
MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Critical Assessments

Edited by Christopher Macann

VOLUME I: PHILOSOPHY



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To my mother:

whose illness prompted me to undertake this work but whose death made it impossible for her to witness its completion.

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Editor's preface

For the past twenty years I have been working at a programme drawn up along much the same lines as the programme outlined in the Introduction to Being and Time, and comprising a phenomenological philosophy (constructed on ontological foundations and employing what I call a 'genetic' methodology) and an epochal interpretation of the history of modern philosophy. I am therefore committed to the view that it is far too early to relegate Heidegger (even, and even especially, first Heidegger) to the status of a historical philosopher, that the source represented by the Gesamtausgabe holds a resource which is very far from being exhausted and that therefore, in a certain critically significant sense, phenomenological philosophy still operates within a framework whose basic parameters were laid down by the thinking to which this collection of papers is devoted. It is for this reason that I have sought to bring together papers which treat Heidegger's work as a living body of thought rather than a historically determined corpus.

Despite, or even perhaps because of, my involvement in a programme inspired by the Heideggerian example, my personal acquaintance with Heideggerian scholars and thinkers was, prior to this editorial venture, quite limited. Perhaps the most agreeable aspect of my task has been the opportunity it afforded me to get to know those working in the field and to do so in the most satisfying manner, by publishing the work they so generously made available to me.

By far the most laborious feature of my editorial task has been the extraordinary number of translations (over one volume's worth!) I have had to do from the French and the German in order to make it possible to include papers from the two cultures which have contributed most to our understanding of Heidegger. I have however also been helped by the readiness of certain of my English-speaking contributors to do translations of their colleagues' papers as also by the efforts of several of my

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foreign-language authors to get their papers into an English version. My task has also been greatly assisted by the willingness of so many of my contributors to write original pieces for this collection, thereby circumventing permissions problems while, at the same time, throwing fresh light upon the scene. It is not an exaggeration to say that, without the assistance and encouragement of so many of my authors, so many that it is impossible for me to name them individually, this huge collection could never have been put together.

At least two, entirely unforeseen, circumstances prompted me to undertake this work and made it possible for me to complete it on schedule. In the Summer of 1989, I returned to London after a Heidegger conference in Bonn, sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, to find my mother critically ill with cancer and in need of constant attention. Critical Assessments was a suitable labour for me to undertake while attending to someone who, however, did not live long enough to see the completion of the task that her condition made it both necessary and possible for me to take on. Richard Stoneman, the editor of the series, not only first proposed this project to me but, in the period of financial insecurity which followed upon my mother's death, advanced me a sum of money without which I should not have enjoyed the freedom to complete the project on time. To my mother goes the dedication of this work, while thanks are due to Richard Stoneman (and to his editorial assistant Heather McCallum, to Adrian Driscoll, Maria Stasiak and Virginia Myers) for the support he has shown over the two-year period when this project moved, sometimes with seemingly imperceptible slowness, from idea to reality.

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Christopher Macann 'Genetic phenomenology: towards a reconciliation of transcendental and ontological phenomenology'. Original piece written for this collection.

Maria Villela-Petit 'Heidegger's conception of space'. First published as 'L'espace chez Heidegger. Quelques repères', in *Etudes philosophiques*, and extensively rewritten by the author for this collection.

Joseph Kockelmans 'Heidegger on time and being'. First published in the Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 4, 1970 and reprinted in Martin Heidegger, ed. Ballard and Scott, Nijhoff, 1973. Reproduced here with the kind permission of the author and the editor of the Southern Journal of Philosophy.

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Introduction

Christopher Macann

To think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands still like a star in the world's sky.

(Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens)

In 1989 the world celebrated the centennial of Heidegger's birth. And already, within twenty years of his death in 1976, we are in a position to say that the one thought to which Heidegger dedicated his life (the thought about Being) stands still like a star in the world's sky.

How does thinking of this order arise? Heidegger gives us plenty of clues. 'Out of long guarded speechlessness and out of the careful clarification of the cleared ground arises the utterance of the thinker.' What a warning to those who today, and by virtue of the pressures imposed by the institutional environment in which they are obliged to work, feel compelled to rush into print at the earliest opportunity! 'To know how to question means to know how to wait, even for a whole lifetime.' The great danger is then surely that this patient, life-consuming thinking will be perverted in a manner with which we are only too familiar and against which Heidegger constantly warned us. In a poem from the same text as that previously cited we find the following, poetically voiced, warning: 'Few are experienced enough in the/difference between an object of/ scholarship and a matter of thought.'

