

Mark W. Elliott
Providence Perceived

Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte



Begründet von
Karl Holl† und Hans Lietzmann†

Herausgegeben von
Christian Albrecht und Christoph Marksches

Band 124

Mark W. Elliott

Providence Perceived

Divine Action from a Human Point of View

DE GRUYTER

ISBN 978-3-11-031056-6
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-031064-1
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-038297-6
ISSN 1861-5996

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

© 2015 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck
♻️ Printed on acid-free paper
Printed in Germany

www.degruyter.com

Contents

Introduction — 1

Chapter One: Providence in the early Christian Church's Theology — 5

Ecumenical Beginnings after the Apostolic Era — 5

The Western development — 37

Political History — 45

Chapter Two: The Medieval Account of Providence — 55

Boethius first — 55

Medieval Historiography — 71

Byzantium and Eastern Christianity — 84

The Western High Middle Ages — 92

Chapter Three: Later Medieval Developments — 104

Alternatives to the High Medieval Consensus — 104

More radical traditions — 128

Chapter Four: Reformation Providence — 135

The impact of Luther — 135

Calvin and the Swiss-Dutch tradition — 141

The Heidelberg Catechism and Bullinger — 149

And the Lutherans? — 157

Catholic voices — 166

Chapter Five: The Doctrine's Fortunes in the Early Modern Era — 173

Protestant and Catholic perceptions — 173

Philosophical Moves — 189

Theological responses in the Early Enlightenment — 194

Chapter Six: The Enlightenment's ongoing Challenge to the Doctrine of Providence — 202

Later Enlightenment voices — 202

Hegel and Beyond — 221

Chapter Seven: Providence in twentieth-century theological discussion — 231

The major contribution of Barth: renewing the tradition — 233

Reactions to Barth on Providence — **242**

Providence in post-confessional German theology from 1960
onwards — **247**

English-speaking discussion — **260**

Recent Catholic contribution to the Doctrine — **267**

The place of the historical in God's purposes — **272**

Chapter Eight: Coming up to date: works in the last five years — 279

Conclusion — 291

Bibliography — 295

Index of Scripture References — 325

Index of Key Figures — 328

Introduction

This opening chapter is not the place to try to be synthetic, let alone systematic. Indeed, even the chapters that follow will hardly please the reader who is looking for such qualities. At times this book might seem *annaliste* in the sense of recounting “one damn thinker after another.” Moreover, a short apology as to why this work will be largely an attempt to describe past thinking using the historical research of others is required. First, theology has always drawn on the past generations’ theologizing as its life-blood, hence the need to present movements and thinkers in some sort of historical order and with full assistance from the work of the respective experts on each period. That is to resist the temptation for modern theologians to ignore both the sequence of primary sources and relevant historical theological scholarship in a hurry to annex the realm of “the tradition” and to dispose of it like its property. This work intends to counter the tendency among theologians to treat history badly and anachronistically. For, employing postmodernism as a fig leaf for such shameful behaviour, such modern theology asserts that there is no such thing as history, only things in the past that can be made useful, like the odd original fireplace in one’s hi-tech dream home. Ideas, one is told, get “received according to the mode of the receiver” (itself a re-conditioned idea from Thomas Aquinas) and that justifies pinning a modern idea to an ancient name, and colonizing it.¹ It is hence understandable that some contemporary theology prefers to escape from the contingents of past traditions and prefers to deal in more general discourse of meta-ethical nature with reference to “community”, “hospitality”, “inclusion.”

However, for all this unfortunate behaviour towards the past (those who colonise it and those who ignore or patronise it), there are plenty of examples of exemplary practice in allowing the voices of the past to be heard in concert, even if the perfect eludes us. Jaroslav Pelikan’s *The Christian Tradition* comes to mind, as does Bernard McGinn’s *The Presence of God*. Multi-authored attempts are something different, but one stands in awe and admiration before the (Protestant) *Handbuch der Dogmen-und Theologiegeschichte* and the (Catholic) *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte*. One or two attempts at the history of exegesis are also inspiring. Henri Brémond’s *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France* is more specialized yet in its own way “immense.” Alister McGrath’s *Ius-titia Dei* continues to offer much for understanding the development of “Justifi-

¹ John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom ‘What is Received is Received According to the Mode of the Receiver’”, in *A Straight Path: Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman*, ed. Ruth Link-Salinger (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 279–89.

cation,” and provided that author with a tracing flare to guide his subsequent, popular introductions to Christian theology.

Second, in attempting to be synthetic about a period or a school or a thinker from the past, drawing on a goodly amount of teamwork is appropriate. If a respected contemporary scholar (or two or three) has written a book on the theme of Providence (or its cognates) in x, then it not only saves time in the attempt to allow a wider picture to emerge, it is an act of collegial trust to resist the urge *always* to go back *ad fontes* and re-read the primary texts for oneself. Obviously important things can be missed even by the best scholars, but not every piece of scholarship needs to be like the dissertation, with a fixed amount of primary material from a certain provenance, whose secrets yet need to be brought into the sunlight. A good monograph on ‘Providence in x’ will point one to the key primary texts, where the argument turns, or is pithily summed up by the original author. Hence something of that flavour should come through. No further or longer apology needs to be made for the reliance on secondary sources. Secondary sources which are studies based on primary sources have done the work of selecting and compressing that a work of this sort very much needs. It strikes me as something almost disrespectful to rely on our own three-hour dip into a commentary or a treatise when there is a work devoted to that text that took three or more years in the researching. Creativity comes in the use and interweaving of research of others, and often in going through the secondary sources to the primary ones, when specific questions related to Providence go unanswered. This will involve diving into primary sources at many points where the thing remains unexplored, or the questions one has to ask are somehow different. Yet what is to be avoided is large paraphrase of chunks of primary text, *unless* it comes from a text that has not yet been translated.

Furthermore, one looks at specialist studies partly because they often aim to put texts in their contexts. Therefore Church History or, rather, that which is reflected in the primary texts of Christian theology and spirituality through the years and according to context, is invaluable when heard as much on its own terms as possible, not least for this particular doctrine: Providence. For Church History deals with as a matter of first importance the perceptions of God’s dealings with his people. Church History is invested in understanding how the way people have regarded Providence has in turn made a difference to how they received biblical and historical teaching anterior to themselves, and how they themselves then added to the growing tradition. The biblical texts themselves in turn stand as records of how the history of God and humanity in particular times and places was grasped and interpreted. This re-appropriation went on even during the biblical period: books like those which make up the so-called “Wisdom Literature” emerge from a self-understanding of writers representing

a people that is quite well aware of its own historical “situatedness.” In the chapters after this one we shall look afresh at some of these texts, from the bible as interpreted by Christian theologians and the Christian tradition (with some reference to Jewish thought too). (It might be said here that intentionally faithful reading of authoritative Scripture is likely to have more to illuminate the biblical text than fanciful use of Scripture for rhetorical effect: proof texting proceeds on the idea that someone else has already established the link between a verse and a doctrine: this of course is not a sufficient way of hearing the bible, but it is arguably better than modern allegorical readings where the Scriptural text is melted down to one idea-e.g. “exodus” and then re-fashioned into some modern cause. Even G. Gutierrez said too much was made of “the exodus” by liberationist theologians.)

Third, this work will try not to be too defensive, not least in claiming that the fact the raw material for this study comes from the past does not mean that its truth is outdated. It could be said that the history of human ideas is the database for all research in the humanities. Ortega y Gasset in his *Historia como sistema* (Towards a Philosophy of History, 1941) following Michelet and even Vico put it this way: “Man in a word has no nature; what he has is history.”

Unfortunately there has been a wrong sense of what Providence is – people have seen it as a ghost that lives near them rather than Intelligence which forms the whole, their little bit included. If there is truth in Kierkegaard’s adage, that life is lived forwards but understood backwards,² then ecclesial theology has quite a wisdom to gain from reviewing the life of the *ecclesia* to this point. Yet one feels admiration for the Systematician who feels confident enough to help herself from the larder of historical theology according to her tastes and requirements. There is nothing worse than information served up with all the *élan* of a telephone directory. Certainly the questions one should ask of the past should not (for the most part) be those of the antiquarian. Yet history is our resource as an alternative to natural science or even human science in the sense of sociology, where there often seems to be very little taken account of that is joyfully and non-self-consciously contingent and apparently accidental, even flukey.

With Providence (and it shall be capitalised when it is meant as a concept), any self-abandonment to it³ requires a belief that there is something behind that name which will preserve our best interests, or at least will not allow a result that

² *Journals* IV A 164 (1843).

³ As in J.-P. de Caussade, *Abandonment to Divine Providence*, (publ. Paris, 1861, 110 years post-humously) it is the idea of self-sacrifice, where the offering is something that does not cost one nothing (1 Chr 21:24) and gives value to the notion that our hold on things, even life, is only as tenants (not quite the same as “stewards”).

is overall harmful to us. It will not cause us so much hurt that we would feel less inclined to trust in the future than we do at this present moment. The right human disposition towards Providence is not so much “saving faith” but faith that God intervenes in this world too, and not merely for the sake of our participation in the afterlife, but for penultimate ends too. As such it might well appear a rather self-centred kind of doctrine, even while the very reverse is the point of its content. A God who looks after *me*? It is almost the very opposite of Aristotle’s famous view in *Metaphysics* XII,9, that divine providence does not extend “beneath” the guiding of the stars and planets. The corollary is the idea that humans are then freed to act and not be mannequins, but rather responsible moral agents, who flourish in the knowledge, the cognitive “good outlook,” that a Providence is playing and will play its part. Something of this concern was also there in the ethical teaching of Proclus. So the ancient understanding of the doctrine was not one that encouraged passivity, let alone indolence. The flipside, as it were, of Providence, one might say the religious affect that accompanies the doctrine, is that of *fiducia*.⁴

⁴ See recently Simon Peng-Keller and Ingolf U. Dalferth, eds., *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumenische Diskussion um die fiducia*. Quaestiones Disputatae 250 (Freiburg: Herder, 2012.) Or as Klaus Fischer has recently expressed it: “Ziel der Studie ist es, den *biblischen* Grund des Glaubens an Gott herauszuarbeiten, sodass er als *Chance* für die Begegnung mit dem Schicksal begreifbar wird: in Vertrauen, Gelassenheit und Freiheit des Geistes (*Filippo Neri*).” Klaus P. Fischer, *Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008), 10.

Chapter One: Providence in the early Christian Church's Theology

Ecumenical Beginnings after the Apostolic Era

Genevieve Lloyd recounts how the ancient playwrights struggled to show how even the gods were subject to necessity at times, and that as a counterpoint, human beings did have a measure of control over the way things turned out.¹ In the *Alcestis* of Euripides, Apollo gave Ametys reprieve from mortality for being a good master to him, while Alcestos is able to step in and make a difference. The lesson to learn was to accept mortality and be brave where freedom could be asserted: “there is no horror in the inevitable.” (Aeschylus’ *Hypsipyle* would be admired by Chrysippus and Cicero.²) In this pre-Christian vision “true wisdom lies in the delicate art of learning to live with both necessity and chance.”³ The playwrights and Cicero maintained free will where the Epicureans gave all to chance and the Stoics all to fate. Cicero in *De Natura Deorum* (2.35.88/44.115) is able to see Providence as neither: there is a design, an intelligence, which might just deserve the epithet “personal.” For Foucault, the ancients believed that humans had resistance to offer the course of events, and this disposition could be summed up in the term *parrhesia*. The body needed to be taken hold of, and yet the soul in so doing was nevertheless serving the body, even in the example of the medicalization of sexuality.⁴ All in all there was some “further” reason for such ordering. Human beings seemed to require “a bigger scheme of things,” even a “macrocosmos” to work with or over-against. Epictetus (born 55 CE) seemed surprisingly like Paul to the point that some like Theodore Zahn thought there just had to be an influence at work.⁵

The New Testament thought that certain things were indeed fixed, the two advents of Christ in particular, but little else is predetermined and no plan

1 Genevieve Lloyd, *Providence Lost* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008.)

2 Fischer, *Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie*, 19.

3 Ibid., 40. As for Lucretius comments: “Still, the knowledge that our free will rests on random cosmic ‘swervings’ may hold terrors of its own.”

4 See *Histoire de la sexualité III: Le Souci de Soi* (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), 185.

5 Whereas Stoic *epistrophe* meant a turning back to one’s source, ancient Christians believed in something else. “Il s’agit d’un bouleversement de l’esprit, d’un renouveau radical, il s’agit d’une ré-enfantement du sujet par lui-même, avec au centre, la mort et la resurrection comme experience de soi-Même et de renoncement de soi à soi.” (Michel Foucault, *L’herméneutique du sujet* [Paris: Gallimard, 2009], 208) Foucault proposes a third: return of the self to the self and to being no longer being distracted by the world around.

may be discerned. There is not much mention of *pronoia* in the sense of divine overseeing or provision. The New Testament is very interested in the prophesied and enacted history of salvation in Christ, but that in turn does not give much insight into the course of world history of individual life stories.⁶ If one has to resort to Jewish contemporaries, Josephus names as one of the distinguishing features of the Pharisees their belief that “Fate” took the choices of humans into account.⁷ Even this is still more determinist than what one learns from *Avot* 3:15 from Akiva: “All is foreseen, but freedom of choice is given.” For Josephus himself at times (in *Ant* 2,4) he could assert a Stoic-like providence against Epicureans (although when it came to particular events like the Red Sea crossing he was less sure.)⁸ The book of Wisdom has a long coda where God’s working with Israel in history is a manifestation of his clear involvement in the world (see especially *Wisdom* xiv.3, xvii.2). It would seem that cosmological ordering is then given some sort of fulfillment in the history of Israel, as it is presented. Josephus too could look back and attribute the fall of Jerusalem and the temple’s destruction to *providentia Dei et confusione hominum*.⁹ One senses, however, that with the interest in creation and new creation in an “eschatologically minded” first century, that there was less space available for the present and the penultimate.

Philo held the Logos (as distinct from “Sophia”) to be responsible for Providence. David Winston comments:

But if this “dance of the Logos” involves a “perpetual flux”, how is it to be reconciled with Philo’s belief in the ultimate advent of a messianic age? The answer appears to be that the rotational equality that rules the present cosmic era will ultimately be replaced by a steady-state form of equality. The ideal natural law embodied in the Mosaic Torah will then govern

6 Wolfgang Schrage, *Vorsehung Gottes? Zur Rede von der providentia Dei in der Antike und im Neuen Testament* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchner, 2005), 137: “Vorsehung ist also anders als in der Stoa nicht auf die göttliche Weltregierung fokussiert.” 157: “[...] dass mit der Gewissheit des durch Gottes Vorsehung begründeten unumstößlichen Heils kein Universalschlüssel für eine sinnvolle Erklärung des Weltgeschehens oder des eigenen Lebensschicksals gewonnen wird.”

7 *Antiquities* xviii.1, 2.

8 See Harold W. Attridge, *The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates Judaicae of Flavius Josephus*, Harvard Dissertations in Religion 7 (Missoula: Scholars, 1976).

9 See Bernhard Mutschler, “Geschichte, Heil und Unheil bei Flavius Josephus am Beispiel der Tempelzerstörung,” in *Heil und Geschichte: Die Geschichtsbezogenheit des Heils und das Problem der Heilsgeschichte in der biblischen Tradition und in der theologischen Deutung*, eds. Jörg Frey, Stefan Krauter, and Hermann Lichtenberger, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 103–27.

all the nations of the world, so that there will no longer be any dislocations in the divine economy and hence no need for periodic redistributions.¹⁰

In other words, Philo did not see Providence as the occasional but sharp intervention which might well get more and more disruptive, but rather as a steady rotational equilibrium that will be replaced by a non-rotational, stable one. Now clearly Philo is writing more from God's viewpoint, or trying to, and placing the emphasis on order and constancy. When Socrates wrote that providence could be demonstrated from the careful arrangement of human anatomy, he was doing something similar to Philo.¹¹ The latter's *De Providentia* is neither thorough or systematic – it is more a refutation of his nephew Tiberius J. Alexander that the very existence of evil disproved providence. It is a proper question: How can the provident yet transcendent God extend his providence to creation? For creation to exist in time its creation has to be in between divine planning and continual sustaining.¹² Relying on the work of David Runia, Peter Frick comments on the Philonic “three levels” of the Logos: “On the highest, transcendent level, the Logos is the mind of God, and on the lower, immanent level, the Logos administers the cosmos with its attendant powers. Combining both of the levels on a second level is the Logos as the instrument of creation.”¹³

In this Philo came quite close to the Middle Platonist Atticus. It seems a little strange to say that Philo thinks of God as essentially provident when it seems clear that in *Spec* 1:209 προνοητικός seems to follow on from creation, i.e. his treatment of God as such comes after saying he is ποιητής γεννητής. It is not the case that a predicate demands “essence.” But Runia and Frick's general point is well-taken: God's Providence is a doctrine about God and Creation, not just about God and His excellence – as was the case with Atticus.¹⁴ For Philo then, the Logos provides a gracious link between God and human soul via the rest of creation. God's gracious providence that is greater than goodness is not something apophatic but is goodness in action. *Pronoia* originally meant “intention” as in 2 Macc 4:6; or “eternal plan” that freed the Israelites (Wis 17:2).

10 David Winston, “Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon on Creation, Revelation, and Providence: The High-Water Mark of Jewish Hellenistic Fusion,” in *Shem in the Tents of Japhet, Essays on the Encounter of Judaism and Hellenism*, ed. James Kugel, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 120 – 30.

11 Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, i.4,2.

12 Peter Frick, *Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria*, Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism 77 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 190. See Philo, *Opif* 171–72.

13 *Ibid.*, 115, with reference to David Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, *Philosophia Antiqua* 44 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 242.

14 Frick, *Divine Providence*, 65; Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 441

For the Neoplatonists *pronoia* was a general rule that allowed for no exceptions. With Philo it was very much related to the law and one's following of it.¹⁵ It is about taking part in an eschatological conflict between good and evil spirits, whose dialectic drives history's course, or rather the destiny of the individual.¹⁶ If Philo's work was really a polemic against fatalism, rather than a treatment of the theme as a whole, then it could be argued that before Plotinus there was no work dedicated to the topic, unless one counts Book X of Plato's *Laws*. There was much more done on Fate: Seneca's work *De Providentia* is actually about fate (of a fairly blind sort), and offering oneself up to it.¹⁷ Yet, insisted Seneca, it is incumbent on a person to struggle to hold his course against his fortune.

In the earliest decades of the history of the Church there seems to have been little real attempt to address the issue of Providence; the Apologists only touch on it when claiming that God's sustains the world through the *Pax Romana*, while some contemporaries were convinced the world was at an end, so that to speak of God's providence of it would have been a futile pursuit. Justin Martyr saw biblical, interventionist providence as concerned with the souls of believing individuals only. Tertullian viewed anything lying outside of salvation history as simply demonic, with safety only found in God's ownership. Compared with the other second-century Apologists for whom Creation and its initial goodness, was more of a concern, Athenagoras had quite a lot to say on Providence as God's ongoing ordering activity in creation and human free will. He was possibly the first Christian to distinguish "general" from "specific" providence. Much of his writing mixes in influences from Plato and the Stoics wherever they fit with the biblical view of a ruling, upholding God. As David Rankin outlines, "From Chapter 24 on of the *Legatio*, after he has indicated that the spirit opposed to God was given the administration of matter and material things, he speaks of the general and universal Providence over all things exercised by God alone and of the particular Providence which is given to angels called into existence

15 Folker Siegert, *Philon von Alexandrien: Über die Gottesbezeichnung "wohlthätig verzehrendes Feuer" (De deo)*, WUNT 46 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 135f. "Philon will möglicherweise an Stellen wie *Spec. I*, 308ff. oder der unseren etwas Ähnliches sagen; doch wirkt bei ihm die Vorsehung ausschließlich auf dem Wege der (physikalischen und ethischen) Gültigkeit des (Mose-) Gesetzes."

16 Jutta Leonhardt-Balzer, "Heilsgeschichte bei Philo? Die Aufnahme der Zweigeisterlehre in QE I 23," in *Heil und Geschichte: Die Geschichtsbezogenheit des Heils und das Problem der Heilsgeschichte in der biblischen Tradition und in der theologischen Deutung*, eds., Jörg Frey, Stefan Krauter, and Hermann Lichtenberger, WUNT 248 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 129 – 147.

17 *De providentia* 5,8: "grande solacium est cum universo rapi. 9: non potest artifex mutare materiam; hoc passa est [...] contra fortunam illi tenendus est cursus."

for this purpose (24.3).¹⁸ Yet at 25,2 he is quite happy to say *against* the Stoics that God is quite happy to delegate oversight of sub-lunar regions to the wills of angels (perhaps a “third providence”) and men, and that the only necessity is that of consequence. God’s providence will only fully catch up with earthly history on the day of Judgement (*De resurrectione* 14.5).

An awareness of Providence can be seen in the religious practice of late antique Egypt: “No, no-one prayed for sun to rise, but they prayed for the Nile to rise.”¹⁹ Reports on what seems to have been a widespread view of providence at a popular level at the end of the second century. Where there was contingency, there arose a felt need for special providence. In this respect second-century Christian thought was more like Josephus and Wisdom than like Philo. Robert Grant relates that the world of Imperial Rome, at least when interpreted by those with religious sensitivity, is quite ready to ascribe events to the action of supernatural power. It was well known that the Twelfth Legion was “miraculously” spared when the Quadi tribe was struck by lightning.²⁰ Furthermore divine help was actively sought and expected: Dio Cassius (60.9.2–5) reports incantations, or prayer to Mithras before battle. But the divine employment of the elements was not always so predictable. As Theophilus of Antioch, reflecting on Jeremiah 10:13 and Psalm 134:7 has it: “multiplying lightnings turn into rain. It is God himself who controls the flashes from burning up earth.”²¹ Also, Theophilus declared that humans are like seeds within the pomegranate who cannot see outside it. Foresight is not guaranteed.²² These few details that Grant helpfully relates seem a world away from how Philo wrote about providence, or maybe one could say as far as a heaven’s eye-view is from an earth-bound one. Having established that the term “Sebaoth” (LXX: *pantakratôr*) means one who has actual, limited power, Gijbser van den Brink notes that there took place a gradual semantic shift toward a definition of “omnipotens,” i.e. as one having actual unlimited power, but in the first few centuries of the Common Era this was not so. The actuality of this function combines with the idea of divine “total sustaining,” a notion, he argues, introduced by Posidonius into Stoic circles. Hence *kratein*

¹⁸ David Rankin, *Athenagoras Philosopher and Theologian* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 61. Cf. Michel Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des pères de l’église: de Clément de Rome à Clément d’Alexandrie*, Patristica Sorbonensia 1 (Paris:Le Seuil, 1957).

¹⁹ P. Oxy. XXXVI, 2782.

²⁰ Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* V,5,3. See Robert M. Grant, ‘God and Storms in Early Christian Thought’, in Andrew B. McGowan, Brian E. Daley and Timothy J. Gaden (eds.), *God in Early Christian Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 351–60.

²¹ Theophilus, *Ad Autolycum*, 23.

²² Eusebius, *ibid.*

came to mean “sustain, preserve, hold” and not just “have power.” He concludes, “Instead of describing God’s sovereign power as exemplified in creation, on occasions the term *pantokrator* is now more and more going to point to a continuous relationship between God and the world.”²³ In other words, a providential one. He adds that most of the fathers have this, from as early as Theophilus of Antioch: “But he is called *Pantokrator* because he himself holds (*kratei*) and embraces (*emperiechei*) all things (*ta panta*) [...] there is no place withdrawn from his power” (*Ad Autolycum* I,4)²⁴.

One needs also to remember the “Gnostic” contribution to the formation of Christian thought. As one might expect, there is evidence of a very full, possibly overwhelming activity of God for those who have been chosen, of their being progressed until a point where the loving Father is happy with his choice creation, those who long to be “at home.”²⁵ For it is unlikely that humans are able to look after themselves given their captive state and so need God to move them towards their destiny. In *Letter to Flora* Ptolemaeus writes of a *προνοία* that belongs to the Creator only and which, when he comes to earth, moves soul out of the realm of Fate (*Heimarmene*) into that of *Pronoia*,²⁶ whereas Valentinus seems to speak about Christians – including the heart’s sanctification. Why would such a believing soul have been in the realm of fate in the first place? This strengthens Markschie’s case that the early Valentinians did not think of pre-fixed natures but rather of divine condescension in order to make a difference. If a soul is destined for salvation would God not look after it before?²⁷ But Valentinus, despite what Clement is suggesting in *Stromateis* II 115,1, does not think of those “saved by nature.” Yet Clement adds: “why say the heart becomes ‘pure’ if it was not ‘impure’ in creation?” Clement’s point is that not just a few but in fact *all* receive care from a universal *Pronoia*. Certainly with Clement the educative function of providence comes to the fore (*Strom* 4.12.87) to disci-

23 Gijsbert van den Brink, *Almighty God: A Study of the Doctrine of Divine Omnipotence* (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1993), 52.

24 Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 126 (GNO II, 366) “So when we hear the name *pantokrator*, our conception is this, that God sustains in being all things, both the intelligible and those which have a material nature.”

25 Christoph Markschie, *Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur Valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 77 “Der Gedankenfortschritt liegt in dem Nebensatz ‘μέχρι μή προνοίας τυγχάνει’. Wer wendet aber dem Herzen Sorgfalt, Vorsorge zu? Der folgende Satz und das Stichwort *προνοία* legen es nahe, an ‘den allein guten Vater zu denken, der das Herz heimsucht.’”

26 Ibid., Anm. 143 “nach Theodot führt der Kyrios die Menschen, wenn er zur Erde kommt, von der Heimarmene zu seiner *προνοία*” (Exc. Thdot 74,2).

27 Ibid., 80.

pline for sin, specifically. In fact this is what shapes Clement's literary corpus, argues Osborn, who also notes that Clement is very close to Irenaeus in respect, except for a notion of faith as participation, and an emphasis on the present age of salvation history. (Irenaeus paid more attention to the sweep of the "past" biblical evidence.)²⁸

In his introductory musings about ancient philosophy and Providence, Christian Parma puts his finger on the relationship of Providence to ethics as well as epistemology (with God the providential founder of truth). In other words, that is how Providence serves: it offers guidelines for moral living. These are not immediately obvious or of the nature of laws carved in stone: it takes a while to perceive this kind of Providence properly – close inspection and comparison, the workings of wisdom with which human need to align themselves. Creation requires some amount of getting used to, but humans are to think of themselves as possessed with free will if this Providence is to make sense, for it cannot be so strange to creation that it would override it. Humans are responsible for maintenance and fine-tuning of a given moral order.²⁹ For a Seneca the way of progress is steady virtue and fixity of soul, whereas for a Horace it means keeping oneself ever more withdrawn from the world. Ovid introduced the idea of the "roundness of life's wheel of fortunes," an idea perhaps already there in Herodotus, *History* I,20,7.³⁰

For Stoics, it was not about generous benevolence by God but a balanced dialectic of accepting the rough with the smooth. What comes together needs to be accepted, as Marcus Aurelius (*Meditations* V,8) taught.³¹ What the Stoics do contribute is a sense of Providence as horizontal and linear, not vertical or transcen-

28 Eric Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 55: "The divine movement from invitation (*Protrepticus*) through instruction *Paedagogus*) to perfected humanity (*Stromateis* VII) is as decisive as are the earlier ages of the plan of salvation. Movement goes on in the new age which has been inaugurated, as humans participate in the salvation which God offers and move from faith to the vision 'Face to face'."

29 Christian Parma, *Pronoia und Providentia: Der Vorsehungsbegriff Plotins und Augustins* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 4.

30 Nicole Hecquet-Noti, "Fortuna dans le monde latin: chance ou hazard?" in *La Fortune: themes, representations, discours. Recherches et rencontres*, eds. Yashima Foehr-Janssens and Emmanuelle Metry (Geneva: Droz, 2003) : 13–29, 19.

31 Aldo Magris, *Destino, provvidenza, predestinazione. Dal mondo antico al cristianesimo* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2008), 475: for Stoics "La provvidenza infatti è anche destino, e il destino è anche il *logos*, cioè il *col-legamento* [...] L'idea stoica della *pronoia* non è quella di una generosa beneficenza da parte del 'Dio', come in Platone, ma una dialettica che cerca di vedere un nesso nel chiaroscuro dell'esperienza e sopportarne le conseguenze senza meravigliarsi, senza lamentarsi per come vano le cose, poichè il riconoscimento della provvidenza fa tutt'uno con l'accettazione del destino."

dental. According to Foucault, Plato had seen the need for leadership with *parresia* even in a state where laws and magistrates were perfect and the city well governed.³² This would test, cajole and guide. Aldo Magris argues further that *Pronoia* of the philosophers was God's taking care of the whole world, but the Jewish "wisdom" personified the assistance God gave to Israel, including the punishment of their earthly enemies and so providence can to be understood as the showing forth of miracle and sign. And yet even with the Latin writers, a common Aristotelian ontology remained strong,³³ just as the Church Fathers resisted Gnostics. There was no place for "Evil," as such and it is humans who are the principles of their own movements. The Saviour has freed human beings from dark, overpowering forces (Gal 4:3–9), and Deut 30:19 calls all to choose life or death, a theme especially important for the early Christian Apologists and Clement of Alexandria.³⁴

Picking up on Philo's distinction of the Logos as *logos endiathetos-logos prophorikos*, Clement took the matter a step further.³⁵ Although the *Kerygma Petri* already contained the idea of this outward-looking *arché* being made in time, in *Stromateis* VI,7,58,1, with a thought that would be developed by Origen's *epinoia*-teaching, Clement asserted that the creation of humanity takes place *within* the life of the Trinity. It did not take place once, but eternally, hence repeatedly and providentially. God as eternal is always *pantokrator*, and He needs a creation to reveal this, not to make it so.³⁶ And in any case, it seems that his nature as Wisdom in his relationship to the Father God means that his activity *ad extra* will not be arbitrary, or of the "absolute power" type. In fact, as far as most church fathers are concerned God has to be true to Himself and his ordaining of things.³⁷

32 Michael Foucault, *Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres*, Cours au Collège de France, 1982–3 (Paris: Gallimard-Seuil, 2008), 187 f.

33 Magris, *Destino, provvidenza, predestinazione*, 602.

34 Ibid., 584.

35 Jean-Pierre Batut, *Pantocrator. 'Dieu le Père tout-puissant' dans la théologie prénicéenne*, Collection des études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 189 (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Augustiniennes, 2009), 363. "Mais la lecture de Clément marque un net progrès. En effet, il n'y a plus là deux étapes de l'existence du Logos, mais deux aspects de ce même Logos, totalement un en lui-même: il est désigné comme 'Sagesses' lorsqu'on le considère dans sa relation à la Pensée du Père, et comme "Principe" dans sa relation aux hommes."

36 Ibid., 526.

37 Ibid., 506 "Dieu ne peut exercer sa toute-puissance que de manière ordonnée, c'est-à-dire conformément à sa Sagesse, parce qu'il cesserait d'être Dieu, si, par impossible, il n'agissait pas ainsi."

One is indebted to Silke-Petra Bergjan's work to see how Clement, Origen and Eusebius contributed to a significant development in the Christian understanding of providence, quite possibly in response to a challenge, or, better, a stimulus from philosophers. According to this Christian tradition, *Pronoia* is not God's looking out in advance to plan the course of history but instead is his interactive care for the world, which is quite unlike the business of *causing* all things to be as they are (unlike Fate or *Heimaremene*).³⁸ Origen is clear that providence means the arrangement of distributive justice, and that God is watching to take note of moral performance, in order to give informed judgement post mortem.³⁹ Whereas Justin differed from pagan Philosophers in believing that God doesn't just care for types but for each Christian individual, Clement agrees but specifies that the Christian difference is that there is individual *pronoia* only for those who accept discipline and *paideusis*. One chooses to join the Elect by responding well to Providence.

More recently, as part of an upsurge in Clement studies, Bergjan has revisited Clement. Clement liked to gloss *pronoia* as *epimeleia* and *kédemón* and to visualise God as "shepherd" and "king." More direct divine care is accorded to those who will be delegated responsibility to care through leading (*Strom* VI 158, 1–2).⁴⁰ For Stoics the immanence of fate (*heimarmene*) as an indwelling force in the world makes it difficult to speak of any intentional overseeing. Bergjan differentiates between the familial-pastoral language of *Sirach* 18:13–14 and Stoic legal metaphors. However, one might want to speak of "house rules" as a kind of fusion of influences.⁴¹ Some souls will end their lives still very much in need of learning, but the gnostic will be like Job who will not be bothered by innocent suffering. "The gnostic's destiny will not lie in Tyche's hands." Love bears and endures all things (*Strom* IV.52, 2–4).⁴² Of course individual free choices can map out fate for us. If events were guided by the stars then there

38 Silke-Petra Bergjan, *Der fürsorgende Gott: Der Begriff der "Pronoia" Gottes in der apologetischen Literatur der Alten Kirche*, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 81 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), conclusion.

39 Ibid., 334.

40 Οἱ ἡγεμονικοὶ καὶ παιδευτικοί, δι' ὧν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς προνοίας ἀριδὴλως δείκνυται. Cf. VII, 42, 7 for the idea of under-shepherds and under-rulers

41 As at VII, 70, 8 where the family man providing for the household offers a εἰκόνα ἀτεχνῶς σφζοντος ὀλίγην τῆς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ προνοίας.

42 Silke-Petra Bergjan, "The Concept of Pronoia in the Stromateis, Book VII", in *The Seventh Book of the Stromateis*, eds. M Matyáš Havrda, Vít Hušek and Jana Plátová, VCS 117 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 63–92. See also Jon D. Ewing, *Clement of Alexandria's reinterpretation of Divine Providence: the Christianization of the Hellenistic idea of pronoia*. Lewiston, N.Y. (Lampeter : Edwin Mellen, 2008.)

would be a lot of confusion since on that account the stars compete with each other. "Instead of fate and stars a new star arose, Christ or *Kyrios*, who superseded fate and the providence of the powers through his *pronoia*" (*Exc.* 69,1–74,2). Even if this excerpt here paraphrased is not by Clement himself, nonetheless the idea of a new arrangement is his. Angels will be given not only to nations but to specific individuals (*Strom* VI.157,4–5). *Pronoia* now starts with the individual, Jesus or a disciple.⁴³ Clement is too Trinitarian to believe that the Logos only looks after particulars: in fact the whole and the individuals receive the same amount of attention:⁴⁴ "So the universal *pronoia* passes on its active power (*energeia*) through the movement of the closest beings down to particular things" (*Strom* VI.148,6).⁴⁵ The Incarnation has guaranteed that providential working can be channelled through receptive people. *Stromateis* V.6.2 speaks not of mere "conservation" but of the same active power of creation. Strictly providence here is assigned three roles: the punishment of the impious, the overseeing of prophetic fulfilment regarding Christ and the orderly appearing of things skilfully made.

Clement's spiritual successor Origen emphasized the idea of the cosmic whole with each in its place (*princ* 2.9.6) with much less of an interest than Clement in the formative aspect of providence in psychological terms. Instead, individuals are simply parts of that whole which needs divine ordering so that each part plays its role. Origen employed the Stoic "body and members" metaphor (*princ.* 2.1.2). *Pneuma* permeates the rational realm and beyond to maintain it. Pseudo-Aristotle too in *De mundo* had thought of providence as that which ties all together, and hence not especially about educating rational beings. Human progress on the other hand does not seem tied to *pronoia*, which is about consolidation, even if of a flowing, non-static cosmos.⁴⁶ Origen agreed with certain philosophers that the world is not subject to God by necessity but by word, reason, teaching, through stimulus to freely chosen improvement.⁴⁷ Origen however differed from pagan philosophers on freedom of the will because he had a distinctively Christian idea of Providence, as matched to individuals and their circumstances. Fore-seeing meant just that: God looked to see how people would

⁴³ Ibid. 82: "Clement summarises as follows: *pronoia* cares first for the individuals, second for people as a community, and third can be found everywhere." (*Strom* VII.6,1)

⁴⁴ Ἐντεῦθεν ἡ πρόνοια ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ καὶ πανταχοῦ.

⁴⁵ τῇ τοῦ τεχνίτου ἐνεργείᾳ συντελοῦσας τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον, οὕτως τῇ ἡ καθολικῇ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοια διὰ τῶν προσεχέστερον κινουμένων καθ' ὑπόβασιν εἰς τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους διαδίδοται ἡ δραστικὴ ἐνέργεια.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 184.

⁴⁷ *Princ* 3,5,8.

choose, making the universe more a moral one. Unlike some, Origen did not deny that humans operated without being influenced. They were not independent from divine power, but free choice presupposed how they had responded to these impressions and impacts. However if Origen substituted *oikonomia* for *pro-noia* this does not mean that how God influences human lives is restricted to *Heilsgeschichte*, but rather that the former term includes the ordering of all events in this world (“eine Anordnung aller Ereignisse in dieser Welt”).⁴⁸ Yet it is not clear that such an “economy of the spirit” (which in Origen’s view would be for the Church only) exhausts divine planning (as in the 18th *Homily on Jeremiah*.) If anything the texts that Benjamins (such as the *Homily on Ezekiel* 16:5) adduces indicate the Father of all to be the one who cares. It might well have been a *heilsgeschichtlich oikonomia* that counted, for those before, during and after the coming of Christ.⁴⁹ One might want to note that in *De Principiis* (*Peri Archôn*) III.1.10–11 where God’s “act” that leads to Pharaoh’s hardening of heart is mentioned, Origen’s argument is directed against Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom any divine entities were completely blind. Gijsbert van den Brink leaves us with an interesting point to consider: “Contrary to what is generally suggested for example, Origen as far as I can see never directly equates God’s being *pantokrator* with His sustaining activities.”⁵⁰ (The same could be said for Athanasius.)⁵¹ Providence is much more actively committed to world-history than to mere “creation order” and much more alert and anticipating than blind or disinterested ‘sustaining’.

For Origen, God could and did know the outcome of contingent events without determining all of them.⁵² In *Peri Archon* III,2–3 he emphasised how “freedom of the will” endured against the background of demonic temptation: the

48 See Hendrik S. Benjamins, *Eingeordnete Freiheit. Freiheit und Vorsehung bei Origenes*, Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae* 48 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 193 & 208f. Origen ‘follows’ Clement in extending the meaning of *oikonomia* from Irenaeus’ limiting it to “biblischen Heilsgeschichte”. ‘Es [...] kann bei Origenes von einer ‚Individualisierung‘ der *oikonomia* gesprochen werden.’

49 Ibid., 188–91.

50 *Almighty God*, 54f. For Origen, see e.g. *De Principiis* II 9 1; *Excerpta in Pss* 23,10, pace André de Halleux, “Dieu le Pere tout-puissant” in *Patrologie et oecuménisme* (Leuven: Peeters, 1990), 68–89.

51 With reference to Carmelo Capizzi, *Pantokrator saggio d’esegesi letterario-iconografica*, *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* 170 (Roma: Pont. Inst. Orientalium Studiorum, 1964).

52 Benjamins, *Eingeordnete Freiheit*, 130: “Freilich meidet Origenes den Determinismus, der aus dieser Kette hervorgehen könnte durch den Satz, daß die zukünftigen Ereignisse, die sich zu einer Kette gliedern, kontingenterweise miteinander verknüpft sind. Demnach kennt Gott den Ausgang des zukünftig Kontingenten im Voraus. Alexander hält es dagegen für logisch unmöglich, daß die Götter wissen, wie das zukünftig Kontingente ausgehen werde.”

story of Job shows just how restricted those powers are. God has taken human freedom of choice into account in his planning, but there is no note of Stoic resignation. Theiler had assumed Origen favoured the Ammonian idea, that souls made a pre-existent choice that would fix their destinies, but when it comes to the shape of one's life, it seems to be rather the deeds on earth that now matter to God's planning and interaction.⁵³ The soul is poised between spirit and flesh equally (Romans 7) and God gets involved in order to make it more of an even conquest, to give each person a chance.⁵⁴ Albrecht Dihle observed that Origen's principle of choice did not really correspond with the bible's clear voluntarism – the divine will which Greek philosophy tended not to take into account.⁵⁵ He was, in Dihle's view, guilty of giving inappropriate weight to the rationality of the order of being. Benjamins defends Origen from this charge; because in contradistinction to both philosophical überpersonale and mechanistic views of Providence,⁵⁶ the point is "interaction." God's goodness certainly reaches towards the rational beings (*Vernunftwesen*), yet he pays more attention to the one who prays, while graciously also burning up his mistakes. God is free to give more than is deserved (*Peri Euchês* VI.4)⁵⁷ and also to harden in response to choice. God acts according to the character and personhood of each, so God is not necessitated by reason in a pre-determined course. Correspondingly, it takes the living Spirit for humans to realise what is going on in God's purpose: rationality by itself cannot grasp such. Because it is a plan that develops, it is not bound by its first principles.⁵⁸

Oikonomia signifies in its usage that *some* things have been fixed before time, but there is a lot to play for. It is the most important work of Providence. Clement had widened the concept of *oikonomia* out from meaning the history of salvation (Irenaeus) so that by Origen's time it was wide enough to include the

53 Ibid., 143: "Weil die Schöpfung der Welt gerade auch auf diese vorweggenommenen zukünftigen Taten eingestellt ist, wird die Bedeutung der Vergeltung des Vorlebens abgeschwächt."

54 Ibid., 138: "Alles in dieser Welt wird von Gott verwaltet, und als gerechter Leiter des Kampfes überwacht er die Kämpfe, so daß wir mit ebenbürtigen Gegnern, die unserem Vermögen nicht überlegen sind, zu kämpfen haben."

55 A. Dihle, *Die Vorstellung vom Willen in der Antike* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985.)

56 As laid out by Heinrich Dörrie, "Der Begriff Pronoia in Stoa and Platonismus," *FZPhTh* 24 (1977): 60–87, 62ff.

57 Benjamins, *Eingeordnete Freiheit* 1, 53. This in accord with the parable of workers in the vineyard.

58 Ibid., 167: "Origenes' Auffassung von der Vorsehung bezieht sich nicht auf irgendwie Gesetzmäßigkeit der *pronoias*, durch die diese Welt verwaltet ist. Sondern sie bezieht sich auf einen Heilsplan Gottes."

Logos teaching all people (including the Jews in the Old Testament). For Origen (*Contra Celsum* VI.80 and *Comm Matt* X.10) there are two economies – one old and one new;⁵⁹ but one might argue that Origen blurred the line between these two by de-historicising the biblical narratives, turning them into oracles suited to individual reception as part of the providential gift of Scripture.

The secondary impress of divine economy and revelation was what Scripture was seen to be. For Origen it is a question, not of any conciliar or synodal decision but of tradition, which handed down the Scriptures under the sway of divine providence.⁶⁰ Origen's contribution was to try to see just what was received by all, and he insisted on what the church universally agreed on: *Homologumena*; but those not recognised everywhere seen as *Antilegomena*. In his *Letter to Africanus* 8: "Providence who has given edification through the Holy Scriptures to all the churches of Christ, did it not have care for those purchased at a price, for whom Christ died [...] so that all things would be gifted to us?" Here there is an interesting use of ἵνα as if to say that the provision of the Scriptures by God is predicated on and guaranteed by the giving up of Christ in his death. Origen does not go so far as to make the pun of *traditio evangelii* (handing down of the gospel) and *traditio Christi* (handing over of Christ), but the idea is there. Commenting on the *Letter to Africanus* 8 & 19, with reference to Origen and the Book of Tobit, Edmon Gallagher writes:

Though contextually this passage concerns textual distinctions between Jewish and Christian manuscripts, Origen here establishes the general principle that what is received in the Churches is given by Providence. These comments from the first section of the letter should control the interpretation of Origen's statement later that 'the churches use Tobit.' In other words, if what is received among the churches is given by Providence, then Providence has given Tobit to the Church, since the churches use it [...]. [This is] to signify that Tobit constitutes part of the Providentially-ordained bible.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid., 188.

⁶⁰ Th. Zahn, *Grundriß der Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons* (2. Aufl., Leipzig: Böhme, 1904), 41: "Das entscheidende Wort hat bei Orig. die kirchliche Tradition, welch ebenso wie die Entstehung der hl. Schriften unter der Leitung der göttlichen Vorsehung steht (ep. Ad Afric. 4.9).'" (ἀρα δὲ καὶ ἡ Πρόνοια, ἐν ἁγίαις γραφαῖς δεδωκυῖα πάσαις ταῖς Χριστοῦ Ἐκκλησίαις οἰκοδομῆν, οὐκ ἐφρόντισε τῶν τιμῆς ἀγορασθέντων, ὑπὲρ ὧν Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν [...] ἵνα σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν χαρίσῃται [Rom 8,32].)

⁶¹ Edmon L. Gallagher, *Hebrew Scripture in Patristic Biblical Theory. Canon, Language, Text*, Supplement to *Vigiliae Christianae* 114 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 57–58; with reference to Adam Kamesar, *Jerome, Greek Scholarship, and the Hebrew Bible: A Study of the Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesis*, Oxford Classical Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 15–17.

Origen immediately follows this with an appeal to Prov 22:20's injunction not to change the boundary stones of one's predecessors. The context is that of the deuterocanonical books that Origen wants to keep, but the principle applies to the New Testament ones too, as he moves on to discuss the case of *Hebrews*. Old Testament and New Testament apocrypha get lumped together (the *Didache* and *Shepherd* are Origen's favourites). For him these were appointed by the Fathers to be read by those who newly join us. One is therefore catechised by these books, which might appear counter-intuitive to those for whom basic doctrine might seem to come from the core books of the New Testament. It seems odd, but the idea is that piety can be taught even before doctrine. In any case the various scriptures are given to make us better because they are divine.⁶² They are part of divine *provision*.

As Origen himself has it: "In his providence God willed to share with humanity the way of salvation and included the simple folk in this. Hence the Holy Spirit announced all this in narratives and laws [...] but the main purpose was to reveal the spiritual connection of the whole economy of salvation" (*Peri Archon* IV, 2,9).⁶³

In what Athanasius writes in 359 about the canon there are only three possibilities, but while Origen and Eusebius were content to speak of certain disputed ones, the time for disputation has now passed. One cannot receive the Apostles' view of the *homousion* of the Son at Nicea and not also receive the full canon of Scripture. Yet as the Church in 325 came to sum up true doctrine on the authority of what it has received, so the Nicene Church in the mid-fourth century did with Scripture. The only difference in method was that this is clearly not building on the authority of other councils, synods or rulings. There is something more mysterious: it has worked out for the good through history, although at times it all looked precarious, especially for five of the seven Catholic Epistles and Revelation.

⁶² Lothar Lies, *Origenes' 'Peri archon': eine undogmatische Dogmatik: Einführung und Erläuterung*. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), 32: "Kurzum, die Schriften des Alten und Neuen Testaments sind gott-erfüllt" (*endeon*) with reference to PA IV.1,7.

⁶³ PA IV.1,7 links the obscurity of Scripture to the hiddenness of Providence. Marquerite Harl comments: "Origène parle le même langage pour faire comprendre que l'action divine s'étend à travers tout le texte 'inspiré' [...] de même que la Providence est partout à l'œuvre dans la création, jusque dans les plus petites choses, sans toutefois que nous puissions en reconnaître la puissance partout [...] le lecteur de la Bible trouvera autant de difficultés pour tout comprendre dans les Écritures que le savant en raconte lorsqu'il essaie de tout comprendre dans le monde." (*Philocalie, 1–20: Sur les Écritures*, SC 302 [Paris: Cerf, 1983], 60) Cf. Spanneut, *Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l'Eglise*.

Although the Early Christian writers do not use the term “providence” any more than “canon” in explaining the addition to the Old Testament of the New Testament, the idea that chance was a factor would have seemed very odd. If anything, chance did not have a chance, since there was no long period of evolution of New Testament Scripture. It is not the case that Irenaeus or Origen or Athanasius thought that Paul’s words were authoritative because they were incorporated into the canon, but that they were received by the original readers and each put into the canon almost in a single movement: as they were written to be added. It might well have taken time for all the Church to come to an agreement in recognition, but that’s a different matter.

In a recent edition of *Modern Theology* devoted to the topic of Spiritual Interpretation of Scripture, Brian Daley comments, with reference to Origen:

Just as we only come to recognize the working of divine providence in human history retrospectively, and God’s guidance is seldom evident in the moment when it is actually operating, so the inspiration of Scripture – the fact that God is guiding human writers to speak his truth for the salvation of all peoples – is something that is only fully known in retrospect, when promises are fulfilled. The insight of Christian faith is that the focus of that fulfillment is Jesus, and with him the community of his disciples now gathered and led by his Holy Spirit.⁶⁴

The same providence that guided salvation history guided its imprint. Likewise Herbert Haag in *Mysterium Salutis* maintains: “That the most ancient manuscripts, which in any case contain more than one Gospel (P⁴⁵, 3rd century, which contain all four (and Acts) is more than a bare fact: it is a symbol for the sure spirit-led Hand which proved the Church in its decisions.”⁶⁵ Or, according to G. Steins: “The connection of the link between Scripture and its subject matter is best done in liturgy when the reading of Scripture helps to make present the reality whereof the texts speak.”⁶⁶ The economies of *Heilsgeschichte* and *Heilige Historie* are very closely related to each other.

⁶⁴ Brian E. Daley, “‘In Many and Various Ways’: Towards a Theology of Theological Exegesis,” *Modern Theology* 28 (2012): 597–615, 610.

⁶⁵ Herbert Haag, “Die Buchwerdung des Wortes Gottes” in *Mysterium Salutis*, vol. 1: *Die Grundlagen heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik*, eds. Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1965): 289–427, 383: “Daß die älteste Hs., die überhaupt mehr als ein Ev. enthält (P 45, 3.Jh), sie gleich alle viere (und Apg.) enthält, ist mehr als ein nacktes Faktum: es ist ein Symbol für die sichere – ein Christ wird bekennen: geistgeführte – Hand, die die Kirche in ihren Entscheidungen bewies.”

⁶⁶ G. Steins., “Kanon und Anamnese. Auf dem Weg zu einer Neueren Biblischen Theologie” in E. Balhorn-G. Steins (ed.), *Der Bibelkanon in der Bibelauslegung: Methodenreflexionen und Beispielerexegesen*, 110–129, 128f.: “Anamnese, Gedächtnis und Erinnerung sind nicht nur ein Thema

Overall then, in Origen's understanding the goal of pedagogical *pronoia* was the restoration of the original unity through the renewed participation in him as he co-ordinates things.⁶⁷ Through the co-ordinating of one *Heilsgeschichte* there can be a return to the plan of what Tzamalikos names "providential creation,"⁶⁸ i.e. the original prelapsarian one. So when *Heilsgeschichte* is analysed it is really a made-to-measure education for all, one which incited each to freedom and a universal order of justice.⁶⁹ If salvation means new creation in Christ, there is a sense that there is an accompanying fatherly guiding of the created potential of persons, parallel to although not separate from the story of personal salvation. Unlike the Stoic future of an endless return, there is progress, as souls are directed with their own wills (*De Princ.* II,3,4). For Origen moral praxis rather than philosophical theory mattered in his scheme,⁷⁰ such that truth is not so much about grasping ideas as doing. For Origen creation's fulfillment through providential care and salvation history are two sides of the one and same divine self-communication. It is through this perfecting of men and its reception in freedom that is as history the way of knowing God – and there is so much value in that creation.

In her assessment of Origen, Bergjan takes issue with calling Origen's doctrine of Providence "paideutic" as had Hal Koch,⁷¹ a study which Andrew Louth commends for its demonstration of the Alexandrian's debt to Plato on

in der Schrift, sondern die *formale Bestimmung des Sinns der Schrift* überhaupt [...]. Der genuine Ort einer solchen Schriftauslegung ist nicht die historische Forschung, sondern der Ritus, indem der Bezug auf Vergangenheit nicht temporal konstruiert wird, sondern ontisch."

67 Christian Hengstermann, "Christliche Natur- und Geschichtsphilosophie: Die Weltseele bei Origenes," in *Origenes und sein Erbe in Orient und Okzident*, Adamantiana 1 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2011): 43–76, 69.

68 Panayiotis Tzamalikos, *Origen: Philosophy of History & Eschatology*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 85 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 254: "Nevertheless, a difference between Origen and the Hebraic pattern of history is that providential creation precedes the actual creation of the world."

69 Hengstermann, "Christliche Natur- und Geschichtsphilosophie," 70.

70 Everhard Schockenhoff, *Zum Fest der Freiheit: Theologie des christlichen Handelns bei Origenes*, Tübinger Theologische Studien (Mainz: Grünewald-Verlag, 1990), 279f.: "[...] sein dezidiert ethisch-geschichtsphilosophisches Wahrheitsverständnis, nach dem nicht vorrangig die philosophische Theorie, sondern die sittliche Praxis Kriterium, der Wahrheit einer angefeindeten Lehre wie der christlichen ist." Hengstermann comments: "Wahrheit ist bei Origenes damit keine primär erkenntnistheoretische, sondern mehr noch eine ethisch-geschichtsphilosophische und sogar politische Kategorie" ("Christliche Natur- und Geschichtsphilosophie," 73).

71 Hal Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus*, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 22 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1932).

such matters, despite Edwards' recent arguments.⁷² For Koch was happy to say that *oikonomia* or *pronoia* – which he used interchangeably – means nothing other than the training of the soul through chastisement and instruction.⁷³ Origen first built his system himself and then read it into Scripture. His concept of God was fairly static, wanting to avoid Manichean and folk religion ideas of God as embodied and passible. God is not almighty in the sense that he can do anything; in Origen's scheme God is not above the good-evil distinction as in the Neoplatonists. Also, Origen's biblicism demands that even if God did not create the sensible creation directly he is nevertheless involved in it. (Here Koch seems to contradict himself: now biblicism shapes Origen's theology, whereas earlier Koch maintained Origen used Scripture according to pre-set ideas.) Free will means that logical beings have the power to follow God ethically and spiritually, and Origen in *Hom in Gen* III,2 and *De Principiis* II,1,1 is clear that providence does not follow exactly what God wants in all situations but has to accommodate other wills at points. Providence really means "knowledge of" rather than "causation of" all things.

Koch's argument would be favourably received by Werner Jaeger. However, Bergjan's controverting case is that the "platonic" Origen viewed providence as that which is saved up for the judgement. He thereby shared common ground with Celsus that the governance of the whole is what God does in the present but adds that in the future individuals will be accountable as part of this providential oversight.⁷⁴ The divine providence is distributive rather than summative in assessment.⁷⁵ The implied answer is reminiscent of Kant: God sets and marks the examination, but he does not coach. The *Homily on Jeremiah* 6,2 is the only place where *pronoia* is used in association with teaching, but there the point is proved because people do not learn if they don't want to. *Pronoia*

72 Bergjan, *Der fürsorgende Gott*, 137: "Die Strafe dient aber nicht nur der κάθαρσις. Sie hat zugleich einen positiv erzieherischen Einfluss, und zwar in doppelter Weise. Erstens dient sie anderen zur Warnung [...]. Auch auf andere Weise wird Gottes Strenge gegen den einen zum Nutzen anderer." Suffice it to say that I find somewhat unconvincing Mark Edward's case in *Origen against Plato*, Ashgate Studies in Philosophy & Theology in Late Antiquity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) defending Origen from the charge of believing in the pre-existence of souls despite *Princ* 3,3,5.

73 "[D]iese Ökonomie aber ist nichts anderes als die allmähliche Erziehung der Seelen durch Strafe und durch Belehrung" (Bergjan, *Der fürsorgende Gott*, 145).

74 Bergjan, *Der fürsorgende Gott*, 188: "Fortschritt besteht in der wiederholten Einordnung des einzelnen in das Ganze, in einem Prozeß von Zustandsbestimmungen und der Summe einer Reihe von gerechten Zuteilungen an die Vernunftwesen. Nach Origenes schreiten die Vernunftwesen fort und können sich die Menschen verändern, aber deswegen verändert sich Gott nicht."

75 *Ibid.*, 175: "Die Pronoia verteilt die Noten, aber wird sie damit zum Lehrer?"

does not have a pedagogical aspect of changing people but only a distributive one, of putting people where they were meant to be, and that means according to what they chose to put themselves. Providence does not help the performance but stands at a distance and weighs up the choices made, which for Origen fundamentally means the choice made before birth.⁷⁶ This means that God takes care that all get their just desserts, and this runs through world-history – it is not merely to be revealed eschatologically, but can be seen already, e.g. in the fate of Pharaoh. It needs to be added that Origen had no place for astrology, yet acknowledged that the stars could be portents. He quotes Gen 1:4 “let them be for signs” and Jeremiah 10:2 “be not dismayed at signs of heaven” and allows that perhaps the stars cause the seasons in their regularity.⁷⁷ Is this then not, rather than the triumph of free will, rather a *psychological* determinism, by which those who accept forgiveness and co-operate, had the right disposition to begin with? It does seem however – to qualify Bergjan’s argument – that *pronoia* in Origen *can* provide wisdom or instruction, probably from events.⁷⁸ *Pronoia* then works for those already signed up and willing: it moves along with the Church, the realm of the Holy Spirit. If this is the case then *pronoia* presupposes *oikonomia*. But the latter sends sun (regular) and rain (more contingent) on the just and unjust. In *Contra Celsum* Origen makes it clear that even Jesus’ prediction of his death is not what made it inevitable. It would have happened without his prediction. Providence is for all but believers know how to tap into it and make the most of it.

The continuation of this Alexandrian providentialist way of thinking can be evinced in Dionysius of Alexandria, who seems to be more Stoic in the sense that he views Providence as that which provides for all creation. Providence is a divine intentionality within the texture of creation. It took the New Testament to realise that divine care of the world was not limited to the history of Israel. Dionysius sees the point of creation and providence not to lie in their place in improving human beings, but in showing the divine glory as divine action, and in

⁷⁶ Even if this is disputed (see Volker Henning Drecoll, “Review of Der fürsorgende Gott: Der Begriff der *pronoia* Gottes in der apologetischen Literatur der Alten Kirche by Silke-Petra Bergjan,” *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 129 (2004): 531–534.)

⁷⁷ Alan Scott, *Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 145. See also In Num hom 24.2.

⁷⁸ *Hom in Ierem*; SC 232, 334: “Ἐπ’ αὖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς προνοίας γίνηται πάντα εἰς ἡμᾶς. ἵνα συντελεσθῶμεν καὶ τελειωθῶμεν, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ παραδεχόμεθα τὰ τῆς προνοίας τῆς ἐπὶ τελειότητι ἡμᾶς ἐλκούσης [...]”

this he thinks very differently from Origen.⁷⁹ There is no employment of a Logos idea either. Dionysius' vision is much more Stoic and the fragment on Ecclesiastes 12:7 speaks of God active in working, guiding, doing good, caring (as quoted in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VII,19,7). It carries the idea of immanent purpose. Yet what humans do get out of it is not so much soul-making but awareness and awe over against the revelation of divine glory in this Providence.⁸⁰ For a God to be worth anything, as Lactantius put it, he could not let evil go unchecked.⁸¹ It is a poor creator who is negligent of what goes on in the world.

If Clement based his Christology on *pronoia* (strom 1,11,52,2; 6,15,123,2), then Eusebius built *pronoia* on Christology as it related to the doctrine of God.⁸² With Eusebius, as in Origen, there is a tight connection between providence and distributive justice. Knowing this belongs to the *Grundgewissheit* of Christians, especially martyrs to and for Christ, who know that *they* would not be helped in this life but would be taken into the world to come.⁸³ A generation ago Glenn Chesnut claimed Eusebius distinguished between general and special providence, and that God chooses particular events out of set of possibilities.⁸⁴ Bergjan is, I think, wrong to say that this means the Chesnut is claiming that Eusebius believed that providence concerned itself with individual human persons.⁸⁵ Rather, for Eusebius it was about individual concrete events, not about individual people.⁸⁶ Of course the original Roman ideas of *pax Romana* and *salus generis humani* became, it seemed to Christians, more of a reality with the accession of

79 Wolfgang Bienert, *Dionysius von Alexandrien*, Patristische Texte und Studien (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978), 114: "Der πρόνοια-Begriff hat bei Origenes eine heilsgeschichtliche Dimension und kann mit dem Leitgedanken der παιδευσις geradezu identisch werden. Dionysius aber geht es nicht um Gottes Erziehungswerk am Menschen – auch dies unterscheidet ihn von Origenes – sondern um das Wunderwerk der Schöpfung, durch das Gottes Vorsehung hindurchschimmert. Die Vorsehung wird bei Dionysius sogar zum handelnden Subjekt, die sich um Schönheit und Nutzen der Dinge kümmert."

80 Ibid., 118: "Die Welt ist nach Dionysius für den Menschen eine Werkstatt, ein Theater, eine Schule und eine Sporthalle, d.h. Ort der Bewährung und Gegenstand der Betrachtung, die zur Erkenntnis des Menschen über sich selbst führen soll."

81 *De ira Dei* 4,5–7: "sed si nihil curat, nihil providet, amisit omnem divinitatem."

82 "Euseb von Caesarea konzentriert in den späten Schriften die Pronoia Gottes mit all ihren Aspekten auf das Subjekt des Logos, dies hat nicht mit soteriologischen Überlegungen zu tun, sondern mit der Gotteslehre." (Bergjan, *Der fürsorgende Gott*, 339).

83 Ibid., 304.

84 Glenn A. Chesnut, *The First Christian Histories: Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Evagrius* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977).

85 Bergjan, *Der fürsorgende Gott*, 279.

86 Chesnut, *The First Christian Histories*, 75,

Constantine.⁸⁷ In his *Triecennial Oration* of 336, one year before Constantine's death, Eusebius's argument went as follows: "it is not only God, but Constantine, who guides the turbulent chariot of the world; and whereas Christ is said [...] to have resumed his hearth, or *hestia*, with the Father." Eusebius notes that Constantine restored the sacred *Hestia* of Jerusalem.⁸⁸ Even at Rome's most glorious moment, Jerusalem was not forgotten. Its health guaranteed that of Rome.

Recently Gerhard Richter has dealt with the very question of the relationship between *pronoia* and *oikonomia* in the early church.⁸⁹ Richter writes that *pronoia* does the job of God's arranging and confirming of the world and the givens of Nature or divine action in history, where God's hand can be discerned in consistency with what has gone before.⁹⁰ *Oikonomia* has more to do with God's action considered from his point of view: set in contradistinction to *theologia* which is about God in himself. Richter insists that a change took place in theology just after 400 which brought humanity into the centre, a change he sees evidenced in Nemesius.⁹¹ The point is that it was already there in the Cappadocians, and as good as completed with Theodoret. The idea was that God could be as interested in the human cosmos as much as in the non-human one and has demonstrated this by sending Christ, yet without worrying too much about how salvation is accommodated to individual situations.⁹² Human choices are caught up in God's saving order; *oikonomia* concerns souls and their salvation directly, *pronoia* only indirectly as regulating the created order. Whether speaking of the actions of God or man, Chrysostom used *oikonomia* to denote a certain decisive action, one which results in marvellous and great things: organising spiritual

87 See Eckhard Schendel, *Herrschaft und Unterwerfung Christi: 1 Korinther 15, 24–48 in Exegese und Theologie der Väter bis zum Ausgang des 4. Jahrhunderts*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Biblischen Exegese 12 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1971).

88 Rebecca Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius, and Athanasius*, Oxford Theological Manuscripts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

89 Gerhard Richter, *Oikonomia: der Gebrauch des Wortes Oikonomia im Neuen Testament, bei den Kirchenvätern und in der theologischen Literatur bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 90 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005) makes a provisional judgment at 172: "Origenes weder in Hom. in Ez.6,1 noch in princ. 1,6,3; 2,10, 5f das Wort *πρνοια*/providentia verwendet."

90 Ibid., 199: "Indem Origenes von der Oikonomia Gottes nicht von einer stetig wirksamen Fürsorge spricht, sondern sie als Maßnahme ausgibt, die er den Gegebenheiten anpaßt."

91 Ibid., 429.

92 Ibid., 437: "Theodoret nimmt damit Wesentliches von der ursprünglichen Bedeutung der Oikonomia als Fürsorge auf [...]. Über die göttliche Lenkung eines einzelnen verliert er kaum ein Wort."

things, not least the church for a great purpose.⁹³ It would seem indeed as though Humanity or the Church does come to the fore. *Oikonomia* has the disadvantage of being a term that implies a resistance to disruption (if one can permit such a double negative), keeping things ordered. Richter insists that the idea of *Heilsgeschichte* or recapitulation is something that gets added in: by itself *oikonomia* lacks an eschatological dimension.⁹⁴ In reading Richter's account one senses he is fighting a losing battle to keep the two apart. Although Richter has over-emphasised eschatology, the idea is that *Heilsgeschichte* builds upon *oikonomia*. The question that remains is: does *pronoia* encompass both? Let us examine the evidence from the late Fourth Century.

Basil the Great wrote of God as an attentive Father and physician. For humans there is no way of escaping the privilege of being in God's image, especially sharing his moral freedom (*proairesis*).⁹⁵ All is providence, including nature and redemption.⁹⁶ Basil was close to Origen in linking Spirit to the Son in their activity in creation. The Son is the creator of all, while the Spirit's job is more about getting rational creatures to acknowledge that, with the help of Scripture. As with Proclus, obedient recognition of Providence is itself providential.

In Gregory Nazianzen's account *pronoia* seems to have the role of improving creation⁹⁷ as well as preserving it.⁹⁸ If it is the Logos that works creation, then it is the common energy of the Trinity that goes out into the world. Richard equates this to the place of the *logoi spermatikoi* in the Stoic scheme. Gregory wrote a Poem (I,I,6)⁹⁹ on Providence, against Epicurean atomism. He also opposed Aristotle (really pseudo-Aristotle, *De mundo*) for its famous limitation of providence

⁹³ Ibid., 345: "Geringer belegt hat Chrysostomos das Handeln Gottes im alltäglichen Leben des einzelnen Menschen."

⁹⁴ Ibid., 89f.

⁹⁵ Basilio Petra, *Provvidenza e vita morale nel pensiero di Basilio il grande* (Romae: Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, Academia Alfonsiana, 1983), 126.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 127: "Tutto è provvidenza: natura e storia, creazione e redenzione. L'una fissa e codificata nella legge naturale garantita dalla parola creativa di Dio; l'altra dinamica e attenta sempre a recuperare la novità umana in una possibilità di salvezza individuale e collettiva."

⁹⁷ Anne Richard, *Cosmologie et Théologie chez Grégoire de Nazianze*, Collection des études Augustiniennes: Série Antiquité, 169 (Paris: Institut d'études Augustiniennes, 2003), 84f. Or 40,45 says: "καὶ Πρόνοια. τοῦ ποιήσαντος διοικούμενον, δέξασθαι τὴν εἰς τὸ κρεῖττον μεταβολήν." Cf. Or 30,11 on Jn 5,17 ("My father is always working even to this day").

⁹⁸ Or 28,16: (SC 250, 134): "et la préservation conformément à la nature première des choses." Cf. Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 41: "so God did not have to start again [...] so things can remain stable (βεβαίως διαμένειν)."

⁹⁹ PG 37,430.

to the supralunary realm. In *Oration* 27,10 he attacked the erroneous interpretation of Psalm 35:65 (“power appears unto the heavens”); as Clement had remarked in *Stromateis* V XIV,90.3, this interpretation encouraged over-estimating the division and distance from heaven to earth with intermediaries. For Nazianzen God was present in the world as continual cause and transcendent, even while omniscient. Yet again we also see Origen's legacy, when Gregory writes that in one sense he reigns only in those who submit to his will (Or 30,4; SC 250, p232), when divine light can be received without ontological change. Otherwise God withdraws his presence.¹⁰⁰

It might seem invidious to give the two Gregories such short shrift, especially given the pastoral seriousness of the issue that is manifest in what Gregory of Nyssa had to deal with in his *Contra Fatum*. However this work was intentionally less about constructing a doctrine of Providence as it was about destroying the theoretical undergirding of superstitious practice. Here he criticises some believers for being led astray by pagan prophecies and astrology. The occurrence of happy events does not mean that fate controls things, for demons can deceive people into thinking that they have power in history, in objective terms. The turning away from looking at God, which would prepare for oneself an outcome full of good things, rushes above all to the demons. To have trusted those who do not discern what the divine will holds concerning the life, but in the turning of stars and the power coming from them, he rather fixes on a vision of the blasphemous nature of demons.¹⁰¹ Nyssa insists on the principle of free will at all costs, with perhaps strong influence from the Sceptic Carneades (according to Amand).¹⁰² Nazianzen is rather similar in his intention in his *Peri Pronoias*.¹⁰³ *Akolouthia* is that salutary sequence by which God brings things to their providentially appointed telos.¹⁰⁴ Providence not only mends, it enhances.

The sole Christian figure who seems to have taken on the issue of Providence and given it the prominence in his anthropology by devoting the last two chapters (42&43) of his work (*De natura hominis*) to it, as well as discussing issues of the stars and our position in the cosmos from Chapter 35 onwards – this is the

100 Richard, *Cosmologie*, 116: “La présence divine est alors aussi communication au sens d'un dialogue, d'un échange.”

101 *Contra Fatum* (GNO VI; GRHGORIOU EPISKOPOU NUSSHS KATA EIMARMHNHS), 62,19.

102 David Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque: Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les Philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles* (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1945).

103 Andreas Schwab, ed., *Gregor von Nazianz: Peri Pronoias*, Classica Monacensia (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2009).

104 Paul M. Blowers, *Drama of the Divine Economy: Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology and Piety*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 152.

shadowy figure, Nemeseius. A contemporary, perhaps a good friend of Gregory of Nyssa, his writing is often labelled as derivative, but ironically it was also largely influential, not least on Maximus and John of Damascus. His work is derivative perhaps; however, such detailed and explicit interaction with the pagan schools is rare in a Christian (he was, it seems, a late convert in the style of Marius Victorinus or Augustine). Nemeseius nails his colours when he begins by saying that providence is especially known in the “divine and incredible work of providence in the embodiment of God on our behalf through the overflow of his love;” the Incarnation is model for understanding Providence in terms of God’s ordering of the world. In Telfer’s translation: “He [the human] is the creature whom God thought worthy of such special providence...through which all things now and to come and through which God became man, ending up in immortality and escaping the mortal [...].”

Yet immediately after this, Nemeseius supplies a good example of a proof of providence (to those who do not believe in the Incarnation) and of a caring God with the case of the poet Ibycus. Here was a man who was murdered in the countryside without anyone seeing it except for some birds, cranes in fact, whom the villains spotted. A few weeks later, when the authorities had all but given up finding any leads, the murderers were sitting at the games when some cranes flew overhead and one, with a loose tongue exclaimed – “Ibycus’ witnesses!”, thus indicting himself and the others. God, as well as keeping us alive and rewarding hard work and virtue, also speaks to people in needy or desperate situations through dreams. Nemeseius, for all his love of a story which sounds more like a moral tale for keeping one’s mouth shut, is alert enough to the question in the philosophers as to whether creation and providence need to be kept distinct. He insists they must be. Creation is like the work of a craftsman; providence is more like the work of shepherds. Providence includes the preservation of what made us distinct, so that as individuals we do not in growing old end up looking the same; people do not confuse each other and therefore incest is avoided. The distinguishing features of jackdaws and crows (or is it hooded crows and crows?) helps them keep to their own and continue the wonderful diversity that is God’s creation. Providence preserves creation in its integrity, diversity and morality included.

Here Robert W. Sharples makes a telling point: “Rather, what is central to his [Nemeseius] account is the implied contrast between the universal and the individual or particular (τὰ καθ’ἑκάστα, τὰ κατὰ μέρος).”¹⁰⁵ God is concerned

¹⁰⁵ Robert W. Sharples, “Nemeseius of Emesa and Some Theories of Divine Providence,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 37 (1983): 141–155.

about the lives of individuals, unlike Aristotle's laissez-faire divinity, which could hardly be sub-lunar regularities, such as ensuring the continuation of species. Sharples is right to hold that Nemesis was opposing the supposition that providential concern is beneath God's dignity, that we not deign to do more than ensure the preservation of kinds. However his dismissal of Telfer's view that Nemesis had the Neoplatonists in view here, in favour of thinking that it is rather Alexander of Aphrodisias, the follower of Aristotle, two centuries previous, is not backed up by hard evidence but only the coincidence that Alexander was notorious for his denial of the immortality of the soul, which Nemesis notes as "Aristotelian" in his review of philosophical positions. Of course he mentions this, and it is tightly connected to the question of God's "particular providence," but surely those envisaged are the theological philosophers such as Aetius and Eunomius (the so-called "neo-Arians") who wanted to keep God at a far remove from material creation, although not from rational perception. Whereas the Aristotelians speak of a lower, particular providence that works from nature (even though people's nature goes against what God is trying to do generally), the Stoics claim that people have free will as the bit that fate (including natural forces and impulses) allows them to do. Nemesis counters this position, citing biblical examples and alluding to others, that the "work of providence" is the obedience in trials which have happy endings, and meantime, the conclusion is that all can be well even if it appears otherwise. This is to speak from God's viewpoint and is hence not "Panglossian" optimism. But that which is good is also "provided".

Commenting on the Twelve Prophets Theodore of Mopsuestia took the seeing stones of Zechariah (3:9; 4:3; 4:10) to stand for providential governance: At the time [vñv], in fact, the disclosure of these events brought no little consolation to the wronged; and after the fulfillment of the disclosures they even further that this had been said of old by the will of God and had later come into effect, both representing proof of God's care for them. So it was obvious that he had made this disclosure out of care [ἐπιμέλειαν] for the people to whose salvation God directed great attention, as I have often remarked.¹⁰⁶ By the time John Chrysostom came to write his discourse *On Providence*, his outlook would have been shaped by not only his ascetical tendencies but also a recent experience of running through mountain passes to escape from those who would seek to arrest him even in his place of refuge, after being driven out of Constantinople a second time by the fickle Empress Eudoxia. The work was written while John was in Cu-

106 *Comm. Obad.* (before v. 1 but no preface) 176/159. Thanks to Hauna Ondrey for alerting me to this passage. God's care for Israel constitutes a prominent theme of Theodore's commentary on the XII Prophets.

cuse (on the edge of Armenia) in 407, which he described in *Epist* 224 as “the loneliest place in the world.”¹⁰⁷ Yet at least it was tranquil. He had come from Caesarea where monks had attacked him; he was missing friends, the mail was unreliable and the excessive cold was exacerbated when at one point in winter 405 he had had to flee even further because of wild Isaurians. When he wrote this, not beaten and certainly not bowed, things had improved a little. The work was written for Olympias and all the community at Constantinople. The flavour of gritty endurance as well as a grasp of providence as seen from personal experience flavours the work. John insists that our intelligence as a gift from God can give us some idea of God’s action in world.

To give a short account of this work in paraphrase: Even Paul who only looked at one part of God’s providence (concerning the Jews) was overwhelmed, realising not only how incomprehensible, but how inexplicable God’s ways were (Rom 11:33; II,7 [p64]: οὐ μόνον γὰρ καταλαβεῖν τις οὐ δύναται, ἀλλ’οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν ἐρεῦνης ποιήσασθαι). So, unlike the Manicheans, we refuse to say anything created is bad; on the other hand, we part company with the Greeks (philosophers) who thought creation was divine. The Sun is harmful to eyes, it dries up the ground and makes it into desert and other things that seem negative; maybe, but our touchstone is “God saw it was good,” and we should not doubt this. Meanwhile, laughing and living in pleasure may not be the good they seem to be. Take Solomon who lived too easily; he was to lament this later. Night, despite appearances, can be a good thing – though dark, it provides rest from evils, and is re-energising. Is affliction an evil? Not necessarily: Lazarus was crowned for his poverty and Job became famous through his suffering! The advantage of being a child of God is that not only do we get his oversight, as do all human beings, we also get his love, and that is received by us not in the *agape* a human receives from God apart from Christ and faith, but as *eros*. Yet what is striking here is John’s belief in the caring paternity of God with respect to everyone – God saw the Ninevites even before they began to pray – and that the love for us is, as Gregory of Nyssa had already said in his sermons on the Song of Songs, *eros* is intensified *agape*. In the case of the Christian, the parent becomes the lover. There is no hint of awkwardness at the “Oedipal” nature of this image: these are just images of divine mysteries. But parental care which becomes intensified towards the believer is an interesting metaphor.

One should note that earlier in his career John preached (while at Antioch) on Isa 45:1:

107 St. Jean Chrysostome, *Sur La Providence* (SC 79), 8: “Dans toute la correspondance, l’expression ἐρημότατος devient une sorte d’épithète de nature, inséparable du nom de Caucuse.”

Do not let the false prophets undermine you; God can give you peace and consign you to captivity – the meaning of ‘making peace and creating evils.’ For you to learn that this is true, let us make a precise examination of the individual expressions: after saying before, ‘I am the one who brought light and darkness into being,’ he then went on, ‘Making peace and creating evils.’ He cited two opposites first, and two opposites after that, for you to learn that he is referring not to fornication but to calamities. I mean, what is set as the opposite of peace? Clearly captivity, not licentiousness, nor fornication, nor avarice. So just as he cited two opposites first, so too in this case; the opposite of peace is not fornication, nor adultery, nor licentiousness, nor the other vices, but captivity and servitude.¹⁰⁸

In John's account, God does not make sins, but he does make the punishments. Scheffczyk notes that Chrysostom has “Providence being understood as that continuous Creation which is necessary if the world is to remain in being, if it is to exist at all (*Ad populum Antiochenum. Hom., X,2–3*).”¹⁰⁹ Perhaps, but the dark side of Providence is divine retribution for sin, not the sin itself. There is no trace of cosmic dualism here.

In the next generation Theodoret of Cyrhus reinforced the disparagement of Greek literature when he says there is nothing worth contesting in the work of Greek poets. Basil in *On the Value of Greek Literature* had confined himself to Homer, Hesiod, Theognis and Prodikos. As more oriental in his influences, Theodoret is suspicious that any unqualified views of common grace or universal providence may lurk behind appeals to the value of pagan “wisdom.” Showing off his training in the history of Greek philosophy, Theodoret sketches or caricatures the extreme of the Epicureans (God with his back to us in a corner of the universe) or the Stoics (no space for free-will, even if God not totally determinate of all that happens). Finally he turns to Plato who, at *Philebus* 30c, “must be drawing on Hebrew sources,” such is the similarity to the Scriptures, since the One “who rules and orders months, years and seasons, [and] is called *σωφία καὶ νοῦς*.” Plato's *Laws* (II, 661a–d) is cited approvingly, and Plato is seen to have formulated what must be the first principle of providence. Likewise, Plotinus is right to criticise those who complain about a part of world without seeing

108 *Old Testament Homilies: Homilies on Isaiah and Jeremiah Volume Two*, translated with an introduction by Robert Charles Hill (Holy Cross Orthodox Press: Brookline, Massachusetts, 2003), 36–39: *Homily on Isaiah* 45.6–7. Cf. Silke-Petra Bergjan, “‘Das hier ist kein Theater, und ihr sitzt nicht da, um Schauspieler zu betrachten und zu klatschen’: Theaterpolemik und Theatermetaphern bei Johannes Chrysostomos,” *Zeitschrift für antikes Christentum* 8 (2004): 567–592.

109 Leo Scheffczyk, *Creation and Providence* trans. Richard Strachan (London: Burnes & Oates, 1970), English translation of the original German *Schöpfung und Vorsehung*, *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte* II/2a (Freiburg: Herder, 1962/1963).

the beauty of whole. Plotinus might even have heard David (Ps 18LXX:2) “The Heavens proclaim the glory of God [...]” Theodoret acknowledges the aesthetic argument which he then further elaborates. As a good rhetor he begs to offer an addition to complete Plotinus: “The only thing I would add: it is unthinkable that the Creator, the divine architect would leave lost humanity to neglect, especially when he made the whole rich world for us.” This theme is repeated, with the interesting twist: “His visibility kept him sheltered from sin.”

Theodoret goes on: it would have been easy to destroy sin and save the world without the covering of the flesh (δίχα τους τῆς σαρκὸς προκαλύμματος), but God preferred to show the justice of providence more than its power, just as when the prophetic message had come through mere men. So, he constructed a human skein for himself. Thus the union did not mean the pouring together of both natures nor was the maker of time made subject to time, but each nature stayed distinct from the other, with one undergoing passion – of hunger and thirst. Like a good doctor, he tried the medication first. Theodoret adds a flourish that the Word taking on flesh has had universal ramifications: ignorance is gone, idolatrous error departed, Greeks Romans and Barbarians all recognise the divinity of the crucified and they worship the Trinity; martyrs are honoured and ascetic retreats sanctify the furthest flung places. This optimism reflects the relatively stable situation of the 440s. There is much more emphasis on the Incarnation as a seal of approval and care than in Chrysostom who preferred to regard it as a scandal of costly love, supremely brought to its perfection and forever symbolised in the Cross. Theodoret introduced the sign of Jesus as a sure and public sign of God’s philanthropic love (while the resurrection was a more secret event), and Theodoret’s “optimism” compared with Chrysostom’s “realism” shines in the examples he gives of responses to situations people found themselves in. However, it is an optimism at the price of ignoring some messier individual cases.

Andrew Louth has argued that the Stoic idea of the cosmos as a living being with soul and reason was a doctrine that Greek Christians came to express by calling human kind a “little cosmos:” “In consequence the Stoics regarded the cosmos as ordered, not just for the good, but for the human good, a view rejected as absurd by Platonists and Peripatetics (e.g. Alcinous, for whom the soul had no master), but as we shall see, enthusiastically embraced by Christians.”¹¹⁰ A belief in Providence to the exclusion of Fate runs through Greek Christian thinking when Westerners had turned their attention to predestination and grace,

110 Andrew Louth, “Pagans and Christians on Providence,” in *Texts, and Culture in Late Antiquity*, ed. J.H.D. Scourfield (Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales 2007): 279–297, 284.

even to the point of long-running debates about the fixing of the date of one's death.¹¹¹ Of course there have been one or two exceptions: as Louth reminds us, contemplation of Providence is the lowest level in Evagrius (e.g. at *Gnostic Centuries* I.27) – including especially one's knowledge of one's own place in it. Now, this interpretation of Evagrius, still largely dependent on Hans Urs von Balthasar's two 1939 articles on him, has been contested by Irénée Hausherr and recently Gabriel Bunge. Origenists like Evagrius thought of the *henas* as an essence in which creatures gathered and where they could become partakers of the divine *monas* (i.e. the unicity existing between the three divine hypostases and the intelligible creation which was made for this relationship with the divine) about unity with his creation.¹¹² In other words at least the intellectual creation is well taken care of in God's provision.

For one who stands in this tradition, Maximus sounds quite different in *Difficulty* 10,19 where he distinguishes between Providence which holds together the universe through *logoi* and Judgement which differentiates things according to *logoi*; providence further raises up possibilities for the human race (Diff 10, 31f), while judgement is a testing of performance. For Plato (seen perhaps through Alcinoüs' eyes), "What is up to us comes under the sway of providence, i.e. God works through our free choices (including prayer) to achieve the designs of his providence, while the consequences of our actions are ruled by fate," but God can temper the outcomes, so in Christian thinking the last part of this does not apply. Neoplatonists like Plotinus agreed with Christians that religion and prayer could work. For Proclus, Providence as its names implies, is an activity "prior to intellect" by which is meant "prior to any intellective element in any causal process as such." "Thus, belief represents the ineffable element interpreted primarily from below and providence the same element viewed from above."¹¹³

What Balthasar has to say about the positive features of Maximus' understanding of providence is that God is free to adapt nature according to his purposes. Reality then is more than just a fixed ontology, but includes the supernatural-historical activity of the same Logos who created that ontology (with the law of Nature) and the modifications (the Old Covenant) as shaped towards

¹¹¹ Ibid., 279.

¹¹² Gabriel Bunge, "Encore une fois: Hénade ou Monade? Au sujet de deux notions-clés de la terminologie technique d'Évagre le Pontique," *Adamantius* 15 (2009): 9–42, 40.

¹¹³ Stephen E. Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition*, Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 117 f.

the Incarnation.¹¹⁴ God acts in the world through *Krisis* and *Pronoia* (a pairing received from Evagrius), with the latter reinforcing the latter's judgements which divide reality into its component parts in order to fix them and re-integrate them, rather like a mechanic working on an engine.¹¹⁵ So there is the interruption of grace if providence is to work and lead to an eventual rest from sin. It is not about the overcoming of opposites in its cosmic movement.¹¹⁶ Punishment can hence be seen as educative. *Krisis* is no longer the ripping of unity but is part of providence. Movement is no longer a bad thing as in Evagrius or even a necessary process to alleviate a problem but is part of the world's reality.¹¹⁷ Providence affirms creation in its particularities and its limitations, including its desire for God as a felt lack.¹¹⁸ As 'middle-man' God is the overseer of the procedure as well as the initiator and completor (Rom 11:15). As Logos, He contributes the Logoi of the divine will to the movement of the creation (*Amb* 42; cf. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration* 14, 31).¹¹⁹

It can be argued that Maximus reduced or qualified Origenist personalism in the sense of God's being found in his self-revelation to conscious receivers of his words and messages.¹²⁰ Providence was more a subtle yet powerful energy than a summons to vocation. According to Albert the Great's inheritance of this, in fact from Albert's reporting on Maximus's commentary on Dionysius, *Divine*

114 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1941), 121: "aber sofern Gottes Vorsehung frei, souverän und übernatürlich bleibt, steht über dem Naturlogos immer (antistoisch!) der aus ihm unableitbare Vorsehungslogos; in diesem Sinn unterscheidet Maximus sorgsam die θεωρία τῶν ὄντων von der θεωρία προνοίας καὶ κρίσεως [...]. vielmehr öffnet sich alle Wesensschau ja schon auf eine Schau der geschichtlich-übernatürlichen Wirklichkeit; ist ja historisch derselbe Logos, in Naturgesetz wie in Schriftgesetz (d. h. in der geschichtlichen Ökonomie vom Alten zum Neuen Bund) verkörpert, auf beiden Wegen unterwegs zu seiner Menschwerdung."

115 Ibid.: "κρίσις betrifft die gute wesens-begründende Unterscheidung der Dinge, die ja selbst eine Form der Nachahmung Gottes ist, und προνοία hebt, in der Lenkung der Wesen auf Gott hin, diese Unterscheidung nicht auf, sondern begründet und bestärkt sie, indem sie die in böse Vereinzelung versunkenen durch erlösende Liebe zur gottgewollten und gottnachbildenen Integration führt (*Amb* 91 1133C–36 A)."

116 Ibid., 347.

117 Ibid., 607: "'Werden' und 'Bewegung' faßt Maximus stets in aristotelischen Sinn einer naturhaften (keineswegs dem Sündenfall, sondern der Geschöpflichkeit als solcher zu verdankenden) Dynamik von Potenz zu Akt" (ibid., 532.). Also: "Denn die προνοία ist nicht ein Prozeß, der nur auf Überwindung seiner selbst hindrängt, sondern eine ausdrückliche Wahrung der Welt in ihrer Unterschiedenheit und Endlichkeit."

118 His *Ambigua* 91,1220 questions all Origenism (cf. CG 144.1.10.)

119 Blowers, *Drama of the Divine Economy*, 164.

120 Antoine Lévy, *Le Créé et L'incrée: Maxime le confesseur et Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), 479.

Names c13, it is Providence that saw to movement as part of the natural way of things. It seems to be a force that sees not only to the going out of creation but also to its return, even by overcoming obstacles. As such history of salvation seems to be included in this natural process.¹²¹

One might also say that for Maximus, the One (Monad) is like the hub of a wheel in touch with all the *logoi* as radii towards the periphery. It is the hub that directs and drives the periphery. For Dionysius “universal providence” meant creation, while “general and specific acts of providence” meant preservation of each creature in its capacity to act (*Divine Names* I.7 596D–597 A). This includes a free decision to return (*epistrophe*): “Thus, God exercises His providential role only over the beings who return to Him [...]. The purpose of providence is the return of all the beings which God contained beforehand to Him as their final home.”¹²² Can Providence have a purpose before the creature decides to return? Maximus in *Ambigua* 7 however seems to anticipate this objection by insisting on the term *anaphora* (the liturgical connotation should not be overlooked), which is qualified by the two adjectives *epistreptike* and *cheiragôgike*. God is very much involved in the action of turning and leading (by the hand). Yet for Dionysius Providence as such was more about preserving the creature so as to be able to turn or convert to its superiors, love its equals and provide care (*pro-noia*) for those weaker. Also, the logos of well-being is reached on the way to the Logos of Eternal Being in God (Amb 7,1084C; 10,1160). One might want to speak of “penultimate” goods. Maximus accepts this, but develops the point that particular creatures matter (*Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 2,272AB). For Judgement (*krisis*) is not about the education of sinners as in Evagrius but involves distinction, i.e. the preserving of differences.¹²³

The early Byzantines held to a fairly impersonal view of Providence because it was a force that did not single anyone out for special treatment or help and left it to the free agents to personalise providence through making it their own; providence set up the conditions for relating to God whoever one was, whether one was born barbarian or in Constantinople, but any individual “fortune,” material

121 Ibid., 430: “De manière générale, le *reditus* des créatures est l’objet constant de la Providence divine. Le mouvement selon l’opération naturelle serait non seulement impossible sans l’opération d’une Providence divine antérieure qui en produit le principe, mais sans les effets d’une Providence actuelle qui en assure l’exécution sans entrave.” He goes on, “Ainsi, l’idée de Providence contient l’histoire du salut à titre de moyen terme entre l’*exitus* créateur et le *reditus* glorieux” (480).

122 Vladimir Cvetković, “Predeterminations and Providence in Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor,” in *Dionysius the Areopagite between Orthodoxy and Heresy*, ed. Filip Ivanović (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011): 135–156, 147.

123 Cvetković, “Predeterminations and Providence,” 150; cf. Louth, *Maximus*, 66.

or spiritual, good or bad, belonged to the realm of personal spirituality. Scripture verses on providence were more likely to be of the type “God sends the sun and the rain on the righteous and the unrighteous” than “You intended this to harm me but God intended it for good.” Providence is less a story of God’s game of chess and more the chessboard and the rules or conditions established.

John of Damascus, who could not believe that God had wanted Jerusalem to fall to the Ummayyads, was driven to argue, concerning a child conceived in adultery that God was never the author of evil things. Indeed God has stopped creating anything.¹²⁴ He has withdrawn from the creation process after the seventh day and before the Fall and left such things up to human agency. The will of God is only that which is holy, in accordance with the commandments. God is so far off so that his immanence is only a moral one (God is near when we do his will). In sum, only God causes good. Only men and the devil cause evil.

Nine dialogues of different lengths correspond to real questions Christians received.¹²⁵ Three of these seem to concern the question of Providence, to which John provides answers:

1. The bible doesn’t say that God begat Seth, but that Adam did, since God’s creating days were over; to the objection: “yet what about Jer 1:5 ‘I sanctified you since the womb?’”, the Christian has to reply that Jeremiah was prophesying baptismal regeneration. Abraham, Isaac and Jacob must have been baptised.
2. The Jews who crucified Christ followed God’s tolerance, not his will: there is distinction between θέλημα and ἀνοχή και μακροθυμία.
8. When a worm appears in a wound, who made the worm? Certainly not God. It is just like when after the fall the earth was condemned to produce weeds.

To evaluate this: 8. has something to compel it, but 2. hardly offers a typical case of God putting up with any old sin – the specific issue is not addressed, and 1. is hopeless on exegetical grounds.

124 Raymond Le Coz, *Jean Damascène: Ecrits sur l’Islam. Présentation, commentaires, et traduction*, Sources Chrétiennes, 383 (Paris: Cerf, 1992), 150: “Ce que le Musulman appelle création continue n’est autre que la procréation. Mais nulle part ailleurs le Damascène n’explicite pas sa pensée, qui demeure donc très incomplète et très floue. Ainsi ne voit-on pas très bien à quelle moment se situe, pour lui, la création de l’âme chez l’homme.”

125 LeCoz in *Ecrits sur L’Islam*, 87. Daniel J. Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam: The “Heresy of the Ishmaelites”* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 101–102 has observed: “As far as the content matter is concerned, the subjects discussed in the *Disputatio* are all found in Chapter 100/101 of the *De Haeresibus* [...] the *Disputatio* is a supplement to, and an elaboration of, the preliminary discussions of Chapter 101. It is found among the *Opuscula* of his student Abu Qurra – the content at least is the product of John’s thought.”

Of course that is not the end of the story: the *Expositio Fidei*, argues Louth, includes a more mature version of his doctrine of Providence with more room for human agency taken up in the divine plan. As Bouteneff observes, John omits any parallel references to other religions and systems even as he draws on Nemesis.¹²⁶ He works with the stock definition related by Nemesis and passed on by Maximus: "Providence, then, is the care that God takes over existing things. Providence is the will (βουλήσις) of God through which all existing things receive their suitable direction."¹²⁷ Yet what is the place of συγχώρησις, the permission which God's patience offers? Origen had made the distinction in his Homily on Gen 3:2, where he pondered: Is Providence other than will: is providence permission

John adds, however:

When I say all things, I mean those things that do not depend on us (*ta ouk eph' hēmin*); for that which does depend on us is not a matter for providence, but for our own free will' (Expos. 43.21–5).

To quote Andrew Louth on this passage:

This would provide a potentially massive exception to the remit of divine providence, and it is not clear to me that it is an exception that could be carried through without effectively denying God's providential care over human affairs. The paragraphs that follow, however, return to a closer dependence on Nemesis, and seem to qualify this stark exception.¹²⁸

John introduces a distinction between what happens by God's good pleasure (*kat' eudokian*) and what happens by his permission (*kata sygchorēsīn*). What happens by God's good pleasure is unequivocally good; but he permits misfortunes, and even plainly evil things, to test human virtue or make it manifest, or to bring about some greater good, as in the case of the Cross. God appears to abandon people for various reasons: for the instruction of others, "for we are naturally humbled, seeing the suffering of others" (Expos. 43.37–8); or for the glory of another, as with the man born blind for the glory of the Son of Man (John 9:3).¹²⁹ On this account Providence always has to have a special pur-

126 Peter C. Bouteneff, "The Two Wills of God: Providence in St John of Damascus," *Studia Patristica* 42 (2006): 291–296.

127 Expos 43.2; Bonifatius Kotter (ed.), *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*. 5 vols. Berlin 1969–1988, II, 100; cf. Maximus Amb. 10.42; Nemesis Nat. hom.42,343f. (Morani [ed.], 125.).

128 Andrew Louth, *St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002), 261.

129 Ibid., 43. Cf. Louth's "Pagans and Christians on providence," 279–297.

pose of a spiritual or redemptive sort wherever it allows evil. Where that could not be the case (e.g. the child born in adultery), that would continue to be outside God's providence.

The Western development

One can understand why Leo Scheffczyk in his textbook treatment of Creation and Providence wanted so much to keep Providence attached to Creation. It stops the latter getting mixed up with Soteriology, and works like a buffer between the orders of creation and salvation. For that reason he praises the East – for John of Damascus God only *foreknows* all things and allows free will in the economy of salvation. There is a dichotomy between Creation-Providence and the divine economy of salvation, and yet the two are in parallel, since creaturely freedom is assured in both and both are equally about orderly movement. Augustine with his idea of divine foreknowledge *as* control according to God's plan in *civ dei* IV,33 and V,9, was much clearer on the goal to which Providence leads creation. Yet is inaccurate when Scheffczyk writes: "The philosophy of history underlying *De civitate Dei* is concerned more with the revelation of divine justice and wisdom than with the leading of the world to Christ."¹³⁰ For creation has its own becoming through a process which involves the Trinity (V,11), into which the economy of salvation fits. This includes forgiveness and that seems unlike the dichotomy in the Damascene, and none the worse for that.

Just after 386 Ambrosiaster wrote both answers to two Questions (115 & 116). The latter (on Astrology) was directed more against "false Christians" and was mostly a polemic against astral fatalism – at least up to paragraph 38.¹³¹ God does not submit himself to his own decrees; and individuals can change according to discipline and according to the Law. To believe in Fate is to disbelieve in Last Judgment. Furthermore, how can stars affect fate when they have no power to alter own courses?

This is actually consonant with what Parma concludes that for Augustine there is an outer divine law that we can't understand, but is also that which drives us to struggle within. Providence does not move world history but enrich-

¹³⁰ Scheffczyk, *Creation and Providence*, 101, n. 32. Cf. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboullic, "Ordre manifeste et ordre caché dans le Sermon sur la Providence de saint Augustin," in *Augustin prédicateur (395–411)*, ed. Goulven Madec (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1999): 303–319.

¹³¹ Marie-Pierre Bussi eres, *Ambrosiaster. Contre les Pa iens. Sur le destin. Texte, traduction et commentaire*, Sources Ch r tiennes 512 (Paris,  ditions du Cerf, 2007), 48: "En r alit , la nature de chacun est d termine par le hazard et l  o  il y a du hazard, il ne peut y avoir de destins."

es the soul. Likewise, even in the later Augustine, there was never any doubt but that human will was responsible for sin and all its trouble.

C. Parma put his finger on something important: that belief in Providence rather than *eudaemonia* is what drives and steers Augustinian ethics. Providence needs to involve a sense of God's having sight or consciousness, or it soon becomes very much like fate or luck.¹³² For Providence is what allows humans to be free enough from strong, often irrational forces to be able to choose. That Providence might be communicated in grace to the individual in prayer or via the church, or it may come through institutions and good habits of cultures influencing the individual to make a choice that is now informed by the Good. Ethically, then, it leads the sinner on the right way, which is not to despair.¹³³ If one just thinks of oneself, one fears others as enemies, and one comes to adapt a bigger picture only after the failure of one's own project, as Augustine himself had experienced. For Plotinus both reward and punishment are immanent to the human spirit; for Augustine there is an outer divine law that we cannot understand due to its complex intelligence. It is not that God causes humans to act well; rather, those who are aware of playing their part in God's providential plans will act better.¹³⁴ Patterns of custom and best practice should contribute to human performance.

For Augustine God has a relationship of ordaining to all creation but no other relation. God is "other" to it, and Augustine tries to lessen any danger of pantheism by saying that creation has no existence per se, not even by God's implantation. Indeed, Augustine did not identify Providence with God any more than Plotinus did with the One – it is an effect of God and hence a property. This is a one-way street. God gives his goodness to his creation. Creation is not such an "other" as to be able to contribute to God's work.¹³⁵

In summarising Augustine's position, Parma maintains that God created all in is goodness and as such preserves all things as *summa causa* through his word, which as Wisdom contains the reasons of all things.¹³⁶ Matter is created at the same time, yet is still receptive, secondary. And hence creation becomes

132 Parma, *Pronoia und Providentia*, 4: "Der Mensch will sich so gut wie möglich verwirklichen. Zur Selbstverwirklichung in Einzelsituationen wie in seinem Lebensentwurf überhaupt beansprucht er die Vorsehung, die göttliche Fürsorgen als das Gute, an dem er sich orientiert, durch das er geleitet wird."

133 Ibid., 9.

134 Ibid., 123.

135 Ibid., 74.

136 Ibid. 91. Cf. Batut, *Pantocrator*, 507: "ce qui est proprement patristique, et qui demeure intact chez Augustin, est le lien de connaturalité entre la puissance et la Sagesse". God can go with nature but in flexible way."

providence because it is all in time. Augustine sees providence as working in two ways: the natural operation and God's voluntary operation, and, as that affects humankind, for the sake of body and then of soul. Both are equally valued by God.¹³⁷

Why does God give of himself to his creation, yet only want to save a few people (*Soliloquies* I,2.10)? Augustine implies that for the good that any creatures do, there is already grace from the *Summum Bonum* at work. Responsibility for sin lies in the defect in the will of the creature, hence there is nothing "necessary" about sin. Predestination is about the knowledge God has.¹³⁸ Freedom to align with God is available. It is "we" who chose not to keep up. *De vera religione* I,17,34 sets out the connection of Providence to the placing of things in their cosmic order towards "the other," giving the world a form.¹³⁹ Providence is for the whole human race, not just individuals (I,25,46), and therefore, we should each be humble. It is almost like a form to the world (*Mor* II,17,45).

The early work *De Ordine* 1,7,19 maintains that there is just no place for evil things in the created order. God's order excludes rather than includes or comprehends them. A true distribution means distinguishing between good and evil: it is not a case of a harmony of opposites. Also, *De ordine* I,5,12 tells us that there are many things that have purpose yet which have no obvious utility to us. This is because Providence works for the whole human race (note, not "ecology" or "the earth"), and not just individuals (cf. *De vera rel* 25,46 and *De div qq* q44). Like Plotinus, Augustine argues that one needs to have the right spirit to discern providence (*de ordine* I,1,1): to see God in things and in knowledge of them. To think of Fate as a world principle leads to dualism.

In Bouton-Touboullic's monograph, *L'Ordre Caché*, she sums up the significance of the early *De Ordine* for the question of Providence. It might seem as though things don't look ordered, but the point is that Providence is doing something behind the scenes, in a series of quiet judgements leading to a very public eschatological judgement.¹⁴⁰ In *De Ordine* the solution in the meantime is to adopt a *contemptus mundi* attitude and not be trapped by wrong expectations.

137 *De Genesi as Litteram* II, viii,9,17. (Parma, *Pronoia und Providentia*, 126).

138 *Praed sanct.* 10,19: "Praedestinatione quippe Deus ea praescivit, quae fuerat ipse facturis: unde dictum est: 'Fecit quae futurae sunt.' Praescire autem potens est etiam quae ipse non facit; sicut quaecumque peccata." See Friedmann Drews, *Menschliche Willensfreiheit und göttliche Vorsehung bei Augustinus, Proklos, Apuleius und John Milton*, Topics in Ancient Philosophy 3 (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2009), 2:643–55.

139 See Parma, *Pronoia und Providentia*, 29.

140 Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboullic. *L'Ordre Caché: la notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*, Collection Etudes augustiniennes (Paris: Institut d'études Augustiniennes, 2004). Cf. *civ Dei* XX,2; re Rom 11:33.

(When it comes to the more political realm as the City of God describes, divine justice is more apparent.)¹⁴¹

Unlike with Plotinus the Christian God does not arrive at providential rulings necessarily by some process, but rather reflects and decides.¹⁴² And against the Stoics, Providence is a secret of the transcendent divine will and does not belong immanently to the world. In his *Enarratio* on Ps 148:8 Augustine proclaims that all the weather elements execute his word of command, and on Ps 148:10: there is distributive justice, giving each region the weather that it is due.¹⁴³ If we are believers, God will remind us by making us see things that happen as too much his work for them to be coincidences. The natural work of providence is continuation of creation; in this “Part II”, God acts through the wills of angels and men. He is often at work to counterbalance: some apparent orders need shaken. But there is also a saving order: There is order if we hold on to it in life. It will lead to God, and if we do not hold to it in life, we will not reach God.¹⁴⁴ This requires grace and inner illumination by the Teacher within, relating to God through conversion, charity and political involvement. Whereas Plotinus’ discourse is one of identity and difference, Augustine’s is of dependent relation. For Plotinus substance goes over into relation, and on into showing itself. So Providence is the noetic “making known structure,” and the relationship of substance and knowledge is Providence, to be perceived in the soul, giving knowledge of itself into life. With Augustine there remains a sense of God’s objective action which in turn serves to correct faulty noetic structures.

The best part of two decades later Augustine can be seen returning to the topic, but this time with more an emphasis on human history, not least salvation-history. Writing Q.24 of *De diversis questionibus*, he posits: “Creatures are in a different mode from God.” That means supremely their deficiency, which

141 In the early *Contra acad* 1,1,1: “divinam providentiam non usque in haec ultimata et ima pertinendi” – but that is the Stoic solution. To which Augustine’s answer runs: “Nam si divina providentia pertenditur usque ad nos, quod minime dubitandum est. mihi crede, sic tecum agi oportet, ut agitur.” See Jörg Trelenberg, *Augustins Schrift De ordine: Einführung, Kommentar, Ergebnisse*, Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie 144 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009).

142 Bouton-Tourboullic, *L’Ordre Caché*, 234: “Il n’en reste pas moins qu’à ses yeux la Providence n’est pas le produit d’un processus ontologiquement nécessaire, mais l’attribut relevant en propre de la volonté d’un Dieu auquel on peut assigner des choix réfléchis, des signes de volonté (*nutus*), parfois explicitement rapports à la Providence.”

143 *Ibid.*, 241.

