V

The Institut's Analysis of Nazism

> State capitalism is the authoritarian state of the present . . . a new breathing space for domination.
>
> — MAX HORKHEIMER

> The very term "state capitalism" is a *contradictio in adiecto.*
>
> — FRANZ NEUMANN

"We were all possessed, so to speak, of the idea we must beat Hitler and fascism, and this brought us all together. We all felt we had a mission. That included all the secretaries and all coming to the Institut and working there. This mission really gave us a feeling of loyalty and belonging together."[1] So Alice Maier, Horkheimer's secretary in New York, described the Institut's overriding concern in the late thirties and early forties. Common purpose, however, did not necessarily mean complete analytical agreement, as we shall see in the present chapter. The continuing influx of refugees from Europe into the Institut's affairs brought with it new and sometimes conflicting perspectives. In some cases, such as that of Adorno, who became a full-time member in 1938, older trends in the Institut's work were reinforced. Adorno's approach to fascism rested on the same psycho-social assumptions that had informed the *Studien über Autorität und Familie.* Theoretically, he was very close to Horkheimer, as we have seen in Chapter 2. With other new entrants into Institut life, however, this uniformity of approach was no longer the case. The three additions who were most important were Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, and Arkadij R. L. Gurland. A fourth, Paul Massing, had little direct impact on the debate, although his place in Institut affairs after 1941 was an important one in other respects. The presence of these men in New York contributed to an enrichment of the Institut's investigations of Nazism, but also led to a subtle challenge to the basic premises of Critical Theory.

Of the three, Neumann was the most influential, largely through the impact of his now classic study of Nazism, *Behemoth*,[2] a book, as we shall see, in many ways at odds with the work of the older members of the Frankfurt School. Neumann came to the Institut in 1936 on the recommendation of Harold Laski, one of the Institut's sponsors in London and Neumann's teacher at the London School of Economics. He was not, however, totally unknown to the Institut, having met Lowenthal in Frankfurt in 1918, where they were both instrumental in the founding of the Student Socialist Society. London, his initial place of exile, had proved uncongenial, despite Laski's efforts to help him become established; as Neumann later wrote, English "society was too homogeneous and too solid, her opportunities (particularly under conditions of unemployment) too narrow, her politics not too agreeable. One could, so I felt, never quite become an Englishman." [3] America, however, offered a more hospitable welcome, and Neumann chose to spend the rest of his life on this side of the Atlantic.

Before the emigration, his life had been that of a political activist as well as a scholar. Neumann was of the same generation as the Institut's inner circle around Horkheimer. He was born in 1900 into an assimilated Jewish family in the town of Kattowitz near the Polish border. Like Marcuse, he first became politically involved in the Soldiers' Councils at the end of the war. During the Weimar period he became increasingly committed to the moderate Marxism of the Social Democratic Party, although he was to the left of its leadership, whose policies he often disputed. His political activities were of sufficient magnitude to lead to his arrest in April, 1933; escape to London followed after a month of imprisonment.[4]

Neumann's academic background differed from most of the Institut's other members. His university training at Breslau, Leipzig, Rostock, and Frankfurt was predominantly legal rather than philosophical. In Frankfurt he studied with the distinguished jurist Hugo Sinzheimer, whose other students included such future refugees as Hans Morgenthau and Ernst Fraenkel. In the half decade before the collapse of Weimar he lived in Berlin, where he gave legal advice to the SPD and one of its affiliated unions, and wrote for a number of scholarly and political journals.[5] At the same time he taught at the famed Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (German College of Politics), which sent other scholars such as Arnold Wolfers, Hans Simon, Ernst Jaeckh, and Sigmund Neumann (no relation) to American universities after 1933. Neumann also maintained a legal practice in Berlin, which on occasion brought him before the Federal Supreme Labor Court. As might be expected, his expertise in German law proved useless in England. And so, under Laski's guidance, he set out to retrain himself in political science. In 1936, the year he joined the Institut, Neumann was granted a doctorate by the London School of Economics.

Coming to political theory from his legal background, Neumann had a different perspective from Horkheimer and the other members of the Institut's inner circle. His Marxism, so they always felt, was less dialectical and more mechanistic than Critical Theory. Neumann was also far less concerned with the psychological dimension of social reality than Horkheimer, Fromm, or Adorno, which also served to distance his work from theirs. In short, although it is clear that Neumann possessed an analytically probing mind, which the others recognized, he was generally considered closer in many respects to Grossmann and Wittfogel, despite his distaste for their Stalinism.

Neumann's first contribution to the *Zeitschrift* in 1937 reflected his legal interests.[6] In it, he traced the changing function of legal theory in bourgeois society, with particular emphasis on developments in the twentieth century. He focused, among other things, on the vaunted liberal notion of equality before an impersonal law, which, he contended, served as an ideological cover for the rule of the bourgeoisie and an aid in the operation of a free-enterprise system dependent on legal calculability. The so-called rule of law, Neumann suggested, contained a deception, in its refusal to admit that behind the laws were always men, or more precisely, certain social groups.[7]

At the same time, however, he pointed to the positive side of liberal theory, with its guarantee of at least a minimum of legal equality. "Equality before the law is, to be sure, 'formal,' i.e., negative [the distinction between positive and negative freedom made in the previous chapter will be recalled]. But Hegel, who clearly perceived the purely formal-negative nature of liberty, has already warned of the consequences of discarding it." [8] In so reasoning, Neumann paralleled the arguments of Horkheimer and Marcuse on the place of formal logic: although inadequate in itself, formalism provided a vital safeguard, which substantive rationality, whether legal or logical, ignored at its peril. Formalism, in short, was a genuine moment of the dialectical totality, which ought not to be simply negated.

Neumann then turned to an analysis of the function of legal formalism, with special emphasis on the notion of the generality of the law, in Weimar and after. Generality, he pointed out, had enjoyed a recent resurgence of support among legal theorists after a brief eclipse around the turn of the century. Only now, its function was very different from what it had been in the heyday of liberalism in the nineteenth century. The source of the change had been economic: "The postulate that the state should rule only by general laws becomes absurd in the economic sphere, if the legislator is dealing not with equally strong competitors but with monopolies that reverse the principle of the free market." [9] In other words, generality no longer served the same equalizing function as before. Its obsolescence was in fact recognized by Weimar's authoritarian successor, which had replaced it with an arbitrary, nonegalitarian decisionism. Fascist legal theory, to be sure, claimed to have introduced "institutionalism," which replaced the legal individual with institutions or corporations. But, Neumann argued, this was an ideological facade for decisionism, because the institution was "divorced from the context of power relationships, without which it is unintelligible." [10]

Thus, Neumann concluded, law in the fascist countries was illegitimate, because it lacked the generality of liberal, positivist law without being grounded in the rational foundations of natural law.[11] Furthermore, he implied, the trend in nonfascist countries was in the same direction: "Under monopolistic capitalism private property in the means of production is preserved, but general law and contract disappear and are replaced by individual measures on the part of the sovereign." [12] In other words, political existentialism, which Marcuse had discussed in an earlier *Zeitschrift* piece,[13] had permeated the fascist legal sphere and threatened to do the same in all other societies dominated by monopoly capitalism.

In his next essay in the *Zeitschrift*[14] Neumann indicated the legal alternative he favored. Here he was in agreement with the other members of the Institut: reason ought to be the source of law as well as the ground of all social relations. All the doctrines of natural law that Neumann examined in his article were rooted, he claimed, in a concept of man as a rational being. Neumann expressed his agreement with Hegel, who had attacked the previous forms of natural law but not the notion of rational law itself. "We must not be driven," he wrote, showing Horkheimer's influence, "to the extreme of positivism, pragmatism, and perhaps still further to a nihilistic relativism. . . . The truth of a doctrine will depend upon the extent to which it embodies concrete liberty and human dignity, upon its ability to provide for the fullest development of all human potentialities. It is thus in the historic development and the concrete setting of the natural law doctrines that their truth must be determined." [15]

All varieties of natural law, he continued, are rooted in the belief that the principles of law can be somehow derived from the lawfulness of nature, a lawfulness in which man himself shares. They are thus incompatible with a radically historicist politics such as Aristotle's, which defines man solely in terms of his socio-political existence. There must be a doctrine of man's underlying nature, Neumann argued, in a way that showed some divergence from Critical Theory's "negative anthropology." There of course had been many different notions of human nature, ranging from the optimism of Locke, Hooker, and the anarchists to the pessimism of Epicurus, Spinoza, and Hobbes. In contrast to both extremes Neumann expressed sympathy with what he called agnosticism, which characterized man in the state of nature as neither good nor bad. Here he singled out Rousseau as the most articulate spokesman of this position: "[Rousseau's] agnostic view believes that only in civil society can man's original rights merge with those of his fellow citizens into one collective right."[16] Natural law theories, if based on an optimistic view of man's innate nature, logically lead to anarchism; if pessimistic, they imply absolutism. The agnostic view, on the other hand, can lead to a democratic state in which "the sovereign power then ceases to be sovereign, is no longer an external power confronting the subjects. It is rather society itself which governs and administers itself."[17]

In short, of all the theories of natural law — and Neumann discussed several others, such as the Thomist and the constitutionalist — he found most congenial the one that corresponded to the isonomy of positive freedom, implying the identity of rulers and ruled. Accordingly, he rejected the argument that political power and state authority were inherently wicked, at least in the period before the perfect identity of particular and universal interests had been achieved.[18] Here he agreed with the general assumption of Critical Theory that the one authority, legal as well as political, that men should follow was that of reason. And accordingly, because natural law theories were rooted in a normative rationality, they were necessarily critical of prevailing legal conditions.

The source of Neumann's distance from Horkheimer and the other members was not in this conclusion, but rather in the legalistic approach he used to derive it. It also arose from his psychologically spare characterization of man as already endowed with reason, which ignored all the findings of the *Studien* concerning the sway of irrational forces over modern man's behavior. Still, in many ways, Neumann's essays on legal theory in the *Zeitschrift* demonstrated the influence of his discussions in the Institut and of Horkheimer's editorial suggestions. The real quarrel came with the publication of *Behemoth* in 1942.

Before embarking on a discussion of this formidable work, the two other new Institut members who contributed to the analysis of Nazism should be introduced. In fact, in many places *Behemoth* reveals the influence of their collaboration. Of the two, Otto Kirchheimer[19] was the more active participant in Institut affairs. In many ways his background was similar to Neumann's. Five years his junior, Kirchheimer was born in 1905 in Heilbronn, also of Jewish parentage. From 1924 to 1928 he studied law and politics at Münster, Cologne, Berlin, and Bonn. His teachers included Max Scheler, Rudolf Smend, Hermann Heller, and perhaps most importantly, Carl Schmitt. Kirchheimer's doctoral dissertation at Bonn was a contrast of the socialist and Bolshevik concepts of the state, strongly influenced by Schmitt's decisionism and his notion of the "emergency situation." [20] During the waning years of Weimar, Kirchheimer, like Neumann and Gurland, participated in SPD affairs, lecturing in trade-union schools and writing for such journals as *Die Gesellschaft*.

The most trenchant of his writings during this period was an analysis of the Weimar constitution, *Weimar — And What Then?*,[21] which combined insights from both Marx and Schmitt. During the late twenties Kirchheimer expressed little sympathy for the reformist wing of the Social Democratic Party, but was equally reluctant to embrace the Jacobin notion of the party advocated by the Leninists further to his left. Like Schmitt, he argued that true democracy could exist only on the basis of a unified people, free of social contradictions. Where he broke with his former teacher, however, was in rejecting the idea that the racial nation was such a homogeneous community. To Kirchheimer, as a Marxist, true unity was reserved for the classless society of the future.

In the period before the Nazi take-over of power, Kirchheimer, like the members of the Institut then in Frankfurt, preserved a guarded hope that the proletariat might still fulfill its historical role. In 1932 he argued against the importance of mass culture as a sufficient explanation of the working class's reluctance to realize its revolutionary potential. Here, of course, he was more optimistic than his future colleagues: "However one may evaluate this process Ortega y Gassett has called *The Revolt of the Masses*, it seems clear that the condition which is interpreted either as self-limitation or as submission of the masses, depending on one's ideological attitude, belongs to the past." [22] In fact, Kirchheimer's optimism led him to argue that the corporate-institutional state that Schmitt had lauded for transcending social antagonisms was in fact sharpening them. Because of his faith in the revolutionary potential of the workers, Kirchheimer was able to argue that the SPD ought not to support the presidential government of Brüning, despite the arguments to the contrary of more moderate Socialists.[23] To Kirchheimer, the authoritarian "state above the parties" was less an obstacle to fascism than a prelude.[24] The way to prevent Weimar's collapse to the right was to accelerate its potential to the left.

In 1933, of course, his optimism proved faulty and Kirchheimer, like so many others, was forced to flee. In Paris, his first way-station, he was able to join the Institut's branch in 1934 as a research associate. During his stay in the French capital, he began writing for French legal journals[25] and worked on a critique of the Third Reich, which was published in Germany pseudonymously and under the ostensible auspices of the then Councillor of State Carl Schmitt.[26] In 1937 he resettled in New York as a research associate at the Institut's central office.

In New York Kirchheimer was assigned the completion of the work George Rusche had begun in 1931 on the relationship between penal practices and social trends. The result, *Punishment and Social Structure*, published in 1939, was the first of the Institut's major works to appear in English.[27] Rusche had completed the first part dealing with the period before 1900; Kirchheimer picked up where he left off, writing a final chapter on fascism and, with Moses I. Finkelstein's help, translating the manuscript into English. The basic premise of the study was that "punishment must be understood as a social phenomenon freed from both its juristic concept and its social ends. . . . Every system of production tends to discover punishments which correspond to its productive relationships." [28] In examining such modes of punishment as imprisonment, fines, solitary confinement, deportation, and forced labor, Rusche and Kirchheimer were able to demonstrate a rough correlation between such variables as the labor market and the circulation of money on the one hand and specific penal forms on the other. In his chapter on changes under twentieth-century authoritarian regimes, Kirchheimer pointed to the general collapse of legality in the period of monopoly capitalism, which Neumann had noted and which Kirchheimer himself was to explore in a subsequent *Zeitschrift* essay.[29] "The separation of law from morality," he wrote, "as an axiom in the period of competitive capitalism, has been replaced by a moral conviction derived immediately from the racial conscience." [30] The result, he argued, was a much harsher penal policy, characterized by the reintroduction of capital punishment and the decreased use of fines. Statistics in Germany, as well as in France and England, however, demonstrated no connection between such penal measures and the crime rate. Only social change, he concluded, could lead to a decrease in the rate of criminal offenses.

Kirchheimer's contribution to the Institut's analysis of Nazism came in a series of articles he wrote for the *Zeitschrift* and for its successor in late 1939, *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*. Before turning to these, which we shall do when discussing *Behemoth* later in the present chapter, we must complete the account of the Institut's new members. Some attention must also be paid to the work of the older Institut figures, whose analyses of Nazism contrasted in certain respects with Neumann's and Kirchheimer's. The third new entrant who wrote extensively on Nazism was Arkadij R. L. Gurland. Gurland's association with the Institut, however, was shorter than Neumann's or Kirchheimer's, lasting from 1940 to 1945, and his influence was correspondingly less. Born in 1904 in Moscow, the son of an engineer, Gurland went to gymnasia in Moscow and Sebastopol before coming to Germany in 1922. There he studied economics, philosophy, and sociology at Berlin and Leipzig, writing his doctoral dissertation at the latter university on the concept of dictatorship in the materialist theory of history.[31] In the late twenties Gurland became active in the SPD, contributing to affiliated publications such as *Der Klassenkampf (The Class Struggle)*, which was to the left of the party leadership.

Many of the positions Gurland took at the time were similar to those advocated independently by the Institut. For example, he strongly attacked Karl Kautsky's mechanistic materialism, in favor of a Marxism that recognized its roots in Hegelian dialectics.[32] He also chided the Communist Party for its subservience to Moscow and its unwillingness to jeopardize its party structure to make a revolution.[33] Like Kirchheimer and Neumann, he was a member of the SPD's left wing, imploring its membership to engage in active *praxis* instead of waiting for capitalism to collapse from the weight of its own contradictions. And like both of them, he was driven into exile by the events of 1933. In Paris his career in political journalism was difficult to sustain, and Gurland began to retrain himself as a student of Nazi economics. By the time he came to New York and the Institut in 1940, he was writing almost exclusively on that subject. Despite his earlier interest in philosophy, Gurland did not contribute anything theoretical to Institut publications. His work for the *Zeitschrift* showed more of an affinity for the approach of his former colleagues in the SPD than for that of Critical Theory.

If Neumann, Kirchheimer, and Gurland brought with them ideas somewhat unlike those nurtured in Frankfurt and matured in New York by the Institut's inner circle, they were not the first in the Institut's history to differ with Horkheimer's approach. We have already discussed Wittfogel's more orthodox Marxism and the diminution of his association with the Institut. Henryk Grossmann, the last member of the Grünberg generation of Institut members to remain on its staff, was also a more orthodox Marxist critic of Critical Theory.[34] After several years in London and Paris, Grossmann emigrated to New York in 1937, but his connection with the others on Morningside Heights became increasingly tenuous during the next decade. In fact, the last significant contribution he made to the *Zeitschrift* was his long critique of Borkenau's *The Transition from the Feudal to the Bourgeois World View*, which appeared in 1934. Except for occasional reviews, thereafter his work ceased being published by the Institut. During the late thirties he worked at home rather than in the Institut's building on 117th Street. The termination of the *Zeitschrift* during the war prevented the publication of his study of Marx's relationship to the classical economists,[35] which he had spent much of his time preparing with the major objective of stressing the severity of Marx's repudiation of their work. In the forties several of his pieces appeared in non-Institut journals.[36]

Clearly Grossmann's most productive period had been in the decade before 1933, which culminated with his treatise on the collapse of capitalism. The disruption of European intellectual life brought about by the Nazis helped prevent it from receiving the attention it might have earned at a less turbulent time. Thereafter, the dislocation of Grossmann's personal life added to the waning of his productivity. In America Grossmann led a lonely and isolated existence, having left a wife and children behind in Europe. In New York he had no official connection with Columbia or any other university and scarcely more than a formal one with the Institut. There is also evidence to show that in the early forties his intellectual differences with other Institut members were supplemented by strains in personal relationships.[37] Grossmann's continued support for Stalinist Russia did little to endear him to the others.[38] In addition, according to Alice Maier,[39] he began to fear that his former countrymen, the Poles, were intent on hurting him. Ill health brought on by a stroke compounded his general unhappiness. Finally, after the war he decided to try to resettle in Europe. Unlike some of the other Institut members who returned to Frankfurt, Grossmann went to Leipzig, where the East German government offered him a chair in 1949. The Institut helped him ship his belongings, but by then his bitterness had led to a complete break. Thus only indirectly, through Mrs. Maier, did word reach them of his disappointment with Leipzig in the short time before his death at the age of sixty-nine in November, 1950.

Grossmann's ideological inflexibility prevented him from having much impact on the Institut's analysis of Nazism, or on much else in its work for that matter. It would, however, be a very great mistake to assume that the Institut's analysis of the crisis of modern society completely lacked an economic dimension. Almost every issue of the *Zeitschrift* had an article on an economic problem. Gerhard Meyer analyzed the emergency measures of the Western democracies and their relation to a truly planned economy.[40] Kurt Mandelbaum wrote from London on technological unemployment and the theory of economic planning.[41] Critiques of non-Marxist economic models were made by "Erich Baumann" and "Paul Sering" (a pseudonym for Richard Löwenthal).[42] Joseph Soudek, who helped Pollock with administrative matters in New York, contributed occasional reviews. Even Felix Weil returned to write a few essays on related matters.[43] Further discussions of the relationship between economics and technology were added by Marcuse and Gurland.[44] In short, although the Institut often castigated vulgar Marxists for their economic determinism, it still acknowledged Marx's insight into the crucial role of the economy in capitalist society.

It would, on the other hand, be an error to argue that these economic analyses were really integrated into the heart of Critical Theory. Horkheimer and Adorno, however broad the scope of their interests and knowledge, were never really serious students of economics, Marxist or otherwise. In fact, Horkheimer's attempts to discuss economic theory were greeted with considerable skepticism by the more orthodox Marxists in the Institut.[45] Even the non-Marxist economists like Gerhard Meyer remember how uneasy the relationship was between the Institut's leaders and the economic analysts.[46] There seems to have been some residue of the long-standing German philosophers' distaste for the more mundane world of getting and spending.

Where Critical Theory broke new ground was in its argument that the role of the economy had changed significantly in the twentieth century. In fact, the debate within the Institut over the nature of fascism centered largely on the character of that change. *Behemoth* shared many of the same assumptions about the nature of monopoly capitalism with orthodox Marxists such as Grossmann. The older members of the Institut's inner circle, on the other hand, followed the lead of its associate director, Friedrich Pollock, who, despite his administrative duties, found time to devote to scholarly pursuits.

The centerpiece of Pollock's work was his theory of state capitalism, with which he described the prevailing trends of modern societies. In large measure, the theory was an extrapolation of his earlier analysis of the Soviet economic experiment.[47] Pollock, it will be recalled, did not feel that Russia had succeeded in introducing a truly *socialist* planned economy. In fact, one of the reasons for the Institut's relative silence on Soviet affairs was its belief that the Russian economy, despite its unique qualities, was a variant of state capitalism. As early as the first issue of the *Zeitschrift* in 1932, Pollock had discussed the prospects for achieving a stabilized capitalist economy despite the Depression.[48] The conclusions he drew were directly opposed to those of crisis theorists such as Grossmann, who predicted the demise of the system within a relatively short period of time. Pollock pointed instead to the growing use of economic planning by government direction as a means to contain capitalist contradictions indefinitely. He also discussed such additional factors as the deliberate encouragement of technological innovation and the effects of an increasing defense sector, which contributed to capitalism's staying power.

In 1941 Pollock extended his observations about the durability of the system into a general theory of state capitalism.[49] Liberal laissez-faire economics, he argued, had been superseded by monopoly capitalism. This in turn had been replaced by a qualitatively new form of capitalism, characterized by governmental direction. Although the authoritarian regimes of Europe had been the first to introduce extensive controls, the Western democracies, including the United States, were likely to follow. Unlike both earlier stages, state capitalism suspended the free market in favor of price and wage control. It also pursued the rationalization of the economy as a deliberate policy, assumed control over investments for political purposes, and restricted consumer-oriented commodity production.

What perhaps distinguished it most strongly from earlier capitalist phases, Pollock argued, was its subordination of individual or group profits to the needs of the general plan. Social relations consisted no longer of the interaction of employer and employee, or producer and consumer through the mediation of the market. Instead, individuals confronted one another as commander and commanded. Although not completely lost, "the profit motive," Pollock argued, had been "superseded by the power motive." [50] One reflection of this, he continued in a way reminiscent of James Burnham,[51] was the loss of control by stockholders over management. The traditional capitalists were becoming little more than *rentiers* living off diminished profits.

The general prognosis for collapse that emerged from Pollock's analysis was bleak. Forced full employment through public works was being used by state capitalism to forestall Marx's predicted pauperization of the proletariat. Problems of distribution were solved by administered prices and predefined needs. Overaccumulation, which

Grossmann had especially stressed, would be solved by the continued expansion of the military sector of the economy. In short, a new system of directed capitalism now existed, and was likely to endure for some time.

Pollock's pessimism was, however, cautiously tempered by certain qualifications. The contradictions of capitalism — class struggle, falling profit rate, and so forth — were not truly resolved, as they were to be in a socialist society. Moreover, the state, which had seized control of the economy, was itself directed by a mixed ruling group of bureaucrats, military leaders, party functionaries, and big businessmen (the same components as in Neumann's analysis). Conflict among them, although currently minimized, was by no means an impossibility. Other sources of possible instability in the system included the natural limits on resources and skills and the friction that might arise between popular demands for an increased living standard and the needs of a perpetual war economy. Still, the general trend that Pollock saw was in the direction of the proliferation and strengthening of state-capitalist economies. Pollock finished his article by posing several questions about the viability of a democratic as opposed to an authoritarian state capitalism, questions whose answers he said could be given only by history.

In his next essay in the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, entitled "Is National Socialism a New Order?," Pollock focused on the Nazi variant of state capitalism. In opposition to Gurland and Neumann, he argued that almost all the essential characteristics of private property had been destroyed by the Nazis. No longer was investment for maximum profits an inalienable prerogative of big business. Although Nazi planning was still haphazard, the government had introduced a deliberate, and generally successful, policy of full employment, capital rather than consumer production, price control, and relative economic autarky. The individual's position in Nazi society, Pollock continued, was now dependent on his status in the social hierarchy rather than on his entrepreneurial skill or private property.[52] In general, technical rationality had replaced legal formalism as the guiding principle of the society.

In short, Pollock answered the question posed in his title affirmatively. That Nazism was a truly "new order," he argued, drawing on the Institut's studies of authority and family, was shown by its deliberate attempt to hasten the disintegration of the traditional family,[53] which had been a bulwark of bourgeois society. The old capitalist order, even in its monopolistic stage, had been an exchange economy; its successor was what the Nazi economic theorist Willi Neuling had called a "command economy."[54] The Nazis had thus achieved the "primacy of politics" over the economy.[55] Unless they lost the war, Pollock concluded with characteristic pessimism, their system was not likely to collapse from within.

In stressing the politicization of the economy, Pollock was very much in the mainstream of Critical Theory. If the Frankfurt School refused to develop a discrete political theory, as we have argued in Chapter 4, it equally rejected a purely economic approach to social theory. In his article "Philosophy and Critical Theory," which appeared alongside an essay by Marcuse with the same name, Horkheimer had made it clear that he considered domination by the economy a purely historical phenomenon. It would be a mistake, he argued, to judge the future society according to its economic form. Moreover, "this is true for the period of transition in which politics gains a new independence in relation to the economy." [56] The fetishization of the economy was left to more orthodox Marxists, such as Grossmann. Economic relations were always understood as representing relations among men in all their complexity, although admittedly they were the reified form in which capitalist men tended to relate to one another. The profit motive, Pollock stressed, had always been a variant of the power motive.[57] Today, however, the mediation the market had provided was disappearing. Domination was becoming more blatant in the "command economy" of the authoritarian state-capitalist systems. In so reasoning, it should be noted, Pollock was still in the Marxist tradition, in the sense that Marx had always understood economics as "political economy." Inherent in all of Marx's economic writings, even *Capital,* was the underlying assumption that economic relations were basically human interactions, which in capitalism were variations on what Hegel had called the "master-slave" relationship.[58]

Thus, in creating his model of state capitalism, Pollock was speaking for Horkheimer, and probably Lowenthal and Adorno as well. (Marcuse, who was personally much closer to Neumann, adopted a position nearer to Neumann's in *Reason and Revolution*, where he wrote: "The most powerful industrial groups tended to assume direct political control in order to organize monopolistic production, to destroy the socialist opposition, and to resume imperialist expansion.")[59] To Horkheimer, however, state capitalism was "the authoritarian state of the present . . . a new breathing space for domination." [60] In all his work during the late thirties and early forties, Horkheimer stressed the end of the liberal mediations, economic, political, and legal, that had previously forestalled the realization of the domination implicit in capitalism (which he was later to expand into the entire Western "enlightenment" tradition). As he wrote in his preface to a special volume of the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* devoted to the transition from liberalism to authoritarianism, "With the advent of fascism, dualisms typical of the liberalistic era, such as individual and society, private and public life, law and morals, economy and politics, have not been transcended but obscured." [61] The essence of modern society had been revealed as domination by "gangsters." [62] Racket protection, Horkheimer argued, using one of Benjamin's favorite categories, was the "ur-phenomenon" of modern domination. The notion of rackets, it should be added parenthetically, was also prominent in Kirchheimer's analysis of Nazism.[63]

In the service of domination, Horkheimer argued, the ruling groups employed a technological rationality, which, as he often noted, was a betrayal of reason's true essence. Connecting this indirectly with one of his philosophical *bêtes noires,* he wrote: "Fascists have learned something from pragmatism. Even their sentences no longer have meaning, only a purpose." [64] In "Authoritarian State" he developed a critique of technological rationality, which applied as well to its socialist practitioners, anticipating many of the arguments he was to develop with Adorno in *Dialectic of the Enlightenment.* The locus of his analysis of fascism had thus shifted away from the orthodox Marxist concept of the last stage of monopoly capitalism to a more general analysis of technology. This was related to the critique of Marx's own overemphasis on the process of production and his fetishization of labor, which we encountered in Chapter 2 when examining the foundations of Critical Theory. When in "The Jews and Europe" Horkheimer wrote that "he who does not wish to speak of capitalism, should also be silent about fascism," [65] it should be understood that he meant state capitalism, not its liberal or monopoly predecessors.

In fact, Horkheimer's distaste for the technological rationalization of advanced capitalism led him to express grave doubts about a socialist movement that saw itself as its inevitable successor. Engels and others like him, Horkheimer argued,[66] who equated the socialization of the means of production with the end of domination, were the true utopians. In fact, the naive expectation of freedom as the result of such a socialization anticipated the authoritarian state of the present. The perverse alliance of Lasalle and Bismarck was a symbolic expression of this fact. True freedom, Horkheimer argued, could be achieved only by breaking out of the technological straitjacket that state capitalism had forged and that socialism, at least as embodied in the Soviet Union, had perpetuated. Appropriately included in a volume of essays devoted to the memory of Walter Benjamin, who shared the belief that the realization of freedom could only come from a rupture in the continuum of history,[67] "Authoritarian State" expressed the most radical strains in Critical Theory. In one of his most important statements, Horkheimer wrote:

> Dialectics is not identical with development. Two antagonistic moments, the take-over of state control and the liberation from it, are contained together in the concept of social revolution. [Social revolution] brings about what will happen without spontaneity: the socialization of the means of production, the planned direction of production, and the domination of nature in general. And it brings about what without active resistance and constantly renewed struggle for freedom will never appear: the end of exploitation. Such a goal [social revolution] is no longer the acceleration of progress, but rather the jumping out of progress [*der Sprung aus dem Fortschritt heraus*].[68]

In 1942, when this was written, Horkheimer did not yet despair that such "active resistance" might yet be forthcoming. Here he remained somewhat more optimistic than Pollock. "The eternal system of authoritarian states," he could write, "though terribly threatening, is no more real than the eternal harmony of the market economy. As the exchange of equivalence was still a shell of inequality, so the fascist plan is already open theft. . . . The possibility is not less than the despair." [69] The cement of fascism, he argued, was not merely the psychic compliance of the authoritarian personality, although this was very important. It was also based on the constant and unremitting application of terror and coercion.[70] The various components of the ruling class were themselves united only in their common fear of the masses, without which they would dissolve into a band of squabbling gangsters.* [71]

Moreover, Horkheimer argued, the material conditions for the realization of freedom had finally been achieved. Like Marcuse, who developed this idea in his article on technology in the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, he maintained that the end of scarcity, as well as new forms of domination, might possibly result from the spread of the technological ethos. In fact, the break with the past for which he called was now dependent solely on the wills of men. In the most direct expression of what might be called a "Luxemburgist" or syndicalist strain in Critical Theory, he wrote: "The modalities of the new society are first to be found in the course of its transformation. The theoretical conception, the council system, which according to its pioneers is supposed to show the way to the new society, arises from *praxis.* It goes back to 1871, 1905, and other events. The revolution has a tradition on whose continuation theory is dependent." [72] Thus, instead of a Leninist transitional dictatorship, Horkheimer seemed to support the direct seizure of control by the people. The choice was clear, he wrote: "a retreat into barbarism or the beginning of history." [73]

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* As Brecht's play *The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui* shows, many refugees saw the Nazis as gangsters, at least metaphorically. Not all did, however. Hannah Arendt, for example, in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1958), wrote: "The totalitarian form of government has very little to do with lust for power or even the desire for a power-generating machine. . . . Totalitarian government, all appearances not withstanding, is not rule by a clique or a gang. . . . Isolation of atomized individuals provides not only the mass basis for totalitarian rule, but is carried through to the very top of the whole structure" (p. 407). Miss Arendt singled out *Behemoth* for criticism on this score in an accompanying footnote. Later, in the aphorism "Massengesellschaft" in *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno also abandoned the gangster comparison and argued that the fascist leaders were basically the same as the masses they led. In Chaplin's *The Great Dictator*, they pointed out, the dictator and the barber were the same man.

Yet despite the hortatory note of "Authoritarian State," it was becoming increasingly apparent to Horkheimer that the chances for barbarism were greater. In the same article he expressed for perhaps the first time the argument that the life of the mind was becoming the last refuge of revolutionary *praxis,* an argument that was to appear with increasing frequency in the subsequent work of the Frankfurt School. "Thought itself," he wrote, "is already a sign of resistance, of the effort to allow oneself no longer to be deceived." [74] Once "barbarism," or at least its fascist embodiment, had been defeated, without leading to the "beginning of history" that had seemed its only alternative, Critical Theory began to question the possibility of *praxis* itself in the modern world.

To discuss this development in any detail now, however, would be to leave our central concern, the Institut's treatment of Nazism. As mentioned earlier, Neumann, Kirchheimer, and Gurland brought with them different viewpoints from those of Horkheimer, Pollock, and many of the older Institut figures on such questions as the nature of the Nazi economy. Of the three, Kirchheimer was perhaps closest in spirit to Critical Theory, despite the more positivistic bent of his mind and the legalistic basis of his education.[75] His first article in the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* after the publication of *Punishment and Social Structure* showed a continued interest in criminology.[76] In analyzing criminal law in Nazi Germany, Kirchheimer distinguished between two phases in the development of legal theory after 1933: the authoritarian and the racist. In the former, which lasted only briefly after the seizure of power, Roland Freisler's volitional notion of law prevailed, stressing the subjective motivations of defendants rather than their objective acts. It was soon superseded by the antinormative, antigeneralist "concrete" legal theory of the so-called Kiel School of "phenomenological" law.[77] Here the judge's intuition of the "essential" nature of the defendant replaced the judgment of his actual actions. Crimes committed by omission were extended; the "social feelings of the people" as revealed through the pronouncements of their leaders and the rulings of the judicial bureaucracy influenced judicial decisions, even to the point of retroactive legislation. Departmentalization of jurisdictions — the SS, the labor service, the party, for example, all had separate legal hierarchies — replaced the unified system of criminal law that had prevailed before 1933. In short, the judiciary had been transformed into a dependent administrative bureaucracy increasingly responsive to the ideological demands of the state.

One of the major contentions of the phenomenological school, and of Nazi political theory in general, was that it had brought together the spheres of law and morality, which had been separated in liberal jurisprudence. In a subsequent essay Kirchheimer sought to express the ideological nature of this claim by revealing the underlying character of Nazi law. Of the old pillars of liberal law, private property and liberty of contract, Kirchheimer argued that the former, although still in existence, was "heavily mortgaged to the political machine,"[78] while the latter had been rendered practically meaningless. In one sense then, Nazi legal doctrine had bridged the old liberal gulf between the private and public realms, but only at the cost of the liquidation of the former. The Nazi claims of a "concrete" policy had been realized in certain areas, such as anti-Semitic legislation and pro-populationist measures (for example, reducing sanctions against illegitimate births and supporting larger families). But in most other areas, such as agriculture, where the ideology of "blood and soil" had been sacrificed to the demands of modernization, this was not the case. In fact, the basic thrust of Nazi law was in the direction of that technological rationality that Horkheimer had emphasized. "Rationality here," Kirchheimer wrote, "does not mean that there are universally applicable rules the consequences of which could be calculated by those whom they affect. Rationality here means only that the whole apparatus of law and law-enforcing is made exclusively serviceable to those who rule." [79] Still, Kirchheimer did not go as far as Pollock in describing the new order as postprivate capitalism: in Kirchheimer's words,

> The concentration of economic power which characterizes the social and political development of the Nazi regime crystallizes in the tendency toward preserving the institution of private property both in industrial and agricultural production, whilst abolishing the correlative to private property, the

freedom of contract. In the contract's place the administrative sanction now has become the *alter ego* of property itself.[80]

Yet Kirchheimer, more than Neumann or Gurland, felt that the power of the state, or at least the ruling clique around Hitler, was basically unchallenged. In a broader discussion in the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* of the political changes that had occurred under the Nazis he offered his reasons.[81] He distinguished three phases of political compromise in recent Western European history. In the liberal era, a "complex of working agreements among parliamentary representatives and between them and the government" prevailed.[82] The influence of money in politics was particularly strong. Around 1910, however, the elements in the compromise began to shift as the era of mass democracy came of age. Voluntary organizations of capital and labor were the major participants in the struggle for power, with the central banks acting as mediators between the economic and the political spheres. Monopolies replaced individuals in both politics and economics. In the third period, which began with the rise of fascism, the influence of economic factors had declined drastically. The fascist governments were too strong to be toppled by an investors' strike or other manifestations of private economic pressure. Although monopolies obviously still existed in such areas as labor (government-controlled), industry (still private), and the so-called Food Estate (also private), the government had seized the whip hand. In fact, the Nazi party was now involved in creating a competitive economic apparatus of its own, which helped increase its bureaucratization. But this meant a betrayal of earlier Nazi promises: "The party proved no support for the independent middle classes in their struggle for survival, but, instead, actually hastened their final decline more than any other single factor in modern German history." [83]

The new structure of political compromise that resulted from all this was now dependent on the Führer and his clique. With money no longer a real expression of social power, "leadership" had become the arbiter of intergroup conflicts. These were relatively frictionless only because of the expansive nature of fascist imperialism, which permitted a division of the spoils among all the competing elements of the ruling coalition. "It is this interdependence between the unquestionable authority of the ruling group and the program of expansion which offers the characteristic phenomenon of the compromise structure of the fascist order, directs its further course, and decides its ultimate fate." [84]

The imperialist dynamic of Nazism also played a key role in the analyses of Gurland and Neumann. In his first article for the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*,[85] Gurland focused on the importance of economic expansion as a means to prevent conflict within the Nazi system. Although admitting that the government sector had grown significantly, he opposed Pollock's argument about the drastic reduction of big business's power. The government, he asserted, represented the antimonopolistic resentment of the petite bourgeoisie, but without really challenging the prerogatives of the entrenched business interests. In fact, the discontented *Mittelstand* (white collar workers, small business owners, and petty bureaucrats) had always wanted less the destruction of big business than a sense of participation in its prosperity. With imperialist expansion, this yearning had been fulfilled to the benefit of both the government and big business. In opposition to Pollock, Gurland stated that "expansion guarantees the realization of the profit motive and the profit motive stimulates expansion." [86]

Although Gurland agreed that technological rationalization had been advanced under the Nazis, he did not feel that this spelled the end of private capitalism. In fact, the bureaucratization and centralization of the economy had started within and among private corporations well before the Nazis took power. These private conglomerates, Gurland argued, were still much more powerful than such Nazi competitors as the Hermann Goering Steel Works. The technological innovations that Pollock had stressed were more the work of these concerns, especially in the chemical industry, than of the government. Moreover, although managerial growth had certainly taken place, this too did not mean the transformation of capitalism, for "those who control the means of production are the actual capitalists whatever they may be called." [87] The managers still derived their income from profits (although not from dividends, as had the traditional stockholders). In short, the system as Gurland understood it was still monopoly capitalist, although based on the condominium of political bureaucracy and economic managers united in their pursuit of imperialist expansion.

Gurland's unwillingness to discount the perseverance of monopoly capitalism was also shared by Neumann, to whose *Behemoth* we can now finally turn. Ultimately to become a classic, although suffering a relative eclipse during the Cold War, *Behemoth* was a work of enormous and painstaking scholarship, all the more remarkable for Neumann's distance from his sources. In several areas, such as the history of the German labor movement, Neumann was able to draw on his own personal experience before 1933. All of this was recognized by Horkheimer and the other members of the Institut's inner circle, but Neumann's conclusions and the methodology that he had used to derive them were sufficiently foreign to Critical Theory to prevent the inner circle from considering *Behemoth* a real expression of the Institut's views.[88]

There were, to be sure, some similarities between his approach and theirs. Neumann, for example, minimized the independent importance of anti-Semitism and racism in general,[89] as had Horkheimer in all his writings from *Dämmerung* until the war. He went so far as to call the German people "the least anti-Semitic of all," [90] a belief curiously shared by the other Institut members.* Neumann also agreed that fascism lacked a true political theory because of its irrationalism, whereas a "political theory cannot be nonrational." [92] And finally, he felt that the system would not inevitably collapse from within without conscious political *praxis:* "The flaws and breaks in the system and even the military defeat of Germany will not lead to an automatic collapse of the regime. It can only be overthrown by conscious political action of the oppressed masses, which will utilize the breaks in the system." [93]

Yet the differences were on the whole more significant. Neumann's general disdain for psychology has already been mentioned on several occasions. Like the left-wing historian Eckart Kehr, whose influence on Neumann was considerable,[94] he felt that psychoanalysis was little more than a bourgeois ideology. *Behemoth* did contain a short section on the psychology of charisma, but it ignored the Institut's earlier work on the authoritarian personality entirely. There was scarcely anything in *Behemoth*'s more than six hundred pages (including an appendix added in 1944) to suggest that Neumann accepted Fromm's notion of the sado-masochistic character type. Furthermore, in his analysis of the failure of the working class during Weimar,[95] Neumann ignored Fromm's study of the ambivalent mentality of the German proletariat.

More central still was his disagreement with Pollock's notion of state capitalism. To Neumann, "The very term 'state capitalism' is a

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* When I mentioned Neumann's remark to Lowenthal, he said that many of the Institut's members thought the Germans less anti-Semitic than the Americans they had come to know after emigrating to this country. The discrimination to which they referred was social, which was practically unknown in Weimar, rather than political. All the Institut members with whom I spoke stressed how completely assimilated they had felt in Germany before being forced to leave. This attitude towards the amount of anti-Semitism in Germany was echoed in the 1939 prospectus the Institut prepared on the general problem, in the *Studies.* Today the following statement, which was included in the prospectus, sounds more than a bit naive: "While frank disgust for the anti-Semitism of the government is revealed among the German masses, the promises of anti-Semitism are eagerly swallowed where fascist governments have never been attempted." [91]

contradictio in adiecto." Quoting Hilferding, he continued, "Once the state has become the sole owner of the means of production it makes it impossible for a capitalist economy to function, it destroys that mechanism which keeps the very processes of economic circulation in active existence." [96] That the "primacy of politics" and the managerial revolution had not yet been achieved Neumann set out to prove by examining the German economy empirically. In doing so, he also made it clear that he did not share Pollock's general gloom about the invulnerability of the system: "The present writer does not accept this profoundly pessimistic view. He believes that the antagonisms of capitalism are operating in Germany on a higher and, therefore, a more dangerous level, even if these antagonisms are covered by a bureaucratic apparatus and by the ideology of the people's community." [97]

The evidence he first cited was the testimony of the Nazi leaders themselves, none of which seemed to indicate a deliberate policy of state control.[98] Neumann then presented considerable data concerning the increased cartelization and rationalization of big business that had taken place during Weimar. This process, he contended, had created an unstable situation in which the economy was becoming more rigid, more susceptible to cyclical changes, and vulnerable to pressures from the discontented masses. As a result, the state had to intervene to break the increasingly explosive deadlock. Its choice was clear: "Shall the state crush monopolistic possessions, shall it restrict them for the sake of the masses, or shall interference be used to strengthen the monopolistic position, to aid in the complete incorporation of all business activities into the network of industrial organizations?" [99] To Neumann, the answer was obvious: the Nazis had taken the latter course, despite their propaganda to the contrary. Still, Neumann's analysis was more complicated than the orthodox Marxist position, classically expressed by George Dimitrov at the seventh World Congress of the Comintern, that fascism was "the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, and most imperialist elements of finance capital." [100] To Neumann, "The German economy of today has two broad and striking characteristics. It is a monopolistic economy — *and* a command economy. It is a private capitalistic economy, regimented by the totalitarian state. We suggest as a name best to describe it, 'Totalitarian Monopoly Capitalism.' " [101]

This was demonstrated, he continued, in such ways as compulsory cartelization legislation. The rulers and benefactors of the new monopolies, he argued, were not the new managers, but in most cases the old private entrepreneurial individuals or families. The Nazis, he pointed out, had refrained from nationalizing most industries; "on the contrary, there is a definite trend away from nationalization." [102] Even the construction of the party's alternative economic structure did not spell the end of capitalism. "On the contrary, it appears as an affirmation of the living force of capitalistic society. For it proves that even in a one-party state, which boasts of the supremacy of politics over economics, political power without economic power, without a solid place in industrial production, is precarious." [103] In short, although a command economy was in the process of being created, it was by no means replacing the old monopolistic capitalism. In fact, Neumann argued, agreeing with Gurland, the two could survive side by side as long as imperialist expansion permitted the satisfaction of the claims of the various groups in the ruling elite.

That Neumann distinguished among groups within this elite — big business, the party, the military, and the bureaucracy — showed that he was not positing a simplistic view of fascism as solely the creature of the monopolies. "This does not mean," he wrote, "that National Socialism is merely a subservient tool of German industry, but it does mean that with regard to imperialistic expansion, industry and party have identical aims." [104] Still, unlike the analyses of Pollock and Horkheimer, Neumann's was rooted in more traditional Marxist categories. Pollock had written of the power motive. In reply, Neumann remarked: "We believe that we have shown that it is the profit motive that holds the machinery together. But in a monopolistic system profits cannot be made and retained without totalitarian political power, and that is the distinctive feature of National Socialism." [105] The new order that Pollock had described was really not so new after all.

Nor were such theorists as the New School's Emil Lederer, an old Institut foe, correct in calling Nazi Germany an amorphous mass society without class differentiation. In fact, the Nazis' atomization of the masses had stopped short of the self-atomization of the elite. If anything, Neumann argued, "the essence of National Socialist social policy consists in the acceptance and strengthening of the prevailing class character of German society." [106] Where Neumann did agree a change had occurred was in the class solidarity of the lower and lower middle classes. The Naxis had introduced a new hierarchy based more on status than on traditional class, thus reversing Sir Henry Maine's classic formula about the transition from status to class.[107] This had been accomplished by a deliberate attempt to atomize the masses, a process whose ramifications Neumann explored in analyses of propaganda, terror, labor and wage policy, and Nazi law (based largely on his and Kirchheimer's earlier articles in the *Zeitschrift* and the *Studies*).

Neumann's more orthodox class analysis prevented him from seeing domination in technological terms, as the group around Horkheimer was beginning to do. Like Gurland, he felt that the rationalization and centralization of the economy were not incompatible with private capitalism. In fact, the technological revolution had "originated within the very mechanism of capitalistic production, refuting the belief of those who hold that capitalism has lost its dynamic." [108] Yet Neumann felt it possible that the tension between the logic of technological rationalization and the demands of profit-maximization might increase in the long run. "We believe," he wrote, "that the antagonism between the engineer, by whom we understand all technicians and foremen, and totalitarian monopoly capitalism is one of the decisive flaws in the regime." [109]

Still, the major burden of Neumann's argument was that, contrary to Pollock, Nazism was a continuation of monopoly capitalism, albeit by other means. *Behemoth*, however, had a secondary thesis as well, which corresponded somewhat more closely to some of the notions of the Institut's inner circle. This argument was reflected in the book's title, which referred to Hobbes's study of the chaos of the English civil war of the seventeenth century. To Neumann, "National Socialism is — or [is] tending to become — a non-state, a chaos, a rule of lawlessness and anarchy." [110] Not only was "state capitalism" a misnomer, but the existence of a state in any traditional sense was itself questionable. Instead, domination was becoming more nakedly unmediated without the buffer, however imperfect, provided by the liberal state.

In other words, Neumann, like Horkheimer and the others, felt that the semi-humane mediations of the past were rapidly being eroded in the authoritarian states. Where they disagreed was in their descriptions of the nature of the unmediated domination. To Neumann, it was still along the lines of capitalist over exploited worker, without the state acting to lessen the viciousness of the class conflict. He could therefore still write, "there exists objectively a profound antagonism between the two classes. Whether or not it will explode we do not know." [111] To Horkheimer, on the other hand, the domination was becoming increasingly psychosocial, without the buffering of the capitalist market. Following Pollock, he asserted that the state was the main perpetrator of the domination, which also included the deliberate application of terror and coercion. In time, however, the role of the state would cease to be very great in his analysis, as domination became a kind of pervasive condition in the society as a whole. Here Horkheimer's arguments concerning the increasing role of the technological ethos played a crucial part. As we shall see when examining the later work of the Frankfurt School, especially as related to its analysis of American society, domination in what Marcuse was to popularize as "one-dimensional" society seemed to exist without the conscious direction of dominators, whether economic or political. As a result, it appeared more sinister and invulnerable, and the chances for effective action to negate it even more remote.

In summary, then, it can be said that the Institut employed two general approaches in its analysis of Nazism. One, associated with Neumann, Gurland, and Kirchheimer, focused on changes in legal, political, and economic institutions, with only a passing glance at social psychology or mass culture. Its basic assumptions were those of a more orthodox Marxism, stressing the centrality of monopoly capitalism, although with considerable refinement. The other major approach, followed by the group around Horkheimer, saw Nazism as the most extreme example of a general trend towards irrational domination in the West. Although agreeing that this had occurred as an outgrowth of advanced capitalism, it no longer considered the economic substructure the crucial locus of the social totality. Instead, it paid increased attention to technological rationalization as an institutional force and instrumental rationality as a cultural imperative. In so doing, it explored with far greater interest than Neumann or the others of his persuasion the psychosocial mechanisms of obedience and sources of violence. By pointing to the various ways in which advanced capitalism had avoided the fulfillment of Marx's predictions of its collapse, it revealed a more profound skepticism about the possibilities for change, which was to increase in the years to come.

Because the Horkheimer-Pollock approach had gone beyond the orthodox Marxist concentration on the economy, it was able more easily to be applied to American social phenomena after the war. The economy of the United States, after all, might be characterized as monopoly capitalist, but its society had proved resistant to fascism just the same. The postwar transformation of Neumann and those in his camp into uneasy liberals can perhaps be partly attributed to their acknowledgment of this reality. The group around Horkheimer, on the other hand, shared a pessimism about the future of the proletarian revolution, but did not become liberals in the same sense as Neumann, Kirchheimer, and Gurland. In Marcuse's case, as we shall see, radicalism was intensified. In Horkheimer's and

Adorno's, the caution was far greater, but the basic analysis never became truly liberal or pluralist in its assumptions. To speak of postwar developments now, however, is to anticipate our narrative. This cannot be done until the Institut's refocusing of its attention on America is discussed in our next chapters.

Before turning to the Institut's analysis of American society, its history during the war must be brought up to date. With the expansion of fascism's power in Europe and America's entry into the war there came a general reorganization of the Institut's institutional structure and a reevaluation of its goals. The French branch, the sole remaining Institut outpost in Europe at the outbreak of the war, was closed with the occupation of Paris in 1940. During the thirties, the Paris office had not only been a liaison with the Institut's publishers and a source of data for the *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, but also a link with the French academic and cultural community. Walter Benjamin was not the only contributor of articles to the *Zeitschrift* living in Paris. Other pieces were written by Celestin Bouglé, Raymond Aron, Alexandre Koyré, Jeanne Duprat, Paul Honigsheim, Maxime Leroy, Bernard Groethuysen, and A. Demangeon. In 1938 Bouglé was one of two distinguished European scholars to deliver a series of public lectures at the Institut's New York branch (Morris Ginsberg was the other).

Now the link was broken. In addition, the Librairie Félix Alcan could no longer continue to print the *Zeitschrift*. Instead, the Institut decided to publish in America the third section of the 1939 volume, which appeared in the summer of 1940. This necessitated a reversal of the Institut's long-standing unwillingness to write in English. As Horkheimer explained in his foreword to the rechristened *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*:

> Philosophy, art, and science have lost their home in most of Europe. England is now fighting desperately against the domination of the totalitarian states. America, especially the United States, is the only continent in which the continuation of scientific life is possible. Within the framework of this country's democratic institutions, culture still enjoys the freedom without which, we believe, it is unable to exist. In publishing our journal in its new form we wish to give this belief its concrete expression.[112]

Publishing in America, however, was more expensive than it had been in Europe, and the Institut's funds were not what they once were. In the late thirties its capital endowment had suffered a setback of some seriousness. Unsuccessful investments in a bear market, a disastrous real estate transaction in upstate New York, and the distribution of considerable sums of money to other refugees on the Institut's enlarged staff resulted in a limitation of its financial options. Thus, by 1941, when the Institut transferred the last of its capital from Switzerland and Holland to America, where it was administered by the Kurt Gerlach Memorial Foundation, the Hermann Weil Memorial Foundation, and the Social Studies Association,[113] the amount it brought was not sufficient to permit the continuation of all the Institut's programs. One of the first casualties was the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science,* which was initially changed into a yearbook and then, in March, 1942, with the third issue of volume nine (officially 1941), discontinued for the duration of the war. It was never to reappear in its original form, thus ending a journal of remarkable distinction and accomplishment. With hindsight, it might well be argued that the brief decade of its existence was the Institut's true *Blütezeit,* its period of greatest creativity.

The Institut's financial problems also necessitated a reduction of its staff, which had been swelled by the influx of new refugees from Europe. Some of the Institut's associates — Karl Landauer, Andries Sternheim, and, most prominently, Walter Benjamin — had resisted its pleas to emigrate until it was too late. In many other cases, however, escape proved successful. By the war, new "research associates," who were often very peripherally associated with the Institut, included Karl Wilhelm Kapp (economics), I. Graebner (anti-Semitism), Fritz Karsen (education),[114] Olga Lang (Sinology), Wilhelm Mackauer (history), Alois Schardt (art), Joseph Soudek (economics), Edgar Zilsel (sociology), Paul Lazarsfeld (sociology), Maximilian Beck (philosophy), Kurt Pinthus (literature), and Hans Fried (sociology). Many of them, in addition to other recipients of Institut grants such as Joseph Maier, Alice Maier's husband, could no longer be retained on the Institut's reduced budget.

The same problem existed among the senior members of the staff. By 1939, as we have seen, Fromm had left to pursue his private practice, Gumperz was involved with his activities as a stockbroker, and Wittfogel had found new sources of income. Adorno was employed part-time by Lazarsfeld's Radio Research Project at Princeton and later at Columbia, which was a source of research and secretarial assistance for Lowenthal as well. Government consultation was also a means of supplementing income while doing useful work. Neumann was the first to go to Washington to aid in the war effort. In 1942 he joined the Board of Economic Warfare as its chief consultant and then, soon after, the Office of Strategic Services, as the deputy chief of the Research and Analysis Branch's Central European section. Neumann's departure from the Institut, which proved permanent, was hastened by personal as well as theoretical differences with older Institut figures,[115] as was the case with others such as Fromm and Wittfogel. Horkheimer was displeased with the summary way in which Pollock's arguments were treated in *Behemoth.* Furthermore, there was an apparent rivalry between them over the selection of a professor at Columbia from among the Institut's members. The older figures from the Frankfurt period were distressed by the prospect that Neumann, with his divergent opinions, would be representing the Institut on the regular Columbia faculty. In fact, after the war Neumann was offered such a position, which he accepted, but by that time the Institut had decided to allow its connection with Columbia to lapse.

Other Institut members spent a considerable part of their time in Washington during the war. Kirchheimer also joined the OSS, as did Marcuse after completing *Reason and Revolution*, his last extensive publication for more than a decade. Here they were members of a remarkable community of intellectuals, which included such distinguished scholars as Hajo Holborn, Norman O. Brown, Carl Schorske, H. Stuart Hughes, Leonard Krieger, Crane Brinton, and Franklin Ford. Marcuse had briefly served with the Office of War Information before joining the OSS. The OWI was also the focus of Lowenthal's governmental work after 1943. Although he continued to spend some time in the Institut's New York office, he served for a time as an OWI section chief. Pollock was an occasional consultant to the Department of Justice's antitrust division and to the Board of Economic Warfare. Gurland, although remaining for the most part in New York, found time to collaborate with Kirchheimer and Neumann on a study, *The Fate of Small Business in Nazi Germany*,[116] for a special Senate subcommittee led by Claude Pepper.

Despite the reduction of the Institut's budget and the partial dispersion of its staff, the effort to continue its scientific work did not flag. But for the first time, supplementary grants were necessary to make its projects feasible. These were not always forthcoming. In February, 1941, a prospectus for an analysis of the "Cultural Aspects of National Socialism," [117] under the joint direction of Horkheimer and Eugene N. Anderson of American University in Washington, was announced. The projected responsibilities for individual sections were as follows: Pollock was to study bureaucracy; Lowenthal, literature and mass culture; Horkheimer, anti-Christianity; Neumann, the ideological permeation of labor and the new middle classes; Marcuse, the war and the postwar generation; and Adorno, art, and music. Grossmann was described as "an adviser for economic history, statistics, and economics for all sections where such problems may enter." [118] But the project could not be started for lack of a foundation cosponsor. Nor was money available for the continuation of the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* as a yearbook. In fact, only with the support of the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee, acquired in October of 1943, could the Institut devote its collective energies to a large and costly project. The series, *Studies in Prejudice*, that resulted will be the subject of Chapter 7.