This difference between philosophical thinking and academic scholarship is to be found all over his corpus. 'It is not a matter of knowing philosophy but rather of learning how to philosophize',⁴ he says in one of his earliest texts, the *Grundprobleme*. Or again, more forcibly and critically still:

We no longer think but simply busy ourselves with philosophy. In the

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kind of competitiveness which such a business demands, philosophy is openly done as an 'ism' and each 'ism' seeks to outdo the other. The pervasiveness of such a conception of philosophy is not accidental. It rests, and especially today, upon a real dictatorship on the part of publicity.⁵

Never has Heidegger's comment been more pertinent than today, not the 'today' to which Heidegger himself refers but our today. For there have never been more 'isms' than today. We have existentialism and structuralism and de-constructivism and relativism and post-modernism and Marxism and critical realism and so on and so forth, so many schools of philosophy which, more than anything else, are schooled in the art of promoting their cause by getting their own works published and their own men into the available university positions.

'All this', Heidegger tells us elsewhere, 'would be highly comical, were it not deeply sad, showing as it does that philosophy no longer reflects upon the things and problems themselves but upon the books of colleagues.' And how? By encouraging and even requiring that philosophers run from conference to conference, from symposium to symposium, from seminar to seminar, using for this purpose instruments of international travel and communication which were barely conceivable in Heidegger's day, no matter how keenly he might already have felt the inauthenticity of

people today who travel from one conference to the other and get the feeling that something is really happening, as if they had been really doing something. But in fact they have just relieved themselves from work, and have tried to conceal their own helplessness under the cover of idle talk.⁷

It is astonishing that some fifty years ago, and in a university environment very different from (and in certain respects much healthier than) our own, Heidegger should have anticipated a state of affairs that has become quite characteristic of our own time. Nothing seems to me to sum up our *present* situation more poignantly than this last citation: 'The most thought-provoking thing about this, our most thought-provoking, age is that we are still not thinking.'8

It is the underlying objective of this collection of papers on the thinking of Martin Heidegger to remain true to this vision of philosophical thinking as an on-going enterprise which will never be completed, which at all times exhibits an inherent tendency to lapse back into mere scholarship and so has constantly to be dragged back into the light of thinking by, amongst other things, reawakening the original, living meaning of the basic questions and doing so with a view to assuming the burden of

thinking as one's own and carrying it on to whatever conclusions are implied by the single thought under whose star any and every thinker is born.

To put it in other words, I have tried to remain true to the very wording of the series to which this particular four-volume set belongs: Heidegger: Critical Assessments.

Two major obstacles face any attempt to arrive at a critical assessment of the philosophical significance of Heidegger's philosophy. The first is that of uncritical dismissal, either in the form of more or less deliberate ignorance of his work (largely operative in the analytical circles in which I was originally introduced to philosophy) or in the form (for which the historically famous example is provided by Carnap's critique, briefly referred to in Gadamer's paper) of a rigorous application of alien criteria of validity, from which it readily transpires that Heidegger's philosophy is not worth bothering with since it fails to conform to even minimal requirements of truth and meaningfulness. In view of the ever-increasing importance ascribed to Heidegger's thinking in certain circles, such a dismissal is barely sustainable today and reflects more discreditably upon those who attempt to voice it than it does upon Heidegger himself. But there is a second danger, that of uncritical allegiance, a danger to which Heidegger's thinking seems peculiarly susceptible despite the fact that it is so obviously contrary to the spirit in which he conducted his own philosophical inquiries – as the accumulation of citations at the beginning of this Introduction clearly and unequivocally attests.

Surely, the greatness of a thinker is to be measured by the fruitfulness of his thinking, the range and diversity of the thinking to which his own inquiries gave rise, and this even when the philosopher may himself not have intended any such deviation from the norms established by his own work. The classical case in point is that of Kant, who naively supposed that the Critical philosophy had solved all outstanding problems in the discipline and that nothing more remained for philosophers to do but rigorously apply his own canons to the various branches of thought to which they might apply and who, consequently, looked askance at attempts by such varied thinkers as Fichte and Schopenhauer to carry on the Kantian tradition in ways which the master never approved. To make matters worse, though both Fichte and Schopenhauer claimed to be true inheritors of the Kantian philosophy, neither could find anything of value in the thinking of the other, a discrepancy enshrined in Schopenhauer's cryptically witty dismissal of Fichte's principal work as Wissenschaftsleere. And yet, despite Kant's barely suppressed exasperation at the 'misguided' labours of his disciples, the Critical philosophy did not bring the richness and variety of German philosophy to a close but rather marked the beginning of one of the most astonishing outbursts of philosophical creativity the world has ever known, a phenomenon which

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led Heidegger, in his own highly unorthodox Kant interpretation, to turn against Kant a remark which he (Kant) had himself directed at Plato: 'it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself' (A 314 = B 371).

