruments, and practical utility), and (3) political logic (argument, language, and principles of strategy). It is a valid mode of knowledge different from scientific knowledge yet not contradictory to it. It is not disputed that in certain cases it is even possible to derive "ought" from "is." Political philosophy treats empirical data in a nonempirical way; it elicits their essential structure and puts them within a coherent framework. It is both a

model *of* and a model *for* reality, the main goal of which is more logic than empiricism, so its premises and goals are first of all evaluative regardless of the standards of evaluation used. This raises the issue of justification when the idea of foundation, rational, or other, is missing. Admittedly, this view is not shared by those influenced by the neurosciences and neo-Darwinism, who hold that science does not need philosophy to promote normative and praxeological principles, nor by those to whom politics cannot be an object of science and thus does not need it. It is, however, still dominant despite the early assault of analytical philosophy. The hard version of analytical philosophy used to deem political philosophy meaningless: If philosophy is a second-order activity—that is, neither empirical nor evaluative but aiming exclusively at testing the logical coherence of the meaning of concepts and statements—it ensues that political principles, precisely because they are evaluative—that is, neither true nor false—cannot be philosophically justified. Political philosophy must be confined to what Felix Oppenheim calls the "reconstruction" of concepts and must get rid of illogical assumptions such as the ideas that ethics has no relation to facts, that science has no relation to values, and that it is contradictory to claim that ethics involves both value judgments and scientific theory. Yet since John Rawls's integration of a normative perspective in his analysis of justice, analytical philosophers have accepted political philosophers into their ranks, and conversely, empirical theorists are no longer declaring political philosophy "dead" for lack of empirical content, as was suggested in the 1950s by David Easton, Peter Laslett, and Robert Dahl.

Philosophy was long considered to be synonymous with true science. Likewise, political philosophy was the fount of theoretical political knowledge and thus of political science. In the ancient and medieval conception of "practical philosophy," this knowledge was also practical since it aimed at the synthesis of philosophical principles and empirical observations, distinct from both the analysis of processes as "objects" and the abstract deduction *more geometrico* from first principles taken as the foundation of reality. Politics was considered basically as a process of government to be both empirically known and normatively assessed in order to improve through



education the rulers' moral virtues and ability to perform their task and the contenders' moral and technical bases to contest the incumbents' positions. Political philosophy was then the performance of that endeavor, whether or not the members of a polity, be it a tribe, a city, a kingdom, or an empire, used the term *politics* or thought of its rules as a separate domain, distinct from religious or ethnic rules. By the same token, political philosophy need not have been named as such since the term *philosophy* points to the rational quest for wisdom and has to be ignored or demeaned in societies ruled by the belief in a natural order of things or a supreme knowledge submitting reason to the revelation of a god-given law. Political thought was never absent from the world of classical Islam, yet *falsafa* (Islamic thought founded on interpretations of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism) was always less developed and authoritative than *sunna* (the knowledge derived from the study of the Holy Koran), despite the great names of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) or Al-Farabi being associated with it. In the Catholic Church's doctrine, philosophy was deemed "the servant of theology," and though René Descartes in a very Aristotelian fashion put philosophy at the root of all kinds of knowledge, it was because it still appeared possible to marry a specific philosophy to Christian theology, despite Blaise Pascal's admonitions against philosophies. Admittedly, a problem had to arise if religions were torn apart by religious (*fitna* in Islamic parlance) and not merely by economic, ethnic, and dynastic deadly conflicts, together with the symmetric problem of the relations between peoples of different religions that claim to be universal and aim for the conversion of nonbelievers to the religion reigning in a definite area. It was thus necessary to coexist and haggle with the "significant others" since they could not (and for certain theologians, such as the Italian Jesuits in China, should not) be converted right away. In those cases, a philosophy of some sort, as well as a corpus of laws (the Roman *jus gentium*), was needed to justify different practices, from war to peaceful cooperation, on a basis sounder than the mere empirical fact that, until the final conversion of the whole world to the true faith, a political compromise had to be passed between empires even though they were waging war on one another. Usually, such a philosophy

took the form of some natural law common to different religions, a view still largely held today, when "religions" are complemented or replaced by "cultures" and "civilizations."

### Contemporary Political Philosophy and Its Professionalization

The fundamental change occurred as the outcome of two processes: the *autonomization of political reason*, contemporary to the European religious wars, and the *autonomization of philosophy*, following the evolution of the concept of science.