144 *De ord* I,9,27: “Ordo est, quem si tenuerimus in vita. Perducat ad deum, et quem nisi tenerimus in vita, non pervenimus ad Deum.”

by providence is ordered to the whole of creation to alleviate it.¹⁴⁵ At Q.27 of *De diversis questionibus*,¹⁴⁶ he seems to admit that God can use evil, and that not all of God's providence is salvific. To give a paraphrase:

It could be that through evil, divine providence ought punish and assist humans. For the ungodliness of the Jews supplanted the Jews and for the Gentiles amounted to salvation. Likewise it could be that divine providence which comes through a good person both damns and helps, as the Apostle puts it: *We are to some the odour of life to life, to others the odour of death towards death*. Every tribulation or punishment of the ungodly is also a training of the righteous since in both cases it is the same thresher (*tribula*) and ear (of corn) and corn comes out of the ear of corn, from where tribulation gets its name. Again, since peace and rest from bodily troubles both gives rewards to the good and corrupts the bad, all things are moderated by divine providence according to the merits of souls. However the good do not choose for themselves the ministry of tribulation, and the evil do not love peace. Those through whom providence happens in a way that they do not know, they accept the reward of their malevolence, but not of justice, which must be ascribed to God. In this way it cannot be imputed to the god whatever harms, but to the good mind the prize of benevolence is given. Therefore other creatures, for the merits of their rational souls either visible or hidden, are either troublesome or helpful. With God on high administrating well what he has made, there is nothing inordinate in the universe and nothing unjust, either to us knowing or not knowing. But in part the sinning soul offends; however since where there is for merits, there she deserves such to be and suffers those things which is appropriate to suffer, she deforms the whole kingdom of God in no way by her filthiness. For this reason, since we do not know all things that the divine order does for us, we act according to the law in good will alone. For the law itself remains unable to be changed and He moderates all mutable things with the most beautiful governance. Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will.

Third, Augustine's *Epistle* 231 to Darius in 429 mentions his own sermon on Providence. For a long time this work was missing, only to be found by Dolbeau at Mantua in recent times; he dated it to 405–415, and 408–9 seems most likely. In this recently discovered sermon there are, observes Bouton-Touboullic, thirty-one occurrences of “ordo” or its cognates.¹⁴⁷ In some ways sermon 243's diatribe is atypical, as it does not start with a complaint about human misfortune but is more balanced between a consideration of good and bad in the universe. As with *City of God* XII,4, there is an implicit admission that humans are not in a position to appreciate order and beauty of the universe, and they certainly cannot see the whole of history. The big question is: does divine order contain good

¹⁴⁵ Mor II,7,10: “in quantum autem ab essentia deficit, non sit ex deo, sed tamen divina providentia semper sicut universitati congruit, ordinetur.”

¹⁴⁶ CCL XLIV.1, p. 33.

¹⁴⁷ Bouton-Touboullic, “Ordre manifeste et ordre caché,” 303–319.

and bad, or are the pagans right that there is no such thing? The divine order is real, but it is hard to know it. As in all study, it seems one has to move from the tangible to the intangible. There seems to be no way of predicting who will be rewarded for their behavior in what way.

Unlike a decade earlier in his work *De ordine*, Augustine's mature account of Providence now presupposes the existence of order, present behind the apparent disorder. If God gives order to bees and ants, then so also for humans and angels, even though the latter one is hidden not least because of human sin, which makes the yearning for order even greater. This should not be too hard: it is clear that our bodies are providentially made.¹⁴⁸ It is the fact of revelation which paradoxically tells us that there is a hidden reality. The Incarnation is the main proof of divine care, and that apparent evil can serve good. So "order" obtains a historical and temporal value. It cannot show itself completely so as to settle questions concerning providence, at least not until the eschaton.¹⁴⁹ In the light of the Judgement to come, Christ has taught us true value, such that happiness for an evildoer might actually be a punishment (*Sermo de Providentia* 8,134f). As Madec puts it, conversion is the condition for optimism.¹⁵⁰ The human body is ordered by reason, so also the world, and if animals, then more so humans (1 Cor 9:10), which makes it even more imperative to be aware of it and not act anti-rationally.

Certainly the course of his own life, as seen in his *Confessions*,¹⁵¹ is suggestive: *Confessions* (X,4,6) alludes to Psalm 9:2, that God was determining his life course. But he also supposes the work of providence in the *Confessions*: with reference to God's moving out from heaven to the ongoing creation in time, Augustine speaks of the divine will reaching the object through love. Hence there is a type of being that matter possesses through that act of love (*Conf* XII,6,6).¹⁵² The scheme is not as harmonious in Augustine as it was in Plotinus, for substance is subordinated to relation such that the creation is outside of God and there is no mutuality.

148 "Adtingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter" (7,118f.).

149 Bouton-Touboul, "Ordre manifeste," 318: "Les *res humanae* ont leur *ordo* qui les transforme en une histoire orientée par une eschatologie."

150 Goulven Madec, "Thématique augustinienne de la Providence," *RÉAug* 41 (1995): 291–308. Madec adds (297), that for Augustine here God created all in his Word. In non-human creation He works by natures, in human realm he works through wills, as is clear from *De Gen ad Litt* VIII, 23–24 "biperto providentiae suae opera."

151 God is addressed as "Peccatorum autem tantum ordinator" (*Conf* I,10,16).

152 *Conf* XII,7: "Tu eras et aliud nihil, unde fecisti caelum et terram duo quaedam, unum prope te, alterum prope nihil." 'Nihil' seems somehow to be in relation with God:

Fourth, in *City of God* XII,21, God himself is described as the source of the rationes which give order and system to creation. This accords with what he said in XII,9 that right intelligence for free and wise decision-making is given – as a gift of enlightened intelligence, which is not quite the same thing as saving grace, falling some way short of it.¹⁵³ *The City of God* XI,22 also tells Christians not to speculate what Providence is, but to believe that there is Providence.¹⁵⁴ Augustine opposed the use of “fatum” by Christians back in *City of God* V, as he had earlier with “fortuna.”¹⁵⁵ However, good and evil are contained within, as XIX,17 clearly states. He quite probably had read Plotinus *Enneads* II,2 on *Pronoia*. Hence in *Gen ad litt* XI,15, it speaks of providence over both “cities”; in *City of God* VIII, Providence is seen to be natural through the secret administration of God, by which he gives growth to trees and plants, but it is also voluntary through the wills of angels and humans.¹⁵⁶ The famous passage (*Gen ad Litt* 6.14–17) about “seminal reasons” in creation does not mean a pre-programming of nature but allows space for divine agency to shape and influence in history: “they also specify the ways in which things in the world can be acted on by God.”¹⁵⁷ If evil is committed, then God re-establishes order (*Conf* I.10,16). Augustine would later confirm this, for as *City of God* XI,20 has it, the angelic “darknesses” were ordained, although not approved.¹⁵⁸ Just before he attacks Origen on the reason for material creation in XI,23, in XI,21 he posits that God “does not look ahead to what is future in the way that we do, or glimpse what is present, nor look back to what is past; but in another way, far away from the way of our thoughts [...] he comprehends all these things in a stable and everlasting

153 Parma, *Pronoia und Providentia*, 140f: “Gleichermaßen erreicht die zur bona voluntas erforderliche göttliche Gnade (*conf* XII,9) den Menschen nicht von ‘Außen’, sondern ist die Befreiung des Menschen aus seiner Festlegung; insofern kann der Mensch sich nicht von seinem—so festgelegten—Selbst her befreien, sondern ist auf das momentum intelligentiae der einsetzenden rechten Einsicht in diese Festlegung und deren Kriterien angewiesen.”

154 At *Conf* VII,13,19 he appeared to be able to contemplate creation as a whole. Of course this is not quite the same as knowing God’s providential plans.

155 c. *Acad* I,1,1: “Etenim fortasse, quae vulgo Fortuna nominator, occulto quodam ordine regitur, nihilque aliud in rebus casum vocamus, nisi cuius ratio et causa secreta est.” In *Retr* (I,1,2) he wishes he had never even mentioned *Fortuna*, since “cum videam homines habere in pessima consuetudine, ubi dici debet: hoc Deus voluit, dicere: hoc voluit Fortuna [...] forte, forsan, forsitan, fortasse, fortuitu, quod tamen totum ad divinam revocandum est providentiam.”

156 *Civ dei* VIII,9,17: “naturalis quidem per occultam Dei administrationem, qua etiam lignis et herbis dat incrementum, voluntaris vero per angelorum opera et hominum.”

157 Rowan Williams, “Creation,” in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 251–254, 252.

158 “tenebrae autem angelicae, etsi fuerandae ordinandae, non tamen fuerant adprobandae.”

present.”¹⁵⁹ One might say that Providence clearly works on the individual (*Confessions*)¹⁶⁰ and on the human race (*City of God*), and that in both modes it is a question of an “eternal present.” In *City of God* XIV,3,2 unlike in Plotinus, *Enneads* III 6,14,1 – which appears dangerously to give humanity an otherness of a species to the divine species, both belonging to a common genus – Augustine wants to emphasise that there is a dependency in that otherness, which is not a noble but a vulnerable position for humanity to be in.¹⁶¹

There is, despite some recent emphases,¹⁶² a place in Augustine's account for meaningful God-pleasing activity in history, under God, as it were. Even the controversial Christian Emperor Theodosius I in *City of God* 5.25 gets praised after all! Yet Augustine quickly adds that eternal salvation is all that counts.¹⁶³ Is this then a case of Providence being subsumed in the history of salvation, as Madec seems to think?¹⁶⁴ Well, Madec thinks Parma over-reacted against Norbert Scholl's attribution of personalism to Augustine's doctrine of Providence in his 1960 Freiburg dissertation.¹⁶⁵ Augustine does seem to talk more of pre-vidence of a future-gazing sort and God as one who belongs within history to the degree that he does not transcend it completely, but is part of it. What about the picture of Wisdom advancing to believers smiling which he got from Sap 6:17?, wonders Madec.¹⁶⁶ The question is: is that anthropomorphism really how Augustine un-

159 “non enim more nostro ille vel quod futurum est prospicit, vel quod praesens est aspicit, vel quod prateritum est respicit; sed alio modo quodam a nostrarum cogitationum consuetudine longe alteque diverso [...] ipse vero haec omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia comprehendat.”

160 *Conf* V,6,1: “qui me tunc agebas abdito secreto providentiae tuae.”

161 Parma, *Pronoia und Providentia*, 132: “Diese Begrenzung führt zu einer gewissen Selbständigkeit des Menschen, einer Isolierung vom Urgrund, deren Intensität von der Distanz abhängt, aus der der Mensch als ‘Spiegel’ das göttliche ‘Licht’ reflektiert.”

162 I think here of the exaggerations in the reception of Robert Markus' *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

163 “Quorum operum merces est aeterna felicitas, cuius dator est Deus solis veraciter piis. Cetera vero vitae huius vel fastigia vel subsidia, sicut ipsum mundum lucem auras terras aquas fructus ipsiusque hominis animam corpus, sensus mentem vitam, bonis malisque largitur; in quibus est etiam qualibet imperii magnitudo, quam pro temporum gubernatione dispensat” (*civ dei* V.26.1). Books 4&5 were published before Orosius's *Historiae* of 415.

164 Madec, “Thématique Augustinienne de la Providence,” 299: “La Providence de Dieu s'exerce donc aussi admirablement dans l'économie du salut” – especially in *De vera religione* 7,13: “Huius religionis sectandae caput est historia et prophetia dispensationis temporalis divinae providentiae, pro salute generis humani in aeternam vitam reformandi atque reparandi.”

165 Norbert Scholl, *Providentia: Untersuchungen zur Vorsehungslehre Plotins und Augustins* (PhD Diss.; Freiburg i. Br., 1960). See Madec, “Thématique Augustinienne de la Providence,” 296.

166 Madec, “Thématique Augustinienne de la Providence,” 297.

derstood it, or is it more in the way of a simile? As Madec affirms, the Providential God is at least *like* someone who condescends to Israel *in some way*. Scholl is probably right, that the image of Wisdom is not to be taken too realistically.

Of course Augustine insisted on distinguishing providence from luck (“casus”) and from *fortuna*, as is clear from *City of God* IX,13 and *Contra academicos* I,1,1. In this one might see (as Calvin would make more explicit) providence as the truth between the two extremes of the disorder of fate and the iron bondage of Fortune. Augustine’s view that God is reflective, that He knows the content of his will before choosing to execute it, implies a contingency, which Plotinus did not know.¹⁶⁷ God is indeed a creator or artifex who takes his time: see *Conf* XII,12,13. *City of God* XIX,13 tells us that order is the disposition of things equal and unequal, putting each where it belongs. Christians are told to make use of the good things for the sake of peace with God.¹⁶⁸ It does seem for now that God’s providence does embrace some less than ideal things. History is to be the place where evil intergrates itself back to order. Order is part of God’s activity as an artist.

Political History

In their allegorising of the holy city of Jerusalem, Clement and Origen seem to have proceeded by identifying the heavenly city as the soul itself, with the ecclesiological option then appearing as a conglomeration of souls. According to Thraede, Clement relies on a combination of Phil 3:20 and Gal 2:20, which he splices together to speak of a citizenship of the believer’s higher self in the heavens.¹⁶⁹ Meanwhile in Origen’s account, it was significant that Gal 4:26 and Heb 12:22 have Israel as “seeing God,” so that Jesus went to Jerusalem in order to get to upper Jerusalem above (Jn 12:12), even if the terrestrial place’s part in salvation history was not totally ignored. The literal sense of Jerusalem as the historical city, which continued to have the holiness the Old Testament bestowed on

¹⁶⁷ 33: “Die Interpretation der manus dei als dei potentia, dei invisibiliter dei visibilia schafft, läßt aber offen, wie die Relation beider Bereiche zu denken sei.”

¹⁶⁸ 646: “la signification de l’ordre reside principalement dans la relation qu’il induit entre l’homme et Dieu.”

¹⁶⁹ Klaus Thraede, “Jerusalem II (Sinnbild),” *RAC* 17 (1995): 718–764, 730: “In diesem Sinn hat Clemens auch Phil. 3,20 in Verbindung mit Gal 2,20 zu nutzen versucht: Ich lebe aber, obwohl ich noch im Fleische bin, als wandelte ich schon im Himmel [...] schon jetzt gleichsam als Bürger der Himmelsstadt (strom. 4,12,6).” See Karl Ludwig Schmidt, “Jerusalem als Urbild und Abbild,” *Eranos Jahrbuch* 18 (1950): 207–248.

it could elevate the imagination as material for meditation, perhaps in a way that is the reverse of the direction of sacramental grace: ascent rather than descent (cf. Origen on Is 54:11).¹⁷⁰ Likewise with Didymus: the allegorical sense of Jerusalem concerned the soul, while the literal sense was about the church. This reminds one of what Origen, in Rufinus' version did with the Song of Songs. But Thraede concludes that there is a similar combination of ideas and texts to that which Augustine would employ.¹⁷¹ And Orosius would simply take this further: the pilgrimage sites and the church's sacred space occupy a blessed half-way house between individual and empire.

Eusebius saw the larger horizon – it is very much the *Logos asarkos* who drives things, and he is understood to have worked as Saviour from the era of the patriarchs onwards.¹⁷² History swallows up cosmos, as it runs towards the end times. Moreover, Eusebius is really the first to combine chronicle with a theology of history. Like other early Christian writers, the idea is to exhibit the ancient pedigree of Christianity, but as the account of history gets closer to the present day, the focus gets much narrower. As Winrich Löhr puts it, universal history shrank to fit the dimensions of the Church,¹⁷³ even though it still thinks of itself as universal chronology in genre. For Eusebius, unlike Africanus, the time after Christ was just as important to God and his purposes as the time of *praeparatio evangelica*.¹⁷⁴

Accordingly in Late Antiquity, Jerusalem became a place of pilgrimage (cf. Egeria's travels), but also a place or a collection of places that also symbolised

170 Thraede, "Jerusalem II (Sinnbild)," 732: "Nicht einfach 'die Seele' erlangt dies [...] denn es gibt [...] verwerfliches Dasein (s. oben zu 'Israel' in princ. 4,3,8), sondern die anima dei capax als Civitas dei, das sind alle, die in populo ecclesiae (=unter den Töchtern Israels) auf ihrem Weg zur spiritalis sapientia [...] den Fluß der Weisheit überschreiten, der jene 'Stadt Gottes' laut Ps 45,5 bewässert (in Num.hom.26,7 [GCS Orig. 7, 254,22f.]."

171 Thraede, "Jerusalem II (Sinnbild)," 742. Cf. Bonaventura, who borrowed from (Ps)-Dionysius in his *Coll. in Hexaem* xxii,2: "as the sun receives light from moon so does the militant church from the church on high": "Caelestis hierarchia est illustrativa militantis Ecclesiae." However Bonaventura had less interest in church than in soul.

172 Friedhelm Winkelmann, *Euseb von Kaisareia: Der Vater der Kirchengeschichte*, Biographien zur Kirchengeschichte (Berlin: Verlags-Anstalt Union, 1991), 127 ff.

173 Winrich Löhr, "Heilsgeschichte und Universalgeschichte im antiken Christentum," in *Heil und Geschichte Die Geschichtsbezogenheit des Heils und das Problem der Heilsgeschichte in der biblischen Tradition und in der theologischen Deutung*, eds. Jörg Frey, Stefan Krauter and Hermann Lichtenberger, WUNT 24 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009): 533–558, 557: "Die universalgeschichtliche Chronographie wird – teilweise – in Kirchengeschichte transformiert [...]. Eine eingehendere heilsgeschichtliche Strukturierung ist nicht festzustellen."

174 See the essay by William Adler, "Eusebius' Critique of Africanus," in *Julius Africanus und die Christliche Weltchronistik*, ed. Martin Wallraff, TU 157 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006): 147–157.

and referred to the Jerusalem *above*. In Christian terms it was not a place to be had and held for itself. It served the religious function of mediating heavenly realities enjoyed directly by the blessed departed and also the political one of undergirding the Christian Imperial project. But this extra mysteriousness only added to its exotic charms. Describing the attitude of the mid-century Bishop Cyril of Jerusalem, J.W. Drijvers has written: “In particular, Jerusalem’s holiness represented by the physical presence of sites and objects – the Cross especially – was important to Cyril. Jerusalem’s direct and tangible connection with the early history of Christianity made the city the center of the Christian world.”¹⁷⁵

This mission (“the propagation of Jerusalem’s holiness”) would be continued by Cyril’s successor John, and the campaign seemed to have been successful when it achieved the recognition by Chalcedon of its position as apostolic see. Yet the status would be short-lived, contested even in the two centuries between Chalcedon and the Muslim takeover – an event which put an abrupt end to Jerusalem’s claims to any residual ecclesio-political significance.¹⁷⁶

One may observe a Western development of this idea in the ideas of Marius Victorinus.¹⁷⁷ For him, Jerusalem on earth serves politically, i.e. its political master, Rome, (presumably meaning that in Paul’s time, Jerusalem was under the Roman heel) whereas: “The free city is our mother to whom we must hasten.”¹⁷⁸ But, somewhat curiously, Victorinus insists that “there is earth both here and there,” i.e. even an earth somewhere above the heavens. Cooper in his commentary tries to play this down. Victorinus, he claims, would not have departed from Neoplatonism so much as to make any sense of an “earth above the heavens.”¹⁷⁹ But, notwithstanding that consideration, for Victorinus heavenly Jerusalem has spatial dimensions, it would seem.

For Augustine the heavenly city has its feet firmly on earth and so it is not the case that the heavenly city needs to be mirrored in the church on earth.

175 Jan Willem Drijvers, *Cyril of Jerusalem: Bishop and City*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 72 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 177.

176 For what might have been, the recent book by Pauline Allen, *Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-century Heresy: The Synodical Letter and Other Documents*, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2009) is suggestive.

177 On Victorinus, Thraede, “Jerusalem II,” 755: “Seine um Textnähe bemühte Exegese von Gal 4,26 zeigt sehr schön, wie leicht die Argumentation des Apostels in eine spätplatonisch gefärbte weltbildhafte Vorstellung umgebogen werden konnte; der Autor versteht das paulinische *sursum* (ἀνω) als *supra caelos* [...]. Paulus habe aufs himmlische J. verbunden, weil es, als nicht in mundo befindlich, nicht diene; In-der-Welt-sein bedeutet Dienen.”

178 Steven A. Cooper, *Marius Victorinus’ Commentary on Galatians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 323.

179 *Ibid.*, 343, n. 121.

Yet the city, also known as “the heavenly Jerusalem”, has its centre, one might say its centre of gravity, located in heaven.¹⁸⁰ In his study of *The Two Cities*,¹⁸¹ Johannes van Oort was much more interested in the sources (Semitic-Punic particularism as found in Tertullian, admixed with a certain amount of Manicheism) for Augustine’s *City of God* rather than in the *Nachleben* of that book. Van Oort insists quite correctly that we should not translate *civitas* as “state” but as “community.”¹⁸² The idea is that of a community rather than a city, let alone “the state:” “In the metaphorical language of Scripture, the *civitas* Jerusalem is a city, as is its antithesis Babylon,” and van Oort sees the germ of the idea in catechetical teaching which is salvation-historical in tone, employed by Augustine as early as *cat rud* 31.¹⁸³

Donald X. Burt helpfully points out that in the *City of God* Augustine wants to speak of a city of Seth, or “longings,” where Christians aspire to share in the City of God. Situated somewhere in between that and city of Cain (in moral-spiritual terms) was Rome, although it sat a little closer to Babylon than to Jerusalem, as Augustine puts it (*civ. dei* XVI,1; 17; VXIII,2).¹⁸⁴ Of course it is clear that Jerusalem has no political status, only a religious significance as the heavenly city.¹⁸⁵ Unlike the Babylonians who worshipped demons, the Jews were the only ones to get religion right (*civ. dei* VII,32), and they ascribed a providentialist function to the law, temple and priesthood. Staubach notes that the place of the interpretation of the biblical texts about Jerusalem in Augustine’s understanding of cities had been rather overlooked. For Augustine, Jerusalem, in its ideal form

180 Émilien Lamirande, “Jérusalem Céleste,” in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 8, edited by Marcel Viller, Charles Bumgartner, and André Rayez (Paris, Beauchesne): 944–958, 949: “On remarquera que ce n’est pas l’Église terrestre qui est l’image de la cité celeste. Celle-ci est exilée et pèlerine en une partie de ses membres et aspire après le jour où il lui sera donné de les réunir à la société angélique: “*civitas Dei peregrinans in hos saeculo*” (XV,20,1).”

181 Johannes van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine’s “City of God” and the Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities*, Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae* 14 (Leiden: Brill, 1991).

182 *Ibid.*, 161

183 *Ibid.*, 167.

184 Nikolaus Staubach, “Quattuor Modis Intellegi Potest Hierusalem. Augustini *Civitas Dei* und der Vierfache Schriftsinn,” in *Alvarium: Festschrift für Christian Gnllka*, edited by Wilhelm Blümer, Rainer Henke and Markus Mülke, *JAC* 33 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2002): 345–358, 350: “Rom und Jerusalem stehen einander auf der gleichen Stufe der Kultgeschichte als Repräsentanten von *civitas terrena* und *civitas Dei* gegenüber.” Cf *civ. dei* X, 32 “Haec est igitur universalis animae liberandae via.”

185 Donald X. Burt, “Cain’s City: Augustine’s Reflections on the Origins of the Civil Society (Book XV 1–8),” in *Augustinus: De civitate Dei*, ed. Christoph Horn (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997): 195–210.

at least, was home for Christians. He may not have a theory of universal history, but the special historical events of scripture, prophetically mediated, are bearers of more than merely moral meanings there, for nations as for individuals, but such “prophetic history” (VII,16.2) is the extra.¹⁸⁶ There is to be no talk of building a civilisation and progressing in a godly direction.¹⁸⁷

However it was Augustine’s contemporary John Cassian whose *Collationes* 14,8 contains the memorably pithy statement of the four senses of Jerusalem.¹⁸⁸ This choice of Jerusalem as example for the exegetical technique was far from coincidental. In this particular monastic tradition of interpretation, spiritual reading did not rely on the literal, but on the application of the particular in a figural way. In the ninth-century *Navigatio S. Brendani* the monastery of St

186 Gerard O’Daly, *City of God. A Reader’s Guide* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 195. Cf. Ernst A. Schmidt, *Zeit und Geschichte bei Augustin* (Heidelberg: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985).

187 Karla Pollman, “Augustins Transformation der traditionellen römischen Staats- und Geschichtsauffassung (Buch I–V),” in *Augustinus: De civitate dei*, ed. Christoph Horn (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997): 25–40, 39. Augustine denied a this-worldly *Tun-Ergehens-Prinzip*. Regulus did not have good fortune in this life (*City of God* I,24) and piety is really a gift, not a desert.

188 “Theoretice vero in duas dividitur partes, id est, in historicam interpretationem, et intelligentiam spiritalem. Unde etiam Salomon cum Ecclesiae multiformem gratiam enumerasset, adiecit: Omnes enim qui apud eam sunt, vestiti sunt dupliciter (Prov. XXXI). Spiritalis autem scientiae genera [sunt], topologia, allegoria, anagoge; de quibus in Proverbiis ita dicitur, Tu autem describe tibi ea tripliciter, super latitudinem cordis tui (Prov. XXII). Itaque historia praeteritarum ac visibilium agnitionem complectitur rerum quae ita ab Apostolo replicatur. Scriptum est enim, quia Abraham duos filios habuit, unum de ancilla, et alium de libera; sed qui de ancilla, secundum carnem natus est; qui autem de libera, per repromissionem (Galat. IV). Ad allegoriam autem pertinent quae sequuntur, quia ea quae in veritate gesta sunt, alterius sacramenti formam praefigurasse dicuntur: Haec enim, inquit, sunt duo testamenta: unum quidem de monte Sina, in servitutem generans, quod [Lips. in marg. quae] est Agar: Sina enim mons est in Arabia, qui comparatur huic, quae nunc est Jerusalem, et servit cum filiis suis. Anagoge vero de spiritualibus mysteriis ad sublimiora quaedam et sacratoria coelorum secreta conscendens, ab Apostolo ita subjicitur: Quae autem sursum est Jerusalem, libera est, quae est mater nostra. Scriptum est enim: Laetare sterilis, quae non paris; erumpe et clama, quae non parturis; quia multi filii desertae magis quam ejus quae habet virum (Ibid.). Topologia est moralis explanatio, ad emendationem vitae et instructionem pertinens actualem, velut si haec eadem duo Testamenta intelligamus practicen et theoreticen disciplinam; vel certe si Jerusalem aut Sion animam hominis velimus accipere, secundum illud, Lauda, Jerusalem, Dominum; lauda Deum tuum, Sion (Psalm. CXLVII). Igitur praedictae quatuor figurae in unum ita si volumus confluent, ut una atque eadem Jerusalem quadrifariam possit intelligi: secundum historiam civitas Iudaeorum, secundum allegoriam Ecclesia Christi, secundum anagogen civitas Dei illa coelestis quae est mater omnium nostrum; secundum tropologiam anima hominis, quae frequenter hoc nomine aut increpatur, aut laudatur a Domino. De his quatuor interpretationum generibus Apostolus ita dicit: Nunc autem, fratres, si venero ad vos linguis loquens, quid vobis prodero, nisi vobis loquar, aut in revelatione, aut in scientia, aut in prophetia, aut in doctrina (II Cor. XIV)?”

Ailbe gets described in terms of scriptural accounts of the temple, especially those of 1Kings 6 and the vision of the last chapters of Ezekiel.¹⁸⁹ What seemed to matter was the form, not the matter (e.g. tabernacle cloth, temple stone, even spiritual flesh). With a nod to the work of Thomas O'Loughlin, David Jenkins concludes: "By the seventh century Jerusalem was an accepted liturgical motif as the place where God was to be met."¹⁹⁰ There are liturgical resonances in the *De locis sanctis* of Adomnan.

Eusebius had made sure that universal history preceded Church History in his account. (Here can be traced Origen's influence on Eusebius, according to which Church History was like a second tier, building on universal history.) Yet when we come to Orosius, there seems to have been a losing sight of protology and eschatology, and subsequently he is always trying to account for the whole and the parts of history, with the sense of the parts being somewhat relativized.¹⁹¹ Orosius had read *City of God* IV.33 and concluded that God was not bound by his own providence: therefore although God had hung an ominous cloud over Constantinople and prophecy of doom, repentance and then divine mercy followed (Orosius, 3.3.2).¹⁹² Christianity has saved the Empire for now – but clearly its existence is contingent on divine will. Christians suffer less because they know their sins are to blame (Orosius, 7.41). "Alaric's Goths are the precisely targeted instruments of God's Providence: as barbarians, they loot and rampage but as Christians they do so in an urbane way."¹⁹³ Alaric spared blood and even honoured churches: Christianity overcame barbarians. The case of Placidia, the daughter of Theodosius I showed how piety could soften the likes of her fierce pagan captor, Athaulf. Her capture was therefore "providential."¹⁹⁴ It is interesting that in the proemium to Book 5, Orosius asks: "Shall I thus call our times happy? We surely think they are happier than the past." For example, one has a passport to flee to any part of Empire, which

189 David Jenkins, *Holy, Holier, Holiest. The Sacred Topography of the Early Medieval Irish Church*, *Studia Traditionis Theologiae* 4 (Turnhout: Brepols 2010), 85.

190 *Ibid.*, 143.

191 Martin Wallraff, "Protologie und Eschatologie als Horizonte der Kirchengeschichte. Das Erbe christlicher Universalgeschichte," in *Historiographie und Theologie: Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte im Spannungsfeld von geschichtswissenschaftlicher Methode und theologischem Anspruch*, eds. Wolfram Kinzig, Volker Leppin, and Günther Wartenberg, *Arbeiten zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte* 15 (Leipzig: Ev. Verlagsanstalt, 2004): 153–167. Sozomen (HE 1.1.11.15) will agree with Orosius that only a Christian historian can see what the true causes of events are.

192 Peter van Nuffelen, *Orosius and the Rhetoric of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

193 *Ibid.*, 183.

194 *Ibid.*, 185; Orosius 7.40.

was not the case before. As well as encouraging mobility, Christianity is spreading a deeper unity of the Empire. Van Nuffelen concludes: "Orosius' view of history is thus ecclesiological, in the sense that it attributes the prime role as agent to the Church."¹⁹⁵ For most of the last century many, like Erik Peterson, saw Orosius as the opposite of Augustine. But Orosius agrees with Augustine that the past was hardly to be admired and that it will not be a Christian Empire that is to be looked to, as though the old structure could serve the ever-new spirit. What Orosius suggests is that the Church can be understood as a mediator or intercessor.¹⁹⁶

Orosius' and Augustine's contemporary Prosper of Aquitaine wrote *De providentia dei* around 416,¹⁹⁷ at a time when Gaul was being decimated by invasions, adding piquancy to a consensus that life in general was not fair. Prosper argues that some amount of opposition of forces is good in nature, since working against resistance builds strength and gives force.¹⁹⁸ Or, that which is poison can be medicine.¹⁹⁹ God should not be understood in human terms as if too much care taken on his shoulders would wear him down. He penetrates every member of the world and has the power even to remit sin simply as part of his general power. Humans should not despair about themselves too much, since Christ and the saints provide a remedy to add to the gift of reason.²⁰⁰ One should learn to have trust for God's care in the afterlife through seeing his care in this. Nature has been put at our disposal by the power of reason. Even the Hebrews in the desert were preserved.²⁰¹ The Law was placed in hearts before ever it was written down.²⁰² Furthermore, Christ absorbed mortality; receive in heart that message from heaven. As part of his overall providence, God's care extends to salvation for all, as His love gets diffused among all.²⁰³

195 Ibid., 189.

196 The pagan history as preparing the way for Christ the king was presented by Orosius cf. Hans-Werner Goetz, *Die Geschichtstheologie des Orosius*, Impulse der Forschung 32 (Darmstadt: WBG, 1980).

197 Miroslav Marcovich, ed., *Prosper of Aquitaine – De Providentia Dei: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 10 (Leiden, Brill: 1989).

198 123–6: "contraria discors/omnia motus alit, dumque illi occurrit illo,/vitalem capiunt cuncta exagitata vigorem./Quae vel pugra situ, vel prono lubrica lapsu/aut cursu instabili, stabili aut torpor perirent."

199 150: "et quae sola nocent, eadem collate mederi."

200 Ibid., 206–7; 222.

201 Ibid., 413: "nec membris nocuisse aevo, nec vestibis usu."

202 Ibid., 434: "Nec nova cura fuit nostri, cum tradita Mosi/littera."

203 Ibid., 547–9.

To continue the paraphrase of Orosius: One is to serve the higher by using the lower for seeking salvation. People should remember that they are not imprisoned by external forces so as to be prevented from obeying God, but are held captive only by forces within. God has so arranged it. Now, as for those who complain that there is no justice, would you want it for every single fault, including that of your own?²⁰⁴ Also, we wouldn't want all the virtuous to be here and now given their reward by being taken to heaven and leaving the earth impoverished. Yet all the same there is justice, albeit only to some extent.²⁰⁵ Of course innocent children get killed, and this maybe for the sins of their fathers, which is better than for their own guilt; this reminds us to accept correction when it comes. Lastly, as if getting to the point and the pressing concern, it is wrong to blame God for the marauding Goths. They have come because we have opened the citadel of our mind to false teaching. Let the wicked prosper outwardly, so long as the faithful God's people remained faithful.²⁰⁶

By the end of this period of political instability, as some amount of civilised solidity emerged, one finds in Gregory the Great's *Moralia in Job* a treatment of this biblical saint that aimed to show how inconsiderable Job's sufferings were, not what a martyr he was. "While literal, Christological and anagogical levels of exegesis are present, Gregory is most interested in the moral and ecclesiological meanings of the text: how Job represents the good Christian, the elect or the Church itself. As such the *Moralia* is a compendium of his spiritual teachings, and was for the medieval monks and preachers a manual of moral, ascetic and mystical advice and inspiration."²⁰⁷ Gregory was more ascetical than Augustine in his conclusions: pain was no bad thing. Yet even more one senses the mystical flavour of a "wounded by love" discourse,²⁰⁸ as drawn from Job 5:18. "For he himself wounds but will heal, he cuts and his own hands will mend" (cf. Deut 32:39 and Cant 2:5 for a spirituality of wounding with love: *Mor* 6,25,42), turning from a wounding of affliction into a wounding of love which he gets from Augustine's *Confessions*. God is breaking the believer down, sending an arrow from which we both flee and yet are drawn towards. Penitence and

204 Ibid., 747.

205 Ibid., 839ff.

206 Ibid., 923.

207 Carol Straw, *Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection*, Transformation of the Classical Heritage 14 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991), 49

208 Jean Doignon, "Blessure d'affliction et blessure d'amour. une jonction de thèmes de la spiritualité patristique de Cyprien à Augustin," in *Grégoire le Grand: Actes de Chantilly, Centre culturel Les Fontaines, 15–19 septembre 1982*, eds. Jacques Fontaine, Robert Gillet and Stan Pellistrandi (eds.), (Paris: CNRS, 1986): 297–303.

compunction become a permanent inward disposition because of the uncertainty of God's judgement and the impossibility of knowing either one's own sinfulness or the sufficiency of one's penance. One might conclude: the *Moralia in Job* is really *spiritualia in Job*, to do with life in relation to God's mysterious purposes.

Job as figure of the suffering Christ is the true hero of the poem; and yet the power of God rather than the innocence of Job is the lesson (although that is not "moral" as such). Carole Straw on *Moralia in Job* 33,30 comments: "The good which we do comes at the same time from God and ourselves; from God by his prevenient grace, and from us by the free will which follows his grace [...]. By the agreement of free will we have chosen the good actions which we do."²⁰⁹ God's Providence is thus more "made to measure" than "one size fits all." Fear gets balanced by hope. One keeps penitent and, as with Job, continues to offer sacrifices in the hope of God's mercy (especially for sins of ignorance).

Gregory taught that one of main results of the Fall is mutability, and this even in man's spiritual nature.²¹⁰ It is a true consolation that all penal suffering comes from the Creator's hand because as one knows this, one can repent and at least be free from unrighteousness. Gregory lays weight on the importance of hidden judgements, which only later become obvious as such. In general, difficulties should be viewed as signs of divine grace. Job represents the *totus Christus*²¹¹ in the sense of being the *corpus Christi* over against the *corpus diaboli*. There was no longer a secular city to speak of by the time of Gregory, who turned away from the world into a divine dispensation, with Christ at centre of this. God's purpose for the likes of Gregory was to seek no earthly glory but to devote himself to following that longing for the *patria*.²¹²

209 Grégoire le Grand, *Morales sur Job. Pt 6, Livres XXVIII–XXIX*; texte Latin de Marc Adriaen (CCL 143B); introduction by Carole Straw; translated by Les Moniales de Wisques; notes by Adalbert de Vogüé (Paris: Cerf, 2003).

210 Katharina Greschat, *Die Moralia in Job Gregors des Großen: ein christologisch-ekklesiologischer Kommentar*, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 31 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 100, on *Moralia* VIII 32,54 (from Is 45:7): "Dann versteht Gregor darunter, daß mit den äußeren *flagella* die Dunkelheiten der Schmerzen geschaffen werden, um im Inneren das Licht des Geistes durch die Erkenntnis zu erhellen' – intus per eruditionem lux mentis accenditur."

211 *Ibid.*, 248.

212 See Michael Fiedrowicz, *Das Kirchenverständnis Gregors des Großen: eine Untersuchung seiner exegetischen und homiletischen Werke*, Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte 50 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1995).

Gregory was confident that God would bring his will to pass on a wide field of history, and this distinguished him from Augustine.²¹³ Gregory was more moralising than Augustine in the sense of expecting Christians to get involved in countering the enemy activity: daily life is like death and is passing, with the growing old of the world *senectus mundi*. Christians should seek the *bona caelestia* and not the *bona temporalia*. Rade Kisic reminds us that Gregory certainly did act: we should not read his exegesis without the context of his letters, which in their crisis-solving and pastoral admonishment, witness to a programme of activity which he deemed to be God's will.²¹⁴

213 Rade Kisic, *Patria Caelestis: Die eschatologische Dimension der Theologie Gregors des Großen*, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 61 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 185: "Darin wies er immer auf die Vorsehung Gottes hin, die alles auf das Endziel der Geschichte hin steuert." Cf. Gregory, *dial* III, 36..

214 *Ibid.*, 262.

Chapter Two: The Medieval Account of Providence

Boethius first

If for Augustine Providence was to be considered in linear terms, from creation to eschatological summation, as the ancillary facilitating of salvation-history, then Boethius drew on the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic heritage that considered Providence to stand for the truth that there was a divine realm above, to which one could hope to ascend (through Wisdom or its equivalents). However by contrast, Fortune raises up *only* to cast down and is considered to have something of that false promise of future hope. Indeed Wisdom warned that Fortune would lead one blindly towards a precipice lurking beyond the horizon. Yet there was no complete escaping from Fortune in this life, as Boethius' own life story only too painfully illustrated. While God's Providence as previously understood was, as Augustine had taught, about "the big picture" of world-history, about God's preservation of his church in world-history, individual human lives were more ruled by Fortune: an entity excluded by Augustine, but that Boethius had allowed back in.¹ Fortune or *Fortuna* works in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* "comme une médication par anamnèse."² Yet, arguably for all her unreliability in the long run, Fortune is better than a fickle mistress, for she tells Boethius she gave him a good long period of success (*Consolation* II,2).

If human knowledge is pitifully subjective, divine knowledge is much more comprehensive and in the divine mind is where providence is to be first located (IV,4,6).³ Here Boethius seems to have been agreeing with the Neoplatonic philosopher Ammonius' criticism of the Aristotle commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, for whom the gods could know only possibilities. There is a second type of necessity to be considered in addition to the first type, that of absolute neces-

1 Matthias Vollmer, *Fortuna Diagrammatica: Das Rad der Fortuna als bildhafte Verschlüsselung der Schrift De consolatione Philosophiae des Boethius*, Studien zur Kulturgeschichte und Theologie 3 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009), 239.

2 Emanuelle Métry, "Fortuna et Philosophia: Une Alliance Inattendue," in *La Fortune: Thèmes, Représentations, Discours*, eds. Emanuelle Métry and Yasmina Foehr-Janssens, Recherches et Rencontres 19 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003): 59–70, 60. Momigliano famously argued that Boethius' Christian faith collapsed and the *Consolation of Philosophy* was the result, but this view receives little credit these days.

3 Pierre Courcelle, *'La Consolation de philosophie' dans la tradition littéraire: antécédents et postérité de Boèce* (Paris: Études augustinienes, 1967), 217: "si Dieu est l'éternel présent, il peut connaître de façon déterminée l'événement des futurs contingents."

sity (e.g. “all men are mortal”). This second type, as Boethius tells us (*Cons.* V,pr.6,91) is where if one knows that someone is walking, then they “must be” walking; in such a case the necessity is not natural, but comes through the addition of a condition. God has not forced things to be what they are, but rather things necessarily are what they are as they become so.

Hence Boethius’ view of Providence was that it was of little earthly use to most ordinary mortals whose vision was horizontal, and that it mattered exclusively to those who looked upwards after *Fortuna* had disappointed them.⁴ In *Consolation of Philosophy* IV,6 Boethius calls fate “a disposition inherent in changeable things by which Providence connects all things in their due order. In other words, “Providence is the vision of the divine mind as it sees the unfolding in time of all things, and sees all these things all at once, whereas the unfolding of these events in time, seen as they unfold in time, is called Fate.” For *providentia est ipsa illa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta*, a reason which could guide those who appreciated the gift of divine wisdom, of which there were alarmingly few. Or it is something one shares in with hindsight: “*ergo providentia non pertinet ad cognitionem practicam sed speculativam tantum*.”⁵ Neither of these statements sound very reassuring; that is one reason why the work is called “the Consolation of Philosophy” and not “The Consolation of Providence,” since it was Philosophy that comes close in one’s hour of need and would lead us to Providence away in her high chamber. Providence will not condescend in order to console, but lets Fate or *Fortuna* deal its hand, and Philosophy hold out its helping hand. Tilliette makes the point that it was the figure of *Philosophia* and not *Fortuna* that was appreciated as contributing to the popularity of the *Consolatio*.⁶

Alternatively, Providence arranges for a gift of *philosophia*, which too often has not been received as practical wisdom. Isidore’s definition of *fatum* in *Etymologia* 8.11.94 is significant:⁷ Fate should be set apart from Fortune, since the latter is less predictable than fate. Fate might sound like a very pagan thing,

4 Marc Fumaroli, “Préface: in Boece: *Consolation de la Philosophie*, edited and translated by Colette Lazam, Rivages Poche/Petit Biliothèque 58 (Paris: Rivages, 1989), 36: “la participation de l’homme à l’ordre divin, son concours à la harmonie transcendante de l’univers.

5 At *Consolation of Philosophy* I.9 Boethius’ prayer is indeed as universal as it is personal; he longs and prays for a *reditus*: and the phrase “*vector dux semita*” echoes John 14:6.

6 Jean-Yves Tilliette, “Éclipse de la fortune dans le haut moyen âge,” in *La fortune thème, représentation, discours*, edited by Yasmina Foehr-Janssens and Emmanuelle Métry, *Recherches et Reccontres* 19 (Genève: Droz, 2003), 93–127.

7 “*Fatum autem a Fortuna separant: et Fortuna quasi sit in his quae fortuitu veniunt, nulla palam causa; fatum vero adpositum singulis et statutum aiunt.*” The distinction goes back to Cicero (*Academica* I,29).

but one should be more suspicious of the plausible and more pious sounding Fortune. In any case these two stand on the ground, while *Providentia*, the divine planning, hovers above, high, aloof and not at all obvious.

To say that the high point of the work, the view of God and his providential ways in the hymn “O Qui perpetua” of *Consolation* III,vi is “personal,” as Dronke does, is perhaps to claim too much:⁸ “Boethius’ terminology at times looks Calcidian and hence Platonic: Boethius’ distinction between providence and foresight (*providentia* and *praevidentia*), for instance, is very close to a passage (176) where Calcidius insists that *Providentia* does not “run ahead” (*praecurrit*).”⁹ Béatrice Bakhouché thinks Boethius had immediate access to the Calcidian commentary that accompanied the translation, whereas Courcelle proposed Macrobius as an intermediary.¹⁰ In any case Boethius shared with Calcidius (1) the idea of a God who did not look let alone plan ahead from the first to the last, but more “spectated” on high, and (2) the universe’s perpetuity, with its own built-in transformative powers,¹¹ and as a corollary the somewhat “hands off” approach of the Divine Ruler. In other words God oversees but does not intervene in human affairs. In turn the human soul has two powers: there is the prudence (*opinatrix*), which helps one deal with mutable and generated things of everyday import. But moreover there is wisdom (*sapientia*), to contemplate immutable nature. However, “[i]n connection with the problems of destiny, Calcidius says that when a planned outcome is complete, it is ‘comprehensible’.”¹² Again we see the benefit of hindsight. In the present age wisdom has little chance to predict the flow of events but is there best to adapt to them. The world itself as a network has its own ways and even will. Necessity is not of the absolute type, only conditional, i.e. on the basis of freely chosen action (as Boethius in turn articulates at *Cons.* V,6,18–26) such that humans too have freedom, for God never knows anything in advance so as to fix or predetermine

⁸ Peter Dronke, *The Spell of Calcidius: Platonic Concepts and Images in the Medieval West*, *Millennio Medievale* 74; *Strumenti e Studi* 17 (Firenze: SISMELE edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008), 42.
⁹ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹⁰ Béatrice Bakhouché, “Boèce et le Timée,” in *Boèce ou la chaîne de saviors: Actes Du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac, Présidée Par Edouard Bonnefous, Paris, 8–12 Juin 1999*, edited by A. Galonnier, *Philosophes Médiévaux* 44 (Louvain-la-Neuve/Paris: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie/Éditions Peeters, 2003): 5–22.

¹¹ Calcidius’s patron was Ossius, and hence wrote perhaps prior to or just after Nicea; although: Waszink wants to date him circa 400.

¹² Dronke, *Calcidius*, 10.

it.¹³ In the Calcidian scheme, *Providentia* is exalted in being identified with *Nous* such that the *anima mundi* obeys her. Such Providence holds and embraces all things more closely than the Transcendent Good, having penetrated matter (*silva*) entirely, “forming her fully, not like the visual arts giving form to the surface only, but in a way that nature and soul, permeating solid bodies, bring everything to life.”¹⁴ Providence is Divine Wisdom in action, caring for the everyday things: “Boethius’ divine pilot steers with perpetual, not with eternal, reason.”¹⁵ The word *perpetua* is tellingly chosen. In Book V of the *Consolation*, Boethius averred that God has seen everything from eternity and that humans, far from being under his control are free to practice virtue, in other words to practise right things whatever way the world’s events take them. Worldly goods and prospects don’t matter: since all things long to return to God, we should all the more cling to God as the *fons bonorum*.

The *Anonymous* of Sankt Gallen in his commentary on Boethius was the “first of the Carolingians to identify the *anima mundi* with the sun,” as suggested by Calcidius: the sun is at centre of all things, like a body’s vivifying heart, and one is warmed “by the homeguiding fire” (*ignis redux*).¹⁶ King Alfred the Great’s free translation and expansion of the *Consolation* emphasised that the first example of the Creator’s tenderness towards creation is the phenomenon of the changing seasons. Further, where Boethius had “drawn all things from exemplar on high,” Alfred wrote “without exemplar.” Albert popularised the notion that not just Fortune, but the human soul itself is like a wheel that rises upwards when it reflects on God, but downward when it gazes on transient things. In *Beowulf* the term “wyrd” means humankind’s lot. “What comes out in *Beowulf* is not the old-Germanic belief in Fate, but a Christian resignation to the inevitability of the course of events as they are ordained by God’s Providence in his benign rule of history.”¹⁷

Calcidius’ work also persuaded John Scotus Eriugena:

13 Peter H. Huber, *Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicher Vorsehung und menschlicher Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius* (Zürich: Juris, 1976), 57ff. This is in contradistinction to the emphasis of Ammonius.

14 Dronke, *Calcidius*, 25.

15 Ibid., 42. See Periph I.452C: *theos* is defined as He who runs through all things in that his word runs rapidly (*velociter currit sermo eius*).

16 Courcelle, *Consolation*, 51.

17 Paul E. Szarmach, “Boethius’s Influence in Anglo-Saxon England: the Vernacular and the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*,” in *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, ed. Philip Edward Phillips, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 30 (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 221–54, 246, with reference to B. J. Timmer.

“to see matter in a way that was far from mere imperfection or privation: rather, as having a unique bond—*informatas*—with the transcendent divine realm. Calcidius likewise introduced Eriugena to the Aristotelian concept of the “perfected life,” the entelechy [...] and enabled him to relate his non-Platonic concept to Plato’s *anima mundi*, as the fount of all particular souls.¹⁸

What is perpetual is a perennial transformation which has a near vertical trajectory in the sense of ascent towards the higher. Pseudo-Dionysius in his *Celestial Hierarchy* (261B) had contended against the view that there were angels for different races, since there was one *pronoia* and one source of all. In that sense God directs all races, and Eriugena echoes this in his commentary on Dionysius, where (Expos 9.528) he claims that Jews are wrong to think that God does this only for them, and for other peoples uses angels. God contains all providential activity within Himself, even as he sees it all unfolding (Periphyseon II, 590B).¹⁹

According to Eriugena in *Periphyseon* III, 6–7, “Nothingness” is merely the flipside of Being rather than its presupposition, or matrix.²⁰ “Nothingness” helps to reinforce the contingency of that which is, or works at least as a symbol for that contingency. All things have been in God’s word, before they have come into being (*Periphyseon* III,15) such that a true understanding of the *ex nihilo* is “from the Word of God.” And of course, while there is real difference between Creator and Created, there is not a separation for they come together in the act of creation.²¹ Also, God’s vision of everything is its foundation (*Periphyseon* I,12:704B). Moreover, while essence is that which something has or is at core in God, nature is that which can change and grow (just as indicated in the root meaning of the Greek word *physis* (*Periphyseon* V,3). With allusion to Maximus’ resolution of opposites in *Ambigua* 37, *Periphyseon* V,8 develops the idea to the point that in the state of perfection all that will remain are the spiritual unchangeable substances, which will be taken up into world of ideas. Hence in the

18 *The Spell of Calcidius* (Firenze: Sismel 2008), xx.

19 Cf. Jean Trouillard, “Erigene et la theophanie creatrice, in *The Mind of Eriugena: Papers of a Colloquium, Dublin 14–18 July 1970*, eds. John Joseph O’Meara and Ludwig Bieler (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1973): 98–113.

20 Dirk Ansorge, *Johannes Scottus Eriugena: Wahrheit als Prozeß. Eine theologische Interpretation von ‘Periphyseon’* (Innsbruck; Wien: Tyrolia, 1996), 221: “Eriugena hingegen, der vor allem an der Unveränderlichkeit Gottes festhalten möchte, geht davon aus, daß das Seiende von Ewigkeit her in Gott geschaffen ist. Damit aber kann das ‘Nichts’ nicht mehr als etwas begriffen werden, das dem Geschaffenen zeitlich irgendwie vorausgeht. Es ist vielmehr etwas, was mit dem Seienden als solchem immer schon gegeben ist.”

21 “Diese aber trennt das Geschaffene nicht vom Schöpfer; sie vereint vielmehr beide im schöpferischen Geschehen selbst” (Ibid., 238). This refers to: “Datum refertur ad naturam, donum refertur ad gratiam” (Comm Jn III, ix, Jeaneau, 53).

human understanding of things we are wrapped up in the Word; and this means that just as there is process in the world's unfolding, so too there are processes in understanding it. Only thus will bodies qualify to share in glory, as spiritual bodies by association with spiritual minds.²² Boethius notion of *perpetuitas*, argues Giulio D'Onofrio, was a gift to Eriugena, who developed it into his notion of *tempora aeterna*.

Eriugena employed the term *endelechia* to mean the perfection of the soul as that which (and here he was much more Platonic than Aristotelian) has the function of being the perfecter of all things. He resisted any idea of a created *anima mundi* as the force at work, and at *Periphyseon* I,476 he approves of Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine*, because it does not resort to the notion of *anima mundi*. In *Periphyseon* II,563 it is clearly God the Holy Spirit at work in guiding and perfecting creation, not a creaturely *anima mundi*. Thus in Eriugena's *Periphyseon*, *providentia* was viewed as a divine Mind (*nous*) at work. Matter and divine wisdom have formless nothingness in common and thus they come to meet and complement each other: the latter comes to exist in the former. The extremities of being are thus linked. As Dronke puts it: "the highest and the lowest have a bond that links them, they have certain features in common. It is such a bond that Calcidius had seen between the divine Mind and primordial matter (*Providentia* and *Silva*), and which Eriugena envisages between divine and material formlessness (*informitas*)."²³ Matter is something positive for Eriugena's scheme of creation's perfection: "He thereby distinguishes matter, the non-being which is pure potentiality for form, from neediness – the non-being which is privation of form."²⁴ The point is that creation is continuing.

A further side of this immanentism can be found in *Periphyseon* V,8–12, where this vision set forth shows many signs of Stoic thinking and an emphasis

22 Giulio d'Onofrio, "A proposito del 'Magnificus Boetius.' Un' indagine sulla presenza degli 'Opuscula Sacra' e della 'Consolatio' nell'opera eriugeniana," in *Eriugena. Studien zu seinen Quellen: Vorträge des III. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums, Freiburg Im Breisgau, 27.–30. August 1979*, ed. Werner Beierwaltes, *Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1980): 189–200, 198: "Provvidenza è per Boezio la forma immobile di tutte le cose stabilita nel presente eterno senza tempo del sommo principio, e cioè quello che Giovanni Scoto indica come 'tempora aeterna'; fatto è l'ordine e la connessione temporale delle cose mutabili, secondo il piano della disposizione provvidenziale, ossia, secondo l'Eriugena, lo svolgersi dei 'tempora saecularia'. [...] Ma la prospettiva del 'reditus' permette a Giovanni Scoto di accogliere in un certo senso questa idea [perpetuitas], attribuendo alla creature una durata senza fine che può adeguatamente essere definite 'perpetuitas', in quanto tutte rientrano nelle loro 'rationes' eterne."

23 Dronke, *Calcidius*, 79f.

24 Ibid., 12.

on continuity between old and new creation.²⁵ Despite the fall humanity has *essentially speaking* remained the same in God, even though nature has been spoiled.²⁶ One might ask whether the thing that is relied on to become and grow is also that which has been vitiated, and then enquire how those two things can be correlated. In all this apparent “panentheism” one might also wonder whether Eriugena’s much-vaunted individual human freedom (as charted in his *De Praedestinatione*) is only provisional. Yet part of the gift of grace, as distinct from the given of creation, is individuation of human persons, for Christ is not just *principium adunationis* but also *principium individuationis*. Human nature is changed: human individuality exists in recognising the truth of one’s common elevation, in which the dialogue with God will continue endlessly. Put another way, the change Christ brings was primarily a noetic one, whereby the good that creation contains and its being “Spirit-formed” can now be recognised.

As already mentioned, the vision of God is the very foundation of the universe. Seeing and making are one and the same, such that the vision of it is his will and the working of his will. Moreover, God even somehow sees Himself in His creating.²⁷ Creation’s essence is what it is at its core and in God, but *natura* is something that can change and grow.²⁸ Grace reaches out beyond the existent towards theosis.²⁹ One can say that all is to be taken up into God. As created beings, human bodies are bound for glory just as much as souls; together they will become spiritual bodies by the overcoming of division.³⁰ Human nature is changed: one’s individuality exists in recognising the truth of our common elevation.

One might then say that for Eriugena, *Providentia* is higher than creation because it is *nous*: the *anima mundi* or “second mind” obeys it, and as such is the personification of Fate, which is ultimately controlled by a chain of command, although it enjoys a fair bit of freedom. Providence holds and embraces all

25 “totus homo manens secundum animam et corpus per naturam, et totus factus Deus secundum animam et corpus per gratiam. Naturarum igitur manebit proprietas.”

26 “suae pulchritudinis vigorem integritatemque essentiae nequaquam perdidit neque perdere potest.” (*Periphyseon* V,6).

27 704B (*Periphyseon* I,12): “visio dei totius universitatis est conditio. Non enim aliud est ei videre et aliud facere, sed visio illius voluntas eius est et voluntas operatio.”

28 See *Periphyseon* V, 3. Here there is a strong influence of Maximus, *Ambigua* 37.

29 Ansorge, *Johannes Scottus Eriugena*, 303: “‘Gabe’ bezieht sich auf die Schöpfung in ihrer Gegebenheit, ‘Geschenk’ hingegen auf deren gnadenhafte Vollendung: ‘Datum refertur ad naturam, donum refertur ad gratiam’ (Cf. *Comm Jn* III, ix, Jeaneau, 53.).

30 “totus homo manens secundum animam et corpus per naturam, et totus factus Deus secundum animam et corpus per gratiam. Naturarum igitur manebit proprietas” (*Periphyseon* V,8–12).

things more closely than any Transcendent Good alone would. *Providentia* has penetrated *silva* or matter entirely, forming her fully, not – as with the visual arts – giving form to the surface only, but in a way that nature and soul, permeating solid bodies, bring everything to life.³¹ This is work that is ongoing, and a commanding holiness persuades *silva* to offer herself,³² to the extent that *sapientia* and *Providentia* become synonymous.³³ By the Twelfth Century, the business of creating new forms was also ascribed to *Natura*, as in Bernardus Silvestris *Cosmographia* and Alan of Lille's hymn to *Natura*. Accordingly *sapientia* is also able to develop.

Ever since Alcuin's discovery of Boethius' *Consolation* in the late Eighth Century, it became increasingly popular,³⁴ not least because it advocated learning Wisdom as some sort of natural theology, which drew from experience and inclined towards virtue. Among the Carolingians, Remigius the pupil of Erigena actually made sure to deny any power to *Fortuna*. As Courcelle noted, Remigius' approach was an assertively Christianising one.³⁵ Fortune or fate could be tamed if put in its place, under the close attention of Providence. For Richard of Reims (c 980) who used "*Fortuna*" twenty times, the term *Fortuna* was associated with

31 Ansorge, *Johannes Scottus Eriugena*, 25.

32 Ibid., 270.

33 Eriugena worked with the concept of "primordial cause," which he received from Augustine's *De Gen ad litt*. Robert Crouse, "'Primordiales causae' in Eriugena's Interpretation of Genesis: Sources and Significance", in *Ioannes Scottus Eriugena: the Bible and Hermeneutics*, eds. Gerd van Riel, Carlos Steel, and Michael Richter (Leuven: Peeters, 1996): 209–220, 213 comments: "In any case, it is evident that the causal reasons have an ambivalent status: they are eternal, one and unchanging in the eternal Word of God; they exist *aliter* in the elements of the world, where all things were created at once, timelessly; and they exist also in things which are created through the process of time. As defining the ideal natures of created things, they prescribe also the ends towards which all creatures move, as returning into their primordial causes," which exist in the mind of God; but the passage quoted by van Riel at n.26 on p.219 (re. *De Gen ad litt* VI,10,17 CSEL 28/1,182: "Sed haec aliter in verbo Dei, ubi isti non facta sed aeterna sunt, aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia simul facta futura sunt, aliter in rebus, quae secundum causas simul creatas non iam simul creatas non iam simul, sed sua quaeque tempore creatur") – this really contains nothing as fancy as he claims. Eriugena is hardly true to Augustine at this point.

34 Courcelle, *Consolation*, 47: "Enfin, dans une *Lettre aux moines d'Hibernie*, Alcuin revient sur les degrés de la Philosophie boécienne et ose présenter les sept disciplines comme le moyen nécessaire pour monter jusqu'à la faite de la perfection évangélique."

35 Quoted in Ibid., 288: "Nota fatum nihil esse, ut beatus Augustinus alique dicunt. Sed quidquid providentia Dei disponente foris agitur, fatum vocatur? Sed beatus Gregorius dicit fatum nihil esse. Sed si fatum aliquid esse dicendum est, fatum est naturalis ordo rerum ex providentia Dei venientium. Siquidem fatum dicitur locutum, et dixisse Dei fecisse est: *Dixit et facta sunt, mandavit et create sunt* (Ps 32:9). Fatum est igitur opus Dei quod ex providentia descendit."

the rupture of harmony, although it was used in a slightly more positive sense by Liudprand of Cremona. The study of Providence in that sense (not trying to trace God's purposes in history but to observe meaningful patterns of human behaviour, apparent "coincidences" and consequences both in private and public life) could take one to the portal of the gospel. At least Remigius of Auxerre and others up until the high middle ages thought so, and would also benefit from the rediscovery of interest in things classical during the Renaissance. It is perhaps no coincidence that Eriugena remained very much part of this appreciative movement. The idea of the "world-soul" immediately implied the extra-temporality of the world in its formal essences. For Boethius, the *esse* of creation was already in God's mind, but "*id quod est*" needed creation. The gloss on Boethius by Remigius which might well come from his master, Eriugena, states that before things are made they are "God" and "wisdom" in his providence and disposition.³⁶

Boethius could help one to see that there was a quasi-secular, "pre-sacred" or "ordinary" realm in which created agents were free to work, and God moved in a sort of eternal present, so as to be cause of all, yet cause of no event in particular.³⁷ Courcelle points out that the medieval commentaries on Boethius seemed to miss his warning about Fortune as a fickle and evil mistress and almost inverted his message. Fortune under Providence's tutelage and guidance gained respect the more was ascribed to her as delegated by Her Guide, despite the warnings from the Carolingians. For on the one hand there was Augustinian *Heilsgeschichte* for the Church and the State, i. e. political theological history as it were, the kinds of things which God was directly interested in, and on the other hand there was the Boethian-inspired "other history," wherein Providence uses proxies to mediate between the eternal God who "spectates" and all that is created, all for the sake of spiritual improvement. Creation in turn experiences prov-

36 Siobhan Nash-Marshall, "Boethius's Influence on Theology and Metaphysics to c.1500," in *Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, eds. Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr. and Philip Edward Phillips, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 30 (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 163–91, 187, n.62, quoting *Commentum in Opuscula* 3: "Omnes enim res quaecumque sunt, ante essentiam, id est antequam in formam essendi veniant, deus sunt et sapientia sunt in providentia et dispositione eius."

37 Jean-Yves Tilliette, "Éclipse de la fortune dans le haut moyen âge," in *La fortune thème, représentation, discours*, eds. Yasmina Foehr-Janssens and Emmanuelle Métry, Recherches et Rencontres 19 (Genève: Droz, 2003): 93–127, 99: "La doctrine de Jean, qui s'emploie à sauvegarder la liberté humaine, s'appuie notamment sur la distinction, d'origine augustiniennne, mais aussi, me semble-t-il, d'inspiration boétienne, entre deux orders de temporalité, les *tempora saecularia*, au sein desquels s'exerce cette liberté, et les *tempora aeterna*, temps de Dieu étant pour lui pure contemporanéité."

idence as fate dealt out by resolute *Fortuna* and, as experienced, often seems plain contrary to reason. It is this that provides humans with the framework and chain of events in which they have to act. Humans are free in that they can rise above their history, surf it, as it were.³⁸ Boethius gave his medieval readers an alternative realm which was part of the Christian universe, not just the pagan one. In turn, the writers of *Parzifal* and *Erec* (Wolfram von Eschenbach and Hartmann von Aue) knew Boethius from summaries of the early medieval schools, which were provided in the Arts faculties. It is not insignificant that of all the church theologians, Bocaccio cited only Augustine and Boethius.³⁹

One might wish to compare and distinguish, Isidore of Seville (d. 636) one who was more interested in reinforcing the place of his own national unit, Spain,⁴⁰ as vital for God's continuing purposes. There were, so he thought, seven ages of world history; yet he interpreted these without having space for *Heilsgeschichte* as such. There was no sense that the history was sacred or in any sense fashioned according to biblical history.⁴¹ The point of Isidore's *Etymologies* was to give moral guidance from Providence's instruction – in this he seems quite close to Boethius – but on a wider, national level. God's plan in history, unfortunately did not seem very obvious to those who followed him. Medieval commentaries on Boethius' Consolation therefore typically focused on the *o qui perpetua* poem (*Cons.* III,9), the sort of paternal consolation which keeps one trusting for a happy outcome. As Dronke puts it, "Boethius' divine pilot steers with perpetual reason, not with eternal. The word *perpetua* is tellingly chosen."⁴² It is not the case that humans, however pious, can gain a God's-eye view. There is an echo of what the Wisdom of Solomon 7:27 (*et in se permanens omnia innovat*)

38 Frederick P. Pickering, *Augustinus oder Boethius? Geschichtsschreibung und epische Dichtung im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*, 2 volumes, Philologische Studien und Quellen 39 and 80 (Berlin: Schmidt, 1967–1976), I: 88: "Zwischen dem ewigen Gott (*spectator cunctorum*) und allem Ungeschaffenen und Geschaffenen vermittelt die göttliche Vorsehung; alles Erschaffene (Sonne, Mond, Gestirne, der Mensch) erlebt in der Zeit die Beschlässe der Vorsehung als unerbittliches Fatum, das für den Menschen -- infolge der Unvollkommenheit der ihm bescherten *ratio* -- oft vernunftwidrig erscheinen muß. Zwischen dem Menschen und seinem Fatum vermittelt *Fortuna*; in Ausübung seines *librum arbitrium* handelt er; sie gestaltet seine Geschichte, den jeweiligen *eventus*."

39 Ibid., 94.

40 Arno Borst, "Das Bild der Geschichte in der Enzyklopädie Isidors von Sevilla," in *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 22 (1966): 1–62, 3: "[...] vielleicht schuf er [Isidor] sogar als Gegenstück zum universalen Geschichtsverständnis des Orosius die Grundlagen für das nationale Geschichtsbild des spanischen Mittelalters."

41 Ibid., 59: "Es fehlt die über die Zeiten hinwegspringende Typologie, der Glaube an die Sendung der *Roma aeterna*."

42 Ibid., 38.

ascribes to Wisdom. The procession-return of creation reflects that of God: the world-soul turns round the nous and moves the cosmos. By making ultimate reality cosmic, one can be less perturbed by things not working out so well at a personal or national level.

The *O qui perpetua* presents a picture of order being brought into the world, both in the visible and invisible realms, through restraining, guiding and leading back. The point is that for the godly, God will be seen in rest as beginning, middle, guide and end. Boethius' theological respectability was safeguarded in part through the selective reading which privileged this and a few other key passages where the stability of Divine Providence is lauded, even though it does seem rather to have been "kicked upstairs," leaving Fortune as its untrustworthy steward. Despite Boethius' Christian taming of *Fortuna* – "the motif of the *Consolatio* that proved most influential in narrative and iconographic terms is *Fortuna* at her wheel, an allegory of the inconstancy of the human condition [...]. But when she [*Fortuna*] reappears powerfully in the literature of the High Middle Ages, in most cases it is rather the image of the licentious, fickle donator of worldly goods and controller of the wheel that proves more influential than her Boethian manifestation."⁴³ Fortune is dangerously neutral, a double agent. In Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudianus* she is depicted as living on a steep rock in the sea and needs to be persuaded to help in making the new perfect human being.

To describe a shifting Fortune as having a residence seems paradoxical. Fortune itself is a bit of a vagabond, and in the *Anticlaudianus* Books 7–8, Alan disagrees that noble origins are a result of noble morality: Ridiculing this, Alan asserts that nobility is something quite contingent, a mere accident of birth. This applies to Fortune herself. Alan and Bernard Silvestre see *Fortuna* as without falsehood, well-meaning enough yet with a torn and flawed cloak, which is Nature. Alan likes to use *Prudentia* as a synonym, although the sense is a prescriptive one: in theory Fortune with scales placed in her hand by God (following Wisdom 11:21) touches heaven while being shaped for humans on earth. Continuing in this vein, by the Thirteenth Century *Fortuna* is somewhat sacralised by its employment in the cultivation of virtue, so that Aquinas could view *Fortuna* favourably; as Aristotle mentions, it can make one generous (STh2.2 q129,a8).⁴⁴ Although Aquinas is not a representative of a "double truth," his distinction of

⁴³ Christina Hehle, "Boethius's Influence on German Literature to circa 1500," in *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, eds. Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr. and Philip Edward Phillips, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 30 (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 255–318, 283.

⁴⁴ "Introduction" à l'édition, avec traduction française, de la *Consolation de Philosophie de Boèce* (Paris, 2009, collection "Lettres gothiques").

the orders of grace and nature, with the latter slotting into the purposes of the former and yet also being sustained and renewed by it, illustrate a Boethian-Eriugenian as much as an Aristotelian approach to history, that of creation in its being moved.

The Middle Ages viewed *Fortuna* as the unexpected turn of the wheel, while God's Providence moved at a level that was "higher" than in that of individual lives.⁴⁵ In the case of the Emperor Henry IV the *fortuna* could be sad, and came close to *fatum*, but in other cases it was not without favour; however, this seemed to occur precisely because the unhappy circumstances of his "private life"⁴⁶ took him away from the steady guidance of the advance of salvation history. The lack of connection between ethical behaviour and fortune corresponded to an area not as tightly governed by Providence which had delegated responsibility to a lower force.⁴⁷ *Fortuna* was both good and evil: it was unpredictable, just like a wheel. As Aquinas would represent it: ethics follows (mis)fortune, not vice versa.

Manegold of Lautenbach was bishop in 1133 when he wrote a commentary on the *Consolation* (with cross-references to Ovid's *Metamorphoses*) showing how divine power is able to order all things. The ethos of Ovid's work where the one constant seems to be "capricious transformation" does not sound very reassuring for the reader, unless one thinks it is about misfortunes that happen to other, less pious people! Certainly in the notable humanist William of Conches one learns that morality is linked to the whole organisation of the world, to a degree which can sound almost "karmic:" "The mixing bowl is Plato's name for divine providence [...]. Human souls are contained in the bowl which is divine Providence [...]. Human souls, that is, share even in the realm of divine Providence, though their destiny is not the immutable one of the World-Soul, but is full of vagaries."⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Hans-Werner Goetz, "Fortuna in der hochmittelalterlichen Geschichtsschreibung," in *Das Mittelalter: Perspektiven mediävistischer Forschung Zeitschrift des Mediävistenverbandes I, H 1: Providentia-Fatum-Fortuna*, ed. Joerg O. Fichte (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996): 75–89, 86: "Fortuna und providentia Dei repräsentierten folglich unterschiedliche Sichtweisen, doch sie bewirkten letztlich dasselbe Geschehen." This with reference to Otto of Freising's *Chronik* and the anonymous *Vita of Emperor Henry IV*.

⁴⁶ Georges Duby, ed., *A History of Private Life, Vol. 2: Revelations of the Medieval World*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 88, Anm. 104: 'Rahewin, *Gesta Frederici [Barbarossa]* 4,4: Deo favente 'mores non mutabimus cum fortuna.' [Sallust, *Catil.* 2,6.]. I

⁴⁸ Rosalind Love, "The Latin Commentaries on Boethius's *De consolazione Philosophiae* from the 9th to the 11th Centuries," in *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, eds. Noel Harold

Peter Abelard changed his mind about this *Anima Mundi*. From supposing like William of Conches that it could be a real entity, even the Holy Spirit in the world, he came to view it more like a metaphor for God's universal effects. For Abelard, the vivifying power of the World-Soul in human souls means nothing other than the spiritual life which the Holy Spirit grants to souls through its gifts; its quickening of all physical bodies is a "beautiful metaphor" (*pulchrum involucrum*) for the working of God's love (*caritas*) in human hearts."⁴⁹ Citing the phrase from Psalm 135:5, – "he who has made the heavens in his intellect" (*Qui fecit caelos in intellectu*) – Abelard adds, "as if there were a twofold creation of things: a first one in the ordering itself of divine Providence, a second in the handiwork. In accordance with these two creations, philosophers have affirmed that there are two worlds, one intelligible, the other sensible (*sensibilem*)".⁵⁰ By "sensible" one could understand "the things of the world in as much as these are not immediately part of the divine purpose, but accidental to it."⁵¹

By and large only the Chartres scholastics felt comfortable enough to comment on vv. 12–21 of the *O qui perpetua* in the *Consolation* where the sense seems at times both cosmic in a physical sense and yet also metaphysical. Yet the very final verse (*Principium, vector, dux, semita, terminus idem*) and hence the poem as a whole seems very much to echo the Wisdom of Solomon as John of Fécamp and Thomas de Cîteaux saw. In Thierry of Chartres' account, nature is more a force, one which presides over birth and becoming of things. It exists under God to complete His works and has a certain amount of influence of its own.⁵² In this idea of semi-autonomous Nature, that which is embodied shares in dignity, with the divine goodness as final cause of creation's goodness. The Word has knowledge of the end of things, but the *anima mundi* does seem to give definition to divine providence, not least by its omnipresence. Thierry drew on Eriugena to posit an intimate presence of God to all creation. God as the essence of all seemed to his enemies to suggest that the Holy Spirit operated on a lower level and was therefore subordinate in the Trinity, but direct references to

Kaylor, Jr. and Philip Edward Phillips, *Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition* 30 (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 75–134, 116.

⁴⁹ Dronke, *Calcidius*, 122.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 124.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Tullio Gregory, *Anima mundi: La filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la Scuola di Chartres* (Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di filosofia dell'Università di Roma, III; Florence: Sansoni, 1955), 182: "Qui la natura non appare più come una semplice epifania del divino o un simbolo di realtà morali, ma piuttosto è una forza che presiede al nascere e al divenire delle cose; pur sempre rimanendo soggetta alla divina volontà, la natura ha avuto una specifica funzione, cioè continuare e completare l'opera del Creatore, e perciò ha acquisito un autonomo valore."

the Spirit are rare in his work on creation. If for Thierry, the *anima mundi* brings form and matter together, for William of Conches it also holds creation together, along with (Augustine's) seminal reasons which keep creation continuing.⁵³ Here we have possibly the Holy Spirit, but it actually seems more like a divine energy common to the Trinity. Rather than delineate the Trinity in terms of "power-wisdom-will," which proved overly controversial for William's career, Thierry's pupil Clarenbald of Arras (d. 1160) wrote that the Father creates, but the Son "is the force that providentially imposes forms on matter, moving it from the state of pure potentiality to the state of fulfilment, in which it can be known by the human mind. In addition, the Son supplies the created substances thereby brought into being with seminal forms."⁵⁴

In Bernard of Silvestris's *Cosmographia* the character *Natura* persuades *Nous* to make things better – *Silva* can be beautiful once more. Creation is understood to be engendered by tertiary theophanies.⁵⁵ *Nous* has to admit it is not all *Carentia*'s fault but nevertheless she has been remiss. Wisdom is then presented as the divine power and plan, and is not totally identified with Christ, – although there is some amount of fusion; *Natura* is to enlist *Urania* and *Physis* her sisters to help her in beautifying things anew: in a garden the three fashion a new human being with a soul and provide her with intellect so she can overcome necessity.

Peter Lombard had no place for such speculation in his *Sentences*. In fact, he had to give the angels a lot of work to do in the administration of creation (Sent II,d.2–8). It was quite unacceptable to divide up the work of creation between the Persons of the Trinity. Instead, the angels were created all at once (and treated in Sentences II,dd.10–11), then everything else arrived over six days, for Lombard agrees with Gregory against Augustine that creation did not all happen si-

53 Ibid., 310ff.

54 Ibid., 317. Cf. Michel Lemoine and Clotilde Picard-Parra, eds., *Théologie et cosmologie au XIIe siècle: l'Ecole de Chartres*, Sagesses médiévales 2 (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2004). Also, Willemien Otten, "Nature, Body and Text in Early Medieval Theology: From Eriugena to Chartres," in Michael Treschow, Willemien Otten and Walter Hannam (eds.), *Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr. Robert D. Crouse*, eds. Michael Treschow, Willemien Otten, and Walter Hannam, Studies in Intellectual History 151 (Leiden: Brill, 2007): 235–256. For the texts: Nikolaus M. Häring, *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School*, Studies and Texts 20 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971). Edouard Jeuneau, "Le prologus in Eptateuchon de Thierry de Chartres," *MS* 16 (1954): 171–175, reprinted in *ibid.*, *Lectio philosophorum. Recherches sur l'école de Chartres* (Amsterdam: A.M.Hakkert, 1973): 87–91.

55 Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 volumes, Studies in Intellectual History 41 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), I: 307.

multaneously. Yet “seminal reasons” can do the work of continuing creation, along with the angels of course. Like Hugh of St Victor,⁵⁶ Peter seems anxious to get on to the order of redemption than to discuss cosmology. At Sent II, dd. 24–26, having treated the Fall, he comments that the body of man was previously both mortal and immortal, in that it was both able to die and not to die, and at d. 29: “For he was not able to take a step without the aid of operating and co-operating grace; yet he was able to stand straight.”⁵⁷ In other words the intervening of God seems reserved for God’s relating to pre-lapsarian Adam and to the *ordo restorationis*, but nothing in between. If there is something quasi-providential in *postlapsum* creation, it is something built into it rather than something belonging to divine superintendence.

The strong influence of the Neoplatonic and Pseudo-Aristotelian work known as the *Liber de Causis* can be felt as the high Middle Ages approached. According to the *Liber*, the heavens and the earth are connected in a parallel motions.⁵⁸ Some writers like William of Auvergne would oppose any such valorization of physical laws with a strictly moral ontology adapted towards the changes of history. The law of the gospel (*lex evangelii*) leads one on from the law of nature (*lex naturae*) towards perfection: many of Moses’ laws are included as belonging to this natural law, which has not lost its relevance. These two realms (of nature and history) overlap of course, but later developments like the laws of the Mohammedans were to be considered laws of sensual pleasure.⁵⁹ William ridiculed the idea that the Hebrew laws had their origin in Saturn, the source of prophecy and revelation, which was the reasons the fortunes of the Jews were so very variable. Simply, stars and planets do not have souls, and as ignoble they cannot influence the noble (souled) on this earth. Nevertheless despite William’s

56 *De Sacramentis* I,2, where Hugh says that an example of Providence presiding over its own creation by judging evil and paying sinners the wages of sin–death.

57 Peter Lombard, *The Sentences, Book II: On Creation*, ed. and trans. Giulio Silano, *Mediaeval Sources in Translation* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007), 143.

58 “Moventur enim motores particulares in hoc mundo ad aliquid simile vel proportionale illius ad quod movent superiores et universales motores” (William of Aragon, *De pronosticatione sompniorum*, p26; quoted in Tullio Gregory, “I Sogni e Gli Astri,” in *Mundana Sapientia: forme di conoscenza nella cultura medievale*, Storia e Letteratura: Raccolta di Studi e Testi 181 (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1992): 347–387, 376.

59 Michael Schmaus, “Das Gesetz der Sterne. Ein Kapitel aus der Theologie des Wilhelm von Auvergne,” in *Speculum Historiale. Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung – Johannes Spörl aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages, dargebracht von Weggenossen, Freunden und Schülern*, eds. Clemens Bauer, Laetitia Boehm, and Max Müller (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1965): 51–58, 53: “Das Gesetz der Natur ist der Ontologie, das Gesetz der Hebräer ist dem menschlichen Schicksal zugeordnet.”

warnings, the *Liber* influenced the popular theory of dreams and astrology; a fusion of physical and spiritual terminology borrowed from the bible often appeared.⁶⁰ Fire as a principle of life is a supreme example of the physical and the metaphysical,⁶¹ and was related to fire as the quality of the sun's sustaining power; fire in its activity however could move and have some sort of subtle but powerful agency. This line of thinking resulted in Thomas Aquinas's refusal to ascribe agency absolutely to God without remainder, so as to emphasise the role of things as causes – it is fire that heats, not God, as some more self-consciously Augustinian writers would claim. On the whole, dreams were not to be relied upon unless they were clearly a revelation from God: one can receive one-off impressions in the soul during sleep, but otherwise knowledge came through the senses. Yet Albert the Great and Roger Bacon would see dreams as providentially sent, especially in preparing for the struggle against the Anti-christ.⁶²

As the noonday of the Middle Ages approached, human destiny was seen as being in the image of divine providence, hence containing true freedom and opportunity for virtue and blessing. With the translation of Nemesius by Alfano of Salerno and then by Burgundio of Pisa, the intellectual tradition of "Christian Stoicism" enjoyed attention by mainstream theologians such as Robert Grosseteste and Albert the Great: "Whereas destiny is an invariable chain of causes and effects, providence supplies for everyone that which is profitable and beneficial."⁶³ Unlike the Plotinian alternative, this theology believed that God did not emanate from himself but freely created the contingent as contingent, as in keeping with the Timaeus. For Albert, God creates all things but co-creates with these all their activity. The view that St Paul was influenced by Seneca had become a

⁶⁰ Gregory, "I Sogni", 379: "Nella teoria dei sogni – come nell'astrologia – il naturalismo arisototelico-arabo toccava forse uno dei suoi limiti estremi per la progressive riduzione entro termini fisici di fenomeni che tradizionalmente appartenevano alla sfera del sacro e costituivano momenti fondamentali della storia biblica e cristiana."

⁶¹ Tullio Gregory, "La Nouvelle Idée de Nature et de Savoir scientifique au xiii^e siècle," in *Mundana Sapientia: Forme di Conoscenza nella Cultura Medievale*, Storia e Letteratura: Raccolta di Studi e Testi 181 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1992): 115–143, 125: "calor artifex est quidem omnium quae generantur, et ipse est causa generationis principalis" (cf. Alan, *Libellus de effectibus qualitatum*).

⁶² *Speculum astronomiae* ch3 in Roger Bacon, *Opus maius*, ed. John Henry Bridges (Frankfurt: Minerva-Verlag, 1964): 266–269; quoted in Gregory, *Mundana Sapientia*, p. 385, n. 106.

⁶³ Gérard Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 78.

commonplace, and hence there was no automatic rejection of Stoicism.⁶⁴ However, Verbeke concludes that Thomas Aquinas “rejects the unbreakable connection between causes and effects as it was presented by the Stoics.”⁶⁵ One can see that accentuated in Ulrich of Strasburg, for whom things are best executed for Providence by the children since they love the Father and act freely; slaves act out of fear and the animals need pushed. God takes real care especially over those that can also have a supernatural end.⁶⁶ For Providence to work best creatures need to co-operate. God will succeed in realising his purposes quicker and easier if (like children) humans listen, rather than (like slaves) merely blindly obey without using their imagination and initiative to help fulfil God’s will.⁶⁷ We cannot make Providence responsible for all, for virtue and vice play a part. Indeed sometimes an event that seems nasty might be good, like a doctor’s cure.

Medieval Historiography

Whereas as late as 1100 the iconography of the wheel was widespread, this was not brought into association with any “goddess” Fortuna, until around 1220, as evinced by the Munich BS.4660 (fol.1.v1220). The political context was that of the Gregorian attack on self-vaunting monarchy. Profane history is presented as circular and meaningless, in thrall to Fortune.⁶⁸ Nevertheless there was something

⁶⁴ Ibid., 8. Also, William of Moerbeke in the late 1200s would translate Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Fato* and Proclus, *De providentia*.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 93.

⁶⁶ Joseph Georgen, *Des heiligen Albertus Magnus Lehre von der göttlichen Vorsehung und dem Fatum: Unter besonderen Berücksichtigung der Vorsehungs- und Schicksalslehre des Ulrich von Straßburg* (Vechta: Albertus-Magnus-Verl., 1932.)

⁶⁷ Ibid., 161: “Was häufig geschieht, irrt, wie die Sklaven im Hauswesen, häufig von der Ordnung ab und dient dem Gut und dem Wohl des Universums nur unter der Leitung des immer Geschehenden. Was selten geschieht. Verhält es sich zur ersten Ursache wie die Haustiere zum Hausvater, dient es dem Wohl des Universums nur unter der Leitung und Zügelung des immer und häufig Geschehenden.”

⁶⁸ Jean Wirth, “L’iconographie médiévale de la roue de Fortune,” in *La Fortune: Thèmes, Représentations, Discours*, eds. Emmanuelle Métry and Yasmina Foehr-Janssens, *Recherches et Rencontres* 19 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003): 105–28. Also Jean-Claude Mühlethaler, “Quand Fortune, ce sont les homes Aspects de la démythification de la déesse d’Adam de la Halle à Alain Chartier,” in *La Fortune: Thèmes, Représentations, Discours*, eds. Emmanuelle Métry and Yasmina Foehr-Janssens, *Recherches et Rencontres* 19 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003): 177–206, 177: “Le succès du *Roman de la Rose* et la vulgarisation du *De consolation Philosophiae* de Boèce, traduit (entre au-

about the stability of Rome that helped one to feel that in this life, things were somehow under divine control. For a while in the very early Middle Ages Christian Rome was promoted as the image of the heavenly Jerusalem, even its “shop window.” For instance in the *Vita St Fulgentii* (PL 65.131) one reads what suggests a harmonious correspondence, a parallel between the heavenly Jerusalem and the earthly Rome: “*Fratres, quam speciosa potest esse Hierusalem coelestis, si sic fulget Roma terrestris!*,” words said to be uttered by Fulgentius as the triumphant Theodoric visited Rome in 500. After all, Rome had the bones of Peter and Paul: “But when the senate of the city faded out in the late sixth century, the popes emerged as the authority best equipped to rule Rome.”⁶⁹ Hence the Emperor was able to depose Pope Martin I in 653 but not Pope Sergius in 687. Accordingly, “in the eighth century the entire imperial infrastructure in Rome steadily became papal.”⁷⁰ The papacy also became dynastic during the ninth century, and it could be argued that Rome was becoming too much the earthly player to have any enduring pretensions to be a holy pilgrimage destination. Furthermore, the Carolingian church with its conservative, even retrospective mentality was bound to privilege Christian Jerusalem (and even Jewish Jerusalem, or rather the eschatologically to-be-restored temple) over Christian Rome. Indeed the *Libri Carolini* go so far as to equate Rome with Babylon. For Aachen was to be the *new* Rome with its chapel imitating the “tomb church” (which would become the Church of the Holy Sepulchre), which in turn was understood to symbolise the heavenly Jerusalem in a sacramental arrangement.⁷¹ The Patriarch of Jerusalem sent the key of the sepulchre to Charlemagne in 800 at his coronation in Rome, but it was intended for Imperial, not Papal custody. While Rome became progressively identified as the earthly seat of the Pope, the Emperor was to rule over a “city of peace”, a spiritual though earthly Jerusalem purchased by Christ.⁷² Char-

tres) par Jean de Meun, ont largement contribué à la floraison de Fortune à la fin du Moyen Age.”

⁶⁹ Chris Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome: Illuminating the Dark Ages 400–1000* (London: Penguin, 2009), 147.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Robert Konrad, “Das himmlische und das irdische Jerusalem im mittelalterlichen Denken: Mystische Vorstellung und geschichtliche Wirkung,” in *Speculum Historiale: Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung – Johannes Spörl aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages, dargebracht von Weggenossen, Freunden und Schülern*, eds., Clemens Bauer, Laetitia Boehm, and Max Müller (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1965): 523–540, 532: “Die Pfalzkapelle in Aachen stellte wohl das Abbild der Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem dar. Das ist von fundamentaler Bedeutung, denn die Grabeskirche könnte auch als Abbild des himmlischen Jerusalem gelten.”

⁷² For Alcuin, “Karl herrscht vielmehr über ein geistiges Jerusalem, die *civitas pacis*, errichtet durch das kostbare Blut Jesu Christi” (Alcuin, Epp; *MG EE IV*, nr 198, p. 327), whereas, on the

lemagne was to rule as *gubernator* on behalf of Christ. Furthermore, the Carolingians changed Augustine's definition of "Jerusalem" as of *visio pacis* to *civitas pacis*, which emphasised the communal aspect of the experience rather than that of its content.⁷³ Earthly providence and rule matched that of heavenly order.

For some "the Jerusalem descended from skies" was not any place on earth, but was the pilgrim Church. Haimo and Rupert in their commentaries share this patristic principle, but Gregory the Great and Bruno of Segni think of it to be the higher place where angels and men dwell together. Either way the earthly and the heavenly movement worked together. Curiously, as Rome came to assert itself as a *holy* city in the present, Jerusalem became more and more *the* place of pilgrimage, and Jerome's old warning against pilgrimages to the City went unheeded.⁷⁴ The verse Ezekiel 5:5 ("Thus says the Lord Jehovah: 'This Jerusalem have I placed in the midst of the nations, and raised about her the countries'") was popular in the collective imagination. Abelard saw Zion as *caput regni Christi*; Peter the Venerable regarded the Tomb of Christ as the heart of the world.⁷⁵ But this is clearly in idealized, not political terms. As Konrad notes, Jerusalem is hardly central on maps of the world around the turn of the millennium.⁷⁶ What mattered more was its quasi-sacramental relationship to the heavenly.

The Christian grasp on the Holy Places seemed always to be at best tenuous, and ironically the agonistic Crusades helped to foster the *symbolic* value of Jerusalem which becomes conceived as a centre "ou nombril du monde," not least in Urban II's 1095 sermon where he proclaimed: "*Jherusalem umbilicus est terrarum...civitas regalis, in orbus medio posita. Pugnat pro duplici regno, quia quaerit utramque Jherusalem, decertat in hac ut vivat in illa.*"⁷⁷ To paraphrase: "let him fight for the two-fold kingdom since he seeks each Jerusalem" or "one has to fight for this one so as to live in the other." Jerusalem was first and foremost the earthly version. Again, as with the early Christian theologians, the relationship between the two levels is not a sacramental one, but is predicated on a

other hand, "Christus gilt als Stifter einer irdischen Herrschaft. Seine *civitas* auf Erden kann als Spiegelung des himmlischen Jerusalem gelten." (Konrad, "Das Himmlische und das Irdische Jerusalem," 528–9). There was a myth-saga of Charlemagne's crusade in the *Chronik* of Benedict of S Andrea [MG SS III 701f.](Konrad, "Das Himmlische und das Irdische Jerusalem," 530, n. 35).

73 .Cf. Johannes Spörl, "Die *Civitate Dei* im Geschichtsdenken Ottos von Freising," *La Ciudad de Dios: Revista de cultura e investigación* 167.2 (1956): 577–597.

74 Rahewin, *Gesta Frederici* imp lib IV, ed. G Waitx, 320. (This on Lamentations 4:12: "*vere Hierusalem erat mater nostra Romana ecclesia.*")

75 Sermon II: PL 189,978.

76 Konrad, "Das himmlische und das Irdische Jerusalem," 532.

77 Lamirande, "Jérusalem Céleste," 953, quoting Godefroy de Bouillon.

grasp of salvation history in which just as Christ ascended to Jerusalem before ascending to heaven, so too must the penitential pilgrim.

“Nothing in the Scriptures, nothing in Christian tradition or literature, had prepared the church for what happened on 15 July 1099. In a providential way, the City of God has been given back to God’s people.”⁷⁸ To take up the crusade was to fulfil Christ’s command to take up the cross. Yet after that initial success, weariness set in, as can be viewed in William of Tyre’s work: “The sense of providential guidance that was so marked a feature of the progress of the crusaders is not sustained by subsequent decades. A description of a divine act has been replaced by a the [sic] history of a kingdom: Latin Jerusalem.”⁷⁹ As pessimism replaced crusading triumphalism, on the basis of Galatians 4:26 and Lamentations, Jerusalem could be viewed as “our mother Church” only in an ideal or eschatological sense. Jerusalem was, as it were, eventually “kicked upstairs” and Rome was left full of power, as a place where sacred and political resources were hard to distinguish. The parallels with the respective cases of Providentia and Fortuna are hard to ignore.

Augustine had already established that Christians on earth were only citizens of God through their being co-citizens with angels (*civ dei* XI,7&24), and monks already had angelic life, since for Bernard of Clairvaux, the angels were already brides of Christ. Monks at Clairvaux could even be said to be ‘in Jerusalem’ as in the case of Philip canon of Leicester whom Bernard excused from going on further to the Holy Land.⁸⁰ Verses such as Rev 21:2 & 9–10 were popular ones which Augustine had hardly cited. Unlike Augustine, Bernard equated the bride with the City and joined the love of the community to love for Christ. The flip-side of an exalted view of Christian leadership is the opposite regard for the church’s enemies. The *corpus diaboli* idea was much received in the high Middle Ages, but of course this now seems an error of interpretation of the Church Father, since although quoted by Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana*, it

⁷⁸ Colin Morris, *The Sepulchre of Christ and the Medieval West: From the Beginning to 1600* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 184.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 189.

⁸⁰ “Et si vultis scire, Clara-Vallis est. Ipsa est Jerusalem, si quae in coelis est, tota mentis devotione, et conversationis imitatione, et cogitatione quadam spiritus sociata.” Then In cant s 55.2 “Puto enim hoc loco [Soph. I, 12] prophetam Jerusalem nomine designasse illos qui in hoc saeculo vitam ducunt religiosam, mores supernae Jerusalem conversatione honesta et ordinata pro viribus imitantes [...]. Mea autem, qui videor monachus et Jerosolymita, peccata [...]”; in terms of spirit the monk is in heaven and “l’una civitas deviennent una sponsa.” (Quoted in Morris, *The Sepulchre of Christ*, 178.)

was not much employed by him.⁸¹ But actually the likes of Otto of Freising were not so misinformed as moderns are, argues Nikolaus Staubach; Augustine did think that the city of God was on its way to *societas perfecta*, such that Robert Markus' "liberal" reading of the evidence is possibly too one-sided. Indeed, the point is that although Gregory VII was wrong to see political powers as *membrum diabolicum* and his church as pure, nevertheless the notion of *imperium Christianum* can be seen as a continuation of Augustine's idea – which was determined not to separate liturgy from social structure.⁸² In all this, sacred history brought the providential affairs of nations and kings "kicking and screaming" in its wake. As the Church became more Christianized through the monastic influence, society around it became more civilized.

A new wave of interest in theology of history came from the Reichenau monastery around 1050. Otto of Freising who emerged from this context looked on the changes of epochs without alarm, as clear signs of a definitely structured plan for history which God was rolling out. The need for civilisation to mature was the main reason why Christ was born so late in time.⁸³ Otto made the connection of *Consolatio* III,9 to Plato's *Timaeus* 27d as he found it in Calcidius, and used it to help praise the constancy of God who made time continue to flow out of eternity.⁸⁴ History could be written to trace the tendency or tenor of the events, at its worst to show the *miseriae mutabilium casibus rerum alternantium*. In other

81 See Friedrich Ohly, "Halbbiblische und außerbiblische Typologie," in *Schriften zur mittelalterlichen Bedeutungsforschung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977): 361–400, 376.

82 See Jeannine Quillet, "La tradition de l'augustinisme politique dans L'Europe medieval," in *L'unité de culture européenne au moyen âge: XXVIII Jahrestagung des Arbeitskreises Deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters Straßburg, 23–26. September 1993*, eds. Danielle Bushinger and Wolfgang Spiewok, Wodan – Greifswalder Beiträge zum Mittelalter 38 (Greifswald: Reineke-Verlag, 1994): 103–110. See also see Nikolaus Staubach, "Geschichte als Lebenstrost: Bemerkungen zur historiographischen Konzeption Ottos von Friesing," *MjB* 23 (1991): 46–75.

83 Hans-Werner Goetz, "Der Umgang mit der Geschichte in der lateinischen Weltchronistik des hohen Mittelalters," in *Julius Africanus und die Christliche Weltchronistik*, ed. Martin Wallraff, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur 157 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006): 179–205, 190: "Die Geschichte war für Otto somit durchaus von Wandel und Zäsuren gekennzeichnet...durch einen politischen Wandel, zugleich aber (als göttliche Heilsgeschichte) durch einen geordneten Wandel, der sich vor allem in der vorbestimmten Abfolge (und Aufeinanderfolge) der Reiche manifestierte, besonders der vier großen Weltreiche [...] Den Geschichtsablauf verstand Otto dennoch als eine fortschrittliche Entwicklung."

84 Hans-Werner Goetz, *Das Geschichtsbild Ottos von Freising: Ein Beitrag zur historischen Vorstellungswelt und zur Geschichte des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Köln/Wien: Böhlau, 1984), 86; 181.

words, History really served to show just how unreliable things are.⁸⁵ The virtuous are those who stand fast, holding out for the values of the age to come. The theological impulse came perhaps from Hugh of St Victor's pessimism (*De sacramentis fidei* I,3,15). Hugh's doctrine of creation viewed God's initial work as very much intended as a basis for the work of restoration (*opus restauracionis*). One should also consider Hugh's distinction in I,4,17 between a substantial good (*bonum secundum se*) and an accidental one (*bonum ad aliquid*), i.e. good for some purpose. Hence there are evil actions which God can make use of, with reference to Augustine,⁸⁶ and to the failure of the Crusades. Goetz however claims that for Otto, such difficulties provide the very path to Glory, and so this cannot be understood as pessimism, not least (also) because Revelation is available through these events. God has revealed himself in history even while transcending it, so that the human mind may perceive him *via* His effects. For Otto, God's will controls all that happened, and is "providential" as the guiding power in history.⁸⁷ After taking over from the world empires, Christ now reigns directly. Yet he conserves the world in his grace.⁸⁸ And yet the goodness of his creation also has a say in how history will develop, especially in the case of the created acting person (angelic and human), here using the Boethian definition as developed by Gilbert of Poitiers. This helped Otto have a view of individuals as unique and irreplaceable, yet he made sure to use the term "Person" only about humans and not about God. Fortune's wheel is really God's will. Yet humans are to play their part in God's purposes, trying to move from mutability to stability.

In some ways Otto's vision of the end-times was more ambitious than that of Joachim of Fiore a century later; there was to be a spiritualisation of the whole of society which would form a perfect bride for Christ to come back to, including a Papacy without secular pretensions.⁸⁹ Providential patterns could be seen in God's judgement on Rome: Odoacer, like Cyrus was a judge-liberator. "*Geschichte ist grundsätzlich Heilsgeschichte*" not least because God's rule is extending into

⁸⁵ Ibid., 87: "Otto folgt der Darstellungsweise des Orosius, indem er eine 'Unglücksgeschichte' schreibt," but without any sense that things would get better during the course of world-history.

⁸⁶ *Civ dei* 11,17; cf. Otto, *Gesta Fredrici* I, 66.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 103: "dort, wo Otto konkret wird, spricht er eher von *nutus*, *consilium* oder *iudicium Dei*."

⁸⁸ *Chr. Prol.*: "Sub potenti manu Domini regna mutantis ac pro voluntate sua cui voluerit miserentis humiliemur ipsiusque misericordiae [...]."

⁸⁹ Amos Funkenstein, *Heilsplan und natürliche Entwicklung: Formen der Gegenwartsbestimmung im Geschichtsdenken des hohen Mittelalters*, Sammlung Dialog 5 (München: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1965), 110.

all of history and society.⁹⁰ It is changeable yet foreplanned: on the way to fulfilment there is no place for blind fate or violence that will not be checked and judged.⁹¹ Church and kingdom very much overlap. Christ raises up his kingdom, “*regnum suum, quod est ecclesia*” – a phrase Otto is not afraid to use – to become Lord of the earth through it. Otto agreed with Eusebius’s likening of Constantine to the sunshine, for since that Emperor’s reign there had no longer been a history of a *civitas terrena* but instead one of Church. This is of course a *civitas permixta*, yet even so the *civitas Dei* is becoming increasingly more visible and political throughout; it as it blooms on its way to blessedness. Now, the *Investiturstreit* means dark times of division, yet there is hope coming from monasteries,⁹² and spreading stability as the antidote to fragile mutability, which is the image of death, and which the whole Chronicle laments.⁹³

On this account, Providential History is connected to the ontological order in a way that means that it too is ordered, demonstrating the firm structures of the realities behind it. Scripture was understood as tracing that history and yet manifesting timeless truths at the same time.⁹⁴ For example, Guibert of Nogent in his *Gesta Dei per Francos* claims that Zechariah 12:1–9 concerned the siege of Jerusalem in 1099. It takes a gift for spiritual interpretation to interpret history properly, but Guibert displayed a healthy optimism in his search for patterns in history and in creation as a whole, with the help of Scriptural interpretation. Those facts of ancient biblical saving history could continue to guide contemporary life. Events signified truth, which in turn meant the perception of present and near-future events.⁹⁵

90 Otto von Freising, *Chronik oder die Geschichte der zwei Staaten* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960), introduction by Rudold Buchner, xlii.

91 Ibid., xii.

92 Ibid., I: “Ihre letzte und feierliche irdische Wirklichkeit gewinnt die *civitas Dei* in den mönchischen Orden.”

93 Ibid., lxii: “Die mutatio rerum ist die rückbedeutende Gegenfigur, rückdeutend auf die Erhebung und den Fall Adams und der Engel. Die mutatio ist damit das Sinnbild des Todes, welcher aber das Leben in Gotes Staat erst sichtbar macht.”

94 Laetitia Boehm, “Der wissenschaftstheoretische Ort der historia im Mittelalter: Die Geschichte auf dem Wege zur ‘Geschichtswissenschaft’”, in *Speculum Historiale: Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung – Johannes Spörl aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages, dargebracht von Weggenossen, Freunden und Schülern*, eds., Clemens Bauer, Laetitia Boehm, and Max Müller, (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1965): 663–693, 687: “Die historia gehört beiden Ordnungen an: der Ordnung des Wirklichen und der dahinterstehenden Ordnung des Wahren.”

95 Cf. Alan C. Charity, *Events and their Afterlife: the Dialectics of Christian Typology in the Bible and Dante* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).

To regard history as something in decline, a view perhaps already there in Augustine, was, as W. Kamlah saw, something that held medieval and early modern Christianity captive. If all is repetition or no more than new permutations of combinations, then the earthly city has no future and no chance of progress.⁹⁶ This was all part of a *contemptus mundi* education.⁹⁷ Staubach is even more scathing about what he finds in Otto. It hardly deserves the name “history.” There seems no sense of obligation to wait and see or try to judge history in any *a posteriori* way, or that new situations require wisdom of a fresh sort. In the end, and in contradistinction to Rupert of Deutz, Gerhoh of Reichersberg⁹⁸ and Joachim with their chronological typology, Otto complained that history doesn’t make sense; hence, one needs to look beyond it to the heavens, focusing on the City of God as it rises above and is immune to earthly vicissitudes.⁹⁹ What history teaches us is how to be sober and have lower expectations. This is not Spengler-style pessimism, but one that is very selective and cautious in its optimism.¹⁰⁰

At some point Otto seems to have lost his Orosian sanguinity and any idea of *civitas permixta*, probably around the time of the investiture conflict. The *Corpus permixta* doesn’t mean that state has taken over church but simply that in it

96 Wilhelm Kamlah, *Christentum und Geschichtlichkeit: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung des Christentums und zu Augustins “Bürgerschaft Gottes”* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1951), 337: “Diese raum-zeitliche Ordnung der terrena civitas also gibt die besonderen Allgemeinheiten her, in denen Augustins Geschichtsphilosophie wie spielerisch sich betätigt, während sie die Besonderungen eines allgemeinen Fortschritts der Heilsgeschichte vernachlässigt.”

97 Staubach, “Geschichte als Lebenstrost,” 74: “Es ist fraglich, ob man diese Nutzenanwendung der *historia* für das Heil des Betrachters als Geschichtstheologie bezeichnen darf.”

98 Cf. Erich Meuthen, *Kirche und Heilsgeschichte bei Gerhoh von Reichersberg*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1959), 761, n. 89: “Bei Gerhoh von Reichersberg werden *regnum* und *sacerdotium* im Rahmen seiner Lehre von den sieben Weltreichen und der Daniel-Vision mit *civitas diabolica* und *civitas Dei* identifiziert und im Sinne einer triumphalen *exaltatio sacerdotii* einander untergeordnet.” Cf. Gerhoh on Ps 64 (*MGH Ldl* III, 468).

99 Staubach, “Geschichte als Lebenstrost,” 73: “Die Gottesstaat gehört dagegen dem Jenseits an und ist hier allein als Ahnung und Vorgeschock erreichbar, indem man sich aus der Hingabe an die Welt löst und der Betrachtung der ewigen Heilswahrheiten zuwendet.” This with reference to *Chronica* I, Prol: “Haec est civitas Dei Ierusalem caelestis, ad quam suspirant in peregrinatione positi filii Dei confusione temporalium tamquam Babylonica captivitate gravati. Cum enim duae sint civitates, una temporalis, alia eterna, una mundialis, alia caelestis, una diaboli, alia Christi, Babyloniā hanc, Hierusalem illa esse catholici prodidere scriptores [...] 8–9: historiam [...] per quam Deo largiente erumpans civium Babyloniae, gloriam etiam regni Christi post hanc vitam sperandam, in hac expectandam ac pregustandam Ierusalem civibus ostenderem.”

100 Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte* (München: Beck, 1923).

there are also heretics and excommunicates abroad in the state. A theocracy of the type of the rule of Abel over Cain seemed possible to Gerhoh. In the case of Otto there was a good combination, not only of Augustine and Orosius, but also Boethius was added to the mix.¹⁰¹ Otto not only made room for, but placed at centre stage the notion of *Fortuna* in his *Gesta* as something belonging to individual leaders, an idea which he had excluded in his *Chronicle* work. The *Chronicle* viewed things from God's position of overall hegemony and direction,¹⁰² but when the *Gesta* focused on individuals it was clear (e.g.) that for Frederick I, his misfortune was his own fault.¹⁰³ If Ordericus had rediscovered *Fortuna* as a fickle force, then Otto developed this idea. Otto came to see history as being all about mutation and mutability, with political power one tool to try to make order out of that chaos.

