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**MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE TRANSGRESSION OF THEOLOGY:
An Inquiry into the Philosophical Implications of the Archive for the Thinking of Theology**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the implications of the thought of Michel Foucault in relation to traditional Systematic Theology. It offers an outline of different types of theology to address the shortcomings exposed in the critique of Systematic Theology.

The first two parts of the thesis are an inquiry into the meaning of an archive. This word identifies an epoch of history, but it is a spatial rather than a chronological emphasis. An archive identifies experiential conditions that limit both the potential and sense of thinking; yet, such limitations simultaneously permit sense and thinking. An archive denies and constitutes possible sense-perception. In relation to knowledge, this calls forward several sociological and historical factors. It was Foucault's uniqueness to place great emphasis on power and on the general sense of the sociology of knowledge.

The focus of Part III rests on the critique of traditional Systematic Theology. In particular, this tradition has tended to presume the correctness of what Schleiermacher called the religious *a priori*. In this approach, the fact of existence demonstrates the necessity of a pregiven source of existence. But this attempt to transcend existence covered up several

important questions related to the experience of the *a priori* from within the archive. Foucault demonstrates that the transcendental tradition did not sufficiently consider its sociological context or the spatial dynamics involved in its production.

In response, there are different types of theological practices available. The first type (called theology A) arises from the affirmation that knowledge is a dynamic archive location. From this point of view the history of Christian thought can be approached as sets of archives in which certain types of God-sense are produced. The second type of theology (called theology B) arises from the affirmation that a critical theology is possible only when, from its location, it orients itself to non-events and non-being. Theology is accomplished critically when it undertakes to affirm itself as both a product of its archive and an orientation toward the available nothingness of its archive.

The work of Michel Foucault opens to theology two different manners of approaching its history and its contemporary task.

Résumé

Cette thèse concerne certaines implications de la pensée de Michel Foucault en relation à théologie traditionnelle. On se trouve ici une esquisse d'une théologie désignée à adresser les problèmes qui s'exposent par une critique foucaudienne.

Les deux premières parties composent une étude du mot foucaudien "archive." Ce mot indique une époque d'histoire, mais l'accentuation tombe sur les aspects spatiaux et pas chronologiques. Une archive du sens foucaudien est l'indice à la fois des limitations et des possibilités de pensée. L'archive refuse et admet la perception du sens. De cette façon, la conception d'une archive relève des aspects sociologique et historique. Et c'était Foucault qui a introduit à cette étude la relation pouvoir/savoir.

La troisième partie de cette thèse a comme but la critique de la théologie traditionnelle (c.a.d., "systématique"). Au point, la théologie traditionnelle a toujours eu la tendance de présumer ce que Schleiermacher appela l'apriori religieux. Selon cette conception de théologie, le fait d'existence démontre la nécessité d'une source de l'existence. Néanmoins, l'aspiration de transcender l'existence cache, en même temps, des questions importantes qui sont révélées par l'archive. Foucault démontre que la

tradition occidentale de transcendance n'a pas placé un poids suffisamment lourd sur le contexte social ou les dynamiques spatiales qui la produit elle même.

L'incorporation de Foucault aux considerations théologiques nous donne deux différentes reponses. La première (ce que on appelle théologie A) viens de l'affirmation du savoir comme un lieu dynamique produit dedans une archive. Appliqué aux problèmes théologiques, ça veut dire que l'histoire de pensée chrétienne peut être considerée comme une collectivité d'archives où se trouve certaines modèles productifs de dieu. La deuxième (ce que on appelle théologie B) viens de l'affirmation qu'une théologie "critique" est possible seulement quand, de son lieu dans l'archive, elle se lève vers les non-evenements et non-être. La théologie critique est accomplie quand elle affirme à la fois sont lieux comme produit et comme une pointe d'orientation vers le "rien" que l'accomplir.

L'oeuvre de Michel Foucault ouvre à théologie deux différentes façons d'aborder son histoire et sa tâche d'aujourd'hui.

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important form of contact humanity can share with the earth.
And to my wife, Petra, with whom I share a deep friendship
and love and who I regard as the most beautiful person on
earth, I dedicate this thesis.

ABBREVIATIONS

For works cited with some frequency, detailed references are given on first mention. Thereafter the following abbreviations are used. For works cited more than once, but not to the same level of frequency, a standard form of shorter citation is used.

(1) Michel Foucault

AS; AK = L'archéologie du savoir; The Archaeology of Knowledge

DE = Dits et écrits

HF; MC = Histoire de la folie; Madness and Civilization

HS2 = History of Sexuality, Volume 2

LCP = Language, Counter-Memory, Practice

MC; OT = Les mots et les choses; The Order of Things

NGH = Nietzsche, Genealogy, History (an essay in LCP above)

OD = L'ordre du discours

P/K = Power/Knowledge

SP; DP = Surveiller et punir; Discipline and Punish

(2) Other Frequently Cited Works

BSH = Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics

CCF = Cambridge Companion to Foucault

Deleuze = Foucault by Gilles Deleuze

FCR = Foucault: A Critical Reader

QCT = The Question Concerning Technology

WCT = What is Called Thinking

A NOTE CONCERNING TRANSLATION

This thesis does not concern word studies nor is it strictly related to an exposition of textual and literary criticism. It is also true that in some cases, even when a French text was available, the English translation was used. However, some important points should be noted. Every text of Michel Foucault used in this thesis that was available in both French and English, usually by way of Dits et écrits, was read in both French and English. Every text of Michel Foucault of major significance to this thesis is cited in both English and French. All quotations of Michel Foucault that originally appeared in French are either translated by me or accepted by me after a review of the original French. Therefore, I hold responsibility for all translations taken from an originally French text. The reader may wish to know that some debates and interviews of Foucault appear originally in a language other than French even though Foucault most likely conducted himself in French (albeit, in later years, in the United States, Foucault did conduct himself in English). For example, a television programme featuring Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky issued its manuscript in English (entitled "Human Nature: Justice versus Power") even though Foucault spoke in French. In such cases (which occur also in Spanish, Italian, and German), I have used Dits et écrits, where such interviews are collected, to translate from the French. However, these instances occur very rarely.

PREFACE

Michel Foucault and the Transgression of Theology: An Inquiry into the Philosophical Implications of the Archive for the Thinking of Theology.

The thought of Michel Foucault has been used in Religious Studies generally to illuminate historical and ethical questions. His thought, often well understood, defined and re-defined as archaeology and genealogy, has become a sort of provocative analytical tool that unearths certain problems and effectively addresses certain others. This thesis, by contrast, is not about analyzing the methods of Foucault so much as carrying out a project based on his archaeological and genealogical thought. It is about imagining the kind of theologian one would be, the kind of practices one would undertake, and the kind of ethics one would be committed to given the impact of Foucault's thought not as a tool of analysis but as a way of thinking philosophical theology. Indeed, this thesis might even be understood as a kind of ground work for a re-statement of the philosophy of theology.

The investigation arose from the desire to answer one question. What happens in the human condition that the experience of a God concept exists? To answer this question, two aspects of Foucault's thought proved to be

significant. The first is the notion of the archive. To Foucault, an epoch of history can better be called an archive. To be inside an archive is to be among the scattered relics, written and oral, social and political, of a different experience and a different place. Whereas the epoch is time, the archive is space. Whereas an epoch begins and ends, an archive is the location of happenings which occur not consecutively but contingently within the set of circumstances that create their condition of possibility. An epoch of history is related to the spectrum of history as a chronology within the development of events relating one stage to the next, one worldview to another. An archive concerns the emergence of events within an active set of events that locate them. The archive is not the passive description of what has happened but the identification actively of what produces the present.

It was somewhat unique, on Foucault's behalf, to apply this particular term to the history of Western thought, though it is not at all novel to see "the history of thought" as something more than untroubled stages of progress. The view of history that simultaneously affirms the historical conditions involved in the experience of thinking is in fact a long story to which no definitive beginning exists. While it is widely

accepted that the notion of "historicity" begins with Hegel, and emanates from revisions by Hegel's disciples (particularly, Feuerbach and Marx), this is not as self-evident as often assumed. Affirming that "thought" as experience belongs to its condition in time or its archive (that it is as experience historicity) is characteristic of the mistrust that marked the ancient Greek judgement of sense perception and its ability to "in-form" the human mind. And it is evidently true too, even from the time of the Greeks, that the Western tradition has sought to jump around this barrier of mistrust by means of transcendentalism. Whether this task was accomplished by affirming a transcendental reality as an independent realm eclipsing perception or as an immanent order by which perception is directed (whether by means of the Platonic or Aristotelian tradition), there is great truth in saying that both transcendental structures assume the same problem: how can sense-perception be solved?

What Foucault has done with the archive is thereby more than what first appears. He has not only introduced a different model for the contemplation of the history of thought, he has also changed the way the question of thinking can be asked. For this Foucault owes a great debt to Heidegger, but it ought to be recognized that

Foucault stands out in his ability to be more direct (and really more Nietzschean) than Heidegger. Whereas Heidegger tended to return to the theme of the Western hiding of "Being" in the question of being (or, of the Western inability to think authentically the question of Being) in order to critique the tradition of transcendentalism, Foucault changes the direction and sense of this approach. The problem is no longer one of "hiding the question"; it is rather a problem of understanding "how the question" is manufactured. In the archives of history, how do certain structures create the possibility, and even desirability, of certain questions? What conditions exist such that there is a sense of importance or necessity to a question and such that "the question" is even a credible inquiry? The archives of history are a way of recognizing the condition of thinking in history, but in addition they are a way of thinking the thinking of the condition of thought.

The second aspect of Foucault's thought that is of significance is the well discussed notion of genealogy. Unsurprisingly, genealogy, in Foucault's way of using it, is distinct from lineage or parentage, at least insofar as these words would indicate a direct link from one event to another.

Again, initially, this can seem not at all novel. It was Nietzsche who first presented genealogy in this fashion, but the idea of "historical accidents" is again very ancient indeed. Nietzsche used the notion of the accident effectively to reverse the evolutionary theories of his day. In particular, Nietzsche attacked Paul Rée and the success of his book, The Origin of Moral Sensation, in which human history is presented as a steady progression to a higher state. For Nietzsche, human beings (or, at least, his Germany) was moving quite the other direction. Nietzsche posed history as a process of degeneration or nihilism in which lowly *ressentiment* rather than higher principles was a driving force. In this manner, history was not in the process of evolving to a higher state but rather in one of degenerating and scattering by descent. In Nietzsche's thinking, "genealogy" must describe not advancement but descent. It must account for breaks in continuity and the emergence of difference.

Foucault, for his part, uses the Nietzschean technique of turning the question around with great effectiveness. Foucault can speak of archives descending not by means of advances but by accidents and mutations that reconstitute one order of history in the forms of another. Typical of genealogy, in Foucault's archives

there is little sense of direction to history and no sense of an absolute meaning or purpose to the process. Still, this is not to say that these terms (meaning and purpose) hold no conditional power in an archive at all. Just as Foucault elaborates Heidegger's question, so here another elaboration is found. In the case of Nietzschean genealogy, that elaboration is power. Foucault adds to genealogy the problem of power at a level perhaps not previously pursued. The archive may be a complex association of conditional factors that frame if not enable the possibility of the question of truth, but this by itself gives no account of why an archive should be dynamic and capable of change, mutation, or disintegration. The analytic of power, for Foucault, provides the necessary dimension for the exploration of this problem. The archive's forms—its juridical and technical mechanisms; its social structures; its educational and political institutions—form part of its composite function. And inasmuch as appropriate linguistic investigations can give some account of the possible expressions of "truth" (i.e., explain the appearance of discourses that count as true) and their structure of credibility, the settings in which such dynamics occur involve such an endless play of socio-political relations that only an analytic of "power"

could portray. The occurrences involved in the valuations of given events include not only the immediate players and the interaction of each position but also the manner in which power fluctuations are governed inside the setting of the archive. This "government" of power may not be—and perhaps even is least of all—deliberate, premeditated acts by key historic figures. Rather, what is given by the setting is a diagram of permitted associations that carve out, in the very nexus of the activity of those relations, that generality of credible events and potential relations. What is given is the "location" of the event and the weight of that location according to the anonymous consequences of the relationships of power. Albeit, a naiveté that refuses responsibility to agents in history is not Foucault's point, what is to be gained from this insight is that power is not singular and simple but omnipresent and complex; it includes intertwined and co-dependent relationships of events that surface in, and that can surface only according to, the activity of the nexus that conditions them. Power is like the mesh of a netting which is necessarily present if any relationship is to exist at all, for outside of power there is no location and therefore no event.

The archive and genealogy, which respectively provide the means of describing locations and power, are useful to address the question given at the outset. But on the basis of the opening commentary, that question is advanced by being refined to ask how is the concept of God a permissible concept? There can be no denying that this type of question is phenomenological or even post-phenomenological. That is, it is an inquiry into the experience of experiencing, but it is not carried out by the familiar model of transcendental subjectivity. Actually, it is in the style of this investigation to ask how the experience of transcendental subjectivity was a permissible experience of modernity. And for such investigations, it is obvious that Foucault is one of the few philosophers of history to raise the question in such a manner. But this investigation, though both dependent on and critical of phenomenology, is not about the question of the permission of phenomenology. It is rather an investigation of the permission of the concept of God. To this end, the whole dynamics of the archive and power remain of central concern. It will be necessary first to develop as well as comprehend the vocabulary of permission (associated with the archive and genealogy) before the consideration of the possibility of a God-concept experience is introduced. The latter style

of questioning depends on the former way of understanding the question. Consequently, it will only be Part III of this work that addresses explicitly conceptions associated with modern Christian theology. Parts I and II are concerned with the articulation of important conceptions from Foucault and an elaboration of the experience of an event in an archive. The Panopticon from Discipline and Punish, proves to be a key image for this most encompassing task.

As stated, the task of Part III consists of using the elaboration of Parts I and II to address philosophically the permissible dynamics of a God-concept (i.e., elaborating a post-phenomenological philosophy of theology). However, the greatest trouble here is that this is not characteristic of any use of Foucault by theologians or philosophers of religion. There is in fact, in the genre of the philosophy of theology, no apparent example of the use of Foucault in this manner at all. It is therefore the aim of this work to indicate directions of thought not commonly approached in the realms of speculative theology.

Still, this is not to deny that there are several examples of the use of Foucault by theologians and philosophers of religion. Even though these examples do not address the directive question of this inquiry, it

remains important to know of them and to be familiar with the context of Foucault and theology.

(1) Foucault and Christian Theology

In Religious Studies, scholarship on Foucault becomes increasingly noticeable only after the death of Michel Foucault in 1984. Indeed, very few discussions occur at all in the context of theology prior to the appearance of the first volume of the History of Sexuality (translated to English in 1978). However, the situation has now vastly changed, and so far as North American theology is concerned, there are generally three areas in which the thought of Michel Foucault has proven useful. One area could be called the ethical, and the second, the historical. These are perhaps the most obvious areas of application since Foucault raises direct questions on the nature of Western moral systems and unabashedly attacks the "nineteenth century" notion of continuity in history. Only a few comments will be made of these areas since the concern here is a third significant subject area where Foucault has received attention, that of the philosophical investigation of theology.

Insofar as ethics and history are concerned, it is the traditional practices of Christian asceticism, confession, and sexuality that attract attention. At times the point of different scholars is to critique several conclusions Foucault had reached concerning the influence of Christian practices (specifically expressed in the History of Sexuality and in seminars and papers exemplified in Technologies of the Self). In particular, Foucault had claimed that the fourth Lateran Council of 1215, in which annual confession was made mandatory for both sexes, invested a type of truth obligation into the Western psyche that attracted certain technologies of observation and punishment, uncharacteristic of earlier experience, to human sexuality.¹ Yet, scholarly discussions tend not to address (or perhaps simply miss) Foucault's contention that "practices" infiltrate space and arrange or focus thinking. Instead, what is brought under attack is the statistical validity of Foucault's examples. These types of criticism, which can be illuminating but on the whole fail to confront the actual question, presuppose the very notion of "truth" (explicitly, that of the method of "scientific" history

¹ See Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp. 16-49.

and the self-assured "evidence" of chronological facts) that Foucault brings under scrutiny. So it is that Pierre J. Payer questions Foucault's account of the confessional tradition without discussing precisely what Foucault intends to place in crisis (namely, the presumptions of "tradition" itself);² and likewise Elizabeth A. Clark³ or Philip F. Riley⁴ will question Foucault on history and sexuality outside of Foucault's stated concern for techniques of the self. The substance of these critiques also finds parallel in general effort of historians, not concerned with church history, in terms of both the chosen focus and the evident misunderstanding.⁵ On the other hand, the challenge of Foucault has been received constructively as a thinking tool in ethical reflection, as exemplified by Sharon D. Welch or Marc P. Lalonde. In the case of Welch,⁶ she

² See Pierre J. Payer, "Foucault on penance and the shaping of sexuality," Science Religieuses/Studies in Religion 14,3 (1985), pp. 313-320.

³ See Elizabeth A. Clark, "Foucault, the Fathers, and Sex," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 56,4 (1988), pp. 619-641.

⁴ See Philip F. Riley, "Michel Foucault, Lust, Women, and Sin in Louis XIV's Paris," Church History 59 (1990), pp. 35-50.

⁵ See Gary Gutting, "Foucault and the History of Madness," The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 47-70.

⁶ See Sharon D. Welch, "A Genealogy of the Logic of Deterrence: Habermas, Foucault and a Feminist Ethic of Risk," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 2 (1987), pp. 13-32.

tried (in 1987) to use Foucault's genealogy to detail the (il)logic of deterrence used to defend the deployment of nuclear weapons. And Lalonde⁷ was able to use Foucault's notion of Power/Knowledge to complement the concerns of liberation theology and to speak of power and responsibility (this in response to the charge that power in Foucault precludes freedom and human agency). Both of these are examples of using Foucault positively, as if an objective content or a lens of vision, but they are not integrative statements of theology and Foucault.

The area where there is far more likelihood of integration, such that Foucault is not a working tool of theology but a way of Christian thinking, is philosophical theology. In this area, however, far more work has been put into defining the challenge of Foucault, and issuing and re-issuing the call of that challenge, than into the task of actually thinking through a theology. The implicit signal of Owen C. Thomas's words of 1988, that "Christianity must await the archaeological and genealogical study of the history of

⁷ See Marc P. Lalonde, "Power/Knowledge and Liberation: Foucault as a Parabolic Thinker," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61,1 (1993), pp. 81-100.

Christianity,"⁸ remains true. David Chidester was one of the first to attempt to outline what Foucault might mean to theology. After reviewing the work of Foucault, he mentioned five areas of concern (which I will not elaborate) for the study of religion: otherness, displacement, tradition, body, and power. He concluded by suggesting that Foucault "may provide an opportunity to recover in a new way the perspective on religion as a *total social fact* in which its power is simultaneously invested in the formation of religious, legal, moral, economic, and aesthetic discourses and practices."⁹ But the promise of this "may" remains unfulfilled in Christian theology. Then, Philip Mellor suggested that Foucault calls for a methodology that does not just understand context but puts to question "the process of contextualizing";¹⁰ and James M. Bryne spoke of a Foucaultian reading of tradition which "...constantly seeks to undermine the dominant ideologies by calling into question the discourse which says that the tradition be

⁸ Owen C. Thomas, "On Stepping Twice into the Same Church: Essence, Development, and Pluralism," Anglican Theological Review 70,4 (1988), p. 299.

⁹ See David Chidester, "Michel Foucault and the Study of Religion," Religious Studies Review 12,1 (1986), pp. 1-9.

¹⁰ Philip Mellor, "The Application of the Theories of Michel Foucault to Problems in the Study of Religion," Theology 91 (1988), p. 491.

read in this way or that way only," and followed up these comments by claiming that the challenge of Foucault for theology consists of admitting "...from the outset that the continuity of tradition can no longer be a premise from which we deduce other truths, or even an attainable goal which we have not yet reached."¹¹ These remarks may indeed be truly suggestive, but it remains the case that few theologians have ventured past the use of Foucault as a critical tool and struggled with the task of developing theological thinking in the key of Foucault.

This is not to preclude the fact that several authors have sought to undertake, as Thomas R. Flynn aptly put it, an articulation of the "religious availability of Foucault's thought."¹² This latter focus has rightly fixed itself on Foucaultian understandings of space and the transgression of space. It has tended to concentrate on theology as a practice of being actively located in an archive and seeking a way to undertake its responsibility as "presence."¹³ And, it has generally

¹¹ See James M. Byrne, "Foucault on Continuity: The Postmodern Challenge to Tradition," Faith and Philosophy 9,3 (1992), pp. 335-352.

¹² See Thomas R. Flynn, "Partially Desacralized Spaces: the Religious Availability of Foucault's Thought," Faith and Philosophy 10,4 (1993), pp. 471-485.

¹³ This term, which is used frequently in the latter part of the thesis, is not related to Jacques Derrida's critique of logocentrism. It refers to the existential "being-there" or, in the

"negative theology." These works, more than others, need to be understood in light of the present endeavor both to examine an archive and to practice theology inside one. Although, as it will be indicated, even with the negative theologians, the guiding question (How is the God-concept a possible experience?) is still not raised.

(2) The Religious Availability of Foucault

The term "negative theology" is expressly linked to the consequences of "deconstruction" theologically construed. In North America, in the twentieth century, negative theology usually recalls the Death of God movement, but when the question is raised in the context of post-structuralism or deconstruction, it is about the death of "man" and "history" (or more appropriately, the "end" of these two [simultaneous] events). Foucault could never be described as a Death of God theologian, although he may provoke—or be the source of—a death of "man" theology, as James Bernauer describes.¹⁴ Still, the talk of death is potentially misleading, for the very

case of the archive, "being-in the there" and not to the reductive continuities of ontological discourses.

¹⁴ See James Bernauer, "The Prisons of Man: An Introduction to Foucault's Negative Theology," International Philosophical Quarterly 27,4 (1987), pp. 365-380.

fact that one is speaking from the other side of a line (after a death and therefore from the position of being able to see it) means that a shift has taken place and a different viewing point is held. That is why "death" is really "ending," and the very fact of reaching an "end" is in itself a point of beginning. The nature of that crossing point, in Foucaultian terms, is composed of a shift from time to space. "Man" is a creature of time, whereas the "end of man" is an introduction to space.

We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein. One could perhaps say that certain ideological conflicts animating present-day polemics oppose the pious descendants of time and the determined inhabitants of space.¹⁵

Foucault's practice of genealogy was really one of a "history of space" that attempted to contradict or at least bring into question the overwhelming emphasis on chronology that he took to be the legacy of the nineteenth century. Time has much to do with the positioning of things, the predictability of things, and

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," Diacritics 16,1 (1987), p. 22. This text was based on a lecture given by Foucault in 1967. It appears in French in the journal Architecture-Mouvement-Continuité, October (1984).

perhaps above all (because of these latter two) the training of things. What is characteristic of modernity is its temporal appropriation of space—the precision of its measurement and the investment of technology to formalize it—whereas what marks Foucault's "postmodernism" is precisely his appeal to spaces he called "heterotopias" (this term being adopted from George Bataille). Those spaces that cannot be measured, or that measurement excludes and (in this) produces as the other, are heterotopias: sites of delinquency, of transgression, of abnormality, of crisis, and waste. Foucault felt that modern time saw the progressive conversion of spaces he called "crisis heterotopias" to "heterotopias of deviation." Crisis heterotopias were "privileged or sacred or forbidden" sites which, in relation to a society, were reserved for particular individuals. One could imagine sacred practices or rituals belonging to this type of space (for example, the prophet of ancient Israel was a privileged speaker from a crisis location), but Foucault also named "...adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc."¹⁶ With the modern emphasis on training, discipline, measurement, and standardization, heterotopias of crisis

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 24.

slowly disappear only to emerge in the form of deviation. Once the setting of a standard is undertaken, there can be a "normal" adolescence which emerges as the object produced by the measurement of the new standard; and the consequence is a new reading gauged against the technology of the normal that defines "deviant" characteristics as "cases" requiring the look of a professional eye. Where there was once a space of social "crisis," and various means in which this crisis was accommodated, modernity introduces the psychiatric hospital or the prison. This is not to conclude that all problems can be reduced to the evils of modern technology (Foucault is the last one to advocate strict reductions), rather it means that the space of modernity—the space that is produced by technology—is itself problematic. Technology does not solve problems but produces the very way problems are read, and in this way "creates" the site of modernity. The questions that Foucault is able to raise concern the genealogy of this modern productivity. How was classical space able to become as it were a colonial frontier accommodating modern practices; how did classical space permit modern time? Secondly, by the very possibility of heterotopias existing side by side and in juxtaposition of modern time, Foucault is able to identify sites of resistance, transgression, and

alternative to the collectivity of practices that constantly refine the modern notion of normality.

At once it becomes obvious that the question of ethics appears. Precisely what alternatives exist, and how does one go about determining good and bad alternatives or addressing the troubling fact that any new alternative also produces its own set of normalizing judgments? Foucault opts for the persistent need of transgressive alertness in the midst of any setting of normalizing practices, but it is really only with the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality that ethics as such becomes a distinctive question.

When it comes to the question of ethics, theologians have often, as indicated above, focused on the accuracy of Foucault's description of practices rather than on the problem of history these practices seek to raise; but when it comes to the question of space, of transgressive space and liminal experience, theologians have been able to speak of negative theologies and theologies of resistance.

Charles E. Winquist, in particular, has brought attention to theology "as a liminoid form of public

reflexivity."¹⁷ Winquist noted that postmodern deconstruction offers a unique opportunity for theology to re-position itself, or perhaps re-interpret its position, in the contemporary world. If theology is understood as "text" in the sense that it is a discipline that relies on semiotic and syntactic structures to position itself in public discourse—i.e., as Winquist points out, if theology uses words to "defer" immediate experience to the "world of the text"¹⁸—then it is also true that theology can question its appropriate location. And, as Winquist reports, "...we misunderstand its potential if we try to relocate it in the center of societal life."¹⁹ What Winquist picks up from Foucault is the possibility of locating a discourse tensively at the limit, i.e., transgressively, in relation to dominant structures that form normal discourse. He speaks of a shadow that cannot be spoken or thought precisely because as the excluded it is covered-up (or made liminoid) by domination. This shadow location is called by Winquist the "unthought," and with this notion he concludes:

We acknowledge the unthought not in itself but

¹⁷ See Charles E. Winquist, "Theology, Deconstruction, and Ritual Process," Zygon 18,3 (1983), p. 295.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 297.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 300.

only in the transgression of what we can think. It is a shadow that does not come into speech except for the silences and broken figures that have become so characteristic in modern voices.²⁰

Winqvist's comments are characteristic of the religious availability highlighted in the thought of Foucault. With the modern emphasis on temporalizing space, the very practice of theology—its emphasis on the non-temporal and the mystical—(at least potentially) contradicts the permission granted by the technical disciplines of modernity. Theology can be a type of propheticism of space in the midst of an overwhelming obsession with time. It can be a negative location against an idolatry of time and place.²¹ Indeed, these very themes associated with heterotopias and spaces of transgression, these very definitions of negative theology founded on a mysticism of absence and the experience of the limit, are repeated in a most thought provoking fashion by Flynn.²² They remain the most obvious place where Foucault and theology meet.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 303.

²¹ This theme has been expanded with success by Charles Davis, "Our Modern Identity: The Formation of the Self," Modern Theology 6,2 (1990), pp. 159-171.

²² See Thomas R. Flynn, op. cit.

(3) Some Questions Remain

This thesis will use some of the expressions available above, and briefly these can be indicated. But there are some questions not addressed that remain "available." The fault with most questioning raised through the study of Foucault is that rarely—as is evident in many of the examples above—is the Foucault style turned upon itself. Foucault is above all an ironist, and it is surely a mistake not to read this when reading him. The questions of genealogy constantly play back on themselves, pose themselves again by the very problem that composes them, such that one can almost hear Foucault laugh (as he so often claimed to have laughed both at his reader and himself) as his genealogy accounts for his questioning by means of the very power/knowledge his questions critique. The same is true for Nietzsche (and so also Kierkegaard, perhaps more deliberately than any other), whose "thought" at last is accountable by the same accidents he claimed had blinded Paul Rée. What is missing most often in the theological use of Foucault is irony, possibly because (and unfortunately so) the very notion of theology contains the pretension of its authority. After all, what "certainty" can possibly be called "divine," i.e., "outside of the human experience,"

when precisely it is always and once again only a human being who so claims it? What can save theology from its overly serious notion is irony, including the irony of this statement.

Foucault's irony in relation to theology comes in the form of the question, How is the God concept a permissible event in human experience? Before the question can be asked about shadow-events, about liminoid positions, or about negative notions of theology, it is a priority that the irony of such questions be noted should any sense of "humility" let alone humanity exist. Possibly God is only what God is allowed to be, only a type of residue that is produced out of productivity itself; possibly God is only what the human experience permits in the sense that every act, even in its completion, lingers inside a potential never reached. Possibly God is only this, but possibly God is only possible because that "permitted" space creates the unpermitted, that non-God or absent God who is reached only out of a human fullness that can touch its emptiness and its non-being. This is the genealogical side of the question, and it can launch such mysticism and negativity by answering first its self-encounter: What is permission? and How is God permitted? These latter two questions are what Foucault gives to theology first and

before the space of transgression. These latter questions are also the questions of an ironist.

When space is made available to the negative, the pursuit of Winqvist and others can be picked up again. Transgression is a possible understanding, a movement from the outside of "otherness" that defies the normal of the usual. Likewise, the "unthought" can be thought of because the absence of God has been encountered. But above all, it seems, an image such as "shadows" can express a creative and critical mysticism. Eventually, I will use such terms as "shadow" and "shadow-events" to explain not the notion of nothing but the location of the ironic fact of being in an archive. There is an advantage to this type of identification even though, at first, the intention may appear to be the dismissal of any seriousness to the notion of God. In the end, however, it is not a question of seriousness at all; it is a question of claiming that an "orientation" can exist (i.e., a way of being present rather than a belief or a confession) that affirms the irony of itself but at once does not lose sight of its productive capacity despite its foundation on nothingness. To speak of the shadow is to speak of nothing; it is to create a type of presence out of what is not. But when this is taken up in irony, the point of focus is not strictly on the "not" but on

presence itself (the creativity and the strangeness of its being being). The task of Foucault's "not," and indeed of the "not" long since known in theology, is finally not to be liminoid but to be present. It is the presence of absence that is the irony of faith. If this is taken positively, it can be called critical.

This thesis will deal with Foucault, his archaeology, his genealogy, and his sense of an archive; but in the end it will deal with all the things that these are not and cannot be; in the end it will deal with only what they deliver: the orientation of critical mysticism. Once in less cynical times this was called hope.

PART ONE

THE CONCEPT OF AN ARCHIVE

Introduction

Several years ago, when I was a student at the University of Winnipeg, I was encouraged to read Arnold B. Levison's Knowledge and Society.¹ It was impressed upon me that knowledge is sociological; and more significantly, philosophical "knowledge," unlike the North American sense of science, is based on models and relationships rather than (the false security of) a supposed objectivity.

This insight, though, is gained only by accepting and allowing to stand a certain number of problems. The first problem, which finally poses itself as the fundamental wisdom of philosophical thinking, is that each expression of knowledge is at once an expression of ignorance. For the moment one "model" is employed, it holds to itself a set of presumptions, a family of associations, and an environment of sensibility by

¹ Arnold B. Levison, Knowledge and Society: An Introduction to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc., 1974).

which the event of "knowing" is experienced. The "set" of an experience of knowing thus excludes knowledge inasmuch as it opens up only one type of orientation to the world. Because a set is at once a community of sense it makes strange or even unimaginable those sets for whose presumptions it can hold no orientation. North America easily orients itself toward technology, due to the set of presumptions anonymously related to its history, but, for example, has very little appreciation of magic, dreams, and altered states of consciousness as valid guiding principles of political experience or objective descriptions of reality. The tendency rather is to ostracize these as "delinquencies," an act which, in turn, only justifies further the order of objective and reasoned speech at the expense of what was once considered sacred.

These comments introduce a second problem, which is that contradiction must be gained as a strength, i.e., as a vehicle of thinking, if the philosophical sense of knowledge is to be approached. The Aristotelian heritage, wherein the emphasis is on the law of contradiction and excluded middle, has tended to proscribe metaphysical speculation by over-confidently celebrating contradiction as a self-evident demonstration of falsity. What is often ruled out by

this enthusiasm is the much larger concern of Aristotle himself for the condition of potential events and the question of the potential in relation to the actual and to the process of actualization. Indeed, the aforementioned laws are intended only logically as definitive of the condition of speaking, indicating, and being present in the community of beings. They do not intend to deny the *co-present-ness* of contradiction to the actual experience of knowing. One ought rather to uphold that knowing constantly results from and is possible on the basis of contradiction. And even further it is only by holding together constantly the contradiction of knowing and not knowing, of being and non-being, of presence and absence (all based on the simultaneous description above of a set both making available and excluding experience) that critical thought is possible. Being present to thinking is always being present to, and holding simultaneously, contradiction. But such a consideration is only available when focus returns to the question of potential experience and its tensive relation to the actual space of the "knowledge set" in question.

The strength of Michel Foucault and the concept of an archive lies here. The archive is a vehicle by which one can gain an avenue of presence to the set of

anomalies that compose a space or mode of orientation. The "archive" is descriptive of those many sociological factors that compose and locate its moment. The archive is able to understand itself as both an opening and a closing, a beholding and an excluding, of the "real" that supports the very contradictions inherent in this claim. What Foucault offers by the concept of an archive is really a diagram of the set of the conditions of an event.

The potential mistake here is that one who seeks to locate Foucault himself in all this will only succeed to rob him, *à coup sûr*, of the affirmation of ironic contradiction so crucial to his understanding. The archive really can never be defined since it is always involved in the work of definition. Rather, an archive is something that must be played with, manipulated, and consciously engaged. It is necessary to identify different tools, even tricks, that both allow the sense of discovery in an archive and at once recognize precisely that "discovery" is very much the product of the tools put into play. Foucault ultimately affirms Nietzsche and Nietzschean genealogy as the means for this engagement, but he did so almost reluctantly.

Foucault is famous for denying that he was a "structuralist" even when, at times obviously, he was once very delighted to be classified as one. In France, in the early 1960's, it was popular to be "after Sartre," and Foucault no less than Lacan or Barthes was eager to meet this demand. But "structuralism," after an initially popular swell, proved overly complex to serve usefully as a general classification. By the late 1960's Foucault deliberately distanced himself from this word and rightly pointed out that while his concern was with discourse, it was not as such an inquiry into the process of signification or the concern to isolate its elemental, if not universal, relations. The editing involved in the 1972 edition of The Birth of the Clinic is an example of Foucault attempting to shed the label of "structuralism" from his earlier work.²

Foucault's use of the distinguishing word "archaeology" to define the examination of a system of discourse without claiming to reach the level of elementality, however, did not prove sufficiently capable of by-passing the basic problem of structuralism. Like "structuralism," archaeology can

² See David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (London:

never answer the question it raises against itself: that question asks what position the archaeologist holds when doing archaeology? And perhaps a more bitter pill to swallow, how can one claim to be doing a positive "science"³ when one's engagement actively produces the rules that define the positivity of the science one is supposedly doing? In this archaeology suffers in its inability to support irony, which is the strength of genealogy. Archaeology proves to be serious whereas genealogy, which affirms its own existence as an anomaly, is play.⁴ It was the later genealogical turn in Foucault's work that was capable of holding simultaneously the two types of problems above: first, the presence of the non-actual (thus remaining a philosophy committed to "thinking"), and secondly the affirmation of its own existence within

Vintage Books, 1994), p. 171.

³ Archaeology is indeed the supremely positive science since it claims to identify those rules that determine the conditions of any expression of positivity whatever. See Michel Foucault, L'archéologie du savoir (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1969), pp. 218-220. [Hereafter cited as AS.] The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1972), pp. 167-169. [Hereafter cited as AK.] AK, 167-169 [AS, 217-221]; See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1983), p. 93. [Hereafter referred to as BSH.]

⁴ This certainly is included in Nietzsche's intentions with such a title as *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*.

the community of an archive that both recognized and denied its "truth."

The road from being serious to being playful, i.e., from comprehending the structure of archaeology only to release it to genealogy, is the key to entering the archive with appropriate awareness, complexity, and subtlety. Undertaking its journey also guards against a quick judgement that might otherwise veil Foucault behind one diminutive.

Part I concerns this movement. It seeks to define the place of Michel Foucault, encounter the notion of an archive, and, through this, comprehend a sense of its experience.

CHAPTER ONE

THE PLACE OF MICHEL FOUCAULT

"Do not ask who I am and do not tell me to remain the same: it is the responsibility of our bureaucrats to keep our papers in order."¹ I open with a diatribe not untypical of Michel Foucault. Inasmuch as it marks the frustration he held toward those who would attempt to classify his thought, it marks equally the difficulty involved in approaching his thought. Who was Michel Foucault? Was he the analyst of discourse who surprisingly divorced himself from structuralism, the very subject that seemed to be his specialty? Or was he the later Foucault who turned his question around to see discourses as operations that invade the social spaces opened by the practices of power? Was he the supreme phenomenologist of language who asked by what means discursive formations make conceptual experience possible, or was it the genealogy of history, in which linguistic and social events emerge as if from the twists and turns of a labyrinth, that finally interested Foucault? Perhaps Foucault was all these

¹ AS, p. 28; AK, p. 17.

things or perhaps anyone of them in particular. Perhaps Foucault was mostly the genealogist, but perhaps to be a genealogist one must never be only a genealogist.

Foucault's thinking cannot be classified strictly, but it can be described, placed in context, and understood as a struggle with the environment that would position him. And this no doubt is the most significant word. Struggle. Foucault is to be ranked as a thinker in the way this word is meant.² He is not a commentator on what has been thought but a wrestler with thinking itself. He is often not as novel as some would have him be, for he is constantly picking up tools left to him by philosophy, anthropology, or linguistics. However, one need not be novel in order to be original. Foucault was an original. It is never a question of where he fit in when considering the broader context of his thought; it is rather a question of what he did with the tools his context afforded him.

² Martin Heidegger stated, "The wish to understand a thinker in his own terms is something else entirely than the attempt to take up a thinker's quest and to pursue it to the core of his thought's problematic. The first remains impossible. The second is rare, and of all things the most difficult." Foucault was a thinker in Heidegger's second or rare sense. He was not a commentator on other thinkers but one who used Friedrich Nietzsche and Heidegger, the two most influential thinkers for him, to engage a quest and a problematic. Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 185. [Hereafter referred to as WCT.]

Foucault was not a structuralist, but no one can avoid structuralism when dealing with him. Strictly speaking, he was no phenomenologist either, but it is impossible and one might add rather foolish when reading Foucault to avoid the influence of this subject generally and Martin Heidegger in particular. And to whatever extent we might label him "Nietzschean," we can only do so with the full knowledge that, for Foucault, Nietzsche was only the beginning.

We can take these three terms, structuralism, phenomenology, and genealogy, as words of orientation, even of invitation, to the thought of Michel Foucault. They do not answer the question, who was Foucault, but they do give a place, a setting, where the engagement of his struggle can begin.

(1) The Structuralist Picnic

The admittedly tempting desire to place a thinker such as Michel Foucault in a school only constitutes a strategy to avoid thinking; it suggests that if an appropriate and familiar label can be found, his screams and protests may finally fall to silence. Yet, the vast reach and implications of Foucault's thought

let alone his screams and protests are the evidence of something more flexible, more elusive, than adherence to a "school" allows. The influence of Michel Foucault has been felt simultaneously across so many fields that it has long since been possible to speak of a Foucault effect. "Ten years after his death," the *Magazine littéraire* reported following the publication of *Dits et écrits* in 1994, "the Foucault effect continues on, gets louder, constantly changes, and takes a new turn."³ The sheer desire to grab on somewhere and begin a confrontation with this thought demands some means of orientation, something like a "school." There is no doubt a medium between these two poles, whether or not "happy," that one can try to reach.

The desire to place Foucault somewhere is perhaps best exemplified in a cartoon by Maurice Henry, first appearing in 1967, that sat a cheerful Foucault across from the sober faces of Jacques Lacan, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Roland Barthes. Each figure wears a grass skirt, which Lacan supplements with a bow tie, in a

³ *Magazine Littéraire* No. 325 (October, 1994), p. 16 [no recorded author]: "L'effet Foucault, dix ans après sa mort, se poursuit, s'amplifie, se transforme, rebondit."

scene that is described as the structuralist picnic.⁴ Given that each participant here depicted, excepting Lévi-Strauss, denied being a structuralist, the cartoon inadvertently introduces perhaps the most enduring characteristic of this science: as Jean-Marie Benoist aptly put it, "...although those who have attracted this label may be shown to have a number of methodological presuppositions in common, and even a convergent approach, we should bear it in mind that it would be more appropriate to speak of structuralisms, in the plural."⁵ Possibly, if the matter was pressed, one could speak of a Foucaultian structuralism, but this exercise could obscure the uniqueness of Foucault's thought and fail to account for the several shifts it had undertaken. A better service is done when structuralism is taken up as a type of implement that serves to focus, or at least frame, the context of Foucault's archaeology and give some sense to the urgency and passion with which he later introduced a revolutionary genealogy. Accordingly, however

⁴ The original cartoon is in *La Quinzaine Littéraire*, July 1, 1967. I initially came across it in Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 176.

⁵ Jean-Marie Benoist, The Structural Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 2.

tentative a walk through the setting of a structuralist picnic may be, it remains the most appropriate point of departure.

In the well-known introductory work of Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow,⁶ there is an attempt to distinguish between atomistic and holistic structuralism.⁷ The first, to which Foucault does not belong, is described as the act of sifting out the definition of various elements that compose a social or philosophical system. The elements, defined independently of the contextual setting, are "...completely specified apart from their role in a system."⁸ Dreyfus and Rabinow do not relate any example of a thinker who can be described as "atomistic," but one is reminded of Talal Asad's critique of Clifford Geertz. Asad claims that the manner in which Geertz analyzes religion is such that the meaning of the religious symbol under investigation

⁶ BHS, op. cit.

⁷ In an interview for a Tunis newspaper on April 2, 1967, as Eribon recounts, op. cit., p. 167, Foucault also once spoke to two types of structuralism. One was carried out in a specific field such as linguistics while a second was a structuralism that defined relationships between domains that compose the activity of a society or culture (for example between medical science and clinical psychology). The latter type was a general structuralism to which Foucault at that moment comfortably adhered.

is, after the initial examination, isolated from the system in which it functions. Asad remarks, "If religious symbols are understood...as vehicles for meaning, can such meanings be established independently of the form of life in which they are used?"² In contrast, what is called "structuralist holism" never loses track of the setting in which an element or set of elements occur; in fact, the emphasis of holism is to determine the relationships of the whole system that, in effect, place into focus if not "produce" the element of attention. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault's concept of archaeology is closest to this kind of structural holism. Foucault asserts that "the whole determines what can count even as a possible element."³

² BSH, p. 53.

³ Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 53.

⁴ BSH, p. 55. It is somewhat striking that the above mentioned atomistic and holistic distinction is reminiscent of that between the sensationalist and Gestaltists in the late 19th and early 20th century psychology. Against the attempt to reduce ideas to particular sensations, Gestalt theorists, such as Wolfgang Köhler (1897-1967), emphasized wholes and the relationship of parts within wholes that cannot be reduced to single elements. Outside of this note the matter will not be further pursued, but it is curious that Dreyfus and Rabinow, who seem to borrow the language!, make no mention of it.

Hayden White also distinguishes¹¹ between two branches of structuralism by using the title "eschatological" to describe what for Dreyfus and Rabinow is holism. Here, White places Foucault in the company of his picnic partners Lacan and Lévi-Strauss.

Foucault shares with Lévi-Strauss and Lacan an interest in the deep structures of human consciousness, a conviction that study of such deep structures must begin with an analysis of language, and a conception of language which has its origins in the work of the recognized father of Structural linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure.¹²

Disregarding for the moment White's comment on "deep structures" and Ferdinand de Saussure, his title eschatological structuralism refers to the irreducibility of human consciousness. The eschatological wing of structuralism is "dispersive,"

¹¹ Allan Megill adds yet another shade to this distinction by determining a difference between a narrow structuralism, which examines the sign (and thus is based on Saussure), and a broad structuralism that examines the structure of structure (or, as he says, a "Structuralism of structure"). The latter, which he (unclearly) associates with Nietzschean Apollonianism, he believes marks the early work of Foucault and defines, essentially, archaeology. See Allan Megill, "Foucault, Structuralism, and the Ends of History," Journal of Modern History 51 (1979), pp. 451-503. To his credit, Roger Paden is one of the few commentators who tries not to exaggerate the move from archaeology to genealogy as a dramatic shift, but instead holds that Foucault was able to integrate his structuralism into the development of genealogy and, indeed, use it in a positive, if tacit, way. See Roger Paden, "Locating Foucault: Archaeology vs. Structuralism," Philosophy and Social Criticism 2.11 (1986), pp. 19-37.

meaning that "it leads thought into the interior of a given mode of consciousness, where all of its essential mystery, opaqueness, and particularity are celebrated as evidence of the irreducible variety of human nature."¹² This statement compares to the holism of Dreyfus and Rabinow because, like the latter, the "nature" of human nature remains contextually placed into the relations that compose the setting of experience and articulation. Eschatological structuralists, White states, can appear very "anti-scientific" by turning their form of structuralism on Western science itself as a set of relationships that produce a particular context of meaning. Thus, if holistic-eschatological structuralism is used to identify Foucault's elusive sense of structure, there are at least two points to make. In the first place, the task of examining systems of thought begins by identifying the limits of a context (or bracket) of meaning, a sort of *terminus ab quo* and *terminus ad quem* on the historical map. To do this, Foucault employed (among others) the term *episteme* (taken from the Greek,

¹² Hayden White, "Foucault Decoded: Notes from the Underground," History and Theory 12 (1973), p. 23.

¹³ Ibid., p. 53.

επισταμμαι) to identify dominant discursive practices that ground the functioning of knowledge in a given era. The seventeenth and nineteenth centuries respectively he called the classical and modern era.¹⁴ Secondly, having determined the contextual setting, he employed the word archaeology to describe the work necessary to understand the production of meaning in and through the positive uses and limitations of discourse that define the context of operation. The "dispersive" nature of archaeology is evident here in that each context holds its own set of presuppositions inevitably produced in the active relationships of its discourses and that the presuppositions to which discourses refer shift and vary from era to era (or, as Foucault describes, from archive to archive). To Foucault, for example, what constituted "man" in modernity as an object of scientific discourse has no correlate in the classical era. "Man" is an invention

¹⁴ These terms are especially important in Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses (Paris: Édition Gallimard, 1966). [Hereafter referred to as MS.] Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1970). [Hereafter referred to as OT.] However, the classifications are not intended to be fixed or resolute categories.

of the modern technical discourses that accompanied "his" appearance.¹⁵

Yet if one can loosely discuss two types of structuralism, what Foucault called archaeology continued to surpass them by raising "structuralism" itself, and with it indeed even archaeology, into the problems of dispersion. Structuralism remains in the context of the system of its appearance and is "meaningful" insofar as the system in question finds it useful. This is why Foucault did not pose his archaeology with the same universalistic intentions that first accompanied structuralism.¹⁶ Foucault discusses archaeology as a working tool, no more and no less, rather than a theory or a totalizing paradigm. This is also why, if now a return is made to White's mention of linguistics and De Saussure, structuralism as such ultimately cannot serve to define the intentions of an archaeologist.

¹⁵ Foucault makes this point particularly in the final two chapters of MC, OT.

¹⁶ It is wise to remember here that Claude Lévi-Strauss posed a structuralism of universal significance that undermined Western colonialist assumptions. Universalism in structuralism, then, does not mean that the particular experience (Western technology) is raised to the status of a transcendental truth. It rather means that the experience itself can, upon examination, say something definitive about the manner in which interpretation

The main problem with structuralism, from the Foucaultian point of view, even when considering the eschatological version, is with White's reference to its search for "deep structures." This term does not serve to recall Freudian notions of symptoms by which a concealed unconscious can be read. The structuralist sense of "deep" means "base." It refers to the binary way human beings think regardless of the cultural specificity of the thinking act or the instruments available with which to think. In structuralism, binary representation is a clue to a deeper universal rationality that accompanies the culturally specific representation. The archaeologist, in the main, rejects the structuralist notion of rationality, which seems to me to be a fundamental oversight on the part of White. And in place of the problem of representation, the archaeologist is concentrated on discursive formations and regulations.¹⁷ In

occurs. In this way, there are hints in structuralism of Edmund Husserl and phenomenology.

¹⁷ See AS, p. 40; AK, pp. 27-28. Foucault makes a distinction between the analysis of thought and the analysis of a discursive field. Structuralism constitutes an analysis of thought (representation), whereas archaeology is that of discourse (discursive formations). Foucault states, "the analysis of thought is always *allegorical* in relation to the discourse that it uses. Its question is unfailingly: what was being said in what was said. The analysis of the discursive field is oriented completely differently; it is a question of ceasing the statement

archaeology there is no sense of a deep rationality but rather a focused effort to uncover the manner in which discourse and its regulations allow types of rationality to count as normative or meaningful. In place of structuralist talk about binary oppositions, Foucault spoke of binary exclusions.¹⁸ It is linguistic practices that claim archival domains and that come to dominate, out of the relationships and battles that form them, the setting of their actualization. Accordingly, while it is true to say that the archaeologist like the structuralist examines the surface to reveal something deeper, Foucault's surface was linguistic practices, not the general sense of representation, and his "something deeper" did not eclipse but rather emerged in the regulations that govern linguistic operations. To understand the sense of this claim, some reference to de Saussure is in order.

narrowness and the singularity of its event; of determining the conditions of its existence, of fixing its precise limits, of establishing its correlation to other statements that can be linked to it, of showing what other discursive formations it excludes."

¹⁸ This is the case that is slowly made in Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1972). [Hereafter referred to as HF.] Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: Random House, 1965). [Hereafter referred to as MC.]

The linguistic structuralism that was developed by Saussure (which incidentally owes a heavy and generally unpaid debt to Hyppolyte Taine¹⁹), emerged from the growing concern at the end of the nineteenth century about the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign.²⁰ In Saussure, the linguistic sign unites a sound and a concept. As Saussure's famous example of the sheet of paper explains,²¹ sound is like the reverse side of thought; the spoken word is intimately linked to the mental image as the recto is linked to the verso. But the relationship that composes the sign is arbitrary in the sense that there is no fundamental or primordial reason why one sound and one thought should be linked together. Instead, the sound bears only a conventional relationship to intentional thought. Here, the distinction *signifiant* and *signifié* (signifier/signified), the spoken and the intended, is

¹⁹ See Hans Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1982), pp. 356-371.

²⁰ In France, some of the personalities involved included Michel Bréal and Antoine Meillet as well as Taine and de Saussure. Hans Aarsleff argues that the French tradition rests on Etienne Bonnot Condillac and, from here, can be traced to John Locke. Yet it is odd that Aarsleff, who so insists on defending the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign, should at the same time criticize Foucault for rendering arbitrary the course of history and tradition! See Hans Aarsleff, op. cit., p. 22.

made. The convention of language means that no one can freely exchange other sounds for familiar concepts. The linguistic sign may be arbitrary in composition, but is fixed in signification. The French say *mouton* and the English say *sheep*; both words are accidental signifiers emerging from the linguistic history of the two cultures. Yet, the arbitrary composition of this sign never rests independently of the linguistic system in which it occurs, English or French. It functions as sign because it is contextually present in a system of signification. To account for the context, Saussure here introduces *valeur*.²² By *valeur*, he tempers the arbitrary composition of the sign relationship.²³ The sign is present as a function by means of a system of *valeur*. It is the system of the relationship of signs already operating prior to the employment of words that sets the contextual valuation of a sign. In other words, one must start with the whole, in good "eschatological" fashion, to comprehend the part.

²² Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (Paris: Payot, 1973), pp. 154-169.

²² This word is best understood as valuation or valuing.

²³ Saussure, op. cit.

Still, despite the apparent emphasis on the contextual relativity of linguistic operations, Saussure's paradigm ends up taking on a totalizing effect. By *valeur* Saussure maintained a theory of concurrence²⁴: the English word sheep has a *concurrent* association not found in French. As such, in English one does not eat sheep but employs a second sign, mutton. The English word mutton occurs in the linguistic cluster of cuisine whereas the word sheep does not occur in this cluster. In this way it is possible to understand that linguistic *valeur* is a clustering of signs whose internal operations open and limit the functional possibility of words through the concurrence of associations present in that cluster. The consequential impression is that it should be possible to jump underneath, as it were, a linguistic cluster to examine not the concurrence specifically but the general structure by which a linguistic concurrence operates. It should be possible to understand the linguistic operation in a universal sense as "thinking"; and although this line of questioning is never followed up in the work of Saussure, it is the

²⁴ Ibid.

legacy that marks the eschatological structuralism White described as a quest for "deep consciousness." In Saussure, *valeur* opens an avenue to the depth of the linguistic sign and a linguistic universal. Though everywhere the sign as such is arbitrary, the act of valuation underneath its appearance is necessarily universal.

Foucault distinguishes himself from structuralism in that, concerning the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign and the act of valuation, he does not resort to the Saussurian terms of synchronic and diachronic events. These words, perhaps best expressed by Lévi-Strauss,²⁵ define the surface and depth of the linguistic sign. *Valeur* as such can be understood as a type of meeting point between two historic dimensions that occurs when a sign-event occurs. The synchronic dimension is simply the location of a sign beside other signs; the diachronic dimension is the depth relation of that sign to its history of synchronic appearances. Lévi-Strauss used the example of an orchestra score: the synchronic location of the note is read from right to left, whereas the diachronic harmony is that union

²⁵ Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (New York: BasicBooks, 1963), pp. 206-230.

of notes down the orchestra score and across the diversity of instruments. It is a useful example and it gave to Lévi-Strauss the well known conclusion that "...man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers."²⁵ Or, to relate this back to the metaphor of music, the notes played have different locations and are sounded by different instruments; but the capacity to play is at bottom an equal achievement.

The archaeologist, while employing the word "event" and applauding the dispelling of the idea of progress, does not attempt to surpass the achievement of Saussure's *valeur* through recourse to deep structures of consciousness and linguistic universals. As indicated above, the archaeologist is interested in discursive formations; in place of *valeur* Foucault will speak of "strategies"; and while the event of the linguistic sign and its concurrences are noted, they do not invoke a universal undercurrent but call forward an

²⁵ Ibid., p. 230

examination of the "rules of discursive formation."²⁷ While the ultimate aim of structuralism, at least of the eschatological type, is to arrive at the universality of the condition of thinking (and accordingly, structures of human experience), the archaeology of Foucault poses a different question based on different suppositions. For Foucault it is the record of discourse that provides the only available material to examine the record of thinking. What must be determined is the condition of the "statement" in the archive where the event has occurred. When it is a question of finding the rules that exclude and include, locate and isolate, celebrate and condemn the particularities of the circulation of discursive practices in a given field, then it is as such that field itself and its specific mode of existence that is the ultimate question at hand. The question of the deep structures of rationality breaks open to the examination of the archival space that permits specific discursive events. Rationality becomes secondary to the question of what permits an event to count as reason; and in place of a quest to

²⁷ These words appear in AS, AK.

uncover meaning lies a question about how meaning is produced.

Rather than highlighting these differences, there remains a certain insistence on the part of several commentators to cover the archaeology of Foucault in the blanket of structuralism. By consequence, the specific warnings of Foucault are ignored. "It is only too easy to avoid the trouble of analyzing such work by giving it an admittedly impressive-sounding, but inaccurate, label."²⁸ Edith Kurzweil is perhaps the most unfortunate case in point when she claims that "like Lévi-Strauss, [Foucault] promises order at the end, after all representations have been unveiled when the codes of knowledge of each of his periods will be clearly known."²⁹ But Foucault's promise does not lie in "codes of knowledge," which, in the first place, is not his term. Foucault is interested in regimes of knowledge that do not hide but carefully fabricate what can count as knowledge. Neither does archaeology concern "order at the end of the day" (a phrase that

²⁸ Michel Foucault from the foreword to the English edition of OT, p. xiv.

archaeology is precisely to disrupt *the order of things* by accounting for exclusions, discontinuities, and limitation that emerge with the discursive event. Near the conclusion of the Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault offers this frank account:

My aim was to analyze this history [of ideas], in a discontinuity that no teleology could reduce in advance; to place it [réperer] in a dispersion that no pre-established horizon could enclose; to allow it to be deployed in an anonymity on which no transcendental constitution could impose the form of the subject; to open it up to the temporality that could not promise the return of any dawn.³⁰

The promise is not to "de-code" history, as if history should be a kind of secret, but to "expose" history. The promise does not allow access to the questions an historical period itself never asked; archaeology is highly practical. Its aim is set on low ground. What it seeks is the identification of the condition of the actually said.

Albeit Foucault could applaud France's episode of structuralism for its ability to expose the illusion of nineteenth century progress and to dissolve "man,"

²⁹ Edith Kuszweil, The Age of Structuralism: Lévi-Strauss to Foucault (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 1980), p. 205.

³⁰ AS, pp. 264-265; AK, p. 203.

Foucault's aim was not to go "beyond" structuralism (as Dreyfus and Rabinow impress) but to abandon it. The inherent desire of structuralism to uncover the depth of rationality hides from view the archaeological quest to understand its production. Structuralism never proved to be cognizant of the structures that made it possible. Though archaeology is no automatic solution, for not even Foucault could write outside of the system to which he belonged, still with archaeology there is some ability to embrace the problem. Archaeology does not seek the bottom of history or the continuity of human experience, since on both counts the event emerges in the immediacy of the specificities of a discursive field. The experience of the archive is constantly retro-spective, that is, constantly invoking a view of history from the point of event; and the "event" itself is constantly the product already there as a point of orientation in the activity of discourse. In short, in archaeology there is no location "outside" of a system of discursive activity, which is why Foucault holds no promise of order or of a foundation for a teleology of history.

These latter hermeneutical problems that deliver no outside progressively lead Foucault further from

structuralism and toward Nietzsche and Heidegger. They accounted for the need of genealogy to supplement archaeology. They explain why Foucault and Heidegger, a subject rarely explored, requires address.

(2) On Bracketing Phenomenology And Inverting Authenticity

From the earliest time of his academic career, Foucault was under the influence of transcendental phenomenology. Years before the appearance of his thesis, *Folie et déraison: histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1961), he had already published a long, critical introduction to Ludwig Binswanger's Dream and Existence,³¹ an existential psychology based on Heidegger's phenomenology of *Dasein*. In an interview, Foucault recounted how, prior to his reading of Nietzsche in 1953, his question was, "Is the phenomenological, transhistorical subject able to provide an account of the history of reason?"³² And it

³¹ Ludwig Binswanger and Michel Foucault, Dream and Existence (Seattle: Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 1986).