In the realm of government, after the age of god-kings in large units came the age of an ontological vision, including the notion of a basic tension between the transcendental and mundane orders articulated by elites that carried models of a cultural order centered on the belief in the creation of the world according to some transcendental vision and command (Shmuel Eisenstadt, 1986). Hence, the "clerical" idea that the "sword," albeit responsible for restructuring the political order, was accountable before a higher authority, be it God or divine law, represented by the "pen." This model was slowly thrown down with the emergence of the sovereign state, which had to be justified and legitimated for its own sake. In Strauss's curious and creative interpretation of Thomas Hobbes, nature and God went radically beyond the reach of Reason's intelligence, and the only "natural law" (the "desire of liberty"—i.e., of survival) that makes the world of the "state of nature" unbearable by each one also makes the political world of "civil society" bearable by all. This led to the *de jure* separation of the legitimacy of an order given and revealed by a "comprehensive moral doctrine" (in Rawls's parlance) and the legitimacy of a constructed artificial order founded on the necessity of peaceful coexistence between individuals and groups divided by an irrepressible mutual distrust and prone to resort to violence to avoid being unjustly subjugated by others. The safety of physical bodies came to be seen as more important than the salvation of souls. The move was spotted by Strauss in Nicolò Machiavelli's work. Strauss thought that such a sea change justified political "ferociousness," whereas Isaiah Berlin found it morally valid as a part of civic humanism. This marked the beginning of a trend

leading to the assertion that the two principles of legitimacy (religious and political) should be kept separated as a consequence of the necessary supremacy of the state's sovereignty. In the political realm, the logic of sovereignty had to prevail, and the sovereign's authority, according to Hobbes, was *jure divino* (divine law), whereas the clerks' authority was only *jure civili* (civil law).

Be it the mark of the new age of "self-assertion," breaking with any revealed theology or foundational philosophy, or, as it is still held by some, the permanence of a political theology masquerading under a new guise (Carl Schmitt, 1988), the original feature of the new ontology was not first secularization, since religion did not immediately lose its grip on public life to be replaced by an improbable, even to this day, "naked public space," but the progressive appearance of a public sphere governed by the primacy of politics and a public morality within the limits of the political order. This does not mean that moral requirements disappeared altogether from the depths of society, since morality is a universal feature, although it is doubtful whether a substantive "thick" universal morality does exist, or that the sovereign governed by "reason of state" is devoid of any morality. Nor did morality depend on the sovereign's self-interest since norms and values do not exist just for efficiency reasons.

For these reasons, the ontology of the axial age faded away in Western political spheres and only there. It is still more alive and deep-rooted than ever in Islamic modernity, where a host of self-styled revolutionary reformers maintain the subjection of politics to justice—that is, a God-given morality under which the individual cannot but be genuinely free since Islamic law and human nature are in perfect harmony, which requires a type of Islamic politics where the individual could be both free and governed. In the Western world, it did not wither away in the moral sphere, divine law being at times merely replaced by human rights, global justice, or biodiversity, all things supposed to be located above politics yet interacting with it and imposing duties on peoples and governments (which may induce the revival of the old and permanent temptation to devise a monist political theory similar to the Islamic one). When Baron de Montesquieu, later followed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Alexis de Tocqueville, diagnosed the

emergence of a "new political science," outlined in *L'Esprit des lois* (The Spirit of the Laws), he both rejected the direct criticism of political practice for moral reasons and advocated a morality not to be left to the decision of sentiments. He emphasized openly the need for a political philosophy that had been slowly developing and expanding since the 16th century, namely, the search for the relationship between power politics and moral character. Hence, the great divide, still very topical, between the "civil Enlightenment" of Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf, where political authority is based on its desacralization and on conventions binding physical bodies governed by the *conatus sese preservandi* (self-preservation), and the "metaphysical Enlightenment" of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Immanuel Kant, "resacralizing" the political realm by basing it not on theology but on a philosophy of the "kingdom of ends" (Ian Hunter, 2001). The first Enlightenment gives preeminence to the legal system and leaves ethics to the private sphere, which may pave the way for moral relativism since many legal rules disciplining practices need not be based on deep philosophical reasoning but only on historical conventions and political convenience, defining for a time what kind of behavior cannot be tolerated. The second Enlightenment expounds the necessary relation between the legal and moral systems, a point stressed today by the varieties of republicanisms, which may lead to the determination of a single moral system as the universally best way, a subject of most of the controversies on the relationship between multiculturalism, universalism, and equality in liberal democracy. Therefore, political philosophy is today always more or less in tension with moral philosophy and more generally with different realms—aesthetic, religious, economic, and so on.

With the appearance of a new conception of natural science and its later extension to the ideational, linguistic, material, and strategic interactions between human beings in specific physical, ecological, and economic contexts, philosophy acquired a new meaning.