For Bernard of Clairvaux, the angels were already brides of Christ, and monks at Clairvaux were already at Jerusalem as illustrated by the famous anecdote concerning the would-be pilgrim to Jerusalem, Philip, canon of Leicester.¹⁰⁴ In terms of spirit the monk is in heaven and "*l'una civitas deviennt una sponsa.*" Written by the sixth successor of Bernard, Henri, just before 1190, the *De Jerosolmitana Peregrinatione acceleranda*¹⁰⁵ offered a foil to Otto's historiography. Although more aware of Augustine at every turn, Henri starts not with angels and Abel but with Exodus, and all the Old Testament history is preparation

101 Cf. Pickering, *Augustinus oder Boethius?*

102 Yves M. Congar, "Église et Cité de Dieu chez quelques auteurs cisterciens à l'époque des croisades, en particulier dans le *De peregrinate civitate Dei* d'Henri d'Albano," in *Melanges offerts à Etienne Gilson*, Études de philosophie médiévale. Hors série. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1959): 173–202, 185: "L'évêque de Freising, lui, rédige ses *Chronica sive Historia de duabus civitatibus* comme une histoire humaine appréciée du point de vue du plan et des jugements de Dieu."

103 Elisabeth Mégier, "Fortuna als Kategorie der Geschichtsdeutung im 12. Jahrhundert am Beispiel Ordericus, Vitalis und Ottos von Freising," *Mja* 32 (1997): 49–70, 67: "[...] in den *Gesta* erscheint die *fortuna* gerade als das, was sie in der Chronik nirgends ist, nämlich als das persönliche Glück des Herrschers, was besonders im Kontext des verunglückten Kreuzzugs wie eine Provokation wirken muß. Otto, der in der Chronik auch die wechselnde *fortuna* fast nicht kennen möchte, macht in den 'Gesta' aus der *fortuna*-Glück den Angelpunkt seiner Darstellung."

104 Congar, "Église et Cité de Dieu," 178. Resting at Clairvaux en route, Bernard told him he had already arrived in Jerusalem. "Et si vultis scire, Clara-Vallis est. Ipsa est Jerusalem, si quae in coelis est, tota mentis devotione, et conversationis imitatione, et cogitatione quadam spiritus sociata." Then *In Cant sermo* 55.2: "Puto enim hoc loco [Soph. I, 12] prophetam Jerusalem nomine designasse illos qui in hoc saeculo vitam ducunt religiosam, mores supernae Jerusalem conversatione honesta et ordinata pro viribus imitantes [...] Mea autem, qui videor monachus et Jerosolymita, peccata [...]."

105 PL 207,1057–70.

for Christian history, in contrast to Otto's disparagement of it. The City of God is brought into current history and observed there. The pilgrimage metaphor gave way during the 1250s or so to a military one, which connoted the *ecclesia militans* as ready to wage literal war.¹⁰⁶ One could conquer the earthly Jerusalem as a sacramental stepping-stone towards freeing the heavenly one (the Church). Henri stressed the theme of liberty associated with "the city above" from Galatians 4:26,¹⁰⁷ gained by means of a new penitence associated with crusade. Henri was still more pessimistic about the size of the crime fitting the corresponding divine punishment: it has been the sins of the spiritual Jerusalem that had caused disaster to the earthly one, and there was great need for renunciation if any liberty were to ensue. It was part of Otto's contribution to blur the lines between the two cities, which went against Canon Law's keeping them apart, but had some Cisterican precedent. Whereas for Henri, the City of God was presently best suited to monks, who needed to purify themselves for blessing to ensue, Otto, as uncle to the Emperor, liked to see *ecclesia-civitas* as identical with Christian society. To give one example:

But from this time [of Theodosius I] on, since not only all the people but also the emperors (except a few) were orthodox Catholics. I seem to myself to have composed a history not of two cities but virtually of one only, which I call the Church. For although the elect and the reprobate are in one household, yet I cannot call these cities two as I did above; I must call them properly but one – composite, however, as the grain is mixed with the chaff [...]. However, the faithless city of unbelieving Jews and Gentiles still remains, but, since nobler kingdoms have been won by our people, while these unbelieving Jews and Gentiles are insignificant not only in the sight of God but even in that of the world, hardly anything done by these unbelievers is found to be worthy of record or to be handed on to posterity.¹⁰⁸

Looked at the other way, the Church is very much a political and providential agent. To re-inforce this with a taste of Otto's rhetoric:

How can I interpret 'The stone cut out without hands' (Dan 2,34&42) as anything other than the Church [...]. It is clearly the Church that smote the kingdom near its end [...]. The Church smote the kingdom in its weak spot when the Church decided not to reverence the king of the City as lord of the earth but to strike him with the sword of excommunication as being

106 Congar, "Église et Cité de Dieu," 191: "Dans la seconde moitié du XIIe siècle, on commence à parler d'*Ecclesia militans* et d' *Ecclesia triumphans*, en un sens tel que la première menait à la seconde en qui elle avait son terme et son couronnement."

107 Ibid, 194: "Si les moines s'appliquaient à parvenir à la Jérusalem celeste et même l'habitaient déjà, une nouvelle forme du meme ideal s'offrait, celle de la conquête de la Jérusalem celeste par la conquête de la Jérusalem terrestre, début de celle du ciel."

108 Cf. Otto, Book 5, Prologue (Mierow trans., 323 f.)

by his human condition made of clay. All can now see to what a mountainous height the Church, at one time small and lowly, has grown.¹⁰⁹

Gregory VII is presented as a martyr for the cause and the humbling of Emperor Henry IV at Canossa as paradigmatic. Moreover, if there were any doubt about Otto's emphasis on the Providence of God, it should be removed by the strategic statement in the Prologue to the Seventh Book of the Chronicles:

Therefore from the fact that every wise and good man loves and cherishes his own good works, we are privileged to understand clearly that God does not neglect His world, as some claim, but rather that by His omnipotent majesty He created things that were not, by His all-wise providence guides His creatures, and by His most kindly grace preserves what He guides and controls.¹¹⁰

Otto believed God to be the author of goodness and the fount of grace, who "permits no evil save that which, however much it may in itself be hurtful, is yet of advantage to the whole", as e.g. in the blinding of Jewish "nations" through which all peoples saw light. The *corpus permixtum* idea is clearly presented in the same passage: "For that, as matters now stand, the rest who profess the Christian faith must be numbered as members of the Church, even if they do not follow up their professions of faith, no one can doubt who knows that the net of the Lord contains both bad and good."¹¹¹

There is also the idea that God withholds judgement at times from the earth for the sake of a few holy men. The world will be preserved (Eccles 1:4: "But the earth abideth for ever"; cf. 1 Cor 7:31): the fashion, not the nature of this world passeth away.¹¹² As Revelation 21 indicates, the City of God, i.e. the inhabitants of heaven, will be revealed and will hardly touch the earth. Divine Providence, which on earth allows the church to be a *corpus permixtum*, is intended for the ultimate sake of the heavenly city in its purified form.

For Otto one must look to the past in order to guide the present into the future. He stresses continuity from epoch to epoch, unlike Honorius of Autun.¹¹³

109 Ibid., 400.

110 Ibid., 402.

111 Ibid., 404. Cf. The Prologue of the Eighth Book: "In brief that the Church, not only when it reigns with Christ but even while it contains in its present granary both grain and chaff, is called the Kingdom of Christ, you find set forth in the Gospel where it is said that all things that cause stumbling are to be removed from his Kingdom" (Ibid., 453).

112 Ibid., 464.

113 Fabian Schwarzbauer, *Geschichtszeit: Über Zeitvorstellungen in den Universalchroniken Frutolfs von Michelsberg, Honorius Augustodunensis und Ottos von Freising*, Orbis mediaevalis. Vor-

One could say that history is less about getting somewhere as it is opening up connections and possibilities. Whatever transformation there is, the human race is still “in” history.¹¹⁴ The movement of Christianity from East to West has become a prevalent theme, and “meaning in history,” more than about just the preservation of an assembly of the faithful, is rather more “future expectation”-oriented. Schwarzbauer thinks that history for Otto, was about getting back to those elements of humanity that are stable and transcend transience. Meanwhile the instability of history is something we can learn from. Typology within Christian history cannot help us now; rather, one should look to the bible and to the world of nature.¹¹⁵

Among medieval historians there was an awareness of human changeability and as such history felt the tension between itself and its distant and foreign destination, eternity.¹¹⁶ As the imprint of revelation, history could be interpreted; although with the exception of some like Otto of Freising, the theological-hermeneutical task was left to the reader. Otto was indeed looking to the past as an ideal from which to gather the better truth and demonstrate this to anyone who would listen.¹¹⁷ However it is not clear that its meaning was as Hans-Werner Goetz supposes. Post-biblical history became a matter for exegesis. Nor was it all about keeping past, present and future in separate compartments. History writing was like exegesis of facts and a simple explanation of them, as the bible had been to its “facts.” Then the mysteries were the second dimension (breadth) and tropology the elevation of these meanings (as in Hugh of St Victor’s *De arca Noe morali* 4,9). History is high-level stuff, and very powerful if viewed eschatologi-

stellungenwelten des Mittelalters 6 (Berlin: Akademie, 2005), 265: “Seine Mutabilitaslehre ist als zentrales Moment seines spezifischen Geschichtsdenkens anzusehen. Anders als historische Erklärungen, die den verändernden Fluss der irdischen Zeitverläufe aus der Perspektive ihres faktischen Gehaltes heraus thematisieren, löst die Lehre von der Wechselhaftigkeit aller Dinge die Ereignisse aus ihrer zeitlichen Verortung heraus. Die auf diese Weise entzeitlichten Manifestationen des Geschichtlichen erhalten ihren höheren, über das Geschichtliche hinausgehenden Sinn in der geforderten Abwendung des einzelnen Menschen eben vor dieser grundsätzlichen Bedingung des menschlichen Lebens. Überspitzt formuliert, sollte die Geschichtsbetrachtung ihren Sinn aus der Abkehr von Geschichte beziehen.”

114 Ibid., 266: “[E]ine Transformation des historischen Zeitraumes in eine historische Raumzeit.”

115 Ibid., 280.

116 Hans-Werner Goetz, *Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewußtsein im hohen Mittelalter*, Orbis mediaevalis 1, 2. Auflage (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008), 41f.: “Sie galt als die von Gott gewollte und gelenkte Entwicklung des Menschen und damit als ‘Offenbarung’.”

117 Bernard of Clairvaux, *sermo* 91,1: “in horto, id est in historia, continetur triplex Trinitatis operatio: creatio caeli et terrae, reconciliatio caeli et terrae, confirmatio caeli et terrae” (quoted by Goetz, *Geschichtsschreibung*, 101).

cally as a spur to monastic reform and such movements. The historian's job was to help to trace these patterns out. The past was seen not as "other" but as teacher.¹¹⁸ Arno Borst has observed that while in Bede's *History* there is an account of *Heilsgeschichte* happening in a small corner of the world, by the time of Otto of Freising there is world history which is not *Heilsgeschichte*, since *that* is confined to the cloisters, although it may spread out from there. There was yet some way to go before salvation could be returned to world history.¹¹⁹ By the time of Dante a Universal History about the race and the individual had become possible.

As already discussed God was believed to be at work as much in every day life and purposes as in more obvious *Heilsgeschichte*. This meant that God watched over the "home front" when the Emperor was away doing mighty *Gesta*, exposing dishonesty and corruption amongst abbots and builders alike. For Notker Teutonicus (d. 1022), these divinely caused effects, once perceived, strengthen faith and are like judgements on the way to the Last Judgement.¹²⁰ Whereas at the change of the millennium the action of God was understood to be secret and "from below," by the end of the Twelfth Century an increased sense of a hierarchical cosmos implied that God directed matters downwards through his employment of earthly powers. Urban II in his *Epistle* 93 praised Roger I's stout defence of God and the Papacy's interests against Greeks and Arabs in Southern Italy in the 1190s. God favours his people, and rewards those who trust with healing, it seemed. Most Chroniclers used the providentialist language when speaking of salvation history; this included protection from invaders but also use of invaders to punish for sin. Ekkehard of Aura saw it as divinely ordained (*divina dispositione*) that Henry IV fled before his son's insurrection and thus great loss of life was spared.¹²¹ In Liudprand of Cremona's report of the battle of Birten in 939, where a victory against the odds was achieved through effective prayer and

118 Ibid., 424.

119 Arno Borst, "Weltgeschichten im Mittelalter?" in *Poetik und Hermeneutik V: Geschichte, Ereignis und Erzählung*, eds. Reinhart Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter Stempel (München: Fink, 1973): 452–56, 454: "Diese Heilsgeschichte kümmerte sich weder um das Zeitkontinuum noch um die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts, weil sie das jenseitige Ziel nicht mit dem irdischen Weg verwechselt. Heilsgeschichte konnte erst 'Weltgeschichte' werden, wenn Welt und Geschichte zu Ende waren, wenn Gottesvolk und Menschheit identisch wurden, also gerade nicht vorderhand."

120 Hans-Werner Goetz, *Gott und Die Welt: Religiöse Vorstellungen des frühen und hohen Mittelalters*, Orbis Mediaevalis. Vorstellungswelten des Mittelalters 13/1 (Berlin: Akademie, 2011), 78: "Das *iudicium Dei* wacht auch über das Karlsreich, wenn Karl zu beschäftigt ist, alles selbst ahnden zu können, indem es etwa die Machenschaften eines betrügerischen Abtes und Baumeisters aufdeckt und diesen mit dem Feuertod erschlagen läßt."

121 Ibid., 110.

the effects of a holy lance being carried by right of being Constantine's and arguably King David's successor, God's effects on the earthly plane are presented as having eternal significance.¹²² Sometimes signs and wonders were to prepare people for worse to come. Yet God, as Boethius might have said, knows all things before in the sense of adapting them to his eternal plan, although nothing is past or future to him.¹²³

Byzantium and Eastern Christianity

André-Louis Rey has argued that when it came to historiography pagans tended to look back, but Byzantine Christians wanted also to look forward.¹²⁴ This corresponded to the Christian dating system which counts from the year of the Incarnation, yet whose liturgical year begins with the Festival of Advent which looks towards the Second Coming. There was arguably also a strong sense that grace set Christians free to make fresh history and not simply repeat sinful patterns. Hence John of Damascus could claim that human freedom to act (*autoexousia*) was "proved" by the very existence of human evil-doing!¹²⁵ Providence did give limits to the range of free choice; the Damascene borrowed from Nemesis different categories of necessity and chance. It is not without significance that in his *Chronicle* the Antiochene historian John Malalas (d.578) rarely mentioned *pronoia*, yet *tyche* (chance) appears twenty-five times, most often when referring to the foundation of a city. In his work Malalas just gives chain of events without really discussing causes. *Pronoia* tended to be used only for direct action of God – and hence was something rare, possibly an act of judgement. For Agathias (d. 582), *tyche* seems to take the place of *pronoia*, yet often as something unstable which should encourage prudence; even so, Agathias doesn't use it when relating the troubled third quarter of the fifth century: those events were ascribed to individual free choices by kings.

¹²² Ibid., 121.

¹²³ Ibid., 172, citing the mid-twelfth century Regensburg-based Honorius of Autun's *Inevitable* (1204C): "Deus omnia praescivit; et hoc aeternitati eius congruit, qui nihil futurum quasi fiendum nec aliquid praeteritum quasi transactum novit; sed omnia fienda et transacta immutabili intuitu praesentia inspicit."

¹²⁴ André-Louis Rey, "Tychè et Pronoia: notes sur l'emploi de Fortune et Providence dans l'historiographie byzantine ancienne?" in *La Fortune: Thèmes, Représentations, Discours*, eds. Emmanuelle Métry and Yasmina Foehr-Janssens, *Recherches et Recontres* 19 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003): 71–92, 77f.

¹²⁵ *Expositio Fidei* 39,23–29; 40,17–18.

Procopius (d. 565) commented that even where wrong decisions were made in battle, God's will could turn things to the advantage of those for whom the wind of *tyche* blows (*Wars* VII,13,15–19). Any discussion of causality beyond this was rare, unless one counts the mention of a sort of assisting *daimon* (VI,29,32). The point is that humans are primary agents, whom God assists. *Tyche* became used to explain misfortune and was developed at length into Theodoros Metochites (1270–1352)'s "pessimistic" conception of *tyche*, although such tendency toward cosmic dualism and pessimism was resisted by Plethon of Constantinople a century later. He felt it better to recognise the existence of *tyche* (chance) or *moira* (fate) but to order these under Providence, which ruled the soul: hence a tendency towards cosmic dualism was replaced with one towards Platonic dualism. "Providentialist" historians are optimistic ones (Eusebius, Socrates, or Sozomen each in their own way could be called that). For Procopius, the Providence of God has a place in *The Secret History* 28.13 and at *Wars* VI.1–18. In Book VIII of *The Wars* Procopius writes of Bessas' capture of Petra in 551: "Thus human affairs are governed not by what men think, but by the judgment of God, which men are accustomed to call 'fate' since they are unaware why events occur in the way that they seem manifest. For the name 'Fate' is usually applied to whatever seems unreasonable." It was fate or God's will that meant that Belisarius lost to Totila in Italy because he broke his oath to Photius. But "fate" could be synonymous with the devil – as in the same story where Belisarius was tricked (*Wars* VII.19.22).¹²⁶ In the Chronicle of Georgios Monachos (c.870) there is the accusation against Aristotle that denying the soul's immortality and dignity is a denial also of Divine Providence. In other words, divine and human agency do not compete with each other.

As a convinced Aristotelian Patriarch Photius (d. 893) had reservations about seeking causes outside the empirical order. Yet the next great Byzantine thinker, the Platonist Psellos included astrology as part of that empiricism: it was a case of tracing a parallelism between the movements of the stars and those of the soul.¹²⁷ Perhaps a system of *duplex veritas* was operating, but it is more likely that Psellos believed that comets gave warnings of disaster but did not teach one anything about God. Astrology had *some* biblical warrant, he thought,

¹²⁶ Warren Treadgold, *The Early Byzantine Historians* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 223–5. But earlier Belisarius had been rewarded for his self-control (*Wars* III.16).

¹²⁷ Hans-Georg Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend*, 2. Auflage (München: C.H. Beck, 1994), 72.

and Joannes Katrarios observed that *tyche* seemed to have ruled ancient history, and possibly had a place in world history even in Christian times.¹²⁸

But astrology reached the zenith of its influence under Manuel I Komnenos, and that in direct opposition to his own father's regime, although on his death-bed Manuel did abjure the power of the stars under the Patriarch's insistence. In any case Manuel's nuanced position, like that of Psellos was, that there was both true and false astrology: the stars could not make anything happen, but only signify them. Manuel was also interested in wonders in history, which seemed more reliable guides. Joannes Katrarios went so far as to argue that astrology even *encouraged* free will, because it got people ready to take action to prevent doom.¹²⁹ Gerhard Podskalsky mentions a letter (*Poslanie*) of the monk Jacob to Count Dmitri from mid-eleventh century Kievan Russia, which asserted that God prefers to let creatures exercise their agency, and allowing them to find their way back to him. He will receive them in his judgement and mercy right up to the Day of Judgement itself.¹³⁰

The Byzantine theologians often had to contend with popular and heretically inspired views of a world in Satan's power. Yet in their theologically more responsible responses, it seems less a question whether one thinks of one or two determining powers and more about the limits of the divine range. John of Damascus's *Dialogos kata Manichaôn* (PG 96,1505–64) and the Ps-Damascene *Dialexis* were similar in content and influenced Theodoros Abu Kurra, who applied the thinly veiled critique of Muslim determinism, by complaining that Muslims see God's will even in divorce.¹³¹ Niketas of Byzantium (d. 873) was engaged with direct polemics against Islam: his *Anastropé* and two responses to requests by Michael III include a refutation of *Surah* 2, and argue from contradictions in the Koran (*Surah* 7,188).¹³² For Niketas, Good and Evil cannot come from the same principle, and the answer to the evil principle lies within human wills. Photius, although remembered as Aristotelian in his philosophical training, when he came to write his work "Against the Manichees" (PG 102,16–264) showed himself to be exegetically precise, probably writing it at leisure during his exile

128 Fritz Jürss, "Johannes Katrarios und der Dialog Hermippos oder über die Astrologie," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 59 (1966): 275–284.

129 *Ibid.*, 81, with reference to "Ερμύππος περί ἀστρολογίας (Wilhelm Kroll and Paulus Viereck, eds. *Anonymi Christiani Hermippus de astrologia dialogus*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1895).

130 Gerhard Podskalsky, *Christentum und theologische Literatur in der Kiever Rus* (988–1237) (München: Beck, 1982).

131 Hildebrand P. Beck, *Vorsehung und Vorherbestimmung in der theologischen Literatur der Byzantiner* (Roma: Pontifical Institute Orientalium Studiorum, 1937), 42.

132 *Ibid.*, 49.

from 867 to 877. In his second sermon (PG 102,85 ff.) he argues that the same God who cares for the soul also cares for the physical body which He made “good.” People cannot therefore blame their bodies for inclining them towards evil. His opponents would blame material things like fire for sending evil to other material things on the earth.¹³³ A century later Michael Psellos’s polemic was turned against the Euchites and loss of free will, although again there might well be in the background resistance to Islamic (Mutazilite) determinism, which viewed God as involved in the very action. Now Psellos taught astrology in the sense that he believed that one could read the forces operating on the soul from what was happening with the planets.¹³⁴ Comets give warnings but could not teach anyone anything about God and his ways, he argued. Psellos’ natural theology was expressed in a sort of encyclopedia of phenomena with divine meaning, the *Didaskalia pantodapé*.

Owing to a consistent felt need to oppose Islamic theology including its deterministic character, the Byzantine views of Providence tended to limit God’s action up to the point governed by human free will, such that Hans-Georg Beck could claim that it seemed rather a novelty when Gennadios Scholarios, possibly under the influence of Aquinas, stretched the ordaining (ὁρισμός) of God to all events, including human actions!¹³⁵ In his second main treatise *Περὶ θείου προορισμοῦ δεύτερον* of 1467 he rejected the idea attributed to Basil (falsely, alleged Gennadios) which had become a motto of his great hitherto patron Mark Eugenikos, the Metropolitan of Ephesus: that the place of demons was given by God; hence, Mark was working with an only partly demythologised pagan view. Supernatural forces could be felt as real and this pressure led to a drive to personalise them in a hypostasising of experiences. Concomitant with this went a diminished felt need for theodicy, as a *gegenkosmos* was mapped out.¹³⁶ Psellos had long before been very occupied with demonology from ancient sources and there were doubts about God’s control of all things expressed in the early “Question and Answer” literature and in that popular epic from the end of First Millennium, the *Digenis Akritas*. One could also hear numerous re-

133 Ibid., 89.

134 Ibid., 72: “Parallelismus zwischen den Bewegungen des Gestirne und denen der Seele.”

135 Ibid., 152f., with reference to Gennadius, *Oeuvres (Oeuvres complètes de Georges (Gennadios) Scholarios*, eds. Martin Jugie, Louis Petit, and Xenophon A. Sidéridès, [Paris: Maison de la Bonne Presse, 1928–1930], I: 412–426).

136 Hans-Georg Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend*, 2. Auflage (München: C.H. Beck, 1994), 264.

ports of witchcraft in otherwise respectable places.¹³⁷ Patriarch Metochites (d.1332) accused the Byzantines of only believing in providence when it seemed favourable to them; but in truth even he seems to have regarded *Tyche* as more the regnant force, with providence only operating on the boundaries.¹³⁸ To employ a theatrical metaphor, this made God seem more like the audience or a critic than an actor or director.

The Byzantine thinkers did have a strong sense of continuity throughout history. Beck considers world chronicler Michael Glykas,¹³⁹ known for using the bestiary *Physiologus* (whose animals embodied virtues and vices) in telling the creation story in his *World Chronicle*. He also wrote a catechism of proverbs (*Sprichwörtercatechismus*) in the middle of the Twelfth Century, during his imprisonment at the pleasure of Manuel I, and in his poetry liked to take on themes of cosmic ordering and providence.¹⁴⁰ He reported previous cases of courtly forgiveness to reassure the Emperor's niece Theodora, who had murdered a rival of her possible salvation; another letter quietly criticised Manuel's dabbling in astrology. Nikephoros Blemmydes in his *Commentary on the Psalms* described how his tradition believed one could reach the start of the knowledge of God through contemplation of creation, both philosophically and theologically.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, one sees the likes of Nicolas Cabasilas in the later fourteenth century complaining that people used the term *pronoia* in a very worldly way, in order to give extra weight to claims to assured rewards in return for military service. The army must be 'provided for' went the slogan, which meant properties were often sequestered from monastic lands, and monasteries then fell to the temptation to become money-making enterprises. This practice had gone on since the Twelfth Century whenever armies had to be raised.¹⁴²

A particular question which preoccupied Byzantium for many centuries was "does God predetermine particular persons to die while they are committing sin and so predetermine them to hell", or vice versa, "does he predetermine the hour of death in such a way that they will go to heaven whether they want to or

137 Beck concludes wryly: "Mit einem explizierten Glauben an Gottes gütige Vorsehung aber haben all diese Dinge nicht zu tun." (Ibid, 269.)

138 Ibid., 272.

139 Cf. Karl Krumbacher, *Geschichte der Byzantinischen Litteratur: von Justinian bis zum Ende des Oströmischen Reiches* (527–1453) (München: Beck, 1891) see PG 158.

140 Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend*, 402.

141 Gerhard Podskalsky, *Von Photios bis Bessarion. Der Vorrang humanistisch geprägter Theologie in Byzanz und deren bleibende Bedeutung*, *Schriften zur Geistesgeschichte im östlichen Europa* 25 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003), 84.

142 Ihor Ševčenko, "Nicolas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse: a Reinterpretation," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 11 (1957): 81–171, 157 ff.

not?”¹⁴³ In the sixth century Anastasios of Sinai in his *Questions and Answers* (16&17) had argued against the idea that God fixed in advance for each person the day of their death. Six centuries later Nikephoros Blemmydes must have known the like of John of Damascus’ ruling that God foreknew all without determining all, as well as the opinion of Psellos that God’s eternal knowing would indeed know such things.¹⁴⁴ Psellos set Providence as over against the laws of Nature, which to him seemed just too much bound to Necessity.¹⁴⁵ There was a preference for the *a posteriori*: one might just spot God’s activity with hindsight, but prediction of how he would work was certainly to be avoided. As to just how God influenced human activity, it was easier to say how he did this in terms of grace than in the realm of the laws of nature.¹⁴⁶ Wolfgang Lackner argued that in his treatment of the subject Nikephoros was concerned for free will and his main target was the Western Dominican theology of divine omnicausality. One could not know that God had determined the day of death, except in the case of certain holy men who were indeed exceptions.¹⁴⁷ God wants to give grace to all, but people can choose to squeeze God out.¹⁴⁸ Blemmydes insisted that the bible related stories of how warnings were given that helped people respond freely: for that was what teaching Providence was all about.

However two centuries later, in his fourth treatise on the question of the predetermination of death, Gennadios strongly rejected the earlier treatment by Anastasios of Sinai, bluntly stating that Anastasios lacked the theological capacity required for discussing such a problem. As the editor Wolfgang Lackner observes, there was little balanced discussion in the literature, and the twin question of Providence and astrological Fate got unhelpfully confused.¹⁴⁹ The

143 Joseph Munitiz, “The Predetermination of Death: The Contribution of Anastasios of Sinai and Nikephoros Blemmydes to a Perennial Byzantine Problem,” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 55 (2001): 9–20, 9f.

144 For Psellos, God could know possibilities as possibilities, i.e. without determining them. There was a debt to Proclus: see Franz Tinnefeld, “Schicksal und Vorherbestimmung im Denken der Byzantiner,” in *Das Mittelalter: Perspektiven mediävistischer Forschung. Zeitschrift des Mediävistenverbandes* I, H 1: *Providentia-Fatum-Fortuna*, ed. Joerg O. Fichte (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996): 21–42.

145 Wolfgang Lackner, ed., *Nikephoros Blemmydes: Gegen die Vorherbestimmung der Todesstunde*, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Philosophi Byzantini, 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1985), LXXII: “Psellos und ihm folgend Nikolaos von Methone übernehmen von Proklos bzw. Dionysius Areopagites den Gedanken, daß Gott Unbestimmtes bestimmt erkenne, d.h. daß die Erkenntnis an den ontischen Rang des Subjektes, nicht des Objektes gebunden ist.”

146 Beck, *Vorsehung*, 208.

147 Lackner, *Nikephoros Blemmydes*, LXXIV–V.

148 Tinnefeld, “Schicksal und Vorherbestimmung,” 38.

149 Lackner, *Nikephoros Blemmydes*, LXXXIV.

story of Hezekiah was brought forward, perhaps in opposition to Augustine and Gregory the Great (*Moralia* 16,10) on the issue.¹⁵⁰ Lackner's study does show the Byzantine authors to be fairly evenly split on the matter. There could be some sort of general providence for human beings as a race, and something more "watchful" for those who would reach eternal glory.¹⁵¹ So the idea of Predestination is only used in the realm of grace for the righteous where their free prayers are taken into account. Everything exists under some order and fixedness, but with contingency all the same. Compared with the West, there was a stronger belief in human possibilities, despite the reservations of some like Theodore Metochites and a sense of fatalism among the ordinary people. Despite the influence of Aquinas' notion of causation in Byzantium, there seems no echo of this in the late Byzantine treatment of the question of the divine foreknowledge.

In John of Damascus' account Providence was viewed more as part of theological anthropology than as part of the Doctrine of God, especially in the use of definitions from Nemesius. By the time of Gregory Palamas in his *Κεφαλαία*, things had changed, with *pronoia* not part of God's being but rather part of His energies, even as a turning towards the creature.¹⁵² Nicolas Cabasilas in turn viewed the sacraments as a sure case of the working of divine providence. It seems to be only those such as Gennadios Scholarios who knew the Western thinkers who were prepared to call created things instruments or instrumental causes, and God the αἰτία αἰτιωτάτη.¹⁵³ The enemies of free will were the devil and human custom, where sinful habits took control in people, so that each was responsible for letting the bad habit take hold. Georgios Gemistos Plethon seems to have been one who perhaps uniquely spoke of the complete bondage of the will, people acting out of unhappiness and God's punishment a means of weaning someone off that addictive pattern.¹⁵⁴ For the conservative leader of the Patriarchal Academy Matthaios Kamariotes (d. 1490), God sees the future as present, which means He sees everything that is contingent to be necessary, and all possible as actual. In the divine granting humans free choice humans re-

150 Even Haymo of Auxerre in fighting Gottschalk could argue that virtue and sinning could affect the fixed length of days (PL 116,903B).

151 "Gennadios Scholarios teilt [...] die Vorsehung in eine πρόνοια im engeren Sinne (für die unvernünftige Kreatur) und in den προορισμός für die Menschen. Auf diesen προορισμός γενικώς bezieht sich offenbar seine erste und allgemeinste Definition. Dieser zerfällt aber wieder in einen προορισμός ειδικώς für diejenigen, welche die ewige Seligkeit erreichen werden, und in die ἀπιδόκιμασία für diejenigen, welche dieses Ziel nicht erreichen werden." (Beck, *Vorsehung*, 238)

152 Ibid., 160–89.

153 Ibid., 210.

154 Ibid., 215.

main free: there is nothing of the “*futura libera conditionata*” of later Western thought.

The distinction between God’s permitting an only apparent evil (συγχώρησις) and permitting sin (παράχωρησις) was continued by Mark Eugenikos (although it had been overlooked by Photius).¹⁵⁵ John of Damascus had distinguished apparent evil from real evil of sin. Hence suffering could be very useful.¹⁵⁶ This discussion did not deal with the question of the evil of Hell, although Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos saw *that* as a future punishment as having a *good* use as a sharp disincentive to sin.¹⁵⁷ This distinction is not far away from that which would be made by Leibniz. Manuel gave a number of reasons why suffering existed: the main one was to draw people to God by purifying them in their sins without any immediate and obvious reward (Vat.gr.1107 fol.181v). Although Manuel did add that God knows how to remind the faithful of their reward, he was clear that it was the sins of the Orthodox people, not the Orthodox religion itself that stood under judgment.

Byzantine Providentialism could be so strong and was so positive about where God was leading them, that the Byzantines found it very hard not to see the end of their Empire as the end of the world.¹⁵⁸ Oecumenius’ Apocalypse-commentary was much more concerned with the fall of the long gone *pagan* Rome, while Andreas of Crete took it to refer to more recent history, up to his own time (c.600), yet with a positive expectation of a new world within a generation.¹⁵⁹

155 Ibid., 222–25.

156 Kotter II, 221.

157 Tinnefeld, “Schicksal und Vorherbestimmung,” 41f.

158 Gerhard Podskalsky, “Répresentation du temps dans l’eschatologie imperial byzantine,” in *Le Temps chrétien de la fin de l’Antiquité au Moyen Age, IIIe–XIIIe siècles*, ed. Jean-Marie Leroux, Colloques Nationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 604 (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1984): 439–50, 446; “les Byzantins des derniers siècles ont certainement souffert de l’isolement dans lequel les enfermait l’identification de la chute de Constantinople à la fin du monde.” Podskalsky tried to give an account of the less mystical side of Byzantine theology, one which was concerned with culture, politics and history, while very much interested in the bible.

159 Cyril Mango, “Les Temps dans les commentaires byzantins de l’Apocalypse,” in *Le Temps chrétien de la fin de l’Antiquité au Moyen Age, IIIe–XIIIe siècles*, ed. Jean-Marie Leroux, Colloques Nationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 604 (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1984): 431–438, 435.

The Western High Middle Ages

The Boethian emphasis on the unity of God, as One in three persons and who in some sense is himself the *forma mundi*, as Gilbert of Poitiers put it, probably lost out to a more Augustinian account, according to which God's threeness could be postulated as reflected only in the higher reaches of creation, such as the human mind, but only very dimly in the rest of creation. Since bodily disintegration cannot thwart souls, equipped with human intellect they are able to act to seize their end. The Goodness of God is inserted into creation only to draw them, not to make them feel at home in the world. For if every creature has an immanent *telos*, then this is in turn open to the transcendent end on which it depends and which it obeys.¹⁶⁰ This thinking is that upon which Thomas Aquinas would expand.¹⁶¹ Humans can ordain things to their ends usefully.¹⁶² While teleological in his thinking, Maimonides had no place for a final end since he agreed with Aristotle on things being contained within the circle of the world. Creatures exist for themselves, and Satan was considered to be the "first of his ways."¹⁶³ God is ascribed a *voluntas consequens* that wills evil. His version of Job 36 portrays a God who excels in divine disruption.

In Albert the Great's commentary on Ps.-Dionysius' *De caelestia hierarchia* c. 7 he rejects the idea that God knows only human individual essences, since God does not "know" as "we know," and declares that God knows the whole of the human being, even though of course it is only individuals who enjoy the results of his providence, as Eliphaz in Job had it: only those worthy get providence as reward.¹⁶⁴ In Albert's *Quaestio 76 de Providentia* he divides the question in a way that is very similar to that of Alexander of Hales. Yet while Alexander dealt with 'faith in Providence,' Albert keeps the discussion as part of his doctrine of *God*.

160 Stephan Otto, "Augustinus und Boethius im 12. Jahrhundert: Anmerkungen zur Entstehung des Traktates 'De Deo uno,'" in *Materialen zur Theorie der Geistesgeschichte*, ed. Stephan Otto, *Die Geistesgeschichte und ihre Methoden 2* (München: Fink, 1979): 94–105, with reference to Aquinas, *Super Iob* 25,3.

161 Denis Chardonnens, *L'homme Sous Le Regard de La Providence: Providence de Dieu et condition humaine selon l'Exposition littéraire sur le livre de Job de Thomas d'Aquin*, Bibliothèque Thomiste 50 (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 75: "Un agent est la fin de son effet en ce que ce dernier tend à lui ressembler."

162 Aquinas, *Super Iob* 38,13.

163 *Ibid.*, 40,14a.

164 See Caterina Rigo, "Zur Rezeption des Moses Maimonides im Werk des Albertus Magnus," in *Albertus Magnus? Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven*, ed. Walter Senner, *Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens*, 10 (Berlin: Akademie, 2001): 29–66.

He uses the same scriptures (e.g. Wis 6:8; 12:13 which speak of care for noble and ignoble creatures) as Alexander,¹⁶⁵ but focuses more on God's character than on the process as experienced by creatures. Where Alexander, depending on Augustine, Boethius and John Damascene emphasised a definition of Providence as final and efficient cause, Albert simply uses the term "cause." God is clever enough to be acting by way of reaction at every moment and not just as a final cause.¹⁶⁶ The character of the Providential God in Himself matters. One further distinguishing feature of Albert's treatment is that although (and his invocation of 1 Corinthians 9:9 makes it more clear) God does not concern himself with dumb beasts, nevertheless he is aware of the value of base things in God's sight, for Hebrews 4:13 tells us that all creatures can be seen by God. So whereas Alexander is clear, not least from Origen on Numbers 22:20 that strictly speaking evil things are not part of providence, Albert did not draw that inference.¹⁶⁷ Albert placed Providence between Predestination and Reprobation as well as making it one of his preferred names for God Himself. His vision was of God's care being helped, not hindered, by orders and hierarchies: channels, not barriers.¹⁶⁸ Peace (*pacificus ordo*) as it reigns in the universe is the product of the divine processions. There is certainly a generosity in Albert's concept of God,¹⁶⁹ as a source of all things, indebted to nothing and no one. For nothing causes Providence, since it causes all things; and yet it takes into account all things in its planning in a simple view of the whole, and it leads each thing accordingly even in one simple view.¹⁷⁰

165 "Die Verwertung aristotelischer Gedanken ist bei Albert intensiver als bei Alexander" (Ibid., 21).

166 Georgen, *Des heiligen Albertus Magnus Lehre von der göttlichen Vorsehung und dem Fatum*, 31: "Zum Unterschied von Alexander v.H. nehmen Albert wie Thomas in ihre Erörterungen über die Bestimmung des Vorsehungsbegriffes außer den göttlichen Attributen der Weisheit, Macht und des Willens noch ein weiteres auf: das der Klugheit."

167 "Ergo mala non sunt sub divina providentia" after Origen's 'sed ea utuntur ad necessarias causas.'

168 Georgen, *Des heiligen Albertus Magnus Lehre von der göttlichen Vorsehung und dem Fatum* 48: "Als Endziel und Endzweck der zielstrebenden Geschöpfe gilt nach Albert in Anlehnung an Ps. Dionysius Gott als der höchste Gute und Schöne."

169 Ibid., 65: "Das Wort 'Deus' zeigt an, daß der Träger dieses Namens imstande ist, alles mit dem Lichte seiner Schau (=visio) zu überblicken, allem schnell und nachdrücklich und mit der Glut seiner Liebe die ihm entsprechende vorsehende und fürsorgliche Leitung angedeihen und aus seiner Güte und Macht heraus allem Geschöpflichen den ihm entsprechenden zum Dasein und zum Beharren notwendigen Vollkommenheitsschmuck zufließen zu lassen" (re: 1 Sent D 2. art 11.ad q2).

170 Ibid., 81: "Insofern die göttliche Vorsehung eine 'Fürsorge' ist und für die Geschöpfe, soweit sie gut sind, gleich dem göttlichen Wille Ursache ist, fällt sie unter den Begriff der ersten

There is no necessity in all this, for divine foreknowledge has no causative effect – it knows good as well as evil; and even though logically speaking it comes before, it is not prevenient as a cause. God's light fills the necessary and contingent so that he can see which is which. God's will is only causal for all the good things, yet not in a forceful, but in a cooperative way. There is "pre-determining providence" (*providentia praedeterminans*) and also "providence according to concession" (*providentia secundum concessionem*) which has space for free willed actions of creatures. Most events are a mixture of these two. One of the few things which is totally necessary is the hierarchy of things in the universe and the sequence of orders. One should not rule out the term *fatum* since heavenly bodies can play their part in influencing what happens below.¹⁷¹ Albert was happy to consider the effects of the heavenly cycles in a way that Thomas and Alexander of Hales would not. Nevertheless Albert was strict in forbidding any place for Fate in the lives of believers *qua* believers.¹⁷² Thomas would avoid the terminology altogether.¹⁷³

Building on the work of his Franciscan master, Alexander, Bonaventura took Providence to be located less in the divine plan and more in the divine working of the divine *voluntas*. Providence is not part of the divine *sapientia*, which stands in contrast with Boethius' "*ratio ordinis rerum exemplaris in mente divina existen*." Nor when Bonaventura is talking about divine will in *Distinctiones* 44–48 does he think of Providence as planned wisdom; this even though in *Breviloquium* 9 he asserts that Providence is the will of God as guided by reason. When it came to his Sentence Commentary he is happy to address *Fatum* as having a place under God's overarching control.

In his History of doctrine Reinhold Seeberg complained that Bonaventura did not really address the issue of Providence.¹⁷⁴ It is true that his treatment

Wirkursache. Insofern die göttliche Vorsehung 'das höchste Gut' genannt und damit ausgesagt wird, daß die das erste quellhafte Gut ist, das allen Geschöpfen das ihnen entsprechende Gute einströmen läßt, und gleichzeitig auch Endzweck ist, fällt sie unter den Begriff der Endursache [...]. Das vornehmste Ziel der göttlichen Regierung bezüglich der Menschen ist nach Albert deren Heiligung" (re: Albert's Commentary on Dionysius' *Divine Names*: de div nom c 12 No 313.ad 3).

171 Albert, *In III Ethicorum*, Tr I cap 17:7,21: "dicimus, quod fatum negare, est negare totum ordinem rerum naturalium" (Georgen, *Des heiligen Albertus Magnus Lehre von der göttlichen Vorsehung und dem Fatum*, 105).

172 *In evang hom Epiph* 10,n4 (PL 76,1112): "absit hoc a fidelium membris, ut fatum esse aliquid decant."

173 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium of Theology*, 123–47.

174 Reinhold Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 4 volumes (Erlangen: A. Deichert, 1913), III: 360.

was pithy rather than expansive. Bonaventura's taxonomy was a useful rule with which his Dominican counterparts would not wholly concur, but which can be seen as a stronger reaction to pagan views than theirs. *Praesentia* was God's cognition in its relation to things, when it somehow included the event in it. *Providentia* included God's knowledge of things but especially denoted the will to effect in conservation and governance. In turn, *Dispositio* is when some enhancement is added in effecting it for the good of nature, and *praedestinatio* stood for a superadded good, and reprobation for a deprivation of good.

However the background noise coming from natural philosophy at this point sounds less sanguine. If Avicenna's position was that God could know only ideas, Maimonides took a significant step forward to argue that God knows species and guides those species to their ends. Aristotle could be interpreted to allow for some sublunar providence. So all things are treated by Providence, in that God cares for the species. The contribution of Maimonides was indeed significant. The relation of providence is not the same to all men. Divine influence reaches man through the intellect. The greater man's share in this divine influence, the greater the effect of divine providence on him. With the Prophets it could vary according to their prophetic faculty; in the case of pious and good men, according to their piety and uprightness. Now, the twist is, that if humans are aiming to be without worry through exercise of their divine-like intellect, then perhaps God at heart is also "without care" (*insouciant*).¹⁷⁵ Another distinctive in Maimonides' account is that, while the Christian doctrine of Providence had a clear relation to moral activity, and similar ideas could be found in Saadia Gaon, for example, with Maimonides things were different: "true perfection does not consist of moral virtue but rather of rational and intellectual excellence. It is more important to be wise than to be just." That is, to have "true opinions concerning divine matters."¹⁷⁶ Job was morally perfect, but he lacked wisdom, such that he suffered. The more one studies science the more one gains wisdom and becomes immune to circumstance. Bildad in Job 8:7 might just as well have been a Mutazilite for believing in Providence and post-mortem reward. Just as natural actions differ from artificial actions, so do the divine governance of, the divine providence over, and the divine purpose for those natural things all differ

175 Cf. René Lévy, *La Divine Insouciance: étude des doctrines de la providence d'après Maïmonide* (Paris: Verdier, 2008).

176 Jacob S. Levinger, "Maimonides' Exegesis of the Book of Job," in *Creative Biblical Exegesis: Christian and Jewish Hermeneutics through the Centuries*, eds. Henning Graf Reventlow and Benjamin Uffenheimer, *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series* 59 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988): 81–87.

from our governance of, our providence over, and our purpose for whatever we govern, provide for, and intend.¹⁷⁷

Aquinas preferred to argue that Job was not without sin, hence morally culpable. Whereas Maimonides argues that God's answer to Job's question about divine providence implies that Job himself though perfectly just remains unwise, Aquinas argues on the contrary that Job though perfectly wise is unjust.¹⁷⁸ For Aquinas the God of Job 9:23 is not amoral, but He destroys all on account of the universality of original sin. However Thomas' vision was an optimistic one. For instance, he interpreted Job 7:1 (*sicut dies mercenarii dies eius*) in a positive way. It is not the struggle (as Gregory the Great had it) that should be emphasised, but rather the rewards; for as Job 7:17 f. shows, men have special aptitude to join this life up to the one they will live eternally and they should be encouraged to fix their eyes on that goal and the route thereto. In Aquinas' commentary on Job 28, it becomes clear that wisdom means a full submission of faith to God's true providence alone, for this alone is all-knowing and all-caring, and extends even to corruptible things, the least of which have a share in being called towards the ultimate end.

As Denis Chardonnens comments, Thomas saw Job's quest as knowing God and his providential action in one and the same moment.¹⁷⁹ In Thomas' systematic treatment of the topic in his articles on *De Providentia*, God is clearly the governor of the whole universe, from highest to lowest.¹⁸⁰ There are so many tools in the artisan's box that it takes "a Being" like God to understand all their uses and ultimately gives reward to the conscious component parts which have helpfully played a role. Nothing ever happens for chance's sake. As for the permission of the existence of sin, well, God prefers a larger good to the absence of smaller evil (art 5, ad 3). In Article 9 Thomas is clear that heavenly bodies, although they rely on divine power to move and have no part to play in creating, are partners with God in the movement of lower bodies ("*in opere gubernationis, non autem in opere creationis*").¹⁸¹ Any effect they do have is given to them by God's power, so that that their energy is not a physical one, but a divine one in which they

177 Martin D. Yaffe, "Providence in Medieval Aristotelianism: Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas on the Book of Job," *Hebrew Studies* 20–21 (1979–1980): 62–74.

178 *Ibid.*, 62.

179 Chardonnens, *L'homme Sous Le Regard de La Providence*, 293.

180 Jean-Pierre Torrell, ed. *Thomas d'Aquin La providence; La prédestination Questions disputées sur la vérité, question 5-question 6*. Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques. (Paris: Vrin, 2011), 95: "sicut peccatum hominis ordinatur a Deo in bonum eius, ut eum post peccatum resurgens humilior reddatur, vel saltem in bonum quod in ipso fit per divinam iustitiam dum pro peccato puniatur." This special kind of educative providence is suggested to him by Wis XII:18.

181 *Ibid.*, 140.

participate (with thanks to Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII). It is the secondary cause, which introduces any necessity of a causal type into an act. Thomas also approves John of Damascus' view that higher bodies such as stars can be fore-warning signs of judgements which do not in fact come to pass, because God creates (by grace) a correction of behaviour which then deflects the need for such divine judgement (art 9, ad 1). The outlook again is a sanguine one. Humans are already capable of perpetual existence even before this capacity gets doubled by grace and glory. With the higher soul made in the Trinitarian divine image humans have intellective knowledge and operative power, free will and an aptitude for grace, which Aquinas underlines with a citation: Job 14:20.¹⁸² With terrestrial goods ordered towards the major spiritual felicity, humans may live under the sign of hope, which is part of God's providence.

Thomas is able to say along with Avicenna that the final cause is the cause of all causes. Some things like games contain their ends within themselves or indeed they may have an end that is unintended by their protagonists. Preservation of being clearly aims at the Good (not meant in a narrowly moral sense).¹⁸³ Reality has to have its effect and bring forth its likeness. Dionysius seems to expand Aristotle by concluding that all things, not just intentional agency work towards the Good. God conducts all things towards their end and this means that Providence extends to all creatures with certitude, though not necessity.¹⁸⁴ Is providence in God's knowledge (as Boethius held), omnipotence (Scripture) or will (John of Damascus)? Thomas opposes the deniers of final causality and God's knowledge of singulars. Maimonides had made an exception for humans as individual creatures to whom God deigns to show providence, and only as individuals can they merit: but Thomas supplies Matthew 10:29 ("not one sparrow will fall to the ground") to confound Maimonides and his emphasis on Providence as a reward for piety.¹⁸⁵ Providence itself relies on nothing, as Albert had established. Even if Thomas had not managed to read his senior colleague

182 "roborasti eum paululum ut in perpetuum pertransiret inmutabis faciem eius et emittes eum." (See Chardonnes, *L'homme Sous Le Regard de La Providence*, 152).

183 Rolf Schönberger, ed., *Thomas von Aquins 'Summa Contra Gentiles'* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2001), 120 f.

184 Sent I d 39q2a1; Jean-Pierre Torrell, "Saint Thomas et l'histoire: état de la question et pistes de recherches," in *Nouvelles recherches thomasiennes*, Bibliothèque thomiste 61 (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2008), 131–175 (= *Revue Thomiste* 55 (2005), 355–409), 151. Cf. Walter L. Ysaac, "The Certitude of Providence in St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman* 38 (1961): 305–21. Also, Horton Davies, *The Vigilant God: Providence in the Thought of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Barth* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1992).

185 *Summa Contra Gentiles* III.93; *Summa Theologiae* I.q22.a2.

gue on this, (Ps.)-Dionysius with his theme of divine generosity had inspired him to reach the same conclusion.

The Dionysian influence on Thomas leads to the view that corruptible things are also reached by Providence, as Romans 13:1 suggests. In the *exitus-reditus* scheme, the end and beginning are one.¹⁸⁶ In the *Summa Theologiae* Providence is therefore God's practical knowledge of us: two slaves meet "by chance" as they see it; but the master sent both. The universal provider does not however have to arrange for perfection in every detail. God plans immediately, but in execution he utilises intermediaries (STh I,q22.art 3), yet even then, because he is all-present he works as an agent. Those hardened towards God are not excluded from His providence, and they are kept in being.¹⁸⁷ The implication of this however is that this is the total of God's involvement with them.

Predestination is here presented as a special form of Providence only for spiritual or intellectual creatures. Thomas's account is very much part of the doctrine of God, particularly of his knowledge and will: again, the divine *ratio* is like prudence in humans. His action is immediate even while making use of secondary causes. Thomas did not think of time itself as cyclical. There is indeed a return (*reditus*) to God but no endless replaying of a loop.¹⁸⁸ Humanity moves from creation to fall to redemption to glorification, yet there is no place for a Joachimite fulfillment of history within this world. One might say that Thomas did not have a theology of the unraveling of history, yet he retained a historical vision of humanity.¹⁸⁹

In *De veritate*, Thomas's major treatment of the subject, the operative analogy is that of Prudence.¹⁹⁰ For both Prudence in humans and Providence in God require not only knowledge of ends but also something like desire of them. In the earlier Commentary on the Sentences, God is presented more as an artisan and

186 Torrell, *Thomas d'Aquin, La providence*, 95: "les traits de la création du monde et des diverses creatures parlent de la "sortie" de Dieu, tandis que celui du gouvernement divine – qui vient immédiatement après et termine la Première partie de la Somme – commence précisément à décrire le mouvement du "retour" vers Dieu."

187 Cf. Steven A. Long, "Providence, liberté et loi naturelle," *Revue Thomiste* 102 (2002): 355–406, 383.

188 Torrell, "Saint Thomas et l'histoire," 137: "En réalité, c'est la 'structure' de l'évènement, entendue comme sortie-retour, qui est identique partout et toujours."

189 Max Seckler, *Das Heil in der Geschichte: Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin* (München: Beck, 1964). cf. Winfried H.J. Schachten, *Ordo Salutis, das Gesetz als Weise der Heilsvermittlung: Zur Kritik des Hl. Thomas von Aquin an Joachim von Fiore*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 20 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1980).

190 Michal Paluch, *La profondeur de l'amour divin: évolution de la doctrine de la prédestination dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Bibliothèque Thomiste 55 (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004), 121.

there is less material about Providence. Of course this might be related to his source Lombard's not making much space for the topic in the Sentences. In the later work, Thomas observes that some creatures are led to their ends for their own sake, others to their ends for the sake of others; the latter are directed only for the good of their species, not as individuals, while the spiritual beings participate in guiding (*De ver* 5,5). Creatures on earth can also do this guiding of others – rather imperfectly but in a way that bestows dignity on humans. This endures so long as humans live as rational creatures.¹⁹¹ Should they however act like animals, they will be treated like those who exist only for the sake of others. One must stay on the right path or one will end up receiving providence only for the sake of others (*propter alios*). Thomas, like Albert, follows John of Damascus' distinction between *providentia approbationis* and *providentia concessio-nis*.

Thomas' own ideas on the matter matured as he came to realise that God willed things not only to be, but that his will extended to caring for all beings.¹⁹² “Thomas therefore makes no apology for talking about the life of man uplifted in grace in the *secunda pars* before he presents Christ, the one mediator of that grace.”¹⁹³ In the *tertia pars* Christ is presented as the exemplary cause of all that providential return.

However, in the development of Aquinas' ideas, with Franciscan views acting as a foil, the distinction between providence and predestination seems to have decreased.¹⁹⁴ The Thomas of *Summa Contra Gentiles* had already treated some questions concerning Predestination in the section on Providence. It is the same power to effect that operates in each. Can prayer really change anything? Yes, because God's decision (*sententia*), which is executive as it were, is

191 Ibid., 128: “Si la creature rationnelle est fidèle à la direction divine dans l'exercice de sa providence, *tout concourt au bien de ceux qui aiment Dieu*. Selon l'Épître aux Romains (8,28): ‘Avec ceux qui l'aiment, Dieu collabore en tout pour leur bien’.”

192 Ibid., 181: “[...] découvrant que Dieu ne veut pas uniquement que les choses soient mais qu'elles soient selon tel ou tel mode, il a pu accéder à une conception de la providence qui embrasse tous les êtres de façon certaine.”

193 Romanus Cessario, “Is Aquinas's *Summa* only about Grace?” in *Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris: image et message de Saint Thomas d'Aquin à travers les récentes études historiques, herméneutiques et doctrinales; hommage au professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell OP à l'occasion de son 65e anniversaire*, ed. Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira, Studia Friburgensia 78 (Fribourg: Editions Universitaire, 1993): 197–210, 208. Chenu seems justified in arguing that Thomas learned the *exitus-reditus* scheme at Viterbo in 1267.

194 Paluch, *La profondeur de l'amour divin*, 310: “Alors que la providence achemine à leur fin de façon infaillible les êtres soumis à la nécessité, mais oriente seulement les êtres dotes de liberté, la predestination conduit infailliblement les élus à la fin dernière.”

not the same thing as his divine counsel which is fixed and unchangeable. So there exists within God himself a *ratio ordinis* which Thomas calls “providence” as such and also his *executio ordinis* or *gubernatio* (governance). Both reside in God, but one is more “inner” and the other is more “outer” (Sent Id.39,q.2a.1ad1). Predestination belongs more to the latter.

Providence has very much to do with God’s knowledge of his creatures, according to the analogy of human prudence (Cicero), although in Thomas knowledge has priority over will, which in turn is a divine quality by which God conducts things. God is like a father guiding the running of the house he built, and in that sense it does seem that Aquinas gave a bit less room for free will, human or divine, as everybody knows their place from the beginning.¹⁹⁵ The structure of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* seems to witness to a change in Thomas’s thinking, for there is a link between the Providence at the end of Book 3 and Book 4: the journey of creatures towards their ends.¹⁹⁶

In *De veritate*, Thomas seems to leave issue of God’s care for humans to the question on Predestination. As is noted by Torrell in his notes on this great work, Providence in the form especially designed for humans seems limited to the Elect.¹⁹⁷ This should not be viewed as any sort of a retreat from “objectivity” in face of atheism – such an idea would be anachronistic. In belonging to the Doctrine of God it is still very much an “objective” account of Providence.¹⁹⁸ There is little place for the experience of that care because Thomas wants to think more about God himself and his action than about human experience thereof. It could be that with all this “speculation” about God there is not much Scripture in his argument and that these do appear when other terms are used for how humans receive providence. Maybe this is why there is little scripture here: other more “biblical-sounding” terms for providence are more often used when Aquinas is writing about the experience of Providence by humans. Nevertheless there is always some connection between these two things, and Thomas sees this in the effects of God’s execution or operation of his eternal

195 Paluch, *La profondeur de l’amour divin*, 356: “La contingence des décisions du libre arbitre est soumise à la certitude de la prédestination.”

196 Bernard McGinn, “The Development of the Thought of Thomas Aquinas on the Reconciliation of Divine Providence and Contingent Action,” *The Thomist* 39 (1975): 741–752.

197 Torrell, Introduction to *Thomas d’Aquin, La providence*, 16: “Au reste, ce genre est aujourd’hui franchement dévalué et seuls les croyants convaincus peuvent parler de manière crédible d’un signe de la providence dans la déroulement de leur propre vie ou de ‘L’abandon à la divine providence’.”

198 *Ibid.*, 35: “il ne confond pas métaphysique et psychologie.”

decisions.¹⁹⁹ Providence itself is something higher, regular, belonging to divine knowing oriented and disposed, rather than to divine execution of divine will.

Any evil that happens to any animal can only be for sake of another animal or of the efficacy of secondary human causes: higher bodies can influence lower bodies (hence angels can, although not stars). Sinners exist at a level lower than that of animals and need to be brought back from that state if God is going to grant them good. This vision is more cosmological than personal in its ontology: yet, epistemologically speaking, for Thomas providence is one of those revealed things for faith (*Summa Theologiae* II-II q1,art8,ad1).

As Torrell in his commentary on *De Providentia* observes, already in *De Veritate* 6a1 predestination and providence are clearly distinguished, for the latter implies the idea of *universal* orientation towards the end of all things, for all creatures, rational or irrational, bad or good. All human beings are ordained towards blessedness by God's providence, but not all make it the distance to the glory, even though all are set on course. The Job commentary has only one mention of the connection between providence and prudence, but it is more clearly set out in *Summa Theologiae* I, q22. What is called prudence in humans has its analogue in God's Providence. God allows certain defects for the greater good of the whole (prey for predators, persecution for martyrs) and knows both sides of any story (as in that of the two servants who meet, they think, by accident).

Boethius had written (*Cons.* iv, 6): "Providence is the divine type itself." Aquinas had already mentioned Boethius's *O quis perpetua* in his Commentary on Job 2 and in his Prologue to his Sentences commentary.²⁰⁰ Rather than adopt a Boethian compromise according to which the world is not eternal but is perpetual,²⁰¹ Thomas separated his discourse into that of faith and reason: according to the former the world was temporal. It is clear that this would simplify an account of creation's dependency upon its Maker. Thomas develops the idea of the all-knowing ordering in (STh I, q22) article 2 *resp*: "And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art."

199 Ibid.: "La défaillance meme des êtres inférieurs reste "récupérable" par la providence à un niveau supérieur."

200 Ibid., 182: "Albert le Grand et Alexandre de Halès incluront aussi le début de cette prière dans leurs *Sommes* théologiques"

201 Courcelle, '*La Consolation de philosophie*' dans la tradition littéraire, 343: "La querelle repaît au XIIIe siècle, Presque dans les memes termes."

The question of the relationship to Predestination is found best articulated in article 2's Reply to Objection 4.

When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: 'In the hand of his own counsel.' But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For 'to them that love God, all things work together unto good' (Romans 8:28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence.

It would seem that Predestination is God not allowing a cause to intervene and divert particular human creatures from the universal end. He had previously mentioned the example of water stopping fire from burning: God will see to it that "the just" hold their course.

There is a mixed economy of necessity and contingency. At article 4, ad 3 Thomas writes:

We must remember that properly speaking 'necessary' and 'contingent' are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things [...]. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. (Art 4 resp.)

For Aquinas each creature continues to need God to be kept in existence: so providence is just a continuation of his created power. Ratzinger argues that Bonaventura was less interested in souls relating to God than in establishing that they found their place by incorporating the higher cosmos in themselves. One could call this providential-ethical rather than personal-mystical (as in Augustine).²⁰² In any case Providence is about linking creation with the present

202 Joseph Ratzinger, "Der Mensch und die Zeit nach Bonaventura," in *L'Homme et Son Destin*

through the sweep of history.²⁰³ At this point we can see how the Dominican and the Franciscan concur in their cosmic vision of God's providence.

d'après les penseurs du moyen âge, ed. Marie-Dominique Chenu, Actes du premier Congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Louvain et Bruxelles, 28 (Louvain-Paris: Nauwelaets 1960): 473–83, 479: “aristotelisch-kosmisch, nicht augustinisch-personalistisch...entscheidet er [Bonaventura] sich für einen körperlichen locus continens, das Empyreum, das als vornehmster Körper den Kosmos abschliesst und begrenzt, sodass es ‘ausserhalb davon schlechterdings nichts gibt’.”

203 Michael Schmaus, *Katholische Dogmatik II/1. Gott der Schöpfer*, 6. Auflage (München: Huber, 1962), 124: “Falsch ist die deistische Anschauung, daß die Welterhaltung nur eine negative sei, eine Nichtzerstörung. Aber ebenso unrichtig ist die Meinung, daß die Welterhaltung eine fortgesetzt erneute Schöpfung sei (Bayle, gest. 1706). Sie ist eine *fortgesetzte dauernde* Schöpfung.”

Chapter Three: Later Medieval Developments

Alternatives to the High Medieval Consensus

It might be illustrative to take the example of what happened to the medieval phenomenon of the “trial by ordeal” wherein the establishment of guilt or innocence of the accused was left to divine Providence’s reaction to the imposition of an ordeal (handling a red-hot iron, being tied and thrown in water, etc.). As Robert Bartlett has demonstrated,¹ the ordeal supposed that God “can change the natural properties of the physical world” such that hands would be unblistered and the innocent life preserved through drowning. Peter the Chanter in his *Verbum Abbreviatum* protested against the practice, as did Aquinas.² The abolition of the ordeal began with Lateran IV in 1215 and this was established in law by most nations during the century thereafter. The problem was that the ordeal looked a bit like a pseudo-sacrament and hence needed theological justification, which was not forthcoming. By the later Middle Ages the trial by ordeal had disappeared, but not, thinks Bartlett, on the grounds of doubts in God’s immediate providence or immanent justice.³ The critics argued from Scripture that it was an illicit tempting of God, not that it was irrational in metaphysical terms of other beliefs. The providentialism of the Middle Ages was full-blooded and coherent: a powerful God could and did make His will known.⁴ Hence it is perhaps ill-advised to see the Enlightenment as delivering the vital blow to Providence when early modern theologians (e.g. Perkins and contemporary early sixteenth-century Jesuits) were still viewing ordeals with suspicion owing to their occult associations as “counter-witchcraft” rather than on the grounds that “nothing happens.” The very fact that in practice judicial torture towards confession increasingly took over from ordeal during the period of 1200–1700 does suggest a loss of confidence in the method.⁵ One should note that God was not seen interfering with his laws, but rather the natures; including the relevant innocence or guilt would push towards an outcome which would reveal the character of the secondary cause.

1 Robert Bartlett, *Trial by Fire and Water: the Medieval Judicial Ordeal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.)

2 Aquinas, *Summa Theologia* II-II 95,8.

3 Bartlett, *Trial by Fire and Water*, 164.

4 Ibid., 166.

5 Ibid., 142.

The challenge to “in-built providence” and its subsequent decline as a fixed idea might well have had philosophical antecedents. In the sixth century, John Philoponus in his *De opificio mundi* had combatted the notion, affirmed by Aristotle, that all or “the universe” was naturally in a state of inertia, needing power from outside for movement or change. Power, as a non-physical entity could be inherent in the system, and that was part of the high medieval view, Thomas included.⁶ Up until the time of Franciscus de Marchia (d. 1344), “impetus” could be viewed as something God delegated to creaturely agents. But with Nicolas of Oresme it was established that there was a constant energy needed to work to keep the heavens in movement.⁷ The language of *anima mundi* is not used, and in any case the power is viewed as something that changes things rather than just preserves or unites them as God’s power in creation had been viewed in earlier centuries. Neither was it worked by angelic mediation being sent out by God, nor is it a force in the air between God and his creation (as Philoponus’ critic, Cosmas Indicopleustes thought),⁸ but it comes from outside into creation in an active and dynamic way.⁹ Ultimately this world-view is a monistic one, since all is connected, including the heavens and the earth, and any distinction that operates is one of “form-matter” rather than of “spirit-matter.”¹⁰

For an Averroist like Siger of Brabant, divine providing meant divine determining and ordination of causes to effects, which then offers God prudence (as distinct from eternal wisdom), which considers the future.¹¹ Providence then is not only prescience, but goes beyond it, to include power, ordaining and directing, as part of the divine version of practical reasoning. As Siger comments on Aristotle’s *Physics* II,18,2, one might wonder whether, since human prudence considers contingent things, this excludes them from being subject to divine providence. His answer is: no, divine providence touches contingent things

6 Klaus-Jürgen Grün, *Vom unbewegten Beweger zur bewegenden Kraft: Der pantheistische Charakter der Impetustheorie im Mittelalter* (Paderborn: Mentis, 1999).

7 Ibid. 175: “Der *impetus* zeigt sich hierbei als Kraft, die zwischen Gott und dem Menschen vermittelt [...]. Bei (Nicolas) Oresme nimmt der *impetus* die Gestalt einer universalen Kraft an, die es erlaubt, auch die Himmelsbewegungen durch die Impetustheorie zu erklären.”

8 Buridan in his Questions on *Physics* VIII thought that Aristotle’s theory that the air was the agent for the object was just too complicated.

9 Grün, *Vom unbewegten Beweger zur bewegenden Kraft*, 114. Cf. Richard Sorabji, *John Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 10, who terms this “internal impetus.”

10 *Comm. on Aristotle’s Physics* 2,p15: “ἡ φύσις πάντα ἔνεκα του ποιοῦσα.”

11 Johannes Josef Duin, *La Doctrine de la Providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant*, *Philosophes médiévaux* 3 (Louvain: Editions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1954): 303: “Providere veut dire, selon Siger, préordonner des causes à une fin determine.”

too, even if human prudence does not. So even human prudence is included in divine prudential operation. To truly govern one must know the ends of things, and God does indeed. There is no doubting providence's power: nothing it ordains can fail. Some contingency in the universe is preserved, yet the keynote for Latin Averroism is that the Unicity of being carries with it a necessity in itself, with a kind of relationship that is analogous to that of cause and effect. Whereas Thomas was interested in demonstrating the existence of God, Siger focused on God's universal causality: not *that* He is, but *what* He *does*. Even the intellectual soul although eternal, is caused and known in its essence.¹² As mentioned this still leaves room for some contingency in what things get up to or are "in themselves," in fulfilling their own nature, but that is a fairly thin account of freedom. Knowing things "in essence" sounds close to the notion that God knows things through their species. One might think of a potter who makes many pots and knows the basic design, although some colouring and shaping might be distinctive. There will be no large surprises for God, nor for his creation. In as much as God knows his power he can be said to know all things to which that power extends.¹³

As with Siger, so Thomas had believed in a divine knowledge of particulars that was extended through a hierarchy of beings, and in that sense there is truly no *praevidentia* to God: too much gets in the way of a clear view, as it were. As with the famous Boethian image (Cons V.6) of seeing all parts of the road from the mountaintop, all ages and their events were equally known to God. Yet God can be of course viewed as the first cause of the will's free action, moving each will to move freely (as laid out in *Summa Theologiae* I, q83,a1). But the conditional necessity that ensues is that which results from the freedom of the creature. There is, as it were, plenty of room for God to manoeuvre without impinging on creaturely freedom. So, in order to give direction to things God must have knowledge of their ends, but not a fore-knowledge that causatively fixes all things. John Wippel describes the change thus:

According to Thomas, it is because things are eternally present to the divine mind that God can know future contingents with certainty as they are in themselves. It is also true, of course that for such events to be realized in actuality in the course of time, the divine will must intervene; but this is required to account for their actual existence, not for God's knowledge of them. However, according to Henry [of Ghent], it is because God

12 Ibid., 323: "En pleine conformité avec saint Thomas, Siger y enseigne que Dieu connaît les futurs contingents et que cette prescience ne supprime pas leur contingence parce que Dieu ne les connaît pas en eux-mêmes, mais dans et par sa propre essence."

13 Ibid., 325: "Son essence et son intelligence sont l'*ars factiva omnium*: comme l'artisan connaît son œuvre, de même le Premier connaît tout ce qui derive de lui."

knows the eternal decrees of his will that he knows with certainty the things he will produce and therefore, things that are future to us [...] Whether his account will allow for divine foreknowledge of such things as they are in themselves, or only as they are in God, their productive cause, might well be questioned.¹⁴

In other words, for Henry,¹⁵ a secular master who opposed an Averroist picture of divine emanation and taking all the initiative in creation in its stage of continuation, God could not ‘blindly’ cause something to come into being in time without also fore-knowing it. This however does not mean fixing everything, and there is a large degree of mutuality in the God-creation nexus. One could argue that the Franciscan doctrine of the simplicity and infinity of God suits a view in which God is understood as extended into creation and time by his will.¹⁶

According to Henry creation is one act and the preservation in existence of creation is another. At creation the creature changed into existence, which sets up existence as an experience of change. Later Henry would controversially suggest the obvious corollary, that creaturely essences in God’s mind pre-existed God’s decision to actualise them, which would seem to accord creatureliness the status of necessary being rather than just a degree of creaturely autonomy.¹⁷

However to stay with the earlier Henry and to emphasise his view of a providential God: God being Trinity means this: “(t)hat God is absolutely self-conscious in terms of knowledge and love, as well as wholly free to create or not, implies His wholly undivided and responsible awareness of each and every crea-

14 John F. Wippel, “Divine Knowledge, Divine Power and Human Freedom in Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent,” in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives*, ed. Tamar Rudavsky, Synthese Historical Library, Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy 25 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984): 213–241, 230.

15 On Henry in general see the useful W. Vanhamel, ed., *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996).

16 Zenon Kaluza, *Les querelles doctrinales a Paris Nominalistes et Réalistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècle*. Quodlibet. Ricerche e strumenti di filosofia medievale 2 (Bergamo: P. Lubrina, 1988), 62: “Chez Duns Scot et les scotistes la simplicité de l’essence divine et la distinction formelle des attributs sont fondées sur la notion de l’infini.”

17 Robert Wielockx, “Henry of Ghent and the events of 1277,” in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*, ed. Gordon A. Wilson, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 23 (Leiden: Brill, 2011): 25–62. Cf. Raymond Macken “La temporalité radicale de la creature selon Henri de Gand,” *RTAM* 38 (1971): 211–272.

ture and act of creation.”¹⁸ This prevents creation being “necessary,” at very least in its existence here and now. Flores explains this well:

The immanent emanations are necessary, since God is necessary. Creation is not necessary, since the divine potencies of intellect and will are fully actualized in the personal emanations. No further action is needed for their perfection [...] Because of the personal emanations God is a personal Creator [...] Because of the production of the Holy Spirit, God’s will is wholly free to create among these possible creatures. Accordingly, God is wholly conscious and responsible for each and every one of His creatures.¹⁹

God is inseparable from all that is created; the universe was the combination of creator and created, and being has to participate in God in order to be. Divine freedom is safeguarded by the hypothesis of “possible worlds.”

Considering the extent to which the later medieval thinkers sound so philosophical in their theologies, how might one go about defending the assumption that the Church’s theology of Providence has been drawn in large measure from the bible? Or at least how demonstrate that an imaginative understanding of Christian revelation shaped the definition and employment of metaphysical concepts as much as vice versa?

As Venicio Marcolino has argued, the Franciscan Alexander of Hales wanted to apply the theological principles of salvation history back on to God and his work of creation, and to consider the latter only in the light of the former and in God through his revelation.²⁰ So God’s work of setting things up in creation, and not just the aspects of salvation, the *opus reparationis*, to use Hugh’s term with which Alexander engaged, is the subject of theology; everyday things are to be regarded in the light of God too, and to do that we need the illumination provided by revelation. This includes finding conceptions of ontology in Scripture.²¹ With great respect for the Hebrew Scriptures, Alexander sought to find,

¹⁸ Juan Carlos Flores, “Henry of Ghent on the Trinity,” in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*, ed. Gordon A. Wilson, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 23 (Leiden: Brill, 2011): 135–150, 145.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 147.

²⁰ Venicio Marcolino, *Das Alte Testament in der Heilsgeschichte: Untersuchung zum dogmatischen Verständnis des alten Testaments als Heilsgeschichtliche Periode nach Alexander von Hales*, BGPTM, NS 2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), 24f.: “Eine scheinbare Metaphysierung der Theologie ist in diesem geistigen Umbruch die einzige Weise, das Heilsgeschichtliche in ihr zu retten. Der heilsgeschichtliche Zug der Schöpfung begründet ihre theologische Handlung.”

²¹ “Materia de qua est divina substantia manifestanda per Christum in opera restorationis,” Alexander, *Summa*, 238,185c, cited in Marcolino, *Das Alte Testament in der Heilsgeschichte*, 29, where he comments: “Alexander entwickelt eine biblische Theologie, welche keine reine Exegese mehr ist, aber aus der Schrift herauswächst und immer von ihr lebt.” Cf. Ludger Honnefeld-

e.g. the idea of the movement of return to God on the basis of Exodus 3:7–8 and 14–15. The Old Testament Law (and much of the Old Testament canon contains instruction) is an expression of the divine will, which can develop, if not mutate as such. The law in the context of Israelite history shows humans their powerlessness without Christ, to whom the Old Testament thus points.²²

Yes, the order of theology should follow a creation-fall-restoration (as per Hugh and Peter Lombard), but theology aims at beatitude and that should be central. Hugh had really not known what to do with history between creation and Christ, but Alexander saw its importance as a mirror of the human state, needing to move forward to find beatitude. Although divine presence in the Old Testament's account of Israel seemed provisional, nevertheless one can speak of the presence of Christ in the Old Testament through their sacrifices or sacraments. In New Testament sacraments, there is *gratia unionis*, while in the Old Testament believers can benefit from the *gratia virtutum* which removes guilt – this distinction was influenced by Albert the Great.²³ Time and *Heilsgeschichte* are like medicine, but while it is the universality of Christ's saving deed that makes possible the reaching of salvation, still it is the image of God to which that *gratia virtutum* attaches.²⁴ Alexander followed Hugh and not Lombard here in arguing that the Old Testament sacraments functioned as means of salvation. He admits they did not have the same effect as New Testament sacraments; since from the New Testament onwards, *gratia virtutum* has been predicated not on sin but on the image of God. The Old Testament history therefore describes the encounter of educative providence and corresponding penitence. Its sacrifices (as described in Leviticus) are nicely balanced between those

er, "Die Kritik des Johannes Duns Scotus am kosmologischen Nezzessitarismus der Araber: Ansätze zu einem neuen Freiheitsbegriff," in *Die abendländische Freiheit vom 10. zum 14. Jahrhundert: Der Wirkungszusammenhang von Idee und Wirklichkeit im europäischen Vergleich*, ed. Johannes Fried, Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke, 1991): 249–263.

²² Marcolino, *Das Alte Testament in der Heilsgeschichte*, 108, with reference to Alexander, *Glossa III d40 2 IIIa* 542.

²³ *Ibid.*, 139., Anm. 67. The OT believers are believed to be in limbo, i.e. in the restful bosom of Abraham for those who do have faith, as beneficiaries of Christ's hell-descent.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 199: "Das Gesetz bestimmt nicht nur das sittliche Tun des alttestamentliche Menschen, sondern auch den Kult, in dem er seinen Glauben ausdrückt." Also, Italo Fornaro, *La teologia dell'immagine nella Glossa di Alessandro di Hales* (Vicenza: LIEF, 1985). Also, Walter H. Principe, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union*. Vol. 2 *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early 13th c.* (Toronto: PIMS, 1967).

which indicate the ongoing and leading grace of God and the need to acknowledge and rue sin.²⁵

An example of the move towards contingency and providence being taken more seriously from the late thirteenth century onwards can be seen in treatments of the topic of the binding of Isaac in Genesis 22. Following Albert, Thomas was clear that the conditions for *God's* operating were quite different from those binding on humans. There was of course the aspect of the miraculous; as lawgiver he could have dispensation from his own laws, although this was exceptional, as if to prove the rule that one could rely on Natural Law as pretty much fixed. However the Franciscans, Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure would regard “law” as part of history or *Heilsgeschichte* and so as subject to development.²⁶ By their lights, something evil is in the first instance evil because it is prohibited (*malum quia prohibitum*). This led to new insights into the changeability of morality: to call morality provisional is to assert, as Ockham would, that it was part of God’s providence. Natural law then had to correspond to a nature that was liable to evolve, or rather be changed by God in response to the contingencies of history, including sin.

As has been established, Thomas Aquinas followed the Boethian motto that all things are equally present to God, and that anything “future” is only so in relation to other things. God can know all things eternally. And while contingency of creaturely freedom is preserved, ultimately, in God’s view the actions are fixed: “Although Thomas claimed elsewhere that the domain of God’s causality also encompasses man’s free acts of will, remarkably enough he did not use God’s causality in his account of foreknowledge.”²⁷ “Thomas affirmed the necessity of God’s knowledge, including that of future contingents,”²⁸ and that knowl-

25 Marcolino, *Das Alte Testament in der Heilsgeschichte*, 214: “Das Alte Testament selbst äußert sich über das Sündenbekenntnis in Jos 7,19, über die Reue in Jer 3,14 und Joel 2,13, über die Genugtuung in Lev 4–6 (QA 48,5,844) culpa autem actualis peccati deletur virtute contritionis peccati [...]” It is not absolution but contrition that matters.

26 Isabelle Mandrella, *Das Isaak-Opfer: Historisch-systematische Untersuchung zu Rationalität und Wandelbarkeit des Naturrechtes in der mittelalterlichen Lehre vom natürlichen Gesetz*, BGPTMNF 62 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2002), 174: “Thomas hingegen stellt die Dekaloggebote als solche nicht der Wandelbarkeit anheim, sondern verlegt diese in die Ebene der jeweiligen Konkrektion eines Gebotes.”

27 Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought*, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 50 (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 167, with reference to Thomas, *Sent I* d38,q1,a 5c; *STh I*,q14a,13c—following Boethius.

28 Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, 172: “Thomas affirmed the necessity of God’s knowledge, including that of future contingents.” That is, even if the thing is contingent; his knowledge is immutable.

edge was immutable. Yet Duns Scotus two generations later observed that all that pagans could manage to demonstrate by reason was the mere existence of a creator and a conserver. When it comes to divine action, providence of a more “special” sort, then Revelation is needed. Just as God’s ubiquity could not be proved, but was a matter of faith (Rep. Par., d37,q2),²⁹ the fact of divine action in a person does not prove God is present, for He can do his conserving power without presence, *pace* Thomas.³⁰ Creation has an ontological autonomy: any contact with the Creator has to be “personal” or “relational” and only in that sense at a distance, since personal-relational preserves distance.³¹

In the case of Aquinas, since contingents are things that are only arrived at by the intellect through the senses, in God’s case there has to be some indirectness about how God could know contingents, in other words through the secondary cause affecting the event or thing or creature. However, Duns Scotus was not content with the idea that contingency can be placed in the two-causes theory, since that would mean that God’s immediacy to the event would be removed.³² Scotus urged “divine immediacy”; if Thomas insisted that God’s action be tailored to the receiver, then for Duns, God’s coexistence with creation involved a real relation. That is how he understood the God of the Bible and the Fathers. For Scotus it had nothing to do with any sort of randomness of non-necessity, but very much to do with freedom, if God is to be the Christian God. Scotus’ outright attack on Averroistic philosophers’ necessitarianism when naming God the author of things grew from his conviction that there was radical contingency as well as variety in creation. In his *Ordinatio* I.d.2 and his *De primo principio* c4, Scotus argued that God’s providence reigned in all things, and that He had the freedom to determine and hence necessitate Himself; but it is a necessity

29 Luigi Iammarone, *Giovanni Duns Scoto. Metafisico e Teologo: Le Tematiche Fondamentali della sua Filosofia e Teologia* (Roma: Miscellanea Francescana 1999), 465: “Indubbiamente Scoto nega che la provvidenza divina speciale con la quale vengono governati gli esseri intelligenti, possa essere dimonstrata con la sola ragione. In effetti, tale provvidenza riguarda l’economia dell’ordine soprannaturale, la quale, come Scoto afferma in tutto il prologo dell’*Ordinatio*, è conoscibile soltanto per divina rivelazione.”

30 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I,q8,aa; *Quodlibet* XI,a1; *SCG* III,68.

31 Iammaronne, *Giovanni Duns Scoto*, 476.

32 Fritz Hoffmann, *Ockham-Rezeption und Ockham-Kritik im Jahrzehnt nach Wilhelm von Ockham in Oxford 1322–1332*, BGPTM 50 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1998), 300: “Kontingentes wird nach der Lehre des Thomas direkt durch den Sinn und nur indirekt durch den Intellekt erkannt. Da Gottes Wissen unveränderlich ist, muß ihm auch das Kontingente in einer unveränderlichen Weise gegenwärtig sein. [...] Der Kontingenzbegriff ist bei Thomas wesentlich ontologisch geformt [...]. Ganz anders bei Duns Scotus! Sein Kontingenzbegriff ist wesentlich von der Theologie her bestimmt.”

of will not of nature. For God's will is in constant motion in the world and as such there is some amount of flux in the world, rather than it being the case that His will might be moving at any moment from potential to actuality.³³ Correspondingly, human free action is always deliberative and reactive. God is so necessary that all else is contingent, and gives it all *potentia executiva*. Contingence is not just physical but also metaphysical, as God chooses from various possible worlds.

Fritz Hoffmann argues that, in turn, Ockham personalised this contingency even more, and was happy to say that God knew future contingents – against Aristotle. For again, the biblical God is one who is infinite and roams all over: that is who God is in himself.³⁴ There is mystery to God: “Lord” and “God” are names for God, which do not exhaust his essence. Scotus thought that providence, being a matter of the divine will, could not be well grasped by reason alone. It was part of God's supernatural economy as he stated right away in the Prologue to his *Ordinatio*. Pagan reason could demonstrate the existence of a Creator and a conserver, but no more. His conserving power did not require his actual presence but the power of his expressed will.³⁵ Just as God's ubiquity could not be proved, but was a matter of faith (*Reportatio Parisiensis*, d37,q2), so the fact of divine action being experience by a human person did not prove God is present. It is just like the Sun and its rays: He can do his conserving power without presence.³⁶ This wards off any danger of pantheism and there remains an ontological autonomy, such that any contact with the Creator has to be “personal.”³⁷

God now seemed to be in the business of making things happen through touching the affective forces of humans.³⁸ Many Franciscans after 1277 were try-

33 See Honnefelder, “Die Kritik des Johannes Duns Scotus,” 249–263.

34 F. Hoffmann, *Ockham-Rezeption und Ockham-Kritik*, 305: “Weder das vom göttlichen Willen determinierte Wissen Gottes (Scotus), noch die Ideen (Bonaventura), noch die alles ungreifende Allgegenwart Gottes (Boethius, Thomas von Aquin), sondern allein die Unendlichkeit Gottes ist der Grund dafür, daß Gott alles Zukünftige weiß. Ockham setzt die Unendlichkeit Gottes mit dem Wesen Gottes gleich” (see Ph. Boehner [ed.], *Guillelmi de Ockham opera philosophica et theologica. Opera theologica* [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1967–1986, 441]).

35 Iammarone, *Giovanni Duns Scoto*, 465.

36 *pace* Thomas in his STh I,q8 aa; Quod;XI,a1; SCG III,68.

37 Iammarone, *Giovanni Duns Scoto*, 476.

38 Peter Nickl. “‘Libertas proprie non est nisi in voluntate’: Libertà e soggettività in Pietro di Giovanni Olivi,” in *Pierre de Jean Olivi – Philosophe et Théologien: actes du colloque de philosophie médiévale, 24–25 octobre 2008, Université de Fribourg*, eds. Catherine König-Pralong, Olivier Ribordy, and Tiziana Suarez Nani, *Scrinium Friburgense*, 29 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010): 355–368, 367, on his *Lectura super Apocalipsim*: “Lo Spirito non si manifesta in modo intellet-

ing to avoid the idea that God's will was just the executive organ of the intellect.³⁹ Reading the Scriptures in a literal sense, they looked for typological correspondences, which like skimming stones would leap beyond the New Testament into the history of the Church and, more importantly the beginnings of a history of a new Humanity.⁴⁰ Theology was called back by Peter John Olivi from its philosophical pretence to embrace biblical exegesis: to be scriptural requires an eye for scriptural symbolism. Olivi whose two main authorities were the bible and Ps-Dionysius, found it significant that the book of Revelation came last. Only at the end of History would God's plan be fully revealed. Spiritual understanding of the text was not about allegory but about understanding the letter of the text in its providential disposition, its context within the whole of the text as a reflection of the divine intention, carefully and precisely as well as richly reflected in Scripture.⁴¹ Therefore Olivi did not employ a schema of four scriptural senses; with Bonaventura he held that poverty was the key to scriptures, or, one might add, a looking-up to Christ from a lowly position, trusting in his spiritual providence and timing. Christian history included the progressive unveiling of the sense of Scripture and its symbolism in which the impression of the Spirit's new interpretations would be harmonised with the tradition of the Church's understanding.⁴²

Olivi was perhaps the first to sustain the modern idea of freedom as a particular capacity of the will. Bonaventura had already written (II Sent d25p1a,un.,q6) that free will resided between reason and will as its start and

tuale, ma affettivo, cioè come 'fiamma e forno dell'amore divino,' come 'camera dell'ebbrezza spirituale.' Come 'farmacia di aroma divini e unzioni spirituali [...] per cui tutta la verità del Verbo Incarnato e della Potenza di Dio Padre non si manifesterà solo tramite la semplice conoscenza, ma anche tramite l'esperienza gustative e palpabile.'" Affect is what penetrates more deeply than intellect into reality.

39 Bonaventura, *In II Sent* d25,p1a,q6: "arbitrii libertas residet penes rationem et voluntatem, ita, quod in una illarum potentiarum inchoatur et in alia consummatur."

40 Sylvain Piron, "Le métier de théologien selon Olivi," in *Pierre de Jean Olivi – Philosophe et Théologien: actes du colloque de philosophie médiévale, 24–25 octobre 2008, Université de Fribourg*, eds. Catherine König-Pralong, Oliver Ribordy, and Tiziana Suarez Nani, *Scrinium Friburgense*, 29 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010): 17–85, 82: "Ce dévoilement progressif ne peut lui-même provenir de nouvelles interventions incompréhensibles de l'Esprit dans l'histoire. Il doit au contraire trouver son ressort dans l'histoire de l'Église, au sein d'un processus qu'Olivi comprend sur une mode conflictuel."

41 *Ibid.*, 62: "Il s'agit à la fois de saisir la lettre dans son sens littéral. Étant place là où elle l'est, et de l'éclairer en la rapportant à l'ensemble du texte don't la structure reflète le plan divin [...] comprendre cette disposition providentielle de la lettre indique que rien n'a été écrit par hasard ou par erreur."

42 *Ibid.*, 82.

completion.⁴³ However for Olivi it was the will alone which in entertaining synchronic contingency (the ability to act the opposite at the same moment) was truly free. Very much unlike Thomas, but in accordance with Scotus, reflection was for the will alone, thus dethroning the Intellect.⁴⁴ This might appear to be a matter of anthropology rather than having anything to do with Divine Will and Providence, until we read that the Spirit does not show himself in an intellectual way, but in a flame of love, ecstatically,⁴⁵ with the result that God can guide creation from within, by getting in between its cracks, as it were. To work on affect is to penetrate more deeply than simply to work on conscience.

Accordingly Olivi opposed the Aristotelian *idée fixe* that God could not be directly effective at a distance, as though his ideas for the world had to be executed by himself in the world by a two-step movement. Relying on Roger Bacon's theory of light-emanation, by which the species of light turned divine idea into action, Olivi held the world to be in perpetual motion, but teleologically, not mechanically (equal and opposite reactions were excluded), although impetus-theory could make room for God's effective presence. In a sense God's touching the world at a tangent is a way of explaining how God could be close in act to the work, as He gives over his power into the universe. God is not close in the sense of Being.

Hans Blumenberg has called this development the theory of transferred causality (*übertragene Kausalität*), like the energy that the stone-throwing hand gives to the stone. The cosmos takes on something of that energy. Grün traces the late-thirteenth-fourteenth-century development of this idea from Peter John Olivi to Nicolas Oresme and on to John Buridan, with all this happening in the context of a condemnation of "pan-dynamism" at the Council of Vienne in 1311,⁴⁶ because it seemed to be associated with the idea of God revealing Himself within the world in present epochs, a form of Joachimite heresy. As for Oresme he was clear that one should not be considering impetus here as a physical cause

43 "arbitrii libertas residet penes rationem et voluntatem, ita, quod in una illarum potentiarum inchoatur et in alia consummatur." It is a case of "both-and."

44 "Duns Scoto, dal canto suo, giungerà addirittura a caratterizzare la volontà come unica facoltà razionale dell'uomo, lasciando l'intelletto in disparate in quanto facoltà 'irrazionale'." (Nickl, "*Libertas proprie non est nisi in voluntate*," 358).

45 Cf. Pierre de Jean Olivi, *De septem sentimentis Christ Iesu*, ed. Marco Bartoli. *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 91 (1998): 533–549, 535: "*summus et supremus gradus elevationis mentis in Deum est per experimentales et medullares sensus et gustus amoris.*"

46 Grün, *Vom unbewegten Beweger zur bewegenden Kraft*, 162: "Olivis Konzeption von Bewegung und bewegender Kraft der Seele nimmt streckenweise den Charakter eines Pandynamismus an, wie er für seine Epoche unüblich ist und teilweise auch Gegenstand der Verurteilung von Vienne in Jahre 1311 gewesen sein dürfte."

but as something higher or metaphysical.⁴⁷ God was very much involved in natural processes, as he argued in his *Livre du ciel et monde*, even though He was not part of them. In the 1360s Oresme had translated Aristotle's *Poetics* and his thinking verged on the kind of thing condemned in 1277. Annelise Meier has argued that in the fourteenth century causality came to mean efficient causality 'from beyond', such that the things which received (formal and material causes) were not seen as making much of a contribution, or were making just as much as the "prior" thing operating causally on them.⁴⁸ Oresme's distinctive was to regard acceleration as the true cause of movement, although this would not be influential, since Jean Buridan's version would be accepted in the following two centuries. Yet for Orseme there was an acceptance of mechanism in the acknowledgement of a pendulum, in the days when watches were first being made: the point is that energy is passed on and saved – but it ultimately has to come from outside, although not remotely, since Oresme was aware that natural chains of causation would weaken owing to resistance. God came very close. Grün notes the similarities to Schelling, who contested Goethe's and Hegel's notion that energy was intrinsic to matter.⁴⁹ Oresme's *Optik* stressed the need for prophecy in negotiating a world that was neither eternal (Averroism) nor about to end imminently (Joachimite apocalypticism).⁵⁰ In the sense that hypotheses work like prognostications, the advance of natural science owed something to Joachimite prophecy, but really as tempered by Oresme's more sober concerns for the present world. Likewise it would be Newton's penchant to bring the kingdom of God forward into "present-future" history, where it could be "tamed," lose its terrors, and become "postmillennial," a view of Eschatology that stood at the end of this early modern development. This was a progression from within medieval Eschatology, although Fried argues that this would only make the demons which reason could not quite drive out return later with more force.⁵¹

Dante, the great poet of that time (early fourteenth century), stands out as exceptional in his equating a lower-level *Fortuna* with Providence, for it was

47 Ibid., 185: "Bezüglich der Impetustheorie vertritt Oresme die Ansicht, daß der *impetus* nicht in das Gebiet der Naturwissenschaft oder Naturphilosophie gehört, sondern in die Metaphysik."

48 Annalies Maier, *Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie*, Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik 4 (Roma, Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 1955), 150.

49 Grün, *Vom unbewegten Beweger zur bewegenden Kraft*, 203.

50 Johannes Fried, *Aufstieg aus dem Untergang. Apokalyptisches Denken und die Entstehung der modernen Naturwissenschaft im Mittelalter* (München: Beck, 2009), 169f. Cf. at 181: "Der Aufbruch der exakten Naturwissenschaften war eingehüllt in Eschatologie."

51 Ibid., 188ff.

Providence indeed that was bringing about the restoration of the Empire.⁵² As Alcuin once had, Dante too called *Providentia* the “daughter of God” when he spoke of her as the general *ministra* of God (*Inferno* vii,78). In Book 2 of the *Roman de Fauvel* by Dante’s contemporary Gervais de Bus, *Fortuna* tells us that she applies the decrees of Providence in the sub-lunar sphere; she is sister of Wisdom and is suspicious of the category of “good luck.”⁵³ Fortune seems also to play a role in helping eternal wisdom to be taught to those temporal creatures, particularly as the world possibly entered into an awareness of insecurity. If Fortune had carved out an area for itself in the earlier Middle Ages, it was now closely identified with God’s wisdom and providence, and very much part of fulfilling God’s purposes in the later part of that period.

Consequently I think Matthias Vollmer is probably right:

Fortuna, fatum und providentia werden hier abermals zusammengebracht und dennoch getrennt gehalten. *Fortuna* mit ihrem Rad zieht zuerst den Blick des Betrachters auf sich, sie ermahnt und erinnert den Menschen an den Lauf alles Irdischen; ähnlich wie bei den beschriebenen Kirchenfassaden gleitet der Blick zur nächsten Seite und sieht vor sich ausgebreitet die kosmische Ordnung, das Jüngste Gericht ist allenfalls durch den Abyssus repräsentiert. Der Fokus hier liegt jedoch auf der Ordnung des Kosmos, die von Gott installiert worden ist. Die Erfahrungen des täglichen Lebens sollen einerseits Teil des göttlichen Gesamtplanens, der *providentia dei* sein, andererseits jedoch soll der Bereich individueller Erfahrung des irdischen Wandels der *Fortuna* zugeeignet werden. Würde man auch die persönliche Erfahrung von Leid an Gott herantragen, dann stünde die Güte Gottes zur Disposition. Der *Fortuna* mangelt es an Einsicht in den göttlichen Gesamtplan, der *dispensatio divina*, die zur *providentia* gehört.⁵⁴

There was thus the idea of fusion or at least an overlap of divine energetic purpose with the circle of everyday life, with the former allowing the latter to keep rolling when in danger of getting stuck, as it were. Everyday life seemed cyclical, but therein it contained a certain order and dynamism, every bit as much as the church calendar did.

In the Franciscan Matthew of Aquasparta’s account of Providence in his Question 1: *De providentia*, he insists that not everything happens from necessi-

52 Courcelle, ‘*La Consolation de philosophie*’ dans la tradition littéraire, 184: “On ne s’étonnera pas, avec de tels antécédents, de voir Dante placer son *Paradis* sous le signe du *Te cernere finis* boécien; il semble s’être assimilé très intimement cette Prière et n’hésite pas à mettre le vers de Boèce sur le meme plan que le verset de saint Jean relative à la vie éternelle.”

53 Ibid, 181: “Déesse païenne à l’origine, Fortune deviant la porte-parole d’un savoir encyclopédique par lequel elle combat l’aveuglement spirituelle des hommes.”

54 Vollmer, *Fortuna Diagrammatica*, 239.

ty.⁵⁵ Voluntary things as well as natural things are cared for by God in that people are punished or rewarded according to the laws of providence. Rom 11:36 with its message of all things being “from and through and in Him” became an important verse for him here, as well as Apoc 1:8 where Christ says he is “alpha and omega,” watching over the whole field of time. At Question 4 Matthew adds that God administers according to the works of grace and mercy, but also according to the works of justice (“*quantum ad opera iustitiae*”) through which spiritual creatures exercise God’s punishment on His behalf.⁵⁶ For God has always been seeking to draw people back to him. The spiritual creatures or angels are used to overcome the temporal-causal barrier in the working of this providence, yet the power that is given them is divine power such that God can also be said to be present immediately. Human wills which are incorporeal cannot be moved by heavenly bodies (Qu. 5), yet as distinctively human actions are free (Qu. 6).⁵⁷ In an abnormally long response he argues that for God to act in a compelling way (“*per modum impellentis vel compellentis*”) would be incompatible with freedom, and other such modes. Yet it would seem fine to think of divine action as chivvying, leading, helping, propping up and ministering to,⁵⁸ not pouring in knowledge but arousing the hearer to work with the “*seminales rationes omnium intelligibilium*,” communicating through senses (rare), through the imagination (most rare), or through the intellect (extremely rare). Here the debt to Augustine and Gregory is palpable, but Matthew seems clear that providence as distinct from grace takes less the form of a “head-on” encounter, but has more to do with God’s creating the conditions for creaturely motivation to respond to His grace more deeply. God rules corporeal things through spiritual creatures: this is stated with a nod to Dionysius (*Divine Names* 4.6–7). Joined to this notion is “the principle that the Church is the interpreter of, as well as an expression of, divine providence.”⁵⁹

In a sense, God became understood as dependent on creation, to the degree that God was unthinkable without creation. With William of Ockham the view that God was continually creating by rolling out a pre-made plan became in-

55 *Quaestiones disputatae de production rerum et de providentia*, ed. P. Gedeon Gal (Florence: Quaracchi, 1956), 288. These questions were probably given for the most between 1279 and 1287, in Rome.

56 *Ibid.*, 319.

57 *Ibid.*, 374.

58 *Ibid.*, 377: “*per modum excitantis, manducentiis, adiuvantis sive adminiculantis et ministrantis; et hoc consonat legi caritatis et ordini providentiae gubernantis.*”

59 David Andersen, “Fra Paolino’s ‘*De Providentia et Fortuna*,’” *Das Mittelalter* 1 (1996): 51–73, 68.

creasingly unthinkable.⁶⁰ One cannot really speak of a seamless whole of *Heilsgeschichte*, then rolled out like a magnificent carpet. For every intervention God makes to change things accords with his *potentia absoluta*, which is not prefixed. Yet God can and wills to act so as to make sure that what he does is in continuity with before.⁶¹ God's freedom for Ockham is not independence from creation and its laws, but rather the power to do things new and differently: Ockham was at pains to argue that God is by no means arbitrary in his action. He gives grace because he chooses to, not because he has to. As for particulars God does not know the parts through the whole as Scotus thought, for every individual being is dependent on His Creating power, and therefore that is how we too are to know them, just as He does. Here epistemology gets grounded on a view of providence even though one might refrain from claiming that Ockham's epistemology drove his doctrine of God's providential action. God's sharing prudential insight with creatures is part of his great providence. One can speak of a contingency and hence a "made to measure" sense of how God's plans and his *Heilsgeschichte* came to be understood, even if God's own existence as Creator seems a necessary postulate. One cannot quite be sure that one can foretell the next thing on the basis of knowledge of the recent past and the present, on the specious ground of species or from "what one would expect from past form": yet that does not mean God's new action has to be arbitrary and unintelligible. God can exceptionally make knowledge intuitive, as with Saul on the Damascus Road, where the convert was given knowledge of non-present things, but God did not and would not act to deceive. What is the Christian testimony, empirically speaking, of his continued faithfulness? That is worth more than the establishment of God as in principle "predictable." For Ockham, the divine will did have qualities distinct from intellect, but of course the two work together and the former is a reflection of divine love. In all this talk of the immediacy of God to creation and the bypassing of heavenly and metaphysical hierarchies, perhaps the church too could be by-passed on occasions. Ockhamist Providence in that sense is "worldly," going out to draw in towards the place of salvation.

Joachim Söder argues that the Scotist doctrine of the will inaugurated the late medieval and Renaissance quest for self-determination, in that humans

60 Klaus Bannach, *Die Lehre von der doppelten Macht Gottes bei Wilhelm von Ockham. Problemgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen und Bedeutung* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1975), 255: "Die Unmittelbarkeit von Gottes schöpferischem Handeln verbietet es Ockham, sich den Ablauf der Heilsgeschichte als sukzessive Verwirklichung eines in Gott notwendig präexistierenden Planes zu erklären."

61 *Ibid.*, 261.

truly were free to choose in the most important of matters.⁶² This is all very well, and to that degree the Blumenberg thesis holds water, but it was not a case of the human will replacing the divine will. Divine Providence was not excluded by Scotism, Ockhamism or the Renaissance. As we shall see, it was its guarantor. Indeed, Ockham claimed that not only is God immediate to the world, He is an immediate and not indirect *cause*. As for miracles, in the lions' den of Daniel 6 the fire did not hurt the three friends, because God did not immediately co-operate with the fire to produce heat.⁶³ It is not that God has to have a more powerful causality; unlike Aquinas it is not that the secondary cause needs the working of the stronger primary cause on it in order to act, for as secondary it simply relies on its built-in *rationes seminales* for doing "what comes naturally." Scotus still thought that the first cause had an influence on the second even when acting simultaneously, as in a hand with a hammer delivering the blow. Ockham abandoned a hierarchical chain of causation altogether and promoted a more truly "co-operative" arrangement between primary and secondary causes. In theory a first cause could act without a second, yet normally it is a case of not so much "acting through" (Scotus) but "acting with." God is "moved" closer to the events, yet secondary causes are freer.

If one confesses that God is the cause of everything, then in what sense could this include sin? (*Quodlibet*, aiii,q3). Well, God is the immediate cause of everything without "Nature" intervening. God causes "nothing" in fact. Moreover, since all propositions are from God then (even) an "impossibility" *qua* term is from God. And anything that is factual is from God anyway as both its mediate and immediate cause. So one can conclude that God wills sin, in the sense that he wills giving alms even when this is done vaingloriously, and he wills sin *justly*.

Ockham was quite clear that *potentia*, whether *absoluta* or *ordinata*, is one and the same power, just that *ordinata* is God's power considered from the standpoint of his decrees, his revealed will.⁶⁴ Biblical miracles are cases of *potential*

62 Joachim R. Söder, "Notwendigkeit-Kontingenz-Freiheit," in *Zwischen Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Johannes Duns Scotus im Gespräch*, ed. Franz Lackner, Franziskanische Forschungen 45 (Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 2003): 170–178, 177: "Neu und wegweisend ist auch der scotische Willensbegriff. Der Wille, der in einem Augenblick zwischen verschiedenen Alternativen wählt, wird hier erstmals in der Geistesgeschichte philosophisch konsequent als Vermögen ursprünglicher Selbstbestimmung gedacht."

63 Egbert P. Bos, "Ockham on the First Proposition of the *Liber de Causis*," in *On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy*, eds. Egbert P. Bos and Pieter A. Meijer, *Philosophia Antiqua* LIII (Leiden: Brill, 1992): 171–189, 174.

64 William Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 99 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 254.

ordinata specialis, not of *potentia absoluta*. After Ockham the famous distinction became all about “possible worlds” and adopted an ecclesio-political application when the absolute/ordained distinction was then used for Papacy in Henry VIII’s argument that the Pope can dispense with church law: “Most theologians in the fourteenth century were careful not to allow their discussion of God’s *power* considered absolutely to become a discussion of God’s *acting* absolutely. As long as the concept was being applied in the traditional manner, excessive use could never undermine the present order of things or produce uncertainty.”⁶⁵

Amos Funkenstein quotes Montaigne to the effect that for late medieval elites the natural beliefs of people seemed “monstrous” and in need of revelation and training. With creation no longer hierarchical the problem became the mode of God’s presence to creation. It would seem that Revealed theology was indeed slowly shaping philosophy. It would be too crassly triumphalistic to say that all the traffic was one way, but univocity and the importance of Revelation for theology, while sailing close to the rocks of anthropocentric and anthropomorphic at times, worked together in a harmony of Biblicism and philosophy. But since Aristotelian mathematics did not work for a universe that included things that were liable to change,⁶⁶ a Neo-stoic paradigm became predominant. Stoics believed in the overall homogeneity of things, but they looked to “forces” to explain them. “The Stoics always took the whole to be more than the sum of its parts,”⁶⁷ partly because of the role of language in integrating. “Purpose, in part and in the whole, governed the Stoic universe, which was indeed thoroughly teleological. In opposition to this stood the atomistic universe, dominated entirely by chance.”⁶⁸ However, as it became clear in the Renaissance, despite having a doctrine of Providence, Stoicism was too close to Pantheism to be easily Christianised. Even though God was believed to be omnipresent, for Stoics “the most natural way to *perceive* God’s presence in the world was symbolical.”⁶⁹

In Funkenstein’s view, if Scotus’ reputation can be rescued, then the same cannot be said of Ockham. Scotus held that absolute power and ordained power were not two types of power but simply aspects of the same divine power resulting in the same range of acts. The distinction had only to do with jurisdiction. God could be present at a distance, thus having “ubiquity by

⁶⁵ Ibid., 257.

⁶⁶ Aristotle argued (Physics B8.193b22–194a6) that mathematization “worked for static structures, but not for change” (Funkenstein, *Heilsplan und natürliche Entwicklung*, 30)

⁶⁷ Ibid., 39.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 41.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 49. My italics.

power.” Scotus here had perhaps “paved the way toward the covenantal understanding of the orders of nature and grace,” i.e. Ockhamist primacy of will over wisdom.⁷⁰ God was regarded as everywhere and nowhere in particular and hence somewhat indifferent: “The radical change in the perception of the world that occurred between the generation of Thomas and that of Ockham is embodied in the latter’s principle of annihilation.”⁷¹ For Thomas things are held in place by others which are hence necessary and necessitating, but for Ockham, one could be taken and another left behind. All things are immediate of God and in theory could continue even if the whole world were destroyed. And yet there is something even in the “taken...left behind,” which, if bad news for a sense of a morality founded on a providential sustaining of a united whole, could be reassuring for those who thought that morality was essentially something that moved forward or discouraged complacency. Yet the impersonalism, which may be ascribed to the scholastic way of discourse, might well be part of the legacy. André de Halleux saw already in Aquinas “almightiness” becoming more a power than providence and detached from creation in a way the Greeks never did.⁷² However Ockham’s doctrine of God seemed much more severe.