In one instance, the Institut's financial recovery allowed it to reverse the trend towards the reduction of its staff. Paul Massing, who had joined as a research associate in 1941, became one of the Institut's more important contributors in the next few years. He was not, however, a total newcomer to Institut affairs, having started his dissertation under Grünberg in 1927.[119] Yet in one way Massing was a unique addition. Unlike most other important figures in the Institut's history, he was of gentile origin, a factor that he was later to feel prevented his full acceptance by the Institut's inner circle. In the twenties Massing had been a close friend of Karl Wittfogel for both personal and political reasons. Like Wittfogel, he was one of the several Communist Party members associated with the Institut before the emigration, having joined the Party in 1927. And like his older friend — Massing was born in a small village near Koblenz in 1902, six years after Wittfogel — he was put into a concentration camp for his politics when Hitler took power. Both men were liberated at approximately the same time and both left Germany in 1934. Each wrote of his experiences in the concentration camp in pseudonymously published novels: Wittfogel's, written under the name Klaus Hinrichs, was called *Staatliches Konzentrationslager VII*; Massing's was entitled *Schutzhäftling 880* and was published under the name Karl Billinger, which he had whimsically chosen as a combination of John Dillinger, the master criminal, and Richard Billinger, a German poet jailed by the Nazis.[120] Accompanied by a pro-Soviet introduction by Lincoln Steffens, Massing's novel was translated as *Fatherland* in 1935. Its publication in English cost him dearly by delaying his naturalization until the late 1940's.

Another parallel between the two men was their growing disenchantment with communism. Wittfogel had left the Party as a dues-paying member by the time he departed the Continent for England in 1934, eight months before his emigration to America. His final break with his Communist past, however, did not come until the summer of 1939, after his experiences in China in the middle thirties.[121] Massing's apostasy was considerably more dramatic. Although he had made a brief trip to the United States after his liberation from the camp, he and his wife, Hede, returned to Europe to work for the Party. In 1937 he was summoned to Moscow to discuss his affairs with his superiors. By this time the purge trials were at their height, and like many others, Massing was becoming disenchanted with Stalinist practice. Although discouraged by his wife, he decided to go to the Soviet Union, as he remembers it, out of a sense of honor to announce his break with communism. What began as a two-week visit ended as an eight-month nightmare with no certainty of survival.[122] Finally, in 1938, Massing was permitted to leave both Moscow and the Party, but his involvement with communism was not yet entirely over. After returning, he began a comparison of Hitler's foreign policy with the intentions announced in *Mein Kampf*, in the hope of putting together a marketable book. *Hitler Is No Fool*, as it was finally called, was published in 1940 by Modern Age, at that time secretly controlled by Communist editors. "Karl Billinger's" contention that the war in the west was merely a preliminary for a drive eastward went against the new party line after the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Consequently, the book was suppressed by its own publishers and copies already printed were recovered if at all possible.

The loss of Massing's book was paralleled by the loss of his friendship with Wittfogel, although for precisely the opposite reasons. As noted earlier, Wittfogel began to shift rightward after his return from China. His third wife, Esther Goldfrank, was herself conservative and seems to have influenced the intensity of Wittfogel's change. In addition to leaving the Party, he began to distrust anyone who had ever been connected with it in any way. Massing fell into this category, and his relations with Wittfogel progressively deteriorated. The final break came in 1948, so Massing recalls, over his refusal to support unreservedly the allegations of Ruth Fischer in her *Stalinist Germany*. In Wittfogel's account, their falling out had more personal reasons.[123] What is clear is that Massing, no longer a member of the Party but unwilling to share Wittfogel's rabid anticommunism, had reached a political position not dissimilar to that of the Institut's leadership. By 1941, when he joined its ranks, his political career was clearly over. In fact, his contribution in the forties showed little effect of the Marxism he had so actively espoused at an earlier date. In this he mirrored the Institut's gradual withdrawal from an aggressively Marxist stance, some of whose effects we have seen in this chapter. In fact, a number of factors during the war and the immediate postwar years contributed to this change in the Frankfurt School's attitude towards Marxism. These will become readily apparent in our subsequent discussions of its work in the forties.

Perhaps the most important change in the Institut's history during the war resulted from Horkheimer's health. Because of a mild heart condition, his doctors advised him to leave New York for a more temperate climate. As a result, Horkheimer, accompanied by Adorno, who came largely out of personal loyalty,[124] moved to Pacific Palisades near Santa Monica, California, in early 1941. Without Horkheimer's personal stimulus, the Institut's New York office lost some of its vitality. Lowenthal and Pollock remained as its directors, and Marcuse, Kirchheimer, Gurland, Massing, and Felix Weil continued to do work there. Still, the volume of research, for all the reasons mentioned above, generally declined during the war. In June, 1944, the building on 117th Street was turned over to the U.S. Navy for training courses, and the Institut was relocated in smaller quarters in Low Memorial Library and in another building on Morningside Heights. Clearly, the Institut's Columbia period was drawing to a close when it distributed an account of its achievements in 1944 entitled "Ten Years on Morningside Heights." [125]

In moving westward to California, Horkheimer and Adorno gave symbolic confirmation of the Institut's increased distance from its European origins. In February, 1940, while still in New York, Horkheimer, Pollock, Marcuse, and Lowenthal had taken out naturalization papers. By the end of the war almost all the Institut members had become American citizens. The end of the *Zeitschrift* meant the beginning of a new English-speaking audience for the Institut. Starting with *Punishment and Social Structure* in 1939, all the Institut's published work appeared in its adopted language. In the forties the *Studies in Prejudice* picked up where the *Studien über Autorität und Familie* had left off, but now the focus was on American forms of authoritarianism.

With the shift in subject matter came a subtle change in the center of the Institut's work. Authoritarianism in America appeared in different guises from its European counterparts. Instead of terror or coercion, more gentle forms of enforced conformism had been developed. Perhaps the most effective of these were to be found in the cultural field. American mass culture thus became one of the central concerns of the Frankfurt School in the forties. To understand its work, we must now return to our long delayed discussion of the Institut's analyses of cultural phenomena. We have already treated Lowenthal's contribution to those analyses. In the next chapter we shall turn to the extensive and penetrating work of Adorno and Benjamin in the context of the Institut's treatment of what Horkheimer called "affirmative culture." [126]

VI

Aesthetic Theory and the Critique of Mass Culture

> There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.
>
> — Walter Benjamin
>
> It is not that chewing gum undermines metaphysics but that it *is* metaphysics — this is what must be made clear.
>
> — Max Horkheimer
>
> Mass culture is psychoanalysis in reverse.
>
> — Leo Lowenthal

Marxist aesthetic criticism, as George Steiner has argued,[1] has traditionally proceeded along two separate lines. The first, derived primarily from the writings of Lenin and codified by Zhdanov at the first Soviet Writers' Congress in 1934, finds merit only in those works displaying unabashed political partisanship. Lenin's demand for *Tendenzliteratur* (partisan literature), conceived in combat with aesthetic formalism around the turn of the century, ultimately culminated in the sterile orthodoxy of Stalinist socialist realism. The second strain, which Steiner among many others considers more fruitful, follows the lead of Engels, who valued art less by the political intentions of its creator than by its inherent social significance. The objective social content of a work, Engels maintained, might well be contrary to the avowed desires of the artist and might express more than his class origins. This second approach has been pursued by the non-Soviet bloc critics Michel Crouzet once called para-Marxists. Among the most prominent of these were, at varying times in their careers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Lucien Goldmann in France, Edmund Wilson and Sidney Finkelstein in America, and members of the Frankfurt School in Germany.

To Steiner, as to other commentators, Georg Lukács presents a complex case, with characteristics placing him in both camps. Lukács, certainly the most gifted critic who remained within the Soviet orbit, sought to bridge the gap between the Leninist and the "Engelian" positions. In developing Engels's now famous dichotomy between realism and naturalism — the former, exemplified in the works of Shakespeare, Goethe, and Balzac, reconciling objective world and subjective imagination organically; the latter, best illustrated in Zola's writings, mechanically reflecting the artist's unassimilated phenomenal environment — Lukács pursued an important distinction neglected by orthodox Zhdanovists. Zola, despite his sympathy for the oppressed, so Lukács maintained, is artistically inferior to the royalist Balzac, whose artistic imagination allowed him to portray the historical totality with greater fidelity. Similar considerations led to Lukács's unexpected praise in *The Historical Novel* for the works of Sir Walter Scott.[2]

And yet, Lukács, the man who repudiated his own *History and Class Consciousness* because of criticisms by the Party hierarchy, never truly freed himself from the Leninist straitjacket. This was apparent in a number of ways. One of the better known is his practically unrelieved hostility to artistic modernism of all kinds.[3] To such writers as Proust,, Joyce, and Kafka, Lukács turned a deaf ear, because of their alleged formalism and subjectivity. Much of twentieth-century art Lukács associated with the alleged irrationalism in the writings of Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard.[4] Along with this attitude went a rather conservative preference for the masterpieces of bourgeois culture and a less than critical deference for the products of socialist realism. This latter aspect of his work was perhaps due to an overly optimistic appreciation of the reconciliation of contradictions already achieved in socialist countries.[5] Still another manifestation of his adherence to Leninist standards appeared in his relative indifference to the effects on art of technological innovation; class conflict remained the sole motor of history underlying his criticism. For all the insights contained in the vast corpus of his critical works, Lukács's compromise with political authority and his almost temperamental insensitivity to modernist art prevented his achieving the kind of critical flexibility that Western para-Marxists, such as those connected with Frankfurt School, were able to attain.

Having said this, however, it must be acknowledged that much of what the para-Marxists wrote would not have been the same without certain of Lukács's writings. *History and Class Consciousness*, whatever its author may have thought of it later, was a seminal work for them, as Benjamin, for one, was to admit.[6] As Adorno also acknowledged in a much later piece on Lukács whose tone was generally critical, it was the first study to focus on the crucial problem of reification, the key to a Marxist or neo-Marxist analysis of culture.[7]

Moreover, the Frankfurt School, like other para-Marxists, shared the "Engelian" distinction between realism and naturalism that Lukács did so much to develop, although they tended to agree more with his definition of the latter than of the former.[8] Whatever the disagreements that separated them in subsequent years — and they were serious — the Institut and Lukács spoke to similar questions from within a common tradition.

The objective of this chapter is the presentation of those elements that made the Frankfurt School's aesthetic criticism different from both its traditional bourgeois and its orthodox Marxist competitors. Special attention will be paid to the contributions of Adorno and Benjamin, with side glances at Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Lowenthal, whose discussions of mass culture will be considered as well. The chapter will end with a treatment of the way in which the Institut integrated its critique of art with its more general analysis of modern society.

From the very beginning, of course, the post-Grünberg generation of Institut members had been interested in aesthetic and cultural phenomena. Hans Cornelius, the major academic influence on a number of Institut figures, had been an artist *manqué* and had written extensively in the philosophy of art.[9] Horkheimer's excursions into fiction, which continued into the forties,[10] have already been mentioned, as have Adorno's more substantial musical pursuits. Adorno's study of Kierkegaard, in which aesthetics played a central role, has also been discussed, as have Wittfogel's plays and aesthetic criticism. And finally, we have paid attention to Lowenthal's numerous essays in the *Zeitschrift* on literary matters.

What remains to be done is a more complete presentation of the other components of the Institut's extensive analysis of cultural subjects, particularly the work of Adorno and Benjamin. The difficulties in such a task are formidable. The antisystematic impulse of Critical Theory was extended to the cultural criticism it fostered. The result makes summary a difficult, if not impossible, project. In addition, the form in which the criticism appeared was an essential part of its total effect. The unique texture of an Adorno or a Benjamin essay and the studied intricacy of their prose styles defy translation,[11] not to mention reduction to their fundamentals. Their mode of reasoning was rarely inductive or deductive, a reflection of their insistence that every sentence must be mediated through the totality of the essay in order to be understood fully. Reading a piece by Adorno or Benjamin brings to mind a comment the filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard is once said to have made when asked if his films had a beginning, a middle, and an end. "Yes," he replied, "but not necessarily in that order." The principle that Adorno attributed to the symbolists also informed their work: "Defiance of society includes defiance of its language." [12] The difficulties that resulted for the average reader were thus less the product of caprice or inarticulateness than a direct challenge to the reader to respond with commensurate seriousness. Adorno himself indicated his purpose indirectly when he wrote of Schönberg's music: "It requires the listener spontaneously to compose its inner movement and demands of him not mere contemplation but *praxis*." [13] Other artists, such as Kafka,[14] whose work Adorno particularly praised, seem to be guided by the same consideration.

Benjamin's concern for language and style was no less great. In fact, as Adorno once suggested,[15] Benjamin saw himself as the vehicle for the expression of objective cultural tendencies, a belief that made the mode of expression particularly crucial. One manifestation of this was his hope to exclude all subjective elements from his work by writing an essay consisting solely of quotations from other sources.[16] Although this never came to pass, Benjamin strove to give his words a richness and resonance that normal prose lacked. His interest in the Talmud and the Cabala may have led him to the conviction that multiple levels of meaning exist in every sentence.[17] If Benjamin's style differed from that of other Institut members, it was a product of his searching for the most concrete mode of expression possible. Because his thought was more analogical than theirs, he was less inclined to use traditional philosophical jargon, which he dismissed as the language of procurers.[18] In fact, Benjamin and Horkheimer exchanged letters in which their different appreciations of the value of philosophical language came to the surface.[19] Neither convinced the other, and Benjamin's style remained closer to the evocative prose of artistic literature than to the denotative language of theoretical philosophy. This, in addition to the fragmentary condition of much of his later work, the recent disputes over the authenticity of some of his texts, and the distance he always maintained from Critical Theory, makes an assessment of his contribution to the Institut's work especially difficult.

Still, with these qualifications in mind, the general outlines of the Frankfurt School's approach to aesthetics, shared by Adorno and, to some extent, by Benjamin, can be discerned. If, as we have seen earlier, the Institut refused to fetishize economics or politics, it was equally reluctant to treat culture as a realm apart in society. Occasionally, this seemed to mean an almost reductionist analysis of art to a reflection of social trends, as when the Institut in one of its official histories wrote: "We interpret [art] as a kind of code language for processes taking place within society, which must be deciphered by means of critical analysis." [20] Although generally less direct, the Institut was certainly at the opposite pole from the tradition of *Geisteswissenschaften* (cultural sciences) in Germany, which tended to treat intellectual history in a social vacuum. Members of the Institut never tired of attacking the opposition between culture as a superior sphere of human endeavor and material existence as a lesser aspect of man's condition. The interrelationship between culture and society was such that the former never fully succeeded in transcending the inadequacies of the latter. Thus, Adorno praised Spengler for demonstrating "the way culture itself, as form and order, is in complicity with blind domination." [21] And Benjamin stated baldly that "there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism." [22]

Equally foreign to the Institut's thinking was the evaluation of artistic phenomena as merely expressions of individual creativity. Horkheimer, it will be recalled, wrote his *Habilitationsschrift* on Kant's *Critique of Judgment.* Almost two decades later, he returned to Kant's argument that an element of common humanity, of shared hope for the potential of mankind, informed every aesthetic act.[23] The supra-individual subject was not, however, abstractly transcendental, as Kant had believed, but was historical instead.[24] The artistic subject was in a sense social as well as individual. Works of art thus expressed objective social tendencies unintended by their creators. The artist's alleged creative freedom was in some ways illusory. "Like artists' lives," Adorno wrote in his essay on Valéry and Proust, "their works appear 'free' only when seen from the outside. The work is neither a reflection of the soul nor the embodiment of a Platonic Idea. It is not pure Being but rather a 'force-field' between subject and object." [25]

Thus, to the Frankfurt School, the aesthetic rationale of expressionism, which was particularly popular in the Germany of their youth, was ultimately false. In an article written on Kafka during the forties, Adorno returned to an argument he had used earlier in his critique of Kierkegaard: "Absolute subjectivity is also subjectless. . . . The more the I of expressionism is thrown back upon itself, the more like the excluded world of things it becomes. . . . Pure subjectivity, being of necessity estranged from itself as well and having become a thing, assumes the dimensions of objectivity which expresses itself through its own estrangement." [26] Although the spontaneity of subjective creativity was a necessary element in genuine art, it could realize itself only through objectification. And objectification inevitably meant working with materials already filtered through the existing social matrix. This in turn meant the necessity of at least some reification. In his critique of Aldous Huxley, Adorno wrote that "humanity includes reification as well as its opposite, not merely as the condition from which liberation is possible, but also positively, as the form in which, however brittle and inadequate it may be, subjective impulses are realized, but only by being objectified." [27] Adorno's use of reification as a synonym for objectification in this passage indicates his pessimism about the total de-reification of life. Here his stress on nonidentity, which we have examined earlier, was especially evident. The complete reconciliation of subjective imagination and objective materials might be approached in great works of art, but never fully achieved. Thus, even when discussing such artists as Valéry, Proust, George, and Hoffmanstahl,[28] for whom he had great respect, Adorno chose to discuss them in dialectical pairs in order to transcend the inherent insufficiency of individual accomplishments.

If artistic creativity was limited by social factors, so too was the subjective appreciation of art. The liberal notion of individual "taste," so Adorno and Lowenthal frequently pointed out,[29] had been fully undermined by the gradual liquidation of the autonomous subject in modern society. The implications of this development were crucial for an understanding of mass culture, in which the manipulation of preferences was almost complete. As we have already seen in Chapter 4 when discussing Lowenthal's essay on Dostoyevsky's readership in prewar Germany, the Institut saw the changes in the reception of art as a valid field for its investigation.

What distinguished the Frankfurt School's sociology of art from its more orthodox Marxist progenitors', however, was its refusal to reduce cultural phenomena to an ideological reflex of class interests. In Adorno's words, "the task of criticism must be not so much to search for the particular interest-groups to which cultural phenomena are to be assigned, but rather to decipher the general social tendencies which are expressed in these phenomena and through which the most powerful interests realize themselves. Cultural criticism must become social physiognomy." [30] In fact, one of the sources of disagreement between Adorno and Benjamin was the latter's tendency to seek more specific correspondences between social groups and cultural phenomena.[31]

Critical Theory's stress on dialectics and negation prevented its analyses of art from becoming simple exercises in decoding class references, although this was not totally absent from the Institut's work. Not only was art the expression and reflection of existing social tendencies, but also — and here is where the Institut diverged most sharply from Leninist criticism, and from Lukács as well — genuine art acted as the last preserve of human yearnings for that "other" society beyond the present one. "Art," Horkheimer wrote, "since it became autonomous, has preserved the utopia that evaporated from religion." [32] Kant's notion of the disinterestedness of beauty was therefore wrong: true art was an expression of man's legitimate interest in his future happiness. Art, to use a phrase of Stendhal's that the Institut was especially fond of quoting, gave *"une promesse de bonheur."* [33] Thus, although false in one sense, the claims of culture to transcend society were true in another.

All culture was not a bourgeois swindle, as vulgar Marxists seemed at times to think.[34] All art was not simply false consciousness or ideology. A dialectical, or "immanent," critique of art, Adorno argued, "takes seriously the principle that it is not ideology in itself which is untrue but rather its pretension to correspond to reality." [35] One way in which art might offer a "true" foretaste of the future society was in its harmonious reconciliation of form and content, function and expression, subjective and objective elements. Certain artists, such as Beethoven or Goethe, were capable of achieving at least moments of such fulfillment in their work, although "the utopia of art transcends individual works." [36] In fact, in accordance with Critical Theory's distrust of any positive representation of the reconciliation of contradictions, the harmonies it most admired always contained a recognition that a solely aesthetic reconciliation was insufficient: "A successful work, according to immanent criticism, is not one which resolves objective contradictions in a spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of harmony negatively by embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its innermost structure." [37] In other words, until social contradictions were reconciled in reality, the utopian harmony of art must always maintain an element of protest. "Art," Adorno wrote, "and so-called classical art no less than its more anarchical expressions, always was, and is, a force of protest of the humane against the pressure of domineering institutions, religious and otherwise, no less than it reflects their objective substance." [38] In short, the aesthetic sphere was inevitably political as well, a realization, as Marcuse pointed out,[39] that was most clearly expressed in Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man.*

Not all that passed for art, however, contained this negative moment. In fact, at the heart of the Institut's critique of mass culture was its belief that the *"promesse de bonheur,"* the vision of the other society, had been systematically eradicated from what was increasingly an "affirmative culture." * How seriously the Frankfurt School took this development we shall see later in this chapter. What is necessary to note now in our more general discussion of the Institut's approach to culture is that even in its moments of greatest pessimism about the elimination of negativity, a dialectical qualification usually appeared. (This might also be said about Marcuse's later popularization of this analysis in *One-Dimensional Man*, although here the qualifications were few and far between). A good example of this reluctance to close off the possibility of negativity appeared in Adorno's article on Thorstein Veblen, which appeared in the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* in 1941. Veblen's notion of "conspicuous consumption," which might be considered an integral part of any mass culture analysis, was attacked by Adorno for its undialectical shallowness. "The happiness that man actually finds," he wrote, "cannot be separated from conspicuous consumption. There is no happiness which does not promise to fulfill a socially constituted desire, but there is also none which does not promise something qualitatively different in this fulfillment." [40] In other words, even the distorted desire for status recognition contained a critical element in its demand, first of all, for real happiness, and secondly in its recognition that such a condition necessarily included a social component. Consumption, however conspicuous, still meant a protest against the asceticism the Frankfurt School so disliked.

Among the salient characteristics of "affirmative culture" was such an ascetic moment. As we saw when discussing the nature of the Institut's materialism, the demand for happiness was a fundamental element in Critical Theory. What Adorno later said of Benjamin might well serve as a description of the Frankfurt School as a whole: "Everything that Benjamin said or wrote sounded as if thought, instead of rejecting the promises of fairy tales and children's books with its usual disgraceful 'maturity,' took them so literally that real fulfillment itself was now within sight of knowledge. In his philosophical topography, renunciation is totally repudiated." [41] Furthermore, the Institut's notion of true happiness went well beyond its equation with economic well-being, which characterized the limited thinking of many orthodox Marxists. In fact, the very separation of culture from material contentment was one of the clues that the Institut saw as betraying orthodox Marxism's inability to transcend affirmative culture. The dichotomy of substructure and superstructure, however accurate it may have been in describing a certain moment in bourgeois history, ought not be eternalized. In the society of the future, the two spheres would be integrated in a healthy way. As Marcuse argued in his discussion of hedonism, the continued separation of production and consumption was part of an unfree society.[42]

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* "By affirmative culture," Marcuse wrote, "is meant that culture of the bourgeois epoch which led in the course of its own development to the segregation from civilization of the mental and spiritual world as an independent realm of value that is also considered superior to civilization. Its decisive characteristic is the assertion of a universally obligatory, eternally better, and more valuable world that must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially different from the factual world of the daily struggle for existence, yet realizable by every individual for himself 'from within,' without any transformation of the state of fact" (*Negations*, p. 95).

This integration, however, was still a utopian hope. In the present, the greatest threat came from cultural tendencies that implied the premature reconciliation of contradictions at the level of popular consciousness. Vulgar Marxism's sociological reductionism was itself a manifestation of this trend. As in Critical Theory in general, the Frankfurt School's aesthetic criticism maintained a determined stress on the importance of mediation[43] and nonidentity. Because Adorno, like others in the Institut, denied the existence of philosophical first principles, he always interpreted even the most reified artifacts of affirmative culture as something more than derivative reflections of a more fundamental reality. "The less the dialectical method can today presuppose the Hegelian identity of subject and object, the more it is obliged to be mindful of the duality of the moments." [44] An example of Adorno's consistent reliance on dialectical antireductionism came in his treatment of one of the fundamental Marxist categories, the fetishism of commodities (by which Marx meant the process of estranging commodities from their human origins, thereby making them into mysterious, opaque, alien objects rather than the transparent embodiment of social relations). Here he disagreed with Benjamin, to whom he wrote on August 2, 1935, that "the fetish character of commodities is not a fact of consciousness, but dialectic in the eminent sense that it produces consciousness." In other words, it was a social and not merely a psychological reality. To talk of the commodity form *an sich* (in itself), as Benjamin seemed to be doing, was to give it a metaphysical rather than a historical sense.[45] Elsewhere, in his essay on Veblen, Adorno argued in a similar fashion: "Commodity fetishes are not merely the projection of opaque human relations into the world of things. They are also the chimerical deities which originate in the primacy of the exchange process but nevertheless represent something not entirely absorbed in it." [46] In criticizing other cultural critics such as Lukács or Veblen, Adorno was always careful to single out any traces of reductionism he detected in their work. One frequent manifestation of such reductionism was the dismissal of appearances as totally insubstantial, a fallacy that he also noted in philosophical phenomenology. "As the refiction of truth," he wrote, "appearances are dialectical; to reject all appearance is to fall completely under its sway, since truth is abandoned with the rubble without which it cannot appear." [47]

Adorno's sensitivity to dialectical mediation was most clearly demonstrated in the studies of music to which he devoted a major portion of his intellectual energy throughout his life. To Adorno, polyphonic music, the least representational of aesthetic modes,[48] was perhaps best suited for the expression of that imageless "other" that Critical Theory refused to define positively. In addition, the complexities of its mediations — composer, performer, instrument, technical reproduction — made music a particularly rich field for the play of his dialectical imagination. Originating in the rhythms and rituals of everyday life, music had long since transcended its purely functional role. It was thus both tied to material conditions and above them, responsive to changes in social realities and yet more than merely their reflection.

As early as the 1920's and his years in Vienna,[49] Adorno began to explore all facets of musical expression: the history of classical composition, the current production of avant-garde music, the reproduction and reception of musical forms, and the composition and psychosocial function of popular music.[50] In the first two issues of the *Zeitschrift* in 1932, he outlined the principles underlying his approach to music.[51] From the beginning, Adorno made it clear that he was no ordinary musicologist. Music, he argued, contained social contradictions in its own structure, although its relation to social reality was problematical. As was the case with all cultural phenomena, it was neither fully reflective nor fully autonomous. Still, in the current era, its autonomy was severely threatened. Most music displayed the characteristics of a commodity, dominated more by exchange than by use value. The real dichotomy, Adorno contended, was not between "light" and "serious" music — he was never a defender of traditional cultural standards for their own sake — but rather between music that was market-oriented and music that was not. If at the present time the latter tended to be incomprehensible to most listeners, this did not mean that it was objectively reactionary. Music, like theory, must go beyond the prevailing consciousness of the masses.[52]

In the first installment of his essay, Adorno concentrated on the primary trends of contemporary composition. His major focus was on the opposition between the music of Schönberg and that of Stravinsky. Understood more as the embodiment of certain aesthetic principles than as personalities, these were the two composers who were to play the central roles in his later work on the *Philosophy of*

Modern Music.[53] As might be expected, Adorno's sympathies lay with the man in whose school he had been tutored in Vienna. Schönberg's development of the possibilities of atonality, Adorno argued, expressed a refusal to compromise with the unresolved dissonances of contemporary society. The content of his early expressionist period pointed away from false reconciliations. With the unselfconsciousness of the true artist, Schönberg allowed his own unconscious impulses to express their contradictions. Since, however, atonality sought to avoid tonality at all costs, it led away from pure arbitrariness into a new order based on the twelve-tone row, which prohibited the repetition of any one note until all twelve had been sounded. In so progressing, Schönberg had objectified his subjective impulses in a way that put him in touch with the classical tradition. The articulation of the new twelve-tone order was a dialectical product of his earlier music, not a short-circuited imposition of order from without. By withdrawing into the logic of the music itself, Schönberg was able to protect himself somewhat from the external pressure of social forces.

In turning to a musical form in which alienation and contradictions were overcome, however, it might be argued that Schönberg had reconciled himself to the perpetuation of alienation in the social sphere. On the deepest level, the ideal of the fulfilled work of art, taken from classical art, might not be compatible with the means he chose to realize it. The creation of a "pure" music, like Karl Kraus's notion of a "pure" speech, might be ultimately unattainable.[54] But Schönberg's striving to attain it presented a constant standard against which the reality of bourgeois society could be measured.

In later years, it might be added parenthetically, Adorno's estimation of the negative, critical element in Schönberg's type of music was to decline, especially after the twelve-tone row became a more rigid imperative of composition to his followers. "It is not the method itself that is false," he wrote in 1952, "— no one can compose any longer who has not sensed with his own ears the gravitational pull towards twelve-tone technique — but rather its hypostatization. . . . To be true to Schönberg is to warn against all twelve-tone schools." [55] In the thirties, however, Adorno identified Schönberg with all that was progressive in modern music.

The opposite was the case with Stravinsky, the composer to whose works he turned after a brief treatment of Schönberg's disciples, Berg and Webern. To Adorno, Stravinsky represented an antipsychological, neoclassical "objectivism," which ignored the alienation and contradictions of modern society and returned to prebourgeois tonal forms such as the dance. Unlike the romantics, who used the past as a negation of the present, the objectivists belonged with the purveyors of *völkisch* culture, who undialectically adopted old forms to current needs. Although the mediating connection was difficult to illustrate satisfactorily, Adorno went so far as to suggest that objectivism was in a sense the correlate of fascism. Its use of neoprimitive rhythms corresponded to the shocks of unintegrated *Erlebnis* (experience) fostered by fascist society. The irrationality of the objectivists' principles of composition — the composer's "taste" rather than the immanent dialectic of the music was decisive — suggested the arbitrary control of the fascist Führer.[56] Stravinsky might be attacked by the fascists for his "destructiveness," but whether they knew it or not, his music expressed their ideology.

Perhaps more "reactionary" still was the music of one of Frankfurt's most celebrated sons, Paul Hindemith. Hindemith's naiveté, "healthy humor," [57] and anti-ironic style further extended the ideological thrust of objectivist music. The despair occasionally expressed by Stravinsky in such works as *L'Histoire du Soldat* was fully absent from Hindemith's work, which resembled the false facades of *Neue Sachlichkeit* architecture and the illusory community of *völkisch* propagandists. Similarly, certain proletarian music, such as that composed by Hanns Eisler, suffered from the same problem, despite its agitprop value. Socialist realism in music, as in all art, was almost as reactionary, Adorno intimated, as neoclassical objectivism. Both constructed premature harmonies, ignoring the persistence of social contradictions in a way that Schönberg did not. What resulted was a kind of *Gebrauchsmusik* (utilitarian music), which was dependent on a model of technological rationality and thus served less to enlighten than to divert. Only occasionally, as in the music of Kurt Weill, was *Gebrauchsmusik* turned in a critical direction. Adorno praised Weill's fragmentary montage style, which employed shocks in a different way from Stravinsky, as the most progressive and critical popular music of the day.

In the second part of his article, in the next issue of the *Zeitschrift*, Adorno turned from an analysis of composition to the historical dialectic of reproduction, the mediating link between producer and consumer. Here he distinguished between precapitalist music, in which a continuum of production, reproduction, and improvisation existed, and music in the capitalist era, in which such a relationship did not exist. In the latter, the composition was like an isolated commodity separated from the performer, whose interpretive flexibility was highly circumscribed. In the nineteenth century there had been "irrational" performers whose individualism corresponded to the persistence of areas of subjectivity in liberal society. In the twentieth century, however, with the rise of monopoly capitalism, their counterparts were really trapped by the tyranny of the text. Here once again Adorno mentioned Stravinsky's imposition of his own "taste" on the performer, although he was also afraid that Schönberg's music could not avoid similar problems when it was performed.[58]

In the rationalized, administered world of the present, the public still yearned for the "soul" of the nineteenth-century artist. The organic was glorified over the mechanical, personality over anonymity, and inwardness over emptiness. Objectivism attempted to capture these traits in its composition, but without success, because, for reasons Adorno did not explain, they should be the attributes more of reproduction than of production itself. Efforts to redress this situation, Adorno argued, were failures: the "soulful" conductor with his imperious gesture of command was a poor substitute for genuine spontaneity. In fact, he represented the musical equivalent of the authoritarian dictator.

Adorno next turned to the popularity of certain musical forms and their significance in a historical context. Opera, he argued, had lost its appeal with the upper middle classes, although the petite bourgeoisie was still attracted to its repressive elements. Instead, the upper middle classes increasingly patronized concerts, which provided a false sense of subjective inwardness and suggested a phony reconciliation of property and education.[59] The search for true inwardness, however, was no longer realizable in modern society. Richard Strauss was the last meaningful "bourgeois" composer, but even in his music, as Ernst Bloch once pointed out, all negation had been lost. As he used them, chromaticism and dissonance had lost their critical power and become emblems of world economic mobility.[60]

What followed after Strauss, with the exception of avant-garde atonal music, was *Kunstgewerbe*, art as commodity alone. Light music, which once used to mock the aristocracy, now served to reconcile man to his fate. Folk music was no longer alive, because the spontaneous *Volk* had been consumed in a process that left popular music, like all popular culture, the creature of manipulation and imposition from above. Adorno ended the article by remarking on the ideological function of various forms of popular music, a foretaste of the project he set himself in his next few *Zeitschrift* essays.

The first of these, "On Jazz,"[61] was written primarily during his stay in England. It was published pseudonymously under the name "Hektor Rottweiler," because Adorno still made occasional trips back to Germany. Much of its content came from conversations Adorno had had with the jazz expert at the Frankfurt conservatory, Mátyás Seiber, before 1933.[62] Adorno himself had yet to visit America and thus had not experienced jazz at first hand. This distance from his subject allowed his dialectical imagination full sway. It also produced an essay with occasionally outrageous assertions, made in an uncompromising manner designed less to persuade than to overwhelm. Other members of the Institut were themselves unwilling to agree entirely with Adorno's conclusions.[63]

"I remember clearly," Adorno admitted later, "that I was horrified when I read the word 'jazz' for the first time. It is plausible that [my negative association] came from the German word *Hatz* (a pack of hounds), which evoked bloodhounds chasing after something slower." [64] Whatever the initial verbal association, jazz remained for Adorno a source of continued horror. He began his article by emphatically rejecting any kind of purely aesthetic analysis of jazz in favor of psychosocial critique. Here the verdict was uncompromisingly unfavorable. Jazz, he wrote, "does not transcend alienation, it strengthens it. Jazz is commodity in the strictest sense." [65] All of jazz's claims to express liberation Adorno scornfully rejected. Its primary social function, he contended, was to lessen the distance between the alienated individual and his affirmative culture, but in the repressive manner of *völkisch* ideology. It thus served to reverse what Brecht had called the *Verfremdungseffekt* (estrangement effect) of true art in the modern era. At the same time, jazz gave a false sense of returning to nature, whereas in fact it was totally a product of social artifice. Furthermore, jazz was pseudo-democratic in its substitution of collective for individual fantasies. It was likewise pseudo-individualistic, all alleged improvisation being repetitions of certain basic forms. The "hot" varieties of jazz represented only an illusory sexual emancipation. If anything, the sexual message of jazz was castration, combining the promise of liberation with its ascetic denial.

Moreover, its ideological function was confirmed in the myth of its Negro origins. In fact, Adorno argued, "the skin of the Negro as well as the silver of the saxophone was a coloristic effect." [66] If the Negro contributed anything to jazz, it was less his rebellious reaction to slavery than his half-resentful, half-compliant submission to it. In a later essay on the same subject, Adorno made the point even clearer: "However little doubt there can be regarding the African elements in jazz, it is no less certain that everything unruly in it was from the very beginning integrated into a strict scheme, that its rebellious gestures are accompanied by the tendency to blind obeisance, much like the sado-masochistic type described by analytic psychology." [67]

In denigrating the black contribution to jazz, it might be argued that Adorno displayed a characteristic European ethnocentrism. Indeed, there was a provincial streak in his make-up that came out most clearly in his lack of interest in non-Western musical forms. Hans Mayer, who had known Adorno since 1934, once remarked on this quality of his personality: "Adorno, as far as I see, never took a trip out of the simple desire to see. Europe sufficed for him entirely. No India or China, no Third World, not the people's democracies and not the workers' movement. Even in his needs for life experience, he remained a citizen — and sovereign — of a small state." [68] Still, what also must be remembered is that the jazz he was most concerned with was the commercial variety churned out by Tin Pan Alley, not the less popular variety rooted in black culture itself. Much of his apparent insensitivity came from his failure to make the appropriate distinction between the two.

From a purely musical point of view, jazz, Adorno argued, was also completely bankrupt. Its beat and syncopation were derived from the military march, which suggested its implicit relation to authoritarianism, despite its being banned in Germany. Cool jazz was similar to the musical impressionism of Debussy and Delius, but watered down and conventionalized. Its subjective element was derived from salon music, but it had long since lost any spontaneity. In fact, any attempts to reintroduce elements of true spontaneity were quickly absorbed into its reified system. "The pseudo-vocalization of jazz," Adorno wrote in yet another treatment of the subject, "corresponds to the elimination of the piano, the 'private' middle-class instrument in the era of the phonograph and radio." [69] The piano, we scarcely need to add, was Adorno's own instrument and his bias in its favor obvious.

More significant still, jazz tended to spatialize rather than temporalize musical movement. Here Adorno was pointing to one of the key characteristics of mass culture as the Institut understood it: the substitution of mythic repetition for historical development. "In jazz, one substitutes the immobility of an ever-identical movement for time." [70] The decline of temporality was connected implicitly with the liquidation of the autonomous individual. As Kant had argued, temporal development was a crucial attribute of individuality. Further evidence of the destruction of the individual subject in jazz, Adorno asserted in a supplement to the article he wrote in 1937,[71] was its being used more often as dance or background music rather than being listened to directly. This meant that it did not require, in a Kantian sense, a synthetic unity of apperception. The listener, instead of being forced to engage in a kind of *praxis,* as was the case with Schönberg's atonal music, was reduced to masochistic passivity.

If there was a negative moment in jazz — and Adorno was reluctant, despite his dialectical intentions, to admit there was — it existed in its potentially ambiguous sexual *(Zwischengeschlechtlicher)*[72] implications. Anticipating Marcuse's later praise of polymorphous perversity, Adorno wrote that the suppression of the genital-centric subject, although possibly suggesting regression to sadism or homosexuality, might also provide a foretaste of the social order beyond patriarchal authoritarianism. The saxophone, the most characteristic jazz instrument, gave intimations of this sexual liberation because it was a metal instrument played like a woodwind.[73] But in almost every other respect, jazz represented a capitulation before the powers of the status quo.

This evaluation of jazz, it might be added, did not change after Adorno's emigration to America. In 1953 he wrote another essay, "Perennial Fashion — Jazz,"[74] which was as hostile as ever. And just a short time before his death he discussed the original "Hektor Rottweiler" piece as having been too optimistic in its estimation of jazz's spontaneous character.[75] What Adorno thought of popular music and its connection to the student protest movement in the 1960's is difficult to know, as to my knowledge he never discussed it in print. The likelihood is that, unlike Marcuse,[76] he was impressed more by its pseudo-liberating aspects than by its genuine ones.

After "On Jazz" was published in the *Zeitschrift*, Adorno did not have to wait long before sampling American popular culture at first hand. His time at Oxford, where he wrote on Husserl and began studies of Beethoven and Wagner (only the second of which was ever completed), was drawing to a close. Returning to Germany, it grew increasingly clear, had become practically impossible. Moreover, Horkheimer and his colleagues in New York were anxious to draw him across the Atlantic. In the mid-thirties his gravitation towards the Institut had grown to the extent that Horkheimer was able to write jubilantly to Lowenthal on July 13, 1936, that Adorno now "really belongs to us." The Institut's reduced budget, however, made a direct invitation to become a full member difficult. Still, with Horkheimer's prodding, Adorno made his first visit to New York in June, 1937.[77] His impressions were generally favorable, and he decided to come if the opportunity arose. He did not have long to wait, as Paul Lazarsfeld's Princeton Office of Radio Research, located at that time in Newark, offered him a half-time position as the head of its music study in February, 1938.[78]

Adorno's tenure with the Office of Radio Research was an uneasy one, primarily for methodological reasons that we shall discuss in the following chapter. In addition, he faced all the problems of adjustment that had plagued the other Institut members when they emigrated a few years earlier. In March, Lazarsfeld wrote of his first impressions of the new arrival in a memorandum to two of his colleagues at the project, Hadley Cantril and Frank Stanton:

> He looks exactly as you would imagine a very absent-minded German professor, and he behaves so foreign that I feel like a member of the Mayflower Society. When you start to talk with him, however, he has an enormous amount of interesting ideas. As every newcomer, he tried to reform everything, but if you listen to him, most of what he says makes sense.[79]

In subsequent years, Adorno's refusal to make himself over as an American remained firm, and his critical distance from American culture did not diminish substantially.

Despite this, or perhaps because of it, his scholarly production continued to be prodigious. His first piece written in America, "On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Hearing," appeared in the *Zeitschrift* in 1938.[80] Continuing his generally critical evaluation of contemporary music, the article served as a rebuttal of the more optimistic analysis of the social significance of another mode of popular culture, the film, which Benjamin had contributed to an earlier issue[81] and to which we shall return shortly. Once again, Adorno attacked the false harmony of much contemporary music. Instead, he argued for a new asceticism, which would imply the *promesse de bonheur* in its very denial of the fraudulent happiness of affirmative art. And also as before, he stressed the end of true subjectivity in society and in the art it produced. "The liquidation of the individual," he wrote, "is the particular signature of the new musical situation." [82]

What was new in the article was his exploration of the concepts of fetishism and the "regression" of hearing. Totality, as we have already noted, was one of the central categories of the Frankfurt School's social theory. To the Institut, one of the fundamental characteristics of a nonideological theory was its responsiveness to the interrelationships of past history, present realities, and future potentialities, with all the attendant mediations and contradictions. Concentrating on only one aspect of these — as for example, the positivists did by hypostatizing present "facts" as the only reality — was to make a fetish of one part of the whole. Fetishization, however, was not only a methodological failing. As Marx had demonstrated, it was even more fundamentally an element of alienated capitalist culture, a culture in which men blindly venerated their own products as reified objects. Fetishization, Adorno argued in the Marxian manner, was not merely a psychological category; it was an economic one as well, rooted in the commodity character of a society dominated by exchange rather than use value.[83]

Because music had been invaded by the capitalist ethos, its fetishization was almost total. On one level, that of production, it appeared in the inordinate focus on arrangements rather than composition, in the frequent introduction of coloristic effects, and in the nostalgic resurrection of outdated musical styles for their evocative value. On another, the reception of the music, it manifested itself in the stress on "stars," in both classical (for example, Toscanini) and popular music; in the cult of instruments such as Stradivarius and Amati violins; in the importance of being at the "right" concert rather than going to hear the music itself; and in the empty ecstasy of the jazz enthusiast who listens for the sake of listening alone. To verify fetishization, however, by normal social scientific techniques was impossible — here was the crux of his conflict with Lazarsfeld. Questionnaires or interviews were inadequate because the opinions of the listeners themselves were unreliable. Not only were they incapable of overcoming the conformity of cultural norms, but even more fundamentally, their ability to hear had itself degenerated. It had regressed, not physiologically, but psychologically. The regression was not to an earlier musical era, but rather to an infantile state in which the listener was docile and afraid of anything new, a state similar to the passive dependency Fromm had described in his article "The Feeling of Impotency." Like children who demand only food they have enjoyed in the past, the listener whose hearing had regressed could respond only to a repetition of what he had heard before. Like children who respond to bright colors, he was fascinated by the use of colorative devices that gave the impression of excitement and individuality.

The regressed listener, Adorno argued, was not confined to any one class.[84] If there was a social moment expressed in his condition, it was that of the meaningless leisure of the unemployed. Although at present depoliticized and passive, his masochistic self-abnegation might develop into destructive rage turned outwards. The frustrated sexuality of the frantic jitterbugger expressed this pent-up hostility. Adorno was not optimistic however, about the constructive purposes to which this repressed anger might be put. He was also far less sanguine than Benjamin about the revolutionary potential of popular art, at least in its present affirmative form. "The collective powers also liquidate unsalvageable individuality in music," he wrote, "but only individuals are still capable of representing consciously and negatively the concerns of collectivity."[85] Adorno, as might be expected, saw his role and that of other members of the Institut in this light. His tenure with the Princeton Radio Research Project, although complicated by his methodological differences with the more empirically oriented Lazarsfeld, was by no means unproductive. With the "editorial assistance" of George Simpson,[86] he wrote a total of four papers for the project. The first, "A Social Critique of Radio Music," was delivered in 1940, although not published until 1945.[87] Here Adorno built on the work done by another former student of Schönberg, Ernst Krĕnek, with whom he had been friends since their Viennese days.

Krĕnek had already contributed a study of radio music to the *Zeitschrift* in 1938.[88] Its conclusions were based on a survey of sixty-seven stations in eleven countries. Most stations, he noted, played very little modern, atonal music of the kind he wrote himself. His explanation was that the central function of radio, the transmission of information, had permeated its musical broadcasts as well. Moreover, the information it conveyed through its music was the need to conform. Music, he argued, had been reduced by the radio to an ornament of everyday life. Furthermore, by being a reproductive medium of the second order, after the actual performance itself, radio brought about a crucial change in the aesthetic experience of the listener. In simulating the sense of attending the concert in the flesh, radio could preserve the *nunc* or "nowness" of a performance but not its *hic* or "hereness." In so doing, it destroyed one of the crucial features of what Benjamin had called the "aura" of a work of art, its ritual, cultish nimbus. Instead of experiencing the music with its "auratic" qualities intact, the radio listener heard it in a depersonalized, collective, objectivized form, which robbed it of its negative function.

Adorno's own study of radio music agreed with Krĕnek's conclusions. He began his paper by stating certain basic axioms: the commodity character of modern society; the trend towards monopoly in all sectors of the society, including communications; society's reaction to any threats to its preservation by a tightening of its conformist elements; and the existence of social antagonisms in the cultural sphere.[89] What followed from these premises was similar enough to the analysis of Krĕnek's paper and Adorno's own work, described above, not to require recapitulation here. His three subsequent essays with the Radio Research Project were devoted to explorations of popular music, the NBC "Music Appreciation Hour," and the radio symphony.[90]

The first of these, "On Popular Music," was published in a special issue of the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* concentrating on mass communications, done in collaboration with the Radio Research Project.[91] The essay continued the hostile appraisal of jazz that Adorno had begun while still in Europe. Standardization and pseudo-individuality were among the salient traits of popular music in Adorno's eyes. Recognition of the familiar was the essence of mass listening, serving more as an end in itself than as a means to more intelligent appreciation. Once a certain formula was successful, the industry promoted and plugged the same thing over and over again. The result was to make music into a kind of social cement operating through distraction, displaced wish-fulfillment, and the intensification of passivity. However, as in the case of jazz, Adorno felt there might still be an isolated element of negation in popular music. Here he saw it potentially existing in the spiteful resentment of passivity that the pseudo-activity of jitterbugging implied. The energy thus expressed, he contended in a way reminiscent of Nietzsche's analysis of the ascetic priest, at least expressed a vestige of unextinguished will. "To become transformed into an insect," he wrote, playing on the name of the dance, "man needs that energy which might possibly achieve his transformation into a man." [92]

Adorno's third study for Lazarsfeld was a content analysis of the NBC "Music Appreciation Hour," showing how it spread false musical knowledge. Of greater interest than this project, which was never published and was soon outdated, was his final contribution to the Office of Radio Research, an analysis of the radio symphony.[93] Like Krĕnek, he argued that the "presence" of the music was lost to the radio listener, and with it, a part of music's "auratic" spell. Also lost was the actual volume of the performance and the sense of community created by being a member of a live audience. By isolating the individual, the radio served to destroy the symphonic "space," which, like that of a cathedral, surrounded the listener at a real concert. It also served to return the listener to serial time rather than immersing him in the "suspension of time-consciousness" [94] that characterized great symphonies like Beethoven's. (What Adorno meant by this suspension was different from the repetitive timelessness of affirmative culture. Normal time was indeed suspended by great works of art, but in its place was a type of coherent development, which was a foretaste of the temporal order of the "other" society. Benjamin was especially fond of distinguishing between "homogeneous, empty" time and time "filled by the presence of the now.") [95] Serial time corresponded to the breakdown of true individuality, which, as we have seen, meant meaningful development and relatedness to the totality. To Adorno, "the tendency towards atomized listening" was "perhaps the most universal of [the] present day's musical consciousness." [96] Deprived of its unity as an aesthetic totality, the symphony degenerated into a series of reified quotations, snatches of melody taken out of their context, without any negative resonance at all.

In a second section of the original manuscript Adorno continued his critique of the deleterious effects of radio by pointing to its stimulus to standardization. Although relating this to the permeation of the exchange ethic of capitalism, he also saw a connection with technical rationality itself, in a way similar to Horkheimer's analysis of trends in the authoritarian state. "Its basic standardization," he wrote, "is certain to prevail in some way or other under noncapitalist forms of production. Technical standardization leads to centralized administration." [97] Once again, he gave clear evidence of his distance from the Leninist strain in Marxist aesthetic criticism, with its general indifference to technological innovation. Published in shortened form in the 1941 volume of *Radio Research*, the essay met with considerable opposition from American commentators. And in later years Adorno was to admit that one of his arguments had been made obsolete: "that the radio symphony was not a symphony at all, a thesis derived from the technologically produced alterations in sound . . . which have since been overcome by the techniques of high fidelity and stereophonics." [98] In general, however, it can fairly be said that Adorno's musical criticism found an unsympathetic audience in this country, which was only partly a function of its being written primarily in German.

Moving to Los Angeles in 1941 meant an end to Adorno's fitful collaboration with Lazarsfeld. It also led to a redirection of his attention away from the consumption and reception of music back to its production. To discuss in detail the complexities of his work in this area beyond what has already been done, let alone to analyze it critically, would be beyond my ability. Still, certain points relating it to the Institut's other work can be made.

In New York, Adorno had put the finishing touches on his study of Wagner, parts of which had appeared in the *Zeitschrift* in 1939.[99] Publication of the completed manuscript was delayed until his return to Germany in the 1950's. Many of the categories he used, however, demonstrated how close in spirit the work was to other examples of Institut thinking in the thirties. For example, Adorno used Fromm's notion of the "social character" to integrate Wagner's anti-Semitism, antibourgeois posturing, and pseudo-rebelliousness with certain strains in his music. Here he introduced such terms as "conductor-composer" and the "gestural type" of composition to illuminate the social content of the music. Another new concept was "phantasmagoria," which indicated Wagner's tendency to mask the social-psychological genesis of his music by making it appear to be derived from "natural" sources, a deception characteristic of much authoritarian thought, as we have seen in Marcuse's and Lowenthal's work. This was a characteristic of Wagner's ideology that Adorno connected with the mythical elements in his music dramas, elements that sought to interpret the unconscious while at the same time dissolving reality into it. Adorno also discussed the *Ring* in terms of the betrayal of the revolutionary by the "rebel," once again using concepts developed by Fromm in his theoretical essay in the *Studien über Autorität und Familie*. In the last fragment that appeared in the *Zeitschrift*, Adorno analyzed the pessimism and nihilism Wagner had adopted from Schopenhauer. Here he admitted that a certain measure of utopian protest was contained in Wagner's vision, in the way in which his dialectical approach always, or almost always, perceived a subdued strain of negation in even the most affirmative cultural products.

Although unpublished, the Wagner manuscript circulated among Adorno's friends in the exile community in the Los Angeles area. While New York was clearly the center of resettlement for most refugees, a number of exiles had emigrated to California, some of them drawn to Hollywood and the work it offered in the movie industry. Among the more celebrated were Heinrich Mann, Alfred Polgar, Bertolt Brecht, Alfred Döblin, and William Dieterle. After their arrival in 1941, Horkheimer and Adorno were quickly accepted into the exile community.[100] One of the most illustrious of their number was Thomas Mann, about whom Horkheimer had written not entirely with favor in an earlier year. Mann's celebrated irony, Horkheimer had argued in 1938,[101] had passive implications, and his support for Weimar was ill conceived. Still, he recognized that Mann's repudiation of the Nazis had moved him in a more progressive direction and predicted an increasingly radical future for him.

By the time of their arrival in California, previous disagreements had been muted, and Mann became close friends with the two fellow emigrés. During the forties Mann occasionally participated in Institut-sponsored seminars and lent his name to an Institut study of the help German gentiles had given to persecuted Jews, which was conducted in 1943 primarily through a survey in the *Aufbau*, the leading emigré newspaper.[102] Increasingly occupied with an attempt to render the Nazi experience and its origins in a fictional form, Mann hit on the device of using the life and works of a composer as the symbolic equivalent of Germany's cultural decline. Not unexpectedly, he was attracted to Adorno, with his unique background in both music and philosophy, as a source of information. The first example of Adorno's work that came to his attention was the manuscript on Wagner. Mann recognized it as an "extremely shrewd treatise . . . which never entirely passes over to the negative side . . . and has a certain kinship with my own essay, 'Sufferings and Greatness of Richard Wagner.' " [103]

Adorno's subsequent work made an even greater impression on Mann when Adorno gave it to him in July, 1943. The first half of what was later called *Philosophy of Modern Music* was an essay on Schönberg, developing some of the themes Adorno had first discussed in the *Zeitschrift* in 1932. By the forties, Adorno, as we have mentioned earlier, had grown more critical of the changes in his former idol's music, especially his acceptance of his pupils' hypostatization of the twelve-tone system. According to Mann, Schönberg, who at that time was also living in southern California, "sensed the critical note within his disciple's respect," [104] making relations between them strained. Mann, on the other hand, was very enthusiastic about what he read and set about incorporating it into the novel he was then engaged in writing.

In his later discussion of that novel, *Doctor Faustus*, Mann expressed his gratitude for Adorno's help: "The analysis of the row system and the criticism of it that is translated into dialogue in chapter XXII of Faustus is entirely based on Adorno's essay. So are certain remarks on the tonal language of the later Beethoven, such as occur early in the book in Kretschmar's sputterings: the uncanny relationship that death establishes between genius and convention." [105] Throughout the writing of the work, Mann returned to Adorno for advice. In October, 1943, Mann heard Adorno play "the entire Sonata Opus 111 [of Beethoven] in a highly instructive fashion." The effect on him was profound. "I had never been more attentive," he remembered. "I rose early the following morning and for the next three days immersed myself in a thoroughgoing revision and extension of the lecture, which became a significant enrichment and embellishment of the chapter and indeed of the whole book. Into the poetic little illustrative phrases I wrote for the arietta theme I slipped Adorno's patronymic, Wiesengrund (Meadowland), by way of showing my gratitude." [106] In December, 1945, Mann wrote Adorno a ten-page letter apologizing for his "scrupulously unscrupulous" [107] borrowings from his work, and asked for still more advice, which was quickly forthcoming. When the novel was finally published in 1947, Adorno received a copy inscribed by Mann to his "privy councillor." [108] Mann's relations with Schönberg, it might be noted in passing, were seriously undermined by the composer's accusation that his ideas had been stolen without attribution; Mann added an explanation to all subsequent editions of the novel.[109] *Philosophy of Modern Music* itself appeared the following year, with a section on Stravinsky written during the war to balance the Schönberg chapters. Later, Adorno was to call the entire work a long excursus on *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, which we shall examine in Chapter 8.

In the forties Adorno also collaborated with another refugee in California, the composer Hanns Eisler, on a book dealing with music in the film. However, because of Adorno's reluctance to be associated with the more politically involved Eisler, his name was not on the title page when the book was published in 1947.[110] He also found the time in California to write essays on Huxley, Kafka, and cultural criticism in general, which were included in a volume called *Prismen* published in Germany after his return. In the summer of 1948, immediately following the completion of *Philosophy of Modern Music*, he turned his attention to music in the Soviet bloc. The result was a highly critical essay entitled "Gegängelte Musik,"[111] (*gängeln* roughly means being fettered or led around by the nose), in which he attacked the promotion of "healthy" art by advocates of socialist realism.

In addition to his work on cultural matters, Adorno maintained his theoretical interests leading to *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* and his book of aphorisms, *Minima Moralia*;[112] he also spent time trying to employ American empirical techniques in his work on *The Authoritarian Personality* and in a study of an American demagogue.[113] Adorno returned to Germany with Horkheimer in 1949, but his work in California had not yet ended. In the winter of 1952–1953 he came back for a few months, primarily to retain his American citizenship. Through connections made while working on *The Authoritarian Personality*, he secured a position as director of the scientific branch of the Hacker Foundation in Beverly Hills. Here his two final works on American mass culture were composed. The first was a study, written with Bernice T. Eiduson, of the new mass communications medium, television, for which they performed content analyses of scripts with the aim of uncovering the latent messages of the shows.[114] The second was a longer and in some ways more original study of the *Los Angeles Times*' astrology column.[115] Adorno had already written several pages on the occult in *Minima Moralia*.[116] With the additional work of *The Authoritarian Personality* behind him, he was able to broaden his critique considerably.

In "The Stars Down to Earth," as the study was called, Adorno treated astrology as a "secondary" superstition, in the sense that it affected secondary groups like classes rather than primary ones like the family. Thus, although Adorno used psychoanalytical insights, with the help of Dr. Frederick Hacker, a trained analyst, they were not directed primarily at individuals but rather at groups. Or more precisely, they were used to explore the psychosocial layer between individual psyches and allegedly individual consciousnesses. The Freud Adorno was most interested in here was the Freud of *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.*[117] As a result, the study showed the convergence of the Institut's critique of mass culture with its analysis of authoritarianism, which will be examined in the next chapter. Astrology, Adorno concluded, was an "ideology of dependence" [118] answering many of the irrational needs of types of people who were "high scorers" on *The Authoritarian Personality*'s "F Scale."