Science has always been viewed as a cumulative way to reach the objective truth through formal argument and regulated observation made available to everyone (depending on the political contexts) rather than by revelation, persuasion, or rhetoric, but it was still conceived as a way to be

the mirror of reality, a “natural philosophy” confirming the order and beauty of a god-made world. Yet science was becoming divorced from this concern, and in the realm of politics it came to be seen as no longer paving the way for the discovery and prediction of what a “good polity” was and should be in every conceivable case. Admittedly, there are still attempts to solve Montesquieu’s problem by reducing philosophy to scientific psychology, as advocated by Dahl in the 1950s; to devise a theory of democracy by bringing empirical and formal theories closer; to use the social welfare function to determine the proper domain of a good government; to elicit the conditions making majority rule both logical and legitimate; and above all to explain why democracy is the only good regime today, a statement that for the moment lacks an indisputable scientific foundation, democracy being actually less valued than the security brought about by a real and effective state and the economic prosperity brought about by good institutions. However, several psychological studies have to admit that it is impossible to disentangle the logics of “appropriation” (avoiding the “gaffes”) and utility maximization, and it is necessary to rely on a “sense of fairness” close to Aristotle’s concept of justice, which can be observed through surveys but, given its variegated meanings in specific contexts, cannot be conceptualized without resorting to a philosophy taking into account the “public culture” of a given society (Rawls, 1971, 1993, 2001).

For that reason, most of these attempts are based on implicit or explicit philosophical foundations despite their use of empirical or formal (rational choice) scientific research. Several democratic empirical theories actually depend on grand narratives that treat history as a whole as the grand theories of big science treat the evolutionary nature of physical realities, and they do so by moralizing the events. It is *because* political science today has built-in democratic features—roughly, the “bottom” explains the “top,” the “micro” explains the “macro,” and the individual is a well-meaning and rational being—that it comes to hold that democracy is the best political regime and not because the “value-free” scientific research (a contested concept) has decisively proved that democracy is the one best way, which is merely confusing the causes and the consequences of the statement.

The reverse—a “neutral” position on the evaluation of democracy—seems closer to the facts because both the “strong program” of sociology of science and liberalism (as both an intellectual climate and a philosophy) hold that empirical political science can flourish only when there is a pluralism that does not treat democracy as the best way.

Besides, with the waning of general theories aiming at lawlike generalizations applicable to the whole society without leaving anything outside their explanatory system (organicism and holism—both of them still upheld in the natural sciences—and functionalism, systems analysis, and historicism), political science has come to be perceived as the systematic study of institutions and social mechanisms in a state of permanent disequilibrium and provisional equilibrium, viewed as a game’s stable outcome achieved through institutions grown by rational actors in a context not finalized by the market. The mechanisms and models are simplifications of reality, not because they are not observable in real life but because they are always embedded in a specific combination of other mechanisms. So, between the mere historical narrative and the nomological ambition, social science aims at the fine-grained analysis of a given society and regime through the use of abstract causal models that may be exported from a given context to another but cannot be considered as “laws” since, in real life, two mechanisms may logically coexist while being contrary to each other. For example, a state may have a formal commitment to democracy, yet it might exhibit authoritarian behaviors in its operation. Moreover, mechanisms are always “local,” that is, particular and limited by borders, and so causality is equally local and cannot be replicated but only adapted to fit empirical observations. Jon Elster’s two laws of pseudoscience—“everything is a little bit like everything else” and “everything is causally related to everything else”—are no longer taken seriously. Only functionalism still withstands the assault of analytical sociology, at least in so far as it is carefully “situated.”

This move toward a science of embedded and combined mechanisms has deprived political science of the claim, still maintained in certain departments of economics, of being able to forecast the future as a whole. But lest the science of politics become the art of entertainment and storytelling, it

had to revive the plea for political relevance, long ago taken for granted, then thriving in the 19th-century “noble science of politics” and later openly voiced as a reaction to behavioralism. Not that empirical science lacks a certain political relevance. For example, the elucidation of mechanisms and the findings of behavioral economics, by helping us better understand the causes and (often unintended) consequences of our actions, may lead to an assessment of the conditions of the possibility of political actions and then to an intelligent practical action. But unless those prescriptions are based on a comprehensive philosophical view of the world as a whole, they remain limited to specific and local cases.

So the revival of political philosophy was marked by “the return of grand theory” (Quentin Skinner, 1990). The main obstacle to philosophy as a rational endeavor was long erected by the natural sciences since, as Bernard Williams has noted, the pursuit of scientific truth alone leads to a disconnection between reason, on the one hand, and individual and collective goals, on the other. But if social sciences do not pursue that fantastic endeavor or pursue it in a more modest way, philosophy regains some ground. If the good polity made by good citizens, good institutions, and good rulers is to be from now on beyond the reach of empirical political science despite the valuable efforts made to work out new theories of government, both descriptive and prescriptive, it remains nevertheless a highly relevant endeavor and philosophy. At least in its practical and prudential form, it has to thrive again to restructure political space in order to annul for a moment political time by encompassing it in a worldview. So political philosophy has revived what was called with some contempt the “traditional theory,” combining perennial questions (What should man be for the political order to be livable? What should the political order be for man to live a “good life”?) and historical contexts (the diagnosis of a social disease, outline of a better future order, or reinsertion of politics into a wider order). Today, political philosophy figures in some introductory courses of political science as a part of the political theory canon identifying the main domains of scientific research of which it is a necessary input: order, democracy, community, equality, legitimacy, justice, and narrativity.