Describing Ockham’s position, Marilyn McCord Adams observes:

To sin is to act contrary to one’s obligations. But according to Ockham’s ethics, God does not have any obligations to anyone and so cannot act contrary to His obligations no matter what He does [...] As Ockham sees it, the fact that God cannot will anything maliciously or command anything unjustly – like the fact that He cannot sin – is merely a reflection of the fact that God has no moral obligations to anyone [...].⁷³

Matthew Levering accepts Adams’ analysis, as do many, including Batut for whom the idea of God as all-powerful and all-determining was a pernicious invention of the Middle Ages, especially when it reached its apotheosis with Ockham.⁷⁴

Funkenstein has also argued that a salvation-historical view of time came to dominate in the high Middle Ages, and that in a denial of Augustine.⁷⁵ The lines between the City of God as church history and those of universal history were

⁷⁰ Ibid. 133.

⁷¹ Ibid., 135.

⁷² Batut, *Pantocrator*, 88.

⁷³ Matthew Levering, “Providence and Predestination in Al-Ghazali,” *New Blackfriars* 92 (2010): 55–70, 69f., n. 58.

⁷⁴ Batut, *Pantocrator*, 484.

⁷⁵ Funkenstein, *Heilsplan und natürliche Entwicklung*.

smudged. History had significance only in terms of what it symbolized: it was not necessarily going anywhere, certainly not ‘progressing’, and yet one can speak of development, or rather ‘unfolding’ (*Entwicklung*) of a series of contingencies.⁷⁶ In part due to the demise of the Holy Roman Empire after 1300 and more importantly of the Imperial ‘idea’, people turned to write local histories and universal history became encyclopedic.⁷⁷

To illustrate that this was as much an issue in philosophy and not just the epiphenomenal result of ecclesiastical politics, within the history of Jewish Philosophy one finds Saadia Gaon (d. 942), who had insisted God’s knowledge would not cause what He knew. But for Gersonides (d. 1334) there was a genuine test. ‘Hence God doesn’t know what Abraham will do.’⁷⁸ In his ‘Super-Commentary’ on Averroes’ Commentary on *De Interpretatione* Gersonides came down clearly on the question of what can be known of the outcome of the sea-battle, as imagined by Aristotle: God can know no outcome, for there is nothing yet to know. Gersonides believed that God could fix only the universals of things but not their particulars. It was up to the prophet and his special revelation who then tries to particularise these by foretelling things in detail.

Thomas’ denial of real divine *fore*-knowledge of particulars was criticised, for surely even the prophets knew human wills with certainty. Scotists argued, as Bañez would in the sixteenth century argue, that surely divine foreknowledge implies causality. Scotus himself had taken issue with Thomas’s Boethian view: instead, he argued, God knows the contingent through the infallible causality of his will.⁷⁹ Henry of Ghent too had argued that God does not know things through ideas, but “God knows all future contingents by knowing what his will is going

76 Funkenstein, *Heilsplan und natürliche Entwicklung*, 116: “[...] neuer Weg sowohl zur Einbeziehung der Profangeschichte in die Heilsgeschichte als auch zur heilsgeschichtlichen Gegenwartsbestimmung gefunden wurde.”

77 Ibid.: “Für die Hochscholastik hingegen fielen historische Vorgänge und historisches Detail eher in den Bereich des Kontingenten und ließen sich höchstens in eine systematische Lehre als *exempla* einfügen.” He claims this with reference to Arno Borst, *Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker*, 6 volumes (Stuttgart: A. Hierseman, 1957), IV. Ernst Benz, “Die Kategorien der religiösen Geschichtsdeutung Joachims,” *ZKG* 50 (1931): 24–111.

78 Seymour Feldman, “The Binding of Isaac: A Test-Case of Divine Foreknowledge,” in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives*, ed. Tamar Rudavsky, Synthese Historical Library, Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy 25 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984): 105–133, 128.

79 Funkenstein, *Heilsplan*, 175.

to produce,”⁸⁰ and he chooses between two or more alternatives. As John of Ripa contended, all these future contingents are known by God – divine freedom is not ruled out by human freedom.⁸¹ God’s knowledge of contingents is itself contingent; the divine intellect knows what has been determined by creaturely will, hence causing it. Here Henry was in agreement with Bonaventura and Grosseteste.⁸² Marsilius followed Henry here and agreed on the radical contingency of things: the moment something is, it can still not be.

Ockham’s criticism of this position was: how can something be known if it does not yet exist? God can only know contingently actions which are the *actual results* of creaturely free will; for there is nothing for God to know before they things happen. “According to Ockham, God’s will determines the truth of contingents but not God’s knowledge of them.”⁸³ In any case, God does not know things via his will, but his intellect. The events he knows are contingent and so his knowledge is too, although this does not mean that God in himself is subject to change. Yet the emphasis was on divine contingency *ad extra* and even his “vulnerability” to events, such that God is as much one who plays “black” as “white” in the great “game of chess.” Gregory of Rimini got round this problem by supposing that all creaturely actions have something of God’s action in them: God can have certain knowledge of things he wills, including things willed together with a human being.

With its firm belief in creaturely contingency, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with a few exceptions were suspicious of Thomist “necessitas absoluta” as articulated especially in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. The idea of divine-creaturely cooperation was exquisitely Scotist. With the exclusion of any condign merit among such a soteriology, it can hardly be accused of being Pelagian.⁸⁴ Marsilius of Inghen (d. 1396) was perhaps the best known of Nominalists, although of a moderate, hence successful sort, worked at Heidelberg where he

⁸⁰ Ibid., 177. See Henry of Ghent, *Opus sapientiae Dei in disponendo huius ornatus productionem* 115 (Lectura Ordinaria = *Opera omnia* Leuven 1980, vol. 36).

⁸¹ Hermann Schwamm, *Magistri Joannis de Ripa doctrina de praescientia divina*, Analecta Gregoriana 1 (Roma: Pontifica Universitate Gregoriana, 1930), 222: “Deum cognoscere futura contingentia, etiam actus liberos creaturae, cognoscendo praedeterminationes voluntatis divinae.”

⁸² Cf Hermann Schwamm, *Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Dun Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern*, Philosophie und Grenzwissenschaften Bd. 5, Heft 1/4 (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1931).

⁸³ Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, 186.

⁸⁴ Manfred Schulze, “Marsilius von Inghen und die vorreformatorische Theologie: Augustinrezeption, Willensfreiheit und Gnadenlehre,” in *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit*, eds. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen & Paul J.J.M. Bakker (Leiden: Brill, 2010): 67–87, 83, who takes issue with Alister McGrath’s view that Augustinianism was waning among Scotists.

gave his famous lectures on Lombard's *Sentences* (between 1392 and 1394). His work eventually became popular among Paris nominalists who in 1474 gave a response to his work wherein "it is stated that according to nominalists (*nominales*), deity and wisdom are one, whereas according to the realists (*reales*), divine wisdom is distinct from the deity."⁸⁵ For Gregory of Rimini it was not enough for God to have knowledge of the species in order to know individuals, as Thomas had suggested was how divine knowledge worked. Marsilius agreed with Gregory. From around 1310 the role of humans in determining divine foreknowledge became a serious question.⁸⁶ God and humans could share a wisdom that seemed quasi-prophetic, and wisdom joined humans to God himself.

"With regard to God's knowledge of future contingents, however, the situation was quite different. Here Marsilius primarily based himself of Scripture instead of natural reason."⁸⁷ God has knowledge of states of affairs as can be expressed in propositions. Thomas Bradwardine represented the other, necessitarian side of the argument, defending the idea of the necessity of future things in his *De Causa Dei*. To Marsilius, Bradwardine was destroying liberty, even while radical Ockhamists were overemphasising liberty,⁸⁸ but the mainstream thinkers were trying to reconcile Boethius and Augustine.

For Marsilius, God is only the cause of the *act* of will, not of its movement away from the good (as Holcot would come close to saying in his *Sentences Commentary*, which would make God into a cause of evil). Marsilius added a Neoplatonist influence into his thinking, drawn especially from John of Ripa who was being read in Paris in the 1360s. God knows the contingent in virtue of his *im-mensitas* (Ripa), and obviously His knowledge is very different to ours. One could summarise the position this way: "On the one hand, God is the universal cause of all things, while on the other hand, he is not the cause of his knowledge of things. What God foreknows depends on future events, and not on his act of will."⁸⁹ But Marsilius avoids saying that divine foreknowledge is dependent on man as such, unlike Wodeham and Rimini. What can be caused, for Marsilius, is the proposition "God knows...x," such that while human freedom is preserved, the outcome is known by God, not the human action. The truth is necessary but does not necessitate the activity to which it refers.

⁸⁵ Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, 13. Marsilius was not totally *modernus*; in fact in his opening lectures on the *Sentences* he defended the "antiqui."

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 28–32.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 215.

⁸⁸ Is man really able to change God's knowledge? Such radical contingency could be countenanced by Adam Wodeham, *In Sent* I d38c1.

⁸⁹ Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, 227.

To take an example of stronger “nominalist” thinking,⁹⁰ Robert Holcot was born around 1290 near Northampton, England, dying in 1349, possibly from the plague. He effectively lost his job as teaching regent in Oxford in 1334, and it is unclear whether Cambridge ever benefited from his talents. As a Dominican he interpreted Thomas’ teaching to mean that God was a cause of human action. Holcot was famous in academic circles for *Quodlibetal Questions*, whose influence on Chaucer’s *Nun Priest’s Tale*⁹¹ was through his *Moralitates* (sermon illustrations), and also because “[...] the evocative ‘verbal’ pictures of Holcot’s Wisdom commentary brought philosophical issues into court company.”⁹² Holcot felt free to say that there were some future contingents not precisely known by God, the crucifixion for instance. Prophecy of the crucifixion in the Old Testament was somewhat vague. Better to say then, with Boethius and Anselm that God’s knowledge is not *fore-knowledge*, nor *fore-seeing* (*praevidentia*) but *over-seeing* (*providentia*).⁹³ It was not the case that on account of the world to come God knew that he would create this one. Unlike Thomas, for whom God’s indirect demonstration of love in his creation was enough to instill in creatures a sense of reciprocal love, for the “personalist” fourteenth and fifteenth century theologians God can be described as “reaching out”: God’s *acceptatio* is the main thing that distinguishes Scotus, Ockham and Holcot from Thomas. For Holcot, God can even be named *acceptatio*, even while absolute and transcendent and free. And the secrets of the faith can be irrational not just suprarational (Thomas).

⁹⁰ On Nominalist theology see Sigrid Müller, “Nominalismus in der Spätmittelalterlichen Theologie,” in *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit*, eds. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen and Paul J.J.M. Bakker (Leiden: Brill, 2000): 47–65.

⁹¹ See, e.g., Sabine Volk-Birke, *Chaucer and Medieval Preaching: Rhetoric for Listeners in Sermons and Poetry* (Tübingen: Günter-Narr, 1991), 276. More fully, Robert A. Pratt, “Some Latin Sources of the Nonnes Freest on Dreams,” *Speculum* 52 (1977): 538–570.

⁹² Robert Holcot, *Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents*, eds. Paul A. Strevler and Katherine H. Tachau (Toronto: PIMS, 1995), 2. See also see Beryl Smalley, “Robert Holcot O.P.,” *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 26 (1956): 5–97. At p. 63: “The Wisdom-Commentary in particular shows him impressed by the need to warn students against superstition and magic.” Yet, “He took the whole of life as his library” (65). He made use of Nicolas Trevet’s commentary on Boethius with notions such as: the shiny things of the world are as lasting as brittle ice; God reveals himself to true seekers; his existence cannot be proved by reason. The Wisdom and Twelve Prophets Commentaries should be dated to around 1333 (Smalley).

⁹³ In *III Libros Sententiarum* Q2, Lib II p123–4, re. Anselm *De casu diaboli* cap xxi. “‘Breviter,’ inquit Anselmus ‘hoc respondeo/ Praescientia Dei non proprie dicitur ‘praescientia’; cui enim omnia semper sunt praesentia; non habet futurorum praescientiam sed praesentiam scientiam’ – and Boethius too 5.6.15–18: “non praevidentia sed providentia potius dicitur.”

For Holcot, whose position was often one of fideism in the sense of starting all theological reflection with Revelation, God's being above human reason meant he transcended any human evaluation of what is consistent in his behaviour. Scripture tells us that prophecy can change its referent and its message. Hence even God's truth is flexible and God can say false things, even though he cannot lie. God can reveal something but then stop it happening. Ockham hadn't gone quite that far, but Holcot appealed to Ps 131:12, Jonah 3:4 and similar Scriptures.⁹⁴ As Scotus had argued, the decrees of Predestination could be altered without touching God's essence, since all moments are present to God.⁹⁵ (Whereas Thomas had said no, the divine will was not the immediate cause of contingent effects and once God had set a chain of secondary causes in motion it was hard to interrupt it.) Holcot was aware of the need for God's continuous involvement, as if the secondary causes could not be trusted to deliver.⁹⁶ As with Ockham, predestination is not something in God but something in between God and creation, hence allowing for variation, without infringing on God's transcendent changelessness. There is a necessity in Nature and in God, but this metaphysical motion "in-between" was non-necessary.

Augustine had portrayed Christian philosophy as a human response to God. Bonaventura viewed wisdom as mediating between the speculative and the practical. According to Aquinas, Wisdom attains to God more intimately and is able to lead to action as well as contemplation; it is twofold, arising out of both virtue and learning. Into this tradition we might want to place Holcot, as one who took *Sapientia* (the deuterocanonical Book of Wisdom) and perhaps Wisdom seriously enough to devote a commentary or series of lectures to it.

To take one example from Holcot's commentary on *Sapientia*: Chapter 14 seems to look back to Noah as the righteous non-Jew, yet one who enjoys some sort of covenantal relationship with God; if anyone crosses the sea trusting in an idol on the ship's prow, he is forgetting that the Lord was providential to Noah in and after disaster. The word of verse 7, as verse 6 makes clear, is that which God provides for the ark of Noah, even though it is referred to in v 5 as a "raft" (ὄχηδία). It is just as clear from v 3 that *πρνοβία* is not just "foresight" or "overseeing" (as per the Boethian way which wants to emphasise God's non-responsibility for events) but is active, intereventualist and salvific.

⁹⁴ Fritz Hoffman, *Die Theologische Methode des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Robert Holcot*, BGPTM 5 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1971), 311. Cf. Holcot, *In II Sent* q2a8.

⁹⁵ Hoffmann, *Die Theologische Methode*, 316.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 330: "Gottes Schöpfung ist jedoch so sehr in seine Hand gegeben, daß sie nicht einen Augenblick ohne die erhaltende Kraft des Schöpfers bestehen kann."

Having mocked those who trust in the same wood that forms their ships and their false gods, Holcot sees God here represented as the father of all who govern by providence, “providing a way and route, a most firm path in the sea, to save from all dangers even the one who is at sea without reason or plan. But so that the works of your wisdom be not devoid of wisdom, for this reason men trust in the smallest wood and heading forward are freed by a raft.”⁹⁷

Yet the first theological point Holcot makes is that God intervenes by means of secondary causes: the making of a boat involved divine-human co-operation. So he writes, “But the ship was made by divine wisdom in consultation with human since it was fitting that salvation was a common effort, as was said to Noah” (*sed navis fabricata est a sapientia divina consulente hominibus quod commue congruebat saluti sicut dictum est noe*).⁹⁸

In his modern (1999) commentary, Hans Hübner comments that at v. 2b it is merely the human wisdom of the shipbuilder that is meant,⁹⁹ and not the wisdom of God. The modern Catholic commentator Helmut Engel disagrees, judging that a Wisdom from on high is meant here: “wisdom who inspires the craftsman” alludes to Exod 31:3, where, Engel argues, *divine* Wisdom is meant.¹⁰⁰ In Cleanthes’ *Hymn to Zeus*, the Paternal God is seen as the father who steers all according to law. This means, for Engel, that just as passengers don’t need to know how to construct or steer a ship, God takes care of the shipbuilding and the navigating. Yet in Cleanthes’ hymn, the “according to law” is important. Law means a wisdom that can be to a degree learned by humans, just as in Exodus 31: the heaven-sent wisdom flowed through their natural skills and achieved something remarkable in the form of the tabernacle. Verse 3 speaks of God himself called “providence” who provided a path through the Red Sea and saved them [διδασκῶν in v.5 can be understood as a divine passive].

But for Holcot that would be a false opposition. Does anyone really think that God could save men in the sea without the help of a ship, which demands human hands to build it? And there is a case of synecdoche or part for the whole, by which Holcot means the ship’s being jointly made denotes the whole joint effort which went into “Operation Noah.” Here is a Dominican rejoicing in the harmony of primary and secondary causes. Moreover, the considerable suitability of a ship is emphasised in the passage, thinks Holcot, since God could

⁹⁷ Robert Holcot, *Expositiones in librum Sapientiae Salomonis* (Basel 1506), ad loc.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ *Die Weisheit Salomos: Liber Sapientiae Salomonis*, Das Alte Testament Deutsch – Apokryphen Neues Göttinger Bibelwerk 4 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 173f.

¹⁰⁰ Helmut Engel, *Das Buch der Weisheit*, Neuer Stuttgarter Kommentar – Altes Testament 16 (Stuttgart: Verlag katholisches Bibelwerk 1998), 223.

directly by himself guide a person on the sea. But he wanted to give humans navigational prudence. And that is what is meant by “So that the works would not lack wisdom”: that they not be unfruitful or unproductive in the learning of wisdom in how to sail. Now of course this does not seem to be just what the passage means: it is so that God’s work of creation in Genesis 1 & 2 would not have been in vain. But Holcot seems to insist that the main reason humans trust God in such situations is their sense of the trustworthiness of his wisdom. Wisdom was becoming a way of talking about God in his ways, after the manner of those revealed in the bible. For this reason men trust their souls to the small piece of wood, not as something to pray to as with an idol, but something that floats, as according to the Divine purpose in the creation of wood. That is their temporal lives which are kept safe in crossing the sea by a raft, that is by the ship. Holcot does not think these verses concern salvation as such, but preservation in this life. It is about guidance, preservation, wisdom for living, and, if you will, ethics. Holcot demands that it be noted that Christ can be seen as referred to in a moral sense here: a “small piece of wood” on account of the humility of his mind. To paraphrase Holcot:

But “wood” also on account of the fertility of his fruit. Hebrews 2 speaks about his smallness: We see Jesus who became smaller a little lower than the angels. And in the Psalms he will be like a tree planted by flowing waters which gives fruit in season. This tree was planted in the earth, in the blessed incarnation. That is in the glorious virgin of whom it is said in the psalms: You have blessed o Lord your earth.

We should notice that nothing is made of the “wood” as the Cross of Christ. Ever since Ambrose this had been a very popular interpretation of this verse. Yet, as Maurice Gilbert noted, in the twelfth century the idea that “wood” meant the cross or Christ crucified suddenly dropped out of use, perhaps due to the insistence by the School of St Victor on the priority of the historical sense, a movement in which Thomas Aquinas was involved. Verse 7 fits too well with the rest of the passage to be suspect or secondary as modern literary-critical commentators might suppose. The wisdom that accommodated God to human size for the sake of salvation is but an outworking of a general wisdom God uses towards his creation in history, a wisdom that can be detected, and even imitated or shared in.

More radical traditions

One should probably treat Meister Eckhart (d. 1327) and Nicolas of Cusa (d. 1464) as exceptions during the later Middle Ages, as thinkers who did not lay so much

emphasis on the movement of the divine will. For Eckhart, God is pure Being, and not purity *from* being, as Gilson wanted to describe Eckhart's position. God has the fullness of being precisely as Intellect. As the One who is, God is negation of negation in a purely positive sense, one might say He is the "affirmation" of being. In the *Questiones Parisienses* question 1, Eckhart is clear that God is not distinct from the creation,¹⁰¹ since the Transcendentals (Being, Good, One) serve to keep God and creation in touch.

If God is intellect, then it is as such that He is moving through creation, and one can trace the invisible things through the visible, since the former leaves its stamp on the latter. Whereas for Thomas, the image of God was to be located in the acts of the soul,¹⁰² Eckhart felt it simpler and more accurate to locate the image in the human intellect. His hearing of the mystic Margaret Porrete's condemnation at Paris in 1309 acted as a prompt to publish more works in the vernacular, and to insist on the close divine-human connection, with a challenge to Aristotelian substance ontology and its replacement with his brand of "Intellectualism." The image of God is born in humans by their becoming aware of that birthright. Righteousness, which exists in humans by their thinking aright therefore is no accident. Eckhart's burden was to see humans as caught up in God, rather than just in his will and his ways, as such. In his famous *Book of Divine Consolation*, God himself is presented as the consolation.

According to this intellectualist tradition, God moves all by seeing.¹⁰³ Seeing is what Providence is, after all. Unlike for Jean-Paul Sartre, for whom God seeing all degrades humans to mere objects, for Nicolas of Cusa, where eyes rest, there love is and a life-giving power too.¹⁰⁴ Humans, indeed all creatures, need God to

101 Jan A. Aertsen, "Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)," in *On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy*, eds. Egbert P. Bos and Pieter A. Meijer, *Philosophia Antiqua* LIII (Leiden: Brill, 1992): 120–140, contrary to Ruedi Imbach's emphasis in his *Deus est intelligere: Das Verhältnis von Sein und Denken in seiner Bedeutung für das Gottesverständnis bei Thomas von Aquin und in den Pariser Quaestiones Meister Eckharts*, *Studia Friburgensia* 53 (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1976).

102 See Loris Surlese, *Homo divinus: Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), with reference to Proclus, *De providentia*, 8. Also, cf. Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. David B. Burrell (London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1968), 183–220.

103 Klaus Kremer, "Gottes Vorsehung und die menschliche Freiheit ('Sis tu tuus, et Ego ero tuus')," in *Das Sehen Gottes nach Nikolaus von Kues: Akten des Symposions in Trier vom 25. bis 27. September 1986*, ed. Rudolf Haubst (Trier: Paulinus, 1989): 227–252, 227: "Gegenüber einer Definition bevorzugt Cusanus die manu ductio durch eine Ikone des alles-sehenden Gottes."

104 *Ibid.*, 229: "Gottes Sehen impliziert Lebendigmachung (*vivificare*) und Umarmung (*amplecti*)."

look at them in order to be and to look back to him. *Providentia* is only a subset of *visio*,¹⁰⁵ but it is very much one of divine respect for each and every individual creature. The individual is no longer just being given shape as for Aristotle, and nor, as Blumenberg interpreted Cusa, that humans were “an adventure of God,” some sort of “vanity project”: no, they are rather a mirror of Him and of the universe. More generally, Blumenberg’s idea of Cusa as a voluntarist seems misguided.¹⁰⁶ Cusa’s pastoral message, in Kremer’s view, is that humans only have freedom as they cling to God, and that under His influence they do not have to be victim of less benign forces. God’s power is a persuading, attracting one,¹⁰⁷ and only for animals is it one of compulsion.

Humans are to seek fulfilment in their own nature; 1 Timothy 6:16 speaks of divine inaccessibility and hence the need for God to give himself to his creatures so that they are empowered to act at all. We realise ourselves eye to eye with God;¹⁰⁸ but it needs to be said: one starts with self-love and works towards the love of God. There is a balance between autonomy and theonomy, and, *pace* Blumenberg, one sees one’s own truth in the face of God. With Cusa there is an unfolding of God’s reconciling of oppositions in which humans can take part.¹⁰⁹ Opposition is present in the world but not in God, who grants the world at least stability: here Cusa can be viewed as a forerunner of Leibniz. The call comes from God for the finite consciously to participate in an Infinity. Hence, for Cusa, the human mind moves out to be the measure of all things, but not because it can exhaust all things. God is not other to ourselves, and so there can be co-operation even if not full understanding, given that even in his revelation God is less to be known than worshipped.¹¹⁰

105 Ibid., 232: “Wenn Gott, wie Cusanus unaufhörlich betont, keine Kreatur und erst recht keinen Menschen verläßt, wenn er die aufmerksamste Fürsorge (*diligentissima cura*) sogar dem geringsten Geschöpf gegenüber (*minima creatura*) hegt, als sei es das größte und das gesamte Weltall, dann kommt darin nicht einfach Bejahung, sondern vor allem die hohe Wertung einer jeden Kreatur und insbesondere des Menschen von seiten Gottes zum Ausdruck.”

106 Hans Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*, 2. Aufl. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999), 485.

107 Kremer, “Gottes Vorsehung und die menschliche Freiheit,” 238: “Beim Studium der cusanischen Schrift fällt auf, daß Cusanus den Einfluß (*influentia*) Gottes bzw. seines Wortes auf den Menschen stets mit *attrahere* bzw. *trahere* charakterisiert oder mit *excitare* und *sollicitare*.”

108 Ibid., 241.

109 Thomas Leinkauf, *Nicolaus Cusanus: Eine Einführung*, Buchreihe der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 15 (Münster: Aschendorff 2006), 178: “Im Hintergrund steht der Grundgedanke, daß Gott, als der Gegensatz der Gegensätze (*oppositio oppositorum/oppositionum*), die alles in sich einfaltende aktive Verneinung des Gegensätzlichen in der Welt ist.”

110 Martin Thurner, *Gott als das offenbare Geheimnis nach Nikolaus von Kues*, Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der Mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie 45 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 22: “Jedesmal, wenn ich die Apostelgeschichte lese, staune ich

Finally, in the *Cribatio Alkorani* III,7 Cusa tells us that the *providentia Dei* does not make things necessary; for God only *sees* all things, and in *De Visione Dei* 10, N. 42, he confirms that God is not “older than” or before the world in a temporal way: the eye that sees one thing and then another is not omnipotent.¹¹¹ There is no hard necessity of Fate but divine leading and care. Providence calls out to human morality and wishes humans freely to respond, the very thing Nicolai Hartmann was complaining about when he spoke about the *Antinomie der Vorsehung*.¹¹² Instead one may speak of a joint teleology of man and God.

By the mid-fifteenth century, when scholars began to look at just what the ancients had said, Lorenzo Valla’s attack on Boethius was representative.¹¹³ God foreknows the actions of humans because he knows their will: God’s decrees are not necessary in the way that Boethius supposed. Boethius’s idea of God’s considering all things as if present is foolish. Providence as *praevidentia* means that God looks ahead to see what humans freely will do.¹¹⁴

So was there here a change, a swerve, a *Wende* towards a new “pagan” paradigm, as Stephen Greenblatt has recently claimed? The intellect might well have lost its access to cosmic realities. Scepticism crept in well and truly just before 1500. Jill Raitt suspects this was already there in the way the Hussites were treated, not as a heresy to be proved wrong but as force that was a political and moral threat in terms of its challenge to authority. There was a suspicion of pleasure, and this reinforced an animus against Epicureanism, going back to Lactantius, with Peter Damian’s emphasis on flagellation as a high or low point. Pagans put up with pain; they did not embrace it as a stepping-stone.¹¹⁵ Of course a hard life freely chosen lent Christians moral authority. Greenblatt points to Florentine Republicanism, and the visit of Chrysoloras in 1397 by Chancellor Salutati

über diese Gedankenführung.” The watchword came from Augustine, *De quantitate animae* 34,77: “*Deus quo nihil [...] secretius, nihil praesentius*” (CSEL 89,226.) See further, Kurt Flasch, *Nikolaus von Kues: Geschichte einer Entwicklung*, (Innsbruck: Georg Olms Verlag, 1998).

111 Kremer, “Gottes Vorsehung und die menschliche Freiheit,” 248: “Aber jenes, was unmöglich erscheint, ist die Notwendigkeit selbst. Denn ‘jetzt’ und ‘damals’” sind nach Deinem Wort.”

112 Ibid.: “Die in der göttlichen Vorsehung enthaltene Finalität und Teleologie hat für die Welt des Menschen nur noch den Sinn des Sollens, sie will daher gerade nicht zwingen, sondern setzt die Freiheit voraus.” This might serve as a response to the likes of Nicolai Hartmann, *Teleologisches Denken* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966), 134.

113 In his *De Libero arbitrio* (1439).

114 Dario Brancato, “Readers and Interpreters of the *Consolatio* in Italy, 1300–1550,” in *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, eds. Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr. and Philip Edward Phillips, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 30 (Leiden: Brill, 2012):, 357–405, 374 ff.

115 Stephen Greenblatt, *The Swerve: How the Renaissance Began* (London: Bodley Head, 2011), 107.

as marking a new interest in non-Latin scholastic learning. With Nicolo Niccoli's library and Poggio as an excellent humanist scriptor, learning became an escape from Christian certainties, and was expressed in Niccoli's transcription of Lucretius' *De rerum natura*. Poggio's vision at Baden of a carefree life was typically Epicurean. When a whole copy of Quintilian was found at St Gall, Poggio cared more about that manuscript than about the misfortunes of the Hussite Jerome of Prag.¹¹⁶ It was at Fulda that he discovered Lucretius. Of the seasons, only spring and summer seemed any good in the sense of enjoyable to a red-blooded human. Poggio wrote of calamities befalling humans, but he also translated the mordant Lucian for fun.

Greenblatt's historiography is more suggestive than convincing. Ficino wrote a commentary on Lucretius then burned it; Macchiavelli copied *De Rerum Natura*. Valla's attitude towards Epicurus is not straightforward. Clearly there is *something* in the idea that Epicureanism and Renaissance values share a family resemblance. In Hans Blumenberg's account, as well, freewill is associated with the "swerve of randomness." The picture Lucretius painted of the ideal Epicurean thinking hard about the senses is elitist as well as transcendental in the sense of believing oneself to have climbed above the forces of fate:

But nothing is more blissful than to occupy the heights effectively fortified by the teaching of the wise, tranquil sanctuaries from which you look down upon others and see them wandering everywhere in their random search for the way of life, competing for intellectual eminence, disputing about rank, and striving night and day with prodigious effort to scale the summit of wealth and to secure power (*De rerum natura* 2:1–13).

Blumenberg sees this as about "overcoming delusion of focussing too much on one thing; atoms, void and nothing else."¹¹⁷ As with Montaigne (*Apologie pour Raymond Seybond*), to be such a voyeur is to stop putting oneself or humanity at the centre of things.

Nominalism is often portrayed as a sort of Marcionism whereby God is sure to save some and discard the rest; but since all the natural order is merely contingent, then the world is no longer favourable to men any more than God is.¹¹⁸ Blumenberg's portrayal of Ockham as some sort of empiricist, who had no place for "the given," let alone first principles, ignores too much the theological side to the Venerable Inceptor, and those under his spell, as those for whom Revelation must be taken into account. On the one hand, divine immediacy to things was

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 179.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 199.

¹¹⁸ Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*, 240.

certainly part of Ockham's animus, and likewise Peter d'Ailly understood engaged and involved divine power as that which is revealed in Scripture. On the other hand, tracing the covenantal pattern in Scripture and in the world mattered, because the free will of a covenantal partner mattered. It is in the assenting area of the covenanted people that grace can paradoxically have its most intense and powerful effects. How much it was the case that in proto-modernity the mind tried to raise itself above the cosmos, to interpret and then to lend it meaning, and became its own transcendental – all leading to a counterproductive search for certainty – such a thesis needs to be proved and not just accepted on the basis of learned books by the likes of Louis Dupré.¹¹⁹ Dupré's idea that Nominalism separated the mind off from the rest of reality because Nominalism opted to by-pass "species," and relied on "intuition" so as to avoid abstracting from the sense of experience, that many a faith felt threatened by Ockham¹²⁰ – all this seems exaggerated. For, as Susan Schreiner describes it,¹²¹ Ockham if anything increased reliance on the world and human senses with his intuitive theory of cognition. Rather than Truth as radically unstable (Greenblatt) one might speak of the reliability of immediacy of the Providential God. The "God" of 1450 still used mediators like created things and human senses, even if "species" was given a decreased role in order to allow for a certain amount of immediacy. This was at issue in Valla's rejection of transcendentals, as well as of Boethian Stoicism which claimed too much in offering consolation simply through "knowing that one is on God's side" – and can one ever know that anyway?¹²² Citing Psalm 36:8 (*ex torrente voluptatis potabis eos*), Maristella de Panizza Lorch describes Valla's account of living out of joy as "an *action* for God, *qualitas* for us: an active flowing of the essence of pure intense pleasure. It is a permanent state of ebriety to which we are uplifted by God's generosity."¹²³ The spirit is one of *delectare in Domino* (Ps 37:4).

In the idea that the Christian life experiences pain but moves towards pleasure, Valla certainly offered something which in its day seemed novel. A Christian *honestas* (virtue) admits to that and combines intensity with joy – it is *voluptas*

119 Louis Dupré, *Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

120 Katherine Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics. 1250–1345*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 22 (Leiden: Brill, 1988).

121 Susan Schreiner, *Are You Alone Wise? The Search for Certainty in the Early Modern Era*, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18.

122 Maristella de Panizza Lorch, *A Defense of Life: Lorenzo Vallas Theory of Pleasure*, Humanistische Bibliothek/1, 36 (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1985), 268.

123 *Ibid.*, 268.

informed by faith, hope, and love. It is reward that motivates renunciation, not renunciation that demands reward. In 1461 Valla could write: “On the other hand we do not find in Holy Writ that God should be loved for himself, but simply that God should be loved” (*De libero arbitrio* XIII,3),¹²⁴ “as the Creator of the good that makes our life possible.”¹²⁵ Other Renaissance Christian writers wrote against the pagan eccentricities of those whom Greenblatt would view as representative, as when the Franciscan scholar Raudense (Antonio da Rho-Franciscan) revised his *De vero falsoque bono* in 1433 to counteract the ideas advanced by Niccoli in his *De voluptate* of 1431.

Theoretically, God *could* deceive the senses and might *potentia absoluta* as when Saul saw the witch of Endor, but most of the time, *potentia ordinata*, he did not. The *homo viator* might not have the immediate intuition of God but he could, with grace, grasp the course or shape of God’s providential will. Humanists rallied together, as Susan Schreiner noted, to urge: “trust your senses.”¹²⁶ Human history could still be very much part of Divine History, even while human living and ethics seemed to lay a larger part than in previous eras. Humanists could and did ridicule Nominalist speculation but only in the way of a younger cousin trying to establish himself over against the family ties: “So too both the Nominalists and humanists placed a renewed emphasis on the particular and on experience.”¹²⁷ But even Schreiner’s own argument for “perspectivism” in that period is lacking in strong evidence: if anything they identified with Greek and Latin historians in seeking to tell a common, universal history.

124 Lorenzo Valla, *Über den freien Willen / De libero arbitrio*, ed. Eckhard Kessler, Humanistische Bibliothek II,16 (München: W. Fink 1987), 151–54.

125 Ibid., 281.

126 Schreiner, *Are You Alone Wise?*, 26.

127 Ibid., 31, discussing Ernesto Grassi, *Renaissance Humanism: Studies in Philosophy and Poetics*. Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies 51 (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1988) and his anachronistic claim that Renaissance scholars meant what Heidegger would much later mean by “historicality of being.”

Chapter Four: Reformation Providence

The impact of Luther

According to a leading historian of philosophy the medieval Ptolemaic worldview did not lend itself to a serious consideration of providence. Only with the change to a Copernican worldview did Providence begin to drive a static doctrine of Creation from the field or at very least find some *Lebensraum*.¹ However, the tipping point in that process is dated sometime between Melanchthon and Bartholomaeus Keckermann, thus 1550 – 1600. Melanchthon's Neoplatonic resistance to inductionist empiricism meant a resistance to leave behind a fixed idea of fixed cosmic order.² Yet what one can perceive already in the case of Martin Luther is a conviction that Providence is less a question of God's orders and the laws of Nature, and more to do with the action of God towards humans. In fact, in light of what has been observed in the previous chapter, it needs to be questioned just how non-medieval an interest in Providence was. What does seem to be the case with Luther and other Reformers is that providence became understood in covenantal terms that verged on the existential.

As early as his Heidelberg Disputation (1518) Luther had stated:

19. That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened. 20. He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross.³ Thus, the church must say with Job, "Though God slay me, yet will I trust in him" (Job 13:15 AV), for God's actions contradict his promises, which we know and which have been fed to us.⁴

In his *Personal Prayer Book* (1522) Luther explained: "Compared with your will ours is never good but always evil. Your will is at all times the best, to be cher-

1 Siegfried Wollgast, *Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung 1550–1650*, 2. Aufl. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 71.

2 Günther Frank, "Wie modern war eigentlich Melanchthon? Die theologische Philosophie des Reformators im Kontext neuerer Theorien zur Herkunft der Moderne," in *Der Theologe Melanchthon: Schriften zur Melanchthonpreisverleihung 1997*, ed. Günther Frank (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2000): 67–82, 76: "Daß Melanchthon gegenüber der Rolle der Erfahrung oder Induktion für die Begründung des Wissens skeptisch und zurückhaltend bleibt, muß hier nicht weiter verwundern. Es war gerade sein neuplatonischer Vernunftapriorismus."

3 Luther's Works (LW) 43:220.

4 Ibid.

ished and desired above everything else. Therefore have mercy upon us, O dear Father, and let nothing happen just because it is our own will.”⁵

So for Luther:

everything we do, everything that happens, even if it seems to us to happen mutably and contingently, happens in fact [...] necessarily and immutably, if you have regard to the will of God. For the will of God is effectual and cannot be hindered, since it is the power of the divine nature itself; moreover it is wise, so that it cannot be deceived [*Confession concerning Christ's supper*, 1528: LW 37,223–28].

Piotr Malysz has commented: “According to Luther, God – precisely by virtue of being God – is at work in the realm of creation in an immediate manner. God in his majesty is always a ‘*Deus praesens*’.”⁶ Hence, and in keeping with Augustine, humans have spontaneity in their choices but not freedom. Malysz notes how this is cognate with a Dionysian (we might say also Eriugenian) *exitus-reditus* scheme, which Luther adapted by removing any trace of free will. He also “departs from Dionysius in questioning whether God’s unknowability can be conceptualised at all apart from God’s being God in relation to creation. It is fundamentally as *praesens* that God, for Luther, is unknown and unknowable.”⁷ So, God can only be *known* where he promises to reveal himself, not generally from his effects in the world. Hence humans are, one might add, encouraged to be listeners. When it comes to examining the world and God’s works, “God so orders this corporal world in its external affairs that if you respect and follow the judgment of human reason, you are bound to say either that there is no God or that God is unjust.”⁸

This impenetrable working can be understood as “Providence,” as distinct from “guidance,” where the human is conscious of some activity and can make at least some sense of where God is leading. No sense can be made of Providence. For Luther, one can have a strong belief *that* God is at work, not how he is or who he is in it. This is at least reminiscent of Valla in wanting to escape the notion of Providence as “something understood.”

Something of this confidence in the power of God irresistibly at work in the world can be seen in what Luther wrote about the origins of creation:

5 LW 43:33, cited by Mary Jane Haemig, “Prayer as Talking Back to God in Luther’s Genesis Lectures,” *Lutheran Quarterly* 23 (2009): 270–95, 289.

6 Piotr J. Malysz, “Luther And Dionysius: Beyond Mere Negations,” *Modern Theology* 24 (2008): 679–692, 683.

7 Ibid., 684.

8 LW 33:291; *Weimarer Ausgabe* (WA) 18:784 (‘On the Bondage of the Will’).

Whatever God wanted to create, that He created then when He spoke. Not everything has come into view at once. Similarly, an arrow or a ball which is shot from a cannon (for it has greater speed) is sent to its target in a single moment, as it were, and nevertheless it is shot through a definite space; so God, through His Word, extends His activity from the beginning of the world to its end.⁹

On this Jonathan Schwanke comments that God remains with his creation, is effective in it, continually allows new animals and human beings to be born, and continually grants new beginnings, in this way preserving creation.¹⁰ But what is even more important here in Luther's thinking is mediation. Also: "God's action as Creator can only be perceived through the mediation of creatures. God does not act in the abstract, not *nudum* (without means), as it were, but rather binds his activity to creaturely events."¹¹ For example, parents distribute or convey divine parental care. Workers achieve God's purposes for him. Famously, Luther could say: "Hence when a maid milks the cows or a hired man hoes the field – provided that they are believers, namely, that they conclude that this kind of life is pleasing to God and was instituted by God – they serve God more than all the monks and nuns [...]."¹²

So, recognizing our co-working with God pleases him, although this consciousness is what changes providence into providential vocation. Providential care that is expressed in political, ecclesial and economical ordering was barely affected by the Fall.¹³ There was room within them for individuals to progress in their vocation, and Luther's account was different to his friend Melanchthon's belief, worked out in his Commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in natural law as the intermediate origin of the states (*Stände*). Luther in describing providence as directly communicated personal vocation which both affirmed and stretched a person's position or state emphasized what one's "providence" is and might become, not whence it came or being able to give reasons for it.

⁹ WA 42, 57:34–58:2; LW 1:76 (on Gen 2:2).

¹⁰ Jonathan Schwanke, "Luther on Creation," *Lutheran Quarterly* 16 (2002): 1–20, 3.

¹¹ WA 44,259,34–37; LW 6:347 (on Gen. 37:12–14): "Nisi matres parerent, lactarent, mundarent. foverent infantes, totum genus humanum interire necesse esset. Cum autem Deus ipse autor sit horum officiorum, [...] esse optima et gratissima exercitia pietatis erga Deum et homines."

¹² WA 43,106,2–6; LW 3:321 (on Gen. 20:2).

¹³ Christopher Voigt-Goy, "Die gesellschaftlichen Stände, die Schöpfung und der Fall. Zur Ständelehre in Luthers Genesisvorlesung (1535)," in *Kontexte: Biografische und forschungsgeschichtliche Schnittpunkte der alttestamentlichen Wissenschaft: Festschrift für Hans Jochen Bodcker zum 80. Geburtstag*, eds. Thomas Wagner, Dieter Vieweger, and Kurt Erlemann (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2008): 65–80. For more detail, see Ulrich Asendorf, *Lectura in Biblia: Luthers Genesisvorlesung (1535–1545)*, *Forschungen zur Systematischen und Ökumenischen Theologie* 87 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998).

Again this seems to be a question of emphasis: Luther supplied the personal and epistemological account and the communal possibilities, whereas Melancthon saw true ethical regeneration as helped by the way God made those institutions and states operate.

Given Luther's belief in God's providence and his unshakable confidence in the sure promises of God, what place was there for a divine mercy received by accident? Mickey Mattox reinforces this Lutheran sense of certainty with an appeal to Luther on Ps 90:3: "Men do not come into being by accident. They are not born by accident. They do not suffer by accident. They do not die by accident.' In each case, 'by accident' is *temere*."¹⁴ Yet according to Mattox there is something of the accidental or the fortuitous in the realm of grace. It is not covenantal and fixed but applies to those outside that arrangement. This is best shown in the great *Lectures on Genesis* which occupied him from 1535 to 1545.¹⁵ Luther began to use *fortuita* positively, pairing it as an adjective with *misericordia*. An example is God's promise to Cain in Genesis 4. Mattox comments:

It was a mere *promissio legalis*, Luther explains, because it depended for its execution not on the infallible faithfulness of God, but on human obedience to a divine law. As with the moral law more generally, so also this law constrains human sin, preserves the lives of Cain and his posterity, and leaves open the possibility of salvation for the elect among them. Accidental mercy, then, is not a saving but rather a preserving grace, one given in the paradoxical form of a divine positive law, conditioned on human obedience.¹⁶

As Mattox explains: "However, 'accidental mercy' refers not merely to the preservative effect of a divine positive law, but to the salvific impact of the word of God as, in God's own good time, it brings light where once there was only darkness." Mattox later glosses this otherwise slightly confusing assertion: "that the accidental mercy of God is at work to preserve the lives and prolong the histories of outsiders so that they, too, can one day turn to saving faith."¹⁷

In Luther's *Larger Catechism* one could argue that God's providential care is at the heart of the explanation of the opening gambit, the First Commandment,

¹⁴ Mickey Mattox, "'Fortuita Misericordia': Martin Luther On The Salvation Of Biblical Outsiders," *Pro Ecclesia* XVII (2008): 423–443, 429, n.22.re. WA 40.III,518; LW 13.96–97.

¹⁵ Cf. Ulrich Asendorf, "Die ökumenische Bedeutung von Luthers Genesis-Vorlesung (1535–1545)," in *Caritas Dei: Beiträge zum Verständnis Luthers und der gegenwärtigen Ökumene: Festschrift für Tuomo Mannermaa zum 60. Geburtstag*, eds. Oswald Bayer, Robert W. Jenson, and Simo Knuuttila (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 1997): 18–40.

¹⁶ Mattox, "'Fortuita Misericordia'," 434 re. WA 42.225; LW 1.306.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 435; 439.

and at the heart of the whole work.¹⁸ Luther was but more profound and truer to human experience than Leibniz, according to Werner Elert.¹⁹ Yet there was true hope as well as realism. It is not coincidence that many regard Luther's great Genesis commentary as the crowning glory of his theological endeavour, as he traced the movement of God in the lives of the patriarchs and others. Luther portrayed God as a restless mover among all his creatures (*inquietus actor in omnibus creaturis*) (WA 18,711). Salvation history happened where God alone was at work, but in the realm of the everyday and also in the ethical outworking of faith there would be room for co-operation and concursus in the sharing of everyday life and its ambitions and anxieties with God.²⁰ There was a different yet most real kind of freedom under providence. Wilfried Härle spotted the connection between the doctrine of Providence and Luther's *Zwei-Regimenten-Lehre*: Providence and Law (*Gesetz*) go together, perhaps primarily in a Lutheran-Augustinian way²¹ – pushing back decay, with *annihilatio mundi* as counterpart to *creatio ex nihilo*.²² Eschatology seems to demand a teleology of world-history towards the kingdom of God, which one gets to by going through and beyond

18 “Gott allein trauen und sich eitel Gutes zu ihm versehen und von ihm gewarten soll, als der uns gibt Leib, Leben, Essen, Trinken, Nahrung, Gesundheit, Schutz, Friede und alle Notdurft zeitlicher und ewiger Güter, dazu bewahrt vor Unglück und, so etwas widerfährt, rettet und aushilft; also dass Gott (wie genug gesagt) allein der ist, von dem man alles Gute empfängt und alles Unglücks los wird. Daher auch, achte ich, nennen wir Deutschen Gott eben mit dem Namen von alters her (feiner und artiger denn keine andere Sprache) nach dem Wörtlein ‘gut’, als der ein ewiger Quellbrunn ist, der sich mit eitel Güte übergießt und von dem alles, was gut ist und heißt, ausfließt.”

19 Werner Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums 1: Theologie und Weltanschauung des Luthertums hauptsächlich im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1931–32), 418: “Wer von Luthers Erklärung des 90. Psalms oder von seiner Schrift gegen Erasmus herkommt, wird keinen Augenblick im Zweifel sein, daß er nicht unnötig schwärzer als Leibniz, sondern wirklich tiefer.”

20 Gottfried Hörnig, “Vorsehungsglaube und Geschichtshandeln: Überlegungen zu einer Neugestaltung der Providentiallehre,” in *Unsere Welt – Gottes Schöpfung: Festschrift für Eberhard Wölfl zum 65. Geburtstag*, eds. Wilfried Härle, Manfred Marquardt, Wolfgang Nethöfel (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1992): 223–233, 223: “Nach reformatorischer Überzeugung handelt Gott in der Erschaffung der Welt sowie in gnadenhaftem Zuspruch der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung ganz allein, wirkt aber in seinem Geschichtshandeln durch das Handeln des Menschen hindurch, so daß von einem ‘Zusammenwirken’ Gottes und des Menschen gesprochen werden kann.”

21 Wilfried Härle, “Luthers Zwei-Regimenten-Lehre als Lehre vom Handeln Gottes,” in *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie I: Vom Handeln Gottes*, eds. Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, Marburger Theologisch Studien, 22 (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1987): 12–32.

22 Hornig, “Vorsehungsglaube und Geschichtshandeln,” 233: “Mit dem Vergehen von Himmel und Erde vollzieht Gott die Aufhebung seiner im Schöpfungsakt erfolgten Selbstbegrenzung.”

“world history.” Likewise, vocation (*Berufung*) was not a private matter, but a social one. Elders watched over it *in loco Dei*. It was based on love and service, not just ambition: Luther would see private contracts in some way as morally speaking “public” matters, since they were part of building up society. In theory vocation could break through the “given” of *Stand* or position in society: in that sense it was “dynamic.”²³

Now this providential care is something short of sure mercy, which saving faith alone can grasp, but it is continuous with it, prepares for it, reinforces it and fulfils it. The idea is that God corrects us not to punish us so that we pay off our debt, but to wake us up, as well as having a mortifying, then sanctifying effect at a deeper level than our acts. In the Genesis lectures (WA 43&44; LW 1–8) Luther tells of Joseph playing a game with his brothers (Gen 42–44) yet doing this with tears: this is an allegory of how God treats the saints for their good.²⁴ God tests them as he tested Abraham: “Those who endure such trial come to a deeper understanding of God’s mercy and providence. ‘O my heavenly Father,’ they exclaim, ‘were you so close to me, and I did not know it?’” For Luther, this is what Scripture means by “seeing the Lord face to face”: to be brought back from hell into reconfession and reaffirmation.²⁵

Steve J. Munson ends his study by giving two fine quotations about how providence is grasped, even if not comprehended:

In faith you should offer resistance so that you may conquer and become Israel. How? Not with the strength or weapons of your flesh and nature but with confidence in the cause that intervenes between you and God, namely, that he has promised and sworn that he will be your God. With this confidence you will conquer, inasmuch as it arises not from Nature but from the promise. If, therefore, he meets you as a wrestler and wants to destroy you or to hide his name and promise, be strong and hold firmly to the Word, even though you feel great infirmity, and you will conquer.²⁶ [...] Even if [God] hides himself in a room in the house and does not want access to be given to anyone, do not draw back but follow. If he does not want to listen, knock at the door of the room; raise a shout! For this is the highest sacrifice, not to cease praying and seeking until we conquer him. He has already surrendered himself to us so that we may be certain of victory: ‘[...] he who believes and is baptized will be saved.’ These promises will never disappoint us unless we refuse to follow and seek.²⁷

23 Werner Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums 2: Sozialehren und Sozialwirkungen des Luthertums* (München: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1932), 74.

24 Steve J. Munson, “The Divine Game: Faith and the Reconciliation of Opposites in Luther’s Lectures on Genesis,” *CTQ* 76 (2012): 89–115, 100.

25 *Ibid.*, 101 re. WA 44,112.

26 Munson, “The Divine Game,” 115, quoting WA 44:115.

27 Munson, “The Divine Game,” 108, re. WA 44:104.

Likewise in connection with the story of Lot: “But God changes this will because Lot fears God and prays. This is God’s ordered power, not His secret power. For God does not want to rule us in accordance with His secret will; He wants to do so in accordance with His will as it has been ordered and revealed by the Word” (WA 43:82.14–21; LW 3:289).

Haemig explains that in the *Large Catechism* (1529) Luther argued:

that this petition [the Lord’s Prayer] prays that God’s will be done rather than the will of the devil, the world, or our enemies [...] He did not place God’s will in opposition to the will of the one praying [...]. In the Genesis lectures Luther went further, making clear that questioning God and even trying to change what is perceived as God’s will is part of the life of faith. It was acceptable for Abraham to question God on whether God would really fulfill his promise. Further, it was not just tolerable but laudable that Abraham tried to influence God’s actions toward Sodom.²⁸

Calvin and the Swiss-Dutch tradition

There is something in the thesis that just as the “Second Reformation” in terms of Dogmatics was more about process and action rather than about new beginnings and status, its philosophical theology was more about Providence than Creation.²⁹ In his essay “Calvin on Universal and Particular Providence,” Charles Partee summarises from Calvin’s *Contre la secte phantastique et furieuse des Libertines qui se nomment spirituelz* (Calvini Opera 7:186–90). General providence means the sun, moon and stars in their courses:

The second aspect of God’s work in his creatures is that he extends his hand to help his servants and to punish the wicked. Thus prosperity and adversity, rain, wind, sleet, frost, fine weather, abundance, famine, war and peace are works of the hand of God. The third aspect of the work of God consists in his governance of the faithful, living and reigning in them by his Holy Spirit.³⁰

Partee explains further: “In [Hermann] Bavinck’s treatment common grace seems to be the presupposition of special grace. However Calvin does not

²⁸ Mary Jane Haemig, “Prayer as talking back to God in Luther’s Genesis lectures”, *Lutheran Quarterly*, ns 23 (2009), 270–295.

²⁹ Wollgast, *Philosophie in Deutschland*, 71: “Hatte bis zur Reformation das Hauptinteresse der Theologen Gott dem Schöpfer gegolten, so wurde dieses Interesse während und nach der Reformation teilweise von der Providentia-Lehre verdrängt.”

³⁰ Charles Partee, *Calvin and Classical Philosophy*, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 15 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 126–45.

make special grace depend on common grace, nor special providence depend on universal providence.”³¹ Special providence – that which concerns believers in their Christian lives – takes precedence in Calvin’s scheme. God can withhold sun and rain (universal providence) for the sake of special concerns. Providence should really be understood in the first place as special providence: “Since God’s providence is a ‘rampart of defense,’ Calvin objects to the idea of separating creation from providence and understanding the latter as the provision of a kind of neutral context for life rather than as God’s special care for all that he had created” (Com Ps 35,22; *Calvini Opera* 31,356).³² Thus the basic understanding of God’s Providence is not a neutral common grace, but the conviction that God has the power to protect the faithful. Partee ascribes *providentia specialissima* to the Holy Spirit, and he makes it amount the same thing as predestination in Calvin’s scheme. “The third stage in the development of the doctrines of providence and predestination is reached in the final edition of the *Institutes*. Here the main exposition of providence *precedes* the treatment of predestination (*contrast* the 1539 *Institutes*), although Calvin does not explain why.”³³

However, against what Partee and Kusche maintain, Book I of the final edition of his famous *Institutio* treated providence as part of the doctrine of God, giving it nearly the same position it had in the scheme of Thomas Aquinas, while predestination was placed in an altogether different position, as part of the section on soteriology (III.xxiff.), immediately preceding the discussion of the resurrection. In the edition of 1541, this emphasis had been even more striking, when the early section on providence was lacking and that doctrine was discussed only after the section on Predestination, which is part of soteriology. The arrangement of the edition of 1541 suggests that providence also may be best understood as a work of grace (However in the 1559 edition, “Providence is separated from predestination and finds full expression as a part of the knowledge of God the Creator.”³⁴ Indeed, “God’s government of worldly affairs seemed to be one thing, and involved one set of rules; his action for a person’s eternal welfare was another, governed by rules of an altogether different order.”³⁵

31 Ibid., 129.

32 Ibid., 130.

33 Ibid., 139.

34 Susan Schreiner, *The Theater of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 7.

35 Heinrich Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics*, ed. John W. Beardslee III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 17f. Cf. Richard Stauffer, *Dieu, la création et la Providence dans la prédication de Calvin*, Basler und Berner Studien zur historischen und systematischen Theologie 33 (Bern: P. Lang, 1978), Ch 6: “La Providence,” 261: “On sait que la doctrine de la Providence qui ne fait

Christian Link helpfully comments that the treatment of Providence in the 1539 *Institutes*, as in the 1536 edition was grounded in the doctrines of Creation and of God. Rom 8:30 is attributed to Providence, and it denotes an *ordo misericordiae*. But the main difference is that whereas Predestination is now (by 1539) defined as *aeternum dei decretum*, Providence is now *Anordnung (gubernatio)*. And yet the language seems interchangeable so that it is hard always to distinguish the two. In his treatment of Ephesians 1:3 and 2 Tim 1:9 there is a veritable intermingling of Providence and Predestination: they donate content to each other. Special providence only comes into play where Christ and salvation are operative.³⁶

To be truthful, by 1559 Calvin was not really interested in classifications but in the pastoral implications of certain views. If anything, his picture of God the Father (not the Spirit) is one of a pastor with a eudemonistic tone. David in the Psalms was the model for the rhetoric here, as he praised the general or universal providence of God the Father.³⁷ On the negative side, he was concerned not to have something between God and us called “fortuna.” He confesses himself to be tired of people saying “fortune” when they should say “God” (*Inst* I,16,5). Calvin followed Guillaume Budé in constructing a total opposition between divine providence and Fortune: Even to think of historical events as “coincidence” is not any better: that is to make everything just accidental and meaningless. Calvin came to see that it was not enough just to draw near to history, to let it instruct us, as pagans thought it was. Rather, with the Holy Spirit’s help, one was to see what an event or series of events meant for the whole of history, the present included. Scripture contained prophecy after all. Holy Scripture might well relate special stories but that does not mean that the action of God in them should be seen as irregular or exceptional.³⁸ The older Calvin was less confident in treating

pas l’objet d’un chapitre particulier dans l’*Institution chrestienne* de 1536, apparaît, liée à la doctrine de la prédestination, dans le chapitre 8 de l’édition de 1539/1541, avant d’être disjointe de la doctrine d’élection dans l’édition de 1559/1560.”

36 Christian Link, *Schöpfung*, vol. 1, *Schöpfungstheologie in reformatischer Tradition*, Handbuch systematischer Theologie 7/1 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1991), 177 ff. Cf. 182: “Der Skopus der Gotteslehre ist die Providenz, sofern sie erst Gott als den Schöpfer recht erkennen läßt. Der Skopus der Christologie ist die Prädestination, sofern wir in der Bestimmung des Menschen zum Heil das Ziel der Sendung Christi erfassen.”

37 *Inst* I.16.5: “[...] generalem Dei providentiam [...] Puerile est, ut iam dixi, hoc ad particulares actus restringere, quum sine exceptione loquitur Christus, nullum ex passerulis nullius pretii cadere in terram sine Patris voluntate.”

38 *Inst* I.16.7: “Quinetiam particulares eventus testimonia esse dico in genere singularis Dei providentiae. Excitavit Deus in deserto ventum australem, qui populo adveheret copiam avium [Exod. 16,c13] Quum Ionam voluit in mare proiici, ventum turbine excitando emisit

extra-biblical history as providing examples. Calvin seems to envision a general providence, which is a universal presence rather than an occasional one. One might expect Calvin to want to protect the Father's transcendence a bit more. But the point is that "special providence" is a continuation of the "general," or a sharpening of it. God controls generally in order to be ready to adapt the world for his special ends.

Providence is something God exercises towards all his creatures, but this is not always for their apparent good since it is directed towards their ultimate good, which is acknowledgement of Him, rather than guaranteed eternal life with Him. It is properly not part of soteriology, although as Providence leads on to saving history so might acknowledgement of it well prepare the way for salvation. There is clearly no hiatus between creation and salvation.

The solution of the difficulty is well known, that God ceased from all his work, when he desisted from the creation of new kinds of things. But to make this sense clearer, understand that the last touch of God had been put, in order that nothing be wanting to the perfection of the world. And this is the meaning of the words of Moses, "From all his work which he had made"; for he points out the actual state of the work as God would have it to be, as if he had said, then was completed what God had proposed to Himself. On the whole, this language is intended merely to express the perfection of the fabric of the world; and therefore we must not infer that God so ceased from this works so as to desert them, since they only flourish and subsist in him.³⁹

There is no sense that God has delegated any of his agency to any subordinate.⁴⁰ Calvin wanted to bury any idea of *Fortuna* to which people ascribe good and bad events. The sun, for all its glory, is a mere instrument. Just like one holding a key God moderates all events, as he puts it in *Institutes* I, 16,4 ("*sed veluti clavum tenens, eventus omnes moderatur*"), while the French version of the following year (1560) has: "he is like a ship's owner who takes over the rudder" ("*il est comme un patron de navire, qui tient le gouvernail*").

Only believers can really see this, since whereas nature manifests, history often obscures providence, which can be recognised only by the *sensus fidei*: for how he meant this the *Commentary on the Psalms* is the key witness.⁴¹ But

[Ionaë 1.B4] Dicent quid not putant Deum mundi gubernacula tenet, hoc fuisse praeter commune usum. Atqui idne colligo nullum unquam ventum oriri, vel surgere, nisi speciali Dei iussu."

³⁹ *Commentary on Genesis* (<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/calcom01.html>) Vol 1, 104.

⁴⁰ Calvin I.16,2: "Quo melius pateat hoc discrimen, sciendum est, providentiam Dei, quails traditur in Scriptura, fortunae et casibus fortuitis opponi."

⁴¹ "De aeterna praedestinatione dei" (Calvini Opera [CO] 8:347–9).

that does not mean that God in his providence is only providing for or interested in believers. As Richard Stauffer points out, the hand-holding (*manutentia*) is not reserved for believers (Sermon 33 on 1 Tim 1): God here also guarantees nonbelievers from danger.⁴² For that protection is a demonstration of how God feels paternally towards *all people* (“une manifestation, dans l’ordre de la création, de l’amour paternel de Dieu envers toute l’humanité”).⁴³ Deuteronomy 8:3 and Matthew 4:4 are both about physical bread, yet Calvin defines this as *special* providence – because bread is not a product of the earth naturally – and God has to arrange things, with rain and creatures (farmers and millers) required. God is interested in more than souls. Stauffer declares that for Calvin (on Deuteronomy) God’s care for bodies is evidence, a sign that he cares for souls.⁴⁴

In *Institutes* I,16,9 Calvin admits that, in the story he relates of the merchant who gets separated from friends in the forest and is killed, it seems an unlucky turn of events, rather than something decreed by God. But Job 14:5 (“a person’s days are numbered”) would suggest that it was divinely intended, and of course it is easier to see such things in scripture as God-planned. Of course we should note also Calvin’s love for examples, which he learned from his classical and rhetorical training. As Ganoczy and Scheld note: Seneca’s *De luxu* was relevant for Calvin’s own brand of Stoicism, as was the *De Clementia* on which he wrote a commentary. Also Senecan Tragedies and Lucan’s *Pharsalia* on the Roman Civil War are echoed in Calvin’s praise of *rusticitas*, and his approval of an ethos of sober living, an eschewing of *fortuna* and a determination to help for the poor. The encomium of all things rustic would have seemed like backwardness to many Genevans. Moreover, civil war was a reality during the time of writing *On the Secret Providence of God*. His interpretation of Psalms 114 & 124 is set against a background of religious armed conflict in Germany. The Stoic paradox of seeking life through death accorded with Calvin’s theology of the cross. Likewise, Calvin saw God’s slowness to judge as allowing the sins of persecutors to add up (“comble des péchés”), although there was always a chance for repentance, unlike Agrippa d’Aubigné, according to whom, more under the influence of Bullinger, they had lost their chance.⁴⁵ One might want to say that although

⁴² CO 53, p400, on 1 Tim 4:10.

⁴³ Stauffer, *Dieu, la creation et la Providence*, 267.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 270: “Oublier qu’il veille sur notre existence temporelle, c’est oublier à coup sûr qu’il s’intéresse à notre vie éternelle. Ne pas voir en lui la Providence, c’est inmanquablement se condamner à ne pas reconnoître en lui le Sauveur” (On Deut; CO 26, 94.).

⁴⁵ Elliott Forsyth, *La Justice de Dieu: Les Tragiques d’Agrippa d’Aubigne et la Reforme protestante en France au XVIe siecle*, Etudes et Essais sur la Renaissance 5 (Paris Honore Champion 2005), 234: “Pour Calvin, Dieu exerce sa patience afin de permettre au pécheur de se repentir

not dominant, apocalypticism, with the idea of imminent judgement, was the world-view of a sizeable minority in the Reformed movement of the later sixteenth century. Its rhetoric and conception of God as avenger would continue to be influential, even if the vengeance lay more in the world to come than in this. Bullinger and Calvin at the very least encouraged the view that what was needed was not merely the renewal of the Church, but of the whole world.

The other side of the coin is that Calvin and his “God” mistrusted human agency. There was a sin of looking to dominate and control all things, as Seneca did.⁴⁶ Susan Schreiner observes that for Calvin, creation is now too far fallen into corruption for God to entrust acts to secondary causes. Providence is more a “bridle” (Job 1:6), and it might be better to think of secondary causes as instrumental rather than efficient causes.⁴⁷ Calvin forbids any notion of God’s being caught up in secondary causes, for all that He is immanent to creation to act on it. There is something about the divine will in relation to creation that continues in his teaching on Providence. Calvin’s dislike of Ecclesiasticus 18:1 is apparent when he insists “the Greek text cannot be used to mean ‘He who lived forever created all things at one and the same time’.” No, God took successive periods to unroll creation (*Comm Gen* 1:5; *CO* 23:17). As Schreiner notes the Psalms commentary and three Psalms in particular should be noticed (Ps 104, Ps 107 and Ps 115).⁴⁸ Also in the famous Preface to that work, Calvin famously wrote that God with the hidden rein of his divine providence turned his course aside.⁴⁹ It is interesting that if there is a biblical book that provides much of Calvin’s food for thought on this subject it is not Job, but the Psalms.⁵⁰ The Book of Jonah shows Calvin at

et de recevoir son pardon. Pour d’Aubigné, cependant, l’oppresseur du peuple de Dieu n’a aucune possibilité de se repentir, aucune possibilité de pardon.”

⁴⁶ Ganoczy-Scheld, *Herrschaft, Tugend, Vorsehung: Hermeneutische Deutung und Veröffentlichung handschriftlicher Annotationen Calvins zu sieben Senecatragödien und der Pharsalia Lucans* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1992), 22. In his Pentateuch-harmony Calvin would come to speak out strongly against Stoicism (*CO* 25,90) (*ibid.*, 27).

⁴⁷ Schreiner, *The Theater of His Glory*, 36.

⁴⁸ He pitted himself against Averroist Italians: God is not just a force, but one who determines (Ps 115:3); cf. Ps 107:43. Aristotelians try to tie God up in secondary causality. The order of nature is not a hierarchy but a stability that nevertheless requires God’s constant attention (Ps 104:29), including the waters above the earth (*CO* 37:631–2).

⁴⁹ *CO* 31.21: “Deus tamen arcano providentiae suae fraeno cursum meum alio tandem reflexit.”

⁵⁰ Pieter C. Potgieter, “Providence in Calvin: Calvin’s View of God’s Use of Means (*media*) in his Acts of Providence,” in *Calvinus Evangelii Propugnator: Calvin, Champion of the Gospel: Papers Presented at the International Congress on Calvin Research, Seoul, 1998*, eds. David F. Wright, Anthony N. S. Lane, and Jon Balserak (Grand Rapids: Calvin Studies Society, 2006): 175–190. On Ps 104:30 Calvin wrote: “Gradatim vero describit animalium interitum, ubi arcanum suum vigorem retrahit Deus, quo melius ex opposito continuam inspirationem commendat, qua vegetantur”

his most resistant to Christological interpretation for the message of that small book was to affirm the divine control over nature for the sake of history. Calvin consulted Guilelmus Rondelet's work *Libri de piscibus marinis* and concluded that what swallowed Jonah was not a whale but a man-eating shark (*lamia*), which in turn was a symbol of providential conservation.⁵¹

According to John Hesselink:

the abundant references in Calvin's writings to the governing and guiding work of the Spirit suggest that although the concrete truths and injunctions of Scripture may be implied or understood and although Christ is always the model (exemplar) for our lives, Calvin submits that we are given not only faith and assurance by the Holy Spirit but also both general and specific wisdom and direction for our lives quite apart from any explicit instruction in the Scriptures or preaching of the gospel. In short, the Spirit at times gives seemingly independent and secret guidance.⁵²

The Spirit gives a sort of suprarational insight and understanding, and this is very much connected to sanctification and mortification, as in the *Geneva Catechis*, question 173. Hesselink further argues: "But Providence supplies a kind of a guidance when we cannot see," and Calvin gives the example of the cripple at Lystra finding his way to Paul.⁵³ There arises a veritable *terminus technicus* in Calvin's writings, particularly the commentaries and sermons, viz., "by a secret impulse of the Spirit/God" (*arcano spiritus/ Dei instinctu*).⁵⁴ Hesselink points here to the work of scholars who have researched Calvin's pneumatology and ecclesiology.⁵⁵

(Calvin, *Comm Ps* 104.30; *CO* 32:95). Here Calvin rejects Servetus's claim that creatures partake in the Holy Spirit simply by being created. Cf. *CO* 8:606: "nihil in coelo est vel in terra, quod non sua praesentia arcanoque influxu vegetetur Dei spiritus" (*Refutatio errorum Michaelis Serveti*).

51 Jens Wolff, "Providenz und Meeresforschung: Auslegungsgeschichtliche Beobachtungen zu Johannes-Calvins Jona-Kommentar," in *Der problematische Prophet: Die biblische Jona-Figur in Exegese, Theologie, Literatur und bildender Kunst*, eds. Johann Anselm Steiger and Wilhelm Kühlmann, *Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte*, 118 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), 139–58: Jonah himself was not a type of Christ but his three-day underground sojourn was a type of Christ's *triduum*.

52 I. John Hesselink, "Governed and Guided by the Spirit: A Key Issue in Calvin's Doctrine of the Holy Spirit," in *Reformiertes Erbe, Festschrift für Gottfried W. Locher zu seinem 80. Geburtstag: Band 2*, eds. Heiko A. Oberman, Ernst Saxer, Alfred Schindler, and Heinzpeter Stuckim, Zwingliana (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1992): 161–171, 163.

53 Commentary in Acts 14:9 (*CO* 48,321).

54 Hesselink, "Governed and Guided by the Spirit", 169.

55 Ibid., 161: cf. Werner Krusche, *Das Wirken des Heiligen Geistes nach Calvin* FKDG 7 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957); see also the appendix to Benjamin Charles Milner Jr., *Calvin's Doctrine of the Church*, SHCT 5 (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 197 ff.

Hence there is merit in what Cornelis van Sliedregt says: as one moves from Calvin to Beza, one moves from omnicausality and care into omnicausality alone. There seems a true loss of the experiential side: Beza wanted to make theological corrections of philosophy, and to provide respectable Christian apologetics.⁵⁶ J. Dantine saw the Zwinglian influence in Beza's liking for God as *sum-mum bonum* in his tying Providence to the Doctrine of God. That which Bohatec ascribed to Calvin, viz. the view that Providence was the *Stammlehre*, or the starting-place ("proscenium arch") with Predestination as the central dogma – seems to fit Beza. All that happened was tied to God's original decree which is the substance of his eternal providence.⁵⁷ Providence is the overarching concept for the decree and execution – and it serves the doctrine of Election, with the Trinity as the "place of refuge" theme. For Beza, Predestination and Providence went hand in hand, and hence he went his own way from Calvin, notwithstanding the protestations of Richard Muller not to make too much of this. Calvin makes the distinction of divine willing and divine permission in Predestination, but not in Providence. As Jeremy Mallinson observes, as early as 1569 Beza used the term "Deist" (coined by Guillaume Farel) – "*qui se Deistas vocant*" – and so it was never enough for him just to prove God's existence.⁵⁸ God was an Actor, in fact the Hero of the Play.

We find a nice summary of Beza's view in his *Aphorisms*:⁵⁹

30. For the Sophisters set will against permission, or sufferance: whereof doth follow that God suffers the things which he suffers, either against his will, or at leastwise being idle, & not caring for them. But contrariwise, lest we should either take from God his endless and unmeasurable power, or after the opinion of the Epicures, say as the thing indeed is, that God neither works anything by instruments, but willingly, nor yet suffers the instruments to work, but willingly, yet in such sort that whatsoever he works, he works most justly, and whatsoever he permits or suffers, he most justly suffers.

31. And God works in respect of his own work: and permits or suffers in respect of the work that the evil instruments do of their own accord work, or insofar as they are active and not passive instruments, that we may keep the terms used in the schools. Yet doth God just-

56 Cornelis van Sliedregt, *Calvijns Opvolger Theodorus Beza: Zijn Verkiezingsleer en zijn belijdenis van de drieënige God*, Kerkhistorische Monografieën 4 (Leiden: Groen, 1988), 271. On p. 272 one reads in his conclusion concerning Beza's *Confessio*: "via de voorzienigheid de predestinatie vooronderstelt."

57 Johannes Dantine, *Die Prädestinationslehre bei Calvin und Beza* (Göttingen: Georg August-Universität, 1965), 55 f.

58 Jeremy Mallinson, *Faith, Reason, and Revelation in Theodore Beza: 1519–1605*, Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 109.

59 *Theodore Beza's Thirty-Eight Aphorisms against Castalio*, translated by John Stockwood (http://www.truecovenant.com/supralapsarian/beza_against_castalion.html).

ly suffer the thing that these instruments unjustly work, for because that sins, insofar as they are suffered by God that wills, are not sins: but punishments of sin. For with GOD it is a just thing to punish sins with sins. But these selfsame actions insofar as they come from Satan, and evil men provoked by Satan and their own concupiscence or lust, are so far sins, which the Lord in his time doth justly punish. For the Lord doth never suffer sins so far as they are sins, nay he doth always forbid them.

32. Neither is this consequence or reason good: God wills all things, therefore he allows all things. For he wills many things, and therefore suffers them, not because he simply allows of them, but after a certain sort, for he allows them, so far as he suffers them, even so far as they are no sins, as we said even now: But he disallows & punishes them, so far as he hath respect or looks unto the evil instruments, whose actions they are.

Here Providence seems to be very much about divine judgment and about the doctrine of God and his reputation.

The Heidelberg Catechism and Bullinger

Emidio Campi has this to say about Peter Martyr Vermigli:

Moreover he sided unequivocally with Augustine, Luther and Calvin in highlighting God's continual presence in creation (*creatio continua*). He did not take the statement that "God finished his creation the seventh day" (Gen 2:3) to mean that God no longer creates. It would be more accurate to say, and Vermigli is explicit about this, that God is at every moment creating, for the creation would cease to exist altogether if God were to withdraw his sustaining power.⁶⁰

Vermigli was of course the teacher of Ursinus, the chief theologian of the hugely influential Heidelberg Catechism of 1563. The word that rings out at the very beginning of that Catechism is "Trost". This should not mean that we take the spirituality of the Heidelberg Catechism to be a passive one. As Thorsten Latzel observes,⁶¹ the tone is one of encouraging *Lebensmut* through a consideration of

⁶⁰ Emidio Campi, "Genesis Commentary: Interpreting Creation," in *A Companion to Peter Martyr Vermigli*, eds. Torrance Kirby, Emidio Campi, and Frank James III, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 16 (Leiden: Brill, 2009): 209–229, 220.

⁶¹ Thorsten Latzel, *Theologische Grundzüge des Heidelberger Katechismus: Eine fundamental-theologische Untersuchung seines Ansatzes zur Glaubenskommunikation*, MThSt 83 (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 2004): 45: "Das *nächstliegende* Missverständnis besteht in der semantischen Bestimmung des Begriffes von dem Verb 'trösten' her. 'Trost' wird so *negativ* definiert als Verarbeiten von Trauer und bleibt am Vergangenen orientiert [...]. Das intendierte Trostverständnis leitet sich dagegen von 'getrost sein' bzw. 'sich trauen' ab [...] ein Sich-Trauen, das positive bestimmt und zukunftsbezogen ist."

providence in the whole of life, not just for its difficult moments: it is all important that “Trost” is understood not as mere consolation, but comfort in the sense of strengthening for action: “gerade in der Befähigung zur Selbsthingabe bestehen.” The Christian life is one turned around and turned outwards. The associations are therefore ethical not mystical: there is some indirect connection to soteriology, even the soteriological relevance of the doctrine of Creation.

Hartogh contends that the Providence teaching of the Heidelberg Catechism is not about theodicy any more than that was Calvin’s emphasis.⁶² If anything, it is about humans being put to the test, in the way that Abraham was.⁶³ The truth is that *voorzienigheid* is not indifferent (*Zondag 3, Vraag 8*). In his discussion of *Zondag 1*, the neo-Calvinist Klaas Schilder makes much of the biographical sense of the consolation of faith as that which looks to God’s past faithfulness (so, Alexander Comrie), rather than the mystical feeling of sense or any amount of deliberation in which consolation might become a thing in itself (so, the Arminian Episcopius). Schilder warns his reader: the mystical way of co-operative presence seems to offer reassurance of God’s friendly presence but really this kind of universal, general *concursum* is not typically scriptural: ⁶⁴ the Jesuit Lessius liked simultaneity after all! There is a need to continue to struggle against Molinism. Schilder wishes rid of cooperation as Romantic and panentheist.⁶⁵ There is enough cooperation already in the term “preservation” (*onderhouding*); and here he name-checks Bavinck.

On the other hand, when we look at the theologian who tried to explain his own catechism (Ursinus, *Explicationes catecheticae* 1564) and then a theologian whose teaching nicely concurs with it, we see something a little bit more optimistic: first, Ursinus tells us that grace and mercy lead us to flee sin and divine wrath against it, while all torments and troubles lead us to salvation by teaching

⁶² Gerrit den Hartogh, *Voorzienigheid in donker licht: Herkomst en gebruik van het begrip ‘providentia Dei’ in De reformatorische theologie, in het bijzonder bij Zacharias Ursinus* (Heerenveen: Groen, 1999).

⁶³ Klaas Schilder, *Heidelbergsche Katechismus*, (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1947–51) I: 448, “Men bedenkt niet, dat God *altijd* een oordeel heft over den *konkreten* mensch.”

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, IV,215 (Z 10,Vr 27) 20: “Wannerr men nu sprekt van Gods ‘concursum’, dan heft men dus weer het oog op een zekeren vorm van tegenwoordigheid Gods [...]. Der z.g. concursum (de samengang) van God met de kreaturen is dus in ieder geval een bepaalde *vorm-van-tegenwoordigheid*: en waar ze zich tot alle schepselen uitstrekt, daarin natuurlijk elke creatuur in haar door God zelf gestelde wezen erkennende (terese, zie S 67), daar wordt ze wel genoemd *generale concursum*, of *universeele concursum*.”

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, II:255.

us to be patient ⁶⁶ Yet even if it is not easy, it is at least easier to see Providence in an optimistic way if it is the cases of believers which we are discussing.⁶⁷ Second, when we turn to Bullinger, that theologian famous for his reservations about preaching Predestination, we see a very positive appreciation for Providence in its own right.

The providence of God does not upset the order of things or the offices of life, and it does not discard the just economy and obedience but through these it works for the salvation of those who accommodate themselves religiously by divine help to his decrees or institution and divine operation, and who offer acceptance to Him of whatever good that can be done against human corruption [...] and against whatever evil we do.⁶⁸

Bullinger continues: We should be encouraged of God's good will towards us and not discouraged by the devil; God is a good and powerful creator, as Psalm 99 and 148:5 tell us. This is so far from the question of theodicy that comes up post-Enlightenment. Can God be all-powerful and all-good? Yes, since for Bullinger those two qualities reinforce each other. As he comes to the end of this section on Providence, he writes that God's wisest governance of all things is always just and most equitable. Worthy of praise are his works towards us. Bullinger then recites the ways in which natural forces do his bidding before narrowing down to the human realm: God gives commands and rulings against wrong, Noah the most righteous he delivered from the perils of the flood, Enoch he transferred into the society of friendship, and finally since He is generous and good and will not allow the world to be parched of his rivers of grace, he sent the apostolic doctors into the whole world to be sent by his son so that the con-

66 *Explicationum catecheticarum absolutum opus* (Neostadium Palatinorum [Neustadt], 1600), 137: "Ut suae gratiae et singularis misericordiae ad effugiendum peccatum, necessitate, et suam adversus peccatum iram, suamque iustitiam, et potentiam in eo puniendo patefaciat' Loci comm 587 (88); 1. In adversis nunquam erimus patientes, nisi sciamus a Deo patre nostro ea nobis immitti. 2. Nunquam erimus pro beneficiis grati, nisi agnoscamus ea divinitus nobis dari. 3. Nunquam habebimus spem bonam et certam de futuris, nisi faciamus voluntatem Dei praesentem, eamque de nobis et omnibus electis servandis immutabilem esse persuasi simus."

67 Contra Carl Heinz Ratschow, "Das Heilshandeln und das Welthandeln Gottes: Gedanken zur Lehrgestaltung des Providentia-Glaubens in der evangelischen Dogmatik," *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie* 1 (1959): 25–80, who would reserve providence for *Heilshandeln* but not for *Welthandeln*.

68 H. Bullinger, *Dekaden* (1552), 4.4., (*Heinrich Bullinger Werke*, 3. Abt. *Theologische Werke* (ed. P. Opitz, Zürich: TVZ, 2007), 595: "Nam providentia dei ordinem rerum non turbat, officia vitae, laborem et industriam non abrogat nec tollit e medio iustam oeconomiam ac obedientiam, sed per haec operatur salute hominum accomodantium se religiose per auxilium divinum decretis seu instituto et operationi divinae cui merito acceptum ferunt, quicquid bene fit, contra corruptionem humanae et nostrae inscitiae ac peccatis, quicquid male fit."

dition of the human race would have an instructor who says ‘father’ to God in his prayers. So this providence is not only running alongside world history, but it runs through cities and states as it does its work.⁶⁹

Having delicately treated the question of Predestination along the way, Bullinger ends by emphasising God’s fairness in providence, hence in his predestination, just as both things are meant for his glory. He then paints a picture of the richness and diversity of life: by God’s command all things are moved, springs gush forth, streams flow, waves rise up, all give birth to their young, storms arrive, seas surge, all things everywhere diffuse their fertility which he planted the garden of our happiness for our forebears and gave the command and established a statute against wrongdoing. God delivered the most righteous Noah from the dangers of the flood and transferred Enoch into the society of his friendship. And since he is more generous, lest the whole world be lost to his rivers of grace and dry up, he wishes the apostolic teachers to be sent into the whole world through his Son.

In *Decades* IV,4 then, Bullinger seems to deal with Predestination and Providence as two parallel topics, rather than subordinating one to the other. So Providence stands in relation to Creation of course, but more fundamentally it stands also in relation to the Decree: (see Wollebius, 29; Heidanus, 347). If Prov-

⁶⁹ Ibid., 601: “Adiecimus paucula de gubernatione rerum omnium sapientissima et optima per divinam eius providentiam semper iustam aequissimamque; Item de bona dei erga nos voluntate, de praedestinatione et aliis quibusdam his agnatis Omnia vero haec recitavimus ad ornandam gloriam cognitionemque dei creatoris nostri. Cui testimonium reddit tam invisibilium quam etiam visibilium, et semper et tota natura. Quem angeli adorant, astra mirantur, mari benediciunt, terrae verentur, inferna quaeque suscipiunt. Quem mens omnis humana sentit, etiamsi non exprimit: cuius imperio omnia commoventur, fontes scaturiunt, amnes labuntur, fluctus assurgunt, foetus suos cuncta parturient, venti spirare conantur, imbres veniunt, maria commoventur, foecunditates suas cuncta ubique diffundunt, qui peculiarem protoplastis nostris foelicitatis hortum plantavit, mandatum dedit sententiamque contra delictum statuit. Noe iustissimum de diluvi periculis libertavit, Enoch transtulit in amicitiae societatem [...]. Et quia ultro largus et bonus est, ne totus orbis aversus gratiae eius fluminibus aresceret, apostolos doctores in totum orbem per filium suum mitti voluit, ut conditio generis humani institutorem et, siquidem sequeretur, haberet, quem pro deo in suis iam postulationibus patrem diceret. Cuius modo providentia non tantum sigillatim per homines cucurrit aut currit, sed etiam per ipsas urbes et civitates, quarum exitus prophetarum vocibus cecinit, imo etiam per totum orbem Cuius propter incredulitatem exitus, plagas, 602 deminutiones poenasque descripsit. Et ne quis non etiam ad minima quaeque dei putaret istam infatigabilem providentiam pervenire – Mt 10,29. Cuius etiam cura et providentia Israelitarum non finit nec vestes consume nec vilissima in pedibus calceamenta deteri. Nec immerito (Dt 29,5). Nam si hic omnia complexus est continens, omnia autem et totum ex singulis constant, pertinget consequenter eius as usque singulae quaeque cura, cuius ad totum, quicquid est, pervenit providenti. Huic soli Gloria.”

idence is related to an eternal decree, then it is not subject to Creation but already exists alongside it, and not just to preserve it, but to correct and guide. This does not mean continuing to create as such, for Providence does not derive its marching orders from creation but from the covenant and the Lord of the covenant. The writings on Providence, which have wanted to focus on theodicy and God and creation, from Beza onwards up into our present day, are by definition works of defence and apologetics. Gijsbert van den Brink and Cornelis van der Kooi have observed, the Early Modern Protestants were well aware of the question of God and evil, although it is evil as sin that they focused on.⁷⁰ Yet for Bullinger and the Heidelberg Catechism, Providence was that which prepared people for the gospel, before and after Christian conversion.

One can detect between 1550 and 1580 a shift from seeing persecution as due to God's chastising for sins (Calvin) to a later view (after St Bartholomew's Day, 1571) that the apocalyptic answer might be the right one. The succession of these stages is reflected in the work of Agrippa d'Aubigne: God seemed to be inactive in Agrippa's *La Chambre dorée*, but in fact he has become a character on earth observing the atrocities. The message is that martyrs are not meant to trust in arms, and are being reduced in number by massacres to become the "remnant of Israel." When Apoc 6:10 asks "how much longer?", Calvin saw this as letting the persecutors' sins add up to a "comble des péchés."⁷¹ Bullinger reinforced this and sharpened things and the *Cent sermons sur l'Apocalypse* was in French a year after it was published in Zürich in 1557–58, followed by the 1577 translation of his *De Persecutionibus Ecclesiae Christianae* of 1573: the end of the world was close, in a way that Calvin had resisted in his lifetime. Attention now switched to the final judgement of the persecutors.

By the turn of the century (i. e. c. 1600) for a theologian like William Bucan at Lausanne, what Providence meant for "God" in himself seems to have mat-

70 Gijsbert van den Brink and Cornelis van der Kooi, *Christelijke dogmatiek* (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2012), 221: "De sporen daarvan zien we terug tot in de zeventiende eeuw, een bloeiperiode van optimistisch getoonzette verhandelingen over de voorzienigheidsleer. In de daaraan voorafgaande eeuw van de Reformatie treffen we weliswaar veel meer bijbelse spanning en dynamiek aan rond de voorzienigheid van God. De filosofische invloeden werden echter niet geheel uitgezuiverd. Ze werden veeleer nog versterkt door nieuwe theologische motieven die opkwamen uit de strijd tegen het laatmiddeleeuwse coöperatiedenken, waarin God en mens geacht werden samen te werken met het oog op het heil. In hun afkeer van elke leer van 'goede werken' spraken Luther, Ulrich Zwingli en Calvijn krachtige taal over het alomvattende karakter van Gods voorzienigheid en 'alleenwerkzaamheid'."

71 Forsyth, *La Justice de Dieu*, 210: "Pour Calvin, Dieu exerce sa patience afin de permettre au pécheur de se repentir et de recevoir son pardon. Pour d'Aubigné. Cependant, l'oppresseur du peuple de Dieu n'a aucune possibilité de se repentir, aucune possibilité de pardon."

tered the most. Providence had two parts: an eternal unchangeable disposition and an actual and temporal administration. The latter can be further divided into three: it is triplex: *universalis*, *specialis*, *particularis*, with the second of these God's governing of all human activities.⁷² But it is all about activities. God is perceived in act and as act, with his paternal qualities reserved for those within a covenantal relationship. As Partee has argued, this seems to be not so much special providence driving everything, but a separation of universal and special providence from a more personal *providentia specialissima* operating within the covenantal boundaries. A similar emphasis on "large-scale" everyday special providence (*providentia* that is merely *specialis*) is obvious in Wollebius and Heidegger and most of the other Protestant scholastics.⁷³ One finds a reaction against this in Romantic Reformed theology, where with Schleiermacher all providence is *providentia specialissima*. But for the early Seventeenth Century, *providentia specialissima* was a step-up, where God worked through believers and churches to make history. Yet it is interesting that so much attention was paid to merely "everyday" "special providence."

Bucan gave a fairly standard reply to the old question of whether God stopped working on the seventh day with reference to John 5:17 and Wisdom 1:7. The three types of providence are also rehearsed, with "special" pertaining to all humans, although this in turn is supposed to be perceived in order to strengthen the faith of those who enjoy the particular providence of Election (Locus XI).⁷⁴ There are causes which are contingent. We should not add in divine causation as another cause because that would make for necessity. In fact in the case of

72 "Specialis – inter homines vero, nulli concipiantur, nascantur, vivant, conserventur, moveantur, agant quidquam, mortem obeant, nisi ex nutu & voluntate dei," Bucanus, *Institio theologica* (Lausanne, 1605), 151.

73 The secondary causes God uses could have been otherwise. So Heinrich Heppe, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche*, ed. Ernst Bizer (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1958), 202 "Indem somit die kontingenten Dinge bezüglich der causae secundae zugleich wirklich kontingent, und zwar in der Weise, daß die Kontingenz durch die *causa prima* begründet und erhalten wird. Daher leuchtet gerade in der finalen Ordnung, welche die kontingenten Dinge durchdringt, die Wirksamkeit der göttlichen Providenz am hellsten hervor."

74 Bucanus, *Inst*, 115: "Ego accipio causas tantum interiores & proprias cuiusque rei, quarum effectum, quia ab illis & produci & non produci potuerunt, sunt contingentia. Providentiam autem non addo, quod ea causa si extrinseca. Quae si additae, evitari non potest, quin ex hypothesis necessitas aliqua consequatur. Exempli causa, Saul occurrit viris portantibus hodeos, panem & vinum. Voluntas illorum natura sua infinita erat, ut vel darent illi aliquid, vel non darent: Sed eam voluntatem, Deus providentia sua, in alteram partem terminavit. Ibant ad Bethel, ut sacrum facerent. Occurrebant Saulo lasso de via & enecto fame, humanum videbatur illum reficere, Ista Deus mentibus illorum obtulit, & si qua errant, quae hanc voluntatem impedire possent. Et fraenavit."

Saul, the men who brought him wine and bread were quite free under God's providence, but God used these means to get Saul to change his heart.

On the other hand, the Zürich-based Johann Heidegger (d. 1698), the chief architect of the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* of 1675, emphasised that Special Providence is that which preserves each creature's essence and directs its actions,⁷⁵ although, again, it seems from what the Psalm says in its contrast of right-acting believers and wicked unbelievers that God's guidance of the moral life is for those who are earmarked for a particular providence. Just as important is his insistence that creation did not stop at one moment in time and conservation take over. That would be absurd.⁷⁶ Creation and conservation are the same command, so that the thing before it exists exists by order. The proof text seems to have been Psalm 104:30 ("you send your spirit, they are created"). Cooperation in providence goes back causally to the creature's dependence on God for existence. The purpose of it all, however, is the peculiar providence that is that of Election. One cannot say how a life has been at the point of death, but one would need to know how it fared after death.⁷⁷ In Joseph's case God wanted Joseph to be sold and the brothers to seek him; He would not prevent the brothers' sin, but would use their sin for His predestined end. It was the same with Christ. Lastly, unbelievers are given an extraordinary grace to be distinguished from that given to the church, which is what Adam had. God withdrew help from them so that they might need to seek it.⁷⁸ This kind of grace moves them to grasp certain things and to make some progress in the moral life and to aid their internal efforts by the means of external aids and circumstances.

75 Heidegger, *De providentia Dei* 239" 'quae cuiusque creaturae essentiam conservet, & actiones dirigat, comprobetur Ps 33,13f."

76 Ibid., 251: "Sicut ergo creatio est aeterna & efficax Dei jussio, ut res existat: ita conservatio eadem Dei jussio est, ut res pro eis etiam existere jussa porro existat."

77 Ibid, 255–58.

78 Ibid., 273: "ita Deus subtrahendo gratiam Spriitus sui, non per accidens & negative, sed per se & positive [...] non tantum gratiam subtrahit, sed etiam, ut viam iis aperiat [...] nec speciale & supernaturale ad opus supernaturale, idque vel extraordinariam & miraculosum, quid nascente Ecclesia etiam reprobis communicari poterat, vel ordinarium, electis proprium, quo Deus eos ordinarie ad fidem & vitae sanctimoniam juvat. Quod cum nunquam impii habuerint, iis subduci non potuit, sed minus commune quo certos himines, etiam irrogenitos prae aliis adjuvat, vel ad rerum cognitionem & peritiam, vel ad virtutes morales, vel ad certa opera & negotia in rebus naturalibus, vel spiritualibus etiam, quantum homini naturali in iis procedere datur, perficienda; & praeter internam operationem, dotesque, tum animi tum corporis, externa etiam media, adminicula & instrumenta suppeditat".

Heinrich Heppe summed up the Reformed view in its mature development by the likes of Heidegger:⁷⁹ God's will *ad extra* is his own essence and as such immutable. There is no reason for a distinction between inner decree and outer execution.⁸⁰ It does seem, however, that Heppe is reading this into Heidegger's texts. If the Reformed believed in the eternal, unchangeable presence of God expressed in creation, as Heppe insists, one would expect this to be made a bit more explicit. Likewise, when he cites Braun to make the claim that for the Reformed Orthodox providence was about God's extending his purpose in creation to its fulfilment.⁸¹ But the quote from Johannes Braun (c. 1668) doesn't quite say that.⁸² One might agree with Heppe that the Reformed believed in some sort of *praemotio physica* within Providence,⁸³ in that God grounds all action, except for its morality: he is part of sinful deeds' ontology but not their morality. What they do seem to grasp is that action means that will is the essence of it as it were, and essence belongs to the will.

79 Heppe, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche*, 100: "[...] und da der Wille Gotes das göttliche Wesen selbst in seiner nach außen hin gerichteten Aktuosität ist. So ist es auch eben das eigene Wesen Gottes (nicht aber einer von diesem unterschiedene Kraft oder Tätigkeit), durch welches Gott seine Providenz ausübt, weshalb die providentielle Wirksamkeit Gottes in Kraft der göttlichen Wesenheit absolut independent, allmächtig, heilig, weise, usw. sein muß."

80 With reference to Heidegger's summary statement at VII,3: "Providentia Dei est externum eiusdem opus, quo res omnes verbo suas creatas, – maximas, minimas eodem verbo suo conservat, earum motus, actiones et passiones regit, cuncta ad suos fines sapienter ita dirigit, ut bona omnia efficaciter et clementer promoveat, male vel severe cohibeat vel sancte permittat, sapienter ordinet, iuste puniat, cuncta denique ad nominis sui gloriam et fidelium salute moderetur."

81 Heppe, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche*, 207: "Die reformierte Auffassung der Lehre von der Providenz charakterisiert sich zunächst dadurch, daß in ihr der Begriff der Providenz als ein Moment im Begriff der Schöpfung oder als die andere Seite desselben geltend gemacht wird. Schöpfung und Regierung der Welt sind eine Tätigkeit Gottes, welche zunächst erschaffend und sodann erhaltend und regierend hervortritt. Die Regierung der Welt ist der eigentliche Zweck ihrer Erschaffung."

82 Braun in Heppe (*Ibid.*): "Providentia dei nihi aliud est quam efficacissima ista Dei volitio, per quam ab aeterno voluit, ut res talis sit, tam diu existente et hoc modo operetur; quae efficax volitio est ipsissima Dei creatio, si res consideratur in sua existentia; et conservatio sive providentia si consideratur in sua duratio et operatione."

83 "Deus cum humana voluntate non concurrat tantum influx generali et indifferente, sed speciali et determinante." (J.H. Hottinger, quoted by Heppe, 205).

And the Lutherans?

As is well known, the Lutheran Reformation gave a Christological dimension to metaphysics: God is everywhere as Christ, according to Johannes Brenz.⁸⁴ How is one to distinguish God's omnipresence from his providence?⁸⁵ One might consider the answers of theologians like Hollaz and Gerhard who insisted on setting a "dynamic" divine presence over against creation, as something not contained within it. Already Melancthon in his lectures on *Physics* in 1549,⁸⁶ and later Gerhard too, were clear that the three parts of Providence – preserving, concurring and direction – are all active as divine. Freedom of divine will was the basis of contingency, with appeal to Ps 104:28 ("when you open your hand, they are filled with good things"). Abraham Calov, in part out of his own life-experience of vicissitude, could write that *concursus* is God's spontaneous *influxus*.⁸⁷ As such the action is teleological working according to a number of modes of causality.⁸⁸

Providence is often seen as distinctive to early Lutheranism in its hymns.⁸⁹ Such an approach to theology through spirituality would tie everything that happened in creation to the necessitating commands of the divine will, not least with reference to Hebrews 1:3, that God bears all things by his Word.⁹⁰ Theology begins and ends with wonder at creation, which is part of the experience of faith. This seemed in keeping with much of the founder, Luther's ideas and was fine for a rough and ready piety, but not for responsible theology, so that, a century later, Johann Gerhard would conceive it differently and return to something more scholastic. Surely things in themselves as creaturely should be viewed as remaining contingent and kept in their proper place. God's presence lends things some

84 Ulrich Beuttler, *Gott und Raum – Theologie der Weltgegenwart Gottes*, Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie 127 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010).

85 Ibid., 41: "Die Allgegenwart ist daher nicht nur anenergetisches Attribut der ruhenden *adessentia*, sondern auch der energetischen *omnipraesentia* [...] nicht intrinsisch den Dingen selbst als solchen innewohnend, sondern aktuell und *per effectus providentiae*. Die operationale Wirkpräsenz Gottes ist auch Wesenpräsenz, durch die Gott *immediate* wirkt."

86 Ibid., 57: "Entsprechend deutet er die göttliche Eigenschaft der *adessentia* im Sinne der *sustentatio*, *moderatio* und *gubernatio* und versteht diese dezidiert als *actio Dei generalis*."

87 A. Calov, *Systema. Locorum theologicorum* III,vi, c.2 (Wittenburg, 1661), 1204.

88 Beuttler, *Gott und Raum*, 63: "Es handelt sich um eine Personalpräsenz im umfassenden Sinne, die sowohl essentiell als auch operativ und dabei kausal, kommunikativ und final ist."

89 Jutta Zimmermann, *Lutherischer Vorsehungsglaube in Paul Gerhards geistlicher Dichtung* (Diss. Halle, 1955)

90 Cf. Luther, WA 18,726,1; on the Father God working in creation. "Die providentia Dei ist für Luther wirkende Gegenwart Gottes." (Cf. U. Krolzik, *Säkularisierung der Natur: Providentia-Dei-Lehre und Naturverständnis der Frühaufklärung* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1988), 22, re. WA 18,753).

necessity but not absolute: so the old scholastic distinction returned, that between *necessitas absoluta* and *necessitas consequentiae*. That things exist at all is absolutely necessary, but they are still free to will their consequences, and God's foreknowledge thereof doesn't remove that capacity.⁹¹ Melanchthon and Chemnitz had already embraced such a position but only in the early seventeenth century, not least in reaction to Calvinism, did this distinction become the majority view.⁹² For most Lutherans, in any case, there was no chance of *sola providentia*. By the eighteenth century *Providentia* became a name for God who was beneficent in being willing to afford the goods of creation to be constantly available, but not a gift of Himself at all times and places.

What made Melanchthon distinctive was his lack of interest in looking to the past for examples of providence, in the way that Calvin did and as Zwingli had done before him.⁹³ Geographical examples are adduced by the *Praeceptor Germaniae* to illustrate how God rules the present world now. His teacher Johannes Stoeffler had been Professor of Mathematics-Astronomy at Tübingen, and offered an account of providence from below – then back again – to prove a providential God, and also show how God worked in the world. Melanchthon made sure to keep Creator and creation separated by “divine action.”

Here Melanchthon contrasts with his foil Zwingli in the progressive sounding belief that one could not derive clear knowledge of God's present *gubernatio* from simply proving him to be a powerful creator.⁹⁴ In fact Melanchthon wanted to distinguish *providentia* as what God knows from *gubernatio*, as what God did with this knowledge. An awareness of the ordered teleology of the cosmos helped Melanchthon to develop this.⁹⁵ Zwingli seemed to concentrate on biblical passages and get stuck on creation. What Manfred Büttner really objects to is the

⁹¹ Bengt Hägglund, “De providentia: Zur Gotteslehre im frühen Luthertum,” *ZThK* 83 (1986): 356–369.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 365f.; Gerhard had 7 forms of God's *Mitwirkung* here; but sometimes to Gerhard God's ways were also inexplicable (See his use of Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* V,3 in his *Loci* IV,100).

⁹³ Manfred Büttner, *Regiert Gott die Welt? Vorsehung Gottes und Geographie. Studien zur Providentiallehre bei Zwingli und Melanchthon*, Calwer Theologische Monographien 3 (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1977), 10: “Melanchthon ist dagegen praktisch nicht am Damals interessiert. Die Reformierten müssen ihre geographischen Beispiele aus Bibel und Natur schöpfen, während die Lutheraner ohne die Schrift auskommen.”

⁹⁴ “Die providentia ist über den Kraftbegriff nur ‘ontologisch’ und damit in stärkster Koppelung an das Damals der Schöpfung aussagbar,” (Büttner, *Regiert Gott die Welt?*, 29). “Zwingli gelangt nicht zum (jetzigen) Regierer-Gott, sondern nur zum (damaligen) Schöpfergott” (Büttner, *Regiert Gott die Welt?*, 33).

⁹⁵ Günther Frank, *Die theologische Philosophie Philipps Melanchthons (1497–1560)*, Erfurter Theologische Studien 67 (Leipzig: Benno, 1995).

Zwinglian suspicion of *gubernatio*: since for Zwingli, providence is conservative, about preserving the orders of creation.⁹⁶ In the Zürich reformer's book, *Heilsgeschichte* is something quite different, sealed off from the rest of world history and other events. For Zwingli, conceivably the creation could stand on its own, with no need for divine guiding (*Lenkung*), a position favoured by J.A. Comenius as late as 1633. If God removes his backing, the world would collapse, so what God supplies is conservation. The point is that even if Melanchthon was encouraged by his cosmological knowledge in countering this conservatism, it was the experience of Christians *qua* humans that meant that he could inductively point towards the existence of the God of Jesus Christ.⁹⁷ In some ways it is remarkable that Melanchthon treated the topic of Providence in his *Physics* (first part). Büttner presents Melanchthon as making a remarkable change with a natural theology which was rooted not only in natural science, but also in the existential character of pristine Lutheran theology.⁹⁸ However, one has to be careful not to be anachronistic concerning lines of demarcation. Melanchthon had his own conservatism after all when it came to the institutions of family and government as the backbone of providential ordering, yet even then these institutions were posited as having a teleology, even a vocational dynamism.

The examples from Scripture Melanchthon gives in his *Loci Communes* of 1555 are not meant to serve as proof texts. The point of a distinct locus of Providence is that individuals should be aware of divine Presence at work. Providence is the first proof of a knowable God, even though this is an additional way to God, over and above Scripture and presupposing it. Providence can only corroborate the path that Scripture has set out. Further, for all his ground-breaking qualities, Melanchthon's geography is arguably more classical, Aristotelian even. Yet the contingency of the natural order requires a guide as well as a sustainer. From the example of the friends in the furnace in Daniel 3, one could draw a distinction between *providentia ordinaria/extraordinaria* but all providence was directed for the good of creation and actively preserving it.

⁹⁶ Büttner, *Regiert Gott die Welt?*, 38: "Die 'Fehler' Zwinglis: Aus der Seinsvermittlung folgt nicht notwendig die Seinserhaltung."

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 289: "Melanchthon greift mit seinen Argumenten ausdrücklich nicht auf die Bibel und die Schöpfungstheologie zurück. Ausgangspunkt der Providenzbeweise ist vielmehr – genau wie ihre Quellen in der stoischen Philosophie Ciceros – die alltägliche Erfahrung, die, sofern sich in ihr eine Zielgerichtetheit und Vernünftigkeit aller Ereignisse in der Welt manifestiert, einen zielsetzenden Intellekt postuliert, der in der Vorsehung die Ziele der Geschöpfe durchsetzt und sich in besonderer Weise um den Menschen sorgt."

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 56: "Luther öffnet ihm den Blick für das Jetzt des gnädigen und tätigen Gottes."

Ultimately, Melanchthon understood divine activity sweeping through creation as a consoling force for souls, whatever bodily limitations and pains afflicted people.⁹⁹ “God anticipates us, calls, moves, aids; but we must see to it that we do not resist.”¹⁰⁰ As Christian Link observes, *gubernator* and *moderator* are “die wichtigsten und häufigsten der von ihm verwendeten Gottesprädikate.” His *Initia Doctrinae Physicae* offers a bipartite definition of providence: knowledge and governance.¹⁰¹

Melanchthon’s mature position seems to have been that the heavens could foretell and give warnings of impending doom, but the stars did not themselves fix events on earth. Some amount of *astrologia divinatoria* came with his seeking a propitious day for the founding of the Leucorea Academy at Wittenberg. As Wilhelm Maurer summarises, Melanchthon was wary of astrological prediction: even less that stars determine events, but they could show how God rules. As early as his *Genesis Commentary* of 1523, Melanchthon commented that stars are signs of events which God had ordained, but that Scripture is required to know for what these signs are intended.¹⁰² Scripture offers a grammar of natural signs. Geyer sums up Melanchthon’s version of Providence under five heads: 1. All other creation works for humans; 2. All humans have moral capacity; and know what God requires; 3. God ensures misdeeds do not go unpunished; 4. God sends heroic deeds in times of crisis; 5. God gives warnings, not least by means of the stars.¹⁰³

99 Link, *Schöpfung*, I:85: “Der Mensch in der Mitte der Welt ist das Telos der geschaffenen Welt.”

100 1543 Loci, quoted Richard A. Muller, “*Scimus enim quod lex spiritualis est*: Melanchthon and Calvin on the Interpretation of Romans 7:14–23,” in *Phillip Melanchthon (1497–1560) and the Commentary*, eds. Timothy Wengert and M. Patrick Graham (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997): 216–237, 237.