³² Gérard Raulet, "Structuralism and Poststructuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault," Telos, vol. 16, No 55 (1983), p. 199.

is apparent from the introduction to George Canguihem's The Normal and the Pathological that Foucault traces the line of this question through Canguihem to Edmund Husserl.³³

The background of this experience does not deliver to Foucault the prestigious title "phenomenologist" any more than he felt worthy of being called a "structuralist." There are key and distinctive characteristics that will separate Foucault from phenomenology and Heidegger, though the question concerning Heidegger is much more difficult. And unlike the question of structuralism (where Foucault disclaimed affiliation), Foucault was serious enough about phenomenology to have understood himself to suffer a "rupture" with this inquiry after encountering Nietzsche by way of Heidegger.³⁴ All the critical work of archaeology unfolded after this so-called rupture, and it proves correct that a comprehension of

³³ Foucault wrote that "the lectures on transcendental phenomenology delivered in 1929 by Husserl marked the moment: phenomenology entered France through that text." He stated further that Husserl took two readings in France, one leading to Jean Paul-Sartre's existential analysis and the other to the history of science (which Foucault felt was closer to the foundations of Husserl's thought). Foucault placed Canguihem, with Koyré and Cavailles, on the latter side of this reception. George Canguihem, The Normal and the Pathological (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 8.

³⁴ Telos, op. cit.

archaeology is best achieved in contrast to, on the one hand, trans-historical subjectivity and, on the other, Heidegger's *Dasein*. Both Heidegger, then, and Husserlian based phenomenology,³⁵ form another profitable avenue of investigation.

The road to understanding Foucault as distinct from phenomenology is filled with many false starts and false turns. This is particularly the case when the very specific and often complex term of phenomenological "bracketing" is uncarefully used to describe Foucault's concern for the autonomy of discourse. Dreyfus and Rabinow, in particular, characterize Foucault's suspension of truth as comparable to Husserl's phenomenological method. "Not only must the [archaeological] investigator bracket the truth claims of the serious speech acts he is investigating—Husserl's phenomenological reduction—he must also," they claim, "bracket the meaning claims of

³⁵ I will not be able to engage in the question of Heidegger's relation to Husserl, which is both complex and the subject of many books and articles. I will confess, however, that I do not read Heidegger as a radical break from Husserl. I understand that Heidegger placed the phenomenological task into the hermeneutical existential (loosely, temporality and the ecstases of temporality [care, understanding, history]) of *Dasein*. In my view, Heidegger grounds Husserl existentially. Arguably Husserl undertakes this same task in *Crisis*.

the speech acts he studies."³⁶ Fundamentally, this is descriptive of archaeology, but it is a misleading statement in relation to Husserl. And since the reader is being asked to approach Foucault by way of Husserl, from the start the understanding of Foucault is placed in jeopardy. Dreyfus and Rabinow oblige one to think that Foucault had incorporated the phenomenological reduction at that point where he seems most deliberately to avoid it.

In phenomenology the transcendental subject is already given to the experience (*Erleben*) of the world (which constitutes the totality of all possible experience) and is already in the world as the constituting "for-me" of the horizon of possible experience. It is on the basis of this bare transcendental subjectivity as "present consciousness"³⁷ in the world that the world, as such, must be bracketed. Husserl brackets the natural experience of the world in order to concentrate on the structures of the intuition of the world in for-me experience. The act of bracketing the world in order

³⁶ BSH, p. 49.

³⁷ Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 8.

to focus on the essential acts of intuition is called the *eidactic* reduction, for one takes intuition as essence (*eidos*). Intuitive acts are reduced to essences in order to be described apart from the natural assumptions associated with the objective world.³⁵ Modern technical sciences are misleading, for Husserl, not because objects of world history are unsuitable as objects of knowledge but because those objects are posed as the primary project of *scientia*.

When Dreyfus and Rabinow state that Husserlian "brackets" apply to the "truth" of serious speech acts, one is directed to phenomenology in a backward fashion. It is as if the task were to make the *eidetic* reduction (truth claims) in order to ignore it in favour of the natural perception (in the nearness of speech acts) of the world. In truth, phenomenological brackets in this case would have to apply not to truth claims but to the structure in which those claims are made such that an address to the intuition of truth in speech acts is

³⁵ I offer here the basic line of argument that is characteristic of Husserl in the period between Ideas and Cartesian Meditations. I oblige the reader to understand the difficulty involved when describing Husserl and phenomenology in a few sentences. See Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1962) and Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).

exposed. Secondly, such a reduction would be undertaken for the purpose of arriving at the proper subject of science, which is the orientation toward the world given in the "for me" structure of consciousness. To start here, then, in order to approach Foucault and archaeology is a blatant misstep. Foucaultian brackets, if one could appropriately use the term, would be placed on the transcendental subject, and the objective of Foucault would not be found in the question of transcendental subjectivity but in the historical question of how "brackets" should come to be thought necessary at all. Archaeology is not a super-revision of phenomenology but rather like its reversal: the world is not bracketed to arrive at the subject but the subject is bracketed to observe the structural possibilities the world gives to it. Husserl brackets "natural knowledge" in order to arrive at the essences of consciousness; Foucault brackets consciousness in order to account for the historicity of its manufactured experience. To start with Husserl to reach Foucault, particularly at this level of opposition, risks the simultaneous misunderstanding of both.

Perhaps in a certain sense Foucault does bracket Husserl's brackets, as Dreyfus and Rabinow's presentation tries to impress.³³ Still, the manner in which Foucault suspends "truth"⁴⁰ not only has an objective quite different from Husserl but is also based on a fundamentally different point of departure. For Foucault the suspension of truth is necessary to avoid imposing on a past archive the participating actuality of the historian as a discursive event in the contemporary archive. Since the historian, in the act of doing history, also occupies history, such concepts as world views, types, or the spirit of an age belong more to the contemporary knowledge-function than to the archive of investigation. And the "world-view" Foucault speaks of includes the transcendental subjectivity of phenomenology very familiar in Husserl. What Foucault disputes is the supposition that a unifying subjectivity can be posited at all and

³³ See AS, p. 69; AK, p. 50. Dreyfus and Rabinow impress their reader with how Foucault used "double brackets" as if to out-smart or in some manner one-up Husserl. They might have asked, however, how Foucault was actually relying on Heidegger, at this point, when he inverts Husserl (and Merleau-Ponty) in order to ask how consciousness is an effect of a facticity that essentially eclipses it. See BSH, pp. 50-52.

⁴⁰ I use this term in a general sense to represent the truth, meaning, and seriousness of discourse experienced in the function of the archive

therefore disputes even the possibility of the practice of "bracketing." In archaeology he deliberately opts, over against the phenomenological subject, for modes of discursive possibilities. And phenomenological subjectivity is seen as one such discursive mode of possibility given within the matrix of the modern archive. The question is not what is the true nature of experience (and consequently what is knowledge) by which phenomenological bracketing has its sense, but how is knowledge permitted to happen given the constrictions of discursive formations (and consequently what are the rules of these constrictions)? When Foucault suspends the ultimate questions of meaning or truth, a practical rather than theoretical action unfolds. Since meaning and truth abstract from specificity (as seen particularly in structuralism) they cannot be turned around to examine specificity in linguistic operations. They hide rather than specify linguistic operations by covering archival locations with imported consistencies that dispel the dispersion of language and override the examination of the event. The suspension of totalities, whether phenomenological or structural,⁴² is for the sake of

⁴² See AS, pp. 25-26; AK, p. 15: "...my aim most decidedly is

concentration on archival "positivities," that is, on the historicity of discourse.⁴² How does discourse emerge and under what regime of restrictions, rules, or limitations of space does it exist? What is referred to as "bracketing" by Dreyfus and Rabinow could only casually be considered a technique that allows Foucault a certain concentration on functional positivities, but it is misleading to conjure the image of Husserl and transcendental phenomenology as the helpful avenue of advance.

A far more convincing parallel occurs between Foucault and Heidegger when Foucault describes the portrait, *Las Meninas*, of Valesquez in The Order of Things. This painting, which was decisive in Foucault

not to use the categories of cultural totalities (whether world-views, ideal types, the particular spirit of the age) in order to impose on history, despite itself, the forms of structural analysis. The series described, the limits fixed, the comparisons and correlations established are not based on the old philosophies of history, but are intended to question teleologies and totalizations." The critique of the "history of ideas" occupies part IV of this text.

⁴² By positivities Foucault refers to the specific conditions in which discursive formations are manifest. One could think of them as rules of discursive formation. There is also a potential for what is called "inter-positivity," where the rules of one formation overlap and constrict the operating space of another formation. But they are called "positivities" for the sake of averting their being mistook as a priori or hidden factors. For Foucault, the condition of discourse is the archival operation; what must be determined are concrete sites of dispersion, whether institutional (a hospital) or personal (an individual doctor) or disciplinary (medicine), in which discourse is regulated.

for describing the disjunction of the classical and modern world, relays those very descriptions that for Heidegger differentiated modernity from any previous era. In the classic essay, "The Age of the World Picture,"⁴³ Heidegger described the experience of ancient Greece as apprehending and the modern experience as representing. He claimed that the Greek experience could not be relayed by the image of the world picture because the Greek experience could never place itself inside the setting of that "picture." In apprehending Being, the Greek experience remained, as it were, before Being and in receptive relation to Being. Therefore whatever can be known or apprehended already belongs to the totality of Being that opens itself to the one who is present before it. "To be beheld by what is," Heidegger says, "to be included and maintained within its openness and in that way to be borne along by it, to be driven about by its oppositions and marked by its discord that is the essence of man in the great age of the Greeks."⁴⁴ The

⁴³ Martin Heidegger. "The Age of the World Picture." The Question Concerning Technology (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). [Hereafter referred to as QCT.]

⁴⁴ QCT, p. 131.

can be described by the world picture. Being is no longer what is opened from the totality in all beings to the apprehending presence of human beings; Being is now "represented" in the totality of "man." The human experience is as such a bringing before or a placing at hand the experience of Being as a relation constituted by the transcendental subjectivity of the human being. The human experience opens the question of Being by the act of bringing the world before itself (representing), the world that comes into being by and stands before the human experience. "What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth."⁴⁵ The age of modernity is defined by the event of the human being who "...puts himself into the picture...into the open sphere of that which is generally and publicly represented."⁴⁶

Modernity in Foucault is that time of "being in the picture," for it marks a break from the classical era by formulating the concept of "man" by means of a

⁴⁴ QCT, p. 131.

⁴⁵ QCT, pp. 129-130.

transcendental doublet. The *Las Meninas* portrait is an attempt to characterize this difference, for in the portrait all angles of vision are accounted for except for the subject who views the portrait, who has it as representation for the self, from the outside of the figures who compose it. Valesquez, the classical period artist, cannot put into the picture the representation of the picture (he cannot make the picture stand before, in Heidegger's sense of the word, as picture), for the whole scene (which depicts an audience before the King and Queen where the latter are known to us only by their reflection in a mirror) is a play with angles of light and darkness, revelations and secrets, of what in its totality beholds him as an artist. Valesquez to be sure is in the picture insofar as his portrait is a self-portrait, for he stands in the audience as the artist painting the invisible King and Queen, but the artist does not include himself as the transcendental doublet, as the one who sets up and brings to the fore the inside of the picture as his outside, as his beholding and representing of the self for the self. This latter act of being placed into the

"picture," where one is in the scene before the object of the world, is what emerges with modernity, and the description of this fundamental disjunction remains in Foucault a Heideggerian accomplishment.

The commentary on Valásquez and the transcendental doublet are not the only locations where traces of Heideggerian influence reside. There is also Foucault's thorough concentration on the event of "man" becoming the subject. This is also a major question for Heidegger, but on a different plane. For Heidegger, the interest in the question of "man" becoming a subject, as S. Ijsseling discusses, "...is an aspect of the history of being..."⁴⁷ But it was the very process of that history that paradoxically withdrew the question of Being which could only be reawakened in the analytic of *Dasein*. Heidegger's concentration on the subject was accordingly twofold: to accomplish the existential hermeneutic of *Dasein* as being in the world (the so-called early Heidegger); to recover Being in an age of modern technicality that risked appropriating the world on a purely instrumental level (the so-called later Heidegger). To carry out

⁴⁷ Ijsseling, "Foucault with Heidegger," Man and World, 19 (1986), p. 420

this task, in various forms Heidegger constantly engages temporality and the analysis of *being-in-the-world* (a phrase that describes a completed experience prior to *Dasein's* project or the contextual interpretation of that project or its extensive possibility in the condition of its history).

It is reasonable to suggest that Foucault's questioning of the history of the subject emerged definitively from his reading of Heidegger,⁴⁸ but it is impossible to draw clear lines here⁴⁹. Foucault differs from Heidegger in that his approach is foremost epistemological in contrast to Heidegger's dominant ontological themes. This probably marks the influence of Canguihem's reading of Husserl, the latter for whom, as Ricoeur has summarized, "the ontological question is the epistemological question."⁵⁰ Secondly, Foucault's

⁴⁸ So Ijsseling, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ Foucault used Heidegger in order to think, a task that both complements Heidegger (for that is how Heidegger wished to be used) and hides the presence of Heidegger in the formulations of Foucault.

⁵⁰ Paul Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, p. 89. Ricoeur derives this reading from Husserl's remarks on transcendental-phenomenological self-experience at the end of the first meditation of the *Cartesian Meditations*, *op. cit.*, p. 26, where it is stated that "the objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me, this world, with all its Objects, I said, derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me,

understanding (and suspicion) of the stability of the subject is most likely derived from his critical reading of M. Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger in this regard would in fact have aided Foucault in his critique of phenomenological subjectivity, but this remains inferential. At times it is apparent that Heidegger is simply a convenient foil by which Foucault can colourfully relate his own ideas. Consider, for example, the comment made by Foucault at Berkeley:

For Heidegger, it was through an increasing obsession with "technae" as the only way to arrive at an understanding of objects, that the West lost touch with being. Let's turn the question around and ask which techniques and practices form the Western concept of the subject, giving it its characteristic split of truth and error, freedom and constraint.⁵¹

One could debate whether Foucault really has turned Heidegger around at this point, though the effect of the statement is impressive. What can be detected here is not so much the contradiction of one against the other but a deliberate redirection, on the part of

from me myself..." It is on the word *sense* that much emphasis is placed, here referring to the order of significance (*Seinsgeltung*) of the world for me (*Für mich*). On the basis of that ordering or valuing Ricoeur distinguishes Husserl's priority of the epistemological event from Descartes' ontological foundation.

⁵¹ These comments are taken from documentation at the Centre Michel Foucault in Paris. The statement was made at Berkeley, California, during the Howison Lectures, October 20, 1980.

Foucault, of a question that in fact is Heidegger's. It was the "early" Heidegger who most specifically wanted to engage by the analysis of temporality the reawakening of an authentic *Dasein*. But what Foucault raises is the troubling question of how the "being," with which we have lost touch, is effectively fictioned for us by the *technae* that poses its lostness to us. Indeed, what Foucault states here is very similar to the "later" Heideggerian problem of the essence of technology. Technology is the problem that poses its solution within the enframing that it has itself produced.⁵² Foucault, in this example, then, contrary to Dreyfus and Rabinow's idea of "beyond," poses himself in a manner more "authentically" Heidegger than Heidegger. Foucault, in effect going back to Heidegger or back to the question of Heidegger, seeks to define those positivities of language (the linguistic equivalent of Heidegger's *technae* that perhaps even enframe Heidegger's enframing) that produce the setting of the subject, and the sense of being, in modernity. Archaeology, perhaps more accurately than Heidegger, sees the very question of the subject not only caught

⁵² See QCT.

up in the world but also constrained in the discursive circulation that allows the inquiry its credibility. What can count as the question of Being is as such an event of the archive. And the troublesome question of what kind of event can be called "authentic" never arises in the manner Foucault approaches this problem.

This brings to the fore the unique expression "statement" found in the Archaeology of Knowledge. It is not out of order to claim that what *Dasein* was to Heidegger's ontology the *statement* was to Foucault's archaeology. As *Dasein* is the fundamental way to the question of "being," so the statement, as archival site, uncovers the fundamental question of discursive formations. Although Foucault wrote nothing about Heidegger, a Foucaultian approach would emphasize that the *Dasein* is a site in the archive of regulatory events, that the *Dasein* is produced, even in its elusive authentic form, by the constraining, competing, and finally constricted possibility of archival expressions. I will progressively call the activity of the archive producing its setting, the "constricted possibility" (and at times the constriction of possibility), and I will call the emergence of the event in constriction, the "permission" of the

archive.⁵³ Further, the setting of the archive that is given to the event is called the "is-already" condition for the purpose of identifying the setting in which "permission" is active. These considerations will progressively prove crucial, but they rest on the initial formulation of Foucault's statement, which, in the first place, must be understood.

When taking the example of a French typewriter, Foucault asks his reader to consider a handful of letters. Given as a random selection, they are virtually meaningless (A, Z, E, R, T). However, as the order of letters that appear on a French typewriter, "...are they not a table of letters chosen in a contingent way, the statement of an alphabetical series governed by laws other than chance."⁵⁴ This simple illustration achieved through a series of letters allows for the following general clarification:

...the statement is not the same kind of unit as the sentence, the proposition, or the speech act; it does not bring forward therefore the same criteria; but neither is

⁵³ Briefly, I mean that discursive circulations open archival locations to sense-functions and that these functions, due to their recognizable form as knowledge or authority within the matrix of archival activity, locate the epistemological cradle of interpretation and meaning. They thereby permit experiences produced within archival boundaries to stand as normative.

⁵⁴ AS, p. 114; AK, p. 85.

it the same kind of unit as a material object, with its limits and independence. It is indispensable, in its own way of being unique (neither entirely linguistic, nor exclusively material), for our ability to say whether or not there is a sentence, proposition, or speech act; and [it is indispensable] for our ability to say whether the sentence is correct (or acceptable, or interpretable), whether the proposition is legitimate and well constructed, whether the speech act fulfills its requirements, and was in fact carried out. It is not necessary to seek in the statement a unit that is either long or short, strongly and weakly structured, but one that is caught up, like the others, in a logical, grammatical, locutory nexus.... The statement is not therefore a structure (that is, a group of relations between variable elements, thus authorizing a possibly infinite number of concrete models); it is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not they make sense, according to what rule they follow one another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation (oral or written).⁵⁵

The statement, then, may be comprehended as a nodal point within the diagram of the archive. It is not specifically any single utterance but rather forms, in the collectivity of statements, the propriety of the circulation of discourse. Statements mark out the boundaries of the archive and at once are the locations of the dispersion of possible expressive modes. The

⁵⁵ AS, pp. 114-115; AK, pp. 86-87.

statement as that propriety of circulation, that *episteme* of archival activity, maps as it were the is-already function by which "sense" is decided upon. Every archive has its own diagram of statements, its own functioning *episteme*, by which Foucault appeals to the surface of events. The *Dasein* question in Foucault would always already be the event of the statement and as such belongs to the "picture" of its diagram.

Yet, by whatever means Foucault will differ from Heidegger on this point, to whatever extent he will pursue the condition of the archive in which the "statement" of the subject is produced, he will to a great extent emulate Heidegger by finally confronting Nietzsche as the most pressing problem. What Foucault could not account for in his archaeology was the factor or factors that produce the constriction the archive holds or that account for the fluctuations and alterations the archive undergoes. Why in short should there be one archive and not another; or why, if archaeology asks what factors of a system make an element even count within that system, should that element have arisen and assumed its dressing, its colour, or its form of being? And if an archive should be stable, what accounts for that stability and then

(perhaps suddenly) a violent turn to revolutionary convulsions? Though he had read Nietzsche as early as 1952, it is not until 1975 that the impact of the Genealogy of Morals and the Nietzschean concept of power is seen in what is probably Foucault's foremost book, Discipline and Punish.

(3) The Genealogical Predicament

To think is to be involved in the tautology of thinking. The tautology of thinking is the condition of being unable to think outside the location of thought. These turning phrases were realized even in the time of Antisthenes and Epimenides in the movements of Greek Skepticism. Bertrand Russell brought it forward again by asking if the set that includes all sets that do not include themselves belongs to itself. If the answer is no, it is yes; if it is yes, it is no. What is the point, except to say that thinking experiences its own limit, its own unattainable outside, from the constitution of itself, from inside itself. The act of thinking seizes itself within its own coil: it can reach beyond itself, to its outside, only by and through itself; but since that reach

succeeds on the basis of the experience of thinking, the "outside" remains an achievement within the limits of the constitution of thinking. Thinking is the experience of that which is already given to its possibility. Thinking always belongs to the set it already is. These turning phrases: realized by Antisthenes and Epimenides, acknowledged too by Nietzsche, are finally admitted and welcomed by Foucault as the *a priori* of archival experience and the *fundamentum* of genealogical analysis.

Genealogy arises out of archaeology because archaeology cannot finally explain or escape itself. Archaeology perpetually catches itself inside itself; like Russell's paradox it can never stand outside the tangled knots of its self-definition. It turns upon itself as a product of its own explanation. Archaeology belongs to the archive of archaeology, to a set of discursive rules and limitations that define the very "modernity" it so boldly sought to eclipse. Archaeology seeks to account for the rules of discourse, but its very style of seeking is constituted by those same rules that now justify its quest, that

produce the *episteme* of its sense.⁵⁶ Archaeology is not an outside but an inside. It is not a quest but a distribution of discursive practices. Ian Bapty states:

The obvious question becomes, how does Foucault escape the historical a priori of the contemporary *episteme*? Is his analysis not similarly situated according to a pre-determined set of discursive regularities ultimately bringing it back, however unwillingly, to the level of a kind of Nietzschean anti-history [i.e. totalization]?⁵⁷

Is genealogy a step around this problem, a solution to the coil of thinking? No. It is not a solution but an admission; genealogy accounts for the condition of "no-outside" and makes that condition the advantage of its analysis.

Let us begin with Nietzsche. "Ultimately, no one can extract from things, books included, more than one already knows. What one has no access to through

⁵⁶ This critique is perhaps most poignantly made by Jean Baudrillard who describes Foucault's discourse itself as a technique ("production") of truth: "Foucault's [discourse] is not therefore of truth but a mythic discourse in the strong sense of the word, and I secretly believe that it has no illusions about the effect of truth it produces. That, by the way, is what is missing in those who follow in Foucault's footsteps and pass right by this mythic arrangement to end up with the truth, nothing but the truth." Forget Foucault (New York: Semiotext[e], 1987), p. 10.

⁵⁷ Ian Bapty, "Nietzsche, Derrida and Foucault," Archaeology After Structuralism (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 257.

experience one has no ear for."⁵⁸ Ultimately, becoming oneself is a question of becoming the joyful coincidences of the contingencies of existence. Put into the tautology intended: becoming what one is, is a question of being what one becomes.⁵⁹ The notion of a stable or archetypal being is not found in Nietzsche: Nietzsche is profoundly anti-ontological at this point. The self does not have an originating nature (*Ursprung*) but a becoming nature (*Herkunft*) that emerges (*Entstehung*) as an event of the condition of its possibility.⁶⁰ It is not that Nietzsche delivers the

⁵⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo* (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 70.

⁵⁹ The full title of *Ecce Homo*, *op. cit.*, includes the subtitle "How One Becomes What One Is."

⁶⁰ Foucault indicates that Nietzsche has both a stressed and unstressed sense of origin. The unstressed sense employs synonymously several words to describe an origin. Here one may find expressions such as *Ursprung*, *Herkunft*, *Geburt*, or *Entstehung*. But there are occasions when Nietzsche is deliberately contrasting one sense with another. Foucault refers to *Human, All Too Human*, where, in the first paragraph, *Wunderursprung*, referring to a metaphysical preoccupation of philosophy, is set against *Herkunft und Anfang*, which refer to the active analyses of philosophy in the condition of historicity. Foucault also felt that another distinction briefly occurs in the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals* where *Ursprung* and *Herkunft* seem to represent an instant of a stressed difference. The first term, *Ursprung*, describes the work of Paul Rée, which Nietzsche understood to be dependent upon a notion of consistency and stability in history; the second term more specifically concerns the historicity of morality as unstable practices that emerge in the context of a complex and variant competition. It was in the spirit of this distinction that Foucault goes on to say "...if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is something altogether

self purely as a product of the mechanisms of history; it is that Nietzsche celebrates the mechanisms of history as chance and as play. The *Übermensch* is a being of play.⁶¹

Archaeology started "most decidedly" as a practice void of totalities,⁶² but it ended by asking itself if it too had become an image of what was shunned.⁶³ Archaeology, when isolated from genealogy,

fabricated in the piecemeal fashion from alien forms." It is perhaps also this stressed sense that lies behind the description in a 1976 lecture, "Let us give the term *genealogy* to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allow us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today." See Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 83 [Hereafter referred to as P/K]. My distinctions above need to be seen against the stressed differentiation made by Foucault between *Ursprung* and *Herkunft*. I have used the word "originating nature" against the word "emerging" to make this distinction. See also Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 142. [Hereafter referred to as NGH.]

⁶¹ The *Übermensch* is most famously the figure of Zarathustra who, in the section entitled "The Seven Seals," celebrates yes-saying in laughter and dance. See Friedrich Nietzsche, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," The Portable Nietzsche, translated by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), pp. 340-343.

⁶² Recall from note 41, the "...aim is most decidedly not [*il ne s'agit pas (et moins encore)*] to use the categories of cultural totalities..." AS, p. 25; AK, p. 15.

⁶³ "You make curious use of the freedom that you question in others...It would no doubt be better if you had a clearer awareness of the conditions in which you speak, but in return [you should grant] a greater confidence in the real action of others and in their possibilities." AS, p. 271; AK, p. 208.

lacks the quality of play, that quality of turning that turns to itself and on itself, that recognizes the paradox it inevitably represents. There are two errors; Foucault was aware of them both. First, archaeology cannot stand outside the system that it analyzes. Second, archaeology cannot account for the origin of a system or its rupture.

We have already encountered the first problem and the degree to which archaeology tried to compensate for it. Foucault knew modernity was the age of conceiving the world as picture; he also comprehended transcendental subjectivity precisely as a problem that sought its resolution in the setting of that picture; in this way, he knew phenomenology was the effect of the very rules of discursive formation that constituted its problem. Phenomenology was the structure of a discourse that permitted it to be seen, that indeed constructed it as a problem. With archaeology one merely seeks to label the positivities of that constitution, thereby at once reveal the instabilities of the supposed resolution and establish archaeology as an outside practice. Archaeology is always capable of

laughing at attempts of totality, unification, or resolution.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, Foucault's archaeology showed little indication that its "outside" position depended on the "inside" functions it attempted to label. It did not see itself ironically as *emerging*. It did not recognize its dependent relation to, because of its definition over-against, the very transcendental subjectivity it critiqued and so easily assumed to surpass. Archaeology occupies a "space" extended from and opened by the functions of transcendental subjectivity: archaeology is a potential of this function realized on the horizon of its operations. If one would examine the matter first from the point of genealogy, it could be said that transcendental subjectivity produced out of its operations a potential for horizons that transgress it; and, archaeology at best is a transgression, not an outside. This affirmation, which casts doubt on the success of archaeology, is at once the irony of genealogy.

⁶⁴ In the Preface of The Order of Things Foucault spoke of the "laughter that shatters...all the familiar landmarks of my thought." The laughter arose from the encounter with a "certain Chinese encyclopedia's" classification of animals. MC, p. 7; OT, p. xv.

Genealogy can both account for its emergence and remain active in the contingencies that make it possible.

The subtle hints at power, productivity, transgression, potential events realized, and potential events lost, all composing a complex of relationships within the function of an archive, is the second problem that remained tacit in archaeological analysis. In place of an explicit confrontation with the problem, however, archaeology turned consistently to the task of delineating the *episteme*, the task of locating positivities, that cradled the rules of discourse and truth.⁶⁵ Foucault, it seems, was aware of this shortcoming too, so he plays with the notions of "other

⁶⁵ Michael Mahon argues that archaeology occupies the truth axis of Foucault's three main investigations: truth, power, and the subject. In this way he correctly states that Foucault was always doing genealogy and that archaeology was really a guise for the genealogy of discursive formations. My presentation upholds in addition that archaeology in fact delivers Foucault to an explicit genealogy and the investigation of power. Or, as stated above, genealogy emerges from its subtle presence in archaeology as the overall aim and completion of archaeological investigations. I believe accordingly it is correct to judge The Archaeology of Knowledge as both a summary and turning point in Foucault's thought. In relation to this question, scholars of Foucault tend to divide themselves among those who see a dramatic shift from archaeology to genealogy (Sheridan and Smart), those who see consistency (Russo and Bernauer), and those who occupy something of a middle ground (Dreyfus and Rabinow). My reading is closest to Mahon, who takes his lead from Lemert and Gillan. Archaeology as it is outlined in the Archeology of Knowledge is an essential element of the genealogical problematic. See Micheal Mahon, Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy (Albany: New York State University Press, 1992.), pp. 101-103.

archaeologies"⁶⁶ that inquire into the direction of sexuality, ethics, and political behaviour. Awkwardly, though, other archaeologies are only repetitions of the all too general, finally reductionist, question of discursive formations that constitute "truth." Foucault's other archaeologies were only other locations of the same task. To achieve a broader analysis, to work complexity out of this otherwise blanket examination, he had to turn to the antidote of Nietzschean genealogy.

Genealogy does not abandon archaeology, as some would have it,⁶⁷ but complements and completes it.

⁶⁶ See AS, pp. 251-255; AK, pp. 192-195.

⁶⁷ "There is no pre- and post-archaeology or genealogy in Foucault" is a good clear statement by Dreyfus and Rabinow (BSH, p. 104); this contrasts with several attempts to find a break or radical transformation between an early and late Foucault. However, the desire to separate archaeology and distinguish it from genealogy (See David R. Shumway, Michel Foucault [Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989].) is not without foundation so far as the matter is carefully conducted. Accordingly, I will pause here briefly to relay the matter in more detail.

What archaeology relies on, it is pointed out (Todd May: 1993; Shumway: 1989; Gilles Deleuze: 1986; Pamela Major-Poetzl: 1983), is the assumption that the said (positivities) and unsaid (rules governing positivities) are separate realms. The division however demands from Foucault an account of the heteronomous relation between the two: how do rules govern statements; how do statements uncover rules? In other words, since the description of positivities relies on the function of rules "...Foucault must offer an account of how they can also be related, which he does not do until his later works" (May [trusting Deleuze on this point], p. 29). This is fundamentally the point I have made by claiming that archaeology catches itself inside itself; but what the above critique does not manage to highlight is that there is already genealogy at work with archaeology or even that archaeology finds itself ultimately to be a working tool of

Genealogy rises out of the archaeological task finally to incorporate it. The principles of inversion, discontinuity, specificity, and exteriority that defined archaeology remain the counter-practices of genealogy, but they aid the investigation of non-discursive ("institutional") practices in which the events of discourse emerge. How do discursive events determine or at least pre-dispose the constitution of ourselves, our "knowledge," and our mode of rationality? Genealogy is fundamentally the aim of

separated from an earlier one. Archaeology used rules of discursive practices to understand the dispersion of statements, i.e., the diagram of the archive. Secondly, it remained occupied with linguistic practices due to this commitment to dispersion. Linguistic practices reflect functions, or let it be said "results," of already established statements; there is no depth (*ontos*) or point (*telos*) to linguistic practices save that those practices are the dispersion of previously functioning statements. Archaeology thus establishes itself as a "genealogy" of linguistic practices, and it is in this sense that one can affirm it quite separately from structuralism. What happens with the introduction of power is twofold. In one sense, the unseen (function of rules) is accounted for as present and as active (as its "own realm of truth" [Shumway, p. 105]); in a second sense, the statement is no longer strictly tied to linguistic formations but progressively emerges within the tangle of archival functions as both product and horizon (which I will demonstrate in later chapters). What one witnesses in Foucault then are the slow emergences of genealogy as that which encompasses archaeology. This is why the introduction of power puts archaeology into a whole new environment without, at the same time, dismantling its usefulness. The "later" and "earlier" Foucault model can be very misleading regarding the consistent presence of genealogy in Foucault's thought.

this question, and archaeology, one of its constructive tools.⁶²

The first work of an explicit genealogical undertaking is in The Order of Discourse,⁶³ which attempts to define certain "procedures" (external and internal) by which discourse is controlled. These procedures may initially be understood as "discursive regularities" through which Foucault will attempt to unite power and knowledge, where power is that which constitutes the domain of objects of knowledge.⁶⁴ Genealogy seeks out locations where knowledge emerges in the archive, where and how it is sustained, ruptured, or transgressed; it employs power as that relationship of archival forces that actively produce, expand, define, and enclose the space of these operations. But immediately this is jumping too far

⁶² See Michael Mahon's quotation and footnote from Martin Jay's interview with Foucault at Berkeley, 1983. Op. cit., p. 105.

⁶³ Michel Foucault, L'ordre du discours (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1971). This essay is a reproduction of Foucault's inaugural lecture at the Collège de France given on December 2, 1970. [Hereafter referred to as OD.]

⁶⁴ The expression "will to knowledge" (*volonté de savoir*) becomes important at points here, but Foucault also speaks in this lecture of a modern "will to truth" (*volonté de vérité*) which he understands as a formation of the latter: i.e., a focusing on a particular discursive product called "truth" by means of the mode of disciplinary rationality. OD, pp. 10-23.

ahead; instead, let us first comprehend discursive regularities.

The Order of Discourse speaks of external and internal procedures of regulation, which are helpful if only to understand an initial definition of power. In Foucault, the functions of everyday life compose practices external to discourse that nevertheless exclude, divide, prioritize, and hierarchize its use. The exclusiveness of institutionalized conventions (and Foucault means particularly the innumerable professions of modernity) categorize discourse according to orders of associated nuances and expertise. Foucault felt that these daily exclusions act to regulate social space by narrowing, defining, and to a degree parceling out its limits. These locations might be called discursive clusters, an expression used in the Archeology of Knowledge, that indicate a specific "delimitation" afforded one shade of discursive practice.² Among such possible practices of exclusion

² The French word is simply *délimitation* that implies, as English, a narrowing of boundaries and a controlling of the spatial dimension in which an event can occur. I take from this term, and this general idea, my expression "permission," which (appearing later) attempts to define the boundaries that constitute the outlines of an area of a potential event and accordingly permit the event within those boundaries. Permission is in this sense the factor that controls the possibilities of meaning, and when an event transgresses its "permission" it is

are named so-called taboo discourses that generally surround the subject of politics or sexuality. These discourses, in a sense secret and specialized, are not simply words disarmed of significance as elements of a signifying chain. They are not neutral functions but social locations of desire and power. They are a foil external to the emergent event.

One easily knows that [in our society] we do not have the right to say anything at all, to speak about any kind of circumstance, any who or any what...[It is] as if discourse, far from being a transparent or neutral element in which sexuality is disarmed and politics is pacified, is one of the areas where they [sexuality and politics] exercise, in a privileged manner, some of their most fearful powers.⁷²

Foucault's conception of power is not representative (i.e., an issued word signifies the political office) but productive. The orders of discourse, set apart by the exclusivities which separate them and the limitations that privilege them, at once become objects of desire that precipitate the circulation of power.

regarded skewed as either nonsense or disruptive in relation to the established order. Depending upon the relation established to the potential horizon of permission, to which the transgressive event stands "outside," the transgression may remain silenced or may surface as revolutionary.

⁷² OD, pp. 11-12.

...discourse as psycho-analysis has shown is not simply what reveals (or hides) desire; it is also what is the object of desire; and...as history never ceases to teach us discourse is not simply what translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the reason and the means of struggle, is the power that we seek to grab hold of.⁷³

What Foucault highlights here is how the means of delimitation that selectively "order" discourse control its clustering and associating. In effect, they put discursive operations into focus as objects of desire. They produce "events."⁷⁴ This "highlighting" of which I speak is not restricted exclusively to realms of expertise such as politics. Foucault also mentions certain institutional disjunctions such as madness and sanity, thoroughly examined in Madness and Civilization, that silence the "mad" by relegating the official discourse on madness to the "reason" of the asylum.

Yet it is no doubt evident that internal regulations also govern discourse. And this suggests a second appearance of power far more subtle than the first. The function of "doctrine," as an example of an

⁷³ Ibid., p. 12.

⁷⁴ For now "events" can be understood generically as the occasions of the emergence of discourse and as the activities of the social apparatus that surround those occasions.

internal regulation of discourse, acts to "place it in common" modes of "conformity."⁷⁵ Doctrine arranges discourse within the disjunction of heresy and orthodoxy, thereby "...linking individuals to certain types of enunciation and by consequence forbidding all sorts of others."⁷⁶ In a similar manner, Foucault will speak of internal regulations that define or cluster discourse within the limits of (modern) disciplines, literary commentary, the function of an author, even structuralism and phenomenology. His point remains twofold: the rarification of discourse—those delimitations that account for its specific emergence and its specialization by constant practices of exclusion and normalization, of control and thematization—produces the "space" of experience and the emergence of discourse as event.⁷⁷

The emergence of discourse as event, or as Archaeology of Knowledge called it, its "rarification," creates out of the discourse in question an object of desire. Hence, emergence links desire (and indeed the "will to truth") to a complex of discursive and non-

⁷⁵ OD, p.44.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

discursive activity. It is this context of relationships of force, that is to say competitions and conflicts of desire, that rarify the potential space of social activity and no doubt the coordinate appearance of discursive clusters. Power, then, is not at all a general term and certainly not a dyadic one (what one agent has and another does not) but finally, albeit ubiquitous, linked to the specificity of the production of the moment in the archive.

Genealogy is not an abandonment of archaeology. It continues to make full use of the familiar search for ruptures, discontinuities, and reversals already known. But genealogy shifts the focus from truth to power, it admits that once truth is seen to be productive and eventful, once truth is comprehended within a matrix of rarifying activities that account for its emergence, once the idea of truth is no longer history's transcendental theme but its specificity of institutional functions, the stage is set to place truth after and in consequential relation to power. Truth is immediately and already a power/knowledge

complex. Knowledge of truth is already an act of power.⁷⁶

What archaeology must seek to do from this point is dig around "molelike" in the anonymous activity of erudition.⁷⁷ Its task is to discover and describe the spatial setting in which the event emerges. After The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault never uses the term archaeology again, but he will employ certain of its conceptions to recount a genealogy of the moment. This calls forward an encounter with the archive.

⁷⁶ Gilles Deleuze: "There is no model of truth that does not refer back to a kind of power, and no knowledge or even science that does not express or imply, in an act, power that is being exerted." Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 1988), p. 39. [Hereafter referred to as Deleuze.]

⁷⁷ This term is in NGH, p. 140. Gilles Deleuze also employs it (Deleuze).

CHAPTER TWO

Entrance to an Archive

"'Truth' cannot be conceived apart from its practical bearings, which compose the community of doubt and beliefs. Truth is an event within the community."¹ These words of Charles Sanders Peirce, who was little known to Foucault, in large part answer the question what is an archive?

For Foucault an archive is neither an old collection of dusty records that, on occasion, prove valuable nor is it a library of books or relics generally related by a common theme. Instead, an epoch or "framework" can be recalled with the special sense of designating a community of discursive practices.² An archive is a set of relationships that define the limits of an operating rationale and indeed the set in which that "rationality" as such is constituted. The archive

¹ Charles Sanders Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Philosophical Writings of Peirce, Ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 23-44.

² In a summary of one of Foucault's seminars at the *Collège de France* that examined the intimate ties between political functions and demographic sciences (the setting of the expression "bio-power"), Foucault describes "...the framework of the political rationality within which they [demographic sciences] appeared and took on their pointedness." This relays a descriptive sense of an archive. Michel Foucault, "Foucault at the *Collège de France*,"

brings forth the image of an arrangement of space and, more precisely, a grid in which and by means of which the events of history, its words and its things, emerge. But none of these descriptions, however evocative of harmony and regularity, can reduce the concept of an archive to a unifying principle. In Foucault, an archive cannot account for how things are arranged; it can only account for how things are scattered. The archive must always be a reminder of the genealogical sense of the "order of things"; for what appears and what is stated is consequential in relation to the constraints that locate it and the community of events that define its setting of emergence. The archive accounts for the arrangement of things only to the extent that as a working tool it describes the *episteme* of their difference and their duration.³

Truth as an event within a community aptly describes the useful picture an archive evokes, but Foucault is meticulous when it comes to understanding the composition of that community and its functioning.

³ AS, p. 171; AK, p. 129.

There is always in Foucault a certain sense of a *a priori* when speaking of the archive. The concept of an archive concerns principally the positivities that compose it, that make it as such "...the system that regulates the appearance of statements as unique [*singuliers*] events."⁴ Therefore, even prior to the sense of community, an archive is that system of formation in which community itself emerges to take its order. And yet, it is not a formal *a priori* that concerns Foucault. He speaks not of an "atemporal structure" or an "unmoved heaven" that eludes history.⁵ Foucault's *a priori* is that of historicity itself: it is the condition of the dispersion of positivities that compose the archive and indeed subject those very positivities to historically specific transformations and deformations. This is why, even though the concept of the archive first appears as the condition of possibility given to what can be said and identifies the threshold between what is said and what can no longer be said, the definition of an archive is not limited to an archaeology of discursive practices. If

⁴ Ibid.

it is possible to speak of genealogy as the complement and completion of archaeology, it is equally possible to offer the concept of an archive as the place where these two practices define each other and carry out their work.

Archaeology examines the space of the statement; it designates the searching out of discursive practices and their coexistence in the formation of truth. Genealogy complicates this picture by relating the notion of truth to non-discursive practices and the general complexities of the relationship of forces. In the first instance it is a question of constriction and permission; in the second, it is a question of emergence and power.

(1) The Space of the Statement

As Deleuze most effectively outlined, the archive concerns itself firstly with the statements that define it; but Foucault is a new type of archivist whose statements pertain not to logical propositions but space occupations.

⁵ AS, p. 168; AK, p. 127.

Rather than seeking the permanence of themes, images, and opinions through time, rather than retracing the dialectic of their conflicts in order to individualize various groups of statements, could one not rather mark out the dispersion of the points of choice, and define prior to any option, to any thematic preference, a field of strategic possibilities?⁶

Deleuze takes from Foucault three categories to outline the dimensions of the statement in relation to a field: collateral space, correlative space, and complementary space. He seeks in a highly illuminating, hermeneutical presentation not just to explain Foucault but to distinguish the manner in which archival space locates the constricted setting of a statement-event and holds the underlying *episteme* of composite statements in endurance. This act, he believes, compares to Henri Bergson's⁷ notion of memory, where a statement continues to exist as long as the space that structures it continues to preserve it.⁸ Space encircles and sustains statements, which is why statements are understood as locations that sustain the *episteme* as a diagram of an archive's space.

⁶ AS, pp. 51-52; AK, p. 37.

⁷ See Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York: Zone Books, 1991), pp. 204-223.

Earlier the statement had been defined as a type of nodal point that when related collectively to its environment, forms the propriety of discursive activity. The first space that Deleuze identifies is precisely that sense of collectivity that identifies associated groupings of discursive activity. This association, however, is never stable. Deleuze warns that a statement operates transversally, meaning that it does not belong to a single grouping of discourse or to singular associations between groups. "Even when they seem to operate in the same language," Deleuze explains, "statements of a discursive formation move from description to observation, calculation, institution and prescription, and use several systems or languages in the process."² Collateral space, consequently, describes at once the dependence of discursive groupings on the same statements and the simultaneous use of statements among various medium of association. The statement does not therefore define but accounts for dispersion in the archive. Within the same archive variant groupings utilize identical

² Deleuze, p. 5.

³ Ibid.

statements (for example, groupings associated with schools and military colleges); and while the groupings remain heteronomous (meaning that they disperse the "statement" according to local variations), the statements by which dispersion occurs, even on which and through which regularities of words, phrases, and sentences function, remain rare if not "primitive"¹⁰ in relation to the groupings that employ them. What defines a statement-event, therefore, is the manner in which the actual emergence of discursive functions are held tensively to the statements that ground their regularity. And it is precisely the instability of statements grounding the emergent regularities of discourse that account for, on the one hand, the deceptive stability of a system of discourse and, on the other, the potential mutation of that system.

Deleuze unfortunately, in the course of this opening investigation, dismisses as immaterial the fundamental question of whether space or statements hold priority. The dismissal appears due to his desire to avoid a Kantian attempt to establish a notion of absolute space given prior to the possibility of local

¹⁰ Deleuze, p. 6.

space. But this hides from investigation the possible importance of questioning how statements affect not only the apprehensibility (which is a secondary effect) of space but also constitute the very possibility of spatial openings. In the correlation of statements and space, Deleuze does not articulate the productive effect of statements pre-given to the apprehensibility of space and the constant interplay between space and statements that may account for archival shifts and instability. There cannot be linguistic groupings if there is not first spatial openings—that is, if not first the accomplishment of the *episteme*—already regulating the propriety by which the very notion of “grouping” is possible. By dismissing the constitutive priority of statements Deleuze seems to undermine the conclusion he wants to reach, which consists of identifying emergent statements as the principle of the multiplicity of collateral spaces.

Potentially, however, Deleuze compensates for this shortcoming when the question is turned to the definition of correlative space. Here, Deleuze examines the space of the statement as a relationship established between its location (that is to say, its

event as either an articulation or a non-discursive practice) and the referent subjects, objects, or concepts that utilize its accomplishment. These referents are distinctive from the models of transcendental identity that are customary in metaphysics. They are not understood as signifiers that invoke the stability of the signified (i.e., the intention of the transcendental ego or the form of the transcendental ideal). Deleuze points out that the correlative space of the statement established between the statement location and the events that utilize it remains a function of the statement itself; therefore, a "statement" as such constantly disposes the working of its referent according to the functional operation engaged in the appearance of the referent. For example, a letter implies a writer and a contract, an underwriter, as Deleuze indicates, but these functions are not identities. They are more like arrangements directly linked to the order for which the statement itself accounts. This suggests that a location in space is not separable from the comprehensibility of the statements that direct it. The practice of letter writing is not a simple reflective recording or report

of ideas and experiences; it is a practice that, in its operation, opens the functions of its space. It is as if statements position the speaker or the writer by the sheer fact that their engagement constantly opens an anonymous position in the bedding of the archive. This is why Deleuze here reports that "...Foucault echoes Blanchot in denouncing all linguistic personology and seeing the different positions for the speaking subject as located within a deep anonymous murmur."¹¹ It is in this fashion that Deleuze seems to retrace his steps now by upholding the fundamental role played by statements in relation to (and prior to) a comprehensible function of an operation of space, and this it seems to me is much closer to Foucault's project as a whole.¹²

Deleuze's third angle of approach to the notion of the statement is by means of complementary space.

¹¹ Deleuze, p. 7.

¹² Shortly the introduction of genealogy will complicate the picture still further. The notion of a practice will be introduced as prior to and productive of a space into which "statements" flood, but even here (where the question of priority becomes less significant) it is the statement that is given prior to the comprehensibility of space even though the statement as such remains co-existent with (and is linked to) a practice. Hence, later it will be necessary to speak of the precedence of practice.

Foucault called this an area of *rapprochement*¹³ that exists between discursive formations and non-discursive domains. Complementary space indicates a linkage that exists between the statement and an "institutional milieu"¹⁴ amid which linguistic operations occur. What must be added to avoid misjudgement is that complementary space cannot be reduced to the context or contingencies that surround a linguistic act. Foucault does not seek here a causal relationship between an institutional setting and the production of its language. Nor does he draw a direct relation between linguistic acts and institutional symbolizations (between, for example, medical discourse and practices of confinement). Rather in this example the statement gives a type of horizon potential to the setting of employed language and symbolizations. There is a tensive relation between the potential of linguistic acts given in the statement of an archive and the setting in which linguistic acts find their historicity as events. Complementary space identifies this link not by fixing the statement to an institution, such as

¹³ AS, p. 212; AK, p. 162.

¹⁴ Deleuze, p. 9.

the diagnosis of madness to the asylum, but by comprehending the space of madness as simultaneously held to a potential horizon that exists in the linkage between the statement and the institution in question. "Madness" is accordingly a "historicity" of complementary space that has, as it were, a history of its historicities. There is constantly a fluctuating potential of madness historicity given in the event of "madness" as a moment in complementary space. Archaeology in this way is a history of historicities, and here again archaeology depends on genealogy to account for this descent by means of power and the relationships of power caught up in the emergence of the event.

(2) Constriction and Permission

These descriptions are perhaps best demonstrated through an example, and it is fortunate that Foucault is never lacking for one. One can see the workings of space and the genealogy of emergence in the descriptions of the disciplinary archive recounted in Discipline and Punish. In this book Foucault presents two overlapping archives. Arising through the cracks of the first, which is the juridical system, emerges the order of the second, which is the disciplinary system. Between these two systems is the contrast of historicities evident in the actual arrangements of space and the openings of statements.

The juridical archive is defined by the sovereign power of the monarchy. Using Kantorowitz's example¹⁵ of the king's two bodies, Foucault presents the social experience of the Middle Ages as an extension of the body of the king. Society is arranged hierarchically with the king as the head of its administrative

¹⁵ E. Kantorowitz, The King's Two Bodies (1957). Kantorowitz refers to the person of the king and the integration of social order and purpose with the king's identity. The king's body is simultaneously unique and social.

functions and the body politic as the extension of the king's authority to the most common orders of life. Foucault believed that this sense of administrative authority tied to the body of the king remained basically intact, though progressively scattered into societal institutions, through the enlightenment into modernity. As he saw it, in this respect the twelfth century revitalization of Roman Law is a most decisive event.

This resurrection of Roman Law had in effect a technical and constitutive role to play in the establishment of authoritarian, administrative, and, in the final analysis, absolute power of the monarchy. And when this legal edifice escapes in later centuries from the control of the monarch, when, more accurately, it is turned against that control, it is always the limits of this sovereign power that are put in question, its prerogatives that are challenged. In other words, I believe that the King remains the central personage in the whole legal edifice of the West.¹⁵

The notion of sovereignty, which was observed strictly in the high Middle Ages and transformed progressively by the nationalism of the French Revolution, remains a juridical form of power exercised through the legal apparatus of the West. The king's

¹⁵ P/K., p. 94.

body as such is in itself a "statement-event" of the juridical archive. It is firstly the statement by which collateral spaces are associated; secondly, it is the statement by which correlation is constituted between an individual body and functional authority in the body politic; and finally, it marks complementary space in that between the statements of the juridical archive and the non-discursive practices of hierarchical authority lies the statement-event of the king's body as that link between discursive practices and the juridical experience as historicity.

No doubt because of its horror, the most impressive example of juridical practices locating the statement-event of the king's body in the spaces of archival activity is the execution of the regicide Robert-François Damiens, who is that incredible and hopeless figure described on the opening pages of Discipline and Punish. Damiens' crime was the attempted assassination of Louis XV in 1757.¹⁷ Foucault discovered an account of the execution of Damiens by opening the archives of *La bibliothèque*

¹⁷ The attempted assassination occurred about a year into the Seven Years War in which France lost some of its colonial claims, including Canada, to England.

nationale in Paris, where the gruesome record of these events are recorded. We are told how Damiens was taken to the foot of the main door of the Church of Paris to confess his sorry crime, how he was then delivered in a cart to the site of the execution while being forced to carry a torch of burning wax that would shortly be poured upon him, how atop of a scaffold his flesh was torn apart by hot pincers while molten lead and the melted wax mixed with sulfur was poured over his wounds, and finally how Damiens was drawn and quartered—a scene that necessitated the use of a knife to separate his stubborn limbs from the trunk of his body—until at last in agony Damiens was dead (or at least seemed to be) as his body was delivered to the stakes to be burned. The references to sites, to excesses, and to the body of poor Damiens are telling. Damiens' body is made to stand as the object of the king's wrath. As a disobedient body—or as one that brought into question the sovereign limits of Louis XV—he is not so much punished as a criminal as he is used as a site of a royal display of might undertaken to prove the stubborn and still unsurpassed sovereignty of the king. Damiens' body is momentarily, in its

agony, the location of the king's (political) body and the expression of (political) self-control. Juridical sovereignty is played out by excessive pomp that, in the case of crime, gives itself to displays of violence that leave royal power beyond approach. Louis XV is a "subject" in a way Damiens could never be: he has a self-control, socially constituted, that necessarily demonstrates its prevalence against acts that threaten the maintenance of the social order. The king has identity, whereas Damiens has identity on the basis of the king.

The wrath poured out on Damiens was nevertheless a style of punishment that was slowly dying out. Europe was on the verge of supplanting extravagant punishments by solitary confinements and secretive executions carried out behind prison walls. What can be taken from Damiens' story, then, is not the detailed fact of his execution (which no doubt remains remarkable if still horrifying) but indeed the very historicity of it. It can be understood that Damiens' fate is at once the condition of the statements manifest in the setting of the juridical sovereignty that judged him and the spaces that held him. His own

physical body is a statement-event emergent and qualified in innumerable ways. From the construction of the setting of scaffolds to the cries of Damiens, the body as site constantly collapses the horizons that surrounded it. In Damiens the carnival atmosphere that accompanied his death, the laments of sympathy and vulgar chants of abuse voiced by those gathered, met with the legal proceedings that carried out his execution and the ecclesiastical rituals that sought to comfort him. And these "collateral" spaces that shifted constantly over the statement of crime were also constantly caught up in the correlative spaces that positioned his body under the vengeful labour of the executioner and the complementary spaces that held him between discursive and non-discursive reasonings of torture.

Foucault still does not bring the matter to rest here. Damiens remains little more than a caricature of an archive until the inquiry reaches into the shifts and redistribution, the emergence and descent, of archival statements and the regime of their truth and order. Initially, Foucault is not exhibiting the meaning or purpose of torture. He is rather displaying

locations of torture (Damiens' body) and the matrix of meaning (regicide) caught up in a historicity of relationships of force (monarchical jurisprudence) bounded by the *episteme* of their actual appearance. The scene of Damiens' torture, located in a competition of interactive forces, sees the constant engagement on all sides of the interplay of space and statement that constricted, that is to say, held within a periphery of potential meanings, the emergence of the event. Damiens is an event of a constricted potential of meaning whose significance is located by statements of the juridical archive.

But what if one ventures outside the periphery of the constricted event? What if one pushes toward the limits of a specific constriction? Can the location of the event eclipse the statement that seeks to hold its emergence? Foucault shows that outside the constriction of the event there always lies the shifting grounds of a potentially different arrangement. Damiens' body, though an event of royal extravagance, *potentially* eclipses the statements that locates it.

It was evident that the great spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by

the very people to whom it was addressed. In fact, the terror of the public execution created centres of illegality: on execution days, work stopped, the taverns were full, the authorities were abused, insults or stones were thrown at the executioner, the guards and the soldiers; attempts were made to seize the condemned man, either to save him or to kill him more surely; fights broke out, and there was no better prey for thieves than the curious throng around the scaffold...But above all—and this was why these disadvantages became a political danger—the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty than in those rituals intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of power.¹⁷

The constriction of the event that displays itself on Damiens' body, the body that contains and manifests the royal self-control, was constantly a potential location of upheaval; in potential, Damiens as the constricted event was also the open possibility. Damiens, the criminal, was also the hero, and the event of his execution provided an occasion of royal disarray. At the periphery of every constricted possibility is the opening that undermines the manifest event of constriction.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir, (Paris: Edition Gallimard, 1975), p. 66. [Hereafter referred to as SP.]
Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 63. [Hereafter referred to as DP.]

What is held at the periphery of the scene of excess, witnessed in Damiens' story, comes into play only a few decades later. The periphery meaning of public torture, which was the occasion of social revolt, eclipsed the functional meaning of royal jurisprudence and necessitated public trials and efficiently executed punishments. Of course, the appearance of the modern form of prison executions discharged behind walls or of modern courtrooms and juries are not reducible to the need to curtail the carnivals engendered by public scaffolds. Rather Foucault's interest is to identify points of reversal, places where the relationships of force, exercised by the king as domination, have turned inside out and reordered the *episteme* of experience. He seeks to display in Damiens' execution the way one event works to influence the fluctuation of the very relationships of force that account for its emergence. The event as such holds an ambiguous status: it is both a constriction within the horizon of potential given to the range of available archival experience (thus concretizing the statements that make it possible) and it is again, in the very activity of its emergence, an

orientation in potential of a wholly different order. In the archive, each event is both a constricted possibility (that is, an emergent function of meaning) and a point of fluctuation. The significant point to remember is that this double edge of potential is always "held." This means, it is always potential, whether as actual constriction or as possible fluctuation, in relation to the statements that found the horizon of its emergence. Even fluctuations that point outside of the event, even to undermine it, remain fluctuations in the potential horizon of the archive statements. Even fluctuations, that is to say, are held.

The structure of this understanding allows the clarification, here given briefly, of how mutations that can form a new archive emerge as forms of the hold of a precedent archive. The case at hand here is discipline emerging from juridical practices. Foucault reviewed the matter in a relatively easy fashion, though this is not to betray the task of genealogy (constrictions and fluctuations) by renewed notions of progress in history. As Foucault recounts it, the former royal "self" was distributed into new forms of

the political state by such institutions as prisons, courthouses, public lawyers, judges, and experts of criminology; forms of domination that were both excessive and obvious in the body of the king became local in the new politics of population control and economic management. The royal menagerie was dispersed among and between members of the social order. The former hierarchy of power surplus was displaced by collateral hierarchies, both institutional and bureaucratic, that, at each point of event, scatter relationships of force and potential power fluctuations across the whole network of society.¹³ Out of the very complexity of multiplying competitions, the potential fluctuations necessitated the conversion of power excess to the efficiency of training practices that "held" forces upon the individual as a body of predictable movements and thoughts. Where the self and self-control had been the specific privilege focused on the king's body, modern subjectivity emerges with the

¹³ Foucault understood this process to be the exact opposite of that found in Hobbes wherein the problem is no longer the central will but the myriad subjectivities that are produced by power relations scattering their effects across the peripheries of society. See Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (New York: Prometheus books, 1988), pp. 96-117 [covering chapters XIX to XXI]; P/K, pp. 97-98.

installation of power at the level of local institutions of population management that meticulously insert and focus forces on the examination of individual subjects. In modernity, according to Foucault, it is no longer the powerful subject who represents the norm (the king or the wealthy landed class) but rather the deviant from the norm (the vagabond or the delinquent child) who received the greatest attention of subjectivization (examination, classification, and training). And it is no doubt, Foucault reports, that out of such scattered and often trifling practices (vétilles), the modern "man of humanism" was born.²⁰

Disciplinary practices emerge underneath and within the apparatus of juridical dominations as local points of power distribution and focused practices of subjectivization. But Foucault's attempt is not to trace the lineage of law and society from those crucial moments of the twelfth century to the present. What he seeks to accomplish is the display of a conception of power that liberates itself from the singular model of

²⁰ SP, p. 143; DP, p. 141.

domination to the problem of dominations distributed within society and formative of its historicity as events. The ability to demonstrate the problem of power came not by rejecting the association of power and domination but rather by recounting its reversal from the privileged realm of the king's court to the subjectivizing practices of a disciplinary society.

My aim, therefore, was to invert it [domination], to give due weight, that is, to the fact of domination, to expose both its latent nature and its brutality. I then wanted to show not only how right is, in a general way, the instrument of this domination which scarcely needs saying but also to show the extent to which, and forms in which, right (not simply the laws but the whole complex of apparatuses, institutions and regulations responsible for their application) transmits and puts into motion relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but of domination...Not the domination of the King in his central position but that of his subjects in their mutual relations.²¹

The summary of Foucault's accomplishment can be given by recalling the three terms central to the analysis undertaken above: statement-event, permission, and genealogical relations. All of these are present in the descriptive movements from the

²¹ P/K, pp. 95-96.

juridical to disciplinary archive. The statement has already been presented as a location instead of a unit of articulation; but location, it must be clear, means the apprehensibility or even enunciability of a process of judgement and activity. The statement is an event because it includes a whole environment of apparatuses involved in the possibility of a credible thought and act (i.e., the correlative, collateral, and complementary spaces of the archive). In the Damiens story, that whole apparatus was the system of the king's body. To carry out an execution was an activity of enunciability—a statement-event of epistemic manifestation—reduced or constricted to the body of Damiens as a location of judgement and credible reasonings of punishment.