Political philosophy stays in some respect aloof from apocalyptic or revolutionary utterances since, contrary to the opinion of Max Weber, the different quests for a better world and an axiological rationality are not doomed to lead to a “war of gods.” Even though we have long and too well known that the collision of ultimate values may lead to murderous, and unfortunately necessary and even “just,” wars (suffice it to recall the real stake of World War II), such a violent outcome is by no means fatal since such a collision is also a permanent feature of a pluralist and peaceful view of politics (Berlin, 1962), and it may be restricted and kept under control in a “cold war.” If it is true that several worlds are indeed conceivable and equally good, it is impossible to have the best of all of them, and political philosophy has to put up with this imperfect state of affairs without lapsing into the perspective of “the extreme case” through the subjection of politics to a “methodological exceptionalism” of some sort, where the “exception” (the crisis) is part of the “rule” (ordinary politics)—that is, a “warlike” framework from which all the other political states should be derived (Schmitt, 1972, 1988).

Philosophy can perform that task in two entirely different ways that have long been the watershed of the discipline. The first one, from Plato to Karl Marx, Friedrich von Hayek, and Robert Nozick, considers politics as something awkward, superficial, and empty since, like the state itself, it cannot be reduced by an iconography of order. Therefore, the genuine reality must be located elsewhere, in “society,” biology, religion, law, economy, philosophy, and so on. Politics is then a social misformation that should, and could, disappear some day from this world. The alternative, dating back to Aristotle, is to view politics with all its “patterned disorder” as a constitutive dimension of the human condition (Walzer, 2007), the frontiers and values of which may widely vary and be expanded or displaced, as evidenced today by the various feminist political philosophies insisting, for instance, on completing “justice” by replacing it with “care” as the foundation of a fair political community. This entails substantial changes in the assessment of past political philosophies and political science itself. A third way has recently appeared, stating that we are currently witnessing the transformation of the idea of political community

inherited from European history and its Westphalian turn, which may lead to a revival of cosmopolitics, with notions worked out by empirical as well as philosophical theories such as global citizenship, global civil society, transnational governance, world government, global state, and world-state, reminiscent of Dante's universal "Empire" expounded in *Monarchia* and Alexandre Kojève's comparable concept of a universal homogeneous state. Although the idea of a world-state is sometimes rejected by cosmopolitics and has been strongly criticized by Walzer as a dystopian top-down tyranny (the opposite of the Kantian advocacy of a league of small republics), those ideas are alive since many of them stem from the contention that politics should not be viewed as the taming of the social war and the containment of violent conflicts opposing virtual enemies. Rather, striving to address problems such as climate change and poverty by addressing the factors generating them is the only proper task of politics since politics is first of all about the production of public goods and the implementation of global justice. Although the last position is strongly denied by those holding that social justice can only be conceptualized within domestic politics—that is, the state—globalism requires other virtues such as the Kantian duty to assist those who need it the most. The same problem surfaces when one moves from social to economic justice, raised, among others, by "the more Rawlsian than Rawls," such as Thomas Pogge. Actually, the plausibility of such a turn does not depend on philosophical arguments but on the psycho-sociological consequences of those global changes: If, as it seems almost certain, they entail a vastly unequal distribution of costs and benefits among different areas, then the "common enemy" will not unite humankind but will turn certain frustrated human groups against others and philosophy shall be back to square one.

This leads at times to the fading of the Hobbesian divide. On the one hand, the realist theory of international relations holds that, whatever the preferences of reason, conflict is the order itself and, accordingly, virtual wars are always possible in a metaphorical state of nature, which does not mean that realism is averse to international law and morality. So war may be legitimized by self-defense against aggression, which keeps alive the issue of the moral legitimacy of war, a very ancient concern

of Christian, Muslim, Indian, Buddhist, and Chinese political thought, especially in the thorny issues of the preventive use of force and armed humanitarian interventions without the mandate of the United Nations. On the other hand, the liberal philosophy of domestic relations, where war is banished, civility within conflict should reign, and conflict, albeit a necessary component of a vibrant polity, has its magnitude and severity limited by the requirements of order, may question the necessity of a sovereign to reach that goal, one of the most pressing issues of contemporary political science and philosophy since it encompasses all the claims to the obsolescence of the Hobbesian divide. Rawls has attempted to take into account the resilience of the Hobbesian divide by devising another "veil of ignorance" applicable to the construction of justice in the "international community" while getting rid of the concept of (an implicitly "sovereign") "state" (replaced by "people") (Rawls, 1999).