Adorno's California years were thus enormously productive. In his essay on Huxley he had written: "It is made unmistakably clear to the intellectual from abroad that he will have to eradicate himself as an autonomous being if he hopes to achieve anything or be accepted as an employee of the super-trust into which life has condensed." [119] Adorno never sought, nor did he receive, that acceptance, but his achievement was, if anything, strengthened by his remaining stubbornly on the outside. Instead of succumbing to the demands of the American cultural "super-trust," he was able to write, as the Institut almost always had done, for a constituency more ideal than real — the exception being the Institut's work on authoritarianism. And ironically, after his return to Germany, an audience was to materialize large enough to make Adorno into one of the major European intellectual figures of his time.

A strong sense of the pressures of American cultural life played as great a role in the life of Walter Benjamin, to whose contribution to the Institut's history we can now turn. Throughout the thirties Benjamin resisted the Institut's entreaties to join its other members in New York.[120] In January, 1938, at what was to be their last meeting, Benjamin turned down Adorno's urgent plea by saying, "there are still positions in Europe to defend." [121] By the time these positions had been overrun and remaining in Paris was no longer possible — the Gestapo seized Benjamin's apartment in the summer of 1940 — emigration to America had become increasingly difficult. German refugees who had escaped to France at an earlier date were in danger of being returned to the Nazis by the Vichy government. Benjamin was put into an internment camp at Nevers in anticipation of such a move. The Institut began then to do all it could on his behalf. Maurice Halbwachs and Georges Scelle intervened to have him released from the camp.[122] A certain number of emergency visas to the United States were available, and, primarily through Pollock's efforts, one was obtained for the reluctant refugee. Benjamin was less successful, however, in securing an exit visa from France. Although an obstacle, this did not present an insurmountable problem, as a generally unguarded road over the Pyrenees to the Spanish border at Port Bou was considered a safe alternative. Benjamin, in ill health at the time because of a heart condition, was one of a party of refugees who set out for the frontier on September 26, 1940. In his baggage were fifteen tablets of a morphia compound, which, so he told Arthur Koestler in Marseilles a few days earlier, "were enough to kill a horse." [123] By chance, the Spanish government had closed its border just before their arrival. Tired by the trip, distraught over the prospect of returning to Gestapo seizure, and still unenthusiastic about his future in America, Benjamin swallowed the pills during the night. Refusing to have his stomach pumped the next morning, he died in agony, a few months past his forty-eighth birthday. On the next day, the Spanish border guards, shaken by his suicide, allowed the rest of the party to pass through to safety. As a grim footnote to the story, Koestler, hearing the news, took some of the same pills, which Benjamin had given him in Marseilles. "But," he wrote later, "Benjamin apparently had a better stomach, for I vomited the stuff out." [124]

What Benjamin's emigration to New York would have meant to the Institut, or to American intellectual life for that matter, will of course never be known. How well he would have integrated his talents with those of the other Institut members can only be conjectured. Horkheimer and Adorno had hoped to win him over more closely to Critical Theory, having previously tried to do so from afar, but whether or not he would have continued to resist is a matter for speculation alone. What can be said with certainty is that the Institut was sorely disappointed and upset by his premature death. In subsequent years it sought to secure for him the recognition and acclaim he had been denied in life. The first manifestation of this was a memorial volume circulated in a limited, mimeographed edition (because of the Institut's financial problems) in 1942. It contained essays by Adorno, Horkheimer, and Benjamin himself.[125] After the Institut returned to Germany, Adorno, with the help of Benjamin's old friend Gershom Scholem, published editions of his writings and letters, which have sparked widespread interest in Benjamin's work in the last decade. Whatever his critics may have said about Adorno's interpretation of his friend's ideas, and its repercussions on the picture of Benjamin he fostered, they could not deny that only through his efforts, in collaboration with Scholem, did Benjamin become a figure of controversy at all.

What Adorno never denied was that Benjamin's perspective, combining theological and materialist elements in a unique way, was all his own. To explore it adequately would require another study, one moreover that Rolf Tiedemann has already written[126] and that therefore need not be attempted now. In fact, merely to sift through the controversy that has surrounded Benjamin's name in the past decade would be a task of considerable proportions.[127] What will be attempted here instead is a discussion of Benjamin's specific relations with the Institut and his contribution to its work, especially its analysis of mass culture.

Benjamin was born in 1892 in Berlin, and grew up, like most of the other Institut members, in a family of well-to-do assimilated Jews. His father was an antiquarian and art dealer from whom he inherited a collector's fascination with books and the artifacts of the past.[128] Relations with his family, however, were never easy. Although he would return to his childhood again and again in his work,[129] it was apparently a period of great sadness for him.[130] Like many other disaffected bourgeois German adolescents, he joined Gustav Wyneken's Youth Movement before the war, becoming a member of its most radical wing, which was composed largely of Jewish students.[131] During the period of his affiliation, he rose to the presidency of the Berlin Free Student Association and was a frequent contributor to Wyneken's *Der Anfang*, under the pseudonym "Ardor." During the war, however, his interest in another escape from the oppressiveness of bourgeois life crowded out the Youth Movement. Zionism became the dominant passion of his life for the next few years. His interest in it was strengthened by the close friendship he began with Gershom Scholem in 1915, who also awoke his curiosity in Jewish theology and mysticism. Benjamin's wife Dora, whom he married in 1917, was herself the daughter of a prominent Zionist, Leon Kellner. Benjamin's commitment to Zionism, however, was never undiluted. In 1922 he resisted Scholem's entreaties to accompany him to Palestine, although later letters indicate his continued interest in such a move.[132] With the collapse of his marriage in the twenties — divorce came in 1930 — what was perhaps another stimulus to the maintenance of his Zionism disappeared.[133]

Yet the impact of his Jewish studies under Scholem's influence remained strong through the rest of his life, although after 1922 — the year of Scholem's departure and the failure of a projected literary review with a religious perspective, to be called *Angelus Novus* — it was never as central as before. We have already discussed the influence of certain Jewish strains on the Institut's work: the unwillingness to name or describe the "other" at the heart of Critical Theory, and Fromm's interest in a philosophical anthropology similar to that of Martin Buber and his colleagues in the Frankfurt Lehrhaus. The influence of Jewish thought and custom on Benjamin was somewhat different. Benjamin's keenest interest was in the Cabala, the most arcane of Jewish mystical works; here his friendship with Scholem was crucial. When Max Rychner, the editor of the *Schweizer Rundschau*, asked Benjamin about the particularly abstruse introduction to his book on baroque tragedy, *The Origin of German Tragedy*, Benjamin referred him to the Cabala.[134] What appealed to Benjamin about it was the exegetical skill needed to probe its levels of meaning. In a letter to Rychner written in 1931, well after Benjamin had become interested in Marxism, he could still comment, "I have never been able to do research and think in a way other than, if I may so put it, in a theological sense — namely, in accordance with the Talmudic teaching of the forty-nine levels of meaning in every passage in the Torah." [135] As has often been noted,[136] Benjamin's examination of cultural phenomena resembled that of a biblical scholar probing a sacred text. In his hope of writing a book consisting solely of quotations, Benjamin expressed a quasi-religious desire to become the transparent mouthpiece of a higher reality. His theory of language was similarly rooted in the assumption of a central reality, which could be revealed, albeit incompletely, by the power of exegesis.[137]

If Benjamin responded to the revelatory elements in Judaism, he was equally sensitive to its redemptive strains. The messianic current in Jewish thought, which was appropriated in a secularized form by Marxism, ran through his writings from beginning to end. One of the last essays he wrote, the posthumously published "Theses on the Philosophy of History," made this very evident. It was here that Benjamin most clearly articulated his distinction between homogeneous, empty time and the messianic *Jetztzeit* (the fulfilled time of the present)[138] that the revolution was supposed to usher in. It was also here that he made clear his life-long commitment to a theological mode of thinking, in the parable that opened the "Theses":

> A puppet in Turkish attire and with a hookah in its mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. . . . Actually, a little hunchback who was an expert chess player sat inside and guided the puppet's hand by means of strings. One can imagine a philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet called "historical materialism" is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight.[139]

It should be added that the Institut, far from encouraging the theological elements in Benjamin's thought, as some of its critics have implied, sought to influence him in a more secular direction. The general reaction to the "Theses" within the Institut was not especially favorable.[140] Adorno's correspondence also shows his disapproval of the Jewish residues in Benjamin's thought.[141]

On the other hand, the Institut was not entirely enthusiastic about the brand of Marxism Benjamin adopted in the mid-twenties. Unlike the others, Benjamin came to dialectical materialism following its heroic period in the immediate postwar years,[142] although his curiosity had doubtless been aroused as early as 1918, when he became friends with Ernst Bloch in Bern.[143] Lukács's early work served as another bridge to Marx, especially *History and Class Consciousness* and *The Theory of the Novel.*[144] Personal acquaintances also played a key role. In 1924, on holiday in Capri, Benjamin met the Russian director and actress Asja Lacis, who was traveling with a company performing Brecht's *Edward II.* Possibly, Benjamin, whose marriage to Dora Kellner was in trouble, fell in love with Miss Lacis. In any case, she introduced him to her circle of Marxist friends and helped arrange a trip to Moscow for him in the winter of 1926–1927. In the Soviet capital he met Mayakovsky and Byeli and made arrangements to write an article on Goethe for the Soviet Encyclopedia, which was never actually completed. And then in 1929 Asja Lacis introduced him to the man who was to play the most important role in his Marxist development, Bertolt Brecht.

Brecht's relationship with Benjamin has been one of the major sources of recent controversy. Scholem and Adorno both considered Brecht's influence more destructive than beneficial.[145] Rolf Tiedemann, Adorno's student, asserted that the relationship ought to be understood less in intellectual than in psychological terms, because of Benjamin's fear of Brecht.[146] Especially baleful, they all agreed, was Benjamin's acceptance of Brecht's crude, even vulgar, materialism. Almost as unfortunate, at least in Adorno's eyes, was Benjamin's adoption of his friend's overly optimistic attitude towards the revolutionary potential of popular art and technological innovation. Personal distrust of Brecht doubtless contributed to their dislike of his hold over Benjamin. The Frankfurt School, it should be noted, never saw eye to eye with Brecht on political matters, despite their respect for his literary achievements. The sentiment was returned in kind. Well after Benjamin's death, when Brecht had moved to California, he, Horkheimer, and Adorno saw each other socially; but as his diary demonstrates,[147] the old animosities continued unabated. To Brecht, the Institut consisted of "Tui-intellectuals," who prostituted themselves for American foundation support. (His proposed novel, set in the fictitious Chinese kingdom of the Tuis, was never actually completed.) They in turn considered him a petit-bourgeois *poseur* and an apologist for Stalinism.

To Benjamin, on the other hand, Brecht was far more attractive. "My agreeing with Brecht's production," he wrote in 1933, "represents one of the most important and most reinforced points in my entire position." [148] Hannah Arendt, who knew Benjamin in Paris in the thirties, has commented that the attraction lay in Brecht's "crude thinking," [149] the very rejection of dialectical subtleties that Adorno so loathed. Benjamin, she continued, saw in Brecht's unmediated materialism "not so much a referral to practice as to reality, and to him this reality manifested itself most directly in the proverbs and idioms of everyday language." [150] Miss Arendt was not alone in pointing to the fascination Brecht held for Benjamin. Other detractors of the Institut further to the left went so far as to accuse Adorno and Scholem of deliberately minimizing Brecht's importance for their own purposes.[151] This seems not to be the case, however, for Tiedemann, who is usually identified with the Adorno-Scholem camp, edited a collection of Benjamin's articles and reviews of Brecht in 1966.[152] That they considered the relationship harmful no one denies. And in fact it might be argued that Benjamin, for all his admiration, shared some wariness about the friendship, which manifested itself in his refusal to leave Paris permanently to join Brecht in his Svendborg, Denmark, exile.[153] Brecht, on the other hand, seems to have remained devoted until Benjamin's death. In fact, he wrote two moving poems on that subject in 1940.[154]

The undialectical note that Adorno detected in Benjamin's acceptance of Brecht's more vulgar materialism was perhaps a product of the difference between Benjamin's intellectual background and that of the other Institut members. Benjamin's university training had taken place in Berlin, Freiburg, and Bern, where, during the war, he received his degree with a thesis on the German romantics.[155] The most important philosophical influence on his thinking had been neo-Kantian. Near the end of his life, he wrote to Adorno that Heinrich Rickert had been his most influential teacher.[156] From the beginning, however, it seems that Benjamin was dissatisfied with Kant's agnostic dualism, with its distinction between noumena and phenomena. In an early essay he wrote: "It is the task of the coming theory of knowledge to find the sphere of total neutrality in relation to the concepts of object and subject; in other words, to ascertain the autonomous, original sphere in which this concept in no way signified the relationship between two metaphysical entities." [157] In so arguing, of course, he was on ground familiar to Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno. Where he differed, however, was in the comparatively minor impact of Hegel on his thinking. In general, he sought to free himself from the burden of philosophical jargon, which he dismissed as the chatter of pimps *(Zuhältersprache)*.[158] On this score, as their correspondence reveals, he and Horkheimer were at odds.[159]

Another source of friction between Benjamin and at least Adorno was his relative indifference to music, especially as a potentially critical medium. According to Adorno,[160] he had developed an animosity to music in his youth, which was never entirely overcome. In an important essay, "The Author as Producer," [161] written when Brecht's influence was at its height, Benjamin suggested that words must be added to music to give it any political content. The model he chose was the collaboration between Brecht and Hanns Eisler on *The Measures Taken.* There is little indication in his work that he shared Adorno's taste for the more demanding forms of modern music or his belief in the importance of music's nonrepresentational quality.

Moreover, Benjamin's thinking was always more analogical than Horkheimer's or Adorno's, more concerned with the universal implicit in the particular. For all Critical Theory's interest in the interplay of totality and moment, it is unlikely that Horkheimer and the others would have accepted without qualification Benjamin's assertion that "a historical materialist approaches a historical subject only where he encounters it as a monad." [162] Their mode of thinking was always more explanatory than his, more concerned with uncovering the discontinuities and mediations among various social phenomena. To Benjamin, the importance of nonidentity was not as great as his colleagues argued. And as a result, he was not as concerned with the salvation of subjectivity as they were. His "dialectics at a standstill" [163] was far more static and direct than Critical Theory. Still, Adorno took pains to avoid lumping him together with the phenomenologists, whose lack of dialectical irony he often scored:

> To interpret his lack of system and of a closed theoretical foundation as sufficient reason to align him with the representatives of 'intuition,' eidetic or otherwise . . . is to overlook what is best in him. It is not his glance as such which lays claim to the unmediated possession of the absolute; rather his manner of seeing, the entire perspective is altered. The technique of enlargement brings the rigid in motion and the dynamic to rest.[164]

If Benjamin's unique perspective distanced him from Critical Theory, it also served to undermine his chances for a successful academic career. His critical study of Goethe's *Elective Affinities*, written in 1924–1925, appeared under the sponsorship of Hugo von Hofmannsthal.[165] But the work explicitly criticized the ideology of the then powerful circle around Stefan George, which resulted in his being ostracized from the scholarly world into which their influence extended.[166] Later attempts to gain his *Habilitation* at the University of Frankfurt were equally fruitless. The work he submitted as his credentials was a study of German baroque drama in which he sought to "rescue" the category of allegory. It proved, however, too obscure for his examiners, among whom were the head of the literature faculty, Franz Schultz, and the university's expert on aesthetics, the same Hans Cornelius who had been the teacher of several Institut members.[167] Although ultimately published in 1928, *The Origin of German Tragedy* failed to earn Benjamin a place in the academic hierarchy. With this defeat went his father's refusal to continue supporting him, and Benjamin was forced to eke out an existence as a private critic and occasional translator of writers like Proust.[168] In the twenties and early thirties he wrote for such journals as the *Literarische Welt* and such newspapers as the *Frankfurter Zeitung.* He also did reviews for a Frankfurt radio station directed by his friend Ernst Schoen.[169] Although his work was often of the highest quality — his evocative memories of childhood, later published as *Berlin Childhood Around 1900,*[170] were serialized in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* — it received relatively little notice.

The Nazi take-over meant the end of the few sources of income Benjamin had in Germany. After attempts to write pseudonymously as "Detlef Holz" and "C. Conrad" proved unsuccessful, he accepted the necessity of emigration. Paris, a city in which he had felt comfortable on previous visits, became his chosen refuge. In many ways, the modern city was one of the central foci of his work,[171] and Paris was the European metropolis *par excellence.* As early as 1927 he had begun writing a major analysis of bourgeois culture, an *Urgeschichte* (prehistory) of the nineteenth century, which used Paris as its central metaphor. Entitled the *Passagenarbeit* (a reference to the *Passagen,* or arcades, of Paris), it was to occupy Benjamin for the remainder of his life. Although extending to thousands of pages, only parts of it were ever actually completed to his satisfaction.

The Institut's role in the development of this project has been another source of controversy. Benjamin's main support in Paris after the end of 1935 was the Institut's stipend. Other projects, such as the collection of letters he published as "Detlef Holz" in Switzerland,[172] might have brought in some income, but, as his own correspondence indicates, not very much. Benjamin had been acquainted with Adorno since 1923, when they had met in Frankfurt.[173] In 1934, after

Benjamin's flight from Germany, Adorno persuaded Horkheimer to accept some of his work for the *Zeitschrift*. His first essay, a study of the social position of current French writers, appeared in the first issue of that year.[174] It was soon followed by a survey of linguistic sociology, in which Benjamin revealed his life-long interest in language and its broader implications. Shortly thereafter, Horkheimer extended an invitation to Benjamin to join the Institut in America. Although Benjamin had written in April, 1935, that "there is nothing so urgent to me as connecting my work as tightly and productively with the Institut as possible," [175] he declined the offer. At the end of the year, however, he was made a research associate of the Institut's Paris branch and began to receive a regular stipend, which, although never very much, allowed him to say that it "brought about an immediate unburdening." [176]

Because of Benjamin's admitted financial dependency on the Institut, it has been argued by the *Alternative* circle that his work was changed in fundamental ways, even censored, by his editors in New York. Without going into the textual questions in all their complexity, it does seem accurate to say that on occasion the wording of Benjamin's essays was altered in a less radical direction. A clear example of this was his article "The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction," which ended in Benjamin's original text with the words: "This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art." These are the words that also appear in the English translation, in *Illuminations* (page 244). In the *Zeitschrift*, however, the printed version replaced "Fascism" with "the totalitarian doctrine" and "Communism" with "the constructive forces of mankind" (page 66). On the same page, the original "imperialistic warfare" was changed to "modern warfare." [177]

These changes, however, were usually made in correspondence with Benjamin and not after he had submitted finished versions to the New York branch of the Institut. What is crucial to understand is that they were not done specifically to bring Benjamin into line with a dogmatic Critical Theory, but were rather a reflection of the Aesopian language the *Zeitschrift* frequently used, to protect itself from political harassment. The accusations of other refugees at the New School, Adorno's later reluctance to be associated with Hanns Eisler, the subtle change in the English translation of the title of Grossmann's book have all been previously mentioned. It is abundantly clear that the Institut felt insecure in America and wished to do as little as possible to jeopardize its position. Well before the actual emigration, Horkheimer had written in *Dämmerung*: "Sooner or later, the right of exile for political refugees will be abolished in practice. . . . The right of exile will disappear from the common interests of the international capitalist class, as soon as it no longer concerns emigrés from Russia or *völkisch* terrorists." [178] Having already been forced to flee one continent, he and his colleagues were not anxious to court a similar fate.

This fear comes out clearly in the Lowenthal-Horkheimer correspondence. For example, on July 30, 1939, Lowenthal wrote to Horkheimer of a new deportation law being considered in the Senate, with a very broad scope. Accordingly, he advised Horkheimer to add "European" before "liberalism" in the article he was preparing. Later, on July 30 and August 4, 1940, he mentioned police visits to the Institut, which, although routine, seemed ominous enough to report. And even as late as July 26, 1944, when the Institut was studying anti-Semitism in American labor, Horkheimer could still worry about the reaction of American right-wingers to "a bunch of foreign-born intellectuals sticking their noses into the private affairs of American workers." This feeling of insecurity, in combination with the Institut's traditional desire to remain a "scientific" rather than a political institution, resulted in its striking the more inflammatory passages from Benjamin's texts.

On the other hand, what is equally clear is that the *Zeitschrift* did print certain of Benjamin's essays with which Horkheimer and Adorno were not in complete agreement — his "The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction" and "Eduard Fuchs, the Collector and Historian," [179] which were in some ways too radical for their taste. How much the published versions were altered, however, is uncertain.[180] One part of Benjamin's work, an important section of the *Passagenarbeit*, was turned down completely, primarily, it would seem, because of Adorno's reservations. In 1936 Benjamin had been very impressed with the little-known cosmological speculations of Auguste Blanqui, the nineteenth-century French revolutionary, which appeared in a book by Blanqui called *L'Éternité par les astres.*[181] Blanqui's mechanical view of nature seemed to Benjamin to be related to his social order, which was dominated by a kind of eternal return. What Benjamin attempted to do in his essay, which was entitled "The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire," was to develop the hidden relationship between Blanqui and the poet who was the central figure of Benjamin's entire work, Baudelaire. The essay was planned as the second part of a tripartite study, a more focused version of the *Passagenarbeit*, and one tentatively called *Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century.* The first part was to be a discussion of Baudelaire as allegorist; the second, the section just discussed, was to be its antithesis, a social interpretation of the poet; the third part was to synthesize the first two by analyzing the commodity as poetic object.[182]

On his first reading of the draft of "The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire," Adorno was critical. Vacationing in Hornberg in the Black Forest, in the summer of 1935 — Adorno occasionally returned to Germany after the Nazis took over — he wrote Benjamin a long letter outlining his objections.[183] His most general criticism was of Benjamin's allegedly undialectical use of such categories as the fetishism of commodities. As noted earlier, Adorno saw some reification as a necessary element in all human objectifications. Accordingly, he argued against Benjamin's equation of the commodity with the "archaic" as such.

Tied to this criticism was Adorno's dissatisfaction with Benjamin's use of "dialectical images" *(dialektische Bilder)*, which were objective crystallizations of the historical process. In his letter, Adorno argued that as they were conceived by Benjamin, they reflected social reality too closely. Instead, he contended, "dialectical images are models not of social products, but rather objective constellations in which the social condition represents itself. Consequently, the dialectical image can never be expected to be an ideological or in general a social 'product.' "[184] Moreover, to reduce the dialectical images to a kind of Jungian collective unconscious, as Benjamin on occasion seemed to be doing, was to ignore the continued importance of the individual. "When I reject the use of the collective unconscious," Adorno explained,

> it is of course not to allow the "bourgeois individual" to stand as the actual substratum. It is to make the social function of the intérieur [a term, it will be recalled, he used in his study of Kierkegaard] transparent and to uncover its inclusiveness as illusion. But as illusion not in opposition to a hypostatized collective conscious, but the real social process itself. The "individual" is thus a dialectical instrument of passage *[Durchgangsinstrument]* which should not be mythicized away, but can only be sublated *[aufgehoben]*.[185]

In a subsequent letter to Benjamin in November, Adorno expressed his continued disappointment with the progress of the essay on Baudelaire and Paris.[186] Here he spelled out his objections to Benjamin's theological and philological approach as undialectical. "One can express it thus," he wrote. "The theological motive to name things by their names tends to be transformed into the astounding presentation of simple facticity. If one wants to speak drastically, one could say the work has settled in a crossroads between magic and positivism. This spot is bewitched. Only theory can break the spell: your own merciless, good, speculative theory." [187] As a result of his reservations, Adorno advised against accepting the essay, which Lowenthal had advocated printing in part, because it "represents you not in the way this work must represent you." [188]

Chastened, but not willing to give in entirely, Benjamin wrote back in his own defense.[189] His major argument was in favor of the philological approach employed in the essay:

> The appearance of closed facticity, which adheres to philological investigation and casts a spell on the researcher, will disappear to the extent that the object will be constructed in historical perspective. The base lines of this construction converge in our own historical experience. Therefore the object constructs itself as a monad. In the monad, everything which is mythically fixed in the text will come alive. . . . If you think back on my other work, you will find that the critique of the philogical position is an old affair with me — and innately identical with that of the myth.[190]

Adorno, however, remained unconvinced of the dialectical merit of the essay, and it was never published by the Institut.[191] In the correspondence that followed, both men continued to debate the progress of Benjamin's "prehistory" of the nineteenth century. Finally, in the first issue of the 1939 *Zeitschrift*, the section of *Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century* that Benjamin had intended as its "thesis," "On Certain Motifs in Baudelaire," was published. In this essay Benjamin broached many of the basic themes of the entire study, several of which we have mentioned earlier. One of these was his distinction between two types of experiences: integrated *Erfahrungen* and atomistic *Erlebnisse.* Drawing on insights from Proust, Bergson, and Freud, Benjamin argued for the place of tradition in genuine experience: "Experience is indeed a matter of tradition, in collective existence as well as private life. It is less the product of facts firmly anchored in memory than of a convergence in memory of accumulated and frequently unconscious data." [192] Adorno also stressed the relevance of tradition, which he saw alive, it will be recalled, in Schönberg's music, despite its obvious novelty. Both he and Benjamin saw an erosion of true experience *[Erfahrungen]* as characteristic of modern life. One example that Benjamin gave — the replacement of coherent narration by dissociated information as the dominant mode of communication — was also used by Ernst Krĕnek in his essay on radio music. Another, the increase of traumatic shocks as stimuli in modern life,[193] also found an echo in the Institut's various psychosocial studies. A third, the role of the crowd in

Baudelaire's work, was a frequent motif in the Institut's work on mass culture. Benjamin, it should be noted, was somewhat critical of Baudelaire's understanding of the crowd: "Baudelaire saw fit to equate the man of the crowd . . . with the *flâneur.* It is hard to accept this view. The man of the crowd is no *flâneur.*" [194]

Benjamin's fascination with the *flâneur,* the idler who strolled leisurely through the arcades of Paris, has encouraged the commentators who stress the static element in his work.[195] Even more striking support for this position was the interest Benjamin's essay showed in Baudelaire's attempt to preserve the *correspondances* which art revealed. "What Baudelaire meant by *correspondances,*" Benjamin explained somewhat cryptically,

> may be described as an experience which seeks to establish itself in crisis-proof form. This is possible only within the realm of the ritual. If it transcends this realm, it presents itself as the beautiful. In the beautiful the ritual value of art appears. The *correspondances* are the data of remembrance — not historical data, but the data of prehistory.[196]

Elsewhere, Benjamin revealed a similar fascination with what Goethe had called *Urphänomene,* the eternal forms that persist throughout history.[197] In all of this, the theological roots of his thought would seem apparent.

Yet what also must be understood is the historical moment in his thinking, which was strengthened by his brush with Marxism. In the same essay on Baudelaire, Benjamin took Bergson to task for removing death from his notion of endured time, using an argument similar to Horkheimer's in his own essay on Bergson:[198] "The *durée* from which death has been eliminated has the miserable endlessness of a scroll. Tradition is eliminated from it. It is the quintessence of a passing moment *[Erlebnis]* that struts about in the borrowed garb of experience." [199] Moreover, as Tiedemann has pointed out,[200] the *Urphänomene* were transferred from nature in Goethe to history in Benjamin. The *Passagenarbeit* was to be a "prehistory" of the nineteenth century, not all human history. Even Benjamin's fondness for Karl Kraus's saying that "Origin is the goal," which he quotes in the "Theses on the Philosophy of History," [201] should not necessarily be understood as meaning a desire to return to a Platonic or Goethean Ur-form. Origin *(Ursprung)* can also mean newness.[202] And to Benjamin, one of the primary aspects of myth was its repetitive, uncreative sameness; the *Immergleiche* (always the same) was one of the salient characteristics of that mythic sensibility produced by alienated capitalist society.

To be fair to those who stress the static component in Benjamin's thinking, it should be added that much of what he wrote betrayed a kind of nostalgia for that ritual value he associated with the *correspondances.*[203] This was evident at the end of "On Certain Motifs in Baudelaire," where he touched on the "crisis of artistic reproduction,"[204] but it was even more obvious in his earlier essay in the *Zeitschrift*, "The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction." It was here that he developed his notion of the "aura," which was so frequently used in the Institut's cultural analyses. As mentioned earlier, the aura was the unique nimbus that surrounded an original work of art. It was the special sense of *hic et nunc,* (here and now) giving authenticity to the work. It also existed, Benjamin suggested, in nature, where it was "the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be."[205] In art as well, this quality of unapproachability was an essential element in a work's aura, not unconnected with the ritual, magical context out of which art originally came. It was this unique aura of a genuine work of art that could not be preserved once the art was reproduced — clearly, Benjamin was referring more to the plastic arts than to music or drama, although, as we have seen in Adorno's and Krěnek's discussions of radio, music might also have an aura.

Whatever the prehistoric, ritual quality attached to the aura, Benjamin also acknowledged its historical element, which went beyond the *correspondances.* "The authenticity of a thing," he contended, "is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced."[206] And later in the same essay: "The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of tradition."[207] Thus the end of "auratic" art in the era of mass reproduction meant not merely the loss of the artistic *correspondances,* but also the end of *Erfahrung* (experience rooted in tradition). It was this aspect of the cultural crisis of modern society with which Benjamin's colleagues at the Institut were in agreement. They also tended to accept the conclusion he drew from the loss of aura: "The instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice — politics."[208] With the advent of mechanical reproduction, the cult value of an art work was replaced by its exhibition value. The best example of this, Benjamin asserted, was the film.

Where the other members of the Institut, especially Adorno, disagreed with Benjamin was in assessing the repercussions of this change. First of all, they had always considered art to have a political function: the presentation of a foretaste of the "other" society denied by present conditions. What they now feared was that mass art had a new political function diametrically opposed to its traditionally "negative" one; art in the age of mechanical reproduction served to reconcile the mass audience to the status quo. Here Benjamin disagreed. For, while mourning the loss of the aura, he paradoxically held out hope for the progressive potential of politicized, collectivized art. Here once again he followed the lead of Brecht, who was still optimistic about the revolutionary function of the film, despite his personally disappointing experiences with the film industry.[209] In Benjamin's words:

> Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie. The progressive reaction is characterized by the direct, intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment with the orientation of the expert. . . . With regard to the screen, the critical and the receptive attitudes of the public coincide.[210]

Moreover, whereas Adorno always demanded concentration on the part of the viewer or listener — we have already mentioned his stress on the *praxis* of genuine aesthetic reception — Benjamin was more sympathetic to the positive implications of distraction: "The tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at the turning points of history cannot be solved . . . by contemplation alone. They are mastered gradually by habit. . . . The ability to master certain tasks in a state of distraction proves that their solution has become a matter of habit." [211] It was on this assumption that Benjamin could end his article by calling for the Communist politicization of art as a response to what he called the fascist "aestheticization of politics." [212]

Adorno, as we have seen, was far less sanguine, and responded to Benjamin in his article "On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Hearing." Benjamin tried to patch things up by writing: "In my work I sought to articulate the positive moments as clearly as you brought the negative to the fore. I consequently see a strength of your work where a weakness of mine lay." [213] He then suggested that sound films were undermining the revolutionary potential of the cinema and proposed to Adorno a collaborative study of their effects. This, however, was never to occur, because of Benjamin's death. The Institut's subsequent work on mass culture, in the forties, to which we now turn, lacked the optimistic thrust of his analysis. The spirit of that work was far closer to that expressed in the now famous remark Benjamin made in an earlier period (and which was used much later to end Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man*): "It is only for the sake of those without hope that hope is given to us."[214]

In the forties, a number of Institut members devoted their time to investigating American popular culture. In 1941 the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* put out a special issue on mass communications, in cooperation with Lazarsfeld's Office of Radio Research, now at Columbia. Horkheimer began, with "Notes on Institute Activities," which contained the most concise restatement of the principles of Critical Theory to appear in English. Lazarsfeld contributed a comparison of "Administrative and Critical Communications Research," which stressed their compatible features. Articles followed by Herta Herzog, Harold Lasswell, William Dieterle, Charles A. Siepmann, and Adorno.[215] In the next issue, the last of the *Studies* to appear, Horkheimer used Mortimer Adler's *Art and Prudence* as an occasion for a general denunciation of mass culture,[216] many of whose points we have already incorporated into our treatment of the Institut's work in this area.

The member of the Institut who became most extensively engaged in the analysis of mass culture was Leo Lowenthal. As early as 1929 Lowenthal had written regular drama criticism and articles on aesthetic problems for the *Volksbühne*, in both Berlin and Frankfurt. Although his early articles in the *Zeitschrift* were primarily on literary figures such as Ibsen and Meyer, he was also interested in the popular reception of high culture, as illustrated by his essay on Dostoyevsky's public in prewar Germany. In the forties he turned his attention to more direct examples of popular art. With the help of Lazarsfeld's project, which supplied him with secretarial and office assistance, he conducted analyses of news commentators and news programs in Philadelphia, which remained in manuscript form. He also made a content analysis of popular biographies in Germany after World War I, which was published many years later in a *Festschrift* for Marcuse.[217] His similar treatment of biographies in American magazines appeared in Lazarsfeld's *Radio Research: 1942–1943*.[218] Lowenthal also contributed to the discussions that led to the essay on the *Kulturindustrie* (Culture Industry) in *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*. In fact, throughout the forties and during the period after his connection with the Institut was severed, Lowenthal continued his exploration of mass culture, the culmination of which was his collection of essays published in 1961, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society*.

Fragments of the correspondence between Horkheimer and Lowenthal after the former had moved to California are worth dwelling on here for the light they cast on the Institut's conception of mass culture. On February 3, 1942, Lowenthal wrote of his forthcoming essay on magazine biographies:

> While, on the one hand, historical information for the masses becomes a cobweb of lies and of ridiculous accumulation of the most insignificant facts and figures, the same masses show by their very occupation with these people and with their ways of "consumption" a longing for a life of innocence. From my whole inner life I can deduct more and more how hateful the whole idea of production in the sense of permanent changes, transformations, incessant treatment of man and nature by machines and organizations must become to the unconscious and even conscious life of the majority. In a certain sense, the German biographies which I have studied in former years and the American material belong quite closely together. The first one falsifies history by an enchanting net of profound metaphysical and metapsychological phantasmagories; the second one is just the reverse and instead of taking history serious, it takes it funny *[sic]*. But: they both represent distorted utopias of a concept of man to which we stand in an affirmative way, namely, they both imply the unconditional importance of the real, living, and existing individual: dignity, happiness.

Several months later, Horkheimer mentioned the essay in one of his letters to Lowenthal. On June 2 he wrote, referring to his own work on *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*:

> I was particularly delighted by the paragraphs on "repetition." This category will play a most decisive role in the whole book. What you call the lack of rebellion against the eternal repetition in life and art points to the bad resignation of modern man, which is, so to speak, the main topic between your lines and which will become one of the basic concepts of our book. . . . We cannot blame people that they are more interested in the sphere of privacy and consumption rather than [in] production. This trait contains a Utopian element; in Utopia production does not play a decisive part. It is the land of milk and honey. I think it is of deep significance that art and poetry have always shown an affinity to consumption.

On October 14 Horkheimer spent a large part of his letter to Lowenthal discussing the article:

> You lay too much stress on activity vs. passivity, sphere of production vs. sphere of consumption. You say that the life of the reader is scheduled and governed by what he gets, not by what he does. The truth is, however, that doing and getting [have] become identical in this society. The mechanisms which govern man in his leisure time are absolutely the same [as] those

> which govern him when he works. I would go as far as to say that still today the key for the understanding of the behavior patterns in the sphere of consumption is the situation of man in industry, his schedule in the factory, the organization of office and working place. Consumption tends to vanish today, or should I say, eating, drinking, looking, loving, sleeping become "consumption," for consumption already means that man has become a machine outside as well as inside of the workshop?
>
> You will remember those terrible scenes in the movies when some years of a hero's life are pictured in a series of shots which take about one or two minutes, just to show how he grew up or old, how a war started and passed by, a[nd] s[o] o[n]. This trimming of an existence into some futile moments which can be characterized schematically symbolizes the dissolution of humanity into elements of administration. Mass culture in its different branches reflects the fact that the human being is cheated out of his own entity which Bergson so justly called "durée." This is true for the heroes of biographies as well as for the masses. . . . The countertrend in mass culture is represented in escape from it. Since man's wakeful state today is regulated in all details, the real escape is sleep or madness, or at least some kind of shortcoming and weakness. The protest against the movies is not found so much in bitter critiques but in the fact that people go in and sleep or make love to each other.

And finally, Lowenthal responded to Horkheimer's arguments in his return letter on October 22:

> Your remark about the montage of a life story in the moving picture is especially revealing for me, because it throws more light on my observation of the isolated and piecemeal sequence of hardship and breaks of childhood and adult life. All this seems to be also tied up with the concept of lovelessness, because the criterion of love is continuity and this is just the phenomenon which is never admitted. Mass culture is a total conspiracy against love as well as against sex. I think that you have hit the nail on the head by your observation that the spectators are continuously betrayed and robbed of real pleasure by sadistic tricks. This sadism has the special function to prevent psychologically and physiologically "Vorlust." Take, for example, the ballet scene in "Holiday Inn," one of the newest pictures, where a couple starts dancing a minuet, but as soon as this minuet develops to a more amorous situation and one could very well imagine that the dancing partners will end by kissing each other, the sweet and melodious music is suddenly stopped and replaced by jazz which almost verbally castrates the dancers. This fits very well together with the elucidating remarks which Teddie [Adorno] once wrote about the connection of castration and jazz.

A number of characteristics of the Institut's critique of mass culture are evident in the interchange. More than once, for example, is its concern for genuine happiness evident. Unlike more conservative critics of popular culture, the Frankfurt School refused to defend high culture as an end in itself apart from material concerns. Like Nietzsche, whose seminal contribution to the analysis of mass culture the Institut often acknowledged, Horkheimer and his colleagues saw a subterranean connection between the notion of transcendent culture, which pretended to be above material life, and psychological asceticism. They consistently attacked such commentators as Aldous Huxley for the puritanical streak in their protest against mass culture.[219] With equal fervor they denounced the nostalgic yearnings of elitist critics such as Jose Ortega y Gasset. "The right to nostalgia, to transcendental knowledge, to a dangerous life cannot be validated," Horkheimer wrote. "The struggle against mass culture can consist only in pointing out its connection with the persistence of social injustice."[220] As Marcuse argued in 1937, the segregation of cultural life from its material base served to reconcile man to the inequalities implicit in the latter; idealist, bourgeois culture was in this sense "affirmative."

What the letters also show is how strongly the Institut, for all its Marxist tendencies, valued tradition. As we have already seen, Adorno spoke of the traditional component in Schönberg's seemingly revolutionary music, and Benjamin considered tradition to be a part of an art work's aura. In his letter of October 22 Lowenthal referred to continuity as the "criterion of love," an observation that followed on the heels of Horkheimer's assertion in the previous letter that mass culture deprived man of his *durée.* What should be understood, however, is that by tradition, the Institut meant something very different from the continuation of "progress," as it was understood by Enlightenment thought. This was clear in the essay "Authoritarian State," which we examined in the previous chapter, as well as in the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, to which we shall come presently. Tradition referred to the type of integrated experience the Institut members called *Erfahrung,* which was being destroyed by so-called "progress."

Yet another thing the letters demonstrate is the effect of personal experiences on the Frankfurt School's analysis. That such a connection existed, Critical Theory would not have denied. As Horkheimer wrote in his letter on Freud, "the greater a work, the more it is rooted in the concrete historical situation."[221] As refugees from Central Europe, who had been tutored in all that its rich cultural heritage had to offer, they were inevitably ill at ease in the less rarified atmosphere of their new environment. On occasion, this alienation meant an unresponsiveness to the spontaneous elements in American popular culture — Adorno's unremitting hostility to jazz, for example, suffers from a certain a priori insensitivity. But at the same time, it provided an invaluable critical distance from the culture, which prevented the Institut from equating mass culture with true democracy. The category of "repressive desublimation," [222] which Marcuse was to develop years later to characterize the pseudo-liberation of modern culture, existed in embryo in the personal experience of the Institut's members. Having known an alternative cultural milieu, they were unwilling to trade in its *promesse de bonheur* for the debased coin provided by the culture industry.

As Adorno later explained,[223] the phrase "culture industry" was chosen by Horkheimer and himself in *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* because of its antipopulist connotations. The Frankfurt School disliked mass culture, not because it was democratic, but precisely because it was not. The notion of "popular" culture, they argued, was ideological; the culture industry administered a nonspontaneous, reified, phony culture rather than the real thing. The old distinction between high and low culture had all but vanished in the "stylized barbarism" [224] of mass culture. Even the most "negative" examples of classical art had been absorbed into what Marcuse was later to call its "one-dimensional" facade. Tragedy, which once meant protest, now meant consolation. The subliminal message of almost all that passed for art was conformity and resignation.

As in so many other areas, the Institut believed that liberal platitudes about the preservation of the autonomous individual had been rendered obsolete by social change. Kant had defined art formalistically as "purposiveness without purpose," but in the modern world it had become "purposelessness for purposes," purposes dictated by the market.[225] Even the excuse of popular art as diversion, which Benjamin had supported, Adorno and Horkheimer thought suspect: leisure was the continuation of labor by other means. The only laughter permitted by the culture industry was the derisiveness of *Schadenfreude*, laughing at the misfortunes of others. Suppression replaced sublimation, desire was aroused only to be denied; mass culture, in short, followed the ritual of Tantalus.[226]

Increasingly, the Institut came to feel that the culture industry enslaved men in far more subtle and effective ways than the crude methods of domination practiced in earlier eras. The false harmony of particular and universal was in some ways more sinister than the clash of social contradictions, because of its ability to lull its victims into passive acceptance. With the decline of mediating forces in the society — here the Institut drew on its earlier studies of the lessening role of the family in the process of socialization — the chances for the development of negative resistance were seriously diminished.

Moreover, the spread of technology served the culture industry in America just as it helped tighten the control of authoritarian governments in Europe. Radio, Horkheimer and Adorno argued, was to fascism as the printing press had been to the Reformation.

In short, all the celebrated pessimism of Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* was anticipated in the essay on the culture industry in *Dialectic of the Enlightenment.* The only hint of negation preserved in mass culture Horkheimer and Adorno allowed was in corporeal rather than intellectual art: for example, the circus performer, whose fully reified body promised to break through the commodity character of mass art by carrying objectification to its extreme, thereby exposing what had hitherto been veiled.[227] Aside from this, the Institut feared the closing-off of all possibilities for a transformed future, short of that "explosion in the continuum of history" that the essays in the Benjamin memorial volume had still been able to cite as a possibility.

In many ways, the Institut's critique of mass culture and its related analysis of the American authoritarian potential had the greatest impact on American intellectual life of all the work it did in this country.[228] One obvious reason was that, unlike the theoretical essays of the thirties, much of it was written in English. But more important, it came at a time when Americans themselves had begun to fear the realization of those dire prophecies that foreign visitors since Tocqueville had made about the effects of mass democracy.[229] Before the Second World War, sociologists like Robert Park and his pupil at the University of Chicago, Herbert Blumer, had been engaged in rudimentary studies of mass society, but generally in isolation and with more hopeful conclusions. By the mid-forties, however, the interest in this type of analysis had grown both within and outside the academic community. Clement Greenberg and Dwight MacDonald, the latter through his influential journal, *Politics*, began to disseminate a critique of mass culture among a wider public. Sociologists like David Riesman increased scholarly awareness of the same issues.[230] Richard Hoggart did the same for English-speaking readers across the Atlantic.[231] For the first time, popular culture was attacked from a radical rather than a conservative direction. Here the Institut's influence, and that of former members such as Fromm, played a significant role in adding substance and depth to the attack, and it was frequently acknowledged.

What was crucial in the radical critique was its implicit political overtones. It would be a mistake to interpret the Institut's shifting of focus from base to superstructure as an abandonment of its commitment to the ideals of its earlier period. The decline of traditional, "negative" culture was not a matter for intellectuals alone. Mass culture was the seed-bed of political totalitarianism. The mediating mechanisms between culture and politics were best understood, so Horkheimer and those around him felt, in psychosocial terms. Their studies of popular culture were thus connected with the investigations of the authoritarian potential in America that they conducted in the forties. These investigations were cast primarily as psychological analyses, although always based on the broader assumptions of Critical Theory. Because these theoretical premises were rarely understood by American commentators, however, the "Studies in Prejudice" were often taken as strictly psychological. As we shall see in our next chapter, this was not the case. As Adorno had explained to Benjamin in 1935, the bourgeois individual was only a dialectical *Durchgangsinstrument* (instrument of transition); the totality remained the central reality. If in its studies of mass culture and psychological authoritarianism the Institut seemed to fall back on the embattled individual, it was only because the utopian alternative they sought was preserved nowhere else but in the "damaged lives"[232] of cultural outsiders.

VII

The Empirical Work of the Institut in the 1940's

> The central theme of the work is a relatively new concept — the rise of an "anthropological" species we call the authoritarian type of man.
>
> — MAX HORKHEIMER

The war years brought a serious reevaluation of the Institut's goals and a gradual redefinition of its institutional structure. Horkheimer's circulatory illness, which necessitated the move to California, and the increased involvement of other Institut members in government service meant that the type of connection with Columbia enjoyed by the Institut since 1934 was no longer possible. Moreover, a new internal factor within the university's sociology department spelled potential trouble for the future. The struggle for control between the department's more speculative wing, led by Robert MacIver, and its empirically oriented counterpart around Robert Lynd had been resolved largely in favor of the latter. Or at least so Lowenthal reported to Horkheimer by letter on January 23, 1942. Thus, not surprisingly, Horkheimer was willing to permit the loosening of the Institut's ties with Columbia brought by the war and his illness. In fact, as early as May, 1941, before the resolution of the Lynd-MacIver conflict, he had expressed to Lowenthal ambivalence about the consequences of the sustained relationship with Columbia.[1] The leadership of the Institut, despite its awareness of the need to maintain an institutional identity, was always concerned about the possible sclerosis that over-institutionalization might bring.

Still, with the end of the war, an attempt was made to keep the Institut on Morningside Heights. Horkheimer's illness had become less of an immediate worry, allowing him to come back to New York in 1944 and 1945 for extended periods of time. Although certain Institut members, such as Marcuse, chose to remain with the government, others were eager to return to a full academic life. Within Columbia hopes were still alive to retain the Institut in some capacity. Ironically, the major effort to revive the Institut's connection came from within the ranks of the empirical sociologists. Paul Lazarsfeld, who had transformed his Office of Radio Research into a newly constituted Bureau of Applied Social Research,[2] suggested the integration of the Institut into his bureau. Despite the failure of his collaboration with Adorno before the war, Lazarsfeld was optimistic about the interaction of Critical Theory with his own brand of "administrative research." [3] In a series of letters to other members of the department, such as Theodore Abel and Robert Merton, Lazarsfeld extolled the Institut's accomplishments. On February 5, 1946, he wrote to Abel that the department had done an injustice to the Institut, but not because of the former's own shortsightedness:

> the whole mess is due to the idiocy of the Institute group. I told them for years that publishing in German will finally destroy them. But they had the fixed idea that their contribution to America will be greater if they preserve in this country the last island of German culture. This is especially true of their *Zeitschrift.* I have asked Lowenthal, its former editor, to make a brief content analysis of the ten volumes which have appeared in this country. Everyone will be surprised how much of value is buried there.[4]

As a solution, he proposed the affiliation of the Institut's empirical wing with the Bureau of Applied Social Research. Lowenthal, Massing, and Marcuse were to have full-time memberships; Pollock and Neumann, part-time. Horkheimer, because of his health, and Adorno were expected to remain in California in what presumably would be the Institut's speculative rump. Lazarsfeld left the door open for at least Horkheimer's return if his condition improved. Although the sociology department acted on Lazarsfeld's recommendation and extended an invitation to the Institut, it was ultimately declined, Horkheimer citing his health as the reason.[5] Of all the Institut members, only Neumann chose to return to Columbia after the immediate postwar period.

One probable reason for the Institut's decision to refuse the offer was the improvement of its financial position. As mentioned earlier, in 1938 unsuccessful financial investments combined with the extended use of capital for the support of new refugees had seriously depleted the Institut's resources. During the next few years, foundation sponsorship for a projected study of German culture proved unavailable, and the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* were discontinued, primarily for financial reasons. The situation was critical enough for Horkheimer to speculate in a letter to Lowenthal on the possible dissolution of the Institut if no sponsor were found. A grant must be obtained, Horkheimer wrote, "otherwise the work for which we live and which, I suppose, is your aim as well as mine — not only the work but our lives as scholars with specific tasks and responsibilities — and not only our intellectual lives but the material basis of our lives — will be destroyed."[6] During the summer of 1942, however, a contact had been made with the American Jewish Committee, and in October of the same year Horkheimer had a successful interview with John Slawson, the AJC's executive vice-president. As early as 1939 the Institut had prepared a prospectus for a study of anti-Semitism, which was printed in the penultimate issue of its journal.[7] Not unexpectedly, the AJC expressed an interest in the project, with the hope of preventing in America what was already happening in Europe. The result was a grant of considerable size, which helped to keep the Institut together as well as to finance the most exhaustive study of prejudice ever attempted. In May, 1944, a two-day conference on prejudice was held in New York, at which an ambitious research program was outlined for the future. At the same time, the AJC established a Department of Scientific Research, with Horkheimer at its head. It was here that the *Studies in Prejudice*, which were to employ a variety of methodological approaches to the study of social bias, were officially launched. Thus began the Institut's most extensive and sustained concentration on empirical research.

What ought not to be forgotten, however, was that at the same time, Horkheimer and Adorno were engaged in serious speculative work, which produced a number of important new statements of Critical Theory. Foremost among these were their joint effort in *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, Horkheimer's *Eclipse of Reason*, and Adorno's *Minima Moralia*. These will be the subject of the next chapter, which will deal with the Institut's changing theoretical perspective in its last decade in America. At times, however, some of their new ideas will play a role in our present discussion of the empirical work, and we shall also refer on a number of occasions to the analysis of the Institut's critique of mass culture in the last chapter.

Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the *Studies in Prejudice*, certain basic attitudes of the Institut towards the proper role of empirical research should once again be made clear. From the first, it will be recalled, the Frankfurt School was critical of the reductionist tendencies implicit in inductively oriented, empirical social science. In the exploration of social phenomena, it placed theory prior to the gathering of "facts," just as in politics it put theory before *praxis*. At the same time, of course, it was never satisfied with the cavalier dismissal of all empirical research, including the quantification of results, which characterized certain of the more obscurantist German sociological schools. As Fromm's study of German workers and the *Studien über Autorität und Familie* demonstrated, it was anxious to use empirical methods for the enrichment, modification, and support (although never quite verification) of its speculative hypotheses. Although the Institut admitted the primitive level of its techniques before the emigration, it looked forward to their growing sophistication with time. Thus it willingly sponsored such studies as Mirra Komarovsky's analysis of *The Unemployed Man and His Family*, and sought to apply American techniques to the study of mass culture.

The difficulties, however, often proved greater than expected, as Adorno's experience with the Office of Radio Research demonstrated. His ideas about the changes in music-listening patterns, which were described in the previous chapter, proved untranslatable into testable hypotheses. The reasons, so Adorno felt, were not merely technical. Three decades later, he wrote:

> It appeared to me, and I am still persuaded today, that in the cultural sphere what is regarded by the psychology of perception as a mere "stimulus" is, in fact, qualitatively determined, a matter of "objective spirit" and knowable in its objectivity. I oppose stating and measuring effects without relating them to these "stimuli," i.e., the objective content to which the consumers in the cultural industry, the radio listeners, react. . . . To proceed from the subjects' reactions, as if they were a primary and final source of sociological knowledge, seemed to me thoroughly superficial and misguided.[8]

What caused Adorno particular distress was the unmediated way in which cultural phenomena were transformed by his new American colleagues into quantitative data. The very equation of culture with measurable quantities seemed to him a prime example of the reification characteristic of mass culture. "When I was confronted with the demand to 'measure culture,' " he later recalled, "I reflected that culture might be precisely that condition that excludes a mentality capable of measuring it." [9] This was an assumption that made his collaboration with Lazarsfeld, whose "administrative research" was grounded in the rigorous use of quantitative methods, unlikely to succeed from the start. By the summer of 1939 this was clear to both men.

Lazarsfeld wrote a five-page letter to Adorno voicing his extreme disappointment with the outcome of their association.[10] Its tone was pointed, even harsh at times. Clearly Lazarsfeld felt the time for euphemism was past. Referring to one of Adorno's memoranda, he wrote:

> You pride yourself in attacking other people because they are neurotic and fetishists, but it doesn't occur to you how open you are yourself to such attacks. . . . Don't you think that [it] is a perfect fetishism the way you use Latin words all through the text? . . . I implored you repeatedly to use more responsible language and you evidently were psychologically unable to follow my advice.

At other points in the letter, Lazarsfeld went beyond personal criticism to attack Adorno's "grave deficiencies of elementary logical procedure." He also accused Adorno of both arrogance and naiveté when it came to his remarks on verification techniques: "Your disrespect for possibilities alternative to your own ideas becomes even more disquieting when your text leads to the suspicion that you don't even know how an empirical check upon a hypothetical assumption is to be made." And finally, he expressed extreme dismay at the stylistic deficiencies in Adorno's texts, which were all the more disturbing in view of Adorno's frequently asserted concern for the importance of correct language.

Lazarsfeld's last paragraph deserves full quotation, not only for the light it casts on this specific instance of a conflict between two strong-willed, highly intelligent scholars with differing views, but also for the insight it provides into the complex character of one of the men who played a central role in the Institut's history. Few men who knew Adorno doubted his intellectual brilliance and imaginative powers; fewer still — and here Horkheimer was the major exception — found him an easy collaborator. "It was not a pleasant task to write this letter," Lazarsfeld concluded,

> and I would not have spent two solid working days in working it out if I didn't feel that it is vital for our project to make you think yourself about the whole situation. You and I agree upon the superiority of some parts of your intellectual work but you think because you are basically right somewhere you are right everywhere. Whereas I think that because you are right somewhere you overlook the fact that you are terrible in other respects, and the final reader will think that because you are outrageous in some part of your work where he can easily catch you, you are impossible altogether. So I am sure that what I have done in this letter will be finally beneficial for yourself. . . . Let me assure you once more of my unwavering respect, friendship, and loyalty.

When the Rockefeller Foundation reviewed its grant for the Radio Research Project in the fall of 1939, the music project was omitted from its budget. Later, in a more mellow frame of mind, Lazarsfeld ruminated on the failure of his collaboration with Adorno.[11] The success of *The Authoritarian Personality* had demonstrated that Critical Theory and quantification were not as irreconcilable as the music project had made it seem. "I have an uneasy feeling," Lazarsfeld generously wrote, "that my duties in the various divisions of the Princeton project may have prevented me from devoting the necessary time and attention to achieve the purpose for which I engaged Adorno originally." [12]

Whatever the real reasons, the music project was unsuccessful, while *The Authoritarian Personality* became a classic of social science immediately after its completion. The explanation for this change cannot be sought solely in Adorno's own development — he was only one of a large number of coworkers on the second project — but with time, he did gain valuable methodological experience that caused a modification of his initial hostility to American techniques. Thus, for example, his stress on grasping the "objective spirit" rather than measuring subjective reactions to it had diminished by the end of the decade. As we shall see, the "objective" dimension of prejudice was by no means ignored, but it was never fully integrated into the subjective analyses of his and the Institut's work on the problem. Culture might not be measurable, but it seemed as if bias more easily could be.

Adorno, of course, was not the only one who gained methodological experience in the early forties. The New York branch of the Institut, although reducing its activities during the war, did not cease to function. After the closing of the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, several of its members began to spend more time with empirical work. One of their projects was an inquiry into the pattern of help extended by German gentiles to Jewish victims of Hitler. With the prestigious cosponsorship of Thomas Mann, data was collected by such means as advertisements in the *Aufbau*, the leading German-language refugee newspaper. Although never published, the study did show that Catholics and conservatives had given more assistance than Protestants and liberals. According to Paul Massing, this conclusion was later used by Horkheimer to support his argument that conservatives were often better preservers of critical ideals than liberals.[13]

Far more ambitious was a massive study of the degree of anti-Semitism within American labor, which the Institut began to organize in 1943 and carried out in the following two years. At about the same time as the American Jewish Committee had extended its offer of support, the Jewish Labor Committee, chaired by Adolph Held, made a grant of somewhat more modest proportions available for research into its own special area of interest. The JLC had created a Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism with Charles S. Zimmerman as its head and was anxious to begin with a scientific analysis of the problem. Its contacts with the AFL, the CIO, and various nonaffiliated unions facilitated the collection of data, which was carried on in New York, California, and Detroit.

The amount of data accumulated was, in fact, so overwhelming that the Institut had difficulty in organizing it for publication. A four-volume, 1300-page report was made to the JLC in 1944, but subsequent efforts to whittle it down to publishable size failed. Gurland, Massing, Lowenthal, Pollock, and Weil had been involved in the original collection and analysis of the material. Added help from Herta Herzog of the Bureau of Applied Social Research was obtained for the quantification of the data, and Adorno wrote frequent memoranda, methodological and substantive, throughout its progress. The problems of organization and editing, however, remained insurmountable. After allowing the study to lie fallow for several years, renewed efforts were made in 1949. Paul Lazarsfeld and Allen Barton were recruited to write a methodological introduction. By 1953, the Free Press of Glencoe announced its forthcoming publication with a description of the contents, which were predominantly devoted to a qualitative analysis of anti-Semitic belief patterns. But disagreements within the Institut about the value of presenting a study made almost a decade earlier persisted,[14] with the final result that the book never went to press.