The second term, permission, was not used in the descriptions of Damiens given above, but it can here be introduced as a designation of spaces of credibility. It was evidently according to permissible reasonings of torture and execution that Damiens was delivered to his fate in the manner employed. Damiens occupied a certain scope of space wherein the statement he had become emerged and held an enunciable status;

permission, that means, indicates the "normal" space of functioning relationships within a specific archival definition. And even when it is given that there are statement-events located at the periphery—where they may not be characteristic of a general or normal permission—here would nevertheless be a "permissible" periphery (and at best a held potential) that remains dependent, as a point of orientation, on the normal functions already in question. The permissibility of statements as such, even in relation to the question of deviation, remains therefore continually linked to the operating episteme."

The final term, genealogical relations, is important simply to affirm that the movement from juridical practices to disciplinary practices cannot be reduced to a simple progression of stages of human evolution. The break from one archive to the next is not based on teleological ground; there is no conception here representing an aim naturally embedded in one archive that virtually automates the production

" It will be necessary eventually to address the possibility of transgressing a permission, but in whatever way this may be considered, the point here is to affirm that even transgression is possible because it too remains a *peripheral event permitted in the potential horizon.*

of the other. The predecessor is not inherently directed to its processor. The more appropriate term is "accomplishment," in that one archive emerges from the accomplished events of another. This means that, void of direction or planning but on the basis of mixed horizons held only by the potential the event gives to its location, in the spaces left open by the play of power distributions and fluctuations, there lies an activity that finds its location on the periphery of permission. It is here at this most remote edge of chance that archives succeed one another and might be said to accomplish one another. True, philosophy has long since spoken of a "finite freedom," an experience of choice in a mixture of contingencies; but if this expression is raised to the level of an archive something more complex is at stake. Archives are conditions of what already is. Archives are contingencies (practical bearings, as Peirce aptly put it) that hold potential emergence to the already given event: any new archive, any new order of truth and falsehood, is held to the potential horizon of permissible statements. It is not a deliberation but a play of power relationships that account for emergence;

and it is not history but genealogy that engages this play. The archive then is "finite" in the sense that both its definition and its potential are held in the contingencies of its composition, but its emergence is "free" in the sense that the statement-event is not necessarily restricted to the location that holds it. It is not possible then to say that events are haphazard since any event is already located at its emergence and already dependent upon a statement-event in order to be at its emergent location; but while this means that a processor is held by the accomplishment of a predecessor, genealogy qualifies this condition by plays of power rather than teleological foundations. In what way can this tensive relation be understood, such that "significance" as the interior of the archive experience can be expressed without abandoning genealogy in favour of teleology or other historical continuities?

(3) Colonization, Emergence, and Power

The term genealogical relations suggests that if there is a link between different archives it is in the

very practices that open the spaces of mutation. As Foucault attempted to demonstrate, between the open execution and the enclosed prison cell lay the effort of those eighteenth century reformers. They sought to express, in the forms of good reasoning and sense, a consistent humanity (and degree of social usefulness) that might be recognized in those who would otherwise suffer Damians' horrid fate. This was possibly only typical of the eighteenth century sense of an "inner light," for which reason stood, but Foucault's point in any case is not here. Rather, Foucault speaks of this intermediary period as a brief moment of repose, a time of "new" ideas and experimentation, that was quickly "colonized," restructured, and overtaken by the very disciplinary procedures that had first occasioned the possibility of reform. Foucault so often plays with these kind of ironies: since it is practices that open the space of statement-defined order, there can be no new space that is not also at once an ordering of the practices that opened it. Since a space in this way cannot be an absolute possibility, since it is always an already ordered event, it cannot be but an *always already constricted* location within the order that

holds it. Space is always a "colonial" site in the sense that, in relation to the positive acts of the statement, it is definitive of a permitted constriction.

The word "colonization" is in this respect of some significance to Foucault.²³ Colonization is a term that invites irony because it implies that "events" are both serious and inevitable. There is never in Foucault a non-colonizer or a position free from colonization; every practice is also a movement of colonization since it is by its very emerging already an order of statements intimately related to and productive of the sense of the space in which the practice has emerged. Even practices of "detachment" definitive of modern science already occupy the space of the sense of the comprehensibility of detachment. It is not possible for history not to be "serious" as an order of comprehensible experience even though this very admission implies the comical self-regarding affirmation available in genealogy.

²³ Few writers outside of Michel de Certeau comment on the possible significance of this term in Foucault. See The Practice of Everyday Life, translated by Steven Rendall, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 45f.

The tension of this very comic-serious condition invokes the trouble that the word colonization markedly indicates. Such a word cannot be employed without escaping the implications of a deliberate use of force to control another body or culture. Colonization is never less than brutal; it is a wholly systematic and arrogant confiscation of property and life. Foucault certainly means this and means to invoke these images. But the startling nature of this word serves to indicate equally startling subtleties that, by being less vibrant, are dangerous at insidious and multidimensional levels. In the archive, so far as the modern practices of discipline are concerned, colonization occurs when the object of focus, whether the body of the condemned or the mind of the student, becomes self-realizing according to the very categories that open this possibility to it. Colonization, as a general term in the archive, defines the activity of the relationship of forces that are not only exercised against the "other" as object but that also, and perhaps most importantly, produce in the other the location of the space opened by the apparatuses of its own composition. The reformed criminal or the learned

student is not an indication of enlightenment but rather the accomplished effect of an order of knowledge. Colonization is therefore not strictly the act of enslaving; it is foremost the act of converting.

The sense that Foucault has reached in these concerns has been followed up by several scholars who explore methods of order and truth characteristic of Western colonialism. Particular examples of Foucault's influence are seen in recent attention given to Western discursive practices which represented (and indeed produced) the "Orient" for popular consumption. Such popular authors as Timothy Mitchell and Edward Said⁴ discuss Western discursive practices as types of mythological practices that, embedded within the institutional milieu of capitalism, govern and constrict the possible conceptual structure of discourses on the other. As Robert Young reports, reviewing the seminal work of Said, "This meant that the kinds of concepts and representations used in literary texts, travel writings, memoirs and academic

⁴ See Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. ix; Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 12.

and social sciences, could be analyzed as a means for understanding the diverse ideological practices of colonialism."²⁵

It is no doubt difficult to dispute the value of postcolonial studies that make use of Foucaultian notions of discourse and power, particularly when to do so places one in the position of the colonizer; still reference to these studies is useful insofar as here lies an indication of limited and at times narrowed interpretations of Foucault's intention. Postcolonial studies can, in this manner, inadvertently demonstrate the irony named above. Colonization in Foucault is usually not meant to indicate the manner in which the "other" is represented by the colonizer's discourse (though this is significant); rather, above all, the point is to expose an occupation of space (a

²⁵ Robert Young, "Colonialism and the Desiring-Machine," Liminal Postmodernisms, edited by Theo D'haen and Hans Bretens (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 1994), p. 11. Said describes "Orientalism" in most poignantly Foucaultian terms when stating, "It is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what 'we' do and what

confinement²⁵) that characterizes the invasion of one archive into the boundaries of another. This point is in fact clear enough when it is noticed how postcolonial discourse must use the language of the colonizing power both to define and present itself. When the postcolonial author uses and indeed needs the achievement of Western postmodern discourse to define his or her project, what is evident is not the objection to colonial forces but their accomplishment; this is Foucault's point beyond all else.

Colonization, as the art of opening space and as the emergence of one archive in the horizon of another, is a useful term, then, insofar as it introduces how space is confined or held (as earlier stated) to a specific horizon. Foucault will turn to the image of colonization only on occasion, but consistently his point is to introduce the notion of space occupation and, most significantly, the conquering or usurpation of space by practices.

The emergence of practices that transformed the space held by the juridical to the disciplinary

'they' cannot do or understand as 'we' do)." Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 12.

archive, then, are exemplary. Foucault is not simply saying that an event emerges but that a usurpation of space is accomplished. To be sure, the juridical and disciplinary models co-exist in a heteronomous relation; there remains in the contemporary setting the order of law and social disciplines. What Foucault describes, however, is a progressive invasion. Modern practices open spaces in competition with classical jurisprudence, and the opening itself already includes its order of statements. Criminology invades the weighing of crimes, and punishment transformed by new technologies is training. Modern practices convert the enunciable capacity of the juridical archive by displacing its horizon. This is colonization in that subtle sense of implanting a foreign order as the very possibility of ordering.

Foucault expanded on the accomplishment of this invasion by examining the new possibility given in the technology of the subject. Foucault held that subjectivity was born in that re-distribution of space (in that mutation) wherein the speaking of the subject already indicated the accomplishment of a colonial

²⁶ The French word here is *enfermement*.

delimitation. The emergence of modern biology, at the end of the eighteenth century, which Foucault claimed was not a progression but transformation of epistemological space, provided an example.

It seems to me likely that the transformations of biological knowledge [connaissance] at the end of the xviiith century appeared, on the one hand, due to a series of new concepts of scientific discourse and, on the other, gave birth to a notion such as that of life which permitted us to designate, to delimit and to situate this type of discourse...In my opinion, the notion of life is not a scientific concept, but an epistemological indicator, classifier, and differentiator whose functions have an effect on scientific function but not on their object [of inquiry].²⁷

But the question remains, how does the emergent event surface as an indicator of new functions and, finally, an altered space of discourse? To this Foucault claims that in the very contingencies of emergence lies a potential competition in the horizon of events which, while maintaining heteronomy in relation to the actual event, may act as a type of invading force. This is expressed particularly by the succession of disciplinary practices, which are

²⁷ Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 474. [Hereafter referred to as DE.]

associated with modern sciences, in the space of juridical practices. The emergent competition arrives juxtaposed to the mechanism of the juridical archive, but invades by means of reversals of the potential horizon. Crime and punishment serve as a kind of flash point. When royal sovereignty scattered its institutions, during the era following the French revolution, across the canopy of rising nation states, the resulting isolation of local level bureaucracies held in their horizon the needed presence of measuring standards. Modern disciplines appear on the horizon of located juridical practices that initially required scientific precision and indispensable normal judgements. Governmental institutions homogenized the practices, locations, and events of new nations (as statement functions and enunciable, epistemological systems) and, accordingly, held in the horizon of royal jurisprudence a reversal that focused increasingly on the need to supervise populations. Foucault sees this reversal as an investment and finally coercive usurpation by disciplinary practices underneath the discourse of juridical rights. Or, to phrase it more

directly, he sees here the colonization of law by discipline.

I believe that the process which has really rendered the discourse of the human sciences possible is the juxtaposition, the encounter between two lines of approach, two mechanisms, two absolutely heterogeneous types of discourse: on the one hand there is the re-organisation of right that invests sovereignty, and on the other, the mechanism of the coercive forces whose exercise takes a disciplinary form. And I believe that in our own times power is exercised simultaneously through this right and these techniques and that these discourses, to which the disciplines give rise invade the area of right so that the procedures of normalisation come to be ever more constantly engaged in the colonisation of those of law.²⁸

With the comprehension of emergence as an invasion, a surfacing of practices in new locations and under the order of a different space, as techniques and procedures that displace and convert events that accounted for a potential horizon, as an invasion from the horizon that relates itself heteronomously to that which located it, we can turn with Foucault to the question of power in its disciplinary setting.

The said emergent event that appears as competition on the horizon of archival locations is not

²⁸ P/K, p. 101.

at all inexplicable. It is complex to be sure and a result of complexity, but its presence remains intelligible.²⁹ What Foucault will pursue here is the investigation of power as that which can account for emergence, but to avoid connotations of power defined as a propertied entity or transcendental commodity, he explains it genealogically as a relationship of forces that actively underpins the archive and produces the *episteme* of formation.

It is not exceptional for Foucault to turn to western military history in order to disclose his genealogy of power. Images of war, struggle, and conflict vividly describe the sense of truth as an experience produced in the matrix of forces. This key allows Foucault the fundamental claim that power is not sufficiently defined by repression, and it is insufficiently understood if reduced to the strict dyadic of having and lacking. Foucault asks,

If power is properly speaking the way in which relations of forces are deployed and given concrete expression, rather than

²⁹ Foucault claimed in a interview, "History has no 'meaning', though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail..." P/K, p. 114.

analysing it in terms of cession, contract or alienation, or functionally in terms of its maintenance of the relations of production, should we not analyse it primarily in terms of *struggle, conflict, and war?*³⁰

The image of the army serves as the genealogical insistence to apprehend events in complexes, in a massive field of forces that, out of interaction and reaction, produce effects of far reaching yet vastly anonymous consequence. As Deleuze adroitly put it, "...force is never singular but essentially exists in relation with other forces, such that any force is already a relation, that is to say power: force has no other object or subject than force."³¹ Power is not an entity but a relation, and an archive is a complex in the sense that it is a containment of a relationship of forces against forces producing the event.

Colonization again proves its usefulness when it is recognized that what Foucault wants to identify by the image of a battle is fundamental to the activity of a set of archival experiences. It is not just that power constricts, but precisely that the constriction

³⁰ P/K, p. 90.

³¹ Deleuze, p. 70.

by which it is engaged is at once definitive of a spatiality or location: indeed, the productivity of power is most evident in the ordering of knowledge and the cultivation of desires that fall on its social institutions.

...Power would be a fragile thing if its only function were to repress, if it worked only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression, in the manner of a great Superego, exercising itself only in a negative way. If, on the contrary, power is strong this is because, as we are beginning to realise, it produces effects at the level of desire and also at the level of knowledge. Far from preventing knowledge, power produces it.³²

At this point the significant notion to maintain is the link between the sense of colonization and the concept of an archive. The employment of the word colonization allows for the understanding of space as more than an enclosure of forces or (positively) a display of the possible. Colonization raises the question of power as productivity and spatial relations, both serious and ironic, formed by the mechanisms of reason and framed as the objects of desire.

³² P/K, p. 59.

CHAPTER THREE

Productivity and the Panopticon

The architecture of the Panopticon was discovered by Foucault in the works of Jeremy Bentham; Bentham for his part gave credit for the idea to his brother whom he had visited at Crichoff in White Russia in 1786. It is not, strictly speaking, a prison design, though it may be most noted as such; it is rather a machine of surveillance that stands, in Foucault's mind, at the apogee of architectural accomplishment in the disciplinary society. The Panopticon is the complement of the plague and the contradiction of the dungeon. The Panopticon is the accomplished space of modernity.

The Panopticon might first be described in the strict words of Bentham himself:

The building is circular. The apartments of the prisoners occupy the circumference. You may call them, if you please, the *cells*. These *cells* are divided from one another, and the prisoners by that means secluded from all communication with each other, by *partitions* in the form of *radii* issuing from the circumference towards the centre, and extending as many feet as shall be thought necessary to from the largest dimensions of the cell. The apartment of the inspector occupies the centre; you may call it if you please the inspector's lodge. It will be convenient in most, if not all cases, to have a vacant space or area all round, between such centre and such circumference.

You may call it if you please the *intermediate* or *annular* area. About the width of a cell may be sufficient for a passage from the outside of the building to the lodge. Each cell has in the outward circumference, a *window*, large enough, to afford light enough to the correspondent part of the lodge. The inner circumference of the cell is formed by an *iron grating* so light as not to screen any part of the cell from the inspector's view... To the windows of the lodge there are *blinds*, as high up as the eyes of the prisoners in their cells can, by any means they can employ, be made to reach. To prevent thorough light, whereby, notwithstanding the blinds, the prisoners would see from the cells whether or no any person was in the lodge, that apartment is divided into quarters, by *partitions* formed by two diameters to the circle, crossing each other at right angles.¹

A central tower of observation, to which a circle of cells, potentially stacked several stories high, standing open and illuminated, hides the eyes of a secretive but constant surveyor. This is a simple architecture of several effects. The surveying eye is constant, but unverifiable. It issues a force upon the body, but by contrast to the transitory yet explosive excesses of a monarchy it is a minimal force of permanent consequence. In the Panopticon sight lines constantly fall upon the body judging its movements with equally hidden norms and standards. The

¹ Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (letter 11), John Bowring edition (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1962), pp. 40-41.

"prisoner" is obliged to display, by body movements and postures, a conforming obedience, an internal condition of self-reflected discipline. The prisoner is challenged to show that, in the depths of a secret self, the expectation of the eye is constantly duplicated and a dialogue between the focal point and the circumference has taken place. The Panopticon places the interior of the prisoner in highest magnitude. It is the hidden self, perhaps the lost self, and its buried motivations that is in question; and, it is a carefully manufactured, self-constituted subjectivity that is demanded from the prisoner in return. Bentham's brilliance was that he conceived an economy of forces dedicated to training that would implant social norms into the self-realizing subjectivity of the deviant object. In short, he designed the architecture for creating a soul.

In Foucault, the Panopticon as a machine of discipline correlates and, in a sense, summarizes the practices of discipline that emerged during the time of the plague. Whereas the dungeon was used as a holding cell to hide social deviants or covertly torture infidels, the Panopticon works on the principle of maximum exposure. It is not incidental that the

section entitled "panopticism" in Discipline and Punish begins with a seventeenth century description of measures to be taken in a town infested by the plague. The plague, an anonymous, unexpected social event to which a cause was constantly sought and for which blame was constantly laid, brought with it a whole set of social demands that opened new appropriations of space to controlling observations and various governing mechanisms. In contrast to the social "problem" of the leper, who was shuffled to the outside of societal boundaries by categorical "exclusion", the Panopticon is an encompassing and inclusive gaze of simultaneous and indiscriminate activity. It is a gaze most adaptable to a disease like the plague, whose origin is indefinite and whose emergence is both concurrent and widespread.

Something as horrifying and incomprehensible as the plague demanded the government of the individual not so much by bureaucracies but by practices and machines, by regulations and the control of space, by an isolation and a partitioning of the inflicted within, rather than at the exclusion of, the dynamics of society.

If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion...then the plague gave

rise to disciplinary projects. Rather than the massive, binary division between one set of people and another, it called for multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an organization in depth of surveillance and control, an intensification and a ramification of power. The leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure; he was left to his doom in a mass among which it was useless to differentiate; those sick of the plague were caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were the constricting effects of a power that multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself; the great confinement on the one hand; the correct training on the other.²

Here is Foucault's description of the quarantine practices of a town stricken with plague, upon which the above quotation is based:

First, a strict spatial partitioning: the closing of the town and its outlying districts, a prohibition to leave the town on pain of death, the killing of all stray animals; the division of the town into distinct quarters, each governed by an intendant. Each street is placed under the authority of a syndic, who keeps it under surveillance; if he leaves the street, he will be condemned to death... The syndic himself comes to lock the door of each house from the outside; he takes the key with him and hands it over to the intendant of the quarter; the intendant keeps it until the end of the quarantine. Each family will have made its own provisions; but, for bread and wine, small wooden canals are set up between the street and the interior of the houses, thus allowing each person to receive his ration without communicating with the

² SP, p. 200; DP, p. 198.

suppliers and other residents; meat, fish and herbs will be hoisted up into the houses with pulleys and baskets... Only the intendants, syndic and guards will move about the streets and also, between the infected houses, from one corpse to another, the 'crows', who can be left to die: these are 'people of little substance who carry the sick, bury the dead, clean and do many vile and abject offices'. It is a segmented, immobile, frozen space. Each individual is fixed in his place. And, if he moves, he does so at the risk of his life, contagion or punishment.³

The plague placed households under surveillance; it made the body a manifest symptom of something far more insidious and gave to the juridical eye the role of establishing normalizing practices. As the architecture of the plague, the Panopticon is not simply an occupation of space, a "freezing" of relationships within a partitioning structure. The Panopticon in effect "is" space; that is to say, it is the accomplishment of an occupation and thus the proof of the disciplinary confinement that is already the fact of the archive.

Foucault's association of plague with panopticism is without doubt a point of critique for many scholars. In truth the Panopticon in an exact sense exists rarely: *la Petite Roquette*, the *Maison centrale* at

³ SP, p. 197; DP, p. 195.

Rennes, and a prison at Stateville in the United States are a few examples. This suggests that perhaps Foucault is exaggerating or at least overemphasizing if not practicing an needless reduction of what is otherwise incidental. "The analysis of Discipline and Punish," Jacques-Guy Petit reports, "presents aspects of reductionism that take no account of the diversity and complexity of the social and ideological game which exists even within bourgeoisie power."⁴ But is Foucault really guilty of a reductionism or is he merely reporting on an archive that has already been accomplished? Is he offering a blanket analysis or is he rather naming the forces that have produced one? Petit fairly misses the point: "reductionism" is an act to pacify complexity; the Panopticon is a consequence of an already completed pacification. This then raises a crucial distinction. There is a place to talk about emergence, about points of invasion, appearance, and occupation. But there is another place to talk about accomplishment. An archive at a certain

⁴ Jacques-Guy Petit, "Le philanthrope et la cité panoptique," Michel Foucault: Lire l'œuvre (Grenoble: Editions Jérôme Millon, 1992). In French the quotation reads, "Sans discuter encore la réalité globalisante de la cité panoptique ou carcérale, il faut pourtant relever que l'analyse de *Surveiller et punir* présente des aspects réducteur, ne rendant pas compte de la diversité et de la complexité du jeu social et idéologique, à l'intérieur même de la bourgeoisie au pouvoir."

point can be considered accomplished, meaning not that it reaches an end but that it defines the normative activity of experiential presence. When Foucault speaks of the Panopticon, he is describing an activity of production that is consequential, rather than reductive, of "social and ideological" forces that create an experiential present.

François Ewald understands this subtlety with greater clarity. He sees the Panopticon correctly as a mechanism intimately linked to the fabrication of a homogenized social space, to an accomplished reduction that might otherwise be called "normality":

Foucault did not want to say that the disciplinary society was a society of confinement in general. Actually, he meant the inverse. In effect, the diffusion of the disciplines is manifest proof that their techniques are foreign to the principle of confinement or, more exactly, that with the disciplines confinement is no longer segregation. The characteristic of the disciplinary society is precisely that the disciplines do not enclose. On the contrary, their diffusion, far from splitting up or compartmentalizing society, homogenizes social space. The emphasis in the idea of the disciplinary society is the idea of society itself: the disciplines fabricate society; they create a sort of common language between all sorts of institutions; they make it possible for one to be translated into another.⁵

⁵ François Ewald, "A power without an exterior," Michel Foucault Philosopher (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 170. This

The Panopticon is a type of display or opening within the established occupation of disciplinary space; it is the symbolic characterization of the already accomplished and operating *episteme*; it locates that paradoxical condition of governed space that becomes both the mechanism of enclosing space and, by this, of opening "events" within a theatre of constricted and contrived meaning. When Ewald speaks of homogenization, he speaks of fabricated or produced constrictions, of multiple parts observed by the same technical standard of judgement. The plague is noteworthy in this regard because it constitutes a significant set of practices that, at one level, trains the body and sets it in seclusion and, at another, opens the secluded body to general observation and normalizing judgement.

The appropriate question that Ewald attempts to highlight is what constitutes the fundamental texture of that homogenization which renders possible the "...interplay of redundant elements and infinite homologies"?⁶ Or, if this question can be slightly

text also appears in Lire l'oeuvre (op. cit.), from which I have translated it.

⁶ Ibid.

transformed, at what point is an archive accomplished such that its operation is at once its justification?

The strict answer to this question is normalization. An archive is accomplished firstly when its very operation has established its space-occupation as the presupposition of its statement-events, when its practices have *already produced* its valuations as normative. The Panopticon does not define but displays what has been accomplished. It is the case of a mechanism in place on the basis of a presupposed *line of vision*:

The exercise of discipline presupposes an mechanism which constrains by means of [*par le jeu du*] observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible.⁷

This brings about the second characteristic of an accomplished archive: that as normative it no longer has an exterior.⁸ The claim here introduces two very significant elements. Because the archive itself is a way of seeing, its "exterior" is a hermeneutical

⁷ SP, p. 173; DP, pp. 170-171;

⁸ By "exterior" one might here think of difference. Panopticism reaches the point of accomplishment when it is no longer simultaneous with its difference but when difference itself is appropriated, and in effect normalized, by its regard.

experience of what is already its "point of view" or location of sight. In other words, the exterior is a production of the activity of its own interior; this will be followed up in later chapters. The second element is that the very manner of experience, in this case characteristic of the Panopticon, is a reflective accomplishment; it constantly renders itself accountable to the already given operation of archival statement-events. It is the function of the archive, its circulation of forces and its production of knowledge, that form the norm (the governed space) of its constricted event. Foucault links the constricted normal of the disciplinary archive to three techniques of accountability: hierarchical surveillance, normalizing judgement, and the examination. It is not important to describe the functioning of these techniques so long as they are understood as *technologies of discipline*.

In this regard, a return to Ewald is helpful:

Architecture is the instrument, the technique, the apparatus by means of which, in the absence of a sovereign, and correlative to the individualization of the subjects, there exists the possibility of an *objectivity* in the self's judgement of the self.⁹

⁹ Ibid., p. 171.

The Panopticon describes an accomplished form of judgement by means of techniques of observation. Since these techniques are both a usurpation and redistribution of power associated with the king, they reflect an observing architecture that in itself has formed a new "normal." Hierarchical surveillance is an arrangement of observation, a positioning of the eye at the maximum point of vision; normalizing judgement is issued from that hierarchical point where all lines of vision converge and cross, and where the king is replaced by a professional eye that penetrates the body to stare at the soul. Finally, that penetrating vision, that objective norm that simultaneously incites by its constancy the self-reflecting self to duplicate the norms of the archival achievement and render authority to the transcendental posture of the eye of judgement, is the event of examination. Here then when speaking of the normal it is space that is spoken of and, more significantly, the working of space as an arrangement of forces instrumentally issued through a technology of relationships constituting the location of the normal statement. That "location" in the disciplinary society, that place where the "event" of discipline occurs and where it is defined, increasingly

evident in Foucault, is indeed the body itself. In panopticism the body is at once isolated as an object but wholly open to view as a self-realizing subject. This is why Foucault will say that we are bodies trapped inside minds¹⁰ and why the whole effort of Discipline and Punish is significantly captured by claiming that the location of both the problem of power and the event of the statement has moved from monarchical jurisprudence to the training of individuals.

Since this relocation is wholly tied up in architecture, the most insightful points to be made through an examination of the image of the Panopticon are gained by its lines of vision and its activity of statement-events. That these factors, however, are already given to the constricted event and already constitute the location of judgement and the epistemology of its ordering is evidence of the accomplished archive. An archive, let it be said, is that accomplished relationship of forces whose working produce the possibility of conceiving normative judgement in any sense at all.

¹⁰ The words here alluded to are from SP, p. 34; DP, p. 30, "the soul [is the] prison of the body."

(1) The Dimensions of Panopticism

René Descartes opened his examination of optics with words praising the status of sight. "The conduct of our life depends entirely on our senses, and since sight is the noblest and most comprehensive of the senses, inventions which serve to increase its power are undoubtedly among the most useful there can be."¹¹ To Descartes, light and vision, though subject to illusion, remained by far the surest avenue to certain knowledge. And even in the case of visual illusions, it is precisely by solving its riddles that true knowledge is gained. Husserl, to a degree, escapes this "hegemony of vision."¹² For Husserl, the more obvious the presence of a phenomenon, the more it is uncovered before us, the more hidden it remains to us. The "at-hand-ness" of the world itself causes the world to be taken for granted and, as such, covers knowledge by the presumption Husserl called "forgetfulness." Natural sciences, which are marked by the employment of technology that brings into view the smallest and most

¹¹ René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes, volume one, translated by John Cottingham et. al., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 152.

¹² See David Michael Levin (ed.), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision (Berkeley: the University of California Press, 1993).

exact details, indicates above all the forgetfulness of modern times. The technology of viewing forgets the phenomenology of vision. It was the first and perhaps highest aim of transcendental phenomenology to "save the appearances"¹³ of phenomena from the forgetfulness practiced by the empirical sciences.¹⁴

Foucault is by no means naive like Descartes, where the dispelling of illusion delivers a lucid and comprehensive vision, nor overly suspicious like Husserl, where precisely apparent clarity should not earn our trust. But neither does Foucault lie merely between them. Thomas R. Flynn tries to explain that with Foucault one must speak of the eclipse of vision, though it remains difficult to know precisely what Flynn gains by this term.¹⁵ By "eclipse" he seems to suggest that Foucault is interested in combating the normalizing "gaze" of nineteenth century disciplines, by which phenomena were both isolated and penetrated,

¹³ See Owen Barfield, Saving the Appearances (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, nd.).

¹⁴ See Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 194.

¹⁵ Thomas R. Flynn, "Foucault and the Eclipse of Vision," Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, edited by David Michael Levin (Berkeley: the University of Berkeley Press, 1993), pp. 273-286.

through a type of contextual or diacritical analysis.¹⁶ This would suggest that Foucault wants to overcome modernity when he places the suppositions of "enlightenment" active in the nineteenth century under the shadow an archaeological and genealogical dispersion. However, it is not easy to say how programmatic Foucault is when it comes to the application of archaeology. Rather than eclipsing modernity and its hegemony of vision, is it not a case of problemizing the perception of modernity as historicity-experience in such a way that an account of its elements can be presented? Modernity was not a question against which Foucault sought to pose a solution; it was for him a set of problems in the face of which one asks how it was (and lingers as) a conceptuality. Once again Foucault takes a phenomenological approach that does not eclipse but uniquely turns around the question. Reminiscent of a line from Heidegger ("we see what we say"¹⁷), Foucault raises the problem of permission in relation to the visible: it is not the question of the certainty of

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 278.

¹⁷ Martin Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time, translated by T. Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 56.

what we see that must be addressed but rather the question of how we are allowed to speak what we see as certainty. Moreover, Foucault insists that the unusual accomplishment of modernity was not the transformation of perception but the disciplining of it; therefore, it ought to be approached primarily as historicity consequentially related to the statements that train the seeing of its archive.¹⁸

(2) The Visible and the Articulable

The world that is spoken is the articulable world; the world that is seen is the visible world. In both realms there exists the *constriction of possibility*; in both, the *horizon potential* is held in modernity by panopticism. What is not expected is that the relationship between the articulable world and the visible world should be presented as competitive (Deleuze says, "heterogeneous"¹⁹) despite the fundamental similarity of definition. It is the familiar image of battles and competitions that

¹⁸ For the distinction between perception and gaze alluded to here, see Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), p. xiii.

¹⁹ Deleuze, p. 66.

describes the influence of one against the other, a series of crossfire that forms their communication. Still, Foucault ventures little beyond this description,²⁰ and the consequence is the presence of a lacuna that will be filled by the expression "normalizing effect." This expression will demonstrate that in the "war" Foucault displays, visibility cannot win; it will also demonstrate that the consequence of the dominance of the articulable is the experience of "necessity." These words fill out Foucault's analysis, but they are not presented as a substitute analysis.

What comprises the visible and articulable world? Beyond what we see and what we say, or rather in order to see and to speak, what elements function to open the possibility? According to Foucault (and subtleties drawn from Deleuze²¹), there is in each world the condition of the world and the conditional element by which it functions. The "condition" is linked to

²⁰ One will not find in Foucault something beyond the visible and the articulable as modes of dispersion that problematize knowledge (Raymond Rousel, Archaeology of Knowledge, and History of Sexuality) or as orders of the episteme that circulate knowledge (Discipline and Punish). The larger problem of the experience of knowledge, which "necessity" addresses, only emerges later when Foucault (occasionally) turns to the question of ethics. However, he never uses the word necessity either as "effect" or as experience.

²¹ In relation to the comments that follow, Deleuze, op. cit. is by far the most helpful commentator.

space; the "conditional" is linked to possibility. All the work to this point necessary to comprehend the constriction of possibility will pay off when it comes to explaining the latter term and understanding its horizon in the Panopticon.

The condition of the articulable is language, and the condition of the visible is light. Language and light are conditions because they are the requirements of existence for each world. One finds here perhaps the only retreat to Kant in Foucault. Foucault must posit the condition of each world *a priori*. However, the *a priori* of Foucault is distinct. In Kant, space and time are *a priori* to knowledge. Both perception and comprehension are given as already using (already engaging in the act of being present by) space and time.²² For Foucault, space and time are fictional: they are fabrications or "effects of" the condition of articulation and light. The place to begin, then, is to express the fiction of space and time in order to move away from Kant and to arrive at the sense of articulable and visible *a priori*.

²² See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by F. Max Müller (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 23-43.

The sense of *a priori* was raised earlier, but there the setting was to explore the condition of the possibility of events. There it was claimed that the production of space is prior to its experience and the production of time is prior to its definition. My point was that space and time must be comprehended genealogically as "events" or as the product of the relationship of forces. Now, with this background, the significance of the statement can be unpacked further. Space can be understood as that which is produced by articulation. Or, put in another way, articulables create the conditional horizon of their own emerging exteriority. This means that when the articulable emerges as "event," its very order of emergence is already given to it by the statement that creates the *episteme* of its possibility. The articulable unit is placed as emergence in space—is, that is to say, made exterior—on the basis of the condition by which exteriority is possible. This has two preliminary implications. The first is that articulables are locations in the archive; they can ostensibly be taken as external formations that rest on the accomplishment of the statement (the *statement-event*). The second is that articulables fabricate meanings in the space of an

archive. This means that statements are *a priori* to the activity of articulables (perception), which is fundamentally different from Kant and fundamentally opposite to Husserl. Statements are the event that fabricate by emergence functions of perceptuality in space. Articulables, thereby, defined first as the external occasion of statements are the evidence of that fabricating activity; and at the second level, defined as the exteriority of statements are the condition of the possibility of space. The *a priori* sense of articulables in Foucault is captured when it is understood that they make "exteriority" possible; and it is the "making possible" of the exterior that accounts for space as the productive fiction of the statement.

When "time" is placed in this matrix, a similar conclusion is drawn. Like Kant, space is given prior to time, but in this case time is determined actively (as product) rather than passively (as *a priori*). The activity of creating exteriority, the product of the *a priori* activity of articulables, includes the succession of an exteriority-event as a repeated possibility. Time is in this fashion embedded in the archive as a mechanism of its experienced exteriority

and as the justification of the order of that exteriority. The "timetable," which is of significant importance in Discipline and Punish, serves as an example. The timetable fabricates a deliberate experience of repetition within an order of space (in this case, repeated functions of labour). Each succeeding event is the copy of the immediately prior event, thus stabilizing the series as "normal" functions of experience. A mechanism, such as a timetable, by means of its regulating activity, fabricates a particular experience of the "normal" and, by the act of consistent reproduction, introduces that normal as the grounding justification (the foundation of perceptivity) of all further successions. Following from the *a priori* productivity of statements there is first the setting of a matrix of relations (the archive) and second the fabrication, within that matrix, of the successive or normal experience. Statements are thus *a priori* both to space and time by means of producing the setting of their bounded or archival operation: in the case of the former, by creating the possibility of experience; and in the case of the latter, by creating the setting of possible succession. Articulables by the consequence of the

event of statements are already the form of space and time according to the statements that holds them. Put in another way, articulables as events constrict the experience of space and time to the accomplishment of emergence (i.e., of exteriority) in an archive. They are not absolutes, but fictions of the operation of that archive.²³

(3) Activity and Passivity

Articulables are evidently active, in relation to space and time, since their activity constantly produces space and time; by contrast visibles are passive, since their activity is the reception of light in the already accomplished archive. Visibles cannot produce light, but they tolerate light as the revelation of their presence, their "here-now."²⁴

²³ Here again it is evident that the sense of *a priori* in Foucault is very similar to that found in Heidegger. From the point of view of Kant, one would want to say that space and time must already operate in order for articulables to act upon space and time; but for both Heidegger and Foucault it is not possible to arrive at this point of conceptual experience except by the *a posteriori* condition of conceptuality itself. The condition thereby may well imply an *a priori* necessity for its presence to experience, but this "image" of itself is in fact a reflection of its "already being" as condition. These aspects will be explored later in the discussion of God and the *a priori* in religious experience.

²⁴ Deleuze would appear to disagree with me on this point, for he claims that visibles are not passive; they are of a

Visibles are the external form of light, just as articulables are the external form of the statement. Visibles describe the path the circulation of light will follow and the line of vision it will traverse according to the here-now of the accomplished archival. The Panopticon, with its lines of vision and its use of brightness and shades, is an example of a passive visibility tolerating a form of light. Thus while light is the condition of visibles, it does not determine them; on the contrary, visibles function as the location of light dispersion in the archive. Further, the passive activity of dispersion is an agent of what the archive tolerates as "normal." This is so because the dispersion can only operate in the active and productive horizon of the *already-made-exterior* articulable of events in the archive.

Visibles and articulables, following from these considerations, are called by Deleuze the "there-is" (or "being") of light and language.²⁵ Articulables function by means of language; language, Deleuze

heterogeneous realm. Yet he claims they are nevertheless "not primary," which accounts for the fact that they are "determinable" by the activity of articulables. I have chosen to ignore this argument on the basis of its evident self-destruction: what is described as neither primary nor autonomous seems to me passive insofar as its form is determined strictly in relation to an activity that exposes it. Deleuze, pp. 60-69.

indicates, is the "there-being" of articulables: it is the manner of "being-at-hand-in-the-world" for articulables. The parallel is exact for light, though a fundamental difference occurs with the passivity of light when contrasted to language. Visibles function by means of light; light is the "there-being" of visibles (its manner of "being-at-hand-in-the-world").⁴ Each instance of "there-being" is also an instance of an appearance in constricted possibility; each "appearance" is already the condition of the possibility of its being seen or being said. The "constricted possibility" accounts for the "conditional element" of language or light. What then is this conditional element? The conditional element need not be understood as a specific "thing" but as a setting. Language produces the space of its own emergence (the condition); it is the necessity of its own possibility. But its emergence is tolerated inside the archival setting of the forces that locate events and that

³⁵ Ibid. p. 58.

³⁴ The implication of Heidegger here is noteworthy, but so is the difference. The *Lichtung* of Heidegger, in relation to the world, is the at-hand disclosure of the spatiality of the "there"; in Foucault, the "there" is always a mode of being-there, i.e. an epistemic actuality of the already-given archive; secondly, the realm of the visible and the articulable are in competitive relation, as we shall see, and the former is not simply available to the latter.

produce the presence of an event as an element of the *episteme* (the conditional). In a simple way, one could return to Taine and Saussure, recalling the diachronic nature of what Taine (not Saussure) first called "value." The constriction of space actualization (what is the occasion of its actuality) occurs through the dynamics of exercises of valuation. What Foucault has done is raise the stakes. Valuations are not left in abstraction but are located in the social apparatus, and they are no longer called valuations, but "forces." In short, forces produce values; values are effects of the relationship of forces. When it is stated that language produces the space of its appearance, attention is being drawn to the *toleration* of a specific constriction. "Language produces space" means that articulables are the simultaneous conjunction of the statement and the dispersion of forces that fabricate the boundaries that its emergence occupies. Articulables imply in their appearance an archive of actuality. The question, which comes first? the archive or its statements?, is not possible. The "there-being" of articulables is the archival actuality. There is no first question.

The conditional element, then, of light and language is indeed the simultaneous composition of the archive event: it is the "there-being" emergence of light and language that accounts for both the constriction of possibility (the very emergence of the event itself) and the horizon potential (the field opened to constriction at the moment of the event). Still, the conditional elements of language and light (i.e., their constriction and their horizon) are at variance in terms of their relationship. Between them there is a struggle, a "battle," where lines are crossed and where the "well determined primacy of one over the other" expresses the relation.²⁷ If at the preliminary level both are identical as conditions, both are the "there-being" of language or light, at the level of the conditional element the relationship is played out as heterogeneous and competitive. The there-being of the articulables is "present" by means of language, and language is infinite; the there-being of visibles is light, and light as receptive is dependent. This fundamental difference is most significant to their relationship, for it gives the advantage to language; the consequence being that

²⁷ Deleuze, p. 68.

articulables dominate visibles to the point of having them replicate the "normal" the articulables establish (this shall be elaborated).

(4) The Activity of the Statement

In the first place, the "statement" (which locates the activity of the articulable) is spontaneous by virtue of the infinite possibilities of its external condition (language)²⁸: it is present in every archive at every time and is concomitant with the archive function. The only limitation of a statement is its definitive facticity as the constriction of possibility at the point of emergence in a particular archive; but the "possibility" of statement emergence (or again the statement-event) as such is infinite. It can appear in any constriction because it is emergent with all constrictions. Also, due to its *a priori* concomitant status with all constrictions, it is not necessarily (by way of teleology or ontology) any specific constriction. Since its condition is thereby "infinite facticity," attention is drawn from a transcendental meaning to an emergent meaning.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 67.

Secondly, the infinite and spontaneous character of language indicates, as such after the fact (i.e., by route of the tangled and mutually presumptuous relation of a *priori* and a *posteriori*),²⁷ the reasoning for defining the statement as active. For the statement, as the archival location of active articulables, activates its spontaneity by language at the point of its emergence which is at once an event of constriction. A brief return to Saussure at this point can provide an illustration. Recalling that the French word *mouton* and the English word *sheep* occur in a spectrum of constriction engaged by the functional operation of each language, it is evident that "I really like eating sheep" in English violates a constriction, which renders the claim peculiar. On the contrary no violation occurs in French (*J'aime bien manger du mouton*). For Saussure, a valuation occurs in English that calls for the use of *mutton* in place of *sheep*. Albeit, with Foucault the "valuation" is a fictitious event linked to a constriction and located by the productivity of the relationship of forces, the

²⁷ Here I mean to indicate the limitations of the capacity to demonstrate the statement. For while I uphold the *a priori* of the statement in relation to space, the statement is (as such, after the fact) already included as the event of demonstration.

example is constructive. One can see that the statement is to be defined as active because its event as a "here-now" element consists of the engagement of the forces that constrict its emergence. Its spontaneity and infinity, therefore, is not defined as the state of being "unconstricted" but as the capacity to be "presence" in the productivity of any constriction. This point proves valuable later to discuss the Foucaultian sense of transgression.

The statement, then, is pivotal as both locating emergence and engaging forces. These aspects are the two sides of its presence as an actual event. The key role of forces, too, is never lost. Force relationships not only account for the engagement of constriction but also account for the potential horizon of replicated constrictions (and mutated constrictions) given simultaneously at the point of any emergent statement-event. For though the fact of exteriority is accounted for by articulables, the function of the matrix of the archive in which statements are productive is accounted for by the potential horizon forces will tolerate given the actual operation of the archive and the actual "event" produced. One says, the statement is "active," by consequence, because it is

the vehicle of this production of forces by means of its spontaneity and infinity giving itself as event to constriction and to potential horizon.

If the world of the articulable is spontaneous and active by reason of its being the condition of language, the world of the visible is receptive and passive by reason of its being the condition of light. What is visible is "produced" passively by the reception of light. Taking a simple object as an example, first it receives light on its form and refracts that light; then, the light is received by the viewer, and again it depends on the action of another to make its appearance. It is due to its fundamental dependence in order to be an "event" that the whole realm of the condition of light is not defined as active. The contrast with articulables touches several points: the act of being exterior for the visible is the act of the receptivity of light; and visibles are not locations that spontaneously hold a place in constriction. Instead they are locations as "flashes of light" revealing an already constricted event. The "event" in effect is a visibility only because it is first a location in space, which has been defined as the statement *a priori*. In this way, the statement can

be called a determining form, for it composes the episteme in which forces flow and events emerge, whereas the visible is a determined form, for it an already present form receiving light. By this difference, Deleuze explains, "...we can assume that determination always comes from the statement."³⁰

Deleuze however is incorrect to leave the matter here, for this does not reach the question at hand. The point that must be made is that because the statement is determining it is in its relation to the visible a dominating form called "interpretation." Though light is a *priori* for the condition of the visible, the visible does not accordingly escape its conditional actuality as dependence. The statement, as a location that is productive in the archive by the engagement of the relationship of forces, "allows" or "tolerates" light receptivity only according to the locations it has opened by emergence.

In the battle between the two worlds, "light-being" is dominated by the interpretation of "language-being." This means, "light" is colonized by language; it is won over by interpretation. How is this so? This is so because at the point of conflict, the active

³⁰ Ibid.

agent establishes the constriction of possibility before the passive agent can appear as event. Thus, as visibles are related passively to statements at points of interpretation, the statement conflicts actively with visibles as the agent of domination. The statement's effect on the visible is "normality"; this means, the effect of the statement upon the visible is to open up the terms of the tolerated constriction of possibility that has been *already achieved* in the world of the articulable. Light-being has its "presence," that is to say, is an actual occasion, by means of the event through which it is manifest. It is the statement-event, then, that opens the constriction of possibility in relation to the visible. Accordingly, the effect of the event of the statement in its battle with the visible is called the "normalizing effect" because it constricts the visible according to the order of the articulable; or, it "presences" the visible by means of the accomplishment of the articulable which is—as repeatedly stated—the external of the statement that is already and simultaneously the normal archive. All of these considerations are left unaddressed by Deleuze.

(4) Dominating the Visible

The elaboration of the normalizing effect of the statement on the visible must include the concept of the "echo," which will be fundamental to understanding the Panopticon as a function. An "echo" occurs when the duplication of the productivity of the statement is given in the form of the visible. The echo is one of the means by which the normalizing effect places itself in a determining relation to a potential horizon. By the act of duplication, in which the visible repeats by its very presence the accomplishment of the normal statement, a "hold" of the potential horizon is achieved by the statement that disposes the potential succession of events toward the accomplished normal of archival constriction. The "echo" thereby, occurring in the realm of the visible, is not only evidence of the domination of the statement but also that of the active constriction already accomplished externally at the level articulables. The visible does not merely echo the statement by the repetition of the normal, accordingly, but also by holding the horizon of the accomplished archive as the secondary evidence of its very claim to "normality." The echo in this sense

justifies in the visible realm what has been accomplished in the articulable realm; for this reason, it can be stated that the visible is not merely dominated but actually recruited if not "colonized" by the project of the statement.

An "echo" makes its appearance consequentially as the activity of the normalizing effect replicating in visibility the archival function; the echo as an activity of replicating is another factor producing the experience of the "normal event" (the event that is at once definitive of the accomplished archive). The "echo" is the sign that replication has occurred; the question at hand, as such, is reduced to understanding replication as that which accounts for the presence of the echo as its effect.

If one returns to the realm of articulables and to the emergence of the archive, replication is seen as a necessary event for the establishment of an archive. The statement is productive of space; as explained, that means it locates exterior points of coordinated forces that outline an archive. A statement-event, however, can emerge as a momentary mutation in an archive, a simple occurrence on the horizon of potential, that only disappears at the very instant of

constriction. Such mutations are timeless because, not being succeeded, they do not hold a location in the archive; rather, they remain "un-remembered" as unoccurred occurrences. For a mutation to "become" time it must occur as memory. It must have a "presence" as succession to belong to the archive or to be a mutation potentially leading to a new archive. Therefore, a manifestation of force constriction may open an event, but the event does not occur as time until it is replicated in succession.

Replication means then that a location in the archive (a productive statement) is actively present. The forces that conjoin at the location of the statement (and simultaneously account for it being there) repeat the accomplishment of the event to "hold" it as a location in time. Over again, forces recombine with a statement which, held in its collective setting of statements, forms the justifying *episteme* that cradles an entire machinery of "knowledge." This is why Foucault insists that knowledge is to be defined as power/knowledge: it is not that only the powerful have knowledge (due to holding the mechanisms of power); the meaning is that "knowledge" is a carefully fabricated accomplishment in the machinery of event production.

"Knowledge" is present as an operation of an archive, as a coordination of the relationship of forces. Knowledge too is consequential and dependent on replication, for it results only when it stands on justified statements, and justified statements are replicated recombinations of forces that produce the normality of an archive.

When replication occurring at the level of the statement relates itself to, or does battle against, the visible, what emerges is the echo. In this way, according to the two worlds defined, there is the normal of the articulable (and its production of knowledge) present in the productive replication of the statement that dominates the visible by producing an echo. The visible is "per-ceived" on the basis of the already accomplished knowledge of statements, and the visible is thereby "con-ceived" in the image of the event of the replicated knowledge. The "echo" shall thereby be defined as a replication occurring in the realm of the visible. Foucault will demonstrate this through his descriptions of lines of vision, which while very important in the Panopticon are consistently present in all texts from Madness and Civilization onward. It is clear that, if the manner is put

bluntly, in Foucault, what we see is what we know. Put differently, the echo acts to replicate in vision what is already justified in articulation. For clarification, in order that replication in the order of the statement is not confused with replication in the order of the visible, the latter may be called the "echo effect" to complement the former as the normalizing effect. The echo effect is a reinforcement occurring at the level of the visible of the normal occurring at the level of the articulable.

(5) Conclusions

The discussion of this chapter began by defining the condition and the conditional elements of the visible and the articulable. The condition respectively was light and language. Each was present as the mode of exteriority to the world concerned. The conditional element, however, was seen to be distinctive in each world. In short, the conditional element was definitive of the archive, but the activity of actualization (the event) of light and language was distinctively accomplished in the archive by each condition. For language, the activity was positive,

indicating that articulables enabled the exterior location of statements and located the conjoint presence of forces; for light, the activity was receptive, indicating that the visible revealed what was already accomplished by the statement. The determination of the relationship between the two worlds introduced a variety of expressions, the key being the normalizing effect. This was presented as the act of the statement being productive in the archive by means of recombining forces in replication. Replication defined the succession of the event as time and memory. Replication also accounted for the normalizing effect, which was stated to hold the "event" in a repeated constriction as a "justification." It was called a normalizing effect because its status as justification is as the foundation of knowledge. The visible world was said to be dominated by the articulable world because "knowledge" is already accomplished at the occurrence of "light." The visible replicates knowledge as if an echo of the statement; it produces an affirmation of justification by revealing it passively in the reception of light. The normalizing effect occurs conjointly, then, with the echo as a production of

knowledge. Its definition as normal follows from the victory of articulables over visibles. This victory can be described as the colonization of the visible by the replication of the articulable.

All of these conclusions will prove important to progress beyond the superficial analytic of Foucault as a philosopher of power. It will be significant to understand that "power" in Foucault is an entire operation that cannot be reduced to simple formulations of one force effecting a second or of "truth" being reduced to force. In neither of these formulations is there a comprehension of the "event" as an accomplishment of the "archive," and—in any case—there is no evidence that Foucault's genealogical orientation has been properly understood. The "event" is a complex, not a fact; and because it is a complex it is "fiction," which means it is accomplished not teleologically (as a transcendental fulfillment of "truth") but actually in the specificity of the moment.

CHAPTER FOUR

Emergence and Tolerated Knowledge

The world of the articulables and the world of the visibles are definitive of the archive because they compose it. They are the means by which an archive event is exterior as actuality. They are the way by which an event (whether as an instance of perceptual facticity or as a moment of normal experientiality) is an archive form and the way by which the tensive matrix of the archive—its relationship of forms—expresses its regularity. Articulables and visibles are exterior sites of the composite stratum "given" to the archive that proclaim, in the very ordering of which they are already the fact, the capacity of the archive for an actual event. They are both regular and regulative because they are definitive of an archive and its capacity.

Articulables and visibles can be taken as the means to examine the composition of an archive because they are its principle forms of distributing the forces that compose it. If this sentence is repeated in a different way, so that "forms" through which forces

pass are understood as "knowledge" (for knowledge is the use of forms), it could be said that to examine knowledge is to examine the distribution of forces; or again, in another way, as Foucault has claimed, knowledge is power/knowledge.

This calls into question the relationship of what has already been given as normalizing effect and justification to power. For knowledge, it ought to be clear, could not exist without replication lest it have no location and no form of exteriority. But here some backtracking seems necessary in order to consolidate previous conclusions that are fundamental to any further progress. To wit, how does knowledge take its form as exteriority such that it could be called an effect of normalizing activity?

An archive is active because it is capable of replicating through its forms the "relationships"¹ or sets of regularities that mark its characteristics. In turn, the regularities are essential to the overall capacity of the archive function as an inclusive network of articulable and visible distributions. It

¹ "Relationships" is Foucault's term. One can also imagine "sets of regularities" because here one speaks of clusters (which are already "relationships" in themselves). Clusters in relation to other clusters can be thought of as sets in relation to sets. The language concerning clusters is found in AS (AK).

would never have been possible for Foucault to speak of relationships between labour, life, and language (as in The Order of Things) or between prisons, schools, and barracks (as in Discipline and Punish) if these linguistic and visible clusters of distribution did not hold a "capacity" of relationship to each other by means of the active *episteme* that regulated the archive of their emergence.² Criminology and education may be entirely different disciplines, but both the prison and the classroom are examples of "panopticism" because the *episteme* definitive of the actual archive is the credible foundation of both expressions. Both, that is, are disciplines in the sense of being produced

² Arnold I. Davidson speaks of rules of formation as synonymous with the *episteme*; I have used the word capacity to indicate a different nuance. The *episteme* is not directly articulable in Foucault. It is evident rather only from outside the actual space of the archive of its operation (discussed earlier above). Such a recognition is therefore both the privilege and the problem of the historian's look after the fact. Rules of formation, on the other hand, can be articulated and indeed engaged within the actual archive. In this manner, they are perhaps close to the notion of a paradigm in that—while often assumed and left unquestioned—they are not entirely hidden. Rules of formation are like arrangements that are sensible or conceivable because of the accomplishment of the statements by which the *episteme* is both actual and active. This is why rules are so closely related to "knowledge" and, as we shall see, so important to the sense of justification. What changes in genealogy is that rules and forms are united with forces and machines. See Arnold I. Davidson, "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics," Foucault: A Critical Reader, edited by David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 222. [Hereafter referred to as FCR.]

regularities within the capacity of the disciplinary society.

Education and criminology can also be called two clusters that are conditioned fundamentally by the regularities of panopticism, by the rules that govern the capacity of credibility in relation to the specific functions of articulation and vision. But Foucault's "rules" are not abstractions in transcendental relation to functions. They are rather the historic "forms" taken by articulables and visibles. Rules are not the "there-being" of visibles and articulables (as light and language) but define the discursive capacities of the archive regime through which visible and articulable events combine and emerge. Rules are the manifest "historicity" of the activity of the power/knowledge network. Whether the actual event in question emerges in a general system of regulation, such as panopticism, or is a specific event within the Panopticon itself, "rules" intend to describe historic potential by describing the very regulations active at the level of the constricted possibility.

In the Archaeology of Knowledge there is some hint that rules in fact precondition the possibility of the statement—that is to say, the possibility of the

productive form of the statement-event—and, in this way, rules account for the unity of discourse as well as the regularity of the institutional setting in which discourse is employed. "By system of formation, then," Foucault claimed, "one must understand a complex network [*faisceau*³] of relations that function as a rule: it prescribes what must be placed in relation, in a discursive practice, such that this referent indicates such and such an object, so that it brings to the fore such and such an enunciation, so that it utilizes such and such a concept, so that it organizes such and such a strategy."⁴ But this claim suggests that, for instance in the case of the clinic, it is the pre-existence of the regulation of clinical discourse that accounts for the unity of practices that define the clinic.⁵ This is one specific instance where genealogy changes the picture: discursive regulations understood as pre-existent to institutional formations

³ This can also be translated as fagot or bundle.

⁴ AK, p. 74; AS, p. 98.

⁵ According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, "...only when Foucault gives up his semi-structuralist claim that discourse has some sort of priority which enables it to 'use' nondiscursive relations can he discover the legitimate domain of the functioning of discursive practices, and give an account of the unique way discourse is both dependent upon and yet feeds back and influences the nondiscursive practices it 'serves.'" BSH, p. 67.

do not account for the arbitrary changing and fluctuating emergence of events. Rather, by an estimation that must be understood as conservative and hesitant on the part of Foucault, they appear to inhibit this possibility entirely. Archaeology, when it is so rigorously applied, appears to eliminate the fluctuations of power and its arbitrariness. Rules—insofar as they are the historic capacity of specific forces and forms—must in contrast account for both manifest strategic relations (i.e., regularities) and arbitrary fluctuations (i.e., the horizon potential) if they are to be useful to the dynamic comprehension of an archive. From the genealogical point of view, forms must be related equally to power as to discourse. Indeed, from the genealogical point of view, there is no difference between power and discourse: discourse by taking form is already power. This is why, with Nietzsche, "there are no durable ultimate units" when it comes to genealogy.⁶

In the genealogy of Foucault it is not possible to have, in a Platonic sense, a form independent of matter by which it emerges: it is rather the emergent

⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 380.

event that produces the experience of the form. Neither is a "form" the essence of matter in an Aristotelian sense (namely, that matter has a consistent determinant of its meaning). Forms are precisely the instance of the regulative operations that open by their productivity the capacity of the possible experience of an "essence." With Foucault, forms are very much specific and very much integrated into the vehicles by which forces are distributed. Forms are simultaneously the product and the production of the archive; they define the very mechanisms by which it functions, but precisely because those mechanisms function, forms are produced. Again here, the impossibility of a "first question" is met; and what was given in archaeology (the pre-existence of discursive regularities) is taken away in genealogy.

When it comes to a practical example such as the rules of prison life, it is the institutional forms (cells, courtyards, classrooms) that produce discourse as much as it is discursive forms (criminology or reformatory theories) that create its possibility. The architecture of the prison is its form in as much as the architecture is the statement of the accomplishment of discursive formations. Each is the instance of the

definition of the archive emerging as regulative activity at the site of a constricted possibility. The significance of the "form," then, whether one means a rule or an edifice, is not its origin but its capacity: that is to say, its capacity to utilize the space of the statement that is its articulable and visible function. And it is precisely by the utilization of space in the act of replication that the function of a form is united with the *justification* of knowledge.

Here the backtracking may end, for when it comes to answering how knowledge is an effect of normalizing activity, the answer is given in the silent presence of the *episteme* replicated through forms as the "self-evident" regulation of experience in an archive. This "self-evidence" is no doubt deceptive or even ironic; it is self-evident only within the interior experience of an archive produced throughout the network of forces active in and through forms. It is self-evident as long as a replication by means of forms manages to hold in order the present of the *episteme* that founds the possibility of the archive experience of knowledge. In modernity it was a "self-evident" truth that a social deviant needed to be trained; and this act required the

corrective action of institutionalization, surveillance, and instruction. But the "self-evidence" of this set of practices assumed the "achievement" of both the forces that composed modernity and the forms that created its historic experience. The self-evidence was an active accomplishment of forces distributed as knowledge in, among other things, criminology forms. In archives before modernity and in the contemporary archive that follows it, the self-evident prison does not exist. Thereby, knowledge, when it is understood as power/knowledge, is an accomplished archival "activity" that rests on the constricted site of operating regularities that are already present in the knowing act. Or, power/knowledge is the effect of the *justification* of active forms.

Through this manner of argument, a different understanding of knowledge is given by claiming that "knowledge is normal"; indeed in this age of knowledge so quickly praised and paraded as brilliance, it is more effective to say that "knowledge is wholly normal." There is no such possible thing as brilliance in relation to knowledge if one understands Foucault

(and Heidegger and Husserl⁷). Rather, knowledge is a normal, archival operation; and brilliance, insofar as this ought really to mean ab-normal and transgressive, is never comprehended in the archive of its emergence and generally never accepted within the community of the archive's official knowers.