Whatever the life chances of those opposing viewpoints, the professionalization of political philosophy, different according to each historical context, should not be construed as making irrelevant other forms of political reflections derived from religious beliefs and above all from works of art, such as Homer's epic poetry, Greek tragedy, Shakespeare's plays, or, closer to our times, the works of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Robert Musil, George Orwell, or Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. It may even be claimed that political philosophy and any form of political thought have a "literary dimension," with Martha Nussbaum stressing that the texts always express the linkage between *what* is said and *how* it is said and Stanley Cavell viewing autobiography as intrinsic to all interesting philosophical writing. Of course, philosophy remains bound to seek self-understanding and the understanding of human culture by using logical reasoning instead of an edifying narrative. Yet it remains possible that in such a sense it may miss something vital in politics if it is a knowledge not born of pain and passion since those passions and emotions cannot be tamed by pure reason or even instrumental rationality, so reason cannot rule unfettered in the human world. As Williams noticed, philosophy's shortcoming may be having kept the traces, dating back to the 5th century BCE and earlier, of an Epicurean conscience not yet superseded by Plato's

and Aristotle's endeavors to make our relation to the world fully intelligible.

Although a significant part of contemporary political philosophy appears dedicated to keeping political tragedy at bay, a sense of tragedy lingers, due to the Senecian conflict between the individual will to excel in the practice of self-domination and the political and institutional conventions of the city and also to a conflict involving the meaning and foundation of different values within the same set of conventions. In this respect, the warnings of green political theory are, sometimes unwittingly, not devoid of a tragic character, and, especially but not only in international relations, the practical tensions between restorative justice (righting the wrongs of the past) and peace (ensuring harmony in the present) are more complex than several philosophers seem to think. An idealist and heroic effort to deny any place to tragedy lies at the heart of many contemporary philosophies of democracy: such as economic, deliberative, judicialized, communication based and Kantian republican, educative, without enemies, strong, and cosmopolitan.

Most of them (the economic theories being the obvious exception) extol the virtues of rational and peaceful dialogue as a necessary and sometimes sufficient condition not only of philosophical practice but also of real-world democratic politics, forgetting too often that an ideal dialogue leading to consensus is only one of the many features of a complex process that brings about interaction, understanding, and mutual agreement through a host of creative proceedings, majority decisions, negotiation, compromise, lawmaking, jurisprudence, socialization, economic innovation, and so on (Walzer, 2007). Likewise, the opposite concept, the will of the majority, does not exist as a plain empirical fact, and Dahl's concept of polyarchy is closer to facts, although it leaves out the issue of the necessary decision stressed by Weber. It may even be dangerous if taken as the dogma of the will of the people. The people as a plurality (the Aristotelian multitude) has no unified will except the universal (and universalist) banality that every human being wants to live in the *tranquillitas ordinis* (tranquility of order) of a just and safe society protected against "outsiders," which leads more to interpretive divisions than to political consensus, as evidenced in collapsing states where different

peoples want to make up a people without agreeing on its identity, one of the main issues of secession and self-determination. Yet a majority is neither useless nor devoid of validity. It, along with deliberation, is one of the many practical devices invented to reach an acceptable decision. Both of them need prior conditions to function smoothly.

### A Tentative Normative Epistemology of Contemporary Political Philosophy

That leads one to venture out into a bit of normative epistemology. First, like historical sociology, political philosophy must eschew both the illusion of "historical inevitability" (the present is already written in the past) and the "fallacy of discontinuity" (the present is *radically* new yet bound to happen).

Second, although philosophy resembles science in so far as it has to rely on argument without claiming any longer to be the mirror of nature, the validity of political philosophy's discoveries should be viewed as different from scientific discoveries. Because philosophical "truths" cannot claim the monopoly held by vindicated scientific theories (at least provisionally until they are falsified by a new scientific discovery), they do have the same status as scientific ones. Political philosophy seeks a balance, depending on practical contexts, between values, for instance, "negative" and "positive" liberty or the "politics of faith" and the "politics of skepticism." Far from being a weakness, this is the enduring strength of contemporary political philosophy: not to edict a theory of everything and to accept as a truth the plurality of reality and so the reasonable pluralism of different philosophies, by nature partial and incomplete, without falling into the relativism of mere opinions. As Williams says about Berlin, being "truthful" is perhaps the only way to be true.

Third, political philosophy should stay away from both sociological and philosophical reductionisms (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1983). Sociological reductionism makes philosophical statements and their reception a secondary effect of social determinations; therefore, they need not be studied in themselves but can be explained away as prescientific. Yet sociology properly understood may account for the emergence of ideas and their context of discovery, but it does not

follow that the context of justification and justification itself can be disposed of by the same method. On the other hand, philosophical reductionism as a narrative drawing a stylized and idealized picture of politics is flawed, not so much because it may presuppose a human being “floating” above history and untied from any social relation but because it excludes from empirical reality everything that does not conform to its philosophical requisites. As Walzer (2007) puts it, “Habermas argues for unconstrained communication, but he means only to exclude the constraints of force and fraud, deference, fear, flattery and ignorance” (p. 26). Paradoxically, such a reductionism substitutes opinions and impressions for sound empirical knowledge. This does not by any means entail the banishment of utopia from political philosophy: Utopia is not the depiction of an actual perfect future but the present depiction of what shall never be. It is a “transcendental horizon” we should always keep in mind to help us stay alert when dealing with the actual political arrangements of today.