Because of the publication of the *Studies in Prejudice* in the interim, the findings of the labor project now seemed redundant. Its goal was therefore changed, as Adorno wrote in one of his memoranda; it was now "to find out how to study anti-Semitism, not to obtain final results." [15] But here once again, the methodological achievements of the various volumes in the *Studies in Prejudice* overshadowed the more primitive techniques the earlier report had developed. Moreover, another reason for the Institut's general reluctance to publish the work had an effect. As Pollock remembers it,[16] the conclusions of the study were so damaging to American labor that the Institut, with its characteristic caution, was hesitant about broadcasting its findings. As early as July, 1944, as mentioned earlier, Horkheimer had worried about the reaction of American domestic opinion to "a bunch of foreign-born intellectuals sticking their noses into the private affairs of American workers." [17] More than half the workers surveyed had shown anti-Semitic bias of one sort or another,[18] but in 1953 the Institut's leadership wished to tone this down. Moreover, the attempts to shorten the manuscript had resulted in certain oversimplifications. Massing wrote to Lowenthal of his indignation at the changes:

> I most seriously object to these "Conclusions." These pages show the transformation the study has undergone from a socio-political to a purely psychological one. In the present version, there cannot be any such old-fashioned remarks as to "danger signals," need for education, and any reference to "American Labor" is outright ludicrous. The American labor that appears in part I of the present study is anti-Semitic.

The revisions of the first part of the study, he charged, had ruined it: "It reads like a mediocre high-school attempt, operates with two or three broad psychological concepts which are ridden to death, is repetitive to the *n*th degree . . ."[19] Apparently, Barton, who with Lazarsfeld was to write the methodological introduction, felt the same way.[20] For all these reasons, Horkheimer ultimately decided to withdraw the book from publication.

Still, the goal expressed by Adorno in his memorandum was in fact attained to a significant extent. What the Institut learned most clearly was the necessity of approaching anti-Semitism as indirectly as possible. Sample populations in factories on both coasts and in the Midwest were examined in basically the same way. Instead of distributing questionnaires or conducting direct interviews, "screened" interviews were developed, in which the objective of the project was concealed as much as possible. This meant that 270 workers in the factories were selected as agents of the project. They were instructed to memorize a prepared set of questions which they used to probe the reactions of workers when anti-Semitic or related incidents occurred. A total of 566 interviews were conducted and the results broken down by such categories as ethnic background, union or nonunion membership, AFL or CIO. Much of the material gathered in this way and some of the questions were later used in the interviews for *The Authoritarian Personality*.[21] Moreover, the conceptual structuring of the findings contributed to the refinement of the typologies developed in the later work. Thus, although in one sense stillborn, the project proved an important testing ground for the Institut's more ambitious work for the AJC.

Before turning to the specific studies that were a part of the *Studies in Prejudice*, certain comments about their relation to the Institut's general outlook should be made. On the surface, it appears as if the *Studies* were a radical departure from some of the basic tenets of the Critical Theory. In certain ways this was true. The caution we have seen displayed in America by the Institut on a number of occasions was unmistakably apparent in its empirical work in the forties. For example, the opposite of the "authoritarian personality" was no longer the "revolutionary," as it had been in the *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, it was now the "democratic" instead. The values expressed by the various authors connected with the *Studies*, especially those foreign to the Institut's ways of thinking, were invariably liberal and New Deal rather than Marxist or radical. Education for tolerance, rather than *praxis* for revolutionary change, was the ostensible goal of the research, which aroused the scorn of more orthodox Marxists like Brecht.[22] "Our aim is not merely to describe prejudice," Horkheimer and Samuel Flowerman wrote in the Introduction to the *Studies*, "but to explain it in order to help in its eradication. That is the challenge we would meet. Eradication means reeducation, scientifically planned on the basis of understanding scientifically arrived at. And education in a strict sense is by its nature personal and psychological." [23] Nowhere in any of the volumes did the critique of tolerance for its own sake, which had first appeared in Fromm's work on Freud and was later repeated by Adorno and Marcuse, make an appearance.

But perhaps what seemed most characteristic of the change in emphasis was an unwonted stress on psychological rather than sociological explanations of prejudice, a choice deliberately made in connection with the pedagogical goals of the project.[24] This was so pronounced that two of *The Authoritarian Personality*'s most serious critics, Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, could argue that its authors "take the irrationality out of the social order and impute it to the respondent, and by means of this substitution it is decided that prejudiced respondents derive their judgments in an irrational way." [25] If this were true, then Critical Theory had certainly gone a long way towards abandoning its original position. Further evidence of the dilution of its radical component could be found in the type of psychological analysis actually used in the various studies. Although the basic perspective was Freudian, a certain measure of ego psychology was added to the analytic framework, the same ego psychology of Hartmann and Kris whose conformist implications Adorno criticized elsewhere.[26] Similarly, the use made in *The Authoritarian Personality* of a character typology seemed at first glance to contradict Adorno's critique of Fromm's typology.[27] By describing integrated character types, he and his colleagues appeared to be abandoning that insistence on nonidentity that was one of the central tenets of Critical Theory. Adorno, to be sure, attempted to answer this criticism in advance by defending the use of a typology on historical grounds:

> The reason for the persistent plausibility of the typological approach, however, is not a static biological one, but just the opposite: dynamic and social. . . . The marks of social repression are left within the individual soul. . . . Individualism, opposed to human pigeonholing, may ultimately become a mere ideological veil in a society which actually *is* inhuman. . . . In other words, the critique of typology should not neglect the fact that large numbers of people are no longer, or rather never were, "individuals" in the sense of traditional nineteenth-century philosophy.[28]

This, however, might explain the use of a typology to explain reified personalities, but not those who still retained some authentic subjectivity. These, presumably, would be the more tolerant, but Adorno used a typology to describe them as well.

In general, however, the situation was considerably more complicated than a cursory reading of the *Studies in Prejudice* suggested. First of all, the Institut's Marxist origins, although altered in a manner that will be examined in the next chapter, were not obliterated entirely. Evidence of their persistence appeared in a number of ways outside the work itself. Occasionally, for example, an Institut member would make a remark that showed how reluctant he was to take sides in the incipient Cold War. Thus, in 1946, Horkheimer could write, in terms that would later appear naive, that "at present the only country where there does not seem to be any kind of anti-Semitism is Russia. This has a very obvious reason. Not only has Russia passed laws against anti-Semitism, but it really enforces them; and the penalties are very severe."[29] At about the same time, he defined for Lowenthal "the task of theory in this historical period" in a way that made clear his priorities:

> Deserving as it may be to point out the horrors of German or Russian despotism, the effort of conceptual thinking has, in my opinion, still to be concerned with the social development in industrialized society as a whole. To conceive the horror is as horrible as to see the night. The horror in the human world should be understood as the verdict against specific forms of social self-preservation. Today the world has become too much of a totality as to justify the isolation of one power block so as to oppose it to the rest of civilization as good or bad, or better or worse. Such a procedure is justified in practical respects but not when it comes to theoretical thinking. Here, I must say the principle of the lesser evil is even more dangerous than in politics.[30]

In short, although the Institut refused to provide excuses for Stalinism — by no means a new development in its history — it also refused to join the chorus of apostate former Marxists in excoriating the "God that failed." Its critique extended to "industrialized society as a whole," which certainly included the United States.

More important from a methodological point of view, the psychological emphasis of the *Studies in Prejudice* did not represent as much of a break with Critical Theory as some of its critics on the left assumed. In fact, frequent reminders ran throughout the volumes, especially those sections written by Adorno, that prejudice had to be understood on its most basic level as a social rather than an individual problem. For example, in his discussion of personalization in politics, he wrote: "Ever more anonymous and opaque social processes make it increasingly difficult to integrate the limited sphere of one's personal life experience with objective social dynamics. Social alienation is hidden by a surface phenomenon in which the very opposite is being stressed: personalization of political attitudes and habits offers compensation for the dehumanization of the social sphere, which is at the bottom of most of today's grievances." [31] Despite Hyman and Sheatsley's contention, the Frankfurt School continued to see the social order as inherently irrational. Thus, at no time was the sufficiency of a psychological approach suggested. What was problematical, however, and what caused so much confusion was the proper roles of sociology and psychology in analyzing the phenomenon of prejudice. Although never spelled out explicitly in the *Studies*, the Institut, if not its collaborators, did have a strong opinion on the correct relationship between the two levels of interpretation. Fromm, it will be recalled, had been criticized for what the Institut considered the premature reconciliation of psychology and sociology in his work in the forties. In doing so, Adorno and the others argued, Fromm had smoothed over the vestiges of nonidentity that Freud's intransigent "biologism" had preserved. Thus, in the same way in which the Institut challenged the unity of theory and *praxis* on the one hand, and the unity of theory and empirical verification on the other, it discounted the possibility of unifying sociology and psychology in one grand theory. This was made clear in one of the memoranda Adorno wrote for the Labor Project in 1944, in which he suggested certain methodological axioms to be included in the final report:

> a) We do not call the influence of socio-economic factors psychological since they are more or less on a rational level. They are motivating ideas rather than compulsory psychological forces.

> b) The term psychological should be reserved for those traits which are *prima facie* irrational. This dichotomy means that we do not approve of a socio-psychological approach à la Fromm, but rather think in terms of rational and irrational motivations which are essentially to be kept apart.
>
> c) This means, methodologically, that our psychological analyses lead us the deeper into a social sense the more they abstain from any reference to obvious and rational socio-economic factors. We will rediscover the social element at the very bottom of the psychological categories, though not by prematurely bringing into play economic and sociological surface causations where we have to deal with the unconscious, which is related to society in a much more indirect and complicated way.[32]

Although the rather simplistic equation of rational with socio-economic and irrational with psychological was never really operative in the Institut's analyses, the dichotomy between the two methodological approaches in general was.

Accordingly, the Institut did articulate a more sociological interpretation of the problem of anti-Semitism and prejudice, which treated them as part of the "objective spirit" rather than merely as individual, subjective delusions. One of the sections of *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* was entitled "Elements of Anti-Semitism." Unfortunately, it appeared only in German, which contributed to the unbalanced understanding in America of the Institut's work on prejudice. Although a full appreciation of the essay will be possible only after a discussion of the general argument of the book in which it appears, which must wait until the next chapter, certain of its points should be mentioned now to provide a foil for the treatment of the more psychological work that follows.

In "Elements of Anti-Semitism," Horkheimer and Adorno went beyond the reactions of anti-Semites to a discussion of the function of the Jew himself in Western civilization. Like Marx in his essays on the Jewish question,[33] they rejected the liberal assumption that Jews were different from other men only in their religion. Jewishness, they argued, was also a socio-economic category, although one that had been forced on the Jews in the past and perpetuated today largely out of irrational needs. "Bourgeois anti-Semitism," they wrote, "has a specific economic basis — the veiling of domination in production." [34] Anti-Semitism was in one sense the self-hatred of the bourgeoisie projected onto the Jews, who in fact were relatively impotent, confined as they were mostly to the sphere of distribution, rather than participating in production. Because of the continuation of the contradictions of capitalism, the Jews, or a group like them, were a necessary outlet for repressed frustrations and aggressions. Thus, the liberal hope for assimilation was a fraud, because of its assumption that mankind was a potential unity under prevailing socio-economic conditions. Liberalism, Horkheimer and Adorno pointed out, had promised happiness without power to both the Jews and the masses. But the masses, denied both happiness and power, turned their fury on the Jews, out of the mistaken belief that what had been withheld from them had been given to the Jews.

This part of their analysis was within the Marxist tradition, but Horkheimer and Adorno also went beyond Marx in a number of ways. First, in their discussion of the "objective spirit" of anti-Semitism they employed psychological categories, such as paranoia and projection, in an epistemological and sociological context. They argued, for example, that paranoia was not simply a delusion. In its denial of the merely given, its mediation of immediacy, paranoia transcended a naive positivist understanding of the world.[35] Thus, all true thought contained what might be called a moment of paranoia. In fact, in projecting its internal fears and desires onto an external object, paranoid thought expressed a distorted protest against the suppression of the reconciliation between particular and universal, a suppression that bourgeois society perpetuated behind its facade of universality.

Yet, of course, Horkheimer and Adorno did not deny the distortion in the protest. Paranoia was fundamentally a delusion, a "shadow of knowledge." [36] True knowledge, they contended, meant the ability to distinguish between intellectual and emotional projections. Paranoia was really the system of the half-educated, who go beyond immediacy only to reduce reality to a reified formula. Incapable of enduring the dichotomy between inner and outer life, appearance and essence, individual fate and social reality, the paranoid achieves harmony at the cost of his own autonomy. In late capitalism, they argued, this condition had been generalized. Collective projections such as anti-Semitism took the place of individual ones, with the result that the system of the half-educated became the objective spirit.[37] Finally, under fascism, the autonomous ego was destroyed entirely by the domination of collective projections. The totality of the paranoid's delusory system corresponded to the totalitarianism of fascist society.

Horkheimer and Adorno also went beyond Marx in suggesting that anti-Semitism had certain archaic roots, which extended back further than capitalism and liberalism. This meant more than religious origins, although they did devote considerable attention in their essay to the Christian contribution to anti-Semitism. The roots they had in mind extended back into the dim prehistory of Western man. In an unpublished paper written in 1940[38] Adorno had proposed one of his more speculative hypotheses, half historical, half meta-historical. The pre-Diaspora Jews, he argued, had been a nomadic, wandering people, "the secret gypsies of history."[39] The abandonment of this mode of life in favor of a sedentary existence, which had come with the development of agriculture, had been achieved at a terrible price. The Western concepts of work and repression were intertwined with the postnomadic attachment of man to the soil. A subterranean memory of the wandering Jew, however, persisted in Western culture. This image of the Jew, Adorno held, "represents a condition of mankind which did not know labor, and all later attacks against the parasitic, consumptive character of the Jews are simply rationalizations."[40] In other words, the Jew embodied the dream of gratification without toil, a dream whose frustration resulted in the displacement of fury onto those who seemed to have realized its promise.

In a letter to Lowenthal in 1944[41] Horkheimer made a similar point with special reference to the curious intertwining of Jewish and German destinies. Here the historical reference was not to the Jew as pre-Diaspora wanderer, but rather as post-Exilic dweller in alien lands. "If both Germans and Jews show a militant sort of patriotism," he suggested,

> the patriotism of the Jews is characterized by a longing for the soil which was lost, while the Germans want to win soil which they never possessed. The unconscious is alike insofar as they dream of getting the fruits of the earth without laboring it themselves. The land of milk and honey is represented in the German soul by the nostalgia of the South.

In its final formulation in "Elements of Anti-Semitism," this general idea was brought up to date. The Jews were hated, Horkheimer and Adorno argued, because they were secretly envied. Having lost even their economic function as middlemen, they seemed to embody such enviable qualities as wealth without work, luck without power, a home without boundaries, and religion without a myth.[42]

On the one hand, then, the Jews represented a covert challenge to the work ethic and instrumental rationality, which had been important elements in the Enlightenment logos. They were in a peculiar way an embodiment of the reaction of nature to the domination implicit in the Enlightenment program, which, as we shall see in the next chapter, was one of the major themes of *Dialectic of the Enlightenment.* In this, they were the *Gegenrasse*[43] of the Nazis, whose pseudo-naturalism was a distorted reflection, even partly an imitation, of the Jews' seeming embodiment of unrepressed nature. *Gegenrasse* meant a kind of misbegotten, inferior race in Nazi ideology. Here Horkheimer and Adorno used it ironically, to mean the reflection of the Nazi's own perverted qualities.

On the other hand, the Jews were also identified with the Enlightenment and its liberal, rationalist traditions. As Horkheimer had argued in "The Jews and Europe," the emancipation of the Jews had been intimately connected to the emergence of bourgeois society. Accordingly, with the decline of that society in the twentieth century, the position of the Jews had been rendered extremely vulnerable. The identification was more than merely external or fortuitous. Despite the image of the "natural" Jew mentioned above, Jews through the centuries had contributed significantly to the "disenchantment of the world" and the manipulation of nature that it implied. In a letter to Lowenthal in July, 1946, Horkheimer wrote of the role Jews had played in one aspect of this process, the instrumentalization of language:

> The root of fascist agitation is the fact that there is something rotten in language itself. The rottenness I have in mind is . . . a phenomenon which is expressed in Jewish religion by the verdict against trying to call God by His name and by the story of the Tower of Babel. The corruption of language seems also to be expressed in the legend of the Expulsion from Paradise, where all the creatures had been named by Adam. We must beware of the idea that the fascist use of language is something radically new in our society. . . . The distrust of the peasant against the city-dweller with his mastery of language was partly justified. This distrust is an element of anti-Semitism itself, and the Jew who manipulates language so easily is not free from guilt in the prehistory of what you explain as the fascist handling of language. Here, too, the Jew is the pioneer of capitalism.[44]

In short, the dilemma of the Jew was that he was identified both with the Enlightenment and with its opposite. His true emancipation as a man could only come when domination — that of capitalism, and more fundamentally, of the Enlightenment in its most instrumental and manipulative forms — was itself ended. Only when reconciliation, which ironically was the highest value of the Jewish faith,[45] was realized in the social sphere could anti-Semitism truly end. Partial solutions such as Zionism[46] and assimilation were destined to fail.

Finally, Horkheimer and Adorno took little comfort in the "defeat" of anti-Semitism brought by the victory of the Allies over Hitler. Overt antagonism to the Jews might have been successfully extirpated, but its underlying cause had been preserved in what might be called a "ticket mentality," which threatened to destroy all vestiges of individuality in Western culture. "Anti-Semitic psychology," they wrote, "has largely been replaced by a mere "yes" to the fascist ticket, to the list of slogans of quarrelsome heavy industry."[47] Implicitly, of course, this applied to all advanced industrial societies in the West, including the United States. As Horkheimer had written to Lowenthal, in theoretical speculation "the principle of the lesser evil is even more dangerous than in politics." Hitler's conquerors might have eliminated the more obvious effects of anti-Semitism, but they had done little to destroy its root causes. *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, as we shall see in the next chapter, was in large measure a phenomenology of the alternative displacements that stemmed from those causes.

This then was the general analysis of the objective dimension of anti-Semitism that informed the Institut's thinking while it conducted its empirical probes of the subjective side of the problem. It was expressed, however, only in German or in private correspondence. As a result, one side of Adorno's methodological division was lost to public view, leaving in its place what seemed to some like psychological reductionism and the abandonment of Critical Theory's stress on the totality. Years later Adorno would refer the curious reader to "Elements of Anti-Semitism," [48] but at the time the *Studies in Prejudice* appeared few readers had known enough to anticipate this advice. This was one of the disadvantages resulting from the Institut's wariness about betraying its more radical side to the American audience.

What also must be kept in mind, of course, is that from the beginning the series as a whole, including the work on which the Institut had worked most extensively, *The Authoritarian Personality*, was a collaborative effort. Non-Institut members tended to be psychoanalytically trained, but in most cases unfamiliar with the larger perspective of Critical Theory. Thus, although Horkheimer was general director of the project, he could not exert the guiding influence he had been able to exercise within the Institut in the past. This was even more the case after his health forced him back to California and Samuel Flowerman replaced him as director in 1946. The Lowenthal-Horkheimer correspondence contains ample evidence that relations with officials of the AJC, especially near the end of the project, were anything but smooth. Personal frictions played a role, but theoretical disagreements certainly existed as well.

The *Studies* as they were originally conceived at the New York conference in 1944 were to consist of two types of research. The first was to be more limited and deal with specific problems facing educational agencies. The second was to be broader in scope and its questions more comprehensive. Both short- and long-range studies were to be conducted with interdisciplinary methods. When the *Studies* were finally published at the end of the decade, however, their form was somewhat different. Three of the five volumes dealt with prejudice as a basically subjective phenomenon: *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans*, by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz;[49] *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation*, by Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda;[50] and *The Authoritarian Personality*, by T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. The fourth, *Prophets of Deceit*, by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman,[51] analyzed the techniques of the demagogue. The last, Paul Massing's *Rehearsal for Destruction*,[52] presented a straightforward historical account of anti-Semitism in Germany.

Although of the three subjectively oriented studies, *The Authoritarian Personality* is most germane to our analysis of the Institut's empirical work, brief comment should be made about the other two volumes. The most strictly psychoanalytic of these was the Ackerman-Jahoda study. Ackerman was himself a practicing analyst associated with the Psychoanalytic Clinic for Training and Research at Columbia. His professional orientation was Freudian, although ego psychology served to modify his orthodoxy. Before the founding of the AJC's Department of Scientific Research, he had approached John Slawson about the possibility of doing a Freudian study of anti-Semitism. When the *Studies* were launched, his suggestion provided the basis for one of its projects. His collaborator, Marie Jahoda, came to work with him primarily through an indirect connection with the Institut. She had been Paul Lazarsfeld's colleague, coauthor of *The Unemployed of Marienthal*,[53] and, for a time, his wife, in Vienna before the war. After an eight-year exile in England, she emigrated to America in 1945 and became a research associate with the AJC. Although trained as a social psychologist, she had been personally analyzed and was familiar with Freudian theory.

Collection of data for the study began at the end of 1945. Twenty-five analysts, primarily from the New York area, were asked to volunteer material from their clinical practices. Patterns revealed in the forty case studies that were ultimately contributed were then summarized, without any attempt at quantification. Considerable caution was also displayed in relating specific emotional disorders to types of prejudice. In fact, few generalizable conclusions emerged from the study, although its descriptive content was often highly suggestive.

At no time did sociological considerations enter into the discussion.

Also rooted in Freudian theory, the second study of the subjective dimension of social bias, *Dynamics of Prejudice*, went beyond the Ackerman-Jahoda book in its willingness to introduce statistical analysis and sociological insights. Bruno Bettelheim, not yet the author of the works that would make him one of America's most celebrated psychologists,[54] had emigrated from Vienna in 1939. At the time of his work for the AJC he was on the faculty of the University of Chicago as assistant, then associate professor of educational psychology. His collaborator, Morris Janowitz, was a sociologist at the same university with a special interest in political sociology.

The conclusions of *Dynamics in Prejudice* were based on interviews that lasted four to seven hours administered to one hundred fifty male veterans in Chicago. Veterans were chosen because their counterparts in Europe after the First World War had shown themselves to be highly susceptible to the attractions of fascism. Bettelheim and Janowitz hoped to see whether or not similar conditions of faulty reintegration into society prevailed in America after World War Two. They explored such psychological hypotheses as the projection of past frustrations and anxieties about the future onto outgroups because of inadequate ego strength. They also attempted to uncover relationships between ethnic intolerance and the individual's social dynamics, and sought correlations between anti-Jewish and anti-Negro sentiments. What they did not hope to uncover, however, was a general syndrome of the intolerant personality, which was the primary goal of their counterparts at Berkeley.

Among the conclusions reached by Bettelheim and Janowitz were the following. Tolerance tended to correlate positively with such variables as ego strength and acceptance of external authority (acceptance, it should be noted, was said to differ from submission, but whatever the term, this was a conclusion very much at odds with that reached in *The Authoritarian Personality*). A relationship between bias against Jews and bias against blacks did exist, although alienated superego traits tended to be projected on Jews (for example, Jews control the country), while alienated id characteristics were projected on blacks (for example, blacks were dirty and sexually licentious). This last finding, it might be added parenthetically, was very different from what had existed in Europe, where Jews were the objects of both types of projections.

Correlations between intolerance and socio-economic conditions, including familial relations, were less easy to establish. One conclusion that did emerge was that rapid social mobility, especially when in a downward direction, often correlated positively with prejudice.

The key determinant, however, was less the objective experience of the individual than his subjective feelings of deprivation. The demands made by sudden social change were most inadequately handled in those cases where childhood experiences had hindered the development of a strong ego. Thus, "the weaker the personality, the stronger becomes the influence of the social field." [55] This was a conclusion, it will be recalled, which was close to the one reached in the *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, with the difference that in the earlier study, the decline of the family was seen as the source of the weaker ego, a decline that was placed in the larger context of the liquidation of mediating factors in advanced capitalist society. Bettelheim and Janowitz refrained from speculations on this more cosmic level. Similarly, the recommendations that appeared at the end of *Dynamics of Prejudice* were well within a liberal framework. They included better parental training to create more integrated personalities; the strengthening of the legal system, which was understood as the basic symbol of external social control; and increased preschool training for tolerance.

As Bettelheim and Janowitz were themselves later to note,[56] their work differed from that of the group in Berkeley in a number of other ways. Most significantly, *Dynamics of Prejudice* found intolerance most prevalent among those who resisted society and rejected its values, the reverse of the correlation between prejudice and conformity discovered by the California researchers. The difference, as Nathan Glazer was to point out,[57] was perhaps due to the disparity in population samples of the two projects. The Chicago study tested predominantly lower-class and lower-middle class subjects, whereas the Berkeley project confined itself to the middle class. The implication of this difference, of course, was that *Dynamics of Prejudice* lacked the implicit critique of the social totality that informed *The Authoritarian Personality.*

As might be expected, *Prophets of Deceit*, in whose writing Leo Lowenthal had a central role, was much closer to the traditions of Critical Theory. Content analysis, the basic technique he and Norbert Guterman used, had been applied to literature and popular biographies in his earlier work for the Institut. The historical frame of reference of the study, so its authors explained,[58] was the analysis of earlier agitators, such as Cola di Rienzi, Savonarola, and Robespierre, in Horkheimer's "Egoism and the Movement for Emancipation." Moreover, the basic assumption of the work — that manipulation rather than free choice was the rule in modern society — had served to underlie the Institut's work on mass culture. As was the case with most of the Frankfurt School's earlier work, it sought to go beyond appearances and unmask the "objective" content of the phenomenon it studied. Thus Lowenthal and Guterman could write that "the agitator should be studied in the light of his *potential* effectiveness within the context of present-day society and its dynamics, rather than in terms of his immediate effectiveness." [59] This meant that more than the individual susceptibility to demagoguery was at issue; latent trends within the society as a whole were important as well.

In writing a phenomenology of political agitation, Lowenthal and Guterman had earlier, unpublished studies by Massing of Joseph E. McWilliams, by Adorno of Martin Luther Thomas, and by Lowenthal himself of George Allison Phelps to build on. They also benefited from the work being done simultaneously by the other authors of the *Studies* on subjective elements of prejudice. Whereas the other studies focused on the responses of the persons most accessible to demagogic propaganda, *Prophets of Deceit* examined the various devices used to evoke those responses. The language of the agitator, its authors held, had to be deciphered by a kind of psychological Morse code.[60] As was to be expected, the major source of the code was psychoanalysis, which also served as the basis for a more theoretical analysis of fascist propaganda by Adorno in an article written two years later.[61]

Lowenthal and Guterman also introduced the work of another refugee, Erik Erikson, to supplement Freud's seminal insights. Erikson's study "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth" [62] had argued that Hitler was the embodiment of the rebellious big brother as well as an authoritarian father figure. This facilitated the paradoxical search for and rejection of authority that characterized fascism. Erikson's perception of the confused rebelliousness of the fascist personality corresponded nicely to the "rebel" as developed by Fromm in the *Studien.* Furthermore, his remark that the German father suffered from an "essential lack of true inner authority — that authority which results from an integration of cultural ideal and educational method" [63] — fitted well with the *Studien*'s observation about the breakdown of familial solidarity. On the surface, however, Erikson's view of the German family seemed to contradict the argument about the family structure best suited for the cultivation of authoritarian potential that appeared in *The Authoritarian Personality*, at least as some commentators understood it.[64]

Before discussing whether or not such a contradiction did in fact exist, the origins and methodology of the project that produced the most important volume in the *Studies in Prejudice* should be made clear. As in much of the work done by the Institut, Horkheimer's guiding influence was strong.[65] Because he took no part in the actual writing of the book, however, his name did not appear among the coauthors. In 1944 Horkheimer had made contact with a group of social psychologists at Berkeley that included R. Nevitt Sanford, Daniel Levinson, and Else Frenkel-Brunswik.[66] His initial interest in their work had been aroused by a study of pessimism directed by Sanford.[67] The basic irrationality of the pessimism that was studied suggested that an underlying personality trait or constellation of traits was at its root. This, of course, was the direction the Institut's earlier findings had taken as well. Thus, with the grant from the AJC just acquired, Horkheimer was able to suggest a working relationship between the Institut and the social scientists around Sanford, who called themselves the Berkeley Public Opinion Study Group. His proposal was accepted, and work on what was to become *The Authoritarian Personality* began in the following year.

Adorno and Sanford were selected as codirectors of the project, with Levinson and Mrs. Frenkel-Brunswik as chief associates. Although all four senior members of the staff cooperated on the various parts of the project, their major responsibilities were divided.[68] Sanford was most concerned with research techniques and the two case studies, which were presented in full detail. Adorno was responsible for setting the data in a more general sociological framework, with special emphasis on the ideological content of the interviews. Mrs. Frenkel-Brunswik worked on some of the personality variables and was charged with the categorization and quantification of the interview material. And finally, Levinson was primarily responsible for the project's scales, for the psychological interpretation of the interview data and the projective questions, and for the overall statistical methods.

Pollock, who by the end of the war had moved out to the West Coast, was selected to organize a secondary research team in Los Angeles, which included C. F. Brown and Carol Creedon. Lowenthal, although busy with his own research, contributed to the content analysis in Adorno's chapters in the final version of the project's findings. In addition, individual monographic studies were contributed by various members of the Berkeley Public Opinion Study Group: Betty Aron on the Thematic Apperception Test, Maria Hertz Levinson on psychiatric clinic patients, and William R. Morrow on prison inmates.

The basic objective of all the research was the exploration of a "new anthropological type," [69] the authoritarian personality. As postulated, its characteristics resembled those of the sado-masochistic character type constructed by Fromm in the *Studien.* Similarities also existed with the so-called J-type developed by the Nazi psychologist E. R. Jaensch in 1938,[70] although the sympathies of the authors were of course very different from his. Jaensch's J-type was defined by its unwavering rigidity. Its opposite he called the S-type, for synaesthesia, the capacity to confuse senses, which he equated with the effete, vacillating uncertainty of the democratic mentality. There was also a striking resemblance to the portrait of an anti-Semite drawn by Jean-Paul Sartre in his *Anti-Semite and Jew,* a book that appeared after *The Authoritarian Personality* was well under way.[71] Wilhelm Reich and Abraham Maslow were also acknowledged predecessors in the construction of the syndrome.[72] As it was finally understood, the authoritarian character, in Horkheimer's words, had the following qualities:

> a mechanical surrender to conventional values; blind submission to authority together with blind hatred of all opponents and outsiders; anti-introspectiveness; rigid stereotyped thinking; a penchant for superstition; vilification, half-moralistic and half-cynical, of human nature; projectivity.[73]

That such a type did in fact exist was not the issue in question. As Adorno later admitted:

> we never regarded the theory simply as a set of hypotheses but as in some sense standing on its own feet, and therefore did not intend to prove or disprove the theory through our findings but only to derive from it concrete questions for investigation, which must then be judged on their own merit and demonstrate certain prevalent socio-psychological structures.[74]

Thus, despite its use of American empirical and statistical techniques, the Institut had not truly abandoned the methodology of Critical Theory. In general it remained faithful to the tenets of that methodology as outlined in "Traditional and Critical Theory," although with the important change that *praxis* was no longer stressed as the testing grounds for the theory. The Institut's critique of the hypothesis-verification-conclusion model of social research, however, was still in effect. Induction, as normally understood, was not acceptable. As Horkheimer wrote in the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* in 1941:

> Categories have to be formed through a process of induction that is the reverse of the traditional inductive method, which verified its hypotheses by collecting individual experiences until they attained the weight of universal laws. Induction in social theory, per contra, should seek the universal within

> the particular, not above or beyond it, and, instead of moving from one particular to another and then to the heights of abstraction, should delve deeper and deeper into the particular and discover the universal law therein.[75]

Accordingly, *The Authoritarian Personality* saw its individual interviews as extremely important complements to its statistical surveys. Its highly detailed reproductions of two of those interviews — one with a highly prejudiced respondent named Mack, the other with a low scorer on the scales called Larry — were meant less as examples of abstract types than as monad-like particulars embodying universals. In a sense, they were really not very different from Weberian "ideal types," with their stress on individuality and disdain for abstract laws.

With the expertise of the group around Sanford to draw on, however, statistical refinements were introduced into the project that went well beyond anything the Institut had done in the past. As in the *Studien* and in Sanford's work on pessimism, the basic assumption was the existence of different personality levels, both manifest and latent. The goal of the project was the exposure of the underlying psychological dynamics corresponding to the surface expression of a prejudiced ideology or indicating a potential for its adoption in the future. Public opinion questionnaires based on the conscious articulation of beliefs were dismissed as inadequate for two reasons. First, they failed to reveal a coherent syndrome of opinion, and second, they were incapable of probing the psychological predispositions that might correspond to the syndrome.[76] Perhaps the primary methodological objective of the project was to develop a relatively simple device to test the existence of the underlying psychological structure or structures fostering authoritarian beliefs and possibly authoritarian behavior.

The research began with the distribution of questionnaires containing factual questions, opinion-attitude scales, and projective, open-answer questions to a group of seven hundred college students. A number of the questions had been used before in the *Studien* and in the labor project. The opinion-attitude scales were designed to uncover quantitative estimates of anti-Semitism (the A-S Scale), ethnocentrism (the E Scale), and political and economic conservatism (the PEC Scale). With practice the scales were refined, so that specific items on each one became reliable indicators of a more general configuration of opinions: "The procedure was to bring together in a scale items which, by hypothesis and by clinical experience, could be regarded as 'giveaways' of trends which lay relatively deep within the personality, and which constituted a *disposition* to express spontaneously (on a suitable occasion), or to be influenced by, fascist ideas."[77]

Ultimately the subject population numbered 2099 and was composed of a number of groups. Almost all those questioned, however, were white, native-born, gentile, middle-class Americans. To clarify the statistical data that resulted from the questionnaires, clinical interviews and Thematic Apperception Tests were administered to a selected number of those who fell in the highest and lowest quarters of the curve. The interviews lasted for one and a half hours and were divided into an ideological and a clinical-genetic section. As in the labor project, the interviewees were not informed of precisely what they were being questioned about. Under Mrs. Frenkel-Brunswik's direction, a scoring manual with ninety categories and subcategories was devised to help the nine interviewers decipher the results. Both "underlying" and "manifest" questions were put to the forty men and forty women chosen for the interviews. The TAT's were given to approximately the same subjects. In both cases, quantification of the results was attempted.

During the course of the research, the various techniques were both "expanded" and "contracted":

> Expansion was exemplified in the attempt to bring more and more aspects of antidemocratic ideology into the developing picture and in the attempt to explore enough aspects of the potentially antidemocratic personality so that there was some grasp of the totality. Contraction took place continuously in the quantitative procedures as increasing theoretical clarity permitted a boiling down so that the same crucial relationships could be demonstrated with briefer techniques.[78]

The scaling procedures that were used had been developed by Rensis Likert in 1932, as a modification of an earlier technique created by L. L. Thurstone.[79] In both cases, varying degrees of agreement or disagreement with the question were allowed on a scale ranging from plus-three to minus-three. A neutral zero was excluded from the possible responses. Refinement of the scale consisted of weeding out items that failed to correlate with the general score or that lacked clear discriminatory power. If the Likert scale had a major disadvantage, it was the possibility that different patterns of response might produce the same final score.[80] The interviews were designed in part to overcome this potential problem by revealing the specific configurations of belief in individual cases.

The most valuable methodological achievement of the project was the condensation of the three original attitudinal scales into one set of questions capable of measuring authoritarian potential on the latent psychological level. The new measuring device was the celebrated "F Scale." [81] The content analyses of the various agitators' devices, previous experience with the empirical work of the *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, and the studies in New York of anti-Semitism in labor all contributed to its construction. It sought to test nine basic personality variables:

CONVENTIONALISM. Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.

AUTHORITARIAN SUBMISSION. Submissive, uncritical attitude towards idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.

AUTHORITARIAN AGGRESSION. Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish, people who violate conventional values.

ANTI-INTRACEPTION. Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.

SUPERSTITION AND STEREOTYPY. The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.

POWER AND "TOUGHNESS." Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

DESTRUCTIVENESS AND CYNICISM. Generalized hostility, vilification of the human.

PROJECTIVITY. The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

SEX. Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on." [82]

A certain number of questions were designed to reveal as indirectly as possible the subject's position on each variable. At no time were any minority groups mentioned explicitly. With increased testing, the correlation between the F Scale and the E Scale reached approximately .75, which was considered a sign of success. More questionable, however, was the .57 correlation between the F and the PEC Scales. To explain this failure, a distinction was introduced between genuine and pseudo-conservatives, only the latter being truly authoritarian personalities. No attempt was made (or at least reported in the final results) to correlate the F with the A–S Scale. More specific correlations within the subgroups of the sample population showed considerable consistency among all the different groups. And as we have seen, the clinical interviews were used to substantiate the findings of the scale. Examinations of their results seemed to support the F Scale's accuracy.

In subsequent years, however, the success of the F Scale as an indicator of authoritarian potential was the subject of a lively controversy. The most exhaustive critique of its effectiveness was made by Hyman and Sheatsley in a volume devoted solely to the impact of the study.[83] In general, they were very critical, and in a number of cases their criticisms were telling. Paul Lazarsfeld, on the other hand, whose skepticism concerning the unqualified application of Critical Theory to empirical problems was clearly shown in his collaboration with Adorno, was far more positive. The F Scale's individual indicators, he wrote in 1959, play both "an expressive role in regard to the underlying trait and a predictive role in regard to the originating observation which the trait is supposed to explain." [84] Roger Brown, a more severe critic of the project, ended his analysis by admitting that "there is a substantial residue possibility that the chief conclusion of the questionnaire work is correct." [85]

Critical assessment of the interpretation of the interview material proved to be equally mixed. The interviewers began with specific questions in mind in six general areas — vocation, income, religion, clinical data, politics, and minorities and "race" — and continued to probe indirectly until they thought the questions had been answered. Certain critics objected to the fact that the interviewers were "too knowledgeable" [86] because of their advance information on the scores of the individual respondents on the scales. Other criticism dealt with the coding of the results. Despite the scoring manual prepared by Mrs. Frenkel-Brunswik, the coders' interpretative leeway remained considerable. On occasion, it was argued,[87] certain circular reasoning seemed to creep into their interpretations. For example, rigidity was equated with an intolerance of ambiguity, while intolerance was itself explained by rigidity. Other attacks were directed against the choice of high and low scorers rather than middle groups for the interviews, a procedure, so it was argued, that was designed to support the data rather than seek a representative cross section of the sample population.[88]

Criticisms, as might be expected, were not confined to methodology alone. The substantive conclusions of the project came in for their share as well. Paul Kecskemeti, for example, challenged the implicit assumption that prejudice in general, and anti-Semitism in particular, foreshadowed a total overthrow of the democratic system. This "catastrophic perspective," he argued, was far too alarmist.[89]

More specific questions were raised by others about the genetic explanations of authoritarianism. Unfortunately, all the data about the childhood origins of the personality types under examination came from adult memories rather than the actual observation of children. Mrs. Frenkel-Brunswik addressed herself to this problem in a subsequent study, which was regrettably not completed before her premature death in 1958.[90] As revealed in the available interview data, authoritarian characters were most likely to be nurtured in a home in which discipline was strict but often arbitrary. Parental values were frequently very conventional, rigid, and externalized. As a result, it was likely that those values remained ego-alien to the child as well, which prevented the development of an integrated personality. Resentment at parental harshness was often displaced onto others, while the outward image of the father and mother proved to be highly idealized. The "stern and distant"[91] father frequently reported in interviews of the high scorers on the F Scale often seemed to promote passivity in the child combined with repressed aggressiveness and hostility. These were qualities, it will be recalled, evident in the sado-masochistic type developed from Fromm in the *Studien über Autorität und Familie.* By contrast, the parents of the low scorers were remembered as less conformist, less status-anxious, and less arbitrarily demanding. Instead, they were more ambivalent, emotionally demonstrative, and affectionate. Accordingly, the image their children had of them was less idealized and more realistic. And perhaps most important, ego-alienation of moral norms was less pronounced, indicating the likelihood of a more integrated personality.

One of the questions raised by subsequent commentators was the compatibility of this view of the authoritarian family with the Institut's assertion, so often made elsewhere, that the family had declined in modern society. Leon Bramson was the most insistent critic on this point, calling the argument about the decline (which he mistakenly attributed to Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* alone without seeing its antecedents in the *Studien*) "directly contradictory to the work of the early Fromm and the Berkeley group."[92] As Bramson saw them, these studies seemed to indicate the continued strength of the authoritarian family. On a closer examination, however, it can be seen that the two interpretations were by no means as irreconcilable as Bramson believed.

First, as mentioned before, the Institut was impressed with Erikson's picture of the German family, in which the father lacked true inner authority. The pseudo-revolt of what Fromm had called the "rebel" was in fact a search for a new authority, produced in part by the absence of a positive authority model at home. This was a syndrome that *The Authoritarian Personality* certainly acknowledged, giving it a prominent place in Adorno's analysis of "high" character types.

Even in those cases where identification with a seemingly strong father rather than rebellion against him was the rule — admittedly the most frequent syndrome — the contrast with the earlier analysis in the *Studien* was not that marked. In fact, in describing the "authoritarian syndrome"[93] Adorno referred the reader to Fromm's sado-masochistic character and employed Freud's ideas about the Oedipus complex to explain its origins.[94] In cases where Oedipal conflicts were poorly resolved in childhood, aggression against the father was transformed into masochistic obedience and displaced sadistic hostility. What connected this purely psychological explanation to the more sociological perspective of the *Studien* was Horkheimer's theory that "external social repression is concomitant with the internal repression of impulses. In order to achieve 'internalization' of social control, which never gives as much to the individual as it takes, the latter's attitude towards authority and its psychological agency, the superego, assumes an irrational aspect."[95] This was a syndrome, Adorno concluded, that was highly prevalent among the lower middle classes in Europe and might be expected "among people whose actual status differs from that to which they actually aspire"[96] in America. In short, the classic authoritarian syndrome did not mean simple identification with a strong patriarchal figure, but implied instead considerable ambivalence and conflict about the relationship. External repression, when intensified, served to activate the latent tensions in the poorly resolved Oedipal situation.

Adorno outlined other syndromes that expressed ways in which this ambivalence might be acted out. These included "surface resentment," the "crank," and the "manipulative type." Another syndrome found among high scorers was the "conventional," which most closely approximated a conflict-free internalization of parental and social norms. It was this latter type that seemed most congenial to a patriarchal family structure in which paternal authority was still relatively intact.

The authoritarian family that emerged from the interview data was itself a reflection of growing external pressures. Anxious about its status, rigidly adhering to values it no longer held spontaneously, the authoritarian family was obviously overcompensating for the hollowness at its core. The authority it tried so frantically to protect was in fact no longer rational. As Horkheimer argued in an essay written in 1949,[97] the more the economic and social functions of the family were liquidated, the more desperately it stressed its outmoded, conventional forms. Even the mother, whose warmth and protectiveness had once served as a buffer against the arbitrary harshness of the patriarchal world — Fromm's strictures on matriarchalism were echoed here — was no longer capable of functioning in the same way. "The 'Mom'," Horkheimer wrote, "is the death mask of the mother." [98] "By contrast," *The Authoritarian Personality* revealed, "the family of the typical low-scoring man seems to be centered about a mother whose primary function is to give love rather than to dominate, and who is not weak or submissive." [99]

It was no surprise, then, that the authoritarian personality usually felt no pity, a motherly quality. The Nazis' undermining of the family, despite their propaganda to the contrary, was no accident. The authoritarian family did not produce authoritarian children solely because of what it did — provide a model for arbitrary domination — but equally for what it could not do — protect the individual against the claims made on his socialization by extra-familial agencies. Thus, although *The Authoritarian Personality* concentrated on the intra-familial origins of the "new anthropological type," the implications of its analysis pointed outward to the society at large. The Institut's earlier emphasis on the decline of the family, Bramson to the contrary notwithstanding, was preserved in the portrait of the authoritarian family it drew in its later work.

Perhaps some of the confusion about this question was a product of terminological ambiguity. As a number of commentators have pointed out,[100] there is an important distinction that should be drawn between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Wilhelminian and Nazi Germany, for example, were fundamentally dissimilar in their patterns of obedience. What *The Authoritarian Personality* was really studying was the character type of a totalitarian rather than an authoritarian society. Thus, it should have been no surprise to learn that this new syndrome was fostered by a familial crisis in which traditional paternal authority was under fire. Much of the difficulty — and perhaps some of it was conceptual as well as linguistic — might have been avoided if this distinction had been clearly articulated.

Another, perhaps more substantial criticism of the study was made by Edward Shils and echoed by a number of others.[101] The political bias of the project's directors, they argued, colored its findings. Why, they asked, was authoritarianism associated with fascism alone and not communism? Why was the F Scale not the "C Scale," or at least the "A Scale?" Why was political and economic conservatism seen as connected with authoritarianism, while the demand for state socialism was not? In short, why was the old left-right distinction upheld, when the real opposition was between liberal democracy and totalitarianism of both extremes?

The great irony of this attack lay in the fact that the Institut had abandoned many of its more radical ideas in its work for the AJC. As we have seen, the fundamental assumptions underlying the *Studies in Prejudice* were liberal and democratic. Even so hostile a critic of the work as Paul Kecskemeti could write: "the authors' own liberalism is plainly conservative insofar as the American constitutional tradition is concerned." [102] Toleration had never been an end in itself for the Frankfurt School, and yet the nonauthoritarian personality, insofar as it was defined, was posited as a person with a nondogmatic tolerance for diversity. What the Institut always feared was the fetishization of tolerance as an end rather than a means. A good, although indirect, example of this can be found in Bettelheim and Janowitz's *Social Change and Prejudice*, where the nonconformist, antiauthoritarian character valued by the Berkeley research team was criticized in the following way: "If some nonconformists display a high level of tolerance, it may be the result of a reaction formation or displacement of hostility generated by unsatisfactory relations with authority. It is not farfetched to call these persons false tolerants, for while they may be tolerant of minorities, they often are intolerant of accepted ways of social life." [103]

Nor had political democracy in its representative form been the Institut's final goal. Yet *The Authoritarian Personality* gave little evidence of the traditional Marxist critique of "bourgeois democracy," which had informed the Institut's earlier work. There was a further irony in Shils's claim that the old left-right dichotomy had been outmoded. As we have already noted, Horkheimer stressed the necessity of unmasking domination in any political form, whether fascist, ostensibly socialist, or otherwise. From its first years in Frankfurt the Institut had been skeptical about the Soviet experiment. With time, skepticism had turned to outright disillusionment. As Pollock had argued, the Soviet Union was no more than a state capitalist system with little to distinguish itself from similar systems in the West. The key difference with Shils and other American thinkers was that the Institut refused to contrast totalitarianism to an individualist, libertarian, nonideological pluralism as a polar opposite. As we have seen in looking at its treatment of mass culture in the West, the Institut saw domination working in new and subtle ways to destroy the vestiges of true individuality behind a facade of diversity. *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* extended its gloomy analysis of current trends to all modernized societies. Thus, in a way, the Frankfurt School agreed that the left-right dichotomy, at least as it was embodied in actual political structures, was no longer relevant. Where it did disagree, of course, was on the level of theory, where its sympathies remained basically the same as before.

The Authoritarian Personality gave little direct evidence of this pessimism. It refrained from offering any conclusions about the prevalence of authoritarianism within the society as a whole by extrapolating from its limited sample. It did not even go as far as the unpublished labor project in presenting percentages of high and low scorers within its sample population. Instead, it merely presented a descriptive typology of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian characters, without suggesting anything about their respective frequency. On occasion, though, it did offer hints about the extent of authoritarian personalities in its sample. Thus, for example, Adorno wrote that "it is one of the unpleasant results of our studies, which has to be faced squarely, that this process of social acceptance of pseudo-conservatism has gone a long way — that it has secured an indubitable mass basis." [104] On the whole, however, it held to the view that "the majority of the population are not extreme but, in our terminology, 'middle.' " [105]

Shils's critique of latent political bias was perhaps more on the mark when it turned to the study's implicit assumption that conservatism and authoritarianism were somehow related. The unreliability of the PEC Scale to correlate significantly with the F Scale had led to an attempt to distinguish between genuine and pseudo-conservatives. The former were defined as people, "whatever the merits of [their] political views," who were "seriously concerned with fostering what is most vital in the American democratic tradition." [106] The latter were only outward conservatives, whose underlying personalities marked them as potential candidates for fascism. Although this distinction was designed to overcome the simple equation of right-wing ideology and authoritarian personality structure, the association lingered subconsciously, because there were no comparable efforts to develop a typology of pseudo-liberalism or radical authoritarianism. In fact, there was no real attempt to distinguish among nonconservative ideologies. The prototype liberal, who "actively seeks progressive social change, who can be militantly critical (though not necessarily totally rejective) of the present status quo, who opposes or deemphasizes numerous conservative values and beliefs . . . and who would diminish the power of business by increasing the power of labor and the economic functions of government," [107] was seen as the primary foil of the genuine or pseudo-conservative. How problematical this characterization was became evident in the next generation, when New Deal liberalism itself came under strong attack as an ideology oriented towards the status quo.

If *The Authoritarian Personality* did attempt to account for authoritarianism of the left, it did so by constructing a vaguely defined category of "rigid low scorers." [108] In later years, Adorno would refer to this subtype as an answer to such critics as Shils.[109] On closer observation, however, this proved a less than satisfactory response. Whereas in the case of the PEC Scale, the discrepancy between conscious opinions and subconscious personality structure could be used to explain the inadequate correlation with the F Scale, there could be no such discrepancy in the F Scale itself, because it had been designed explicitly to measure trends in the subconscious personality. Thus to say that low scorers were rigid was tantamount to saying that the scale had failed to measure their rigidity, "stereotypy," and conformity, which were key features of the high-scoring syndrome. It would be to negate the very purpose of the project, which was to develop a device to measure the existence of authoritarian potential beneath the level of conscious ideology. Clearly, more work had to be done on authoritarianism of the left, and, in fact, in the next few years it was carried out by other researchers in America.[110]

Other difficulties in the methodology and conclusions of *The Authoritarian Personality* might be mentioned, but to dwell on them unduly would be to miss the tremendous achievement of the work as a whole. As Adorno himself was later to admit, "if *The Authoritarian Personality* made a contribution, this is not to be sought in the absolute validity of the positive insights, even less in statistics, but above all in the posing of the issues, which were motivated by a genuine social concern and related to a theory that had not previously been translated into quantitative investigations of this sort." [111] Although nearly a thousand pages in length, the final volume was understood by its authors as only a "pilot study." If this indeed was the real purpose, then there can be no doubt of its success. One of the early reviewers of all the volumes in the *Studies in Prejudice* was right in calling them "an epoch-making event in social science." [112] In the years that followed, an enormous flood of research resulted from the stimulus they, and in particular the Berkeley study, provided.[113]

As a postscript, it might be added that the impact was not confined to America alone. When the Institut returned to Germany in the early fifties, it brought with it the social scientific techniques it had acquired in New York and California. Its first collaborative effort after the reestablishment of the Institut was a study of group interaction published under Pollock's name in 1955, whose basic purpose was the introduction of American methodology to a German audience.[114] In fact, even Adorno found himself in the unwonted position of promoting empirical techniques to counteract the traditional German hostility to anything smacking of Anglo-Saxon positivism. In a conference of sociologists held in Cologne in 1952, Adorno argued that sociology must no longer be considered as a *Geisteswissenschaft* (a cultural science), because the world, dominated as it was by reification, could scarcely be understood as "meaningful." "The much abused inhumanity of empirical methods," he told his audience, "is always more human than the humanization of the inhuman." [115] Accordingly, the methods of administrative research should be used, albeit within a critical framework, to explore social phenomena. Although theory could not be proved or disproved by empirical verification — this was a tenet of Critical Theory he was not prepared to abandon — when translated into research questions, theoretical ideas could be immensely enriched. Thus, for example, psychoanalysis had been significantly improved by its translation into empirical questions, although of course its initial formulation had been anything but inductive.

By the end of the 1950's, however, the Institut's attitude towards empiricism had undergone a serious reversal of emphasis.[116] Bringing American methods to the attention of German social scientists had succeeded too well. And so, once again, the Frankfurt School's sensitivity to the reductionist abuse of an empirical methodology came to the fore. In the next decade, to jump out of our chronological framework for a moment, German sociology was split into warring camps of dialectical and empirical methodologists, whose polemical interchanges evoked comparisons with the great *Methodenstreit* (methodological dispute) of the Wilhelminian era.[117] Although the Institut and such allies as Jürgen Habermas at the University of Frankfurt were the major exponents of the dialectical position, they were careful to avoid the wholesale repudiation of the techniques that the Institut had mastered with such effect in America.

How to integrate those techniques with a truly critical approach stressing the primacy of theory was the real problem. As we have seen, this was more than merely a methodological dilemma; it reflected real divisions and contradictions within the society as a whole. The success of the *Studies in Prejudice*, it might be argued, had resulted in part from an avoidance of the issue. The analyses of anti-Semitism in *The Authoritarian Personality* and in "Elements of Anti-Semitism" — the one dealing with the subjective dimension, the other more with its objective side — were never really reconciled. In fact, one reason why the Berkeley project succeeded while Adorno's collaboration with Lazarsfeld was a failure was that the former did not concern itself with the "objective spirit" of modern society in the way in which the latter did. When the Frankfurt School did speculate on those objective trends, its prognosis was bleak indeed. How much so we shall see in the next chapter, which is devoted to the theoretical work of the Institut in its last decade in America.

VIII

Toward a Philosophy of History: The Critique of the Enlightenment

> If by enlightenment and intellectual progress we mean the freeing of man from superstitious belief in evil forces, in demons and fairies, in blind fate — in short, the emancipation from fear — then denunciation of what is currently called reason is the greatest service reason can render.
>
> — MAX HORKHEIMER

The problem of discontinuity was perhaps the central internal dilemma for Critical Theory in the 1940's. The Institut, it will be recalled, had been launched with the intention of synthesizing a broad spectrum of disciplines. Its founders had also hoped to integrate speculation and empirical research. And finally, they had sought to overcome the academic isolation of traditional theory from its practical implications without at the same time reducing speculative thought to a utilitarian tool of polemical interests. In short, although criticizing the adequacy of orthodox Marxism, they had not rejected its ambitious project: the ultimate unity of critical theory and revolutionary practice. By the 1940's, however, the Frankfurt School began to have serious doubts about the feasibility of these syntheses. Its interests remained interdisciplinary, but the mediations between its theory and both empirical research and political *praxis* grew increasingly problematical.

As noted in the previous chapter, the *Studies in Prejudice*, even those parts most heavily influenced by members of the Institut, often departed from the tenets of Critical Theory as they had been articulated in the *Zeitschrift*. Most obviously, the analysis of anti-Semitism in *The Authoritarian Personality* differed significantly from its counterpart in *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*. Although attributable in part to the role of non-Institut scholars in the Berkeley project, the discrepancies were also a reflection of more fundamental developments in the theory itself. So too were new uncertainties in the Institut's attitude towards political activism. One of the essential characteristics of Critical Theory from its inception had been a refusal to consider Marxism a closed body of received truths. As the concrete social reality changed, so too, Horkheimer and his colleagues argued, must the theoretical constructions generated to make sense of it. Accordingly, with the end of the war and the defeat of fascism, a new social reality had emerged, which required a new theoretical response. This was the task that presented itself to the Frankfurt School in its last decade in America. By examining the changes that its members made in their theoretical work, we can better understand the sources of the discontinuities that later observers would find so troubling.

Our discussion will proceed as follows. We will begin by exploring the basic change in Critical Theory, a new emphasis on the underlying relationship between man and nature. The first part of our presentation will center on the Frankfurt School's critique of what it considered to be the prevailing relationship throughout most of Western history. This will be followed by a discussion of the alternative that it proposed, including its more problematical elements. We will then turn to the connections between that alternative and the Institut's continued stress on rationality and philosophical thought in general. And finally, we will focus on the implications of the change in the theory for the Institut's attitude towards *praxis,* subjectivity, and utopianism.

Although the articulation of the new elements in Critical Theory did not occur until the late forties, Horkheimer had recognized the need to rethink certain of the Frankfurt School's basic ideas in the years before the war. One of the sources of his willingness to leave New York was impatience with his institutional responsibilities, which prevented the assimilation and interpretation of the immense amount of work done by the Institut in the years after his assumption of the directorship. As early as 1938, he expressed his eagerness to begin work on a book on the dialectic of the Enlightenment.[1] The circulatory disorder that made it necessary for him to leave New York also made it possible to cast aside his administrative duties and begin the long-awaited theoretical summation. With Adorno his most frequent companion in California, their thinking merged even closer than before. While only one of their theoretical statements in the forties, *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, bore both their names, the other two, *Eclipse of Reason* and *Minima Moralia*, were strongly affected by the collaboration.