(1) On Paradigms and Archives

The distinction made by Thomas Kuhn between normal science and paradigm questioning may be recalled here to give this investigation another avenue for approaching the sense of the normality of knowledge. With Kuhn, the second term (paradigm) is what constitutes the first, for a paradigm is as such the boundary experience necessary to carry out the operations of normal science. This is why Kuhn says that "in so far as he is engaged in normal science, the research worker is a solver of puzzles, not a tester of paradigms."⁸ Rules define the critical principles that

⁷ As previously expressed, phenomenology holds the insight that every act of knowing simultaneously covers up the possibility of knowledge; and insofar as one says "I know," one has forgotten.

⁸ Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 144

outline a paradigm and that guide the positivities by which puzzle solving within that paradigm is carried out. To test a paradigm, on the other hand, is to put the principle rules themselves into question—to question the way of questioning or to examine the perceptual categories by which examination itself is carried out—but this usually does not occur by deliberate acts (although, it can be deliberate) but by casual and sometimes mistaken anomalies that occur almost at random. In other words, events for which normal science cannot account predispose the experiential potential of science itself to a shifted horizon or paradigm, for such an “incommensurable” event opens the horizon to the style of questioning necessary for the shift of the active paradigm. Thus the normal is normal precisely because it is the usual—the replicated in the function of the paradigm—whereas a paradigm shift require a perspective form of the “abnormal” sufficiently acceptable to recast the whole ground of normality.⁹ It ought to be expected, then, that such a shift is highly unusual and generally

⁹ Kuhn also concludes that a paradigm can inhibit this perspective and therefore insulate the scientific community from the critique of itself and its operant paradigm. Ibid., p. 37.

unsuccessful at its first appearance, and this is what Kuhn finds to be the case in the history of science.

The paradigm image helps with the understanding of Foucault due to various points of similarity even though Foucault is never directly concerned with Kuhn.¹⁰ For one, an archive shares with a paradigm the same conviction regarding normality. Kuhn's normal science and Foucault's knowledge are both the consequent practices of an interior achievement. Kuhn relates that the scientist for the most part is engaged in puzzle solving since the act of research—and indeed what is allowed to stand as "research"—is defined within the operating periphery of a paradigm and is generally carried out by applying the rules of the paradigm to the problems it (the paradigm) brings to the fore. Puzzle solving, which is the normal activity of science, is carried out within the operation of a paradigm and assumes the usefulness of the paradigm employed. But since the paradigm itself more or less creates the puzzle, since it grounds the interpretive "look" of the scientist, the activity of puzzle solving only replicates the space already occupied by the

¹⁰ However, both Kuhn and Foucault share Koyré as a significant source for their respective critiques.

paradigm. In a very similar manner, knowledge is an archival normal because it is an accomplishment within the parameters and forms of the archive that function to define it. What can count as knowledge, just as what can count as a problem, must assume the truth of the whole apparatus by which knowledge is legitimated.

There is also a way in which, with regard to the paradigm and the archive, knowledge is normal in the sense that it is anonymous in a manner both passive and active. Kuhn speaks of puzzle solving as a type of question or set of questions already set up in the order of the paradigm. For instance, "The scientist or philosopher who asks what measurements or retinal imprints make the pendulum what it is must already be able to recognize a pendulum when he sees one."¹¹ To use the pendulum for the purpose of displaying, for example, the independence of weight and rate of fall, as Galileo did, presupposes a specific orientation toward motion that includes a given valuation to the pendulum demonstration. Thereby, in one sense Galileo as an individual problem solver was a genius, but in another sense his "genius" was wholly anonymous since it consisted of puzzle solving within the order that

¹¹ Kuhn, op. cit., p. 129.

already produced the puzzle and already held the solution. The use of the pendulum was indeed an active use of knowledge because it involved the use of the puzzle solving practices of an operating paradigm; and the use of the pendulum was also a passive use of knowledge because its employment depended upon the tacit presence of the order of the problem and solution by which the pendulum proved its use. It was an anonymous "event" in the sense that it is representative of (and belongs to) the complexity of functions and regulations that created its possibility.

Knowledge in this way is an anonymous function that emerges out of the order in which it is practiced; it is active when it uses that order, but passive because it depends on that order. And precisely because it is always within an order (a paradigm or an archive) and problemized by it and because of it, its normality remains the anonymous shape of a whole set of regulating practices.

Yet, despite the usefulness of the paradigm image, and however helpful this image remains due to its popularity (for it has become of itself a paradigm), there are marked differences between it and the analogy of the archive. The most significant

difference is the inclusion in the archive of the presence of power through relationships of force constituted by the collection of forms; secondly—due to power—the account of changes or shifts in the archive places far more emphasis on mutations (that have no cause) than on anomalies that may be experienced in the use of a paradigm. The movement from one archive to another is not necessarily tied to various problems an archive may be incapable of solving. Rather, such movement, as shall be seen, is related to different ordered practices that, upon appearance, reshape the space around them and recast the knowing of them. But the greatest difference is even more subtle. Whereas a paradigm can be consciously used as a model in problem solving, and can even be put to a test, the archive is the relationship of the composite statements of the *episteme* upon which, in the first place, a paradigm is active and, secondly, in which a paradigm emerges. An archive cannot be put to the test as can be a paradigm, for unlike the paradigm the archive is not a way of perceiving phenomenal relations but the way in which perception is a capacity such that a paradigm is even seen at all.

The question of the pendulum, taken from the archivist point of view, is not only that it is seen, and must be seen in order to be a question, but that it constitutes an accomplished archive—a regime of perception—in which its “question” is both produced and valued as knowledge. Whereas the paradigm remains the model of perception; the archive is the politics of perception in which weight is given even to the “evaluation” carried out by paradigm employment. Hence in as much as the image of the paradigm can clarify the sense by which knowledge is normal, it does not account for the genealogy of forces that produce knowledge or for the effects of knowledge as the complex of power/knowledge.

(2) Knowledge and Permission in the Archive

If a return is made to the basic statement that forces pass through forms and produce knowledge, it will be possible to pursue the meaning of the archive along those very lines that are left unaddressed by the paradigm. Here the normality of knowledge can be understood as a permissible fabrication of regularities emerging in archival battles. And, because knowledge is introduced in the context of a battle, i.e., as a

struggle of forces, it can be called not just "normal" but an "effect" of archive productivity. This means the "normality" of knowledge is a secondary or passive effect whose active forms must be related to the capacity allowed by the productive environment of the archive. This is the sociological side of genealogy that is not addressed with the concept of a paradigm.

Due to the archive being composed of regulatory activities governing the emergence of its events, the archive as a whole can be understood as a "permitted" field because its internal operation is founded on nothing other than the effects of the forms that compose it. The archive as a whole, in other words, also holds a certain anonymous status—not in the sense of being without identity but in the sense of being without purpose. It plays within the workings of itself and produces the ground that appears to order the demonstrable evidence of its foundation yet remains the effect of the internal historicity of its *episteme*. The term permission is useful to the discussion of this matter.

What the paradigm left without address was the relationship power/knowledge and the ability to examine what this means for the status of knowledge. Since

with Foucault it is quite clear that nothing pre-exists an archive except for the previous archive that conditions it, the status of knowledge is always wrapped up in the tensive relation between the mechanisms an archive inherits and the new statements that fill it. The examples of the asylum and of the prison will suffice.

The appearance of the asylum does not arise from the establishment of the classical practices of confinement (as if a syllogism of logic) anymore than the prison is the necessary (or natural) result of practices of modernity. But in both cases there is a the play of the bifurcation of the two elements, the visible and the articulable, and their mutual *affectivity* carried out by the forms that relate them and the setting that contains them. The "madman" is an emergence not strictly tied to a new discursive formation any more than the asylum appears only out of a new way of looking at folly. It must be upheld rather that the "madman" emerges as an object of knowledge into the scene of the asylum that now becomes the central point of locating "him." The "madman" becomes an external location of the forms that create "his" externality. In effect a new way of speaking

about madness and seeing madness invades one archive from its outside to become the in-forming practice (i.e., placed in the form) of the mechanisms that define the exterior. The classical houses of confinement, in which the "mad" were first enclosed and where their uniqueness was first segregated, delivered to modernity the science of the asylum. One archive floods the spaces of the next. And the new knowledge to be sure is a consequential formation in relation to the original flexibility of new statements and new visions, but it is knowledge as an "effect" of (meaning it is produced, tied into, and twisted by) the battle that occurs between visibles and articulables on the one hand and the setting available to them on the other. Knowledge is secondary in this most highly anonymous manner: it escapes through the crevasses of a battle only to be refocused on the "object" that the battle itself has delivered to it.¹² Here then is perhaps the most significant point to be made: knowledge is normal, by the understanding of genealogy, because it is first and above all an apologetic function permitted by the archive in which it is found. Knowledge is this function because it is the archive's

¹² See Deleuze, pp. 42-44.

effect. And it is defined as this function because it is defined as the representation of the course of the battle by which it is ironically derived. Furthermore, the dependency of knowledge on the battle that forms it accounts for its potential fluctuation, and the justification of knowledge by the effects of the battle that produce it accounts for its formation as a permitted effect or apology.

Knowledge as a potential emergence may be neither governable nor predictable, but it is significant to note that as a potential formation it is "held" to a horizon by the conditions that precede it. The "delinquent" in the modern era, who is "permitted" by the activity of the in-forming capacity of the prison, is a collapsed potential of a horizon left available by the classical era (specifically, by way of the plague as Discipline and Punish suggests) to the constrictions of the modern era. The new discursive regularities surrounding delinquency and creating its exterior were potential mutations of the classical activity of segregation that were held by knowledge formed as representation.¹³ The emergence of the new knowledge,

¹³ I mean here that classical reasoning was ordered by representation where words stand in place of (and are parallel with) the natural order. The poor, the homeless, the unemployed, and the

which moves from the former position of potential to the new position of a constricted possibility, at once formulates a new order of statements and a new echo of vision as the "effect" of an accomplished invasion. Thus despite the inability to predict the mutation that can occur, there is nevertheless a hold on that mutation by the practices that, by replication, produce the space of potential horizon. It is this "hold" of space, which is the accomplishment of the operation of forms, that suggests even the change of an archive or its shift (if comprehended as a paradigm) remains anonymous and ungrounded as an "effect" of an active fluctuation that undermines knowledge and produces a new horizon of emergence.

The term permission is therefore useful in a variety of ways. It describes the relationship of forces that composes the archive as well as the tolerated forms the archive takes. Permission means that neither the forms nor the forces must be understood as pre-determined or as historically

"mad" were collectively representative of disorder and accordingly removed from the streets of society. This is described by Foucault as the "great confinement." On the other hand, the renaissance is a reasoning of resemblance in which the impoverished of society or the troubled indicate a portion of the natural order of the universe, or at least its hierarchical dimensions, as it was inherently meant to be. The consequence is that there is little need for the practice

necessary in their identity. It also describes the complexities involved in the replication of a constricted event as well as the horizon in which a mutation is available and a new archive is born. In a general sense, it accounts for anonymity being attributable to the whole archive, for the archive as such is only conditionally present by the hold of its predecessor but not absolutely determined in the movement or variations of history. Still, though it is the anonymity of the activity described that accounts for the use of the word permission, it would remain misleading to say that events in the archive are therefore superfluous or not "real." With Foucault, the archive reality is not to be found on transcendental ground, on a *telos* or *ontos*, or on necessary laws of evolution. The archive reality is that it is; or more significantly, that it constantly is and becomes not as identity and not as aim but as potential "presence" constantly wrapped up in power relations, mutations, and new events. Because it is presence, the archive is "always real" in the sense that it is always particularly something without being

of confinement since there is no conception of poverty or madness as a "problem." See MC.

necessarily anything. The paradox of the archive is that its very historicity is the indication that it has no fundamental general history. The term permission indicates that the archive can take as its "sense" any cloak of legitimacy; the only hold on this potential is again the battles and the limits of the events that carry it.

This leads to the final sense permission can take, which is related to the anonymous activity of forces themselves. Forces pass through forms and act on other forces; forces relate to other forces by the reaction of forces to forces; forces are manipulating and manipulated. It is this last characteristic that is so crucial to Foucault yet so much the subject of misunderstanding. It must be clear that to portray forces as unaccountable activity is not to say that violence is unanswerable. Neither is it the case that violent acts therefore cannot be liable acts. An important distinction is to be set here. At the level of life experience, people do make decisions, institutions do plan actions, arguments are carried out, oppression does occur. None of these points is in dispute, but all of them are accounted for by the effects of power and the relationship of forces through

forms. The permission of forces attempts to explain that though there is a form, such as "education," and though that form can be oppressive, a form does not define a force or reduce it to one function. Rather, though an archive is constituted in its manner according to the constrictions of its forces, only specific instances of the relationship of forces are stabilized by forms. Forces remain elusive in their general activity and at liberty in relation to each other: this is why no archive is necessarily what it is and any archive is potentially other than what it is. At the level of society, this is not a pretext to renounce the possibility of responsibility but all the more reason to understand responsibility as a "real" event. This is the ethical side of Foucault that is often overlooked.

One sees with Foucault that there is a dualism at work in the anonymous relationship of forces. There are forces that are at work in the archive, circulating within it, passing through its forms, constituting those forms, and constricting possibility, and there are forces that remain uncontained, elusive to forms, and outside. This dualism is deliberately unresolved, for it works to account for archival fluctuations and

the definition of the archive as fiction. In Foucault there are not really "two" types of force so much as two ways forces remain anonymous: they are either constitutive and present as "in-formed" or they are outside the threshold of tolerated boundaries. At the outside, they could be called un-informed and non-events. Forces in this fashion hold a potential that is free of the "horizon" of the archive and that stand as the "outside." To an extent, and in a very subtle way, this outside is admittedly "held" by the horizon (because even as a "non-horizon" it must still be related to from a location), but here its "hold" must be described negatively since it is, as such, a potential comprehended as elusion: it is the elusion that occurs as a non-event co-extensive with the point of the positivity of the constricted event.¹⁴ Care needs to be taken so that this "non-event" is not qualified by positing it as an event in "potential"; what is meant by non-event is permanent elusion or permanent negativity that is at once the permanent

¹⁴ I mean here that the fluctuation of forces considered "outside" the archive remain nevertheless a conceptual estimation from within the archive. What I am proposing, in other words, is still "held" inside the archive I occupy and used for conceptual activity. But since I am speaking of a constant or perpetual outside that concurs with any archive, I call that perpetual elusion the negative effect because, outside of the located reference to it, it is formless and incomprehensible.

complement of every event. Any event that occurs is already constricted; it is archival; but each new event-occurrence is also a new threshold complemented by a new outside. It is only in relation to the outside, and only by crossing the threshold, that the normal functions of knowledge (which ironically constitute the outside *via negativa*) deliver themselves to thinking. By definition, then, thinking is the crossing of a threshold; it is an act of transgression. One must simply retain the irony of the notion that, as *via negativa*, thinking by definition is in permanent recess in relation to its activity.

Again an ethical boundary, one that Foucault is often reluctant to address, is here confronted. If thinking is transgression, is it self-evident or necessary that transgression is the aim of thinking? In truth, transgress can have no such automatic status since by definition it eludes itself in this articulation. Such a status can only stand if the thinker "forgets" the archive; but this would then be "knowledge," not thinking. Foucault will never give his reader the false security of knowledge in place of thinking. The problem is that neither does he orient

the face of this dilemma, to deliberate political or social residing.¹⁵ When Foucault then is taken into the context of theology, where the definitive activity of thinking theology is to make present the permitted reality of the Holy Spirit, the ethical dimensions are difficult to ignore (however, this address must await further study).

The immediate problem remains that which emerges from the very definition of the normality of knowledge. Since knowledge integrates the relationship of forces in and through forms, power is primary because, if not, there would be nothing for knowledge to integrate and there would be no "knowledge effect" in the archive. Accordingly, if knowledge is a power-effect within the established archive, what power-effect establishes an archive?

¹⁵ There are of course several scholars who would take exception to this claim, in particular Arnold I. Davidson who writes about the significance of Foucault's last works for the history and analysis of ethics (see The Cambridge Companion to Foucault [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], pp. 115 ff. [Hereafter referred to as CCF], and FCR, pp. 221 ff.) However, Charles Taylor is right to indicate that this is not really the problem. The problem is that Foucault does not answer the question about what we are liberated to or from (or even if we should care about liberation at all) and how do we discriminate between the "good" and "bad" forms this may take. See Charles Taylor, FCR, pp. 69 ff.

(3) The Precedence of Practice

In 1453, in the town of Mainz, Johannes Fust was one of the first to see the results of a technical triumph several years in the making. The triumph spoken of was the Mazarin Bible, perhaps the first book printed with moveable type, and Fust, who financed the whole project, entered what would turn out to be a short-lived partnership with one Johann Gutenberg.

Not so far away and not so much later in time, a young monk of some distinction was pursuing the usual routine of the medieval academy. There had been a discussion brewing over the use of indulgences by the church; the question did not concern if indulgences ought to be used but if or how they should be limited and if or how their abuse detracted from the teaching of Christian faith. So it was that, following the practice of a disputation, 95 theses concerning indulgences were publicly advertised on the door of the castle church in Wittenberg. Shortly thereafter, Martin Luther's disputation of 1517 was printed by Johan Gutenberg's invention of 1453, and the ideas of the Protestant reformation spread like wildfire across the face of Europe.

It is pure speculation to ask if the practice of 1453 did not exist, would the disputation of 1517 have occurred? On one level, the answer would have to be in the affirmative. With or without the printing press, it is hard to imagine Martin Luther any less spirited or the indulgence controversy any less heated. But in another way, no answer can be formed at all. The printing press was not just an object but also a way of knowing. And, upon its success and wide spread use, it opened up a type of social space around which its "normality" thrived. The medieval disputation went on for centuries before the printing press, but the reformation was one of the first disputations to be looked at and known by the printing press. What is meant here is that the printing press is a relationship to texts (and even the creator of "text-knowledge") as much as it is an invention; and more importantly, before the practice of the printing press, there was no knowledge about the text as a relationship to the press. In a certain sense the reformation could not have occurred without the press since the Protestant imagination (which is the imagination of the text) needed the practice of printing for its emergence.

For Foucault the machine that exemplifies the relationship of forces establishing an experiential "knowing" in an archive is the Panopticon. Immediately, the Panopticon is a technical invention, which Jeremy Bentham seems to have regarded in a manner no less revolutionary than the printing press, but to Foucault the Panopticon is important for its ability to describe a technology of practices, a way of seeing an event, and a technique that carves out of space a new form of imagination. In the way it can be argued that the printing press was significant because it created Protestant "knowing," Foucault presents the Panopticon as a central image of "modern" knowledge.

The Panopticon, in Discipline and Punish, is an archive diagram. This means, it is a regulated relationship of forces that produce a specific set of events. The "Panopticon" is about "panopticism," a certain design of the gaze that circulates according to the forms and practices that constitute it as power/knowledge. "Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the detained a state of

conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power."¹⁶

The Panopticon, understood as a diagram of modernity, is a collective description of practices that operate as the credibilities tolerated by the modern *episteme*. Yet, with Foucault, and consistent with a genealogical understanding of history, practices do not *follow from* a new diagram but precede it. Practices, at the point of emergence, create a setting of space. They are "events" that create the seeing and the speaking of an object and that, by extension, open (as if agents of colonization) a new frontier of vision and articulation. Practices, in effect, are the genealogical call for the archaeological statement's relocation.

Practices are concrete. They are the physical means by which power/knowledge occupies space in the archive. As Deleuze properly notes, practices on the whole introduce the main question of power. Since the identity of power is not examined in Foucault—for power consists not directly as a force applied to an object but indirectly as the affects of forces in

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris: Edition Gallimard, 1975), p. 202. [Hereafter referred to as SP.] Michel

relation to other forces that compose (and defy) an archive—the fundamental question is not "'What is power and where does it come from?' but 'How is it practiced?'"¹⁷ In modernity, Foucault is convinced, the answer to this question lies in the apparatuses of discipline. Mechanisms of the government function, and social orientations are ordered, according to disciplinary forms; thus discipline is described as a circulation of a *regime of forms* in which the child or the patient or the criminal occupies a determined or constricted archival space.

Here again one must caution against wandering into the Platonic or Aristotelian world of the forms. A regime of forms describes neither pre-conceptual ideals nor inherent patterns of order. "Forms" are "con-forming regulations" that arise from and circulate the relationship of forces; they are the consequence of a practice or a set of practices opening a space of convergence. For example, one conforms to definitions in order to speak a language. This means one is within an arrangement and a distribution in order to be functional. Likewise, Foucault presents power as the

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, translated by Alan Sheridan, (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 200. [Hereafter referred to as DP.]

functional. Likewise, Foucault presents power as the self-evident, inter-relationship of practices by which an archive is its function.

Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individual are caught up.¹⁵

By this path, Foucault is putting forward the argument that "forms of discipline" (acts that are regulative and productive of discipline) precede the system of discipline called panopticism.¹⁶ What does this insistence mean?

One way to answer this question is to complement the genealogical sense of practice with a genealogical

¹⁵ SP, p. 203; DP, p. 202.

¹⁶ "The development of the disciplines marks the appearance of elementary techniques of power that open [*qui relevent*] a completely different economy: mechanisms of power which, in place of arriving from above [*en lieu de venir "en déduction"*], integrate themselves into the productive efficiency of the apparatuses from within, into the growth of this efficiency and into the use of what it produces." Here Foucault relays the specifics of the dynamic under discussion above in relation to the appearance of the disciplinary archive; he feels the uniqueness of this archive is the manner in which the practices of discipline that compose it overtook from within the spaces of juridical functions that preceded it and consequently reformed the productivity of the juridical forms (in the manner relayed earlier). The reference to "deduction" is slightly peculiar in both French and English; I take it to refer to the hierarchy of power of the juridical archive that has been complicated by disciplinary practices. The quotation serves as one example of the precedence of practices whereby "space" is re-shaped and re-articulated such that it is "seen" according to a different sense of power/knowledge. See SP, pp. 220-221; DP, p. 219.

has so many implications that even Foucault's definition of a strategy as a "theme" or a "theory"²⁰ is unsatisfactory. Though a theme or a theory may outline a group of related statements, this hardly indicates why such groupings should be accomplished in the operant archive. Strategies, more than a theory, cover a whole circulation of forces that, by the active and reactive condition of their relation, exclude specific possibilities from the horizon, account for certain statement "constellations" within an archive, and influence the option for a specific constriction of possibility. Strategies furthermore identify the relationship between co-existent statement clusters within a single archive. In the Order of Things, grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth are described as clusters of statements that exist contemporaneously. The three distinctive clusters operate according to a competitive praxis of regulations. Though they occupy collectively the archive of the classical era, Foucault explains that the manner in which activity is carried out in each

²⁰ See AS, p. 85; AK, p. 64. Strategy is not used by Foucault outside of its archaeological setting in The Archaeology of Knowledge where it refers to the anonymous relationship of statements and statement-clusters. To develop a genealogical sense, strategies must be related to power and understood in the matrix of the relationship of forces.

sphere modifies, excludes, and opens certain possibilities in relation to the others. When this is re-cast in a manner more deliberately genealogical, each sphere is seen to relate to, and even to integrate, certain forces of other spheres and the relation of forces in those spheres—i.e., each affects and is affected—to the point of “constricting” the possibility in the immediate horizon of the other formations. There is then no satisfactory way to explain the genealogical meaning of a strategy. It must be taken as a comprehensive term that covers what can generally be called the “economy of discourse.”²¹ Strategies are the circulation of the relationship of forces being carried out simultaneously within and between clusters of statements (such as the analysis of wealth and general grammar). A strategy refers to that specific relationship of forces stabilized at the level of the clustered statements and the rules of that cluster by which it is identified. Equally, the interrelation of all clusters, and their mutual competition, informs the archival as a whole.

When attention is returned to the question of practices, it is evident that practices become archival

²¹ This term is modified slightly from AS, p. 88; AK, p. 66.

at the moment when they become dispersive sites of an overall strategy. This means that practices as such locate diagrammatic point of exchange and inter-relationship, even "struggle,"²² of the dispersion of epistemic events, thereby accounting for the borders of the constriction of possibility. Or again, practices attract points of strategic conflict which, in turn, define the circumference of a potential horizon. In short, strategies account for the limits of an archive's potential and define its actual toleration. Practices create the potential of the archive condition as an experienced historicity.

(4) Anonymous Strategies

A student writes a thesis. This is no doubt the most basic practice of a Ph.D. program in the Arts. The practice of writing a thesis opens up, each time it is completed and presented, a whole competition of inspection by the professional academy. Each inspector tries to hold that angle of gaze somehow more subtle, somehow more brilliant, than the one under whose gaze the thesis has passed. But this is a replication of

²² See PK, p. 164.

space already opened before; what the thesis does is merely occasion its operation and its sense of purpose. Sets of gazes crisscrossing over a text are tolerated strategies; and a thesis, if even imaginative or unique, generally cannot violate the toleration for fear of being refused. At best, a thesis can indicate the horizon. But to do so it must remain within a competitive spectrum of experienced historicity in order to be understood as work. If on the other hand the picture is changed slightly, the matter of precedence appears. The student does not hand in a thesis but rather hundreds of hours of video tape detailing time in the library, work at one's desk, reading, writing, modifying, editing, and obvious engagement in the production of a document. Can the video stand in place of the document? Is the video a sign like a thesis is (or at least is supposed to be)? Our age is veering on the border of such a question, though it will not be so simple and not involve videos. The question will be about signs and what, in academia, is given the authority of a sign and what is not. Practices, such as virtual reality, are already exceeding the toleration of the tradition of the University, but by their very existence, the practices

are demanding the attention of strategies. The practices open up new space around which a new forms of the competition emerge. Finally and inevitably these forms are not just different but other; they are the relationships of an economy currently not our own.

This minor excursus serves the point of affirming that power, however much strategies suggest order, remains essentially unstable, which means that there is always a practice lurking outside of a toleration and always new strategies able to produce new historicity. When practices defy toleration they create new space, but new "space" is no easy or automatic achievement. Newness can occur in the realm of toleration, which should then be regarded only as modifications of a constellation of statements. Equally so, Foucault gives the example of Port Royal grammar (in the classical archive) and the taxonomy of Linnaeus (of the same archive), it can be that the relation of one constellation to another, may free elements that are both intrinsic and new.²³ It may be that strategies will free practices hitherto embedded in an archive whose emergence in turn break the threshold of the archive, defying its toleration, and pose regulations

²³ Ibid.

only a new strategy can accommodate. What would be the status of such "outside" practices that invent an "outside" strategy? These practices are transgressive practices, and the strategy that they form (though it may become an archive of its own) are in relation to the active archive "counter-strategies."

One point Foucault seeks to uphold here, in the case where toleration is defied, is that the "new" is never a simple "uncovering" of truth hitherto obscured or misunderstood. He calls the reader to imagine a "shift" of relationships (an anonymous occurrence) that has modified the surface of exclusions, possibilities, and choices. It is as if the shift causes fissures in the old strategy where, as a consequence, a new "space" along with a new "seeing" becomes a fundamentally real if even suddenly obvious option. In short, Foucault describes archival shifts as the emergence of new practices that produce new truth rather than as an uncovering of essential truth formerly obscured by false practices.

What the Panopticon brings to the discussion is an encounter with practices that operate in the classical era in such a manner as to produce spatial fissures through which strategies emerge and events are

"known." The prison, in effect, creates a "space" that attracts a strategy. This is why Foucault will insist that practices precede the diagram, for he is upholding the genealogical project of a counter-history. Foucault rejects the notion that a theory appears first, followed by the testing of the theory through contrived and acceptable practices, and finally the installation of some tested practices in the social apparatus. In place of this deductive form of history, Foucault introduces his meticulous scrutinizing of detail, showing that it is at the level of exclusions and productions (of affecting and affected events) that new practices emerge between the cracks of one regime to recast a strategy that is at once the "looking" of another regime. Thus practices are prior to the "knowledge" of a new archive since they are primarily products of an active archive that have crossed its threshold of toleration. Determining the location of these cracks or openings or gaps, or simply arriving at a limit experience, is the process of identifying the threshold.

A practice, therefore, can install a strategy of power relationships outside of an operant archive. And, once this has occurred, it is a question of how or

if that new strategy will embody the instrumental functioning necessary for replacing the operations of the existing archive.²⁴ Additionally, if one "practice" can be understood inclusively as the defining "image" of a new archive, then it can be called an "epochal event." This is exactly the status that must be given to the Panopticon.

Foucault's use of the Panopticon cannot be limited to a descriptive device of modernity (hence, a predicate) but is actually an account of the "strategy" of modernity (hence, an order of practices) and a naming of the fictive permissions of modern truth. More than a vehicle by which the circulation of power occurs—productions, constrictions, tolerations, etc.—it is a summation of the practices that make of modernity an event.

²⁴ This is how Foucault understood the usurpation by modern discipline of the classical "system of right." Modernity bears witness to the emergence of practices and strategies of power through the cracks of the system of right. It was in the development of efficient government that the constellation of statements of the classical era excluded (i.e. created) a space of disciplinary measures. This locations existed at points distant from administrative centres, calling for an apparatus of institutions necessary to exercise these functions universally. It is here where "power surmounts" the rule of "right" and places itself within the functions of its instruments. This fundamental turn at the birth of modernity displays the appearance of practices creating a new circulation of strategies and a new space of knowing previously excluded by rituals of juridical practice. See PK , pp. 92 ff.

"Panopticism" as emergent event is recounted in the details of Discipline and Punish. In classical torture described earlier by the merciless exercise of regal power poured out upon a criminal body (who represents social delinquency) lies the traces of a local threshold. The vicious nature of the execution intended to display, by its very excessiveness, the inviolable power of the king. But the very necessity to *display* the execution gave it over to the atmosphere of a carnival. The suffering Damiens became the inadvertent political counteract that vicariously represented the oppression of the monarchy.¹⁵ Damiens, legally a criminal, is popularly a hero. Damiens is a figure who "shifts" to an outside position, and back again, by crossing and re-crossing a threshold, by holding a hesitant position between business and revolution.

Juxtaposed to the execution Foucault gives us a timetable, drawn up some eighty years later, for the House of Young Prisoners in Paris. This surprising

¹⁵ The unintended counter-activity that emerged in the space of the carnival/execution distinguishes Foucault at this point from Mikhail Bakhtin. Foucault, one assumes obviously, is influenced by Bakhtin, but it is unclear how directly this claim can be made. For a discussion of Bakhtin's sense of carnival, see Allon White and Peter Stallybrass, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (London: Methuen, 1986).

change quickly awakens the reader to the distinctive marks of a different archive; here punishment is defined by efficiency rather than surplus. The timetable distributes social practices at substantially different sites according to a different set of strategies. The previous archive that employed excesses to punish is now interpreted not only as cruelty but also as waste. Foucault presents with the timetable the first signs of panopticism, whose texture differs from sovereignty and whose aim is the training of bodies. What has occurred is not an evolution but the emergence of new textures of space and time, of constrictions and normalizing effects, of visibles and articulables, attracting and finally defined by strategies. It is not the evolution but transgression that accounts for the new strategy.

When the Panopticon is called an epochal event, the significance of this classification reaches beyond the strategies that compose it or the emergence that conditions it. Though these categories account for its distinction, the point is to present the image as the *episteme* on which a paradigm or a theory is produced and holds comprehensibility. By presenting the story of Damians and the timetable from the House of Young

Prisoners, Foucault resists any effort to reduce archive emergence to the simple refinements of apparent—if complex—anomalies. The focus on transgressions that lie at the horizon of constricted possibilities give witness to fissure practices in which new space awaits the stabilization of strategies informing the sites of knowledge.

It is worthwhile for the moment to summarize what to this point has been secured. Knowledge has been defined as a both a normal and anonymous function; it was so called because it was defined as the act of integrating forces within the toleration boundaries of an archive. The "toleration" was thought of as the circumference of the horizon of potential where an event can occur whether as a mutation or a replication. These activities, because they are held, were said to be permitted. Across the threshold of the circumference of toleration was said to lie the "outside" of the archive where relationships of force flow and the status of the "un-informed" remains. To think was expressed as the reach across the threshold to establish a relation to the outside. But this question is interrupted by the very instability of power and the fluctuations on the archive horizon.

Accordingly, when the Panopticon is introduced as an epochal event, it invites not only the analysis of the circulation of power but also an account of its emergence. An archive arises to a point of definition by escaping the constriction of its predecessor by means of practice. The production of power/knowledge is therefore, in the final analysis, an effect of transgressive practices by which power claims a new space. It is time now not to look at emergence but at the activity of the production of the events within an archive and on the characteristics of the effects called knowledge.

PART TWO

THE FUNCTIONS OF AN ARCHIVE

Introduction

The notion of power in Michel Foucault has been consistently developed as a ubiquitous relationship of forces that define and defy an archive. Power does not have one location, one form, or one expression, which is why it is called forces, nor does it have one way of being, one identity, or one definition, which is why it is called a relation. To a degree, the way in which Heidegger described technology as neutral yet ever present in the very framing¹ of the question of

¹ Heidegger would mean neutral in the sense of "being autonomous" and in this sense "being anonymous" as a functioning that functions regardless of (or indifferent to) its engagement. The word "framing" comes from the German word *Gestell*, which Heidegger hyphenates when he first uses it. The hyphenation appears to emphasize the activity of displaying or framing (the revealing of) a unit of experience. The word *Gestell* is often translated as "Enframing" to give it the unified sense of a "presenting-to" or a "presenting-out." However, this translation is also limited since, in the German language proper, *Gestell* never means "enframing." Commonly, it means a "display unit" such as a set of shelves on which one might find ornaments. Thus one can call a washing machine a *Waschegestell* (a washing unit), or the undercarriage of a car is a *Fahrgestell* and the landing gear of an airplane is *Flugzeuggestell*. The English "Enframing" is often too static for the intended meaning, which is the "activity of showing or revealing" as a challenging order rather than the passive "freezing in a frame" as a *statio* object. Accordingly, displaying and unifying must be included in the understanding of framing, and generally "Displaying" (a bring out or a challenging forth) is a better translation than "Enframing" (a putting inside or a placing to the side). Technology "frames" in the sense that it is a particular, and problematic,

technology, Foucault's understanding of power is likewise neutral even though it is always present in the formulation of its question.

1) Thinking Foucault with Heidegger

In the "Question Concerning Technology" Heidegger states that "The revealing that brings forth is also the way that has the character of destining."² Technology is a revealing. This means that the relationship to the world established by means of technology brings forth the world according to the order by which technology opens it to viewing. Technology is a "revealing that brings forth" because it is no general relationship to the world but a particularly ordered relationship in which the world is given as a specifically viewed object. Then, since technology "brings forth" according to the manner in which it opens the world for viewing, it also "destines" the world by way of that same order. This means that the manner in which the world is opened is simultaneously that measuring which gives forth its meaning. Technology, then, is not only the relationship that reveals the world but also the

challenging forth of the natural world. See "The Question Concerning Technology," QCT.

² Ibid., p. 29.

relationship that destines it by the order of its revealing.

Even though technology is described as neutral, it is nevertheless not neutral in so far as its "bringing forth" and its "destining" are historically constituted relationships that impact and affect *Dasein's* activity in the world and "regard" of the world. When the world is opened and destined according to technology, even though technology is neutral, it is at once a historicity that is enacted and a specific destining that is effecting the order of its appearance. Technology in itself may be neutral, but its engagement is never neutral.

Foucault's notion of power is similar in effect to Heidegger's question concerning technology since it also has the same "neutrality"—i.e., being in itself neutral—as technology. But power, unlike technology, is not given as a vehicle of revealing, even if that vehicle itself becomes the question of its own revealing and the vehicle of its own destining. Power, rather, accounts for the relationship of forces that puts technology into the question and that, once technology is the question of its own questioning, "holds" it in the modern horizon as the vehicle of revealing and of destining. Power is before technology, indeed is productive of technology, since

technology is what power delivers to the question concerning technology. And even more than a mere deliverance, power is also the problemization of the question that is, in modernity, technology. For while on the one hand power delivers technology, on the other hand technology is the form of power. Technology is, as it were, the set of practices that constitute the forms through which forces pass and power, as a whole, circulates. Since, then, in the speaking of power, power is present as the relationship of forces that produce the openings of articulation, and in this production technology is already present as the practice that forms the relations, it is never possible to discern an essence of power inasmuch as, as Heidegger likewise concluded, it is never possible to name the essence of technology.³ - Power is always already present in its questioning just as technology has already destined the revealing of the object.

What needs to be said is that, because power is already given to its own question, which renders it

³ I mean this in the sense that the essence of technology is not given through any traditional understanding of essence, but is given precisely as the essence that "conceals revealing itself." It is the type of essence that presences the order of its question such that, as essence, it cannot be reached. It is that paradoxical essence that is only present when it is unknown, and this is precisely the knowledge technology covers over by its presence as *Gestell*. Ibid., p. 27.

impossible to speak of an essence of power, the troubling conclusion that, therefore, power is neutral must be comprehended in a wrapping of great subtlety and dimension. If power is neutral, it is only in the sense that, as an absolute or self-standing, transcendental concept, it does not exist. This "nominalist" claim is not as radical or incomprehensible as it first appears. Nominalism here simply means that power does not exist because it is not a "thing" (*quid*) in the sense that it is to be understood as a quality or a form present in all acts of power.⁴ In effect, so far as one persists on the course of genealogy, nothing that is described as an essence "exists" since, by definition, its existing "name" destroys the identified essence by the act of being its already-in-history presencing. Power is neutral only because it does not refer to an essence but rather refers to the relationship of forces; secondly, it is neutral because the relationship of forces, as a relationship, is never a determined form—and never can be a determined form—precisely because it is not an essence. Power's neutrality is related to its anonymity, which is approached by the decisive affirmation of nominalism.⁵

⁴ See for example Thomas Flynn, CCF, p. 39.

⁵ Nominalism as it is applied to Foucault does not strictly intend the model of its 14th century predecessor. Albeit power

But a degree of subtlety must be maintained here, for (the second point) what has been given on the one hand must be taken away on the other. If on the one hand power is neutral, it is true that on the other hand because power is neutral it is never neutral. This is the same point that was made for technology: it is the neutrality of technology that make its neutrality a "practical" impossibility. The neutrality of power, like the neutrality of technology, is therefore only mentioned to eclipse the question of an essence; but once this question is eclipsed, and once the nominalist affirmation is made such that power, like technology, is understood as a relationship and a set of relationships that reveal and destine their own questioning, then it is evident that only by way of the contingencies of the question

does not exist as a transcendental form of a stable or centred identity, neither is power restricted in its meaning to an individual act that occasions 'in anima' a property pertaining only to names. In Foucault nominalism indicates a tensive relation between two extremes: on the one hand "power does not exist" and on the other power "runs through the whole social body." This is a nominalism of power insofar as, discussed earlier, power is given actually (i.e., non-essentially) as a relationship of the relations of forces and, secondly, as a active local product of a set of relations. Hence, power "does not exist" in the sense that what is named by power is both a non-centred and fictioned product (rather than the identity of a real entity); and power is everywhere in the sense that, comparable to Heidegger's understanding of technology, it is always already active in the question of its activity or it is always already the condition of its own possibility. It is due to the definition of power as a relationship rather than an entity and as the *always already* there to its questioning that the term nominalism is employed.

can a "revelation" be encountered. This means, the question always gives itself as the qualified experience of its questioning; thereby, it can never be neutral since it is always relational or communal in the event of its questioning—it always affects both the questioning and the question—experience of its presence. Power can never be neutral, and in the same manner technology can never be neutral, due to this condition of historicity. It is always flavoured in its questioning by the question it has itself produced and of which particularities it is a part.

It remains to be said then that the questioning of power, however abstract this appears as a question and however metaphysical its expression seems, is not an abstract question or strictly a metaphysical question. In the proper sense, it is always a philosophical question. It is a question in that sense of philosophy wherein questioning itself, and thinking itself, is an "ethical"⁶ activity, for it is a question in the midst of the affirmation of the impossibility of abstraction (of "drawing away from" [abstrahere] the self). It is a question that is possible only by means of the denial of metaphysical questioning in the case where "metaphysics" means only

⁶ The word ethical has been chosen as best representative of the historical task of philosophy which is "know thyself" as both a personal challenge and also a socio-political task.

the study of essence(s). But since the thinking of power denies this very "only," it remains that kind of thinking that intends to "affect" the way its thinking can be thought; it intends to affect the historical experience that makes the thinking of power available to questioning; and it intends to affirm that, when its questioning is neglected, the question of power is then all the most dangerous by its being hidden. For when power is "only" domination or "only" possession, it gives itself "only" in the very cloak that, by such strict definition, hides it. Power examined uncritically as domination hides the question, for example, of the domination given in this very approach to the question. Or again, power, when it is not affirmed as that which is present in its questioning, negates the critique of the forms by which it is produced as questioning. Hence, even though the question, by turning on itself, appears of the most abstract character, it is infinitely practical in its aim and, in the most traditional sense, philosophical in its character. Power is questioned for the sake of its involvement and, finally, its alliance in the formation of new questions or different ordered questions that it, ironically, will hide from question all the more if it remains "only" abstraction. But when engaged actively, which means that when it is

affirmed in the relationship of forces not as essence but as productivity, the questioning of power is itself that activity that is called ethical thinking. This of course is not "moral" thinking (the act of posing moral rules); ethical thinking is the historicity of thinking: it is thinking the thinking of thinking. And it is this by its affirmation of power.

This new way of thinking power is of a fundamentally different texture from that of modernity⁷ where power is given firstly as a commodity that can be owned, secondly as a commodity that can be gained, and thirdly as a commodity that can be shared. It is in this way understood as an essence; and as an essence it can be a commodity that is either present or absent. This calls forward a brief look, at this point of introduction, at the "tradition" that surrounds the understanding of power in modernity and the ways in which ethical thinking differs from it.

The tradition of power in philosophical modernity is for the most part tied to Karl Marx. Foucault wrote, at times explicitly, against the "totalizing" character of Marxism (which, one might add, Marx also wrote against) in which the definition of power is more or less restricted to conflict. This means that

⁷ See P/K, p. 88.

power is understood as the ability of one group, for example the propertied class, or one class, such as the bourgeoisie, to dominate another group or class who lack the institutional or material means of self defense. By this model, a class or group who do not have power can unite as a single force to gain more power or (in extreme cases) overthrow those in power. In the classical analysis by Marx, the proletariat lack power because they lack possession of the means of production but rather are themselves owned as producing machines. The proletariat is dehumanized, but from this vantage point can, in solidarity, announce "the dissolution of the existing social order" by declaring "the secret of its own existence" (which includes the poverty of the proletariat artificially produced by the structures of bourgeois capitalism).⁸ Foucault's target, however, is unlikely Marx; he rather has in sight Jean-Paul Sartre. Foucault's concern is not with the right of the proletariat or the disadvantaged to revolt. Indeed, Foucault assumes this right and his life consistently witnessed to his active identification with society's marginalized and misrepresented.⁹ The problem is that

⁸ Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, edited by Tom Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 190.

⁹ See David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (London: Vintage, 1994) for an excellent biography that recounts

power is reduced to an individual's will and personal insight, such that it is only the enlightened proletariat (who are no doubt enlightened by the professional academic) who can understand the need and reason for solidarity and revolt.¹³ It is then the classical role of the academy to enlighten society in general and its most vulnerable sectors in particular. This restricts the analysis of power to class wars where one group seeks to gain certain advantages held by another and where a utopian vision of a classless (and therefore power-less) society is possible. What Foucault recognizes is that the scholar, who is the "knowing subject," is in fact as much a result of power as he or she is the analyst of power (its official "voyant," so to speak). Power produces the vehicles by which the subjective experience of the "objective viewer," who surveys social ills and who has the academically normative means to "name" problems, is produced. Power accounts for the production of a particularly experienced subjectivity that modernity set against the objective world and it

Foucault's political activities often pursued in collaboration with Jean-Paul Sartre.

¹³ This is perhaps especially a critique that would work against Georg Lukács and his distinction between actual and ascribed class consciousness, which is a distinction available only to the proletariat presumably enlightened by Lukács. See Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, translated by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971).

accounts for the social forms in which this experience is allowed to count as knowledge. It is not the revolutionary nature of Marxism that remains the trouble of Marxism; rather, it is the inability of classical Marxism to comprehend the ubiquitous presence of power—its nominalist definition as a relationship of forces in which the archival life-experience, its historicity, is fabricated—that infiltrates social analysis and (even) creates of the bourgeois, for the proletariat and over against the proletariat, an object of desire (and a fetish of the academy).

Over against the modern tradition that hides the problem of power within the enlightenment of the academy stands the new notion of power as the relationship of forces that problemizes the reading of the academy since it accounts for the academy's social privilege as the possessor of normative knowledge. To approach this problem, and therefore to consider the consequences of the critique of normal knowledge within the academic enterprise of official theology (and philosophy), the whole dynamics of the experience of historicity as the condition of being in the archive must be considered. The chapters following this introduction, accordingly, outline the effects

(and the "affectivity") of the condition of being in the archive.

2) Thinking Foucault with the Archive

It is to be recalled that by a genealogical approach to questions of space and time and by the determination of the dynamics of this approach through terms such as "event" and "constriction" or "horizon" and "strategy," a traditional approach to power, which above is represented in classical modernity, has been eclipsed. Power, in Foucault, is released from the exclusively negative definition of acts of oppression and exploitation that one subject exercises upon another subject to an ambiguous term identifying ubiquitous and productive forces. The Foucaultian challenge is not to explicate a detailed metaphysics of power but to concentrate on the location of forces that produce acts representative of the archival strategy.

Foucault's orientation toward power is strictly Nietzschean, but it is a mistake not to admit that much of what Foucault has to say arises, as he put it, out of his making Nietzsche "scream and protest."¹¹

¹¹ This expression is from my private notes of documentation available at Centre Michel Foucault in Paris, France.

Among the possible interpretations of this phrase, one has to imagine that Foucault means he has forced Nietzsche to encounter problems the philosopher had never anticipated: this would include the elaboration of a language of the analysis of forces, which has occupied much of Part I, and the elaboration of genealogy in the study of specific and local acts, which is where Damians appears and where the outside becomes a factor.

If, however, Foucault took the liberty to take Nietzsche beyond the strict limits of Nietzschean philosophy, it is the aim of this work to do something of the same with Foucault. In the first place, Foucault did not provide the language necessary to elaborate the role of power in relation to the statement-event, ruptures, and strategies of the archive. To have a concept of the archive that emphasizes power, fluctuations, and the relationship of forces, it is necessary to unite aspects of the Archaeology of Knowledge with those of Discipline and Punish (with Damians and the Panopticon in particular). To take such liberties with Foucault can raise the question of faithfulness to the project Foucault envisioned. Yet, the risk is infinitely worthwhile insofar as the task remains not to comment on Foucault but to put Foucault to the question—i.e.,

to think with Foucault—even if Foucault should “kick and scream” in rebuttal. If any approach is to be made with Foucault to theology, an area on which Foucault properly speaking never comments,¹² then a “thinking” of Foucault must be undertaken beforehand in order to raise the question of theology at all.

In the spirit of Foucault's thought, an archivist-genealogical approach to hermeneutics can be used to put theology to the question. To develop this foundation, Part I saw the use of novel but identifiably Foucaultian terms: “constriction of possibility” and “held horizon” among them. There was also use made of the expressions, “propriety,” “replication,” and “permission.” These words, however, form only the tools of a further elaboration. From this point, then, a second way of making Foucault “kick and scream” remains. Since the aim of this thesis is to explore the basis on which a Foucaultian philosophy of theology can be created, an examination of the specificities of the actual conceptual possibility of meaning as an archive event will be undertaken. The sense of this question will be

¹² The comments of Foucault in relation to theology were restricted to the Church in the Middle Ages, following the second Lateran Council, on role of confession as a pastoral use of power (a further elaboration of this no doubt lies in the unpublished fourth volume of the History or Sexuality). A sense of the nature of this material appears in an interview entitled, “The Confession of the Flesh” in P/K, pp. 196ff.

defined through the image of the Panopticon and from the comprehension of power as a relationship of forces called panopticism.

The basis of this elaboration remains linked to terms opened in the first encounter with Damians, which brought to light the notion of transgression and the outside. These two terms have a potentially mystical status, and this is evident from Foucault's early comments on Georges Bataille.¹³ It has already been stated that "thinking" in Foucault is to be distinguished from "knowledge" and that thinking emerges in relation to the outside. It is Bataille, perhaps above all, who had expressed this relation for Foucault by recasting and elevating to a mystical level what was otherwise an erotic and appalling display of human transgressions. The degradation recounted in Bataille's Story of the Eye was, for Foucault, an explicit movement toward the outside and, as such, acts that rested on the extremities of the

¹³ See "Hommage à George Bataille," reprinted as "A Preface to Transgression" in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, translated and edited by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). [Hereafter referred to as LCP.] In the essay, which originally appeared in 1963, Foucault claimed that "in that zone which our culture affords for our gestures and speech, transgression prescribes not only the sole manner of discovering the sacred in its unmediated substance, but also a way of recomposing its empty form, its absence, through which it becomes all the more scintillating" (p. 30). Foucault understood this mystical relation to absence to be Bataille's accomplishment.

archival normal. Since the produced normal of the archive functions interpretively through the strategies of the relationships of force, the deliberate challenge of the archive occurs at those points breaking its regulations and counter-sensing its episteme. That break, which is a stepping into the threshold, is by definition a conscientiously transgressive act. In Discipline and Punish, the word "indiscipline" is used for such an identification. As Foucault relays, "Confronted with discipline on the face of the law, there is illegality, which puts itself forward as a right; it is indiscipline, rather than the criminal offense, that causes the rupture."¹⁴ Yet, this concept is developed no further and it is only in the context of other reflections (for example, on Bataille or Rousell¹⁵) that Foucault hints at a mysticism of transgression.

Still, "thinking," the "outside," the "threshold," and "indiscipline" compose a collective of fragments of transgressive discourses. Though each is transgressive only insofar as the archive itself produces such limits that so open this activity (and therefore remains a "holding" despite the attempted

¹⁴ SP, p. 298; DP, p. 291.

¹⁵ In relation to Rousell, an example is Foucault's comments on the mysterious death of Rousell at the threshold of a closed door separating two hotel rooms.

eclipse), a challenge is nevertheless issued by these transgressive fragments that consists of opening a space of movement and alteration. Out of this space, or better within it, can emerge the outline of a theological project of an archivist's genealogy for religious investigations. This development will consist of an embellishment of the terms already employed and will introduce some new modifications. Notably, the concept of the "moment" will be introduced and will appear in conjunction with the outside; there will also arise some need to distinguish between two senses of an "outside" in relation to the archive. Then, three terms will be used to define further the service of the term permission. These terms are "repetition" (from Part I), "impression," and "penetration." These prove important for understanding the function of that type of meaning that is the main characteristic of panopticism. The above terms, too, will demonstrate later why the theological discipline of Systematic Theology ought to be put to significant critique.

Part II is given as the transitional step from Foucault to the Foucaultian investigation of Theology.

CHAPTER FIVE

Philosophy of the Event

Foucault has been called a "philosopher of the event"¹ not in regard to his exegesis of this term but due to his concrete use of history. To Foucault, the event is the exact circumstances of a statement and the immediate instance of its emergence. Even though, by this, an event can appear to mean simply any occurrence whatsoever,² Foucault's meaning is encountered only when the novelty and the texture of each event is comprehended. In Foucault at one level the event signifies those unaccounted and sometimes discontinuous happenings that change the order of an archive, those special circumstances witnessed in Damians that reverse a political regime. But at another level, the word "event" is employed to mark the novelty and the placement of any archival happening. In this latter case, it is not significant that events happen but that distinctions can be made among them. The problem is "...to differentiate the networks and levels to which they [events] belong, and to reconstitute the lines

¹ Thomas R. Flynn, "Partially Desacralized Spaces: The Religious Availability of Foucault's Thought," op. cit.

² See Ladelle McWhorter, "The Event of Truth" Philosophy Today, 38,2 (1994), p. 161.

along which they are connected and engender one another."³ The event is always a location of happening or a nexus within a network and thereby, as an occurrence, always implies the novelties and particularities under and within which is defined its condition of emergence.

Still, there are events that simply re-occur and that, ostensibly, can be called stable. The Panopticon is a producer of events, but within it there are constancies, especially related to the tower (its location, its regard) that remain. Such recurring events are of such a regularity that as event they appear not at all novel but customary and usual. But even in such instances, there remains no detraction from Foucault's central point. Every event, particularly those regarded as customary, are necessarily embedded in the working, circumstantial network in which the event as such not only lies but is also composed. Every event is presence—even more so those of recurrence since above all these are dependent on the contingencies of reproduction—because it is emergent in the archive. And even as customary, an event is nevertheless novel. It is novel because its

³ P/K, p. 114.

emergence (its being presence) is constantly accomplished by production.

To say that an event is production, or is the consequence of the activity of production, is to invoke the work of a whole socio-political as well as technological set of contingencies that create the very present-ation of the normal event. In the modern archive, Foucault is very insistent that the normal production, by means of its union with the production of the subject, is very deliberately tied to the concept of training. Modern training, in a special sense, is a normal event—or has as such "permission" on the archival level—to the extent that the manner in which it is held as presence is linked to a consistent productivity of "space." In this way, it is possible to say that the novelty of the event in modernity was held in the present by practices of training. Or again, the productivity necessary for modern normal events is training. In Foucault such modern productivity is linked to the image of the Panopticon, to power, to images of competitions and battles, and to technology.

When the event is understood so as to be constant novelty held in the present by specified techniques through training, it is regarded differently from the

Enlightenment understanding of an "event." In the Enlightenment experience an event of note is a phenomenal act that sets a new standard of achievement for successive "same events" until such a time that another phenomenal act of higher significance again breaks through to a higher level. The Enlightenment concept, however, never admitted to the constant restraint its idea of the event imposed on novelty by means of the teleology implicitly employed in its "same event" reading of history. The Enlightenment never grasped how the affirmation of sameness covered up the possibility of newness. Since in the Enlightenment perspective an achievement of significance sets a standard of measurement for any subsequent "new achievement," that very standard begins to hide both the novelty of each performed repetition of "the same" as well as the contingencies of the constant coordination of complexities and levels of relationship that necessarily accompany every event emergence. Enlightenment "sameness," which then becomes the gauge by which to measure the progress of the past and to posit the present as its natural *telos*, creates—out of the constancy of its own "look at history"—the phenomenological condition of hiding the question. When history is reduced to the revealing of an embedded

process, so that the present is consequential of an evolutionary "aiming" within the whole, the actual novelty of presence in relation to any event (and the whole contingency of productivity) is hidden from experience by the ideological order represented precisely in the so-called "aim" of history. The direct question of the event, and more significantly the direct question of "questioning" itself that emerges with the event, is silenced by the insidious ideology of the consecutive unfolding of the same. As Ladelle McWhorter describes, the sense Foucault wishes to convey is contrary to the Enlightenment. In Foucault the event is caught up in a network of forces. It "names no thing at all; instead it marks something."⁴ And, in order to reach the question of the event as a marked location in the relationship of forces, it is necessary to avoid the Enlightenment "imposition of an orderly similitude on profuse complexities."⁵

A review of the Enlightenment can prove helpful to approach the sense of the event in Foucault more thoroughly, particularly in relation to Kant (with whom and against whom Foucault aligned and positioned

⁴ McWhorter, op. cit. p. 162.

himself).⁶ With Kant the use of a concept of the event is known. It occurs in the specific setting of the conflict between the so-called higher faculties (Law, Theology, and Medicine) and the lower faculty (Philosophy) of eighteenth century Prussia. In the second of what was originally intended as a series of three essays from this conflict collectively called The Strife of the Faculties, Kant produced a text, translated in English as "An Old Question Raised Again: Is The Human Race Constantly Progressing?",⁷ that employs the concept of *Begebenheit* (literally "betakenness" which is rendered in English by occurrence or event). With this Kant indicates that at certain points in history something can occur that is not contained wholly within the structures of the moment of its appearance. An event can emerge out of the often anonymous agency of human freedom, which is perhaps best emphasized when capitalized as "Event,"

⁵ Ibid., p. 163.

⁶ I mean here that Foucault affirms the Enlightenment understanding of the project of the self and the constant critique of the subjectivity of the subject; on the other hand, whereas Kant sought to define the limits within which reason must reside, Foucault very much sought to encounter those limits as potential points of transgression. See Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment" The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.)

⁷ See Immanuel Kant, On History, translated and edited by Lewis White Beck et. al. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 137-154.

that foreshadows a future type of humanity or significant advancement of the human predicament. Kant here thinks particularly of the French revolution when he further describes that the experience called an Event refers not to a single occurrence but the birth of a mind set; it is therefore a movement of the human spirit that today would be called a paradigm shift. Kant also claims that the Event is to be understood as "disinterested," which means that it is a "mode of thinking" demonstrating a "character of the human race at large." It is disinterested insofar as it is not reflective of an individual achievement but rather reveals the general progress of humankind.⁹ In Kant, though an Event is not reducible to any one occurrence, it merits a careful consideration because it contributes to the overall advance of history even if, in the immediate experience of history, things seem to be going for the worse.

What is evident from the general Enlightenment notion is the sense of an implied, underlying stability. This is what is identified by the term, "sameness." According to the Enlightenment understanding, sameness is the constant refrain in the

⁹ Ibid. p. 144.

background of history by which two crucial notions are evident: the significance of the "Event" stands out precisely because of its difference; and the intuitive capacity to recognize difference is founded on the transcendental ground of archetypal sameness. If this were to be stated in Schelling's terms, who arose shortly after and depended upon Kant, the Event is evident because of the "identity of identity and non-identity."⁹ Here the philosophy of the simulacrum that defines "Sameness," again here using a capital letter and recognizing the reach that extends from Plato to Hegel,¹⁰ declares its presence: difference can be accounted for only by means of the negativity through which passes the Same. And history therefore is progress in the sense that it is the struggle of the Same solving the contradiction of its own shattered identity (of its subject and object; of its sameness and difference) in the historicity of its historic setting. Foucault put it this way:

For difference to exist, it was necessary to divide the "same" through contradiction, to

⁹ See Stanley Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 59.

¹⁰ See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 263, "Thus, Hegelian contradiction appears to push difference to the limit, but this path is a dead end which brings it back to identity, making identity the sufficient condition for difference to exist and be thought."

limit its infinite identity through non-being, to transform its positivity which operates without specific determinations through the negative. Given the priority of similarity, difference could only arise through these mediations.¹¹

The identity of identity and non-identity is then, after all, principally about Identity: that is, it is about the manifest necessity of the Same prior to the very contradictions that makes it evident as sameness as well as manifest its becoming, "progress."

To Foucault, the order of the Same is not given prior to but is rather imposed on difference such that difference, far from being the sign that Sameness is necessary to the existence of difference, stands out as a protest against those impositions that would seek to train it. The Same is always that which must be enforced, which must intervene, as a kind of guardian of the *status quo*; and again it is only by the strictness of this reasoning of the same that "advances" in history are impressed upon us. For in a structure such as that given in the Enlightenment, the Event emerges not comprehended in the complexity of novel coordination but as the revelation of the

¹¹ Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum" in LCP, p. 184.

timeless nature of the Same fulfilling its self-project.