101 *Corpus Reformatorum* 13,203, as discussed by Link, *Schöpfung*, I:83: “Usitatum est vocare providentiam, et cognitionem, qua Deus omnia cernit et prospicit, et gubernationem, qua naturam universam servat, id est, ordinem motuum, vices temporum, foecunditatem terrae et animantium, et curat et servat genus humanum, custodit politicam societatem, imperia, iudicia, iustitiam, punit atrocia scelera pugnancia cum lege naturae, in qua voluntatem suam nobis ostendit, et tandem iniuste oppressos liberat.”

102 Wilhelm Maurer, “Melanchthon und die Naturwissenschaftler seiner Zeit,” in *Melanchthon Studien*, Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 181 (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1964), 45, n. 13: “sunt ergo stellae non autores, sed signa, et signa non omnium eventuum, sed eorum ad quae Deus ordinavit; et quorsum ordinavit haec signa, sciri non potest nisi e scripturis.”

103 Melanchthon, *Initia Doctrinae Physicae* (*Corpus Reformatorum* XIII,204–5); cf. Hans-Georg Geyer, *Welt und Mensch. Zur Frage des Aristotelismus bei Melanchthon* (Diss.: Bonn, 1959), 150–152.

Arguably more important for the fate of Christian astrology were those who came in Melanchthon's wake.¹⁰⁴ In 1579 Jacob Andreae criticised those (Phillipists) who would count Astrology among the *artes*, but his opponents could say that for all Luther's dislike of superstition, he had called for a "new astrology" (*Tischreden* 4638). The influence of Melanchthon's *Physics* ("heiliger Physik") on his son-in-law Caspar Peucer's *Commentarius* could be seen in what the latter wrote about the Saturn-Mars conjunction and related diseases. Peucer himself added in much more detail about the devil. Illness often resulted through loss of the soul's harmony, when men gave themselves to lower desires, and not to God. Correspondingly believers could let healing flow, and sickness could be pushed back by God revealing healing remedies. The will plays a greater role than nature in sickness, as Galen had written. Like his father-in-law, Peucer understood sickness to have theological causes, although he was hardly a theologian. In fact Peucer would be accused of crypto-Calvinism and in 1575 dismissed from the chair in Medicine he had held since 1559 at Wittenberg's Leucorea.

Peucer does seem to have been quite flexible in his views. By the end of his life, no doubt "encouraged" by years of incarceration, he seemed clear that much was mystery, just as in the case of the presence of Christ's divinity in the bread (a Gnesio-Lutheran view) and, as he explained in a *Letter to Tycho Brahe* of 10.5.1589, stars do not move themselves, but as to how they move, well, one should just ascribe it to God's power. Likewise he admitted that when he simply believed God, and stopped trusting in astrology, as when in prison, he was eventually freed (*Letters to J. Camerarius* of 28 Aug 1584/ 26 April 1586).

Claudia Brosseder has observed that for Melanchthon and Peucer, Daniel's prophecy was still the key text for grasping the large shape of history, and for giving what one should be looking for when it came to details. There were actually three cases of comets recorded in sixteenth-century Germany – 1531, 1572 and 1577 – as signs for particular troubles to come.¹⁰⁵ The insistence by Melanchthon and Peucer on prophecy as well as astrology – connected in Daniel itself – shows their distance from Jean Bodin's secularising of world history, as related by Rein-

104 Martin Roebel, "Caspar Peucer als Humanist und Mediziner," in *Caspar Peucer 1525–1602: Wissenschaft, Glaube und Politik im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, eds. Hans-Peter Hasse, Günther Wartenberg (Leipzig: Evang. Verlagsanstalt, 2004): 51–73, 62.

105 Claudia Brosseder, *Im Bann der Sterne: Caspar Peucer, Philipp Melanchthon und andere Wittenberger Astrologen* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), 98, refers to: "der Komet als hermeneutisches Instrument des Wandels im Kleinen."

hart Koselleck,¹⁰⁶ where there was no place for a biblical prophecy which could not be about opening new possibilities to an individual “today.”¹⁰⁷ Hence the comet of 1572 was regarded not a new star (for all of those were created on the fourth day) – but a sign – to be taken along with Saint Bartholomew’s Day murders. The heavens could never be changed, except when God intimated the end of the world.¹⁰⁸

Against any allegations of cosmic determinism, Peucer insisted that humans are free in ethical action.¹⁰⁹ One could feasibly argue that it is a Melanchthonian axiom that through observation of Natural Laws, moral agency becomes stronger. What comes across is an understanding of Providence as being about “the big picture” of world events and world history. Perhaps this is a sign of confidence in God’s power. Roughly put, Melanchthon inherited from Nicolas of Cusa the idea that humanity was the mediator in cosmos, but he would not embrace the Renaissance love of *Fortuna*. Wisdom could be that which God would share with humans, even if nothing else, in the Melanchthonian account, as his main means of caring for them.¹¹⁰ Yet one should not over-exalt the place of hu-

106 Reinhart Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979.)

107 Brosseder, *Im Bann der Sterne*, 110–11: “Die Aussagen eines Horoskops waren jedoch anders als die der Kometen nicht mehr von prophetischem Gehalt [...]. Peucer und Melanchthon definierten den speziellen Erfahrungshorizont eines Individuums mit physikalischen Begriffen, die sich aus vergangenen (Natur-)beobachtungen speiste. Sie sprachen mehr von natürlichen Veranlagungen als von anthropologischen Bedingungen, die sich aus einem Erbsündenverständnis ergaben. In diesem sehr begrenzten Sinne trennten sie mit Hilfe der Astrologie einen zukünftigen Erwartungshorizont von einem primär heilsgeschichtlich verstandenen Erfahrungshorizont vergangener Individuen.” Cf. Uwe Koch, *Zwischen Katheder, Thron und Kerker: Leben und Werk des Humanisten Caspar Peucer 1525–1602: Ausstellung 25. September bis 31. Dezember 2002, Stadt-Museum Bautzen* (Bautzen: Domowina, 2002).

108 “Dei opera talia sunt, & ad praedictum pertinent de signis apparituris in Sole, Luna & Stellis, quorum crebriora & stipenda magis, sub ultimam mundi aetatem, Christus haud dubie eventura denunciat.” (*Commentarius de praecipuis divinationum genreibus* [Frankfurt 1607]), 596f. See M. Weichenhan, “Caspar Peucers Astronomie zwischen christlichen Humanismus und Nicolaus Copernicus,” in *Caspar Peucer (1525–1602). Wissenschaft, Glaube und Politik im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, eds. Hans-Peter Hasse and Günther Wartenberg (Leipzig, Evangelische Verlagsanstalt): 91–110, 108.

109 Geyer, *Welt und Mensch*, 172: “[...] ein Mensch, der mit Hilfe der Astrologie seine charakterlichen Neigungen erkannt hatte, konnte entweder seine bösen Neigungen zurückweisen oder seine guten kultivieren.” Cf. Quirinus Breen, “Melanchthon’s reply to Pico della Mirandola,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13 (1952): 413–426.

110 Maurer, “Melanchthon und die Naturwissenschaftler seiner Zeit,” 47: “Das Naturgesetz wird beherrscht von dem gnädig in der Geschichte wirksamen Heilswillen Gottes – denn diese Weisheit erkennt anbetend Gott als den Herrn über das Naturgesetz und damit über das

manity as Pico had done, and Copernicus threatened to do (see Melanchthon's 1543 lectures). The world should be understood as "ensouled" itself. But there was a *heilsgeschichtliche* role for Medicine, apparent in Peucer's *Oratio de vita Galeni*: medicine serves to ameliorate the effects of the Fall. This view is similar to that expressed in the statutes of Helmstedt faculty by David Chytraeus. Werner Elert has reminded one that there was no theological conspiracy to stop Copernicus in Wittenberg – and by 1549 Melanchthon admitted growing admiration. (Part of his hesitation had more to do with the fact that strong advocacy came from his theological opponent, Osiander.) Copernican ideas would in fact prosper in Lutheran universities such as Tübingen,¹¹¹ until the seventeenth century when they slipped into a Biblicism, represented by the likes of Leonhard Hutter (c. 1610).

The Doctrine of Providence was very significant in Lutheran treatments of the Doctrine of God, to the extent that God's existence or *esse* became identified with his providence.¹¹² The idea of *concursus* in Lutheranism was well represented by Abraham Calov, in succession to Melanchthon; God's action accommodates to move simultaneously with the created movers. Providence does not remove freedom, which reflects the creative initiative of God. (That the Reformed were different can be seen in Francis Turretin's insistence that the created is subordinated to the control of Divine [Inst. I,VIqVI].)

Also, just as *heilsgeschichtlich* in flavour was the philosophy of Reformed and crypto-Calvinists that God's providence worked to restore the Image of God to humans through encyclopedic learning. Bartholomäus Keckermann made Calvinism into a pedagogical force, and more moderate: "the instauration of the image of God project – underlying the encyclopedic efforts of Keckermann and Alsted."¹¹³ Keckermann stood for a natural theology that was independent of the doctrine of God gained through speculation. The outcome of this ecumenical project was that through knowing how God operated in the world through causes and forces one could come to a knowledge of him that produced a wisdom for life. The bible was the foundation and the touchstone of this, but the project

geschichtliche Verhängnis [...]. So setzt sich Melanchthon bewußt in Widerspruch zu einem beherrschenden Motiv der Renaissance, das in dem Sprichwort zusammengefaßt wurde: *Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia*."

¹¹¹ Elert, *Morphologie* I, 372.

¹¹² Carl Heinz Ratschow, *Gott existiert: Eine dogmatische Studie*, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann 12 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), 41.

¹¹³ Howard Hotson, *Johann Heinrich Alsted 1588–1638: Between Renaissance, Reformation, and Universal Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 229.

sought to by-pass confessional differences, which were inessential for faith.¹¹⁴ In other words, this was a learned pietism in which it seemed that the basic illumination from Scripture was clear enough and in which reasonable men could join together to probe more deeply into the natural world. Johann Heinrich Alsted's division of fundamental from secondary issues, such as those debated at Dort, was inessential to salvation. His *Theologica polemica* (1620) was perhaps the charter document for those like Comenius in the following generation. The latter was known for his panentheism, a theology in which divine-creaturely cooperation was to the fore, and in which humans were very much *capaces finiti*. One can see this extended by Jacob Boehme for whom the course of Providence not only belonged to God but affected him and was necessary for who He was in his becoming.¹¹⁵ Alsted was much more soberly focused on the needs of creatures. He believed that natural theology was insufficient for salvation, but that it could be used as an introduction which led towards it, as when simple people could see God working in nature and be disposed towards him. One might want to call it a sort of "Fundamental Theology".

Lutheranism of the scholastic sort could be very conservative, as Krolzik noted. Thus there was a shift of attention amongst Lutherans (just after 1600) away from the present world-governing function of God in favour of a fixed order of nature.¹¹⁶ Concursus in Lutheranism is clear in the treatment by Calov; God's action accommodates to move simultaneously with the created movement. The heirs of Calvin in the Seventeenth Century thought otherwise. So, as just indicated, while the Reformed Francis Turretin (*Institutiones* I,VI,qVI) made it very clear that the created is subordinated to the control of Divine in all actions, both in that the latter has temporal priority and in initiating, the Lutheran position as promoted by Quenstedt was more balanced: *Idem effectus non a solo Deo, nec a sola creatura. nec partim a Deo, partim a creatura, sed una eademque efficientia totali simul a Deo et creatura producat.*¹¹⁷ In the realm

114 Willem Hendrik van Zuylen, *Bartholomäus Keckermann – Sein Leben und Wirken* (Leipzig: Borna, 1934), 67: "Die Theologie verhält sich zum Glauben wie das Ganze zum Teil; die Theologie umfaßt alle geistlichen Tugenden, der Glaube nur eine, wiewohl die wichtigste." Cf. Manfred Büttner, "Die Neuausrichtung der Providentiallehre durch B. Keckermann im Zusammenhang der Emanzipation der Geographie aus der Theologie," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 28 (1976): 123–132.

115 Cyril O'Regan, *The Gnostic Apocalypse: Jacob Boehme's Haunted Narrative* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 189.

116 "[...] von der gegenwärtigen Weltregierung Gottes zugunsten einer von der Schöpfung her festgelegt Naturordnung verändert" (Krolcik, 81).

117 Johann Andreas Quenstedt, *Theologia didactico-polemica sive systema theologicum* (Wittenberg, 1685), 531.

of Providence, as distinct from the realm of salvation, God and creatures are both ascribed a constant, active and initiating presence.

In Lutheran Pietism's own *Erbauungsliteratur*, one finds Johannes Arndt in his introduction to the fourth book of his *Wahres Christentum* (1610) sponsoring the idea that creatures are the hands and messengers of God which lead us to God. Acts 14:7 is quoted, and his universal Fatherhood emphasised. God is not perpetually trying to run after his creation in His own scheme, but has set it up so that it would take care of human needs, and an anthropocentric teleology was built in.¹¹⁸ God's working in the world is obvious through the regularities of creation's goodness.¹¹⁹ Creatures show, and do not hide God's Providence. Krolcik argues that whereas the *Weltbegriff* of the first 3 books is a Lutheran *Existenzbegriff*, there is in Book 4 a change to an "*ontologische Weltbegriff*" such that sin cannot prevent humans seeing the fatherhood of God. Also, human discoveries are the gifts of Providence.¹²⁰

Paul Gerhardt's hymns speak of a world-transcendence enhanced by expectation through finding safety in God's lordly provision in this life, which gives joy. He represented a belief in the annihilation of the earth in the imminent Last Days, rather than any renewal thereof; yet in the meantime, Nature provided a screen for reflecting God's love. Arndt was less "apocalyptic," even while impatient to move on from this world to better things. Spirituality provided evidence to confirm the doctrine of Providence as of the Last Things.¹²¹

However among the theological schools by 1631 the Lutheran Daniel Clasens had made Natural theology a special part of Metaphysics.¹²² The doctrines of both Creation and Providence then were submerged in the consideration of God's properties. By the time of the Jesuit M. Martini in 1618 there were commonly two main proofs for God's existence: one from conscience and the other from the universe as world-machine. The discussion of Aristotelian entelechy seemed to make providence something redundant. The final cause of divine providence was the praise and honouring of God, not of some component within the cosmic

¹¹⁸ Krolcik, *Säkularisierung*, 20.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 23: "Im Vergleich mit dem lutherischen Providentiaglauben läßt sich nun klarer die Eigenart des Arndtschen erkennen. Im Gegensatz zu Luther ist bei Arndt die Vaterliebe nicht mit der Verborgenheit Gottes verbunden, sondern ist in der Naturordnung jedermann ersichtlich" (4. Vorrede, 5f.).

¹²⁰ Johann Arndt, *Wahres Christentum* 4.I.4.3f.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 35f.

¹²² Cf. Robert Spaemann, "Natur," in *Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe*, vol. 2: *Gesetz – Relation*, eds. Hermann Krings, Hans Michael Baumgartner, and Christoph Wild (München: Kösel & Pustet, 1973): 659–669.

scheme.¹²³ It could well have been Lutherans who thought of *providentia specialissima* as being reserved for the godly, as separate from non human and other humans. There was a strong emphasis on *creatio ex nihilo*, possibly in order to preserve the idea of divine transcendence. However, apart from that, God was avowedly anthropocentric in the purpose of his works, employing the rest of creation to that end, as seems clear from Calov (*Systema* III, art VI, cII).

Although the Lutheran orthodox divine Johannes Gerhard believed in some sort of “sense of the whole” as leading to knowledge of God, he was clear in his belief that Scripture would make knowledge from nature clearer (as in Gerhard’s *Loci* V,4 p80).¹²⁴ All the same Gerhard underwent a change in position from a focus on the present world-governance of God to an interest in the order of nature established as creation.¹²⁵ This accorded with Descartes’ idea of the conservation of energy which would develop into a physics without recourse to Divine action.¹²⁶ This was about created, cosmic certainties in uncertain times, as history appeared less and less in the control of the One God.

Catholic voices

History and God’s help to chastise then establish His people on a stronger footing was felt in Catholic circles too. In her recent monograph Sandra Chapparo speaks of a felt need in the early modern period to escape from a metaphysical passivity where all was created and fixed such that history was in some sense bound to the fixtures of (human) Being.¹²⁷ The outworking of this was (as per her study) history’s recognition of the conservatively loyal and “ordered” Spanish people as the chosen nation – in the work of Juan de Salazar (d 1560). However, that confidence in fixed order was shaken later, in 1589, that *annus horribi-*

123 Ratschow, *Gott existiert*, 78: “Causa finalis der providentia ist als finis ultimus die Anerkennung und Verehrung Gottes.”

124 “certior autem et perfectior est illa providentiae divinae cognitio, quae ex scripturae libro petitur” (*Loci* VI, 9), 81.

125 Ibid.

126 Descartes, *Principia philosophiae* II,36: “Deum ipsum, qui materiam simul cum motu et quiete in principio creavit, iamque per solum suum concursum ordinarium tantundem motus et quietis in ea tota quantum tunc posuit conservat.”

127 Sandra Chapparo, *Providentia: El discurso político providencialista español de los siglos XVI y XVII*, Biblioteca Comillas: Historia de las Ideas 2 (Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2012), 199: “La Providencia irrumpe en el pensamiento occidental en un intento por resolver la ‘pasividad metafísica’ que surge de la constatación de que la historia debe su existencia a los hombres pero no es hecha por ellos.”

lis, when Pedro de Ribadeneira described the destruction of the Armada as being like that of the armies of Egypt, the result of divine wrath. Humans were taken to be free to co-operate with God, and tribulation was like a medicine or simply a balancing of a covenant as per Leviticus 26 (“If you obey my laws...”). The Holy War in South America was not to preserve order but to change it.¹²⁸ In this providential history as theorized by Salazar and John of Nuremberg,¹²⁹ there was much room for delegation of action to a chosen people, as guided by Scripture: Charles V was David; Philip II Solomon, and Spain was the Fifth Empire of Daniel.¹³⁰

Catholic spiritual writers operated with a long tradition of depicting Providence as the presupposition of a deepening spiritual life. Both the fact of Providence and trust in it as a given meant that one could accept Ignatius’ teaching: “trust yourself to God as though all came from you, but work as though all from him and not vice versa.” Catherine of Siena’s major work had borne the title *Dialogo della divina provvidenza* (1378). Prior to this, she besought the Divine Providence to provide for things in general, and in particular, for a certain case with which she was concerned. In other words, her request was that God punish her for her sins rather than take it out on the poor. Providence is about providing means of purgation and suffering done gladly, of testing and proving and forming virtues in charity. In the early modern period the theologian Leonardus Lessius (d.1623) could now describe God’s providence as the working of a sort of numinous power. His majesty means he sees more details in creaturely existence than creatures do themselves. God does concern himself with details: *Qualis enim esset ille Deus qui ignoraret etiam ea quae nobis sunt perspicua?*¹³¹ Hence Augustine was right in *The City of God* V,9 to refute Cicero: if God is to be God, then it cannot be just any power by which world is ruled.¹³²

Lessius continues (to paraphrase):

Now while we see that the wicked and unjust prosper and that Machiavelli was possibly right, the true answer is to see ourselves as finite, and in that days and seasons run their courses this is a sign that everything is governed by the force of nature: no other

128 Ibid., 185.

129 Ibid., 129 f.: John of Nuremberg in 1643 wrote that Spain had received laws and institutions from God and now must defend them and propagate them in the providential battle against evil.

130 Ibid., 185. Bossuet would draw on these in his 1679 work on sacred politics.

131 Leonardus Lessius, *De providentia numinis et animi immortalitate libri duo adversus atheos & politicos* (Antverpi: Ex Officina Plantiniana, 1613).

132 Ibid., 5: “Si esset aliquod Numen quo mundus regeretur, non sic invalesceret improbitas, non tam prosperos haberet successus, nec ita posset opprimere virtutis & innocentiae cultores; sicut omnibus saeculis factum videmus.”

power is to be postulated, and even humans go through stages. There are many reasons quite apart from those given by revelation for thinking that the supreme Power does care. All civilisations seem to believe this, as do their best philosophers. For example, the second reason is demonstrated by the course of the heavenly orbs, which move too fast for this to be unaided.

He then goes on to appeal to an uncaused cause, designer, that which keeps them all in their places, and one who donates the structure and arrangement of parts of the world in order to their end.¹³³ Where does the sea's saltiness come from? It is ridiculous to postulate that the sun burns the sea bed and produces salt: no, it was there in the first place since it was meant to sustain fish, not plants. All these things were done for the sake of humans. There is a moral dimension to this and hence a personal one.¹³⁴ Just like a ruler violently puts down rebellion, so too there is strong governance and subjugation of anything that would cause trouble. All things visible and invisible are set up nicely so that man will love the *Numen*. He alone can appreciate it all. And all is for him. Providence can be supremely detected in the disposition of mediums to their end¹³⁵ – to make them so they can do what they do. The *vis formatix* works to shape creatures.¹³⁶ Humans don't act from instinct as animals, such that humans are thus much more able to adapt. Humans are equipped not only with reason but with a universal providence by which he is able to rule himself, to set himself a goal in each work and is able to dispose the means to that opportunity.¹³⁷ A human can retreat from his work, but God doesn't know how to do this and is always among his works. Things cannot stand without God in them. For all things have a tendency towards nothing. All depends on God much more than on their immediate cause, since He is greater.

Lessius continues by stating that Providence can be discerned in the variety of voices and faces, such that we do not confuse people. Poverty is also presented as a good thing. For it is clear how salutary poverty can be for the human race and it cuts out the tinder of evil and occupies the mind with innocent con-

133 He quotes Psalm 93(94):9: "qui plantavit aurem, non audiet? Qui finxit oculum, non considerat?"

134 Ibid., 82: "Numen etsi caelos & elementa in commodum hominum instituerit, tamen ita regit omnia ut subinde incommode & damna per ea irroget, ad ipsorum peccata vel maiora, vel minora, sine quibus non vivitur, castiganda."

135 Ibid., 85: "Providentia enim in nulla re magis cernitur, quam in apta mediorum ad finem dispositio."

136 Ibid., 87.

137 Ibid., 105: "Homo quia ratione & providentia quadam universali praeditus est. qua seipsum regere, sibi finem in singulis operibus statuere, & media ad illum opportune disponere potest."

cerns. He then goes on to discuss miracles, but from this point onwards he uses scriptural revelation in tracing the theme through the Old Testament then the New Testament. In the following century “occasionalists” like Malebranche, Berkeley or Leibniz would write of the reality of divine agency working in and through creation. This differed from the more traditional “efficient causality,” according to which a distinct heat rises in the heated body itself (Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* III,69), and there is no real transfer of accidents though a communication of *esse*. The case of *creatio ex nihilo* was a clear case of this: there was no transfer involved in the change of affairs, yet the thing gets bumped into more fullness of being by means of a communication of *esse*. Conservation, however, requires less explanation, for it is more about removing agents whose actions would diminish it (*conservatio per accidens*). Although there is both a *per se* and also mediate conservation: without this, the way things are, things could not continue to exist, as well as be what they are. God can annihilate so surely he can also preserve.¹³⁸

The idea of concurrence did not much feature in the early modern Aristotelians since it was first missing in Aristotle, for whom God was not directly needed, e.g. in procreation, or in the other ordinary causes of nature. Suarez was not an occasionalist (since he has already targeted occasionalists in *Disp. Met.* 18), but came close to arguing this in his attack on Durandus, who gave over too much to secondary causes and made God a remote cause. In the case of the three men in the furnace (Daniel 3), God was able to change the fire from within it. But the secondary agent can resist it or act without it. “Broadly speaking, Suarez’s account of God’s general concurrence runs parallel to the account published by Luis de Molina a few years before the appearance of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*.”¹³⁹ God can permit a sinful act because he leaves the choice to the agent. So there is conditional foreknowledge of how possible free agents would act.

And so because he does not know exactly how free creatures will act just on the basis of his own intention to concur with their actions, God needs middle knowledge antecedently in order for his providential plan to be complete—that is, in order to be able knowingly to intend or permit free acts as particulars.¹⁴⁰ In the same way God also wills to give sufficient grace to those he foreknows

¹³⁸ Freddoso, xcv.

¹³⁹ Francisco Suarez, *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17–19*, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), cxv.

¹⁴⁰ Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (1597), 22.4.38–9.

will not make good use of such grace, in order than they might be absolutely capable of making good use of such grace.¹⁴¹

One can also detect a change in how mystical spirituality relates to providence in the world.¹⁴² For Teresa of Avila, her mystical union allows God's plans to become hers. It is very much about Grace – and yet that grace is about being caught up in divine *plan*. And although there are only six uses of the noun *providencia* in Teresa's work, the verb *proveer* is used seventy-one times and always seems as part of a relationship of union.¹⁴³ Indeed it very much involves God's re-arranging of the material circumstances around each union. In her *trato de Amistad* the need for *Fiduzialglaube* and security in God through a dialectic of justification in that relationship is affirmed. Furthermore, in her autobiography (*Vita* 18,15) she wrote: "I did not believe the untrained who said: he is only present through grace but a great scholar [Bañez or Barrón] from the Dominicans delivered me from the doubt he truly would be there." It is the experience of God in all things that seems to have been a *novum in the Siglo d'Oro*.¹⁴⁴

Suarez in his *De legibus* asked whether the *ratio aeterna agendorum* should be considered to be the same thing as Providence? If Providence is something "added later in time," then it can be considered to be a law *materialiter* but not *formaliter*: the status of the law is in time even if in thought of the lawmaker it is eternal. Armogathe adds: "Later on, in the work of a Louvainist commentator on Aquinas, one finds the expression *lex aeterna* like to *gubernatio rerum*, in a formula which further clarifies the thinking of the angelic doctor: 'eternal law is the order to govern things with the will of binding them to this mode of opera-

141 Ibid., 237.

142 Klaus Kleffner, *Vorsehung und Zumutung: Skizzen zu einer Theologie der Vorsehung aus dem Werk Teresas von Ávila*, Theologie der Spiritualität: Quellen und Studien 4 (St. Ottilien: Eos Verlag, 2012), 434: "Die Vorsehung ist unter dem Aspekt der Willenseinung eine *Beziehungsweise*, in der der Mut, das Vertrauen in Gott und das befreite Engagement des Menschen für die Welt fruchtbar werden. Die Zumutungen als Ausdruck der Liebe im Hinblick auf die immer tiefere Einnung, d.h. auf die freundschaftliche Beziehung mit Gott [...] haben mehr als einen Vorbereitungscharakter [...]."

143 Ibid., 495. Since relational, "(w)ie Vorsehungsglaube im Sinne des Glaubens an die heilbringende Freundschaft Gottes [...]" (ibid., 503).

144 According to Bañez humans are free to decide, in that there is partnership but power is one way, and general grace is enough to have free choice. Ibid., 610: "Der Lebenslauf des Menschen ist mit Teresa insofern nicht in allen Details von Gott vorherbestimmt, sondern als ein dialogisches persönliches Antworten auf Gottes Gaben zu verstehen." It is not goal-driven – God accompanies, but draws us in whatever we do; the leading of God only comes in after that decision by special grace.

tion' (*lex aeterna est ordo rerum gubernandarum cum voluntate adstringendi ad illum operandi modum*).¹⁴⁵ Providence then was not so much a law as an action to order things. There emerged a new interest in History, Politics, and "technique" or logic, which was in common to God and man. There was a unity in intelligence.¹⁴⁶ Acts 17:32 seems to have come to be *the* text.

Luther's claim that the invading Turks were executing God's will was one reason why the Bull threatening Excommunication of 1520 (*Exsurge Domine*) accused him of being in league with the enemy who, Leo X said, were acting very much against God's will. For South German Catholics the decisive victory at Mohacs in 1526 was very significant for this question. Martin Hille describes how a defeatism among Catholic Chroniclers at that time was not necessarily shared by townspeople who trusted in a more continuing providence. Thus from the 1540s onwards a new confidence for this world and the Roman Church swept through the Empire.¹⁴⁷ If the Emperor could not make the Turks go away, perhaps the Jesuit-led mission could have an effect. When the Turks returned again in force – and even Lepanto (1571) did not really stop them – the discourse became more eschatological or "apocalyptic" (rediscovered works like 4 Ezra were appealed to). Whereas the grounds for misfortune earlier in the century were held to be divine judgement, now God was on the side of his people as they resisted. In the Austrian chronicles of 1592, Michael Aitzinger of Köln had no time for any nuancing of fault. The more official church histories like Baronius' *Annales Ecclesiastici* and Petavius' Chronology were quite different, and more interested in the sacred past, for reasons to do with winning the fight against Protestants over the right interpretation of church history, even while bringing it up to date.¹⁴⁸ Precisely in works of this genre, whether Catholic or Protestant, one focused on the history before the Reformation period in order to trace God's Providence, and refused to evaluate the events of that century.¹⁴⁹ This could have

145 Jean-Robert Armogathe, "Deus legislator," in *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008): 265–77, 267.

146 Jean-Robert Armogathe, *La Nature du Monde: Science Nouvelle et Exégèse au XVIIe Siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), 77.

147 Martin Hille, *Providentia Dei, Reich und Kirche: Weltbild und Stimmungsprofil altgläubiger Christen 1517–1618*, Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 81 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 318: "Das Phänomen des nachlassenden Providentialismus zeichnet sich verstärkt seit der 1540er Dekade ab, speziell in den städtischen und private Annalen."

148 *Ibid.*, 390.

149 *Ibid.*, 391: "So selten sich die Zeitbuchschreiber einer eschatologischen Bewertung der Reformation anschließen, so häufig suchen sie Selbstvergewisserung über ihre kirchengeschichtliche Vertiefung. Kirchengeschichte und Heilsgeschichte lösen sich in diesem Säkulum vo-

been because up until at least the middle of the century there was hope there might be resolution and when this did not arrive the recent past just seemed hard to comprehend. Scholars started to look to knowledge mediated through nature and speculation. Avoidance of religious controversy by those who would rather not do confessional church history led to some amount of interest in history in itself, quite apart from Gottfried Arnold's later pro-dissenting account (*Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie*) of 1700. Time itself was given a role alongside God, with the motto: *Deus et tempus revelat omnia*, as if perhaps God could not be held responsible for all that happened, but indeed only shared that responsibility with "Time." In the metaphor of the hour-glass, which was popular in the early seventeenth century this process of secularising of Providence was demonstrated.¹⁵⁰

neinander, gleichwohl fügt sich das historische Schicksal der Ecclesia weiter in den weiteren Rahmen der *Providenta Dei*."

150 "Was daraus werden, wird die zeit offenbaren" (Johannes Mechtel, *Limburger Chronik* [1612], 139). Hille comments (Ibid.): "Eine säkulare, an die *Zeit* gebundene Auffassung vom Strom des Geschehens schiebt sich vor die *Providentia Dei*, ja macht ihr Konkurrenz, ohne sie wirklich zu verdrängen."

Chapter Five:

The Doctrine's Fortunes in the Early Modern Era

Protestant and Catholic perceptions

The majority of Reformed theologians seemed to be clear that Providence and Predestination as part of Soteriology were to be distinguished. However, what seemed all important to the heterodox Jacob Arminius (d. 1609) was that grace was part of providence and vice versa. That was because providence was twofold: it preserved the goodness of creatures according to their nature, and also according to grace through the communication of supernatural gifts. Grace is thus administered to all creatures. "Grace, therefore, belongs to the created order as part of its fundamental relation to God – and is not merely a divine gift later and only to some as a means to the correction of a problem [...] it is in fact, a direct counter to Junius' distinction between universal and particular providence."¹ Providence then was not reserved for "the elect" but for each individual human: predestination comes in by God's providential prescience or wisdom, but this does not take anything away from a universal, guiding presence. God's preservation guides essences, and divine government guides actions and passions. As Richard Muller explains, whereas most Roman Catholics like Suarez saw preservation as the same thing as *creatio continua*, Arminius, significantly, differs on this last point. His basic definition of providence as a temporal, not an eternal act of God – as "continued through [...] the duration of things' and not 'completed in a moment' – allows no room for the Reformed and Lutheran argument for the essential identity of creation."² Distinct "temporal divine activity" is asserted, and here the link with creation could be loosened, as Leo Scheffczyk lamented, for, as with Peter Aureole, in such a view there is a future to God in his knowledge. To quote Muller once more:

Here again Arminius moves away from the Thomist position, as represented in his own day by Suarez, and adopts a view that accords more freedom to the creature. Things are not fixed as by an anchor to creation and the nature of things. In this line, Suarez had thought the divine concurrence flows into the creatures' actions not just into effects. [...] he adds to Durandus that God concurs with the creaturely action: so into the action of the cause (not

¹ Richard A. Muller, *God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 245.

² *Ibid.*, 248.

into the cause nor into the effect) [...]. In other words, Arminius has adopted a fairly consistent Molinism.³

God could hinder sin without necessitating that it ceases its activity, by making sin seem unpleasant, or by making the person ill, so they have little strength with which to sin. Or, as in Arminius's *Disputatio publica* V,vii: "Even so, God hindered the plan of Joseph's brothers to commit murder, intervening more against the act than against the sinfulness of Joseph's brothers; but God permitted the sale of Joseph, allowing the transgression and then using the act itself for his own ends."

In the next generation Gisbertus Voetius insisted that any necessity is only *necessitas consequentiae*.⁴ He explained permission as God's non-interference with evil, and thus as an absence of a positive willed action. And in his work *De termino vitae* 118 he cited Augustine (*City of God* VII,10) and Aquinas (*SCG* III,67&69), in order to conclude: "It is necessary that a particular person dies at a particular hour, in the sense that it is infallibly known by God and immutably decreed by Him."⁵ That was not a case of *absolute* necessity, but was contingent with respect to its created cause. That way, God's providence could be termed a *fatum mobile*, in contradistinction to neo-Stoics like Spinoza.

There is something similar in the work of William Twisse who in 1632 (*Vindiciae Gratiae, Potestatis, Et Providentiae Dei*), against Arminius, saw the one decree as fixing creation, permission of sin and damnation all at once. There is a necessity of consequence between God's permission of evil and its reality. One can see this spelled out even more clearly with reference to Providence in Samuel Rutherford. In his inaugural lecture at St Andrews in 1651, Rutherford answers that of course God's decrees do not influence secondary causes, since any concurrence of God does not diminish the essence of things but preserves them. Hence it does not remove their pure potency, but rather removes the modal potency with regard to the event and outworking of the thing. For God himself is the "uncreated Angel."⁶

3 Ibid., 254f.

4 Andreas J. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676): Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre*, *Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte* 92 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 343.

5 Aza Goudriaan, *Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen*, Brill's Series in Church History and Religious Culture 26 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 149, n. 26.

6 Samuel Rutherford, *Disputatio scholastica de divina providentia* (Edinburgh, 1650), 7. (p. 586) "An decretum DEI positum tollat aliquam potentiam a creatis agentibus? Respondeo non tollit

With these details from Genesis 19:22 Rutherford seems to deviate from what Calvin established, that it was not God Himself who appeared, but a created angel: this “divine immediacy” was a position more identifiable with Lutheran theology. Freedom can be reconciled with the Lord of Lord’s antecedent will: on the one hand the power of God cannot be stopped, but on the other hand it is not an absolute necessity flooding in, but in such a way that his will is the model and character of a free cause without any force, i.e. consequential. There is influence, but nothing stronger.⁷ In Linda Munk’s book about Puritan providentialism, *The Devil’s Mousetrap*, the title relies on the detail that on account of the Greek *pagis* of Ps 124:7 (“we have escaped like a bird out of the snare”) the *Vetus Latina* and hence Augustine read *muscipula* (“flytrap” rather than “mousetrap”).⁸ The idea of Providence as really placed in a cosmic battlefield where great loss is to be expected, and hostile spiritual powers are located more “in the air” than “on the ground,” squares with the growing preference in the Augustinian tradition for theophanies in the Old Testament as involving angels, not the quieter manifest presence of the Lord himself. (Calvin had thought of any forces as natural types of secondary cause.)⁹

Rutherford disagreed with those Jesuits who believed that it was God who pre-moves secondary causes to act. No, God is involved in all actions at the point of the activity.¹⁰ He would distinguish the twofold natural providence of God, which is reckoned to God as the Creator viewing the ends of his creation, and the supernatural, that is reckoned to God as regards the absolute final

potentiam aliqua, creatam vel physicam, neque partem ejus ullam, 1. Quia decreta DEI qua decreta non influunt realiter in causas secundas. Quia prima causa neque concurrente, neque constituendo concurrere, minuit rerum entitates, sed conservat potius, ideoque puram potentiam non tollit decretum Dei, at vero potentiam modalem quae eventum & efficaciam rei respicit, tollit. 1. Quia ipse Deus Angelus increatus, Gen 19.22.”

7 Ibid., 12. (p. 589) “An libertas stare qua cum necessitate antecedente? Respondeo affirmative, alioqui providentiam dominatricem, & principatum, *Dominus Dominorum* in omnes actiones creaturarum haud exercebit.” 13 (p. 589): “[...] Respondeo negative, quia voluntas DEI cum sua invicta & infrustrabili necessitate non agit influx absolute necessario, sed ad modum, geniam, & indolem causae liberae citra omnem vim. Et quails est influxus primae causae in secundam, talis est consequentia. Nam collectio logicalis sequitur modum essendi & operandi: at influxus non est absolute necessarius. Ergo neque consequentia est absolute necessaria.”

8 Linda Munk, *The Devil’s Mousetrap: Redemption and Colonial American Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 22.

9 D. Stephen Long, *Hebrews, Belief: a Theological Commentary on the Bible* (Louisville: WJK, 2011), 11, with reference to Calvin on Hebrews 1:7 and Ps 104:4.

10 Rutherford, *Disputatio scholastica*, 18 (p. 592): “An creatura posset operari sine prima causa concurrente? Respondeo negative, quia actio illa facta a creatura citra DEUM, esset actio conservata sine DEO.”

end and directs all things to God. Augustine and Prosper are right to say about the former providence that no-one was created by God that they would perish. But with respect to supernatural providence, and the end of God above all, God grants that natural being to be, and allows sin by his inscrutable dispensation that the Glory of his justice might shine forth in the most just death and destruction of a human person.¹¹ So Bellarmine is obtuse, he thinks, to say that it is the condition of matter that ordains it to shame, but it is rather the case that creatures ordain themselves to their death, and it is their sin that draws their punishment. But the question is not whether the creatures by sinning ordain themselves dispositionally to damnation by committing those things which incur actual damnation.¹² No, it is rather a question of the predestinating ordination of God. And here he acknowledges the work of the Heidelberg Reformed divine, David Pareus.

In the Dutch Reformed setting around the middle of the Seventeenth Century, Providence could be distinguished from matters of predestination to the point that both doctrines had more room to breathe. For Cocceius the sabbath was a type of, or a sign pointing towards, the eschatological Sabbath and not to be instituted in this life. It was something given in the early days of creation and not really to do with covenants of law and grace:¹³ “God gave rest to people as people, as part of his providential care.” In the meantime, with regard to Col 2:17, one was to cease from moral misdeeds. As Ernestin van der Wall has explained, Coc-

11 Ibid., 6 (p. 228): “Distingui etiam hic velim, duplicem DEI providentiam, *naturalem*, quae competit DEO qua *Creator* respiciens fines creationis, & *supernaturalem*, quae competit DEO quatenus finem absolute ultimum respicit, & ad eum Omnia dirigit. Prioris providentiae respectu *Augustin* & *Prosper* recte dixerunt, *neminem a DEO creatum esse, ut periret*; quae finis creationis & Creatoris est ut communicaret esse creaturis, quod est bonum creaturae. At vero respectu *providentiae supernaturalis*, et finis DEI eminenter supreme, DEUS dat esse naturale & permittit peccatum ex inscrutabili dispensatione, ut patefiat Gloria justitiae in interitu homininis justissimo.”

12 Ibid. “Dilute igitur & insulse *Bellarminus* ait, *vasa facta in contumelia, habere a DEO, quod sint vasa, sed quod in contumeliam, habere non a DEO, sed a conditione materiae*: Quia Creaturae non se ordinant ad interitum sine demeritorie, puta, peccando, At non est quaestio an Creatura peccando dispositive se ordinent ad damnationem committendo ea quae actualem damnationem, incurrunt; at quaestio de ordinatione DEI praedestinativa.”

13 Silke-Petra Bergjan, “Vetus narrator extiti, non callidus disputator: Johannes Coccejus’ Lektüre der Kirchenväter im niederländischen Sabbatsstreit,” in *Patristic Tradition and Intellectual Paradigms in the 17th Century*, eds. Silke-Petra Bergjan and Karla Pollmann, Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation: Studies in the Late Middle Ages, Humanism, and the Reformation 52 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010): 73–104, 81: “Die Ruhe gehört nicht dem Bund der Werke an, und Sabbatpflichten entsprechen nicht dem Bund der Gnade” see *Indagatio Naturae sabbati* (1658); *Opera omnia* 9,2.”

ceians only held to Cartesianism in natural theology, not in revealed theology, and separated these. This division prepared the way for Moderate Dutch theology.¹⁴ This did not stop Protestant biblical interpretation from seeming very rationalistic even among French Jansenists who looked to the tradition of the church's interpretation to ascribe the bible mystery as well as clarity and for which the biblical story provided an exemplar for providence in the present age.

With burning concern to resist the Cartesian "static" view of creation with God shut out from it, and a tendency to restrict God's action to the order of redemption, Voetius' follower Petrus van Mastricht sounded the criticism that a number of Cartesians "transfer to *omnipresence* the *definition* that properly belongs to *Providence* [...]" and in particular their inclination to identify creation and conservation."¹⁵ What however was fairly novel in van Mastricht's thinking, at least in the final part of his *Theoeretico-practica theologia*, was seeing a universalising of providence that guided Israel ever since the New Testament becoming the driving force of history, working through the church into secular history, in the operation of the covenant of grace. As Goudriaan interprets the evidence from Dutch Church Historiography towards the end of the Seventeenth Century: "Occurrences of events that can be called miraculous in these various meanings can make up a cumulative case concerning God's guidance of Dutch history."¹⁶ Providence was seen as divine testimony to right religion, and it flowed from a source of grace to include all creatures.

Beza's *Abraham sacrificiant* is deemed to be the first tragedy written in French. In turn Racine appears like an accident in that he seems unclassical.¹⁷ This is only the case if one sees a gradual secularisation and "progression" with its apotheosis in Voltaire's dramas. What was rich throughout the long seventeenth century was a concern to think of providence in "theatrical" terms and vice versa. Admittedly tragedy with its disproportionate punishment for minor flaws found it hard to survive as the Enlightenment began to take hold. Yet up to that point the radical moralism of Racine, which pinned the blame for the world's disorder on deluded love, represented the forces once represented by

14 Ernestine van der Wall, "Cartesianism and Coccesianism: A Natural Alliance?" in *De l'Humanisme aux Lumières, Bayle et le protestantisme: Mélanges en l'honneur d'Elisabeth Labrousse*, ed. Michelle Magdelaine (Paris: Universitas, 1996), 455.

15 Ibid., 155.

16 Goudriaan, *Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy*, 216.

17 Jean-Pierre Perchellet, *L'Héritage classique: La tragédie entre 1680 et 1814*, Les Dix-huitièmes siècles 85 (Paris Honoré Champion 2004), 350. Also Anna Louise Kromsig, *Le Théâtre biblique à la veille du romantisme* (Zutphen: Nauta, 1931).

the classical gods as part of the psychological make-up of the protagonists and liable to moral approval or disapproval:

Racine's approach [...] is to attack the idea that there are small or moderate moral faults. In the tragic world of *Phèdre*, so often considered a projection of a Jansenist worldview into an ancient pagan framework, human intentionality is so emphasised there is no significant difference between thought and action ('la seule pensée du crime y est regardée avec autant d'horreur que le crime même').¹⁸

So there is not really much room for luck even though it appeared to people in shock as chance (*hasard*), but the world of *sin* is an irregular one. In *Le Cid* Corneille presents the tragedy of indecision. (Only in *Rosemonde* by Nicolas Chrestien des Croix does revenge lead to moral degradation.) Vengeance in this life is a duty, where human agents take on the role of God.

Keith Thomas in *Religion and the Decline of Magic*¹⁹ observed that in the late Middle Ages divine judgment and reward were deferred. Protestants objected that this seemed to imply that the Christian God was unable to touch anyone, for better or for worse, in this life. Prayer, not some apotropaic ritual, could link one to a sense of what God was very soon to bring about in the immediate future. Thomas Beard's *The Theatre of God's Judgment* (1597) forecast punishment on the evildoers and mighty, but also warned Epicureans and Atheists that God's Providence was very real. Conversely, Seneca was deemed to have been a bit too quiet about divine justice in the final reckoning, although was admired for the intensity of the "here and now" natural retribution.²⁰ For *Le Cid* it was a sacred duty to play the role of avenging hero, taking on the requirement of re-establishing God's honour in accordance with the "vengeance is mine" principle. About this Montaigne had written: "God, wishing to teach us that the good have something else to hope for, and the wicked something else to fear than the fortunes and misfortunes of this world, handles and allots these according to his occult disposition, and deprives us of the means of foolishly making a profit out of them."²¹ On this John Lyons comments: "In other words, the world is governed as far as appearances go, by chance. If we insist on finding a deeper explanation, we can simply say that puzzling things that happen from the intentions of a deity

¹⁸ John D. Lyons, *Kingdom of Disorder: The Theory of Tragedy in Classical France*, Studies in Romance Literatures 17 (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1999), 135.

¹⁹ Thomas Keith, *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century England* (London: Penguin, 2003).

²⁰ Elliott Forsyth, *La Tragédie française de Jodelle à Corneille (1553–1640): Le Thème de la vengeance* (Paris: A. G. Nizet, 1962), 104.

²¹ Montaigne, *Works* I.32, 216/161.

whose designs are the equivalent of chance – that is, unknown, incomprehensible, unpredictable and entirely beyond human power to influence.”²² In Montaigne’s *Apology for Raymond Sebond* the world is presented as disordered and unpredictable.²³

Certainly Corneille seems to have seen Fortune as a purposeful even if cruel mistress of events. For Corneille unpredictable exceptions were more interesting. *Clitandre* is all about chance combinations and plots crossing, while *Le Cid* is a tragedy because things are out of the hero’s control.²⁴ Montaigne, although a century earlier, can be seen as standing behind the conviction that even chance is more like Fortune than it is purely accidental.²⁵ Within early modern Catholicism lay contingency, argues John Lyons, but this seems too simple: “Racine’s great achievement in *Athalie* is to reconcile the French Catholic providentialist outlook with neo-Aristotelian poetics by discerning the principal point of convergence: suspense.”²⁶ Meanwhile, human beings carry out God plans unwittingly. “The seventeenth century marked the decline of a totalising, centralising, personalising, spectacular and didactic view of chance, or Boethian ‘Fortune’ – in favour of a punctual, decentred, impersonal, imperceptible and amoral form of contingency, often designated by the term *hazard*.”²⁷

Providence was seen to account for the whole nexus of events and not just individual fortunes or misfortunes. Liberty is qualified by dependence on other created causes and it is always dependent on divine providence, God’s power.²⁸ As Stephen A. Long puts it in relation to Molina: “But the doctrine of the creation and God’s Providence over contingent singular effects is not only received in faith but is demonstrable by reason [...]. Molina, whose implicit removal of

²² John D. Lyons, *The Phantom of Chance: From Fortune to Randomness in Seventeenth-Century French Literature*, Edinburgh Critical Studies in Renaissance Culture (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 24.

²³ See Daniel Martin, *Montaigne et la fortune: Essai sur le hasard et le langage*, Bibliothèque littéraire de la Renaissance; 3. sér., 4 (Paris: Champion, 1977).

²⁴ Lyons, *The Phantom of Chance*, 62: “Only for a Catholic hero – and not for a Huguenot, Calvinist one – would time contain the possibility of a significant accident, an encounter that could alter the hero’s relationship to God.”

²⁵ Philippe Desan, *Dieu à notre commerce et société: Montaigne et la théologie*, Travaux d’humanisme et Renaissance (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2008.)

²⁶ Lyons, *The Phantom of Chance*, 169.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 196.

²⁸ As per Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I,q22,a2 ad4.

will and human agency from Divine Providence evacuated the scholastic theology of its profound thocentricity and destroyed natural order as theonomic.”²⁹

Pierre Bayle related how Pascal's necessitarianism led that great natural philosopher to be considered posthumously by his fellow Jansenists as a Calvinist, at the time of *La Paix de l'église* in 1669 when most Jansenists identified with the Catholic Church. Pierre Nicole would attack Calvinists in 1673. Bayle's own dislike for the ideas about *L'Ame du Monde* which he found in Stoicism, and which he criticised for failing to postulate conditional necessity about the future, can be traced to the influence of Nicole.³⁰ The world of humans and history is contingent.³¹ The Stoic belief in the gods as physical is a problem, and implies that ultimately they trace all deities back to Jupiter. Granted, at least the Stoics were interested in the question of divine purpose in the world and how it related to human purposes and “accidents.”³² Nevertheless, there was a need for revelation if humans were to understand anything of divine working, and the benighted Stoics did not manage to sustain liberty as part of the equation.

A more pious voice and representative of French Catholicism of a serious but not Jansenist mode, Jean-Jacques Olier urged Louise de Marillac: “Follow the order of Providence! Oh! How good it is to let ourselves be guided by it!”³³ “What great treasures there are in holy providence, [...] and how marvelously Our Lord is honored by those who follow it and do not tread on its heels (*qui n'enjambent pas sur elle*)!”³⁴ It seems that “the Spirit” and “Providence” were used interchangeably such that the note of caution in Galatians 5:22 (“keep in

29 Steven A. Long, *Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 209, n. 3. See also Steven A. Long, “Providence, Liberty and Natural Law,” *Nova et Vetera* 4 (2006): 557–606.

30 Jacqueline Lagrée, “Le critique du stoicisme dans le ‘Dictionnaire’ de Bayle,” in *De l'Humanisme aux Lumières, Bayle et le protestantisme*, eds. Michelle Magdelaine, Marina-Cristina Pitras-si, Ruth Whelan and Anthony McKenna (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1996): 581–93. See also Claude-Gilbert Dubois, “David et Saül: L'onction et le droit dans la tragédie biblique française (1563–1601),” *Revue de théologie et de philosophie* 133 (2001): 401–420. Elsewhere, “Juste Lipse: Destins et Providence: in *Le Stoicisme au XVIe e au XVIIIe siècle*, ed. Pierre-François Moreau (Paris: Albin Michel, 1999): 77–92, Lagrée has pointed to Justus Lipsius (c. 1600) as a neo-Stoic forerunner of Spinozan naturalism.

31 “Il est également vrai que cette proposition *le grand Mongol ira demain à la chasse ou n'ira pas* est vrai ou fausse” (Bayle, art. ‘Epicure’: cf. Leibniz, *Theodicy*, 169).

32 Lagrée, “Le critique du stoicisme,” 590: “Bref, le seul mérite de la théologie stoïcienne c'est d'avoir conçu Dieu comme provident et son seul intérêt present est de bien montrer qu'il y a un lien entre providence, destin, liberté humaine et responsabilité.”

33 Raymond Deville, *L'école française de spiritualité*, Bibliothèque d'histoire du christianisme, 11 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1987), 17.

34 Ibid., 54.

step with the Spirit”) could be glossed as meaning not getting ahead of Providence. “Vincent uses precisely the same expression [*ne pas le devancer*] on two occasions when writing about providence,”³⁵ as when he writes to Mère Catherine de Beaumont: “We try in everything to follow the adorable providence of God and not to get ahead of it” (*ne la pas devancer*); or to Bernard Codoin: “Grace has its moments. Let us abandon ourselves to God’s providence and be very careful not to get ahead of it.”³⁶

In the middle of the seventeenth century, Bishop Bossuet of Paris stood fast for all things conservative. Although “(s)urprisingly, Bossuet’s argument requires a heightened perception that the historical world operates randomly,”³⁷ still here one can see the contrast with Pierre Bayle: God does not leave history to contingency, but as with Molina, Bossuet would insist that God actuated things so as to get the results He wanted. Bearing in mind what human agents would do, Molina meant this in the realm of salvation and election, but it characterizes Bossuet’s approach to Providence.

In his History, Bossuet gives a list of figures in world-history: Adam – Noah – Abraham – Moses – fall of Troy – Solomon – Romulus – fall of Jerusalem – Medes & Persians – and in all cases dates are given! There is hardly anything about Athens or even Alexander en route to Maccabean history. He discusses the Dixième Epoque as the time of the Birth of Jésus-Christ inaugurating the “Septième et dernier âge du monde.” The “Onzième Epoque” is that of Constantine, or that of “la paix de L’Eglise” and the “Douzième Epoque”, that of Charlemagne, or “l’établissement du nouvel empire” Precise dates, and the question as to whether the LXX or the Hebrew bible is right in its computations are not that important. It is just that the main events can be given a date, so that it was all about using the time gaps to link the stories and put them in order.³⁸ Israel was an object lesson in Providence.³⁹ From the antiquity of the one religion through the New Testament there was an ongoing flow of a divine history, on

35 Ibid., 55.

36 Ibid., 57.

37 Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, *Discours sur l’histoire universelle* (Paris: Mabre-Cramoisy, 1681), xv.

38 Ibid., 117: “l’ordre des temps, quoiqu’il soit absolument nécessaire pour lier toutes les histoires, et en montrer le rapport.” This all serves to show “la suite du peuple de Dieu et celles des grands empires.”

39 Ibid., 119f: “on ne peut rien concevoir qui soit plus digne de Dieu, que de s’être premièrement choisi un peuple qui fût un exemple palpable de son éternelle providence; un peuple dont la bonne ou la mauvaise fortune dépendit de la piété, et dont l’état rendit témoignage à la sagesse et à la justice de celui qui le gouvernoit.” This was proof: ‘que lui seul conduit à sa volonté tous les événements de la vie présente.’

into the history of the church, with also a continuing providence accompanying it, just as in the times of biblical salvation history.⁴⁰

Providential design in history was viewed as operating within Politics too. In Jakob Bidermann's *Belisarius* (1607) there is the statement of such confident belief.⁴¹ Drews thinks that by the middle of the Seventeenth century (with the Thirty Years War and the British Civil Wars just over), Providence was beginning to disappear as a category that concerned public life and history.⁴² This applies to *Paradise Lost* and to Gryphius' *Carolus Stuardus* (c. 1650). Hobbes' conclusion in the 1660s that Providence would come through the godly Prince was probably a harbinger of this development. So, Drews argues, Providence became relegated to the private sphere and after Vico and Herder it would even be pushed out of there, with "fortune" again a more popular term for what went on in the realm of History (as in the Middle Ages, yet this time without a higher wisdom to check on it). This argument (by Drews) seems to date these developments too early. Well into the Hanoverian period, and a century later in the USA, national public fasts were being called as a response to the vicissitudes of Providence. The mid-seventeenth century saw expectation of the Providential God at their highest. Oliver Cromwell's reaction to the disaster of the expedition to Hispaniola in 1655 can be described as "providential paralysis." Like the Jamestown massacre in 1622 this was hard to accept. In Massachusetts in late 1620s the Johns Winthrop & Cotton felt they were getting out of the way of God's wrath, escaping to a place where nothing happened, where there was no history. Cotton advised that attacking Spain would precipitate Christ's return. Cromwell was "crippled by doubts about the course of providence in the two years before his death in 1658."⁴³ One of his supporters, Stephen Charnock aimed to simplify the doctrine:

1. There is a providence exercised by God in the world.
2. All God's providences in the world are in order to the good of his people.
3. Sincerity in God's way gives a man an interest in all God's providences, and the good of them.

⁴⁰ Ibid., "[...] sa suite, continuée sans interruption et sans alteration durant tant de siècles, et malgré tant d'obstacles survenus, fait voir manifestement que la main de Dieu la soutient."

⁴¹ See Gottfried Kirchner, *Fortuna in Dichtung und Emblematik des Barock: Tradition und Bedeutungswandel eines Motivs* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1970). Also John Barclay's *Argenis* of 1622; tr. 1626. Francis Bacon's 1622 *History of Henry VIII*.

⁴² Drews, *Menschliche Willensfreiheit*, 2:194.

⁴³ Nicholas Guyatt, *Providence and the Invention of the United States, 1607–1876* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 41.

This was rather because God looked at the details and could see every little occurrence, with an interest that preferred small things to glorious empires. Prophecy proves that God arranges history and so nothing, not the least thing down to the care of cattle is by chance. His key text was: “*For the eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole earth, to shew himself strong in the behalf of them whose heart is perfect towards him*” (2 Chron. 16:9).⁴⁴ The Old Testament royal characters are presented as individual believers who also happen to be kings. When he writes: “God’s special providence is over his people, but his general providence over all kingdoms and countries,” it seems clear from the context that it is each of his people that is meant or at most families.⁴⁵

Like Rutherford before him, the future Bishop of Dunblane then Glasgow in Charles II’s Scotland, Robert Leighton held forth on Providence during his professorial inauguration:

These are the great things of faith and godliness, and what the whole religion hinges on. [...] Those who approach God must remember he Must be believed in and that he rewards those who diligently seek him (Heb 1:6; 1 Reg 7,21) Whereas those who design ships and buildings finish with their works and allow fate or chance by having no more care. For in his grasp is that other Providence, that is the constant sustaining and governing of all things seen and unseen [...]. God who is not just the high architect but also the all-wise craftsman never leaves his work but concerns himself in the conservation and is there for its ruling and correcting and is closely present to complete it wholly.⁴⁶

This is a rather minimal account of God’s intervention, by comparison with Rutherford, however. Leighton is happy to mix Epictetus Chapter 12, book 1 with Psalm 139:6: all things work by his counsel (which is picked up by Paul and notes that even Aeschylus and Euripides admitted that human affairs were guided by a peculiar intelligence).⁴⁷ Seneca, Plutarch and 2 Peter 3.8 were all agreed that God treats his own sons more roughly for the purpose of training. Yet the Stoics are to be rebuked for subjecting even God to Fate. He quotes Augustine

⁴⁴ Stephen Charnock, “A Discourse of Divine Providence,” in *The Works of Stephen Charnock* (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1864), 7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁶ Robert Leighton, *De Providentia*: “Haec sunt (85) magna fidei ac pietatis, atque adeo totius religionis, fulcra; [...] Nam et alia suo ambitu complectitur Providentia, rerum scilicet omnium visibilium ac invisibilium, in coelo et in terra, sustentationem ADIALEIPTON et gubernationem. Fabri quidem domos naesque et reliqua sua opificia ubi absolverunt, suis ut plurimum permittunt fati, seu casibus, nihil ultra de iis solliciti. At supremus certe hic Architectus, KAI PANSOPHOS DHMIOURGOS, opus suum nunquam deserit; sed circumdat usque conservando, eique regendo et moderando praeest, et intim inest totum complendo.”

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 88.

on the Psalms to argue how it is the duty of humans to bend their will to that of God's.⁴⁸

Certainly, as late as the end of the Seventeenth Century, public providence was a commonplace. Gilbert Burnet, in welcoming William of Orange to the British Throne, spoke of a:

Work about which Providence has watched in so peculiar a manner that a Mind must be far gone into Atheism, that can resist so full a Conviction as this offers us in favour of that truth: 'It is the Lord's doing', not as the Heavens and the Earth, as the Revolutions of Day and Night, and the whole Chain of Second Causes are his Work. All Signal and eminent things are by the common Phrase of Scripture ascribed to God; and therefore every Event that is great in itself, and may become much greater in its Consequences, ought to be imputed to an immediate Hand of Heaven. Those Things in which God's Honour is most particularly concerned, may well be reckoned His doing.⁴⁹

Here we see a test of whether events contribute to "God's Honour".

John Flavel (d. 1691) insisted that Providence can be viewed in actions which fulfil God's word, and none other. There needs to have been some prophecy or preaching beforehand if one is to be sure an action is providential. Providence brings heaven into souls on the way to heaven. The fullness of seeing how God's design worked for us will only be tasted in heaven. The way it works can be easily summed up: "This Providence raised a dismal cloud, and that dispelled it again."⁵⁰ The treatise proper starts with Ps 47:2; it continues with Ps 138:8 where he appeals to the LXX: "The Lord will perfect by who profiteth me." The address is very much to individuals, which the doctrine seems to concern. It is about providence at work in personal lives. It could be argued that special Divine Providence was the Protestant equivalent to the continuing Roman Catholic interest in miracles. Perhaps the accent was placed on the negative:

Physicians and reformers rejected claims that medivinal waters derived their therapeutic powers from their celestial guardians, insisting instead that this was attributable to their chemical content or their frigid qualities. Nevertheless they and others still acknowledged them as the 'largess of heaven' as gracious gifts from God that might be taken away if the communities to which they were vouchsafed proved themselves unworthy of retaining

48 Cf. *Ibid.*, 94: "Si providentiam hanc ponimus sapientissimam atque optimam, necesse est per omnia velimus quod ipsa vult; alioquin libitum monstrum ei anteferimus, quod prodigii simile est."

49 Gilbert Burnet, *Sermon preached in chapel of St James before his Highness Prince of Orange, 23 December, 1688* (London, 1689.)

50 John Flavel, *Divine conduct; or The mystery of Providence*, Preface, vii; in *Works*, Vol. II (London: D. Midwinter, 1740), 135.

them. Evidence of His beneficence to the poor in particular, the cures they effected were understood to be dependent on divine will and humble repentance.⁵¹

It seemed mostly about conveying terror or at best thankfulness for being spared disaster, rather than the receiving of any positive improvement, such as a miracle might bring.

Details such as changes in the colour of standing water, such as the strange crimson scum on the lake at Newington Green in Middlesex in 1662, were regarded as the work of God. There was a red-hued lake at Loughall, Co. Armagh in 1641, although Thomas Fuller in his *History of worthies in England* (1662) attributed such reports to superstitions conjured by the devil. However as time went on, a more positive register was sounded, and a less punitive voice was heard. Odd events demonstrated God's benevolence through the wonders of creation, causing one to marvel at creation itself – despite Boyle's continuing to focus on unusual phenomena as token of God's intervention. Thomas Burnet in 1684 had published *The sacred theory of the earth*, arguing that after the fall the earth was a ruin from which God had withdrawn.⁵² To this the naturalist John Woodward reacted in his 1695 work *Essay toward a Natural History of the Earth* (1695), that after the flood plenty of proofs of his Goodness could be seen, both in wondrous creation and in civilisation. John Ray, Fellow of Trinity, Cambridge, although disagreeing with Woodward on the role of the biblical flood was in general agreement with this “positive” direction, seeing through Providence to the certain fixities of creation Wisdom of God (1691) ‘explicitly structured as an extended commentary on Psalm 102.’⁵³ Richard Bentley's 1692 Boyle lectures confounded deism but also Robert Boyle's view of the universe as mechanical. Rather, “gravity” should be seen as coming from the right hand of God as a means of holding everything together.

The rise of the modern novel in this context is not really so surprising. In early modern story-writing in England, most popular were “the apparition tale, the criminal biography and the sea deliverance story.” The job of the author

51 Alexandra Walsham, *The Reformation of the Landscape: Religion in Early Modern Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 469. Cf. idem, “The Reformation and the Disenchantment of the World Reassessed,” *HJ* 51 (2008): 497–528.

52 Walsham, *The Reformation of the Landscape*, 480.

53 Scott Mandelbrote, “Early Modern Natural Theologies,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology*, ed. Russel Re Manning, Oxford Handbooks in Religion and Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 75–99, 87.

was to separate “the factual from the merely historical.”⁵⁴ The principle was that a story was “strange therefore true.” Travel narratives across boundaries were a form of science writing by explorers, but with high value in religious terms. When one looks across to the situation in New England, as Hartman observes, the providential story arises “whenever God’s agency is factored in to a tale of the bizarre.”⁵⁵ There was an empirical approach with a love for detail, yet with a moral that held it all together, which also served as a “proof” that God existed and meant business. Even everyday life was dramatized as that of a struggle with doubt and sin. This made almost anything qualify for narration, and that which seemed special was made to seem highly sensational. Everything was placed in heightened relief, e.g. in 1681’s *Captivity Narrative* by Martin Rowland. A famous example of this style of writing on a grand scale was Cotton Mather’s *Magnalia Christi Americana* of 1702. The work includes a selection of captivity narratives, especially Book 6, which emphasized the value of affliction as one trusted in deliverance to arrive at the very last minute. He had already written *Memorable Providences, Relating to Witchcrafts and Possession* (1689), and in his still earlier *Essay for the Recording of Illustrious Providences* (1684) wrote: “Sometimes the Great and Good Holy God hath permitted, and by His Providence ordered such Apparitions, to the end that Atheists might therefore be astonished.”⁵⁶ His *A brand plucked out of the burning* (1693) concerns Mercy S. Short, whose deliverance from “Indians” and then from a wicked French spell provided cause for thanksgiving and pious entertainment.⁵⁷

“Preachers commonly distinguished between the domains of Providence and Grace, with the former roughly applying to the supernatural manipulation of a person’s external life, and the later (sic) the manipulation of a person’s internal process of salvation. But on occasion, they ignored the distinctions entirely, making the term ‘Providence’ cover all those operations.”⁵⁸ There was something almost Aristotelian in the definition of Providence as “Ordered contingency between Fate and Chance.” “Signs of Providence were used to reassure about Election: Even Laud shivered when his portrait fell.”⁵⁹ “Public signal judge-

⁵⁴ Michael McKeon, *The Origins of the English Novel 1600–1740* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 267.

⁵⁵ James D. Hartman, *Providence Tales and the Birth of American Literature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1999).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁵⁷ His *Wonders of the Invisible World* (1694) was an account of Salem witch trials, whose sensibilities were far from sceptical.

⁵⁸ Michael Winship, *Seers of God: Puritan Providentialism in the Restoration and Early Enlightenment*, Early America: History, Context, Culture (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996), 7.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 31.

ments” such as fires, were where God was showing sins of all mankind, not particular ones. Active providence in history bridged the conceptual gap between natural and revealed religion. Detecting the work of God in the most mundane of circumstances served “to correct the common error touching cosmological decay, by which most men and women flattered themselves that disasters were not divine scourges for their sins, but merely symptoms of the world’s advancing infirmity and age.”⁶⁰ Alexandra Walsham’s research highlights those like Dr Thomas Beard, *The Theatre of God’s Judgements* (1597) which contained anecdotes of providential punishments inflicted upon shameless sinners, a “relatively limited repertoire of untimely and exemplary ends.”⁶¹ Beard could be creative, with for example, the story of the Antwerp youth preserved by God while hanging at Bonn, where the original imprecation to Mary for aid was omitted. There was a whole chapter in *The Theatre* on rash “devil take me” utterances. “God chastised communities like an affectionate father, declared Thomas Wilcox in the aftermath of the Woburn fire, to win them away from the vicious and depraved habits to which they were addicted.”⁶² The liturgies for fasting looked like corporate Roman Catholic contrition: “they re-conceptualized sacramental rites in terms of representation, as forms of communion rather than procedures through which the divine and the diabolical were made manifest.”⁶³ Collective immorality got the blame for plagues and for the poor harvest of May 1674 by Henry Newcombe.

There was less of a discernible distinction between the individual and the corporate than would be the case a century or so later.⁶⁴ Diaries began to be kept by many for the sake of witnessing *to others* of the active “providences” of God.⁶⁵ These could be called autobiographies of divine presence, and an ac-

⁶⁰ Alexandra Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 23 re. George Hakewill, *Apology of the Power and Providence of God* (1627).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 78

⁶² *Ibid.*, 122.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 155: “the extent to which the language of corporal repentance and temporal deliverance overlaps with the language of individual redemption and eternal salvation.” Thodore D. Bozeman “Federal Theology and the ‘National Covenant’: An Elizabethan Presbyterian Case Study,” *Church History* 61 (1992): 394–407, observes that through personification eternal salvation was thought to be attributable to cities.

⁶⁵ “[...] weniger ein säkularer Individualismus als ein religiöser Subjektivismus,” Kaspar von Greyerz, *Vorsehungsglaube und Kosmologie: Studien zu englischen Selbstzeugnissen des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 26). Cf. Wolfgang Brueckner, “Erneuerung als selektive Tradition,” in *Der Übergang zur Neuzeit und die Wirkung der Traditionen: Vorträge gehalten auf der Tagung der Joachim Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Hamburg am 13.*

tive presence at that. Von Greyerz views the interest of Providence in England from the time of Thomas Beard's work to have ridden an "Arminian" wave of "providence as divine-human synergism," which would surface in John Wilkins *Discourse concerning the beauty of Providence* (1649). Providence was like a watch of which one can see only two or three of its many wheels.⁶⁶ However this does not really advance Von Greyerz's "Arminianism [with its view of covenantalism as relativizing divine determinism] as secularising force" thesis. If early modern English people looked for blessing in the world as a sign of their election, as many certainly seemed inclined to do, this should not be seen as shaking off the fear of not being elect in the next life in favour of a certain accentuating of immanent blessing in this life.⁶⁷ Even if Daniel Defoe was doing this in *Robinson Crusoe*, one has to ask just how typical he (or Samuel Pepys for that matter) was in so doing. In the examples of Elias Pledger and Oliver Heywood,⁶⁸ both writing in 1689, it seems clear that their being led through physical misfortunes and difficulties both shaped and was shaped by an inward reality, namely that of the sanctification of God's very own. And yet they could see (in that heady year) that the outward political situation as the condition or context of their spiritual growth and work was all part of God's special Providence and most worthy of that name.

For Romans 1:20 ("God's invisible power visible through things He made") to make sense to the Seventeenth-Century mind, the natural man required to have been endowed with quite a lot, which made his rejection of God in Christ seem without excuse. The Sabbath therefore has to be seen as a pre-Mosaic command, binding on all – a moral law – to last. Reventlow instances Herbert of Cherbury⁶⁹

und 14. Oktober 1977, Veröffentlichung der Joachim Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Hamburg 32 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978).

⁶⁶ von Greyerz, *Vorsehungsglaube und Kosmologie*, 79: "[...] den in der Prädestinationslehre als Mysterium verstandenen Heilsplan zu entmystifizieren, in dem er die ständige göttliche Präsenz im Alltag, in der eigenen Biographie und in der kollektiven Geschichte sichtbar und erfahrbar zu machen suchte."

⁶⁷ Ibid., 183: "Vor dem Hintergrund der oben geschilderten Wandlungen des Providentialismus im späten 17. Jahrhundert ist es vielmehr bezeichnend, daß die Vorsehung immer mehr nur noch als "positive", erfolbringende Kraft erscheint. Die Sündenbewußtsein scheint beim älteren Robinson völlig verfliegen zu sein."

⁶⁸ See ibid., 108–14. Cf. Blair Worden, "Providence and Politics in Presbyterian England," *Past & Present* 109 (1985): 55–99.

⁶⁹ Henning Graf Reventlow, *Bibelautorität und Geist der Moderne: Die Bedeutung des Bibelverständnisses für die geistesgeschichtliche und politische Entwicklung in England von der Reformation bis zur Aufklärung*, *Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte* 30 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 215.

to make the point that grace is just as universal as nature and the two should not be set in mutual opposition.⁷⁰ The key feature of Universal Providence is that it holds the two together, showing the gracious loving care for the whole human race by One who is as much Common Father as he is Highest God. Recent research has suggested that while most deists believed that Revelation did not continue past creation and that even the New Testament dispensation was more just a reminder than anything new in terms of information, not all deists disbelieved that God was actively at work in the world.

Calvin had seen Providence as *actuosa procuratio*, which was in fact quite the opposite of determination. God was always in the business of mixing things up, and one could find comfort in knowing his care rather than in a universe of tight laws of cause and effect.⁷¹ Calvin highlighted a strong creator/creature distinction, resisting the patristic-medieval consensus. There was an *Entzauberung* in that Jesus is the Lord of creation and left no space for other forces to roam with unaccountability and impunity. But now, increasingly in the modern world, wonder switched its gaze to the details of Nature; the world itself possessed awe from having energy of its own. Had not God in fact rested from his works? God became interpreted as the ground of possibility of what is the case. God worked in events but not among them.

Philosophical Moves

For Descartes, things were as they were because God willed them to be. Despite this clear-cut endorsement of voluntarism, however, Descartes tended to be a rationalist about God's supervision of the natural order. Simply put, orderliness

70 Ibid., 317: "Quod igitur in omnium est ore, tanquam verum accipimus, neque enim sine Providentia illa Universali momenta actionum disponente fieri potest quod ubique fit... impie igitur dicitur, Naturam sive Providentiam rerum commune, & Gratiam sive Providentiam rerum particularem in Antithesi positam esse, velint se pugnare, cum utraque a Deo Op. Max. profiscantur. An alius verus, ac idem Optimus Maximusque Deus, aut Pater Communis ab omni humano genere recte vocari possit quam qui Providentia Universali utens. Cunctis hominibus ita consulit, ut una cum appetitione status beatorum, quam illorum animis indidit. Media poro quaedam communia, commode. Efficaciaque ad statum illum consequendum subministret?" (Herbert of Cherbury, *De veritate*, p. 122).

71 "Neque enim humano modo vel naturae sensu in nostris miseriis agnoscimus, Deo nostri esse curam: sed fide invisibilem eius providentiam apprehendimus." (CR 31,132: On Ps 13:2); Or "providentiam Dei [...] sic moderatricem esse rerum omnium, ut nunc mediis interpositos operetur, nunc sine mediis, nunc contra Omnia media" (*Inst* 1.17.1).

was more fitting than confusion, so providence would be orderly.⁷² “The mechanical conception of nature – promoted, among others, by Descartes –, left more room for God’s acts at creation than afterwards in conservation (although Descartes defined God’s conservation of things as a continued creation).”⁷³

However, the God of Baruch Spinoza was definitely material whatever else he was. The Amsterdam philosopher manifested hostility towards Maimonides for whom intellect (hence the divine) was higher. For Maimonides, “God has no history and is outside history,” but for Spinoza, overcoming such dichotomy leads to overcoming morality: “Man and fishes are divine in equal measure.”⁷⁴ Following Machiavelli whom he praised, he argued that the masses are more knowing and more constant than the Prince, even without any “nous.” Malebranche and Spinoza were of a common view that only in grace does God intervene: the rest of time He stands as remote *prima causa*, and Providence is all about upholding the order of things.⁷⁵ Malebranche opposed particularism; he mocked duelling as a way that might reveal God’s vindication of the party in the right. God works simply and generally, even uniformly. Only exceptionally will God choose to intervene for a reason. Malebranche reintroduced Augustine’s *rationes seminales* which had suffered considerable neglect. In his *Telluris Theoria Sacra* (1681) he argued that the laws of nature could account for what was amazing, and would in themselves lead to the end of the world as well.⁷⁶ Reviewing the contributions of John Ray, and then George Hakewill in his *Examination and Censure of the Common Errour touching Natures perpetuall and Universal Decay* (1627), Malebranche would promote a naturalism that had already been approved by John Spencer and other early Enlightenment English thinkers. “By the end of the seventeenth century, many natural philosophers had begun to argue that change ought to be thought of not in terms of degeneration, but of fluctuation or even progress.”⁷⁷ William King in his *De origine mali* (1702)

72 Stuart Brown, “The Regularization of Providence in Post-Cartesian Philosophy,” in *Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Robert Crocker, International Archives of the History of Ideas 180 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001): 1–16.

73 Goudriaan, *Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy*, 144.

74 Aryeh L. Motzkin, “Maimonides and Spinoza on Good and Evil,” *Daat* 24 (1990): v–xxiii, xx.

75 Ulrich Lehner, *Kants Vorsehungskonzept auf dem Hintergrund der deutschen Schulphilosophie und -theologie*, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 149 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 13: “Für Spinoza war die Vorsehung sogar ganz mit der Naturordnung identisch, nicht aber mit dem Geschichtslauf.”

76 Peter Harrison, “Theology and Early Theories of Evolution,” in *Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Robert Crocker, International Archives of the History of Ideas 180 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001): 199–224, 205.

77 Ibid.

wrote that God alone is perfection, so that humans must expect imperfection from themselves as natural. One could speak of a translation of theological dogmas into natural scientific ones: from resurrection one could infer “transmutation” (cf. Charles Bonnet, *Contemplation de la nature* [1764]/ *Plaignesie philosophique* [1770]).

Already with Francis Bacon one could argue for a scientific vision of all creation moving under God’s instruction. For both Calvin and Bacon, God is active in all parts of creation. For both Calvin and Bacon, there is nothing which happens which God has not ordained beforehand, and thus God’s omnipotence is preserved. Beyond this, the similarities between the two end. They differ significantly with regard to the way in which God’s omnipotence is exercised. For Bacon, God could ordain something beforehand without it being God’s active decree. It could be approved because God had already woven it into a “bigger picture.”⁷⁸

It is God’s eternal arrangement with the goal of renewal of the whole human race that interested Bacon, as he mutated that which he had received from his Calvinist heritage. “The kingdom of God cometh not with observation, so it is in all the greater works of Divine Providence; everything glides on smoothly and noiselessly, and the work is fairly going on before men are aware that it has begun.”⁷⁹ This “work” embraced the restoration of fallen humanity, or what he preferred to call an instauration within history.⁸⁰ It was all part of divine providence that humans should come to understand nature’s laws through experimentation: we are to look for the Creator’s stamp on creatures and the works of God as the work of his hands; humans are not to proceed by domineering or impressing our own stamp.

A God who moves things around is a God whose will is valued. This insistence with Herbert of Cherbury was lost by the time of Shaftesbury. For Cherbury the interesting question was not “whether God exists,” but whether God is one who can be worshipped and obeyed. Knowing to ask this question at least was contained within basic human knowledge (*notitia communis*), which to that degree was itself naturally religious. As a forerunner of the Enlightenment,

⁷⁸ Steven Matthews, *Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011), 34.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁸⁰ With reference to Ps 104:30 (*Emittes spiritu tuo et creabuntur; et instaurabis faciem terrae*), although the more common reading of the Vulgate here has “*renovabis* in place of “*instaurabis*”. Also, cf, Ps 90:13–17. Matthews, *Theology and Science*, 83 comments: “Bacon commonly used the metaphor of a fruitful plant to describe the providential development of an age in which knowledge would flourish, and to explain the reason why it had not done before.”

however, Shaftesbury denied voluntarism any place: God is to be judged by what is just and good;⁸¹ and hence he showed a fair degree of scepticism towards Revelation. "The Good" is defined as that which makes people more sociable.⁸² It could be argued that Newton steered a middle course here. Newton was no deist, since he accorded God the role of "mover" in a way that echoed with More, Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists. Clarke would defend this position against Leibniz's static world view: "For Clarke and Newton, undoubtedly, the created universe is ultimately and completely a manifestation of total providence."⁸³ If Being includes the possibility to exist, then ongoing change in the creation is natural or essential. The "static" view could be found not only among natural scientists and philosophers, but also with Jacob Böhme, for whom metaphors such as theatre were unfitting in his meditation on creation as "book," and for whom the dynamic energies had to be harmonised.⁸⁴

Newtonianism was criticized by Leibniz as "materialist." "Nevertheless, eighteenth-century natural theology had the opportunity to base itself on a different kind of lawfulness than that which its predecessors had found in nature. At the same time, it was able to advance a far wider range of evidences for divine creation, design, and superintendence than had been available to earlier philosophers."⁸⁵ In that sense Physics – perhaps guided by Scripture – was helping to reveal the world as set in a mysterious universe and dependent on laws which were not obvious to those on the planet. The magnitude of God and the Universe put the known world, for all its size "in its place." Yet all the while lawyers were beginning to locate the origin of moral and societal laws within human societies; the laws of Physics were viewed as higher and more glorious than those of human society. The larger the number of known species the higher the Intelligence that took care of them, to paraphrase John Ray's *The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation* (1691). "The Protestant obsession with Providence

81 Reventlow, *Bibelautorität und Geist der Moderne*, 510.

82 Ibid.: "Gott wird auch genannt, der Name 'Gott' ist ein Verhältnisbegriff, der sich auf Diener Gottes bezieht, und wenn das Verhältnis von Menschen zu Gott mit Wortverbindungen wie 'Mein Gott, euer Gott, Gott Israels' usw. ausgedrückt wird, zeigt sich darin, daß es sich um einen persönlichen, nicht um einen metaphysischen Gott handelt" (Opera IV, 171=*Principia* (ed Koyre-Cohen II, 760f.).

83 Frances E. L. Priestley, "The Clarke-Leibniz Controversy," in *The Methodological Heritage of Newton*, eds. Robert E. Butts and John W. Davis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970): 24–56, 52.

84 Stefan Laube, "Wissenswelten sinnlicher Frömmigkeit: Theatrale Antriebsmomente in der Naturanschauung von Bernard Palissy und Jacob Böhme," in *Religion und Naturwissenschaft im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz et al., Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 210 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2010): 217–36, esp. 232ff.

85 Mandelbrote, "Early Modern Natural Theologies," 91.

led to an increasing emphasis on the regularity of nature within the Aristotelian tradition,”⁸⁶ for it was something above the sphere of secondary and creaturely causes.⁸⁷ Newton’s connection between the two realms, whereby “laws” could mean both axiomatic principles and empirical regularities was beginning to come apart. In Ray’s *Wisdom* there is little mention of history or human action, just the given “integrity and perfection of bodies” (at p. 223), to which one is to respond by allowing the soul to govern them. It fitted a semi-Augustinian theology that: “The Stoic God rules, but not by imposing laws.”⁸⁸ “The image of *Deus legislator*, reinforced by biblical exegesis, remained powerful throughout the seventeenth century, as did the assumption that natural laws must somehow be promulgated.”⁸⁹ The regularity of God’s laws rather than the welfare of his creatures seemed to take priority. The laws were explicit, knowable as the expressed content of the divine mind. The irony was, that something that began with an interest in divine action could end by promoting deism: “the Protestant obsession with Providence led to an increasing emphasis on the regularity of nature within the Aristotelian tradition [...] the Protestant focus on Providence led to a relatively greater emphasis on the regularity of nature.”⁹⁰ Johannes Rist was one of the last Lutherans to believe in God’s strong guidance of the events of world-history as Europe convulsed itself.⁹¹

86 Sachiko Kusukawa, “Nature’s Regularity in Some Protestant Natural Philosophy Textbooks 1530 – 1630,” in *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy*, eds. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009): 105 – 122, 106.

87 *Ibid.*, 122.

88 Catherine Wilson, “From Limits to Laws: The Construction of the Nomological Image of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy,” in *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy*, eds. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009): 13 – 28, 20.

89 Mandelbrote, “Early Modern Natural Theologies,” 90.

90 Kusukawa, “Natural Laws and Laws of Nature,” 106, 120.

91 Anne-Charlotte Trepp, “Natural Order and Divine Salvation: Protestant Conceptions in Early Modern Germany (1550 – 1750),” in *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy*, eds. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009): 123 – 42: 131f.: “Beyond the alternatives of transcendence and immanence, he was omnipresent in his actions, both as an absolute ruler who acted freely according to his will and as an admonishing, punitive and benevolent father.”

Theological responses in the Early Enlightenment

The whole insistence on the Law of Nature in the seventeenth century did much to encourage Providentialism as something which involved even those who had departed from or had never known the Christian faith and church. The move to secure divine freedom then implied (for Ockham and others) an insistence on human freedom through a metaphysical common concept of “Freedom” (as with “Being”).⁹² We find this in the early modern Protestant tradition up to and including Schleiermacher. Brian Gerrish claims: “It is, I think, a mistake (phenomenologically speaking) when in one place Calvin makes such faith contingent on prior acceptance of divine truth, as though one had first to be convinced of the authority of God’s word before one could recognize God’s parental will (*Inst* 3.2.6).”⁹³ One can discern in the Reformed tradition a gradually growing challenge to Calvin’s position (even though Calvin’s own position is more nuanced than Gerrish describes it). However, what Gerrish does here is to confuse those who believe in Providence with those who are its objects. All people, even non-human creation, have been affected by the Fall, so all require and receive care. As we have seen, Peter Harrison has argued that natural science – in the figure of Francis Bacon – came into its own as a way of mitigating the Fall, of halting the slide, even.⁹⁴ Even Calvin could have considered that as part of divine care and a sign of the parental will, although only believers would appreciate it enough to try to shape their lives in accordance with it. In the middle part of the Seventeenth Century it was the project to many from the great pietist Philipp Jakob Spener (“life in the here and now”) to the likes of the dramatist Johann Rist (d. 1667) to react to misfortune and civil war: Rist saw comets as fascinating

⁹² Tilman Ramelow, *Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl: Der Ursprung des Begriffes der besten aller möglichen Welten in der Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen Antonio Perez S.J. (1599–1649) und G.W. Leibniz (1646–1716)*, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 72 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 470: “Steht die Freiheit in der Folgezeit im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit, so ist sie doch später gewissermaßen subjektzentriert [...]. Die frühe Neuzeit entwickelt eine wahrhafte Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit – und dies nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil sie das göttliche Subjekt aus ihren Überlegungen noch nicht ausklammert.”

⁹³ Brian Gerrish, *Secular and Saving Faith. An invitation to Systematic Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 16. Cf. B.A. Gerrish, ‘To the unknown God’: Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God’, *Journal of Religion*. 53 (1973): 263–92: Schleiermacher then Barth delivered theology from thinking that there was a real metaphysical God of properties that lay hidden (*absconditus*) behind his self-revelation in Christ: there was mystery *within* the revealed but not one to be afraid of, but rather one to whom we flee.

⁹⁴ Peter Harrison, *The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

rather than doom-laden.⁹⁵ In that sense Rist was a “modern,” believing in “progress.” It could be said that the Thirty Years War freed many from end-time expectations, switching eschatology in a more post-millennial direction. As Harrison observed, without John Amos Comenius’ peregrinations forced by religious war and his attempts to halt that, there might have been – counter-providentially – no Royal Society. As doyen of that very society, Isaac Newton would be interested less in re-establishing a lost dominion over nature than in uncovering some underlying uniformity and intelligibility that would in turn point to the power and wisdom of God.⁹⁶ What we might see developing here is a growing confidence in the heavens and physics as a safer path to wisdom than that of observing humans and their *history*. Rather than Pietistic interest in the application of Redemption to souls, the Puritans emphasised the visible side of things for the sake of assurance.⁹⁷ The Great Fire of London in 1666 was seen as a sign by Increase Mather, a sign planted by God. Providence could seal salvation as well as be a harbinger of it.

The great Puritan pastor Richard Baxter’s last work *The Certainty of the World of Spirits* (1691) was encyclopedic in a way which was in keeping with the ethos of the Cambridge Platonists. Henry More, in 1651 in his *Antidote to Atheism* (largely, Descartes’ rationalism and Baconian scepticism) had demanded a place in science for the spirit world, which accorded with a (seemingly uncontroversial) belief in witchcraft as well as in God’s power. The reaction of the Cambridge Platonists such as More against Descartes was to assert that space was absolute and infinite, and that spirits too had dimensionality, being able to permeate bodies. Yet God as Spirit was absolute and could not expand or contract: all spirits emanate from Him. Meanwhile the occasionalism propounded by Malebranche meant: “‘The intelligible world demands, for its reification, a continuous act of God’s will,’ but ideas in themselves don’t need this validation.”⁹⁸ Extension, unlike for Spinoza, was something ideal rather than physical.

⁹⁵ Anne-Charlotte Trepp, “Wissenschaft und Religion im Luthertum zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts: Das ‘Glück der eigenen Zeit’ als Forschungsstimulans,” in *Religion und Naturwissenschaft im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz et al., *Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte* 210 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2010): 276–305, 298. Trepp tends to overstate the contrast with “Reformed” England of that time by drawing most of her examples from the headier times of the early C17th, rather than the conditions that were more favourable for science of the Restoration and Glorious Revolution.

⁹⁶ Harrison, *The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science*, 239.

⁹⁷ Jonathan Edwards, *History of the Work of Redemption*; ed. John F. Wilson, *The Works of Jonathan Edwards* 9 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

⁹⁸ Amos Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 88.

And the idea of infinity was indeed an argument for God's existence. Occasionalism meant that created spirit could not cause things in the world, but could only provide an occasion, and so God had to be involved each time for change to occur.⁹⁹ Moreover, through seeing ideas in God himself humans are able to be guided by Providence in a mediated way.

Newton's philosophy too was a fusion of theology and science. He regarded "force as a sequence of impulses that can increase or diminish or stay the same. He did not need a conservation law for forces, while Leibniz could not do without it."¹⁰⁰ Force unlike motion does not depend on spatial relations: there could be elasticity in bodies and hence internal causation. If the mind can influence the body, then God can the world. Metaphysically speaking, there is individuation and separation, but in real terms there is homogeneity through interaction. Descartes had preserved God's transcendence by arguing that he relates to the world only by causality. Between Descartes' extreme voluntarism and Spinoza's determinism, Leibniz wanted to establish that God was bound only by the law of non-contradiction. In a sense this was very freeing for "God:" "Not only can God not create logical contradictions; he cannot even conceive of what is logically possible [...] as impossible. Reason inclines God without necessity."¹⁰¹

In the account of the Cambridge Platonists, as represented by Henry More: some spiritual substance gets derived from divine wisdom itself. Or in the words of Ralph Cudworth: "it may well be concluded, there is a *Plastick Nature* under him, which is an Inferior and Subordinate Instrument, doth Drudglingly Execute that Part of his Providence which doth consist in the Regular and Orderly motion of matter."¹⁰² Divine space could be conceived as God's extension via some world-soul. This in turn had influence on Newton's "absolute space": regarding space as God's *sensorium*, as Newton's disciple Samuel Clarke put it, riled Leibniz. Newton's idea of the working of a fine, electric, elastic spiritus reigned well into the nineteenth century, until Einstein and others proved that light and power needed no carriers of a material sort. God continually allows for laws of nature, which he can correct. Leibniz, who like Suarez would tie prov-

99 Jan Rohls, *Protestantische Theologie der Neuzeit* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), I:101f.: "Okkasionalismus, der die Auffassung vertritt, daß eine geistige Bewegung niemals die Wirkursache einer körperlichen Bewegung, sondern nur der Anlaß (*occasio*) dafür sein könne, daß Gott als alleinige Wirkursache eine bestimmte Körperbewegung bewirkt."

100 Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination*, 93.

101 Ibid., 119. Cf at p. 114: "The 'being in things' of God, his omnipresence, has, of course, no spatial connotations: it means his operation in things, which again means his giving possibles existence."

102 Ralph Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System* (London Richard Roysen, 1678), I,3,s36; cf. H. More, *Immortalitas animae*, III, cXIII, §1.

idence to creation saw no such need for so much emphasis on the contingent: no, the present has the future in its womb, so Leibniz thought. Against Descartes, Newton argued that God is present not only *per potentiam* but also substantially *per essentiam*. So, for Newton God is there not just in a mediated sense, via the world soul but is actually there to constitute space, and not just come into it. (See his use of Acts 17:28 in *Principia* III,172; Ps 90:1). This is God's sensorium. Since for Leibniz God's action was *creatio continua*,¹⁰³ the rationality of a pre-established Harmony reflected that of God himself.¹⁰⁴

Writing on typology and the relationship of type and antitype in the bible, Eric Auerbach gave an illuminating thesis: "Both occurrences are [...] linked to Divine Providence, which is able to devise such a plan of history and supply the key to its understanding [...]. The temporal and causal [...] connection of occurrences is dissolved."¹⁰⁵ Auerbach thereby saw the figural reading as a spiritualising one which, in fact, seems a little unfair to the rather concrete eschatologies and concerns in this world of the Puritans. This typological reading would carry on through to the time of the American Revolution at least. The eschatology, as Bebbington and Noll have shown was more post- than pre-millennial. One finds the idea in Nathaniel Hatch that the young republic could set the scene for a Return of Christ as the Roman Republic had for the First Advent: a "civil millenarianism." In his famous book on the mentality of the early North American settlers, as culminating in the thought of Jonathan Edwards, Perry Miller spoke of "the unity of history."¹⁰⁶ However, Peter Gay's version of the Puritan view of divinely guided history is as one of "a distinct succession of transcendent moments."¹⁰⁷ Gay sees nothing new or modern in that account. Despite the continued "majority view" of Limited Atonement, "redemption would recon-

103 Beutler, *Gott und Raum*, 226: "Während für Leibniz Gott die Dinge in sich selbst wahrnimmt – der Raum sei der Ort der Dinge und nicht der göttlichen Vorstellungen – und sie dadurch erkennt, dass er sie immerwährend hervorbringt, kann Gott für Clarke und Newton nur dann allwirksam sein, wenn er zuvor allen Dingen wesentlich und substantiell am Ort gegenwärtig ist, denn eine Kraft kann ohne Substanz nicht bestehen."

104 *Ibid.*, 228.

105 Eric Auerbach, *Mimesis: Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Literatur*, 10. Aufl. (Tübingen-Basel: Francke, 2001), 75.

106 Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 98.

107 Peter Gay, *A Loss of Mastery: Puritan Historians in Colonial America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 94.

cile the whole creation to God as the means of his glorification,” with a concomitant growth in morality until the Lord’s Return.¹⁰⁸

In a series of sermons dealing with Providence, Edwards showed a clear grasp of its function: “Thus I have briefly considered the principal events of providence that concern the success of the gospel of Christ from Constantine to the rise of Antichrist.”¹⁰⁹ He next says that God suffered Satan to overreach himself through the (Papal) Antichrist and the Mohammedan: “Tis certain that the 1260 days – years [...] did not commence before the year of Christ 479. Because if they did, they would have ended and Antichrist would have fallen by now.”¹¹⁰

So the start date was probably AD 606, when the Pope received temporal powers. Church was like the woman in the desert, fleeing in the form of the Waldensians and others. Now since the Reformation – as he takes up the story in Sermon 24 – God’s Providence has scored some success; “the religion professed and practised as in Muscovy is much nearer to that of the Protestants than formerly it used to be.”¹¹¹ The “heathen Indians” are converting; pietism in Germany looks encouraging. In *Sermon 29* it seems clear that Providence is that which lays the ground for the salvation of individuals, groups and nations.

It appears plainly from what has been said, that this work is the principal of all God’s works of providence, and that all other works of providence are reducible hither; they are all subordinate to the great affair of redemption. We see that all revolutions in the world are to subserve to this grand design [...], so that the Work of Redemption is, as it were, the sum of God’s works of providence. This shows us how much greater the Work of Redemption is than the work of creation [...] as the use of an house in the end of the building of an house. And so all the decrees of God do some way or other belong to that eternal covenant of redemption that was between the Father and the Son before the foundation of the world; every decree of God is some way or together reducible to that covenant.¹¹²

The covenant is none other than the (in)famous *pactum salutis* or “Covenant of Redemption,” such that there is more than a sniff of Eriugena-style monism (for all that Perry Miller would wish to detect synergism) in the climax of his series of sermons.

108 Edward William Grinfield, *The Nature and Extent of the Christian Dispensation with Reference to the Salvability of the Heathen* (London: C & J Rivington, 1827).

109 Jonathan Edwards, Sermon 22; *Works* I, 409.

110 *Ibid.*, 412.

111 *Ibid.*, 433.

112 *Ibid.*, 513.

Providence begins and ends in God as an:

infinite ocean into which it empties itself. Providence is like a mighty wheel whose ring or circumference is so high that it is dreadful with the glory of the God of Israel upon it, as 'tis represented in Ezekiel's vision [...] The wheels of providence are not turned round by blind chance, but they are full of eyes round about, as Ezekiel represents; and they are guided by the Spirit of God.¹¹³

Richard Kingston's *Discourse on Divine Providence* which was replete with references to God's protection of the Protestant nation in 1702 followed close on the heels of the work *A Discourse Concerning the Divine Providence* by William Sherlock in 1694, who as a non-juror (and unable to take an oath of allegiance to another king) did not see history working in quite the same way. In keeping with this caution he reserved explicit treatment of the perception of Providence to the ninth and last chapter of his work. This accordingly displays a neo-Stoic fatalism, yet makes the worthwhile observation in passing: "All such Acts of Providence are lost, as far as our taking no notice of them can lose them."¹¹⁴ This seems a curious idea: that providence is *only* valuable in the lessons it can teach, rather than something objectively fashioned in history. This apparent anthropocentrism could also be read as an insistence on nothing God intends being wasted, in a way analogous to the arguments for Limited Atonement: the divine economy is economical.

A strong belief in America's unbroken divine favour carried the day, such that "historical providence" prevailed over "judicial providence"; in other words, God guided America for good, not that he simply corrected her through painful circumstances.¹¹⁵ Nicholas Guyatt agrees, and he adds that even Tom Paine saw destiny at hand such that he predicted that America would become a mighty empire, and Britain's role was to give birth to America. Wesley insisted that for that reason God still had a role for Britain, but that was early on in the conflict when he argued that America would want to return and forsake "Independency".¹¹⁶ Adam Ferguson had his doubts too as to whether God could favour one nation above others, as he has once done with Israel. Indeed as the American Civil War approached in the following century, judicial providentialism took

¹¹³ Sermon 30; *Ibid.*, 517–19.

¹¹⁴ William Sherlock, *A Discourse Concerning the Divine Providence* (London: William Rogers, 1694).

¹¹⁵ Richard Sher, "Witherspoon's *Dominion of Providence* and the Scottish Jeremiad Tradition," in *Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment*, eds. Richard Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990): 46–64.

¹¹⁶ Guyatt, *Providence and the Invention of the United States*, 123.

over, and with it a sharp dent in American belief in historical providence. God was seen more to punish moral failure than advance moral possibilities.

"With an important exception in the aftermath of the English Civil War, many Britons and Americans came to regard personal providentialism as superstitious and backward even as they continued to believe that God directed the fates of nations."¹¹⁷ One might say that this was the "Moderate" version of Providence: the course of history, including the *Wealth of Nations*. Adam Smith's book of that title does not use the term "invisible hand" often, but it caught the imagination of subsequent interpreters: this was an ersatz providence. During the Scottish Enlightenment, it was recognised that Revelation would suggest that God was indeed a God of history, against the radical deism of Collins. It is partly experience to which Reid and Campbell appeal: a sense of the structure of cause and effect combined with the argument from design, as in Ferguson's *Analysis of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy* (1766).¹¹⁸ The historian William Robertson could insist on a teleology of civility and freedom: other passions contributed no less towards the downfall of Popery, and the establishment of religious freedom in the nation.¹¹⁹ Ferguson was more subtle, arguing that material prosperity did not mean an advance in morals.¹²⁰

Yet, during Europe's early eighteenth century, just as in the time of the dreadful Thirty Years War a century before, Providence did not disappear: it re-emerged both in institutions with the sanction of a God of peace and prosperity, and in a sort of inward-looking piety after the storm, accompanied by a pre-millennialist mood. (It would take Romanticism to encourage a more postmillennialist mood, optimistic about human possibilities of ushering in the Kingdom.) It was a piety that looked at the world not away from it, in contrast to the introversion of Böhme and radical Pietism, and was the forerunner of Enlightenment Christian sobriety.¹²¹ The follower of Leibniz, Christian Wolff argued that meta-

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹¹⁸ M. Alexander Stewart, "Religion and rational theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Alexander Broadie, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 31–59.

¹¹⁹ William Robertson, *The History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and of King James VI* (Edinburgh, 1759), 1:97.

¹²⁰ Murray Pittock, "Historiography," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Alexander Broadie, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 258–279, 271.

¹²¹ Hans Emil Weber, *Reformation, Orthodoxie und Rationalismus*, Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1937–1951), 306: "In der Theologie ist das unübersehbare Vordringen des Vorsehungsglaubens als der Weltbezogenheit der Gottesgewissheit die Spiegelung." (Cf. A. Ritschl) "In dieser Zeit gibt er freilich den Anstößen von Leid, Verfol-

physical evil or created imperfection could not make moral and even physical evil a necessity,¹²² but Buddeus opposed this with a doctrine of *fatalis necessitas*. Kant wouldn't be convinced either, for evil was too radical; however, Pierre Bayle had already thought the same.

gung, Kreuz noch vom eschatologischen Ziel her ihren Sinn; aber in der Aufhellung des Kreuzes beginnt das Verlangen nach Rationalität auch schon hinwegzugleiten über die Unergründlichkeit des schweigenden Gottes. Und die Welt kann den Beweis der Vorsehung liefern.”(307)

122 Ibid., 180, with reference to Christian Wolff, *Bedenken über die Wolffianische Philosophie* (Frankfurt: J. B. Andreä, 1724).

Chapter Six: The Enlightenment's ongoing Challenge to the Doctrine of Providence

Later Enlightenment voices

Looking back four centuries,¹ Wolfhart Pannenberg represents the thesis that the cause of theological (and therefore true) science was sold out firstly by Descartes' principle of inertia, which was subsequently turned by Leibniz and Spinoza into grounds for denying the necessity of God's involvement in the universe. There then came "Evolution" in a form which used to try to argue for physical bodies containing the seeds of their own perfection or complexity, but which had to give way – in a post-secular philosophy of science – to an account of reality, analogous to Genesis 1, in which all the parts are brought continually into order by a spirit-field (drawing on Polanyi).

It is true that the attempt to go back behind "providence" to "creation" in the Seventeenth Century put the former out of focus. In the famous Newton (with Clarke)-Leibniz debate in which the latter refused to accept that space could be a property of God, but was its own subject as something which was filled; Kant followed this and thus "banished" God from intervention. Whereas, for Newton and his disciple Samuel Clarke, space was the medium for God to move his creation, and Clarke even explained God's need to correct his creation as due to the Fall, Leibniz preferred to deny any such dualism of spirit and matter at work in the system, and so in consequence left all to the mechanics of the things in themselves. Christian Wolff's version of this was that perfection was in accord with Nature to the point that humans should be able to see something of God's glory. However teleology should not mean fatalism; and here he distanced himself from Leibniz's controlling monads. Leibniz reacted against the immanism of his time. Eternal verities were put in place in the world, and God connects to the world through these: but these ideas do not bind God. Likewise for Kant there was no built in Providence – just nature – and providence only applies in the moral realm. In Troeltsch's view of history,² all action ends within this world of the senses. There is nothing transcendent; instead, for us, small things seem to belong to something larger, a whole. Leibniz too could not sub-

1 Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Toward a Theology of Nature: Essays on Science and Faith* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993).

2 Lehner, *Kants Vorsehungskonzept*, 702: "Der Vorsehungsglaube deutet und empfindet den Gesamtzusammenhang alles Geschehens auf einen göttlichen Gesamtzweck hin, auf einen absoluten Sinn und das Heil der Gottesgemeinschaft."

scribe to an actualising concept of Providence, but what has been called a sapiential one, preferring to tie Providence to creation and not to history.³

Clarke would later inspire Kant's belief that Providence was indispensable for morals, since one did well to believe that all rational creatures would be recompensed according to their judgements. Leibniz was clear that providence limited itself to ordering the world including giving it enough energy, which does the work of divine conservation. This is a benevolent providence in which even a miracle is part of God's general will, since the general rules to which these events were exceptions were part of the divine will. There is not much place for God to act contingently, since this is already the best of all possible worlds: hence here is not much place for Providence in an active sense. God has seen all prayers and vows from all time before. Only law-accorded action is truly rational, and hence there is no room for special providence. Driven out of Halle for "Spinozism" in 1723, Wolff was accused of having no place for providence and wonder, just fatalistic necessity. Yet in arguing that God establishes laws that are not *absolutely* necessary, Wolff could assert contingency and distance himself from Spinoza. Contingency is the mirror of God's freedom.⁴ Already in the mid-seventeenth century, David Hollaz was typical of those for whom Providence got detached from Creation. Topics such as secondary causes being "the root of all evil" and the question of Order returned to be discussed here under the head of "Providence." Although the reactionary Buddeus in his 1724 *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae* thought that Providence should no longer be tied to Creation, Buddeus was very much fighting a rearguard action. The Wolffian philosophical theology very much wanted to focus on inner-worldly matters and gained the ascendancy during the eighteenth century.

The great Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus described "the Greek goddess personifying the final and effective interweaving of fate and Providence, the actual meting out of justice in accordance with talion" (Intro, 4), with a collection of instances. The Uppsala manuscript of 1758/9 ends with theological implications. He did not share the Leibnizian view of "metaphysical evil as simple imperfection," for all physical suffering was to be traced back somehow to a moral fault.⁵ Reviewing the case of the Swedish warrior king Charles XII, he wrote: "When on the strength of his military successes he forced the German Emperor

3 Ingolf Dalferth, "Übel als Schatten der Kontingenz", in *Vernunft, Kontingenz und Gott: Konstellationen eines offenen Problems*, eds. Phillip Stoellger and Ingolf Dalferth (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 117–169, 163, quoting Ratschow, *Gott Existiert*, 231.