Unlike his friend, however, Horkheimer was never a prolific writer and now seems to have had even greater difficulty. On January 20, 1942, he wrote to Lowenthal that "philosophical argument, which has lost its basis with the abolition of the sphere of circulation, now seems to me impossible." Although he was perhaps distinguishing between traditional philosophy and Critical Theory here, the latter was becoming increasingly arduous as well. "I am getting into my work again," he wrote Lowenthal on November 27, "and it has never been as difficult as now. I feel that this undertaking is almost too great for my forces and in my letter to P[ollock] today, I reminded him of the fact that even Husserl needed about ten years for his *Logische Untersuchungen* and even about thirteen years until the publication of his '*Ideen*' . . ." On February 2 of the following year, he continued in the same vein, adding a moving expression of his sense of isolation:

> Philosophy is overwhelmingly complicated, and the procedure depressingly slow. The idea that you are, and always will be, aware of our raison d'être at least as clearly as myself has always meant more than encouragement: it strengthened in me that feeling of solidarity which is the very basis of what I am doing—beyond the three or four of us there are certainly other hearts and brains that feel similarly to ours, but we cannot see them, and perhaps they are prevented from expressing themselves.

Horkheimer's concern about the isolation of his thought was in fact justified. The theoretical work that he finally did publish in the late forties had a minimal impact in comparison with that of the *Studies in Prejudice. Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, written during the war, was not published until 1947, and then in German by a Dutch publishing house.[2] The *Eclipse of Reason*, which Oxford published in the same year, although accessible to the English-speaking public, was received with little critical fanfare[3] and less commercial success. Only in the 1960's, when the *Dialectic* became an underground classic in Germany — it was widely circulated in a pirated version until its official republication in 1970 — and the *Eclipse* was translated into German as a part of Horkheimer's *Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft*,[4] did they achieve the audience they deserved. Adorno's *Minima Moralia*, also never translated into English, had no impact whatsoever in America.

The critical shift in the Frankfurt School's perspective, which these works expressed, was a product of their last decade in the United States, and thus makes a fitting conclusion to our study of the Institut's American experience. Although it would be unfair to say that after their return to Germany, Horkheimer and Adorno did little but work out the implications of these books — this would be especially misleading for Adorno, who continued to write at his characteristically furious pace — there is an element of truth in such an observation. *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, *Eclipse of Reason*, and *Minima Moralia* presented so radical and sweeping a critique of Western society and thought that anything that followed could be only in the nature of a further clarification. Even Marcuse's later work in America, which is outside the purview of this study, did not really represent the breaking of new ground, although the nuances were often different. As we have seen on several occasions, many of the arguments he developed in *Eros and Civilization*, *One-Dimensional Man*, and his lesser works were contained in an embryonic form in his and others' articles in the *Zeitschrift*. Still others appeared in the works of his colleagues now under consideration.

In calling Horkheimer's and Adorno's critique "radical," the word should be understood in its etymological sense of going to the roots of the problem. This is especially important to grasp in view of the Frankfurt School's growing distrust of what passed for "radical" politics in later years. Paradoxically, as the theory became more radical, the Institut found itself decreasingly capable of finding a connection to radical *praxis*. The desperate hopes of Horkheimer's wartime essay on the "Authoritarian State" soon gave way to a deepening gloom about the chances for meaningful change. Disillusioned with the Soviet Union, no longer even marginally sanguine about the working classes of the West, appalled by the integrative power of mass culture, the Frankfurt School traveled the last leg of its long march away from orthodox Marxism.

The clearest expression of this change was the Institut's replacement of class conflict, that foundation stone of any truly Marxist theory, with a new motor of history. The focus was now on the larger conflict between man and nature both without and within, a conflict whose origins went back to before capitalism and whose continuation, indeed intensification, appeared likely after capitalism would end. Signs of the new emphasis had appeared in the debate over fascism among Institut members during the war. To Horkheimer, Pollock, Adorno, and Lowenthal, domination was taking increasingly direct, noneconomic forms. The capitalist mode of exploitation was now seen in a larger context as the specific, historical form of domination characteristic of the bourgeois era of Western history. State capitalism and the authoritarian state spelled the end, or at least the radical transformation, of that epoch. Domination, they argued, was now more direct and virulent without the mediations characteristic of bourgeois society. It was in a sense the revenge of nature for the cruelty and exploitation that Western man had visited upon it for generations.

With hindsight, it is possible to see intimations of this theme in numerous places in the Institut's earlier work,[5] although in a secondary role. Adorno had employed it in his study of Kierkegaard [6] as well as in certain of his pre-Institut writings on music.[7] Several of the aphorisms in *Dämmerung*[8] had attacked cruelty to animals and the ascetic premises of the work ethic in a way that anticipated the *Dialectic.* Lowenthal had mentioned the liberal notion of the domination of nature while criticizing Knut Hamsun's distorted protest against it.[9] Fromm's discussion of matriarchal culture contained explicit misgivings about the domination over women in patriarchal society, which was facilitated by the equation of womanhood with natural irrationality.[10]

Perhaps most clearly, this motif surfaced in Horkheimer's *Habilitationsschrift, The Origins of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History.*[11] Here, in fact, Horkheimer directly related the Renaissance view of science and technology to political domination. The new conception of the natural world as a field for human manipulation and control, he argued, corresponded to a similar notion of man himself as an object of domination. The clearest exponent of this view in his eyes was Machiavelli, whose political instrumentalism was used in the service of the rising bourgeois state. Underlying Machiavelli's politics, Horkheimer maintained, was the undialectical separation of man from nature and the hypostatization of the distinction. In fact, he argued against Machiavelli, "nature" was dependent on man in two ways: civilization changes it and man's concept of what it is itself changes. Thus history and nature were not irreconcilably opposed.

They were, however, not entirely identical. Hobbes and later Enlightenment thinkers had assimilated man to nature in a manner that made man into an object, just as nature had been objectified in the new science. In their eyes, both man and nature were no more than machines. As a result, the assumption that nature repeated itself eternally was projected onto man, whose historical capacity for development, so closely bound to his subjectivity, was denied. For all its progressive intentions, this "scientific" view of man implied the eternal return of the present.

This was not the case, however, with the figure Horkheimer had chosen to end his study of early modern philosophies of history: Giambattista Vico. Vico's attack on Cartesian metaphysics and the growing idolatry of mathematics set him apart from his contemporaries. So too did his insight that man could know history better than the natural world because man was history's maker. Vico had also transcended the limitations of the Enlightenment interpretation of the origins of myths, which he saw less as priestly tricks than as the projection of human needs onto nature. In so arguing, Vico had anticipated the later Marxist view of ideology. Thus, despite his cyclical theory of the rise and fall of civilizations, which was similar to Machiavelli's, he was unique in seeing that human activity was the key to understanding historical development. Vico had understood that *praxis* and the domination of nature were not the same. Although he separated man and nature, he did so in a way that avoided placing one above the other. By insisting on the subjectivity of man, he preserved the potentiality of the subjectivity of nature.

In his subsequent writings Horkheimer spent little time with Vico, but the critique of the Enlightenment made by the Italian theorist was one he continued to share. In his essays in the *Zeitschrift* he frequently castigated the legacy of Cartesian dualism in Western thought. The stress on nonidentity in Critical Theory never meant the absolute separation of subject and object. Such a separation, the Frankfurt School held, was connected to the needs of the rising capitalist order. "Since Descartes," Horkheimer wrote in "Reason and Self-Preservation," "bourgeois philosophy has been a single attempt to make knowledge serve the dominant means of production, broken through only by Hegel and his kind." [12] Before the war, this type of connection between substructure and superstructure was a frequent feature of the Frankfurt School's work. But even then, the precise relationship was never made clear.[13] This was especially difficult to do because at different times, materialist rationalists like Hobbes, empiricists like Hume; and idealists like Kant were all seen to serve the capitalist system in one way or another. By the mid-forties, the traditional Marxist theory of ideology was even more tenuously applied in the Institut's work. As we have already noted, the chapter on anti-Semitism in the *Dialectic* discussed its precapitalist, archaic roots in a way that Marx would have rejected. In fact, the notion of the Enlightenment underwent a basic change in the forties. Instead of being the cultural correlate of the ascending bourgeoisie, it was expanded to include the entire spectrum of Western thought. "Enlightenment here is identical with bourgeois thought, nay, thought in general, since there is no other thought properly speaking than in cities," Horkheimer wrote Lowenthal in 1942.[14] In *Eclipse of Reason* he went so far as to say that "this mentality of man as the master [which was the essence of the Enlightenment view] can be traced back to the first chapters of Genesis." [15]

Thus, although Horkheimer and Adorno still used language reminiscent of Marxism — such terms as the "exchange principle"[16] played a key role in their analysis — they no longer sought answers to cultural questions in the material substructure of society. In fact, their analysis of the exchange principle as a key to understanding Western society was as reminiscent of Nietzsche's discussion in the *Genealogy of Morals*[17] as of Marx's in *Capital.*

Moreover, not only did the Frankfurt School leave the vestiges of an orthodox Marxist theory of ideology behind, it also implicitly put Marx in the Enlightenment tradition.[18] Marx's overemphasis on the centrality of labor as man's mode of self-realization, which Horkheimer had questioned as early as *Dämmerung*, was the primary reason for this argument. Implicit in the reduction of man to an *animal laborans,*[19] he charged, was the reification of nature as a field for human exploitation. If Marx had his way, the entire world would be turned into a "giant workhouse."[20] In fact, the repressive technological nightmares perpetrated by his self-proclaimed followers in the twentieth century could not be entirely dissociated from the inherent logic of Marx's own work.

Marx of course was by no means the major target of the *Dialectic.* Horkheimer and Adorno were far more ambitious. The entire Enlightenment tradition, that process of allegedly liberating demystification that Max Weber had called *die Entzauberung der Welt* (the disenchantment of the world), was their real target. Here they followed Lukács's lead in *History and Class Consciousness*, where Weber's notion of rationalization was given a greater critical edge by being connected to the concept of reification.[21] Horkheimer had in fact always been an interested reader of Weber. In "Reason and Self-Preservation" he adopted the basic analysis of Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* for his own purposes. "Protestantism," he wrote, "was the strongest force in the extension of cold, rational individuality. . . . In the place of work for the sake of salvation appeared work for work's sake, profit for profit's sake; the entire world became simply material. . . . From Leonardo to Henry Ford, there was no other path than through religious introversion."[22] Calvin's theological irrationalism, he charged, contained "the cunning of technocratic reason."[23]

Yet whereas Weber faced the process with stoic resignation, the Frankfurt School still held out the hope for a break in the continuum of history. This was more apparent in the early years of the forties — once again "Authoritarian State" should be mentioned as its high-water mark — but it was not totally absent after the war. Perhaps the major source of this guarded optimism was the residual belief in the ultimate validity of *Vernunft* that remained in Critical Theory. *Vernunft*, as noted earlier, meant the reconciliation of contradictions, including the one that split man and nature. Despite their distrust of absolute identity theories, Horkheimer and his colleagues stressed the importance of "objective reason" as an antidote to the one-sided ascendency of instrumentalized "subjective reason." "The two concepts of reason," Horkheimer wrote,[24] "do not represent two separate and independent ways of the mind, although their opposition expresses antinomy. The task of philosophy is not stubbornly to play the one against the other, but to foster a mutual critique and thus, if possible, to prepare in the intellectual realm the reconciliation of the two in reality."

This was a hope that Weber, with his neo-Kantian skepticism about the irreconcilability of practical and theoretical reason, could not hold. Although recognizing the replacement of what he called "substantive" reason by its formal counterpart, Weber was unable to entertain the possibility of its restoration. The "rationalization" of the modern world was meant solely in a nonsubstantive sense. Weber, unlike some of his more romantic contemporaries, did not hope to turn the clock back, but it was clear that he greeted the world's disenchantment with little enthusiasm.

Nor, of course, did the Frankfurt School. In fact, they were anxious to point out how little the world had really become "rational." Reason, as the title of Horkheimer's book indicated, was very much in eclipse. In fact, the Enlightenment, for all its claims to have surpassed mythopoeic confusion by the introduction of rational analysis, had itself fallen a victim to a new myth. This was one of the major themes of the *Dialectic.* At the root of the Enlightenment's program of domination, Horkheimer and Adorno charged, was a secularized version of the religious belief that God controlled the world. As a result, the human subject confronted the natural object as an inferior, external other. At least primitive animism, for all its lack of self-consciousness, had expressed an awareness of the interpenetration of the two spheres. This was totally lost in Enlightenment thought, where the world was seen as composed of lifeless, fungible atoms: "Animism had spiritualized objects; industrialism objectified spirits."[25]

Conceptual thinking, at least in the Hegelian sense, had preserved the primitive sensitivity to the mediations between subject and object. The German word *Begriff* (concept) was connected with the verb *greifen* (to grasp). Thus, *Begriffe* were concepts that had a complete grasp of their content, including negative as well as positive moments. In fact, one of the major distinctions between men and animals was the ability of the former to think conceptually, while the latter could not go beyond immediate sense perceptions. Man's sense of selfhood, of identity through time, was the product of his conceptual powers, which embraced potentiality as well as actuality. The major epistemological tendency of the Enlightenment, however, was the replacement of concepts by formulae, which failed to go beyond nondialectical immediacy. "Concepts in the face of the Enlightenment," Horkheimer and Adorno wrote, "are like *rentiers* in the face of industrial trusts: neither can feel themselves secure." [26] Moreover, the Enlightenment's overemphasis on logical formalism and its assumption that all true thought tended towards the condition of mathematics meant that the static repetition of mythic time had been retained, thwarting the dynamic possibility of historical development.

What was especially disastrous was the effect of the Enlightenment domination of nature on the interactions of men. In developing this argument, Horkheimer and Adorno continued the train of thought expressed in Marcuse's article, "The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State." [27] Totalitarianism was less the repudiation of liberalism and the values of the Enlightenment than the working out of their inherent dynamic. The exchange principle underlying the Enlightenment notion of nature as fungible atoms was paralleled in the increasing atomization of modern man, a process that culminated in the repressive equality of totalitarianism. The instrumental manipulation of nature by man led inevitably to the concomitant relationship among men. The unbridgeable distance between subject and object in the Enlightenment world view corresponded to the relative status of rulers and ruled in the modern authoritarian states. The objectification of the world had produced a similar effect in human relations. As Marx noted, although restricting it to an effect of capitalism, the dead past had come to rule over the living present.

All of these changes were reflected in the most basic of cultural creations, language. As noted earlier, Walter Benjamin had always been keenly interested in the theological dimensions of speech.[28] At the root of his theory of language was the belief that the world was created by the Word of God. To Benjamin, "In the beginning was the Word" meant that God's act of creation consisted in part of the bestowing of names. These names were of course perfectly expressive of their objects. However, man, created as he was in God's image, also had the unique gift of name-giving. But his names and God's were not the same. As a result, there developed a chasm between name and thing, and the absolute adequacy of divine speech was lost. To Benjamin, formal logic was the barrier that separated the language of Paradise from its human counterpart. Man tended to overname things by abstractions and generalizations. It was in fact "the task of the translator to release in his own language that pure language which is under the spell of another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of that work." [29] Similarly, the function of the cultural critic was the recovery of the lost dimension of God's speech by hermeneutically decoding man's various inferior approximations.

Benjamin's quest for a pure language had its roots, as we have noted before, in his immersion in Jewish mysticism. It perhaps also reflected the influence of French symbolist poetry, which he knew well. In Benjamin's essay on translation, Mallarmé was quoted as saying that "the diversity of idioms on earth prevents everybody from uttering the words which otherwise, at one single stroke, would materialize as truth." [30] And finally, as some commentators have argued,[31] the subterranean residue of Swabian Pietism on the German idealist tradition may have had an effect on his linguistic theories. Whatever the origins, it is important to understand that Benjamin was far more interested in words than in sentence structure as the divine text, a fact that makes it hard to call him a "structuralist *avant la lettre*," [32] as he has sometimes been labeled.

Adorno and Horkheimer, although eschewing the consciously theological underpinnings of Benjamin's theory of language, did accept the notion that "pure" speech had been corrupted.[33] "Philosophy," Horkheimer wrote in *Eclipse of Reason*, "is the conscious effort to knit all our knowledge and insight into a linguistic structure in which all things are called by their right names." [34] The concept of truth in every genuine philosophy, he continued, is "the adequation of name and things." [35] Once again, the reconciliation theme of *Vernunft* was at the root of Critical Theory's utopian impulse.

By stressing it in their works in the forties, however, Horkheimer and Adorno were not abandoning that refusal to name or describe the "other," which as we have seen was one of the central premises of Critical Theory from the start. In fact, their reluctance to do so was consistent with the Jewish taboo against uttering the sacred. Jews do not call God by his right name because to do so would be premature; the messianic age has not yet arrived. Similarly, the Frankfurt School's unwillingness to outline a utopian vision reflected its members' conviction that true reconciliation could never be achieved by philosophy alone. As Marx had argued, the "realm of freedom" could not be envisaged by men who were still unfree. Until social conditions drastically altered, philosophy had a limited role to play: "inasmuch as subject and object, word and thing, cannot be integrated under present conditions, we are driven by the principle of negation to attempt to salvage relative truths from the wreckage of false ultimates."[36] Adorno, in fact, had taken Benjamin to task for his theological attempt to call things by their right names, as a combination of magic and positivism.[37] In the chapter on the culture industry in the *Dialectic*, he and Horkheimer used the same combination of apparent opposites to describe the ideological, instrumental language produced by mass culture.[38] Negation rather than the premature search for resolutions was the real refuge of truth.

In fact, the greatest failing of the Enlightenment mentality was not its inability to create social conditions in which name and thing might be legitimately united, but rather its systematic elimination of negation from language. This was the reason why its substitution of formulae for concepts was ultimately so destructive. The philosophy of the Enlightenment was overwhelmingly nominalist rather than realist; in Benjamin's sense, it recognized only the speech of man, ignoring God's. Man was the sole name-giver, a role commensurate with his domination of nature. Language thus became, to use Marcuse's later term, one-dimensional.[39] Incapable of expressing negation, it could no longer voice the protest of the oppressed. Instead of revealing meanings, speech had become nothing more than a tool of the dominant forces in society.

Anticipations of this decline of language were evident in the cultural document Horkheimer and Adorno chose to study in their first of two excursuses in the *Dialectic*, Homer's *Odyssey*. The trick Odysseus played on Cyclops by calling himself "No-man" was also a denial of his identity, which to the primitive, pre-Enlightened mind of the giant was the same as his name. Ultimately, however, the trick was on Odysseus, since Western man had in fact lost his identity, as language capable of conceptualization and negation had been replaced by language capable only of acting as an instrument of the status quo.

In other ways as well, Homer's epic — or more correctly, half mythic epic, half rational proto-novel — had anticipated the major themes of the Enlightenment. One example was the realization that self-denial and renunciation were the price of subjective rationality. As we have noted in Chapter 2 when discussing Horkheimer's "Egoism and the Movement for Emancipation," Marcuse's "On Hedonism," and other examples of the Institut's earlier work, asceticism in all of its forms was a frequent target of criticism. In the *Dialectic* the critique was extended: "the history of civilization is the history of the introversions of sacrifice; in other words, the history of renunciation." [40] In fact, that initial denial of man's oneness with nature was at the root of all the subsequent inadequacies of civilization. The *Odyssey* abounded in clear examples of the inherent relationship between self-renunciation and self-preservation in Western thought: Odysseus's refusal to eat Lotus or the cattle of Hyperion, his sleeping with Circe only after extracting an oath from her not to transform him into a pig, his tying himself to the mast of his ship to avoid seduction by the song of the Sirens.

This last episode was especially pregnant with symbolic meaning for Horkheimer and Adorno.[41] The ears of Odysseus's sailors were stopped with wax to prevent their hearing the Sirens. Like modern laborers, they repressed gratification in order to continue their toil. Odysseus, on the other hand, was not a worker and thus could hear the song, but under conditions that precluded his response to its temptation. For the privileged, culture still remained "*une promesse de bonheur*" without the possibility of fulfillment. Here Odysseus experienced that separation of the ideal from the material sphere that was characteristic of what the Institut called "affirmative culture."

Even more fundamentally, Odysseus's version of rationality was an ominous adumbration of things to come. In struggling against the mythic domination of fate, he was forced to deny his oneness with the totality. By necessity, he had to develop a particularist, subjective rationality to insure his self-preservation. Like Robinson Crusoe, he was an atomized, isolated individual living by his wits in the face of a hostile environment. His rationality was thus based on trickery and instrumentality. To Horkheimer and Adorno, Odysseus was the prototype of that paragon of Enlightenment values, modern "economic man." His treacherous journey anticipated the bourgeois ideology of risk as the moral justification of profits. Even his marriage to Penelope involved the exchange principle — her fidelity and the renunciation of her suitors during his absence in exchange for his return.

Still, despite the important prefigurations of the Enlightenment in Homer's epic, it also contained a strong element of homesickness, of the desire for reconciliation. The home to which Odysseus sought to return, however, was still alienated from nature, whereas true homesickness was justified, as Novalis had known, only when "home" meant nature. In the next excursus in the *Dialectic*, "Juliette, or Enlightenment and Morals," Horkheimer and Adorno examined distorted "returns" to nature, which ran like an undercurrent through the Enlightenment. Here return often meant the revenge of brutalized nature, a phenomenon that culminated in the barbarism of the twentieth century. The Institut's earlier work on fascist pseudo-naturalism — Lowenthal's incisive essay on Knut Hamsun in particular — provided a backdrop for the discussion.

Once again, Horkheimer and Adorno stressed the continuity between bourgeois liberalism, in this case symbolized by Kant, and totalitarianism, here prefigured by de Sade and, to some extent, Nietzsche. Kant's effort to ground ethics solely in practical rationality, they argued, was ultimately a failure. The Enlightenment's treatment of nature, and by extension of men, as objects was fundamentally in accord with the extreme formalism of the categorical imperative, despite Kant's injunction to consider men as ends rather than means. Carried to its logical extreme, calculating, instrumental, formal rationality led to the horrors of twentieth-century barbarism. De Sade was one of the way-stations along the route. His *Histoire de Juliette* was the model of functional rationality — no organ left idle, no orifice unplugged. "Juliette makes science her credo. . . . She operates with semantics and logical syntax like the most modern positivism; but unlike the employees of the most recent administration who direct their linguistic criticism predominantly against thought and philosophy, she is a daughter of the Enlightenment struggle against religion."[42] De Sade's other works, such as the *One Hundred Twenty Days of Sodom*, were the cynical, reverse image of Kant's architectonic system. Others, like *Justine*, were the Homeric epic with the last vestiges of mythology removed. In so ruthlessly separating the spiritual from the corporeal side of love, de Sade was merely working out the implications of Cartesian dualism. Moreover, implicit in his cruel subjugation of women was the characteristic Enlightenment mastery of nature.[43] Women, reduced to their biological function alone, were robbed of subjectivity. The Church's cult of the Virgin, which was a partial concession to matriarchal warmth and reconciliation, was ultimately a failure. The witch trials of the early modern period were far more symbolic of the Enlightenment's implicit attitude towards women, despite its outward support for their emancipation. De Sade's blatant brutality was merely the most obvious example of what was a far more pervasive phenomenon. In fact, the Enlightenment's sadism towards the "weaker sex" anticipated the later destruction of the Jews — both women and Jews were identified with nature as objects of domination.

Nietzsche's will-to-power, no less than Kant's categorical imperative, foreshadowed this development by positing man's independence from external forces. His anthropocentric hubris was also at the root of Kant's notion of "maturity," which was one of the prime goals of the Enlightenment as Kant understood it. Man as the measure of all things inherently meant man as the master of nature. It was the overemphasis on man's autonomy that paradoxically led to man's submission, as the fate of nature became man's own. Fascism, in fact, used the rebellion of suppressed nature against human domination for the sinister purposes of that very domination.[44] Mastery in one direction might well turn in the opposite direction; the true "return" to nature was very different from fascist pseudo-naturalism.

In de-emphasizing the total autonomy of man, it might be added parenthetically, Horkheimer and Adorno were being faithful to that refusal to define a positive anthropology which characterized Critical Theory from the beginning. Such a project, they seemed to be saying, implied an acceptance of man's centrality, which in turn denigrated the natural world. Critical Theory, for all its insistence on a standard against which the irrationalities of the world might be measured, was not really a radical humanism at heart.[45] Horkheimer's interest in religion, which surfaced in later years, was thus not as fundamental a departure from the premises of his earlier work as might appear at first glance.

In the remainder of *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno considered the working out of the Enlightenment ethos in the culture industry and in modern anti-Semitism, both of which have been discussed in previous chapters. At the end of the book they included a number of aphorisms, on subjects as disparate as the underground history of the body and the theory of ghosts. Throughout, as we have had occasion to note several times, the tone was pessimistic and the prognosis bleak. The alienation of man from nature so central to the current crisis of Western civilization seemed an almost irreversible trend. In an aphorism devoted to the philosophy of history, Horkheimer and Adorno explicitly rejected the optimistic premises of Christianity, Hegelian idealism, and historical materialism. Hope for better conditions, if not entirely illusory, rested less in the guarantee of their attainment than in the determinate negation of the existing. There was, however, no distinct *praxis* suggested by reason that might help in the struggle.[46]

In fact, the Frankfurt School increasingly treated any attempt to realize the promises of philosophy as instrumentalization. In an aphorism on propaganda, Horkheimer and Adorno excoriated the instrumental use of philosophy and language to bring about social change. In *Eclipse of Reason* Horkheimer made a similar point: "Is activism, then, especially political activism, the sole means of fulfillment, as just defined? I hesitate to say so. The age needs no added stimulus to action. Philosophy must not be turned into propaganda, even for the best possible purpose." [47]

As a result, programmatic advice for methods to change society was not very evident in any of the Frankfurt School's work in the forties. (Not that it had been before, but at least the call to *praxis* was a frequent element in the Institut's earlier work.) Reconciliation with nature was the obvious goal, but what this meant precisely was never fully spelled out. What it clearly did not mean, of course, was the submission of man to hypostatized natural forces. The Frankfurt School did not wish to revive Engels's crude dialectic of nature. Nor did its members want to succumb to the right-wing version of the apotheosis of nature, which Lowenthal had so devastatingly unmasked in his essay on Knut Hamsun. And finally, they sought to distinguish themselves from those all-too-frequent critiques of the Enlightenment running through German intellectual history, which were often little more than a nostalgic yearning for an idealized "state of nature."

Nature, Horkheimer and Adorno made clear, was in itself neither good nor bad. Moreover, a complete reconciliation with nature in the sense of total identity could only mean a regression to a state of unmediated stasis. Critical Theory continued to stress nonidentity in a way that precluded the reduction of subject to object and vice versa. It was on this point that its creators differed with Benjamin and Ernst Bloch, whose philosophy of hope spoke of the resurrection of a natural subject in a manner that seemed to obliterate the distinction between subject and object.[48] Not in the unity of object and perception, Horkheimer and Adorno argued in their discussion of projection, but in the reflective opposition between them was the utopia of reconciliation preserved.[49] Elsewhere, they made it clear that it was the *memory* of nature, rather than nature itself, that was the enemy of domination.[50]

Memory, in fact, played a key role in the Frankfurt School's understanding of the crisis of modern civilization. Here the Freudian component of Critical Theory came to the fore.[51] One of the greatest costs of progress, Horkheimer and Adorno wrote in one of their aphorisms, was the repression of the pain and suffering caused by the mastery of nature. Nature was to be understood not merely as something external to man, but also as an internal reality. "All reification," they pointed out, "is a forgetting." [52] As noted earlier, the search for a liberated future in the integrated recapture of the past had been one of the major themes of Walter Benjamin's work. His theory of experience and concern for the memorabilia of childhood [53] were reflections of this interest. In fact, it was in a letter to Benjamin written in 1940 that Adorno first used the phrase "All reification is a forgetting." [54] The stimulus was Benjamin's *Zeitschrift* article on Baudelaire, in which he discussed *Erfahrung* (integrated experience) and the Proustian *mémoire involontaire* (involuntary memory).

The process of emancipation was understood in part as the development of self-consciousness and the resurrection of the lost past. Here of course the Hegelian roots of Critical Theory were apparent. To Hegel, the process of history was the journey of the spirit becoming conscious of its alienated objectifications. Where Horkheimer and Adorno departed from Hegel was in their refusal, first, to hypostatize subjectivity as a transcendent reality above individuals, and, second, to treat it as the sole source of objective reality. The Frankfurt School never reverted to the idealist notion of the world as the creation of consciousness. As Adorno noted in his letter of February 29, 1940, to Benjamin, some forgetting is inevitable, and by extension, some reification. The complete identity of the reflecting subject and the object of his reflection was impossible.[55]

As was to be expected, the Frankfurt School distrusted the anthropocentric impulse it perceived at the core of the idealists' stress on consciousness, even when that consciousness was theoretically "objective." In 1945, Horkheimer returned to Columbia to give a series of lectures on the subject matter of his books. In one of them,[56] he accused classical German philosophy of wanting to overcome the dualism between man and God, a desire that led to the inclusion of the demonic in its systems. This produced theodicies like Leibniz's and Hegel's with their quietistic implications. In all of the classical philosophers' work, the idea of grace was absent, an indication of their inherent hubris. To avoid this, the Frankfurt School implied, the autonomous integrity of the natural object had to be preserved, although not to the extent of ignoring its mediated interaction with the human subject. What Marx had called the "humanization of nature" and the "naturalization of man" [57] was necessary, but not at the cost of obliterating their inherent differences.

What should be understood, of course, is that the Institut's stress in the forties was heavier on the need for reconciliation than on the necessity to maintain the distinctions. Implicit in their program was the ultimate bridging of the gap between natural and social sciences that Dilthey and his followers had done so much to establish in the late nineteenth century. This was a dichotomy, it might be added, that had worked its way into Marxist theory by the 1920's.[58] Lukács had accepted it in his fight against the reduction of Marxism to a natural science by Engels, Kautsky, and their followers in the Second International. The young Marcuse, in his days before joining the Institut, had stressed the unbridgeable distance between history and nature. "The boundary between historicity and nonhistoricity," he wrote in 1930, "is an ontological boundary." [59] Even Horkheimer, in his favorable contrast of Vico to Descartes, had supported the view that the study of man and the study of nature were not precisely the same.

Although never explicitly repudiating this view, the Frankfurt School in the forties did call it into question by attacking the permanence of the distinction between man and nature. This did not mean, of course, a return to a "scientific" view of history — this was left to later Marxists like Louis Althusser[60] and his followers — but it did imply a modification of the strict dichotomy between *Geisteswissenschaften* (cultural sciences) and *Naturwissenschaften* (natural sciences). Talking about the need for a reconciliation of man and nature, albeit one that did not imply identity, jibed poorly with a belief in the "ontological boundary" between historicity and nonhistoricity. However, precisely what this would mean for a future science of man was never fully spelled out in the Institut's writings.

Equally problematical was the psychological level on which the reconciliation was to take place. Here the Frankfurt School introduced a new term into its vocabulary: mimesis. To be sure, imitation as an explanation of social behavior had been a perennial favorite of certain social theorists. Durkheim, for example, had devoted an entire chapter of his *Suicide* to demolishing such predecessors as Gabriel Tarde for their use of mimesis.[61] Freud in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* also discussed Tarde's work, but subsumed imitation under the more general category of "suggestion," which Le Bon had employed.[62] The use to which it was put by these theorists, however, was primarily as an explanation for certain types of group behavior, especially mass or crowd behavior. The Institut also used mimesis for this purpose, but it developed the concept in another context as well.

In 1941, in the Institut's prospectus for a project on anti-Semitism, the importance of childhood mimesis was introduced, to refute Nazi theories of hereditary racial characteristics.[63] In his later lectures at Columbia and in *Eclipse of Reason*, Horkheimer expanded on this initial suggestion. Imitation, he argued, was one of the primary means of learning during early childhood. Subsequent socialization, however, taught the child to forego imitation in favor of rational, goal-directed behavior. A phylogenetic correlate of this ontogenetic pattern was one of the central patterns of the Enlightenment. Western "civilization" began with mimesis, but ultimately transcended it. "Conscious adaptation and eventually domination replace the various forms of mimesis. The progress of science is the theoretical manifestation of this change: the formula supplants the image, the calculating machine the ritual dances. To adapt oneself means to make oneself like the world of objects for the sake of self-preservation." [64] Mimesis, however, was not fully overcome in Western civilization. "If the final renunciation of the mimetic impulse," Horkheimer warned,

> does not promise to lead to the fulfillment of man's potentialities, this impulse will always lie in wait, ready to break out as a destructive force. That is, if there is no other norm than the status quo, if all the hope of happiness that reason can offer is that it preserves the existing as it is and even increases its pressure, the mimetic impulse is never really overcome. Men revert to it in a regressive and distorted form.[65]

Modern persecutors often mimic the pathetic gestures of their victims; demagogues frequently appear like caricatures of their targets.[66] Even the less virulent forms of mass culture express a certain sadistic element in their repetition of the status quo, an observation made by Adorno in his study of jazz.

Mimesis, however, was not in itself a source of evil. On the contrary, Horkheimer implied, it was healthy when it meant the imitation of the life-affirming aspects of nature, that is, maternal warmth and protection. It was the task of philosophy, he suggested in one of his Columbia lectures,[67] to reawaken the memory of childhood mimesis, which had been obscured by later socialization. The decline of the family must therefore be reversed, or at least the child's imitative impulse, which had become fixated on extra-familial agencies, must be restored to its original object in the family. This goal, it might be added, was closely connected with the unity of word and thing experienced in pure language. As Horkheimer argued, "Language reflects the longings of the oppressed and the plight of nature; it releases the mimetic impulse. The transformation of this impulse into the universal medium of language rather than into destructive action means that potentially nihilistic energies work for reconciliation." [68] Ontogenetically, this condition existed in the consciousness of the two-year-old child to whom all nouns, in a sense, were proper nouns.

If the goal was the restitution of this stage of human development, or at least certain of its better characteristics, what would happen to the ego, which was developed, according to Freud, at a later date? In their speculative works in the forties, Horkheimer and Adorno assumed a very different tone when discussing the ego from that evident in the *Studies in Prejudice*. Now, instead of stressing the need for an integrated ego to combat the projections of ego-alien traits onto minority scapegoats, they connected the development of the ego with the domination of nature. In *Eclipse of Reason*, Horkheimer contended:

> As the principle of the self endeavoring to win in the fight against nature in general, against other people in particular, and against its own impulses, the ego is felt to be related to the functions of domination, command, and organization. . . . Its dominance is patent in the patriarchal epoch. . . . The history of Western civilization could be written in terms of the growth of the ego as the underling subliminates, that is, internalizes, the commands of his master who has preceded him in self-discipline. . . . At no time has the notion of the ego shed the blemishes of its origin in the system of social domination.[69]

Moreover, the struggle of the subjectively rational ego against nature, both external and internal, had been completely counterproductive in the end. "The moral is plain," Horkheimer concluded; "the apotheosis of the ego and the principle of self-preservation as such culminate in the utter insecurity of the individual, in his complete negation." [70]

Here the ego was meant partly in philosophical terms — the *ego cogito* from Descartes to Husserl had been a target of the Institut from the beginning[71] — but it clearly had psychological significance as well. Marcuse's later concept of the "performance principle" as the specific reality principle of Western society was rooted in this earlier critique of the ego as tool of domination. In *Eros and Civilization*, however, he attempted to outline the contours of a new reality principle, whereas Horkheimer and Adorno were content to undermine the traditional ego without offering a fully worked out alternative, an omission that would worry later Frankfurt School adherents like Jürgen Habermas.[72]

Despite the potentially primitivist implications of their arguments, Horkheimer and Adorno were careful to reject anything implying a return to natural simplicity. Nostalgia, as we have seen, was castigated when it appeared among conservative cultural critics; similarly, nostalgia for the lost youth of mankind was not really the Frankfurt School's dominant sentiment. This was clearly demonstrated in Horkheimer's complicated discussion of the relationship between reason and nature in *Eclipse of Reason*. As we have frequently observed, the Institut was highly critical of what passed for reason in the modern world. Instrumental, subjective, manipulative reason, its members argued, was the handmaiden of technological domination. Without rational goals, all interaction was eventually reduced to power relationships. The disenchantment of the world had gone too far, and reason itself had been gutted of its original content.

In so arguing, of course, Horkheimer and his colleagues were by no means alone. In fact, they were at one with a wide variety of thinkers with whom they were rarely in agreement on other issues. As Fritz Ringer has shown, the academic "mandarins" of the Weimar years were obsessed with the rationalization of the world and its consequences.[73] Max Scheler, for example, had criticized the rational domination of nature as early as 1926.[74] Similar sentiments flowed from the pen of another antagonist, Martin Heidegger, whose early influence on Marcuse has often been cited as responsible for the antitechnological bias allegedly to be found in his former student's work.[75] In the forties, conservative writers from totally different traditions also launched heated attacks against instrumental rationality and its effects. Michael Oakeshott's influential essay "Rationalism in Politics" [76] appeared in the same year as *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* and *Eclipse of Reason.*

What distanced the Frankfurt School from some of these writers was, as we have seen, its members' insistence on the varieties of reason, one of which might avoid the clash with nature. What distinguished their view from others was their refusal to accept the possibility that this type of substantive reason might be immediately realized in social terms. Nonantagonistic reason was always a hope, but one whose existence, albeit through negation of the status quo, prevented the uncritical apotheosis of nature. In *Eclipse of Reason* Horkheimer devoted a chapter to a demonstration of the intimate relationship that existed between alleged "returns" to nature and instrumental rationality. Here the argument was similar to that developed in the discussion of de Sade in the *Dialectic.* To Horkheimer,

> the revolt of natural man — in the sense of the backward strata of the population — against the growth of rationality has actually furthered the formalization of reason, and has served to fetter rather than to free nature. In this light, we might describe fascism as a satanic synthesis of reason and nature — the very opposite of that reconciliation of the two poles that philosophy has always dreamed of.[77]

Symptomatic of the connection between the revolt of nature and domination was Darwinism, at least in its social guise. To Horkheimer, Social Darwinism had reversed the potential for reconciliation inherent in Darwin's initial insight into man's oneness with nature. Instead, "the concept of the survival of the fittest was merely the translation of the concepts of formalized reason into the vernacular of natural history." [78] Not surprisingly, he pointed to pragmatism, one of his consistent *bêtes noires*, as an offshoot of Darwinism.[79] Benjamin in his article on Eduard Fuchs had already established the relationship between Darwinian evolutionism and the shallow optimism of Bernsteinian socialists.[80] This type of reconciliation of reason and nature, which really reduced the former to an organ of the latter, was no solution. Regression to pre-Enlightenment "naturalism" was an obvious fallacy with sinister results. "The sole way of assisting nature," Horkheimer suggested, "is to unshackle its seeming opposite, independent thought." [81]

"Independent thought," of course, did not mean a return to pre-Marxist notions of totally autonomous speculation. In *Eclipse of Reason* Horkheimer explicitly rejected attempts to revive earlier metaphysical systems. Neo-Thomism, which in the late forties was enjoying an upsurge of interest, served as the major target of his attack. The neo-Thomist search for absolute dogmas he dismissed as an attempt to overcome relativism by fiat. Its advocates' desire to make Aquinas's teachings relevant in the modern world he ridiculed as conformist and affirmative. To Horkheimer, neo-Thomism was fundamentally akin to pragmatism in its neglect of negation. "The failure of Thomism," he charged, "lies in its ready acquiescence to pragmatic aims rather than in its lack of practicability. When a doctrine hypostatizes an isolated principle that excludes negation, it is paradoxically predisposing itself to conformism." [82] The innate defect of Thomism, as of all positivist systems, "lies in its making truth and goodness identical with reality." [83]

Another popular attempt at "independent thought" that appeared after the war was the existentialist movement. Well before its faddish success, the Institut had been antagonistic towards thinkers who would later be considered its leading spokesmen. Adorno's critique of Kierkegaard was the most extensive attack, but Horkheimer had written unsympathetically of Jaspers,[84] and Marcuse, after joining the Institut, had come to criticize Heidegger's work,[85] as well as the political existentialism of Carl Schmitt.[86] After the war, the most important statement of the movement was Sartre's *Being and Nothingness.* When it came to Horkheimer's attention in 1946, he wrote to Lowenthal:

> After having a good taste of Sartre I am deeply convinced that it is our duty to have our book published as soon as possible. Despite my inner resist-

> ance, I have read a great part of Sartre. . . . This is a new kind of philosophical mass literature. . . . From a philosophical point of view, the most amazing phenomenon is indeed the naive reification of dialectical concepts. . . . The dialectical finesse and complexity of thought has been turned into a glittering machinery of metal. Words like "l'être en soi" and "l'être pour soi" function as kinds of pistons. The fetishistic handling of categories appears even in the form of printing, with its enervating and intolerable use of italics. All the concepts are *termini technici* in the literal sense of the word.[87]

In *Eclipse of Reason*, however, no mention of existentialism was made. The task of demolition was left to Marcuse in the only article he published during his tenure with the State Department after the war.[88] Marcuse's assessment of *Being and Nothingness* was scarcely less critical than Horkheimer's. In several ways, his arguments anticipated Sartre's own self-criticism of later years.[89] To Marcuse, Sartre had erroneously made absurdity into an ontological rather than a historical condition. As a result, he fell back into an idealistic internalization of freedom as something opposed to the outside, heteronomous world. Despite his avowed revolutionary intentions, his politics and his philosophy were totally at odds. By locating freedom in the *pour-soi* (being-for-itself, a version of Hegel's *für-sich*) and denying that the *pour-soi* could become *en-soi* (being-in-itself, or *an-sich*), Sartre severed subjectivity from objectivity in a way that denied reconciliation even as a utopian possibility. Moreover, by overemphasizing the freedom of the subject and ignoring the constraints produced by his historical condition, Sartre had become an unwitting apologist for the status quo. Arguing as Sartre did that men chose their fate, even if it was a horrible one, was monstrous:

> If philosophy, by virtue of its existential-ontological concepts of man or freedom, is capable of demonstrating that the persecuted Jew and the victim of the executioner are and remain absolutely free and masters of a self-responsible choice, then these philosophical concepts have declined to the level of a mere ideology which offers itself as a most handy justification for the persecutors and executioners.[90]

To Marcuse, the entire project of an "existentialist" philosophy without an a priori idea of essence was impossible. This Sartre's own work demonstrated against its intentions: the *pour-soi*, with its perfect freedom, was a normative description of man in his generic state, not in his empirical condition. By absorbing negation into this affirmative view of human nature, Sartre had lost the dialectical tension of essentialist philosophies. In fact, his concept of the *pour-soi* as constant action and self-creation had a specifically affirmative function in bourgeois society. "Beyond the nihilistic language of existentialism," Marcuse charged, "lurks the ideology of free competition, free initiative, and equal opportunity."[91] Sartre's subject, which resembled Stirner's anarchistic ego, was very much in the Enlightenment tradition of the domination of nature.[92]

The only element of *Being and Nothingness* to which Marcuse gave grudging approval was Sartre's discussion of sexuality. As Paul Robinson has pointed out,[93] Marcuse's interest in this question was a way-station to his later involvement with Freud. It also referred to arguments he had made a decade before in the *Zeitschrift.*[94] What struck Marcuse in Sartre's treatment of sexuality was the "negation of the negation" implicit in sexual desire, which when carried to an extreme negated the activity of the *pour-soi.* In sexuality, the body tended to become a completely reified, passive object controlled solely by the pleasure principle rather than by the dominant reality principle. As early as 1937 Marcuse had written:

> when the body has completely become an object, a beautiful thing, it can foreshadow a new happiness. In suffering the most extreme reification man triumphs over reification. The artistry of the beautiful body, its effortless agility and relaxation, which can be displayed today only in the circus, vaudeville, and burlesque, herald the joy to which men will attain in being liberated from the ideal, once mankind, having become a true subject, succeeds in the mastery of matter.[95]

Although no longer talking in terms of the "mastery of matter," Marcuse continued to feel that the passive freedom of total sexual reification negated the existentialist reduction of freedom to the activity of the aggressive *pour-soi.* This, in fact, offered greater insight into the potential transformation of society than Sartre's clumsy attempts to derive a radical politics from his philosophy.[96] The negation of the *pour-soi* — which seemed to operate according to what Marcuse would later call "the performance principle"[97] — suggested a kind of reconciliation with nature, although it was of course only a partial step in that direction. Complete reification meant the negation not only of the dominating aspects of the ego, but also its non-dominating ones as well. This was a reality that concerned Horkheimer and Adorno in their own treatment of the reification of the body in *Dialectic of the Enlightenment.*[98]

It might be argued that the Frankfurt School's most pressing fear in the postwar era was the obliteration of just those elements of subjectivity. As we have seen in looking at the Institut's treatment of mass culture and its empirical work on authoritarian personalities, the existence of genuine individuality was declining at an alarming rate. The Institut did not, of course, wish to revive the old bourgeois individual with his dominating ego, but it did feel that in some ways his replacement by manipulated mass men meant a loss of freedom. As Adorno had written to Benjamin,[99] the "individual" was a *Durchgangsinstrument*, an instrument of passage, which could not be mythicized away, but had to be preserved in a higher synthesis instead. The bourgeois individual, defined as he was in opposition to the totality, was not fully free. As we have noted on previous occasions, the goal of positive freedom implicitly upheld by the Frankfurt School was grounded in the unification of particular and universal interests. But, on the other hand, negative freedom was a moment in that dialectical totality. The bourgeois subject was thus both free and unfree at the same time. In the forced identity of mass man with the social totality, however, there was no freedom at all. At least earlier bourgeois society had contained tangible contradictions that preserved negations of its dominant tendencies. Egoism, it will be recalled, had been defended by Horkheimer for its recognition of the moment of individual happiness preserved in the genuine reconciliation of contradictions. Marcuse had made similar arguments in his qualified defense of hedonistic philosophies.

Now it appeared that the very existence of contradictions, or at least the consciousness of their existence, was in jeopardy, even though capitalism had not been superseded by socialism.[100] In what Marcuse was later to make famous as "one-dimensional" society, the redeeming power of negation was almost totally absent. What was left in its place was a cruel parody of the dream of positive freedom. The Enlightenment, which had sought to liberate man, had ironically served to enslave him with far more effective means than ever before. Without a clear mandate for action, the only course open to those who could still escape the numbing power of the culture industry was to preserve and cultivate the vestiges of negation that still remained. "Philosophical theory itself cannot bring it about that either the barbarizing tendency or the humanistic outlook should prevail in the future," Horkheimer warned. "However, by doing justice to those images and ideas that at given times dominated reality in the role of absolutes — e.g., the idea of the individual as it dominated the bourgeois era — and that have been relegated in the course of history, philosophy can function as a corrective of history, so to speak."[101]

This was the task that Adorno set himself in his most personal and idiosyncratic book, *Minima Moralia*, which was written in bits and pieces throughout the forties and published in 1951. Its fragmented, aphoristic style was no accident: to Adorno negation and the truth it precariously preserved could be expressed only in tentative, incomplete ways. Here Critical Theory's fundamental distrust of systematizing was carried to its extreme. The location of philosophical insight was no longer to be found in abstract, coherent, architectonic systems, as in Hegel's day, but rather in subjective, private reflection. In his introduction, Adorno emphasized how far he thought philosophy had come since Hegel, who in his more generous moments had tolerated aphorisms as "conversation." [102] Hegel, consistently attacking the *für-sich sein* of subjectivity as inadequate, had made one major error. He had hypostatized the bourgeois individual and civil society of his day as irreducible realities. This permitted him to pay as much attention as he did to the totality. Since his time, however, their vulnerability had been amply demonstrated. By the mid-twentieth century the forces of the social totality were so great that subjectivity, bourgeois or otherwise, was in mortal danger. "In the face of totalitarian unity," Adorno wrote, "which cries out for the elimination of differences directly as meaning *[welche die Ausmerzung der Differenz unmittelbar als Sinn ausschreit],* something of the liberating social forces may even have converged in the sphere of the individual. Critical Theory lingers there without a bad conscience." [103] In short, as Adorno wrote in one of his most often quoted epigrams, *Das Ganze ist das Unwahre,*[104] "the whole is the untrue."

Accordingly, the bulk of *Minima Moralia* consisted of oblique distillations of Adorno's own experiences, reflections, as he put it in the book's subtitle, of a "damaged life." As in all of the Frankfurt School's work, traditional philosophical pigeonholes such as epistemology or ethics were transcended. "Intelligence," Adorno wrote elsewhere at about the same time, "is a moral category. The separation of feeling from understanding, which makes it possible for the moron to speak freely and blissfully, hypostatizes the historically created separation of men according to function." [105] Philosophy therefore must return to its original intention: "the teaching of the correct life." [106] Under present conditions, however, it must remain a "melancholy science," rather than a "joyful" one, as Nietzsche had hoped, because of the slim chances for its success. Above all, it must disturb rather than comfort: "the splinter in your eye is the best magnifying glass." [107]

At the end of his effort, in the last aphorism of the book, Adorno showed how far he had come from a belief in the possible realization of the hope for final reconciliation. The terms he chose to use were now self-consciously theological. Philosophy can once again become responsible, he suggested, through the "effort to regard all things as the way they would represent themselves from the standpoint of salvation *[Erlösung]*. Knowledge has no other light than that which shines from salvation on the world; all others exhaust themselves in *post facto* construction and remain a part of technology." [108] Where Adorno drew back, however, was from suggesting that salvation or redemption might be actually achieved. In other words, he denied the possibility of realizing the absolute without at the same time negating the reality of the finite and contingent. Thought, he paradoxically asserted, must comprehend this impossibility for the sake of what was in fact possible: "Against the challenge which emanates from this realization, the question of the reality or unreality of salvation itself is almost immaterial." [109]

Shortly before his death, Benjamin had written that "our image of happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image of redemption. . . . Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a *weak* messianic power." [110] In *Minima Moralia* Adorno seemed to agree with the connection between redemption and happiness, but denied even a weakened messianic power to his age. Positive freedom and the genuine reconciliation it promised, he implied, were perpetually utopian hopes incapable of earthly realization. The negation of the negation, that dream of alienation returning to itself which motivated both Hegel and Marx, must remain frustrated. The dialectic, as the title of one of his subsequent books indicated, could be only negative.[111] Horkheimer's later expression of interest in Schopenhauer confirmed this turn in Critical Theory's focus. When Horkheimer wrote that "to stand up for the temporal against merciless eternity is morality in Schopenhauer's sense," [112] he was merely seconding Adorno's observation in *Minima Moralia* that the demands of the totality could not be met without the destruction of the finite and contingent.

At the same time, of course, the Frankfurt School continued to hold that utopian hopes, although never fully realizable, must be maintained. Paradoxically, only such hopes could prevent history from returning to mythology. As Horkheimer wrote to Lowenthal in 1943 about the Nazis' historical sense:

> Their concept of history boils down to the veneration of monuments. There is no such thing as history without that utopian element which, as you point out, is lacking in them. Fascism, by its very exaltation of the past, is anti-historical. The Nazis' references to history mean only that the powerful must rule and that there is no emancipation from the eternal laws which guide humanity. When they say history, they mean its very opposite: mythology.[113]

In so arguing, the Frankfurt School put itself in a long line of thinkers whose utopian visions were less blueprints for action than sources of critical distance from the gravitational pull of the prevailing reality.[114]

It was this subtle, but crucial, transformation of the Institut's theoretical intentions in the forties that was the major reason for the second discontinuity mentioned earlier. With the shifting of the Institut's emphasis away from class struggle to the conflict between man and nature, the possibility of a historical subject capable of ushering in the revolutionary age disappeared. That imperative for *praxis*, so much a part of what some might call the Institut's heroic period, was no longer an integral part of its thought. Adorno's much quoted remark made shortly before his death in 1969, that "when I made my theoretical model, I could not have guessed that people would try to realize it with Molotov cocktails," [115] was not the lament of a man who had misgauged the practical implications of his thought. It reflected instead a fundamental conclusion of the theory itself: negation could never be truly negated. By *Minima Moralia*, and perhaps before, Adorno had accepted the melancholy reality that "philosophy which once seemed outmoded is now alive because the moment of its realization has been missed." [116]

What type of *praxis* might still be pursued was by no means clear. As Horkheimer had warned in *Eclipse of Reason*, rationality provided no guidelines for political activity. The radicalizing of Critical Theory had increased its distance from what was generally accepted as radical *praxis*. Yet the Frankfurt School never really retreated into liberalism or conservatism as a compelling alternative. Preserving nonidentity and negation seemed to imply liberal pluralism, but the Institut distrusted the reality of competing groups in mass society. In other ways as well, its position was at odds with liberalism, which was very much the child of the Enlightenment. Incremental progress, technical mastery of nature, tolerance as an end in itself, all liberal faiths, were unacceptable to Horkheimer and his colleagues. So too were the irrational premises of a Burkean conservatism, despite the fact that some of its modern exponents, like Michael Oakeshott, attacked instrumental rationalism with similar fervor. Nor were the affirmative bromides of right-wing Hegelian conservatives, with their belief in the inherent rationality of the existing world, very attractive. In fact, Critical Theory was now incapable of suggesting a critical *praxis*. The inherent tension in the concept of positive freedom had become too powerful to ignore. The union of freedom as reason and as self-realizing action was split asunder. The Frankfurt School, following its initial instincts, could only choose reason, even in the muted, negative form in which it might be found in the administered nightmare of the twentieth century. Theory, Horkheimer and the others seemed to be saying, was the only form of *praxis* still open to honest men.[117]

Epilogue

In the spring of 1946, Lowenthal reported to Horkheimer some encouraging news from Germany:

> Josef Maier [a former student of the Institut and the husband of Alice Maier, then the administrative head of the New York branch] wrote in a letter to his wife that the better students and intellectuals in Germany are more interested in getting our writings than in getting food. And you know what that means. He thinks that all the universities would like to have the *Zeitschrift* if they could get it.[1]

The audience for whom the Frankfurt School had so long insisted on writing in German was beginning to materialize. Several months after Maier's letter, the Institut was approached by members of the Frankfurt community, Ministerial Advisor Klingelhöfer, University Rector Hallstein, and Dean Sauermann, with the first concrete offer to return to the city of its origin.[2]

For the time being, Horkheimer was reluctant to respond positively. The *Studies in Prejudice* were not yet completed, and the Institut's commitments in America for the next few years were great enough to postpone an immediate decision. By April, 1947, however, there were signs that Horkheimer had begun to weaken. If there was to be a study of the effects of American antiprejudice programs on Germans, he wrote Lowenthal,[3] a branch in Frankfurt could be useful. Moreover, the Institut might teach American social scientific techniques to German students, thereby combatting the overly speculative bias of traditional German academics. No mention was made at this time of moving the actual center of the Institut back. In fact, possible affiliations with universities in the Los Angeles area were being considered as late as August, 1947.[4]

In the spring of the following year Horkheimer made his first visit to Germany since his hurried departure in 1933. Invited to participate in ceremonies commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the Frankfurt Parliament, he was warmly greeted as the guest of the city and gave a series of well-received lectures at the university. The eagerness of Frankfurt officials to regain some of the city's pre-Nazi intellectual eminence by enticing the Institut back was considerable. And ultimately, their efforts proved successful. With the encouragement of American occupation officials, including High Commissioner John J. McCloy, the city was able to make an offer that Horkheimer found impossible to reject. By September he was determined to return, and wrote Klingelhöfer of his decision, which was quickly accepted. On July 13, 1949, the university chair that had been taken away sixteen years before was restored, with the slight change that it was now in sociology and philosophy rather than social philosophy. With Horkheimer, of course, came the Institut itself with its endowment and library. Its reestablishment, he would later recall,[5] was not to be understood as acceptance of a *Wiedergutmachung* (compensation) by a repentant government, for nothing could make good what Germany had done. It was meant instead as a gesture to honor those Germans who had resisted Hitler by helping the Jews.

Once back in front of German students, Horkheimer's decision was quickly confirmed. "It is amazing," he wrote Lowenthal in February, "how deep and lasting an experience [of the Institut] was created in the minds of many European intellectuals up to 1933. This experience has not been discredited through the period of the Third Reich. It is now our duty to corroborate and deepen it in the future." [6] The eagerness of the students awoke in him an appropriately enthusiastic response. "I have worked literally day and night in the past two months," he wrote in April. "The most beautiful is still the teaching. Even during the vacation, we haven't lost contact with the students." [7] Horkheimer's lecturing virtuosity — Everett Hughes, who was a visiting professor in Frankfurt during those years, remembers him as the finest German speaker he had ever heard [8] — and his personal warmth in seminars quickly won him a sizable student following. Once established, Horkheimer and those who went with him never regretted having chosen the path of resettlement so few other emigrés were to follow.