It was by the display of this distinction that Foucault named three projects that seem to represent the particular legacy of the Enlightenment. It is worthwhile here briefly to note them: neo-positivism, phenomenology, and the philosophy of history. In each case Foucault indicated a particular type of approach to history but did not intend a categorical condemnation of the named subject as such. Precisely what Foucault identified as "neo-positivism"¹² is unclear, but he described it as that attitude that lodges "the event within the density of bodies."¹³ By this, Foucault seems to have indicated that there is no other choice, under the conditions of the positivist attitude, but to reduce the event from the surface to the depth. In this manner, a continuation of the Enlightenment project is witnessed when Sameness is placed intrinsically into the order of things, and

¹² Foucault can often use a general term without a specific reference. In this instance one might imagine that he means process thought since he describes neo-positivism as that act of locating the "event" intrinsically in the material process. This being the case, however, one would have to admit that Foucault's reading of process is very narrow indeed. On the other hand, he may be intending structuralism with reference more or less to the diachronic evaluation of discourse (but more shall be said in this regard below).

¹³ LCP, p. 175.

difference is now accounted for by the surface manifestation of an interior consistency of life energy or force. This type of neo-positivism perhaps describes the basic assumptions of the gaze of modern technical sciences, but Foucault's truncated discussion allows little more elaboration.

Phenomenology, on the other hand, is a specific target. Foucault considered the danger of classical phenomenology to lie in muting the presence, and therefore silencing the novelty of, the event by imposing on the event—despite itself—the primacy of transcendental signification. Secondly, and by virtue of this act, phenomenology privileges the meaning of the event by the active predetermination of its emergence. For this, Foucault criticized Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, saying that for them "meaning never coincides with an event."¹⁴ This comment suggests that the event in phenomenology cannot be comprehended in its presence as simultaneous meaning/emergence but is only "present" by a pre-determined structure of transcendental participation. With this structure, meaning would in fact be necessarily pre-given to the possible experience of the event. Yet, for Foucault

¹⁴ Ibid.

the opposite should rather be the case: meaning is always coincidental with an event. And phenomenology errors precisely when requiring intentionality first in order to have an event, for this leaves hanging the important question of the consequential form that intentionality may take by virtue of the productivity of the event as well as the power of event emergence to structure the very sense transcendental subjectivity may take. Rather phenomenology again posits Sameness first, this time located in the subject, as the *a priori* necessity for the possible significance (and indeed the very possibility) of difference.

When it comes to the philosophy of history, Foucault is more or less following the comments of Nietzsche.¹⁵ He suggests that the grammar of history closes the event in the language of past and future. Foucault recounts how the philosophy of history endows the present with the essence of the past since, as its "former future," it preserves in its actuality the identity of its forerunner.¹⁶ "This sense of the present requires a logic of essences...and then a

¹⁵ See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), esp. Nietzsche's preface and opening sections of the first essay.

¹⁶ LCP, p. 176.

metaphysics of a crowned and coherent cosmos, of a hierarchical world."¹⁷ The logic of a necessary essence, which implies a necessary *telos*, to history constitutes to Foucault perhaps the highest presumption of the Enlightenment project. But it is that presumption itself, that most deliberate measuring of the past in such a manner as to authenticate the present, that hides to the Enlightenment experience the very "event" of its own Event. For Foucault, the "freeing of difference" requires an affirmation of nomadic thinking, a type of thinking that obligates the "...dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of similarity."¹⁸ The question must be, by what avenue is that constraint lifted? By what means is the Enlightenment project countered or, at least in relation to its priority of the same, broken apart so as to release the novelty of the event?

(1) Breaking from the Same.

One distinctive counter-option in this respect was cultivated in the general setting of French

¹⁷ Ibid.

structuralism which, despite Foucault's best intentions, characterized The Archaeology of Knowledge. Though Foucault had sought to qualify the rules by which the statement-event functions in the contingencies of language at the exterior of the subject, there is nothing in this work to challenge the structuralist claim that this task in fact marks the evidence of a "primal"¹⁹ mind. The identification of "rules," the emergence of which Foucault never clearly accounts, do not grant emergent events an integrity of "power" independent of participants who employ them. It appears rather that a type of phenomenology that Foucault himself sought to reject would be necessary to describe the motivated intentionality Foucault's "rules" seem to imply. The case is clearer with reference to the (structuralist) enterprise of Roland Barthes. Even though Barthes generally held that the relationship of signs in any given system of signs is arbitrary, he maintained that within the specificity of a given system, certain relations could be described as

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 185.

¹⁹ See Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). Notably, this work is dedicated to the memory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

motivated relations.²⁰ In this way Barthes' structuralism never eclipsed (the Foucaultian critique above of) phenomenology. Signs may be arbitrary, but only absolutely in the same way Saussure had claimed; while on the other hand, there are operant valuations within systems that occasion the possible meaning of a sign function. For Barthes, these valuations, or motivated occurrences, are accounted for primarily at the subjective level. As Saussure could speak of synchronic and diachronic relations (thus suggesting Lévi-Strauss's primal mind), Barthes could indicate that the inter-action of subjects and the inter-relation of subjects with an environment motivates sign usage and determines sign-sense.²¹ The subject, though vigorously critiqued and even pronounced "dead" by Barthes, remained the constancy necessary for the whole signifying process. Foucault, insofar as The Archaeology of Knowledge is concerned, did not give an alternate explanation than from what can be found in

²⁰ See Roland Barthes, The Fashion System, translated by Matthew Ward and Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 216f. Barthes claims that motivation founds a system and releases from purely human creation; but in this he does not see his own founding of that "system" on the transcendental motivation necessarily inter-subjectively performed. In short, which is how Foucault is finally different, he has no sociology of the sign—despite his apparent effort to suggest one—to account for the sign-function producing the dimensions of its own condition (including its perceptual condition).

²¹ See Ibid., pp. 215ff.

Barthes as to how linguistic rules should function or emerge.

It is only in Discipline and Punish that Foucault makes a decisive break from the Enlightenment tradition of sameness. This occurs with the introduction of power and the specific ways power marks the body and has a history on and with the body. The subject is not given, in this "new kind" of subjectivity,²² as a consistent theme pre-given to the forms of a system of observation; it is rather understood as already shaped, contorted, marked, manipulated, and fabricated within the complex horizons of the relations and uses of power that compose a system. In addition, whereas with Barthes there remains motivated and unmotivated factors that imply the steady presence of a transcendental interpreter, Foucault's introduction of power creates a sociology of productivity fundamentally ignored by Barthes and generally absent in structuralism. When power is introduced there can no longer be a question of an "unmotivated" system (of virtual historical innocence) within which specific signs find natural or motivated association. Every association, however much its experiential presence seems natural or innate,

²² See C.G. Prado, Starting With Foucault (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 51f.

already emerges within the function of power as control, organization, and composition. It is not a question of things such as "a coat and a windy day" (Barthes' example of motivated fashion) being associated by natural experience; it is rather a question of how forces produce a strategy in which the subject is given to the space of fashion productivity. The subject is the *already accomplished* work of power (or the "is-already" product of the archive condition) prior to the question of its place or value within signifying associations. Barthes did not investigate how the body experience is already produced and motivated (located) within the archive that marks it. He had no account of the descent of the body contorted by power given to the permissible setting of subject emergence as signified event. In short, he lacked a sophisticated sense of genealogy.

Foucault brought into consideration the status of the body and the production of subjectivity as fundamentally integrated in space by power. He was able to eclipse the limits of an Enlightenment phenomenology of sameness that he believed lingered in structuralist analysis. By approaching the condition of space as that given to the "event" of experience, he was able to question how the network of power produces

the possibility of the contingent location. Hence the event must be linked not only to a position in language and not only to the subjective experience of the sign (the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of a language group respectively) but also to (and fundamentally to) the condition of space given to an actual moment by the descent of power. In Foucault, that condition of space in modernity included the enclosure of the body, and its actual moment in relation to the descent of power was characterized by the particular experience of discipline. Finally, the form by which power is dispersed and through which subjectivity is permitted was called training. Modern power "descends" by disciplinary practices that manipulate the body through forms of training. In this particular "is-already" setting, the statement-event, emerging as subjectivity located in the technical network of the newly formed social sciences, was specifically linked to the body as a location of knowledge.

In Foucault discipline is the condition of space already given to modernity prior to the question of experience or knowledge. The body is already produced according to a form before it is of social or political relevance. Subjectivity is already a permissible location before it is a question of transcendental

structures. Or, perhaps better stated, the body and its identity are already valued politically and socially according to the condition of space before the physically occupation of that space. Or again, bodies are manufactured before they are born. With Foucault, then, any discussion on the event requires a break from the Enlightenment ideology of sameness in order to introduce the questioning of the condition of space that both descends the body and orders the network of power that composes its permissible experience.

(2) The Modern Descent of Space

The litany of the condition of space descendant of the modern archive began, in Foucault, with the sometimes controversial expression, "The Great Confinement."²³ This expression, given particularly in Madness and Civilization, occurs again in Discipline

²³ See Roy Porter, "Foucault's Great Confinement," History of the Human Sciences 3 (1990), pp. 47-54. Porter argues that Foucault is too general with this term and that, in relation to the specific case of England, such confinements did not exist. However, one is inclined to retort that the "confinement" image is taken too literally by Porter. The understanding of history as an object of statistical measure, represented in Porter's comments, clashes with the understanding of history as epochal consciousness. Foucault uses confinement to describe a set of archive functions. What would be significant, in terms of Foucault, is not the question of how much confinement really took place but why was confinement thought to be something that *should* happen? What made confinement, in other words, a power/knowledge?

and Punish. In the latter work, however, Foucault described practices that emerge as the forms of space in modern times. His aim was to separate the reader from the image of the evolution of sameness that would place modernity at the head of historical developments. Secondly, he sought to pinpoint various conditional operations that already limit (indeed, "train") the possible locations of "modern" experience. Confinement, in the sense of the technical enclosures of space, is the *descendant condition* given to modernity as the matrix of its possibility. The description of this enclosure proceeds as follows:

There was the great 'confinement' of vagabonds and paupers [*des misérable*]; there were other [confinements] more discreet, but insidious and effective. The secondary schools: the monastic model was gradually imposed; boarding school appeared as the most perfect, if not the most frequent, educational regime... Military barracks: the army, that vagabond mass, has to be held in place; looting and violence must be prevented; the fears of local inhabitants, who did not want [their towns] to be a passage way for troops, must be calmed... Along with the spread of workshops, there also developed great manufacturing spaces, both homogeneous and well defined: first, the combined manufactories, then, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the factories proper...it was a change of scale, but it was also a new type of control.²⁴

²⁴ SP, 143-144; DP, 141-142.

It is important overall to see that the descent of the enclosed condition of modern space was linked by Foucault to practices of discipline typical of industrial society. Each subject, whether in the factory, classroom, or military regiment, is given a permanent location in which to perform tasks: "disciplinary space," Foucault tells us, "is always, at bottom, cellular."²⁵ A body placed in solitary confinement or permanently located in relation to the strict measures of normal function is isolated, though insidiously related to all other "normal" subjects, and easily observed. Confinement thus means "analytical space."²⁶ It means that a specific emergence of space remains linked to both practical techniques of discipline and to normative locations in which the subject is permitted a consistency of habit and gesture. It is the space of "apprenticeship" and "hierarchy," fostering the classification of individuals according to measured pieties, cleanliness standards, and efficiently timed activities.²⁷

In organizing 'cells', 'places' and 'rank', the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and

²⁵ SP, 145; DP, 143.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ SP, 149; DP, 147.

hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and gesture.²⁸

The increase of technical observation and classification engenders the strict regulation of activity. The most striking image in this regard for Foucault is the timetable, which was born and fostered first in the setting of religious orders. Commonly, the function of the religious timetable is explained as a self-disciplinary practice in which the orders of the seasons and times of the day are evoked by a deliberate community. In a religious order, the self is repressed as an act of humility for the purpose of identifying with a larger context of divine order. This typically benign interpretation, however, is rightly challenged by a Foucaultian point of view. As Asad has indicated, the practice of the timetable in the religious setting presupposes the success of an "economy of truth" whose effects already compose the descendant traces of disciplinary space.²⁹ Furthermore, by that very presupposition, monastic asceticism forms the product of a certain credibility of spatial experience (and is

²⁸ SP, 149; DP, 148.

thus a possible object of desire) rather than the "humble" volition of the human self. "It was not that the religious community repressed the self—on the contrary, it provided the discipline necessary for the construction of a certain kind of [desired] personality."³⁰ The key word is "construction," and Foucault continually sought the genealogical account of the constituting rationality which the modern sense of space as precision and regularity has been constructed as a virtue.³¹ The modern sense of space demanded physical demonstrations of obedience through the following of orders, the executing of trained maneuvers, and the maintaining of a specified correlation between the body, its form, and its use of time. In the disciplinary experience, the body is a device that signifies its status as subject by the level to which "time" has penetrated its surfaces³² such that its experienced "nature" is self-transcendent actualization.

In addition to the context of the religious order, and perhaps of greater significance, the most

²⁹ See Talal Asad, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³¹ SP, 153; DP, 151.

³² SP, 154; DP, 152.

concentrated location of the disciplinary construction of modernity is found in classical structures of the military. The arrangement of forces characteristic of military tactics cultivated a hierarchical network of surveillance and discipline. Foucault drew particular attention to Guibert's 1772 description of military tactics as a "science of war" that, curiously and simultaneously, necessitated a "knowledge of men."³³ The need to ensure that soldiers carried out the proper commands required by higher ranking officers necessitated the "...knowledge of men, weapons, tensions, circumstances, since it is all these kinds of knowledge brought together that must determine those movements."³⁴ In the classical era, even as philosophers contemplated the image of the social contract, it was the practices of Napoleon and his military regime, Foucault upheld, that had already bequeathed to that space the credible position of the "science of men." The military opened disciplinary space to the society at large as a science it could turn upon itself: the coercion of self objectifying subjectivity.

³³ SP, 170; DP, 168.

³⁴ Ibid.

While the jurists or philosophers were seeking in the [social] pact a primal model for the construction or reconstruction of the social body, the soldiers and with them the technicians of discipline were elaborating procedures for the individual and collective coercion of bodies.³⁵

It was on the foundation of tactical coercion, dispersed subtly in the military and social mechanisms and turned inwardly to produce the object of the "sciences of man," that modern space—i.e., the very texture of its archival imagining—descended as the condition of discipline.

In Foucault, then, an event, over against the sense of that notion found in the example of Barthes, will not be comprehended outside of a socio-genealogical account of the condition of space that carves its possibility. The descent of power tied to and productive of the condition of space constantly describes the "is-already" setting of archival experiences and credibilities. Further, beyond the Enlightenment philosophy of Kant, and indeed a turning around of the question of Kant, the event is not the signal of a precedent mind set inaugurating an advanced level of the same, but actual novelty produced in and productive of the contingent moment.

³⁵ SP, 171; DP, 169.

On the basis of these claims, the definition of the event must remain related to the actual availability of an experienced moment of fabricated truth. And the productivity of events consists precisely of their novelty participating in the order of normal experience at located and intimate levels within the archival setting that, descendant of "is-already" conditions, permit credible truth. All these matters bring back to the fore the set of questions, earlier discussed, of the role of light and language in the permissible experience of truth produced in the disciplinary setting.

(3) Productive Events: The Effect of Seeing Echoes

The recounting by Foucault of the descent and emergence of the disciplinary experience of space is not intended to be exhaustive. It is however intended to be sufficient in order to claim that what is taken as commonplace knowledge in the setting of the modern disciplines of social sciences is not the result of the progress of civilization or of historical events innocent of power. What Foucault attempts to

accomplish is a genealogical "redescription,"³⁶ as C. G. Prado has stated, that displaces the common heritage of Enlightenment teleology. The reference to the monastic setting and to the military apparatus of the state gives a priority to sets of practices that alter relationships of power and carve out networks of emergence which, quite accidentally and yet wholly complex, descend by twists and turns onto the modern body and into the techniques of modern observation and knowledge. Foucault recasts the classical archive not from within the resources of its "same" tradition but, as it were, from the outside of its own practices that, finally, compose the re-directive activity of its permissive boundaries. Modernity emerges not according to sameness but according to difference—according, that is to say, to the very possibility of the competition of its practices—that produce what can count as credible experience. Discipline emerges not by progress but by descent, and hence the question of the experience of truth within the disciplinary archive constantly returns to the boundaries of toleration definitive of that constrictive setting.

³⁶ C.G. Prado, Starting With Foucault (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 45.

The archive has been used as the image to describe not only the circulation of the relationship of forces according to strategies but also to identify specific lines of vision tolerated by the functions contained therein. Though, as earlier demonstrated, Foucault upholds the priority of practices in the emergence of archival space, the significance of the lines of vision are never to be ignored. Indeed, the observing and gazing eye plays a particularly key role in such texts as The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things in addition to Discipline and Punish. But just as, with the last title, the introduction of power changed the capacity to conceive the notion of the event, so too do lines of vision found in Discipline and Punish refine the limits of the first two.

Lines of vision are perhaps most intricately described at the beginning of The Order of Things where the subject is Velázquez's painting, *Las Meninas*. It was indicated earlier how the painting is used by Foucault, in a fashion similar to Heidegger, to demonstrate that the classical perception of the world is dissimilar to modern representation or "framing." Foucault saw great significance to the fact that the actual viewer of Velázquez's portrait is not included in a painting designed exactly to reverse the lines of

vision upon itself. Foucault suggests that this portrait demonstrates the absence of the modern subject who, not there to observe the object, is displaced by a table drawing out angles of resemblance and assorting darkness and light. Foucault, accordingly, describes a void that modern experience has filled:

Perhaps there exists, in this painting by Velázquez, the representation as it were, of Classical representation, and the definition of the space it opens. Indeed, representation undertakes to represent itself here in all its elements, with its images, the eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being. But there, in the midst of this dispersion which it is simultaneously groups together and spreads out, indicated compellingly from every side, is an essential void: the necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation—of the person it resembles and the person in whose eyes it is only a resemblance. This very subject—which is the same—has been elided.³⁷

That same classical regarding of space as if looking upon a table is given again as a turning point in the descriptions of The Birth of the Clinic. Here the doctor's gaze upon the patient is described initially as "classificatory."³⁸ Interestingly, here too the image of a portrait appears: the rational space that classifies and characterizes the inventory

³⁷ MS, p.31; OT, p. 16.

of diseases and treatments remains like the "two dimensional space of a portrait".³⁹ The objective of the classical medical gaze is to solve the puzzle of two spaces, that of the rational space of classification and that of the location of disease in the space of the organism that must be treated.

The patient is the rediscovered portrait of the disease; he is the disease itself, with shadow and relief, modulations, nuances, depth; and when describing the disease the doctor must strive to restore this living density.⁴⁰

Yet, the two dimensional nature of this vision is suddenly pierced by the practices of a new order (*episteme*). Foucault discusses a type of vision that emerged at end of the eighteenth century accompanying the autopsy. In contrast to lines of vision that were two dimensional and classificatory directed at the surface of the patient, "seeing" now meant to break through to the interior of the body and to the nature of the disease itself. Seeing meant viewing the object or seeing "it" as in-itself presence. Maire-François-Xavier Bichat's admonition to "open a few corpses," to

³⁸ See The Birth of the Clinic, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 9f.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 15.

pierce the hitherto darkness of death, sets the medical gaze on a pivot where it turns to look back upon itself and demands of itself an account of the "life" of death and disease.⁴¹ What is this "pivot" that at the same time is a different texture of knowledge (a *savoir* or an *episteme* of experience)? At first, perhaps simply a folding back of the skin, a practice innocent of new "framing" knowledge that sought to classify a new terrain.⁴² But the practice opens a space that is finally a look inside the body proper at its disease; in short it is an objectification of disease as an essence and as a identity. Bichat's look at death leads paradoxically to a "vitalism"; it identifies decay as ever-present, constant, and progressive. It seeks a spirit, and in this sense it is a gaze that must constantly break the surface of each new appearance it encounters. But since each new encounter (the organ, the tissue, the cells) is another meeting with the surface, another encounter that escape classification, the vision echoes back to the examiner as the demand for deeper knowledge or greater precision. Bichat's gaze is thereby a *penetration*,

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 146.

finally not an observation, that is set on the unending path of breaking the surface, sinking into essences, and discovering natures.

But the clinical gaze of Bichat, in as much as the portrait lines of Velázquez, do not account for the emergence of the subject anymore than linguistic rules alone explain the emergence of the transcendental signifier. One had to await the Panopticon, with its dimensions of power and effects of strategy, which accompanied Foucault's "genealogical turn,"⁴³ to render this task possible. The gaze of penetration that accompanied the autopsy remains in the Panopticon, but that gaze which turns upon itself is now accompanied by a whole elaboration of disciplinary techniques that both define and make complex its forms of training.

In the Panopticon, the lines of vision turn back, or echo, upon the subject who is occupying the cell. And the watch from the central tower stealthily observes not only the body or even principally the body but the gestures, the hours of waking and sleeping, and the habits of eating and praying. It observes the

⁴² As Foucault points out, "Bichat's eye is a clinician's eye, because he gives an absolute epistemological privilege to the surface gaze" (*Ibid.*, p. 129).

⁴³ This tends to be the common way to distinguish Discipline and Punish from earlier works.

interior, like an autopsy, but according to a virtual timetable of the psyche by which obedience and conformity is signified. The panoptic gaze is the military quest for the "nature of man" underneath the corporal presence of an individual body. Yet in addition to those lines leading from the tower to penetrate the cell, there is also the lines of vision going out from the cell to the tower. These latter have two simultaneous directions. They are that of a victim regarding a tower as a normalizing standard or measurement, but they are also the echo of that sight turning back upon the cell as the self-establishing gaze of normal strategies creating the automated subject.

The lines of vision, given in the architecture of the Panopticon and the distribution of its strategies, form a set of functions that establish and extend the frontier of the circulation of disciplinary practices. In Foucault, architecture serves as a type of colonization of vision.⁴⁴ Bentham's Panopticon posits itself as the epitome of the *is-already* (i.e., descendant) condition of light being in modern space; it is a practice of space acting out the already

⁴⁴ The discussions of Foucault found in Raymond Rousset, particularly in relation to Locus Solus, makes this claim tenable.

circulating strategy in the archive. The Panopticon physically located the space already carved out by power relations and already claimed by statement-events. The difference is that, unlike the medical gaze, where Foucault recounts a shift in the *episteme*, the Panopticon rather only defines the shift without attempting to account for it. Instead, Foucault presents the Panopticon as an "archival event." It is an instrument *par excellence* that marks the operation of strategies and relationships of force. The Panopticon is the event that *marks* something, and this marking can be referred to as panopticism.⁴⁵

In the Panopticon the occupant of the cell is in a community of the most paradoxical nature. Trapped among hundreds if not thousands, the occupant is alone, holding the same position and same relationship to the centre as every other inmate. There is an equality of fate.⁴⁶ The cell isolates by making the occupant

⁴⁵ It is the physical relations permitted in the architecture of the Panopticon that discipline an observer's lines of vision and articulable location define panopticism as a form of training. At the level of light and vision, training is accomplished passively by replicated sight. And this passive activity, previously named, is the archival echo. Toward the conclusion of this chapter, it will prove possible to discuss an "echo effect," based on this model, as that which accounts for the characteristic subjectivization (*assujétisme*) of modernity as panopticism.

⁴⁶ This is the point that attracts criticism against Foucault in feminism and political science. The equality of fate, which suggests that every individual is trapped inside the same structure regardless of their social status, seems to belittle the struggle of

indistinguishable from others in the first order and segregated from others in the second. Behind the cell, the world-light breaks through the grates of iron and passes anonymously to the tower. The world-light exposes the cell as it stretches its reach to the tower. Indeed, the world-light itself is trained by the architecture; it is already itself a technique that disposes the occupant and opens the cell to the focal point of the tower. From the cell, the tower is the most prominent piece of architecture, surpassing the view of other inmates with whom one experiences the equality of isolation and surveillance. The exterior world is also forbidden. The enclosed relationship is primary, for it is by controlling space that the eye is trained to pivot and look upon itself. The Panopticon defines the condition of possible experience: the is-already network of meaning and truth. In the Panopticon, the abstract sense of space must be forgotten; what Foucault really talks about is history as an opening that constructs a specific regime of truth. The interior of the tower, made so obscured by its darkness, harbours a paradox for the inmate

oppressed groups for liberation, justice, or economic revolution. It might be noted that Foucault's specific intention was not to waiver before the question of justice. What he seeks, among other things, is the problemization of justice and the evasion of totalitarian ("technological") readings of issues.

according to the paradoxical nature of confinement. A tower may be obvious, far more prominent than any other structure; but its contents, the figure who occupies it, the eyes that stare back, contradict clarity by its unverifiable contents. Must there even be someone on guard? In fact, it matters little, for the interior of the cells, vividly exposed by the light that passes through them, stand constantly before a mystery that observes them. There is no secret in the Panopticon except for that of the tower, but this secret is returned to the inmate as exposure. Here then is a vacillating paradox, occurring once in the relationship between the cell and the tower and once again in the identity of the tower itself. In the first, the tower is both obvious and hidden power; in the second, the cell is utterly exposed to a power that is in fact impotent.

The activity of individualizing, placing in cells, collecting under a single vision, recording activity, all carried forward in the structure of the paradoxical play of authority and subject, presence and absence, Foucault calls a double mode of binary vision and branding. The cells in question need not be strictly prison cells; they are also hospital wards, school classrooms, and factory labour units. In each

case the act of partitioning and supervising places the "victim" into the matrix of the double mode: binary vision, a play from cell to tower back to cell, makes the segregation possible (mad/sane, normal/abnormal); branding (the subject is mad), for its part, makes disciplinary training credible (the subject needs to be hospitalized). The Panopticon is not merely the activity of disciplining but the space in which "discipline" functions: the Panopticon is a power/knowledge matrix.

There are, then, these four characteristics of the Panopticon and the experience of its interior. The first is Foucault's dramatic claim, "visibility is a trap".⁴⁷ It is the technology of being exposed that makes the double mode of binary vision and branding possible. Exposure is already the specific play of panopticism, i.e. a specificity located inside a condition of space, just as the "trap" of visibility is simultaneously definitive of panoptic training. This is why it must be upheld that the Panopticon is a physical colonization of space, for it tames as it were light-being to its diagram of statements (or, its articulable locations are tolerated dimension of an

⁴⁷ SP, p. 202; DP, p. 200.

archive power/knowledge). Secondly, Foucault claims that the major effect of the Panopticon is the inducement of the inmate.⁴⁸ The arrangement of space by which visibility is a permanent condition induces in the inmate a "state of consciousness" that assures the "automatic function of power."⁴⁹ If this is put in different words, it can be said that consciousness is a trained condition or (if one prefers) a form. For what Foucault means by "consciousness" cannot be understood as abstract intuition or as a predisposition; it is a certain "effect" of an interior relationship—a self-induced state of affairs—produced within the horizons of a strategy of vision. In the third instance, that "arrangement" of space is itself a key. The "subject" is born out of the fiction of the Panopticon. The term "fiction" is used here due to the potential, if not preference, of the tower being empty. In this manner it is not finally the external condition of imprisonment but at bottom the induced story of panopticism that creates the subject. Fiction is meant to dismiss a notion of solid objectivity in favour of the analytical space of a colonization. The Panopticon fictions space to the extent that its use of space

⁴⁸ SP, p. 202; DP, p. 201.

claims enclosure as the legitimate means, and the only "real" means, of self-actualization; indeed, its claim of space is at once the order by which space is received as "real."⁵⁰ The Panopticon, Foucault relays, produces a specific effect of subjectivization. It is a "reality" of experience induced by the horizons of permission sustained within the panoptic structure. This does not mean that the subject is only what the Panopticon allows; the intention is rather an active one: the subject is what the Panopticon produces. The subject in fact is its function. Accordingly the fourth point arising from the Panopticon is that subjectivization occurs as a consequence of the penetration of power. There is a certain inscription of power on the self by the self (a self-induced surveillance) consequentially related to the operation of the constructed field.⁵¹

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ SP, p. 204; DP, p. 202.

⁵¹ Hence, if the four effects are put into single words, there is exposure, inducement, fiction, and inscription

own subjection.⁵²

The penetration of power inscribes the Panopticon into the process of self-actualization; it is the internalization of panoptic space by which self emergence is held to the fictive (permitted) "normal." It is precisely inscription, or at least the act of self-exposure which is its condition, that justifies encountering the Panopticon as an epochal event. For inscription is not after all the way of producing the subject but rather the way of framing the "subject." The Panopticon is epochal because it is "seeing."

In the manifold ways by which the Panopticon is as such the mechanism producing events in as much as it is an order of seeing them, there remains accordingly, in relation to its structural characterizations above, two significant effects produced by its operation. Lines of vision go out from the cell to the central tower, and the dark tower only returns from its mystery an echo reinforcing the inmate's solitude. The effect is the conditional state of being held in self-surveillance. But the lines of vision that here echo back upon the subject, and that constitute the possibility of the subject, are complicated because

⁵² SP, p. 204; DP, pp. 202-203.

they are passive in accordance with the passive nature of visibles as a whole. Thus, the "echo" here silently repeats (brings to the exterior as "seeing") statements of discipline that form the condition of is-already space of confinement. This effect is one of an impressed necessity to the interpretation available at the subject location. These two effects can be elaborated.

Lines of vision that go out to the tower are a *priori* from the segregated cell; lines that return to the cell are a *priori* from surveillance and discipline. The lines are already conditioned within the "network of constraints" that permit them;⁵³ they are constricted in the permission of panopticism. Hence vision in the Panopticon is an induced effect, but it is not the act of vision so much as its training that is the content of its echo-effect. In this way, of greatest significance to the *permission of space* (its second effect) is the inducement of its reflection as desire or, indeed, knowledge.

As to the first effect, then, the echo is a passively established frame of interpretation; it is

⁵³ Todd May, Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics, and Knowledge in the Thought of Michel Foucault (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 3.

the constriction of possibility that constitutes the normal horizon by means of reflecting the echo of statements in vision. The look toward the tower and the echoing back is already "contextualized" by both the physical architecture and the statements that fill it. It is in this manner that the echo-effect is firstly the seeing of the diagram—or at least its copy—in such a way that "seeing" itself manufactures the inducement of the statement of self-reflecting subjectivity.

But there is a secondary effect perhaps of even superior interest. This is the effect of fictive necessity. As a specific colonial activity, the act of seeing must be above all a trained manner of conceptualizing (a comprehension of) the normal function of the archive space. If the lines of vision are not linked in their operation to normal space—if one does not "see things right"—the disciplinary intention of the Panopticon, in this sense, backfires: delinquency is produced in place of training. If normality is therefore to remain as the standard replication of events—if, that is to say, novelty is to be held to a specifically induced repetition—it is important that the panoptic structure holds delinquency in the fixations of binary vision and branding. Hence,

again, the panoptic lines of vision echo. In this case, however, as the is-already statement that branded the inmate a delinquent, they suspend the delinquent in the constancy of an exposed environment. The echo thereby also repeats itself as the act of holding present the tautology of the evident "necessity" of the order of its normal fiction. Suspending the delinquent in the constant echo of branding steadily demonstrates the "truth" of the very "seeing" that in fact invents the pre-given condition of the delinquent possibility. In this way, visibility is a trap even beyond Foucault's initial comprehension, for there is no solution given to the "condition" of the delinquent outside of conformity to the very permission that has occasioned the delinquent possibility. To conform to the Panopticon, and thus to become its subjectivized product, only reinforces its order of branding delinquency and only reverberates further the echoes that defined this status. The experience of necessity in the Panopticon emerges out of this second "effect" immured in the tautological condition of conformity; necessity occurs as an echo-effect due to the condition that permits a solution only within the structures of an already established problemization of space.

In Foucault, the modern subject is fictive of the productivity of trained vision. Panopticism is the definition of that training whose "aim" is a specific form of subjectivity. The contribution of lines of vision, by means of the echo, is to justify the condition of space by the repetition of its established statement-event through inscription on the body. As the constantly echoing function, they can be understood to be the passively constituted repetition of statements. Lines of vision also augment the account of the experience of panoptic fiction as necessity. These conclusion pose the initial formations of the production of the subject. And perhaps in this regard the concluding words can be given to Foucault:

Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorage of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ SP, pp. 218-219; DP, p. 217.

CHAPTER SIX

Disciplining Observation

The successful functioning of the Panopticon lays in its ability to infiltrate and finally become the archive of experience. It lays in the ability, or even accomplishment, of the Panopticon to be what "seeing" is and to be the constituted "necessity" of seeing according to its productive order. But the success of one archive, such as that of the Panopticon, cannot be unrelated to the operation of its precedent. Indeed, it is rather to be expected that "success," or again more appropriately the accomplishment, of an archive is a permissible event. This means, an archive accomplishes itself on the basis of the constrictions of possibility opened by the productivity of the precedent.

The activity of seeing in an archive reflects or echoes the is-already condition of that archive as an accomplished archive. The question is, how does an archive take advantage of the constrictions of its predecessor such that it becomes accomplished, i.e., becomes a "way of seeing"? The words that describe the activity of archival succession are inversion, infiltration, and distribution. For Foucault, the most

significant consideration when accounting for the movement from a precedent archive to an accomplished archive is not the theoretical constructs of outstanding precedent personalities (for example, Kant as a precedent of modernity) but the anonymous practices of precedent customs that move from the fringe of a prior instance to the "seeing" of the accomplished activity. This movement is seated in practices since practices are active and, in distinction from seeing, locate the space in which "seeing" occurs. Practices are network defining and network creating; they are constitutive of what is called the is-already condition of archival experience.

(1) Practice and Seeing

The specificity of the Panopticon demands an account of the technical practices that locate its emergence and constitute the productivity of its form. One example of this account is Foucault's description of the gap that exists between the image of the leper and the condition of the plague victim. The predicament of these two figures has already been reviewed: the leper is excluded; the plague victim is

supervised. The two bodies are seen in the network of practices that unequivocally constrict the credible boundaries of "being seen." The leper's constricted possibility is exclusion; the plague victim's is discipline. In the case of the former, the practice is categorical and absolute. It is useless to distinguish between the excluded,¹ for they are *en masse* the "other." In the case of the latter, the capacity to be meticulous defines the whole value of a practice. In the encounter with the plague, the smaller the division, the more exact the timing, the more detailed the chronicle of space, then the more control exercised over the other. Discipline creates its object not as useless but exactly as useful, as the "stock"² of its own practices and the locations of its form. But if the two bodies exemplify two archives, what lies between them such that disciplinary practices might be understood as the constricted possibility of excluding forces?

At this point, Damiens (who is the location of the practices of sovereign wrath) returns to the picture. This time Foucault offers the image of Damiens in

¹ SP, p. 200; DP, p. 198.

² Cf. Heidegger, QCT, p. 17.

contrast to another assassin, Fieschi. Damiens is a tortured body because his crime is against the order of the King's body. Fieschi is a character from 1840 who attempted to assassinate Louis Philippe, the so-called bourgeois King. Fieschi's act is the same as Damiens' act, though the two are separated by some 83 years. But while Damiens' body is tortured as the contradiction of the King's body (while Damiens was in effect anathematized by the King categorically), Fieschi's punishment is measured out according to the legal weight that can be placed on the act and to the degree of seriousness that can be attributed to the act. Whereas Damiens is condemned to make *amende honorable*, Fieschi has rather broken the social contract.

Fieschi is located in the matrix of a social arrangement where the relationships of individuals are considered within the set of all acts that define the totality of all relationships. The law is a question not of excluding but weighing, comparing, and determining right judgements. Fieschi belongs to the time of a new regime where his body is created as the object of measuring techniques. Torture is not required because Fieschi's body need not demonstrate

the sovereignty of a King but the justice of a socio-technology. The body of the condemned is delivered to the court of the judge.

The Panopticon belongs to a space "different" from judgement and the judge, though it is not a simple replacement of that space. The Panopticon, rather, is the invasion of the space of the judicial court and its and its inversion. The technology of the Panopticon places itself over top of and finally within the legal practices that accounts for it, and it moves the seat of judgement from the court chamber to the soul of the "subject" its very surveillance has created. The Panopticon on the one hand is the gaze of dispersing judgement stretched across a vast field of objects, and on the other hand it is the gaze of judgement drawn near to the most exact and intimate quarters so as to re-create of its object the self-actualizing subject. The Panopticon creates the subject in its own image and thereby inverts the archive of juridical practice from exterior mechanisms to interior actuality. This is why the Panopticon is supremely a machine of subjectivization.

In the Panopticon the weighing of a penalty, which is a juridical question, is converted to the technical

question of training a delinquent or curing a disease. In the prison actual, this means that certain behaviors must be corrected and other behaviors must be induced. The activity of training is seen by Foucault as a kind of mutation of practices formerly characteristic of the jury. What was once first a question of measured classification has become primarily a process of disciplinary examination. A summary of this genealogy from the King, to judgement, to training is given by Colin Lucas:

Foucault believes that the modern prison was born of the association of the old and the new. From the ancient Regime, it retains the body as the object of punishment through physical constraint of imprisonment. From the revolutionaries, it inherits the emphasis on a process of correction through action upon the mind of the individual criminal. Discipline, as defined here, has become the medium of correction. Thus, says Foucault in one of his neat inversions, the soul has become the prison of the body. But this situation in fact engendered a withdrawal of justice from punishment. The judge can only give a statutory penalty to a criminal act, but the process of correction demands an assessment and an ever-adjustable training of the individual.³

If discipline is to be taken as a constriction emerging from exclusion, then the movement from

³ See C. Lucas, "Power and the Panopticon," Critical Essays on Michel Foucault, ed. Peter Burke (Cambridge: Scholars Press, 1992), p. 137. Originally appearing in *Times Literary Supplement* 26 (1975), September.

exclusion, to judgement, and finally to training must be seen as a process not of development but of genealogy. If it was strictly a question of development, Foucault would have to resort to other techniques; he would be obliged to introduce the great innovators of the past; he would need to recall particular moments of crises and resolutions; in short, he would have to be an "historian" in that classical sense of the history of ideas. And from the readers point of view, he would have to provide something more than the apparent "heightened effects" and "before and after snapshots" that both mark and hide larger complexities.⁴ But the genealogical question is set on another footing: it is not a general accounting of what happened, it is rather an accounting *for* how "what happened" was seen. And even more to the point, it is how what happened was thought about according to what regime of truth and what network of power. What mechanisms can account for the spatiality of truth, its form of tolerated constriction, and its location? What sets of practices account for "the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their spread throughout the

⁴ See Ian Hacking, *FCR*, p. 29.

whole social body," and "the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society"?⁵ The genealogical task returns this question to the activities of inversion, penetration, and distribution. These elements describe the dynamics of constriction as well as account for the horizon potential given in an actual archive in relation to the emergence of its successor. In Discipline and Punish Foucault finds particular genealogical sites of such dynamics in the constituting practices of the army, the factory, and the school.

Each location above is a context of disciplinary forms that, in its self activity, locates a productive site of inversion; each location is as a set of practices that recast their own spatial functions as investments in growing spheres of influence. In the army Foucault finds initially only negative measures, preventive practices, necessary to control large numbers of soldiers or to protect innocent populations from vandalism or looting. But negative practices also form, in virtual Augustinian fashion, a type of vacuum which simultaneously attracts positive forces of productivity and training. If an army is to be

⁵ SP, p. 211; DP, p. 209.

prevented from acting in one manner, this entails a corresponding instruction of another manner.

Military discipline is no longer a simple means to prevent looting, desertion, or the failure of troops to obey orders; it has become a basic technique to enable the army to exist, not as an assembled crowd, but as a unity that derives from this very unity an increase in its forces; discipline increases the skill of each individual, co-ordinates these skills, accelerates movements, increases fire power, broadens the fronts of attack without reducing their vigour, increases the capacity for resistance, etc.⁵

The army is a site of genealogical inversion: peripheral practices implemented to control and restrain become the positive attribute of an *esprit du corps*; the negative returns to the positive; what inhibits also produces; what closes from one angle opens from another. This sense of constant turn and contradiction is the irony of the *constriction of possibility* that defines genealogical descent. A constriction limits, places, holds, and frames, but it also locates, relates, forces, and forms. A practice may be peripheral, but because it opens a space to "seeing" it is also a horizon of and potentially an inversion point of a new constitution. Foucault continues the play with peripheral inhibitions that

⁵ SP, pp. 211-212; DP, p.210.

return to central productivity in the setting of factories and schools. "The discipline of the workshop," he remarks, "all the while remaining a way of enforcing respect for the regulations and authorities [the negative function]...tends to increase aptitudes, speeds, output, and therefore profits" [the positive]. And again, "In the seventeenth century, when the provincial schools or the Christian elementary schools were founded, the justifications given for them were above all negative... Now, at the beginning of the revolution, the goal prescribed for primary education was to be, among other things, to 'fortify,' to 'develop the body,' to prepare the child 'for a future in some mechanical work,' to give him 'an observant eye, a sure hand and prompt habits.'"~

Once a practice is established as a point of orientation, it functions also as a point of regulation. Once a practice creates a space of "seeing" it simultaneously attracts an "order of seeing"; and the activity of the order of seeing returns in constant paradox to produce the space of

SP, p. 212; DP, pp. 210-211. The quotations used in reference to education are taken by Foucault from A. Léon, La Révolution française et l'éducation technique (1968). Léon is referring to the Rapport de Talleyrand à la Constituante, 10 septembre, 1791.

seeing. "What was once an islet, a privileged place, a circumstantial measure, or a single model becomes a general formula."⁸ Discipline multiplies by ironic movements of infiltration and distribution. The judgements of a system that sought only to classify degrees of gravity, as with the case of Fieschi, turn out to be distribution points for the merits of the general techniques of training.

the Protestant and pious armies of William of Orange or of Gustavus Adolphus were transformed into regulations for all the armies of Europe; the model colleges of the Jesuits, or the schools of Batencour or Demia, following the example set by Sturm, provided the outlines for the general forms of educational discipline; the ordering of the naval and military hospitals provided the model for the entire reorganization of hospitals in the eighteenth century.⁹

At the point where a practice is constitutive of spatiality so too is it distributive of the techniques that create its "being seen." Similar to Marx's descriptions of the spinning jenny, which by its innovation engendered the necessary advancements in bleaching, dyeing, as well as the need for a highly efficient cotton industry, so too does Foucault relay

⁸ SP, p. 211; DP, p. 209.

⁹ Ibid.

how the distribution of disciplinary training reproduces its form across the network of an archive.

Thus the Christian School must not simply train docile children; it must also make it possible to supervise the parents. To gain information as to their way of life, their resources, their piety, their morals. The school tends to constitute minute social observatories that penetrate even to the adults and exercise regular supervision over them.¹⁰

Since the school entails a whole observatory of minute social circles, it locates a displaying and dispersing site of the techniques of discipline. Forms of training disperse tactics of surveillance that move to the centre to produce not only well adjusted children but typical families and a normal society.

Foucault's summary of the genealogical descent of discipline offers an opportunity to elaborate the concept of constriction. Practices, perhaps above all those of the military, open space; this is the fundamental dynamic of a constricted possibility. Space is a composite not only of relations but, because it is composite, of the "seeing" of an is-already accomplishment. What Foucault relays is the "story" of bodies deliverance from an economy of judgement circulation to the sites of modern observation.

¹⁰ SP, p. 213; DP, p. 211.

Constriction is not in the end a question of ordered succession; it is not a "history of" prisons in the context of social development. It is a recounting of strategies; it is history only in the sense of understanding the descent of power. Moreover, constriction incorporates the effect of the invasion of a new order into the forms of a precedent such that, in this case, the subordination of juridical forms participate in (and hold) the display of the regulations definitive of modernity. The old "jury" delivers the body to the machine, but it is Bentham's machine that fabricates its subjectivity by the silent persuasion of statement circulation, echoes of light, and disciplined bodies that at once are the "event" of an archival accomplishment. In the Panopticon the trained body is the self-reflecting self who becomes the in-itself demonstration of the machinery that locates its posture and names its nature. This is the ever in-turning "truth" of a structure called panopticism.

It is not, then, a history of prisons we are given by Foucault but an account of the emergent constriction that permits the event of subjectivization. The event is seen to be embedded in the productivity of a

relationship of forces that pass through and comprise a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, and targets. What we are dealing with, Foucault declares, "...is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology."¹¹ Panopticism is not, therefore, to be reduced to bureaucracy or to be dismissed as institutionalization any more than the prison can be assigned to the commentaries of social history. Panopticism is not one function of power but a modality of power. It is a productivity of a constriction of being. It is found at the opposite end of the execution, at the reversing point of an exclusion that spawned its own spectacle of protest; it is found where the old *amende honorable* becomes a question of the social contract that merits the meticulous observation of an enclosed, allocated space over which is set the apparatus of the eye.

It is noteworthy that, as Foucault recounts it, while the frontier of the Panopticon further expands, it constantly divides and segregates social space. Constriction therefore is not to be limited to the singularity of one event location or the condition of possibility at that location but includes the notion of

¹¹ SP, p. 217; DP, p. 215.

a comprehensive economy. The motion of inversion and dispersion is not a simple expansion but an active claiming of space that implies a "margin of lateral controls."¹² What is unique to the techniques of the Panopticon is that its spatial claim, so exactly monitored by its machinery, displays the subject by a series of efficiently ordered cells. The constriction is more than a displaying or an enframing (in the passive sense of placing before vision) but an *episteme* of productive credibility, a network of relationships that create their own "seeing." The machine is both the fact of production and the mode of distribution. The *technae* of technology is its simultaneous product, who in panopticism is "man." In Heidegger, it is the use of technology inside of the technical attitude toward the world that accounts for the regarding of the world as "stock" and that defines the question (i.e. the thinking and the unthinking) of the modern age; in Foucault, it is technology as such that produces the constricted arena of the technical attitude that in turn produces the possible event of "man." The subject is the paradoxical measurement (capable of being correct or in error, capable of being normal or

¹² SP, p. 213; DP, p. 211.

variant) *accomplished* by the machinery that produces "him" and enframes "him" in the archive.

Constriction identifies the limitations of credibility concomitant with sets of practices that open space to discursivity; but it also indicates the forces of arrangement that actively fabricate the possible. Mechanisms of discipline create the location of their event. In this irony, Foucault sees "man" as the modern corollary product of the spaces that holds "him" and the disciplines that name "him." "Man" is the corollary of the technology that uncovers "him."

Subjectivity is accordingly offered as the descriptive condition of the panoptic function. It is related to three acts. The first is the technical reduction of space to the single cell and the use of technology to observe the cell by the permanent measure of the body. This arranged is to be taken, in its functioning, as a relationship of forces where in the body is subject to forms of discipline, angles of vision, standards of normality, and determinations of nature. It is an example of forces passing through technical forms to produce the subject-object position. The second aspect of the condition of subjectivity is the panoptic setting of power/knowledge. Power,

focused minutely and efficiently by mechanical forms constricting and regulating space by subdivision and segregation, folds back upon the body. In the Panopticon relationships of power are focused to penetrate the nature of "man" held in the subject/object position, but power also folds back upon "man" (both the observer and the observed) as the measurement of that nature. The panoptic machinery both encodes and uncovers. The social disciplines, which are productive forms of panopticism, function to survey each claim of space, each cell held within the machinery, such that they are always producing the subject on the basis of their claimed position. The disciplines, as forms, are settings (economies or politics) of force relationships that condition and conduct the movement of power (this is their encoding) and condition the constriction of possibility (this is their uncovering). They define both the cell and, more significant, the purpose of the cell as training, as a power/knowledge operation. Thirdly, in relation to the condition of subjectivity, there is the dispersion of statements. "Man," as it has been claimed above, becomes in the Panopticon the event of its statement and the function of its dispersion. This is so by the

simultaneous condition of "man" as the *observed self-observing observer*. Subjectivity occurs at this level not merely as a location of statement dispersion but as a converted space of dispersion. This means that "man" is not simply an automated function but a possible form whose horizon is held by the penetration of panoptic forms of training and relations of force such as to be a site of the apology of discipline. "Man" is a panoptic achievement insofar as "he" uses the machinery of the Panopticon to demonstrate (to "himself") that "he is man," that "he" possesses knowledge, that the world is "for him," and that "he" represents the achievement of what has formed "him" and brought "him" to birth. "Man," in Foucault, is the ironic product of disciplinary functions who uses those functions to prove "he" is "man."

(2) Victims and Victimization: the Concept of Fiction

To this point the discussion has been carried forward for the purpose of demonstrating the manner in which the Panopticon produces truth; in fact, it has been to show the "kind" of truth produced. That "truth" has been called subjectivity and its movement

from a periphery to a constitutive location in the modern archive has been given a genealogical account. By the example of the Panopticon it is accordingly possible to see that Foucault is outlining not a development but an emergence, a type colonial operation defined by the spreading of disciplinary practices that condition and ultimately internalize a specific archival event. The success of the Panopticon is not due to its ability to displace the preceding archive; it is due to its ability to infiltrate it, to distribute itself throughout it, and to bring disciplinary forms to bear the relationship of forces that define it down to "the most minute and distant elements."¹³ The supreme accomplishment of this activity is the individual in the cell who, as a location of statements, as a site of the echo, as an object of observation, and as an event of self-actualized criticism, examination, and subordination, becomes the effect of subjectivization.

When a constriction, against this background, is understood as both a limitation of a setting and a productivity of a possible horizon, then the argument can be taken one step further to affirm that the

¹³ SP, p. 218; DP, p. 216.

functioning of the archive is the activity of creating its *fiction*. Put more deliberately in terms of the genealogical irony intended, the archive function produces truth effects that are founded not as transcendental, universal categories of perception but locally in the matrix of the relationship of forces constricting event possibility. When the archive function is talked about, then, the concern discussed is the coordination of effects composing an event of truth available in the contingencies of historic and local relations. These relations are called fiction since they do not identify metaphysical universals but carefully manufactured experiences within a specific diagram matrix. An experience of "truth" depends on its constitutive and constrictive diagram, which is arbitrary.¹⁴ Truth is composite; or, it is a composed fiction.

Despite the rejection of the metaphysical history of preapprehended ground, the concept of fiction denigrates neither the "serious" activity of archival relationships or their social and political "reality."

¹⁴ See Foucault, P/K, p. 131, "Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint."

An archive, as such, may be "fictive," but as such this does not mean that its products are illusions.

Foucault did not use the word fiction extensively; perhaps one could accuse him of employing it for sensationalism, of lacking appropriate care or deliberation. Neither is there a sustained or significant analysis of the concept of fiction in Foucault scholarship.¹⁵ However, Foucault did state that "I am well aware that I have never written anything but fiction" and that "a true discourse engenders or manufactures something that does not as yet exist, that is, fictions it."¹⁶ At no time did Foucault mean that "truth" is something made up; more accurately, he meant truth is something dangerous. Truth always has its uses since it is always a located event implying the condition of its possibility or the manufacture of its constriction. It is precisely when the "manufacture" of truth is not admitted that "truth," as a strict and unchanging product, is representative of a regime. For Foucault, when truth

¹⁵ The way I will be discussing fiction is unique, but the reader may wish to note other examples. See Jean-Paul Margot, "Herméneutique et fiction chez Michel Foucault," Dialogue 23,4 (1984), p. 635f. Adam T. Smith, "Fictions of Emergence: Foucault/Nietzsche/Genealogy," Philosophy of the Social Sciences March (1994), pp. 41-54.

¹⁶ P/K, p. 193.

is the representative product of a regime it cannot be a thinking-truth, which is why it is dangerous. On the other hand, a thinking-truth is a truth that turns to struggle with the very regime that creates its possibility, that locates its constricted setting. When truth is called fiction it means that truth is struggle; it is the struggle to express itself within the regime that creates it and, at once, makes its project (to speak the "truth") impossible. Truth is fiction because, in this manner, its condition is permanent irony.

With the understanding of truth as an event of a manufactured coordination, and therefore as that which is always caught up in the struggle of its own possibility,¹⁷ comes an encounter with might be called the great silence of Foucault. While it is clear that Foucault well understood the dangerous fiction of truth, he not did complete the analysis by addressing the equal danger of the truth of fiction. Foucault did not differentiate between victims (all those who

¹⁷ See P/K, p. 133: "'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A 'régime' of truth."

participate in the fiction of a regime of truth)¹⁸ and the victimized (those particulars who suffer the truth of a regime's fiction). This distinction calls forward again a notion of necessity that functions in the context of the "truth" of a regime of fiction.

Foucault once posed the question, "What if fiction were neither the beyond nor the intimate secret of everyday but the arrowshot which strikes us in the eye and offers up to us everything which appears?"¹⁹ Some time later, as Raymond Bellour points out, Foucault claimed that fiction, in distinction from story, is the "regime of the narrative" in which the story is recounted.²⁰ Bellour is right to point out, however, that with Foucault this idea progressively deepens if not, it appears, inverts.²¹ The initial statement that fiction strikes us like an arrowshot means to convey story as that which presents itself ironically according to the structure by which it is seen.

¹⁸ See P/K, p. 131: "Each society has its régime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as truth; the mechanism and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true."

¹⁹ Raymond Bellour, "Towards Fiction," Michel Foucault Philosopher, op. cit., p. 149. The quotation is taken from Critique, nov. (1963), pp. 20-21.

²⁰ Ibid.

Fiction is the how of seeing rather than the way of seeing. Fiction defines the discursive activity that an archive permits. But this concept deepens when Foucault adds a political dimension to determine how power and the social regime permit particular types of access to the story to count as true. As the activity of seeing and speaking at local points of constriction, fiction defines these points as specific relations produced within social and political processes. Fiction, in the latter sense, is more like the politics of permission. And in this sense Bellour claims that, with a work like Discipline and Punish, Foucault produces fiction *par excellence* because he exploits the openings of the present political order to expose its presumptions and reverse its truths.

With Discipline and Punish, Foucault's concern is not to report events but to establish the properties and procedures that permit a whole archive of events.²² To this degree, the expression "regime of a narrative" describes the complexity of relations that govern the manufacturing of an event and, in various instances—depending on location—its permissible comprehension

²¹ Ibid., p. 151.

²² See SP, pp. 151-158; DP, pp. 149-156.

within a political narrative. In the discussion, "What is an Author?", Foucault understands that there exists certain authors who are more appropriately functions, i.e., not individual identities so much as certain weights place within a narrative order or regime of fiction. Certain authors are also events that permit, by the weight of their location and history in an archive, a style of narrative or a telling of truth within an archival story. The name of certain authors, in Foucault's words, "...points to the existence of certain groups of discourse and refers to the status of this discourse within a society and culture."²³ The act of citing of an author for the purpose of stating a truth, and equally of denigrating a work that fails to cite a recognized authority, demonstrates that the question concerning an author is not about an identity (biographical) but about a politic (sociological). Like the functions of a machine, certain authors are practices who open up sites of statement distribution that form not merely the order of the archive but its strategic functioning. The author-function fictions the archive; that is, it serves a discursive function

²³ See LCP, p. 123.

that renders to the archive interior the comprehensibility of its own sense of experience.

Still, as one of the few to discuss explicitly the sense of fiction in Foucault, Bellour has not satisfied the inquiry. Fiction, beyond discursive functions, whether related to authors or machines, must also incorporate power relationships and constrictive possibilities. Bellour refers to no political dimension in association with the notion of fiction; secondly, there is little said about how the regime (what technique) writes the narrative. In Foucault it is clear that the examination typical of the Panopticon "...places individuals in a field of surveillance" and "...situates them equally in a network of writing."²⁴ Out of the occupant of the cell, the Panopticon creates a case. Bellour is reticent to draw out how Discipline and Punish, a work that is itself a "fiction," means to take advantage of the "fiction" an archive offers to it. It is a book about the "occupation" of space as a tactical arrangement of reality. But it works that permissible occupation into a critique; its fiction is not only poetics but in a real sense political in its exposition of discipline.

²⁴ SP, p. 191; DP, p. 189.

In the Panopticon analysis, the regime is displayed by acts of writing, by classifications, by functions of vision, and finally by the victim who is the subject. The explicit concentration is not on narrative but on the systems of constraint that tolerate and order of narrative. Fiction is given as a set of tactical arrangements²⁵ by which an archive occupies space and records the effects of truth.

One function of the Panopticon, one could say its tactical approach, is to write the interior of its victim. Unlike the Middle Ages, where exclusion is ontologically based (i.e., a categorical or pure binary exclusion of clean and unclean), the Panopticon introduces a transformation and dispersion of binary divisions. The victim may be excluded by any number of means or excluded in some respects and included in others. The identity of the victim's "disease" invokes a set of narrative characteristic of emerging disciplinary training. The disciplines multiply exclusions—Foucault details their expansion through the process of dividing and branding—and serve to locate the need, the extend, the measure, and the intensity of corrective reform. As Foucault portrays,

²⁵ See SP, p. 204; DP, p. 202.

the Panopticon makes a plague victim out of the leper.²⁶ He means that "the tactics of individualizing disciplines are imposed on the excluded,"²⁷ but beyond this, those very tactics produce the certain sets of exclusions for which an individual is qualified: normal or abnormal, sane or mad, harmless or dangerous. The function of space in the Panopticon is precisely to reduce the gap separating the former from the latter, creating the "case study," by the constant exposure of the "written" subject to the requirements of separated disciplinary cells. The tactics are to fix on the body of the victim the forces of the prescribed training. "Hence, the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power."²⁸

Since fiction essentially defines the network of force relations playing out the constituted archive's effects, fiction is best understood as the entire interpretive function of the archive frame. To be inside the archive means necessarily to be constituted

²⁶ SP, p. 201; DP, p. 199. The French reads, "on 'pestifère' les lépreux."

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ SP, p. 202; DP, p. 201.

by a concentration of forces at the location of one's immediate experience. That is, the experience of the archive is the experience of available fiction.²⁹ To this extent—and this is a point that must be made and understood with great care—everyone is a victim, for there is no position outside the orders of fiction or a location beyond the concentration of forces that compose them.

In the archive everyone is a victim, but care is taken because this does not mean that everyone is equally a victim. It is here that Foucault overlooks one of the most dangerous aspects of the concept of fiction. Though both the prisoner and the guard are inside the Panopticon, they are not sharing the same position or exercising the same degree of power; it is only the prisoner who can be, in addition to being a victim, victimized. This is true because fiction, as fiction, is constitutive of reality; therefore fiction defines permanent irony (stated above) because it is the "reality" it fictions. This means fiction has "real" effects on real people and, secondly, it justifies real torture and real imprisonment. Fiction,

²⁹ This too needs to be understood paradoxically. One has the fiction of the narrative available for self-expression, but it is that fiction that is actively creating the location of the self and its comprehensible order of expression.

in other words, must be understood as serious even though, and all the while, its constitution is irony. When the Panopticon is really understood as fiction, it is understood as serious. And in order to comprehend how the fiction of the Panopticon is serious, the order of its interior must be entered by assuming the point of view not of its victims but its victimized; that is, those who are at the weakest points in relation to the forces of normalization at work on the body are also the strongest evidence of the effectiveness of the fiction in which they are trapped. The weakest point in terms of vulnerability is the highest point in terms of the impression available in the general colonial occupation and functioning of space.