Last, political philosophers should be aware that they operate in different contexts and temporalities than political actors. Walzer (2007) suggests that perhaps philosophy is politics construed in tranquility, while politics is philosophy implemented in confusion. This does not mean that philosophers should ignore real politics or symmetrically agree to become politicians (or claim to be their masters). Quite the opposite—according to Walzer, they should be aware that their discourse has no value if they do not care for the details of the problems and situations they are commenting on, provided they refrain from playing the philosopher-king. For once, it is not the Devil who is in the details; it is humility and the absence of arrogance.

### Universalism, Localism, and the Challenge of Identities

Contemporary political philosophy, constrained by the duty to be contemplative and reflexive, yet practical and prescriptive, is also facing the unavoidable challenge to say something universally valid at least “in reach,” in Rawls’s parlance, while being “municipal” and interpretative of the local conventions of an age or a civilization. Western philosophy with its various brands—contractarian,

utilitarian, republican, even communitarian, or pragmatic and ironic—occupies most of the field, and most controversies take place within the general framework of political liberalism and democracy. Some important issues include the requirements of a moral life in liberalism, the nature of political obligation, the justification of economic liberalism, the logical consistency of a liberal social justice and democratic equality, the logical requisites of justice and equality, the possibility of a “civic liberalism,” the rules governing institutional design in a democratic context, the role of random selection (“sortition”) in resource allocation and more generally in the improvement of democratic processes in various domains, and, finally, the debates around the right normative framework for justifying democracy, whereby collective decision-making procedures should be justified in terms of their epistemic value—that is, their ability to produce the “right” solution for collective problems to achieve political equality, the fundamental standard of evaluation of procedures and outcomes being political equality. Two requisites are opposed: epistemic proceduralism versus a particular substantive theory of justice, the first one being conceived as escaping the accusation of ethnocentrism confining democracy in a predetermined set of standards.

One should mention here the powerful critiques of Alastair MacIntyre, a critic of analytical philosophy coming from its ranks, and the deconstructionist assaults of Michel Foucault. Foucault is more appreciated for his insistence on the micro-foundations of power in the depths of modern society, disciplined and subjected to governmentality, than for his philosophical ideas on the status of truth and ethics. His statements on “a political history of truth” are ambiguous enough to go beyond a mere social history of science (and morality) to be suspected of unfettered relativism, which would render void his own statements. Actually, Foucault has an ethical sensitivity. He may be right in criticizing the definitive finding of substances such as transcendental truth and morality beyond the contingency of identities, but that does not exonerate him from the duty to search for the truth, without which any agreement should be considered an agreement about truth. As for Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Emmanuel Levinas (the latter being more included by others

in political philosophy than claiming to belong to the tribe), they oscillate between the deconstruction of liberal philosophy, a metapolitical philosophy, and a philosophy of metapolitics.

Therefore, the dominant Western philosophy remains the legatee of the diverse kinds of Enlightenment. One of the only noticeable exceptions is the antiliberalism represented by the Straussian pocket of resistance. Strauss, in his American period, had moved to an untimely liberalism and, albeit careful to distinguish between “ancient” and “modern” liberalisms, paid his respects to modern liberal education. The other two exceptions are the legacy of Joseph de Maistre, and Donoso-Cortès and Carl Schmitt and the conservative thought. The first one is almost outside the borders of “professional” political philosophy, and the second one may claim that being “conservative” it does not deign to be a philosophy. As for nationalism, flourishing under various guises, secular or religious, it must be taken seriously by a political philosophy not entranced by the charms of cosmopolitanism. There may be important arguments about the different types of nationalism or the liberal flavor of certain nationalisms and their compatibility with liberal values, but it cannot be the core of a political philosophy since a nationalist philosophy would be a contradiction in itself.

This apparent dominance of a philosophy born in areas that do not make up more than 15% of the world population and to which the fall of the Berlin Wall marks the beginning of an epochal change in political philosophy brings about its logical and sociological backlash, namely, its indictment of spurious universalism based on a local conception of what an individual is and what his or her concept of liberty, quest for justice, and, more broadly, rationality may mean. To be sure, this small part of the world had once dominated the entire world by founding huge overseas empires, the mere existence and success of which incited many intellectuals belonging to colonized peoples to desert the ranks of traditional thinkers and join the troop of “organic intellectuals,” espousing the basic tenets of the conquerors’ public philosophy to turn it against their imperial endeavor. But despite, or perhaps more accurately because of, the universal success of decolonization and its major theme, anticolonialism, the dual nature of the West, liberal inside and dictatorial

outside, came to be seen not as a logically inconsistent yet sociologically explicable combination of two sets of contrary values but as a whole package of values. This gave rise to *Occidentalism* (the term was coined after Edward Said’s famous *Orientalism* to depict a distorted image of the real object)—all the more so as Marxism, which had long been a powerful tool to convince the colonized elites that they could stick to the Enlightenment while getting rid of its racist and colonialist side, had lost most of its appeal, hence the search for new public philosophies to pursue the unfinished struggle against Western intellectual hegemony and to gain a better understanding of what the subaltern needs and visions actually are.