4 Lehner, *Kants Vorsehungskonzept*, 82.

5 Carolus Linnaeus [Carl von Linné], *Nemesis divina*, ed. and trans. Michael J. Petry, *International Archives of the History of Ideas* 177 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 31.

to grant religious toleration in Silesia, he was hailed throughout Protestant Europe as the agent of Providence.”⁶ Providence arranged for the increase of freedom, for the sake of individuals who matter.

Just as with Newton,

(f)or Linnaeus too, God is both inherent and transcendent, Wholly and completely *Sense*. Wholly and completely *Sight*, wholly and completely *Hearing* and yet also “solely Himself”. He is an essence, only to be seen in thought [...]. We therefore revere Him as Providence. Although to say that He is *Fate* is not to be mistaken, for everything hangs upon his finger; nor is it wrong to say that He is *Nature*, for all things are born of Him.⁷

One can also discern a fatalism which arose from Swedish military toughness, just as when at *Nemesis Divina* IV.iv.1.3 he asserted: “no musket-ball can hit a man except God wills it, whether he walks straight or crooked.”⁸ God the Father is like Fate, who fixes things that happen; but the Spirit is the One who enables humans to come to terms with their prescribed lot, which includes living irreproachably. The influence of the Lutheran theologian Matthias Hafenreffer (*Loci Theologici* 1603) is to be felt. Linnaeus had corresponded with Kepler on Christ's ubiquity via his teacher Flachsen.

In his *De legibus hebraeorum ritualibus* (Cambridge, 1685) John Spencer had already provided an account that resembled archaeology of religion: “Where the deists saw a degeneration from the original pure and natural religion of earliest humankind through the devilish imposture of the priests of all nations, Spencer saw a long but constant progress from the earliest stages of history thanks to a God who has no objection to aping the devil in order to free men from the latter's clutches.”⁹ In other words religion progresses as it trusts in the God of the future.

Likewise, Vico in his 1725 *Scienza Nuova* was one of the few who held on to the notion that God's Providence meant God moving history in its course.¹⁰ Providence that is immanent within man's history was operating primarily through man's freedom but also through social phenomena and institutions such as

⁶ Ibid., 35.

⁷ Ibid., 63.

⁸ “It may be significant, for example, that when he refers to fate in the *Nemesis Divina* he never uses the ordinary Swedish word ‘*skepnad*’, possibly because he was uneasy about its being so closely associated with initiation,” i.e. superstition. (trans. Petry, *Nemesis divina*, 75). That did not stop him giving some credence to the idea of each person having a wraith of virtue and a wraith of fortune, as in his obituary for Andreas Neander (1765).

⁹ Guy Stroumsa, *A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 99.

¹⁰ Maeve Edith Albano, *Vico and Providence*, Emory Vico Studies 1 (Bern: P Lang, 1986).

shame, honor, utility, authority, religion, family, and language.¹¹ The biblical story of Joseph could be at very least inculcating the truth that human lives are mysteriously interwoven, and that conscience, guilt, trade and government – all as institutions of divine provision – contribute to the outcome. In this “immanent providence,” grace is perhaps not explicit.¹²

A rational civil theology of divine providence is a “demythologization” of non-rational divine theology. It demonstrates that the stories about the gods are really histories of men. For it is “a truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind.”¹³ James Morrison comments: “This truth is that what men by their actions intend to do is not what in fact results from them [...]. The idea of divine providence is for Vico simply a metaphor for the irony of history.”¹⁴

This seems a slightly skewed view of Vico. In fact it is the reductionist interpretation given by Benedetto Croce, whereas Vico’s account is much more constructive even if religious metaphor is just a metaphor. Morrison knows this, and he knows that the philosophic-genetic content of the original metaphor of providence is the “religious way of thinking” according to which “it was the gods who did whatever men themselves were doing [...]. His reduction of the intelligible genus of Vico’s ironic metaphor of providence to the heterogeneity of ends does not, however, do justice to its genetic content.”¹⁵ Vico himself had provided the philosophic explanation of his assertion that history reflected providential guidance.¹⁶ If it is up to humans to interpret and even develop institutions, that does not mean they are in Vico’s mind not divinely established in the first place. The use of the term “divination” for this interpretation is not accidental.¹⁷

11 Emanuel L. Paparella, *Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico: Vico’s Paradox Revolutionary Humanistic Vision for the New Age* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1993).

12 James C. Morrison, “How to Interpret the Idea of Divine Providence in Vico’s New Science,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 12 (1979): 256–261.

13 Vico, *Nuova Scienza*, para. 331.

14 Morrison, “How to Interpret the Idea of Divine Providence,” 258.

15 Ibid.

16 Paparella, *Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico*, 153.

17 “Adunque, non da altri che dalla provvidenza divina deve esser tenuto dentro tali ordini a celebrare con giustizia la famigliare, la civile e finalmente l’umana società; per gli quali ordini, non potendo uomo conseguire ciò che vuole, almeno voglia conseguire ciò che dee dell’utilità: ch’è quel che dicesi ‘giusto.’ Onde quella che regola tutto il giusto degli uomini e la giustizia divina, la quale ci è ministrata dalla divina provvidenza per conservare l’umana società” (Vico, *Nuova Scienza*, para. 341).

Gregory Lucente has a less minimalist account:

Vico's "New Science" is in part a "reasoned civil theology of divine providence," in which the progression of the stages of social organization, the development of human reason, and the characteristics of human culture (religion, matrimony, and burial, along with such secondary characteristics as ritual sacrifice and the incest taboo) all testify to the existence of the guiding force that is teleological without being eschatological, or providence itself (see 2. 5. 5, pars. 629–30 *passim*).¹⁸

It is as Croce put it, a necessity that is not that of Fate.

A near-contemporary Johann Heinrich Zedler (d. 1763), famous for his "Universal Lexicon" (Leipzig) believed a world of rational creatures better to be guided than self-guiding. Yet Zedler seems to have thought of Providence as the opposite of fate, rather than giving a positive account of what Providence is. And it must be admitted that Zedler represents something of a rearguard action. As Ulrich Lehner concedes, Providence became less about God's action and more about human potential: Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten had made God's part in the *concursum* secondary to that of the human agent, and a "progress principle" was introduced.¹⁹ Newton with his radical Calvinist voluntarism had argued for contingency in any account of things, but biblical exegesis fell out of theological consideration. So now Nature was mechanical, even if there was a teleological dimension.

Christian Wolff had already written of the interconnections of things in Providence as really the only form *creatio continua* could take.²⁰ For the best possible world meant that God had eternally decided his way of Providence, which is in no way reactive to circumstances and change. God is a watchmaker who can adjust it in theory,²¹ even though most of the time the mechanism is perfect and has purposes of its own. In short the account was deistic. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten reduced providence to conservation and *concursum* in the sense of calling the agent to religious-ethical concerns, so that one could perceive some amount of divine presence in human beings and institutions. His brother (Siegmund Jakob) would claim that God would complete what humans started and give

¹⁸ Gregory L. Lucente, "Vico's Notion of 'Divine Providence' and the Limits of Human Knowledge, Freedom, and Will," *MLN* 97 (1982): 183–191, 186–7.

¹⁹ Johann Heinrich Zedler, "Vorsehung Gottes," in *Zedlers Lexikon* (Leipzig-Halle, 1746).

²⁰ Lehner, *Kants Vorsehungskonzept*, 70 ff.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 76, with reference to *Theologia Naturalis* I.2 § 938. Lehner concludes on Wolff: "Das Welthandeln Gottes reduziert sich auf die Einstiftung der Naturordnung am Anfang der Welt und das Wunder ihrer Enthaltung bzw. den Konkurs." (79)

them confidence to act.²² Johann Friedrich Stapfer too was able to say that even if God intervened materially, this did not intrude on human moral freedom.²³ Moses Mendelssohn could speak of an intimacy of “snuggling up” to God’s decrees and believed in individual providence: we are free to react to the hand God has dealt us.²⁴

A closer look at the reactions to the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake shows that these contained more than just a criticism of philosophical optimism. Certainly a sort of theology of nature or “physikotheologische Denken” was affected, and quickly the idea that God could be seen at hand in his creation had to become more flexible. Physico-theology sprang from the desire to find God in all things but Reimarus’ interest in the laws of animal nature with the divine or religious set as a limit, not in the middle of the treatment,²⁵ reduced the influence of Physico-theology by it being shown how in fact nature is wasteful, if not quite meaningless. It was then suggested that the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 could be seen as God speaking through nature. It also released eschatological or apocalyptic expectation. At first it was seen as a call to penance – e.g. by Pastor Johann Melchior Goeze of Hamburg, who held up Lisbon as a chastisement for a city that embodied human pride.²⁶ It could not just be explained as a natural disaster, at least not until a generation later, when Kant would do just that, stipulating that physics and theology were quite separate jurisdictions. Christian Gottlieb Lieberkuhn’s response at the time was one of extreme sympathy and a “man-centred” compassion. With Kant, for ethical reasons it could not be God acting, and theological support came from Friedrich Christoph Oetinger who ascribed the Earthquake no theological significance, except perhaps as an eschatological reminder for some.²⁷

Lehner’s remarkable and useful work sets the scene for his exposition of Kant on Providence. The pre-critical Kant had little room for Providence and it

²² Ibid., 179 ff.

²³ Ibid., 215.

²⁴ Ibid., 123 ff

²⁵ Ludwig Weimer, “Wodurch kam das Sprechen von Vorsehung und Handeln Gottes in die Krise?” in *Vorsehung und Handeln Gottes*, eds. Theodor Schneider and Lothar Ullrich, Quaestiones Disputatae 115 (Freiburg i.Br.: Herder, 1988): 17–71., 34: “Mit Reimarus in Hamburgs Physikotheologie – er schrieb 1762 seine ‘Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere’ – kommt eine Veränderung. Gott bildet fast nur noch eine Schutzklausel, eigentlich ist es das erste Werk einer Verhaltensforschung, die direkt in den Selektionismus überführt werden kann.”

²⁶ Ulrich Löffler, *Lissabons Fall – Europas Schrecken: Die Deutung des Erdbebens von Lissabon im deutschsprachigen Protestantismus des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 70 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 623.

²⁷ Ibid., 628.

was in his critical work that he expanded the range of this.²⁸ The theistic God was a living one, but also an impartial one, such that there could be no talk of *providentia specialissimima*. That which makes a human more moral is providential, as fitting in with a plan for moral development fitted into the universe, hence deistic after the fashion of Samuel Clarke. Lehner sums it up, that hope in providence became with Kant a hope in the unfolding of human capacities and powers,²⁹ with the hope of a “social providence” of common morality in the near future. There was no such trust in the sweeping course of History and Politics. Kant believed that human reason had fulfilled Nature’s purposes for the species, such that one can speak of Reason’s place in an intentional, if not quite “providential,” progress of humanity. Kant of course did not describe this path to Enlightenment and the fulfilling of Nature as inevitable. Yet, as Genevieve Lloyd writes: “The ideal of shaping a life in accordance with necessity is intelligible even if we don’t believe every detail of our lives to be integrated into a relentlessly ordered whole.”³⁰

According to Kant’s *Religionsschriften* the kingdom of God would take place in history, and it was already present, yet there would be nothing institutional or outward about it. Kant resisted any *heilsgeschichtliche* idea of the human race being saved. There is no victory here on earth, and all we can hope for is grace in the afterlife. It was not as though Kant was secularising (*pace* E. Hirsch), because the bible does allow for grace to draw us to penultimate ends. He thinks the community (*Gemeinde*) can achieve something, although it cannot be defined in political terms. Effectively the kingdom of God has a history but not a development: it is bounded by the transcendent and offers freedom for each agent.³¹ In no way does the visible church have outward victory over radical evil, but success consists of moral commandments being fulfilled internally.³²

28 Lehner, *Kants Vorsehungskonzept*, 184, relying on Josef Bohatec, *Die Religionsphilosophie Kants in der ‘Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft’* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1938.)

29 Ibid., 482.

30 Lloyd, *Providence Lost*, 308.

31 Alfred Habichler, *Reich Gottes als Thema des Denkens bei Kant: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche und systematische Studie zur kantischen Reich-Gottes-Idee*, Tübinger Studien zur Theologie und Philosophie 2 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald 1991), 260–64.

32 Kant, *Gesammelte Werke* VI,100: “Ein moralisches Volk Gottes zu stiften, ist also ein Werk, dessen Ausführung nicht von Menschen, sondern von Gott selbst erwartet werden kann [...]. Deswegen ist aber doch dem Menschen nicht erlaubt, in Ansehung dieses Geschäfts unthätig zu sein und die Vorsehung walten zu lassen, als ob ein jeder nur seiner moralischen Privatangelegenheit nachgehen, das Ganze der Angelegenheit des menschlichen Geschlechts aber [...] einer höhern Weisheit überlassen dürfte.” (152) “Allein da wir nicht wissen, was Gott unmittelbar

Humans are to avail themselves of freedom to fit in with the moral order God has set to work for the greater whole, as God will play his part as we play ours. Or, as Max Seckler puts it: it is redemption through God and not in him (i.e., *Erlösung durch Gott*).³³ Likewise, Kant would not let Nature be left to a mechanism *in se*. One could not reduce teleology to causality, since the freedom of reason and the human being as a rational being were ends in themselves.

An account which would try to offer a more theological version of, or corrective to this “manifest destiny” model was provided by Schleiermacher. According to Brian Gerrish, Schleiermacher developed Calvin’s “insistence on the dogmatic priority of redemption” over a knowledge of God as Father prior to the experience of grace.³⁴ And yet, again, one wonders if that priority of knowing (Providence is real only for those with saving faith) implies that Providence is secondary. Take for example the earlier account Schleiermacher gives in his 1821/22 version of *Der Christliche Glaube*. All things depend on God and his salvation.³⁵ An end is dependent on a means which is mirrored at a psychological level as desire to get there and despair at making it. It is in knowing salvation that God’s providential ordering for us is remembered.³⁶

Schleiermacher then discusses the traditional accounts of Providence which are still operative in his day. *Conservatio* is the dependence of being and all powers of things; *concursus* is the dependence of the activity of things; and *gubernatio* is the leading of all activity as the passive disposition of things towards the

thue, um die Idee seines Reichs [...] in die Wirklichkeit darzustellen [...]. Gott selbst als Stifter der Urheber der *Constitution*, Menschen aber doch als Glieder und freie Bürger dieses Reichs [...]” (237).

33 Max Seckler, “Theosoterik und Autosoterik,” *Theologische Quartalschrift* 162 (1982): 289–298, 292.

34 Gerrish, 72. Cf. Dawn Dvries and B. Gerrish, ‘Providence and grace: Schleiermacher on justification and election’ in *Cambridge Companion to Schleiermacher* ed. by Jacqueline Mariña (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 189–208.

35 Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Die christliche Glaube 1821/22. Zweites Lehrstück. Von der Erhaltung*, ed. Hermann Peiter (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984), § 59; I,168: “Alles was unser Selbstbewußtsein bewegt und bestimmt, besteht als solches durch Gott.”

36 Ibid.: “[...] In diesem Satz ist von göttlichen Zwecken nichts enthalten, den diese Betrachtung, die einen Gegensatz zwischen Zweck und Mittel voraussetzt. Schließen wir deshalb hier, wo wir es nur mit der Beschreibung des Abhängigkeitsgefühls überhaupt zu thun haben, völlig aus. Denn mit dem Gegensatz Zweck und Mittel ist auch ein unbestimmtes mehr oder minder von Zusammenstimmung und Zulänglichkeit gesetzt, welches sich im Gefühl als Lust und Unlust abspiegelt. Wiewol darin, daß die Idee der Erlösung den Mittelpunkt alles christlich frommen Selbstbewußtseins ausdrückt, schon erhalten ist, daß auch die Abhängigkeit aller Dinge von Gott auf die Erlösung müsse bezogen werden.”

divine ends or as fitted to the divine decrees.³⁷ Now, thinks Schleiermacher, we should not separate “doing” and “being done to” any more than “doing” and “being.” Really *concursus* and *gubernatio* should be taken together.³⁸ So maybe it is better to see Providence as having only two components instead: one is about the self-containment of each thing and what comes from it, and the other is about its connection with all other things, and what comes from that. And what moves us as a part of the world happens only by God’s agency.³⁹ We are preserved even as we are moved in conjunction.

Schleiermacher adds that the smallest and the most insignificant thing has its place in the total scheme of dependence; yet many refuse the feeling of relationship, not seeing any hierarchy of causes and think small things affect the whole, when it is really the other way, as pious feeling (*frommes Gefühl*) would teach us. We are too much taken up in small things and factors that lead to chance outcomes. We like to split God’s providence up into our own little bits and then we feel able to talk of dependence on God. But really we should have our eye on the larger picture.⁴⁰ Plans and purposes cannot be carried through if they are not already part of the being and powers contained within things. Thus the divine goal must be in all three concepts together or in none. The co-operative (*concursus*) and passive (being maintained and led by governance) in creatures are two sides of the same coin. In his *Zweites Lehrstück von der Erhaltung* § 46 he also attacks any idea of mechanism in human movements. There is freedom, if limited over against God. Our life-force gives us power and God works with us. Moreover, the working of the Holy Spirit in people today

37 Ibid., 169: “Die meisten Dogmatiker unserer Periode bezeichnen das ganze Abhängigkeitsverhältnis der Dinge in ihrem Fortbestehen durch den Ausdruck göttlicher Vorsehung, providentia als Uebertragung des griechischen *πρνοια*, und theilen dann diese in Erhaltung conservatio, welche die Abhängigkeit des Seins und aller Kräfte der Dinge ausdrücken soll, in Mitwirkung concursus, welche die Abhängigkeit der Thätigkeiten der Dinge, und in Regierung gubernatio, welche die Leitung aller sowohl Thätigen als leidentlichen Zustände der Dinge zu den göttlichen Zwecken oder in Gemäßheit der göttlichen Ratschlüsse ausdrücken soll.”

38 He resists the traditional idea, to be found (e.g.) in Quenstedt, that God’s action in and through creatures is a two-step process: as if there were divine power to do and then another power to make it happen actually. So, *Erhaltung* is *Mitwirkung*.

39 Schleiermacher, *Die christliche Glaube*, 169: “die eine bezieht sich auf das Fürsichgesetzsein jedes Dinges und das was daraus hervorgeht; die andere auf dessen Zusammensein mit allen übrigen, und was daraus hervorgeht” (i.e. subsidiarity and solidarity combine.) “[...] Alles was uns als ein Theil der Welt bewegt, besteht als solcher nur durch Gott.”

40 Ibid., 172: “Denn wenn man die Fälle der ersten Art in ihrem Zusammenhang als einzelnen Ausdruck allgemeiner Gesetze betrachtet, und die letzteren auf die Constitution eines gemeinsamen Willens zurückführt.”

makes Revelation complete, in the form of spiritual wisdom.⁴¹ In this respect God is not so much “God with us” but “God through whom we are.”⁴²

Thus in *Der christliche Glaube* of 1821/22 Schleiermacher was able to relate Providence to the feeling of absolute dependence which marked all creaturely existence as properly religious. This meant, at least in its Christian form, a doctrine of Providence that was soteriological, yet not monergistic: even the *gubernatio/concursus* distinction is overcome in a inter-relating of passivity and activity. What mattered was, in a way that would re-shape Leibnizian theory, solidarity through *concursus* of individual subsidiarities which are preserved, and these in a synergistic fashion. By 1831 the section on Providence was now §46, although there is also a small part of § 59 where Schleiermacher was keen to extend “dependence” to the non-self-conscious world in as much as passivity and opportunity are granted it, in order to be the instrument of the Spirit.

In § 46 of the 1831 version Schleiermacher argues that the inner force or immanent drives are also to be understood as part of “preservation.” Of course, as objective consciousness arises, it might seem that the subjective has to withdraw: but in fact each can inspire the other, especially as we come to realise the extent of our dependence. There is mutual reinforcement, provided there is balance struck between the two. To think God has intervened to help us when we win a bet is a result of excluding too much evidence. He re-iterates that conservation means the absolute dependence of all things on God *and* their mutual conditioning of each thing on another without separation or fusion. Both these aspects – the God-relation and the mutuality of all things – are one and the same thing seen from different angles.⁴³

He then adds that he dislikes the distinction of *specialis* (*besondere*) for providence as species and *specialissima* (*besonderste*) for individual providential things. If that’s the case, then general providence includes all others within it, since only individual things are perishable. And one must think of lasting or fad-

41 “[...] die Welt als die gute immer mehr zur Anerkennung zu bringen” (*Glaubenslehre* § 169.3, p. 513).

42 Ferenc Herzig, *Vorbestimmt und abgesegnet – Schleiermachers Begriff einer göttlichen Vorsehung* (Leipzig: GRIN Verlag, 2011), 17: “In seinem Vorgehen will Schleiermacher sowohl eine teleologische als auch eine protologisch-deterministische Verfahrensweise vermeiden.”

43 *Ibid.*, 231: “[...] dass die göttliche Erhaltung als die schlechthinige Abhängigkeit aller Begebenheiten und Veränderungen von Gott, und die Naturursächlichkeit als die vollständige Bedingtheit alles dessen, was geschieht durch den allgemeinen Zusammenhang, nicht eine von der andern gesondert ist, noch auch eine von den andern begrenzt wird, sondern beide dasselbige sind, nur aus verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten angesehen, ist schon immer von den strengsten Dogmatikern anerkannt worden.” This with reference to Quenstedt’s 1685 *Systematica theologia*, p. 761: “a Deo ut causa universali, a creatura ut particulari.”

ing out as all absolutely depending on God in connection with all other powers and things which, unlike in the case of creation, God employs in *Erhaltung*. There is really no difference between co-operation and preservation, since God's power is always in action; and all is mediated. There is no unmediated action by God, *pace* Quenstedt. Nor can we make such a distinction between means and ends that these two are less than *gubernatio*.⁴⁴ God makes sure that all things are held as themselves and at the same time brought into connection with the rest. One should never play off dependence on God and dependence on Nature. As for miracles, Schleiermacher thought that we should only be interested in them to the extent that perception of these affects the feeling of absolute dependence. To think of God suddenly having an immediate access to creation is “disrespectful” to what goes on in *Erhaltung*, as though it were something merely mechanical. In truth, a miracle does not interrupt the whole, nor the past and the future.⁴⁵

Last of all, there is a clear connection between Providence and Ethics, in which we are to recognise the world as good and to be brought into relationship with the system of redemption and the perfect loving communion with Christ. The world can only be grasped as the perfect revelation of divine Wisdom as the Holy Spirit gives the power to the church to see it that way.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Ibid., (CG II,233): “Denn da die Erhaltung doch das Sein der Dinge zum Gegenstande hat, in diesem aber, sofern sie ein Ort für Kräfte sind, der Gegensatz von Selbsttätigkeit und Empfänglichkeit enthalten ist, sind auch die leidentlichen Zustände schon mit in die schlechthinnige Abhängigkeit aufgenommen, und besonders, da sie ebenfalls zu den unser Selbstbewußtsein affizierenden gehören, sowohl unter der Form der Wahrnehmung als unter der des Mitgefühls, sind sie auch in unseren allgemeinen Satz mit eingeschlossen.” So being acted upon is part of *Erhalten*.

⁴⁵ Cf. Andrew Dole, *Schleiermacher on Religion and the Natural Order* (New York: Oxford, 2009), 148: “One of his objections to the notion of miracles, traditionally understood, was that the idea that God might intervene in the natural order invites the thought that events in that order might unfold otherwise than God had originally ordained. However, Schleiermacher found this thought to imply a less than absolute dependence of all things upon God: ‘[I]t is difficult to grasp how omnipotence should be shown to be greater in the interruptions of the Naturzusammenhang than in its original, immutable, and indeed also divinely ordained course. [...] [I]f one wanted to postulate such an encroachment by the highest being as a virtue of the same, one would first have to assume that there was something which was not ordained by this being, which could oppose him and thus impinge upon him and his work, whereby our fundamental feeling would be entirely overturned.’”

⁴⁶ §169,3 (CG II, 457): “Wie nun hier erst in der Beziehung auf die göttliche Liebe die im ersten Teil dargestellten göttlichen Eigenschaften ihre volle Bedeutung erhalten: so führt uns die göttliche Weisheit als Entfaltung der Liebe hier an das Gebiet der christlichen Sittenlehre, indem uns die Aufgabe entsteht, die Welt als die gute immer mehr zur Anerkennung zu bringen,

Andrew Dole concludes about Schleiermacher's view of God's relationship to creation:

Claims about the divine teleology emerge in various places throughout *The Christian Faith* [...] Schleiermacher argued that "when we trace our consciousness of fellowship with God, restored through the efficacy of redemption, back to the divine causality, we posit the establishment and broadening of the Christian church as the object of the divine government of the world," implying as this does that "the whole arrangement of nature from the beginning would have been different, if redemption through Christ had not been determined for the human race after sin." The logical extension of this idea is a claim about the purpose of the natural order itself: that is, that "the world is the scene (*Schauplatz*) of redemption."⁴⁷

One may claim a bit more for Schleiermacher, one might venture. The order of providence prepares for and is reinforced by the order of redemption, as it were.

Herzig criticises Saxer for saying that Schleiermacher allowed creation to get lost in *Erhaltung*. No, the Berlin giant held both together when he described the original creation not as an act but a process. One might justify a creation/preservation distinction on the basis of the twofold account in Genesis and of the resultant credo in the *Pantokrator*.⁴⁸ Yet it is a very small distinction. Each individual is to be subsumed under created types; nevertheless, every change is a new beginning. For Schleiermacher, creation had its own energy and its own purpose, as an organism.

Matthias Scheeben's *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*, incomplete at his death in 1888, is the prime example of a Catholic Dogmatics in the light (or shadow) of the First Vatican I Council. He quotes the council's definition of *natural providentia*.⁴⁹ Then he adds that there is also a *supernatural* providence which he glosses as *Heilswille* (*predestinatio et reprobatio*). The government of divine

und der ursprünglich der Weltordnung zum Grunde liegenden göttlichen Idee gemäß alles dem göttlichen Geist als Organ anzubilden, und so mit dem System der Erlösung in Verbindung zu bringen, auf daß wir in beider Hinsicht zur vollkommenen Lebensgemeinschaft mit Christo gelangen [...]. Daher den die Welt nur insofern als vollkommene Offenbarung der göttlichen Weisheit gefaßt werden kann, als der Heilige Geist von der christlichen Kirche aus sich als die letzte weltbildende Kraft geltend macht."

⁴⁷ Dole, *Schleiermacher on Religion*, 155.

⁴⁸ Herzig, *Vorbestimmt und abgesegnet*, 9, with reference to Ernst Saxer, *Vorsehung und Verheißung: Vier theologische Modelle (Calvin, Schleiermacher, Barth, Sölle) und ein systematischer Versuch*, Studien zur Dogmengeschichte und systematischen Theologie 34 (Zürich: TVZ, 1980), 51.

⁴⁹ Matthias Scheeben, *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*, 3. Aufl. (Freiburg: Herder, 1948 [orig. 1882]), III/1,103; Vatican I *De fide* c1; DS 1784: "Universa vero, quae condidit, Deus providentia sua tuetur et gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter."

providence is thus (unlike in Schleiermacher) further, one step beyond “creation.” With regard to the relationship between the governing and the governed providence works immediately, because God has immediate knowledge of every creature and influences each directly,⁵⁰ all while supervising secondary causes. In that sense special providence is only involved in the case of “personal essences,” as yet in such a way that the concept of care in a wider sense can be used, according to the Scriptures in relation to all living things, and this can be used as by *a fortiori* reasoning to show a higher care for all personal essences, as per Matthew 6 (§ 110). God executes plans in detail, and all for the sake of individual good, so much as it accords with the good of the whole: which (§ 134) is beautifully ordered as a whole, so that the individual is brought into the sphere of harmony, as all creatures seek the perfection of God in various ways and directions.⁵¹ But providence is not comprehensible to sense, only to faith.

This might as well be a re-iteration of the pre-Enlightenment statement of the case. In the modern worldview there is an exclusion of the vertical dimension, but Catholic truth re-iterates that the principles behind the world have to somehow be in it.⁵² Also, even after Kant one may yet maintain that the world is contingent, as it implies some necessary existence but not a necessary essence. That essence is the possibility of possibility: and it would be strange if that were to be a pure Necessity. Kant would in fact go further than Wolff and reckon that even existence (*Dasein*) has no necessity.⁵³ But this is only that which excludes non-being, anti-necessity. Nothing can come from pure “Nichts” such that God as Necessity is only so in order to counteract Nothingness. The world does not reflect God as an emanation.⁵⁴ But in its movements all is necessarily dependent, yet with the freedom now to be “pro-creative.”

In the time of the Enlightenment, positive religion, that which has made a mark and given itself expression in institutions, and which based itself on foun-

50 Ibid., 109: “Die Regierung der göttlichen Vorsehung ist demnach ferner hinsichtlich der *Beziehung zwischen dem Regierenden und dem Regierten eine unmittelbare*, weil Gott unmittelbar von allen einzelnen kreaturen Kenntnis hat und unmittelbar auf jede einwirkt.”

51 Ibid., 123, with reference to Oration 38 of Gregory Nazianzen.

52 Josef Schmucker, *Das Problem der Kontingenz der Welt*, Quaestiones Disputate 43 (Freiburg: Herder, 1969), 75f.: “Aber wir betrachten sie nicht unter der Rücksicht der reinen Vollkommenheiten des esse und der Transzendentalien als durch ihre Wesenheit begrenzte Partizipationen der letzteren, sondern, uns wiederum mit Kant annähernd, schlicht und einfach als so und so geartete Seiende, die als solche untereinander zutiefst ähnlich und verwandt und doch wiederum in ihrem Sein voneinander geschieden und verschieden sind.”

53 Ibid., 112: “für alles bedingt Daseiende als letzten Grund ein Unbedingtes geben muß.”

54 Ibid., 119.

dational Scriptures, found that natural religion became its a critic.⁵⁵ In such a way Fichte believed that the content of revelation was moral in character.⁵⁶ He was also convinced that a higher power guides, yet since Spinoza it would seem that that very power was invested in nature as it guides itself (*conatus sese conservandi est essentia rerum*). In such pantheism the loss of freedom is the price one pays. Also natural disasters have caused people to suppose that God has withdrawn from the world. Fichte's axiom was that Freedom should not be opposed to Providence (as Kant was making it) but should be viewed as complementary.

Fichte could not conceive of God as anything other than one whose being was in his effecting. The Absolute as divine *Wirken* was as such the source of the ethical, not just its condition. Life was about grasping the plans of God, especially in the experience of a surprise as part of one's destiny (*Fügung*). Kant would say that one cannot move from the lessons of one's experience to God. So Fichte simply posited providence as a necessary *a priori*.⁵⁷ As for experience, the place where God could influence was the conscience or the absolute *Ich*. The sensory world was, in turn, the place of working out one's duty ("Außenseite des Pflichtgebots"). In his *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1801/2, Fichte argued that freedom consists in the act of letting loose the will from blind drives of nature. The *Ich* does best when it relates back to its source. There must be a source of being which gives purpose for freedom to be truly ethical. Freedom is not neutral.⁵⁸ Consequently, history is the return of finite freedom to its sources, the freely chosen uniting as the appearance of the Absolute, meaning that human decision-making is only part of that.⁵⁹

55 See Wilhelm Gräb, *Humanität und Christentumsgeschichte: Eine Untersuchung zum Geschichtsbegriff im Spätwerk Schleiermachers*, Göttinger theologische Arbeiten 14 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980).

56 *Gesamte Arbeit* I, 5, 347–75: "Ueber den Grund unsers Glaubens an eine göttliche Welt-regierung: Der Glaube an die Vorsehung ist ihm [...] die Bejahung des Gesollten."

57 Stefan Gnädinger, *Vorsehung: Ein religionsphilosophisches Grundproblem bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte* (Berlin: LIT, 2003), 134: "Gott, genauer, der göttliche Weltplan, ist gerechtfertigt in der a priori als denknötwendig ausgewiesenen Annahme, daß alles dem einen Zweck des Daseins von Individuum und Gattung Vernichtung des Eigentums zugunsten der Erscheinung Gottes dienlich ist."

58 *Ibid.*, 140: "Freiheit besteht vielmehr in der Bestimmung der Haltung zu den durch mich sich vollziehenden Absichten des Weltplans, ob ich also das mir Aufgegebene aus freien Stücken tue oder nicht."

59 *Ibid.*, 141: "Geschichte ist nach Fichte die Rückkehr aller endlichen Freiheit zu ihrem Ursprung, die freigewählte Einswerdung aller als Erscheinung des Absoluten, und nur sofern ein menschlicher Entschluß sich begreifen läßt als Glied dieser Aufgabe, ist er."

Hermann Lübbe has argued that religion after 1750 or so became all about managing contingency.⁶⁰ Providence as a doctrine had broken down. For a time, a moral rule-based theonomy replaced it, yet with that went an either-or approach and a loss of any sense of *concursum*: divine providence seemed a limitation on human-led providence. A development to escape this followed the star of Hegel, for whom the free worldly consciousness was true religion – and not its opposite. The state became viewed as the epitome of providential action, as that which would care and would be best placed to plan with foresight.⁶¹ This theology would express itself in literary form in Thomas Mann's thinly veiled portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt in his re-telling of the *Joseph* story. One could argue that by this point, theology has retreated to abstractions and has become a theory of transcendence rather than a provocation to concerted action in hand with the Spirit of God. In the sphere of grace, there was a development away from grace as something to be received passively towards grace as including the active response to divine initiative under the internal promptings. God could act only through individual rational agents, and had no other way of changing things in the world. The world became to look less like a theatre of divine drama. With the loss of miracles in the sense of divine power clearly displayed in public yet sacred locations, the church lost authority.

The proclivity for Enlightenment theologians to try to explain the miraculous in natural terms was a reaction to the lack of experience of such things, except through textual accounts.⁶² In other words, stories of wonders are not the wonders themselves. Lessing could allow for Christ's own miracles, as serving a moral lesson, although Kant would prefer to restrict the evidence to Christ's natural, hence ethical deeds. Providence hence stood for the area of the worldly before and apart from as well as in the Church, whereas predestination meant the works of God through the faith of people, whom he called into community.⁶³ In this bifurcation Providence lost its mystery.

60 Hermann Lübbe, *Religion nach der Aufklärung* (Graz: Styria, 1986).

61 Weimer, "Wodurch kam das Sprechen von Vorsehung," 26: "Der Staat hat die Aufgabe der Vorsehung zu übernehmen, der Glaube wird die Realisierung des Staates."

62 Ibid., 40: "Die natürliche Erklärung der Wunder ist eine Reaktion auf die fehlende Theologie des 'mediante' (der Vermitteltheit durch Natur, Geschichte und Sprache, durch Erkennen und Glaube) gewesen; und sie entzündete sich an dem fehlenden Moment des Zeitlichen, Gegenwärtigen, an der scheinbar fehlenden heutigen Begegnung mit dem Wunder [...]. Das Wunder begegnet in einer sprachlichen Nachricht. Schon die abstrakte Eigenschaft der behaupteten *Allmacht* Gottes ist eine solche gefährliche Nachricht."

63 Ibid., 45 "Ich habe vorgeschlagen, Vorsehung und Prädestination als die zwei "Orte" des Eins-Zusammenhandelns von Erst- und Zweitursache anzusehen und auf die Heilsgeschichtstheologie zu beziehen: Vorsehung steht dann für den Raum des Weltlichen vor und in der Kirche,

Indicative was Lessing's *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (1780) with its *Leitidee* of Revelation received by Reason as the education of the human race. The Israelite nation made progress despite not quite coming fully to believe in an afterlife. Jesus took this second step, and the New Testament was the second textbook for humanity. Neither of these were deduced "downwards" from human reason's principles, but built up from them. The last step in enlightened times was for all people with now purified hearts to embrace the eternal Gospel, which will not dispense of the first two foundations yet will not pay attention to them. "*Geh deinen unmerklichen Schritt, ewige Vorsehung!*": with this reference to an invisible providential step forward, the goal can be achieved. It is an awareness that existed in the original unspoiled human consciousness and which could be retrieved. Mysteries were revealed in order to be grasped by reason, which plays the receptive mode. God provides the ground and limiting framework for human freedom as well as its completion, something which Hegel and Marx would later forget. Yet in Lessing there is no cause for considering anything of "this life" to be "tragic," given divine assistance against negative forces. Since each generation is instructed by Providence, and mistakes are corrected, one does not need to defer meaning in history to its end, but rather see past, present and future as one.⁶⁴ The question, brought into focus by the work of Arno Schilson, is how much Providence is about God's presence renewed every moment through a series of moments, in opposition to a Theology of Hope that defers God's activity to another (eschatological) world order, and makes the present and past traditions less valuable. As serving the purposes of Salvation History, Providence belongs as much to Grace as to Nature.⁶⁵

As for Herder, according to his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1791) (following on from his 1774 *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*) the watchwords were variety (versus monotony), the enduring validity of epochs and tradition (versus the idea of progress reducing them to "provisionality"), and the importance of aesthetics (compared with ethics). For Herder history could not be plotted from some *a priori* principles. One will only be able to make sense of history in the eschaton, but for now sense will operate through the feeling of love. History does not advance but wins and loses in equal measure and especially in the modern age one must take care not to lose one's particular identity, which is the gift of the

Prädestination für die Werke Gottes durch den Glauben von Menschen, die er zum Gottesvolk gesammelt hat."

⁶⁴ Arno Schilson, *Geschichte im Horizont der Vorsehung. G.E. Lessings Beitrag zu einer Theologie der Geschichte*, Tübinger theologische Studien 3 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald, 1974), 282f.; 293.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 303.

past.⁶⁶ The new and modern is no more secure, for it does not rest on epochs as foundations but is challenged by the onrush of time. It is not the emergent forces but the present visitation of a transcendent God which is required: "Providence may now be 'lost' from our secular consciousness, but it continues to exert an influence on our thought and on our lives."⁶⁷ Herder wrote that only when all particular experiences are added up can one start to speak of "humanity". Providence is to be thanked most basically for one's physical health or the prosperity of one's nation. The affirmation of nature in its variety resists tyranny. Language difficulties are a sign that each has to learn for himself. The only end of Providence is to lead humans to a kingdom where truth and goodness reign.

In lectures between 1804 and 1806 Friedrich Schlegel claimed that time as the medium of God's freedom and the old doctrine of Providence had not been brought into dialogue. He complained that "Providence for every human" had been reduced to mere moral and useful education for Lessing. Time as the medium of freedom before God was not yet completely linked with the faith in Providence, as it should be.⁶⁸ This was a sign of a readiness to move Providence out of its Enlightenment restrictions. In Fichte and Schelling and Kierkegaard there was a reception of the Jewish critique of claims to the miraculous, as represented by Moses Mendelssohn's *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes*, where he announced that miracle is the recongising of God's face in the particular circumstance.

Schelling, who would influence Johann Sebastian Drey and in turn a series of Catholic theologians, envisioned God's plan as the drama of Providence by God's intervention in the course of history through guiding consciences, albeit with dynamic effect.⁶⁹ Hence there needs to be human free cooperation for to be providence. Herder had argued that before his crucifixion Christ tried to purify disciples, so that they could reach a faith in one God of creation, a sentiment

66 Jochen Johannsen, *J. G. Herders historische Anthropologie und die ausgeweitete Moderne* (Witten: 2004; <http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/25697>), 213–4: "Die Menschheitsgeschichte geht in der Individualgeschichte nicht auf, doch wird sie durch diese erst verständlich. In seinem eigenen Menschsein erfährt das Individuum einen Zugang zur Geschichte seiner Gattung – und das heißt für Herder: nicht nur zu seiner Vergangenheit, sondern auch zu seiner von der Menschheit selbst zu gestaltenden Zukunft. (Geschichte als Menschheitsbildung)."

67 Lloyd, *Providence Lost*, 1.

68 Lübke, *Religion*, 37: "Die Zeit als das Medium der Freiheit vor Gott ist noch nicht umfassend mit dem Vorsehungsglauben verbunden worden."

69 Cf. *Ideen zur Geschichte* 232; *Kurze Einleitung* § 114: Although as B. Hinze notes, Drey's selection of the idea of the story of the kingdom of God owed more to his teacher Dobmayer than to Schelling. B. Hinze, *Narrating History, Developing Doctrine* (AAR 1993), 32. Drey was concerned for the power lying behind the facts of that history.

that not that far from the English Deist Tindal, whom Herder had read in 1796/7.⁷⁰ This “creation faith” was a pre-Christian one, yet it could and should accompany a traditional “saving faith.” God creates and reveals himself by expressing the unconditioned in the conditioned.

In his *Auch Eine Philosophie* Herder had been clear that it would be wrong for a human to try for a God’s-eye or even Kantian view of abstraction. Sin and virtue were the agents of their own recompense, not God by his intervention. The law of right and wrong worked like other natural forces.⁷¹ God’s substance must be fixed, but in his activity he must necessarily be subject to development.⁷² God as one who becomes is not now a leader, for humans must learn to drive history forward themselves by learning to unravel the puzzle of history,⁷³ as preparation for the eventual kingdom of God. If Herder saw the formation of *Bildung* of persons as more important than the broader *Erziehung* of the human race (Lessing), Schelling viewed the church as mediating between, for Christ’s teaching was the seed of history in an organic way, although Schelling is not unaware of corruptions throughout that history.

For Schelling, history, which operates at a certain level of abstraction links the actual/empirical with the ideal. In his *Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung*, in the 21st *Vorlesung*, in order that the world not be seen as a mere emanation, it is necessary that something has to stand between the Eternal Absolute and time or creation. This prevents creation being deemed “necessary”.⁷⁴

In his 16th Lecture, Freedom is understood as nothing less than God’s essence (Wesen Gottes). Brouwer tells us that this idea was already present in Schelling’s earlier *Freiheitsschrift*, although with the Trinity in mind, it is no longer the case

70 Claas Cordemann, *Herders christlicher Monismus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 148; 180, n. 101.

71 Martin Kessler, “Herders Kirchenamt in Sachsen-Weimar in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmbarkeit von Stadt- und Hofkirche,” in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Aspekte seines Lebenswerkes*, eds. Martin Kessler and Volker Leppin, *Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte* 92 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005): 327–352, 346.

72 Rainer Wisbert, “Geschichte und Schule bei Johann Gottfried Herder,” in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Aspekte seines Lebenswerkes*, eds. Martin Kessler and Volker Leppin, *Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte* 92 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005): 353–367, 356: “Als Substanz ist Gott unveränderlich, als Kraft kann Gott gar nicht anders, als tätig und lebendig zu sein, als sich ständig weiter zu entfalten.”

73 *Ibid.*, 358: “Nach Herder ist es das Ziel und der Zweck der Menschheit, die göttliche Naturordnung immer weiter zu enträtseln und zur Darstellung zu bringen und damit in Freiheit das Werden Gottes in der Geschichte fortzusetzen.”

74 *Werke* I, 136 f.: “Die Welt darf also nicht als bloß notwendige Emanation Gottes angesehen werden. Um dies zu verhindern, ist es notwendig, daß zwischen der absoluten Ewigkeit und der Zeit etwas in der Mitte sei, wenn man unter ‘Zeit’ die Welt, Schöpfung versteht.”

for Schelling that God needed the world to enforce his decision to love.⁷⁵ God has the image in him which He then expresses: so there is an inner reflection. There needs at least to be the possibility of hate for there to be love. This does not mean the actuality of the Fall, as some like Herder claimed.⁷⁶ God wants to realise the Good in History, for the sake of an “all in all,” as 1 Corinthians 15:28 has it. And so in *Freiheitschrift* 75.11–14 he writes that the *telos* of creation consists in the autonomous existent come back into God, thereby actualising the Good.⁷⁷

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi had argued that Reason can come to knowledge of God, given that as object of knowledge God has revealed himself and continues to,⁷⁸ requiring reason to filter and discern what is indeed Providence from events, by showing the course of freedom in it. Schelling saw dependence in creation in its unfolding, yet without it being too one-sided, as God too is involved in contingency almost as much as creation.⁷⁹ Right from the beginning with the contingent history of the world going out from the Word, and later with the cross too as contingent, God himself bears contingency like a characteristic.

Unlike Hegel, for whom “in the beginning” was only the idea, Schelling believed in a sort of time before the world. The question of God's freedom in history was an important one to him,⁸⁰ if God were to be the One who led creation into freedom.⁸¹ Thus it is important to postulate that Providence is real, even though one should not try to imagine what its details are. As with Aquinas, there is a distinction between providence as ordering things to their ends, and as God's

75 Christian Brouwer, *Schellings Freiheitsschrift: Studien zu ihrer Interpretation und ihrer Bedeutung für die theologische Diskussion*, Religion in Philosophy and Theology 59 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 256.

76 Ibid., 263. Cf. *Freiheitschrift* 68. Also, cf. Rüdiger Safranski, *Das Böse oder das Drama der Freiheit* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1999), 22–31.

77 *Freiheitschrift* 75.11–14: “Das Telos der Schöpfung besteht darin, dass die unabhängig Existierende wieder in Gott seien und so das Gute aktualisiert werde.”

78 Jacobi, *Werke* IV/I, XXI: “[...] menschlicher Erkenntniß geht aus von Offenbarung, die Vernunft nämlich offenbaret Freyheit, indem sie Vorsehung offenbaret.”

79 Brouwer, *Schellings Freiheitsschrift*, 313: “Schellings Schöpfungstheorie schafft eine Relation zwischen Gott und Mensch (bzw. Welt), die zwar ein deutliches Abhängigkeitsgefälle beinhaltet, jedoch ohne einseitig zu sein. Mensch und Gott bestimmen das Weltgeschehen auf je ihre Weise, so dass dieses sich dem Kausalmechanismus entzieht und Raum für kontingentes Geschehen schafft.”

80 E. Brito, *La création selon Schelling* (Leuven: Bibliotheca Ephemeridum theologicarum Lovaniensium; 80, 1987), 571: “La liberté divine, Schelling veut la reconnaître non seulement par rapport à la creation mais aussi au ‘gouvernement du monde’” (*Weltregierung*, XIII 305).

81 Ibid., 572: “Mais Schelling ne se borne pas à répéter la doctrine classique. La conception ‘Ironique’ du ‘government providential’ constitue à notre avis sa contribution proper dans ce domaine.”

working out his ideas in history.⁸² Schelling could see that for there to be possibilities in the world, then that meant possibilities for God too in his freedom: the realm of possibility mediates between eternity and time.⁸³ With reference to Elijah who heard God behind the natural events (1 Kings 19), the key for believers is to see beyond appearances to God's plans' outworking.

The contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor argues that Modernity was not about throwing things off but putting on new inventions: so it was not a case that Providence was *lost* between 1640 and 1740. If anything humans *gained* confidence in their ability at moral ordering.⁸⁴ The things themselves no longer needed to contain a moral sense, since that was to be supplied by the mental interpretation of things. Providence did not disappear but it did change, "naturalisation" rather than the more personal version in which Providence was about God's procuring. Against the desacralization thesis he writes: "But to contemplate things in the perfection of their natures, although it brackets the work of grace, doesn't turn us away from God."⁸⁵ No, but it did remove Providence from History and leave a vacuum for other forces to fill.

Hegel and Beyond

Hegel's contribution to the history of Christian theology of Providence is of course large. There are however few theologians who regard the positive contribution to theology as direct. Theologians have been provoked, catalysed, even inspired by Hegel, but more in the way of having to correct dangerous implications. One thing that is perhaps praiseworthy is in what Cyril O'Regan comments: "Hegel does not allow Christianity to be determined by the book of Job."⁸⁶ Even if his vision reduces to a quasi-Joachimite hope for heaven on earth, gained by hell on earth, that history is always right in the end (a form of Leibnizian theodicy), that self-reflection is the greatest good, that the actual is rational and that the whole drives the particular ("*Das Wahre ist das Ganze*": Philosophy of Spirit 20), in such a way that God's particular providence, not least the Incarnation, is

⁸² Ibid., 572. Cf Xavier Tilliette, *Schelling: Une philosophie en devenir* (Paris: J.Vrin, 1970).

⁸³ 21. Vorlesung (*Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung*, (Leipzig: Meiner, 2010), 136ff. "Denn Vorsehung ist = Vorstellung [...]."

⁸⁴ Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 34 f.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 91.

⁸⁶ For a grasp of a vast subject, I am grateful to Cyril O'Regan, "Hegel, Theodicy and the Invisibilty of Waste" in Philip G. Ziegler and Francesca Aran Murphy (London: T&T Clark, 2009): 75–108; here, 90.

always merely a clue to what God is about overall; nevertheless, there is something admirable in the refusal of nihilism. The price paid is not only the apparent indifference to the experience of involuntary suffering of history's victims, but also the idolatry of the objectifying gaze which claims to know God's will and hence the Divine Subject through knowledge

Hegel had already accused the Christian doctrine of Providence as overly limited to individuals, and pious ones at that. A proud belief in human progress would usher in a strong "defatalisation": individuals were not to be cowed by Providence as something akin to a "collective instinct."⁸⁷ There was to be no belief in mechanism for its own sake but a negation of a negation in the telos or point of it all, which of course meant Freedom.⁸⁸ The negative experiences in life drove life forward, in the sense that truth needs to be complemented or tested by an experience, when reality and perception come close together in the ethical action.⁸⁹ Reality is formed by a series of moments of truths, and hence Hegel was not so blindly optimistic, but rather insisted that there was always quite some way to go. Any progress takes place in our awareness of increasing freedom, or of our being free already, which happens when we act morally and quietly: therein lies true heroism in this, in the convertibility of the actual with the rational. One starts with the intention of individual actions, but when I regard my own vision as limited then do I overcome limit, and this comes about through making use of ideologies, which are bigger than one's own "interests."

If the hope for universal truth in and through history reached its zenith with Hegel, then very soon, against Hegel, contingency struck back in the form of a localized, self-interested "*selbst-Erhaltung*"; going back to Spinoza Schopenhauer shared this view: Life is suffering (*Leben ist Leiden*), in which one only scratches an itch for it to reappear. The spur of suffering is simply to get one back to where one was, not to progress in any way. History is not a moral executor, and since Nietzsche, it seems that History is no longer the mistress but at best the handmaid of Life. For the interpreter is the mistress in charge; ever since Bernard de Fontenelle in 1688, people have learned to be decreasingly impressed by the Past. One becomes truly human by being over historical in the sense of making history, which seems to have been the lesson of Nietzsche's *Vom Nutzen*

⁸⁷ Taylor, *Secular Age*, 51.

⁸⁸ Robert Spaemann and Reinhard Löw, *Natürliche Ziele: Geschichte und Wiederentdeckung des teleologischen Denkens* (Stuttgart: Klett, Cotta, 2005), 142, with reference to Hegel's *Logik* (Werke V,210).

⁸⁹ Ibid., 147: "in Bedürfnis und Trieb sind die Zwecke schon da." This quoting Hegel (*Werke* VIII,415): "Der Trieb ist sozusagen die Gewißheit dafür, daß das Subjektive nur einseitig ist und keine Wahrheit hat, ebensowenig als das Objektive."

und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben (1874). There could be no final cause and no efficient causes, despite Hegel and Napoleon making a God of History. After all, a Hegelian account of a strong steer of all particulars by History robs people of responsibility. As Reinhart Koselleck expressed it: History is neither a court of judgment nor an alibi.⁹⁰ Koselleck, writing in the aftermath of Stalingrad and Auschwitz, decrees that each piece of history has a number of meanings to a number of observers. On this account, History is senseless and invites, even draws into its vacuous state, any sense-making of the whole.

For Schelling's ungrateful pupil Søren Kierkegaard, a perception of general providence should be more than enough. Those who demand signs of special providence and want to understand their lives forward rather than backwards, do damage to faith, life and God's honour.⁹¹ Humans have at least psychological freedom in the sense that they do not know what God is going to do. As Heiko Schulz describes it,⁹² the Danish philosopher's *Fortyn* comes close to that of Proverbs 19:21 and the motto: "Man proposes, but God disposes." In a late journal entry from 1854: "To be a Christian means to believe in a special providence."⁹³ By which the idea is that God as "chess-player" plays a powerful "black" at times to humans as they play "white." But in that desperate game, God is to be found.

However a Kantian like Ritschl wanted to avoid metaphysical speculation, yet in the prologue to his masterwork declared Nature to be none other than "Gott ist alles in seinen Werken." He regretted as a great loss that in Lutheran Orthodoxy Providence had literally fallen from grace and became treated as part of natural theology and as such ignored.⁹⁴ This had not been the case for

⁹⁰ Reinhart Koselleck, *Von Sinn und Unsinn der Geschichte: Aufsätze und Vorträge aus vier Jahrzehnten* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010), 31: "Die Geschichte ist weder ein Gericht noch ein Alibi."

⁹¹ See his *Edifying Discourses* of 1847.

⁹² Heiko Schulz, "Kierkegaard on Providence and Foreknowledge. A Critical Account," *NZStH* 41 (1999): 115–131.

⁹³ Cited, *ibid.*, 117.

⁹⁴ Albrecht Ritschl, *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1870–1874), III:173: "Ebenso wird die Erfahrung, die der Einzelne von der Vergebung der Sünden macht, fast nur in Luthers Katechismen mit der Stellung desselben in der Kirche verknüpft. Und dieser Mangel ist schon in den Schriften der Reformatoren selbst eingetreten, die den Schaden dadurch verschärft, daß Johann Gerhard den Glauben an Gottes Vorsehung zur natürlichen Theologie schlägt [...]. So treu ist dieser Theologe der Augsburgerischen Confession, daß er dem natürlichen, also dem sündigen Menschen das Vertrauen auf Gott möglich sein läßt. Welches in der leitenden Lehrurkunde demselben gerade abgesprochen wird [...]. Nur Stephan Praetorius leitet die Freudeigkeit der Lebensanschauung und persönlichen Haltung direct aus der Rechtfertigung ab."

Melanchthon, who had insisted that sinners too could have trust in God. All this followed on from the basic idea of Justification. The kingdom of God message in Jesus' teaching suggests Providence on a wide scale. Harnack's famous equation of the gospel with the Fatherhood of God can be seen expressed in terms of the Father as providing for all his children.⁹⁵ Ritschl could write that in the general faith in God's fatherly Providence, religious faith could best be seen as practised, like that of little children.⁹⁶ For it was when one perceived how the world had been set up for the good of human beings that one might realise how trials are intended for our moral good. We should devote attention to making sense of our own fortune without regarding that of others.

Towards the end of the work, Ritschl offers this: Strauss in *Das Leben Jesu* saw Jesus like all others caught up in the nightmarish fanged cogs of the world machine, but that Paul then announced the palliative (*lindernd*) divine presence poured out to soothe. This allows for some amount of consolation, in that humans are somehow elevated by this knowledge to become like spectators. Darwinism is pretty much right at one level, but before we start to doubt our own worth, common sense denies science here, in that it shows how rational it is to dare to try some stepping out and transcending of the oppressions of life and the restrictions both nature and society throw up.⁹⁷ Believing in such forces too much is like believing in the devil. It is a category mistake to think that Providence starts with "natural humanity." It is only for those who have been reconciled through such knowledge and world-transcendence to whom "God is not against us" (Rom 8:32) applies.⁹⁸

For Ritschl, belief in Providence corresponds to the Christian virtue of patience, which is not apathy. Believers know *that* God is going to save us but

⁹⁵ Adolf von Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1900), 46 (44): "Gott der Vater, die Vorsehung, die Kindschaft, der unendliche Wert der Menschenseele, spricht sich das ganze Evangelium aus."

⁹⁶ Ritschl, *Die christliche Lehre*, III:583: "Es ist nun im Allgemeinen der Glaube an Gottes Vorsehung, in welchem die religiöse Herrschaft über die Welt ausgeübt wird. Denn die einheitliche Weltanschauung unter dem Gesichtspunkt des überweltlichen Gottes, der als unser Vater durch Christus uns liebt und uns in seinem Reiche zu der Bestimmung vereinigt, in welcher wir den Zweck der Welt sehen so wir die Selbstbeurteilung, welche dem entspricht, sind das Gebiet innerhalb dessen alle Vorstellungen der Art gebildet werden, daß uns alle Dinge und Ereignisse in der Welt zum Guten dienen, weil man als Kind Gottes ein Gegenstand besonderer Fürsorge und Hilfe Gottes ist."

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 586.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 590: "An der Unklarheit aber, welche auf diesem Punkte sich lagert, ist gerade die orthodoxe Theologie in hervorragender Weise schuldig, sofern sie den Glauben an Gottes Vorsehung als ein Stück natürlicher Religion darstellt."

not *how*, for his ways are unsearchable (Rom 11:33). It means undeserved lowliness and self-forgetting, like the eye that sees all but itself. We are badly in need of help, but sober self-evaluation should not mean self-loathing.⁹⁹ Calvin widened the concept of Providence from meaning “special connection” to a more general one to which appreciation of geography, language and culture can inculcate thankful wonder at the trouble divine care has taken. Lutherans can be proud of continuing the medieval spiritual heritage of hymns, which stress this “humble trust” theme. Pietists relegated the doctrine because rationalists and deists made so much of it.¹⁰⁰ Ritschl saw the whole as designed to go forward although it took humans to make use of its forces and see therein hope for the future.¹⁰¹

In fact it was not Science but History and the natural explanation of ancient wondrous events. Evolution’s provocation was a spur to a more experientially based theology. The Darwinian account of life was neither tragic nor comic but was simply about the struggle to survive. It did at the time fit quite well with the prevalent Romantic theology, for which “order” was to be seen largely in embracing change and dynamism to overcome despair: “When Darwin wrote his *Descent of Man* (1871) he did not intend to proclaim the relativity of moral values. He wanted to explain how the highest form of moral sensibility (that we should behave to others as we would have them behave towards us) had developed naturally.”¹⁰²

99 On humility (*Demuth*), *Ibid.*, 597: “so fällt die *ענוה* sachlich zusammen mit der Gerechtigkeit (Ps 45,5; Zephaniah 2,3).” Also, 602: “Die Geduld nämlich ist die religiöse Stimmung als Herrschaft über die widerstrebende Welt, welche die Demuth als die Stimmung der Unterordnung unter Gott ergänzt.”

100 *Ibid.*, 618: “Um so bedeutsamer ist es, wie unwillkürlich Calvin, wo er die fiducia als Vollendung des Glaubens beschreibt (Inst III.2.16), die speciellen Beziehungen des dogmatischen Glaubens zu den allgemeinen Beziehungen der göttlichen Vorsehung erweitert.” 623: “Man gibt sich in pietistischen Kreisen den Anschein, den Vorsehungsglauben für etwas Untergeordnetes zu halten, weil auch der Rationalismus darauf lautete, und demselben doch nicht zugegeben werden soll, daß er ein gesundes Element des Christentums an sich hat.” Cf. Johannes Zachhuber, “Albrecht Ritschl and the Tübingen School: A Neglected Link in the History of 19th century Theology,” *ZnTh* 18 (2011): 51–70.

101 Dale M. Schlitt, “Albrecht Ritschl on God as Personal and as Loving Will,” *Theoforum* 42 (2011): 229–272.

102 John Hedley Brooke, “Darwin and Victorian Christianity,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Darwin*, eds. Jonathan Hodge and Gregory Radick, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 192–213, 194.

In Darwin's peroration to the summary Chapter 21 of that work:

Important as the struggle for existence has been and even still is, yet as far as the highest part of man's nature is concerned there are other agencies more important. For the moral qualities are advanced either directly or indirectly much more through the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, etc., than through natural selection; though to this latter agency the social instincts, which afforded the basis for the development of the moral sense, may be safely attributed.

The critic of Victorian literature John Beer's argument is that while the theme of Providence appearing large in the works of Richardson and Fielding seems incontestable, it was still alive and well in the middle of the nineteenth century, for instance in *Jane Eyre*, although perhaps more in the shape of "Nature," or "a spirit which is as present in the great energies of Nature as in the moral law, and as little confined by them."¹⁰³ Wordsworth had already taken comfort in his personal fortune with other womenfolk when his own amorous plans were thwarted (*Prelude* 1805, xi, 199–223). Beer admits that in Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, "Christian faith is maintained, but barely." And by the time of Brontë's *Villette* the mood is much darker with no grand design. Comfort in that novel is more of a material or an "Old Testament" sort, whereas in *Jane Eyre* that theme was left behind.

In George Eliot's novels, characters were starting to claim their own design to be identical with Providence, a development with catastrophic consequences in the hands of Nazi ideology.¹⁰⁴ However Eliot moralizes against this trend and reinforced the link between Providence and morality: "If Providence offers you power and position – especially when unclogged by any conditions that are repugnant to you – your course is one of responsibility, into which caprice must not enter."¹⁰⁵ John Ruskin might have written to Elizabeth Barrett Browning: "God's laws you can trace, His providence, never," in his lectures at Oxford in 1870:

But so far as we use the word "Providence" as an attribute of the Maker and Giver of all things, it does not mean that in a shipwreck He takes care of the passengers who are to be saved, and takes none of those who are to be drowned; but it *does* mean that every

103 John Beer, *Providence and Love: Studies in Wordsworth, Channing, Myers, George Eliot, and Ruskin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14.

104 *Ibid.*, 18: "the thought of Providence assists self-deception (in the case of Casaubon)." "The beloved was then looked to not only as the provided but the provider" (*Ibid.*, 20).

105 In *Daniel Deronda* (1876) (Beer, *Providence and Love*, 207). Cf. Thomas Vargish, *Providential Aesthetic in Victorian Fiction* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1985).

race of creatures is born into the world under circumstances of approximate adaptation to its necessities [...].¹⁰⁶

Frederic Myers saw his contemporary Alfred Tennyson as Prophet of Evolution.¹⁰⁷ If Tennyson could write another famous line from *In Memoriam*: “Better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all,” the late Victorian natural philosopher Henry Drummond echoed this for the world of nature: “better to have lived and been eaten than never to have lived at all.”¹⁰⁸ For both it was not about whence we have come, but whither we are going – and there was still a long way for humankind to go. Tennyson in 1864 was invited to become a Fellow of the Royal Society but declined. His work and thought became increasingly impressionistic, irrational even. But for Tennyson this world was not enough; it provided merely a form for Spirit which went ahead. One just has to work away morally and see whether things then change for the better. For, as Carlyle concluded: “the difficulty in tracing the exact workings of providence should not be made a reason for doubting its existence as such.”¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, de Tocqueville’s conviction of “the irresistible march of democracy” continued to work irresistibly in the USA: “The gradual development of the equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact, and it possesses all the characteristics of a divine decree.”¹¹⁰

In the nineteenth century when faith seemed put on trial, the theme of Providence sprang up; possibly due to a defeatist passivity which longed to be rescued from trials, including the attack on faith. Yet this was an easy target for theologians. James McCosh differed little from the Boston transcendentalist Theodore Parker when he played down the existence of “special providence,” and asserted that poverty and illness were not generally the result of judgement on immorality.¹¹¹ God would work through persuasion of those open to moral in-

106 Beer, *Providence and Love*, 241.

107 Frederic Myers, “Tennyson as Prophet,” in *Science and a Future Life: With Other Essays* (London-New York : Macmillan, 1893).

108 Brooke, “Darwin and Victorian Christianity,” 164.

109 Ibid., 305. On Edward Caird’s Idea of ‘Development,’ see Peter Hinchcliff, *Benjamin Jowett and the Christian Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 212f.

110 Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 11, quoting *Democracy in America*, Introduction.

111 Charles Cashdollar, “The Social Implications of the Doctrine of Divine Providence: A Nineteenth-Century Debate in American Theology,” *Harvard Theological Review* 71 (1978): 265–284, with reference to James McCosh’s *The Method of Divine Government, Physical and Moral* (New York: Carter, 1851) and Horace Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural as together constituting the one system of God* (New York: Scribner, 1895).

fluence. A strong emphasis on human creativity as enabled by God's deliverance from chaos could be developed. Yet radical critics of Providence such as John Stuart Mill were ready only to see the negative effects of Providentialism on human initiative. Already Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (d. 1865) was a theologian of progress, yet as such was also an opponent of "Divine Providence." Christianity had once served to personalize "fate," but now fate needed to be wholly removed from Providence through the latter's becoming the property of human initiative (in his *Système des contradictions économiques ou philosophie de la misère* of 1846). In Comte's version, although with much of a debt to Condorcet's *The Progress of the Human Mind*, this included moral improvement and socialization, which afforded a more "catholic" and less individualized vision, one which Hegel had hoped for. As Karl Löwith concluded, Progressive Evolution with a faculty for planning (*prevision rationnelle*) and risk-assessment now replaced Providence. As human advancement happens in the collective, not in the individual-moral, wars would soon cease and Napoleon would be a distant memory.¹¹² Löwith argued, if Karl Marx was arguably more typically Judeo-Christian in that he "maintains the original tension of a transcendent faith over against the existing world," Hegel and his "spirit" was more reconciled to the world as it was. The chapter in *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschichte* entitled "*Fortschritt contra Vorsehung*" maintains that the modern was not just greater than the ancient, but also that Christianity itself was outdated, and its eschatology was already being adapted prior to Vico. Indeed, progress was a feature of Catholic civilization, not Protestant, with its regressive attachment to Hebraic antiquity and sacral kingship over religion.¹¹³ What Comte offered was catholic in the sense of a communal religion independent of the state – something more spontaneous, voluntary and energetic, while collective. The courses of salvation history and universal history ran parallel; it is, according to Löwith, probably better to see the two sides of Christianity as the same, only offering different interpretations of the same events, or lives, whether that of a Pontius Pilate or a less famous figure.¹¹⁴ Unlike Jews, Christians do not have a visibly obvious, narratable story.¹¹⁵ Originally they believed there was no pattern to history and, thinks Löwith, the Twentieth Century seems to have proved them right. It might then be odd to suggest that the move to history was a secularizing moment (as Hans Blumen-

¹¹² Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 88.

¹¹³ Karl Löwith, *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschichte*, in *Sämtliche Schriften* II (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1983), 7–239, 89.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 205.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 210 f.: "Die Christen sind kein geschichtliches Volk [...]. Die Zeit nach Christus ist nur insofern christlich, als sie Endzeit ist."

berg observed),¹¹⁶ when one realizes that from the beginning eschatology included both historical process, although not so much progress – as well as “apocalyptic” intervention from on high.

Charles Taylor’s case is that with late modernity there was a change from Augustine’s model, whereby eternity is not timeless but is the past taken into present and projected into the future and can be a place where God and humans meet. What has replaced that is modern time, which is all about changes, measurements and time as commodity and as an iron cage for reality, with God’s eternity pushed far away. A medieval Cosmos was inherently meaningful, an expanding universe seems less so. Yet Pascal had long before given an account of God’s care for an infinite and irregular universe.¹¹⁷ If God is to be truly present, then he also has to be invited in where human incapacity demands it. If God is everywhere sanctifying, then still He requires faith’s hospitality for that to happen. Taylor finds this “heroic” Jansenist alternative to be dangerous, for it might then turn our active response to God’s action into “all or nothing.” Living all of life for the glory of God with its higher demands risks the danger of “loading ordinary flourishing with a burden of renunciation it cannot carry.”¹¹⁸ It might be better to see God’s glory in the world as one where He works with people to stop society from becoming wholly vicious, and to build the right inner attitude of confident humility. I have some sympathy with Taylor’s questioning of whether “desacralisation” matters for this: “But to contemplate things in the perfection of their natures, although it brackets the work of grace, doesn’t turn us away from God.”¹¹⁹ Indeed. And yet, *pace* Taylor, it matters that grace takes us beyond nature, for that is what gives nature a shape. And while what Spaemann calls “mechanical interpretation” presupposes that all is bound together by a comprehensive connectivity of life (“umgreifenden Lebenszusammenhanges”), that is just as much a metaphysic of its own, but not really one that explains anything.¹²⁰ If we are striving for *sense* in life, then that means there is something more. Spaemann wonders what we are aiming at when we aim to preserve the species.¹²¹ The answer could be a circular one of course, and no answer might be a better response. Yet there is something in his argument that ordinary human

116 Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*, 44.

117 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 61.

118 *Ibid.*, 82.

119 *Ibid.*, 91.

120 Spaemann and Löw, *Natürliche Ziele*, 205: “Als Fazit ergibt sich, daß die Begriffe Ursache und Wirkung jedenfalls ungeeignet sind, um Ereignisse zu erklären.”

121 *Ibid.*, 242f.: “Er bezieht nicht Treibholz teleologisch auf das Leben der Eskimos, sondern dieses Stück Holz auf diesen Eskimo in diesem Augenblick.”

life is marked by moments of meaning, as the eskimo receives the driftwood, (s)he is in receipt of Providence even if (s)he does not recognise it as *Fügung*, not even when instruction for how to work with wood comes along. Teleology means that the thing includes the goal in its being; providence means that without some external combinations and re-arrangements the beauty of particular life-patterns and vocations is missed.

Well before the First World War, Thomas Hardy offered a bleak vision of the course of life in which horrid coincidence reinforces the meaning that there is no meaning.¹²² Yet within a few years of that episode of military carnage, a hopeful account of the filial trusting of God's fatherly goodness resulting in activating human creativity according the image, came into view. Yet Maurice Blondel's *L'homme provident*, posited that a providential relation with God should be viewed as one of dignity equality, such that humans who enjoy it are by no means trapped by God's goodness, in some indebted way, and are far from being objects or pawns of Providence.¹²³ Blondel emphasized provision and family-like belonging in the world, behind all its illusions of passion.

122 The novels that comes to mind are *Jude the Obscure* and *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*; the poem, *The Convergence of the Twain*. See Vernon White, "Providence, Irony and Belief: Thomas Hardy – and an Improbable Comparison with Karl Barth," *Theology* 113 (2010): 357–365. Also, Gillian Beer, *Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, 3rd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Part Three: Responses-George Eliot and Thomas Hardy.

123 See Pierre-Jean Labarrière, "Providence," in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 12, eds. Marcel Viller, Ferdinand Cavallera, and Joseph de Guibert (Paris: Beauchesne, 1986), 2464.

Chapter Seven: Providence in twentieth-century theological discussion

Providence was perhaps *the* doctrine that came under close scrutiny in the Modern Era. Since it seemed to be restricted to the people of God, as per as something directed towards Israel then and the Church now, the rest of the world's population and its philosophers could see no sign of anything being done by God either to upset creation when reliable, or fix creation when unreliable. This of course is disputable: e.g., Calvin was bold enough to call the *world* the theatre of God's glory, and the Church is more the "choir" or "orchestra."¹ However by the eighteenth century Jansenist claims to miracles in their midst as signs and portents were disqualified as delusional and subjective, in tandem with their unpopular doctrines and the occasionalism of Malebranchean philosophy. In other words, Leibniz and Voltaire's positions were two sides of the same coin in trying to establish the fixedness of the order of things. One might argue that it was disbelief in Providence that led to problems for Christology, although resort could still be made to the idea of a special Apostolic Era in which special laws of God's intervening applied. In *Theodicy* (§249 H,280), although Leibniz brackets out creation and the Incarnation as unique "mysteries," he views most "miracles" in terms of the predictable functioning of more rarefied substances according to the laws of nature, not without parallel to Augustine's *rationes seminales* (*Gn. litt.* 8.26, 9.16–18).

Michael Beintker observes that after Hegel, History itself took God's place as the driving force behind events.² Ernst Moritz Arndt and Emmanuel Hirsch used this in the 1930s to worrying effect. This helps us realise that what happens on the surface of history is not everything: God appears in the middle of the historical, without being identifiable with it. The message of Good Friday and Easter is that God is to be found moving mysteriously in the dark moments, not in the high points of world history: the experience of believers in fact of all humans takes place with eschatological reservation. This caveat was often missing from the old dogmatic definitions such as that by Polanus [d. 1610], according to whom Providence just meant extending the doctrine of creation into the expe-

¹ Comm. I Cor. 1:21, CO 49:326; CTS 39:85. Comm. Heb. 11:3, CO 33:146; CTS 44:266. Cf. Belden Lane, 'Spirituality as the Performance of Desire: Calvin on the World as a Theatre of God's Glory,' *Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality* 1 (2001), 1–30.

² Michael Beintker, "Die Frage nach Gottes Wirken im geschichtlichen Leben," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 90 (1993): 442–461.

rience of the reader, with the assurance that God has not given up on it.³ Along with that there is a conservative ontology with little sign of eschatological longing for His will to be done on earth as in heaven, with the endpoint drawing the starting-point and much in-between towards it (so, Gerhard Gloege).⁴ The wars of that century raised questions for the doctrine which even now threaten to overwhelm it, in a way perhaps more acutely than did the wars of the early seventeenth century, which necessitated a re-working of Polanus' theology.

In that it was the Modern Age (say, 1650 – 1950) which accentuated the personal and the private, it is perhaps an irony that *personal* Providence was perhaps *the* doctrine that became vulnerable during that time. If evidence for the visibly miraculous was an embarrassment, then very soon so too the idea that God's hand was invisibly weaving the cat's cradle of interconnected events.

While not being a topic that can be said to be fashionable, in German circles over the last half-century the topic has at least received comparatively more attention. German philosophy and theology, at least since its Idealist and Hermeneutical stamping in the early nineteenth century has considered "meaning in history" as a subject worthy of attention. This is not to say that the topic, especially after the Second World War was unproblematic. Hitler even attributed his survival of an assassination attempt on 21 July 1944 to Providence sparing him in order to finish his life's work.⁵ It is tempting and perhaps not altogether illicit to speculate that if Karl Barth's 1950s reading of events was one that echoed the costly victory of God at work through humanity over the powers of evil, the 1960s & 70s German versions were stunned by the impact of coming to realise the full horrors of the *Shoah*.

3 Ibid., 451: "Die Konzentration auf die Erhaltung (conservatio) des Geschaffenen verleiht der Providenzlehre einen (im guten Sinne) 'konservativen' Grundzug."

4 "Der Rahmen der Weltgeschichte ist jene umgreifende Energetik der Zukunft, die man Heilsgeschehen nennt." (Ibid., 452, quoting Gerhard Gloege, "Vom Sinn der Weltgeschichte," in *Theologische Traktate I: Heilsgeschehen und Welt* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965): 27–52, 39.

5 "Ich fasse dies als eine Bestätigung des Auftrags der Vorsehung auf, mein Lebensziel weiter zu verfolgen." Quoted in Reinhard Feldmeier, "Wenn die Vorsehung ein Gesicht erhält: Theologische Transformation einer problematischen Kategorie," in *Vorsehung, Schicksal und göttliche Macht: Antike Stimmen zu einem aktuellen Thema*, eds. Reinhard G. Kratz and Hermann Spieckermann (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008): 147–170, 147.

The major contribution of Barth: renewing the tradition

Although Reformed theologians of the late Nineteenth Century like Charles Hodge disliked the term “concurrence,” Herman Bavinck approved of it. Nevertheless Bavinck was clear that Providence is for believers only as it is received in and through the cross; one can only know Providence if one knows God. Within the Dutch tradition, Gerrit C. Berkouwer seemed to radicalize this: “The relation between belief in fate, fortune, *Schicksal*, or *Vorsehung* and the Christian faith is not one of relative depth or breadth. There is a radical break, an absolute difference between them. While the terms used may seem identical, the gulf between the contents is as high as the heavens”⁶ “Providence is nothing other than God’s free grace, and God’s free grace in Christ is Providence.”⁷ Berkouwer was happy to affirm Providence as sustenance, governance and then (with chapter Five) he introduced “A Third Aspect?” which he explained as; “sinful man gives form to the God-given matter of act.” He concluded: “By God’s leading is not meant the actualization in world history of His hidden plan, for the realization of His plan embraces the universal scope of things, and this can never be the normative measure for human action or the standard ‘for the judging of the course of world History’.”⁸

Barth’s “cautious optimism” was grounded in doctrines of God, Creation, Election and Christologically driven salvation-history. Hence it could be agreed that there was some amount of meaning in history, but only that as guaranteed by the history of Jesus Christ. Barth had for a long time insisted that God is not revealed in any “process.” Also, this came at the expense of the church’s role in creating an understanding of Providence through looking at its history to gain wisdom. Eschewing any notion of providence as “continuous creation,” Barth prefers to speak of it as divine “overruling,” even contradiction, chipping away at the carnal qualities of the human race, showing divine patience as unending. So, the main foundation of his doctrine was, perhaps unsurprisingly, Christological: “Predestination is rather the presupposition, and its fulfilment in history the constitutive centre, of God’s overruling and the basis and goal of its realisation.”⁹

⁶ Gerrit C. Berkouwer, *The Providence of God*, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1952), 45. One might want to compare Karl Barth, *Die Christliche Lehre nach dem Heidelberger Katechismus* (München: Kaiser, 1949), 56 (cited by Berkouwer, 36) for another immediately post-war understanding.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁹ *Church Dogmatics* (henceforth CD) III/3, 4.

With these words Barth showed that he did not subscribe to the view that Predestination was some intensification of Providence, but rather that the former was the core, itself grounded in the inner-Trinitarian election of the Son by the Father, then activated as a thin line which gives a shape to world-history and every individual providence contained within. Right at the start of §48 Barth made it clear that Providence should be treated as part of the doctrine of creation rather than part of the doctrine of God (as the medievals did). For it is a work outside God, an *opus ad extra*. It is the same creating power (*virtus*) of God that continues on in Providence, but in a different way. Yet it is *based on* the predestinating election of Christ, the Son of God, as it were “within the doctrine of God.” Barth found this connection between Providence and Christ to be rare in the Christian tradition and loved to praise the odd exception: “there may still be seen clearly the Reformation connexion, expressed by Paul Gerhardt, between ‘Commit thou all thy griefs and ways’ and the Christmas hymn ‘All my heart this night rejoices’.”¹⁰ If only the Heidelberg Catechism had been attended to and not lost in a mix of pietism and rationalism, which inspired the false confidence that humans had immediate access to God.

So works of Providence can only be viewed by faith; and even when it sees God at work, faith is aware that this event is only the mask of God. One should not try to create a philosophy of history on that basis. Properly conceived, the believer “believes in the divine providence itself, not in an assertion or estimation, however well-founded, of what he thinks is perhaps its previous course, or present *kairoi*, or future purpose, in short its plan.”¹¹ Barth uses what he perceives the God of the Old Testament and New Testament to be, and this is not what Gottfried Arnold or Johann Albrecht Bengel have made of Him with their claiming to know how he has acted in their own times. Moreover knowing the times can sometimes get in the way of living in it. The prophets did not get inspired *by* history but spoke words of light *into* it. Prophecy needed to be open to self-censure. It is a belief *that* God is providential on the grounds of biblical revelation, not *how* He is to me or us. Our experience of God’s ways do not provide the material for a doctrine.

According to Barth, a misunderstanding arose early on in the Church with Eusebius’s representation of Constantine as a Second Moses; the problem was the great historian did not like the Apocalypse and its theme of a critique of history. The Fatherly hand and divine power are one and the same, but both work always for sake of His Son. In all history God remains free, unlike a principle

¹⁰ CD III/3, 16.

¹¹ CD III/3, 22.

which quickly becomes formless. Barth here seems more concerned with the Church than with Christ when he tried to counter the mixture of general theism and personalized subjectivity, which in modern times has meant “at every point preference being given to a resolute attachment to the views which Jews, Turks, pagans and finally Christians can have in common concerning the existence and lordship of a supreme being.”¹² This development, thought Barth, was responsible for the fact that “providence” became a favourite term on the lips of Adolf Hitler. It is a chief Christian doctrine; and one needs to see it as the work of Christ. Again however Barth insists that Providence is closely attached to covenantal soteriology, as when he comments on Genesis 22: “This divine *providere* belonged to this concrete context of the history of salvation.” God integrates creaturely occurrence to the covenant ending in the Kingdom.¹³

One might wonder whether Barth is justified in arguing that although 1 Peter 5:6 – as being about Christians (“humble yourself under God’s mighty hand that he might lift you up; cast all you cares upon Him [...]”) concerns something quite different from Matt 6:26f (“do not worry [...] will He not much more clothe you”) – as being about general providence, nevertheless, he claims, Ephesians 1:11¹⁴ links them together. Barth does not quote the Ephesians text in full (although he does the other two and even Rom 8:28). He prefers to think of the first phrase as “we have *become* an inheritance,” according to a possible textual variant.¹⁵ Barth does not dwell too long here, for it suggests that election is a sub-set of the accomplishment of all things. The question of the identity of the “we” remains unresolved. To argue that Predestination and Providence are co-ordinated¹⁶ is to say too little. In fact even Romans and Ephesians here seem to be

12 CD III/3, 32.

13 CD III/3, 35; or in German (*Kirchliche Dogmatik* III.3. 44): “Eine wirkliche und eigentliche Beziehung zwischen seiner Geschöpflichkeit und seiner Bestimmung zu Gottes Bundesgenossen könnte vielmehr erst auf Grund einer anderen neuen Schöpfung in Frage kommen. Unterwegs zwischen seiner Schöpfung und diesem Ziel würde der Mensch als Geschöpf sich doch nur an die Identität Gottes und also an die Parallelität seines eigenen Seins als Geschöpf mit seiner Geschichte im Bunde mit Gott, nicht aber an eine positive Bedeutung seiner geschöpflichen Geschichte für diese andere halten können.”

14 “In Christ we have obtained an inheritance, having been destined according to the purpose of him who accomplishes all things according to his counsel and will.”

15 KD III/3, 45: “Wie aber wird man unter dieser Voraussetzung in der Auslegung von Eph. 1,11 durchkommen, wo es nun einmal heißt, daß die Christen zu Erben gemacht wurden, vorherbestimmt nach der zuvor getroffenen Entscheidung (nach der πρόθεσις) dessen, der Alles wirkt nach dem Ratschluß seines Willens?”

16 Ibid.: “Es ist dann nicht nur mit einem Parallelismus, sondern mit einer positiven Beziehung zwischen den beiden Reihen zu rechnen. Die besondere Entscheidung Gottes über seine Auserwählten und sein Regiment über das All, ihre Liebe zu Gott und ihre Existenz inmitten dieses

saying different things. Barth does seem to reduce Providence to that which helps the Church to be the Church, given that the Church is an inclusive body.

And yet Barth wants to make sure that this is not to give the Church any glory. The Church should take no credit. “Calvin perhaps had this in view when he described the totality of the cosmos and cosmic occurrence as the *theatrum gloriae Dei*.”¹⁷ We are called to mirror that salvation history with our own lives: by an *analogia fidei sive revelationis*.

Through Providence “we” learn how creation may *become* God’s instrument, for we cannot say that it already is. Rather it becomes as He takes it in hand and gives it qualities and determinations, even its function, *telos* and character. Thus as Barth insists at the beginning of §49, the divine preserving means more than just an owner looking after his goods but that (as per Rom 11:36: “for for him and through him and to him are all things”) things need preserving if they to have a share in kingdom. This seems a kind of “forbearance” (Rom 2:4), but when Barth comes to spell this out he uses the Augsburg Confession (CA VIII: *quod una sancta ecclesia perpetuo mansura sit*). By doing this he thinks he is being Christocentric, but the result seems more ecclesiocentric, despite his express intention. The idea seems to be that as God acts indirectly and directly in salvation history, the ripples of that action are felt more widely. Barth is critical of Cocceius (in his *Summa theologica* 1162 m, 28, 12) where the latter embraced a doctrine of continuous creation: for such a concept would undermine the priority of Predestination-Election in the fulfillment of creation.

The connexion between *servare* and *conservare*, between saving grace in Jesus Christ and the gracious preservation of creaturely being by God the Father, emerges most clearly in the New Testament and especially the Pauline passages in which the verbs τηρειν, φρουρειν, φυλασσειν, βεβαιουν and στηριζειν are used to describe a specific activity of God or Christ in relation to Christians.¹⁸

All this is so that the creature *may* continue to be eternally before Him; it is not a case of just prolonging existence. This eternal preservation is the foundation of the temporal.¹⁹

So far it would seem that Barth’s doctrine of Providence is quite “narrow,” or narrow in that it is ecclesiocentric, even ecclesiomonist. In turning to consider the divine *concursum*, he writes that God accompanies creation as its Lord. This

Alls rücken dann offenbar nicht auseinander, sondern zueinander; sie sind dann als sachlich koordiniert zu verstehen.”

¹⁷ KD III/3, 47.

¹⁸ Ibid., 82.

¹⁹ Ibid., 87.

does not mean creaturely absolute dependence, which would be a mechanical relationship, but that God is always a step in advance of the creature in His freedom to co-travel.²⁰ Petrus van Mastricht was right that Romans 11:36 means the operation of God *himself* in Providence²¹ – and other New Testament verses. Yet here is Barth possibly guilty of the worst kind of proof-texting? Does “working” mean the same thing in Philippians 2:13 as it does in 1 Corinthians 12:6?

Barth continues by arguing that *concursum* can hardly be considered a Lutheran distinctive in that many Lutherans ignored it (e.g. Gerhard and Calov), and only Quenstedt, Hollaz, and Baier treated it. And yet the Reformed were almost all aware of it and for many of their scholastics, God affirms creaturely freedom, despite Alexander Schweitzer’s misrepresentation (only Zwingli really backed his case that Reformed were all determinist in interpreting *concursum* as *praecursus*). Most of the Reformed appear quite Melancthonian on this point. But some amount of *minor gloria creaturis* in the form of human dignity as agents did matter to them. And, on the other hand, Lutherans no less than the Reformed used the conceptuality of “cause.”²² Indeed “cause” is not foreign to the bible’s conceptuality, so long as one does not think of *Ursache* (cause) as a *Sache* (thing). Regrettably the schools did not fill the term with Christian content, and hence they completely missed the relationship between creation and the covenant of grace. However Barth thinks the term is a useful one.

He insists that as *causa prima* God is unlike other causes: schools were perhaps bad at realizing that. “*Causa* is not a genus, of which the divine and creaturely *causae* can then be described as a species.”²³ Divine and human subjects in fact cannot be compared, despite the claims of Catholics for *analogia entis* (and of some of the Protestant scholastics!). Barth seems to say they are unlike in their self-grounding, but that does not rule out their similarity *qua* actor. Barth rues the fact that “nobody” followed van Mastricht, who saw

²⁰ Ibid., 93. Cf. “Ich mache damit Gebrauch von einer Formulierung von J. Coccejus: *nutus voluntatis in Deo [...] comitatur operationem creaturae* (*S. theol.* 1662, 28, 25). Der Begriff ist sehr allgemein und darum sehr gefährlich.” (KD III.3, 103)

²¹ CD III/1, 95. In the German original: “Es war hier vor allem die zweite Wendung in dem Satz Röm. 11, 36 δι’ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα, an den man sich erinnern wollte, wobei P. van Mastricht (*Theor. Pract. Theol.* 1698, III, 10, 1) sicher im Entscheidenden richtig exegesierte hat, wenn er mit dem διὰ Gott nicht als *causa instrumentalis*, sondern in der im Werk seiner Vorsehung stattfindenden *ipsa operatio* des Vaters, des Sohnes und des Heiligen Geistes bezeichnet sehen wollte” (CD III/3, 107).

²² One of the pithiest definitions was given by the Reformed scholastic Heidegger: “*Concursum s. cooperatio est operatio illa Dei quis cum causis secundis utpote ab eo sicut in esse ita etiam in operari dependentibus immediate ita cooperatur*” (Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics*, 200).

²³ CD III/3, 102.

cause as “the Triune God of biblical revelation,” which Barth takes to mean “the God revealed in covenant.”

And this same God accepts the creature even apart from the history of the covenant and its fulfilment [...] Therefore His *causare* consists, and consists only, in the fact that He bends their activity to the execution of His own will which is His will of grace, subordinating their operations to the specific operation which constitutes the history of the covenant of grace.²⁴

This works so that “the creation which in some degree approximate to this new creation” is for the time being “under the promise.” The *causa prima* is only known in prayer and *causae secundae* in gratitude. Barth mentions five conditions for safe and responsible use of the *causa* concept, yet only lists four. Nevertheless, perhaps most important is that the link between the First Cause and the particular cause cannot be made into a philosophical principle but something only to be seen in the light of faith.²⁵ The necessity of his love is of a type that does not imprison God. So, in any echo of the Christological *genus idiomaticum* Barth issues this elliptical statement: “God concurs with the creature, but the creature does not ‘concur with God. That is, the activity of the creature does not impose any conditions upon the activity of God.”

Perhaps freedom works both ways. As Bruce McCormack comments: “Barth did *not* follow Thomas or the later Calvinists in making the efficacy of God’s eternal will depend on a work that God does *in* human beings. He thoroughly revised the Thomistic/Calvinist understanding of God’s providential activity so that the autonomy proper to the creature could be fully honored.”²⁶ The figure of Christ supplies the necessary objectivity. In him we see human will not being overridden but its willed action being directed towards divine goals.

²⁴ Ibid., 105.

²⁵ Ibid.: “Und der Kausalbegriff hat dann (4) selbstverständlich keinen solchen Inhalt, kraft dessen er aus dem Element eines Satzes christlichen Bekenntnisses und theologischer Erkenntnis zu einem Element eines philosophischen Weltbildes werden könnte. Denn es ist klar, daß die *causa princeps* und die *causa particularis* sowohl je für sich als auch in dem *concursum* ihres beiderseitigen *causare* dann, wenn die beiden Subjekte so verschieden und so vereinigt sind, nur durch Offenbarung und nur im Glauben erkannt werden können [...]. Dies sind die fünf Bedingungen, unter denen der für die *Concursum*-Lehre der alten Dogmatik so bezeichnende Gebrauch des Kausalbegriffes gutzuhießen ist. Die Erfüllung der vier ersten Bedingungen hängt an der der fünften. Gerade von ihr war in der alten Dogmatik leider weit und breit nicht die Rede. Kein Wunder darum, daß sie auch hinsichtlich der vier ersten Punkte nicht gesichert war.”

²⁶ Bruce L. McCormack, “The Actuality of God: Karl Barth in Conversation with Open Theism,” in *Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives*, ed. Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008): 185–242.

For Barth, *Heidelberg Catechism* 26–28 is the best of all Reformed statements; but Calvin must be held partly responsible for a move towards fatalism which affected Protestantism. Whatever denomination, “all of them lay sick in the same ward, playing with the same concepts without reference to the biblical centre.”²⁷ Since it is gracious, God’s almightiness doesn’t enslave, and there is nothing fatalistic about its operation. Yet “the activity of God precedes, *praecurrit*, that of the creature. As we vindicate and follow the older Reformed theology we must make this proposition first”;²⁸ John 5:17 (“My Father is still working”) states a claim for divine preceding *activity*, not just knowledge, *pace* Calov’s weak and passive spectator God. God initiates but does not set all in stone. Laws of nature do not cause events, even while foreordaining the order and form of creaturely activity, they point towards reality and are approximations to it. Divine foreordination is much more certain and direct, and without a weakening or constraining of the creature it is a predestinating activity through His direct presence to the creature: *praecursus* as *concursus*.²⁹ “To describe the *concursus divinus* we cannot use the mathematical picture of two parallel lines. We have to understand the activity of God and that of the creature as a single action.”³⁰ Thomas was wrong to keep them apart and characterise them as causes. But this does not mean a creaturely *concursus* with God as per Quenstedt. Divine action is “not simply a conditioning and determining of what already exists but a pure and free and absolute positing.”³¹ It belongs to the order of grace and hence unexpected: there is to be no talk of influence, emanation or force, rather of a proving of manifold possibilities. To the “how does God do this?” question, Barth answers: “the operation of God is His utterance to all creatures of the Word of God which has all the force and wisdom and goodness of the Holy Spirit [...] objectively, proceeding from God by His Word; and subjectively, moving towards man by His Holy Spirit,”³² such that all of his activity is fatherly: all is set in train by the divine address. Cocceius was right to speak of *iussio*, whereas the Lutheran Quenstedt was guilty of accommodating God to fit himself to creatures. The Reformed were right to insist in the *Leiden Synopsis* that creatures were only free to the extent they participate in uncreated freedom. We find it hard to trust God for our freedom. This true God is a God who sets free for new possibilities, saving them from predictable outcomes – just as with the Apostles. Yet by the

27 CD III/3, 116.

28 CD III/3, 119.

29 CD III/3, 130.

30 CD III/3, 132f.

31 CD III/3, 135.

32 CD III/3, 142.

end of the sub-section Barth is admitting “that the activity of God follows that of the creature.” God can accompany our words in a way that we cannot.

If *concursum* is about the church under God’s direction, then the category of *gubernatio* seems to offer a less ecclesiocentric, and a wider and more “worldly” vision. As for divine governing, well that is predicated on “Divine Kingship” – the title of §49 in the English translation (the fuller German original is: *Gott der Vater als Herr seines Geschöpfs*, which bears quite a different meaning):

We may well describe as the most gifted definition of the *gubernatio* that of J. Cocceius (*S. theol.*, 1661, 28, 38), who would not allow that the divine operation has any other goal but God Himself, and he explains it quite simply as the *actio Dei*, in *qua sapientiam suam in suis operibus demonstrat* [...] in which God’s glory and wisdom are revealed for the benefit of all creation.³³

God is not in the course of all world-historical events as such. Better to say that he is in their being overruled, miraculously or quietly, but also in his affirming of the state of things too.

Some of the older Reformed thought one could rightly speak of a *fatum Christianum*, but the wiser ones like Johann Heinrich Heidegger thought better of it. Fixed Fate and random Chance are both equally to be avoided. When Barth writes that *gubernatio* is the *ordinatio*, *qua Deus in ordinem redigit*, he admits, “We have here an exact parallel to what we said earlier about the unity of the divine *praecursus* and *concursum*.”³⁴ God controls freedom without taking it away or robbing the creature of its dignity; it is right for a creature to have freedom within limits, otherwise it would be a second god, but this does not mean ironing out all the creases, nor crushing individuality for some common good; rather, as they are directed to a common end they are held together and co-ordinated by the King of Israel, to be concrete. It is not so much about a right or wrong development of the idea of divine governance, “but of the right or wrong relationship to this reality to which the idea has reference”: “this supra-mundane being can make itself present in the world only by free grace.”³⁵

Considering the events of the biblical history: “These particular events are [...] an original and pattern of the general event.”³⁶ Further, “The general events have their meaning in the particular [...] the copy and reflection of the particular events.”³⁷ This is what Frei and Higton in turn have called “figural history,”³⁸ as

³³ CD III/3, 159.

³⁴ CD III/3, 165.

³⁵ CD III/3, 177–8.

³⁶ CD III/3, 183.

³⁷ CD III/3, 184.

the reader moves from the special providence of salvation history to general history. The former is not the history of the Church, for it no more than world-history or the story of the Christian is the primary providence. No, that which grounds all others is the history of the covenant and salvation, as the invisible God-given weft of history:

World-occurrence [...] is no longer the basically uninteresting and even boring *universum* of monads all of which in principle have the same status and form, a *universum* to which our thinking merely adds the basically uninteresting and even boring truth that both in its totality and in each of those monads which have the same status and form, it is directed only by God the chief monad.³⁹

The unity is not inherent but is imposed graciously. Governance is not a theoretical but a practical-existential idea: it has a claim on our lives too. Yet there is no revelation here, but hiddenness for the time being is maintained, and in the meantime only the bible shows how history and economy are one.

Within world history there are certain events which hint that God has and will penetrate history with his revelation: 1. the history of the bible as canon and in its effects. 2. Church history: “we have to confess that Church history actually does have priority over all other history, that with all its insignificance and folly and confusion in history generally, it is still the central and decisive history to which all the rest is as it were only the background or accompaniment.”⁴⁰ Indeed, one can point to God’s faithfulness and renewal, the persistence of the divine call despite resistance. It has not been allowed to wander too far, receiving not just corrections but revival. 3. The History of the Jews, in light of their enigmatical character and their survival. 4. The limitation of human life. This is the doctrine of the *terminus vitae*, of those older theologians who were wise to acknowledge death’s proximity, with the Lutheran Hollaz arguing against the Reformed that God does not fix, although he foreknows, each one’s terminus, as in the case of Hezekiah. Barth insists that from the human perspective, both our beginning and our end are outwith our control howsoever or for whatever time they are decreed: “Therefore my life consists in the possibilities offered by this movement.”⁴¹ This means each of us “wrestle”⁴² with this twofold move-

38 Mike Higton, *Christ, Providence, and History: Hans W. Frei’s Public Theology* (London: T & T Clark, 2004).

39 CD III/3, 191.

40 CD III/3, 207.

41 CD III/3, 232.

42 CD III/3, 265 f.: “Indem er lebt, das heißt indem er sich selbst erlebt, das heißt indem er sich mit dem Auftrieb und Gefälle seiner eigenen Lebensbewegung auseinandersetzt, begegnet er ja

ment so as to act and towards death. Finally, Barth mentions the role of angels who declare God's work, appearing on the margin of world-occurrence,⁴³ as God's primary witnesses. What is noticeable here is that there is no discussion with philosophical (e.g. Martin Heidegger's) thinking on the subject of "limitation." This is a very thin account of God's actual direction of events: only in the world to come will the lines be thick enough for us to be quite sure they have always been there.

Lastly, in the final part of § 49, for the Christian who can see God's universal Lordship, "God the Father as the ruling Creator is obviously not an oppressor, and Christ as a subject creature is obviously not oppressed."⁴⁴ The Christian experiences Lordship from within and learns the spirit of adventure in cooperation with providence. For the freedom of the gospel comes in three forms: faith, obedience, prayer. "In believing, a man becomes a Christian; in obeying, he is a Christian."⁴⁵ If the first movement of the Christian life is acknowledging Christ and his cross, then the second movement is acting in external occurrences, in selecting some opportunities and rejecting others. As for prayer in the first instance this is about asking, as in the Lord's Prayer supremely, where one is even commanded to do so, although one must remember that asking is preceded by hearing the call to participate in Christ's threefold office. In taking the gift of Jesus one takes freedom.⁴⁶ Here Barth brings us back to *concursum* as the graced experience and free response to the covenantal God.

Reactions to Barth on Providence

One reason for giving so much space to Barth is that his work was both a summary of traditional Protestant theology of Providence through the lens of twentieth century post-Enlightenment understanding and the most thorough, detailed and comprehensive attempt to do that, bar none. It was however, also a rear-guard action, an attempt to restate something of the spirit of the traditional ver-

auch ihnen, erlebt er auch sie. In seinen offenen oder blinzelnden Augen, in seinen klaren oder unklaren Gedanken, in seinen entschlossenen oder unentschlossenen Taten sind auch sie für ihn da, setzt er sich auch mit ihnen auseinander, erfährt er ihre Wirkung auf ihn und wirkt er selber auch auf sie."

⁴³ KD III/3, 270: "[...] gewissermaßen um dessen leuchtenden Rand gegen das allgemeine Weltgeschehen hin."

⁴⁴ CD III/3, 241.

⁴⁵ CD III/3, 253.

⁴⁶ CD III/3, 274.

sions of the doctrine, not least in observing the three sub-categories. Yet if Barth's contribution was a watershed moment, then it was a case of: *Après lui, le déluge*.

First, there were suspicions that the Barthian account was much more positive about God's involvement to help the world than the bible itself was. The early interactions, such as that of Max Geiger in Barth's second *Festschrift* were friendly, as one would expect from a *Festschrift* essay.⁴⁷ However by 1976 in the review by Michael Plathow, Barth was allegedly blind to the Old Testament evidence which makes it clear that divine predetermining worked without mediation, unlike natural laws: so any "biblical" doctrine would have to be quite strong meat of a determinist sort. Be this as it may, the stronger criticism is that these sections of Barth's *Dogmatics* were all a bit too full of triumphalistic monism, as Gerrit C. Berkouwer had already noticed.⁴⁸ The Law-Gospel sequential ordering with the Gospel coming to provide a strong sense of leading for Christians is too trite. Plathow concludes that "gospel" is something still ahead of us, who dwell in this dark place.⁴⁹ So the answer is an eschatological one. Even though the defence: "Barth leaves more room for creaturely participation than most in the Reformed Tradition,"⁵⁰ due in large part due to his personalism,⁵¹ may have merit, a rejoinder could simply be: "that is not saying very much." Plathow does not seem to give Barth due credit for his "eschatological reservation."

47 Max Geiger, "Providentia Dei. Überlegungen zur christlichen Vorsehungslehre und dem Problem der Beziehung Gott-Welt," in *Parrhesia: Festschrift für Karl Barth zum 80. Geburtstag*, eds. Eberhard Busch, Jürgen Fangmeier, and Max Geiger (Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1966): 673–707.

48 Gerrit C. Berkouwer, *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction and Critical Appraisal*, 2nd Ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956).

49 Michael Plathow, *Das Problem des concursus divinus: Das Zusammenwirken von göttlichem Schöpferwirken und geschöpflichem Eigenwirken in K. Barths 'Kirchlicher Dogmatik'*, *Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie* 32 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 170: "Nur mittelbar wirken die Naturkräfte und -gesetze auf die Einzelkreaturen; die göttliche Vorherbestimmung, das eigentlich Geste, wirkt demgegenüber unmittelbar."

50 Darren M. Kennedy, "Providence and Personalism: Karl Barth in Conversation with Austin Farrer, John Macmurray and Vincent Brümmer" (Ph.D.Thesis: University of Edinburgh, 2008), 153. Now published as *Providence and Personalism: Karl Barth in Conversation with Austin Farrer, John Macmurray and Vincent Brümmer* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011).

51 Although, thinks Kennedy, (176) Barth unfortunately did not quite rid his theology of causal concepts. Yet, after starting where Barth ends (human limitation) very quickly we are in the discourse of election and reprobation – themes hardly mentioned. The real interest seems to be in Barth's idea of *Das Nichtige* of § 50, which he regards as an Achilles heel, since, he thinks, Barth is accidentally deficient in eschatological concerns.

Second, Dietrich Ritschl's account in a sharp and provocative essay published in 1994 showed the extent to which Barth on Providence had been left behind. The question about providence and protection is a question about the protecting grace-filled effects in my life as well as in church and society. But as for God fore-knowing, acting and directing anything, it was Augustine who subjected governance or *gubernatio* to prescience. For Calvin, God's directing *the church* was more the emphasis than his direction of the world. Yet surely Calvin was overly "monistic" to argue that things which happen against God's command are somehow willed by Him. Ritschl complains that none of the contemporary treatments of the subject are of any pastoral use, preoccupied as they are with questions of absolute power, determinism and the hiddenness of God. As for Barth's treatment of the topic, well, it remains at the level of no more than a "critical new edition" of old Protestant doctrine of Providence, one which amounts to mere repristination.⁵² Barth is not interested in explaining the world and its events. Predestination is tied to the doctrine of God and Christology, while Providence is bound to the doctrine of Creation. So Barth does not actually make all that much of the relationship between Providence and Christ, and there is an extreme shortage of biblical passages. None of the old terms are explained let alone defended. Ritschl says he heard Barth give the lectures which made up §48–51 of *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, but he thinks Otto Weber did a better job around the same time.⁵³ Barth gives no empirical dimension to his theology, and his warning against theologies of history seem to have spilled over into his theology of the present, even though the biblical writers surely encourage us to interpret our own times, says Ritschl.⁵⁴

By 2004 Ritschl's criticism of his former teacher had borne fruit. Caroline Schröder responded to Ritschl's accusation that Barth's Doctrine of Providence was no earthly use and went on to claim that this is because it is *too* ecclesial, too pastoral, too cozily smug. She helpfully notes that unlike Predestination, Providence does not belong with the Doctrine of God and in fact presupposes creation which establishes the covenantal partnership which in turn shapes Providence.⁵⁵ Her interest is in Barth's focus in the final pages of § 49 on the be-

52 Dietrich Ritschl, "Sinn und Grenze der theologischen Kategorie der Vorsehung," *ZDT* 10 (1994): 117–133, 122: "Es bleibt bei einer kritischen Neufassung der altprotestantischen Providenzlehre."

53 Otto Weber, *Grundlagen der Dogmatik*, 7. Aufl (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1995), esp. 560–67.

54 Ritschl, "Sinn und Grenze," 125.

55 Caroline Schröder, "'I See Something You Don't See': Karl Barth's Doctrine of Providence," in *For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology*, ed. George Hunsinger

liever's standing under Lordship which (contra Dietrich Ritschl) enables faith in fatherly providence. Faith is something that holds on to providence as it happens, not from a distance in order to establish the data on the way to formulating a Doctrine of Providence. This is important. She thinks Ritschl is unfair to argue that Barth's treatment lacks a pastoral tone, not least in his treatment of conservation: "The creature is protected from falling back into an apparent (*schein*) or substance-less existence."⁵⁶ Barth favours a God of continuity over a God of surprises. There is a bit of eisegesis when she claims: "Outside the area of influence common to both Word and Spirit, thus 'outside' in the world, there is just – but still! – the Holy Spirit alone."⁵⁷ The quote from Barth she gives (n. 33) does not quite amount to this: "It is only of the Holy Spirit that he can learn to understand situations, to recognize opportunities, to choose possibilities and to distinguish them from impossibilities" (CD III/3, 258). Although up to this point quite sympathetic to Barth, however, the more the essay goes on the more it seems that Schröder finds the strengths of the Barthian approach to be dangerous. She echoes Christian Link's view that for Barth, providence "no longer stands in service of explaining the world" and becomes removed from any discussion.⁵⁸ She is worried about spiritual arrogance in looking at the times and reading them so as to feel invulnerable, rather than being led to see that God has a plan for the whole of creation and its people and that he wants to widen our expectations and jolt our perspectives. She accuses Barth with his pious Christian myopia of seeing the significance of Jewish history only in its fulfillment by Christ.