The impression of the Panopticon can be defined by two distinctive acts: the fundamental act of space allocation, and a strategic act called necessity. The allocation of space, the first and most obvious act that impresses the victim, is carried out in panopticism by enclosure. The Panopticon is composed of self-evident boundaries separating each cell and marking the borders of normal and deviant behavior. On the one hand, deviancy, beyond the transgression of a boundary, is allowed a very subtle appearance in the

Panopticon. It exists only inside a small allocation of space, and hence the key function of constant surveillance set over it. On the other hand, the tower, placed in direct relation to all activity, is the central point of orientation. It is the point at which all lines of vision from each cell converge, cross, and return; it is a strategic centre by which the victim is constantly re-established in the immediate environmental location. From the interior of the cell there is the constant awareness of a returning vision; thus, in the definition of panopticism, a point of orientation, beyond a literal watch tower, is a point to which a discipline-cell opens to the reception of the standardization of its activity. Deviancy occurs only so far as the boundary crossed is that already established by the tower.

The delinquent act is established in relation to the standard of the Panopticon, which means its occurrence happens only inside the operation of the panoptic fiction. The victim is delinquent insofar as the reading of space permits his or her establishment outside the function of the local normalizing activity. The fiction of the Panopticon plays out its irony by creating both the space and the problem of "human

nature." It does so by using space to "impress" the constitution of the panoptic structure in to the interior of its victim. The victim is victimized at the point where the question of the justification of the rules of the panoptic activity is itself a deviation within the allocation of space.³⁰

Delinquency in panopticism is a self-evident witness to the need for training. Victimization, where the archive location of the victim works to justify the need for the training of the victim, is available uniquely at the weakest points of power activity: those points where protest against the normalizing forces of an archive only serve to enhance the reading of the necessity of enclosure. In the Panopticon, a victim is victimized when protest justifies enclosure.

If at once the allocation of space is enclosure, it is so for the purpose of display. "Visibility is a trap,"³¹ Foucault claims, but the effect of the Panopticon is to make this an accomplishment of the self. Foucault compares the Panopticon to a royal

³⁰ In Heideggerian terms, this would mean that the most dangerous element of the Panopticon is that it actively prohibits the question of forgetting. This also stands as is another way to state Heidegger's critique of technology.

³¹ SP, p. 202; DP, p. 200.

menagerie, but it no longer views an exotic assortment of animals from the confines of Versailles.

The Panopticon is a royal menagerie; the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific groupings, and the king by the machinery of a furtive power.³²

Opening to display has the effect of inducing "normalizing judgement."³³ The panoptic management of the visible reduces the gaps between correct and deviant behavior by an overt if subtle control of constrictions in which the capacity of the victim is held to the internal replication of the regulations of an allocated space. Victimization in this sense takes a second turn when by display the automated effects of the constraints of conformity induce the permanent presence of discipline. All of this forms what Foucault calls the furtive power of value-giving measures.³⁴ Still, here once again, one must uphold that there are points at which value-giving depends on a victimization function; and at such a crucial point, Foucault is silent. Not every victim is equally a display; there are those whose display justifies the "value-giving" that makes another specific "display"

³² SP, p. 205; DP, p.203.

³³ SP, p. 180; DP, 177.

³⁴ See SP, p. 185; DP, p. 183.

possible.³⁵ And again, there are those who gain advantage by the fact that object-displaying is positively valued in the panoptic machinery.³⁶

The second impression of the panoptic condition, which is a productive effect of its interior experience, is the strategy of necessity. As the display of the cell was linked to normalization, due to the constant gaze of the tower, so is the immediate experience of the cell called upon to comprehend the panoptic sense of necessity. At this point a second type of silence by Foucault is evident. There must be an account for the panoptic (fiction of) morality. There must be a consideration of the emergence of the credibility of acts of enclosure. Foucault does not ask the question, how is the impression of the Panopticon itself acting within the function of its own archival diagram? His commentary exposes the function of the archive through the prison and disciplinary space, it is true; but the victim cannot be an effect (telos) of this function without also being an end (*finis*) in which to place the effects of the

³⁵ For instance the psychiatrists point of view depends on the social position of the patient; and there is a whole set of value-giving activity that not only creates these two point but impresses their necessity upon us.

constricted setting. This side of the analysis overlooked by Foucault may be due to his apparent refusal to consider a position of victimization in addition to the otherwise general condition of the Panopticon and its victims.

In the first place "necessity" is an impression within the Panopticon only to the extent that the archive diagram as a whole can contain its definitive constriction; the point where that containment collapses is the point where the archival diagram itself collapses. Put in the imagery heretofore used, a collapse would mean that the colonial expansion of an archive has reached a limit and that the repetition of relationships definitive of that archive no longer occurs. The success of the archive, accordingly, is its ability to maintain and to repeat the particular relation of forces that sustain it (i.e., the constriction). It is therefore the sustenance of that repetition (the coordinate relations of forces held to maintain it) that produces the internal effect of necessity. The specificities of sustenance in the Panopticon (or, the peculiarities of its form of necessity) emerge fundamentally at the base of the

³⁶ I will attempt to define and address these ethical

panoptic need for standardization and automated self-regulations. In the Panopticon, necessity is expressed in its active impression by the final aim (*finis*) of self-automation. That is why the training of the victim can be considered satisfactory only when the regulations of training are grasped automatically as necessary for self-actualization. Only when the victim is victimized is the impression realized.

The panoptic structure attempts to hold the form of its constriction perpetually by two functions: in the first place eliminating of the outside by, in the second, creating the "outside" within the experience of the interior. This is done when the Panopticon seeks to create out of its victim the very deviancy that the victim must overcome. To address the first problem, the outside is eliminated by the permanent effect of enclosure. Foucault states that the perfect operation of the Panopticon is realized only when the actual exercise of power is no longer necessary.³⁷ This would mean that every temptation to deviate from the norm is either overcome by the victim or at least permanently interpreted through disciplinary regulations. This eliminates the outside in the Panopticon since the gaze

³⁷ SP, p. 202 ; DP, p. 201.

of the tower is cultivated internally to such length that "interpretation," as an act of dialectical relationships, is no longer possible: that is to say, the dialect is reduced to (and carried out by and defined within) the terms of the disciplinary text. To address the second problem, the outside, as an eliminated possibility, can only exist as an "outside" produced from within. The outside remains only as an internal contradiction, as a deviation from the standard aimed at with training, that is overcome by more normalized activity and self-regulation. This is significant since by the internal production of the outside, the panoptic sense of "necessity" emerges again. This time necessity is given as concomitant with act of training, for the final justification of all acts of punishment, even those self-inflicted, is the inducement of self-consciousness. The specific type of consciousness induced by the Panopticon is an effect of the panoptic form of necessity; it is the internal realization of the totality of the panoptic effect in which the victim automatically replicates the regulations that locate and hold his or her potential to self-induced boundaries, to cells of discipline, and

to the defined measurements of various self-evident standards.

Foucault ends the Panopticon analogy by concluding:

Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of penalty? Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?

But has Foucault given enough commentary or examined enough dynamics to justify a self-referential conclusion? Has not Foucault missed an accounting of why functions, with their effects and impression, with their constrictions and allocations, should be experienced and should be perpetuated by the very victim caught in their observation and control? Without a notion victimization, Foucault lacks a sense of archival necessity. Necessity is an effect which emerges within the specificities of context as both a product and an aim: in the Panopticon, the aim is to create a "soul" of automatic regulation tied so tightly to the mechanisms of observation so as to produce itself. The effect of "necessity" in the panoptic archive installs the interpretive frame of the

Panopticon in the victim so as to eliminate the outside from the horizon. The subject instead must produce an outside of self-overcoming. And when the project of self-overcoming is constantly fed back to the victim on the basis of the location as victim, the "case" of this activity is victimization. The silence of Foucault in relation to this position and the lack of analysis to contemplate this within the totality of the archive effect now draws the investigation toward new areas of metaphysical and ethical consideration.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Archipelago of Colonialism

The descent of the social transformation from the juridical to the disciplinary society, from the King's body to the panoptic economy, has already been undertaken. It is no longer necessary to examine further the details of the shift from one archive to the other or debate the genealogical emergence of the former into the latter. Albeit anecdotes of more detail and historical significance remain, it is understood that Foucault's point, which was to distinguish between archives and to comment on the reformation of relationships in panopticism, has been accomplished.

The purpose now is to satisfy the philosophical task of linking the archival experience of necessity, previously elaborated, to the emergent and specifically experienced normal. When an archive shifts, the presence of its sense of necessity invests itself in new forms of normalization such that specific practices definitive of a location carry with them and impact upon the fictive arrangement of power relationships. Normality, in other words, is the practical regulation of the archive's fabricating activities.

This brings into focus an immediate and new question. Since the fabrications of an archive are of a specific definition, such as panopticism, they are constitutive of the possibility of a credible experience. There must be, accordingly, a link between the activity of constituting a possible credibility—the activity of framing what can count as sense—and the immediate experience of that “credibility” as contextually significant to the moment and setting of its emergence. There must be a link, in other words, between the carving out of the normal and the experience of its necessity. This link can be named by the expression “social teleology.” Such a term indicates that the overall fabrication of an archive is not only of a social nature, involving institutions and relationships of power, but that the activity of fabrication invests the relationships definitive of the normal with a sense of purpose or aim. Social teleology identifies the effect of necessity as it filters through the whole normalizing activity and impresses itself locally. Social teleology, in other words, is a term that unites the concept of necessity and normality as well as accounts for the regulation of

these effects at the level of local disciplines, training, or judgements.

To approach the complexity of these sets of relations, the question can be expressed as follows: how does an archive establish its sense of normality and produce its effect of teleology? If momentarily the latter portion of the question is suppressed, some focus can be given first to the genealogical relationship between a predecessor and a processor archive. This will set up the question of social teleology and also allow for an elaboration of "effects" that accompany if not define the previously spoken experience of necessity.

In relation to the Panopticon and the disciplinary archive, the predecessor and processor archive are linked by the body of the condemned.

(1) Emergence of the Body Classified

Every archive, it could be argued, has its own experience of normality; that is, every archive holds within it frame the functions of its fictive world view that articulate a comprehensive set of active and interpretive principles about the world. It is

difficult to imagine that Foucault would object to such a claim save that this generality hardly poses a critical question. For Foucault the significant point is not that every archive has its "normal," but what sort of "normalizing" is taking place in an archive? In the activities definitive of the Panopticon, the sense of its necessity surfaces in its manifest normal through links to certain mechanisms of judgements (to what Foucault labels disciplinary techniques and technologies). In the genealogical emergence of the Panopticon, the judiciary functions of the classical era formed the precedent inheritance of the new disciplinary society. Foucault very specifically says that above all the classical era delivered the body to the panoptic apparatus—and not just any body but the body already positioned and judged in analytical space. It is the body objectified, classified, and already the subject of measurement that enters the machine.

There was, during the classical age, a complete discovery of the body as an object and target of power. It is easy to find signs of the great attention then paid to the body, the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skillful or increases its forces... However... the historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was aimed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a

relation that in the mechanism itself makes it vastly more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was forming was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, deconstructs it [désarticule] and recomposes it. A 'political anatomy', which was equally a 'mechanics of power', was in the process of birth.¹

From the classical age the Panopticon receives an analyzed and classified body; what the panoptic machinery does is act on that body, determining its modes of consciousness, and introduces techniques aimed specifically at inducing docility and accomplishing training. It is wrong to say that never before has the human body been subject to forms of training and discipline; but it is equally shortsighted to ignore the new mode by which subjectivization is undertaken "within" (and significantly not "by") such a "mechanics of power." The Panopticon does not just subject the body to analysis but creates a particular type of subject out of its analysis. The Panopticon is a machine that succeeds in applying a maximum amount of power while reducing, by the isolation of its subject, the greatest amount of resistance. The body enters the machine, being read and arranged according to the

¹ SP, pp. 138, 139-140; DP, pp. 136, 137-138.

disciplinary "normal," whose functioning creates a widespread application of power to innumerable points of isolation and distributes a normal gaze to innumerable constrictions of activity. The Panopticon in effect destroys the possibility of community but installs the necessity of uniformity.

It is evident then that to Foucault the shell of a precedent archive can remain in tact even though its subsequent invasion by the processor archive virtually converts the existing functions. The predecessor archive forms a setting of possibility, i.e., a potential horizon, for new expressions of necessity given in the functions of emergent norms and aims. In a lecture delivered on January 14, 1976, Foucault claimed that "sovereignty" continues to exist in today's society only as an ideological cloak for the fundamental mechanism of discipline.² Meanwhile, in Discipline and Punish, one reads:

The juridico-anthropological functions that tell of the whole history of modern penalty do not have their origin in the imposition of the human sciences on criminal justice and in the demands related to the new rationality or humanism brought forward with them; they have their point of formation in the disciplinary

² P/K, p. 105.

techniques that were made to play on the new mechanisms of a sanctioned normality.³

It is disciplinary practices that emerged on the horizon of spaces carved out by the functions of juridical structures of the classical era that held the space progressively invaded by the human sciences. This does mean that the human sciences complement "by nature" panopticism; rather, it means that the correlation between the sciences and their sense of necessity had been so fixed in predecessor archival space to the apparatuses of the juridical system that the norm associated with measurement remained a held potential in relation to examinations associated with the body. Panopticism is that strange recombinant, or indeed reversal, whose sense of necessity is now wholly comprehended by the body made manifest by the machine.

The forms of normality in the disciplinary society accordingly inherit elements from their juridical precedent and produces elements out of their own functioning activity. From the point of view of the juridical archive, it is the body of the victim that is delivered to panopticism. This means that the body emerges from juridical classification to a space

³ SP, pp. 185-186; DP, 183.

of isolated inspection. From the point of view of the Panopticon it is the body of the judged, which holds an analytical status, that must be defined within a hierarchy of gazes maintained by machines. The body must be allocated to a fixed location, if it is to be appropriately trained, and surrounded by a complex matrix of observation. It is the positioning of the body, and the insidious need to train it, that preserves the functional *meaning* of the whole disciplinary complex.

It is here that an essential irony of the Panopticon arises. The deviant body, to whatever degree it is so judged, is actually necessary to the long term perseverance of the panoptic accomplishment. Since deviancy above all require the measurement by and placement within discipline, it can be said that the justification of the *functioning* of panopticism is necessary to its continuation. The Panopticon (which is training) as such is always reinforced by its contradiction (which is deviancy). And it is precisely by this arrangement, where the delinquency of bodies demonstrates the need of machines, that the sense of necessity is linked historically by panopticism to a standardization of reading and training the body. The

Panopticon is by this the ultimate automaton; it produces by itself the necessity of its manner of *reading what is in the world.*

It would be false to conclude that here then is a predictable pattern by which "normality" emerges in archives. This would far miss the point as well as severely over estimate the aim and success of genealogy. The normal rather is to be understood as the integrated experience of reading in the archival setting. It is an archive event attached to the play of forces anonymously related by forms characterizing a present constriction and potential horizon of possibility. What genealogy seeks to demonstrate is the manner of expression the play of forces can take given the historicity of the setting of constricting elements. The normal is seen to be a reflective expression of forces, achieved internally, through relationships inherited by a successor archive and emergent in practices and statement-events definitive of a strategy of relationships.

The second point to be made is that the normal is fundamentally linked to the valuation of experience permitted within an archive. What is understood to be effective measures, to be true readings, what or who is

considered to be important or essential, is tied intimately to the normal standard that gives its authority to such judgements. Accordingly the normal that is produced in the Panopticon, that is the event of the activities of its strategies, gives to the examination the authority to measure value. Valuations therefore are never to be disengaged from the accompanying practices attached to them, operating with them, and acting as their mode of production. There is always an entire network of judgements affecting and affected by each other, an operating strategy, that expresses the form of the matrix of the relationship of forces. In the Panopticon it was seen that the machine is the form expressing the relationship of forces that fiction the body, held within its spatiality, as a location of surveillance and an event of power/knowledge. What needs to be said here is that valuations measure the activity of the event; i.e., value is the act of "giving name" to the event, and this occurs wholly within an established arrangement of normality. Taken together, this means that "normalization" is an activity of power relations.

The power of the Norm appears through the disciplines. Is this the new law of modern society? Let us say rather that since the eighteenth century, it has come to join

other powers—that of the Law, the Word and the Text, and that of Tradition—all the while obliging on them new delimitations. The Norm establishes itself as a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education and the establishment of the *écoles normales*; it establishes itself in the effort undertaken to organize a medical body and a national hospital system capable of putting into practice general norms of health; it establishes itself in the standardization of industrial processes and products. Like surveillance and with it, normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age.⁴

In Foucault, discipline produces a historicity setting for value-reading activity rather than value accounting for the need of discipline. Discipline describes not so much the characteristics of the "human sciences" as identifying the mode of being of the human sciences in panopticism. And it must be affirmed that in this mode, the actual experience of giving value occurs in the sociological setting embedding and historicizing necessity. Value-giving is an *act of reading* that embodies the presence of necessity projected on reality by determined measurements of discipline and decision of training. In this manner, valuation or value-giving acts rest as the experienced *a priori* of the necessity their appearance comports. The fact that the

⁴ SP, p. 186; DP, p. 184.

experience itself is a product, rather than a categorical *a priori*, of power relations remains hidden by the event of its own emergence. This is the ironic structure of experience, but how can it be accounted for by the relations definitive of an archive?

The resolution of such a question involve recourse to the passive activity of power, which has been related to light, that complements its active productivity. These two aspects, the passive and active, are affirmed when attention given to the precedent setting of archival emergence. Previously it was indicated that a preceding archive is as a shell to an emerging archive, and that an emerging archive can use its predecessor as a shell to cloak its relations and forms of power. In the event of the Panopticon, the shell is the juridical model; that model sets initial boundaries that constrict the potential of all subsequent emergent boundaries. Therefore, there is a certain form of the normal already at work even prior to the emergent events that characterize the systematic determinations of the disciplinary cell. Prior to the emergent spatiation of the Panopticon and its machinery, the operating normal of the judiciary archive constricted the potential way of seeing

machines and the potential production of new normalizing measures. The explanation of this has been given by saying that the precedent archive holds the potential horizon of the successive archive's constrictions. There is not, to be sure, a determined relation between the horizon of one archive and the constriction of another, but there is an affecting and effecting one. A precedent archive will hold a potential of emergence and will hold a potential of possible *conceptuality* that accompanies the space of emergence. The potential hold of the precedent archive can play both a passive and active role; it can be the stage on which is set a new archive experience (thereby being positive or active in its emergence), and it can be the constitutional foundation of the possibility of a new archive that remains nevertheless persuasive (thereby silent or passive) in the spectrum of activity defining the successor archive. Due to the passive character, and therefore the silence of predecessors co-present in the activity of the archive, a further elaboration can be made by saying that *no archive is without its ghosts*. This means, the predecessor "hold" is never eliminated even though, after succession, it can no longer be described as active.

On the other hand, the active productivity of a present archive continually relates itself to the passive constitution of its setting and the persuasive presence of its predecessor. This double edged passivity co-present in the actual experience of an archive, given once in relation to the forms of light-being in the setting of an archive (as outlined earlier) and now a second time in relation to the predecessor archive, accounts for the possibility of an *a priori*. In other words, it is precisely the condition of history, which the image of an archive describes, that accounts for a *a priori* experience as a secondary or passive effect of actuality. Since a relationship is always maintained to a precedent, but maintained passively as both persuasion and as "being present" in an archive, a precedent holding gives itself to succession as the condition of its present. It is (from the point of view of the actual present) the *a priori* of the possibility of the present. But it must be maintained that despite the constancy of this ghost "effect," the account of the sense of a *a priori* here defined is not offered in a universal way (i.e., in the Kantian sense of the being categorical). This is not the case since the effect here explained is, in

itself, contingently related to its own predecessor; it is a conditional *a priori* or an *a priori* effect of the very contingencies that create its potential emergence. This contingent effect, this "ghost" of the predecessor and this experienced condition of succession, remains the unarticulated agenda of every utterance of value. It is the silent product of production itself.

Yet even though the passive effect of the archival operation can have its "presence" attributed to the twofold condition of persuasion and presence, as above when considering a predecessor archive and the being-present experience in an archive setting, it is to be affirmed nevertheless that this "passivity" is indeed an active product. It is an event. This means that the *a priori* experience is only available in the present and that it is impossible to step behind this most savage⁵ historicity. The immediate relation in an archive to its so-called ghosts can only be a present *a priori* by means of recollection. However, this should not allow the conclusion that this more or less backward orientation to these passive and silent effects should always take one form. On the contrary,

because these are effects of contingency, the assumption ought to be that their constitution is integrated into the activity of forces and production. Passive effects are constantly the living, historic, and complex fabrication of activity. Passive effects are thereby "passive" by virtue of being consequential; but since they are consequential of activity, they are still fabricated and located products. In the example of the Panopticon, the body itself, and the notion of sovereignty that its precedent has given it, is used to create of the norm of "subjectivity" an *a priori* aim wholly tied to the contemporary productivity of machines. The purposes of subjectivity are therefore linked to the *a priori* effect of machines: this means that the "present" experience of panopticism justifies itself passively by means of a fabricated isolation of the body whose purpose is invested backward into, and is thus present *a priori* by means of, the persuasion of sovereignty. This is why the concept of social teleology—a transcendental and *a priori* sense of purpose in the archive—is important to introduce, for it delivers a means by which to signify the influence

⁵ By this term I mean to express the absolute condition of the moment and not to refer to a structuralist notion or to a

of the ghosts held within the experience of the archive.

(2) The Colonial Weight of Teleology

Social teleology is taken as the expression that describes the general purpose manufactured in the total complexity and inter-relations definitive of an archive. It is "social" firstly to indicate that the totality of events composite of an archive include all different locations collectively; it is "teleology" secondly to indicate that the integrative function of events that define the archive impress—this may be given with no further explanation—the purpose or aim of events in the contingencies of the moment.

Social teleology as an inclusive term can be broken down to its general meaning and its specific meaning. The general meaning indicates what is characteristic of all archives or conditions of history; while the specific meaning indicates what is the particular case in the example of the Panopticon. When Foucault speaks in a manner similar to the general characteristics of what here has been called social

tragically misused anthropological term.

teleology, he tends to use the word "colonization" and speak of "penetrations" and "inscriptions." On the other hand, Foucault has no deliberate way to speak of the case of the Panopticon in a way characteristic of social teleology. Compensation for this will be made by employing, eventually, the words "isolation," "unrelatedness," and "contextlessness."

Significantly, since social teleology is a term of utmost inclusion, it incorporates in its definition the most complex and vast aspects of an archivist understanding of history. It articulates, even in the breakdown to general and specific characteristics, passive and active elements, modes of productivity, as well as instances of political, social, and historic irony.

In a way Foucault's use of colonization is not the most effective avenue to reach these dynamics (although I will continue to use this word). To the extent that by colonization Foucault meant to describe a socio-political force of both positive and negative consequences, he would have been better off turning to Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony. To Gramsci, hegemony is negative to the extent that it is a controlling or manipulating of one social class by

another, but on the other hand it is also the positive and revolutionary task of the proletariat. The labour unions must establish a new hegemony of proletariat dictatorship if the revolution is to last.⁶ In the same paradoxical manner, Foucault on occasionally employs his expression "colonization." It was earlier seen that he means to indicate how a successor archive overtakes the mechanisms of a precedent archive and re-defines those mechanisms by its "foreign" order. This was seen to be the case when explaining the movement of the order of panopticism over the structures of juridical order. But the "colonization" of one order by another has both positive and negative aspects too: the negativism of the Panopticon is well expressed by its disciplinary order manipulating the body and fabricating its subjectivity, but conversely the act of colonization is an act of opening space to the occasion of new events. It is really as if colonization identifies the inevitable, and even anonymous, relationship of forces in history in which both the potential and actual constriction of events occurs. Colonization both inhibits and produces the event,

⁶ See Walter L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), esp. pp. 170-178.

trains it and makes it possible. In this way Foucault is describing a look that is always double-faced.

In the collection of essays, lectures, and interview gathered in under the title Power/Knowledge, Foucault employs the word colonization in reference to small theatres of power relations that, in various recombinant forms, spread out to occupy a whole archive. Colonization is the action of power formations investing themselves ever more generally in the mechanisms of a new archive to arise, finally, as its dominating network.⁷ What Foucault fails to mention, in these comments, is that the ascension of power (as it is described) holds a certain dependent relation to the structure it comes to occupy. In other words, power is always an already located power—a specified and functioning order—that may indeed break apart a precedent archive but nevertheless remains a constituted possibility on the basis of that archive and its operations. Therefore, the play of passive and active elements is an important part of recognizing that what is really being spoken of is a subsumption of precedent realities rather than their overlay or direct removal.

⁷ P/K, p. 99.

When colonization means to refer to the act, more or less, of "moving in" to the space of a precedent archive, it is called penetration. This act, which again holds passive and active aspects, unfolds according to the familiar pattern of archive succession. The new order produces, out of the very activity of its being-present, a point of orientation or a "gaze" upon its surroundings. This gaze is the gaze to the outside, but it is of a most paradoxical nature. The new "outside" is in fact the "produced" outside or the "other" who is present according to the order of the productivity of the gaze itself. In the Foucaultian sense, the other must always be understood as an active product of the relationships of power that compose a specific location and local function. The outside is the internal accomplishment of the workings of an archive: it is a space "ordered" in its foreignness on the already accomplished mode of seeing of an invading archive. In this way, penetration is passive, on the one hand, because its "gazing" is dependent on precedent locations but active, on the other hand, because from its location it produces the order of other.

In Discipline and Punish Foucault speaks of penetration when describing how the disciplinary examination has overtaken the mechanisms of the juridical inquisition.⁶ This, combined with what is stated above, can give the following definition: penetration is the activity of forces composing a location or space of orientation in an archive. To this activity is added the second one of inscription. In the Panopticon, the penetration of forces creates out of the body a location of training, who is the subject called "man," but to be "located" is more than occupying a fabricated space. It is also an interpretation of space according to the local order; in the Panopticon, the interpretation has consistently been called subjectivization. This is the normal of panopticism, and it is called inscription (in-scribing) because it identifies not a status but an act. It identifies the act of reading and interpreting the order of things. The specific manner in which the Panopticon inscribes its produced space is clear. By tactics of isolation and permanent visibility, the Panopticon creates its power to play back constantly on the subject. The Panopticon "inscribes" by the

⁶ SP, p. 228; DP, p. 227.

problems and resolutions by means of rituals or beliefs) that qualify this orientation. Yet, for reasons of being a form of permission in an archive, the whole activity is called normal and apologetic.

That God is normal, it remains to be said, does not mean that there is nothing revolutionary or re-evaluative to be found in the concept of God. To be sure, the apologetic conception of God can be revolutionary and indeed socially significant in any number of ways. It can contradict the functions of its archive; it can be critically related to social and political activity. When an in actuality account for the possibility of conceiving a God concept is sought, it does not automatically discount the potential creativity of traditional conceptions in the setting of their emergence. However, the undertaking does make at least two claims. It claims first that the general study of Christian Systematic Theology is a normal practice of theology. This means that Systematic Theology remains a conceptual possibility only on the basis of the tacit presence of perceptual projects produced in the archive and out of its shadows. In short Systematic Theology is a *production of God* that reveals more about the archive in which it resides, and upon which it depends, than about mystical experience

always carries with it a certain sense of an aim or goal that is intimately tied up with the very order of penetration. Social teleology is in effect the project of an archive: it identifies the order according to which the "other" is produced and who, additionally, becomes the aim of penetration and inscription. In every archive, the sense of a teleology is always given with the acts of penetration and inscription; thus, the investigation of social teleology is a question of understanding the manner in which this "sense of purpose" is manifest in the particular mechanisms that have accomplished the general movement of colonization.

The specific project of the Panopticon, and thus the specific manner in which it sustains itself, is evident enough. The Panopticon survives by producing the order of the delinquent, who is accordingly the aim of its inscribing normal. The manner in which the project of the Panopticon guards itself against new penetrations and inscriptions is by means of its three fundamental ways of "being present." In the Panopticon the deviant outside is represented by the pupil, the factory labourer, the newly enlisted soldier, but especially the criminal. Every figure who is made the object of the Panopticon's order of power/knowledge is

is initially (and necessarily) read as deviant.¹¹ The Panopticon survives on the basis of a need for training; therefore, its order of teleology rests on the manufacturing of deviancy.¹² Meanwhile, the deviant subject is "projected" by the Panopticon according to two techniques: the first being the manufactured experiences of isolation and unrelatedness and the second being the condition of "contextlessness."

In the first instance, isolation means that the criminal subject (who is most often representative of the deviant) is not only placed alone in a cell such as to have no direct influence on the mechanisms of observation but is also set in a contrived and highly restrictive environment. Each occupant is shut up as if in "so many small theatres, where each actor is alone."¹³ Then, when Foucault translates this experience to the overall effect of modern disciplines

¹¹ This is not foreign to Foucault's claim that resistance is prior to force. Foucault means that without resistance all would be a monolithic repetition; there could not be dynamics. Here, I mean that there is always a project to the archive, otherwise it could not emerge; and that the emergence of the archive includes the activity of its project which creates, as its justification, the other.

¹² This point, which is fairly straight forward in the last chapters of Discipline and Punish (esp. SP, pp. 261-299; DP, pp. 257-292) need not be overburdened by quotations.

¹³ SP, p. 202; DP, p. 200.

discourse and that, unsurprisingly, this can be attributed to a set of statements by which the archive in question carves out internally its accomplishment of space. Schleiermacher and Bentham, it could be said, shared not so much a contemporary age as a competitive space; and the series of rationalities by which inwardness came to count as certain knowledge indicates not a comprehensive method but an overlapping of forms produced in similar mechanisms. Inasmuch as Bentham's Panopticon represents an arrangement of relationships that accomplished the nineteenth century, Schleiermacher's critical self-consciousness is representative of the side-effects of that accomplished moment historically emergent as a groundwork for a metaphysics of presence.

Yet, from the perspective of theology A, the central notions found in Schleiermacher remain deceptive on the one hand and incomplete on the other. From the vantage point of an outside "spectator" (who is indeed the archivist), to recall the position of the invited guests of Roussel's Dr. Canteral, it appears that Schleiermacher was deceived in his main proposals—being that the God concept is experienced as necessary and that the feeling of this dependency is primordial—by the shadow effects (i.e., the *sense of the totality*

of work, make it less perfect or cause accidents.¹³

The Panopticon accomplishes isolation through its arrangement of power, which is distributed homogeneously on each cell. It is a power sufficiently well scattered so as to be evasive to each individual but functionally well designed so as to be exercised by a glance. Then, it accomplishes "unrelatedness" by excluding the possibility of any other "gaze" outside of the immediate environment. The subject must establish the relationship of perception (of reading and comprehending) not dialectically with other points of experience but hierarchically with an already established normal by which the subject is not just corrected but made. The hierarchical relation installs a normal perception into the space of the deviant theatre. It is therefore more appropriately training rather than learning, and as such is a condition of unrelatedness insofar as the potential of dialectical experience is at best normalized but in practice effectively eliminated.

The condition of contextlessness describes the immediate predicament of the deviant caught up in the

¹³ SP, p. 202 ;DP, pp. 200-201.

machine. While at one level the criminal in the Panopticon is a subject who experiences both isolation and unrelatedness, at another level the whole machinery plays out these two experiences in a "context-less" theatre. The subject is first without a context since the relationship cultivated under discipline exists not between a subject and a living environment but a subject and a machine. The relationship that is posited as "normal" is reduced to the subject and the technically produced subjectivity. The demonstration of normality thus opened to the subject consists of performing regulated tasks that "read" the level of subjectivity achieved. But the achievement happens without a context; i.e., it happens internally according to a projected perception manufactured in the isolation of a theatre of a micro-cause. Though at the broadest level, a context remains (which is the machinery itself), at the functional level "contextlessness" is an apt expression. It means that the normal condition produced by the Panopticon is an automated accomplishment of isolation.

When the general activity of penetrating and inscribing the moment, along with the specific acts characteristic of the Panopticon, is given as a socio-

teleological production, it is colonization in its most insidious form that is being described. This is so since the conclusion of the activity of inscription aims to produce the "reading" of the other, even when that "other" is the delinquent's own self-regarding, according to the teleological project. It cannot be said that colonization, at least in the sense meant in relation to the archive, has occurred until it is the ironic case that the very elements of "colonial" order are accepted as the definitive expression of the normal. Colonization has not occurred, that is, until the mechanisms that define the new archive also constitute the normal reading of the outside.

Colonization is an especially poignant term for understanding how the project of the socio-teleological order is always tautologically structured: the "project" constantly holds the key to the denouement of the problem it itself constitutes. In the Panopticon, for example, the criminal can be "normal," or at least demonstrate normality, only by the categories that read the bifurcation (normal/deviant) he or she is caught in. Thereby in addition to claiming that there is no outside to an archive, the image of colonization also expresses that there is no bottom either. The

experience of grounded purpose, which is the social teleological condition of being-present, permits an order of perception only according to the already permitting accomplishment of the archive. In the archive, perception is the appearance of an "appearing" according to the conditions of a permitting. This (as Kant did not see) is the historicity of thinking that, rather than transcending (ultimately an impossible task), needs to be affirmed. The whole usefulness of the idea of social teleology, and generally the whole usefulness of an archivist notion of colonization, arises particularly at this point. These terms lay down the possibility of articulating with greater precision the function of the archive ghosts and open up the possibility of undertaking their confrontation.

(3) Conclusions

The analysis undertaken in this chapter required the introduction of several new expressions and concepts. No doubt at this point, prior to further progress, a summary of the point made will be prove helpful.

The most important term, when understanding a Foucaultian sense of colonization, is teleology. While Foucault has little direct reflection on this conception, his analysis lends important philosophical and sociological dimensions to this discussion.¹⁴ Social teleology describes the activity of an archive's establishment (its penetration and inscription) as well as the aim of its functioning (in the Panopticon, subjectivity). Social teleology in its generally sense operates by producing an outside. The outside is the tautology of "projecting" its order as its own "overcoming" project. And, it orients itself to its overcoming project on the basis of both passive and active elements: the project order stand in a precedent experience of permission and produces a perceptual (or "reading") experience of order. The specific elements that manufacture this reading in the Panopticon include isolation, unrelatedness, and contextlessness. These three acts define panopticism as the experience of subjectivity. Finally, colonization, as the general term of the whole activity, is understood to be "accomplished" only when

¹⁴ Indeed, the popularity of Foucault among "post-colonial" authors is a strong witness to this fact.

the constituted normal experience at once defines the denouement of the condition of history that the colonial project already is. On the basis of these conclusion, a foundation has be laid for examining the workings of an archive more clearly in relation to the meaning of its ghosts.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Shadows of an Archive

Progressively the challenge of this presentation has been to unfold the complexity of the experience of meaning as an archive event. Meaning is an event neither transcendental nor singular, neither isolated nor eternal, but an emergent space formed in a matrix of so many contingent and coordinate moments. It is a product set in a relationship of forces and located in a theatre of constricted possibility. Meaning is a coordinate moment constantly caught up in the mode of its own production and experienced inside the workings of an archive. Meaning is an effect that "impresses" itself on the apprehending location.

To this point, however, there has been no hermeneutical posture adopted for an approach to theology. Although time and again, meaning can be outlined as the contingent possibility—and indeed a persuasion of contingencies—within archival experience, and experience can be defined inside the function of the archive—inside its teleological dimensions—as a carefully manipulated project, these descriptions alone do not account for the possibility of the notion of the divine or the dynamic activity involved in its emergence as an experienced event.

To adopt the analysis of the archive to speculative theological investigations, some attempt must be made to account for theological space as a credible archive location. How is the God concept a possible credibility and what factors are involved in the form of its emergence?

(1) An Accounting for God

A limitation is detected in Foucault, in relation to the philosophical contemplation of theology, that consists of not addressing "desire" and open mystical aspiration by an agent at a location for the "presence" of a transformative relation to the divine. Albeit Foucault provides some account of truth as a desiring of discourse forms (which are manufactured in relationships of power and constraint)¹ as well as speaks of the transgression of limits, he does not view these factors as explicitly theological or raise the question of their experiential presence. Can the forces manufacturing truth alone account for its desirability? Does the possibility of transgression by itself account for its undertaking? What Foucault does not reach is an account of why, in human experience, a

¹ See OD, pp. 20-23.

desiring for what might be called gods is possible ("gods" here mean to indicate those factors used to justify transgressions or explain transcendental desires)? And even more fundamental, how are such notions, divinely conceived, present in the archive as potential credibility? Although the historic shape or appearance of a religion can be qualified generally by the archive factors involved in its emerging, religion defined as a practice of orientation toward the outside seems ill accounted for as a direct product of a contingent setting. There must be another way to comprehend the consistent presence of the religious orientation as a credible event.

An approach to this question, which will be developed within the context of a Foucaultian religious philosophy, is available by accounting for the "side effect" or "shadow effect" that posits itself concomitantly with the instant of an event occurrence. This approach is initially undertaken by admitting that, though Foucault understood "interpretation" to be an archive experience linked to the productivity of power and to the space that contingent relationships afford, he never strongly affirmed that this event itself (this experience of location, however much arbitrary and however much persuaded) remains one of a located human agent. Indeed in Foucault there is

little sympathy for comprehending a coordinate position in an archive as that precise event of unified perception within a power matrix that is experienced, at the level of an agent, as knowledge or insight or discovery or anyone of a number of descriptive terms for a fundamental numinous recognition. Foucault rather presents the agent almost as an automaton who is created externally by the forces that define it and governed strictly by objects manufactured before it. Foucault does not account for the effects of the *episteme*, in general, on the event of perception by a located individual in particular. The *episteme* of the archive is given by Foucault as an *order of space* but it ought also to be affirmed (perhaps even above all) as a *coordination of space* that accounts for the historical condition of the recognition of the manufactured truth and meaning of an archive setting. The term "side effect" or "shadow effect" is an account of this latter dynamic.

Side effects, it ought first to be stated, can only be highly variable, numerous, and in no way easy to define. To a degree Foucault indicates this too by affirming that archival mutations, shifts in spatial arrangements, and experiential structures remain

ultimately elusive.² It would be a reductive task to counteract the previous exposition of this claim by now offering definitive or categorical "side effect" products. While, then, it is not possible to list a determined set of archival side effects, it has already been indicated to some extent, especially when considering religious experience, that such a concept includes (and further potential elaboration depends upon) an accounting for a *a priori* reasoning (for its Kantian form as a credible experience and for a Foucaultian manner to contemplate it in the context of speculative theology). A *a priori* reasoning as an "effect" associated with a located perceptual event is not to be taken in the traditional sense of metaphysical "ground" for the possibility of experience

² I recognize the potential difficulty involved in following the line of argument that will unfold. Particularly for the reader with a theological background, it may be helpful to think of Friedrich Schleiermacher. In effect, the argument is that the archive as both the setting of the event and the totality available to the event at its actualization is as the dependent setting of the event. The agent then has a relationship to the archive in the way that Schleiermacher describes the *Abhängigkeitsgefühl* (feeling of dependence). The presentation here, however, does not affirm that these "effects" are capable of proving something—for instance the existence of God—but can only account for the presence of things. There will be an effort to account for some of the appearances of so-called meta-narrative that Foucault, often eager to dismiss, failed to analyze or explain. But these meta-narrative must be understood as historic manifestations of the feeling of dependence (again, to use Schleiermacher) and not as "things in themselves"; the point is to account for the "feeling" (what will be called "presence")—and thereby its manifest forms—and not to describe it or to debate its ontological status. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984); The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1976).

but as an indication of the "presence" of the totality of an archive that is available to each location within it.³ The line of this argument is employed for the purpose of describing the effect of the totality of the archive in relation to the coordinate experience of the moment (and location) of actual perception or (above) recognition in the archive.

To begin with, that theological thinking pursued in a Foucaultian manner would not rely on the "traditional" sense of a *priori* is already evident in the recognition that an event is a location produced in a matrix of power relations. Foucault did not understand knowledge to be an achievement independent of a location. He did not seek a consistent perceptual foundations on which to place the inquiry of truth. Philosophical theology so based would likewise affirm that knowledge is always a location in power and is made permissible by the space available to its articulation. This was the insight defined by the concept of a constricted possibility. It can also be claimed as significant to theological thinking that, again on the basis of Foucault, power as the relationship of forces that produce the occasion of constriction is fundamentally persuasive (and this has

been seen to be both positive and negative). Finally, the setting of this whole activity of production and location is called the "inside" of an archive: any effort to define the "side effect" of the event must therefore recognize the specificities of the network of forces that encompasses the location and constricts it.

By means of these conclusions, the traditional sense of a *priori* (i.e., in the sense of categories necessarily pre-given to perception) is criticized and finally dismissed for the reason that, as no less a located "event," it is finally impossible to achieve a *priori* categories that do not already imply dependency on the relationship of forces that make such speculation constrictively actual as possibility. It is the ironic condition of the Enlightenment sense of a *priori* that its credible experience, by definition, is a *posteriori*⁴ to the accomplishment of archival permission. Does this mean, though, that there can be no sense whatsoever to the synthetic *a priori* Kant claimed to have discovered?

What the "side-effect" offers to this discussion is an affirmation of the possibility of Kant's discovery; however, it is an affirmation conceived

⁴ Heidegger again can be illuminating on this point, for Heidegger claims that there is only a *priori* by means of a *posteriori*, and this seems fundamentally in accordance with Foucault's approach.

historically (i.e., by route of a *posteriori*) and inside the archive.

For Foucault the only sense granted to the *a priori* lay in the fact that an archive always functions prior to the possibility of experience and knowledge, for the archive is constitutive of the space of constricted possibilities. Foucault viewed Kant's commitment to the synthetic *a priori* as a product of its historical condition, since Kant's achievement depends heavily on its conditional permission to stand as *epistemically possible*.⁵ However, there remains a second way to consider this problem. The possibility of the credible experience of the synthetic *a priori* need not be limited strictly to the *a posteriori* permission of its emergence. A distinction can be made between the historic permission of an *a priori* structure (this being its contingent or *epistemic* possibility) and the archive impression of an outside that would account for an orientation of numinous "desire." Kant may well have erred to posit universally, and rather reductively, the existence of what can only be based on locations and events. He overstepped the limits even he had sought to define by placing into the transcendental realm what was a

⁵ The critique of Kant is found in AK and in the essay, "What is Enlightenment?" (FR).

permission available to him as a credible event of an immanent situation. But this does not discount that his "experience" of credibility as such was available: that is to say, the event of Kant's conceptual possibility was a recognition. His experience of the *a priori* remained a coordinate possibility impressed upon him within the limits of a permissible setting. Kant therefore not only posed a theoretical structure with his synthetic *a priori*, but he also (from the Foucaultian point of view) "projected"—by means of an anticipation of the dependency of recognition entwined in the events of its possibility—the capacity of the coordinate moment. In addition to the historic (and really conditional) articulation of the synthetic *a priori*, therefore, there remains an anticipation of the event that tacitly couples the actual moment. This anticipation reflects the experience of the setting of the archive in the moment of recognition; it is another way of conceiving an *a priori* structure, but this time it is from within the archive setting. It might be added that this "shadow" *a priori*, because it is reflective and anticipatory, tends to be of the archive order; it tends to justify the reading that is already the product of the relationship of forces.

The shadow (or again, side) "effect" of the contingency of conceptualization itself, the *a priori*

by way of the actual impression of the coordinate possibility, is not accounted for in archive analogies given by Foucault. It arises only when considering the fundamental condition of the agent at the level of the experience of an actual moment of coordination. It arises with the address of the experience of conceptuality itself at the moment of the event of thinking. For, since that moment of coordination implies—indeed depends on—the working arrangement of the whole archive simultaneously (and on its location produced by that working arrangement), it is recognition because it is dependence. Recognition as an actual moment of coordination is constantly impressed by a sense of *a priori* because its location as *archive credibility* always relates itself as if backwardly to the totality of the accomplishment that holds it.

Kant's actual moment of the credible experience of synthetic *a priori* can be described as an archival or contingent manifestation of the sense of the "presence" of the whole haunting the moment of coordination. Even further, it can be described as the haunting of the very necessity of the whole assumed in the actual coordination of the moment. There is, then, an *effect of coordination* in the very event of the "event"; and this so-called effect of coordination is

as a side effect brought about by the impression of the whole on the possibility of the moment.

What is claimed then is that the totality of the archive is present as the condition of the moment of coordination; and this presence is as a shadow that impresses the sense of *a priori*. Secondly, the desiring of the articulation of *a priori* reasoning is accounted for by the fundamental situation implying, as it were, a totality that immanently is beyond experience. In light of such a conclusion, the appropriate question to ask is not what (*quid*) is this shadow (since it is evident that it is "nothing") but what manifestations of this side effect can occur historically?

(2) Two Side Effects in the Panopticon

The attempt to define side-effects that occur in the Panopticon is not an attempt to rescue or redeem metaphysics. It is helpful to recall that Foucault never understood himself to be undertaking metaphysics when he sought to uncover the type of labyrinth in which a problem was found. In the case of the Panopticon, Foucault reminds us, one deals not with a paradigm or a model of truth but with "...a way of making power relations function in a function, and of making a

function function through these power relations."⁶ A form of traditional metaphysics would seek to establish the ground of perception necessarily prior to functions and relationships of force; whereas, for the question of side-effects, it is clear the question concerns concomitant events that are very much tied up with, produced, and located by power "functioning in functions." One deals with a problemization of history that already actively produces both the sense of its problems and the platform of its solutions. This is not a metaphysical venture so much as a "digging around" in an archive. Thus despite using an appeal to a type of *a priori*, the point is not to scale heights or depths but to explore the interior experience of a labyrinth of functions and producing, by means of vast complexity, an instant of coordinated perception as truth and meaning.

It has been said that *a priori* reasoning, however qualified historically, emerges by means of the impression of the "shadow" concomitant with the instant of coordination that is fabricated in the totality of the archive—in itself a fiction of constriction

⁶ SP, p. 208; DP, pp. 206-207.

available contingently—as necessary for that moment's own actuality as event. Every archive, in this manner, has its shadows: those accompanying impressions that permit the experience of recognition as a type of necessity given to the contingent event. These shadows, nevertheless, must be understood as fiction, for they occur only concomitantly with the fabrication of the actual event. They are not "ground" but side-events of the coordination of the perception of events in an archive. They are, with apologies to Aristotle, "accidents" of recognition. Kant exemplifies only one possible impression of the shadow or side-effect in an archive (which, of course, he took not to be a shadow but to be categorical). The Panopticon enables the examination of at least two others that may be called retro-perspectivity and consciousness.

Whereas Bentham claimed that the Panopticon untied the Gordian Knot, Foucault found in the same machine the constant reproduction of the interior. To Foucault, the Panopticon is a turning of forces that turn on themselves and turn into themselves—a turning of functions inside functions—that account for "knowledge" as an event always within and located by relationships of force. The way the Panopticon constantly held a gaze on the subject and reflexively turned that subject into a self-constituted gaze of

subjectivity is already familiar. But the very nature of this contingency, that is to say the very possibility of conceptualizing this constricted moment as aim or desire (as an actual moment of social teleology), depends on panopticism functioning as the is-already setting of experience. This was evident in the way that the Panopticon justifies the use of its mechanisms to establish the very project that they, in fact, produce. Now it may be understood that the circularity of this predicament is the condition of the archive, and that the name for this condition—which has effects on the experience of the emergence of events held within it—is retropectivity. In a way similar to the account of *a priori* reasoning by concomitant events, the Panopticon too assumes at each moment of judgement, at each perceptual moment, the accomplishment of the whole archive to make credible its perception. Every archival event, this means, is retropective as experience, for it always depends on the accomplishment of its antecedents to be located in its moment. In another way, it could be said that the shadow, inasmuch as it can be called a *priori*, can also be said to be a backward orientation. In the archive, the reading of novelty always depends on the whole archive accomplishment already given to the location of reading and the emergence of recognition.

Foucault is not unaware of the condition of retropectivity; indeed his comments on the tautological nature of the project of the Panopticon encourage this notion. When recalling the history of prison reform, Foucault tells how reform has been so tangled up with the prison itself that it constitutes its identity.

One should also recall that the movement for reforming the prisons, for controlling their functioning, is not a recent phenomenon. It does not even seem to have originated in a recognition of failure. Prison 'reform' is virtually contemporary with the prison itself: it constitutes, as it were, its programme. From the outset, the prison was caught up in a series of accompanying mechanisms, whose purpose was apparently to correct it, but which seem to form part of its very functioning.

And, a few paragraphs later,

The 'theory of the prison' was its constant set of operational instructions rather than its incidental criticism—one of its conditions of functioning. The prison has always formed part of an active field in which projects, improvements, experiments, theoretical statements, personal evidence and investigations have proliferated.⁷

It is evident that an emergent event assumes a field of events, but this is not simply to articulate a paradox—for example, here the claim is not similar to claim of

⁷ SP, p. ?; DP, p. 234.

⁸ SP, p. ?; DP, p. 235.

traditional theology that would see the event depending upon events as a contradictory structure of transcendence and history³—but an intention to identify fields of problemizations. In the specificities of the Panopticon, inwardness or subjectivity is the historic manifestation of the active condition of retropectivity. This means that the deliverance of the body of the subject to the Panopticon from the antecedent juridical system is recognized in the shadow effect of retropectivity

³ The paradox of truth in Christian theological history has been structured according to the proposition that an inherent contradiction exists wherein the a-historical is conceived historically and wherein the totality of truth assumes the partiality of human experience. The contradiction, albeit, has never been called illogical (excluding perhaps the extreme statements of Tertullian); it is paradox not by reason but by structure insofar as "God" has been comprehended as the transcendental ground of being who participates in (or holds incarnational relation to) the manifestation of beings. There is accordingly no mutual exclusion but a tensive dialectic proposed. Still, this structure begins with the assumption of the dialectic itself, which hold that the "wholly" true is true transcendently and the "partially" true is an obscurant form of this preapprehended totality. Hence there is posited a primal origin (which is often expressed as innocence or sinlessness) and there is the partially true which, by derivation, is at best a sign of what is absent. This structure is paradoxical in the sense that "what is" [*quiddity*] is the sign of what that "isness" is not [*esse*]. Here on the basis of clues from Foucaultian analysis I am claiming that the "paradox" is so posed only by the inclusion of the assumption that constitutes it and, secondly, that its constitution is an event of archival activity. Accordingly the paradox stands only so far as the archive which constitutes it is actively engaged; but a disengagement of this constitution eliminates the structure and, following, the paradox. The problem changes from one of paradox to one of knowing; and it is not a question of solving the retropectivity that participates in the activity of knowing but of comprehending that retropectivity out of a capacity to be freely disposed before it. This second option, which leads to the problem of defining theological orientation, will be dealt with in the next section.

fixed historically on the problem of the subject. The Panopticon is a whole series of mechanism that locate retropectivity in the historical production of desired inwardness; but it is only by contemplating the totality of the Panopticon that the retropectivity condition can be understood as the "presence" of a desired subjectivity located in the body of the condemned. "Retropectivity," it could be said, is the constant orientation of an archive in the fundamental construction of every event, but it is always a question of what form that construction will take historically as recognition. The uniqueness of the Panopticon is once again its acute focus on the inward condition of the subject-body.

Is then retropectivity only another name for what was already called a form of a *a priori* reasoning? A response here is not easily given since the whole point of the shadow effect is to indicate certain tacit constructs of recognition rather than to articulate a specific theory. Yet, it can be said that insofar as the synthetic *a priori* is an historic manifestation of the anticipated *a priori*, the inwardness of panopticism is an historic manifestation of retropectivity. Thus, rather than anticipation, retropectivity is descriptively more of a "longing for" the origin. Hence, retropectivity accounts not for metaphysical

speculation but for a psychological imperative that, in a socio-teleological setting such as the Panopticon, is present in the form of subjectivity. The backward orientation of this shadow effect, since it is linked to the totality of the archive present at the occasion of every event, does not pose a metaphysical solution any more than did the *a priori* above.

Foucault is also clear that the Panopticon understands itself as the machine that enables the discovery of essential "man," which is why Foucault refers to N. H. Julius's excited claim (1831) that the Panopticon is an event in the "history of the human mind" and why Foucault says that, with the Panopticon, "...under the surface of images, one invests the body in depth."¹⁰ It is also true that the Panopticon, even beyond a machine, is also a type of relationship or field of relations spread out across society.

It is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power, of definition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons.¹¹

When it comes to the second shadow effect that can be

¹⁰ SP, p. 218; DP, p. 217

¹¹ SP, p. 207; DP, p. 205.

comprehending how as a machine that encourages the desire of the depth, the Panopticon produces the specificities of modern consciousness. According to the model so far advanced, consciousness too would first be understood in a spatial manner that is linked to the totality of the experience of the archive; secondly, it would be understood as a specific event of the Panopticon itself. Remaining focused only on the latter sense of consciousness as a product of historic forces, the Foucaultian view would be that consciousness does not describe a passive interior but a consequential effect of forces and the persuasion of forces. Over against the dialectical tradition that defines consciousness as the awareness of experience, regardless if awareness is understood to be posited *a priori* to experience or *a posteriori* as its consequence, Foucault would want to emphasize the spatial dimension wherein consciousness is not only a production of the drama of force relationships but a location of knowledge intimately tied to the mechanism (or forms) of forces. As a product, consciousness can then be presented as an object to be enclosed and trained, and this is precisely what the whole (disciplinary) analysis of the Panopticon seeks to expose.

But again Foucault did not reflect on the

impression of the archive functioning in its totality or comment on the coordinate perception of the agent. Consciousness in Foucault is restrictively given as the historical product, but outside of this mechanical operation rarely is consideration given to recognition, anticipation, and intention. It needs to be upheld that an agent in the archive can hold an actual point of view only based on its location and the immediate permission of the horizon of that location. Thereby, it can be claimed that there is indeed a second shadow in the Panopticon that defines the experience of anticipation based on the *opening to the future* (this would mean, an orientation toward the horizon) from the orientation available at the point of event. Again here, this is linked to and somewhat difficult to distinguish from the already defined *a priori* condition since any opening to the future implies the functioning productivity of its location; still a distinction is possible, it can be stated, because the totality of the archive is now linked actively to the space of seeing. The sense of the coordinate instant always includes, within its very possibility to be, the anticipated relationship of seeing, hoping, and moving toward a location of realized conceptual wholes. By upholding the active and productive sense of experience in the Panopticon,

it can said that the coordinate instant of recognition, even as a backward condition (retropectivity), is nevertheless oriented forward; it is at the moment of its event a successive instant in the archive. What is unfortunate is that Foucault provides no language to explore this area of experience. What is given only as the productivity of subjectivization may rather be adapted to suggest that the shadow effect related to the future (by which is meant succession) is called consciousness. It is a sense of regard or anticipation of the succession of events from the point of view of anticipated permission of wholeness (or even "closure") at a coordinated point of recognition. Consciousness, at a general level, means to indicate an "awareness" available to an agent at a place in an archive. And, like each other shadow indicated, there remains a specific level of the manifestation of this tacit condition in the historic predicament of that condition as an archive effect. In the Panopticon consciousness emerges specifically as the constant regard of the subject. In the Panopticon, the anticipated "whole," which is formed mechanically by isolation and its definitive acts, is focused inwardly as a *telos* called "man." To become "man," in all the ways that this word is defined, measured, established as normal, enclosed, trained, and written about—in all the ways the powers

of the Panopticon play upon the body and entrap the soul—(in all the ways the disciplinary ideal invents and re-invented "man" a thousand times) is the victory of panopticism in modern times.

It is no use at this point to draw the simple conclusion that the consequence of the archive shadows is the emergence of the concept of God. Admittedly, this may not appear to be a great leap when it is understood that the God concept, despite so many possible formulations in history, is tied consistently to variations of meta-narrative: to anticipation and hope, to a *a priori* or preapprehended ground, and to the desiring of or relating to the origin. But the movement from the shadow to the possibility of the concept of God is not so quickly achieved. Albeit an orientation toward a God concept is a possibility by consequence of the archive holding as its condition a certain series of side effects, this poses not a solution for theology but a problem. It raises the question of the sense and usefulness of a God concept at all. It suggests the need to pose the "fictiveness" of the God concept without losing the sense of its "seriousness." Finally, even if it does answer how there is a longing for origin or a desire for unification, it does not answer why this is so. The doorway to these questions is opened by returning to

the archive's "outside."

(3) The Fold of Power

Foucault, along with such figures as Maurice Blanchot and Roland Barthes,¹² is celebrated for pronouncing the death of "man." In the case of Foucault the announcement was foreboding, expressing an expectation of hope and a critique of the present more than an a description of an event already completed. Our time remains that of the disciplinary society, the time of the Panopticon, the time of "man," if not indeed the time of "his" invention. "Man" is the product of a hermeneutical problemization that both created and sought to solve "him" by means of determining normality and conditioning subjectivization through techniques and technological apparatuses of training. The disciplinary society is profoundly interested in identifying and correcting certain obscurities that would otherwise deviate from its norms. Hence, discipline, in the way it has been described, includes that unending and penetrating search for the nature of things, for original and authentic states, for forms that are at once the

¹² See esp. Maurice Blanchot, L'Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969).

identity and norm of the real.

Throughout Discipline and Punish, Foucault described a series of mechanisms arranged in no definitive order that operate to define and constrict the modern archive as panopticism. Nevertheless, is it not true that Foucault is a participant in an irony of his own making? It is not true that his own point of view, in relation to modernity, belongs to modernity? Is not Foucault's position a product of a permissible location? This critique, at once both obvious and poignant, may not be as masterful as it first seems. To Foucault, it is never possible to eclipse the ground on which one speaks, reasons, or judges; it is never possible to be outside of the condition of the inside. What Foucault maintains rather is that, within an archive, it is possible to occupy a situation at the limit of the dominant frontiers an archive permits. This "position at the limit" is also the only point of ethical reflection available in Foucault.

"The interrogation of the limit," Foucault once stated when describing the literary accomplishment of George Bataille, "replaces the search for totality." This comment, appearing first in the *Hommage à George*

Bataille,¹³ was made about the time of the Birth of the Clinic and several years prior to the appearance of The Order of Things. It is one idea, arising out of archaeological investigations, that would remain embedded in the problems of genealogy and power. For Foucault, if it is true that there is never an "outside" of archival experience, this does not mean that there cannot be found from within a relation to elements beyond archive. But the description of a limit situation, which is a relationship within an actual setting to its "beyond," can only occur on the basis of the already accomplishment. Thus what is given as "beyond" is not only a functioning of an actual archival location—which delivers the relationship to the beyond to contradictory tensions (since the language of the limit is also that of the accomplishment)—but likewise still a permissible product of its accomplishment. This was also the situation earlier when it was discovered that the "outside" of an archive is simultaneously fabricated from the inside. Here the trouble is augmented by affirming that the "outside" is limited by the productivity of forces and "available" locations, as it

¹³ Reprinted as "Preface to Transgression" in LCP, p. 50, the original text is in Critique, nos 195-196 (1963), pp. 751-770.

were, only within the historic conditions of recognition otherwise known as *a priori*, retrospectivity, and consciousness. It is not a surprise then that, accordingly, two types of "outside" in relation to the archive can be distinguished. The first "outside" is given in the sense of the "other" that has been discussed as the specific production of internal functions. This is the "other" who is mad in Madness and Civilization or delinquent in Discipline and Punish. This is the "outside" that stands as the frontier project of the archive which, by means of movements of infiltration, accounts for factors such as an expressed social teleology and the coding of various activities as necessary. On the other hand, an orientation to that which is outside of the archive (that is, one characteristic of a limit situation), an orientation that describes the "other" not as the project or the aim and that expresses in itself the affirmation of its paradoxical condition of location inside the archive, identifies a second type of "other" residing in "potential space" that remains in defiance of the normal archival constriction. This second "outside," identifying what is perhaps "beyond" the archive in question, is nevertheless *orientated toward* on the basis of *being in* an archive; that is to say, the general shadows associated with retrospectivity

and the like are a condition not eclipsed in the orientation to the (second sense of) outside. Though great care needs to be taken when distinguishing the second type of outside, it is significant to note that Foucault did invest great relevance in the notion for it is the only place where one finds an expressed sense of "freedom" and a question of ethics. The one scholar who has above all undertaken to explore this path is Deleuze, who speaks of the fold of power.