In the mouth of a Heidegger this remark is no haphazard and perhaps grudgingly conceded admission. For Being and Time laid the foundations of a hermeneutical method which refuses the very possibility of definitive and conclusive results in favour of an open-ended approach to the 'manifold meaning of being' (part of the title of the book by Brentano which served to awaken him from his theological slumbers). When Heidegger, in that famous passage from the Introduction to Being and Time, spoke of the possibility of phenomenology standing higher than actuality he had a quite specific target in mind. For the actuality of phenomenology at that time was marked by the thinking of his master, Edmund Husserl. In placing possibility above actuality Heidegger was surely creating for himself (and others) the leeway needed to question Husserl's conception of phenomenology and to recommend another, quite different, conception.

It might be argued that, in his later thinking, Heidegger rejected, as 'metaphysical' the kind of phenomenological thinking in which he had indulged at the outset of his career and that, consequently, such a project should not be attempted again. But this would lay Heidegger open to the charge that, having forced open the royal gate of metaphysics in order to secure admission for himself, he then took care to slam it shut behind him - so that no one else could come in after him. And this charge would be doubly incriminating. For not only did Being and Time win for Heidegger the audience which would later follow him down the far more esoteric paths of his later thinking and which he might have been condemned to pursuing in more or less Nietzschean isolation had it not been for the enormous success of his first published work; this later thinking was itself more personal and idiosyncratic than his first philosophy and therefore fell even more conclusively under the sway of that 'multiplicity of meaning' already acknowledged as a ruling principle in his hermeneutical philosophy, to the point that, in the end, philosophy, for Heidegger, is brought ever closer to poetry.

No doubt it was in view of the danger of uncritical allegiance that Heidegger himself chose as the motto for his *Gesamtausgabe* (the preparation of which occupied the last years of his life and the editorial responsibility for which he assigned to one of our contributors, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann) the following words: *Wege nicht Werke* (Ways not works). Authoritative pronouncements are enshrined in *works*. They cannot be captured in writings which are indicative of *ways*, ways of

thinking, ways which thinking might take, ways which do not necessarily lead anywhere, ways which are taken to set thinking in motion, not to get somewhere. It was surely also for this reason that Heidegger refused to permit his massive eighty-volume Gesamtausgabe to be accompanied by the kind of critical apparatus which has become customary today in scholarly circles. Heidegger wanted his Complete Works to feature as a source from which philosophers would draw not information but inspiration, the kind of inspiration which would set them on their own path of thinking.

But if Heidegger's thinking was designed to awaken in his readers a response which would direct them down the same path as that which he himself had pursued, we run up against a paradox. For paradoxically, though inevitably, 'same' means here 'different', that is, a path which would bring his students to their own thinking just as Heidegger had been brought to his own thinking by an obstinate, and often deliberately reticent, refusal to tread the beaten track. It is this inspirational response which is threatened by the second of the two dangers mentioned earlier, that of uncritical allegiance.

It is worth noting that uncritical allegiance is rarely, if ever, accorded to one thinker by another thinker. For example while, in general, Being and Time was received with immense enthusiasm by the philosophical public, this enthusiasm was by no means unqualified when it came to the leading spokesmen of the day. We know that Husserl's initial reaction to Being and Time was one of disappointment at the 'unscientific' direction phenomenology had taken with Heidegger (though this did not inhibit him from promoting the publication of the work in his own journal). Similarly, Jaspers intended to undertake a careful study of the work but found the labour insufficiently rewarding (for his own purposes) to justify the effort involved. Cassirer's objections to Heidegger's Kant interpretation are very clearly and effectively reproduced in the paper by Pierre Aubenque (see chap. 23, vol. II of the present work). And if we move on a generation to philosophers who were deeply influenced by Heidegger's first philosophy (I am thinking of figures like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), we find thinkers whose works are not only cast in a very different mould but cast in a mould which Heidegger is sometimes constrained to reject as a mis-understanding of his own work - and I am thinking principally of Heidegger objections to the 'existentialism' Sartre claimed to find in Being and Time and which he (Sartre) worked out along quite different lines. In other words, those best qualified, by virtue of their own creative achievements, to judge the original quality of Heidegger's work have been those most likely to express reservations, or to develop Heidegger's thinking in directions he himself could not approve.