Randall Zachman's "Response to Schröder's 'I See Something You Don't See'" in the *For the Sake of the World* volume is illuminating here:

If Schröder's interpretation is correct – and if I have correctly understood it – then Barth's doctrine of providence would have as its purpose the revelation of the horizon and goal of God's electing work in Jesus Christ. If this is true, then it is hard to see how Barth could really distinguish between the doctrine of election and the doctrine of providence. More-

(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004): 115–135. Cf. Adolf Darlap, "Der Begriffe der Heilsgeschichte," in *Mysterium Salutis*, vol. 1: *Die Grundlagen heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik*, eds. Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1965): 17–90, 72: "Die Lehre von der Freiheit der endlichen und zeitlichen Schöpfung ist somit eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Heilsgeschichte. In diesem Sinn ist die Schöpfung als Setzung der natürlichen geistigen Welt Voraussetzung für den Bund, wenn unter Bund eben die dialogische Partnerschaft zwischen Gott und der geistigen Kreatur verstanden wird, die auf der gnadenhaften Selbstmitteilung der innersten Herrlichkeit der dreifaltigen Gottes beruht."

⁵⁶ Schröder, "I See Something You Don't See," 121.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁵⁸ This is Link, in his short piece: "Gestalt and theologischer Ort der Vorsehungslehre Karl Barths," *ZDT* 10 (1994): 113–115.

over, such an interpretation actually reverses Barth's own position. Barth claims that election reveals the goal and purpose of providence, not vice versa. The self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ reveals that God has taken on himself the future that sinful humans have chosen for themselves, in order to give himself to humans as their future.⁵⁹

Yet that is really just the same as saying that the range of election and providence are one and the same even if one is more visible than the other.⁶⁰ In a recent essay Bruce McCormack has advanced the idea that that in Barth's *Dogmatics* as a whole, Providence was somehow sacrificed, even cannibalised or swallowed in order to create a doctrine of Election and a soteriology that made room for the idea of *concursum* in which the Spirit's job is not to apply the grace of Christ but to reveal in encounter the One in whom all is made new.⁶¹ McCormack's view seems to accord with that of Zachman. One can only get to a belief in Providence through some awareness of Election. Barth allows a limited glimpse of providence on a small scale in believer's own lives (practical), not to be trumpeted as a theory but as a "comfort" (which is a bit more than consolation). Yet at the same time Calvin is to be preferred for seeing God revealed through contemplating his wisdom in natural creation, rather than history. This shows us how low the stock of "Barth on Providence" has fallen. His doctrine of Providence has had the guts taken out of it, and remains as an interpreted "doctrine of comfort." In some ways the threefold division of the topic holds: "The threefold rule over creation, history and the lives of individuals, directed especially to the overcoming of evil, constitutes the pattern of providence in Scripture. It is clear that it lies behind the later scholastic distinction between general, special and most special providence."⁶² If for Aquinas both Providence and Predstination were related parts of God's knowledge, then Barth wants to separate them, seeing Providence as part of Predestination (Election). Yet in doing that Barth holds the two very close, and does not (in Gorringer's view) anchor it sufficiently to the Incarnation's message of God's condescension.

59 Randall C. Zachman, "Response to Schröder's 'I See Something You Don't See,'" in *For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology*, ed. George Hunsinger (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004): 136–42, 138.

60 With reference to CD III/3, 196, Zachman, "Response to Schröder," 139: "The activity of the one God is thus clearly distinguished by Barth into two distinct spheres, the sphere of God's revealed activity, the covenant fulfilled in Jesus Christ, and the sphere of God's hidden activity, the lordship of the Father of Christ over all creaturely history."

61 McCormack, "The Actuality of God," 185–242.

62 Timothy Gorringer, *God's Theatre: A Theology of Providence* (London: SCM, 1991), 7.

Third, one can speak of new directions away from Barth and Classical Theology. This deserves a separate section, as immediately follows.

Providence in post-confessional German theology from 1960 onwards

Almost immediately after Barth's great attempt had been published and translated, yet with hardly a mention of him, a significant note was sounded by Carl Heinz Ratschow, the Marburg-based opponent of Bultmann, whose article in the first volume of a new journal sounded something like a death knell for the doctrine of Providence.⁶³ The traditional view of Providence had supplied a picture of God which protected believers from the feeling of abandonment by God. The observation of the rise and fall of the Nazi Reich gave strength to this faith: a providence-faith, which is often the crystallization-point of the recent Christian faith, even faith as consolation. But this very general faith, that the world is being put right, in a law of rendering what is due as in a "caring wisdom" is evident in the persisting of the faith of the Church, at a time of decline of conviction about the substance of the Christian faith.

Ratschow was concerned that such a faith is not particularly Christian, but instead was part of post-primitive societies' interest in or craving for plans and purposes, especially at times when the outside world was felt to be dark and cruel. The God of Providence had been sadly separated from the God of creation and even the God of salvation. It could be tied to predestination or angelology (Aquinas) or reconciliation (Albrecht Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* III, 167 ff.) in challenging its scholastic pre-modern placement in the doctrine of Creation. This "no fixed abode" of the doctrine is a tell-tale sign that it is a pseudo-doctrine. Simply put, Ratschow cheered on Luther's attempt to let atonement and providence doctrines mix, with the result that the former swallowed the latter. While Barth wanted to posit Atonement-faith (Ratschow's language) as the presupposition of any faith in Providence, the neo-pietist Wilhelm Lütgert thought just the reverse.⁶⁴ Ratschow agreed with neither side, because if we cannot verify God's activity in the world as Providence, we should just give it up. As Wolf Kröttke explained, with one eye on Ratschow, a less extreme alternative was

⁶³ Ratschow, "Das Heilshandeln und das Welthandeln Gottes."

⁶⁴ Wilhelm Lütgert, *Schöpfung und Offenbarung: Eine Theologie des ersten Artikels*, Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, II:34 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1934).

already there in Werner Elert's *Morphologie*, where providence is actually the trial (*Anfechtung*) one experiences as a result of God's hiddenness.

One sees in Elert an extension of Ferdinand Tönnies' famous *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* dichotomy.⁶⁵ For there is a sense that creation, including family and piety, is preserved from the cruel events of history and society, in this Lutheran view. Elert approved of Melancthon's anti-Stoic system of Natural Law yet would add to that an eschatological Utopianism which would challenge the *status quo*. God is not a causal agent such as to be ultimately behind the shocking evils of history, large and small, but He works in and through the "givens" of creation. For Elert, religion is to allow one to unify and discern between different ways of looking at the world, even as it tries to comprehend them all.⁶⁶ The kingdom of God does not run historically, as the kingdom of Christ is not of this world. World history is that of a world growing old, and Elert contrasts this with the optimism of Leibniz.⁶⁷ Luther's joy was in creation not in its perfectibility, creating good out of evil. Yet Luther's emotion went deeper than Leibniz's excitement that his Lutheranism was part of a winning historical movement.

Elert, as appealed to by Scheliha, argued that in post-Enlightenment times there had been an increase in risky contingency and a correlative increase in human perception of this. Religion is something that tries to make sense of the world and encourages "holding oneself together," in the trust that one has a destiny with belief in providence as individual self-determination. On those occasions when events disturb routine one learns that fate is one part of life – the hand one is dealt – but that the other part lies in playing that hand, to encounter what one is given. God in such faith can be seen as present as ground of the process of making meaning for oneself.⁶⁸ One is thereby helped to give a unity to all the parts (fate – risk – my choice). God becomes the co-presence of all possibilities, helping to arrange fate in a creative way that is productive of sense. The unity of cross and Resurrection symbolizes that "sense-making self-determina-

⁶⁵ Elert, *Morphologie* II, 47.

⁶⁶ Arnulf von Scheliha, *Der Glaube an die göttliche Vorsehung: Eine religionssoziologische, geschichtsphilosophische und theologiegeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1999), 339: "Religion ist in dieser Hinsicht die Form der Selbstdeutung, in der das notwendige Bedingtsein der freiheitlichen und sinnhaften Selbstbestimmung durch kontingente Faktizität durch das Gestelltsein in natürliche, geschichtliche und gesellschaftliche Bezüge durchgeklärt wird."

⁶⁷ Elert, *Morphologie* I, 415: "Leibniz begründet seinen teleologischen Gottesbeweis mit der Vollkommenheit der Welt und seine Absicht geht auf den Beweis, daß sie die vollkommenste ist, die denkbar war."

⁶⁸ Scheliha, *Der Glaube an die göttliche Vorsehung*, 341: "Gott wird im Vorsehungsglauben als Grund menschlicher Selbstbestimmung und Sinnproduktion vergegenwärtigt."

tion” does not end in contingent fate but crosses over beyond it.⁶⁹ Human beings have limits but they are also created in the divine image.

In all this one touches on human limitation with God as “ultimate limit,” even while there is freedom in the Image to self-transcend. Moreover, in the moment of justifying faith, one appropriates as trust the transcendent unity of sense which is only present to God and is interpreted as a concordance of all particular images of sense.⁷⁰ This fate, common to all, includes the sense of futility of meaning – that we need help for this and have to trust that more light will be given. So there is a call to trust and hope in the face of the confusion of the aggressive technological society.

But Kröttke wanted to correct Elert’s view, that Providence could be reduced to a sense of transcendence and insisted that such “trial” is not to be viewed as something positive, but rather it is the darkness before the dawn, when God finally comes to illuminate people through a “gospel of creation” (*“Evangelium der Schöpfung”*).⁷¹ History itself is just darkness or the chaos of chance (*“Schicksalhafter”*). Religion had explanatory power only for the past. The best one can hold on to is the consolation of creation and its light. It took Wolfhart Pannenberg to give a more upbeat account of this creation theology, as one in which creation has space for God in the present: “The goal of the Spirit’s dynamic is to give creaturely forms duration by a share in eternity and to protect them against the tendency to disintegrate that follows from their independence.”⁷² God occupies infinite space from which He can get at all locations of creaturely activity. Jewish thought in the 1st century AD often used the term “space” (*makom*) as a divine name on the basis of Exod. 33:21 (“Behold, there is a place by me”), Exod. 24:10 (LXX), and statements in the Psalms like Ps 139:5ff or 90:1.⁷³ God’s infinite space is what is meant, not space as a receptacle of things. (Yet surely *makom* means place – i.e. the temple – not space. That is not a “nit-picking” observation, but a query as to whether God is ubiquitous to the point of undifferentiated presence.)

As Scheliha comments, Pannenberg tied Providence to the creation-order and to the idea that creation has a goal. But in the tension between God’s creat-

69 Ibid., 343: “Die Einheit von Kreuz und Auferstehung symbolisiert, daß sinnhafte Selbstbestimmung nicht am kontingenten Schicksal endet, sondern über es hinausführt.”

70 Ibid., 345: “Im Rechtfertigungsglauben wird die nur Gott gegenwärtige, strikt transzendente Einheit des Sinns als Vertrauen angeeignet und als Hoffnung auf ein Zusammenstimmen aller partikularen Sinngebilde ausgelegt (Eschatologie).”

71 Wolf Kröttke, “Gottes Fürsorge für die Welt: Überlegungen zur Bedeutung der Vorsehungslehre,” *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 108 (1983): 242–252.

72 Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, 3 volumes. trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), I:102.

73 Ibid., I:85.

ing activity and His fulfilling of it all experiences are religiously equalised, so for Pannenberg universal suffering's being overcome by eschatological resolution is what providence is all about.⁷⁴ Yet there is at least an insistence on meaningful divine action in biblical salvation-history, as the headings of his early *Offenbarung als Geschichte* of 1960 suggest.⁷⁵ Yet this does not imply a personal providence that feeds off interpretation of objective divine action in the history of one's own times. And the truth is that Pannenberg's history is a rather large-scale one with an interest in cosmic management of the Universe, rather than on the pattern of human histories. General providence is what God works for societies; *providentia specialissima* is his care for "me," yet this is dependent on a special providence, which touches the church and Christian institutions as structures which communicate the religious content and support individuals. That ecclesial and communitarian location of Providence is Scheliha's preference. Scheliha has a preference for theologies which describe Christian Providence from the point of view of human experience ("von der menschlichen Sebst Erfahrung").⁷⁶ Hence, to define Providence as "divine world rule" is misleading. One is once again reminded that Hitler saw God as providence, as a force that shook and moved things. Divine Providence can be very deterministic and callous if seen this way. It is much better to consider providence as God's presence: *Mitsein* (Bonhoeffer) or even a care (*Fürsorge*) of God, and one might even speak of God's maternal touch (*Mutterhänden*). One needs to learn to recognise limits in our existence and yet somehow to overcome these through an attitude of trust, as reflected in the message of various hymns (*Evangelisches Gesangbuch* 326,5; 65,7; 376,3). One has the sure and certain hope of the resurrection but not the experience of it. The consolation of presence is as good as providence gets. Bonhoeffer was notably agnostic about knowing the counsels of God, at a time when the worst kind of people were all too certain about it.

Another case of the transcendentalist subjectivisation of Providence can be seen in the *Dogmatik* of Gerhard Ebeling, who insisted that the eschatological Providence was not continuous with creation such that one does not have to try too hard to make sense of the latter as though it were related to the natural flourishing of a life-course. Meaningful divine planning transcends any such small stories. Of course, Providence is to some extent about the containing and maintaining of creation, which after all took place at the beginning of time,

74 Scheliha, *Der Glaube an die göttliche Vorsehung*, 19: "In der Spanne zwischen dem Schöpfungs- und dem Vollendungshandeln Gottes werden alle Erfahrungen religiös egalisiert."

75 "Im Unterschied zu besonderen Erscheinungen der Gottheit ist die Geschichts offenbarung jedem, der Augen hat zur sehen, offen. Sie hat universalen Charakter." (ibid., 98)

76 Scheliha, *Der Glaube an die göttliche Vorsehung*, 23.

not in time at its beginning, such that one might speak of its continuing. The fact of sin means a containing action is needed. What God does not do is *build* on creation. In a sense humans have, through sin, fallen out of the Creator's hands, and their world with them. Any new creation is eschatologically in-breaking and even threatening, not the fruit of a maturing process.⁷⁷ The idea of Providence is of Greek origin, while Predestination comes from the bible. The former is concerned with the smallest of things (Martha-like, one could add). There is no job too small for God. However thinking about Providence has been pervaded by the notion of election and its attendant strong sense of "goal". The matured Christian belief in Providence is that both bible and philosophy have been fused together. Hence one can say dogmatically that "*Vorsehungsglaube*" is the application of the doctrine of justification to the understanding of all particularities of the experience of the world and of life: The autojustification of God is the justification of man by God in Christ; and Christianity turns theodicy into a second person singular: "why have you abandoned me?"⁷⁸

For Gerhard Ebeling the experience of prayer was theology's *Grundakt* from which the whole doctrine of God emerged.⁷⁹ Ebeling saw the idea of God's conservation of the world a law from which we need the gospel to free us. As Pierre Böhler following in this tradition put it: providence is grace interrupting people from standing too close to their lives.⁸⁰ Ebeling comes quite close to saying that God allows things to be fairly open on the way to their final goal. Dietrich Ritschl too has appreciated the idea that faith in providence takes shape in contemplative prayer, where freedom is realised ("*Die Gestalt des Vorsehungsglaubens als Andacht*"). Through this one can escape the clutches of *homo sociologicus*.

The problem has been, suggested Christian Link, when one has tried to transpose faith in providence [small "p"] into a Doctrine of Providence [capital "P"]. We should proceed cautiously from the order of knowing to make any claims about what is the case. One also will have more success if one approaches from the angle of eschatology and the open encounter with the Trinitarian God. We move not only in the realm of Nature but also here in the realm of Grace. One

77 G. Ebeling, *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens*, 3 volumes (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1979), I:328.

78 Ibid., III:519.

79 Ibid., I:332.

80 Pierre Böhler, *Prédestination et Providence*, Dossiers de l'Encyclopédie du Protestantisme 43 (Paris-Geneva: Cerf-Labor et Fides, 1999), 63. Cf. 13: "il en va de la priorité de l'initiative de Dieu dans son action à l'égard des homes. La Providence l'exprime sous l'angle de la creation, du point de vue du reel donné, en proclamant ce qui le constitue dans ses limites, sa consistance et sa durée."

only understands Providence through experiencing it and living it in light of the coming God and the future as the source place of all providence.⁸¹ Link's words from 1991 remind one strongly of Jürgen Moltmann's work from around that time.⁸² Yet in the "small print" of p. 559 Link argues that Matt 10:29 ("are not two sparrows sold for a penny? Yet not one of them will fall to the ground outside your Father's care") is to be understood as a reminder of the special relationship with their heavenly father that believing, fiduciary experience offers.⁸³ It is the self-pouring love of the creator who wants to be close to his creation and has nothing to do with the Almightyness of God. Link was resolute in his opposition to the Barthian splitting of creation and providence and hence is happy to speak of Providence as continuous creation. For the sake of showing respect to creation's independence the conservation doctrine has become very, well, conservative and ties creation to its original nature and its laws as something fixed. Instead "conservation is as [Dietrich] Bonhoeffer put it, preparing the way for the coming of grace."⁸⁴ If Stoic fatalism influenced the early church, Link rejoices that in the *Leiden Synopsis* (of all things!) one finds a very different voice: (*Synopsis purioris Theologiae*, Disp. XI,3,6.) "Providence is the present temporal maintenance, ordering and leading of all things and each individual event to the goal fixed by God for them. It takes place in perfect wisdom and righteousness towards God's own honour." The doctrine of Providence is now teleological in accent, with God himself (not fate) mediating. The lilies and ravens show that God has laid claim on the world, such that texts like Rom 8:28 bring the confession of God and his purposes to bear on world experience. There is no law for providence, because it is for God to surprise us:⁸⁵ we lend our prayers to the coming of the Kingdom. But God is free to respond to prayer, to change course as it were. We look at Providence from the standpoint of Promise, which aims at creation's fulfillment.

81 Christian Link, *Schöpfung*, vol. 2: *Schöpfungstheologie angesichts der Herausforderungen des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Handbuch Systematische Theologie 7 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1991), 554–58.

82 Jürgen Moltmann, *Der Geist des Lebens: Eine ganzheitliche Pneumatologie* (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1991); and *Das Kommen Gottes: Christliche Eschatologie* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus 1995).

83 "Was *Vorsehung*, an seiner biblischen Wurzel begriffen, heißt – das wird an dieser Stelle überscharf deutlich –, ist nichts Geringeres, darum aber auch nichts anderes als das Bekenntnis Gottes zu dem besonderen Weg eines Menschen in seiner Welt. Als der Schöpfer definiert sich Gott durch seine Bindung an die sichtbare Welt." (Link, *Schöpfung* II, 559).

84 Link, *Schöpfung*, II:562.

85 *Ibid.*, 571.

However in his more recent work Link seems less sure about some of the emphases in his earlier contribution. His version seems even more pastoral in tone, and even less conservative. Providence used to be viewed as a doctrine made to bridge creation (perceived as a past event) and the present. “In an attempt to fill that gap (as it was seen), the western theological tradition set alongside the doctrine of creation the concept of providence, borrowed from Stoic philosophy [...] in the form of providence it is possible for us to *experience* the world as creation, rather than to understand the world only as the object of a doctrinal statement.”⁸⁶ (I’m not sure that *gubernatio* is God guiding *the future* [as Link does]; perhaps it is better to see it as God’s diachronic active work of initiative, past, present and also future.) Link calls for a concept that “could mediate between world history and salvation history, as does the ‘plan’ or ‘counsel’ in the book of Job.”⁸⁷ God does not steer history, but offers new possibilities to people in it. God is not a shepherd so much as He is a king, “for a king acts among his people through the use of law, with decrees and proclamations, and not in a directly causal influence.”⁸⁸ (This seems naïve: kings do quite a lot of causing and influencing.) The influence of Dietrich Ritschl’s discussion of metaphor seems strong here.

Link complains that most of the German-speaking theologians have stuck with connecting Providence to Creation, and with just presuming God’s sovereignty and intervention to work in rather abstract a way. Christoph Schwöbel is praised by Link for seeing God’s action as that which constitutes reality, or grounds existence, but stops there, and lets the categories of Revelation and Inspiration take over. “Divine action” was a term taken over into bible and theology from outside. Causes do not act, only “persons” do. A king makes laws, but is not responsible for all that happens. Process theology allows us to think of God as wounded. It might also be time to move Providence into the area of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and hence the new creation – in doing just this both Moltmann and Welker⁸⁹ have moved closer to the Eastern Orthodox idea of “divine energies.” Link thinks that *Kraftfeld*’ is appropriate language to use, given that “king” is only a metaphor for God. There is nothing in the bible to prevent us saying that the world is shot through with the spirit even if

⁸⁶ Christian Link, “Providence: An Unsolved Problem’ in *Creation in Jewish and Christian tradition*, eds. Henning Graf Reventlow and Yair Hoffman, JSOTS 319 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002): 266–276, 267.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 275.

⁸⁹ Michael Welker, *Gottes Geist: Theologie des Heiligen Geistes* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1992).

the victory over evil is only partial as God struggles with it. Yet consolation and protection are available! The Spirit can work without a word having to interpret its effects, *pace* the Reformers. God does not create good from evil, but He does create new from old.

One can see in this rather “scatter-gun” series of objections and arguments, which is self-consciously pastoral in tone, a provocation to launch the theology of Providence in a new direction. Link returned to the theme in his *Abschiedsvorlesung* at Bochum, which was published that same year (2005).⁹⁰ To deal with this doctrine means stepping out from the safe place of the Church. The likes of the hymn-writer Paul Gerhardt (Barth’s favourite!) were far too ready to attribute the worst experience to God as ultimate Author. So how then can God expect *us* to be ethical? Also, the point of a doctrine of Providence is not to be able to say what the goal of history is, but to say whether human existence has any sense at all. The biblical help is slim: Genesis does not contain the concept of continuous creation, let alone the term. Today, as Ernst Saxer put it, we think of the gracious God more in terms of Providence than in Atonement.⁹¹ Although the Old Testament very much conveys the impression that God never abandons the bridge of the ship one has to move on to the New Testament for a Christian doctrine. Calvin brought predestination and providence much closer together such that both were about God’s foreordaining and not just foreknowledge (as for Augustine and Thomas) of all world events. But to avoid such Determinism, Link insists that a faith in providence as my experience of God’s guidance is permissible whereas a doctrine of Providence that “explains” God neatly is less attractive.⁹² One cannot speak of God’s action in terms of causation any more. It is better to speak of God opening up ways through that which has been dealt to people (as Schubert Ogden did in the early 1960s).⁹³ This involvement gets experienced as the shining of his presence or countenance (cf. Ps 80:4, with reference to Johannes Fischer).⁹⁴ When God withholds this, then reality falls back into its past. It is far too bold to speak of God as the all-determining reality as the old

⁹⁰ Christian Link, “Die Krise des Vorsehungsglaubens: Providenz jenseits von Fatalismus,” *Evangelische Theologie* 65 (2005): 413–28, 415.

⁹¹ Saxer, *Vorsehung und Verheißung Gottes*, 43.

⁹² Link, “Die Krise des Vorsehungsglaubens,” 420: “So bleibt ein erkennbarer Zwiespalt zwischen dem Vorsehungsglauben, der sich zu Gottes Führung bekennt, und der Vorsehungslehre, die auf ein geschlossenes Bild des göttlichen Handelns drängt.”

⁹³ Schubert Ogden, *Christ without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961).

⁹⁴ Johannes Fischer, “Wie wird Geschichte als Handeln Gottes offenbar? Zur Bedeutung der Anwesenheit Gottes im Offenbarungsgehen,” *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 8 (1991): 211–231.

Dogmatics used to: we cannot say that he is actively present in the death of a starving child. (However, is it better to say that God is not present? Something more about what is meant by “presence” needs saying.) Link thinks that in his earlier work (*Schöpfung*), he was wrong to put Providence as an “appendix” to Creation: it would be better to follow Dietrich Ritschl and Reinhold Bernhardt and put it in the horizon of Pneumatology. He then suggests that Providence works when we move with the laws of nature and history in the power-field (*Kraftfeld*) of his Spirit: this keeps things “relational.”⁹⁵ To see God’s face we must take some steps – providence is not for spectators but those prepared to act, or move. It means challenging the way things are going with the Word of God, and hoping to correct or supply a *Gegenwind* (Dietrich Ritschl).⁹⁶ It gives new meaning to events through their transformation, and so asks not the why (*warum*) question, but “for what purpose” (*wozu*)? God doesn’t always bring good out of evil, but he does create new from the old, according to the bible. (Yet he then immediately quotes Rom 8:35 where the terms “old” and “new” are not used. John 9:3 [“Neither this man nor his parents sinned [...] but so that the works of God might be displayed”] might have been a more obvious “go-to” verse.) God is envisaged as a resistance fighter leading willing people out of enemy territory.

Something similar – i.e. Providence reduced to presence – can be felt in the work of those theologians who want to speak of a non-oppressive presence of God the Holy Spirit as a “force-field” or area into which one might move. For instance, Reinhold Bernhardt has called for a transposing of the doctrine into the article of the Holy Spirit and was critical of Calvin’s splitting of God’s “oversight”: dividing God’s left hand of providence from his right hand of salvation means that the latter gets kept for a very small group of folk. It would be much better if the former hand could retain some salvific function, so that the more fundamental distinction is to be drawn between original divine creative action (to which “conservation” belongs) and divine creating anew or transformation.⁹⁷ This is closer to the biblical picture of both testaments, and is not naïvely

⁹⁵ Link, “Die Krise des Vorsehungsglaubens,” 425. Cf. Link, “Gestalt und theologischer Ort”.

⁹⁶ Link, “Die Krise des Vorsehungsglaubens,” 427: “Die alte Theologie sprach von Gottes “nachfolgendem” Handeln (*succursus*), modern gesagt: von seiner therapeutischen “Nachsorge”, die uns in den Folgen schrecklicher Ereignisse nicht allein lässt, sondern sie auf das “österliche” Ziel hinordnet, dass aus dem Tod – schon heute – ein neues, verwandeltes Leben hervorgehen soll.” This with reference to Dietrich Ritschl’s “Gott Wiedererkennen,” in *Bildersprache und Argumente: Theologische Aufsätze* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchner, 2008): 3–75.

⁹⁷ Reinhold Bernhardt, *Was heißt ‘Handeln Gottes’? Eine Rekonstruktion der Lehre von der Vorsehung Gottes*, (1. Aufl.; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1999), 451: “Sie tendiert dazu, die

claiming that all is continuity. For there is a resistance (*Widerstand*) in creation that has to be overcome through Redemption and the New Testament; it is the same power however that blesses and that frees. God also works to help the Cross be seen beneficially; he doesn't cause the cross's evil as *Unheilstat* but helps to make sense of it, or gives it new sense through his *postcuratio*.

Again, Günter Klein claims that the New Testament tells us not to believe in a God who steers history.⁹⁸ Ebeling was right to insist that kingdom of God is not a rival kingdom in this world; and even believers cannot see his governance. Klein has problems with Krötke's distinction of pre-eschatological and eschatological divine action ("*voreschatologischem und eschatologischem Handeln Gottes*"). Does God actually fight evil all the time in order to let creatures "be," as Krötke suggests, or is it not better to confine that activity to the Cross alone? Ebeling noted that God cannot be observed but is tied up in our own self-knowledge (*Dogmatik* I, 204).

It is noticeable that in the array of New Testament passages that Klein provides, the book of Acts seems altogether missing from a very selective group. To argue that "the devil is abroad" should be seen as message of Ephesians 2, or that Luke teaches that only in church can one find safety seems a very negative-sounding account of Paul.⁹⁹ The irony is that for all that, this philosophy opposes any idea that history has a Reason; it tends to arrest providence in the freeze-frame of the crucifixion, the Hegelian "speculative Good Friday," where theology is reduced to Philosophy that teaches that History, even in its most religious moments, is about Reason. God's directing power is kept in eschatological reserve.

Similarly Wilfried Härle eschews speaking of God's action (*Handlung*) and prefers to speak of God's effect (*Wirken*). The latter denotes activity over a period

Werke der 'linken Hand' Gottes zu entsoteriologisieren und die der 'rechten Hand' auf die Erwählten und Gerechtfertigten zu verengen." This is to be contrasted with Bernhard's preferred position: "Dadurch wird das Vorsehungswirken Gottes nicht einfach hin zum Heilshandeln, wo aber ist es (wie das Heilshandeln) auf ein heilhaftes Ziel ausgerichtet." "*Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem kreativen* (productio, formatio), dem ihm zuzuordnenden *konservativen* (conservatio, stabilisatio) und dem *innovativen* (transformatio, creatio nova) *Wirken Gottes*, deren grundlegende Bedeutung für die Bestimmung dieses Wirkens sich im zurückgelegten Untersuchungs-gang immer klarer herauskristallisierte, ist dem Dual von Schöpfungs- und Heilshandeln vorzuziehen."

98 Günter Klein, "'Über das Weltregiment Gottes': Zum exegetischen Anhalt eines dogmatischen Lehrstücks", *ZThK* 90 (1993): 251–283, 276: we need to renounce mistaken exegetical manoeuvres to reinforce this tottering dogma ("Exegetische Fehlanzeige für den dogmatischen Topos").

99 *Ibid.*, 271.

of time and is constitutive of existence (“*Gottes daseinskonstituierendes Wirken*”) rather than causally operative in it.¹⁰⁰ Divine love does more than excite another but creates that other, yet in doing so relates to it. Providence as conservation links this activity to that of God in history. Härle insists on steering a course between deism and determinism (that, e.g. would argue that Cain’s murder of Abel was just as much willed by God as the deeds of the Good Samaritan).¹⁰¹ It is God who works with us in our work, and not vice-versa, that God enables us to work, as the one who lovingly constitutes existence, not as a cause. He prefers to think of God’s *gubernatio* as something that limits evil outwardly, for anything more requires us to get into the territory of soteriology.

Christoph Schwöbel has contributed across the language divide, but particularly cogent was his 1987 essay. In its opening lines he implies that God grounds and determines the existence of believers: it is Church-centred. Providence in that sense needs to be acknowledged and received in order to be such.¹⁰² God’s action is constitutive of Christian faith, although Kantians deny it cognitive content, materialists any connection with reality and logical empiricists deny it sense, though much the same can be said of human intentionality, at least according to the last two. God’s action grounds faith and is its content, and any discussion of God’s action must be self-involving from the side of the believing creature. Schwöbel likes the idea of *creatio continuata* (“continued” as distinct from “continuous”), for it keeps existence as contingent rather than necessary. Nature’s laws imply a self-limitation of God. In Jesus there is a God-man relation established which is a model for our understanding of divine-human relating. Awareness of this divine freeing gives space for human freedom to be encouraged to act. There is (1) God’s creative action as grounding existence, (2) his revealing action concerning his relationship to his graced creation, and (3) God’s inspiring action as the enabling of confidence in the truth of the constitution of reality. The eschaton is perhaps the *Koextensivität* of these three.¹⁰³ God acts in-

100 Wilfried Härle, “Gottes Wirken,” in *Dogmatik* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000): 282–302.

101 *Ibid.*, 290.

102 Discussing Christian proclamation, see Christoph Schwöbel, “Die Rede vom Handeln Gottes im Christlichen Glauben: Beiträge zu einem systematisch-theologischen Rekonstruktionsversuch,” in *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie I: Vom Handeln Gottes*, eds. Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, Marburger Theologisch Studien, 22 (Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1987): 56–81, 57: “Und sie geschieht in der Hoffnung, daß die Wahrheit der Rede vom Handeln Gottes in Israel und in Jesus Christus so einleuchtet, daß sie als wahre Bestimmung menschlicher Existenz gewiß wird. Das heißt, daß die in den biblischen Texten als Evangelium bezeugte Erinnerung an das Handeln Gottes und die darin begründete Erwartung des Handelns Gottes als Erfahrung in der Existenz des Glaubenden gewiß wird und so als wahr anerkannt werden kann.”

103 *Ibid.*, 71.

tentionally hence personally, and personal intentional action is sufficient explanation. God knows the world as future: these three types bring the Trinitarian structure of Christian belief to the fore.¹⁰⁴ God works that way immanently to produce such effects *ad extra*. Schwöbel seems more positive than his fellow contributors, such as Härle, but also Reiner Preul, who has trouble with conceiving of action (*Handeln*) as attributable to any referent other than a human one.¹⁰⁵ (One might argue that if animals are beneath action of an intentional nature then it is all the more plausible that it applies to God, even if the how of divine action remain mysterious. To claim that talk of God acting “rationally” would make him seem a super-human, seems poor reasoning. God is hardly going to be *less* rational than humans.) Preul worries as much about the riskiness of a model of *psychokinesis* as the revelatory positivism, which refuses to admit the question: how does God act? One possibility is that all actions of God are grounded in the one act of His work in Christ, just as in creation God is better thought of as the ground of all possible creaturely action. Preul concludes that our concern that God should act reflects a spirituality that believes in “whole person” and hence requires that the God who is addressed have complementary, corresponding qualities to “us.” In other words, God as agent is a fiction of religious psychology. (It might not come as a surprise that the follow-up volume from Marburg was entitled “*Erfahrungen*” [Experiences],¹⁰⁶ as though the question of *divine* action had become an unpromising one.)

In the *Festschrift* for Eberhard Jüngel, Wilhelm Hüffmeier notes that Providence as *Vorsehung* (πρόνοια) very quickly became *Fürsorge* (ἐπιμέλεια) (with John of Damascus *De fide orth.* II,29). Günther Klein is one who has overreacted against traditional Providence doctrine by claiming that the New Testament knows nothing of this. Yet Luke sees Christ’s coming as an act in history! If one can see the Creator through the Redeemer, than can one not see the Sustainer and Governor of Creation to this very day? There can be no vacuum between

104 Ibid., 79: “Damit wird das Handeln Gottes zur Welt als *transeuntes* Handeln in Schöpfung, Offenbarung und Inspiration in Gottes trinitarischer Bezogenheit als *immanentes* Handeln begründet.”

105 Reiner Preul, “Problemskizze zur Rede vom Handeln Gottes” in *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie I: Vom Handeln Gottes*, eds. Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, Marburger Theologische Studien, 22 (Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1987): 3–11.

106 Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, eds., *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie 2: Theologische Gegenwartsdeutung*, Marburger theologische Studien 24 (Marburg: Elwert, 1988). And Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, eds., *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie 3: Lebenserfahrung*, Marburger theologische Studien 29 (Marburg: Elwert, 1990).

creation and fulfillment, and Panneneberg and Jüngel are agreed on this.¹⁰⁷ The power of God is felt within this life, and yet God's rule is experienced "in the image of the Lamb" (Jüngel). Part of God's *modus operandi* in the world is to give his creatures strength. It would be wrong to think that the Old Testament history, or history in general, always goes against God's will, for even the story of Ann Frank as it is told today is, in its telling, a victory over evil. At least there is a nuance, mixed economy of setback and progress, which God works in and through humans.¹⁰⁸ Reformed piety always had a predisposition to encourage self-absorption while believing it was enforcing the Lordship of Christ over each and every "me."

"I believe that God" " – and then, her face brightening, briskly finished the sentence: "created me, together with all living creatures [...]. And Clothes and shoes," she said, " 'meat and drink, hearth and home, wife and child, acre and cow'." (Thomas Mann, *Buddenbrooks*, p.7)

The narrative unravelling of family fortunes in Mann's famous novel does not get to the real kernel of Providence in the Heidelberg Catechism, which is preservation of the soul through all of life's dangers.¹⁰⁹ For Barth, the Heidelberg Catechism brought the question about God's action into "my life," even if any statement about providence must be filtered through Christology.¹¹⁰ Matthew 10:30 ("every hair of your head is counted") suggests a most special providence towards Christians, given the co-text of Matth 10:32 (confessing), a feature of which Beintker and Hüffmeier seem oblivious. Barth is on the right lines to see that Providence works where it is closer to Christ, for Christians *qua* Christians.

107 Wilhelm Hüffmeier, "Deus providebit? Eine Zwischenbilanz zur Kritik der Lehre von Gottes Vorsehung," in *Denkwürdiges Geheimnis: Beiträge zur Gotteslehre – Festschrift für Eberhard Jüngel zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Ingolf Dalferth (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004): 237–258, 249: "Doch die Differenzierung des königlichen Amtes Christi in regnum gratiae, regnum gloriae und regnum potentiae, gelegentlich auch naturae (z. B. bei Johann Gerhard) enthält ähnliche Spannungen wie die der göttlichen Eigenschaftslehre. Wie verhält sich das regnum gratiae zum regnum potentiae Christi?"

108 Hüffmeier, "Deus providebit?," 255.

109 "Daß ich mit Leib und Seele im Leben und im Sterben nicht mein, sondern meines getreuen Heilands Jesu Christi eigen bin, der mit seinem teuren Blut für alle meine Sünden vollk  mmlich bezahlt und mich aus aller Gewalt des Teufels erl  st hat und also bewahrt, da  ohne den Willen meines Vaters im Himmel kein Haar von meinem Haupt kann fallen, ja auch mir alles zu meiner Seligkeit dienen mu ." The *Buddenbrooks* family motto was "Deus providebit," as Wilhelm H  ffmeier "Deus providebit?," 238, mentions.

110 Barth, CD III/3, 461.

We see Schwöbel and Hüffmeier having more constructive versions of the doctrine, yet they are aware that they are swimming against an anti-providentialist tide, and yet refuse the high road of any special providence, made available in Christ.

English-speaking discussion

In his famous *Journal of Religion* article of 1963, Langdon Gilkey started off his treatment of the doctrine by clarifying that the doctrine of Providence is a revealed one and comes to us in moments of providence also. Admittedly one does not make great claims for the Mighty Acts of God in History, and God's working has been "pushed back" into our hearts, even though at the same time as modern believers "we insist on moral freedom" in what he traces back to Arminianism.¹¹¹ Whereas Bultmann and his followers took the gospel to be about world-transcending faith, or, in Gilkey's terms, the first two persons were left in favour of the third alone,¹¹² Barth continued to attempt a providence of a God of Nature and History. Yet in Gilkey's mind: "It [Barth's approach] causes more than a slight uneasiness that all other creatures in existence have only the *telos* or end of becoming a 'theatre' of the covenant community."¹¹³ Barth seems to get lost in personalism of covenantal language. And for *Das Nichtige* to be almost a self-determining realm seems to exclude God's sovereignty. Gilkey thinks it would better to see this existentially, that each of us suffers from a lack of subjective meaning that God is required to help us with.

When, therefore, such a structure of meaningful activity vanishes, the things of the self lose their focus and point, and therefore their continuity, and life becomes merely a matter of eating, sleeping and brushing one's teeth. And with this dissipation of the self into a mere series of disjointed activities and unrelated experiences, bound together by no structure of personal relations or of vocational purpose, the sense of the *reality* of the self itself dissipates and *das Nichtige* threatens to overwhelm the creature.¹¹⁴

In this sense the old orthodox doctrine of God's "preservation of the creature against non-being" means more than the gift of existential being within a meaningful context, and that implies the divine ordering of historical and personal life

111 Langdon Gilkey, "The Concept of Providence in Contemporary Theology," *Journal of Religion* 43 (1963): 171–92, 177.

112 *Ibid.*, 185.

113 *Ibid.*, 187.

114 *Ibid.*, 189.

as well as its objective continuation. (Yet surely that is a task for divine *concursus* and *gubernatio*.) Barth sees clearly the relation of preservation and *das Nichtige*, but the relation, as he depicts it, is too theoretical and abstract, for he cannot imagine *das Nichtige* experientially to see its real import.¹¹⁵ Barth is trying to be objective and gets criticised for being theoretical. This was something which Barth himself was aware of. Although the Incarnation is the most concrete of events, God himself is “Other” enough that he demands to be thought of in terms that sound Idealist”.

Gilkey warmed to his task: “The modern consciousness, and we ourselves, are saturated by the sense of the contingency of events, that they are not necessary or determined from eternity, that they may or may not be, depending on the other contingent events in their context.”¹¹⁶ One can add contingency to a list of relativity, transience, autonomy. One might want to add to that creativity. “No factor is a cause in history until it elicits a human response, and that invariably involves human interpretation, intentions, norms, judgments and decisions. Thus history is a process of *centered* decisions in which there is an unremovable ‘given,’ a destiny, but in which also freedom and spontaneity – and so contingency and purposes – are at work.”¹¹⁷ There is a healthy dialectic between old, traditional structures and new possibilities, as the Old Testament encourages us; God allows all this contingency to be possible. It is giving the Apollo of order and the Dionysius of the dynamic each their due. God is not subject to process but is over transience so as to be creative. Our creative possibility requires something that allows it to become actuality to be present.¹¹⁸ Too often one sees the transformation of destiny into fate through sin: “Yahweh is, says Hosea [...] the raging lion with which Israel in sin has to deal”: “concrete history as we experience it has a dialectical, catastrophic, tragic character analogous to this biblical drama.”¹¹⁹ This means to recognise judgement as ours, even as God destroys destructiveness, but also to discern God’s sovereignty as creative of *kairos*. But for this one needs more than the process: “Providence must, therefore, be supplemented by incarnation and atonement and ultimately eschatology;” Grace is required – seeping in to the heart of the same history in the new, purified relation to the depths of one’s being. “The eschatological goal of God, like the creative work of God, extends far beyond the bounds of that community

115 Ibid., 190.

116 Langdon Gilkey, *Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History* (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), 242.

117 Ibid., 244.

118 Ibid., 251.

119 Ibid., 263.

and its history. However the *character* and the *goal* of the universal work of providence, and so the quality of God's eschatological future, are revealed here."¹²⁰ There is in Gilkey a surrender of Providence to Eschatology,

An argument at once milder in tone but stricter in content was provided in the mid-1980s by Maurice Wiles. For instance, in the petitions of the Lord's Prayer one is: "acknowledging the givenness of the world [...] but with that acknowledgment goes also the recognition that it is human creativity that has learnt and is still in process of learning how best to use those conditions for the growing of the corn and that it is co-operative human labour that is needed to turn it into bread."¹²¹ Human beings then are also involved in the making of God's will, in what Wiles calls an "open concept" of Providence, God lures us by the inspiring figure of Jesus:¹²² "This then is the fashion of God's acting in the world – making possible the emergence, both individually and corporately, of a genuinely free human recognition and response to what is God's intention in the creation of the world."¹²³ Much of what we think is graced action is psychological relaxation. For Gordon Kaufman, a major influence on Wiles, God acts with and through others as Solomon did in employing expert stonemasons to build the temple. Wiles's God subcontracts.¹²⁴

As for personal lives, it was Herbert Henry Farmer's concern that there should be grounds for confidence "that man's personal life is the concern of a wisdom and power higher than his own."¹²⁵ Is it that Christians expect more than just the sun and the rain (Mt 5:45)? Augustine (*De spir et litt* 34,60) observed it is ours to receive God's grace and grant our consent to it. So Divine Action is about Friendship rather than competing forces. Yet, Wiles wonders, does God *persuade* as David Pailin claims?¹²⁶ Does he do that for all? If God does this only for the receptive then this avoids Wiles objection: "If God is always offering the best possibility for the future, there seems little room for particular acts of grace."¹²⁷ With Austin Farrer, God gives energy into world at creation: the whole process is his one intentional action, which he borrows from Gordon Kauf-

120 Ibid, 268.

121 Maurice Wiles, *God's Action in the World: The Bampton Lectures for 1986* (London: SCM, 1986), 106f.

122 Ibid., 104f.

123 Ibid., 103.

124 Ibid., 97.

125 Ibid., 71.

126 David A. Pailin, "God and Creation – a Process View," *Epworth Review* 9 (1982): 72–86.

127 Wiles, *God's Action in the World*, 77.

man.¹²⁸ He asks: “Must the God who is the power of all being also be the power of all acting?”¹²⁹ Also, to deny the possibility of self-limitation is to limit God, here echoing Barth. Yet, God is not a person as we are, and divine self-limitation leaves us to get on with things.¹³⁰ God on this scheme is more Master Planner or Director than Master Actor.¹³¹

In the early 1980s, Vernon White reviewed the 1960s-70s works by William H. Vanstone (*Love’s Endeavour*)¹³² and Peter Baelz¹³³ and argued against them that although, admittedly, divine love may not and cannot control the beloved, nevertheless it *may* and *can* control the circumstances around the beloved.¹³⁴ It is all too tempting to see God merely “standing with” victims. But God can also intervene, asserts White, at least mediately. He can use x to help y. Whereas Schubert Ogden’s God was not concerned about particulars, the living God reacts to events and synthesises them, summing up past and present and setting a set of future possibilities.¹³⁵ White accuses Wiles of Pelagianism,¹³⁶ somewhat unfairly, at least on the account that Wiles gave in 1986.

Paul Helm’s belief in a “no risk providence,” is much truer to traditional Reformed theology. With Calvin, Helm thinks that God ordains evil without commanding it. Yet it is not worth trying to learn anything from the course of events. Everything is in God’s control. We affirm that God has a plan definitely, not that we know what it is. Hence: “But providence, as such, is mute, and we should be

128 Gordon. Kaufman, “On the Meaning of ‘Act of God’,” in *God the Problem* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972): 119–147. Cf. Thomas F. Tracy, “Enacting History: Ogden and Kaufman on God’s Mighty Acts,” *Journal of Religion* 64 (1984): 20–36. Also, Kaufman, *God the Problem*, 146: “It must be admitted that the doctrine of providence here entailed is more austere than the pietistic views often found in Christian circles God’s subordinate acts here are governed largely by his overarching purposes and ultimate objectives, not simply by the immediate needs or the prayerful pleas of his children.”

129 Wiles, *God’s Action in the World*, 20.

130 *Ibid.*, 79f.

131 Paul Fiddes, *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity* (London: DLT, 2000), 127: “God hods out, for example, the possibility of living a full human life to all in an impartial way, but only some cash their options and take up the offer.” Then, at 134: “God can offer *general* aims to the whole of the world and humanity, and in particular events God can offer a purpose, a special purpose, an ‘elective purpose’, designed to achieve something new and decisive.”

132 William. H. Vanstone, *Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1977).

133 Peter Baelz, *Prayer and Providence: A Background Study* (London: S.C.M., 1968).

134 Vernon White, *The Fall of a Sparrow: A Concept of Special Divine Action* (Exeter: Paternoster, 1985), 89.

135 *Ibid.*, 75.

136 *Ibid.*, 71.

deaf to any message that we may think it is transmitting to us” –rather we should be looking to do what he commands, avoid what he forbids.¹³⁷ “Christians [...] have no special insight into the unfolding course of events.”¹³⁸

On the “risky” view, argues Helm, it was largely because people did not pray hard enough that Auschwitz happened. No, if anyone prays, God has ordained the prayer. Prayer is certainly often a *sufficient* condition for God to act, but it is a request so not necessary that God so act.¹³⁹ This implies of course that God ordained Auschwitz. God sets something up to happen only if people pray. In prayer there can be no manipulation of God, as He does not manipulate us. “Fate” suggests impersonality, as in astrological beliefs; but providence is personal, the personal activity of God in his creation through which he brings it to its appointed end or destiny.¹⁴⁰ Returning to “no risk” Providence: “That view has positive virtues; in particular it makes it possible to ascribe a significance to the whole of a human life, to every detail, as to the whole of history. It is just *because* God’s providence rules over all, that individual human actions have significance in contributing to the whole.”¹⁴¹

The open, “risky” view has been more popular in the last two decades. It is seen to avoid the impersonalist extremes of Process Theology while learning from that movement. It has been well represented by Paul Fiddes:

A refugee is hungry and cold and desperately needing medical help on Monday; on Wednesday he is given relief by an Oxfam agency. If God is to know the suffering of the man on Monday as it really is, he cannot at the same time be aware of his experience of relief on Wednesday. If we were, he would not know the refugee’s condition as the refugee himself knows it, and so God would not have a complete knowledge of human mentality and would not know everything [be omniscient].¹⁴²

“He desires to be united with us in actuality [...]”.¹⁴³ The actuality has new elements in it which arise from his grappling with the materials – “the canvas, brushes, paint.” Ours is the passivity of waiting to see God’s work completed, a particular color mixed on the palate, as it were. “There is no such thing as a possible particular,” and the painter ahead of time only knows roughly what he is going to do. Hence God only sets the general limits of possible worlds.

137 Paul Helm, *The Providence of God* (Leicester: IVP, 1994), 232.

138 *Ibid.*, 230.

139 *Ibid.*, 156.

140 *Ibid.*, 218f.

141 *Ibid.*, 220f.

142 Paul Fiddes, *The Creative Suffering of God* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 91f.

143 *Ibid.*, 94.

So: "At any one point in time, God knows all the possibilities there are to be known, but he does not know possibilities which have not yet been creatively thought of, and which therefore do not exist."¹⁴⁴

Likewise, Richard Swinburne argues:

Hence, although doing no objectively bad action, on the assumption that God's knowledge of the future is limited by the libertarian free will which he gives to humans, even God cannot know in advance for certain the actual amount of harm one individual will suffer at the hands of another in a given situation. But since God is also omnipotent, he is able to ensure that no one remains in such a situation for longer than he (God) chooses; and is able, if he so chooses, to compensate the sufferer in other ways as and when he chooses.¹⁴⁵

Swinburne declares himself to be inspired by Augustine (*City of God* XI.21). God knows and causes all things in a timeless present. He thinks it unfortunate that Barth could not extend the lowliness of God' in his account of the Incarnation to his doctrine of Providence. It could be said that we can know God better from the history of humans, or the human sciences, than we do from physics. has spoken very much in terms of the causality of love. God's relationship to the universe is personal, and he is outside the universe, so he cannot be spoken of in terms of causality. "God's knowledge, then, could best be understood on the analogy of memory. Just as a person's remembering something does not make the event they remember necessary, so neither does God's foreknowing an event make it necessary." Human beings, like subatomic particles, are less predictable, so any intervention violates less law. God is working with the poor since and as they put up less resistance, as a locus of his providence, or with actor-like creative people, as they are drawn to direction.¹⁴⁶

As Kathleen Tanner describes it:

To be free, a person must be master [...] of that which conditions choice on the created level. To be contingent, a created cause must have a non-necessary logical relation with its created effects. Freedom or contingency of such a sort says nothing about a creature's freedom or contingency with respect to the divine agent who creatively founds the whole of created beings and their effects and their mode of relation.¹⁴⁷

144 Ibid., 97.

145 Richard Swinburne, *Providence and the Problem of Evil* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 231.

146 Gorringe, *God's Theatre A Theology of Providence* (London: SCM, 1991), 66; 78.

147 Kathryn Tanner, *God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 90.

God allows us to take decisions freely but empowers us every step of the way in doing it: wholly done by both agencies. “Participation” is the password that gets one through the divine determination/freewill conundrum.

In Tanner’s account, it is almost impossible to see the join, with the creaturely taken up in the larger divine activity, but not initiating it (her criticism of Biel and Bañez is particularly sharp). God creates causes and effects but is neither one nor the other, being immediate to all things. God does not influence or affect, but instead he effects the actions of creatures.¹⁴⁸ In that sense things are ontologically dependent, yet one wonders whether that is enough for Providence. It is the outcome of an event, one might say the ontic or existential result of an action that has to be up to God. In wanting to deny both creaturely independence and monism, Tanner’s message comes out sounding confused. Sometimes it seems about the operation of grace, at other times about some ground of being. Providence surely is more than grace helping the creaturely response and much more than mere ‘grounding’. Furthermore, manipulation, which Goringe wants to avoid, is more likely on weaker accounts of God’s action, wherein He needs to strike deals and bargains.

In a book whose impact has been felt also outside academic circles, John Sanders argues: “the Bible can be legitimately read as portraying God as experiencing reciprocal relations, being grieved, and responding to creatures (even switching to ‘plan B’ when necessary).”¹⁴⁹ God does not know the future, for the future does not exist for God to know. Hence it is not ruled out *a priori* that prayer can make a difference: “The relationship between Yahweh and Israel is not exactly like that of potter and clay [...]. It should not be understood as teaching total divine control over all things, since the biblical writers do not make use of this aspect of the metaphor.”¹⁵⁰ This seems like special pleading. At one level God’s action is influenced by how the pot turns out, yet there is no sense of the clay or pot having input into God’s decision whether to keep (glaze/adorn/sell) the pot or to smash it and start again. Or in the New Testament: “Jesus wrestles with God’s will because he does not believe that everything must happen according to a predetermined plan.”¹⁵¹ Maybe Jesus thought he could be spared, Isaac-like, Sanders suggests. When it came to the Incarnation, God had been working on things for a very long time. As for favourite Reformed verses such as Rev 13:8 (“saints written in the book/ the Lamb slain be-

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 95.

¹⁴⁹ John Sanders, *The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence*, 2nd Edition (Downers Grove: IVP, 2007), 16.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 91.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 101.

fore the foundation of the world”), well these last six words mean just “a very long time,” probably after the fall happened and the already-planned Incarnation had to be adapted to include the cross. God is free to vary his means. God’s providence is not his arranging things but his care and presence.

In Luke 13:8 Jesus mentions a tower that fell on those who were not especially sinners. “God did not foreordain their deaths. That God does not intend such events is made clear in the ministry of Jesus as he stands opposed (in solidarity with the Father) to human suffering.”¹⁵² Yet the idea of divinely ordained judgment, even if not fore-ordained judgment, does seem strong in this text from the Gospels. Sanders admits that God’s purposes can be opposed. Divine providence took the particular path it did in response to the actions of humans. In other words, God plays black at chess. There is strong criticism of Calvin for whom “God does not decide what he will do in response to anything the creatures do.” Sanders comments: This effectively denies any sort of mutual relationship between God and his creatures. Things would have been better “had Calvin integrated his doctrine of election with his relational understanding of the Trinity.”¹⁵³ The personal God, as Isaak Dorner saw him, “only foreknows possibilities.” Whereas “eternal truths are unchangeable; an eternal Person is faithful.”¹⁵⁴ We should not separate his being *quoad nos* – how he is to us in his saving and caring – from his being in *se*. Almightyness should be redefined as God’s adequacy to the task with which he has charged himself. On the classic model, God has to exercise meticulous providence, and if Paul Helm is to be believed, God is not surprised by sin and so can perform no grieving even over it. The “timeless” God of Sanders does not know anything happening at any time to be happening then. No, God knows the future as future.¹⁵⁵

Recent Catholic contribution to the Doctrine

In the Catholic major works, the space given to the subject both in Leo Scheffczyk’s contribution to the *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte* and in the voluminous *Mysterium Salutis* by Walter Kern is rather limited and symptomatic of a wider problem.¹⁵⁶ The doctrine is very much tied to *Erhaltung*, or the *preservation* of

¹⁵² Ibid., 115.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 158.

¹⁵⁴ R. E. Pollard, quoted by Sanders, p. 187.

¹⁵⁵ Sanders, *God Who Risks*, 198.

¹⁵⁶ Walter Kern, “Zur theologischen Auslegung des Schöpfungsglaubens,” in *Mysterium Salutis*, vol. 2: *Die Heilsgeschichte vor Christus* (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1967): 464–544, 532.

creation. Scheffczyk claimed that the doctrine of Providence was seen in the bible as “creation in the present.”¹⁵⁷ In fact the experience of providence leads one to the doctrine of creation. The connection with salvation history is that those who have been saved out of spiritual danger seem to appreciate creation more, as in the Psalms, or Genesis 1 written in the exile. If creation stopped with the Sabbath, God’s care continues: better this than to speak in terms of *creatio continua*, a theme which, after all, is hardly a big one in the Christian tradition and the scholastics.

It might come as a surprise to find that the book on Providence by the “Monster of Thomism” Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange,¹⁵⁸ was more about ways of responding to Providence, although the full title of the French original *Providence et la confiance en Dieu* (1937) provides a clear hint of this. Instead of the expected objective certainties of the ways of God and his Being, one gets something much more apparently anthropocentric, or at least something that more works back towards God than starts with him. The immensity of God’s presence understood in a non-material way means “omnipresence,” which in turn means that all things are known to him as well as His operating on all things by his creative power.¹⁵⁹ The point is that the believer is fully encouraged to embrace a spirituality of self-abandonment. One might wish to file the book under “Spirituality,” not least with its references to St John of the Cross and Therese of Lisieux.

An even clearer example of theology of Providence taking its orientation from spiritual writing is in Michael Schmaus’ use of Romano Guardini a number of times. Schmaus particularly likes Guardini’s essay “Der Vorsehung” to be

157 Leo Scheffczyk, *Schöpfung und Vorsehung*, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte II/2a (Freiburg: Herder, 1963), 11: “[...] und die Vorsehung nur als eine fortgesetzte Schöpfung verstanden würde [...]. Das Gegenstück der Vorsehung als ewige Gotteswirklichkeit ist die wirksame Erhaltung der Welt und alles Weltwirkens durch Gott.”

158 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Providence*, trans. Dom Bede Rose (Charlotte: Saint Benedict Press, 1998); Richard Peddicord, *Sacred Monster of Thomism: An Introduction to the Life and Legacy of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange* (South Bend: St Augustine’s Press, 2004). Also see Garrigou’s own article “Providence: *La providence selon la Théologie*,” in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 13, ed. Emile Amann (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1932): 985–1023, 1012: “Par rapport aux fins particulières, on distingue, la providence naturelle et la providence surnaturelle.” Natural things are subordinated to “la providence universalissime” and *gubernatio* executes what Providence decrees. “La providence s’étend-elle immédiatement de toute éternité à toutes choses si intimes qu’elles soient, tandis que Dieu gouverne les choses inférieures par l’intermédiaire des créatures les plus élevées, ce qui ne se réalise que dans le temps” [...]. La fin du gouvernement divine [...]. Cette fin est la manifestation du bonté divin, qui veille à l’exécution du plan providential.” (1021) One should not give up all hope in self-abandonment to providence by becoming too quietist.

159 Garrigou-Lagrange, *Providence*, 162.

found in *Der Lebendige Gott*. Providence under which one stands is not a cold system driving me *volens volens*, nor does it work like a law of Nature that manipulates an atom, nor does it use me as a factory uses its workers, but Providence is a system that looks to me. Not only was it necessary that I was given my space in the history of the world, but that this was so arranged that it willed the salvation of my person. *Vorsehung* means that in what happened there is a seeing, and I am as I am seen.¹⁶⁰

One assumes right away, as one would do with Garrigou-Lagrange, that Providence is not a revealed doctrine in the sense of “made manifest to all,” but is something communicated inwardly to a few who have ears to hear. Even if Providence includes God’s will and ways towards all, the Catholic theology of Providence is something which grows from the experience of an elect band.

Yet as such it is not a cushioning doctrine to help believers rest more easily but is much more than that: it is a message, a presence, a power that works to foster discipleship. It deals with, to paraphrase Schmaus: not only the physical and psychological laws which are scientifically established, not only the effects and fate of fundamental powers of existence but that every event happens through love, or rather through a person, the Person of Love, who comes into the situation and calls us and draws us.¹⁶¹ Nothing happens that is not for his Salvation. Or to hear Guardini: the world is open to love and we to his call.¹⁶² One is to give oneself in order to find this and be active, not passive in suffering.¹⁶³ Providence is not a functional apparatus but a constant address of divine

160 Scheffczyk, *Schöpfung und Vorsehung*, 29: “Vorsehung wäre, wenn ich überzeugt sein dürfte: Ich, mit meiner lebendigen Person, stehe nicht nur in einer kalten Ordnung, die mich zwingt, wie ein Naturgesetz das Atom, oder mich braucht, wie die Fabrik ihre Arbeiter, sondern es ist eine Ordnung, die auf mich blickt [...]. Nicht nur müßte ich mit meinem Wesen Raum haben im Weltgeschehen, sondern dieses müßte so angelegt sein, daß es das Heil meiner Person wollte [...]. Vorsehung aber meint, daß in allem, was geschieht, ein Sehen sei; und was da gesehen werde, sei ich.”

161 Schmaus, *Katholische Dogmatik* I,2, 193: “Der Glaube an die Vorsehung ist nicht ein Schlummerkissen, auf dem es sich bequem ausruhen läßt. Die Lehre von der Vorsehung bedeutet vielmehr: In der Welt waltet nicht bloß die von der Wissenschaft feststellbare und durchschaubare Ordnung physischer und psychologischer Gesetze, nicht bloß Sendung und Schicksal unergründlicher Daseinsmächte. Jedes Geschehen ist vielmehr gewirkt von einer unbegreiflichen Liebe oder richtiger von einem Liebenden, ja von der Person-Liebe. Sie blickt aus jedem Ereignis auf uns her, geht in jedem Ereignis auf uns zu, ruft uns an, zieht uns zu sich hin.”

162 Romano Guardini, *Vom lebendigen Gott: Geistliches Wort* (Würzburg: Echter, 1930), 31.

163 Schmaus, *Katholische Dogmatik* I,2,197.

love and a fixed encounter with it.¹⁶⁴ We should not say that our life is the best there was, but that no life is beyond being a spiritual success.

To a degree in the Catholic doctrine as we find it in the twentieth century, there is already a fair bit of subjectivising underway. Appeal is made to Providence being a bit like the safety net for the trapeze act, or more critically the strong arms eternal underling arms. Providence is not so much a relationship in fact as a living connection in operation. Part of Guardini's legacy as a "spiritual theologian" is the provision (!) of guidance to Catholic ethicists in our 21st century. The re-publication of *Freiheit, Gnade, Schicksal* in 1994 was both a sign and a cause of this new impact.¹⁶⁵ Guardini could write in that book: "'Fate' is that which cannot be removed and is arbitrary. And yet Fate is the most personal thing, wherein I stand totally alone, unrepresentable and unchangeable and yet it is that which binds me with everyone."¹⁶⁶ This seems the position of the human being without a conscious believing relationship with God. The medical ethicist from Freiburg, Giovanni Maio is inspired to see this fate as what we are given, the hand each of us is dealt, and while modern medicine would like to focus on possibilities, that is not where people need to start from existentially. And in any case, Disease is not a wholly bad thing, at least it is not something to be denied, but embraced as part of one's life story. Disease is not only to be struggled against but, as we experience its necessity, we learn what freedom and responsibility are. It requires, as another author in the same volume puts it, being prepared to see grey as an acceptable colour in life. This comes through knowing that God is the one that will give eternal happiness – that is the true sense of happiness over our lives (perhaps the word "joy" would be appropriate), rather than happiness as compensation for disappointment.

One does not need to go very far in the popular press to find accounts of how the prognosis of terminal illness made life seem strangely richer, more focused, more appreciated. Yet the Catholic novelist Georges Bernanos suggests through the plot of his best-known work that death should be welcomed as a limit experience more because a sharp awareness of death makes life more a concentrated adventure, yes, but what Bernanos describes is the effect of this awareness in attempts to overcome complacency and self-satisfaction or mediocrity. Charles Mo-

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 203: "Die Vorsehung ist kein mechanisch funktionierender Apparat, sondern ein ständiger Anruf der göttlichen Liebe und eine stete Begegnung mit ihr."

¹⁶⁵ Romano Guardini, *Freiheit, Gnade, Schicksal: Drei Kapitel zur Deutung des Daseins*, ed. Franz Henrich, 7th Ed. (Grünewald: Schöningh, 1994; originally Kösel, 1948).

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 155: "Schicksal ist das Persönlichste, worin ich ganz allein, unvertretbar und unveränderbar stehe und doch wieder das, was mich mit Allen zusammenbindet."

eller observed that the clerical hero of *Diary of a Country Priest* gave peace to the Countess, when he did not possess it himself. Such is the miracle of love, as the Curé says himself, to give what one does not have.¹⁶⁷ I think this is what one might call a dialogical Providence, where it is not a case of it resting on the acuity of one's faith or religious self-consciousness, but on a presence, a shared meaning, and a power that exists where two or three are gathered, even in disagreement.

This key scene from *The Diary of a Country Priest* perhaps illustrates this:

'Nothing, either in this world or the next, can separate us from what we've loved more than ourselves, more than life, more than getting into heaven.'

'Madame,' I answered, 'even in this world, the slightest thing, a mere stroke, can make us cease to know the people whom we've loved best of all.'

'Death isn't like madness –'

No, indeed. We know even less about it.'

'Love is stronger than death – that stands written in your books.'

'But it isn't we who invented love. Love has its own order, its own laws.'

'God is love's master.'

'No, not its master. God is love itself [...]. If you want to love, don't place yourself beyond love's reach'

'Resign myself?' Her gentle voice froze. 'What do you mean? Don't you think me resigned enough?' [...]

She reared like a viper: 'I've ceased to bother about God. When you've forced me to admit that I hate Him, will you be any better off, you idiot?'

'You no longer hate Him. Hate is indifference and contempt. Now at last you're face to face with him.'¹⁶⁸

Now this has the form of an unusual style of catechesis. Yet it is theology that is living and applied, and in that, both conversation partners make their contributions.

The Catholic sense for the everyday location of providence is a distinctive theme. Raphael Schulte has written a very thoughtful piece in the *Quaestiones Disputatae* volume on providence from 1988: "Wie ist Gottes Wirken in Welt und Geschichte theologisch zu verstehen?" He claims that there has been too much focus on extraordinary working of God. Instead, we should look at everyday presence of God. Schillebeeckx is brought in to argue that any divine action

167 "Déjà le curé d'Ambricourt donne la paix à la comtesse, alors qu'il ne la possède pas lui-même; tel est le miracle de l'amour, se dit le curé de campagne, que l'on donne ce qu'on est privé" (Ch. Moeller, *Littérature du XXe siècle et christianisme* [Paris: Casterman, 1954], 424).

168 Georges Bernanos, *Diary of a Country Priest*, trans. Pamela Morris (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1975), 129.

must be thought of as transcendently creative (hence not caught up *in* history) or if intervening, doing so only indirectly. If something has extraordinary-looking significance then that could be called revelation.¹⁶⁹ God can only work through creaturely causes,¹⁷⁰ although that surely does not answer the question *how* God reaches those. Here Weissmahr took leave of Rahner whom he would usually follow: God cannot be a cause among other causes but He could be a “vertical one” moving a created one “horizontally” through the Word. Inner-worldly and outer-worldly are terms which are not really suitable for Christian theology since the outer-worldly One knows no such boundaries. For Rahner,¹⁷¹ God works the world as its ground, but cannot be said to work in it. Biblical faith confesses the still working covenantal God before it confesses the God of first creation; protology is not primary and any statements on *concursus* come from experience so that statements about God as Creator also proceed from there.¹⁷² That God and humans continue to build their shared house and the created world is not so much dependence (*Abhängigkeit*) as loving free response or attachment (*Anhänglichkeit*).¹⁷³ God is the giver who is to be approached via the gift of creation as an expression of Him, so that there is no immediacy of God in the world as process theology thinks. Schillebeeckx was right to emphasise that history means human history but the bible gives us the understanding proper to faith (*intellectus fidei*) that requires us to say that God comes into history, especially when humans decide to ask him in.¹⁷⁴ Truly, history starts with God as he oversaw pre-history and human societies’ first faltering steps, and he works alongside humans, not as added cause. God’s *Wirken* is not physical, but persuasive, interpersonal in freedom. This takes us close to the threshold of ecclesiological questions.

The place of the historical in God’s purposes

Certainly, the fact of Christ (just like the fact of, say, John the Baptist) has priority over the abstract norm in the Balthasarian scheme. In his 1963 *Theology of His-*

169 Raphael Schulte, “Wie ist Gottes Wirken in Welt und Geschichte theologisch zu verstehen?,” in *Vorsehung und Handeln Gottes*, eds. Theodor Schneider and Lothar Ullrich, *Quaestiones Disputatae* 115 (Freiburg: Herder, 1988): 116–168, 120.

170 Following Béla Weissmahr, *Gottes Wirken in der Welt. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur Frage der Evolution und des Wunders*, Frankfurter theologische Studien 15 (Frankfurt: J. Knecht, 1973).

171 Karl Rahner, *Grundkurs des Glaubens: Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums* (Freiburg: Herder, 1976), 94.

172 Schulte, “Wie ist Gottes Wirken?,” 120.

173 *Ibid.*, 137.

174 *Ibid.*, 144.

tory he wrote: "In Jesus Christ, the Logos is no longer the realm of ideas, values and laws which governs and gives meaning to history, but is himself history."¹⁷⁵ In other words, this historical life of the Logos is the centre and source of history: Jesus Christ is the heart and norm of all that is historical. Yet we should note here that what the Incarnation changes is the world and hence philosophy, not God and theology. And in any case, there is nothing active in Jesus that is not already part of his eternal being. Hence Balthasar continues: "the form of his human self-awareness is the *expression*, in terms of this world, of his eternal consciousness as Son."¹⁷⁶ Also, his being as self never becomes a theme or *end in itself* but passes into prayer. His consciousness is up to speed with who he is – i.e. Son –, as the humanity comes to participate in that divine Sonship. As one who was already open to the Father's bidding in eternity, Jesus did not sin by breaking out of time as we tend to do in our rebellion, when we anticipate God, and want to play the titan or hero. Jesus waits, as he did eternally.

Now of course, there is *something* of a dialectic between the eternal or vertical and the particular horizontal diversity of the world that features in Balthasar's thought, as David Schindler has it. Nevertheless Balthasar is clear: The Incarnation was not the playing out of a drama – but it was original, unscored and worked out scene by scene: Christ did not know the end in the way that we do. Indeed, because the Incarnation was unanticipated even by the Old Testament history, it is that which is uniquely contingent and uniquely placed to give shape and even set "tramlines" for salvation history in the age of the Church. It was the Eternal within the temporal that allows the temporal to be taken up into eternal: "herein lies the solution to the theological problem of universals. The life of Christ, as was said, is the 'world of ideas' for the whole of history."¹⁷⁷ Because the historical life of Christ was open to eternity so he can influence things which happen at any point in history. Since Christ, one may speak of a continuance in an eternity latently present under time which flows toward and away from it.¹⁷⁸ The transcendentals (Beauty, Goodness, Truth) are also to be understood as mediating between particularity in creation and in God: they are not to be seen as abstraction.

Balthasar on more than one occasion refers to "the axial moment" around the 6–5 century BC (Karl Jaspers), during which human civilisations turned towards the higher – the god above, away from the horizontal to the vertical. Balth-

¹⁷⁵ Hans Urs von Balthasar, *A Theology of History* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1963), 24.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷⁷ Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Man in History: A Theological Study* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1968), 32.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 108.

asar acknowledges this, then adds that the biblical experience is the first to swing the vertical interpretation over so as to coincide with the horizontal. Eternity qualifies, even reduces the march of time. With an anti-Marxist flourish, Balthasar adds that we have to move forward with Christ to get home, for the way *back* to paradise is blocked, as Maximus told us in *Quaestio ad Thalassium* 59.

Likewise when it comes to the Holy Spirit:

The Holy Spirit in the Church is an historical factor, but it is not something that has developed in history. It creates history because it is its master. And it is the true master by having the freedom, not only of hovering over the waters of history, but of pouring forth from its innermost springs. Church time as the ear of the Holy Spirit is, in contrast to the Old Testament and the era of Christ, not time in which the unsurpassable fullness of revelation establishes and expresses itself.¹⁷⁹

Therefore it is impossible to point to all the secret causes behind significant events (hidden prayers, sufferings), for the stuff of Eternity is mysterious. The Spirit works through God's people. In this, salvation history in the Church is to be distinguished from world history.

A theology of history could be gathered without the burden of a world-historical interpretation of salvation history. More precisely, the salvation story as the historical revelation of God would have to be distinguished from the general history of mankind, in order, at a second stage, to be confronted with it.¹⁸⁰ There is a kind of quality time, a vertical time, (an insight that he ascribes to Bonaventura). Christ has established a 'vertical time' measure as norm for all horizontal, and he is happy to employ the *kairos* versus *chronos* opposition, as he already had done in 1963. Towards the end of the book he describes world history as the growing of the tares or the weeds, whereas the realm of historical grace is about being set free to beat a different path: "just as the indifference of freedom is a necessary creaturely substructure for the free answer of man to the God who incomprehensibly chooses him."¹⁸¹

So if anyone is to say that Balthasar was a theologian of history in a way that most scholastics were not, and point to his contribution in the area of a theology of salvation-history,¹⁸² this needs to be nuanced: his interest was more in *salvation-history* and church history as the continuation of that, than in world-history,

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 118.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 136

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 190.

¹⁸² See the volume dedicated to him: *Mysterium Salutis*, vol. 1: *Die Grundlagen heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik*, eds. Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer (Einsiedeln: Benzinger Verlag, 1965).

history as such, a sphere within which his 1968 book shows him to be unsure to tread.

However Balthasar was more lucid and more positive in the third part of the final part of his Trilogy: *Theologik: Der Geist der Wahrheit*. Refusing any idea of new creation that would compromise this creation (as in Joachim of Fiore), at p. 385 Balthasar teasingly approves of Calvin's view of the Spirit's role as that of sustaining, and giving life, power and movement (Inst I,13,14; similarly Beza *Opera* I,6). Then he name-checks Barth, and agrees that the Spirit allows, carries and is seen in creation so as to offer a foretaste of salvation such that nature is established and secured in grace.¹⁸³ Without giving an inch to Hegel, perhaps one may think of the Spirit as world-soul, he muses. If Augustine believed any such thing, he would fall on the created side of the divide, but the Chartres school and Abelard were a bit more daring in ascribing this activity to the Holy Spirit. This might have encouraged Pannenberg to follow through on Barth's tentative positing of a Trinitarian presence in the cosmos.¹⁸⁴ But Balthasar fears that Pannenberg's scheme subordinates the New Testament witness to the Old. This is to move in the wrong direction, he fears. Again, the New Testament account of the Spirit is that He is not as such immanent in creation but comes to transform it. Yet here we have a willingness on the part of Balthasar to see the Holy Spirit at work in the natural world, but this is not the same as making a great difference within world-history. There is little here to encourage a belief that Balthasar believed in the immanent possibilities of history.

The media-friendly Catholic theologian Richard Kocher has preferred to ally himself with the spirit of a Kantian Enlightenment.¹⁸⁵ There is a need for a theonomous overcoming of both autonomy and heteronomy, so that humans can find their dignified place under their Creator. Thinking in terms of causality is behind western competitiveness and should be eschewed. Providence came to be seen in the Enlightenment as a threat to freedom when human observers perceived it to be a quasi-divine immanence. The task of Reason was not to dispel the miraculous but purify them and make them understandable: that was Lessing's intention, and he allowed room for Christ's miracles since they were tied to extraordinary ethical teaching, which was not the case in the resurrection appearances in the canonical gospels. Miracles without ethical justification got

183 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theologik*, vol. III: *Der Geist der Wahrheit* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1985), 386.

184 *Ibid.*, 388: "Wie Barth sieht er hierfür die Kontinuität zwischen der alttestamentlichen *Ruach Jahwe* und dem neutestamentlichen *Pneuma Theou*."

185 Richard Kocher, *Herausgeforderter Vorsehungsglaube: Die Lehre von der Vorsehung im Horizont der gegenwärtigen Theologie* (St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1999).

in the way of, even undermined the sacred natural law, and it was nature miracles that seemed offensive when conversions did not. Kocher offers a way forward.¹⁸⁶ The living Church as the people of God experiencing such wonder in joyful common discourse will listen to the speaking creation rather than look for God in *Heilsgeschichte*. Franz Rosenzweig could teach us here. Here we see a renunciation of the possibility of mystery in history being understood by the light of faith.

Indeed Kocher argues that a belief in Providence only becomes Christian when it has a “for me” connection and where God is seen to be acting directly.¹⁸⁷ It might have lost respect in learned circles since the Enlightenment, but it is very much there in the Sermon on the Mount. Despite Voltaire’s having more a problem with a Christian doctrine of Providence not creation, 55 % of women and 39 % of men surveyed believe in God’s leading. Often, in Catholic theologies, it gets lost in the Doctrine of God, or one might say that Creation takes its place. However Kocher’s conclusion is upbeat: Jesus prayed to One who is Almighty and Father at the same time. This he thinks is a place to start with re-evangelisation, by announcing a freedom from fatalism, at least at the individual level, without imagining God is going to institute a Christian society¹⁸⁸ – despite our sense of larger space to be lost in. We have no right to happiness and Romano Guardini was right to plead for realism. We don’t have to have answers, or fix things, or create fantasies. One should not exclude miraculous from our consideration of Providence. It might be better to call this “dynamic creationism,” in which God gives impulses which are completed by the creation. Yet one should not confine God to having an effect only on the mind; there is mystery and paradox.¹⁸⁹

The traditional version of typology¹⁹⁰ allows for history to assume some fixed shape.¹⁹¹ One can know the general shape of events without being sure

186 Ibid., 44 with reference to Béla Weissmahr’s *Gottes Wirken in der Welt*.

187 Ibid., 29: “Erst in dem pro-me Bezug wird der Vorsehungsglaube Christlich.” And at 232: “Das Wunder offenbart in der Tat die tiefste, diese Welt eigentlich schon überschreitende Dimension der Welt selbst, weil und insofern in ihm die Endherrlichkeit aufleuchtet.”

188 Ibid., 352, with a nod to Henri de Lubac: “Die Vorsehungslehre mit ihrer Ausrichtung auf den einzelnen kann heute ähnlich befreiend wirken wie damals.” “Nur Gott kann in seiner Vorsehung Zukunft und Hoffnung schenken (vgl. Jer 29,11). Deshalb drängt die wissenschaftlich vortragene Lehre über die Vorsehung auf die Umsetzung im Leben” (354).

189 Kocher, *Herausgeforderter Vorsehungsglaube*, 334.

190 Seckler, *Das Heil in der Geschichte*, 195: “Im übrigen ist, wie sich noch deutlicher zeigen wird, die höchste innergeschichtliche Potenz nicht das Heil, sondern die Eröffnetheit zum Heil.” Cf. Aquinas, STh I-II 106,4: “*Initiavit nobis viam novam.*”

just how everything might turn out.¹⁹² The subjective grasp of Providence is quite limited; yet by knowing what salvation history is, one can at least know that there is such a thing as Providence. Christian faith looks to an ultimate redemption of History (“*Erlösung der Geschichte*”), not just from history (“*Erlösung von der Geschichte*”), according to Seckler, and a cosmic universalizing from the particular await us.¹⁹³ It might be better to say that history contains its own end within it because God is present to each point of it.

A serious contribution to the subject has been made by Hans-Christian Schmidbaur. For God to be active means for God to be personal, such that any attack on Providence is an attack on the Trinity. Nature and God's nature are givens, but God is not trapped in his own eternal bliss. He is not the boundary to all that is other than himself, but his transcendence and his personhood mean something mysterious and mobile, such that one cannot read off his nature from his deeds. Even in the Priestly Writings of the Old Testament, the transcendent God can still act immediately in the world. But he is not present in the way of men, so he gives much room to them to act, and his involvement is more at cosmic level. Thomas Aquinas was able to embed Providence in Heilsgeschichte, rather than vice versa. Any necessity has to do with God's knowledge of things, not in things themselves, as he argues on the basis of STh I q24 a3ad2. Although another way of putting this is that God's knowledge of things has to be a contingent knowledge of contingent things, yet as eternal has some sort of kinship to necessity, one which withstood the nominalist over-reaction whereby changeability became inconsistent and capricious.¹⁹⁴ With Aristotle's help Aquinas managed to free providence from Neoplatonic determinism, and combined this with a trust in spirituality in the future. Schmidbaur is not absolutely clear as to how Reformation predeterminism and Renaissance “autonomy of creation” went to-

191 Ibid., 204: “Gott hat hier in seiner speziellen Providenz das Geschehen gleichsam vorentworfen und vorgezeichnet und bringt dank einer Art prästahlierter Harmonie die in Frage stehende Typik, die als ‘prefiguration providentielle’ zu fassen wäre, hervor. Das (definitive) Ereignis und der (präfigurative) Typus wären in einem Dritten, dem providentiellen Plan, verbunden.”

192 Ibid., 207: “[...] das Plangefüge der Zeiten, aber er kennt nicht das Plangefüge der einzelnen Ereignisse.” Cf. at 209: “die Realisierung der Verknüpfung ebenso wie die Erhellung der Verknüpftheit übergeschichtlich sein müsse, insofern sie im Plan der Providenz gründe. Das ist für die thomanische Position jedoch unmöglich, da niemand diesen Plan kennt, selbst wenn er den Ereignissen tatsächlich zugrunde liegt.”

193 Ibid., 251.

194 Hans-Christian Schmidbaur, *Gottes Handeln in Welt und Geschichte: Eine trinitarische Theologie der Vorsehung*, Münchener theologische Studien 2/63 (St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 2003), 711: “Die Destruktion des thomasischen Vorsehungsbegriffes durch den Nominalismus.”

gether, but he is clear that things got worse in the separation of worlds of matter and spirit, not least in Jansenism, according to which grace worked on a passive nature. Providence went very quiet between Voltaire and Kant but it reappeared with the Idealists. Yet the Christian difference from Hegel is that God has plans for the world, but not for himself.¹⁹⁵

Schmidbaur concludes that Karl Rahner and Béla Weissmahr would wrongly limit God's action to secondary causes only, which fits a pluralistic theology of religions. Although it sounds respectable, the "secondary cause" theory has not really helped theology and science to talk.¹⁹⁶ And God seems to get kept at a distance; or he is close but not in creation, only in church. Something of the Incarnation demands that New Testament faith perceive the nearness of God to his creation. In God's mind some things are fixed although he does not determine all; but in themselves they are open to change.

One should speak of two types of divine action: a natural and a spiritual; in the latter there is not merely a vague presence available but rather a sharply personal one.¹⁹⁷ Yet the former borrows glory from the latter, and becomes soteriological. One might say that in the Cross both ways meet, and the Cross reminds us that there is a difference between the world as it is and the world as it should be as God's creation. All God's actions are particular but not all particular actions are (providentially) special.¹⁹⁸ The Church is not only the place where the activity of God is recognized and acknowledged (as Wiles can affirm)¹⁹⁹ but is also the place of God's special action.

195 Ibid., 718: "Im Christentum ist Vorsehung dasjenige, was Gott für seine Welt will, und das, weswegen er sie erschafft und vollendet, aber sie ist nicht der ewige Plan, wie Gott sich zu sich selbst vermittelt. Bei Hegel hat Gott eine Vorsehung für sich selbst."

196 Ibid., 759: "Sie hat, wie wir zeigen konnten, eher zu einem berührungslosen Nebeneinander naturwissenschaftlicher und glaubensbezogener Welt und Wirklichkeitsdeutung geführt."

197 Ibid., 123.

198 Ibid.: "Mit dieser Unterscheidung wird nicht die generelle Partikularität des göttlichen Handelns bestritten, da alle Handlungen Gottes partikular, aber nicht alle partikularen Handlungen speziell sind."

199 Maurice Wiles, *Faith and the Mystery of God* (London: SCM, 1982), 87.

Chapter Eight:

Coming up to date: works in the last five years

Conservation involves God acting through usual channels to keep promises to creation, although surprising occurrences might take place; *concursum* has God more actively involved. This means that one and the same effect results from two different acts, which both contribute. Charles Wood calls upon Quenstedt to affirm that God is not present in creaturely “undoings” (by creaturely conflict, natural failings and moral fault). The governing or ordering of creaturely activity towards God’s purposes should abandon Quenstedt’s fourfold division (*permissio – impeditio – directio – determinatio*) of “fixing limits”, although these four *could* be reconceived.¹ Accounts of Providence can still be too much stamped by the note of (pseudo-Stoic) consolation. The notion of God as Almighty (*Pantokrator*) can be reclaimed as being the One who holds all together, rather than one whose purpose always prevails – why else pray “Thy will be done”? Divine *gubernatio* includes judgment and mercy. Wood dislikes the Calhoun Report for limiting the Holy Spirit’s empowering presence to those who recognise God. As for us, we are called to the de-centering of our desires:² “God is providing in everything that goes on.”³

As for the Doctrine of God, Wood thinks that one can overdo the personalism in an account of the God of Providence. The doctrine can tend to promote passivity, smugness and bland theism. Trinitarian accounts by subscribing to the *opera Trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt* tend towards a Unitarian account, with God, as great subject, “acting on the world.”⁴ The *conservatio* comes from the Father, the *concursum* in the Spirit, and the *directio* through the Son.⁵ Each person gives one of the forms even if all act in one action.

In his book *Wirken Gottes* Christian Danz offers, at least in the first three-quarters of his book, a history of the idea of Providence. If one were to quip that this was the Providence of Providence, such a call would not be all that inappropriate. Providence has changed, it seems, but only through its being understood differently. And yet this subjectivisation, unlike the catholic writers above, will lead to some confusion of categories, as we shall see.

1 Charles Wood, *The Question of Providence* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 90.

2 Ibid., 115.

3 Ibid., 73.

4 Ibid., 78.

5 Ibid., 80.

According to Danz, an internalization of God's effects as produced in Augustine's late writings on predestination was reinforced by Luther. Augustine's overall view was that God had established order and confirmed it in the cosmos as a whole, even when parts seem out of joint (*Conf* VII.13). Danz approves of Hans Blumenberg's view that Augustine regarded all things as even now fixed and ordered, so as to reflect God's stable goodness.⁶ Contrary to Kurt Flasch's claims, it is not with Augustine, but more with Ockham that things start to change towards changeability.⁷ And when it comes to Luther his Ockhamism makes him all too ready to pounce on Is 28:21 which tells of the Lord's rising up to do his "strange work."⁸ It is necessary for this work to be hidden and not understood when it happens, as it contains a surprise element (*Römerbrief* 1515/16; WA 56,376 on Romans 8:26). Paradoxically, although Danz does not seem aware of it, the teaching that God alone effects what does happen (*Gott als Alleinwirksamkeit*) has, as its upshot, that the human will is about our self-determination.⁹ Of course with Luther it is the mysticism of abandonment, which gets recast as God's *Alleinwirksamkeit*. Just as Luther's teaching on Justification was more "spirituality than "objective" theology, so too with that on creation: Luther de-objectified God's action. Despite an attempt to re-objectify providence, by the time of Kant with his separation of religion and natural science, religion has become a catalyst for morality, or in Fichte's case a bit more important than that, perhaps even a cause. Tellingly, Danz seems to lose himself in discussing "Religion" at the expense of Providence before returning to it with a sort of coda:¹⁰ Schleiermacher confirms the idea that all and any talk of God's providence is an expression of a realisation of limitation. Yet God at the same time is known not metaphysically but as One who is acting.¹¹ Danz then moves to systematic-theological problems of the present. Clearly one of these is theodicy, and Hans Jonas' *Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz* (1984) understandably receives a fair bit of attention. The "theol-

6 Christian Danz, *Wirken Gottes: Zur Geschichte eines theologischen Grundbegriffs* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2007), 50: "Gott regiert und lenkt den Kosmos durch sein ordnendes Wirken."

7 Ibid., 70: "Zwar handelt Gott auch für Ockham immer in einer Ordnung, aber er ist frei von jeder bestimmten Ordnung."

8 Danz is reserved as to whether this is the same thing as "truly you are a God who hides himself"-type of *deus absconditus* theology.

9 Ibid., 87f.: "Luthers Deutung des göttlichen Wirkens als Ausdruck der eigenen Glaubensgewissheit."

10 Ibid., 124: "Die religiöse Rede vom Wirken Gottes ist vielmehr der Ausdruck eines religiösen Endlichkeitbewusstseins."

11 Friedrich Schleiermacher in *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (New York: Harper, 1958), § 130: "Auch Gott kann in der Religion nicht anders vorkommen als handelnd."

ogy and natural science endeavours” of Pannenberg and Welker are passed over fairly quickly. Karl Rahner is approved of for seeing God as a ground of human freedom, or a condition of such possibility. Barth is described as similar to Bultmann for relating providence to the project of the self,¹² although it is not at all clear that that was what Barth intended. The difference between Barth¹³ and Schleiermacher was that for the former, claims Danz, faith was about particular revelation to “me” in concrete situations, not a general sense of the whole, as in Schleiermacher. One thing we can be clear on, he insists: Barth *certainly* did not want to return to a pre-modern, orthodox scholastic account of Providence. Since the Reformation we cannot properly separate God from faith. Luther was aware how his doctrine of God was contained *within* a *credo*: “I believe” encapsulates all the rest. This rough consensus of great evangelical theologians makes Danz feel able to conclude that the reality of God is equal to the event of faith defined as reflexive knowledge of the self. Knowledge of God presupposes the actual fulfilment of faith and is the expression for the contingency of this, or God is the expression of our self-transparency.¹⁴ So, religion (again it seems interchangeable with providence) gives us orientation and maps out our conditions and limitations.¹⁵ Unlike the doctrine of Creation, Providence is not about there being as a given; but the self-assurance and meaning of human freedom. Providence is a place where we can take account of all necessity and contingency.¹⁶

12 Danz, *Wirken Gottes* 182, quoting from *Kirchliche Dogmatik* I/2, 153: “in dieser Beziehung aber nicht durch sie.”

13 Barth, KD I/2, 304–97. This seems a misreading of Barth who can speak of religion only as it receives its impression from God and Christ: “Die christliche Religion ist Prädikat an dem Subjekt des Namens Jesus Christus” (381). Or at 364: “Darin sieht er die Kraft Christi bei sich wohnen, darin weiß er sich stark, darin rühmt er sich. Und man wird ja gerade an Paulus studieren können, wie die wahre Sicherheit seines Seins und Wirkens, wie die Kraft seiner Entscheidung, wie die Festigkeit seiner Position auch nach außen, wie durchaus die Energie seines religiösen Selbstbewußtseins im Verhältnis zu dem anderen darin wurzelt, daß er das alles, die christliche Religion, in concreto: seine besonderen ‘Offenbarungen’ durch die Offenbarung, durch den Herrn Jesus Christus, auf das bestimmteste begrenzt sein ließ: ‘Wenn ich schwach bin, dann bin ich stark’.”

14 Danz, *Wirken Gottes*, 189: “Die Wirklichkeit Gottes ist gleichsam das Geschehen des Glaubens selbst als reflexive Selbsterkenntnis. Gotteserkenntnis entsteht damit erst in dem aktuellem Vollzug des Glaubens und ist der Ausdruck für die Unbedingtheit dieses Vollzugs. [...] Gott als Ausdruck der Selbstdurchsichtigkeit.”

15 *Ibid.*, 209.

16 Walter Sparr, “‘Die Religion aber ist Leben’. Welchen theologischen Gebrauch kann und sollte man vom ‘Leben überhaupt’ machen?,” in *Leben*, eds. Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, Marburger theologische Studien 45; Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie 9 (Marburg: Elwert, 1997): 15–39.

In moving to consider Klaus Fischer's recent book *Schicksal*, what is striking is the number of different threads unravelled as the book goes on, or the collage-like effect of the attempt. Near the beginning he concludes that Greek tragedy tells us that Wisdom can't avoid all evil: prophecy might help if one pays it heed, but even then (in the figure of Oedipus going into exile, in *Oedipus in Colonus*) as those whose insight is at best partial we simply have to trust in divine care.¹⁷ In the re-arranging of the cosmic metaphysical furniture by Plotinus all oppositions were gradually being brought towards harmony. The events in the foreground are (so, *Enneads* III,2[47]) just a game or a play. With Augustine one could go further and adopt an attitude where the *contemptus mundi* was moderated by a feeling of security in the shepherd's protection, with Christ also giving reality to the myths of eternal return: hence Christian flavouring was added to the Plotinian scheme.¹⁸ For Aquinas, God has created the secondary cause in which there is indeed defect and necessarily so (e.g., the prey suffers for the predator's good such that one can speak of evil moments as occasions for Good). God does not will the bad but He uses it. Ockham's God needs to keep creating out of nothing (*Quodlibet* VI.q1; Sent Id.2q.4). If Ockham is arbitrary, Descartes is even more so. Meanwhile with Shakespeare destinies are more self-sown, as in sowing the whirlwind of Hosea 8:7. Leibniz appears at the end of this epoch with the message that creation is limited, and so it is up to humans to be content with the past and creative in the present.¹⁹ Material and spiritual fortunes would correspond (*Monadologie* 79–90). Kant tells us that it is only Reason that gives us a realm of grace away from the actual world with the goal that of blessedness (*Glückseligkeit*). Karl Jaspers observed that chaos lies in the foundations of our actual reality. Accordingly Heidegger left behind Existence for Being, *Dasein* for *Sein*, which comes to us like something fated.²⁰

In this quick tour of theologians and philosophers, the recent ones shrug and admit that the actual world in which we live offers no solutions. Unlike Danz's account, there is no joined-up plot to the story of Providence, even as

17 See Fischer, *Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie*, 29f. The gods have balanced necessity with some order of Reason, even of Grace, despite appearances to the contrary. This insight was shared, with different emphases, by Plato, Aristotle and Epictetus.

18 Pannenberg in his defence of Augustine fails, according to Fischer (*Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie*, 53), to realise that the emphasis on human choice as the origin of sin, gave way to an insistence of the corruption of human nature. (Although surely it was more a case of the will's defectiveness.)

19 *Confessio Philosophi* 57,75; Fischer, *Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie*, 109.

20 Fischer, *Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie*, 119: "Nach der 'Kehre' denkt Heidegger Schicksal nicht mehr vom Dasein, sondern vom Sein her [...]. Statt von Schicksal, geht Rede vom 'Geschick' des Seins;" whereas before it was of *Dasein*.

a concept, let alone as a reality. One can admit that God “backs off” to allow humans to exercise their stewardly freedom.²¹ When William Hasker contends: “We have already seen that, if God were to prevent all evils whatsoever, almost all of our own incentive and motivation to deal constructively with situations conducive to such evils would disappear. But what would be the consequence if, instead, God were known to prevent all *gratuitous* evils – all evils whose occurrence would not lead to any greater good?,”²² we conclude with “absurdity.” Moreover, individual, personal disappointment is what hurts, not the big questions. Fischer is intrigued by Max Frisch’s *Homo Faber* (1957), in which the unlikely is only the boundary of the likely, such that there is nothing mysterious about it. Without admitting that life is bound by death, Frisch appears to have been influenced by Jung’s synchronicity. Fischer ponders whether there can there be a Jungian correspondence between dreams and outward life. There is the energy of the *Anziehungskraft des Bezüglichen* – the power of coincidences in which the psyche of a person comes into contact with repressed, split and cast-off parts of its life’s reality in secret contact, which seek the lost unity and reconciliation, and the psyche now works hard for this.²³ Fate can certainly shock us into knowing ourselves.

In the sphere of Revelation, that realm where faith is powerful and where the Father is a co-ordinating thing, there is, assures Fischer, no room for melancholy (*Schwermut*). Christ may well have experienced *Schicksal* “faktisch,” but it was interpreted within his soul, and hence he was able to transform the experience of Fate (*Schicksal*) into freedom and love. This makes Fischer ask the question with a somewhat clumsy Christological move: was not Jesus’ humanity nevertheless a partaker of darkness? Well surely there was at least some ambivalence about his human state of existence? One can say this without denying the transformation of Fate that has taken place through Christ’s passion, he suggests.²⁴ For us, Christ went through with the cross. Providence has for the believer the figure and face of Christ (“Die Vorsehung habe für ihn Gestalt und Antlitz Chris-

21 Dorothee Sölle, *Stellvertretung: Ein Kapitel Theologie nach dem Tode Gottes* (Freiburg: Kreuz Verlag, 1968), 125: “Der Mensch tritt in die Weltverantwortung ein, die früher Gott zugeschrieben wurde.” However the illusion of moral progress has evaporated. “Es ist nunmehr an der Zeit, etwas für Gott zu tun.”

22 William Hasker, *Providence, Evil and the Openness of God*, Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 147.

23 Fischer, *Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie*, 152: “Die Psyche eines Menschen scheint mit verdrängten, abgespaltenen, ja verstoßenen Teilen seiner Lebenswirklichkeit in geheimem Kontakt, sucht die verlorene Einheit und Versöhnung, ja erzwingt diese, in Falle des Homo Faber geradezu.”

24 *Ibid.*, 160.

ti"). We can behold this, and also be reassured that God will explain our personal trials at a later date.

Perhaps the theologian who commands most respect from Fischer is Karl Rahner, for whom suffering was best interpreted as an encounter with the Inaccessible ("Leid als Begegnung mit dem Unverfügbaren"),²⁵ thereby taking suffering as part of the God-relationship. As such it forces me to an *ekstasis*, as it also becomes real as something between us and God – and I lose myself in God's ungraspability (*Unbegreiflichkeit*).²⁶ This Rahnerian mysticism, one might say Ignatian mysticism, perhaps feels insufficiently dialogical for some tastes. Still, Rahner's point is that some light enters, even in the ungraspability of his disposal of us ("der Unbegreiflichkeit seiner Verfügung über uns").²⁷ Rahner would also insist however that this contributes to the growth of human freedom. We need suffering for training, since it can help point us beyond ourselves to God.

What becomes clear is that modern Catholics receive plaudits. Rahner thinks that non-believers can grasp God at the end of their natural reason: it is not enough to say to someone that God has suffered with them. Küng has agreed, adding that the Psalmist was always calling on God's power. Fischer also name-checks Catholic novelists such as Reinhold Schneider.²⁸ In his masterpiece *Winter in Wien*, Schneider finds painful the pious certainties of Albrecht von Haller. Much better is to acknowledge a presence from approaching death and not fearing it: "*numen adest*," as Schneider puts it.²⁹

The Catholic *Neutestamentler* Klaus Berger is also appreciated by Fischer for his theology of suffering: the answer is to look ahead to new experiences on the way to kingdom. The bible won't tell us why there is evil, but only that God is dealing with it, bringing Order, and helping us trust him for place of suffering in our story. Indeed the bible comes in more and more as the book goes on. Fischer approaches it with a mix of biblical critics, Jewish scholars (Buber) and choice theological exegetes such that the last word might be given to the bible. All these are voices that prefer to speak of Providence as that which pushes through Fate by the power of the Resurrection, not a doctrine to be admired.

25 Ibid., 161, quoting Karl Rahner, *Schriften zur Theologie XIV: In Sorge um die Kirche* (Zürich: Benziger, 1980), 463: "Die Unbegreiflichkeit des Leides ist ein Stück der Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes."

26 Rahner, *Schriften zur Theologie*, 462–6.

27 Text from *The Universe*: Holy Week, 1984.

28 "Genug, es ist ein Gott, es ruft es die Natur, / Der ganze Bau der Welt zeigt seiner Hände Spur."

29 Reinhold Schneider, *Winter in Wien: Aus meinen Notizbüchern 1957/58* (Freiburg: Herder, 1959), 261; Fischer, *Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie*, 156.

For without this technology has become our fate and doom.³⁰ Providence /*Fügung* is not a ground for believing in God, but rather vice versa; non-believers are just going to see it all as pure chance. It is helping each other after a crisis that Resurrection can be experienced, seeing in the darkness a spur to faithful action.³¹

There is a problem with this argument that something has to be seen to be Providence at the time: it confuses the categories of Providence and Guidance or Vocation. Similarly Leo Scheffczyk in an article agreed with Kocher that there lurks a gnostic danger in considering the Incarnation as a sign of optimism for humans. Effectively merely symbolic, it is no better than deism of sorts. His solution is to see creation as including an invitation to fellowship with God which can only be experienced as word and event of calling. Again there seems to be this assumption that Providence requires a sense of guidance on the side of the creature.³²

The late modern Protestant legacy might well be the individual project of the self, its definition and identity and managing of contingency (Danz).³³ The late-late modern offers a collage of views of Providence which shelter in the matrix of a catholic spirituality, overlap and lead to no conclusion except a hope for energising power (Fischer). Yet a corrective that Christian Link provides is to emphasise God's action is not one of force but a movement of suggesting and leading the imagination, so that Providence is not to be reduced to subjectivity at the expense of his will being done. Nor is it simply about a presence or even a power to be harnessed, but is a will coming to us from beyond us. It leads us back to a right understanding of creation, by tracing the footprints of God back to the originating creative purpose (Link).

To come right up to date on the English-speaking side, I shall take two recent essays from the same collection. First David Bentley Hart claims that Calvin had no doctrine of providence because he denied the divine will/permission distinc-

30 Klaus Fischer, "Schicksal, Fügung, Gott," *ZKTh* 133 (2011): 49–68, 51.

31 Ibid., 68: "[...] 'das böse Schicksal schafft,' indem es dieses umschafft, neu schafft, in seinen Dienst nimmt, in Segen verwandelt, zum Guten – Leben und Menschen zugute – fügt."

32 Leo Scheffczyk, "'Vorsehung' als Schlüssel zum Geheimnis von Gottes Welthandeln," *Forum Katholische Theologie* 9 (1993): 299–305, 305: "Danach ist Schöpfung, dem biblischen Verständnis entsprechend, die Eröffnung einer Gemeinschaft Gottes mit dem Menschen, eines convivium, das sich im ganzen Weltverlauf an allen Kreaturen als wirksame Gestalt des Weltbezuges Gottes aufweisen läßt [...]. Schöpfung dagegen bedeutet eine einzigartige Setzung einer Begründungs- und Mitteilungsrelation (vgl. H.E. Hengstenberg), die angemessen nur als personales Wort- und Rufgeschehen verstanden werden kann."

33 Lübke, *Religion nach der Aufklärung*, 166, who cites Francis Bacon: '*Tantum possumus quantum scimus*' and asserts "Bewältigte Kontingenz ist anerkannte Kontingenz".

tion. In the same era decadence was also apparent in the Dominican Banez's doctrine of *praemotio physica*.³⁴ This is a forceful rather than a moral pre-motion, for the creature in fact supplies the moral element of any action. On the Dominican account, God's predetermining the will "vertically" means he does not determine it. He makes it a certain way, and it then acts freely; grace rescues a few. This seems to suggest that God causes being originally and then causes it again each time we will/choose, and *efficient* causality seemed the only kind. Hart laments that this "ontic" causality reduces God to our level as one causal factor amongst others. Those early moderns loved the language of power, and hence were obsessed with cause and causation. The Molinist/Arminian variation, whereby God chooses among worlds to actualize isn't much better. Even Thomas by answering an Augustinian false interpretation of Paul was dealing in false questions in his ST I, q23,a5ad3, resulting in his notorious argument for predilective predestination *ante praevisa merita*.³⁵

Hart wants to start with 1Timothy 2:4 and contend that God simply wills universal salvation. Permissive providence really has to be transcendent as ontological cause built into creation. God is near all creatures. The solution is that God calls all and draws all but gives all the gnomic will to resist. This is closer to Christian revelation, he believes, in that it is more Christ-like, i.e. it is analogous to the way Jesus operated. "Simply said, if God required evil to accomplish his good ends the revelation of his nature to finite minds – then not only would evil possess a real existence over against the good, but God himself would be dependent on evil."³⁶ The voluntarist God of the Absolute is an imposter and leads us into nihilism. We need to listen to Heidegger in his *Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*.³⁷ One might point out that in Hart's previous monograph there was a theology of presence or *kabod*, which did not always seem to affirm God's acting in the concrete particular. The idea of musical counterpoint was as close to analogy for providence as he got.³⁸

34 David Bentley Hart, "Providence and Causality: On Divine Innocence," in *The Providence of God: Deus Habet Consilium*, eds. Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler (New York: Continuum, 2009): 34–56.

35 Ibid., 55, n. 33

36 Ibid., 49.

37 Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2006), 64–5.

38 David Bentley Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).

In the same volume John Webster provides a more balanced approach.³⁹ All Christian doctrines are functions of the doctrine of the Trinity (“Providence is an aspect of the wonder of the overflow of God’s abundant life”). “Moreover, distributed in this way, providence is informed by other tracts of Christian teaching – most of all the doctrine of God, but also, for example, creation, soteriology and anthropology.”⁴⁰ This helps to keep the doctrine’s Christian flavour. Also, it should always be linked to the doctrine of God, or else it gets too subjectivised, as with Schleiermacher who was rather unbalanced when he insisted: “for a Christian consciousness, all the things have existence only as they are related to the efficacy of redemption.”⁴¹

Getting into philosophical debates about causality and agency is secondary, as belonging to the task of disputation, one that comes only after exposition. Hence one must not start from “the universe needs a ruler and God must be he who fitted that job description.” One starts with Christian faith:

Only in that movement of disappointment and trust is providence known. This is simply to say that the knowledge of providence is knowledge of faith [...]. Providence is knowledge of God, and known as God is known, in the act of faith. The creaturely act of faith is the work of the Holy Spirit, a point at which reason is caught up in an antecedent gracious causality which enables the intellect to see God and all things in God by locating its operations *coram Deo*. This is why faith in Providence is only derivatively ‘subjective’, an interpretation of and attitude towards the world. Primarily and strictly it is *objective*, generated and sustained by a movement from outside reason.⁴²

In other words a moment of revelation, or derived from revelation, leading to conviction is needed. Believing that our time is under God’s hand, we can have confidence to attempt to make sense of it. There is comfort not tragedy and a freedom from anxiety that Calvin remarked on (*Institutes* I 17.11), which in turn is creative. Providence anticipates the missions of the Trinity: “providence is the love of God which, corresponding to creativity, superintends the historical order of created being so that its relation to the creator may flourish (love as *fidelity*).”⁴³ This is an engaged involvement which is much more than mere foreknowledge. “The Spirit causes creaturely causes; The Son intervenes to

³⁹ John Webster, “On the Theology of Providence,” in *The Providence of God: Deus Habet Consilium*, eds. Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler (New York: Continuum, 2009): 158 – 75, 159.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁴¹ Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, ed. Hugh R. Mackintosh and James S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963), 723, quoted in Webster, “Theology of Providence,” 161.