If it is initially important to distinguish two senses of the outside, it is equally important to recognize that the possibility of this distinction rests on the "fold" of power. Deleuze used the fold of power to describe various forms of subjectivization that Foucault explored. The manner in which Deleuze will relay this is not as difficult as it may first seem:

The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the outside of the inside.¹⁴

Deleuze indicates how the circulations of power simultaneously scatter and turn across the archive in the course of making up the archive. There is no

¹⁴ Deleuze, p. 98.

"outside" of power except insofar as the relationship of forces themselves, twisting and folding upon each other, compose the outside from within. For an example of the folding of power, Deleuze turns to Foucault's study of the Greeks,¹⁵ who portray a particular type of relationship power has with itself.

In the Greek diagram, Deleuze recounts, force was "folded" upon the self as a practice of the domination of the self. The folding back and folding inward of power, which Foucault describes as a technology of the self, is as an "affect" of the fundamental location of "freemen" in the Greek matrix of forces.

How could they dominate others if they could not dominate themselves? The domination of others must be doubled by a domination of oneself. The relation with others must be doubled by a relation with oneself. The obligatory rules for power must be doubled by facultative rules for the free man who exercises power.¹⁶

The folding of power back on the self was a technique of self creation, a transcendence of the self over society. Moral codes continue to be necessary, but a "free man" was "free" in the sense that "he" had no need of moral codes, i.e., had learned to master "himself" as a project of the self. The free subject (who was male in Athenian antiquity) was thus born out

¹⁵ See *History of Sexuality*, volume 2.

¹⁶ Deleuze, p. 101.

of a folding of the relationship of forces that composed a diagram of domination on to the self who became a self-dominating self. And the higher the achievement of self-domination, the freer the self and the greater "his" public admiration. In this sense, the Greeks invented the "self."

The self of the Greeks, however, was not the disciplinary self of modernity. The Greek self referred not to a normalization, in the sense of objective standards and a measurements, but to a play within the foldings of power. The Greek project was a project of becoming rather than a project of training. Still, the emergence of the "self" in the Greek setting, however unique to the experience of the Greeks, is not wholly explained by making a rather reductive appeal to power relationships and relationships of forms of knowledge.¹⁷ What is remarkable is that the relationship to oneself is through sexuality and, ultimately, a veritable "art of existence"¹⁸ that, Deleuze correctly points out, must finally be integrated into the larger archive matrix.

...there is a break [in the second volume]
with [the first volume of] *The History of*

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 102.

¹⁸ See the introduction to Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, 1985). [Hereafter referred to as HS2.]

Sexuality, which studied sexuality from the double viewpoint of power and knowledge; now the relation to oneself is laid bare, but its links with sexuality remain uncertain.¹³

Hence, as Deleuze reads it, *The Uses of Pleasure* (volume II of The History of Sexuality) reads initially as a detour from the power/knowledge analytic (of volume I); but that detour, which indeed turned out to be an entirely new task, is brought about by re-focusing the analytic of power by the question of its folding. Foucault does not look at sexuality as a product, in the second volume of this history, but as a problematic that finally takes form in a technology of the self. Deleuze, however, remains misleading in the manner he constitutes this argument. It is easy enough to understand that, from the beginning of the second volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault engages the problem of desire in a way his genealogy had not previously addressed. Foucault begins by focusing on practices that formed a "hermeneutics of the self" and that led individuals into relationships that "allowed them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being, be it natural or fallen."¹⁴ In this Foucault is not seeking an account so much as a decipherment of practices already established as functions in the Greek

¹³ HS2, p. 5.

diagram. The shift between the two volumes of this work is not marked, as such, by a movement away from the power/knowledge matrix of earlier work but a "re-location" of this problem in the Greek form of a hermeneutic of the subject. The demonstration of this misstep, on the part of Deleuze, is evident particularly where (as will be seen below) he contradicts its implications by his own further analysis.

In the meantime, it can be upheld that the examination of "subjectivization," as practiced among the ancient Greeks, does not lay bear certain elements beyond or in supplement to the "power/knowledge" formulation of early works. On the contrary, with the Greeks, Foucault plays with a variation of the historicity of power/knowledge found in an ancient hermeneutic of desire. In fact, in relation to this point, Deleuze seeks to formulate four possible distinctions among "types" of foldings of power. First, there is the enfoldings of power that surround the body and act upon it (this would be the play of the location upon the self); second, there is a relation to the foldings that defines the manner power bends back upon the self whether as aesthetic acts (Athenian society) or training (disciplinary society); third, there is the fold called power-knowledge, which is the

productivity of the archive emerging from the tensive battle of practices, strategies of statements, and lines of vision; and fourth, there is the fold of power to the outside, which marks the second and paradoxical sense of a limit situation within accomplished parameters.

It is the third fold of power, which can be called the *epistemic* form of power, which undoubtedly remains the most basic form and the one most acutely addressed by the Panopticon. This form of power—even though Deleuze discusses it thirdly—is fundamental to the means of power manifestation in any form. Since power, even when defined as the aesthetic relation to the body, can only be manifest in the potential of the setting that holds it; this accordingly returns to any examination the relationship of forms through which power passes, that is, brings back the question of power/knowledge. It is not difficult to see why the analysis of Deleuze, on this point, brings him back to commentary on power/knowledge in order to distinguish Foucault from phenomenology.

Everything is knowledge, and this is the first reason why there is no 'savage experience'; there is nothing beneath or prior to knowledge.²²

²² Deleuze, p. 109. Deleuze at this point is claiming that knowledge is an irreducible double: speaking and seeing, language and light. This irreducible plurality surpasses the

He performs the same feat a second time when claiming that though the Greeks folded "force," or at least "...discovered it was something that could be folded,"²² they could not do so without at once being caught up in forces and being dependent upon the matrix in which their "folding" was credible.

But as a force among forces man does not fold the forces that compose him without the outside folding itself, and creating a Self within man.²³

Here again, the is-already of the archive—its epistemic actuality; its composition as location of power/knowledge—is constantly the constriction already given to the potential of an actuality event. The problem that Deleuze does not address is how, in light of the is-already condition that power/knowledge defines, can there be an "outside" in that final or

phenomenological notion, in Husserl, of intentionality wherein "consciousness is directed towards the thing and gains significance in the world" (Deleuze, p. 108). Heidegger could also be said to surpass the phenomenological project by the movement from being to Being, from a phenomenology to an ontology—from the folding of being upon itself to the opening of Being as itself—which lead him from Plato to the Pre-Socratics. But in Foucault, the distinction of light and language prevents the renewed surfacing of the problem of intention. In Heidegger light opens up to speaking—that is, it opens as intention to the phenomenological event—whereas in Foucault there is much less cooperation. What Foucault has is a battle, and the battle produces its reality which, in itself, has no intention. And the subject who is a witness, or perhaps a product, is already involved in the battle prior to being a subject; the battle does not have an outside or a resolution, it is effects and has effects (Deleuze, pp. 112-114).

²² Ibid., p. 113.

²³ Ibid., p. 114.

fourth sense of folding?

(4) The Concept of Transgression

Where the analysis of Deleuze reaches a limit Foucault is able to continue by introducing the concept of transgression. Deleuze will only suggest that "to think is to fold, to double the outside with a coextensive inside."²⁴ He will not, however, take this pivotal comment to a greater conclusion. On the other hand, with Foucault, "thinking" is a point of departure. Thinking, in distinction from knowledge, describes an ethical challenge that can reach even to mystical proportions when defined as the deliberate act of relating to the outside.

The outside, given in its second sense as beyond, exists in relation to, or out of the fact of, the *epistemic* understanding of power as a network of locations: the beyond is the intimate and equally elusive partner of every event emergence. It is the "having not occurred" that is lost as "nothing-ness" at the point of the actual event. In the elaboration of delinquency, the Panopticon reveals some of the intimations Foucault makes of this understanding.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 188.

Criminal misdemeanors tend to act as the functions of panopticism and serve proof of the necessary for its activity. The vicious circle is enacted each time new determinations of the normal at once marginalize more precisely various portions of society. The production of this "outside" goes hand in hand with what Foucault called the "carceral continuum"²⁵ where delinquency actually spreads the network of discipline and expands its influence in society.

However, despite this recognition, a counter-strategy is not developed by Foucault. His immediate task continued to focus on the genealogy of panopticism. And even in work subsequent to Discipline and Punish, Foucault never promises more than the systematic critique of the present. To elaborate the notion of transgression more fully, therefore, means to call upon a certain number of hints and sets of clues not always complete. For example, in an interview, Foucault speaks of a kind of writing he called the "experience book" where one attempts "through experience to reach that point of life which lies as close as possible to the impossibility of living, which lies at the limit or extreme."²⁶ The theme is

²⁵ SP, p. 309; DP, p. 303.

²⁶ Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Traunbadori (New York: Semitext(e), 1991), p. 31.

similarly recounted, in one of the few places where God or theologians are even spoken of, when Foucault writes in a homage to Maurice Blanchot of the indomitable will of this Christian—who did not like the church—to confront the extreme and to realize, in the breaking of the totality of God, the freedom of the self. Of Blanchot, Foucault writes that “he ceased it [the light of God] in the inevitable event that breaks all and the all.” And Foucault adds, “...what escapes history,” for Blanchot, “is not the universal” but the “instant, the fracturing, the tearing apart, the interruption.” In short, Foucault stresses that Blanchot is admirable precisely because he tried to live the “other” of our time.²⁷

It is by appealing to the archive beyond, that is founded on that fourth sense of the folding of power, that a space of resistance can be formed and, at times, a Foucaultian element of mysticism encountered. That fourth sense of folding was, in Deleuze, “...the fold of the outside itself, the ultimate fold.”²⁸ It is a fold

²⁷ The expression is “vivre autrement le temps,” but it would be poorly translated simply as to live “outside of time.” It really means living in the instant, but in the complex way of being strange in the face of the present. Blanchot offers the challenge of a theology of transgression that is both wholly present and other than the present. (Where are these citations from?)

²⁸ Deleuze, 104.

called the "interiority of expectation."³⁹ And it is this description that delivers the greatest difficulties of a paradox.

The fourth fold of power is not as a "product" or even understood according to power/knowledge productivity, but the paradox occurs when it is nevertheless admittedly impossible to understand this sense of power as other than productive and as outside of the link to the power/knowledge that locates it. For any relationship to the "outside" as that which is not (the second sense) is as such an orientation available in the archive and in the foldings of power that constitute the location of that orientation. That is, the orientation to the "is-not" is always accomplished precisely as the defiance of the accomplishment. The beyond of the archive has no actuality as an archive product, is not as such an actual location, but remains constituted as orientation on the basis of what is produced and therefore is, indirectly, in fact a product in the most peculiar sense of being a product of nothingness. The fourth type of folding, therefore, marks that place of archival actuality wherein an orientation to the unaccomplished moment remains constricted by the moment

³⁹ Deleuze takes this phrase from Blanchot, Deleuze, p. 104.

that "folded back" power as an actual event. It is an orientation to an *actual nothingness* that was initially potential horizon that collapsed unfulfilled beside the actual event. This "outside" of the "inside," this event that is not, remains lost as potential but in potential still is the permanency of the possibility of the other.

To have an orientation to the "non-event" is an actual activity because it defines not a general metaphysics of transcendental constitution but a particular location in relation to and defiance of the actual condition of the is-already event. This marks a mysticism of a very different flavour, a type consistent with that represented by Blanchot who, Foucault singled out, was as close as possible to the impossible. The permanent orientation to the non-event that is constantly potential can be called the transgressive option. It is transgressive because it struggles constantly with its historical setting that is, at the same time, its definition. But precisely because it remains "historical" or "archival" sets its struggle fundamentally apart from other totalizing or meta-physical conception of mystical resignation. Its point of orientation does not concern eternity but a fundamental actual "nothing." Here, then, on the basis of the archive and its actual nothingness there lies

the means to develop political and ethical implications; and on the basis of the mysticism of this location, the means for a theology of transgression. These two avenues shall be explored.

The two senses of outside, then, cannot be confused. The first is the product of Deleuze's third type of folding that accounts for the colonization of space by an operant *episteme*; the second is the fourth folding, that fold of power which simultaneously poses, at the collapsed moment of actuality, an orientation to the "is-not" or the "non-event." When the second sense is invoked, it is possible to speak of a fissure—a space of absence—which by its "is-not" transgresses the "is-already." From *Preface to Transgression*, Foucault makes this appeal:

In that zone which our culture affords for our gestures and speech, transgression prescribes not only the sole manner of discovering the sacred in its unmediated substance, but also a way of recomposing its empty form, its absence, through which it becomes all the more scintillating.³⁰

The mysticism of the beyond is born precisely out of its ability, in its nothingness, to transgress the location of the "is."

This allows the claim that the second outside—which in addition to being "beyond" can be called the

³⁰ LCP, p. 30.

"unfulfilled" since it is at the moment of the actual collapse of the non-actual (the ~~is~~)—is as a form of "folding" the *frustration* of the archive. It is its constant non-accomplishment. Unlike process thought, it is not claimed by this that actualization is prehended into the succession occurrence; instead, it is claimed that actualization is accompanied by the frustration of its "is not" (~~is~~). The unfulfilled actually locates itself inside the fold, which means it is an orientation held paradoxically by the archive condition (it is always a product of the is-already condition by the most awkward sense of not being) and in an archival location, but as the simultaneous absence of folding it, thereby, constitutes the desire of folding. Desire, then, is constantly frustrated by the nothingness that defies it. And neither is it claimed that actualization can be taken in the sense of deconstruction, where a signifier of a signifier signifies an absence known/unknown as trace; for in deconstruction, a trace is not a frustration, nor does it account for the desire to signify. In transgression, absence is frustration; and a theology based on transgression is consequently a theology of deliberate frustration. A theology of transgression is an orientation to what escapes history not as the universal but as the moment. This calls for the

outline of a new ways to think the tasks of theology.

PART III

THEOLOGY IN AN ARCHIVE

Introduction

I had once believed that the way to use the thought of Michel Foucault in the context of theology was to engage the history of Christian thought "...independently of teleological motivation and historical continuity."¹ Undertaken with care and appropriate critical awareness, this option remains open. The difficulty to overcome however—and thus the need to qualify this statement with care—lies in the basic matter of teleology and continuity being themselves archival events and thus significant questions of investigation.

It is likely that it is not possible not to experience teleology inasmuch as it is also not possible to evade or bracket or in some manner exist outside of continuity. In both cases, an evasion would require the absence of location, which is impossible. For, as has been previously demonstrated, the event is always already relational, which means that it assumes

its "space" in the act of emergence and therefore always already recalls the permission of its accomplishment. The event is already given to a teleological experience precisely because it is "order" before it is experience, and this means, by reason of the same, that it is equally already continuity. The only question that can be raised—the critical question that is raised in recognition of the productivity of the location of its being raised—is of a twofold nature: fundamentally, why are teleology and historical continuity possible experiences; secondly, what order of experience guides these possibilities in a given archive? These two questions outline two ways of approaching theology; indeed, they indicate two types of theology.

The two types of theology that will be outlined in the final part of this work stem from the comments above but rest on two basic conclusions drawn in parts one and two. In part one it was concluded that every event is a produced location, present actively by means of statements and passively by means of light, which emerges as a constriction of possibility on the one hand and permission on the other. In part two it was

David Galston, "Defining Foucault for Theology," ARC 21

concluded that the event of emergence is complemented by side-events or effects which, though constant, vary in form according to the order of productivity in the setting of emergence. It was concluded that side-effects occur because any location in any archive always implies (by the bare fact of being a location) the totality of the archive that locates it.

These discussions made it possible to speak of a normal event which was generally descriptive of permission or sets of permission. A normal event, because it is permitted, implies accordingly, in its interpretation as event, the order of the archive in which it is set. When the example of the Panopticon was used, it was seen that the disciplinary archive employed techniques of training that implied the subjectivity of a normal panopticism. In relation to this "normal" various side-effects were qualified as peculiar to the history of panopticism. Yet, each side-effect, because it is produced in an archive and is particular to the order and composite location of the archive, is fictive. Side-effects are only a signification of working strategies—and at most a

signification that archive strategies are working—but are not substantive in themselves.

This last claim, however, must constantly collapse to the paradoxical nature in which it is intended. To say that side-effects are not substantive does not mean that they are mere illusion or even dissolution. Indeed, on the contrary, they are historicity and , as such, affective. Even though a side-effect is not a substance, this does not mean that it is not "real." The latter conclusion which would claim that side-effects are an illusion, a conclusion drawn most famously by late nineteenth century psycho-analysis, is false; for indeed psycho-analysis was slow to recognize that it too "worked" according to certain sets of strategies.² Freudian psycho-analysis remained deceived, in this sense, insofar as it too used fictive side-effects as "real" knowledge. This is why it must be said that a side-effect is always affective and always participatory in general in an archive order: it is always the paradoxical condition of a location (even the location of this very writing). To make a subject/object split here (i.e., in the nineteenth

² Sigmund Freud's Die Traumdeutung was published in November, 1899, though it was given the date 1900. Does it really

century way, to imagine that fiction is purely subjective and that only substances are objective) is misleading. A better appreciation of the matter would hold that side-effects are involved in the very making of this split and that this involvement is unavoidable. Insofar as an archive describes an occupation of space, there will always be side-effects that are (paradoxically) present as activity but not reducible to substance.

This is why it can be claimed that "no God is not possible," for it means that the concept of God (or God experience) is given to the order of the permission of side-effects. This does not mean that a particular God, Christian or Jewish, or a particular not-God, Buddhist or Taoist, is given to the order of the permission of side-effects. On the contrary, such "Gods" are already orders themselves. What is claimed here, and what is meant by the claim that no God is not possible, is that no event (no historicity) can occur without a side-effect. It is not possible to have a location at the exclusion of side-effects; and if one were to pose the possibility of "non-side-effect" events, one would be attempting to speak of non-space

belong to the 20th century? I take the view that its aims and techniques are representative of 19th century procedures.

and of non-event-ness. Both these options are excluded by the condition of the paradox: the concept of non-event-ness is already an event; and "non-space-ness" is already a location. It is not possible to solve this circle (and not worthwhile to try to solve it). The only constancy to the condition of historicity, outside of the location that defines its immediate experience, is the order of its condition composed of side-effects: of its "real non-substance-ness." Albeit, this "real non-substance-ness" (in the sense that it is constantly outside the event and is constantly the orientation toward that transgresses the event) may or may not be called "God"; but in the deliberate workings of a theological context, "God" is a most appropriate choice. And a most appropriate claim, in place of the inevitability of real non-substance-ness, is the claim that no God is not possible.

On the basis of such considerations above, theology can take two challenging forms that are distinct from and critical of traditional, so-called "normal," forms. The vehicles employed to critique these traditional forms are called respectively critical theology of history and critical mysticism. With apologies to Soren Kierkegaard, when classified

independently as two types of theology, they are called theology A and theology B.

In juxtaposition to theology A lies traditional Christian Systematic Theology; and in juxtaposition to theology B lies two forms of the negative: the traditional *via negativa* and more recent definitions of negative theology. The traditional theologies will be described as permitted and, on this basis, normal expressions, whereas the goal of the two new types³ of theology is the twofold task of understanding permission and transgressing permission. It may be evident that the twofold task of the new in the end is inseparable, but they will be presented nevertheless distinctively in two chapters.

³ It will be noted that on several occasions the two theologies are called "new"; but it is advisable that this term, which is not intended superciliously, be tamed by the commentary on the new found in the last chapter.

CHAPTER NINE

The Normal God Experience

At this crucial turning point, where a move is made from the strict realm of the archive and hermeneutics to the philosophical contemplation of the event of theology and of the concept of God, it is imperative that from the former activity (which composed the concerns of Part I and II) the basis of the critique of modern theology, out of which the latter activity emerges, is outlined.

What follows in this chapter, then, is not strictly a review of modern theology, which would pose far too ambitious a task, but a critical appropriation of theological experience from a Foucaultian orientation. To accomplish this task, a review of the progress so far made will be offered as a way setting up the development of the concepts of theology A and B to follow and to see what these theologies means in relation to the traditional philosophical exegeses of theology that are here rendered as normal.

(1) Review of the Conclusions so far Drawn

The "constriction of possibility" was seen to be perhaps the most fundamental term for the comprehension of an archive. This term intends not only to describe the condition of the possibility of an event but also to affirm that an event is always local or located in and by the matrix of an archive. An archive event can be understood as occurring as if on a theatre stage with a certain set of props, tools, and vehicles of animation that compose its setting and sense. This setting is a condition of constriction because, in the first place, it is particular of the elements that compose it and, secondly, it is in itself a platform of permission that opens a horizon of possibilities to the actors framed by the products at hand. Never is it the case that all things are possible, which is why one speaks of a constriction, but never too are only prescribed events available, which is why one speaks of a horizon. As a consequence of the condition of the setting, the constriction of possibility is both a composing condition and a permitting condition.

If the question is raised, how does a constriction compose a setting and how does it effect the setting?, the answer must relay the notion of an

archive occupation, the question of language and light, and an appeal to power and to its effects. The archive "occupation" describes the limits of an archive, that is, the reach of its setting; it also describes the manner in which those limits function as both permission and production. This is why it was said that, in the particular case of the Panopticon, a paradigm is useful as an analytical tool but not descriptive of an archive occupation. A paradigm—as a description of a general, working model—indicates a means of arranging phenomenal experience. But the paradigm (and this is its unrecognized component) nevertheless requires an archive occupation in which to work and to hold meaning. An occupation of space is always prior to the employment of space, the latter being what the paradigm is. Therefore, beyond the need to describe an arrangement of phenomena or to recount a structuration of reality—beyond the needs addressed by the paradigm analysis—it is necessary to examine the role of light and language in an archive (these being the means of examining a permissible horizon) by which an occupation occurs. In the end, a paradigm, which is the interior of an occupation, calls upon the archive elements of language and light that account for its permission.

Language-being, as represented by Foucault's notion of the statement, was given as one of the primary and active means by which the boundaries of an archive are drawn; the statement was given as a practice that is before the visible and, as language-being, active and infinite in relation to visible. Statement-events emerge to mark a new space and, thus, open an archive to new forms or areas of occupation. Visibles are not emergent in this sense but passive in that the "seeing" of space is according to the occupation already established in the statement. One cannot see what is not stated.¹ But the structuring of the stated is no automatic or isolated event. It remains constricted in relation to the flow and fluctuations of power.

In the Foucaultian sense, power, it has been seen, is a constant movement of relationships more or less in "battle" with one another that traverse an archive, pass through its forms, and produce its events. Power can be negative in the sense that it prohibits or suppresses acts (this, for example, would be the dominant characteristic of its juridical form),

¹ This comment should not be restricted to the literal act of "seeing." As explained earlier, the statement is both discursive and non-discursive. This means that the statement is

but in the Panopticon power is primarily positive in that relationships of discipline and training are created out of its technical regard. It is evident enough that both functions of power actually exist simultaneously. Power both suppresses and makes advantageous certain acts; power both creates the potential of one event and limits the potential of another. Foucault's breakthrough was that he saw both aspects as productive. Power cannot inhibit one form of being without at once producing another. In an interview, Foucault explained this dynamic most straightforwardly:

If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.²

For the purposes of explaining the productivity of the circulation of power, the forms through which power passes, recombines, and distributes itself in the

the structuration of the archive, and the experience of the archive is passively related to this "stated" accomplishment.

² P/K, p. 119.

archive needed to be identified. In the face of this task, it was important to question the effect the relationship of forces, so elusive yet so constructive, has positively on the location of the event as event. In the particular setting of modernity, the answer was found by identifying some of the forms of relationships fabricated out of machines and techniques through which power acted to enclose and objectify the archive agent. When an individual is "trapped," whether as a prisoner, school child, or patient, the productive consequence of this constriction (i.e., the hold on the possible horizon) given within the structures of the disciplinary forms is subjectivity: the object becomes a self-regarding and ultimately a self-judging subject. Hence, the Panopticon demonstrates that power, far from being a reductive response to the query of the event, poses the very complexity of the query and problemizes it. Power intimately carves, by its circulation, the limits of the condition of the archive's constricted possibility. Every event that emerges in the constricted setting is consequential of the exercise of power upon it, negatively and positively, as a stating or a seeing "affectedly" related to the environment of its actuality. The way in which the coordination of the activity of power was described in relation to the

agent in an archive was by saying that the event is a credibility productively available as a tolerated possibility in the constricted setting. This suggests that, in the matrix of power relations and power permissions, the event (at the level of the agent) is perceptible or experiential as meaning.

What was found to be a necessary addition to this whole presentation resulted from the lack of consideration by Foucault for the agent and for the perceptual experience of the agent in the condition of the archive as a whole. The presentation of this problem, and consideration of its significance, was raised by resorting to what was called side effects. Yet, the lead up to this question necessitated discussion of the event as a moment in the archive as a whole. This is why colonization was first introduced as well as the concept of social teleology. The first accounted for the spread of the occupation of an archive across cultures and, indeed, within a historical epoch. In this, it was seen that Foucault's word "infiltration" best described the movement of new techniques into and over spaces occupied by others. But the experience of this movement at the level of the agent includes as type of *raison d'être*, in order to account for the motives of such successions and acts of

infiltration, that was given the name social teleology. This described the way in which a sense of necessity accompanies every manufactured event by means of the infiltration of the order of the event to the space of its emergence, for the infiltration-act imports with it an order of interpretation and a project of the "other." It was only from this avenue, where some access to the archive as a whole was gained, that a look at its "side effects" was possible. In particular, three were named: the experience of a *priori*, the experience of retroperspectivity, and the experience of consciousness. Each experience is equally a condition, for as side effects they are available potentially only according to the historic orders of a specific archive. The three side effects, it should be recalled, were accounted for on the basis of the inaccessibility of any part of an archive (any location or setting) at the exclusion of the implicit function of the whole archive. This means that there is always a sense of dependence (*a priori*), always a backward look (retroperspectivity), and always an anticipation of the future (consciousness) to every local event. In the Panopticon, these were seen to be historically manifest as the side effects of the

disciplinary regard that were called a *priori* reasoning, subjectivity, and the regard aimed inwardly (which was described as the "becoming of man").

The last conclusion brought forward commentary on the fold of power. Here it was seen that though there is no "outside" to an archive in an absolute sense, there is a possible orientation to the non-event, to that which is not. The non-event describes how, in the course of the occurrence of the event, which is consequential of the fold of power, there is always the absence of the "event" that did not occur. Constriction, in other word, is a specific collapse of available potential to the point of an actual event, leaving behind as a type of non-event or residue all that was held in potential prior to collapse. The "outside" of the archive, comprehended in this second sense of the non-event, is concomitant with the fold of power inside that produces the event. And even further, every event holds a relation, within the peculiarities of its historic appearance, with its non-event. Every event is a point of orientation toward a second outside: to the what-is-not. To act in relation to or in the name of "what is not" can be conceived as a transgression (a term readily available in Foucault) of the order of actual events.

The immediate question that arises from this review is whether the notion of God can be accounted for as a permission available by means of archival side-effects? To this question a positive answer is possible, but this is only one type of theological construction formed from a Foucaultian orientation. This first construction would be the basis of an active critique of the normal tradition of Systematic Theology in Christian thought. Then, there is another type of theology arising not necessarily from a negative response to this question so much as a recasting of negativity and a problemizing of it. This second construction would be the basis of an ironic theology, a critical mysticism, that would be structured transgressively in relation to the normal Systematic (Dogmatic) tradition. These responses are theology A and theology B.

An analysis of the concept of God undertaken in the first sense (theology A) would suspend the apologetic question of the nature and existence/non-existence of God in favour of the account of the *existing* of a God-concept permitted by the effects of an archive. The concept of God (or, in general, the concept of a transcendental order) would be analyzed according to the constriction of possibility. The

questions of the nature and existence of the divine would be replaced by the analysis of the occupation of an archive. The question is not, "Is there a God?" or "What are the attributes of God?", so much as what kind of God-concept is credible and under what order is God produced? This type of questioning must imply, positively, an account of the permissible horizon, thereby engaging the effects of language-being and light-being, the productivity of statements, and the passive revelations of light. Negatively, this questioning would engage the productivity of power by the analysis of limits and the inhibitions of a power/knowledge order. But such examinations would need to reach to the level of the theologian as a local agent, as an active coordinator of recognition, in an archive. At this level, the question would be, how are the side-effects of the condition of being in an archive emergent as credible at a specific point of permissible perception? A particular theologian, especially one who undertakes the Systematic enterprise, cannot be allowed to escape the conditions of occupation. Theology cannot be reduced to—and this no doubt is the essential critique of theology A—the historical apology of a pre-given transcendental

reality; it must confront both its historical condition and its transcendental impressions as historicity.

The type of theology called theology B, i.e., the examination of the transgressive notion, presents not only a challenge of Foucault for theology but also issues a priority for the future philosophical expressions of theology. Here, however, a barrier is encountered given the fact that Foucault has no language for theological matters. Accordingly, theology B will be encountered as a terrain of experimentation requiring the invention of various expressions not previously encountered. Due to the larger nature of this challenge, it will be addressed in a separate chapter; here, however, it can be noted that such an experimentation would involve the consideration of a negative theology set in juxtaposition to normal negative traditions.

The capacity to develop alternative notions of theology identified above depend on comprehending that type of theology against what is called normal theology. To this end, the possibility of the God-concept emerging in the field of an archive must be accounted for; and in this task it is evident that "God seeing" and "God stating" (God within the comprehensible dynamics of the visible and articulable)

needs to be displayed in the outline of normal experience. Yet, that the God-concept can be described at all as normal within the archive ought not to be misleading. Here is no condescending term that might otherwise be construed as a crude critique of theism supposing the superiority of atheism. On the contrary, the proposed critique must regard both theism and atheism, insofar as they are events within an archive, as equally normal. What is identified by normality is the horizon of conceptual credibility produced within and throughout the dynamics of the activity of the archive. Modern atheism is certainly a product of modernity inasmuch as modern concepts of God are likewise. But since the matter under investigation is specifically the positive Christian tradition of apologetic theology (generally called Systematic Theology and Dogmatic Theology), the term "normal" identifies specifically the historic task of defending the faith. What is meant is that every archive gives within its horizons the credible expression of the God-concept and that, within the history of Christian thinking, the traditional task has been to discover the structural possibilities of that explanation within the setting of contemporary world views: for example, Justin Martyr in the setting of late classical

philosophy; Augustine in the setting of the collapse of the Roman Empire; Aquinas in the setting of an Aristotelian revival; Schleiermacher in the setting of new secular paradigms; and so forth. Every positive statement depends upon the accomplishment of the archive. It depends upon permission. It is the insipidity of this state of not calling forward the question of permission (and not using this question as critical self-comprehension) that is called normal.

(2) Seeing the Normal God

Admittedly, God in relation to "visibles," as it is comprehended in the archive, is a rare exploration in the philosophical circles of theology, for here the question does not concern a "vision" in the sense of revelation or ecstatic experience; rather, what is at hand is the capacity to perceive in actuality the possible concept of God. Neither is the question of the visible directly related to the phenomenology of perception wherein God may be posited as a moral or philosophical necessity (i.e., whether in relation to the notions of Kant or Schleiermacher). The capacity to perceive *in actuality* must not be confused as an

actual capacity, the latter being the question of phenomenology. The term "in" actuality is emphasized because the receptivity of light is concomitant of the "event" of meaning, relating itself therefore not directly to the human ability to perceive (Husserl) but to the actual implications of the event of perception itself. This means, the intention of the examination is to isolate the construction of the moment by means of power relationships and the setting of statements at a given location of experience for the purpose of comprehending the manner in which the perceptual possibility of God is given. No doubt, the perceptual possibility differs, at time radically, from one archive to another due not to changes in human knowledge or to changes in context against the persistency of human perception (Hegel) but to changes in the capacity of perception *in actuality*. What can count as "visibles" (that is, as the perceptual capacity of normal experience) is only the passive confirmation of an already accomplished archive. Or in another manner, perception is "normal" according to the archive forms that both produce and regulate it, not extraordinary or transcendental.

Yet, unlike the actual Panopticon machine, where visibles are thrown back to the enclosed subject as an echo replicating the already established measures of training, where the visible was indeed the echo of penetration and colonization, the God-concept, which is a shadow effect, is not only echoed passively in perception according to the accomplishment of the archive but also constitutes perception positively. The God-concept, as a permission emerging from the shadows of the already accomplished event and as a concretization of potential orientation toward the three shadow effects, "produces" the meta-physical order of perception in a way different from the presence of light-being in the archive. Albeit the initial formulation of this claim may seem too dense, it can be broken down figuratively by the use of the "echo" in a slightly modified form.

Instead of simply *repeating* the accomplished statement (the function of light-being echoes in the Panopticon machinery), where (as presented) the repetition was called passive, a metaphysical order emerges actively since it is constituted in and by the activity of the projection of the passive accomplishment. This can be explained by stating that

emergence, insofar as it applies to the event of a perceptual moment in actuality, is accomplished in a second echo (produced by the fact of the first echo of passive accomplishment) that is a (mis)taking of shadow-effects concretized by the permission of the statements already given to the light-being echo. In simpler terms, let it be understood that primarily there is an echo in light-being of the already accomplished linguistic event; then, this echo is taken in actuality as the ground of metaphysical perception. Therefore, in the first case, light-being is passive, yet by this status it is assumed in the active constitution of perceptual metaphysics. Metaphysics, in short, is the active (mis)taking of the passively accomplished. And in this sense, the echo noticed in light-being refracts as it were again to place itself tacitly in the productivity of language.

The historic emergence of the modern system of metaphysical order—wherein *a priori* reasoning is used or wherein one speaks of subjectivity and the “nature of man”—is an archive project by way of this double echo: it is the archive’s historicity, the archives in *actuality* experience. The “project” does not descend from an outside or transcendental order into the

setting of the archive; it emerges in the shifting duplicity of light and permission.

Metaphysics must be tied to light-being since the question of metaphysics concerns "perception" and the permission of perception. But since metaphysics is itself a historicity ordering shadow effects—since it is an archive permission performed in the projects of speculative activity—it is not an unveiling of the ground of speculation but indeed a constructing in historic actuality (in short, concretizing) of the permission of its functioning. Modern metaphysical speculation had sought to ground a point of orientation singularly toward the complex manifestations of time, but the archivist approach demonstrates that multiplicity already produces the (mis)taking of singularity and (perhaps a question that ought to be pursued in another forum) the desiring of a reductive, primal experience as knowledge. The affirmation of the archive enables the advantage of examining fictively (that is, constructively) what in modernity was taken seriously (that is, reductively).

What concerns the secondary echo, by which metaphysical perception was (is) sought to be grounded, describes also (and critiques equally) speculative, Systematic Theology. The emergence of Systematic

Theology (both in its modern form but also as the general and historic enterprise of the Christian Church) is accounted for in three ways: it is firstly a potential of perceptual experience because it emerges concretely from the shadows of the actual event; it is secondly a permission of the archive because its historic articulation is dependent on the receptivity in light-being of the actual productivity accomplished by language-being; it is thirdly constitutive of perceptual theological experience because it projects into speculation the concrete (i.e. second echo) impressions of the event (for example, a *priori* reasoning and the like). If these three points are taken collectively, so that the purpose is to understand how "metaphysics" is a possible conceptual experience and theological speculation is a form of its possible credibility, the general structure of this explanation can be given as such: a metaphysical horizon, whose potential is held or conditioned by the historic locations of the shadow of the statement, is projected positively (or echoed secondly) by visibles as the constituted perception of metaphysical order. This means that a metaphysical order is "seen," is historically actual, according to what is permitted first by the shadows of statements and second by the

project of those shadows taken as transcendental perception. Metaphysical perception is "in actuality" because light-being is passive (receptive) in relation to language-being productivity, but it is "in actuality" positive because even as "receptive-dependent" it nevertheless constitutes the actual exercise of perception. When this is brought to bear on the question of the God concept, it can be said that the God concept emerges in various concrete forms by means of the permission associated with the infiltration of transcendental perception on the horizon as constitutive of the possibility of metaphysical "sense." In addition, because the God-concept is generally representative, in its historic, philosophical forms, of the totality of all possible experience available simultaneously at all point of an archive (*Actus Purus*), it is traditionally given as a *priori* to any possibility of conceptuality whatsoever (the so-called religious *a priori*).

To understand by what manner the traditional tasks of Systematic Theology are normal, one must begin by accepting the claim that the God concept is positive because it is as a projection constitutive of the possibility of religious perception in actuality. By

this point, traditional Systematic Theology is a normal seeing of God precisely because it appeals to the religious *a priori* as ground and dynamically misappropriates the fundamental *a posteriori* accomplishment of the statement on which its appeal rests. It should rather be upheld that, in relation to the statement, the God concept is an archive permission, on the one hand, and an apologetic representation of side-effects on the other. A God concept "emerges" only as an achievement of a condition already functioning with historic locations, implied totalities, and teleological projects. Therefore the far greater task for theology, philosophically speaking, is the significance of the claim that the God concept, and its historic variations, can be accounted for as a concept appearing productively in actuality by permission.

(3) Stating the Normal God

Earlier in the analysis of the archive it was affirmed simply that the condition of the statement is language and the condition of the visible is light, but more importantly it was put forth challengingly that in

the heteronomous relation between the two, language was active and light was receptive. The point was to indicate that in the actual moment of event emergence, language-being was in a colonial relation to light-being in that the "occupation" carved out by the statement was replicated in the receptivity of the "echo" of light. Thus, light-being is receptive of the is-already condition of language-being.

When the concern returns to address the question of how the conception of God is a possible experience in the archive, the activity of language and the receptivity of light must be recalled to understand the complexity of the archive's God concept permission. Since the concept of "God" is consequential in relation to the statement (because it is a permission granted by the shadows of the accomplishment of the constructive strategies of statements), its emergence is understood to be "passive." As with visibles, the God concept is a reception of the statement-event according to the "positive" accomplishment of the event as perception. What must follow then is not a description of how God is stated, for this would inadvertently bring back the question of God as normal experience and turn from the question of (what was called) the act of the statement *in actuality*. Rather, at the level of the

comprehensibility of a conceptual capacity—and therefore at the level of a space already opened and already located as the statement—the question concerns what is taking place such that the speaking of God occurs and the ordering of God is set forth? What takes place, in other words, in the productive activity of the archive such that the statement of God is present?

The answer to this question is best served by an example, although a word of caution is necessary to prevent the example from being misleading. The example to follow is first not a demonstration. Here is not an attempt to isolate an object and then throw the light of scientific analysis upon it. There is no need to see here the proof or refutation of a method or the nature of its chosen object. Neither is an example given to prove the correctness of a conclusion, for this would indicate that the task at hand is wholly misappropriated. In the realm of speculative theology, the point of an example must be to assist the thinking of the question at hand. The point is the valuing of a question as a question and of thinking as thinking. The customary technological idea that thinking is irrelevant if it is not at once problem-solving, the customary idea that fails to grant intrinsic beauty to

thinking, remains a residue of nineteenth century mechanization. Theology, on the contrary, must uphold the art of its questioning in relation to the technical regard and the technology of problem-solving. The example to follow, therefore, is intended in the spirit of theological art: that is, it is given for the sake of thinking the question.

In the Christian context, the most immediate and perhaps fundamental example of an in actuality perceptual capacity is the question of salvation. In the Christian tradition, salvation is so central to the acts of Christ that, in fact, there could be no theological meaning to Christ without it. Outside of the question of salvation, it is only the Jesus of history who remains, of whom scant little can be known, and the theological task of "gospel" becomes impossible. The church has always proclaimed salvation and, suffice it to say, has always had the statement of Christ.

To proceed then, without the benefit of lengthy commentary, let it first be said that the act of salvation is traditionally one of completion.³ In

³ This statement is by no means intended reductively such that salvation defines the static act of being finished with a work. In Christianity, salvation is generally understood as a process whereby Christ restores what is lost in human nature but

Christianity, salvation completes the act of creation, and by this restores what is lost in the experience of history. Yet, considering the examination of an archive, the question is twofold. Why is the Christian historical experience opened as the experience of incompleteness; and how is it possible that the solution to this puzzle can be conceived dogmatically as significant?

It is at this point that the shadow effects return, but this time with the claim that part of the act of that "second" echo (which is the act of [mis]taken constitutive perception) is the impression of "necessity" (which accompanies its general projecting [i.e., constituting] as emergent event onto the speculative horizon). As it has been consistently stated, every point of emergence is at once a point of collapse, or of constriction, of possibilities. Thus

human nature as such persists in its activity and in its dependence on the work of Christ. If this were not the case, there could be no consideration of evil, on the part of the Church, or of good works. Schleiermacher states, "This new life of course presents itself as something in process of becoming, for the individual identity persists and the new life can only, as it were, be grafted on to the old." Nevertheless, Schleiermacher is clear that something new has happened in that, by belonging to Christ, elements previously lost to human experience are newly acquired again: "...humanity thus becomes a new creature [when Christ enters into its state], and one may regard this entrance as also the regeneration of the human race, which to be sure only actually comes to pass in the form of the regeneration of individuals." See Friedrich Schleiermacher, *op. cit.* (T and T Clark), pp. 776-477.

every actual event in its concrete form emerges by means of and as an act of exclusion in relation to the potential that held it prior to its actual moment of constriction. Secondly, it has been consistently held that the act of exclusion creates out of the potential that had held it a shadow horizon that represents the potential that was the necessary environment for the given historical collapse. But if the moment is to be understood as impressing necessity (if it is to be comprehended as a moment of historicity "in actuality"), if it is to be understood as a moment "present" by means of constriction, it must always remain conditionally related to the potential held for its "being present" at the location of emergence. This is why the event, since its actual being present is due to exclusion, is in and of itself constantly incomplete. By the fact of the production of the event (and the fact that it is a location of constriction) it remains at emergence related to all that was lost at the point of emergence. Every event holds a sense of necessity in relation to its emergence because in order to be it must exclude; but precisely on account of this its "being present" is constantly a witness to a lost potential. Every event holds necessity, but it does so because it is incomplete.

The relationship of the location to the shadows is therefore definitive of the location itself, for every event by the act of emergence as a location holds a relation to the residue of potential that is lost in the act of emergence itself. This means, in terms of the constitutive role of perception, the meaning of the location can only be affirmed historically by the reflective articulation of the sense of its being in relation. In this manner again even though the "shadows" are passive insofar as they are comprehended by the permission of the reception of light, they are positive and constitutive insofar as they are "necessary" for the "locating of a location" and for the articulating of the sense of a moment of exclusion by which there is "location" in an archive.

With the contemplation of incompleteness and the metaphysical credibility of wholeness or completion, the matter can be described as concerning exactly how the constriction impresses the necessity of its identity as event on to the shadows that are concomitant of its location. (Indeed that very necessity indicates the presence of the statement, though it cannot be claimed that the statement causes it.) The event, in effect, orients itself to its shadows as the resolution or completeness of its

fundamental predicament as historicity. In this way, the shadow is the resolution of the events unfolding as meaning. And the whole of this dynamic, it could be said, is the statement.

The figure of Christ in the Christian tradition, outside of the important (though at times misleading) question of the historical Jesus,⁴ is an articulation of the accompanying shadows of the historical Jesus, for the productivity of the historical Jesus is solved by the orientation of his location to the Christ. Or, it can be simply said that Christ solved the question of Jesus; and Jesus produced the problem of Christ. The two events can be seen as simultaneous and impossible to separate, but insofar as Jesus and Christ may be posited as event and solution, the investigation of the history of dogma can include the significant question of how an archive Jesus in effect produces an archive Christ and, therefore, how a Christ statement locates the problemizations of Jesus? The investigation of these questions may not yield

⁴ The question of the historical Jesus is of fundamental significance to the study of the origins of Christianity and to the understanding of the socio-political climate of first century Roman Judaism. The question can be misleading, however, when a positivistic attitude toward the "historical Jesus" excludes the greater appreciation of how impossible the historical Jesus really is. For Jesus is only interesting in the first place because of Christ (otherwise he should not likely even be known historically)

definitive answers, but they can be the right questions to uncover the variant Christ-event forms from archive to archive. Secondly, some indication of how a specific event of Jesus produces, passively and constitutively, the in actuality permissible expression of Christ may also be hoped for. By contrast, the consistent error of normal Systematic Theology is to bypass these complications by mistaking the impressed "necessity" of completion categorically for the positive demonstration of the doctrine of soteriology. It is not that the normal tradition fails to account for historical variation; rather the problem lies in its inability to concede that Jesus is a productivity rather than a necessity.

But this concrete example, which only gives a structure to the in actuality experience of credible speculation in an archive, can still be misleading. To give a structure to the event of the experience of credible speculation cannot be understood to imply the general effort of structuralism, as if the whole explanation could be thought of as a kind super-structure pre-given to all variants of the experience of credibility. Again, the distinction of the expression

and it is not clear to what extent the two presuppositions can actually be separated.

"in actuality" must be emphasized. It is only by virtue of the penetration of the statement into perception by means of the shadow-effects that actual archive acts of perception can be mistaken *in actuality* for demonstrations of the existence of God or of a transcendental realm (or whatever the *raison d'être* of the undertaken inquiry). In the archive, the religious experience rests on the available credibility of the necessity of the perceptual-transcendental experience, a viability produced by the statements of location. The religious experience establishes itself as a communion with a permitted transcendental that, in an apologetic, normal form, constitutes itself (and comprehends itself as justified credibility) by using the matrix of accomplished archival statements. "In actuality" is emphasized then because what is witnessed is not the variation of a superstructure in the setting of historical anomalies (which is what Systematic Theology is committed to) but the actual production of the superstructure itself by the actual emergence of events. It is not a case of history "changing" despite the constancy of the transcendental realm but a case of the constitution of the transcendental realm changing according to the permission of archival productivity.

The archive always permits transcendence; it is only a question of how the productivity of events constricts the historic expression of this "normal" orientation.

The explicit act of articulating the permitted transcendence, which is above rendered as "normal" speculation, will depend on the particular strategies of an archive; but the "possibility" of positing this normal activity as necessarily significant to the human condition (as when the Church so posits salvation) remains linked to the appropriation of the qualified shadows as the perceptual foundations of the metaphysical. The metaphysical, at this point understood as the emergent normal, is sensible and articulable on the basis of the penetration (and indeed pre-givenness) of the shadow effects into perception. And, as the now familiar tautology involved suggests, it is on the basis of this pre-given accomplishment that the normal can be presented as necessary since its foundation, in effect, is commentary on an is-already accomplishment. Salvation "works," in the Christian context, not due to anything inherently given to the human condition but due to the emergent necessity of the event metaphysically posited as the "resolution" of the experience of historicity in actuality (in the

Christian case, the resolution to the experience of "Jesus").

Insofar as it can be said that the metaphysical realm is permitted and, therefore, representative (i.e., apologetic) of the archive, it can also be said that, pertaining to the God concept, the God concept is normal. This means that the experience of God is apologetic in form because it is consequential in relation to the achievement of the archive. And, according to the elaboration above, this also means that the God concept is passive because it is in actual perception before it is an historic articulation. It is, that means, "statement" before it is or can be said. But if the God concept is passive, it is not so in the sense of being ineffectual or in some manner uninvolved in the archive of its emergence. This is why a corrective is offered by the word positive. The God concept emerges by means of necessity which is reflective in perception of what is emergent with the statement. Since perceptual necessity functions constitutively as a transcendental orientation that poses itself positively as the solution to the problem of the event, in the religious sense this relationship can be characterized as a "communion" (that is, a basic relationship carved out by simultaneously being in

problems and resolutions by means of rituals or beliefs) that qualify this orientation. Yet, for reasons of being a form of permission in an archive, the whole activity is called normal and apologetic.

That God is normal, it remains to be said, does not mean that there is nothing revolutionary or re-evaluative to be found in the concept of God. To be sure, the apologetic conception of God can be revolutionary and indeed socially significant in any number of ways. It can contradict the functions of its archive; it can be critically related to social and political activity. When an in actuality account for the possibility of conceiving a God concept is sought, it does not automatically discount the potential creativity of traditional conceptions in the setting of their emergence. However, the undertaking does make at least two claims. It claims first that the general study of Christian Systematic Theology is a normal practice of theology. This means that Systematic Theology remains a conceptual possibility only on the basis of the tacit presence of perceptual projects produced in the archive and out of its shadows. In short Systematic Theology is a *production of God* that reveals more about the archive in which it resides, and upon which it depends, than about mystical experience

or the activity of human faith. Then it claims secondly that traditional Systematic Theology is "serious" theology. This means that since Systematic Theology represents rather than questions the project that makes it permissible, it is a positive theology that fails to grasp itself ironically. Systematic Theology does not account for its activity of creating of God.

(4) The Possibility of Alternative Theologies

Immediately, perhaps, it seems that theology inevitably can be nothing other than normal, for is not the stating of God—the thinking and the writing—constantly a recalling and a depending on the accomplished archive; indeed, is not all metaphysical endeavours like a ship doomed to crash against the apology of the statement and its reflexive presence in the visible?

Here a small but critical distinction can be made between exercises in thought that, as such, are "normal" and those which admit to and struggle with their normality. The latter only is appropriately called critical thinking, which can be undertaken by

means of confronting both the condition of the archive and its inevitability.

In the context of theology, this means that two paths are open. The first path, which is theology A, is distinguished from traditional Systematic Theology, the latter being characterized as an enterprise of normal apologetics. Indeed, theology A in its initial expression, which shall be undertaken, is rather like the critique of Systematic Theology (although it is not limited to this). This is true, however, only practically since, from the beginning, the sense of a different expression in theology must depend upon its immediate environment. On the other hand, in the theoretical sense, theology A investigates a question and engenders an attitude different from what is familiar in traditional Systematic Theology. In place of defending the continuity and development of Christian dogma, where the challenge is to find the keys to express theological doctrine (taken as pre-given) in contemporary linguistic forms (and consistent with the problems produced by those forms), the advantage of theology A arises when, by affirming that challenge as normal, it liberates itself to a new point of orientation. The need to "defend" God is substituted by the inquiry into how God is produced.

The latter question calls forward the dynamics of an archive, its statements and its visibles—in sum its flowing and scattering of power—to contemplate the in actuality perception in an archive of history. The apologetic task is suspended in favour of the task of entering a *comprehension* of an actual order of God sensibility. When this avenue of approach is taken so that, from archive to archive, sensibility rather than continuity is sought (and thus so that archaeology rather than history is undertaken), the undertaking can be expressed as a practice of a “critical theology of history.” It is a critical theology of history because, as such, it is not a history of God but an archaeology of God.

Still such a practice as theology A cannot presume to carry out its task at the exclusion of the critical awareness of itself. Even in the midst of examining the productivity of a past archive and comprehending its normal perception in actuality, theology A is constantly “located” in the contemporary normal of its own productive setting. Indeed, it too constitutes partially the network out of which the past is produced and placed before it as an object of analysis.

Here again is encountered that reflexive turn that turns on itself (that essential and necessary genealogy that complements any task of archaeology) that can be grasped as an advantage. It is this that constitutes the character of theology B. The distinction of theology B consists of its dynamic grasp of its own location and its dynamic comprehension of its own "being present" in an archive. It defends this distinction by irony. Its task is the task of negating itself even as it is present and active as a location; i.e., its irony consists of that self-reflexive turn that grasps itself as the product of the contingencies that it too shares in producing. But its end is not self-negation; its end rather is the taking advantage of its grasp of irony to maintain a unique presence in the archive. This makes it different from normal negativity, against which it stands, that in theology is traditionally called the *via negativa* and, in contemporary terms, sometimes called negative theology (the two not being strictly identical). Theology B, as a way of being present in the archive in a deliberate and simultaneous ironic way, is also called a critical mysticism.

These two forms of alternative theology that finally are mutual and complementary will be expressed nevertheless in separate chapters.

CHAPTER TEN

Theology A

To introduce theology A and to prepare for its general critique of normal Systematic Theology, a return to some of the basic concepts of Foucault is in order. Again, the example of a machine displays most effectively the themes that characterize Foucault's approach to the event and to the notion of history as a series—or even sets of—archives. In addition to the Panopticon, which is the most renowned image more or less rediscovered by Foucault, there is also, in the works of Raymond Roussel, a fictive machine to which Foucault turned. It is a useful image that can serve a preparatory role for the task at hand.

(1) Preparation for the Critique of Normal Systematic Theology

In the imaginative and obscure story of Raymond Roussel, Locus Solus, Foucault discovered a curious world.¹ Roussel's book is the fictive account of a prominent scientist named Martial Canterel who invites

¹ See Michel Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: the World of Raymond Roussel (Trans. Charles Ruas) New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1986.

some colleagues out to his estate. There, he shows off to his guests a series of inventions, each stranger and more complex than the previous. In one, fresh corpses have been injected with a fluid called "resurrectine" that causes the bodies to re-enact perpetually the most memorable event of their past lives. Furthermore, the corpses are caged, for the purposes of display, in a huge glass unit. From this example Foucault draws the conclusion that for Roussel machines do not manufacture beings; they maintain things in their state of being.²

In the Panopticon it was noticed how a machine disperses power and produces the event; but with the Roussel example, there is emphasis on another aspect. Let us say that, in Foucault, in addition to colonial productivity, a machine also functions to safeguard the images produced. In addition to producing space, machines maintain an occupation of space technically by employing certain bureaucracies, upholding certain functions, recording certain transactions, issuing reports, etc. All of these, again, define the operant forms of panopticism.

If some focus is given strictly to Roussel, the unique machine of the Martial Canteral figure easily

² Ibid., p. 14.

breaks down to familiar themes. First, the archive is analogous to the glass containment, for the unit as such frames a totality of events held to sets of constricted possibility. And, perhaps more dramatically displayed than with the Panopticon, it is obvious that one can only be outside of an archive to which one does not belong.³ It is only the observing guests who reason, perceive, and experience at the boundaries of what is present before them.

But when that critical Foucaultian question is raised, that kind of question that turns the matter around by asking how the internal activity unfolds and, more importantly, what accounts for the manner in which it unfolds, the word to rely on is strategy. In Roussel's story, the fluid "resurrectine" can be taken as an archive strategy. The resurrectine acts to manifest order, rigour, stability, and themes by means of the bodies it has enlivened.⁴ To be sure the resurrectine too does not and expressly cannot have a role outside of the very archive for which it exists to display. It is wholly caught up in the space that is at once the accomplishment of its productivity. But in

³ And, one can only "see" from within an archive; and, an archive is always included in the constituting of a second as its object, etc.

spite of this and indeed because of it, the resurrectine in itself is evidence that the strategy "works." By the act of its "enlivening" a whole set of inter-relationships, a whole strategy of power, it cradles the "perceptuality" of the whole scene as event. An archive has a way of managing strategies; that is, it has a way of manifesting its interior to itself. It is by definition capable of sustaining as credible the fictive statements it actively produces.

Now when it is here recalled how strategies were said to define the space of *epistemic* imagining—when (that is) it is seen as that relationship of clustered discourses, that effect of circulating statements, that exclusion and simultaneous permission of possibilities, and that regulation of functions and setting of boundaries—it is a rudimentary operation to re-open from here the concepts of normality and necessity. For the machine in modernity, beyond displaying and distributing certain archival functions, also stabilizes the statement; in a sense, as Roussel's figurative invention so vividly shows, the machine permanently re-enacts the statement as the representation of the accomplished. The machine has a

⁴ See AS, p. 85; AK, p. 64.

"normalizing" function that extends its very mode of representation to the level of an order of perceptuality. The machine, in this sense, becomes the productive instrument of the presumptions of judgement; it is, or at least invents itself as, a judgement-standard. An archive thereby will always rest the necessity of its productivity (or the *raison d'être* of its techniques of displaying) on the space those techniques have opened as a judgement-standard. If this is stated in the fullest way, it means that the tautological condition of the interior of an archive is that the available judgement, so wrapped up in the is-already condition that accounts for its credibility, issues its own "reading" as necessary according to the fiction that composes its very self. The uniqueness of panopticism is only that it has fixed this tautology to the permanency of machines.

The significance for theology follows from the given that every event is accompanied by its sense of necessity, for as "archival" the event is always caught in the fundamental tautology of its own production. Accordingly, the sense of the initial understanding of theology A is the claim that (though the ease of this initial statement is slightly misleading) in an archive the God concept is above all experienced as a

precondition to (and available from the orientation of) the sense of necessity.

There is no doubt that Friedrich Schleiermacher is the most famous and systematic expression of this availability of "reasoning" by way of necessity in an archive. To Schleiermacher the concept of God is pre-conditional to history, and thus the very fact of history was already taken as proof of the existence of God. Furthermore, Schleiermacher felt that history could be categorized according to certain stages of divine consciousness, achieved by his conviction to the teleological nature of history.

Yet from the point of view cultivated by theology A, Schleiermacher's thinking is of interest for an entirely different reason. Instead of using Schleiermacher as a way of rendering some proof for the existence of God (and more significantly, defending the practices of a religious attitude), in theology A Schleiermacher rather offers an avenue to the first basis of the critique of the traditional sense of the concept of God. The basis of this critique rests on the regard of the traditional concept of God, for which Schleiermacher is representative, as a positive

"product" (however fictive⁵) that posits itself as an a priori necessity to the very possibility of conceptual experience.

(2) Theology A and the Critique of Systematic Tradition

It is curious that Schleiermacher's general understanding of self-consciousness and the implication of this human "condition" for the contemplation of religion emerged virtually simultaneously with Bentham's great image of modern progress: the Panopticon. And again, as another parallel, the feeling of absolute dependence (*Abhängigkeitsgefühl*), on which the whole of Schleiermacher's Systematic Theology rests, implies almost to the letter that inwardness and trained self-regard that the Panopticon so deliberately produces. This is not to conclude simply that the parallel indicates a one to one correlation. The intention here is far more modest. What can be said, perhaps significantly, is that there is a competition of strategies noted in the realm of nineteenth century social analysis and theological

⁵ This is not a disparaging term, for I mean it in the sense of *fictive imaging*, which is a positive accomplishment of the archive and of theological investigation. It is not the Feuerbachian claim that God is an illusion.

discourse and that, unsurprisingly, this can be attributed to a set of statements by which the archive in question carves out internally its accomplishment of space. Schleiermacher and Bentham, it could be said, shared not so much a contemporary age as a competitive space; and the series of rationalities by which inwardness came to count as certain knowledge indicates not a comprehensive method but an overlapping of forms produced in similar mechanisms. Inasmuch as Bentham's Panopticon represents an arrangement of relationships that accomplished the nineteenth century, Schleiermacher's critical self-consciousness is representative of the side-effects of that accomplished moment historically emergent as a groundwork for a metaphysics of presence.