Such an offhand yet plausible sociology should have nothing to do with a serious philosophical and scientific debate. Yet it is a powerful input that paves the way for new inquiries into the meaning of concepts in areas until now left out of Western philosophical concerns and confined to anthropological and ethnological researches not devoid of biases—hence, the renewed interest in, for example, civil society or freedom. Even more important is the surge of concern for “identities” that deeply modify the usual debates about justice by shifting them from redistribution to recognition. The quarrels over “positive discrimination” lie at the heart of the dilemma of the universal welfare state, trapped in the dual duty of providing services to all on an equal footing and promoting particular categories. They become bitterer when the relevant groups are characterized by their location in a social stratification not based on the division of labor and material reward but on ascriptive traits (religion, ethnicity, and even gender). This may lead to a justification based on a compensating rationality and restorative justice, sometimes curiously put forward to claim that groups whose identities have been excluded, suppressed, or marginalized have a right to the recognition and public toleration of their own intolerant practices. So a combination of cultural relativism and respect for the rights of cultural communities pretends, under the guise of empirical descriptions, to be the political philosophy of our age.

Still more debatable are the assaults against current political philosophy and, by implication, political science. Starting with the now (rightly or wrongly) taken-for-granted demise of sovereignty



as a sociological concept (which it has never been, being a legal concept) and of the “old” theory of the modern nation-state, caricatured as the superposition of one territory, one people, one sovereignty, one constitution, and one homogeneous political space relating directly the individual to the state, they deny most of the value of liberal and republican philosophy when applied to other areas than those where they were born. Parekh, after exposing the cultural particularity of liberal democracy and excoriating the poverty of contemporary Indian political thought, has set himself the task of explaining why Western philosophy stands no chance of succeeding in countries where, for the historical reasons already mentioned above, political institutions of the past are reenacted as alive or revived. Thus, in these societies, according to Parekh (2003), the political imagination is less “disciplined” (a Foucauldian allusion), bolder, more reckless, and prone to explore a broader range of possibilities than in the West.

Parekh’s eulogy can be seen as nothing other than the reverse of the famous “Orientalist” descriptions (perhaps grounded in Hegelian philosophy) that considered non-Western peoples as alien peoples deprived of the values of modern civilization and thus unable to contribute to historical development. A thesis such as Parekh’s suffers from two basic flaws. It does not give us any idea about what such new philosophies might look like, once we have disposed of the Foucauldian fancy of a new “political spirituality,” to which he refers when interpreting the Iranian revolution. One can ask whether the idea of Islamic human rights betters the usual idea of universal human rights or which is the more creative and imaginative of the two conceptions of the relations between religion and politics and the modern role of Muslim legacy that mark the epistemological divide in Islamic political thought: the transcendence of justice as an intangible and eternal trait of the good society versus the historicity of reason. The first epistemology favors revolutionary conceptions of Islam based on ontological premises adverse to political freedom, whereas the second relies precisely on freedom to criticize the first one’s tenets.

In addition, Parekh neglects the necessary combination of universalism and particularism offered by Walzer’s (2007) concept of reiteration. Walzer

begins with a distinction between two universalisms or rather two dimensions of universalism. In the *covering law universalism*, there is one and only one law, one justice, and one correct understanding of the good life, the good society, or the good regime. In the *reiterative universalism*, taking seriously what it means to have a history, every universalist principle is inevitably reiterated in a particular way in its historical existence; even the will to reproduce a principle and to replicate its application brings about some historical singularity. It ensues that the second universalism makes no prediction about the substance of the successive reiterations. Such a line of reasoning provides a solid basis for a moral universalism opposing the obligation to recognize and include groups whose morality is radically at odds with the requirements of a Rawlsian reasonable pluralism and thus freeing the state from its duty of indifference while recognizing at the same time that liberalism is not averse to, and even promotes, the rights of minority cultures. By the same token, political (nonmetaphysical) secularism can be judged as a universal value, provided that it is not restricted to a particular conception sometimes attributed to Western secularism and mainly conceived from a Protestant culture (a position held by Hobbes, Locke, and Voltaire but certainly not by Kant, Tocqueville, or Rawls) and that it does not rely on a rationalist conception of reason, ignoring its plurality and imposing unjustified limits on the manners in which issues are to be brought into the public domain (Rajeev Bhargava, 1998).