Why Horkheimer hesitated for several years before making what proved to be so successful a move is not difficult to understand. Men rarely hasten back to a place where they have suffered ostracism and persecution. In addition, the precise status of the Institut after its return was unclear for a considerable time; an attempt to obtain UNESCO sponsorship ultimately foundered in a sea of personal vendettas. Moreover, despite the highly critical tone of the Institut's writings on America, the personal experiences of its members had been generally favorable. From Nicholas Murray Butler in 1934[9] to John Slawson a decade later, the Institut had received support and encouragement from a wide variety of American sources. Like many other refugees, the members of the Frankfurt School were pleasantly surprised by the number of "men of good will" [10] they encountered in the United States. In several instances, they willingly joined governmental service during the war, out of a feeling of solidarity with America's common fight against Hitler. As a result, Horkheimer and the others felt a keen reluctance to sever their ties with the country that had been home for some fifteen years. In fact, Horkheimer agreed to remain in Germany only after being assured that he could retain his naturalized citizenship. Through special legislation sponsored by McCloy and signed into law by President Truman in July, 1952, he was granted a continuation of his American citizenship despite his return to the country of his origin.[11]

What was perhaps even more distressing than the rigors of yet another resettlement was the prospect that not all of the Institut's members would accompany him back to Germany. Of their number, only Adorno was really anxious to leave. In later years, he would explain his desire in these terms:

> The decision to return to Germany was hardly motivated by simple subjective needs, by homesickness, as little as I can deny that. There was also an objective reason. That is language. Not merely because one can never express as exactly in a new language what one means, with all the nuances and the rhythms of the train of thought, as in one's own. Rather, the German language has a special elective affinity *[Wahlverwandtschaft]* to philosophy, and, to be sure, to its speculative moment.[12]

Pollock was also willing to go, largely out of loyalty to Horkheimer and the Institut, rather than dislike for America.

This, however, was not the case with other members of the Institut's inner circle, especially when it became clear that professorships at the university could not be guaranteed. On February 8, 1946, Lowenthal had written to Horkheimer that "I find myself in a funny dialectical position. In 1938, I was the strongest advocate of all of us in advising to dissolve our organizational framework. Today I see clearer than ever the possible risks." But when it came to implementing this sentiment by actually leaving for Germany, Lowenthal was unable to commit himself. His impending marriage to an American, the psychologist Marjorie Fiske, certainly contributed to his reluctance. In 1949 he accepted a position as director of the research division of the Voice of America, thus ending a twenty-three-year tenure with the Institut. Seven years later, he joined the sociology faculty at the Berkeley campus of the University of California.

Marcuse, whose connection with the Institut had grown increasingly tenuous during the forties, chose to remain with the State Department until 1950, when he returned to Columbia as a lecturer in sociology and senior fellow at the Russian Institute. During the next two years he also did research at the Russian Research Center at Harvard, which led to his book *Soviet Marxism*.[13] In 1954 he joined the history of ideas program at Brandeis, remaining for eleven years, during which his underground reputation, based on *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man*, steadily grew. By the time he left Waltham, Massachusetts, for the University of California at San Diego, in 1965, he was on the verge of becoming an internationally celebrated mentor of the nascent New Left.

Otto Kirchheimer also continued to work with the government after the war, first as research analyst in the State Department's Division of Research for Europe and then, from 1950 to 1955, as chief of the division's central European branch. For the next seven years, he was on the graduate faculty of the Institut's old competitor, the New School for Social Research in New York. In 1961 he published his massive work *Political Justice*. In the following year, he joined the government department at Columbia, where he taught until his death in 1965, a few days after his sixtieth birthday. Other former Institut members also found positions at American universities: Neumann at Columbia, Gerhard Meyer at the University of Chicago, and Massing at Rutgers, where Joseph Maier and M. I. Finley also joined the faculty. Kurt Mandelbaum, changing his name to Martin, ultimately became an economist in Manchester, England. Henryk Grossman, as mentioned earlier, did return to Germany, but not with the Institut. He went instead to the Soviet Zone, where he spent several unhappy years in Leipzig until his death in 1950. Gurland also returned to Germany in 1950 to teach at the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, then at the Technische Hochschule in Darmstadt.

Wittfogel's career at this time took an important turn, which merits some comment. In 1947 he had established the Chinese History Project sponsored by the University of Washington and Columbia, which was the final step in his extrication from the Institut. Four years later, during the growing furor over alleged Communist infiltration of governmental and scholarly institutions, he was subpoenaed to appear in front of Senator Pat McCarran's Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.[14] Wittfogel later asserted that he went with great reluctance and that his testimony on August 7, 1951, was his only contribution to the anti-Communist hysteria of those years.[15] The Institut was mentioned solely as the initial contact with the Institute of Pacific Relations, whose infiltration he discussed at some length. Julian Gumperz, who had been cited as a Party member in the testimony of Hede Massing five days earlier, was identified as the intermediary. The only other figure peripherally associated with the Institut whose name appeared in Wittfogel's remarks was M. I. Finley, whose subsequent decision to leave America for England was certainly influenced by the repercussions of Wittfogel's allegations. Finley's move, it might be noted parenthetically, was ultimately to prove a great success, as he was given the chair in Ancient History at Cambridge in the late 1960's.

Wittfogel also introduced a plaintive note into his testimony when he claimed that his scholarly contacts had dried up when he became an avowed anti-Communist. There certainly can be no doubt that his former colleagues at the Institut found his new position anathema, especially because of his personal disclosures about previous political allegiances. They were firmly convinced that his cooperation with the witch hunters went well beyond the one day in front of the McCarran Committee, despite his angry assertions to the contrary. Wherever the truth may lie, Wittfogel became *persona non grata* to the Frankfurt School from that time on, as he did to many other liberally minded academics in this country. Whereas Horkheimer was disappointed about the decisions of certain Institut members to remain in America, he had no regrets about Wittfogel's choice.

The Institut thus returned to Frankfurt with a much diminished staff. Its support, nonetheless, was considerable. In June, 1949, a petition was circulated to urge its reopening. The list of signatories was highly impressive, an indication of the esteem in which the Institut was held by many of its scholarly colleagues. Among the names were Gordon Allport, Raymond Aron, G. D. H. Cole, G. P. Gooch, Morris Ginsberg, Eugen Kogon, Paul Lazarsfeld, Robert Lynd, Talcott Parsons, Paul Tillich, Robert MacIver, and James T. Shotwell. "The function of the revived Frankfurt branch," the petition read in part, "would be two-fold: the planning and conduct of research projects, and perhaps more significant, the instruction of a new generation of German students in modern developments in social science." [16] Financial support came from a number of sources. The McCloy Funds supplied 236,000 Marks, half the necessary total for the reestablishment. The Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung, the guardian of the Institut's endowment, gave all that it had left, which amounted to one-third more, and the rest came from the city of Frankfurt and private donors. Felix Weil, it might be added parenthetically, was no longer able to lend his support, due to the inflation in Argentina.[17]

In August, 1950, with Adorno as assistant director — five years later, he was raised to Horkheimer's level as codirector — the Institut began work in rooms at the *Kuratorium* on the Senckenberganlage and in the salvaged remains of the bombed-out building next door, which had been the Institut's original home.[18] On November 14 of the following year, a new building was dedicated on the same street not far from the site of its predecessor. Alois Geifer, its architect, designed a spare, functional building reminiscent of the *Neue Sachlichkeit* style of Franz Röckle's earlier effort. The distinguished sociologists René König and Leopold von Wiese spoke at the opening ceremony, as did Felix Weil. Appropriately, the music that began the proceedings was by Schönberg. The "Café Max," as the Institut became colloquially known among its new students, was once again fully in operation. The new nickname was a reference not merely to Max Horkheimer, but also to the Institut's prewar reputation as the "Café Marx." The dropping of the "r" symbolized the shift away from radicalism during the Institut's American period. Significantly, among its first tasks was the translation of several of the *Studies in Prejudice* into German. Although the *Zeitschrift* was not revived, the Institut soon began to publish a series of *Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie*, whose first volume was a *Festschrift* for Horkheimer on his sixtieth birthday.[19]

During the first few years back, Horkheimer was occupied largely with the reorganization of the Institut and with academic affairs at the university.[20] In 1950 he was elected dean of the philosophy department and in November of the following year, at the age of fifty-six, was chosen as university rector.[21] Werner Richter, who had been made rector of Bonn a week earlier, was the first naturalized American to become head of a German university; Horkheimer was the second. Perhaps more symbolic still, he was the first Jew to achieve that post after the war. In 1952 he was selected for another twelve-month term. When his tenure ended, he was given the Goethe Prize, the highest honor bestowed by the city of Frankfurt. Seven years later, after his retirement to Switzerland, the city made him an honorary citizen for life.

Horkheimer's ties to America, however, continued to remain strong. The Institut's branch in New York, although inactive through the next two decades, was maintained with Alice Maier as its caretaker. Horkheimer himself served as foreign consultant to the Library of Congress, for which he prepared a *Survey of the Social Sciences in Western Germany*.[22] In 1954, he returned for a short time to the United States to become a part-time faculty member of the University of Chicago, to which he periodically returned for the next five years. Adorno, however, remained in Frankfurt and never returned to America after his brief time with the Hacker Foundation in Los Angeles in 1953. When Horkheimer and Pollock retired in 1958 to the Swiss town of Montagnola, where they built adjoining homes overlooking Lake Lugano, Adorno assumed the directorship of the Institut. Both Horkheimer and Pollock continued to have an active interest in Institut affairs well into the 1960's, even after new men like Rudolf Gunzert, who headed the Institut's statistical wing, and Ludwig von Friedeburg, who directed its empirical work, began to assume more of the administrative duties. Horkheimer also wrote, although at a somewhat slower pace than before. His newer essays were included with Alfred Schmidt's translation of *Eclipse of Reason* in *Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft*, which appeared in 1967. Efforts to persuade him to republish his essays in the *Zeitschrift*, however, met with initial failure. In June, 1965, he wrote a letter to the S. Fischer Verlag explaining his reluctance in terms of the changed circumstances under which he had written the essays; their content, he argued, might well be misunderstood today as a result.[23] But in 1968 he finally relented, and the long-awaited republication took place in two volumes called *Kritische Theorie*. Their appearance was one of the primary stimuli to the interest in the earlier period of the Institut's history among whose results is the present study.

To present more than this highly schematic synopsis of the Institut's history and that of its central member after the return to Germany is not possible now. Similarly, a serious discussion of the extensive corpus of work published by Adorno from the early fifties until his death in the summer of 1969 must await another time.[24] So too must an analysis of Marcuse's influential transmission of the Frankfurt School's work to a new American audience in the 1960's.[25] By limiting ourselves to the period before 1950, we regrettably must neglect the time of the Institut's greatest impact. We have instead chosen to concentrate on the years of its highest creativity, which were lived in exile in America.

In fact, it might be argued that one of the conditions of that creative fecundity was precisely the relative isolation of the Frankfurt School during those years. After his resettlement in the early fifties, Horkheimer was lionized by a Frankfurt community grateful for the recapture of at least one survivor of Weimar culture. He rubbed shoulders with Konrad Adenauer and made frequent appearances on radio and television, and in the press.[26] The days when he could write to Lowenthal that "beyond the three or four of us there are certainly other hearts and brains that feel similarly to ours, but we cannot see them, and perhaps they are prevented from expressing themselves"[27] were clearly over.

With recognition and public acclaim came a gradual erosion of the Institut's critical edge, which had been reinforced by its earlier outsider status. The sense of a distinct "Frankfurt School" with all the inherent rigidity that implied began to crystallize. "To be true to Schönberg," Adorno had written, "is to warn against all twelve-tone schools."[28] To be true to the original spirit of Critical Theory, the Institut's critics would argue,[29] was to be wary of the reification of the "Frankfurt School." Moreover, what further dismayed the Institut's younger, more radical adherents was the ideological repercussions of this change. The Cold War spirit that Horkheimer and the others had struggled so hard to combat in the forties began gradually to filter into their pronouncements in the fifties and sixties.[30] A widening gulf began to separate Horkheimer and Adorno from Marcuse, whose political inclinations remained firmly to the left. No public acknowledgment of the rift was made because of the personal ties that still obtained, but private disagreements were keen. When Marcuse came to prominence, it was not as the head of a major American university accompanied by the chief of state. In fact, public recognition of his connection with the Frankfurt School was itself minimal. Without an institutional tie beyond that of faculty member at a number of American universities, he was unaffected by the need to present a "responsible" face to an expectant public. To attribute Marcuse's divergence from his former colleagues solely, or even primarily, to this factor would of course be overstated, but probably it had some effect.

To point to the institutional coherence of the Frankfurt School after 1950 as important is not to imply that it had lacked such coherence throughout its history. As Edward Shils has noted,[31] one of the key factors promoting its influence, at least as compared with more isolated figures such as Karl Mannheim, was its unbroken institutional continuity for almost a half century. Horkheimer, for all his avowed dislike of the pedestrian tasks of administration, was a shrewd organizer of men and skilled securer of financial support. Pollock, the trained economist who ran the Institut's administrative affairs, was said only half in jest to be less adept at managing its funds than Horkheimer, the philosopher.[32] One former associate, Paul Lazarsfeld, himself a highly skilled "managerial scholar,"[33] has acknowledged the possession of similar, although not as explicit, qualities by Horkheimer.[34] The Institut's stubborn maintenance of its collective identity through a series of successive dislocations must be attributed in large measure to Horkheimer's complex personality, intellectual power, and practical organizational instincts. "You have no idea," Pollock once remarked, "how many things in the history of the Institut and the writings of its members stem from Horkheimer. Without him, all of us would have probably developed in a different way." [35] When persuasion failed, as in the case of Fromm and Neumann, Horkheimer was willing to see the intransigent opponent eased out of Institut affairs, rather than allow a prolonged difference of opinion to persist. Paul Massing, in describing the loyalty of another member of the Institut to Horkheimer, was moved to quote lines from Schiller's *Wallenstein*, roughly translatable as "since it was not given to me to be his equal, I have decided to love him without bounds." [36] Although it would certainly be unjust to reduce the other members of the Institut's inner circle to no more than satellites around Horkheimer, his predominance was generally unchallenged. Of all his colleagues, only Adorno seemed to exert as much influence on him as he exerted in return.

What set the Institut in America apart from the Institut in its second Frankfurt incarnation was thus not its organizational coherence as such. Rather, it was the role which that organization played in the Institut's interaction with its social and intellectual milieu. In the United States, it functioned to keep Horkheimer and his colleagues insulated to a significant degree from the outside world. Financially independent, at least as far as its theoretical work was concerned, and off by itself in the building on 117th Street, the Institut could continue to produce with little external pressure or interference. Its calculated decision to write in German meant, among other things, the impossibility of a large American following. Although a number of native-born students, such as Benjamin Nelson and M. I. Finley, were trained by the Institut on Morningside Heights, no real "Frankfurt School" developed on these shores. The Institut's outsider status, despite its connections with such prestigious benefactors as Columbia University and the American Jewish Committee, was thus secure.

The costs this entailed were obvious. Although often in some contact with the regular faculty at Columbia, the Frankfurt School remained generally outside the mainstream of American academic life. This allowed it to make assumptions, such as the equation of pragmatism with positivism, that lacked complete validity. It also cut the Institut off from potential allies in the American intellectual tradition, such as George Herbert Mead.[37] And finally, it unintentionally allowed the American public to form unbalanced opinions of its work based on those samples that were published in English.

The reasons why the Institut deliberately rejected the assimilation so many other refugees eagerly sought are complex. The Institut, it should be remembered, was originally staffed by men whose political involvement, although to different degrees in different cases, was on the fringes of Weimar radicalism. Despite the party affiliation of a few of its early adherents, the Institut as a whole was free from any ties to a regular political organization. In addition, from the beginning it was self-consciously distant from the normal German academic hierarchy, despite its loose connection with Frankfurt University. And finally, although its members were usually from assimilated Jewish families — here Fromm with his more orthodox background was the primary exception — they were still Jews whose marginality in German society was never fully overcome. In short, unlike many other exiles to America, the Frankfurt School had been somewhat of an outsider group before being forced to leave Germany.

Not surprisingly, the trauma of the Nazi take-over served to reinforce the Institut's alienated status. Symbolically, at one time or another many of its members were compelled to use pseudonyms: Horkheimer was "Heinrich Regius"; Adorno, "Hektor Rottweiler"; Benjamin, "Detlef Holz" and "C. Conrad"; Wittfogel, "Klaus Hinrichs," or "Carl Peterson"; Kirchheimer, "Heinrich Seitz"; Massing, "Karl Billinger"; Borkenau, "Fritz Jungmann"; and Kurt Mandelbaum, "Kurt Baumann." More seriously, the lives of men connected in various ways with the Institut were snuffed out by the Nazis. Among those lost were Andries Sternheim, Karl Landauer, Paul Ludwig Landsberg, and indirectly, Walter Benjamin. Others such as Wittfogel and Massing had seen the insides of concentration camps, but were fortunate enough to have been liberated before the camps, or ones like them, were turned into annihilation centers. There is thus little reason to question the source of the continued uncertainty of the Institut's members about their security for a number of years after they migrated to America. And with this uncertainty came the Institut's turning inward. As late as 1946, Horkheimer could include the following quotation from Edgar Allan Poe in a letter to Lowenthal:

> In like manner, nothing can be clearer than that a *very* generous spirit — *truly* feeling what all merely profess — must inevitably find itself misconceived in every direction — its motives misinterpreted. Just as extremeness of intelligence would be thought fatuity, so excess of chivalry could not fail of being looked upon as meanness in its last degree: — and so on with other virtues. This subject is a painful one indeed. That individuals *have* so soared above the plane of their race, is scarcely to be questioned; but, in looking back through history for traces of their existence, we should pass over all bi-

> ographies of "the good and the great," while we search carefully the slight records of wretches who died in prison, in Bedlam, or upon the gallows.

And then he added: "During the last years I have never read any sentences which were closer to our own thoughts than these." [38]

After the return to Frankfurt, however, all this had changed. One of the purposes motivating the decision had been the effect the Institut might have on a new generation of German students. This meant a much greater participation in the normal academic life of the university community in which it was located. Instead of developing in relative isolation, the Frankfurt School was now one of the major currents of German sociological and philosophical thought. Instead of being ignored, its theoretical work was the source of an intense dispute, whose magnitude, as previously mentioned, rivaled the *Methodenstreit* (methodological dispute) that had split German social thought half a century earlier. Without the linguistic barrier that precluded the widespread dissemination of the Institut's ideas, their stimulus was felt as never before. Even that most conservative of social sciences, the discipline of history, was influenced by Critical Theory.[39] Against the spare intellectual landscape of postwar Germany, the Frankfurt School stood out even more strikingly than it might have if conditions had been similar to those prevailing in Weimar. In short, after 1950 the Frankfurt School's institutional embodiment served as a positive mediator between the ideas of its members and the society at large. In the place of insularity, it provided a platform for the propagation of Critical Theory as it developed in its new context.

It is not our purpose to dwell on the partial reintegration of the Institut after its return to Frankfurt, but rather to emphasize the contrast that this situation presented with its isolated status during the American years. Without drawing unnecessarily direct connections between the content of Critical Theory and the experiences of its creators, it must still be noted that the Frankfurt School's stress on negation, nonidentity, and the need, in a frequently used phrase, *nicht mitzumachen* (not to join in) was consonant with those experiences.

To suggest this, however, for the purposes of debunking would be a vain exercise, for the Frankfurt School apparently drew the same conclusions. Adorno's *Minima Moralia*, with its reduction of philosophy to "reflections of a damaged life," expressed this unequivocally. The Institut never accepted Mannheim's glorification of the "free-floating intelligentsia." "The answer to Mannheim's reverence for the intelligentsia as 'free-floating,'" Adorno wrote, "is to be found not in the reactionary postulate of its 'rootedness in Being' but rather in the reminder that the very intelligentsia that pretends to float freely is fundamentally rooted in the very being that must be changed and which it merely pretends to criticize."[40]

The Institut's zealous preservation of its outsider status was rooted in the recognition that such a position was in some way a precondition for the maintenance of a truly critical posture in its theoretical work. This meant, however, autonomy not only from normal politics, academic establishments, and mass culture, but also from any social forces claiming to embody negation. Unlike more orthodox Marxists, the Frankfurt School never felt that the personal interaction of workers and intellectuals would be beneficial to either. As early as "Traditional and Critical Theory" in 1937, Horkheimer had denied the necessary connection between radical theory and the proletariat, arguing instead for an alliance with all "progressive" forces willing "to tell the truth."[41] By 1951, Adorno had ruled out the possibility of any collectivity being on the side of truth and located the residue of those progressive social forces in the critical individual. In later years, this led to a denial that student radicals or other nascent "negative" groups were legitimate social forces on the side of true change. After 1950, the Institut may have been reintegrated, but it was not with those groups with whom its members had identified in its earliest stages or with their self-styled successors. Despite their scorn for Mannheim's ideas about free-floating intellectuals, the Frankfurt School's members came increasingly to resemble his model.

To explain the Institut's work solely in terms of its members' personal experiences of estrangement would of course be insufficient. For if the Frankfurt School was alienated from its present cultural surroundings, it still had vital ties to a specific historical tradition. In 1938 Benjamin had written: "The workers of the Institut für Sozialforschung converge in a critique of bourgeois consciousness. This critique takes place not from without, but as self-criticism."[42] Despite the early enthusiasm of Horkheimer and his friends for socialism, they were incontrovertibly the sons of upper bourgeois families. In a certain sense they shared the antibourgeois sentiments of many of their middle-class contemporaries. However, instead of following the classic lineage most clearly expressed in Mann's *Buddenbrooks* — the first generation making the money, the second consolidating the social position, and the third withdrawing into aesthetic malaise — they followed a somewhat different pattern. In their cases, intellectual iconoclasm combined with a sense of social responsibility directly succeeded the acquisition of wealth. Without the intervening generation of social respectability, they were less compelled to assert their independence through rebellious life-styles than other antibourgeois sons of the bourgeoisie. Avoiding the extravagances of the expressionist generation, whose moment in history came immediately before theirs, Horkheimer and the others channeled all their critical energies into the relatively impersonal realm of social thought. Except for the loss of an early religiosity on the part of Fromm and Lowenthal, they seem to have escaped what later was to be called an identity crisis. The characteristic expressionist *Wandlung* (transformation), most clearly demonstrated in the Ernst Toller play of the same name, was not a phase through which they passed. Keeping their distance from the daily absurdities of Weimar and then American life, they were also able to avoid the bitterness and bile that characterized other left-wing intellectuals closer to these occurrences, such as Kurt Tucholsky. For outsiders, they lived in comparative comfort through all their peregrinations. Benjamin, the Institut figure whose life was most marred by misfortune, might well have expressed resentment in his writings, if it had not been for the strict dissociation of life and work that was a strange element in his makeup.[43] The others reacted to their insecurities by tightening their hold on the upper bourgeois life-style in which they had been immersed since birth.

The members of the Institut not only maintained this life-style, but also remained true to some extent to the comparable cultural values. There were, in fact, certain striking similarities between their attitudes and those of the German educated elite whose fortunes Fritz Ringer has recently traced in *The Decline of the German Mandarins*.[44] The Institut, of course, had been founded to counteract the effects of what Grünberg had called *Mandarinanstalten*.[45] However, he and Ringer defined "mandarins" very differently. To Grünberg, they were the technical intellectuals who put their skills at the service of the status quo; to Ringer, they were similar to the Chinese literati studied by Max Weber: "a social and cultural elite which owes its status primarily to educational qualifications, rather than to hereditary rights or wealth."[46] In the late nineteenth century Ringer's "mandarins" had achieved a short-lived ascendancy, during the period of equilibrium produced by the decline of the landed elite and the still unfinished rise of the industrial bourgeoisie. By approximately 1890, however, they felt themselves threatened by the impending triumph of the latter over the former, as the *Industriestaat* (industrial state) began to supplant the *Agrarstaat* (agrarian state).

As a result, they assumed an increasingly defensive and rigid posture against the rise of modernity and mass society.

In certain ways, the Frankfurt School might be assimilated to Ringer's model. Like the mandarins and unlike more orthodox socialists, they wrote works permeated more with a sense of loss and decline than with expectation and hope. They also shared the mandarins' distaste for mass society and the utilitarian, positivistic values it fostered. Similarly, they opposed the spirit of specialization that seemed to pervade modern intellectual life. "What really worried them," Ringer wrote of the mandarins in a sentence that could easily apply to the Institut, "was not the isolation of the disciplines *from each other*, but the growing separation, within the disciplines, between scholarship and a certain kind of philosophy."[47] The Frankfurt School's distrust of the Enlightenment was likewise an essential element in the mandarin defense of traditional German *Kultur*. In exile, they saw themselves as embattled *Kulturträger* (culture-bearers), a self-image the mandarins would have certainly recognized. And finally, their inherently apolitical attitude, even in the period when *praxis* was an imperative in their writings, invites comparison with the mandarins' condescending disdain for the petty squabbles of interest-politics.

And yet, despite these similarities, the members of the Frankfurt School defy simple categorization as latter-day mandarins in exile. First of all, Ringer's mandarins were basically academic insiders, the leaders of the established intellectual elite. As we have noted on many occasions, the Institut sought to dissociate itself from the traditional university community, whose smugness and elitism it criticized severely. Secondly, the historical locus of their values was not precisely the same as the mandarins'. As Ringer notes, "the most important formal elements in the mandarins' scholarly heritage were the Kantian critique, the theories of Idealism, and the German historical tradition."[48] The Frankfurt School, on the other hand, was far closer in outlook to the Left Hegelians of the 1840's. Thus, unlike many of the mandarins, they refused to champion vulgar idealism as an antidote to vulgar materialism. As we have seen, Critical Theory was rooted in a dialectical overcoming of the traditional idealism-materialism dichotomy. Materialism and positivism need not be synonymous, as many of the mandarins assumed. Thirdly, the Frankfurt School's defense of older cultural values never meant the hypostatization of those values as something apart from and superior to material interests. This was the very separation that characterized what the Institut castigated as "affirmative culture." The Institut's concern for corporeal, sensual happiness was rarely shared by the mandarins, whose idealism had an ascetic side. Not surprisingly, the mandarins had no use for the psychoanalysis that Horkheimer and his colleagues wished to integrate into Critical Theory.[49]

What made the Frankfurt School's critique of modern society different was that without dismissing the mandarins' values out of hand, Horkheimer and the others demonstrated that absolutizing these values in a certain way inevitably led to their betrayal. As Adorno argued:

> If cultural criticism, even at its best with Valéry, sides with conservatism, it is because of its unconscious adherence to a notion of culture which, during the era of late capitalism, aims at a form of property which is stable and independent of stock-market fluctuations. This idea of culture asserts its distance from the system in order, as it were to offer universal security in the middle of a universal dynamic.[50]

Finally, the Frankfurt School was distinguished from the mandarins by the refusal of its members to seek immediate panaceas to the contradictions of modern society. Instead of sentimentalizing community and "peoplehood," the Institut sought to expose the dangers inherent in such premature reconciliations. Both the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft* (popular community) and the "one-dimensional society" of postwar America meant the elimination of subjectivity in the name of an illegitimate and ideological consensus.

In short, however much the Institut's members may have absorbed from the mandarin tradition into which they were born, the impact of their early exposure to Freud, and more important, Marx, remained strong. The role of the Institut in the history of twentieth-century Marxism, to be sure, was itself problematical. Despite its ultimate abandonment of many of the essential tenets of Marxist theory — the revolutionary potential of the working class, class struggle as the motor of history,[51] the economic substructure as the center of any social analysis — the Frankfurt School did Marxism a great service in its earlier years. By helping to preserve the integrity of Marx's libertarian impulse at a time when Stalinism was rampant, Horkheimer and his colleagues played a crucial role in the recovery of that impulse by post-Stalinist radicals in later years. By persistently questioning the philosophical assumptions of Marxist theory, they significantly raised the level of discussion within Marxist circles and helped make Marxism a legitimate object of inquiry outside them. By consistently employing historical materialism as an open-ended critique rather than a body of received truths, they helped restore vitality to what was threatening to become a sclerotic dogmatism. Willing to break new ground, the Institut made possible the fruitful interpenetration of such seemingly inconsistent systems as psychoanalysis and Marxism. Finally, by skillfully applying implicit arguments in Marx to cultural phenomena in an imaginative way, the Frankfurt School helped rescue materialist cultural criticism from the sterile literalisms of socialist realism.

Yet, in the end, the Institut presented a revision of Marxism so substantial that it forfeited the right to be included among its many offshoots. By challenging the actual or even potential existence of a historical subject capable of implementing a rational society, the Institut finally jettisoned that central premise of Marx's work, the unity of theory and *praxis*. The clashes its members had with the German New Left in the 1960's were merely the working out of this earlier transformation. Even Marcuse's "Great Refusal" would seem to many more orthodox Marxists a vague and imprecise spur to political action, no more than an "indeterminate negation" of the status quo in the anarchist tradition.[52] In 1962 Lukács voiced his and other Marxists' disdain for the Frankfurt School by dubbing it the "Grand Hotel *Abgrund* (Abyss)." [53] As Marcuse's popularity grew in later years, even his more radical variant of Critical Theory served as the target for orthodox Marxist abuse. This of course was by no means new. Felix Weil, for example, remembers an incident in 1929 in which something he did occasioned the retort of a member of the KPD's central committee: "What a pity, Felix, that you never joined the Party. Otherwise we could expel you now." [54] (These were the same words, it might be noted parenthetically, that Kurt Tucholsky heard in 1932.)[55] What was new was the increasing visibility of the Frankfurt School after 1950, which made its renegade materialism a greater threat to more conventional Marxists and, as a result, a greater object of scorn.

Equally problematical was the Institut's role in the intellectual migration whose collective impact on America was so enormous. Its efforts to aid refugees coming to America were apparently substantial, although their precise dimensions cannot be known until the Institut releases the names of those it actually supported. Through its doors passed approximately fifty younger scholars who would ultimately become American professors,[56] including such influential figures as Paul Honigsheim, Hans Gerth, and Paul Baran. Collaboration with others such as the Berkeley Public Opinion Study Group also doubtless had an effect.

Yet the intellectual impact of the Institut must be considered uneven at best. The considerable influence of its empirical studies in the forties has already been noted, as has that of its critique of mass culture. But in general its theoretical work fell on deaf ears. The Institut's effort to prevent the decline of philosophy into positivist social science was without real success. In part this was a reflection of the Institut's tendency to cast its theoretical critiques in the most extreme terms. "In psychoanalysis," Adorno had written, "only the exaggerations are true." [57] In Critical Theory, so it seemed at times, the same principle was followed. Thus, for example, the Frankfurt School's critique of American society sometimes appeared to suggest that no real distinction existed between Nazi coercion and the "culture industry." In fact, so some of its critics would charge, the Nazi experience had been so traumatic for the Institut's members that they could judge American society only in terms of its fascist potential.[58] By insulating themselves from American life to the extent that they did, the unique historical factors that made American advanced capitalism and mass society different from their European counterparts were lost to view. Totalitarianism, the Institut always insisted, was an outgrowth of liberalism, not its reverse, but in America there existed a liberal, bourgeois society that resisted the transformation. Why this was so the Institut never explored in any real depth. The similarities between Europe and America its members made painstakingly clear, the differences far less so.

To suggest this implies that the mixed success of the Institut's theoretical work in America was largely its own responsibility. The reality, however, was somewhat more complex. What must also be understood was the magnitude of the Frankfurt School's challenge to the conventional wisdom of American social thought. As I have argued elsewhere,[59] a selective pattern of acceptance can be discerned in America's reception of the Central European refugees. Although by no means without exceptions, the warmest welcomes were reserved for those new arrivals whose thinking most closely approximated the *Neue Sachlichkeit* spirit that had prevailed in Weimar's middle years. Whether in architecture with the Bauhaus, in philosophy with the Vienna Circle, or in sociology with Paul Lazarsfeld's brand of quantitative research, the ethic of sober objectivity and technological progress struck a respondent chord in American intellectual life. The Institut, despite the design of its original building, had been critical of the *Neue Sachlichkeit* from the beginning.[60] To Horkheimer and the others, it represented a stylistic correlate of the liquidation of subjectivity and the premature overcoming of contradictions in modern life. Although no longer dwelling on the style as such, they continued to castigate those who worked in its spirit. In the thirties and forties, however, they were clearly going against the current. Not until somewhat later would their strictures on the disadvantages of modernity begin to make sense to an American audience. It was decades before widespread concern for such issues as ecology, instrumental rationality, and women's liberation emerged, issues that the Frankfurt School had treated with sophistication a generation before.

Whether or not the Institut would have succeeded in becoming a major force in American intellectual life if it had remained is thus a moot point. The members who chose to stay certainly thought it would have.[61] Marcuse's sudden popularity in the 1960's, based largely on writings whose general direction was foreshadowed in the Frankfurt School's earlier work, suggests that they might well have been correct. What happened instead was that less central figures in the Institut's history, such as Fromm, Neumann, and Wittfogel, acquired impressive followings, while Horkheimer remained a generally unknown figure in postwar America.

Speculating about what might have occurred is, of course, far less the task of the historian than trying to make sense out of what actually did. The Institut was a unique element in an unparalleled event in recent Western history. It was the only interdisciplinary aggregation of scholars, working on different problems from a common theoretical base, to coalesce in modern times. Moreover, whereas dispersion usually accompanied exile, the Institut managed to remain together. It was furthermore the only collective representative of Weimar culture to survive exile and return to serve as a bridge between Germany's cultural past and its post-Nazi present. When it reestablished itself in Frankfurt, it was able not only to teach methodological techniques acquired in America, but also to restore continuity with the rich heritage Hitler had done so much to obliterate. Having helped to bring German culture to America, it then proceeded to help bring it back to Germany. With students like Jürgen Habermas, Alfred Schmidt (who has just been named Adorno's successor as the Institut's director), Oskar Negt, and Albrecht Wellmer, its continued impact promises to be significant, even if its institutional survival in the 1970's seems clouded by the deaths of several of its older leaders and by increased radical turmoil in its student ranks.

A strained metaphor suggested by Hegel's notion of the spirit returning to itself might seem appropriate here, if not for the crucial fact that the true estrangement of the Frankfurt School did not end with its geographical homecoming. The reintegration of the Institut stressed earlier was never more than a partial and incomplete process. "To write poetry after Auschwitz," Adorno wrote in one of his more bitter moments, "is barbaric." [62] To write social theory and conduct scientific research was more tolerable only if its critical, negative impulse was maintained. For, so the Frankfurt School always insisted, it was only by the refusal to celebrate the present that the possibility might be preserved of a future in which writing poetry would no longer be an act of barbarism.

Chapter References and Bibliography

Chapter References

The following abbreviations are used:

Grünbergs Archiv: *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*
SPSS: *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*
ZfS: *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*

INTRODUCTION

1. William Butler Yeats, "The Choice" (1932).

2. The failure to distinguish sufficiently between the Weimar Institut and the Frankfurt School has marred certain treatments of its history. See, for example, Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York, 1968), in which the Institut during Weimar is erroneously described as "left-Hegelian to the core" (p. 41).

3. Herbert Marcuse, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968), which contains many of the essays republished in German as *Kultur und Gesellschaft*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1965).

4. Max Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie*, ed. Alfred Schmidt, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1968).

5. Walter Benjamin, *Schriften*, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1955); Theodor W. Adorno, *Prismen* (Frankfurt, 1955), published in English as *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967); *Versuch über Wagner* (Frankfurt, 1952); and *Dissonanzen: Musik der verwalteten Welt* (Frankfurt, 1956); Leo Lowenthal, *Literature and the Image of Man* (Boston, 1957); and *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961); Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, ed. Herbert Marcuse (New York, 1957). Other, more recent collections of the work done by Institut figures include Erich Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1970); Otto Kirchheimer, *Politics, Law, and Social Change*, ed. Frederic S. Burin and Kurt L. Shell (New York, 1969); and Leo Lowenthal, *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft: Die Gesellschaftsproblematik in der deutschen Literature des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1971).

1. THE CREATION OF THE INSTITUT FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG AND ITS FIRST FRANKFURT YEARS

1. Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).

2. The biographical information about Weil comes from a series of letters from him to me during 1970–1971.

3. Felix Weil, *Sozialisierung: Versuch einer begrifflichen Grundlegung (Nebst einer Kritik der Sozialisierungspläne)* (Berlin-Fichtenau, 1921).

4. Letter from Weil to Paul Breines, January 10, 1971, which both parties have granted me permission to quote. Another participant at the conference, Karl August Wittfogel, has disagreed with Weil's date, saying that the E.M.A. took place after Whitsuntide in 1923. Weil discounts this by pointing to the fact that the Institut was already in operation by that date.

5. Hede Massing later became an espionage agent for the Soviet Union, but repudiated her connection in the late 1930's. She gave testimony at the Alger Hiss trial in 1948 and wrote a book about her experiences called *This Deception* (New York, 1951). Besides fascinating reminiscences of what it meant to spy for the Russians, it contains several detailed, if occasionally romanticized, portraits of various Institut figures, including Julian Gumperz, Paul Massing, and Richard Sorge. Mrs. Massing herself did some interviewing for the Institut in 1944–1945, when it was engaged in a study of anti-Semitism in American labor.

6. Letter from Weil to Breines, January 10, 1971.

7. Max Horkheimer, "Zur Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft" (unpub., 1922).

8. Horkheimer's *Habilitationsschrift* was entitled *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie* (Stuttgart, 1925). A description of his first lecture can be found in Madlen Lorei and Richard Kirn, *Frankfurt und die goldenen zwanziger Jahre* (Frankfurt, 1966), p. 97.

9. Ludwig Marcuse, *Mein zwanzigstes Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1960), p. 114.

10. Interview with Gerhard Meyer, Meredith, N.H., July 19, 1971.

11. These were projects suggested to Hermann Weil to help persuade him to endow the Institut (interview with Friedrich Pollock, Montagnola, Switzerland, March, 1969).

12. Letter from Weil to me, January 31, 1971.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Pollock interview, March, 1969.

15. F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry, *The Case of Richard Sorge* (London, 1966), p. 32.

16. *Institut für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt am Main* (Frankfurt, 1925), p. 13.

17. Gustav Mayer, *Erinnerungen* (Zurich and Vienna, 1949), pp. 340–341.

18. For data on Grünberg's life, see *Österreiches Biographisches Lexicon, 1915–1950*, vol. II (Graz-Köln, 1957–1959).

19. Gustav Nenning, *Carl Grünberg und die Anfänge des Austromarxismus* (Graz, 1968), p. 94.

20. Norbert Leser, *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolshewismus: Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis* (Vienna, Frankfurt, and Zurich, 1968), p. 177.

21. Georg Lukács, "Moses Hess und die Probleme der idealistischen Dialektik," *Grünbergs Archiv* XII (1926).

22. Letter from Weil to me, June 8, 1971.

23. See, for example, Heinrich Regius, "Die neue Sachlichkeit," *Dämmerung* (Zurich, 1934), p. 216. Heinrich Regius was a pseudonym for Horkheimer, which was necessary to permit the book's distribution in Germany.

24. Carl Grünberg, "Festrede gehalten zur Einweihung des Instituts für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt a.M. am 22 Juni 1924," *Frankfurter Universitäts-Reden* XX (Frankfurt, 1924).

25. Parenthetically, it might be noted that Grünberg's use of the term was the exact opposite of the use to which Fritz Ringer put it in his *The Decline of the German Mandarins* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

26. Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Schriften*, selected by W. Flemmer (Munich, 1964), p. 307.

27. Grünberg, "Festrede," p. 11.

28. Friedrich Pollock, *Sombarts "Widerlegung" des Marxismus* (Leipzig, 1926), a *Beiheft* of the *Grünbergs Archiv*; Max Horkheimer, "Ein neuer Ideologie Begriff?," *Grünbergs Archiv* XV (1930).

29. Letter from Oscar H. Swede to Max Eastman, October 1, 1927, Eastman collection, Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indiana University. I am indebted to Jack Diggins of the University of California, Irvine, for bringing this letter to my attention.

30. In 1930 Franz Schiller wrote a long, laudatory article entitled "Das Marx-Engels Institut in Moskau," *Grünbergs Archiv* XV.

31. This aspect of the Institut's work was continued after the emigration by Hilde Rigaudias-Weiss, who uncovered a hitherto unknown questionnaire of Marx's on the condition of French workers from 1830 to 1848 (*Les Enquêtes ouvrières en France entre 1830 et 1848*; Paris, 1936).

32. Deakin and Storry, *Richard Sorge*, p. 32.

33. Pollock interview, March, 1969, in Montagnola.

34. As late as the Institut's 1944 unpublished history, "Ten Years on Morningside Heights," Korsch was listed as a "Fellow," but this seems to have meant little. The history is in Lowenthal's personal collection.

35. Weil called him "a typical loner, incapable of working in a team" (letter to me, June 5, 1971).

36. Pollock interview, March, 1969.

37. Letter from Matthias Becker to me, June 7, 1971. Becker is Horkheimer's current guardian of the Institut's files, which are kept in Montagnola and are not yet open to the public.

38. H. Regius, *Dämmerung*, pp. 122—130.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

40. Henryk Grossmann to Paul Mattick, a letter included in the appendix to Grossmann's *Marx, die klassische Nationalökonomie und das Problem der Dynamik* (Frankfurt, 1969), with an afterword by Mattick, pp. 85–86 (italics in the original).

41. Biographical information about Wittfogel comes from an interview with him in New York on June 21, 1971, and from G. L. Ulmen's soon-to-be-published biography, *Karl August Wittfogel: Toward an Understanding of His Life and Work*, which the author graciously allowed me to see before publication.

42. Karl August Wittfogel, *Die Wissenschaft der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Berlin, 1922), and *Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Vienna, 1924); his first book on China was *Das erwachende China* (Vienna, 1926).

43. Helga Gallas, *Marxistische Literaturtheorie* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1971), p. 111.

44. Franz Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild* (Paris, 1934).

45. New York, 1964. For the comparison, see George Lichtheim, *The Concept of Ideology*.(New York, 1967), p. 279. Lichtheim, during our conversation of February 16, 1969, stressed Borkenau's brilliance and claimed that he had been treated unfairly by the Institut.

46. H. Grossmann, "Die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der mechanistischen Philosophie," *ZfS* IV, 2 (1935).

47. Grossmann, *Österreichs Handelspolitik, 1772–1790* (Vienna, 1916).

48. Interviews with Pollock in Montagnola (March, 1969), Leo Lowenthal in Berkeley (August, 1968), and Alice Maier, the former secretary of the Institut's New York branch, in New York (May, 1969).

49. Quoted in Grossmann, *Marx, die klassische Nationalökonomie und das Problem der Dynamik*, p. 113.

50. Grossmann, *Das Akkumulations-und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems* (Leipzig, 1929).

51. For a recent treatment of the book, see Martin Trottman, *Zur Interpretation und Kritik der Zusammensbruchstheorie von Henryk Grossmann* (Zurich, 1956). Mattick's discussion in the afterword to *Marx, die klassische Nationalökonomie und das Problem der Dynamik* is a more sympathetic appraisal.

52. See, for example, Alfred Braunthal, "Der Zusammenbruch der Zusammenbruchstheorie," *Die Gesellschaft* VI, 10 (October, 1929). Mattick has strongly attacked this type of criticism in his *Nachwort* to *Marx, die klassische Nationalökonomie, etc.* (p. 127).

53. For a discussion of Marx's own neglect of service industries and his stress on production, see George Kline, "Some Critical Comments on Marx's Philosophy," in *Marx and the Western World*, ed. Nicholas Lobkowicz (Notre Dame, Ind., 1967). Pollock's own observations were never printed.

54. F. Pollock, *Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion (1917–1927)* (Leipzig, 1929).

55. D. B. Ryazanov, "Siebzig Jahre 'Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie,'" *Grünbergs Archiv* XV (1930).

56. For a description of his dissenting behavior at the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, see Adam Ulam, *The Bolsheviks* (New York, 1965), pp. 544–546.

57. Regius, *Dämmerung*, pp. 152–153.

58. Rudolf Schlesinger, "Neue Sowjetrussiche Literatur zur Sozialforschung," *ZfS* VII, 1 (1938), and VIII, 1 (1939).

59. For a description of Rabbi Nobel, see Nahum Glatzer, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought* (New York, 1953), *passim.*

60. For a description of their relationship, see Theodor W. Adorno, "Der wunderliche Realist. Über Siegfried Kracauer," *Noten zur Literatur III* (Frankfurt, 1965).

61. Siegfried Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler* (Princeton, 1947).

62. Adorno, *Alban Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs* (Vienna, 1968), p. 20.

63. René Leibowitz, "Der Komponist Theodor W. Adorno," in *Zeugnisse: Theodor W. Adorno zum sechzigsten Geburtstag*, ed. Max Horkheimer (Frankfurt, 1963).

64. Arthur Koestler, *Arrow in the Blue* (New York, 1952), p. 131.

65. Adorno, *Alban Berg*, p. 37.

66. *Ibid.*

67. Adorno, *Die Transzendenz des Dinglichen und Noematischen in Husserls Phänomenologie* (Frankfurt, 1924).

68. For a discussion of Tillich's relationship with the Institut and of the interaction of his theology with Critical Theory, see the reminiscences of Horkheimer and Adorno in *Werk und Wirken Paul Tillichs: Ein Gedenkbuch* (Stuttgart, 1967).

69. Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Aesthetischen* (Tübingen, 1933, rev. ed. Frankfurt, 1966).

70. See footnote on pp. 6–7 for an explanation of these terms.

71. F. Weil, "Rosa Luxemburg über die Russische Revolution," *Grünbergs Archiv* XIII (1928), and "Die Arbeiterbewegung in Argentinien," *ibid.* XI (1925).

72. Horkheimer, *Die Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart, 1930).

73. "Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung," *Frankfurter Universitätsreden,* XXVII (Frankfurt, 1931).

74. K. A. Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig, 1931). For a recent evaluation of Wittfogel's work, see Irving Fetscher, "Asien im Lichte des Marxismus: Zu Karl Wittfogels Forschungen über die orientalischen Despotie," *Merkur,* XX, 3 (March, 1966).

75. Interview with Lowenthal, August, 1968.

76. Horkheimer, "Vorwort," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932).

77. Horkheimer, "Bemerkungen über Wissenschaft und Krise," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932).

78. Grossmann, "Die Wert-Preis-Transformation bei Marx und das Krisisproblem," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932).

79. Pollock, "Die gegenwärtige Lage des Kapitalismus und die Aussichten einer planwirtschaftlichen Neuordnung," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932).

80. Leo Lowenthal, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur," and Adorno, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932).

81. Horkheimer, "Geschichte und Psychologie," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932).

82. Erich Fromm, "Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932).

83. *Festschrift für Carl Grünberg: Zum 70. Geburtstag* (Leipzig, 1932).

84. Herbert Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt, 1932).

85. Adorno, review of *Hegels Ontologie, ZfS* I, 3 (1932), p. 410.

86. For a list of professors "purged" from German universities, see *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960,* ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 234.

87. Charles Beard, Celestin Bouglé, Alexander Farquharson, Henryk Grossmann, Paul Guggenheim, Maurice Halbwachs, Jean de la Harpe, Max Horkheimer, Karl Landauer, Lewis L. Lorwin, Robert S. Lynd, Robert M. MacIver, Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield), Jean Piaget, Friedrich Pollock (chairman of the board), Raymond de Saussure, Georges Scelle, Ernst Schachtel, Andries Sternheim, R. H. Tawney, and Paul Tillich.

88. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, April 17, 1934.

89. According to Paul Sweezy, "there is no doubt that Paul's intellectual development was profoundly and permanently influenced by his experiences and associations in Frankfurt" ("Paul Alexander Baran: a Personal Memoir," *Monthly Review,* XVI, 11 [March, 1965], p. 32). Baran's friendship with members of the Institut continued after he came to the United States in 1939. His untimely death in 1964 occurred in Leo Lowenthal's house in San Francisco.

90. Josef Dünner, *If I Forget Thee . . .* (Washington, D.C., 1937).

91. Horkheimer [Regius], *Dämmerung,* p. 80.

92. Not until after the war did Horkheimer come to the melancholy conclusion that Zionism had been the only way out for the Jews of Europe. See his "Über die deutschen Juden," in his *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft* (Frankfurt, 1967), p. 309.

93. Letter from Weil to me, June 1, 1969.

94. Conversation with Wittfogel, New York, June 21, 1971.

95. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933–1944* (New York, rev. ed. 1944), p. 121.

96. L. Lowenthal, "Das Dämonische," in *Gabe Herrn Rabbiner Dr. Nobel zum fünfzigsten Geburtstag* (Frankfurt, 1921).

97. See, for example, Edgar Friedenberg, "Neo-Freudianism and Erich Fromm," *Commentary* XXXIV, 4 (October, 1962), or Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber, the Life of Dialogue* (New York, 1960), pp. 184–185.

98. Istvan Deak, *Weimar Germany's Left-Wing Intellectuals* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), p. 29.

99. Letter from Pollock to me, March 24, 1970.

100. Pollock interview, March, 1969. Many years later, Adorno defended his name change indirectly in a memorandum he wrote for the Institut's project on anti-Semitism in labor. "The idea that the Jews should show more pride by sticking to their names is but a thin rationalization of the desire that they should come into the open so that one might recognize and persecute them the more easily" (November 3, 1944, memorandum in Paul Lazarsfeld's possession).

101. Interview with Paul Massing, New York, November 25, 1970.

102. Jürgen Habermas, "Der deutsche Idealismus der jüdischen Philosophen," *Philosophisch-politische Profile* (Frankfurt, 1971).

103. Hannah Arendt, Introduction to *Illuminations* by Walter Benjamin, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 1968), p. 29.

104. Adolph Lowe, a childhood friend from Stuttgart, remembers Horkheimer and Pollock giving their fathers an ultimatum when they were in England: either they were to be allowed to return to Germany to begin their studies or they would emigrate. The senior Horkheimer and senior Pollock seem to have given in without much resistance (conversation with Lowe, New York, N.Y., December 28, 1971).

105. Letter from Pollock to me, July 16, 1970. Although never an intellectual like Adorno's wife, Gretel, Mrs. Horkheimer was a constant source of support until her death in the fall of 1969. When I saw them together in March of that year, at the time of their forty-third and last anniversary, I was touched by the warmth and affection they showered on each other.

106. Regius [Horkheimer], *Dämmerung*, p. 165.

107. *Ibid.*

108. Andries Sternheim, "Zum Problem der Freizeitgestaltung," *ZfS* I, 3 (1932). He also contributed a monograph on economics and the family to the Institut's collaborative project, the *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (Paris, 1936), and wrote regularly in the *Zeitschrift*'s review section.

109. George Rusche, "Arbeitsmarkt und Strafvollzug," *ZfS* II, 1 (1933).

110. Kurt Baumann, "Autarkie und Planwirtschaft," *ZfS* II, 1 (1933); Gerhard Meyer, "Neue Englische Literatur zur Planwirtschaft," *ZfS* II, 2 (1933).

111. Paul Ludwig Landsberg, "Rassenideologie und Rassenwissenschaft," *ZfS* II, 3 (1933).

112. Julian Gumperz, "Zur Soziologie des amerikanischen Parteiensystems," *ZfS* I, 3 (1932), and "Recent Social Trends in the U.S.A.," *ZfS* II, 2 (1933).

113. Grossmann, *Marx, die klassische Nationalökonomie und das Problem der Dynamik*, p. 97.

114. See Franz Neumann et al., *The Cultural Migration* (Philadelphia, 1953).

115. London, 1937.

116. This was written under the name Fritz Jungmann and called "Autorität und Sexualmoral in der freien bürgerlichen Jugendbewegung," in *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (Paris, 1936).

117. Paul Honigsheim, "Reminiscences of the Durkheim School," *Emile Durkheim, 1858–1917*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (Columbus, Ohio, 1960), pp. 313–314.

118. J. Gumperz, *Pattern for World Revolution*, with Robert Rindl, under the dual pseudonym "Ypsilon" (Chicago and New York, 1947).

119. Interview with Horkheimer, March, 1969, in Montagnola.

120. See Fleming and Bailyn, *The Intellectual Migration*; Laura Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants* (Chicago, 1968); *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals* (*Salmagundi*, 10/11 [Fall, 1969–Winter, 1970]); and Helge Pross, *Die deutsche akademische Emigration nach den Vereinigten Staaten 1933–1941* (Berlin, 1955).

121. The well-known classicist M. I. Finley, a translator and editorial assistant at the Institut in the thirties, has stressed the New School's antipathy to the Institut's Marxism (interview in Berkeley, January 31, 1972).

122. For a full listing of the seminars and public lectures given by the Institut from 1936 to 1938, see *International Institute of Social Research: A Report on Its History, Aims, and Activities 1933–1938* (New York, 1938), pp. 35–36.

123. Horkheimer [Regius], *Dämmerung*, p. 8.

2. THE GENESIS OF CRITICAL THEORY

1. See George Lichtheim, *The Origins of Socialism* (New York, 1969), and *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York and London, 1961); Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge, 1968); and Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche* (New York, 1964), for discussions of the Left Hegelians.

2. See Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, rev. ed. (New York, 1960), and Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1971), for an understanding of the transition from negative to positive social theory.

3. In his *Marxismus und Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1966), whose title essay was originally printed in *Grünbergs Archiv* in 1923, Korsch discussed the connection between the reformist politics of the Second International and the mechanistic, nondialectical materialism it equated with Marxism.

4. See H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* (New York, 1958), pp. 161–229, for a discussion of Dilthey, Croce, and Sorel. Lukács was strongly influenced by the Sorelian attitudes of Ervin Szabo, the spiritual teacher of the Hungarian Social Democrats' left opposition. See Lukács's 1967 preface to *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. x.

5. For a discussion of their impact, see Furio Cerutti, "Hegel, Lukács, Korsch. Zum dialektischen Selbstverständnis des kritischen Marxismus," in *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels*, ed. Oskar Negt (Frankfurt, 1970).

6. *International Institute of Social Research: Report on Its History and Activities, 1933–1938* (New York; 1938), p. 28.

7. See for example, Max Horkheimer, "Schopenhauer Today," in *The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston, 1967).

8. Conversation with Horkheimer, March, 1969, in Montagnola.

9. Horkheimer, *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie* (Stuttgart, 1925).

10. Letter from Pollock to me, March 24, 1970.

11. Hans Cornelius, "Leben und Lehre," in *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, ed. Raymund Schmidt, vol. 11 (Leipzig, 1923), p. 6.

12. Letter from Pollock to me, March 24, 1970.

13. Cornelius, *Die Elementargesetze der bildenden Kunst* (Leipzig, 1908).

14. Letter from Pollock to me, March 24, 1970.

15. Cornelius, "Leben und Lehre," p. 19.

16. *Ibid.,* p. 65. Interestingly, when Horkheimer wrote about Kant in 1962 ("Kants Philosophie und die Aufklärung," in *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft* [Frankfurt, 1967]; p. 210), he praised Kant for the antiharmonistic, critical elements in his philosophy.

17. So it has been interpreted in an anonymous article in the *Times Literary Supplement*, "From Historicism to Marxist Humanism" (June 5, 1969), p. 598. The article is by George Lichtheim. For a discussion of Hegel's importance to Critical Theory, see Friedrich W. Schmidt, "Hegel in der Kritischen Theorie der Frankfurter Schule," in *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels.*

18. Horkheimer [Heinrich Regius], *Dämmerung* (Zurich, 1934), p. 86.

19. Horkheimer, "Zum Problem der Wahrheit," *ZfS* IV, 3 (1935), p. 333.

20. Horkheimer, "Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?," *Grünbergs Archiv* XV, 1 (1930), p. 34.

21. Horkheimer, "Hegel und die Metaphysik" in *Festschrift für Carl Grünberg: Zum 70. Geburtstag* (Leipzig, 1932).

22. *Ibid.,* p. 197.

23. *Ibid.,* p. 192.

24. G. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. xxiii.

25. Horkheimer, "Gedanke zur Religion," *Kritische Theorie*, ed. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt, 1968), 2 vols., originally "Nachbemerkung," *ZfS* vol. IV, 1 (1935).

26. *Ibid.,* p. 375. See also Horkheimer [Regius], *Dämmerung*, p. 55.

27. Horkheimer, "Zum Rationalismusstreit in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie," *ZfS* III, 1 (1934), p. 9.

28. Horkheimer, "Materialismus und Metaphysik," *ZfS* II, 1 (1933), pp. 3–4.

29. "Zum Rationalismusstreit," p. 36.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Horkheimer, "Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik," *ZfS* VI, 1 (1937), p. 9.

32. Karl Mannheim had made the same point in his essay, "Conservative Thought," in *From Karl Mannheim*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York, 1971), pp. 213f. But this was written in 1925, well before the Nazi takeover.

33. See Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*, in *Werke*, vol. IX (Neuwied, 1961). Here Lukács repudiated his own origins in Dilthey, Simmel, and others, especially as they had appeared in *History and Class Consciousness.*

34. Horkheimer, "Geschichte und Psychologie," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932) *passim.*

35. Horkheimer, "The Relation between Psychology and Sociology in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey," *SPSS* VIII, 3 (1939) *passim.*

36. See Horkheimer, *Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart, 1930), for a discussion of Vico.

37. "Zum Problem der Wahrheit," p. 361.

38. Horkheimer, "Bemerkungen zu Jaspers' 'Nietzsche,' " *ZfS* VI, 2 (1937).

39. "Zum Problem der Wahrheit," p. 357.

40. "Zum Rationalismusstreit," p. 44.

41. Theodor Adorno, in a review of Ernest Newman's biography of Wagner (*Kenyon Review*, vol. IX, 1 [Winter, 1947]), made a similar point. Nietzsche's negativism, he wrote, "expressed the humane in a world in which humanity had become a sham." His "unique demonstration of the repressive character of occidental culture" was what set him apart from Wagner (p. 161).