Yet, from the perspective of theology A, the central notions found in Schleiermacher remain deceptive on the one hand and incomplete on the other. From the vantage point of an outside "spectator" (who is indeed the archivist), to recall the position of the invited guests of Roussel's Dr. Canteral, it appears that Schleiermacher was deceived in his main proposals—being that the God concept is experienced as necessary and that the feeling of this dependency is primordial—by the shadow effects (i.e., the sense of the totality

of the archive given at any point within it). The shadows impress themselves as "necessary," even though they are rather concomitant events of the event. It is only the sheer "fact" of the totality of the archive, or as above, of the condition of "no outside," that gives to the shadow effects accompanying each archive event an impressed pre-given status to the possibility of the history of that event. And by the history of the event I mean history not only in the sense of the history of all events that precede the event in question but also history in the sense of the actual condition of the event at emergence which is always local and occupying a location. The shadows import a type of transcendental double to the actual event since every event is concomitant in its appearance with the archival totality in which it appears. Hence the privilege taken by theology A lies in suggesting that Schleiermacher's religious *a priori* consisted of substituting for the local experience of the historical condition of concomitant totality a completely "inside" shadow-event that manifestly permitted itself to him according to the availability of his functioning archive (which consisted of the paradigm of a self-transcending self). Schleiermacher, in effect, in a

way similar to Kant's proposed synthetic *a priori*, took himself too seriously. Schleiermacher's attempt to articulate the religious un-conscious remained silent concerning the unconsciousness of its own fictive location. It is not possible, in actuality, when the archive as a whole is considered and when it is accepted that the relationships that compose the archive at once produce its inside experience, to substitute the conditional experience of necessity (again, which reflect the "shadow-effect") with a notion of the totality of experience independent of its conditional matrix of credibility.

What is seen in Schleiermacher is the general characteristic of the tradition of modern Christian Systematic theologies. The appeal to an unconditional and *a priori* ground constantly confuses the effects of history with a transcendental notion of history. Even given that the former can indeed account for the conceptual availability of a God concept in the experience of history, the latter notion nevertheless mistakes the former one as a positively constituted "outside" of history. Yet this traditional step, in which the condition of effects are posited with so much certainty as the unconditional transcendental reality,

is taken on the basis of the interior experience of necessity. The archive's sense of necessity, which accompanies every emergent event, places itself as a window between the shadow effects and their historical manifestation. Necessity constantly allows the shadows to be impressed as wholly essential to the actual moment of perception. When this activity remains unrecognized, the productivity of the God-concept is likewise left uncritically in silence; and in place of a theology that would affirm these fundamental considerations, the "tradition" instead lazily accepts the side-effects unconditionally as self-evident proof of encountered limits and the existence of God.

If this is the mistake of the tradition represented by Schleiermacher,⁵ there remains still an incompleteness to that tradition. Schleiermacher's work was incomplete in the sense that it based itself only on the impression of necessity that accompanies the emergence of an event; Schleiermacher simply took aspects of the experience of necessity as indications of unconditional ground, but he never completed the comprehensive view of history that could have delivered

⁵ I mean of course not strictly Schleiermacher but the theological history of the unconditioned concept of God that he so well articulated.

his *Abhängigkeitsgefühl*⁷ to the intuition of the totality of the archive as a product locally available. In short, the theological tradition still represented by Schleiermacher fails to see that while necessity, as the experience of absolute perception conditioned by the location, always seems to demonstrate the existence of God, it demonstrates really only that the tautology of the archive strategies are at work.

The strategies of the archive work; this means, the archive functions actually to make available certain perceptual experiences that offer, at the moment of their event-ness, potential configurations of the side-effects. One such potential is precisely the desire for the origin, defined earlier as retropectivity, that ties itself to the experience of necessity as demonstrative of the "unconditional" pregiven to experience. In a sense, it could be said that the God-concept emerges historically precisely because "conditionally" it is ineluctable. It is not possible not to have necessity as it is not possible not to have shadows at the point of the event. This is true simply because these two effects define what a

⁷ The "feeling of absolute dependence" described especially in Der christliche Glaube, op. cit., pp. 123ff; The Christian Faith, op. cit., pp. 131ff.

constriction is, and without the constriction of possibility, nothing could take place. Considering religious history from this most basic condition of the archive raises several questions that Christian Systematic Theology leaves unaddressed. Religion, conceived in the most broad terms available to Theology A, is a historic qualification of the relationship to the productivity of the archive strategies. It is a conditional qualification of the side effects an archive allows. From this most general point of view, prior to and outside of the question of mysticism and the greater complexities of religious experience, theology A can boldly analyze religion as the practice of normalizing side-effects (reptroperspectivity, a *priori* reasoning, and consciousness) by doctrines, story-telling, narratives, setting boundaries of belief and practice, etc. When these considerations are focused specifically on traditional Systematic Theology, the claim would at least hold that Systematic Theology is the practice of normalizing God. This means, the practices of defining and defending dogma frame an arena of location in which the retperspective, a *priori*, and consciousness condition of location in an archive are apprehended and qualified

as principles of God-thinking and historic doctrine. Meanwhile, the critical question of the tautology of Systematic Theology and the production of God—the very significant question of how the practices of Systematic Theology produce God—is not raised (and cannot be raised) by the tradition insofar as the emergence of the tradition itself is only a critical qualification its own permission. Schleiermacher's analysis, and that offered by the tradition of Systematic Theology, constantly falls back and even understands itself to be grounded on a continuity of "tradition" that is finally not critically apprehend. In place of being a God thinking theology, traditional Systematic Theology becomes a God producing theology, and it is by this untroubled understanding that it is at once a God normalizing theology.

(3) Outline of a New Critical Theology of History

The critical apparatus of theology A rests on the admission that critical thought cannot by any means escape the tautology of its location and that the demonstration of this is found in the contemplation of archive strategies. Theology A upholds that the tradition of Christian Systematic Theology has been

unable to affirm the first claim and has had no means to examine the second. What is given as two fundamental shortcomings in systematic Theology is picked up by theology A as constructive insights that form the outline of a new critical theology of history.

Before the outline of the new can be pursued, it is certain that from the side of the normal tradition particular objections should be raised. In fact it is easy to imagine a critic who, in defense of the normal understanding of tradition and theology, would raise two difficult questions in parallel to the two claims above. By answering these rejoinders, however, the points made concerning tautologies and strategies come into focus anew and theology A again expresses its strength.

Let us consider the imaginary critic who, in surveying the emphasis on the so-called *in actuality* perception and God productivity, should glimpse the apparent horror of idolatrous considerations. Because theology A uses such phrases to claim that God is permitted, does it not reduce itself to saying that God is equivalent to history? Has not theology A taken away an avenue of transcendental appeal so that, by this, it has eclipsed the possibility of the critique of the setting in which it is practiced?

While the first volley of questions by the critic are indeed poignant ones, they nevertheless remain possible only by assuming certain errors and misconceptions. When critical theology of history claims that God is permitted by history, the appeal is to historicity and contextuality (to the particular Christian experience or *Heilsgeschichte*), not to the general sense of history (to the abstract record of all events or *Weltgeschichte*). There is no sense in claiming, whether by means of theology A or otherwise, that the record of Christian events or Western events or World events abstractly considered is equal to or composite of an object called God. The claim rather is virtually the opposite: Christian history produces the Christian God because, by and in its concrete practice, it opens its historicity as in actuality experience. This condition of opening simultaneously the very presence of what is practiced is not different from practices associated with other religions or indeed practices associated with scientific investigations. The question then is not one of abstract identity wherein it is asked who or what is x and y (whether that x and y are God or history or some equivalency of the two). Rather the question, in the theological

setting, is how? That is, how is God in actuality permission?

When the question of how is pursued, the results are not at all disparaging or in some manner horrifying. When it is said that Christian strategies produce a God form, the claim is that the Christian tradition itself works to define a contextual limitation of the event of God. Therefore, taken positively, the Christian in actuality experience composes a forum of encounter; and the important point for the study of religion is that any religion, including Christianity, cannot be appreciated or comprehended until its permissible framework has been entered. This means, its "productivity of God" (its strategies, its circulation of power, its statements, its visibles, and a myriad of other archival consideration not addressed by the normal tradition) must be accounted for. A more succinct way to recognize this is to say that a religion cannot be known apart from its permitted God-concept that invites to presence an order of being in the world.

The fear that theology A, by taking a constructive approach to history, has affirmed historicity to such a degree that in fact it substitutes itself for God is wholly unfounded. What must be claimed is quite

different. It is the lack of regard for historicity and for its multifaceted complexity—and thus it is the normal traditions surreptitious reliance on shadows and tacit assumption of strategies as “tradition” and “ground”—that eclipses the concrete possibility of difference and thus the fundamental religious notion of encounter. Tradition cannot be known if it is in the end the story of the “same” inasmuch as God cannot be encountered historically if in the end the meeting is with the project of the contemporary archive apology.

Still, even here the imaginary critic could not be satisfied. After all, does not the question of tautology return even for our “brave” theologian A? When God is encountered historically as difference permitted by means of varying constructions in tradition, is not God actually reduced to an encounter with the self (who surely is in all of this the constructive agent)? Has not the whole ontological and transcendental tradition been sacrificed only to result in the elimination of the possibility of understanding religious practices as encounters with a living and changing order of being? Has not too high a price been paid when the “other” is lost wholly to the self?

With this last question, some focus may fall on aspects of theology A heretofore unaddressed. Theology

As it is true progresses on the basis of examining archive *episteme* rather than concerning itself with questions of ontology. Theology A—looking at power/knowledge, events, accounting for the nature and emergent forms of shadow-effects, and asking questions related to strategies and the role of forms of training—upholds that ontological categories arise from (mis)taking shadows as constitutive ground. The substance of the objection from the side of the normal tradition consists of interpreting the lack of regard for ontology as a type of lacuna that is indicative of a crisis of value generally characteristic of so-called postmodern thought.⁹ In distinction from theology A, the normal tradition can affirm ontology in order to place the human condition in the realm of the living God as both the creature of that God and the expression ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) of divine life. Value is seated, in other words, on the intrinsic presence of Spirit in life. In addition, tradition is valuable because it witnesses to the story of the Spirit and its wealth of metaphors in the proclamation of this insight. This respectable critique, against which the intention is not outright dismissal, still remains deceiving in its complaint

⁹ This is the critique impressively upheld by such thinkers

about tautology and continues not to face the difficulties of assuming the built-in continuities of normal theology. Meanwhile, the whole question of "value" (which is both extremely important and problematic) is most appropriately left to the context of theology B.

The focus of the question is returned when it is again affirmed that theology A does not dismiss ontology (for this would be far too presumptuous) but rather seeks to account for it. Ontology is seen as effect, and its constitutive role interpreted as (mis)taking, not for the sake of boasting of a new theology but rather to accomplish the work of entering into an archive's *in actuality* experience of comprehending. And it should be remembered that this task is undertaken precisely to avoid the major error of the normal tradition, which is to miss identifying that anachronistic regard that layers a supposed ontology over past archive orders and then presumes by this to demonstrate doctrinal continuity or progressive historical development. The normal tradition is thus first guilty of a graver tautology not only by simply missing the problem but more significantly by lacking

the ability to address it. The search in Systematic Theology for development and continuity fails to admit to its own role in training the question; it fails to bring its own fundamental regard under critique. Theology A, for its part, is capable of this level of criticism and may rightly return to Systematic Theology and its imaginary defender the accusation of ignoring a far more subtle and therefore potentially more dangerous form of tautology.

The tautology of theology A, therefore, does not consist, as the imaginary defender of the normal tradition upholds, of trapping the theologian in the encounter only of the self. This is rather what is done to the greatest degree in the normal tradition precisely because it has failed to account for its own presence as productive and locating activity. On the contrary, it is because theology A has deliberately recognized and taken account of this factor that it is able shift the problem of tautology to a new plane. Theology A actually seeks to base itself on the assumption that a tautology is always at work simply because strategies are always at work. In any given archive, it must be assumed that the strategies work, and this must be the case since the archive in question is already the expressive fact of its strategies. There

is no way to step behind strategies since they are always already included both in the location of such an attempt and in the reasoning (the setting up and the objectifying) of such a project. Strategies are only apparent after the fact; and this predicament serves to define the condition of historicity.

By the affirmation of the work of strategies, theology A is defending three, possibly surprising, claims. While it rejects the attempt of the normal tradition to penetrate the depth of reality, it does not opt for the Foucaultian idea of staying upon the surface; secondly, while it dismisses continuity, it does not opt for ignoring its significance; and thirdly, while it does not affirm that there are essences in the order of history, it does not opt for the claim that history is meaningless or that essences are illusions. These three characteristics of theology A rest on its first and fundamental principle of the tautology of productivity. These three claims, indeed, may be understood as its outline.

The advice of Foucault was to avoid the problematic aim to "penetrate" the depth of reality (and in this to identify a presumptuous one as the ground reality) but to uncover the strategies that

compose reality and comprehend their productive functions. But this advice (found in the Archaeology of Knowledge), initially curious and attractive and often uncritically accepted, is from the view of theology A ultimately impossible to follow. Simply, it ignores the problem of always already being deeply caught up in strategies, and deeply dependent on their dense and self complementary activity. It is never possible to conclude what constitutes a surface and what constitutes a fold since every event presupposes, in its location, the mutuality of those layers that have enabled it and have held it as the project horizon. Theology A cannot conclude as easily as Foucault that the first step in archaeology is to map the surfaces of emergence⁹ since it is complex enough to understand the subtle place of itself in the very emergence it maps and to avoid positing its exterior at an untroubled distance. Rather it upholds as a first conviction that the archive strategies and their productivity are examined spatially as locations for understanding in actuality experience and for turning the question away from ontology to effects and God-concept credibility.

⁹ AS, p. 56; AK, p. 41.

It is also appropriate to say, to address the second claim, that the turning of theology A to the complexities of historicity is not to undertake the at times strange quest of Foucault to dismiss continuity.¹⁰ The question of continuity is actually of critical importance. Particularly in Systematic Theology (which historically concerns itself with the development of Christian doctrine) it is significant to question the seeing and experiencing of continuity in history not for the sake of theological demonstrations but for the sake of displaying and accounting for the style of its manufacturing. This poses a question of much greater social significance and, at once, turns some attention to the question of responsibility for the "types" of continuity that are allowed to stand socially and politically as knowledge. It is in this sense that theology A is always able to use the turn of its question back on itself as justification for the holding of the theologian as much as the enterprise of theology accountable for the history it examines or the God it defends.

¹⁰ This "quest," one can rightly argue, is often tempered by Foucault in context outside of the Archaeology of Knowledge. Certainly, it is right to say that the problems Foucault raised cannot be reduced, as he said, to proclaiming, "Voilà, long live discontinuity." P/K, p. 112.

By denying that ontology constitutes an avenue to express the ground of being, the third claim of Theology A is voiced. While Theology A remains disinterested in claiming such things as "history has no meaning" or "there is no essence to the historical process," it affirms, again by means of the tautology it recognizes, that strategies position a point of observation and thus manufacture its experience as a position of multiple relations. Theology A accepts as given that the act of combining relations, and relating relations to relations, already assumes an opening of a located and actively productive space. Out of this location, essences in one form or another, albeit manufactured, will always be engaged. Language is the most simple and basic example of this. The only helpful question from the view of theology A concerns the form essences may take and, beyond this, the account of their availability or permission. Hence, while purpose and essence can be easily denied, neither claim accomplishes anything more than entering the endless circle of raising the question of the purpose of denying purpose or the necessary use of essences in opposing essences. Theology A takes the more constructive approach of questioning what practices account for the space of an experience of essence and

by what means is that space manufactured and maintained in an archive. The very nature of these questions illuminate the location of their asking as much as they bring focus to functioning productivities of the past.

The act of affirming tautology is for theology A a fundamental component of its technique. It is the characteristic that brings its archaeological questions into the realm of genealogical examination. By this, as a critical theology of history, it avoids the all too easy tendency of the normal tradition to focus on lost origins or leap to the depths of original being. Tillich, and so Reinhold Niebuhr, relied too greatly on those tacit ontological conclusions wherein a pure form of being is present but covered by the stain of experience in history. A critical theology of history, as that which is upheld by theology A, resists the investigation of depth in favour of location. It remains epistemological by questioning the construction of in actuality perception and genealogical by examining tradition as the setting of constrictive possibility. In theology A, strategies rather than shadows are constitutive of its presence and directive of its quest for understanding.

(4) Ineluctability and Non-essentialism: God in Theology A

It is not possible not to have God. This is an ancient philosophical insight that can find some explanation in theology A.

First, the ancient insight can be expressed in the following manner: insofar as by "God" a first principle or directive is intended, it is not possible to avoid an appeal to such an axiom in the human condition since even to refuse a directive is to uphold the directive of the refusal. This point was probably most famously made by Tillich when, in place of God, he substituted ultimate concern.

The affirmation of theology A is that archives will always have their "gods," though it is able to account for this differently and draw a challenging conclusion.

The condition in the archive of "no God is not possible" is not founded on the universality of being: the conclusion is not based on the normal claim that being is the presupposition and necessary condition of non-being (so Augustine to Schleiermacher). This latter argument holds that being is assumed even in its denial and, therefore, the sense of an originating being (an *a priori* or ground of being) is the constant

orientation of human experience (and the constant problem is to avoid substituting beings for being). But the question of the priority of being is substituted in the archive by the relativity of forces and productivity. In this manner, the question of the priority of being is itself seen to be inclusive of a negativity that is involved in the production of its constricted location. One could only uphold the priority of being by ignoring this constrictive factor and by throwing backward the positivity of its already produced location upon the processes of history from which it emerged. In this act, the located event is taken as a type of demonstration of the event having been implied in the negativity that enabled its emergence. Therefore, negativity presupposes positivity; or being must be prior to nothing. The implications, however, are equally true for the negative. For every negativity is not absolute but located and tied to the event besides which it is a possible orientation. Every event implies a prior negativity of which it is evidence. And as Foucault pointed out, there is no end to this questioning; for the closer one approaches the positive sense of an origin, the further that origin recedes into the negativity that enables it.

Theology A may uphold the inevitability of "gods" but need not do so by entering the unending question of the priority of being. If the affirmation is that the human condition is always the condition of being within forces and always already a produced and productive location, then the event of constriction is always a simultaneous coupling of the positive to the necessary presence of the negative that enables it. There is in this sense an ineluctable necessity that is not itself an essence; or, there is a constant orientation to an essential ingredient that is absent despite the necessity of its presence for constriction. This "ineluctable non-essentialism" induces, despite itself as it were, the need of itself essentially. Theology A seeks to explain that essences arise out of an orientation to what is desirable because ineluctability is unavoidable even though, nevertheless, it is not in itself essential.

It is the desirability of the ineluctable non-essential that accounts for the unavoidability of God. If this problem can be realized in such a manner that it is evident that every archive necessarily desires gods (that is, the productivity of every archive holds an ineluctable orientation toward essences), then it is possible to suggest that the very affirmation of this

condition is at once a grasping of responsibility for the production of God. By this, theology A calls forward and finally leads to an intricate and ironic challenge: one must attempt to live critically, finding no solid ground essentially, in the condition of a constant calling forward of essences that arise ineluctably from non-essentialism. This challenge is theology B.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Theology B

Theology B arises from the implicit irony of theology A; it is by far a more difficult expression since it seeks to speak and to uphold itself within contradiction. It incorporates the notion of transgression, which in a preliminary way can be understood in opposition to permission. In simplest terms, the structure of theology B can be described as a deliberate and permanent orientation from a location to its non-event. The reason why this is described as irony is due to the very condition of the non-event: how it is curiously available because there can be a located orientation and yet how it is simultaneously no longer a non-event as soon as the orientation is undertaken. Thus, the non-event must be in permanent regression. And in this same manner, the orientation toward the non-event is the permanent condition of contradiction grasped as critical presence in an archive location. The elaboration of this critical presence, which is both a presence and absence, can be explained in theology B by the description of a critical mysticism. The difficulties emerge when the "presence" of a critical mysticism is described as a possible archive experience

and when it is distinguished from other "normal" forms of mysticism. These difficulties must now be addressed.

(1) Preparation for the Concept of Theology B

The outline of theology B, which is a critical mysticism based on transgression, is not a "solution" to but a problemizing of traditional theology by virtue of being "un-normal." But this does not mean, and cannot mean if theology B is to avoid a contradictory self-destruction, that it is as such less "archival" or less "permissible" than traditional apologetics. Transgression, however eagerly one may wish to uphold its radical sound, is nevertheless an "event" tied to a location just as is the produced normal. What distinguishes transgression is not merely that, measured against the normal, it is a simple act of delinquency. What is distinctive is that transgression describes counter-activity; it describes a relation between a location in the archive and the archival "beyond" (what in Part II was called the second type of outside). In other words, even though transgression surfaces as "event," it does so as an orientation toward the archive's "nothingness" or its non-event. Transgression, as opposed to delinquency, is always a

defiance of the archive even though it is present because it remains a location in the archive. Its defiance is accomplished by a deliberate relation ordered according to the archival nothing.

To say that transgression is also archival, then, is to claim that it is never other than location and actuality. It continues to belong to the condition of being incomplete and it depends, as equally as normal theology and theology A, on the accomplishment of the archive. What is different is that theology B actively grasps itself as irony; thereby its act of "transgression" is always contemplated locally as a permissible product despite its capacity generally to recognize that such acts are founded on nothingness. Transgression operates according to the archive that permits it, but as with the ironic case of genealogy so transgression. Transgression uses the fact of itself belonging to the permission of itself as a strength of its criticism. Furthermore, in order to maintain its orientation to archival nothingness, it constantly reaffirms the irony of its active presence. If not for this act, a transgressive orientation would only return to an apologetic form by releasing its foundation from nothingness to constitutive perceptivity of the passive yet positive shadows. So it is that even while

theology B is "permitted," it advances its presence ironically as the eclipse of the historicity of the articulation of shadow events. Theology B is the anti-shadow of the actual present by orientation toward nothingness in which it refuses its own emergence as incompleteness and does not resolve itself in and by the shadows.

Yet it is precisely due to the ironic case of theology B that its description always gives itself to contradictory statements even though, as a theology, it is both intentional and consistent. This is true because it is in the archive while it is a defiance of the archive, and if not for the former condition, the latter act would be impossible. Therefore, it can be said that transgression occurs in the social teleology of the archive but is not defined by it; and transgression is located by the project of the archive but is not constitutive of it. All that remains fundamental of transgression is its constant irony: its possibility because it is a production but its identity as a counter-production activity (which is no less a productivity that is again transgressed).

It likewise is appropriate to recall that the formula of transgression, which is inherently the definition of theology B, arises from the Foucaultian

notion of a fold of power. It was the case that the folding of power in the main could be understood according to four definitions: three involving the folding of forces upon themselves and in themselves that account for the structuring productivity of the archive *episteme* (the relationship of its strategies), for the emergence and location of events as power/knowledge, and the definitive relation of that location to its envelopment in power (in Foucault this last was used to talk about technologies of the self but here also was raised the question of archive shadows); and one involving the outside of the horizon of folding potential wherein, at the point of actual constriction, there is a complementary nothing (or non-event). The actual event and the non-event, insofar as they are both held in potential prior to constriction and insofar as they form, in this status, a horizon potential, have emergence opened before them according to the is-already operating *episteme* that limits or holds the archival location. Any potential event, then, as it moves from potential to actualization, locates in the moment of actualization the complementary non-event that had been its potential.

The question must then be, how is this complementary non-event distinguished from what has been previously introduced as an archive shadow? The distinction lies not in the manner in which "nothingness" is available but in the fact that a transgressive orientation is not simply a relation to the un-occurred. A relation to the "unoccurred" would again be an apologetic structure seeking its resolution in its historicity. Transgression is not about the mourning of a lost relation but an orientation that maintains its activity radically by remaining permanently concerned with *what cannot occur* in the archive. For its concern is explicitly not the non-event as representative of the lost but the non-event as the permanently available location of what *is not* in the archive and what *is not* the permission of the archive.

And just as the event at emergence is not singular and isolated but complex and local, consisting within the community of forces that produce it, so too is the transgressive non-event complex and local. This warns that the transgression of theology B cannot be about defining an absolute category representative of the "One." Any "mysticism" that might be associated with

theology B cannot be collapsed to the simple activity of negating any and all positive events. To be sure, the transgressive non-event is available at every point of event, which means that it is co-extensive in the complexities that account for both itself and the event. The non-event is available at every event, and every event, it is true, understood transgressively is also a point of orientation to what cannot be. But this does not mean that transgression is engaged by negating the event. Such again would be a permitted apology arising by a simple succession through the act of negating the event in order to be an event in itself. When it is said that transgression is a specific orientation, the meaning is clear. Theology B transgresses because in place of seeking to make up for events that did not occur, it seeks to be a location in the complexity of events as a relation to the fissures that constantly accompany them. The permanency of this activity is an embracing of irony without being an apology of a constructed permission. Theology B will always be the ironic activity of making sense out of nothing and the courageous act of actualization on the ground of groundlessness.

The last comment calls forward the more practical task of defining those characteristics that mark the

transgressive orientation described as theology B. In the main, it is important to distinguish with greater specificity the transgressive orientation from "negative" forms of theology; secondly, it is important to see how, despite the permanency of its orientation toward nothingness, theology B is a positive activity.

(2) Theology B and Normal Mysticism

The sense of the negative historically, in Christian theology, is expressed by the *via negativa* or the negative path. It cannot be said, due to the very nature of this path, that in one characteristic or another lies its definition and meaning. The *via negativa* constantly defies its definition and its meaning since its role is precisely to break apart these positivities and to place the sojourner of its way before the dark and mysterious abyss that is called God.¹ What

¹ There is in theology perhaps no better articulation of this condition than Karl Rahner's unthematic and thematic expression of transcendental experience, but because the unthematic is necessarily the pre-condition of experience it is genuinely evident in the thematic while it is simultaneously surpassed by it. The thematic gives to us by its being present for us the unthematic which is before it, beyond it, and not contained by it. To explain this, Rahner in various ways uses the *via negativa* as I intend it above: for example, "The ultimate measure cannot itself be measured. The limit by which everything is 'defined' cannot itself be defined by a still more ultimate limit. The infinite expanse which can and does encompass

could be a more effective vehicle to describe theology B, which tries to grasp the non-eventness of its own event, than the *via negativa*?

One problem with the *via negativa* is that its use, in the historic sense, is very much a part of the apologetic tradition of Christian thought; indeed, it is to be described within the work of Systematic Theology. The *via negativa* works not to undermine but to complement the positive accomplishment of Christian doctrine (and in fact historically it is regarded suspiciously only when it appears to fail at this task as, for example, in the case of Meister Eckhart) and, in this, to be the "normal" experience—the demonstration—of theological ineffability. The *via negativa* is given historically as that path which enables and contextualizes a *via positiva*: is this really theology B?

It is best to begin by stating that theology B is indeed a positive theology even though its engagement is undertaken by an orientation that defies positive description. This distinguishes it from the *via negativa* in two ways. First, the *via negativa* does not affirm irony to the same level as theology B and thus collapses

everything cannot itself be encompassed." Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith (New York: Crossroad, 1986), p. 63.

back to ontological assumptions and apologetic norms; secondly, due to this collapse, the *via negativa* does not hold the same structure as theology B, does not undertake the same transgressive challenge, and does not grasp itself as foundationlessness.

The *via negativa* is firstly only undertaken after the accomplishment of the positive;² its role is as if an antidote to idolatry, for by surpassing the positive it denies it an ultimate status. The positive can only approximate the ultimate reality that must, as ultimate, eclipse its rendering, and it is the *via negativa* by which this eclipsing is undertaken. So it is that the implicit formula of the negative tradition holds that the totality of God so surpasses the comprehensible all of human understanding—and even the unimagined which human understanding can bring near to itself—as to be the constant incomprehensibility of the All beyond all at every partial location within it. Here, more or less, is one way to define *Actus Purus*.

² Rahner is again demonstrative of this when he says, *ibid.*, pp. 51-52, that "what we are calling transcendental knowledge or experience of God is an a *posteriori* knowledge insofar as man's transcendental experience of his free subjectivity takes place only in his encounter with the world and especially with other people." Thus Rahner uses his form of the *via negativa* only after this positive affirmation.

By this work, the *via negativa* is ontologically positive; it continues to hold to the concept of the "is" pre-given to the actual concept of God. It does not affirm, and cannot insofar as ontology is its presupposition, the irony of its own role in producing the negativity it uses to undertake the encounter with the incomprehensible positive. Instead it posits and relies on the religious *a priori*, the shadow effect of its own location and activity, that defines the normal permission of its time. The irony of the *via negativa* is limited only to the inversion of the permitted as a means of approaching the tacit presence of the strategies that permit. It is not, in the end, an encounter with nothingness but an encounter with the hiddenness of the principles that permit "encountering"; it is therefore only a paradoxical engagement of the normal. Tillich may have given the most succinct expression to this by saying that "the paradox of every radical negativity, as long as it is an active negativity, is that it must affirm itself in order to be able to negate itself... The negative lives off the positive it negates."³ But in this statement Tillich has not reached the matter completely, for it is not only that the negative must become positive

³ Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven: Yale

in order to surpass itself but that the negative, in its surpassing activity, only achieves the defense of the positive order it assumes. It does not critique itself since it has not grasped itself as location.

It must be upheld that theology B grasps itself paradoxically as a positive negativity that, by this, is a structure different from the *via negativa*. While it remains true that in both the negative path and theology B language is encountered as an event in the archive and thus can be opened as a point of orientation to a negative non-event, it is also here at once that the similarity ends. The content of the negative path is incomprehensible resignation in ontology; the content of theology B is the transgression of permission and its shadows. Transgression, as an activity, cannot be defined by the negative and cannot be approached by the *via negativa*. Rather than surpassing limits in order to stand up front as a mysticism of the "All," transgression is interested in discovering limits and the strategies of their production in order to counter-act them. This recalls appropriately the discussion Foucault understood concerning the Enlightenment. To Foucault, the effort of Kant was to discover the limits of thinking in order to

remain within them whereas "the point, in brief," Foucault claimed, "is to transform the critique [of Kant that was] conducted in the form of necessary limitations into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression."⁴

The transgression of limits, seized out of the position of a permanent orientation toward the non-event, is an active and positive position in an archive that, using the image of a fissure referred to earlier, on the whole can be described as a fissure relationship or fissure orientation. This is an irony that includes three points. As a relationship to non-events, it is a relation descriptive of a constantly renewing location. Every moment of the event of relation is at once a new moment of fissure and a renewed archive position. It is thus an irony that is fundamentally absolute presence. Secondly, as a constantly renewing location, it is as such a presence that must be understood as "held." This means that what is taken as absolute—i.e., as constantly and totally descriptive of the orientation—is presence, but that presence is and only can be location: an orientation on the basis of already productive strategies, already produced statements, and already

⁴ FR, p. 45.

evident visibles. What is called the fissure orientation has thus no absolute in the *via negativa* sense of the All surpassing all but rather holds and locates its negativity locally and relatively to itself as event. Only presence can be absolute since it is totally definitive of the location of the orientation and the potential fissure. To describe this condition, it can be said that the fissure orientation is a presence of held negativity. And, insofar as this negativity is consciously grasped, it is paradoxically a positive position of negative activity. Thirdly, the fissure relationship is one of plurality. This is true because again the relationship is constantly renewal and constantly location. Whereas the *via negativa* seeks the eclipse of the positive so that it may deliver itself to the totality of the singularly incomprehensible All, the absolute of the fissure relation must be the constant affirmation of the produced and productive presence of itself in location. Since that relation is complex, constructive, and relative, its constrictive emergence is itself a coordinate of plural events and, thus, as a point of orientation, open to a plurality of event and fissure relations. In this sense, a final shade of irony lies in the ability of the fissure relationship to see

itself as composite and irreducible, thereby denying it a singularity of identity in the act of its very being-there as presence.

The whole activity of the threefold irony here described, which has been a description of an absolute presence that carefully recognizes its constructed location and the relativity of its orientation linked to a plurality of fissure relations, is in a structural sense a "fiction." This is important to touch on now in that, in the final chapter, it becomes a significant way to describe theology after transgression. For the moment, however, the term is serviceable because theology B is not structured in such a way that its intention is to place itself before the reality of incomprehensibility of the All (the self surpassing self): a task, as stated, that succeeds only by assuming the tacit accomplishment and already working presence of strategies. The intention of theology B is to affirm both the fabrication of the archive and its own location within it. This can be called the task of identifying the forces of production that set the limits of permission and account for the act of constriction. With this identification, theology B is able to affirm the simultaneous fabrication of itself as a presence and the actual workings of its location. As such, it is a

foundation that perceives its foundationlessness; or it perceives its location as a constructed setting. The consequence of these affirmations is the understanding of theology B fictively as "being set" in myth (i.e., the composite context) and "being responsible" for its constructive contribution to the myth that sets it. Since the transgressive orientation, thereby, transgresses the limits of the myth that sets it, its orientation is to a fictive "outside" of non-events and fissures that permit a critical and active presence within the forces of myth making and myth productivity. That the word "myth" is chosen and the word "fiction" is used should not be taken to mean, as it was not so taken in relation to Foucault, that the archive is "not real." The archive is called fictive because it is fabricated, but as a fabrication it is composed of real strategies and real events. Its setting as a whole is called myth because its composite operation works to produce an, as it was explained, "in actuality" experience. However, that fiction and myth should be chosen as descriptive words is justified in order to identify the presence of the fissure relation as an orientation of responsibility. For it is only in the setting of a myth that the transgressing of the limits can be at once the responsible fabrication (fictioning) of new realities.

(3) Theology B and Negative Theology

When it is said, however, that the fissure relation is an orientation toward non-events or nothingness and that its only absolute is given in the affirmation of its own presence, a perceptive theologian (to recall that image of the imaginary critic) would wish to know what difference there is between this so-called theology B and what is more often called negative theology. For negative theology, which identifies a Nietzschean "death of God" theology, also speaks of the fabrication of horizons and affirms the total presence of the moment.⁵

Negative theology, insofar as it is related to the Nietzschean quest, understands by death a nihilism associated with the collapse of transcendental universals that, for centuries, had defined God and the occupation of theology. These universals included those already accounted for in theology A such as ontology and teleology, but in place of the problem of their credible permission (and further problems there associated), the "collapse"—which in theological circles was a collapse

⁵ See, for example, Thomas J.J. Altizer, Total Presence (New York: Seabury Press, 1980). Altizer arrives at his total presence by means of the shattering of the interior of the self which is at once a breaking apart of the theological, transcendental tradition and in itself an awakening to a new universal humanity.

of neo-orthodoxy—engendered the investment of the spirit of God in and with the history of the present. The whole movement here called negative theology has become perhaps the most significant of Christian theological movements in this century for it enabled a theology of the crucified God and a Marxist based liberation theology with its preferential option for the poor.⁵ Negative theology, by its ability to critique the tradition of transcendentalism, is able to counter-act the history of the aseity (and so asceticism) of God with dynamic notions of historicity and compassion. Certainly, theology B by no means intends to deny this significance or denigrate the distinction of many courageous theologians.

Yet there remains a difference worth noting. While negative theology rejected the transcendental categories that defined, if not protected, God, it had—in this rejection—no real way (outside of denigrating “primitives” via Feuerbach) to account for the presence of these categories in history. Because of this, it remains unable to guard against a return, after its initial radicalism, to new if not merely displaced forms of totalitarian notions and normal practices of

⁵ See Jose Miranda, Being and the Messiah (New York: Orbis Book, 1977).

theology.⁷ Indeed, one can pose the question if the contemporary renewal of interests in "pagan" traditions in the West is not at least partially due to the loss of traditional transcendental categories that at times, rather than being exclusively oppressive, were actually socially empowering. The point here, however, is that theology B, because it emerges from the already articulated theology A, can not only understand the inevitability of the emergence of transcendental side effects (i.e., what was called the ineluctability of the non-essential) but, as an actual presence within them, can grasp a sense of responsibility for their forms. Theology B does not in fact reject transcendentalism but transforms it as transgression and uses it positively in the construction of the present responsibility.

A second difference of a more substantial nature lies in the fact that negative theology always has the tendency to take itself seriously (revolutionary, new, and radical). What this comment means to identify is that by a failure to account satisfactorily for transcendentalism (i.e., other than by means of projection and illusion), negative theology leaves for

⁷ Certainly the whole reduction of history to the singular analysis of Marxism or the whole investment of "truth" in scientific methodology (itself a truth of so many assumptions)

itself only the positive space of its actual expression. It does not in fact employ negativity except paradoxically to create its own positivity (and here Tillich's earlier comment regarding this paradox is again appropriate). When its ability to be present is given over to its own positivity, negative theology loses its ability to judge the extent to which it too is a project of a social teleology and a conceptual "in actuality" of its own creation. It does not structure itself in such a way that its projecting presence can be at the same time its own question. Instead it gives itself to the archive as a solution to the problematic of the archival in actuality experience which, in postmodern times, became the loss of the transcendental referent; but its solution is shortsighted insofar as, without a critical movement against itself, it is unable to move beyond the reductiveness of its own positioned reading.³

Theology B is no automatic solution to the shortfalls of negative theology; in fact, theology B is no solution at all—and this is its strength. Theology B intends to be a way of being present in the problematics

exemplifies new forms of normality and training found in the context of negative theology.

³ This is the essential critique of Charles Taylor offers of Derrida. See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 488-489.

of its contemporary archive and of being problemized, so to speak, by that problematic. In a way negative theology does not, theology B has a fully contextual reading of itself and, more importantly, a capacity to transgress itself. It is never painted by its negativity into the reductive corner of its possibility but instead in the constantly tensive irony of its activity it calls to the fore the historicity of its constricted production and fissure orientation. It is a mysticism of a self-transgressing presence; or simply, it is a critical mysticism in place of a negative theology.

(4) Transgression as Liberated Responsibility

When Foucault talked about the technologies of the self, he made the following remarks:

It may be that the problem about the self does not have to do with discovering what it is, but maybe has to do with discovering that the self is nothing more than the correlate of technology built into our history. Then, the problem is not to find a positive foundation for those interpretive technologies. Maybe the problem now is to change those technologies, or maybe get rid of those technologies, and then to get rid of sacrifice which is linked to those technologies.⁹

⁹ From the Howison Lecture, entitle "Truth and Subjectivity," delivered 21 October, 1980, at Berkeley, California. I have taken these comments from personal notes recorded in Paris at the Centre Michel Foucault.

It is in the recognition of presence in the world as fictiveness set in myth that transgression takes up the challenge of these remarks. For transgression is not a correlate to experience that lies somewhere outside of the archival condition; it does not attach itself to the project operating technologies that locate it. It rather releases itself to the activity of being present in those technologies as their frustration to the extent of changing or recreating its own fictive presence and mythic environment. To "get rid of" those technologies, or at least the sacrificial projects associated with them that Foucault speaks of, requires precisely a liberation from and liberal relation to their social teleology; the transgression of theology B intends precisely to engender that liberation.

Yet such a challenge is met, at least initially, only when transgression, born out of an orientation to archival fissures, takes advantage of this liberty to affirm that its very "orientation" remains nevertheless conditional. It can set out, let us say, on the challenge of its presence only insofar as its anticipation is aware of its condition. Transgression

presence. By this it is distinguished from the normal theological activity of grasping a conditional location as somehow misrepresentative, in its finite and relative setting, of the All that encompasses it, thus claiming (in that normal way) that buried in that condition of relative darkness lies the infinite continuity necessary for completion (this being the regard traditionally cast on the Christian incarnation). The transgressive notion seeks to break this circle by recasting its actual presence as orientation toward fissures. This means that the divine possibility is not incarnation as *present-ontos* buried in the ontic but incarnation as *present-orientation* actual by transgression; and in addition, incarnation remains "presence," in the sense of theology B, so long as it defines a motivated *perpetual non-event orientation* in the actual setting as mythology. When this is translated back to simpler terms, it means to say that there is no difference in the transgressive notion of the future between anticipation and fissure. For anticipation is not the work of awaiting the fulfillment of a plan nevertheless already given before hand but the holding of the constant orientation as actual presence. Anticipation

is not tensively related to satisfaction, as in normal theology where the *finis* of the human condition is held tensively to the *telos* of the divine reality, but in relation to constancy. Thereby it may be said that transgressive anticipation is never a satisfied event because it is the perpetual activity of the non-event frustrating the archival normal. Furthermore, the motivation of anticipation is not rooted in the challenge of carrying out the divine programme but in residing in actuality as anticipation. Normal theology is motivated by what ought to be; transgression is motivated by remaining the critical presence of the non-event of what is. Normal theology is an apologetic reflection on the permission of the constricted; transgression is presence in the actually constricted as its frustration. Normal theology is training; transgression is possibility. Perhaps here the figure to recall is Socrates, who said he was the gadfly on the horse called Athens. This reference is well understood when it is affirmed that transgression occurs in the presence of the normal as that activity comprehending its horizon as mythology, which is both the challenge of what is not actual and the frustration of the actually permitted.

While transgression frustrates the actually permitted, it is almost as if a type of fate were at work insofar as its activity is always carried out in the normal. It can transgress only by defying what is already productively available. That is to say, a critical mysticism based on transgression must refuse the colonial project even while being oriented from within it. On the one hand transgression needs to affirm its historic setting as that which holds the possible disposition of the orientation to the fissure; on the other, it deliberately defies its location as the apologetic project. How, in this condition, can transgression counter-produce apology?

While the non-event is understood as the complementary nothingness of the location of event production, it does not elude the orientation of that location. Even as the event emerges as a constricted possibility, the actuality of the event itself likewise constricts the transgressive location and produces the horizon of its orientation. Unless this is upheld, the orientation here spoken of could not be presented as transformative¹⁰ even though, in the same breath, it is

¹⁰ This would be true because the orientation would no longer be an activity in history and in the name of the transformation of history; secondly, it could not be a

fictive and mythological. Unless the transgressive orientation of critical mysticism is undertaken as an actual and deliberate location of transformation, its "production" can only be "deviation," a sort of pointless collapse to delinquency.

In many ways, Foucault exemplified a critical mysticism when he challenged France's prison system. His intentions were not limited to prison reform, the amelioration of prison conditions, or the defense of the rights of prisoners.¹¹ Neither were his acts reducible to those of an anarchist. His quest rather, from within the socio-political fact, was to place himself strategically in orientation toward the outside of the "carceral" archive. Foucault sought to transgress the very structures of the project-reasoning of the prison's existence. In this he understood delinquency as a factor within the productivity of the carceral society, a justifying demonstration reflecting back onto the carceral order itself the need of its own existence. When Foucault spoke of a "carceral

"frustration" because of the lack of relation to history as the setting of the event.

¹¹ Foucault was involved in the founding of the "Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons." He was aided in this task by Daniel Defert, Jean-Marie Domenach, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet.

continuum"¹² and the "carceral network"¹³, both these terms reflected a most poignant conclusion:

the circuit of delinquency would seem to be not the sub-product of a prison which, while punishing, does not succeed in correcting; it is rather the direct effect of a penalty which, in order to control illegal practices, seems to invest certain of them in a mechanism of 'punishment-reproduction', of which imprisonment is one of the main parts.¹⁴

What Foucault actively promotes is a breach of the society of delinquency production. He seeks the frustration of an ethical order that cannot be engaged on its own terms least, by that, its "ethics" continues to produce its "necessity." What Foucault wants is counter-ethics and the employment of his location as productive counter-productivity.

Foucault created of himself a critical presence by his transgressive orientation. This opened to him the permanent activity of critique. In this it can be noted how Foucault took up the irony of the fact of his self positively as simultaneous productivity and defiance. It was by this that he could later speak of a project of the self, and by the same token that theology B can raise the stakes to a social or

¹² SP, p. 309; DP, p. 303

¹³ SP, p. 308; DP, p. 301.

political level. Yet, this activity is never pursued for the sake of totality, that is, as a quest for utopia, but as a self-defying presence, as the ethics of counter-ethics, that permanently places itself before the question of a frustrating critical mysticism, on the one hand, and a productive responsibility on the other.

¹⁴ SP. pp. 282-283; DP., p. 278.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Prolegomena to a New Theology

It is reported that at an early age the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, responding to an admonition to tell the truth, questioned, "Why should one tell the truth if it is to one's advantage to tell a lie?"¹ This comment is not necessarily that of a precocious child so much as the expression of a most basic dilemma of human existence. When the dilemma occurs inside an active cultural system with functioning values and norms, perhaps there is an available answer; however, when cultural specificity is itself affirmed, and one sees meaning as a production of related elements, there is suddenly no bottom to this otherwise innocent question. Truth understood as production does not present the problem of why one should tell the truth or even the problem of what is truth. The new problem is in answering what sort of "truth" ought to be created and allowed to stand within the human community as a guiding principle?

This last question is the critical challenge of theology A and the ethical challenge of theology B. The

¹ Recorded by Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (London: Vintage, 1990), p. 3.

new forms of criticism are not about the pronouncement that there is no such a thing as "truth."² What takes the place of the identity of truth is the social affirmation of responsibility for truth. What takes the place of the normal functions of truth is the creativity of presence as the deliberate engagement of its production.

Christian theology, in the "postmodern" setting, has before it not only certain possibilities of deconstruction and negativity but also of construction and expressly positive renewal. In a vein similar to Nietzsche's pronounced joy at the discovery of nihilism, Christian theology too stands before a strangely exciting horizon: "We have a still undiscovered country before us, the boundaries of which no one has seen, a beyond to all countries and corners of the ideal known hitherto..."³ Within the western context, Christian theology has long since renounced the status of Queen of the Sciences and given up its problematic stature as the house of society's official religion. But this modesty has been a difficult victory and, as seen, the failure to eclipse its apologetic tradition or to comprehend itself

² In itself a highly reductive and useless claim.

³ The Gay Science, 382.

constructively as event remains a peculiar residue of a past that has stubbornly hidden so many critical questions.

This work is foremost an attempt to define that constructive task, evaded by Systematic Theology, and to apply it to the possibility of the concept of God. In this act, some initial steps have been taken toward outlining new challenges for the enterprise of theology. Perhaps above all there is the work of theology A, an archaeology of God. This archaeo-genealogical insight defined the idea of "God" as a communal event emerging reflectively in dynamic power relations that compose social and political fields. Human communities open spaces and epistemic cradles where God concepts function. If there is boldness expressed in theology A, it no doubt lies in its historic reading of God productively and its calling forward social responsibility for "how God is" permitted. By comparison, this type of affirmation exceeds greatly the normal tradition of apology where "God" and "God-thinking" are both passive and defensive in relation to the activity of the archive. In the apologetic tradition, God remains the ultimate justification of normal operations and the produced principle of their measurement.

Under the work of theology B, normal theology is understood as that structure wherein long sought after theological ideals surface out of a shadow and, like the salvation effect itself, tie themselves anachronistically to the recovery of the lost. By contrast, the transgression of theology B does not hold such a backward regard. To be sure, transgression is no automatic assurance of legitimacy to theological endeavours, but what emerges as a possibility in its theological task, what is presented as the transgressive option, is the engagement of human compassion and ethical activity apart from and in spite of the *a priori* tradition of normal theology. This is an advantage insofar as what is avoided is that theological mode of apology in which the question of productivity is lost and the positive claim of responsibility is reduced to passive and reactive renderings. To the concern that such proactive engagement at once poses the dilemma of being present, of being definitive and therefore risking being reductive, it is to be remembered that insofar as the transgressive orientation toward the fissure is held fast, it will always be its own first critic. This is so only because the content of a transgressive act poses its own foundation of critique; that is, a transgressive act is also an

"event" against which stands the non-event as its critical irony and its anticipated presence. Transgression can take up its irony positively only by holding a simultaneously transgressive orientation toward itself and its productivity. For this reason, theology B as a whole is defined as the permanent effect of a critical mysticism and at once the definition of responsibility.

The call of theology A and the tools of theology B are no discarding of tradition but the wholly "systematic" task of reviewing the Christian apologetic for the sake of understanding the *modes of the production of God*. Inasmuch as such theologies assert themselves to be significant questions of human compassion and significant modes of being present absolutely in the world, the outcome can be stated as such: freed from the generalities of Systematic Theology and from its overly confident absolute conclusions, taken together critical theology of history and critical mysticism can place social imperatives ahead of ontological justifications. This is true because they dare to see tradition as construction and transcendentality as permission, thus leaving to the human condition the definitive task of fictive imagining and mythic composing.

When the young Wittgenstein asked the question of truth, perhaps beyond a child-like questioning of the customary order of culture lies the larger question of how lying and truth telling are sensible and by what means they are to be challenged or brought into presence. The means of such a challenge, in theology A and B, is distinctively and deliberately one of fabricating myth.

(1) The Mythic Structure of the New

In the context of theology, the concept of mythology is perhaps the most important yet misunderstood term. Albeit in the case of normal theology, it is commonly understood that myth means world-view and, accordingly, that modern technical science constitutes a "world-view" of no necessarily greater value or legitimacy than ancient experience. But normal theology accomplishes this significant insight by taking "world-view" as representative of fundamental structural precepts that ground the experience of being as such. It takes world-view, in other words, "apologetically" to mean a representation by metaphor (whether of a scientific or ancient order) of a reality that eclipses

in its ultimate expression the human imagination.⁴ In this sense, the biblical account of creation, as much as the natural selection account of evolution or the big-bang account of theoretical physics, not only tells a story but also represents the limits of an engagement of story and being in story. On the other hand, by their rejection of the totalizing nature of Systematic Theology and by their affirmation of a constructive approach to reality (wherein irony is constantly present), the new theologies do not approach mythology in the same representative manner. Is it surprising then that the "transgressive" attitude of critical mysticism and the archaeo-genealogy of critical theology of history should be united in the critique of normal theology for its impoverished understanding of myth?

An inquiry into this matter begins by distinguishing two structures of myth: one is that of normal theology and the other that of the new theologies. The understanding of myth in normal theology unfolds according to what will be called a "real-reality" structure, which will be contrasted by the new understanding called a "real-mythology"

⁴ This general argument of Tillich is found in volume one of Systematic Theology (op. cit.) where the structure of reason, caught up in the predicament of existence, necessarily eclipses itself and leads itself to revelation.

understanding need not be changed even when the "myth" in question is the modern science of evolution or theoretical physics, for the evolutionary process itself as equally as the constantly expanding universe finally brings before itself the wonder of its own incomprehensibility and delivers itself to the mystery of its own process. Hence, the fluctuations that may lie between historical epochs and modes of comprehension do not in normal theology change the fundamental relation established between the historic actual and the transcendental totality; in other words, despite fluctuations, a real-reality structure remains. The new theologies dissent from this investment in consistency since they do not affirm myth as representative of totality. This is true for two reasons, the first being that there is no affirmation of a beginning or end and the second being that transcendence is not apprehended apart from archival permission and the actual condition of the event. The new is real-mythology in the sense that it defines the actual archival setting itself as construction and accordingly understands the very experience of the archive—the fictive way of its being in presence—as myth. Mythology is defined in and with the actual

production of "real" events rather than cast as a constituted representation of the capacity of events to indicate a transcendental reality. Or, the structure engaged here is simultaneous real-mythology as opposed to representational real-reality.

What is important for the new therefore is distinctive from what characterizes normal theology. The longing for the past, for the lost or the fallen, is displaced by the affirmation of the condition of no outside to the archive. In the new, the experience of time itself is myth since affirming no outside to the archive means that the impression of permissible archival shadow effects account for the project of the event. In normal theology, it is the project (the product of time rather than time itself) that is mistaken as myth; that is, the project is taken as the representation of the totality of events that in some manner is proof of the *a priori* necessity of the existence of God; but in the new theologies this is turned around by seizing the project in irony to the effect of understanding its experience in time as myth. Theologies A and B deliver presence in time itself as mythology. It is this structure of real-mythology that

enables the new to be simultaneously self undermining and self constitutive as presence and productivity.

(2) The Novelty of the New

"Is there a thing of which it is said, 'See, this is new'? It has already been, in the ages before us."⁵ Side-effects, shadows, permissions, normal theology, and transgression: are these things new?

There is no doubt some novelty involved when theology tries to understand itself as an effect of the permission of its time, at least to the extent that this is accomplished by examining visibles, articulables, power, and productivity. But there is no novelty involved in an attempt to explain why a God concept exists (Feuerbach), why the history of truth is arbitrary (Nietzsche), and how power produces the location of experience (Foucault). Indeed, even all of these insights can be found again in the precedence of the ancient world.

It may not however be the case that novelty is important. It may instead be the case, in a Heideggerian way, that novelty (when it is pursued purely for its own

⁵ Ecclesiastes 1:10 (The New Revised Standard Version).

end) hinders thinking and that the pursuit of the new covers up the critique of the present. For novelty means that the experienced object is set beside other objects perceived according to the same pattern and compared according to the same judgements.⁵ It means that a new wrinkle has appeared or a new item has been introduced; but it does not mean that "difference" is necessarily present. A novelty shop, after all, is one filled with a fascinating array of things that are the same.

The point of thinking is not novelty; the point of thinking is difference. And even in the case where it is said that Foucault reduces everything to power (the general critique of Habermas⁷), power is not presented as an identity but as the productivity of difference and the sense of emergence and location. In Foucault power precisely is difference; and to grapple with power is to engage in this problematic.

⁵ WCT, p. 33. Heidegger states that "the sciences remain of necessity on the one side. In this sense they are one-sided, but in such a way that the other side nonetheless always appears as well. The sciences' one-sidedness may expand to such proportions that the one-sidedness on which it is based no longer catches our eye. And when man no longer sees the one side as one side, he has lost sight of the other side as well. What sets the two sides apart, what lies between them, is covered up, so to speak. Everything is leveled to one level. Our minds hold views on all and everything, and view all things in the identical way."

⁷ Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," New German Critique 22 (1981), pp. 3-14. In this article Habermas refers to Foucault as a young conservative. The background and sense of this critique is followed up by Nancy Fraser, "Michel Foucault: A 'Young Conservative'?", Ethics 96 (1985), pp. 165-184.

When theologians confront Foucault, it is often the apparent novelty of his forms of analysis that hide the significance of his thought for the study of religion and the general sense of ethics. In the case of Mellor and Chidester, referred to earlier in the preface, it is the novelty of Foucault's emphasis on context (into which the workings of power and technology are introduced) that appear to set the agenda. Foucault gives an impetus to a new theology that would be a theology inclusive of the whole social fact.

Mellor and Chidester have not gone far enough. There has always been to theology the means of a sociology of religion. Foucault may add a few new clichés but these will surely wear thin after the "Foucault effect" has run its course. Importing Foucault's language to the setting of theology does not automatically create theological thinking, especially when the importation is of the style that seeks to accomplish what is already possible according to the already accepted practices.

"Newness" is only genuinely possible when that which creates the "new" is put to the question: when the order of seeing is itself the question of seeing. This is far closer to Foucault's intent. To see God or

religion in context is not to see God at all; to see God is to see the seeing of God, which is to leap to the ground of the position of seeing, which is another question entirely.³

But is it then that in the question of the novelty of the new theology one should turn rather to such statements as Winquist's who holds that "theological thinking is relevant because it is a discourse that can transgressively display the otherness of its semantic achievement"? Is it the novelty of the new theology that it can (as an act of the irony that has already been displayed) see itself as its own otherness? Perhaps there is some merit to this. After all it has been claimed consistently that only from the point of view of power and location can an act of theology be transgressive in relation to the normal apologies that surround it. It is only by "seeing" the fissure, and by being actively oriented toward it, that the permanent critique and the permanent revolution of the moment is possible. This is, is it not, a leap to the ground?

Yet it is the case too that Winquist himself runs into danger while he is busy pointing out the danger of

³ Cf. WCT, p. 41, where Heidegger states, "A curious, indeed unearthly thing that we must first leap onto the soil on which we really stand."

the "liminal" experience. Liminal experience can claim itself unique or precious and thus can, in its own positioning, totalize itself as equally as any "normal" point of view. There is nothing in the liminal that stops its position and its articulation from becoming a new kind of stability and a new kind of centrality, perhaps even more vicious than that to which it was initially opposed. Winquist's answer to this is that "theology needs to stay on the margins to be itself,"⁹ but this is impossible. Being "on the margins" is a false security and at times an irresponsible one. In the first place, every position of articulation is already a position of permission; therefore, the margin is not as "marginalized" as is often thought. Margins produce centres inasmuch as centres produce margins. The ~~relativity of this dialectic cannot be turned away from~~ since it is already assumed in the very act of turning. Secondly, due to their co-productivity, attempts to secure the margin can be attempts to give up responsibility for the forms of life. It can be, that is, to deny the problem of power even in the margin. Is it really possible to pursue theology on the basis of categorically denying its presence and responsibility?

⁹ Op. cit., p. 308.

The development of the "new" is not, on the one hand, a simple novelty of the same order of other types of novelty found on a shelf beside it. Neither is it undertaken to turn finally to an isolation and forsake both the power and responsibility of its presence. The promise of the new theology, of theology A and theology B, of a critical theology of history and a critical mysticism, is precisely to affirm presence and the productivity of being present. This means, it is an affirmation of the theological task of creating God.

In reviewing the progress through the archive, it is evident that in difference to Mellor or Childester (or indeed to theologians generally who see Foucault as a type of mechanism of some usefulness¹⁰) Foucault is important not to solve the question of context, or even raise it more complexly, but to answer the question of thinking in an archive. Foucault is a philosopher of struggle not only with the question of truth or its productivity but also the ethical place of the location that is carved out by its activity. Foucault is a philosopher of struggle in that he not only examines the sociology of truth as that activity which places truth

¹⁰ For example, Pasewark uses Foucault perhaps skillfully but nevertheless like something handy in a toolbox to examine power.

before us but also examines it as that activity that hides truth from us by the presumptions of its own productivity. We are put before the question, with Foucault, not as seekers of knowledge but as problemizations of it and revolutionaries in the presence of it.

This critique holds true for Winquist, whose option for liminal space is only half the struggle. Indeed, the "struggle" only begins after this option has taken place, for it is the first step of the leap to the ground. Theology A and theology B can be taken together as such a step, but in this their uniqueness needs to be upheld. With critical theology of history, the point is to comprehend the mechanisms that construct the experience of *being before the question of truth* historically as being in the archive and being at a location. But this affirmation is taken to be constructive since it is at once the very practice that Winquist avoids: it is the practice of comprehending location not as passive and consequential but active and productive. Only by the second affirmation does it make sense to speak of responsibility since it is only by the picking up of the question that the question actually is before us. Winquist's position, in the end, is impossible since it

does not see its avoidance of the question as equally a picking up and a putting before. Theology B is also a picking up of the question, but in this case it is so in such a way that its concern is no longer the archival experience of the historicity of the past but the present question of "being in" the archive as critical presence. Critical mysticism, or theology B, takes up the challenge of theology A in (so to speak) its own backyard. From the point of critical mysticism the liminal experience is important insofar as it may describe the encounter with nothingness. Critical mysticism uses the encounter with the non-event or "fissure" of its location as a point of orientation that is permanently revolutionary in relation to the event and to itself as event. Critical mysticism constantly turns on itself as its own critique, but this is for the engagement of the present and the engagement of itself as presence. Here is perhaps the novelty of the new: that it sees itself and it sees its nothingness as products equally presented by the emergence of its location. This is novelty because it is simultaneous difference given as a way of being present in the world.

Charles Davies wrote, concerning Foucault, that "freedom is not the abolition or destruction of power, but a relationship of permanent provocation; it is the

refusal to submit the recalcitrance of the will in the network of power relationships."¹¹ The new theology concerns this kind of freedom but with the added insight that the "refusal to submit" is already a partial defeat or giving up of freedom to that position that must be assumed in the seeing of what must be refused. This added insight, this new "novelty," in which theology A and B are combined, is the essential point of freedom but also the essential task of being responsible.

¹¹ Charles Davies, op. cit.

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





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