To be fair, let us recognize that Parekh’s position is not restricted to an excessive indictment of Western political theory when it ventures overseas. Not only does the empirical basis of Parekh’s theory seem quite defensible and supply a theoretical justification for its call to take into account the comprehensive moral doctrines and reconsider the foundations of an autonomous political philosophy, but it also offers some wise advice to do so. Philosophers must confront those doctrines, expose their logical flaws and their inadmissible moral and political implications, and found their own political theory on a reasonably convincing conception of man and the world. However, this is a very difficult task: If the philosopher is involved in politics, he or she cannot start a deep theoretical inquiry for lack of time. According to Parekh

(2003), if the philosopher wants to escape from *vita activa*, the intellectual liberty required by political theory is missing in societies dominated by the religious, ethnic, or ideological orthodoxies, and even in free societies such as India, the inhibition stems from the fear to question the dominant ideological consensus and so to encourage various forms of extremism. The point is very well taken, and Strauss would have been sensitive to those disenchanting reflections.

At least in countries that are “disciplined” by other means and where a relative freedom of opinion and expression still reigns, one could expect political science and political philosophy to eschew the strange dual efforts to (1) accommodate the idea of singular cultural outlooks, irreducible to one another, and the idea of a world community endowed with common values (short of reducing them to market economy rules) and (2) substantiate the idea that the static identities engendering territorial and cultural boundaries are nothing other than the outmoded legacies of nationalism and imperialism while holding at the same time the opposite idea that the cultural minorities and the borderless nations must be institutionally protected, which supposes that identities are somewhat static and worth perpetuating.

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See also Liberalism; Marxism; Normative Political Theory; Political Science, International Institutionalization; Political Theory

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## POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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The relationships between psychology and politics are complex and have generated both controversy and a substantial amount of research. This entry discusses these relationships, which have been the focus of research in the subfield of political psychology in recent decades. They include personality aspects, group and mass phenomena, emotional intelligence, and political symbolism.

In simplistic terms, sociology refers to collective behaviors and psychology to individual ones. Therefore, it might be expected that political researchers who adopt a collective or structural approach toward political relationships would be the most reluctant to acknowledge the relevance of political psychology, while those who support an individualistic approach would be more likely to recognize its usefulness or even to claim its necessity. But this has not occurred. Political psychology has met with much opposition from both sides. Why? After all, Alexis de Tocqueville, whose work is still highly valued by political scientists in both America and Europe, devoted significant attention to psychological considerations of the way in which political systems work. In the 1930s, Harold Lasswell creatively investigated the links between psychopathology and politics, particularly as regards the motivations behind political involvement.

For a long time, however, strong objections to political psychology prevailed as political science became more and more meticulous and rigorous in its methodological practices. Many works in political psychology were speculative essays without valuable data or detailed theoretical frameworks. In Europe, these weaknesses were most apparent in the macrolevel literature devoted to crowd psychology or the ethnic temper of particular nations.

Among the concepts in this literature that have been rejected by political scientists are the notion of “collective unconscious” coined by Carl Jung, a psychoanalyst who competed with Sigmund Freud; the cliché of the irrational crowd moved by its “collective soul” put forward by Gustave Le Bon, who considered himself the founder of crowd psychology; the “herd mentality,” which was described as a human instinct by Wilfred Trotter; and the approximations of the psychology of various peoples and “national character” that so often appeared in works of the first half of the 20th century. All of these superficial considerations tended to cause confusion and suspicion over the use of psychology in politics. As for the psychology of individual actors, most sociologists have denied its relevance, arguing either that the real motivations of personal behaviors remain inaccessible to knowledge by scientific standards or that investigating these is pointless since social structures or the valorization of social roles (a set of expectations involved in an individual’s social status) are the major explanatory factors. Some of these arguments against the use of psychology have merit, but it must be added that a lack of information or a culture predisposed against the psychological field may also explain, at least partially, the refusal of political researchers to borrow frameworks from this discipline.

What is political psychology? It is not a genuine discipline in its own right, nor is it a branch of psychology because it shows no special interest in generalizing about human behavior beyond the political arena. Rather, it is an interdisciplinary academic field intended to provide insights into the way in which politics functions. In fact, each kind of collective behavior, each political event is an outcome of individual actions aggregated and interacting, as Max Weber strongly asserted. So it is not possible to avoid some theory about the cognitive and emotional processing of man in social life when thinking about politics. But if social structures emerge from personal behaviors, personalities are also socially shaped. Moreover, the macrosocial dimensions of politics strengthen the importance of institutional factors to the detriment of free will. This implies, as Erving Goffman has stated, that we need a psychology for sociologists, very different from that for psychologists and, in many respects, quite restricted. Nevertheless, it is useful and even necessary to avoid neglecting contributions and