⁴² Webster, “Theology of Providence,” 163, after Zwingli.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 167.

draw creation back from ruin so that it may attain its end.” God’s action amounts to a ministerial cause not a principal one – though as final and efficient cause. Creation is thus relatively independent “but still needs sustaining, yet not as ontologically precarious.”⁴⁴ A creature can be moved inwardly though derived from outer source. Creaturely willingness not indifference, even as it receives stimulation to act freely.

Recently, Terry J. Wright’s *Providence Made Flesh* wants to see eschatology realized in the sense of Presence. To believe in Providence is to believe: “that God acts as he works out from the midst of his people, the Church, and through the Church, his body, the world; and by faithfully offering humanity back to the Father in his own flesh, again, by the Spirit, the world has access into – or becomes in its entirety the place of – the presence of God.”⁴⁵ In a novel and even refreshing approach, Wright is determined to avoid causal language. *Gubernatio* gets collapsed into *concursus* and “the Son makes atonement and thus ensures the continuance of God’s presence in the world.”⁴⁶ God sustains all things equally, but his presence’s intensity varies. God can be more present in some things than in others. As to how God acts then: this question “need not arise.”⁴⁷ Yet the “how is He present” question is not answered either! “Deutero-Isaiah believed God to be present in the expansion of the Persian Empire across the ancient Near East.”⁴⁸ Well, how so? We are told: “it is in the Spirit-directed, obedient life of Christ, and in the Spirit-directed, obedient life of Christ’s body, the Church, that God’s providence is made flesh,”⁴⁹ yet the examples given: “Is God intensely present equally in the execution of a despot and the rape of a minor?” or in the 9/11 attacks, seems to have little to do with the mediation of that presence through the church.

In another very recent monograph Alexander Jensen is sympathetic towards the Process Theology’s notion of God contributing to history by providing no more than a divine lure, although he wants to suggest it is more than that, because as transcendent (according to transcendence in a “strong” sense), God is source of all being, not an existent being to be in conflict or having to lure another. For as Aquinas and Tanner have both argued, divine causality is quite dif-

⁴⁴ Ibid., 168.

⁴⁵ Terry J. Wright, *Providence Made Flesh: Divine Presence as a Framework for a Theology of Presence* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), 223.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 228.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 232.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 231.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 136.

ferent from the created version.⁵⁰ He rejoices that Providence is really a modern and enlightenment doctrine, since after 1700 the world was no longer viewed as static. What this means for God is a little unclear. It would seem that Jensen accords with Alfred North Whitehead's view of God as poet, giving the world vision, and hence reaction to the world to some degree. What one is left with, from readings of Schleiermacher is that divine presence as "mere extension of his influence" can be corrected by Bonhoeffer's vision, for whom divine personal presence could be mediated through Word and sacrament and the believing community; but don't forget the Spirit who mediates life of Christ in a hidden way. Jensen wants to replace the "feeling of absolute dependence" with "experience of the presence of the Risen Christ" as the centre of the doctrine. "God is beyond being, utterly ineffable, but, at the same time, present in creation in a very real way."⁵¹

This vision is self-consciously Christocentric: the logos as the divine agency within time and space, while the Father is the transcendent divine agency beyond time and space. Drawing on the *De Genesi ad Litteram* 1,2,6 Jensen claims patristic authority for creation as being something that takes place within the duration of the Trinity:

This is supported by the observation that Augustine, discussing creation in *the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, makes an explicit link between the creation of time and the co-eternity of the Son with the Father. Whatever the This is itself excludes the possibility of any stasis in eternity – contrary to Pannenberg's reading, which assumes that Augustine thought of divine eternity as static.⁵²

God may well speak creation into existence which is then all present to him: but that does not mean that God is *not* to be thought as residing beyond created space, for his transcendence is "otherwise." The problem is that such a move has the Arian implications of which Augustine and others would have been only too aware.

Another misinterpretation appears with regard to Scotus and univocity.⁵³ Without going too deeply into late medieval metaphysics, the notion of "univocity of being" allowed for God to be seen as a partner of humanity in his relating

⁵⁰ Alexander S. Jensen, *Divine Providence and Human Agency: Trinity, Creation and Freedom* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2014), 5.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 140 f.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 39.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 43. Jensen helpfully adduces Scotus' *Opus Oxoniense I dist III, q1*, which when combined with Ockham (*Questiones in librum secundum sententiarum Rep II qu 8*), seems to result in a God whose "duration is not completely simultaneous."

to his creation *ad extra*, even while in himself he is totally transcendent and beyond such categories as duration. He seems here to envisage temporal providence mapping on to an eternal willing of long duration, which touches the world through the “organ” of “the one simultaneous and eternal act of God’s willing.”⁵⁴ This means that creation is unnecessary, without having to speculate that God chose it from a number of possible worlds. Yet in Jensen’s picture, the divine will here acts as a conduit for a God who can hardly hold back from creating. Further, where he agrees with Schleiermacher, that God is eternally actively creating, one needs to object that’s not the same thing as God’s being experiencing duration in time, however much Jensen thinks it is. Surely, *pace* Jensen, according to Barth the divine *Dauer* is not a worldly *Dauer*, but there is only analogically speaking “time” or duration in the Trinity.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 142.

Conclusion

The early Christian writers were keen to show how Christianity showed a freedom that was purposeful, because it built on a creation order that manifested those values. If one might view him as synthesizing much of the patristic thinking on the matter, then Augustine conceived of providence as intelligent, that God has a relationship of ordaining and ordering towards creation. Providence works on a cosmic scale, relating to groups (“human race”, “church”) before it comes down to individuals, yet it is for the individual who is pursued by supernatural grace to see how the divine cosmic plan has a place for him or her. How providence works in individual lives remains mostly hidden, with glimpses at odd moments, and is more clearly visible in key turning-points of public history. When individuals embrace it, then the prevenient grace working within them leads them towards providence.

With Boethius as representative of a less confident Christian society, Providence became more transcendent, even aloof, as it remained in heaven as a surveying presence there. Fortune and Philosophy moved in to fill the gap. With Eriugena too, it was not some intermediary world-soul but the Spirit Himself, understood as the divine power of a divine mind, who fulfilled the task of continuing creation and perfecting it while doing so, yet this was done to creation rather than inviting creatures to find their historical place within a divine plan. The earlier Middle Ages did not believe in the progress of nature, or the spiritualising of it, but in the revelation of God through misfortune so that there could be spiritual progress for souls, despite the world’s darkness and senescence (so, Hugh). This pessimism about this world could lead to an eschatological mentality, wherein the monastic movement was the harbinger of a new world taking shape, with Christ’s presence becoming stronger in the world until his return became inevitable. The theology of the Byzantine early middle ages insisted on free will against the insidious temptations of cosmic monism (“Islamic” determinism) or cosmic dualism (forces both divine and Satanic). Not all suffering is evil if the right reaction to it is chosen.

In Scholastic Theology Providence became even more strongly a doctrine about the Being of God, as reflecting on the combination of Divine Intellect and Will. Dominicans stressed both the Generosity and the Omniscience of God, with Predestination in the order of redemption as being more like an executive decision in time, posterior to the providential divine disposition. Franciscans held providence to be less a plan in the Divine Mind and more the exercise of that will. In that sense the Franciscans were true both to Augustine with his emphasis on the Creator-creation relationship, but also forward-thinking. Later

medieval thinkers preferred to see Providence as to do with signposts in creation which gave persons a certain freedom to respond intelligently, rather than seeing Providence in overly directive terms. For Aquinas there was no sense of God being one cause among others, but that did now seem appropriate: divine and creaturely freedom in proportion allowed the affective to be effective, even while resistible. Causality could be viewed as transferred rather than as delegated or secondary, with an immediacy in creation, yet with other causes also being available. God could be related to and one could come to share in his providential detachment, even while trusting one's senses as the best way of being informed about life. One could have a prudential wisdom about the future and this in the image of God.

For Luther, God's larger plans and providence in all His freedom and creativity were not accessible to the human mind, but graciously, guidance for one's own and family life could be glimpsed and even grasped. Special providence was not restricted to believers, since it works off the back of divinely instituted and guided institutions such as family, law, government (Melanchthon) and also culture and the arts (Calvin), but believers are able to recognise it and see God and Christ in it. With the later Reformation, Providence seemed more like judgement, with only a remnant remaining, as Predestination took over Providence, or at least stamped it indelibly. However in Bullinger, and in a continuing tradition, providence was an assurance of everyday goodness, even as the end of the Age approached.

The early modern interest in natural science led to a love of details in a period when theology seemed to be at an impasse in a divided Europe. Although some like Newton believed passionately in a God active in the world (while not belonging to the world as per some pantheism), the Enlightenment confidence affirmed a dignified freedom of humanity through reason. If *concursum* was a doctrine that intended to guard God's part in human affairs, by the eighteenth century it served more to guarantee humanity's part in divine affairs. With an increase in subjectivity as the foundation of religion, providence got easily conflated with guidance or vocation, so long as (in Schleiermacher's view) the things perceived were significant and not trivial. God remained at a height above the all. The humanity of Christ gave moral guidance to help plot one's way in life.

It will be observed that in the review of the last half-century or so on theology of providence, the particular theories of Process Theology and the Theologies in the light of Natural Science have been left to one side, or only mentioned in passing. If this means presupposing a particular theology and a particular Anthropology, then the justification for this can be sought in the following chapters. There are three things to notice in the recent Protestant treatments of the doc-

trine, which one could almost call “trends”: the turn to continuous creation to speak of the maintaining of creation, formerly known as “conservation”; the responsiveness of God in the *concursus* (a co-operation with creatures); the eschatologising and simultaneously the universalising and “developmental-constructive” nature of *gubernatio*.

In what sense are the three components of the traditional understanding of the doctrine: *conservatio*, *concursus* and *gubernatio* to be preserved at all costs? These are not different actions, but three aspects of one Divine work that has been ongoing ever since creation. Translated into theological sense these mean, respectively, that God has to engage with the forces of chaos and un-creation unleashed or given access to the world through human sin, that he has to work with human agents, and hence there is a place primarily although not exclusively for the church, and that he has to steer the rudder in order to correct the direction that a sequence of events is taking, not least when human assertion of creaturely freedom is deceived into compulsive and uncontrollable tendencies. This might seem to make God’s Sovereignty look rather limited, with only the reassurance that the *eschaton* will bring him a full degree of control. (That is of course what Barth allows, while not wanting to speculate overly much on that latter scenario.) Conceived of in this way, *conservatio* and *gubernatio* amount to the same thing, leaving only *concursus* as the area for discussion. The former two could be accounted for through deistic-sounding principles of teleological moral law built into the world: opposing or straying from these will eventually prove one’s undoing. *Concursus* however requires a consideration of “hand to hand” combat (of the Jacob’s Ladder sort).

Part of the problem is the atrophy of the natural scientific imagination. How things work or do not work, how they can be made to work, what is behind the appearances – all these things are worthy, yet like indulged children demand that those who work in the humanities play their games, with their rules. There is nothing outside the material, or what is spiritual is simply energy. Any idea of the historical, the ethical, the metaphysical is only of use as it helps to shed illusions: such discourse is commanded to be self-deconstructing.

History can be viewed as the meaningful unfolding of stories large and small, public and private. Michael Higon has taken Hans Frei’s lament, that the end of figuration meant the end of Providence as a sign that Frei accepted the death and the inevitable remaining dead of figuration: “The providential history of God’s ways with the world which underlays pre-critical figural interpretation has been replaced by an inward history in which the truly significant occurrences lie beneath the surface, as modulations in the rhythms in the one,

cumulative, evolving, continuous story of Spirit.”¹ Higton follows this with what he feels is Frei’s manifesto for retrieving figural interpretation: “What Frei calls ‘figural interpretation’ is nothing more than the process by which Christians pay ever-renewed attention to the particularity of Jesus Christ on the one hand, and to this thoroughly historical world on the other and trust to find glimpses of ways in which each worldly reality might find its own particularly appropriate fulfilment in Christ.”

The point that Higton’s otherwise helpful analysis seems to miss is that for Frei it was more a case of operating from the bible’s own vision of Christ towards a re-shaped vision of the world that would in turn re-shape and not just accommodate worldly reality. There is a confidence that understanding the biblical pattern of providential history can inspire afresh an awareness of how God might be at work now. This does not retreat to the vision that was lost post-Cocceius but it does *reclaim* it as it gains more. Hence, to speak of history in Christ means that history is held as a span between both Advents; that those in Christ can see it as meaningful as much as absurd and that the story of Jesus informs more than is informed by other historical events or mythical constructs. The Cross when understood in its context is rich in possibilities – for hope, self-recognition, transformation, mutual forgiveness, solidarity. There is an energy which is hidden yet which plots and moves, available to all who will not hold on to themselves and lives, but see the story as taking them on.² The Incarnation is more than simply a part of God’s providential order; it is part of it so as to encompass it and suffuse that order with a dynamic presence that makes a possibility of each moment.

Only on the basis of a theology of history which thinks of the course of events as meeting with God’s *Heilsgeschichte* in its judgement and salvation at Creation, Incarnation, Cross and Second Advent, does world-history – and the stories of lives contained within these larger stories – receive a framing and a fixing worthy of a Christian biblical and theological doctrine of Providence. How that *should* look has not been the purpose of this book. *That* has been to review the history of teaching and ideas about Providence, the better to understand Providence and in turn the better to understand providence in our time. However the constructive task of offering insight into what a doctrine of Providence should look like in this generation lies beyond this book, but it is to be hoped that these pages, with their presentation of historical examples of thinkers grappling with Providence have made that next step a little less daunting to take.

¹ Higton, *Christ, Providence and History*, 149.

² I have found the last chapter of Eberhard Jüngel’s *Gott als Geheimnis der Welt*, 6. Aufl. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992) suggestive here.

Bibliography

- Adler, William. "Eusebius' Critique of Africanus." In *Julius Africanus und die Christliche Weltchronistik*, edited by Martin Wallraff, 147–157. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur 157. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006.
- Aertsen, Jan A. "Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)." In *On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Egbert P. Bos and Pieter A. Meijer, 120–140. Philosophia Antiqua LIII. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
- Ahnert, Thomas. *Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment: Faith and the Reform of Learning in the Thought of Christian Thomasius*. Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2006.
- Albano, Maeve Edith. *Vico and Providence*. Emory Vico Studies, 1. Bern: P Lang, 1986.
- Allen, Pauline. *Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-century Heresy: The Synodical Letter and Other Documents*. Oxford Early Christian Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Amand, David. *Fatalisme et liberte dans l'antiquité grecque: Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les Philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles*. Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1945.
- Andersen, David. "Fra Paolino's 'De Providentia et Fortuna'." *Das Mittelalter* 1 (1996): 51–73.
- Ansorge, Dirk. *Johannes Scottus Eriugena: Wahrheit als Prozeß. Eine theologische Interpretation von 'Periphyseon'*. Innsbruck-Wien: Tyrolia, 1996.
- Armogathe, Jean-Robert. *La Nature du Monde: Science Nouvelle Et Exégèse au XVIIe Siècle*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007.
- , "Deus legislator." In *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy*, edited by Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, 265–277. Farnham: Ashgate, 2008.
- Asendorf, Ulrich. "Die ökumenische Bedeutung von Luthers Genesis-Vorlesung (1535–1545)." In *Caritas Dei: Beiträge zum Verständnis Luthers und der gegenwärtigen Ökumene: Festschrift für Tuomo Mannermaa zum 60. Geburtstag*, edited by Oswald Bayer, Robert W. Jensen, and Simo Knuuttila, 18–40. Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 1997.
- , *Lectura in Biblia: Luthers Genesisvorlesung (1535–1545)*. Forschungen zur Systematischen und Ökumenischen Theologie 87. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998.
- Attridge, Harold W. *The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates Judaicae of Flavius Josephus*. Harvard Dissertations in Religion 7. Missoula: Scholars, 1976.
- Auerbach, Eric. *Mimesis: Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Literatur*. 10th Auflage. Tübingen-Basel: Francke, 2001.
- Bacon, Roger. *Opus maius*, edited by John Henry Bridges. Frankfurt: Minerva-Verlag, 1964.
- Baelz, Peter. *Prayer and Providence: A Background Study*. London: SCM, 1968.
- Bakhouché, Béatrice. "Boèce et le Timée." In *Boèce ou la chaîne de savoirs: Actes Du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac, Présidée Par Edouard Bonnefous, Paris, 8–12 Juin 1999*, edited by A. Galonnier, 5–22. Philosophes Médiévaux 44. Louvain-la-Neuve/Paris: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie/Éditions Peeters, 2003.

- Bannach, Klaus. *Die Lehre von der Doppelten Macht Gottes bei Wilhelm von Ockham. Problemsgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen und Bedeutung*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1975.
- Bartlett, Robert. *Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- Barth, Karl. *Die Christliche Lehre nach dem Heidelberger Katechismus*. München: Kasier, 1949.
- , *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*. 4 volumes. Munich: Kaiser, 1932–1970.
- , *Church Dogmatics*, edited by Thomas F. Torrance and Geoffrey W. Bromiley, translated by Geoffrey William Bromiley. 4 vols. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956–1969.
- Batut, Jean-Pierre. *Pantocrator: Dieu le Père tout-puissant' dans la théologie préconcilienne'*. Collection des études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 189. Paris: Institut d'Etudes Augustiniennes, 2009.
- Beck, Andreas J. *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676): Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre*. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 92. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007.
- Beck, Hans-Georg. *Das Byzantinische Jahrtausend*. 2. Auflage. München: C.H. Beck, 1994.
- Beck, Hildebrand P. *Vorsehung und Vorherbestimmung in der theologischen Literatur der Byzantiner*. Roma: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1937.
- Beer, Gillian. *Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-century Fiction*. 3rd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Beer, John. *Providence and Love: Studies in Wordsworth, Channing, Myers, George Eliot, and Ruskin*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Beintker, Michael. "Die Frage nach Gottes Wirken im geschichtlichen Leben." *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 90 (1993): 442–461.
- Benjamins, Hendrik S. *Eingeordnete Freiheit: Freiheit und Vorsehung bei Origenes*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 48. Leiden: Brill, 1994.
- Benz, Ernst. "Joachim-Studien I. Die Kategorien der religiösen Geschichtsdeutung Joachims." *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 50 (1931): 24–111.
- Bergjan, Silke-Petra. *Der fürsorgende Gott: Der Begriff der "Pronoia" Gottes in der apologetischen Literatur der Alten Kirche*. Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 81. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001.
- , "Das hier ist kein Theater, und ihr sitzt nicht da, um Schauspieler zu betrachten und zu klatschen": Theaterpolemik und Theatermetaphern bei Johannes Chrysostomos." *Zeitschrift für antikes Christentum* 8 (2004): 567–592.
- , "Verus narrator extiti, non callidus disputator: Johannes Coccejus' Lektüre der Kirchenväter im niederländischen Sabbatstreit." In *Patristic Tradition and Intellectual Paradigms in the 17th Century*, edited by Silke-Petra Bergjan and Karla Pollmann, 73–104. Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation: Studies in the Late Middle Ages, Humanism, and the Reformation, 52. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.
- , "The Concept of *Pronoia* in the Stromateis, Book VII." In *The Seventh Book of the Stromateis*, edited by M Matyáš Havrda, Vít Hušek and Jana Plátová, 63–92. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 117. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Berkouwer, Gerrit C. *The Providence of God*. Studies in Dogmatics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952.
- , *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction and Critical Appraisal*, translated by Harry R. Boer. 2nd Edition. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956.

- Bernanos, Georges. *The Diary of a Country Priest*, translated by Pamela Morris. London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1975.
- Bernhardt, Reinhold. *Was heißt 'Handeln Gottes'? Eine Rekonstruktion der Lehre von der Vorsehung Gottes*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1999.
- Beuttler, Ulrich. *Gott und Raum – Theologie der Weltgegenwart Gottes*. Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie, 127. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010.
- Bienert, Wolfgang A. *Dionysius von Alexandrien*. Patristische Texte und Studien 21. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978.
- Blowers, Paul M. *Drama of the Divine Economy: Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology and Piety*. Oxford Early Christian Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Blumenberg, Hans. *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*. 2. Auflage. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999.
- Boehm, Laetitia. "Der wissenschaftstheoretische Ort der historia im Mittelalter: Die Geschichte auf dem Wege zur 'Geschichtswissenschaft'." In *Speculum Historiale: Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung – Johannes Spörl aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages, dargebracht von Weggenossen, Freunden und Schülern*, edited by Clemens Bauer, Laetitia Boehm, and Max Müller, 663–693. Freiburg-München: Karl Alber, 1965.
- Boehner, Philotheus. *Guillelmi de Ockham opera philosophica et theologica. Opera theological*. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1967–1986.
- Bohatec, Josef. *Die Religionsphilosophie Kants in der 'Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft'*. Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1938.
- Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. *Widerstand und Ergebung: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 2002.
- Borst, Arno. *Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker*. 6 volumes. Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, 1957.
- , "Das Bild der Geschichte in der Enzyklopädie Isidors von Sevilla." *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 22 (1966): 1–62.
- , "Weltgeschichten im Mittelalter?" In *Poetik und Hermeneutik V: Geschichte, Ereignis und Erzählung*, edited by Reinhart Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter Stempel, 452–456. München: Fink, 1973.
- Bos, Egbert P. "Ockham on the First Proposition of the Liber de Causis." In *On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Egbert P. Bos and Pieter A. Meijer, 171–189. Philosophia Antiqua LIII. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
- Bossuet, Jacques-Bénigne. *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*. Paris: Mabre-Cramoisy, 1681.
- Bouteneff, Peter C. "The Two Wills of God: Providence in St John of Damascus," *Studia Patristica* 42 (2006), 291–296.
- Bouton-Touboulic, Anne-Isabelle. "Ordre manifeste et ordre caché dans le Sermon sur la Providence de saint Augustin." In *Augustin Prédicateur (395–411)*, edited by Goulven Madec, 303–319. Paris: Institute d'Études Augustiniennes, 1999.
- , *L'Ordre Caché : la notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*. Collection Etudes augustiniennes. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004.
- Bozeman, Theodore Dwight. "Federal Theology and the 'National Covenant': An Elizabethan Presbyterian Case Study." *Church History* 61 (1992): 394–407.
- Brancato, Dario. "Readers and Interpreters of the *Consolatio* in Italy, 1300–1550." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr. and Philip

- Edward Phillips, 357–405. Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 30. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Breen, Quirinus. "Melanchthon's Reply to Pico della Mirandola." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13 (1952): 413–426.
- Brito, Emile. *La création selon Schelling*. Leuven: Bibliotheca Ephemeridum theologicarum Lovaniensium; 80, 1987.
- Brooke, John Hedley. "Darwin and Victorian Christianity." In *The Cambridge Companion to Darwin*, edited by Jonathan Hodge and Gregory Radick, 192–213. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Brosseder, Claudia. *Im Bann der Sterne: Caspar Peucer, Philipp Melanchthon und andere Wittenberger Astrologen*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004.
- Brouwer, Christian. *Schellings Freiheitsschrift: Studien zu ihrer Interpretation und ihrer Bedeutung für die theologische Diskussion*. Religion in Philosophy and Theology 59. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011.
- Brown, Stuart. "The Regularization of Providence in Post-Cartesian Philosophy." In *Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Robert Crocker, 1–16. Archives Internationales d'histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas, 180. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001.
- , *Providence and Empire: Religion, Politics and Society in Britain and Ireland, 1815–1914* (London: Routledge, 2008.)
- Brueckner, Wolfgang. "Erneuerung als selektive Tradition." In *Der Übergang zur Neuzeit und die Wirkung der Traditionen: Vorträge gehalten auf der Tagung der Joachim Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Hamburg am 13. und 14. Oktober 1977*, 55–78. Veröffentlichung der Joachim Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Hamburg 32. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978.
- Bühler, Pierre. *Prédestination et Providence*. Dossiers de l'Encyclopédie du Protestantisme 43. Paris-Geneva: Cerf-Labor et Fides, 1999.
- Bunge, Gabriel. "Encore une fois: Hénade ou monade? Au sujet de deux notions-clés de la terminologie technique d'Évagre le Pontique." *Adamantius* 15 (2009): 9–42.
- Burnet, Gilbert. *A Sermon Preached in the Chapel of St. James' before His Highness the Prince of Orange, the 23^d of December, 1688*. London, 1689.
- Burt, Donald X. "Cain's City: Augustine's Reflections on the Origins of the Civil Society (Book XV 1–8)." In *Augustinus: De civitate dei*, edited by Christoph Horn, 195–210. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997.
- Bushnell, Horace. *Nature and the Supernatural as Together Constituting the One System of God*. New York: Scribner, 1895.
- Bussi eres, Marie-Pierre. *Ambrosiaster. Contre les Pa iens – Sur le destin: Texte, traduction et commentaire*. Sources Ch r tiennes 512. Paris:  ditions du Cerf, 2007.
- B ttner, Manfred. *Regiert Gott die Welt? Vorsehung Gottes und Geographie: Studien zur Providentiallehre bei Zwingli und Melanchthon*. Calwer Theologische Monographien 3. Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1975.
- , "Die Neuausrichtung der Providentiallehre durch Bartholom us Keckermann im Zusammenhang der Emanzipation der Geographie aus der Theologie." *Zeitschrift f r Religions und Geistesgeschichte* 28 (1976): 123–132.
- Campi, Emidio. "Genesis Commentary: Interpreting Creation." In *A Companion to Peter Martyr Vermigli*, edited by Torrance Kirby, Emidio Campi, and Frank James III, 209–229. Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 16. Leiden: Brill, 2009.

- Capizzi, Carmelo. *Pantokrator saggio d'esegesi letterario-iconografica*. Orientalia Christiana Analecta 170. Roma: Pontificio Istituto Orientalium Studiorum, 1964.
- Cashdollar, Charles D. "The Social Implications of the Doctrine of Divine Providence: A Nineteenth-Century Debate in American Theology." *Harvard Theological Review* 71 (1978): 265–284.
- Cessario, Romanus. "Is Aquinas's *Summa* Only about Grace?" In *Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris: image et message de Saint Thomas d'Aquin à travers les récentes études historiques, herméneutiques et doctrinales; hommage au professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell OP à l'occasion de son 65e anniversaire*, edited by Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira, 197–210. Studia Friburgensia 78. Fribourg: Editions Universitaire, 1993.
- Charnock, Stephen. "A Discourse of Divine Providence." In *The Works of Stephen Charnock*. Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1864.
- Chaparro, Sandra. *Providentia: El discurso político providencialista español de los siglos XVI y XVII*. Biblioteca Comillas: Historia de las Ideas, 2. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2012.
- Chardonens, Denis. *L'homme Sous Le Regard de La Providence: Providence de Dieu et condition humaine selon l'Exposition littéraire sur le livre de Job de Thomas d'Aquin*. Bibliothèque Thomiste 50. Paris: Vrin, 1997.
- Charity, Alan C. *Events and their Afterlife: the Dialectics of Christian Typology in the Bible and Dante*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- Chesnut, Glenn A. *The First Christian Histories: Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Evagrius*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1977.
- Chrysostom, St. John. *Old Testament Homilies: Homilies on Isaiah and Jeremiah Volume Two*. Translated with an introduction by Robert Charles Hill. Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2003.
- Colish, Marcia L. *Peter Lombard*. 2 vols. Studies in Intellectual History, 41. Leiden; Brill, 1994.
- Congar, Yves M. "Église et Cité de Dieu chez quelques auteurs cisterciens à l'époque des Croisades: En particulier dans le De peregrinate civitate Dei d'Henri d'Albano." In *Melanges offerts à Etienne Gilson de l'Académie française*, 173–202. Etudes de philosophie médiévale. Hors série. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1959.
- Cooper, Steven A. *Marius Victorinus' Commentary on Galatians*. Oxford Early Christian Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Cordemaan, Claas. *Heders christlicher Monismus: Eine Studie zur Grundlegung von Johann Gottfried Herders Christologie und Humanitätsideal*. Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 154. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.
- Courcelle, Pierre. *'La Consolation de philosophie' dans la tradition littéraire: Antécédents et postérité de Boèce*. Paris: Études augustinienes, 1967.
- Courtenay, William J. *Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 99. Leiden: Brill, 2008.
- Crouse, Robert Darwin. "'Primordiales causae' in Eriugena's Interpretation of Genesis: Sources and Significance." In *Ioannes Scottus Eriugena: the Bible and Hermeneutics: Proceedings of the Ninth international Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies held at Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve, June 7–10, 1995*, edited by Gerd van Riel, Carlos Steel, and Michael Richter, 209–220. Leuven: Peeters, 1996.

- Cudworth, Ralph. *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*. 2 volumes. London: Richard Royston, 1678.
- Cvetković, Vladimir. "Predeterminations and Providence in Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor." In *Dionysius the Areopagite between Orthodoxy and Heresy*, edited by Filip Ivanović, 135–156. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011.
- Daley, Brian E. "'In Many and Various Ways': Towards a Theology of Theological Exegesis." *Modern Theology* 28 (2012): 597–615.
- Dalferth, Ingolf. "Übel als Schatten der Kontingenz," in *Vernunft, Kontingenz und Gott: Konstellationen eines offenen Problems*, edited by Phillip Stoellger, Ingolf Dalferth. 117–169. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000.
- Dalferth, Ingolf U. and Simon Peng-Keller, eds. *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumenische Diskussion um die fiducia*. Quaestiones Disputatae 250. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.
- Dantine, Johannes. *Die Prädestinationslehre bei Calvin und Beza*. Göttingen: Georg August-Universität, 1965.
- Danz, Christian. *Wirken Gottes: Zur Geschichte eines theologischen Grundbegriffs*. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2007.
- Darlap, Adolf. "Der Begriffe der Heilsgeschichte." In *Mysterium Salutis 1: Die Grundlagen heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik*, edited by Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer, 17–90. Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1965.
- Davies, Horton. *The Vigilant God: Providence in the Thought of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Barth*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1992.
- de Caussade, Jean-Pierre. *Abandonment to Divine Providence*. Paris: Pêrisse, 1861.
- Desan, Philippe. *Dieu a` notre commerce et société: Montaigne et la théologie*. Travaux d'humanisme et Renaissance. Genève: Librairie Droz, 2008.
- Déville, Raymond. *L'école française de spiritualité*. Bibliothèque d'histoire du christianisme 11. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1987.
- Devries, Dawn and B. Gerrish, "Providence and grace: Schleiermacher on justification and election." In *Cambridge Companion to Schleiermacher*, edited by Jacqueline Mariña. 189–208. Cambridge: CUP, 2005.
- Dihle, Albrecht. *Die Vorstellung vom Willen in der Antike*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985.
- Doignon, Jean. "Blessure d'affliction et blessure d'amour: une jonction de thèmes de la spiritualité patristique de Cyprien à Augustin." In *Grégoire le Grand: Actes de Chantilly, Centre culturel Les Fontaines, 15–19 septembre 1982*, edited by Jacques Fontaine, Robert Gillet, and Stan Pellistrandi, 297–303. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986.
- Dole, Andrew. *Schleiermacher on Religion and the Natural Order*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- d'Onofrio, Giulio. "A proposito del 'Magnificus Boetius.' Un' indagine sulla presenza degli 'Opuscula Sacra' e della 'Consolatio' nell'opera eriugeniana," In *Eriugena: Studien zu seinen Quellen: Vorträge des III. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums, Freiburg Im Breisgau, 27.–30. August 1979*, edited by Werner Beierwaltes, 189–200. Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse. Heidelberg: Winter, 1980.
- Dörrie, Heinrich. "Der Begriff Pronoia in Stoa and Platonismus." *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 24 (1977): 60–87.

- Drecoll, Volker Henning. "Review of *Der fürsorgende Gott: Der Begriff der pronoia Gottes in der apologetischen Literatur der Alten Kirche* by Silke-Petra Bergjan." *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 129 (2004): 531–534.
- Drews, Friedmann. *Menschliche Willensfreiheit und Göttliche Vorsehung bei Augustinus, Proklos, Apuleius und John Milton*. Topics in Ancient Philosophy 3. 2 vols. Frankfurt: Ontos, 2009.
- Drijvers, Jan Willem. *Cyril of Jerusalem: Bishop and City*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 72. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
- Dronke, Peter. *The Spell of Calcidius: Platonic Concepts and Images in the Medieval West*. *Millennio Medievale* 74; *Strumenti e Studi* 17. Firenze: SISMEL, Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008.
- Dubois, Claude-Gilbert. "David et Saül: L'onction et le droit dans la tragédie biblique française (1563–1601)." *Revue de théologie et de philosophie* 133 (2001): 401–420.
- Duby, Georges, ed. *A History of Private Life, Vol.2: Revelations of the Medieval World*. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Duin, Joannes Josef. *La Doctrine de la Providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant*. *Philosophes medievales* 3. Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1954.
- Dupré, Louis. *Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
- Ebeling, Gerhard. *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens*. 3 volumes. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1979.
- Edwards, Mark J. *Origen against Plato*. Ashgate Studies in Philosophy & Theology in Late Antiquity. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.
- Edwards, Jonathan. *History of the Work of Redemption*. Transcribed and edited by John F. Wilson. The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Vol. 9. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
- Elert, Werner. *Morphologie des Luthertums 1: Theologie und Weltanschauung des Luthertums hauptsächlich im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*. München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1931–32.
- , *Morphologie des Luthertums 2: Soziallehren und Sozialwirkungen des Luthertums*. München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1932.
- Eliot, George. *Daniel Deronda*. 2 volumes. New York: Harper & Bros., 1876.
- Engel, Helmut. *Das Buch der Weisheit*. Neuer Stuttgarter Kommentar – Altes Testament 16. Stuttgart: Verlag Katholische Bibelwerk, 1998.
- Ewing, Jon D. *Clement of Alexandria's reinterpretation of Divine Providence: the Christianization of the Hellenistic idea of pronoia*. Lewiston, N.Y. Lampeter : Edwin Mellen, 2008.
- Feiner, Johannes and Magnus Löhrer (eds.), *Mysterium Salutis, vol. 1: Die Grundlagen heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik*, Einsiedeln: Benzinger Verlag, 1965.
- Feldman Seymour. "The Binding of Isaac: A Test-Case of Divine Foreknowledge." In *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives*, edited by Tamar Rudavsky, 105–133. Synthese Historical Library, Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy 25. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984.
- Feldmeier, Reinhard. "Wenn die Vorsehung ein Gesicht erhält: Theologische Transformation einer problematischen Kategorie." In *Vorsehung, Schicksal und göttliche Macht: Antike Stimmen zu einem aktuellen Thema*, edited by Reinhard G. Kratz and Hermann Spieckermann, 147–170. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.
- Fiddes, Paul S. *The Creative Suffering of God*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.

- , *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000.
- Fiedrowicz, Michael. *Das Kirchenverständnis Gregors des Grossen: Eine Untersuchung seiner exegetischen und homiletischen Werke*. Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte 50. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1995.
- Fischer, Johannes. "Wie wird Geschichte als Handeln Gottes offenbar? Zur Bedeutung der Anwesenheit Gottes im Offenbarungsgeschehen." *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 88 (1991): 211–231.
- Fischer, Klaus P. *Schicksal in Theologie und Philosophie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008.
- , "Schicksal, Fügung, Gott." *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 133 (2011): 49–68.
- Flasch, Kurt. *Nikolaus von Kues: Geschichte einer Entwicklung*. Innsbruck: Georg Olms Verlag, 1998.
- Flavel, John. *Divine conduct; or The Mystery of Providence*. London: D. Midwinter, 1740.
- Flores, Juan Carlos. "Henry of Ghent on the Trinity." n *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*, edited by Gordon A. Wilson, 135–150. Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 23. Leiden: Brill, 2011.
- Fornaro, Italo. *La teologia dell'immagine nella Glossa di Alessandro di Hales*. Vicenza: Libreria Internazionale Edizioni Francescane, 1985.
- Forsyth, Elliott. *La Tragédie française de Jodelle à Corneille (1553–1640): Le Thème de la vengeance*. Paris: A. G. Nizet, 1962.
- , *La Justice de Dieu: Les Tragiques d'Agrippa d'Aubigne et la Reforme protestante en France au XVIe siècle*. Etudes et Essais sur la Renaissance 5. Paris: Honore Champion 2005.
- Foucault, Michael. *Histoire de la sexualité III: Le Souci de Soi*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004.
- , *Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres: Cours au Collège de France, 1982–3*. Paris: Gallimard-Seuil, 2008.
- , *L'herméneutique du sujet*. Paris: Gallimard-Seuil, 2009.
- Frank, Günther. *Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melancthons (1497–1560)*. Erfurter Theologisch Studien 67. Leipzig: Benno, 1995.
- , "Wie modern war eigentlich Melancthon? Die theologische Philosophie des Reformators im Kontext neuerer Theorien zur Herkunft der Moderne." In *Der Theologe Melancthon: Schriften zur Melancthonpreisverleihung 1997*, edited by Günther Frank, 67–82. Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2000.
- Frick, Peter. *Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria*. Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism 77. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999.
- Fried, Johannes. *Aufstieg aus dem Untergang: Apokalyptisches Denken und die Entstehung der modernen Naturwissenschaft im Mittelalter*. München: Beck, 2009.
- Fumaroli, Marc. "Préface." In *Boece: Consolation de la Philosophie*, edited and translated by Colette Lazam. Rivages Poche/Petite Bibliothèque, 58. Paris: Rivages, 1989.
- Funkenstein, Amos. *Heilsplan und natürliche Entwicklung Formen der Gegenwartsbestimmung im Geschichtsdenken des hohen Mittelalters*. Sammlung Dialog 5. München: Nymphenburger Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965.
- , *Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Gallagher, Edmon L. *Hebrew Scripture in Patristic Biblical Theory: Canon, Language, Text*. Supplement to Vigiliae Christianae 114. Leiden: Brill 2012.

- Ganoczy, Alexandre and Stefan Scheld, *Herrschaft, Tugend, Vorsehung: Hermeneutische Deutung und Veröffentlichung handschriftlicher Annotationen Calvins zu sieben Senecatragedien und der Pharsalia Lucans*. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1992.
- Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. "Providence: La providence selon la Théologie" In *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 13, edited by Emile Amann, 985–1023. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1932.
- , *Providence*. Translated by Dom Bede Rose. Charlotte: Saint Benedict Press, 1998.
- Gay, Peter. *A Loss of Mastery: Puritan Historians in Colonial America*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966.
- Geiger, Max. "Providentia Dei: Überlegungen zur christlichen Vorsehungslehre und dem Problem der Beziehung Gott-Welt." In *Parrhesia: Festschrift für Karl Barth zum 80. Gebrustag*, edited by Eberhard Busch, Jürgen Fangmeier, and Max Geiger, 673–707. Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1966.
- Georgen, Joseph. *Des heiligen Albertus Magnus Lehre von der göttlichen Vorsehung und dem Fatum. Unter besonderen Berücksichtigung der Vorsehungs- und Schicksalslehre des Ulrich von Straßburg*. Vechta i. Oldbg., Albertus-Magnus-Verl., 1932.
- Gerrish, Brian A. "To the unknown God': Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God'," *Journal of Religion* 53 (1973): 263–92.
- , *Secular and Saving Faith. An invitation to Systematic Theology*. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999.
- Gersh, Stephen E. *From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition*. Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 8. Leiden: Brill, 1977.
- Geyer, Hans-Georg. *Welt und Mensch: Zur Frage des Aristotelismus bei Melancthon*. Dissertation: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, 1959.
- Gilkey, Langdon. "The Concept of Providence in Contemporary Theology." *Journal of Religion* 43 (1963): 171–192.
- , *Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History*. New York: Seabury Press, 1976.
- Gloege, Gerhard. "Vom Sinn der Weltgeschichte." In *Theologische Traktate I: Heilsgeschehen und Welt*, 27–52. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965.
- Gnädinger, Stefan. *Vorsehung: ein religionsphilosophisches Grundproblem bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte*. Münster: LIT, 2003.
- Goetz, Hans-Werner. *Die Geschichtstheologie des Orosius*. Impulse der Forschung 32. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980.
- , *Das Geschichtsbild Ottos von Freising: Ein Beitrag zur historischen Vorstellungswelt und zur Geschichte des 12. Jahrhunderts*. Köln-Wien: Böhlau, 1984.
- , "Fortuna in der hochmittelalterlichen Geschichtsschreibung." In *Das Mittelalter: Perspektiven mediävistischer Forschung. Zeitschrift des Mediävistenverbandes* I, H 1: *Providentia-Fatum-Fortuna*, edited by Joerg O. Fichte, 75–89. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996.
- , "Der Umgang mit der Geschichte in der lateinischen Weltchronistik des hohen Mittelalters." In *Julius Africanus und die Christliche Weltchronistik*, edited by Martin Wallraff, 179–205. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur 157. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006.
- , *Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewußtsein im hohen Mittelalter*. Orbis mediaevalis; Bd. 1. 2. Auflage. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008.

- , *Gott und Die Welt: Religiöse Vorstellungen des frühen und hohen Mittelalters*. Orbis mediaevalis: Vorstellungswelten des Mittelalters 13/1. Berlin: Akademie 2011.
- Gorringe, Timothy. *God's Theatre: A Theology of Providence*. London: SCM, 1991.
- Goudriaan, Aza, *Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen*. Brill's Series in Church History and Religious Cultures, 26. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
- Grant, Robert M. "God and Storms in Early Christian Thought." In *God in Early Christian Thought*, edited by Andrew B. McGowan, Brian E. Daley and Timothy J. Gaden, 351–60. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
- Gräß, Wilhelm. *Humanität und Christentumsgeschichte. Eine Untersuchung zum Geschichtsbegriff im Spätwerk Schleiermachers*. Göttinger theologische Arbeiten 14. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980.
- Grégoire le Grand, *Morales sur Job. Pt 6, Livres XXVIII–XXIX*. Texte Latin de Marc Adriaen (CCL 143B); introduction par Carole Straw; traduction par Les Moniales de Wisques; notes par Adalbert de Vogüé. Paris: Cerf, 2003.
- Grassi, Ernesto. *Renaissance Humanism: Studies in Philosophy and Poetics*. Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies 51. Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1988.
- Greenblatt, Stephen. *The Swerve: How the Renaissance Began*. London: Bodley Head, 2011.
- Gregory, Tullio. *Anima mundi: La filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la Scuola di Chartres*. Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di filosofia dell'Università di Roma, III. Florence: Sansoni, 1955.
- , "La Nouvelle Idée de Nature et de Savoir scientifique au xiii^e siècle." In *Mundana Sapientia: Forme di conoscenza nella Cultura Medievale*, 115–143. Storia e Letteratura: Raccolta di Studi e Testi, 181. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1992.
- , "I Sogni e Gli Astri." In *Mundana Sapientia: Forme di conoscenza nella cultura medievale*, 347–387. Storia e Letteratura: Raccolta di Studi e Testi, 181. Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1992.
- Greschat, Katharina. *Die Moralia in Job Gregors des Großen: Ein christologisch-ekklesiologischer Kommentar*. Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 31. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005.
- Grinfield, Edward William. *The Nature and Extent of the Christian Dispensation with Reference to the Salvability of the Heathen*. London: C. & J. Rivington, 1827.
- Grün, Klaus-Jürgen. *Vom unbewegten Bewegten zur bewegenden Kraft: Der pantheistische Charakter der Impetustheorie im Mittelalter*. Paderborn: Mentis, 1999.
- Guardini, Romano. *Vom lebendigen Gott: Geistliches Wort*. Würzburg: Echter, 1930.
- , *Freiheit, Gnade, Schicksal: Drei Kapitel zur Deutung des Daseins*, edited by Franz Henrich. 7th Edition. Grünewald: Schöningh, 1994.
- Guyatt, Nicholas. *Providence and the Invention of the United States, 1607–1876*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Haag, Herbert. "Die Buchwerdung des Wortes Gottes." In *Mysterium Salutis 1: Die Grundlagen heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik*, edited by Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer, 289–427. Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1965.
- Habichler, Alfred. *Reich Gottes als Thema des Denkens bei Kant: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche und systematische Studie zur kantischen Reich-Gottes-Idee*. Tübinger Studien zur Theologie und Philosophie 2. Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald, 1991.

- Haemig, Mary Jane. "Prayer as Talking Back to God in Luther's Genesis Lectures." *Lutheran Quarterly* 23 (2009): 270–295.
- Häggglund, Bengt. "De providentia: Zur Gotteslehre im frühen Luthertum." *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 83 (1986): 356–369.
- Hakewill, George. *An Apology of the Power and Providence of God in the Government of the World*. Oxford, 1627.
- Halleux, André de. "Dieu le Père tout-puissant." In *Patrologie et œcuménisme: Recueil d'études*, 68–89. *Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium* 93. Leuven: Peeters, 1990.
- Häring, Nikolaus M., ed. *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School*. Studies and Texts 20. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971.
- Harl, Marquerite, ed. *Philocalie, 1–20: Sur les Écritures*. Introduction, texte, traduction et notes par Marquerite Harl. Sources Chrétiennes 302. Paris: Cerf, 1983.
- Härle, Wilfried. "Luthers Zwei-Regimenten-Lehre als Lehre vom Handeln Gottes." In *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie I: Vom Handeln Gottes*, edited by Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, 12–32. *Marburger Theologische Studien*, 22. Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1987.
- , "Gottes Wirken." In *Dogmatik*, 283–302. 2nd Edition. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000.
- Härle, Wilfried and Reiner Preul, eds. *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie II: Theologische Gegenwartsdeutung*. *Marburger theologische Studien*, 24. Marburg: Elwert, 1998.
- , *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie III: Lebenserfahrung*. *Marburger theologische Studien* 29. Marburg: Elwert, 1990.
- Harnack, Adolf von. *Das Wesen des Christentums: Sechzehn Vorlesungen vor Studierenden aller facultäten im Wintersemester 1899/1900 an der Universität Berlin gehalten*. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1900.
- Harrison, Peter. "Theology and Early Theories of Evolution." In *Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Robert Crocker, 199–224. *Archives Internationales d'histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas*, 180. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001.
- , *The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Hart, David Bentley. *The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans: 2003.
- , "Providence and Causality: On Divine Innocence." In *The Providence of God: Deus habet consilium*, edited by Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler, 34–56. New York: Continuum, 2009.
- Hartman, James D. *Providence Tales and the Birth of American Literature*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Hartmann, Nicolai. *Teleologisches Denken*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1966.
- Hartogh, Gerrit den. *Voorzienigheid in donker licht: Herkomst en gebruik van het begrip 'providentia Dei' in De reformatorische theologie, in het bijzonder bij Zacharias Ursinus*. Heerenveen: Groen, 1999.
- Hasker, William. *Providence, Evil and the Openness of God*. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Hecquet-Noti, Nicole. "Fortuna dans le monde latin: chance ou hazard?" In *La Fortune: themes, representations, discours. Recherches et rencontres*, edited by Yashima Foehr-Janssens and Emmanuelle Metry, 13–29. Geneva: Droz, 2003.

- Hehle, Christina. "Boethius's Influence on German Literature to circa 1500." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr. and Philip Edward Phillips, 255–318. Companions to the Christian Tradition, 30. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Identität und Differenz*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2006.
- Helm, Paul. *The Providence of God*. Contours of Christian Theology 3. Leicester: Intervarsity Press, 1994.
- Hengstermann, Christian. "Christliche Natur- und Geschichtsphilosophie: die Weltseele bei Origenes." In *Origenes und sein Erbe in Orient und Okzident*, edited by Alfons Fürst, 43–76. Adamantina 1. Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2011.
- Henry of Ghent. *Opus sapientiae Dei in disponendo huius ornatus productionem* 115. in *Lectura ordinaria super sacram scripturam* 36, edited by Raymond Macken. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1980.
- Heppe, Heinrich. *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche*. Edited by Ernst Bizer. Neukirchen: Neukirchener 1958.
- , *Reformed Dogmatics*. Edited by John W Beardslee III. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Herzig, Ferenc. *Vorbestimmt und abgesegnet – Schleiermacher's Begriff einer göttlichen Vorsehung*. Leipzig: GRIN Verlag, 2011.
- Hesselink, I. John. "Governed and Guided by the Spirit. A Key Issue in Calvin's Doctrine of the Holy Spirit." In *Reformiertes Erbe, Festschrift für Gottfried W. Locher zu seinem 80. Geburtstag: Band 2*, edited by Heiko A. Oberman, Ernst Saxer, Alfred Schindler, and Heinzpeter Stucki, 161–171. Zwingliana. Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1992.
- Higton, Mike. *Christ, Providence, and History: Hans W. Frei's Public Theology*. London: T & T Clark, 2004.
- Hille, Martin. *Providentia Dei, Reich und Kirche: Weltbild und Stimmungsprofil altgläubiger Christen 1517–1618*. Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 81. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010.
- Hinchcliff, Peter. *Benjamin Jowett and the Christian Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Hinze, Bradford E. *Narrating History, Developing Doctrine: Friedrich Schleiermacher and Johann Sebastian Drey*. American Academy of Religion 82. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Hoenen, Maarten. J.F.M. *Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought*. Studies in the History of Christian Thought 50. Leiden: Brill, 1993.
- Hoffmann, Fritz. *Die Theologische Methode des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Robert Holcot*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 5. Münster: Aschendorff, 1971.
- , *Ockham-Rezeption und Ockham-Kritik im Jahrzehnt nach Wilhelm von Ockham in Oxford 1322–1332*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 50. Münster: Aschendorff, 1998.
- Holcot, Robert. *Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents*. Edited by Paul A Streveler and Katherine H Tachau. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1995.
- Hörnig, Gottfried. "Vorsehungsglaube und Geschichtshandeln: Überlegungen zu einer Neugestaltung der Providentialehre." In *Unsere Welt – Gottes Schöpfung: Festschrift für Eberhard Wölfel zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Wilfried Härle, Manfred Marquardt, Wolfgang Nethöfel, 223–233. Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1992.

- Honnefelder, Ludger. "Die Kritik des Johannes Duns Scotus am kosmologischen Nezessitarismus der Araber: Ansätze zu einem neuen Freiheitsbegriff." In *Die abendländische Freiheit vom 10. zum 14. Jahrhundert. Der Wirkungszusammenhang von Idee und Wirklichkeit im europäischen Vergleich*, edited by Johannes Fried, 249–263. Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte. Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke, 1991.
- Hotsen, Howard. *Johann Heinrich Alsted 1588–1638: Between Renaissance, Reformation, and Universal Reform*. Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Huber, Peter. H. *Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicher Vorsehung und menschlicher Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius*. Zürich: Juris-Verlag, 1976.
- Hübner, Hans. *Die Weisheit Salomos: Liber Sapientiae Salomonis*. Das Alte Testament Deutsch – Apokryphen. Neues Göttinger Bibelwerk 4. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999.
- Hüffmeier, Wilhelm. "Deus providebit? Eine Zwischenbilanz zur Kritik der Lehre von Gottes Vorsehung." In *Denkwürdiges Geheimnis: Beiträge zur Gotteslehre – Festschrift für Eberhard Jüngel zum 70. Geburtstag*, edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth, 237–258. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004.
- Iammarrone, Luigi. *Giovanni Duns Scoto. Metafisico e Teologo: Le Tematiche Fondamentali della sua Filosofia e Teologia*. Maestri francescani 10. Roma: Miscellanea Francescana 1999.
- Imbach, Ruedi. *Deus est intelligere: Das Verhältnis von Sein und Denken in seiner Bedeutung für das Gottesverständnis bei Thomas von Aquin und in den Pariser Quaestiones Meister Eckharts*. Studia Friburgensia 53. Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1976.
- Jeaneau, Edouard. "Le Prologus in Eptateuchon de Thierry de Chartres." *Mediaeval Studies* 16 (1954): 171–175.
- , "Le Prologus in Eptateuchon de Thierry de Chartres." In *Lectio Philosophorum: Recherches sur l'école de Chartres*, 87–91. Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1973.
- Jenkins, David. "Holy, Holier, Holiest": *The Sacred Topography of the Early Medieval Irish Church*. Studia Traditionis Theologiae 4. Turnhout: Brepols, 2010.
- Jensen, Alexander S., *Divine Providence and Human Agency: Trinity, Creation and Freedom*. Aldershot: Ashgate 2014.
- Johannsen, Jochen. *Geschichte als Menschheitsbildung: J. G. Herders historische Anthropologie und die ausgeweitete Moderne*. Ph.D. Thesis. Witten: 2004. Online: <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-256974>.
- Jüngel, Eberhard. *Gott als Geheimnis der Welt*. 6. Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992.
- Jürss, Fritz. "Johannes Katrarios und der Dialog Hermippos oder über die Astrologie." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 59 (1966): 275–284.
- Kaluza, Zenon. *Les querelles doctrinales à Paris: Nominalistes et Réalistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècle*. Quodlibet. Ricerche e strumenti di filosofia medievale 2. Bergamo: P. Lubrina, 1988.
- Kamesar, Adam. *Jerome, Greek Scholarship, and the Hebrew Bible: A Study of the Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim*. Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Kamlah, Wilhelm. *Christentum und Geschichtlichkeit: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung des Christentums und zu Augustins 'Bürgerschaft Gottes'*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1951.
- Kaufman, Gordon D. "On the Meaning of 'Act of God'." In *God the Problem*, 119–147. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.

- Kennedy, Darren M. *Providence and Personalism: Karl Barth in Conversation with Austin Farrer, John Macmurray and Vincent Brümmer*. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011.
- Kern, Walter. "Zur theologischen Auslegung des Schöpfungsglaubens." In *Mysterium Salutis*, Vol. 2: *Die Heilsgeschichte vor Christus*, edited by Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer, 464–544. Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1967.
- Keßler, Martin. "Herders Kirchenamt in Sachsen-Weimar in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmbarkeit von Stadt- und Hofkirche." In *Johann Gottfried Herder: Aspekte seines Lebenswerkes*, edited by Martin Keßler and Volker Leppin, 327–352. Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, 92. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Grego Malantschuk. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967–1978.
- Kirchner, Gottfried. *Fortuna in Dichtung und Emblematis des Barock: Tradition und Bedeutungswandel eines Motivs*. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1970.
- Kisic, Rade. *Patria Caelestis: Die eschatologische Dimension der Theologie Gregors des Großen*. Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 61. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011.
- Kleffner, Klaus. *Vorsehung und Zumutung: Skizzen zu einer Theologie der Vorsehung aus dem Werk Teresas von Ávila*. Theologie der Spiritualität: Quellen und Studien 4. St Ottilien: Eos Verlag, 2012.
- Klein, Günter. "Über das Weltregiment Gottes: Zum exegetischen Anhalt eines dogmatischen Lehrstücks." *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 90 (1993): 251–283.
- Koch, Hal. *Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus*. Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 22. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1932.
- Koch, Uwe. *Zwischen Katheder, Thron und Kerker: Leben und Werk des Humanisten Caspar Peucer 1525–1602: Ausstellung 25. September bis 31. Dezember 2002, Stadt-Museum Bautzen*. Bautzen: Domowina, 2002.
- Kocher, Richard. *Herausgeforderter Vorsehungsglaube: Die Lehre von der Vorsehung im Horizont der gegenwärtigen Theologie*. St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1999.
- Konrad, Robert. "Das Himmlische und das Irdische Jerusalem im Mittelalterlichen Denken: Mystische Vorstellung und Geschichtliche Wirkung." In *Speculum Historiale: Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung – Johannes Spörl aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages, dargebracht von Weggenossen, Freunden und Schülern*, edited by Clemens Bauer, Laetitia Boehm, and Max Müller, 523–540. Freiburg-München: Karl Alber, 1965.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979.
- , *Vom Sinn und Unsinn der Geschichte: Aufsätze und Vorträge aus vier Jahrzehnten*. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010.
- Kotter, Bonifatius. ed. *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*. 5 Bände. Berlin 1969–1988
- Kremer, Klaus. "Gottes Vorsehung und die menschliche Freiheit ('Sis tu tuus, et Ego ero tuus')." In *Das Sehen Gottes nach Nikolaus von Kues: Akten des Symposions in Trier vom 25. bis 27. September 1986*, edited by Rudolf Haubst, 227–252. Trier: Paulinus, 1989.
- Krolzik, Udo. *Säkularisierung der Natur Providentia-Dei-Lehre und Naturverständnis der Frühaufklärung*. Neukirchen-Vluyn, Neukirchener Verlag, 1988.
- Kromsigt, Anna Louise. *Le Théâtre biblique à la veille du romantisme*. Zutphen: Nauta, 1931.

- Krötke, Wolf. "Gottes Fürsorge für die Welt: Überlegungen zur Bedeutung der Vorsehungslehre." *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 108 (1983): 242–252.
- Krumbacher, Karl. *Geschichte der Byzantinischen Litteratur: von Justinian bis zum Ende des Oströmischen Reiches (527–1453)*. München: Beck, 1891.
- Krusche, Werner. *Das Wirken des Heiligen Geistes nach Calvin*. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 7. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957.
- Kusukawa, Sachiko. "Nature's Regularity in Some Protestant Natural Philosophy Textbooks 1530–1630." In *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy*, edited by Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, 105–122. Farnham: Ashgate, 2008.
- Labarrière, Pierre-Jean. "Providence." In *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* XII, edited by Marcel Viller, Ferdinand Cavallera, and Joseph de Guibert. Paris: Beauchesne, 1986.
- Lackner, Wolfgang, ed. *Nikephoros Blemmydes. Gegen die Vorherbestimmung der Todesstunde*. Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Philosophi Byzantini, 2. Leiden: Brill, 1985.
- Lagrée, Jacqueline. "Le critique du stoïcisme dans le 'Dictionnaire' de Bayle." In *De l'Humanisme aux Lumières, Bayle et le protestantisme*, edited by Michelle Magdelaine, Marina-Cristina Pitrassi, Ruth Whelan and Anthony McKenna, 581–593. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1996.
- , "Juste Lipse: Destins et Providence." In *Le Stoïcisme au XVI^e e au XVII^e siècle*, edited by Pierre-François Moreau, 77–92. Paris: Albin Michel, 1999.
- Lamirande, Émilien. "Jérusalem Céleste." In *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* VIII, edited by Marcel Viller, Charles Baumgartner, and André Rayez, 944–958. Paris: Beauchesne, 1974.
- Lane, Belden. "Spirituality as the Performance of Desire: Calvin on the World as a Theatre of God's Glory." *Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality* 1 (2001): 1–30.
- Latzel, Thorsten. *Theologische Grundzüge des Heidelberger Katechismus: Eine fundamentaltheologische Untersuchung seines Ansatzes zur Glaubenskommunikation*. Marburger Theologische Studien 83. Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 2004.
- Laube, Stefan. "Wissenswelten sinnlicher Frömmigkeit: Theatrale Antriebsmomente in der Naturanschauung von Bernard Palissy und Jacob Böhme." In *Religion und Naturwissenschaft im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, edited by Kaspar von Greyerz, Thomas Kaufmann, Kim Siebenhüner and Roberto Zaugg, 217–236. Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 210. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2010.
- Le Coz, Raymond. *Jean Damascène: Ecrits sur l'Islam. Présentation, commentaires, et traduction*. Sources Chrétiennes 383. Paris: Cerf, 1992.
- Lehner, Ulrich. *Kants Vorsehungskonzept auf dem Hintergrund der deutschen Schulphilosophie und -theologie*. Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 149. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Leinkauf, Thomas. *Nicolaus Cusanus: Eine Einführung*. Buchreihe der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, 15. Münster: Aschendorff 2006.
- Lemoine, Michel and Clotilde Picard-Parra, eds. *Théologie et cosmologie au XI^e siècle: l'Ecole de Chartres*. Sagesses médiévales 2. Paris: Belles Lettres, 2004.
- Leonhardt-Balzer, Jutta. "Heilsgeschichte bei Philo? Die Aufnahme der Zweigeisterlehre in QE I 23." In *Heil und Geschichte: Die Geschichtsbezogenheit des Heils und das Problem der Heilsgeschichte in der biblischen Tradition und in der theologischen Deutung*, edited by Jörg Frey, Stefan Krauter and Hermann Lichtenberger, 129–147. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 248. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009.

- Lessius, Leonardus. *De providentia numinis et animi immortalitate libri duo adversus atheos & politicos*. Antverpi: Ex Officina Plantiniana, 1613.
- Levering, Matthew. "Providence and Predestination in Al-Ghazali." *New Blackfriars* 92 (2010): 55–70.
- Levinger, Jacob S. "Maimonides' Exegesis of the Book of Job." In *Creative Biblical Exegesis: Christian and Jewish Hermeneutics through the Centuries*, edited by Henning Graf Reventlow and Benjamin Uffenheimer, 81–87. Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series 59. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988.
- Lévy, Antoine. *Le Créé et L'incrée: Maxime le confesseur et Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: J. Vrin, 2006.
- Lévy, René. *La Divine Insouciance: étude des doctrines de la providence d'après Maïmonide*. Paris: Verdier, 2008.
- Lies, Lothar. *Origenes' 'Peri archon': eine undogmatische Dogmatik. Einführung und Erläuterung*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992.
- Link, Christian. *Schöpfung*. Vol. 1, *Schöpfungstheologie in reformatorischer Tradition*. Handbuch systematischer Theologie, Bd. 7/1. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1991.
- , *Schöpfung*. Vol. 2, *Schöpfungstheologie angesichts der Herausforderungen des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Handbuch systematischer Theologie, Bd. 7/2. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1991.
- , "Gestalt and theologischer Ort der Vorsehungslehre Karl Barths." *Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie* 10 (1994): 113–115.
- , "Providence: An Unsolved Problem." In *Creation in Jewish and Christian Tradition*, edited by Henning Graf Reventlow and Yair Hoffman, 266–276. Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series 319. London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002.
- , "Die Krise des Vorsehungsglaubens: Providenz jenseits von Fatalismus." *Evangelische Theologie* 65 (2005): 413–428.
- Linnaeus, Carolus [Carl von Linné]. *Nemesis divina*. Edited and translated by Michael J. Petry. International Archives of the History of Ideas 177. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001.
- Lloyd, Genevieve. *Providence Lost*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Löffler, Ulrich. *Lissabons Fall – Europas Schrecken: Die Deutung des Erdbebens von Lissabon im deutschsprachigen Protestantismus des 18. Jahrhunderts*. Abeiton zur Kirchengeschichte 70. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999.
- Löhr, Winrich. "Heilsgeschichte und Universalgeschichte im antiken Christentum." In *Heil und Geschichte: Die Geschichtsbezogenheit des Heils und das Problem der Heilsgeschichte in der biblischen Tradition und in der theologischen Deutung*, edited by Jörg Frey, Stefan Krauter and Hermann Lichtenberger, 535–558. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 248. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009.
- Lombard, Peter. *The Sentences, Book II: On Creation*. Edited and translated by Giulio Silano. Mediaeval Sources in Translation. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007.
- Lonergan, Bernard. *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*. Edited by David B. Burrell. London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1968.
- Long, D. Stephen. *Hebrews. Belief: A Theological Commentary on the Bible*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011.
- Long, Steven A. "Providence, liberté et loi naturelle." *Revue Thomiste* 102 (2002): 355–406.
- , "Providence, Freedom, and Natural Law." *Nova et Vetera* 4 (2006): 529–556.

- , *Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2010.
- Lorch, Maristella de Panizza. *A Defense of Life: Lorenzo Vallas Theory of Pleasure*. Humanistische Bibliothek/1, 36. München: Wilhelm Fink, 1985.
- Louth, Andrew. *Maximus the Confessor*. The Early Christian Fathers. London: Routledge, 1996.
- , *St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology*. Oxford Early Christian Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- , “Pagans and Christians on Providence.” In *Texts and Culture in Late Antiquity*, edited by J.H.D. Scourfield, 279–294. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 2007.
- Love, Rosalind C. “The Latin Commentaries on Boethius’s *De consolazione Philosophiae* from the 9th to the 11th Centuries.” In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr. and Philip Edward Phillips, 75–134. Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, 30. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Löwith, Karl. *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
- , “Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschichte.” In *Sämtliche Schriften II: Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen*, 7–239. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1983.
- Lübbe, Hermann. *Religion nach der Aufklärung*. Graz: Styria, 1986.
- Lucente, Gregory L. “Vico’s Notion of ‘Divine Providence’ and the Limits of Human Knowledge, Freedom, and Will.” *MLN* 97 (1982): 183–191.
- Lütgert, Wilhelm. *Schöpfung und Offenbarung: Eine Theologie des ersten Artikels*. Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie II: 34. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1934.
- Lyman, J. Rebecca. *Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius, and Athanasius*. Oxford Theological Manuscripts. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
- Lyons, John D. *Kingdom of Disorder: The Theory of Tragedy in Classical France*. Purdue Studies in Romance Literatures 17. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1999.
- , *The Phantom of Chance: From Fortune to Randomness in Seventeenth-Century French Literature*. Edinburgh Critical Studies in Renaissance Culture. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
- McCormack, Bruce L. “The Actuality of God: Karl Barth in Conversation with Open Theism.” In *Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives*, edited by Bruce L. McCormack, 185–242. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008.
- McCosh, James. *The Method of Divine Government, Physical and Moral*. New York: Carter, 1851.
- McKeon, Michael. *The Origins of the English Novel, 1600–1740*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
- Macken, Raymond. “La temporalité radicale de la creature selon Henri de Gand.” *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 38 (1971): 211–272.
- Madec, Goulven. “Thématique Augustinienne de la Providence.” *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 41 (1995): 291–308.
- Magris, Aldo. *Destino, provvidenza, predestinazione. Dal mondo antico al cristianesimo*. Filosofia, Nuova serie 50. Brescia: Morcelliana 2008.
- Maier, Annalies. *Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie*. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik, 4. Roma: Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 1955.
- Mallinson, Jeremy. *Faith, Reason, and Revelation in Theodore Beza (1519–1605)*. Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

- Malysz, Piotr J. "Luther And Dionysius: Beyond Mere Negations." *Modern Theology* 24 (2008): 679–692.
- Mandelbrote, Scott. "Early Modern Natural Theologies." In *The Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology*, edited by Russel Re Manning, 75–99. Oxford Handbooks in Religion and Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Mandrella, Isabelle. *Das Isaak-Opfer: Historisch-systematische Untersuchung zu Rationalität und Wandelbarkeit des Naturrechtes in der mittelalterlichen Lehre vom natürlichen Gesetz*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 62. Münster: Aschendorff, 2002.
- Mango, Cyril. "Les Temps dans les commentaires byzantins de l'Apocalypse." In *Le Temps chrétien de la fin de l'Antiquité au Moyen Age, IIIe-XIIIe siècles*, edited by Jean-Marie Leroux, 431–438. Colloques Nationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; 604. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984.
- Marcolino, Venicio. *Das Alte Testament in der Heilsgeschichte: Untersuchung zum dogmatischen Verständnis des alten Testaments als Heilsgeschichtliche Periode nach Alexander von Hales*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters: Neue Folge 2. Münster: Aschendorff, 1970.
- Marcovich, Miroslav. *Prosper of Aquitaine – De Providentia Dei: Text, Translation, and Commentary*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 10. Leiden, Brill: 1989.
- Markschies, Christoph. *Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur Valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992.
- Markus, Robert A. *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine*. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- Martin, Daniel. *Montaigne et la fortune: Essai sur le hasard et le langage*. Bibliothèque littéraire de la Renaissance; 3. sér., no. 4. Paris: Champion, 1977.
- Matthew of Aquasparta. *Quaestiones disputate de production rerum et de providentia*. Edited by Gedeon Gal. Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi XVII. Florence: Quaracchi, 1956.
- Matthews, Steven. *Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011.
- Mattox, Mickey. "'Fortuita Misericordia': Martin Luther on the Salvation of Biblical Outsiders." *Pro Ecclesia* 17 (2008): 423–443.
- Maurer, Wilhelm. "Melanchthon und die Naturwissenschaftler seiner Zeit." In *Melanchthon Studien*, 39–66. Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 181, Jahrgang 70. Gütersloh: Mohn, 1964.
- McGinn, Bernard. "The Development of the Thought of Thomas Aquinas on the Reconciliation of Divine Providence and Contingent Action." *The Thomist* 39 (1975): 741–752.
- Mégier, Elisabeth. "Fortuna als Kategorie der Geschichtsdeutung im 12. Jahrhundert am Beispiel Ordericus Vitalis und Ottos von Freising." *Mittelateinisches Jahrbuch* 32 (1997) 49–70.
- Métry, Emanuelle. "Fortuna et Philosophia: une Alliance Inattendue." In *La Fortune: Thèmes, Representations, Discours*, edited by Emanuelle Métry and Yasmina Foehr-Janssens, 59–70. Recherches et Recontres 19. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003.
- Meuthen, Erich. *Kirche und Heilsgeschichte bei Gerhoh von Reichersberg*. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 6. Leiden: Brill, 1959.
- Moeller, Charles. *Littérature du XXe siècle et christianisme*. Paris: Casterman, 1954.

- Mierow, Charles Christopher. *The Two Cities, by Otto Bishop of Freising: Translated in full with Introduction and Notes*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928.
- Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- Milner, Jr., Benjamin Charles. *Calvin's Doctrine of the Church*. Studies in the History of Christian Thought 5. Leiden: Brill, 1970.
- Moltmann, Jürgen. *Der Geist des Lebens: Eine ganzheitliche Pneumatologie*. Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1991.
- , *Das Kommen Gottes: Christliche Eschatologie*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1995.
- Moreschini, Claudio, ed. *Boèce. La Consolation de Philosophie*. Translation and notes by Éric Vanpeteghem. Introduction by Jean-Yves Tilliette. Lettres Gothiques. Paris: Livre de Poche, 2008.
- Morris, Colin. *The Sepulchre of Christ and the Medieval West: From the Beginning to 1600*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Morrison, James C. "How to Interpret the Idea of Divine Providence in Vico's New Science." *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 12 (1979): 256–261.
- Motkin, Aryeh L. "Maimonides and Spinoza on Good and Evil." *Daat* 24 (1990): v–xxiii.
- Mühlethaler, Jean-Claude. "Quand Fortune, ce sont les homes Aspects de la démythification de la déesse d'Adam de la Halle à Alain Chartier." In *La Fortune: Thèmes, Representations, Discours*, edited by Emanuelle Métry and Yasmina Foehr-Janssens, 177–206. Recherches et Recontres 19. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003.
- Muller, Richard A. *God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy*. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991.
- , "Scimus enim quod lex spiritualis est: Melancthon and Calvin on the Interpretation of Romans 7:14–23." In *Phillip Melancthon (1497–1560) and the Commentary*, edited by Timothy Wengert and M. Patrick Graham, 216–237. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997.
- Müller, Sigrid. "Nominalismus in der Spätmittelalterlichen Theologie." In *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters: Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit*, edited by Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen & Paul J.J.M. Bakker, 47–65. Leiden: Brill, 2000.
- Munitiz, Joseph. "The Predetermination of Death: The Contribution of Anastasios of Sinai and Nikephoros Blemmydes to a Perennial Byzantine Problem." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 55 (2001): 9–20.
- Munk, Linda. *The Devil's Mousetrap: Redemption and Colonial American Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Munson, Steve J. "The Divine Game: Faith and the Reconciliation of Opposites in Luther's Lectures on Genesis." *Concordia Theological Quarterly* 76 (2012): 89–115.
- Mutschler, Bernhard. "Geschichte, Heil und Unheil bei Flavius Josephus am Beispiel der Tempelzerstörung: Zur Komposition von Jos. bell. 6,285–315." In *Heil und Geschichte: Die Geschichtsbezogenheit des Heils und das Problem der Heilsgeschichte in der biblischen Tradition und in der theologischen Deutung*, edited by Jörg Frey, Stefan Krauter und Hermann Lichtenberger, 103–127. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 248. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009.
- Myers, Frederic. "Tennyson as Prophet." In *Science and a Future Life: With Other Essays*. London-New York: Macmillan, 1893.

- Nash-Marshall, Siobhan. "Boethius's Influence on Theology and Metaphysics to c.1500." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr. and Philip Edward Phillips, 163–91. Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 30. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Nickl, Peter. "'*Libertas proprie non est nisi in voluntate*:' Libertà e soggettività in Pietro di Giovanni Olivi." In *Pierre de Jean Olivi, Philosophe et Théologien: actes du colloque de philosophie médiévale, 24–25 octobre 2008, Université de Fribourg*, edited by Catherine König-Pralong, Oliver Ribordy, and Tiziana Suarez Nani, 355–368. Scriptorium Friburgense, 29. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010.
- O'Daly, Gerard. *City of God: A Reader's Guide*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
- Ogden, Schubert. *Christ without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961.
- Ohly, Friedrich. "Halbbiblische und außerbiblische Typologie." In *Schriften zur Mittelalterlichen Bedeutungsforschung*, 361–400. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977.
- Olivi, Pierre de Jean. *De septem sentimentis Christ lesu*. Edited by Marco Bartoli. *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 91 (1998): 533–549.
- O'Regan, Cyril. *The Gnostic Apocalypse: Jacob Boehme's Haunted Narrative*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.
- Osborn, Eric. *Clement of Alexandria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Otten, Willemien. "Nature, Body and Text in Early Medieval Theology: From Eriugena to Chartres." In *Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr. Robert D. Crouse*, edited by Michael Treschow, Willemien Otten and Walter Hannam, 235–256. *Studies in Intellectual History*, 151. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Otto, Stephan. "Augustinus und Boethius im 12. Jahrhundert: Anmerkungen zur Entstehung des Traktates 'De Deo uno'." In *Materialien zur Theorie der Geistesgeschichte*, 94–105. *Die Geistesgeschichte und ihre Methoden*; Bd. 2. München: Fink, 1979.
- Pailin, David A. "God and Creation – a Process View." *Epworth Review* 9 (1982): 72–86.
- Paluch, Michal. *La profondeur de l'amour divin: évolution de la doctrine de la prédestination dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas d'Aquin*. Bibliothèque Thomiste 55. Paris: J. Vrin, 2004.
- Pannenberg, Wolfhart. *Systematic Theology*, translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. 3 volumes. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991.
- , *Toward a Theology of Nature: Essays on Science and Faith*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993.
- Paparella, Emanuel L. *Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico: Vico's Paradox Revolutionary Humanistic Vision for the New Age*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1993.
- Parma, Christian. *Pronoia und Providentia: Der Vorsehungsbegriff Plotins und Augustins*. Leiden: Brill, 1971.
- Perchellet, Jean-Pierre. *L'Héritage classique: La tragédie entre 1680 et 1814*. Les Dix-huitième et dix-neuvième siècles 85. Paris: Honoré Champion 2004.
- Partee, Charles. *Calvin and Classical Philosophy*. *Studies in the History of Christian Thought* 14. Leiden: Brill, 1977.
- Peddricord, Richard. *Sacred Monster of Thomism: An Introduction to the Life & Legacy of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange*. South Bend: St Augustine's Press, 2004.
- Petra, Basilio. *Providenza e vita morale nel pensiero di Basilio il grande*. Romae: Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, Academia Alfonsiana, 1983.

- Pickering, Frederick P. *Augustinus oder Boethius? Geschichtsschreibung und epische Dichtung im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*. 2 volumes. Philologische Studien und Quellen 39, 80. Berlin: Schmidt, 1967–1976.
- Piron, Sylvain. “Le métier de théologien selon Olivi: Philosophie, théologie, exégèse et pauvreté.” In *Pierre de Jean Olivi, Philosophe et Théologien: actes du colloque de philosophie médiévale, 24–25 octobre 2008, Université de Fribourg*, edited by Catherine König-Pralong, Oliver Ribordy, and Tiziana Suarez Nani, 17–85. Scriptorium Friburgense 29. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010.
- Pittock, Murray. “Historiography.” In *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*, edited by Alexander Broadie, 258–279. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Plathow, Michael. *Das Problem des concursus divinus: Das Zusammenwirken von göttlichem Schöpferwirken und geschöpflichem Eigenwirken in K. Barths ‘Kirchlicher Dogmatik’*. Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie 32. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975.
- Podskalsky, Gerhard. *Christentum und theologische Literatur in der Kiever Rus (988–1237)*. München: Beck, 1982.
- , “Répresentation du temps dans l’eschatologie imperial byzantine.” In *Le Temps chrétien de la fin de l’Antiquité au Moyen Age, IIIe–XIIIe siècles*, edited by Jean-Marie Leroux, 439–450. Colloques Nationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; 604. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984.
- , *Von Photios bis Bessarion: Der Vorrang humanistisch geprägter Theologie in Byzanz und deren bleibende Bedeutung*. Schriften zur Geistesgeschichte im östlichen Europa 25. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003.
- Pollman, Karla. “Augustins Transformation der traditionellen römischen Staats- und Geschichtsauffassung (Buch I–V).” In *Augustinus: De civitate dei*, edited by Christoph Horn, 25–40. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997.
- Potgieter, Pieter C. “Providence in Calvin: Calvin’s view of God’s Use of Means (*media*) in His Acts of Providence.” In *Calvinus Evangelii Propugnator: Calvin, Champion of the Gospel: Papers Presented at the International Congress on Calvin Research, Seoul, 1998*, edited by David F. Wright, Anthony N. S. Lane, and Jon Balserak, 175–190. Grand Rapids: Calvin Studies Society, 2006.
- Pratt, Robert A. “Some Latin Sources of the Nonnes Freest on Dreams.” *Speculum* 52 (1977): 538–570.
- Preul, Reiner. “Problemskizze zur Rede vom Handeln Gottes.” In *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie I: Vom Handeln Gottes*, edited by Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, 3–11. Marburger Theologisch Studien, 22. Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1987.
- Priestley, Francis E. L. “The Clarke-Leibniz Controversy.” In *The Methodological Heritage of Newton*, edited by Robert E. Butts and John W. Davis, 24–56. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970.
- Principe, Walter H. *Alexander of Hales’ Theology of the Hypostatic Union*. The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early 13th Century, vol. 2. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1967.
- Quenstedt, Johann Andreas. *Theologia didactico-polemica sive systema theologicum*. Wittenberg, 1685.
- Quillet, Jeannine. “La tradition de l’augustinisme politique dans L’Europe medieval.” In *L’unité de culture européenne au moyen âge: XXVIII Jahrestagung des Arbeitskreises*

- Deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters Straßburg, 23.–26. September 1993*, edited by Danielle Buschinger and Wolfgang Spiewok, 103–110. Wodan – Greifswalder Beiträge zum Mittelalter 38. Greifswald: Reineke-Verlag, 1994.
- Rahner, Karl. *Grundkurs des Glaubens: Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums*. Freiburg: Herder, 1976.
- , *Schriften zur Theologie XIV: In Sorge um die Kirche*. Zürich: Benziger, 1980.
- Ramelow, Tilman. *Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl: Der Ursprung des Begriffes der besten aller möglichen Welten in der Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen Antonio Perez S.J. (1599–1649) und G.W. Leibniz (1646–1716)*. Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 72. Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- Rankin, David. *Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009.
- Ratschow, Carl Heinz. "Das Heilshandeln und das Welthandeln Gottes: Gedanken zur Lehrgestaltung des Providentia-Glaubens in der evangelischen Dogmatik." *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie* 1 (1959): 25–80.
- , *Gott existiert: Eine dogmatische Studie*. Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann 12. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967.
- Ratzinger, Joseph. "Der Mensch und die Zeit nach Bonaventura." In *L'Homme et Son Destin d'après les penseurs du moyen age*, edited by Marie-Dominique Chenu, 473–483. Actes du premier Congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Louvain et Bruxelles, 28 août–4 septembre 1958. Louvain-Paris: Nauwelaets, 1960.
- Reventlow, Henning Graf. *Bibelautorität und Geist der Moderne: Die Bedeutung des Bibelverständnisses für die geistesgeschichtliche und politische Entwicklung in England von der Reformation bis zur Aufklärung*. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 30. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980.
- Rey, André-Louis. "Tychè et Pronoia: notes sur l'emploi de Fortune et Providence dans l'historiographie byzantine ancienne?" In *La Fortune: Thèmes, Representations, Discours*, edited by Emanuelle Métry and Yasmina Foehr-Janssens, 71–92. Recherches et Recontres 19. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003.
- Richard, Anne. *Cosmologie et Théologie chez Grégoire de Nazianze*. Collection des études Augustiniennes: Série Antiquité 169. Paris: Institut d'études Augustiniennes, 2003.
- Richter, Gerhard. *Oikonomia: Der Gebrauch des Wortes Oikonomia im Neuen Testament, bei den Kirchenvätern und in der theologischen Literatur bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*. Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 90. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005.
- Rigo, Caterina. "Zur Rezeption des Moses Maimonides im Werk des Albertus Magnus." In *Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren. Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven*, edited by Walter Senner, 29–66. Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens 10. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001.
- Ritschl, Albrecht. *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*. 3 volumes. Bonn: A. Marcus, 1870–1874.
- Ritschl, Dietrich. "Sinn und Grenze der theologischen Kategorie der Vorsehung.", *Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie* 10 (1994): 117–133.
- , "Gott Wiedererkennen." In *Bildersprache und Argumente: Theologische Aufsätze*, 3–75. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchner 2008.
- Robertson, William. *The History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and of King James VI*. 2 volumes. Edinburgh, 1759.

- Roebel, Martin. "Caspar Peucer als Humanist und Mediziner." In *Caspar Peucer 1525–1602: Wissenschaft, Glaube und Politik im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, edited by Hans-Peter Haase and Günther Wartenberg, 51–73. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2004.
- Rohls, Jan. *Protestantische Theologie der Neuzeit*. 2 volumes. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997.
- Runia, David T. *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato*. *Philosophia Antiqua*, Vol. 44. Leiden: Brill 1986.
- Rutherford, Samuel. *Disputatio scholastica de divina providentia*. Edinburgh: Roberto Browne, 1650.
- Safranski, Rüdiger. *Das Böse oder das Drama der Freiheit*. Frankfurt: Fischer, 1999.
- Sahas, Daniel J. *John of Damascus on Islam: The 'Heresy of the Ishmaelites'*. Leiden: Brill, 1972.
- Sanders, John. *The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence*. 2nd edition. Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2007.
- Saxer, Ernst. *Vorsehung und Verheißung Gottes: Vier theologische Modelle (Calvin, Schleiermacher, Barth, Sölle) und ein systematischer Versuch*. Studien zur Dogmengeschichte und systematischen Theologie, 34. Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1980.
- Schachten, Winfried H. J. *Ordo Salutis, das Gesetz als Weise der Heilsvermittlung: zur Kritik des Hl. Thomas von Aquin an Joachim von Fiore*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 20. Münster: Aschendorff, 1980.
- Schmaus, Michel. *Katholische Dogmatik*. München, Hueber, 1958.
- Shaw, Jane. *Miracles in Enlightenment England*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006.
- Scheeben, Matthias. *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*. 4 volumes. 3rd Edition. Freiburg: Herder, 1948.
- Scheffczyk, Leo. *Schöpfung und Vorsehung*. Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte II/2a. Freiburg: Herder, 1963.
- , *Creation and Providence*. Translated by Richard Strachan. London: Burns and Oates, 1970.
- , "'Vorsehung' als Schlüssel zum Geheimnis von Gottes Welthandeln." *Forum Katholische Theologie* 9 (1993): 299–305.
- Scheliha, Arnulf von. *Der Glaube an die göttliche Vorsehung: Eine religionssoziologische, geschichtsphilosophische und theologiegeschichtliche Untersuchung*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1999.
- Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. *Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung*. Edited by Walter E. Ehrhardt. Leipzig: Meiner, 2010.
- Schendel, Eckhard. *Herrschaft und Unterwerfung Christi: 1 Korinther 15, 24–48 in Exegese und Theologie der Väter bis zum Ausgang des 4. Jahrhunderts*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Biblischen Exegese 12. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1971.
- Schilder, Klaas. *Heidelbergsche Katechismus*. 4 volumes. Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1947–1951.
- Schilson, Arno. *Geschichte im Horizont der Vorsehung: G.E. Lessings Beitrag zu einer Theologie der Geschichte*. Tübinger theologische Studien 3. Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald, 1974.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *The Christian Faith*, edited by Hugh R. Mackintosh and James S. Stewart. 2 volumes. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1963.

- , *Die christliche Glaube 1821/22*. Edited by Hermann Peiter. 2 volumes. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984.
- , *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*. New York: Harper, 1958.
- Schlitt, Dale M. "Albrecht Ritschl on God as Personal and as Loving Will." *Theoforum* 42 (2011): 229–272.
- Schmaus, Michael. *Katholische Dogmatik*. 8 volumes. 6th Edition. München: Huber, 1960–1963.
- , "Das Gesetz der Sterne: Ein Kapitel aus der Theologie des Wilhelm von Auvergne." In *Speculum Historiale: Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung – Johannes Spörl aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages, dargebracht von Weggenossen, Freunden und Schülern*, edited by Clemens Bauer, Laetitia Boehm, and Max Müller, 51–58. Freiburg-München: Karl Alber, 1965.
- Schmidbaur, Hans Christian. *Gottes Handeln in Welt und Geschichte: Eine trinitarische Theologie der Vorsehung*. Münchener theologische Studien 2/63. St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 2003.
- Schmidt, Ernst A. *Zeit und Geschichte bei Augustin*. Heidelberg: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985.
- Schmidt, Karl Ludwig. "Jerusalem als Urbild und Abbild." *Eranos Jahrbuch* 18 (1950): 207–248.
- Schmucker, Josef. *Das Problem der Kontingenz der Welt*. Quaestiones Disputatae 43. Freiburg: Herder, 1969.
- Schneider, Reinhold. *Winter in Wien: Aus meinen Notizbüchern 1957/58*. Freiburg: Herder, 1959.
- Schockenhoff, Eberhard. *Zum Fest der Freiheit: Theologie des christlichen Handelns bei Origenes*. Tübinger Theologische Studien. Mainz: Grünewald-Verlag, 1990.
- Scholarios, Gennadios. *Oeuvres complètes de Georges (Gennadios) Scholarios*. Edited by Martin Jugie, Louis Petit, and Xenophon A. Sidéridès. Paris: Maison de la Bonne Presse, 1928–1930.
- Scholl, Norbert. "Providentia: Untersuchungen zur Vorsehungslehre Plotins und Augustins." PhD Dissertation: Freiburg im Breisgau, 1960.
- Schönberger, Rolf, ed. *Thomas von Aquins: 'Summa Contra Gentiles'*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001.
- Schrage, Wolfgang. *Vorsehung Gottes? Zur Rede von der providentia Dei in der Antike und im Neuen Testament*. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchner, 2005.
- Schreiner, Susan. *The Theater of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin*. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001.
- , *Are You Alone Wise? The Search for Certainty in the Early Modern Era*. Oxford Studies in Historical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Schröder, Caroline. "'I See Something You Don't See': Karl Barth's Doctrine of Providence." In *For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology*, edited by George Hunsinger, 115–135. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004.
- Schulte, Raphael. "Wie ist Gottes Wirken in Welt und Geschichte theologisch zu verstehen?" In *Vorsehung und Handeln Gottes*, edited by Theodor Schneider and Lothar Ullrich, 116–168. Quaestiones Disputatae 115. Freiburg: Herder, 1988.
- Schulz, Heiko. "Kierkegaard on Providence and Foreknowledge: A Critical Account." *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 41 (1999): 115–131.

- Schulze, Manfred. "Marsilius von Ighen und die Vorreformatrische Theologie: Augustinrezeption, Willensfreiheit und Gnadenlehre." In *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters: Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit*, edited by Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen & Paul J.J.M. Bakker, 67–87. Leiden: Brill, 2000.
- Schwab, Andreas, Ed. *Gregor von Nazianz: Peri Pronoias*. Classica Monacensia. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2009.
- Schwamm, Hermann. *Magistri Joannis de Ripa doctrina de praescientia divina*. Analecta Gregoriana 1. Roma: Pontifica Universitate Gregoriana, 1930.
- , *Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Dun Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern*. Philosophie und Grenzwissenschaften Bd. 5, Heft 1/4. Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1931.
- Schwanke, Jonathan. "Luther on Creation." *Lutheran Quarterly* 16 (2002): 1–20.
- Schwarzbauer, Fabian. *Geschichtszeit: Über Zeitvorstellungen in den Universalchroniken Frutolfs von Michelsberg, Honorius' Augustodunensis und Ottos von Freising*. Orbis mediaevalis. Vorstellungswelten des Mittelalters 6. Berlin: Akademie 2005.
- Schwöbel, Christoph. "Die Rede vom Handeln Gottes im Christlichen Glauben: Beiträge zu einem systematisch-theologischen Rekonstruktionsversuch." In *Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie I: Vom Handeln Gottes*, edited by Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, 56–81. Marburger Theologisch Studien 22. Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1987.
- Scott, Alan. *Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea*. Oxford Early Christian Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Seckler, Max. *Das Heil in der Geschichte: Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin*. München: Beck, 1964.
- , "Theosoterik und Autosoterik." *Theologische Quartalschrift* 162 (1982): 289–298.
- Seeberg, Reinhold. *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*. 4 volumes. Erlangen: A. Deichert, 1913.
- Ševčenko, Ihor. "Nicolas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse: A Reinterpretation." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 11 (1957): 81–171.
- Sharples, Robert W., "Nemesius of Emesa and Some Theories of Divine Providence." *Vigiliae Christianae*, 37 (1983): 141–155.
- Sher, Richard. "Witherspoon's *Dominion of Providence* and the Scottish Jeremiad Tradition." In *Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment*, edited by Richard Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten, 46–64. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Sherlock, William. *A Discourse Concerning the Divine Providence*. London: William Rogers, 1694.
- Siebert, Folker. *Philon von Alexandrien: Über die Gottesbeziehung 'wohltätig verzehrendes Feuer' (De deo)*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 46. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988.
- Smalley, Beryl. "Robert Holcot O. P." *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 26 (1956): 5–97.
- Söder, Joachim Roland. "Notwendigkeit-Kontingenz-Freiheit." In *Zwischen Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Johannes Duns Scotus im Gespräch*, edited by Franz Lackner, 170–178. Franziskanische Forschungen 45. Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 2003.
- Sölle, Dorothea. *Stellvertretung: Ein Kapitel Theologie nach dem Tode Gottes*. Freiburg: Kreuz Verlag, 1968.
- Sorabji, Richard, ed. *John Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Spaemann, Robert. "Natur." In *Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe*. Band II: Gesetz – Relation, edited by Hermann Krings, Hans Michael Baumgartner, and Christoph Wild, 659–669. München: Kösel & Pustet, 1973.

- Spaemann, Robert and Reinhard Löw. *Natürliche Ziele: Geschichte und Wiederentdeckung des teleologischen Denkens*. Stuttgart: Klett, Cotta, 2005.
- Spanneut, Michel. *Le stoïcisme des pères de l'église: de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie*. Patristica Sorbonensia 1. Paris: Le Seuil, 1957.
- Sparn, Walter. "Die Religion aber ist Leben: Welchen theologischen Gebrauch kann und sollte man vom 'Leben überhaupt' machen?" In *Leben*, edited by Wilfried Härle and Reiner Preul, 15–39. Marburger theologische Studien 45; Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie 9. Marburg: Elwert, 1997.
- Spengler, Oswald. *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*. München: Beck, 1923.
- Spörl, Johannes. "Die *Civitate Dei* im Geschichtsdenken Ottos von Freising." *La Ciudad de Dios: Revista de cultura e investigación* 167(1956): 577–597.
- Staubach, Nikolaus. "Geschichte als Lebenstrost: Bemerkungen zur historiographischen Konzeption Ottos von Freising." *Mittelalterliches Jahrbuch* 23 (1988): 46–75.
- , "Quattuor Modis Intellegi Potest Hierusalem: Augustins *Civitas Dei* und der Vierfache Schriftsinn." In *Alvarium: Festchrift für Christian Gnllka*, edited by Wilhelm Blümer, Rainer Henke und Markus Mülke, 345–358. Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 33. Münster: Aschendorff, 2002.
- Stauffer, Richard. *Dieu, la création et la Providence dans la prédication de Calvin*. Basler und Berner Studien zur historischen und systematischen Theologie 33. Bern: P Lang 1978.
- Steins., Georg. 'Kanon und Anamnese. Auf dem Weg zu einer Neueren Biblischen Theologie' in *Der Bibelkanon in der Bibelauslegung: Methodenreflexionen und Beispiele* exegesen, edited by E. Balhorn-G. Steins, 110–129. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007.
- Stewart, M. Alexander. "Religion and Rational Theology." In *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*, edited by Alexander Broadie, 31–59. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Straw, Carol. *Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection*. Transformation of the Classical Heritage 14. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
- Stroumsa, Guy. *A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010.
- Suarez, Francisco. *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- Surlese, Loris. *Homo divinus: Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007.
- Swinburne, Richard. *Providence and the Problem of Evil*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Szarmach, Paul E. "Boethius's Influence in Anglo-Saxon England: the Vernacular and the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr. and Philip Edward Phillips, 221–254. Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 30. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Tachau, Katherine. *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics. 1250–1345*. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 22. Leiden: Brill, 1988.
- Tanner, Kathryn. *God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007.

- Thraede, Klaus. "Jerusalem II (Sinnbild)." *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 17 (1995), 718–764.
- Turner, Martin. *Gott als offenes Geheimnis nach Nikolaus von Kues*. Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der Mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie 45. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001.
- Tilliette, Xavier. *Schelling: Une philosophie en devenir*. Paris: J.Vrin, 1970.
- Tilliette, Jean-Yves. "Éclipse de la fortune dans le haut moyen âge." In *La fortune thème, représentation, discours*, edited by Yasmina Foehr-Janssens and Emmanuelle Métry, 93–127. Recherches et Rencontres 19. Genève: Droz, 2003.
- Tinnefeld, Franz. "Schicksal und Vorherbestimmung im Denken der Byzantiner." In *Das Mittelalter: Perspektiven mediävistischer Forschung Zeitschrift des Mediävistenverbandes* I, H 1: *Providentia-Fatum-Fortuna*, edited by Joerg O. Fichte, 21–42. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996.
- Torrell, Jean-Pierre. "Saint Thomas et l'histoire: état de la question et pistes de recherches." *Revue Thomiste* 55 (2005): 355–409.
- , "Saint Thomas et l'histoire: état de la question et pistes de recherches." In *Nouvelles recherches thomasiennes*, 131–175. Bibliothèque thomiste 61. Paris: J. Vrin, 2008.
- , ed. *Thomas d'Aquin, La providence; La prédestination Questions disputées sur la vérité, question 5–question 6*. Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques. Paris: J. Vrin, 2011.
- , ed. *Thomas d'Aquin, Questions Disputées sur la Vérité: Question XII – La Prophétie*. Bibliothèque des Textes Philosophiques. Paris: Vrin, 2011.
- Tracy, Thomas F. "Enacting History: Ogden and Kaufman on God's Mighty Acts." *Journal of Religion* 64 (1984): 20–36.
- Treadgold, Warren. *The Early Byzantine Historians*. Houndmills: Plagrove Macmillan, 2007.
- Trelenberg, Jörg. *Augustins Schrift De ordine: Einführung, Kommentar, Ergebnisse*. Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie 144. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009.
- Trepp, Anne-Charlotte. "Natural Order and Divine Salvation: Protestant Conceptions in Early Modern Germany (1550–1750)." In *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy*, edited by Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, 123–142. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009.
- , "Wissenschaft und Religion im Luthertum zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts: Das 'Glück der eigenen Zeit' als Forschungsstimulans." In *Religion und Naturwissenschaft im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, edited by Kaspar von Greyerz, Thomas Kaufmann, Kim Siebenhüner and Roberto Zaugg, 276–305. Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 210. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2010.
- Trouillard, Jean. "Erigene et la theophanie creatrice." In *The Mind of Eriugena: Papers of a colloquium, Dublin 14–18 July 1970*, edited by John Joseph O'Meara and Ludwig Bieler, 98–113. Dublin: Irish University Press, 1973.
- Tzamalikos, Panayiotis. *Origen: Philosophy of History & Eschatology*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 85. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Valla, Lorenzo. *Über den freien Willen / De libero arbitrio*. Edited by Eckhard Kessler. Humanistische Bibliothek II,16. München: Fink 1987.
- van den Brink, Gijsbert. *Almighty God: A Study of the Doctrine of Divine Omnipotence*. Kampen: Pharos, 1993.
- van den Brink, Gijsbert and Cornelis van der Kooi. *Christelijke Dogmatiek*. Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2012.

- van der Wall, Ernestine. "Cartesianism and Coccesianism: A Natural Alliance?" In *De l'Humanisme aux Lumières, Bayle et le protestantisme*, edited by Michelle Magdelaine, Marina-Cristina Pitrassi, Ruth Whelan, and Anthony McKenna, 445–455. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1996.
- Vanhamel, W., ed. *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996.
- van Nuffelen, Peter. *Orosius and the Rhetoric of History*. Oxford Early Christian Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- van Oort, Johannes. *Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine's 'City of God' and the Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 14. Leiden: Brill, 1991.
- van Sliedregt, Cornelis. *Calvijns Opvolger Theodorus Beza: Zijn Verkiezingsleer en zijn belijdenis van de drieënige God*. Kerkhistorische Monografieën 4. Leiden: Groen, 1988.
- van Zuylen, Willem Hendrik. *Bartholomäus Keckermann – Sein Leben und Wirken*. Leipzig: Borna, 1934.
- Vanstone William H. *Love's Endeavour, Love's Expense: The Response of Being to the Love of God*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1977.
- Vargish, Thomas. *Providential Aesthetic in Victorian Fiction*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1985.
- Verbeke, Gérard. *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1983.
- Vico, Giambattista. *Principi di una scienza nuova intorno alla natura delle nazioni per la quale si ritrovano i principi di altro sistema*. Napoli: Mosca, 1725.
- Voigt-Goy, Christopher. "Die gesellschaftlichen Stände, die Schöpfung und der Fall: Zur Ständelehre in Luthers Genesisvorlesung (1535)." In *Kontexte: Biografische und forschungsgeschichtliche Schnittpunkte der alttestamentlichen Wissenschaft. Festschrift für Hans Jochen Bodcker zum 80. Geburtstag*, edited by Thomas Wagner, Dieter Vieweger, and Kurt Erlemann, 65–80. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2008.
- Volk-Birke, Sabine. *Chaucer and Medieval Preaching: Rhetoric for Listeners in Sermons and Poetry*. Tübingen: Günter Narr Verlag, 1991.
- Vollmer, Matthias. *Fortuna Diagrammatica. Der Rad der Fortuna als bildhafte Verschlüsselung der Schrift De consolatione Philosophiae des Boethius*. Apeliotes. Studien zur Kulturgeschichte und Theologie 3. Bern: Peter Lang, 2009.
- von Balthasar, Hans Urs. *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1941.
- , *A Theology of History*. London: Sheed & Ward, 1963.
- , *Man in History. A Theological Study*. London: Sheed & Ward, 1968.
- , *Theologik*, vol. III: *Der Geist der Wahrhet*. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1985.
- von Freising, Otto. *Chronik oder die Geschichte der zwei Staaten*. Introduction by Rudold Buchner. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960.
- von Greyerz, Kaspar. *Vorsehungsglaube und Kosmologie. Studien zu englischen Selbstzeugnissen des 17. Jahrhunderts*. Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London 25. Göttingen-Zürich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990.
- Wallraff, Martin. "Protologie und Eschaotologie als Horizonte der Kirchengeschichte? Das Erbe christlicher Universalgeschichte." In *Historiographie und Theologie: Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte im Spannungsfeld von geschichtswissenschaftlicher Methode und*

- theologischem Anspruch*, edited by Wolfram Kinzig, Volker Leppin, and Günther Wartenberg, 153–167. *Arbeiten zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte* 15. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2004.
- Walsham, Alexandra. *Providence in Early Modern England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- , “The Reformation and the Disenchantment of the World Reassessed.” *Historical Journal* 51 (2008): 497–528.
- , *The Reformation of the Landscape: Religion in Early Modern Britain and Ireland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Weber, Hans Emil. *Reformation, Orthodoxie und Rationalismus*. 3 volumes. Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1937–1951.
- Weber, Otto. *Grundlagen der Dogmatik*. 7th Edition. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1995.
- Webster, John. “On the Theology of Providence.” In *The Providence of God*, edited by Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler, 158–175. New York: Continuum, 2009.
- Weichenhan, M. “Caspar Peucers Astronomie zwischen christlichen Humanismus und Nicolaus Copernicus.” In *Caspar Peucer 1525–1602. Wissenschaft, Glaube und Politik im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, edited by Hans-Peter Haase and Günther Wartenberg, 91–110. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2004.
- Weimer, Ludwig. “Wodurch kam das Sprechen von Vorsehung und Handeln Gottes in die Krise?” In *Vorsehung und Handeln Gottes*, edited by Theodor Schneider and Lothar Ullrich, 17–71. *Quaestiones Disputatae* 115. Freiburg: Herder, 1988.
- Weissmahr, Béla. *Gottes Wirken in der Welt: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur Frage des Evolution und des Wunders*. *Frankfurter theologische Studien* 15. Frankfurt: J. Knecht, 1973.
- Welker, Michael. *Gottes Geist: Theologie des Heiligen Geistes*. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1992.
- White, Vernon. *The Fall of a Sparrow: A Concept of Special Divine Action*. Exeter: Paternoster, 1985.
- , “Providence, Irony and Belief: Thomas Hardy and an Improbable Comparison with Karl Barth.” *Theology* 113 (2010): 357–365.
- Wickham, Chris. *The Inheritance of Rome: Illuminating the Dark Ages 400–1000*. London: Penguin, 2009.
- Wielockx, Robert. “Henry of Ghent and the Events of 1277.” In *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*, edited by Gordon A. Wilson, 25–62. *Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition* 23. Leiden: Brill, 2011.
- Wiles, Maurice. *Faith and the Mystery of God*. London: SCM, 1982.
- , *God’s Action in the World: The Bampton Lectures for 1986*. London: SCM, 1986.
- Williams, Rowan. “Creation.” In *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, 251–254. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.
- Wilson, Catherine. “From Limits to Laws: The Construction of the Nomological Image of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy.” In *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy*, edited by Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, 13–28. Farnham: Ashgate, 2008.
- Winkelmann, Friedhelm. *Euseb von Kaisareia: Der Vater der Kirchengeschichte*. *Biographien zur Kirchengeschichte*. Berlin: Verlags-Anstalt Union, 1991.

- Winship, Michael P. *Seers of God: Puritan Providentialism in the Restoration and Early Enlightenment*. Early America: History, Context, Culture. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Winston, David. "Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon on Creation, Revelation, and Providence: The High-Water Mark of Jewish Hellenistic Fusion." In *Shem in the Tents of Japhet, Essays on the Encounter of Judaism and Hellenism*, edited by James L. Kugel, 120–130. Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
- Wippel, John F. "Divine Knowledge, Divine Power and Human Freedom in Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent." In *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives*, edited by Tamar Rudavsky, 213–241. Synthese Historical Library, Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy 25. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984.
- , "Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom 'What is Received is Received According to the Mode of the Receiver'." In *A Straight Path: Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman*, edited by Ruth Link-Salinger, 279–289. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988.
- Wirth, Jean. "L'iconographie médiévale de la roue de Fortune." In *La Fortune: Thèmes, Representations, Discours*, edited by Emanuelle Métry and Yasmina Foehr-Janssens, 105–128. Recherches et Recontres 19. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003.
- Wisbert, Rainer. "Geschichte und Schule bei Johann Gottfried Herder." In *Johann Gottfried Herder: Aspekte seines Lebenswerkes*, edited by Martin Keßler and Volker Leppin, 353–367. Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 92. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005.
- Wollgast, Siegfried. *Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung 1550–1650*. 2. Auflage. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993.
- Wolff, Christian. *Bedenken über die Wolffianische Philosophie*. Frankfurt: J. B. Andreä, 1724.
- Wolff, Jens. "Providenz und Meeresforschung: Auslegungsgeschichtliche Beobachtungen zu Johannes-Calvins Jona-Kommentar." In *Der Problematische Prophet: Die Biblische Jona-Figur in Exegese, Theologie, Literatur und bildender Kunst*, edited by Johann Anselm Steiger and Wilhelm Kühlmann, 139–158. Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 118. Berlin: de Gruyter 2011.
- Wood, Charles M. *The Question of Providence*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2008.
- Worden, Blair. "Providence and Politics in Presbyterian England." *Past & Present* 109 (1985): 55–99.
- Wright, Terry J. *Providence Made Flesh: Divine Presence as a Framework for a Theology of Providence*. Paternoster Theological Monographs. Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009.
- Yaffe, Martin D. "Providence in Medieval Aristotelianism: Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas on the Book of Job." *Hebrew Studies* 20–21 (1979–1980): 62–74.
- Ysaac, Walter L. "The Certitude of Providence in St. Thomas." *The Modern Schoolman* 38 (1961): 305–321.
- Zachman, Randall C. "Response to Caroline Schröder's 'I See Something You Don't See'." In *For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology*, edited by George Hunsinger, 136–142. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004.
- Zedler, Johann Heinrich. "Vorsehung Gottes." in *Zedlers Lexikon*. Leipzig-Halle, 1746.
- Zimmermann, Jutta. *Lutherischer Vorsehungsglaube in Paul Gerhards geistlicher Dichtung*. Theological Faculty Dissertation: Halle, 1955.