42. See Horkheimer, "Zu Bergsons Metaphysik der Zeit," *ZfS* III, 3 (1934), and his review of Bergson's *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* in *ZfS* II, 2 (1933).

43. Review of *Les deux sources*, p. 106.

44. Quoted in Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie*, vol. I, p. 175, from a letter to Celestin Bouglé (January 24, 1935).

45. He did not, however, ignore its origins in the Reformation. See, for example, his discussion of Luther in Horkheimer, "Montaigne und die Funktion der Skepsis," *ZfS* VII, 1 (1938), pp. 10–13.

46. Horkheimer, "Materialismus und Moral," *ZfS* II, 2 (1933), p. 165.

47. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (Frankfurt, 1951), p. 80.

48. "Materialismus und Moral," pp. 183–184.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

50. Horkheimer, "Materialismus und Metaphysik," *ZfS* II, 1 (1933).

51. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

52. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," *Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (New York, 1959), p. 243.

53. Adorno, *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie* (Stuttgart, 1956), p. 82.

54. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 162 (italics in the original).

55. For an example of this consideration in the Institut's work, see Adorno, "Veblen's Attack on Culture," *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967), where he discusses the concept of "conspicuous consumption" (p. 87).

56. For a discussion of Marx's attitude towards the state, which makes this point, see Avineri, *Social and Political Thought of Marx*, pp. 202f.

57. *Dämmerung*, p. 18.

58. Horkheimer, "Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie," *ZfS* IV, 1 (1935), p. 5.

59. Adorno, *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie*; Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence," *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968) (originally in *ZfS* V, 1 [1936]).

60. Anon., "From Historicism to Marxist Humanism," p. 598.

61. See interview with Horkheimer in *Der Spiegel* (January 5, 1970), entitled "Auf das Andere Hoffen."

62. See, for example, "Montaigne und die Funktion der Skepsis," pp. 21, 45, and "Zum Problem der Wahrheit," p. 363.

63. *Dämmerung*, p. 116.

64. Jürgen Habermas, "Der deutsche Idealismus der jüdischen Philosophen," *Philosophisch-politische Profile* (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 41. Horkheimer made a similar point in "Über die deutschen Juden," *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft*, p. 311.

65. See H. Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969), pp. 6f.

66. Avineri, *Social and Political Thought of Marx*, p. 85.

67. *Dämmerung*, p. 181.

68. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, with an intro. by Hannah Arendt (New York, 1968), p. 261.

69. Horkheimer, "Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung," *ZfS* V, 2 (1936).

70. Marcuse was to make the same point in his article "The Affirmative Character of Culture," *Negations*, p. 119 (originally *ZfS* VI, 1 [1937]).

71. Horkheimer, "Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung," p. 171. Marcuse was later to expand this idea in psychoanalytic terms with his concept of "repressive desublimation."

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 174–215 *passim.*

73. Marcuse, "On Hedonism," *Negations* (originally "Zur Kritik der Hedonismus," *ZfS* VI, 1 [1938]).

74. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

79. (Boston, 1964).

80. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

81. For a discussion of "positive freedom," see Franz Neumann, "The Concept of Political Freedom," *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, ed. Herbert Marcuse (New York, 1957), and Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford, 1969).

82. See, for example, Horkheimer's *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1947).

83. Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," *Negations*, pp. 135–136 (originally *ZfS* VI, 3 [1937]). Further amplification of the distinction between the two types of reason can be found in his *Reason and Revolution*, pp. 44–46.

84. For a discussion of the importance of identity theory in Marcuse's work, see my article "The Metapolitics of Utopianism," *Dissent* XVII, 4 (July–August, 1970).

85. "Zum Rationalismusstreit," p. 1; "Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik," p. 6.

86. "Zum Problem der Wahrheit," p. 354.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 357.

88. For a discussion of the Vienna Circle's emigration to the United States, see Herbert Feigl, "The *Wiener Kreis* in America," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

89. See *Eclipse of Reason, passim.*

90. "Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik," *ZfS* VI, 1 (1937).

91. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

92. For an expansion of this point by a second generation Frankfurt School thinker, see Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests, passim.*

93. "Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik," p. 27.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

96. "Zum Problem der Wahrheit," pp. 337–338.

97. "Philosophy and Critical Theory," *Negations*, pp. 147–148.

98. "Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?"

99. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

100. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 55. Marcuse, in his article on Mannheim ("Zur Wahrheitsproblematik der soziologischen Methode," *Die Gesellschaft* VI [October, 1929]), makes the same point (pp. 361–362). Marcuse was a bit kinder to Mannheim than Horkheimer, arguing that Mannheim's reduction of Marxism to the consciousness of a specific class pointed to a valid connection between theory and *praxis.* He did, however, criticize Mannheim for missing "the intentional moment of all occurrences" (p. 362) and for his relationism, with its quietistic implications. Adorno, when he wrote on the sociology of knowledge, was harsher still; see his "The Sociology of Knowledge and Its Consciousness," *Prisms.*

102. *Reason and Revolution*, p. 322.

103. Hannah Arendt, "What is Authority?," *Between Past and Future* (Cleveland and New York, 1961).

104. Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Aesthetischen* (Tübingen, 1933), and *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie* (Stuttgart, 1956).

105. Letter from Adorno to Lowenthal, July 6, 1934.

106. For Benjamin's review, see *Vossische Zeitung* (April 2, 1933). Tillich, newly appointed to the faculty of the Union Theological Seminary in New York, wrote a review in the *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXI, 23 (November 8, 1934). Karl Löwith wrote another in the *Deutsche Literatur-Zeitung*, V, 3F, 5 (1934).

107. "Notiz" in the third edition of *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Aesthetischen* (Frankfurt, 1966), p. 321.

108. Quoted in *Kierkegaard* (1966 ed.), p. 29.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

117. In *SSPS*, VIII, 3 (1939–1940), Adorno wrote an article "On Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Love."

118. This was the word Adorno used when I spoke with him in March, 1969, in Frankfurt.

119. *Kierkegaard*, p. 137.

120. Adorno, *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 24–25.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

123. Adorno, "Husserl and the Problem of Idealism," *Journal of Philosophy* XXVII, 1 (January 4, 1940), p. 11.

124. *Zur Metakritik*, p. 43.

125. "Husserl and the Problem of Idealism," p. 7.

126. *Zur Metakritik*, p. 47.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

128. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

130. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

131. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

132. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

133. In his article on the decline of story-telling ("The Storyteller: Reflections on

the Works of Nikolai Leskov," *Illuminations*), Benjamin wrote: "Experience has fallen in value. . . . Never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power" (pp. 83–84).

134. *Zur Metakritik*, p. 221.

135. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

136. *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29. Marcuse was to state this even more forcefully in his article "The Concept of Essence," *Negations.*

137. Adorno, "A Portrait of Walter Benjamin," *Prisms*, p. 235.

138. Georg Picht entitled his article on Adorno's death "Atonale Philosophie" (*Merkur*, XXIII, 10 [October, 1969]).

139. For one recent example, see Jerry Cohen, "The Philosophy of Marcuse," *New Left Review* (September–October, 1969).

140. Habermas, "Zum Geleit," in *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse*, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 11–12.

141. See, for example, Alfred Schmidt, "Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse," *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse*; and Paul Piccone and Alex Delfini, "Marcuse's Heideggerian Marxism," *Telos* (Fall, 1970).

142. Marcuse, "Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des historischen Materialismus," *Philosophische Hefte* I, 1 (1928).

143. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

144. *Ibid.*, p. 55. According to Schmidt ("Existential-Ontologie," pp. 28–29), there were elements of an expressionistic action for action's sake in all of this. In general, Schmidt is very critical of Marcuse's efforts to combine Marxism and phenomenology.

145. Marcuse, "Beiträge," p. 46.

146. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

148. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

149. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

150. Marcuse, "Zum Problem der Dialektik," *Die Gesellschaft* VII, 1 (January, 1930), p. 26.

151. "Das Problem der geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit," *Die Gesellschaft* VIII, 4 (April, 1931).

152. Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt, 1932).

153. For a discussion of both Hegel books, see Alain de Libera, "La Critique de Hegel," *La Nef* (January–March, 1969).

154. *Hegels Ontologie*, p. 368.

155. Marcuse, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen Materialismus," *Die Gesellschaft* IX, 8 (1932).

156. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

157. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

158. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

159. *Ibid.*, p. 173. Marcuse also wrote an entire article on the ontological centrality of labor, "Über die philosophischen Grundlagen des Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Arbeitsbegriff," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* LXIX, 3 (June, 1933).

160. "Neue Quellen," p. 158.

161. *Reason and Revolution*, p. 78.

162. Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie"* (Frankfurt, 1968).

163. *Reason and Revolution*, p. 75.

164. See Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (Boston, 1955), pp. 170–179, for his discussion of the "play drive."

165. See, for example, Marcuse, "The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian State," *Negations* (originally *ZfS* III, 1 [1934]).

166. "The Concept of Essence," p. 44.

167. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

168. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

169. Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," *Negations*, p. 147.

170. *Ibid.*, pp. 149–150.

171. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

172. *Ibid.*, p. 155. Marcuse was to develop the importance of fantasy in his later works, especially *Eros and Civilization.*

173. New York, 1941. Part of the book appeared in the *SPSS* as Marcuse, "An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy," VIII, 3 (1939).

174. Ironically in the light of his later stance, Marcuse flattered his American audience in his introduction by quoting Hegel's belief that America's rational spirit made it the "land of the future" (*Reason and Revolution*, p. xv.)

175. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

176. *Ibid.*, pp. 313–314.

177. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

178. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

179. See, for example, Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* and *Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie"*; and Albrecht Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society* (New York, 1971).

180. *Reason and Revolution*, p. 400.

181. This was pointed out in a generally favorable review by Paul Tillich in *SPSS* IX, 3 (1941), and in a more critical one by Karl Löwith in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* II, 4 (1942). It is a theme that continues to reappear in assessments of the book; for example, Lucio Colletti, "Von Hegel zu Marcuse," *Alternative* 72/73 (June–August, 1970).

182. Horkheimer, "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," *ZfS* VI, 2 (1937).

183. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

184. Horkheimer, "Zum Problem der Voraussage in den Sozialwissenschaften," *ZfS* II, 3 (1933).

185. "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," p. 276.

186. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

187. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

188. Quoted in Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 231.

189. George Kline, "Some Critical Comments on Marx's Philosophy," in *Marx and the Western World*, ed. Nicholas Lobkowicz (Notre Dame, Ind., 1967), p. 431.

190. See, for example, Horkheimer, "Zum Problem der Wahrheit," pp. 340–343, and "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," p. 252. The Institut tended to assimilate American pragmatism with positivism.

191. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, January 14, 1946 (Lowenthal collection).

192. "Zum Problem der Wahrheit," p. 343.

193. Conversations with Lowenthal in Berkeley (August, 1968) and Habermas in

Frankfurt (February, 1969). For Habermas's discussion of pragmatism, see his treatment of C. S. Pierce in *Knowledge and Human Interests.*

194. "Zum Problem des Wahrheit," p. 345.

195. "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," p. 269.

196. *Ibid.,* p. 269.

197. Marcuse, "The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian State," *Negations,* p. 42.

198. Horkheimer, "Autoritärer Staat," in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis" (unpub., 1942), in Pollock's collection.

3. THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

1. For a discussion of early attempts to merge Freud and Marx, see "When Dogma Bites Dogma, or The Difficult Marriage of Marx and Freud," *The Times Literary Supplement* (January 8, 1971).

2. For a description of Reich's plight see Paul A. Robinson, *The Freudian Left* (New York, 1969), pp. 28–59.

3. Philip Rieff, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* (New York, 1959), pp. 237–239.

4. See Franz Neumann, "Anxiety and Politics," in his *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State,* ed. Herbert Marcuse (New York, 1957), and H. Stuart Hughes, "Franz Neumann between Marxism and Liberal Democracy," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960,* ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

5 *Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus,* translated into English as *The Psychology of Marxism* (New York and London, 1928). For a discussion of de Man, see Peter Dodge, *Beyond Marxism: The Faith and Works of Hendrik de Man* (The Hague, 1966).

6. So Professor Gladys Meyer of Barnard has suggested in a letter to me. Professor Meyer, who was a student at the Institut in the pre-emigration period, has written a novel, *The Magic Circle* (New York, 1944), in which de Man is thinly disguised as Adriaan de Barenne, one of the main characters. Pollock, when I spoke with him in March, 1969, denied the idea that de Man was deliberately brought to Frankfurt for the purpose Professor Meyer claims.

7. Theodor Wiesengrund, "Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der Transzendentalen Seelenlehre" (unpub. diss., Frankfurt University, 1927).

8. *Ibid.,* p. 318.

9. Interview with Horkheimer, Montagnola, Switzerland, March, 1969.

10. It emerged out of a factional split within the German psychoanalytic movement. See Carl M. Grossman and Sylvia Grossman, *The Wild Analyst* (New York, 1965), p. 178.

11. Horkheimer interview, March, 1969.

12. Meng taught a course entitled "Einführung in die Psychoanalyse," Landauer, "Psychoanalytische Klinik," Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, "Psychoanalytische Trieblehre," and Fromm, "Die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf Soziologie und Religionswissenschaft." See the May–June, 1929, issue of *Die psychoanalytische Bewegung* (I, 1) for a description of the Institute's opening. See also Adolf Friedmann, "Heinrich Meng, Psychoanalysis and Mental Hygiene," *Psychoanalytic Pioneers,* ed. Franz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein, and Martin Grotjahn (New York and London, 1966).

13. Erich Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* (New York, 1962), p. 5.

14. See, for example, Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York, 1961).

15. In *Fear of Freedom* (the English version of *Escape from Freedom* whose pagination will be used in these notes [London, 1942]), Fromm acknowledged the importance of Hegel and Marx for their notion of alienation (p. 103).

16. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, p. 28.

17. John Schaar, *Escape from Authority: The Perspectives of Erich Fromm* (New York, 1961), has argued that Fromm fails to answer the criticisms of G. E. Moore and David Hume against the naturalistic fallacy, that he doesn't understand that society is more than nature, that one must have full knowledge of nature before judging what is natural or not, and that if evil exists, it must be part of nature too (pp. 20–24).

18. Letter from Fromm to me, May 14, 1971.

19. See Fromm's *Marx's Concept of Man* for evidence of his respect for Marx's ability as a psychologist. A more extensive statement appears in "Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man," *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1970).

20. *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, p. 12. In his letter to me of May 14, 1971, Dr. Fromm said that he regretted the comparison, because it was foolish to rank one great man next to another, but his judgment about their respective merits was unchanged.

21. *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, p. 10: "There is not a single theoretical conclusion about man's psyche, either in this or in my other writings, which is not based on a critical observation of human behavior carried out in the course of this psychoanalytic work." For a rebuttal of this assertion, see J. A. C. Brown, *Freud and the Post-Freudians* (London, 1961), p. 205.

22. Fromm, "Der Sabbath," *Imago*, XIII, Nos. 2, 3, 4 (1927).

23. Published originally in Vienna in 1931, it appeared in English as *The Dogma of Christ, and Other Essays on Religion, Psychology, and Culture*, trans. James Luther Adams (New York, 1963).

24. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

26. Fromm, "Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932). Translated in *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis.*

27. *Ibid.*, p. 32. Reich's more recent work he approved. See his review of Reich's *Der Einbruch der Sexualmoral* in *ZfS* II, 1 (1933).

28. Fromm, "Über Methode," p. 48. See also Fromm, *The Dogma of Christ*, p. 47.

29. "Über Methode," p. 45.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

32. Letter from Fromm to me, May 14, 1971.

33. "Über Methode," p. 38.

34. Fromm, "Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialpsychologie," *ZfS* I, 3 (1932). Translated in *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis.*

35. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

36. In *Eros and Civilization* (Boston, 1955), Marcuse was to write: "Reactivation of polymorphous and narcissistic sexuality ceases to be a threat to culture and can itself lead to culture-building if the organism exists not as an instrument of alienated labor but as a subject of self-realization" (pp. 191–192). "Polymorphous perversity" was a term Norman O. Brown popularized in his *Life against Death* (New York, 1959).

37. Reich differed from Fromm in arguing that *all* character "armoring" was pernicious and repressive. See Robinson, *The Freudian Left*, p. 23.

38. Interview with Fromm, New York, N.Y., December, 1968.

39. Fromm, "Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie," p. 268.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 273.

41. E. M. Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Cambridge, 1935), p. 327. For a bibliography of articles written on Bachofen in the 1920's, see Adrien Turel, *Bachofen-Freud, Zur Emanzipation des Mannes vom Reich der Mutter* (Bern, 1939), pp. 209–210.

42. Quoted in Robinson, *The Freudian Left*, p. 50.

43. "Family Sentiments," *ZfS* III, 1 (1934).

44. Fromm, "Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechtstheorie," *ZfS* III, 2 (1934). Translated in *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis.*

45. The notion of nature as a dominant force to which man must passively submit played a large part in the Institut's analysis of fascism. See, for example, Marcuse's "Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitären Staatsauffassung," *ZfS* III, 2 (1934); and Leo Lowenthal's "Knut Hamsun. Zur Vorgeschichte der autoritären Ideologie," *ZfS* VI, 2 (1937).

46. Fromm, "Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechtstheorie," p. 221.

47. In the light of Fromm's early religiosity, his discussion of Judaism in this context is worth noting. Although acknowledging the patriarchal God at its core, he also pointed to such elements in Jewish thought as the vision of the land of milk and honey, which were clearly matriarchal. The Hasidim, he argued (once again as Buber would have done), were especially matriarchal in character (*Ibid.*, p. 223).

48. Fromm, "Die gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit der psychoanalytischen Therapie," *ZfS* IV, 3 (1935).

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 371–375.

50. Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, with Robert Paul Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston, 1965). Similarly, Adorno wrote: "The bourgeois is tolerant. His love for men as they are arises out of hate for the correct man" (*Minima Moralia* [Frankfurt, 1951], p. 27). Horkheimer made a similar point in *The Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1947), p. 19.

51. "Die gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit," p. 393.

52. "Repressive Tolerance," p. 109.

53. For Fromm's own attitude towards radicals, see "The Revolutionary Character," included in *The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Religion, Psychology, and Culture* (New York, 1966). Horkheimer expressed similar doubts about Freud's view of revolutionaries as early as 1934 (Heinrich Regius [pseud.], *Dämmerung* [Zurich, 1934], p. 256).

54. "Die gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit," pp. 384–385.

55. Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (New York, 1963), p. 400. Jones also accused Otto Rank of insanity. Fromm tried to set the record straight in *Sigmund Freud's Mission* (New York, 1959).

56. Grossman and Grossman, *The Wild Analyst*, p. 195. Frieda Fromm-Reichman was especially close to Groddeck and was one of the last people to see him before his death in 1934. She included him in the dedication of her first book, *Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy* (Chicago, 1950).

57. Fromm, "Zum Gefühl der Ohnmacht," *ZfS* VI, 1 (1937). This and Fromm's contribution to *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (Paris, 1936) will be treated in the next chapter.

58. See Schaar, *Escape from Authority*, and Guyton Hammond, *Man in Estrangement* (Nashville, 1965), for two discussions of the book.

59. Fromm, *Fear of Freedom*, p. 9.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 251.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

63. Fromm, *Man for Himself* (New York, 1947). Fromm divided character types into "productive" and "nonproductive" orientations. The latter was subdivided into receptive, exploitative, hoarding, and marketing subtypes (p. 120).

64. *Fear of Freedom*, p. 7. In *The Sane Society* (New York, 1955), however, Fromm attacked Sullivan's notion of love as alienated (pp. 193–199).

65. Letter from Fromm to me, May 14, 1971.

66. *Fear of Freedom*, p. 239.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 136. This was a concept Fromm had not used in his discussion of sado-masochism in his article in the *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, "Sozialpsychologischer Teil."

70. *Fear of Freedom*, p. 222.

71. *Man for Himself*, pp. 225–226.

72. Fromm, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, with D. T. Suzuki and R. de Martino (New York, 1960).

73. Letter from Fromm to me, May 14, 1971.

74. *Ibid.*

75. Horkheimer, "Geschichte und Psychologie," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932), p. 141.

76. Horkheimer, "Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung," *ZfS* V, 2 (1936), pp. 225–226.

77. Benjamin wrote an article on Bachofen in 1934. Intended for the *Nouvelle revue française*, which rejected it, it was not published until 1954, when it appeared in *Les Lettres nouvelles*; Walter Benjamin, *Briefe*, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt, 1966), vol. II, pp. 614–615. When Benjamin came to write a brief history of the Institut for Thomas Mann's journal *Mass und Wert* in 1938 (I, 5, May–June), he paid special attention to Fromm's work on matriarchal theory.

78. Interview with Fromm, December, 1968 in New York.

79. Interview with Lowenthal, August, 1968 in Berkeley.

80. Horkheimer, "The Relation between Psychology and Sociology in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey," *SPSS* VIII, 3 (1939).

81. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, October 31, 1942, from Pacific Palisades, California (Lowenthal collection).

82. Horkheimer, "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," *ZfS* VI, 2 (1937), p. 276.

83. In *Sociologica: Aufsätze, Max Horkheimer zum sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet* (Frankfurt, 1955) and *New Left Review*, 46 (November–December, 1967), 47 (January–February, 1968).

84. I am indebted to Professor Lowenthal for making this paper available to me. There is a German version of it in *Sociologia II: Reden und Vorträge*, ed. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt, 1962).

85. Adorno "Social Science and Sociological Tendencies in Psychoanalysis," April 27, 1946 (unpublished), p. 4; in Lowenthal's collection.

86. Benjamin had written extensively on the importance of shocks in modern life

in "Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire," *ZfS* VIII, 1/2 (1939)), which has been translated in *Illuminations*. He explicitly used Freudian ideas to support his interpretation.

87. "Social Science and Sociological Tendencies in Psychoanalysis," p. 6.

88. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

92. Walter Benjamin, *Schriften*, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt, 1955), vol. I, p. 140.

93. "Social Science and Sociological Tendencies in Psychoanalysis," pp. 22–23.

94. *Minima Moralia*, p. 78.

95. For an imaginative use of Freud by a second generation Critical Theorist, see Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1971). Earlier in the Institut's postemigration history, psychoanalytic categories were used in empirical studies, such as the *Gruppenexperiment*, ed. Friedrich Pollock, *Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie*, vol. II (Frankfurt, 1955).

96. *Freud in der Gegenwart, Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie*, vol. VI (Frankfurt, 1957). The book consisted of addresses and papers given at Frankfurt by a number of distinguished psychologists, including Erik Erikson, Franz Alexander, René Spitz, and Ludwig Binswanger.

97. Marcuse, "Autorität und Familie in der deutschen Soziologie bis 1933," in *Studien über Autorität und Familie*. Marcuse also contributed a long introductory essay on the intellectual history of the idea of authority.

98. Robinson, *The Freudian Left*, pp. 188–191.

99. Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968), pp. 122–123 (originally *ZfS* VI, 1 [1937]).

100. *Ibid.*, p. 116. Here Marcuse expressed an attitude towards the carrying through of reification to its extreme which he later was to admire in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* ("Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's *L'Être et le néant*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* VIII, 3 [March, 1948], p. 327).

101. Marcuse, "On Hedonism," *Negations*, p. 190.

102. Robinson, *The Freudian Left*, p. 179.

103. *Eros and Civilization*, p. 218.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

106. *Ibid.*, pp. 54–55.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

109. "The Oedipus complex, although primary source and model of neurotic conflicts, is certainly not the central cause of the discontents in civilization, and not the central obstacle for their removal" (*ibid.*, p. 204). Robinson, in *The Freudian Left*, notes this passage, but neglects Marcuse's discussion of the Oedipus complex in his epilogue, where he grants it greater importance. For an excellent critique of Marcuse's attitude towards the Oedipus complex, see Sidney Lipshires, "Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond" (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1971).

110. Quoted by Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, p. 246, from Fromm's *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (New Haven, 1950), pp. 79ff.

111. *Eros and Civilization*, p. 247.

112. See, for example, Fromm, *Man for Himself*, p. 215.

113. *Eros and Civilization*, p. 248.

114. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (New York, 1950), p. 76.

115. *Eros and Civilization*, pp. 214–215.

116. Here Marcuse did not go as far as Norman O. Brown in arguing that all sexual organization was repressive; see Brown's *Life Against Death*, pp. 122ff. Marcuse refused to accept the total breakdown of differentiations of all sorts championed by Brown. "The unity of subject and object is a hallmark of absolute idealism; however, even Hegel retained the tension between the two, the distinction. Brown goes beyond the Absolute Idea: 'Fusion, mystical, participation' " (*Negations*, p. 138).

117. The term appears in Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), p. 16.

118. Horkheimer and Adorno both expressed doubts about aspects of Marcuse's reading of Freud when I spoke with them in the winter of 1968–1969.

119. Fromm, "The Human Implications of Instinctive 'Radicalism,' " *Dissent* II, 4 (Autumn, 1955), and "A Counter-Rebuttal," *Dissent* III, 1 (Winter, 1956).

120. "The Human Implications of Instinctive 'Radicalism,' " p. 346.

121. Marcuse, "A Reply to Erich Fromm," *Dissent* III, 1 (Winter, 1956). In *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis*, Fromm picked up the debate where he had put it down fifteen years earlier (pp. 14–20).

122. *Ibid.*, p. 81. This was a term Marcuse was to use extensively in *One-Dimensional Man* and his subsequent works. *Nicht Mitmachen* had been a favorite "password" of the Institut from the earliest Frankfurt days, so Lowenthal told me (letter, August 15, 1970).

123. *Fear of Freedom*, p. 158 (italics in original).

124. Fromm, *The Heart of Man* (New York, 1964), pp. 53–54.

125. Horkheimer, "Gedanke zur Religion," *Kritische die Theorie*, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1968), p. 375.

4. THE INSTITUT'S FIRST STUDIES OF AUTHORITY

1. Max Horkheimer, "Autoritärer Staat," in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis" (unpub., 1942; Collection Friedrich Pollock in Montagnola, Switzerland), p. 152.

2. Margaret Mead, "On the Institutionalized Role of Women and Character Formation," *ZfS* V, 1 (1936); Charles Beard, "The Social Sciences in the United States," *ZfS* IV, 1 (1935); Harold Lasswell, "Collective Autism as a Consequence of Culture Contact," *ZfS* IV, 2 (1935).

3. In 1935 Tönnies' rather unexceptional article on the right to work was published out of deference to his position and reputation; Ferdinand Tönnies, "Das Recht auf Arbeit," *ZfS* IV, 1 (1935).

4. 1938 unpublished mimeographed history of the Institut in Friedrich Pollock's collection in Montagnola, p. 13.

5. "Ten Years on Morningside Heights: A Report on the Institute's History 1934 to 1944" (unpub., 1944), in Lowenthal's collection. Paying honoraria for published or unpublished articles and reviews in the *Zeitschrift* was a frequently used device to make the support "more respectable" (letter from Lowenthal to me, August 15, 1970).

6. Interview with Friedrich Pollock, Montagnola, Switzerland, March, 1969.

7. Ludwig Marcuse, *Mein zwanzigstes Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1960), pp. 239–240.

8. Conversation with Professor Pachter, New York, N.Y., October 13, 1971.

9. These appeared in two special issues of a Berlin journal called *Alternative*, 56/57 (October–December, 1967) and 59/60 (April–June, 1968).

10. For a discussion of this period at Columbia, see Robert MacIver's autobiography, *As a Tale That Is Told* (Chicago, 1968). According to his account, MacIver wanted a broader, more theoretically oriented department than Lynd, who stressed a utilitarian, professional approach. The final break came over a hostile review MacIver wrote of Lynd's *Knowledge for What* (pp. 137–141).

11. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, November 8, 1942, in Lowenthal's collection.

12. Henry Pachter, "A Memoir," in *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals* (*Salmagundi*, 10/11 [Fall, 1969–Winter, 1970]), p. 18.

13. Horkheimer, "Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung," *Frankfurt Universitätsreden* (Frankfurt, 1931), pp. 14–15.

14. Adolf Levenstein, *Die Arbeiterfrage* (Munich, 1912). Paul Lazarsfeld first brought the importance of this predecessor to my attention. His student, Anthony Oberschall, has written on Levenstein's work in *Empirical Social Research in Germany, 1846–1914* (Paris, The Hague, 1965), pp. 94ff. Fromm denies the importance of Levenstein's model (letter from Fromm to me, May 14, 1971).

15. Fromm, "Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialpsychologie," *ZfS* I, 3 (1932).

16. Fromm, *Social Character in a Mexican Village*, with Michael Maccoby (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970).

17. So it was called in the *International Institute of Social Research: A Report on Its History and Activities, 1933–1938* (New York, 1938), pp. 14–15.

18. Letter from Pollock to me, March 24, 1970. Paul Massing, who was a student at the Institut in its Frankfurt days, suggested to me that the study was really not that conclusive because revolutions might well be made by authoritarian types under certain conditions (interview with Massing, New York, N.Y., November 25, 1970).

19. Letter from Fromm to me, May 14, 1971.

20. Fromm, *Fear of Freedom* (British title of *Escape from Freedom*) (London, 1942), p. 183.

21. Horkheimer, "Allgemeiner Teil," in *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (Paris, 1936), pp. 23–24.

22. See, for example, Franz Neumann's "Economics and Politics in the Twentieth Century," *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, ed. Herbert Marcuse (New York, 1957), written originally in 1951. Here he wrote: "Marxist theory suffers from a misunderstanding: the confusion of sociological analysis with the theory of political action" (p. 273). In a posthumously published paper entitled "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," in *Politics, Law, and Social Change: Selected Essays of Otto Kirchheimer*, ed. Frederic S. Burin and Kurt L. Shell (New York and London, 1969), Kirchheimer made a similar point.

23. For a recent discussion of this issue, see Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston, 1960).

24. Marcuse, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968), pp. xi–xii.

25. For a recent restatement of the Institut's stress on society, see Adorno's "Society," in *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals* (*Salmagundi*, 10/11 [Fall, 1969–Winter, 1970]).

26. Marcuse, *Negations*, pp. 31ff.

27. For a discussion of this change, see Robert V. Daniels, "Fate and Will in the Marxian Philosophy of History," in *European Intellectual History Since Darwin and Marx*, ed. W. Warren Wager (New York, 1966).

28. Horkheimer, "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung," in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis," p. 25.

29. Fromm, *Fear of Freedom*, pp. 26, 232.

30. Marcuse, *Negations*, p. 39 (italics in the original).

31. Horkheimer, "Autoritärer Staat," p. 153.

32. Horkheimer, "Allgemeiner Teil," pp. 48–49.

33. Fromm, "Sozialpsychologischer Teil," in *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, pp. 132–133.

34. Horkheimer, "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung," p. 29.

35. The relevant section of this work first appeared in English in 1947, in Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947).

36. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

37. Horkheimer, "Allgemeiner Teil," pp. 48–49.

38. Horkheimer, "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung," p. 56.

39. Marcuse, *Negations*, p. 19.

40. Horkheimer, "Die Juden und Europa," *ZfS* VIII, 1/2 (1939), p. 115.

41. Horkheimer, "Zum Rationalismusstreit in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie," *ZfS* III, 1 (1934), p. 36.

42. Marcuse, *Negations*, p. 18.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

50. Horkheimer, "Die Juden und Europa," p. 125.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

52. For an analysis of fascism as middle-class extremism by a theorist very different from those of the Frankfurt School, see Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960).

53. Horkheimer, "Vorwort," *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, p. xii.

54. J. N. Findlay, in his *Hegel: A Reexamination* (New York, 1958), writes: "Alone among modern philosophers Hegel has an almost Freudian realization of the simple sexual and family foundations of organized group-life" (p. 116).

55. For a recent discussion of the literature on the family in the last century see René König, "Soziologie der Familie," in *Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung*, vol. II (Stuttgart, 1969).

56. Horkheimer, "Allgemeiner Teil," p. 19.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

58. In a subsequent article in *ZfS* VI, 1 (1937), entitled "Zum Gefühl der Ohnmacht," Fromm explored the consequences and causes of the growing feeling of impotence.

59. Horkheimer, "Allgemeiner Teil," p. 66.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76.

61. Mitscherlich, a psychoanalyst connected with the University of Frankfurt and director of the Sigmund Freud Institute, was very much influenced by the Institut für Sozialforschung after the war. His *Society without the Father*, trans. Eric Mosbacher (New York, 1970), shows how indebted he was to the Frankfurt School's earlier studies of social psychology.

62. Fromm, "Sozialpsychologischer Teil," p. 84.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

65. See Chapter 3, p. 99.

66. He elaborated on these symptoms of masochistic passivity in "Zum Gefühl der Ohnmacht," p. 117.

67. Marcuse, "Autorität und Familie in der deutschen Soziologie bis 1933," in *Studien über Autorität und Familie.*

68. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre's very harsh treatment of his work, *Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic* (New York, 1970).

69. Marcuse, "Ideengeschichtlicher Teil," in *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, p. 140.

70. The Institut was generally at one with German academic philosophy in concentrating on the Greeks, Descartes, Kant and Hegel, the various philosophers of life, and modern phenomenologists. Most medieval philosophy was ignored, and the empiricist tradition was usually discussed as a whole in order to be dismissed. Marcuse, however, did discuss Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau in lectures at Columbia (letter from Lowenthal to me, August 15, 1970).

71. This quotation is taken from the English abstract at the end of the *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, p. 901.

72. Letter from Fromm to me, May 14, 1971.

73. Interview with Ernst Schachtel, New York, N.Y., June, 1970.

74. Fromm, "Geschichte und Methoden der Erhebungen," in *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, pp. 235–238.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

76. Ernst Schachtel, "Zum Begriff und zur Diagnose der Persönlichkeit in den 'Personality Tests,' " *ZfS* VI, 3 (1937).

77. These included the following:

Karl A. Wittfogel, "Wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Grundlagen der Entwicklung der Familien Autorität."
Ernst Manheim, "Beiträge zu einer Geschichte der autoritären Familie."
Andries Sternheim, "Materialen zur Wirksamkeit ökonomischer Faktoren in der gegenwärtigen Familie."
Hilde Weiss, "Materialen zum Verhältnis von Konjunktur und Familie."
Gottfried Salomon, "Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der französischen Familie."
Willi Strelewicz, "Aus den familienpolitischen Debatten der deutschen Nationalversammlung 1919."
Ernst Schachtel, "Das Recht der Gegenwart und die Autorität in der Familie."
Harald Mankiewics, "Die Entwicklung des französischen Scheidungsrechts."
———, "Die Rechtslage der in nichtlegalisierten Ehen lebendenden Personen in Frankreich."
Zoltán Ronai, "Die Familie in der französischen und belgischen Sozialpolitik."
Hubert Abrahamsohn, "Die Familie in der deutschen Sozialpolitik."
Paul Honigsheim, "Materialen zur Beziehung zwischen Familie und Asozialität von Jugendlichen."

Kurt Goldstein, "Bemerkungen über die Bedeutung der Biologie für die Soziologie anlässlich des Autoritätsproblems."

Fritz Jungmann, "Autorität und Sexualmoral in der freien bürgerlichen Jugendbewegung." (Jungmann was a pseudonym for Franz Borkenau, who was living in London at the time. This was his last contribution to the Institut.)

Marie Jahoda-Lazarsfeld, "Autorität und Erziehung in der Familie, Schule und Jugendbewegung."

Curt Wormann, "Autorität und Familie in der deutschen Belletristik nach dem Weltkrieg."

78. Interview with Pollock, March, 1969.

79. Horkheimer, "Die Juden und Europa."

80. Hans Speier, review of "Studien über Autorität und Familie," *Social Research* III, 4 (November 1936), pp. 501–504.

81. Among Wittfogel's articles in the thirties, which were all part of his more ambitious project to write a series of books on Chinese history and society, were the following: "The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History," *ZfS* IV, 1 (1935), and "Die Theorie der orientalischen Gesellschaft," *ZfS* VII, 1 (1938). In much of his work he was helped by his second wife, Olga Lang, whose book *Chinese Family and Society* (New Haven, 1946) appeared under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Institute of Social Research. Like his work, it did not really employ the methodology of Critical Theory, as Professor Lang admitted to me in conversation (New York, N.Y., June, 1970).

82. Felix Weil, *The Argentine Riddle* (New York, 1944).

83. Mirra Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family* (New York, 1940). Originally, this was to be part of a comparative study of unemployment and the family in European cities as well, but the Institut's European branches were all closed by 1938.

84. For a discussion of Lazarsfeld's Research Center, see his article "An Episode in the History of Social Research: A Memoir," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 285f.

85. Paul Lazarsfeld, "Some Remarks on the Typological Procedures in Social Research," *ZfS* VI, 1 (1937).

86. Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family*, p. 122.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

88. Adorno, "Fragmente über Wagner," *ZfS* VIII, 1/2 (1939). This was a condensation of several chapters of the book he later published entitled *Versuch über Wagner* (Frankfurt, 1952).

89. Leo Lowenthal, *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft; Die Gesellschaftsproblematik in der deutschen Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts* with an intro. by Frederic C. Tubach (Neuwied and Berlin, 1971).

90. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

92. In addition to the opening essay and the piece on Meyer, which were printed in the *Zeitschrift*, a shortened version of the Goethe essay appeared in Lowenthal's *Literature and the Image of Man* (Boston, 1957), and a similarly abbreviated version of the chapter on Freytag was included in a Festschrift for Georg Lukács, *George Lukács zum achtzigsten Geburtstag*, ed. Frank Benseler (Neuwied, 1965).

93. Lowenthal, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur," *ZfS* I, 1 (1932).

94. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

95. Lowenthal, "Conrad Ferdinand Meyers heroische Geschichtsauffassung," *ZfS* II, 1 (1933).

96. *Ibid.,* p. 61.

97. Lowenthal, "Die Auffassung Dostojewskis im Vorkriegsdeutschland," *ZfS* III, 3 (1934). A version of the paper in English is contained in *The Arts in Society,* ed. Robert N. Wilson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).

98. Benjamin wrote him a very appreciative letter from Paris on July 1, 1934, calling it a breakthrough in studies of this type (Lowenthal collection).

99. Lowenthal in *The Arts in Society,* p. 125

100. *Ibid.,* p. 368.

101. Lowenthal, "Das Individuum in der individualistischen Gesellschaft. Bemerkungen über Ibsen," *ZfS* V, 3 (1936). The article appeared with minor changes in translation in Lowenthal's *Literature and the Image of Man.* All quotations refer to the English version.

102. *Ibid.,* p. 170.

103. *Ibid.,* p. 175.

104. *Ibid.,* p. 179.

105. *Ibid.,* p. 184.

106. Lowenthal, "Knut Hamsun. Zur Vorgeschichte der autoritären Ideologie," *ZfS* VI, 3 (1937). This also was republished with a few changes in *Literature and the Image of Man,* from which the following quotations are taken.

107. So Lowenthal told me in conversation, Berkeley, Calif., August, 1968.

108. *Literature and the Image of Man,* p. 198.

109. *Ibid.,* p. 202.

110. They were also to be found, Adorno added in a footnote (written pseudonymously as Hektor Rottweiler), in the music of Jan Sibelius. (Page 338 in the original article in *ZfS,* omitted in the English version in *Literature and the Image of Man.*)

111. *Ibid.,* p. 218.

5. THE INSTITUT'S ANALYSIS OF NAZISM

1. Interview with Alice Maier, New York, N.Y., May, 1969.

2. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944* (rev. ed.; New York, 1944).

3. Neumann *et al., The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America* (Philadelphia, 1953), p. 18.

4. Herbert Marcuse, Preface to *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory,* by Franz Neumann (New York, 1957), p. vii. See also H. Stuart Hughes, "Franz Neumann between Marxism and Liberal Democracy," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960,* ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

5. Most frequently he appeared in *Die Arbeit* and *Die Gesellschaft.*

6. Franz Neumann, "Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft," *ZfS* VI, 3 (1937), reprinted in English as "The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society," in *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State,* from which the following quotations are taken.

7. *Ibid.,* p. 39.

8. *Ibid.,* p. 42.

9. *Ibid.,* p. 52.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

11. Neumann made the same point in *Behemoth*, p. 451.

12. *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, p. 66.

13. Herbert Marcuse, "The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian State," *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968) (originally in *ZfS* III, 1 [1934]).

14. Neumann, "Types of Natural Law," *SPSS* VIII, 3 (1939). The *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* were a continuation of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*. This was its first issue. Neumann's article was reprinted in *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, from which the following quotations are taken.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 75. Neumann was later to change his opinion of Rousseau and positive freedom in general.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

18. Even in his later, more liberal period, Neumann could write, "I cannot agree that the state is always the enemy of freedom" ("Intellectual and Political Freedom," *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, p. 201).

19. For biographical material on Kirchheimer, see John H. Herz and Erich Hula, "Otto Kirchheimer: An Introduction to His Life and Work," in Otto Kirchheimer, *Politics, Law, and Social Change*, ed. Frederic S. Burin and Kurt L. Shell (New York, 1969).

20. Otto Kirchheimer, "The Socialist and Bolshevik Theory of the State," reprinted in *Politics, Law, and Social Change*, p. 15. Later, Kirchheimer abandoned Schmitt's ideas about emergency situations. See "In Quest of Sovereignty," reprinted in *Politics, Law, and Social Change*, p. 191.

21. Kirchheimer, *Weimar — und Was Dann?* (Berlin, 1930), reprinted in *Politics, Law, and Social Change.*

22. Kirchheimer, "Constitutional Reaction in 1932," originally in *Die Gesellschaft* IX (1932), reprinted in *Politics, Law, and Social Change*, p. 79.

23. In their introduction, Herz and Hula remark: "In this respect Kirchheimer clearly underestimated the advantages which even an authoritarian rule of civil servants and military entailed as contrasted with what was to come: Nazi totalitarianism" (*Politics, Law, and Social Change*, p. xvi). Although not wishing to embark on a full-scale discussion of the point, I think Kirchheimer's position had more merit than they allow. I have tried to develop the reasons why in a review of Istvan Deak's *Weimar Germany's Left-Wing Intellectuals* in *Commentary* XLIV, 4 (October, 1969).

24. Kirchheimer also wrote an analysis of the French attempts to establish an authoritarian government above politics in "Decree Powers and Constitutional Law in France under the Third Republic," originally in *American Political Science Review* XXXIV (1940), and reprinted in *Politics, Law, and Social Change.* Here he wrote: "The French example, coming eight years after the German *Präsidialregierung* of Brüning and Papen, shows that the unlimited decree-rule of a constitutional government with a dubious popular or parliamentary basis serves only as an intermediate station on the road to complete authoritarianism" (p. 130).

25. Kirchheimer had articles in the *Archives de Philosophie du droit et de Sociologie juridique* IV (1934), and the *Revue de Science criminelle et de Droit penal comparé* I (1936).

26. *Staatsgefüge und Recht des Dritten Reiches* (Hamburg, 1935), written under the name of Dr. Hermann Seitz and smuggled into Germany as underground literature.

27. Kirchheimer and George Rusche, *Punishment and Social Structure* (New York, 1939).

28. *Ibid.,* p. 5.

29. Kirchheimer, "The Legal Order of National Socialism," *SPSS* IX, 2 (1941).

30. *Punishment and Social Structure,* p. 179.

31. A. R. L. Gurland, *Produktionsweise-Staat-Klassendiktatur* (Leipzig, 1929). The director of the thesis was Hans Freyer of the philosophy faculty.

32. Gurland, "Die Dialektik der Geschichte und die Geschichtsauffassung Karl Kautskys," *Klassenkampf* (Berlin, Sept. 1, 1929).

33. Gurland, "Die K.P.D. und die rechte Gefahr," *Klassenkampf* (Berlin, Dec. 1, 1928). Gurland also wrote a discussion of the SPD's situation, stressing the need for *praxis,* entitled *Das Heute der proletarischen Aktion* (Berlin, 1931).

34. For a discussion of Grossmann's career, see Walter Braeuer, "Henryk Grossmann als Nationalökonom," *Arbeit und Wissenschaft,* vol. VIII (1954).

35. Henryk Grossmann, "Marx, die klassische Nationalökonomie und das Problem der Dynamik," (mimeographed, 1940). Braeuer refers to a manuscript entitled "Marx Ricardiensis?," which Pollock feels may be another title for the same work, although according to Braeuer, it was over three hundred pages long, rather than 113 pages like the one in Pollock's possession (letter to me from Friedrich Pollock, April 16, 1970). The work was finally published with an afterword by Paul Mattick in Frankfurt in 1969.

36. Henryk Grossmann, "The Evolutionist Revolt against Classical Economics," *Journal of Political Economy* LI, 5 (1943); "W. Playfair, the Earliest Theorist of Capitalist Development," *Economic History Review* XVIII, 1 (1948).

37. In our interviews, Lowenthal, Pollock, and Marcuse all mentioned Grossmann's growing distrust of the Institut's members during the forties. The Lowenthal-Horkheimer correspondence confirms their assertions in a number of letters.

38. The same might be said of another old Institut acquaintance, Ernst Bloch, who was refused financial support from the Institut because of his politics (interview with Leo Lowenthal, Berkeley, Calif., August, 1968).

39. Interview, New York, May, 1969.

40. Gerhard Meyer, "Krisenpolitik und Planwirtschaft," *ZfS* IV, 3 (1935); Meyer also contributed several bibliographical essays, "Neuere Literatur über Planwirtschaft," *ZfS* I, 3 (1932), and "Neue englische Literatur zur Planwirtschaft," *ZfS* II, 2 (1933). With Kurt Mandelbaum, he wrote "Zur Theorie der Planwirtschaft," *ZfS* III, 2 (1934).

41. Under the pseudonym Kurt Baumann, Mandelbaum wrote "Autarkie und Planwirtschaft," *ZfS* II, 1 (1933). Under his own name, he wrote "Neuere Literatur zur Planwirtschaft," *ZfS* IV, 3 (1935), and "Neuere Literatur über technologische Arbeitslosigkeit," *ZfS* V, 1 (1936).

42. Erich Baumann was also a pseudonym for Mandelbaum. The article appearing under this name was "Keynes' Revision der liberalistischen Nationalökonomie," *ZfS* V, 3 (1936). "Sering's" piece was entitled "Zu Marshalls neuklassischer Ökonomie," *ZfS* VI, 3 (1937).

43. Felix Weil, "Neuere Literatur zum 'New Deal,'" *ZfS* V, 3 (1936); "Neuere Literatur zur deutschen Wehrwirtschaft," *ZfS* VII, 1/2 (1938).

44. Marcuse, "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," *SPSS* IX, 3 (1941); in this piece Marcuse first expressed some of the ideas he was to develop in *One-Dimensional Man.* Gurland, "Technological Trends and Economic Structure under National Socialism," *SPSS* IX, 2 (1941).

45. Conversation with Karl August Wittfogel, New York, N.Y., June 21, 1971.

46. Conversation with Gerhard Meyer, Meredith, N.H., July 19, 1971.

47. Friedrich Pollock, *Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion (1917–1927)*, (Leipzig, 1929).

48. Pollock, "Die gegenwärtige Lage des Kapitalismus und die Aussichten einer planwirtschaftlichen Neuordnung," *ZfS* I, 1/2 (1932). In the following year, he continued his discussion of the Depression in "Bemerkungen zur Wirtschaftskrise," *ZfS* II, 3 (1933).

49. Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations," *SPSS* IX, 2 (1941).

50. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

51. James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (New York, 1941). Burnham had originally been a Trotskyist. Although Trotsky himself rejected the notion of state capitalism, at least as it applied to the Soviet Union, a number of his followers did not. There is no evidence, however, of Pollock's having gotten the idea from this source.

52. Pollock, "Is National Socialism a New Order?," *SPSS* IX, 3 (1941), p. 447.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 449.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 450. Neumann was to use the same term in *Behemoth*; Willi Neuling had coined it in "Wettbewerb, Monopol und Befehl in der heutigen Wirtschaft," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, LXXXXIX (1939).

55. For a recent discussion of the same issue, see T. W. Mason, "The Primacy of Politics: Politics and Economics in National Socialist Germany," in *The Nature of Fascism*, ed. S. J. Woolf (New York, 1968).

56. Max Horkheimer, "Philosophie und Kritische Theorie" *ZfS* VI, 3 (1937), p. 629.

57. Pollock, "State Capitalism," p. 207.

58. For a discussion of this point, see Robert C. Tucker, "Marx As a Political Theorist," in *Marx and the Western World*, ed. Nicholas Lobkowicz (Notre Dame, Ind., 1967).

59. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, rev. ed. (Boston, 1960), p. 410. Earlier, in his article on "Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitären Staatsauffassung," *ZfS* III, 1 (1934), Marcuse also talked solely of "monopoly capitalism." At this early date, however, the other members of the Institut agreed.

60. Horkheimer, "Autoritärer Staat," in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis" (unpub., 1942), pp. 124–125, in Pollock's collection.

61. Horkheimer, Preface to *SPSS* IX, 2 (1941), p. 195.

62. Horkheimer, "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung," in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis," p. 66.

63. Kirchheimer, "In Quest of Sovereignty," pp. 178–180. Here Kirchheimer related rackets to the technological ethos of modern society: "Rackets seem to correspond to a stage of society where success depends on organization and on access to appropriate technical equipment rather than on special skills" (p. 179).

64. Horkheimer, Preface to *SPSS* IX, 2 (1941), p. 198.

65. Horkheimer, "Die Juden und Europa," *ZfS* VIII, 1/2 (1939), p. 115. This essay was one of the last predominantly Marxist pieces Horkheimer wrote. Not insignificantly, it was excluded from the collection of his work published as *Kritische Theorie*, 2 vols., ed. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt, 1968).

66. "Autoritärer Staat," p. 151.

67. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 1968), p. 263.

68. "Autoritärer Staat," p. 143.

69. *Ibid.,* pp. 148–149.

70. For a more serious discussion of the function of terror and coercion by an Institut member, see Leo Lowenthal, "Terror's Atomization of Man," *Commentary* I, 3 (January, 1946). In a later article on "The Lessons of Fascism," in *Tensions That Cause Wars*, ed. Hadley Cantril (Urbana, Ill., 1950), Horkheimer argued that the authoritarian character was not so widespread until the Nazis began using terror and massive propaganda to atomize the population (p. 223).

71. "Die Juden und Europa," p. 125.

72. "Autoritärer Staat," p. 138.

73. "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung," p. 59.

74. "Autoritärer Staat," p. 160.

75. So Lowenthal told me during one of our interviews, in Berkeley, August, 1968.

76. Kirchheimer, "Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany," *SPSS* VIII, 3 (1939). Kirchheimer also published another article on German criminal practice, entitled "Recent Trends in German Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* XXIX (1938).

77. Compare Kirchheimer's critique of phenomenological law with Marcuse's article "The Concept of Essence," *Negations*, and Adorno's more extensive attack on Husserl in his *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie* (Stuttgart, 1956). The source of the Kiel School's phenomenology was Scheler's materialist eidetics rather than Husserl's idealistic variety.

78. Kirchheimer, "The Legal Order of National Socialism," *SPSS* IX, 3 (1941), reprinted in *Politics, Law, and Social Change*, from which the following quotations are taken (p. 93).

79. *Ibid.,* p. 99.

80. *Ibid.,* p. 108.

81. Kirchheimer, "Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise," *SPSS* IX, 2 (1941), also reprinted in *Politics, Law, and Social Change*, from which the following quotations are taken.

82. *Ibid.,* p. 131.

83. *Ibid.,* p. 155.

84. *Ibid.,* pp. 158–159.

85. Gurland, "Technological Trends and Economic Structure under National Socialism," *SPSS* IX, 2 (1941).

86. *Ibid.,* p. 248.

87. *Ibid.,* p. 261.

88. Conversations with Marcuse and Lowenthal are the major source of this observation. When *Behemoth* came to be published in German, it was not included in the Institut's series of *Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie.*

89. In discussing Emil Lederer's *State of the Masses: The Threat of the Classless Society* (New York, 1940), Neumann wrote, "Were Lederer's analysis correct, our earlier discussion would be completely wrong. . . . Racism would not be the concern of small groups alone but would be deeply imbedded in the masses" (*Behemoth*, p. 366).

90. *Behemoth*, p. 121.

91. *Studies* IX, 1 (1941), p. 141. The prospectus was dated 1939.

92. *Behemoth*, p. 465.

93. *Ibid.,* p. 476.

94. In *Behemoth* Kehr is mentioned several times and called "extremely gifted" (p. 203). Kehr's estimation of psychoanalysis can be found in his essay "Neuere deut-

sche Geschichtsschreibung," *Der Primat der Innenpolitik*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Berlin, 1965).

95. *Behemoth*, pp. 403–413.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 228–234.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

100. Quoted by John M. Cammett, "Communist Theories of Fascism, 1920–1935," *Science and Society* XXXI, 2 (Spring, 1967).

101. *Behemoth*, p. 261.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 354.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 366.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 449. David Schoenbaum's "revision" of Neumann in *Hitler's Social Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y., 1966), which is based on the importance of the Nazi status revolution, was thus in part anticipated by Neumann himself.

108. *Behemoth*, p. 278.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 472.

110. *Ibid.*, p. xii.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 471.

112. Horkheimer, Foreword to *SPSS* VIII, 3 (1939), p. 321. This was actually dated July, 1940.

113. On the board of directors of the Social Studies Association were Charles Beard, Robert MacIver, Robert Lynd, Morris Cohen, and Paul Tillich, all old friends of the Institut. ("Supplementary Memorandum on the Activities of the Institute from 1939 to 1941," mimeographed; Friedrich Pollock's collection in Montagnola).

114. Of the new research associates, Karsen had contributed the most to the *Zeitschrift*, with two bibliographical pieces, "Neue Literatur über Gesellschaft und Erziehung," *ZfS* III, 1 (1934), and "Neue amerikanische Literatur über Gesellschaft und Erziehung," *ZfS* VIII, 1 (1939).

115. Interviews with Marcuse (May, 1968) in Cambridge, Mass. and Lowenthal (August, 1968). One ought not to make too much out of Neumann's friction with other members of the Institut. Pollock, with whom he was most clearly at odds on theoretical matters, delivered a eulogy at his funeral in Switzerland in December, 1954.

116. Gurland, Neumann, and Kirchheimer, *The Fate of Small Business in Germany* (Washington, D.C., 1943). This was partially financed by a grant from the Carnegie Foundation. Pepper's subcommittee was designed to study problems of American small business. The book's conclusion that small business in Weimar and Nazi Germany had been caught in the squeeze between big business and labor fitted well with the goals of the subcommittee.

117. "Cultural Aspects of National Socialism," in Lowenthal's collection in Berkeley. Another abortive project which the Institut tried to get sponsored was a study of the postwar reconstruction of German society.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

119. The dissertation was a study of the agrarian situation in France after World War I. Massing did much of the research at the Sorbonne and spent eighteen

months in Moscow at the Agrarian Institute after its completion in 1929. (This and the subsequent biographical information comes from an interview with Dr. Massing in New York, November 25, 1970).

120. Massing [pseud: Karl Billinger], *Schutzhäftling 880* (Paris, 1955); Wittfogel [pseud: Klaus Hinrichs], *Staatliches Konzentrationslager VII* (London, 1936). The information about the pseudonym comes from my interview with Massing in New York.

121. See Wittfogel's testimony on August 7, 1951, Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 82nd Congress, 1951–1952, vol. III, p. 276.

122. For a description of the trip, see Hede Massing, *This Deception* (New York, 1951), pp. 244f.

123. Conversation with Wittfogel, New York, June 21, 1971.

124. This was the reason Marcuse mentioned during our interview.

125. "Ten Years on Morningside Heights," (unpub., 1944), in Lowenthal's collection.

126. Horkheimer, "Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung," *ZfS* V, 1 (1936), p. 219. Marcuse wrote an article "Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur," *ZfS* VI, 1 (1937), which we shall examine in the following chapter.

6. AESTHETIC THEORY AND THE CRITIQUE OF MASS CULTURE

1. George Steiner, "Marxism and the Literary Critic," *Language and Silence* (New York, 1967).

2. Georg Lukács, *The Historical Novel*, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (Boston, 1963), pp. 30–63.

3. With his *Wider den missverstandenen Realismus* (Hamburg, 1958), after Stalin's death, Lukács lessened his hostility somewhat. See Roy Pascal's essay in *Georg Lukács: The Man, His Work, and His Ideas*, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson (New York, 1970).

4. See his lengthy polemic against "irrationalism" in Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (Berlin, 1954).

5. Herbert Marcuse's critique of socialist realism in his *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis* (New York, 1958) stresses this fallacy.

6. Walter Benjamin, *Briefe*, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt, 1966), vol. I, pp. 350, 355.

7. Theodor Adorno, "Erpresste Versöhnung," *Noten zur Literatur II* (Frankfurt, 1961), p. 152.

8. See Adorno, "The George-Hofmannsthal Correspondence, 1891–1906," *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967), p. 217.

9. For a description of Cornelius's artistic background, see his essay "Leben und Lehre," in *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, ed. Raymund Schmidt (Leipzig, 1923), vol. II. Among his works on aesthetics were *Elementargesetze der bildenden Kunst: Grundlagen einer praktischen Ästhetik* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1911), and *Kunstpädagogik* (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1920).

10. In a letter to Horkheimer on October 27, 1942, Lowenthal refers to a novel that Horkheimer had begun to write (Lowenthal collection).

11. Samuel and Shierry Weber have an interesting essay on the difficulties of translating Adorno at the beginning of *Prisms*.

12. Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 225.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

16. This was similar to the task Norman O. Brown seems to have set himself in *Love's Body* (New York, 1966), where much of the text consists of quotations.

17. See his letter to Max Rychner, in Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 524.

18. Quoted in Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 232.

19. Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, pp. 726, 727.

20. "Ten Years on Morningside Heights: A Report on the Institute's History, 1934–1944" (unpub., 1944) (Lowenthal collection).

21. *Prisms*, p. 71.

22. Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. with an intro. by Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 1968), p. 258.

23. Max Horkheimer, "Art and Mass Culture," *SPSS* IX, 2 (1941), p. 291.

24. This was a transition the young Lukács had made as well. See Lucien Goldmann, "The Early Writings of Georg Lukács," *Tri-Quarterly* IX (Spring, 1967).

25. *Prisms*, p. 184. "Force-field" *(Kraftfeld)*, it will be recalled, was the term Adorno also used in his critique of Husserl

26. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

28. This point is made by Ilse Müller-Strömsdörfer in "Die 'helfende Kraft bestimmter Negation,' " *Philosophische Rundschau* VIII, 2/3 (Jan. 1961), p. 98.

29. Adorno, "Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens," *ZfS* VII, 3 (1938), p. 321; Leo Lowenthal, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961), p. 12.

30. *Prisms*, p. 30.

31. Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 785; Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 236.

32. Horkheimer, "Art and Mass Culture," p. 292. For an expansion of the connection between religion and art, see Adorno's "Theses upon Art and Religion Today," *Kenyon Review* VII, 4 (Autumn, 1945).

33. Nietzsche was the first to pick up this phrase and use it against Kant's definition of beauty as the object of disinterested desire. Marcuse first used it in "The Affirmative Character of Culture," *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968), p. 115.

34. So Horkheimer argued (under the pseudonym Heinrich Regius) in *Dämmerung* (Zurich, 1934), p. 60, and Adorno in *Prisms*, p. 32.

35. *Prisms*, p. 32.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

38. Adorno, "Theses on Art and Religion Today," p. 678.

39. Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," p. 117. This was to be a major theme of his *Eros and Civilization* (Boston, 1955).

40. *Prisms*, p. 87.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

42. Marcuse "On Hedonism," *Negations*, p. 198.

43. In one of the last articles he wrote, Adorno returned to the centrality of mediation for a genuine aesthetic theory. In criticizing the notion of communications in the work of the sociologist of music Alphons Silbermann, Adorno wrote: "Mediation is . . . in the object itself, not something between the object and that to which it is brought. What is contained in communications, however, is solely the relationship between producer and consumer" ("Thesen zur Kunstsoziologie," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* XIX, 1 [March, 1967], p. 92).

44. *Prisms*, p. 33.

45. Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, pp. 672, 676. Several of Adorno's letters to Benjamin are included in the volume.

46. *Prisms*, p. 85.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

48. "Music did not 'represent' anything outside of itself; it was on the order of prayer and play, not painting and writing. The decay of this reality of music by its becoming an image of itself tends to break the spell" (Adorno, "Currents of Music: Elements of a Radio Theory" [unpub. prospectus for the Princeton Radio Research Project, 1939], p. 72). I am indebted to Professor Lazarsfeld for making this available to me.

49. Many of his early articles appeared in the journal he edited, *Anbruch*, and in others such as *Musik, Pult und Taktstock, Scheinwerfer*, and *23*.

50. Several of these articles have been reprinted in Adorno, *Moments Musicaux* (Frankfurt, 1964).

51. Adorno, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik," *ZfS* I, 1/2, and I, 3 (1932).

52. *Ibid.*, 1/2, p. 106.

53. Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik* (Frankfurt, 1949).

54. Adorno, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik," 1/2, p. 112.

55. *Prisms*, p. 166.

56. Adorno, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik," 1/2, p. 116. The relationship between neoclassical objectivism and fascism is not that farfetched. Stephen Spender has suggested a similar connection in the work of T. E. Hulme; see his *The Struggle of the Modern* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), p. 49.

57. Adorno, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik," 1/2, p. 119.

58. *Ibid.*, 3, p. 359.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 368.

61. Adorno [Hektor Rottweiler], "Über Jazz," *ZfS* V, 2 (1936).

62. Adorno, *Moments Musicaux*, p. 9.

63. In his *Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969), Marcuse was to include blues and jazz among the artifacts of "the new sensibility," which he considered critical of the prevailing affirmative culture (p. 38).

64. Adorno, "Oxford Nachträge," *Dissonanzen: Musik in der verwalteten Welt* (Frankfurt, 1956), p. 117. This was originally written in 1937 during Adorno's stay at Merton College, Oxford.

65. Adorno [Rottweiler], "Über Jazz," p. 238.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

67. "Perennial Fashion — Jazz," *Prisms*, p. 122.

68. Hans Mayer, *Der Repräsentant und der Märtyrer* (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 156–157.

69. A review of Wilder Hobson's *American Jazz Music* and Winthrop Sargeant's *Jazz Hot and Hybrid*, written with the assistance of Eunice Cooper, in the *SPSS* IX, 1 (1941), p. 169. Adorno was enthusiastic about Sargeant's interpretation of jazz, which he took as a native confirmation of his own ideas. Hobson, on the other hand, he criticized for trying to abstract the music from its commodity character.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

71. "Oxford Nachträge," p. 119.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

74. *Prisms*, pp. 199f.

75. Adorno, "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 341. Curiously, Adorno writes, "I actually still considered jazz to be a spontaneous form of expression," which seems scarcely to have been the case.

76. Marcuse's mid-1960's enthusiasm for the "counterculture," however, has begun to wane in the 1970's; see, for example, his review of Charles Reich's *The Greening of America* (*The New York Times*, Nov. 6, 1970, p. 41), and his *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972).

77. Adorno, "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," p. 340.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 341, and Paul Lazarsfeld, "An Episode in the History of Social Research: A Memoir," in *The Intellectual Migration*, pp. 322f.

79. Lazarsfeld, "An Episode in the History of Social Research," p. 301.

80. "Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens," *ZfS* VII, 3 (1938).

81. Benjamin, "L'Oeuvre de l'art à l'époque de sa reproduction mécanisée," *ZfS* V, 1 (1936).

82. Adorno, "Über den Fetischcharakter," p. 327.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 330.

84. More orthodox Marxist critics were always quick to point to this as an inadequacy of Adorno's work. See, for example, Konrad Boehmer, "Adorno, Musik, Gesellschaft" in *Die neue Linke nach Adorno*, ed. Wilfried F. Schoeller (Munich, 1969), p. 123.

85. "Über den Fetischcharakter," p. 355.

86. Adorno acknowledged the importance of Simpson's help in his essay "Scientific Experiences," in *The Intellectual Migration*, pp. 350–351. Simpson had been a student of Robert MacIver. His major work was as translator and critic of Durkheim's sociology.

87. Adorno, "A Social Critique of Radio Music," *Kenyon Review* VII, 2 (Spring, 1945).

88. Ernst Krĕnek, "Bemerkungen zur Rundfunkmusik," *ZfS* VII, 1/2 (1938). Adorno later wrote a tribute to Krĕnek in *Moments Musicaux*, entitled "Zur Physiognomik Krĕneks."

89. Adorno, "A Social Critique of Radio Music," pp. 210–211.

90. See his discussion of their genesis in *The Intellectual Migration*, p. 351.

91. Adorno, "On Popular Music," *SPSS* IX, 1 (1941).

92. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

93. Professor Lazarsfeld has graciously made the original manuscript available to me. It was entitled "Currents of Music: Elements of a Radio Theory." A shortened version appeared as "The Radio Symphony," in *Radio Research 1941*, ed. Paul Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton (New York, 1941).

94. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

95. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," *Illuminations*, p. 262.

96. Adorno, "Currents of Music," p. 26.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

98. "Scientific Experiences," p. 352

99. Adorno, "Fragmente über Wagner," *ZfS* VIII, 1/2 (1939).

100. In a letter to Lowenthal, in June, 1941, Horkheimer spoke enthusiastically of his new friendship with the past greats of German letters.

101. Horkheimer, "Die philosophie der absoluten Konzentration," *ZfS* VII, 3 (1938).

102. Interview with Pollock, March, 1969, in Montagnola. The study's results, which indicated that conservatives and Catholics had done more for the Jews than other groups in society, was never published.

103. Thomas Mann, *The Story of a Novel: The Genesis of Doctor Faustus*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1961), pp. 94–95.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

109. See *Letters of Thomas Mann, 1889–1955*, selected and trans. Richard and Clara Winston, intro. Richard Winston (New York, 1971), pp. 546–547, 587–588.

110. Hanns Eisler, *Composition for the Film* (New York, 1947). For a discussion of Adorno's role in its creation, see Helmut Lück, "Anmerkungen zu Theodor W. Adornos Zusammenarbeit mit Hanns Eisler," in *Die neue Linke nach Adorno.* Eisler's brother Gerhart was under serious attack at the time for his involvement in Communist activities, and Adorno wanted no part of the association the book might have suggested.

111. Adorno, "Gegängelte Musik," in *Dissonanzen.*

112. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (Frankfurt, 1951); and Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam, 1947).

113. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950). Adorno's paper on Martin Luther Thomas was never published.

114. Adorno and Bernice T. Eiduson, "How to Look at Television" (paper read at the Hacker Foundation in Los Angeles, April 13, 1953) (Lowenthal collection).

115. Adorno, "The Stars Down to Earth: *The Los Angeles Times* Astrology Column: A Study in Secondary Superstition," *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*, vol. II (Heidelberg, 1957).

116. Adorno, "Thesen gegen den Okkultismus," *Minima Moralia*, pp. 462f.

117. Adorno used this work as the basis of his discussion in an article he wrote at approximately the same time, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda," in *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, ed. Geza Roheim (New York, 1951).

118. Adorno, "The Stars Down to Earth," p. 82.

119. *Prisms*, p. 98.

120. See, for example, his letter to Horkheimer in the fall of 1934 (Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 625f.). Benjamin also resisted invitations to move to Denmark, Palestine, and the Soviet Union.

121. Adorno, "Interimbescheid," *Über Walter Benjamin* (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 95.

122. Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 834. The rest of the history of Benjamin's life comes from the Introduction to *Illuminations* by Hannah Arendt and the biographical sketch by Friedrich Pollock in Benjamin's *Schriften*, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem, vol. II (Frankfurt, 1955).

123. Arthur Koestler, *The Invisible Writing* (London, 1954), p. 512.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 513.

125. Horkheimer, "Autoritärer Staat" and "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung"; Adorno, "George und Hofmannsthal"; and Benjamin, "Thesen zur Geschichtsphilosophie," in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis" (unpub., 1942) (Friedrich Pollock's collection in Montagnola).

126. Rolf Tiedemann, *Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins* (Frankfurt, 1965).

127. See, especially, *Alternative*, 56/7 (Oct.–Dec., 1967) and 59/60 (April–June, 1968), and Hannah Arendt, intro. to *Illuminations*. Other contributions to the debate include Siegfried Unseld, "Zur Kritik an den Editionen Walter Benjamins," *Frankfurter Rundschau* (January 24, 1968); Rolf Tiedemann, "Zur 'Beschlagnahme' Walter Benjamins, oder Wie Man mit der Philologie Schlitten fährt," *Das Argument* X, 1/2 (March, 1968); Friedrich Pollock, "Zu dem Aufsatz von Hannah Arendt über Walter Benjamin," *Merkur*, XXII, 6 (1968); Hannah Arendt, "Walter Benjamin und das Institut für Sozialforschung — noch einmal," *Merkur*, XXII, 10 (1968); and Hildegaard Brenner, "Theodor W. Adorno als Sachwalter des Benjaminschen Werkes," in *Die neue Linke nach Adorno*. Adorno's own reply, "Interimbescheid," is reprinted in his *Über Walter Benjamin*. For a summary of the debate, see "Marxistisch Rabbi," *Der Spiegel*, XXII, 16 (April 15, 1968).

128. See Benjamin's article, "Unpacking My Library," *Illuminations*.

129. Benjamin, *Berliner Kindheit um Neunzehnhundert* (Frankfurt, 1950) *passim*. In 1940 Benjamin wrote to Adorno: "Why should I hide from you that I find the root of my 'Theory of Experience' in a childhood memory?" (*Briefe*, vol. II, p. 848).

130. So Gershom Scholem has suggested in "Walter Benjamin," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* (New York, 1965).

131. Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, p. 97.

132. Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 655.

133. Gretel Adorno has denied the effect of his marriage's failure on his turning away from Zionism (letter to me, November 4, 1970), but Hannah Arendt has suggested otherwise in her Introduction to *Illuminations*, p. 36.

134. Max Rychner, "Erinnerungen an Walter Benjamin," *Der Monat*, XVIII, 216 (September, 1966), p. 42. *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels* was published in Berlin in 1928.

135. *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 524.

136. Adorno, "A Portrait of Walter Benjamin," *Prisms*, p. 234.

137. See Benjamin, "The Task of the Translator," *Illuminations*; Hans Heinz Holz, "Philosophie als Interpretation," *Alternative*, 56/57 (October–December, 1967); and "Walter Benjamin: Towards a Philosophy of Language," *The Times Literary Supplement* (London, August 22, 1968). Although anonymous, this last article is almost certainly by George Steiner.

138. *Illuminations*, p. 263. Miss Arendt adds a footnote to the English translation in which she argues that Benjamin meant a mystical *nunc stans* rather than the more prosaic *Gegenwart* (the normal German word for the present). Ernst Bloch in his "Erinnerungen an Walter Benjamin," *Der Monat*, XVIII, 216 (September, 1966), suggested that *Jetztzeit* meant a break in the continuity of the temporal flow, in which the past suddenly became present (p. 40).

139. "Theses on the Philosophy of History." *Illuminations*, p. 255.

140. Letter from Lowenthal to Horkheimer, June 18, 1942.

141. Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 786. This would seem to contradict Hildegaard Brenner's assertion that Adorno sought to encourage the theological elements in Benjamin's work; see her article, "Die Lesbarkeit der Bilder: Skizzen zum Passagenentwurf," *Alternative*, 59/60 (April–June, 1968), p. 56.

142. One possible reason for Benjamin's distance from Marxism directly after the war was that it was often connected with an expressionist aesthetic, which he strongly disliked. On the merging of radicalism and expressionism, see Lewis D. Wurgaft, "The Activist Movement: Cultural Politics on the German Left, 1914–

1933" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1970). On Benjamin's hostility to expressionism, see Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, pp. 96–97.

143. Bloch, "Erinnerungen an Walter Benjamin," p. 38. According to Adorno, Benjamin's social conscience was also aroused during the same year by the beginning of the inflation (*Über Walter Benjamin*, p. 57).

144. Benjamin quoted from *The Theory of the Novel* (Berlin, 1920) in his piece on Nikolai Leskov, "The Storyteller," *Illuminations*, p. 99.

145. Scholem, in his article on "Walter Benjamin" (p. 18), called Brecht's influence "baleful, and in some respects disastrous." Adorno frequently warned Benjamin against Brecht; see, for example, his letter in the Benjamin *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 676.

146. Tiedemann, *Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins*, p. 89.

147. See the excerpts in Iring Fetscher, "Bertolt Brecht and America," in *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals* (*Salmagundi*, 10/11 [Fall, 1969–Winter, 1970]). For example, on May 12, 1942, Brecht wrote in his diary: "With Eisler at Horkheimer's for lunch. After that, Eisler suggests for the Tui novel: the story of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. A wealthy old man dies, worried over the suffering in the world, leaves in his will a substantial sum of money establishing an institute that shall search for the source of misery — which of course was he himself" (p. 264).

148. *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 594.

149. Introduction to *Illuminations*, p. 15. The phrase (*das plumpe Denken*) is Brecht's own description of his style of thought. Benjamin picked it up in his discussion of Brecht's *Dreigroschenroman* (Benjamin, *Versuche über Brecht*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann [Frankfurt, 1966], p. 90).

150. Introduction to *Illuminations*, p. 15.

151. See, for example, Hildegaard Brenner's essay in *Die neue Linke nach Adorno*, *passim*.

152. Benjamin, *Versuche über Brecht*.

153. *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 657. Benjamin cited the Bibliothèque Nationale as the reason why he could not leave Paris for Svendborg permanently.

154. Bertolt Brecht, "An Walter Benjamin, der sich auf der Flucht vor Hitler Entleibte" and "Zum Freitod der Flüchtlings W.B.," *Gedichte VI* (Frankfurt, 1964).

155. Benjamin, *Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik* (Bern, 1920).

156. *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 857.

157. Benjamin, "Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie," *Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze* (Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 15–16.

158. Quoted in Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 232.

159. *Briefe*, vol. II, pp. 726, 727.

160. Adorno, *Alban Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs* (Vienna, 1968), p. 32.

161. Benjamin, "The Author as Producer," *New Left Review*, 62 (July–August, 1970).

162. *Illuminations*, p. 265. In a letter to me, Gretel Adorno emphatically denied an analogical moment in her late husband's thinking (January 27, 1970).

163. Quoted in Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 234.

164. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

165. It was published in Hofmannsthal's *Neue Deutsche Beiträge*, II, 1 (April, 1924).

166. See Hannah Arendt's discussion in her introduction to *Illuminations*, pp. 8–9.

167. *Briefe*, vol. I, p. 379.

168. With Franz Hessel, Benjamin translated *À l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs* and two volumes of *Le Côté de Guermantes* during the twenties.

169. Letter to me from Gretel Adorno (November 4, 1970).

170. Benjamin, *Berliner Kindheit um Neunzehnhundert* (Frankfurt, 1950).

171. What Benjamin once wrote of Kafka might have been applied to himself: "Kafka's work is an ellipse with foci that are far apart and are determined, on the one hand, by mystical experience (in particular, the experience of tradition) and, on the other, by the experience of the modern big-city dweller" (*Illuminations*, pp. 144–145).

172. Benjamin [Detlef Holz], *Deutsche Menschen: Eine Folge von Briefen* (Lucerne, 1936).

173. As Adorno remembers it, they met either through Siegfried Kracauer or in a sociological seminar run by Gottfried Salomon-Delatour in Frankfurt. See "Erinnerungen an Walter Benjamin," *Der Monat*, XVIII, 216 (September, 1966). Benjamin was also close friends with Marguerite (Gretel) Karplus, later Adorno's wife, whom he met in 1928. Many of his letters in the *Briefe* are addressed to "Felizitas," as he called her. In 1928, so Adorno wrote (*Über Walter Benjamin*, p. 98), Benjamin became part of the Institut's circle. If so, he certainly was not a very close member. In fact, he did not actually meet Horkheimer in person until 1938.

174. Benjamin, "Zum gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Standort des französischen Schriftstellers," *ZfS* III, 1 (1934). In his discussion of French writers from Barrès to Gide, Benjamin showed his distance from the Leninist strain in Marxist aesthetics. For example, he contended that surrealism, although beginning apolitically with Apollinaire, was moving towards reconciliation with political *praxis*, in the work of Breton and Aragon (p. 73).

175. *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 652.

176. *Ibid.*, p. 639.

177. These changes and others are pointed out by Helga Gallas, "Wie es zu den Eingriffen in Benjamins Texte kam oder über die Herstellbarkeit von Einständnis," *Alternative*, 59/60, p. 80.

178. Horkheimer [Regius], *Dämmerung*, p. 178.

179. Benjamin, "Eduard Fuchs, der Sammler und der Historiker," *ZfS* VI, 2 (1937), and "L'Oeuvre de l'art à l'époque de sa reproduction mécanisée," *ZfS* V, 1 (1936).

180. Hildegaard Brenner has argued that the changes were substantial, according to the original copy in the *Potsdam Zentralarchiv* in East Germany; see her piece in *Die neue Linke nach Adorno*, p. 162.

181. *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 742.

182. This was at least one possible plan for the work; see the *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 774.

183. *Briefe*, vol. II, pp. 671–683.

184. *Ibid.*, p. 678.

185. *Ibid.*, pp. 681–682. Benjamin's lack of interest in the subjective individual has often been noted. He once confided to Adorno that "I am interested not in men, but only in things" (Adorno, Introduction to Benjamin's *Schriften*, vol. I, p. 17).

186. *Briefe*, vol. II, pp. 782–790.

187. *Ibid.*, p. 786.

188. *Ibid.*, p. 788

189. *Ibid.*, pp. 790–799.

190. *Ibid.*, pp. 794–795.

191. A translation has appeared as "Paris: Capital of the Nineteenth Century," in *Dissent*, XVII, 5 (September–October, 1970). A more complete version finally appeared in 1969 in German as *Charles Baudelaire: Ein Lyriker im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus* (Frankfurt, 1969).

192. "Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire," *ZfS* VIII, 1/2 (1939), trans. in *Illuminations*, p. 159.

193. To Baudelaire, so Benjamin argued, the creative process was like a duel with the traumas of shocks, in which the artist tried to parry with all his powers (*Illuminations*, p. 165).

194. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

195. Miss Arendt's introduction to *Illuminations*, for example, is rooted in this view of Benjamin.

196. *Illuminations*, p. 184.

197. See Benjamin, *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels.* Tiedemann comments extensively on Benjamin's *Umfunktionierung* (changing the function) of Goethe's *Urphänomene* in his *Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins*, p. 59f.

198. Horkheimer, "Zu Bergsons Metaphysik der Zeit," *ZfS* III, 3 (1934).

199. *Illuminations*, p. 187.

200. *Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins*, p. 69.

201. *Illuminations*, p. 263.

202. On Kraus's concern for origins, see Hans Mayer, *Der Repräsentant und der Märtyrer*, pp. 51–52.

203. Fredric Jameson entitled his article in *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals* (*Salmagundi*, 10/11 [Fall, 1969–Winter, 1970]), "Walter Benjamin, or Nostalgia," and Peter Szondi wrote an article called "Hoffnung im Vergangenen," in *Zeugnisse: Theodor W. Adorno zum Sechzigsten Geburtstag* (Frankfurt, 1963), in which he suggests that Benjamin sought his utopia in the past.

204. "On Certain Motifs in Baudelaire," *Illuminations*, p. 189.

205. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

206. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

207. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

208. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

209. Brecht had been disappointed in 1931 with the film version of the *Dreigroschenoper.* From this experience, he argued that intellectuals had themselves been proletarianized, a theme that Benjamin picked up in "Der Autor als Produzent," written in 1934 and published in his *Versuche über Brecht.* Here Benjamin attacked as reactionary the notion of an independent intellectual *Logokratie*, of the type proposed by Kurt Hiller and the Activists. By implication, Benjamin also questioned the tendency in Adorno's aesthetics to oppose avant-garde art to the popular culture of the working class. "The revolutionary struggle," he wrote at the end of the essay, "occurs not between capitalism and *Geist* [which was the key word of the Activists], but between capitalism and the proletariat" (*Versuche über Brecht*, p. 116).

210. *Illuminations*, p. 236.

211. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

212. *Ibid.*, p. 244.

213. *Briefe*, vol. II, p. 798. Adorno remained skeptical about the validity of Benjamin's position, calling it "identification with the aggressor" in his Introduction to the *Briefe*, vol. I, p. 16. "Identification with the aggressor" was one of the classic psy-

choanalytic defense mechanisms. See Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, rev. ed. (New York, 1966), pp. 109f.

214. The remark was made in Benjamin's study of Goethe's *Wahlverwandtschaften* in *Neue Deutsche Beiträge*, II, 1 (April, 1924), and is quoted in *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), p. 257.

215. Herta Herzog, "On Borrowed Experience: An Analysis of Listening to Daytime Sketches"; Harold Lasswell, "Radio as an Instrument of Reducing Personal Insecurity"; Charles A. Siepmann, "Radio and Education"; and Adorno, with the assistance of George Simpson, "On Popular Music," all in *SPSS*, IX, 1 (1941).

216. Horkheimer, "Art and Mass Culture," *SPSS*, IX, 1 (1941).

217. Leo Lowenthal, "German Popular Biographies: Culture's Bargain Counter," in *The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston, 1967).

218. Lowenthal, "Biographies in Popular Magazines," in *Radio Research: 1942–1943*, ed. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton (New York, 1944); later republished in Lowenthal's *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society* as "The Triumph of Mass Idols."

219. Adorno, *Prisms*, pp. 103–104. This serves to contradict the analysis of such critics as Edward Shils ("Daydreams and Nightmares: Reflections on the Criticism of Mass Culture," *Sewanee Review* LXV, 4 [Autumn, 1957]), who call the Institut puritanical because of its attack on escapism.

220. Quoted in *Prisms*, p. 109.

221. See Chapter 3, p. 102.

222. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, p. ix.

223. Adorno, "Resumé über Kulturindustrie," *Ohne Leitbild* (Frankfurt, 1967), p. 60.

224. The term was originally Nietzsche's. It is quoted in Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 153.

225. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

226. *Ibid.*, pp. 166–167.

227. *Ibid.*, p. 170. Marcuse had used the same example in his article on affirmative culture, *Negations*, p. 116, where he says that "in suffering the most extreme reification man triumphs over reification." This was an idea he also found in Sartre, as his article "Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's *L'Être et le néant*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* VIII, 3 (March, 1948) indicates.

228. For an expanded discussion of this point, see my article, "The Frankfurt School in Exile," *Perspectives in American History*, vol. VI (Cambridge, 1972).

229. For a history of the critique of mass culture, see Leon Bramson, *The Political Context of Sociology* (Princeton, 1961); William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959); Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, *Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America* (London, 1957); and Lowenthal's essays in *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society.*

230. See, for example, David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, written in collaboration with Reuel Denny and Nathan Glazer (New Haven, 1950). The authors expressly acknowledge the impact of Lowenthal's study of popular biographies (p. 239).

231. Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (London, 1957). Several of Dwight Macdonald's essays on mass culture are collected in his *Against the American Grain* (New York, 1962).

232. Adorno termed his own life a *"beschädigten"* existence in the subtitle of *Minima Moralia.*

7. THE EMPIRICAL WORK OF THE INSTITUT IN THE 1940'S

1. The years in New York, he wrote, were by no means entirely negative, but they had forced the Institut to become a *Betrieb* (a research enterprise) with all the attendant problems (Horkheimer letter to Lowenthal, May 3, 1941) (Lowenthal collection).

2. For a discussion of its creation, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "An Episode in the History of Social Research: A Memoir," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

3. In the issue of the *SPSS* devoted to mass communications (IX, 1, 1941), Lazarsfeld contributed a very optimistic appraisal of the future cross-fertilization of the two research styles.

4. The results of the content analysis, which included all the Institut's publications, were reported in an accompanying memorandum and are worth repeating here:

Books	16
Articles and monographs	91
Manuscripts used as basis for lectures and seminars	38
Research reports	2
TOTAL	147

PUBLICATIONS BY FIELD OF INTEREST	NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Studies in authority	76	40
Philosophy	43	22
Studies in literature, music and art	38	18
Social prejudices	17	9
Miscellaneous	22	11
TOTAL	196	100

5. Letter from Horkheimer to Lazarsfeld, June 10, 1946 (Lowenthal collection).

6. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, October 31, 1942 (Lowenthal collection).

7. *SPSS* IX, 1 (1941). the prospectus was dated two years earlier.

8. Theodor W. Adorno, "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," in *The Intellectual Migration*, p. 343.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 347.

10. Letter from Lazarsfeld to Adorno, undated (Lazarsfeld collection). Lazarsfeld remembers it as being written at some time during the summer of 1939. All the subsequent quotations are from the letter.

11. Lazarsfeld, "An Episode in the History of Social Research: A Memoir," p. 325.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Interview with Massing in New York, November 25, 1970.

14. Letter from Paul Massing to Leo Lowenthal, May 31, 1953 (Lowenthal collection).

15. Memorandum of December 1, 1944. I am indebted to Paul Lazarsfeld for making this and other memoranda on the Labor Project available to me.

16. Interview with Friedrich Pollock, Montagnola, Switzerland, March 28, 1969.

17. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, July 26, 1944 (Lowenthal collection).

18. Interview with Massing in New York, November 25, 1970.

19. Massing to Lowenthal, May 31, 1953.

20. Memorandum attached to Massing letter, initialed by Alice Maier.

21. Adorno *et al., The Authoritarian Personality*, vol. II, p. 605.

22. See Iring Fetscher, "Bertolt Brecht and America," *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals, Salmagundi*, 10/11 (Fall, 1969–Winter, 1970).

23. *The Authoritarian Personality*, vol. I, p. vii. This passage should be compared with Adorno's discussion of the "education rather than social change" syndrome characteristic of certain high scorers on the F Scale (vol. II, pp. 700f.).

24. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. vii.

25. Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "*The Authoritarian Personality* — a Methodological Critique," in *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality,"* ed. Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), p. 109.

26. The spread of ego psychology, Adorno suggested in a later essay, was a reflex of society in which individuals mirror objective trends like automatons; Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," pt. 2, *New Left Review*, 47 (January–February, 1968), p. 95.

27. For this critique, see above, Chapter 3, pp. 103ff.

28. *The Authoritarian Personality*, vol. II, p. 747.

29. Horkheimer, "Sociological Background of the Psychoanalytic Approach," *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease*, ed. E. Simmel (New York, 1946), p. 3.

30. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, October 2, 1946.

31. *The Authoritarian Personality*, vol. II, p. 671.

32. Memorandum from Adorno on the Labor Project, November 3, 1944, pp. 43–44 (Lazarsfeld collection).

33. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore, foreword by Erich Fromm (New York, 1964).

34. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 204.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

38. Adorno, "Note on Anti-Semitism," September 30, 1940 (Lowenthal collection).

39. *Ibid.*, p. 1. Here it sounds as if Adorno had projected the condition of the Jews after the Diaspora back to a far earlier period. He offered no concrete evidence of this as a historical reality.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

41. Horkheimer to Lowenthal, July 24, 1944 (Lowenthal collection).

42. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 234.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

44. Horkheimer to Lowenthal, July 5, 1946 (Lowenthal collection).

45. In English, the word "atonement" captures some of this in the sense that it can be understood as "at-one-ment." Yom Kippur, of course, is known as the "Day of Atonement."

46. In a letter to Lowenthal on November 17, 1945, Horkheimer supported alternatives to the creation of Israel "to prevent Judaism, as a whole, being held morally responsible for the fallacies of Zionism."

47. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 236.

48. Adorno, "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," p. 356.

49. Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans* (New York, 1950).

50. Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation* (New York, 1950).

51. Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, *Prophets of Deceit* (New York, 1949).

52. Paul Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction* (New York, 1949).

53. *Die Arbeitlosen von Marienthal* (Leipzig, 1932).

54. Among the better known of these are *Love Is Not Enough* (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), *Symbolic Wounds* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), *The Empty Fortress* (New York, 1967), *The Informed Heart* (Glencoe, Ill., 1968), and *The Children of the Dream* (New York, 1969).

55. Bettelheim and Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice*, p. 171.

56. Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York, 1964), pp. 74f. This was a reedition of *Dynamics of Prejudice*, with considerable new material added.

57. Nathan Glazer, "*The Authoritarian Personality* in Profile: Report on a Major Study of Race Hatred," *Commentary*, IV, 6 (June, 1950).

58. Lowenthal and Guterman, *Prophets of Deceit*, p. xvi. Horkheimer, "Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung," *ZfS*, V, 2 (1936).

59. *Ibid.*, p. xii.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

61. Adorno "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda," in *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, ed. Geza Roheim (New York, 1951). The Freudian text on which Adorno primarily based his argument was *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. He also referred to Erikson's work on fascism (see the following note).

62. Erik Erikson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," *Psychiatry* V, 4 (November 1942); reprinted in *Childhood and Society* (New York, 1950), from which the following quotation comes.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 332–333.

64. Leon Bramson, *The Political Context of Sociology* (Princeton, 1961).

65. So Adorno reports in "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," p. 358.

66. Mrs. Frenkel-Brunswik was herself a refugee from Vienna and the wife of the distinguished psychologist Egon Brunswik. For further information on their contribution to American psychology, see Jean Matter Mandler and George Mandler, "The Diaspora of Experimentalist Psychology: The Gestaltists and Others," in *The Intellectual Migration*, pp. 411–413. Levinson later became professor of psychology at Yale Medical School and Sanford went on to Stanford as professor of psychology and education.

67. R. Nevitt Sanford and H. S. Conrad, "Some Personality Correlates of Morale," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* XXXVIII, 1 (January, 1943).

68. *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. xii.

69. *Ibid.*, p. ix.

70. Roger Brown points out the similarity in *Social Psychology* (New York and London, 1965).

71. Part of *Anti-Semite and Jew* appeared in *The Partisan Review* in 1946, but it was not fully translated until 1948, by G. J. Becker.

72. Wilhelm Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (New York, 1946), and Abraham H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," *Journal of Social Psychology* 18 (1943).

73. Horkheimer, "The Lessons of Fascism," *Tensions That Cause War* (Urbana, Ill., 1950), p. 230.

74. Adorno, "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," p. 363.

75. Horkheimer, "Notes on Institute Activities," *SPSS* IX, 1 (1941), p. 123.

76. Ernst Schachtel, it will be recalled, had criticized personality tests in the *Zeitschrift* for similar reasons ("Zum Begriff und zur Diagnose der Persönlichkeit in den 'Personality Tests,' " *ZfS* VI, 3, 1937).

77. *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 15.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

79. For a discussion of the two scales, see Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook, *Research Methods in Social Relations*, vol. I (New York, 1951), pp. 190–197.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

81. *The Authoritarian Personality*, vol. I, chap. 7.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

83. Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "*The Authoritarian Personality* — a Methodological Critique."

84. Lazarsfeld, "Problems in Methodology," in *Sociology Today*, ed. Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. (New York, 1959), p. 50.

85. Brown, *Social Psychology*, p. 523.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 515.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 506.

88. Hyman and Sheatsley, "*The Authoritarian Personality*," p. 65.

89. Paul Kecskemeti, "The Study of Man: Prejudice in the Catastrophic Perspective," *Commentary* II, 3 (March, 1951).

90. Part of it was published as Else Frenkel-Brunswik, "A Study of Prejudice in Children," *Human Relations* I, 3 (1948). One of the conclusions of the project modified the findings of *The Authoritarian Personality*, as Adorno was to admit in "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," p. 364. The results of Mrs. Frenkel-Brunswik's work, he wrote, "refined the conception of the distinction between conventionality and the authoritarian temperament. It emerged that precisely the 'good,' i.e., conventional, children are *freer* from aggression and therefore from one of the fundamental aspects of the authoritarian personality, and vice versa." This would seem to indicate empirical confirmation of Bettelheim and Janowitz's argument more than that of the Berkeley group, at least if adult behavioral patterns are understood in the same way as children's.

91. *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 359.

92. Bramson, *The Political Context of Sociology*, p. 137.

93. *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 759f.

94. Fromm himself had abandoned the sexual interpretation of the sado-masochistic character, which he had used in the *Studien* for a more "existential" approach. See above, Chapter 3, p. 99.

95. *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 759.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 760.

97. Horkheimer, "Authoritarianism and the Family Today," *The Family: Its Function and Destiny*, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York, 1949).

98. *Ibid.*, p. 367.

99. *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 371.

100. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (London, 1968), p. 371; and Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (Cleveland, 1963), p. 97.

101. Edward Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left,'" in *Studies in the Scope and Method of the "The Authoritarian Personality."* Bramson repeats this criticism in *The Political Context of Sociology*, pp. 122f.

102. Kecskemeti, "The Study of Man: Prejudice in the Catastrophic Perspective," p. 290.

103. Bettelheim and Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice*, p. 75.

104. *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 676.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 976.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 182. The notion of "pseudo-conservatism" was picked up by other scholars in the 1950's. See, for example, Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in *The Radical Right*, ed. Daniel Bell (New York, 1963).

107. *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 176.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 771.

109. Interview with Adorno, Frankfurt, March 7, 1969.

110. M. Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York, 1960). Rokeach tried to develop a "Dogmatism (D) Scale" to measure leftist authoritarianism. On the basis of this and other studies, Seymour Martin Lipset argued that authoritarianism and neurosis might well be inversely related in the working class; Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960), p. 96.

111. Adorno, "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," p. 361.

112. J. F. Brown's review of the *Studies in Prejudice* in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCVXX (July, 1950), p. 178.

113. For a summary of the earlier efforts see Richard Christie, "Authoritarianism Reexamined," in *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality."* For later additions, see Roger Brown's bibliography in *Social Psychology*.

114. Friedrich Pollock, ed., *Gruppenexperiment: Ein Studienbericht* (Frankfurt, 1955). This was published as vol. II in the Institut's *Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie*, ed. T. W. Adorno and Walter Dirks.

115. Adorno, "Zur gegenwärtigen Stellung der empirischen Sozialforschung in Deutschland," *Empirische Sozialforschung* (Frankfurt, 1952), p. 31.

116. See, for example, Adorno's article, "Contemporary German Sociology," *Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology*, vol. I (London, 1959).

117. For a cross-section of the views expressed by participants in the debate, see Ernst Topitsch, ed., *Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Cologne and Berlin, 1965). Adorno's contributions have been posthumously collected in *Aufsätze zur Gesellschaftstheorie und Methodologie* (Frankfurt, 1970). A summary of the recent literature in English appeared in "Dialectical Methodology: Marx or Weber," *The Times Literary Supplement* (London, March 12, 1970) published anonymously but actually written by George Lichtheim.

8. TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: THE CRITIQUE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

1. So Adorno reported to Benjamin by letter on November 10, 1939; Theodor W. Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin* (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 143.

2. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam, 1947). The house was Querido.

3. I have been able to locate two reviews in professional journals: J. D. Mabbott in *Philosophy*, XXIII, 87 (October, 1948), which was generally favorable, and John R. Everett in *Journal of Philosophy*, XLV, 22 (October 21, 1948), which was less enthusiastic. Lowenthal told me during one of our interviews that the sales of the book were disappointing.

4. Horkheimer, *Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft*, trans. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt, 1967).

5. Göran Therborn's assertion to the contrary seems to me clearly erroneous. See his "Frankfurt Marxism: A Critique," *New Left Review*, 63 (September–October, 1970), p. 76, where he writes that the nonmastery of nature "was not present in Frankfurt thinking from the start. Moreover, it is shared by their archenemy, Heidegger."

6. Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Aesthetischen*, rev. ed. (Frankfurt, 1966), p. 97.

7. In an early essay on *Der Freischütz*, Adorno said that salvation (*Rettung*) could be found only in reconciled nature; see his *Moments Musicaux* (Frankfurt, 1964), p. 46.

8. Horkheimer [Heinrich Regius], *Dämmerung* (Zürich, 1934), pp. 185f. on animals, and p. 181 on the work ethic. In *Dialektik der Aufklärung* Horkheimer and Adorno included a long aphorism on "Mensch und Tier," pp. 295f.

9. Leo Lowenthal, *Literature and the Image of Man* (Boston, 1957), p. 197.

10. Erich Fromm, "Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechtstheorie," *ZfS* III, 2 (1934), p. 206. Here Fromm cited Bachofen as saying that the victory of patriarchal society corresponded to the break between spirit and nature, the triumph of Rome over the Orient.

11. Horkheimer, *Die Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart, 1930).

12. Horkheimer, "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung," in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis" (unpub., 1942), p. 43 (Friedrich Pollock collection, Montagnola).

13. Only on rare occasions did the Institut attempt to relate a thinker's work to his life. One example was Adorno's discussion of Kierkegaard's role as a *rentier* in *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Aesthetischen*, p. 88.

14. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, May 23, 1942 (Lowenthal collection).

15. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1947), p. 104.

16. Therborn has made the astute observation that whereas Lukács stressed reification as the essential meaning of capitalism, and others such as the early Marcuse emphasized alienation (Fromm could also be included here), Horkheimer and Adorno regarded the exchange principle as its essence. See his "Frankfurt Marxism: A Critique," p. 79.

17. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Francis Golffing (New York, 1956), p. 202.

18. Much later, one of the younger members of the second generation of the Frankfurt School extended this argument considerably; see Albrecht Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society* (New York, 1971).

19. This phrase is used by Hannah Arendt in her critique of Marx in *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1958). She draws a distinction between man as *animal laborans* and as *homo faber* (man the maker), which the Frankfurt School did not make.

20. This was the phrase that Adorno used during our interview on March 15, 1969, in Frankfurt.

21. In 1913–1914, Lukács had been part of Weber's circle in Heidelberg. For a

discussion of his relationship with Weber, see George Lichtheim, *George Lukács* (New York, 1970), *passim.*

22. Horkheimer, "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung," p. 33.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

24. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 174.

25. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 41.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

27. Marcuse, *Negations*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968).

28. See his article "Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen," in Walter Benjamin, *Schriften*, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem, vol. II (Frankfurt, 1955). Discussions of his theory of language can be found in Hans Heinz Holz, "Philosophie als Interpretation," *Alternative*, 56/57 (October–December, 1967), and Anon., "Walter Benjamin: Towards a Philosophy of Language," *The Times Literary Supplement* (London, August 23, 1968).

29. Benjamin, "The Task of the Translator," *Illuminations*, ed. with an introduction by Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 1968), p. 80.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

31. Jürgen Habermas made this point to me in an interview in Frankfurt, March 7, 1969.

32. Anon., "Walter Benjamin: Towards a Philosophy of Language," uses this phrase to describe Benjamin. In "The Task of the Translator" Benjamin wrote that the transparency of pure language might be approached "above all, by a literal rendering of the syntax which proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator" (p. 79).

33. See the letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal quoted on page 233, Chapter 7, above.

34. *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 179.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

37. Walter Benjamin, *Briefe*, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt, 1966), vol. II, p. 786.

38. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 195.

39. Herbert Marcuse has an extensive discussion of the "closing of the Universe of Discourse" in *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), pp. 85f.

40. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 71. In *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse wrote that "the predominant culture-hero is the trickster and (suffering) rebel against the gods, who creates culture at the price of perpetual pain" (p. 146). He used Prometheus rather than Odysseus as its prototype.

41. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, pp. 76f.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118.

43. This point was developed in the aphorism on "Mensch und Tier," *ibid.*, pp. 297f.

44. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 218. Horkheimer discussed this point at greater length in *Eclipse of Reason*, pp. 121f.

45. Alfred Schmidt has tried to distinguish between Adorno as a "real humanist" and other conventional humanists. The term "real humanist" first appeared in Marx's *The Holy Family* in 1845 in opposition to the abstract, ahistorical humanism of Feuerbach. Adorno himself liked to be called an "antihumanist," not only for the reason Schmidt cites — his dislike of the positive connotations of any static definition of human nature — but also because of his fear that anthropocentricity would

mean the concomitant denigration of nature. For Schmidt's argument, see his "Adorno — ein Philosoph des realen Humanismus," *Neue Rundschau*, LXXX, 4 (1969). See also my article "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism," *Social Research* XXXIX, 2 (Summer, 1972).

46. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 267.

47. *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 184.

48. There is a considerable critical literature on Bloch which stresses this point. For one example, see Jürgen Habermas, "Ernst Bloch — A Marxist Romantic," in *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals, Salmagundi*, 10/11 (Fall, 1969–Winter, 1970).

49. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 223.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

51. In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse wrote that "the restoration of remembrance to its rights, as a vehicle of liberation, is one of the noblest tasks of thought. In this function, remembrance (*Erinnerung*) appears at the conclusion of Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*: in this function, it appears in Freud's theory" (p. 212). In Marcuse's work, the importance of "re-membering" what has been split asunder was closely related to the identity theory he never fully abandoned. Habermas has also stressed the liberating function of memory in his brilliant chapters on psychoanalysis in *Erkenntnis und Interesse* (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 262f.

52. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 274.

53. Benjamin, *Berliner Kindheit um Neunzehnhundert* (Frankfurt, 1950).

54. Letter from Adorno to Benjamin, February 29, 1940, in Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, p. 159.

55. Adorno's defense of some reification as a necessary element of all culture appeared in his article on Huxley. See above, Chapter 6, p. 178. In another context, Horkheimer had criticized Dilthey and his followers for reducing history to the *Nacherleben* of past events. His reasoning was similar: the complete identity of historian as subject and historical event as object was unattainable. See above, Chapter 2, p. 49.

56. Lecture at Columbia University, April 17, 1945. There were three other lectures in the following weeks. These were similar, but not the same as the 1944 lectures on which *Eclipse of Reason* was based (Lowenthal collection).

57. *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York, 1963), p. 155.

58. Marx himself had hoped for one science: "Natural science will one day incorporate the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate natural science; there will be a *single* science" (*Early Writings*, p. 164). His followers had forgotten the second clause of his sentence and also ignored the fact that Marx had said "one day" there will be a unified science of nature and man.

59. Marcuse, "Zum Problem der Dialektik," *Die Gesellschaft* VII, 1 (January, 1930), p. 26.

60. See, for example, Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, 1969). Göran Therborn, whose article on the Frankfurt School is mentioned above, is an Althusserian.

61. Emile Durkheim, *Suicide*, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (New York, 1951), pp. 123–142. Tarde's major work was *Les Lois de l'imitation* (Paris, 1890).

62. Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, trans. James Strachey (New York, 1960), p. 27.

63. "Research Project on Anti-Semitism," *SPSS* IX, 1 (1941), p. 139.

64. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 115.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

66. Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, in *Prophets of Deceit* (New York, 1949), mentioned the frequency with which anti-Semitic agitators mimic Jews (p. 79).

67. April 24, 1945 (Lowenthal collection).

68. *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 179.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 105–107.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

71. See, for example, Marcuse, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968), pp. 32, 47.

72. Interview with Habermas, Frankfurt, March, 1969.

73. Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

74. Max Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 234–235.

75. The most extensive recent defenses of this position can be found in Rolf Ahlers, "Is Technology Intrinsically Repressive?," *Continuum* VIII, 1/2 (Spring–Summer, 1970), and Paul Piccone and Alexander Delfini, "Marcuse's Heideggerian Marxism," *Telos* 6 (Fall, 1970).

76. The essay is reprinted in Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (London, 1962). Oakeshott equated rationalism with its instrumental variant, and was thus able to write: "This assimilation of politics to engineering is, indeed, what may be called the myth of rationalist politics" (p. 4).

77. *Eclipse of Reason*, pp. 122–123.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 123. The book contained an extensive critique of the work of Sidney Hook and John Dewey.

80. Benjamin, "Eduard Fuchs, der Sammler und der Historiker," *ZfS* VI, 2 (1937), p. 364.

81. *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 127.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

84. Horkheimer, "Bemerkungen zu Jaspers 'Nietzsche,'" *ZfS* VI, 2 (1937). In a letter to Lowenthal on May 2, 1946, he made other disparaging remarks about Jaspers (Lowenthal collection).

85. Marcuse, *Negations*, p. 41.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–42.

87. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, August 19, 1946 (Lowenthal collection).

88. Marcuse, "Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's *L'Être et le néant*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* VIII, 3 (March, 1948).

89. Sartre was to repudiate much of *Being and Nothingness* in his *Critique de la raison dialectique* (Paris, 1960). Marcuse's appraisal of this work was far more favorable; see his added paragraph to the German version of his essay on *Being and Nothingness* in *Kultur und Gesellschaft*, vol. II (Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 83–84.

90. Marcuse, "Existentialism," p. 322.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

92. For a later discussion of the existentialists' alienation from nature, see Albert William Levi, "The Concept of Nature," in *The Origins of Modern Consciousness*, ed. John Weiss (Detroit, 1965), pp. 57f.

93. Paul Robinson, *The Freudian Left* (New York, 1969), pp. 192f.

94. Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," *Negations*, p. 116.

95. *Ibid.*

96. This occurred not in *Being and Nothingness*, but in a separate article entitled "Materialisme et révolution," *Les Temps modernes* I, 1 and I, 2 (1946). In the article, Sartre tried to reject the materialist premises of Marxism, but still be a revolutionary.

97. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pp. 40f.

98. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, pp. 280–281.

99. Benjamin, *Briefe*, vol. II, pp. 681–682.

100. More orthodox Marxist critics of the Frankfurt School always pointed to the continuation of contradictions under capitalism. See, for example, Paul Mattick, "The Limits of Integration," in *The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston, 1967).

101. *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 186.

102. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 10.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 80. In the same spirit, he wrote, "the task of art today is to bring chaos into order" (p. 428).

105. Adorno, "Reflexionen," *Aufklärung* IV, 1 (June, 1951), p. 86.

106. *Minima Moralia*, p. 7.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 480.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 481.

110. Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 256.

111. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt, 1966).

112. Horkheimer, "Schopenhauer Today," in *The Critical Spirit*, p. 70.

113. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, December 2, 1943 (Lowenthal collection).

114. A recent student of utopias and of Rousseau, Judith N. Shklar, has made this point in *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1969), p. 2.

115. Quoted in *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung* (April 26–27, 1969), p. 10.

116. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, p.13.

117. Adorno's recent critics have discussed this theme at length. See, for example, Manfred Clemenz, "Theorie als Praxis?," *Neue politische Literatur* XIII, 2 (1968).

EPILOGUE

1. Letter from Leo Lowenthal to Max Horkheimer, May 12, 1946 (Lowenthal collection).

2. The first contact was made in letters to Felix Weil and Friedrich Pollock, so Lowenthal reported in a letter to Horkheimer on October 19, 1946 (Lowenthal collection).

3. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, April 12, 1947 (Lowenthal collection).

4. In a letter to Paul Lazarsfeld written on August 4, 1947, Horkheimer mentioned possibilities at the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of Southern California, and Occidental College. (Lowenthal collection.)

5. Interview with Horkheimer, Montagnola, Switzerland, March 12, 1969.

6. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, February 18, 1950 (Lowenthal collection).

7. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, April 8, 1950 (Lowenthal collection).

8. Conversation with Everett Hughes, Cambridge, Mass., July 21, 1971.

9. In his first letter to me on November 22, 1968, Horkheimer wrote of Butler's "great kindness and understanding," adding, "I met him the first time a few weeks after my arrival in New York and I shall never forget what we owe to him."

10. This was a phrase Pollock used during a conversation in Lugano, March, 1969.

11. This was also extended to Werner Richter. A description of the bill exists in a clipping in Horkheimer's scrapbooks, which he graciously allowed me to see during my stay in Montagnola.

12. Theodor W. Adorno, "*Auf die Frage*: Was ist deutsch," *Stichworte: Kritische Modelle 2* (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 110. Elsewhere in the article Adorno wrote: "At no time during the emigration did I give up the hope of return" (p. 107).

13. Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism* (New York, 1958).

14. Records of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 82nd Congress, 1951–1952, vol. III.

15. Conversation with Wittfogel in New York, June 21, 1971.

16. The petition is in the Lowenthal collection.

17. Letter from Weil to me, March 30, 1971.

18. The description of the Institut's return is derived from clippings in Horkheimer's scrapbooks.

19. *Sociologica I* (Frankfurt, 1955).

20. His addresses on academic affairs were published as Horkheimer, "Gegenwärtige Probleme der Universität," *Frankfurt Universitätsreden* VIII (Frankfurt, 1953).

21. Horkheimer's rectoral address was entitled "Zum Begriff der Vernunft," *Frankfurt Universitätsreden* VII (Frankfurt, 1952).

22. Horkheimer, *Survey of the Social Sciences in Western Germany* (Washington, D.C., 1952).

23. The letter, which was an open letter published as well in the German press, is included in Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie*, ed. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt, 1968), vol. II.

24. A twenty-volume edition of Adorno's works is now being planned by the Suhrkamp Verlag. At this writing, volume VII, a posthumously published fragment on *Ästhetische Theorie*, has appeared (Frankfurt, 1970), as has volume V, *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie* (Frankfurt, 1971).

25. For one treatment of this question, see Paul Breines, "Marcuse and the New Left in America," *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse*, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt, 1968). I have attempted a more extensive analysis of the post-1950 influence of the Institut in America in "The Frankfurt School in Exile," *Perspectives in American History*, vol. VI (Cambridge, 1972).

26. The Horkheimer scrapbooks contain many articles about his appearances in the mass media.

27. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, February 2, 1943 (Lowenthal collection).

28. Adorno, *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967), p. 166.

29. See, for example, Claus Grossner, "Frankfurter Schule am Ende," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg, May 12, 1970), p. 5.

30. In 1966 Horkheimer expressed alarm about the Chinese Communist threat by

saying that Kaiser Wilhelm II's warning about "the menace of the yellow race should be taken very seriously today"; "On the Concept of Freedom," *Diogenes*, 53 (Paris, 1966). In the following year, he appeared at a celebration of German-American Friendship Week on the Romerplatz in Frankfurt, which prompted anti-Vietnam War students to shout "*Horkheimer Raus*" in an effort to persuade him to dissociate himself from American policy. They failed.

31. Edward Shils, "Tradition, Ecology, and Institution in the History of Sociology," *Daedalus* LXXXXIX, 4 (Fall, 1970).

32. Interview with Marcuse, Cambridge, Mass., June 18, 1968.

33. The term is used by Lazarsfeld. See his "An Episode in the History of Social Research: A Memoir," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 286.

34. Conversation with Lazarsfeld, New York, N.Y., January 3, 1971.

35. Interview with Pollock, Montagnola, Switzerland, March 14, 1969.

36. Interview with Paul Massing, New York, N.Y., November 25, 1970.

37. On November 12, 1943, Lowenthal wrote to Horkheimer that "if you look up in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences you will find that this [George Herbert] Mead apparently was a philosopher and sociologist with genuine problems." This, however, is the only mention of Mead in the Institut's writings I've been able to find. Location: Lowenthal collection.

38. Letter from Horkheimer to Lowenthal, July 17, 1946 (Lowenthal collection). Part of this quotation reappears in Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1970), p. 160.

39. Hans Mommsen, "Historical Scholarship in Transition: The Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Daedalus*, C, 2 (Spring, 1971), p. 498.

40. Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 48.

41. Horkheimer, "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," *ZfS* VI, 2 (1937), p. 269.

42. Walter Benjamin, "Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung," *Mass und Wert* I, 5 (May–June, 1938), p. 820.

43. Adorno noted this in one of his essays on Benjamin: "The predominance of spirit extremely alienated his psychical and even psychological existence. . . . He considered animal warmth tabu; a friend could scarcely dare to lay a hand on his shoulder."; *Über Walter Benjamin* (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 50.

44. Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

45. Carl Grünberg, "Festrede gehalten zur Einweihung des Instituts für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt a.M. am 22 Juni 1924," *Frankfurter Universitätsreden*, XX (Frankfurt, 1924), p. 4.

46. Ringer, *Decline of the German Mandarins*, p. 5.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

49. "I have encountered only one favorable comment upon Freud's work in the academic literature of this period, and that was written by the radical critic Ernst von Aster," Ringer wrote (*ibid.*, p. 383).

50. Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 22.

51. This is not to say that the Frankfurt School denied the continued existence of class struggle entirely. "Society remains class struggle, today just as in the period when that concept originated," Adorno later wrote; "Society," *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals, Salmagundi* 10/11 (Fall, 1969–Winter, 1970), p. 149. It was, however, no longer the focal point of their analysis.

52. See, for example, Hans Heinz-Holz, *Utopie und Anarchismus: Zur Kritik der kritischen Theorie Herbert Marcuses* (Cologne, 1968), pp. 60f.

53. This comment is mentioned in one of the clippings in Horkheimer's scrapbooks.

54. Quoted in a letter from Weil to me, January 31, 1971.

55. Harold Poor, *Kurt Tucholsky and the Ordeal of Germany, 1914-1935* (New York, 1968) p. 137.

56. This was the figure Pollock mentioned during one of our conversations in Montagnola in March, 1969.

57. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (Frankfurt, 1951), p. 98.

58. Göran Therborn has written that "understandably, fascism became a Medusa's head for the Frankfurt School. The result was that the initial attitude of revulsion was *frozen*, instead of developing into a scientific analysis and participation in revolutionary political practice"; "Frankfurt Marxism: A Critique," *New Left Review*, 63 (September–October, 1970), p. 94. His criticism was made from the left, but liberals also have pointed to the Institut's obsession with fascism. See, for example, Leon Bramson, *The Political Context of Sociology* (Princeton, 1961), p. 129, and David Riesman, *Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), p. 477.

59. Martin Jay, review of *The Intellectual Migration*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, and *The Bauhaus*, by Hans Wingler, in *Commentary*, XXXXIX, 3 (March, 1970).

60. Horkheimer [Heinrich Regius], *Dämmerung* (Zurich, 1934), p. 216.

61. Marcuse indicated this during our interview in Cambridge, Mass. on June 18, 1968.

62. Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 34.

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The following abbreviations are used:

Grünbergs Archiv: *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*
SPSS: *Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences*
ZfS: *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*

PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUT

The Institut was associated with or published the following journals:

Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, vols. I–XV (1910–1930).

Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, vols. I–VIII, 2 (1932–1939).

Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, vol. VIII, 3–IX, 3 (1939–1941).

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The collective works of the Institut included the following:

Studien über Autorität und Familie (Paris, 1936).

"Anti-Semitism within American Labor: A Report to the Jewish Labor Committee." 4 vols. Unpublished, 1945; in Pollock's collection.

The Institut's own histories included:

Institut für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt, 1925).

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Collections of documents, letters, unpublished papers, memoranda, and lectures in the possession of Leo Lowenthal, Friedrich Pollock, and Paul Lazarsfeld were also used. So too were the various clippings in Max Horkheimer's scrapbooks, which were collected primarily after 1950. Since the time I examined them, the letters in Lowenthal's collection have been deposited in the Houghton Library at Harvard.

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