So, by a critical assessment of Martin Heidegger's work at least four

to, the Heideggerian influence.

things will be meant. First, and most obviously, a critical appraisal of the value and validity of the various Heideggerian themes covered by the contributors to this collection. This involves bringing out the limitations as well as the strengths of the positions Heidegger assumed. Second, and less obviously, many contributors have sought to follow up their own critical intuitions and so to indicate, within the space available, alternative directions in which Heideggerian thinking might profitably be taken. Third, I have sought to solicit contributions from authors who have worked out their own philosophical positions, often in reaction to Heidegger. In this connection, I am particularly happy to be able to print a section from Michel Henry's Essence of Manifestation. Finally, I

have also sought to trace the cross-cultural impact of Heidegger's thinking, sometimes upon thinkers who rejected, or who were never subjected

Nothing speaks more conclusively in favour of the legitimacy of such a critical approach to Heidegger's thinking than the fact that he himself adopted just such an approach, and not just to the thinking of others but also, and more importantly, to his own thinking, reproaching himself in the later course of his development for having written his first philosophy under the superseded, if not discredited, banner of 'metaphysics'. Hence the so-called *Kehre*, the 'turn' or 'turning' which both turned Heidegger away from the path indicated in the general programme outlined in *Being and Time* and returned him to beginning philosophy, to an ever more primordial quest for the origins of Western thinking in Greek thought.

The simplest, and therefore for this reason also perhaps most simplistic, way to present this reorientation is in terms of a shift from human being (Dasein) to Being (Sein). In a book on Heidegger's later philosophy, Kockelmans argues that, in Being and Time, 'Being' and 'World' are to some extent employed as equivalent terms and that therefore the task of investigating the meaning of Being, as such, had still not been satisfactorily completed in his first major work.¹⁰

But there is more to the *Kehre* than just this recognition of a task which had been assumed and never really carried through conclusively. More seriously, certain initial decisions carried his thinking in directions which were later to prove contentious. For instance, a great deal follows from his early decision to adopt Aristotle as his ontological guide. Had he chosen instead to follow up his genial insight into the primordial nature of the imagination (the insight developed at length in the Kant book and which forms, as it were, the core and the foundation of this unique interpretation) and to pursue this line of thought down the path which it had taken in German Idealism through Fichte to Hegel (the Hegel, say, of the *Anthropology*, which is the text in which Hegel comes closest to something like a Dasein's analytic), the primordial conjunction

of feeling and imagination would have brought him much closer to the researches being conducted by such contemporaries as Scheler and Cassirer (and anticipated the researches of a thinker like Michel Henry) and would have made it possible for him to establish a link between his own ontological investigations into the pre-objective, pre-predicative domain and investigations concurrently being undertaken in fields such as psychoanalysis, child psychology, anthropology, mythology and so on.

Instead, he chose to go back to Greek philosophy and, moreover, to that version of it embodied in Aristotle's theory of praxis; which led him to the rather strange conclusion that the 'saving grace' (in his early philosophy, the uncovering of an ontological domain against the ontic has something of the character of a 'saving grace') resides in such basic and familiar activities as tool using, driving cars, making use of communications systems; more generally, operating systems (whether mechanical or human) in the manner to which we have become accustomed in our present, technologically oriented, industrialized society. Undeniably, functioning in this practical way does lead to an overcoming of the distance and detachment implied in theorizing. But then the systems in question are all of them systems into which a large component of theoretical reason has already been invested. Worse, they are systems which are both the result of, and which confirm, an attitude of manipulation and control which it was one of the tasks of his later thinking to call in question. As he watched the world being transformed, in a seemingly irreversible manner, through the multiple and apparently limitless applications of science and technology, and as he watched the human and natural destruction which these same applications wreaked upon the face of the earth, it must have become ever clearer to him that the 'saving grace' had become the 'devil incarnate'.11

When the 'saving grace' becomes the 'devil incarnate' a massive adjustment is clearly called for. But it is absolutely characteristic of Heidegger's 'turn' that it should not have taken the form of a renunciation of his earlier position but rather that of a reorientation (see the paper by von Herrmann). The primacy initially accorded to human being (Dasein) is never entirely given up, in favour, tor instance, of a logic of Being. Rather, the residual persistence of human being is evident in the very terms employed to characterize the new articulation of the Being-relation - as openness, clearing, gift, mittence, en-ownment. Dasein is no longer the one who ap-propriates, makes own (see Pöggeler's 'Being as appropriation'). But, as ap-propriated by Being, en-owned, the recipient of the gift of Being, Dasein is still there, nevertheless.

But if the initial commitment (which called for this elaborate detour) is not one which we, who follow after, need make, it also follows that the conclusive realignment need not be one with which we have to fall in line. By taking our stand in a reassessment of the full potential of

ontological phenomenology (the field opened up with Being and Time), we are free to assume an alternative foundation which will not call for the elaborate 'destruction' which Heidegger performed upon his own earlier thinking, as well as upon the history of philosophy.

But why should one attempt such a reassessment? Obviously, only if it is possible to identify certain striking limitations inherent in the position assumed at the outset. Is it possible to identify such limitations? And if so, how can they be 'overcome' in such a way as to recreate, within the general field of ontological phenomenology, the same latitude (possibility) that Heidegger, the founder of this way of doing phenomenology, claimed for his own enterprise when he placed the possibility of his own (ontological) phenomenology above the actuality of Husserl's (transcendental) phenomenology? Here are some suggestions, suggestions which are by no means intended to be exhaustive.

First, the refusal of Husserl's transcendentalism seems to me not only unjustified, but unnecessary. Heidegger's reaction to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and his determination to develop phenomenology along alternative, ontological lines led to a situation which Merleau-Ponty, in his Preface to The Phenomenology of Perception rather inaccurately portrayed in terms of a both-and (both a philosophy of essences and of existence/a philosophy which reduces the world and a philosophy for which the world is always already there/a rigorous science and an interpretation of lived meanings); inaccurately, because the very incompatibility¹² of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology means that these two ways of doing philosophy can only legitimately be presented in terms of an either-or, not a both-and - at which point the question necessarily arises: with what right can they both then be taken to fall under the same classificatory heading of phenomenology? Is it indeed possible both to distinguish and to clearly demarcate the respective spheres of transcendental and ontological phenomenology (and without such a preliminary clearing of the ground, confusion will reign) and to reconcile and reintegrate these very different, and indeed incompatible, ways of doing phenomenology?

I believe that a positive answer can be given to this question. Indeed, my own ontological phenomenology is devoted to laying the foundation for just such a task of reintegration. At this point however, it is much more appropriate to consider the problems that arise when a disjunction of the kind indicated above is not resolved. First, as Husserl understood only too well, the replacement of transcendental with ontological phenomenology of the Heideggerian variety carries with it the possibility (if not the necessity) of a depreciation (if not a dismissal) of rationality, both of the philosophical and of the non-philosophical kind. Nowhere is this reservation better expressed than in Krisis, that extended cry of pain emitted by Husserl between 1934 and 1937 as he watched his cherished ideal of rationality fall into the abyss of Nazi irrationalism.

A second conundrum follows hard upon the first, the depreciation, if not the dismissal, of Ethics. Here the classic case in point is Kant rather than Husserl. It is one of the objections brought by Cassirer against Heidegger's Kant interpretation that a strict, and unqualifiedly ontological, interpretation of Kant's transcendental philosophy could not hope to come to terms with the significance of Kant's contribution to Ethics which, as we know, Heidegger himself was inclined to dismiss as a derivative discipline (along with logic, aesthetics, politics and so on).

A third implication follows hard upon the first two, a deeply ambiguous relation to what might be called 'voluntarism'. Perhaps the most critical failing of Heidegger's own critique of the voluntarism inherent in the 'philosophy of subjectivity' is his refusal to recognize the difference (or at least the relevance of the difference) between what might be called 'empirical' and 'transcendental' subjectivity. In as much as Heidegger refused to recognize that, in transcendental philosophy, an alternative conception of subjectivity (inwardness/consciousness) had been developed which already brought with it the 'saving grace' which he was seeking, the grace of a subjectivity which had learnt to 'overcome itself' by taking a further and conclusive 'step back' out of empirical subjectivity and into a sphere variously entitled 'transcendental' or 'noumenal', he was obliged to seek the 'saving grace' in question along other lines, lines leading back to a more primordial relation with Being, and so leading on, inevitably, to a critically ambivalent relation to the 'primitivity' of the 'will to power'. Out of the frying pan into the fire!

A second limitation, or delimitation, one which arises out of the first (the refusal of transcendentalism), is Heidegger's initial (and perhaps also conclusive) commitment to the finitude of human being. The Kant book brings out better than any other early text the extent of Heidegger's commitment to this principle. But is it as obvious as some contemporary philosophers would have us believe that this principle is self-evident, or even universally assumed to be such? With the possible exception of a certain interpretation of Buddhism (and such an interpretation is itself highly ambiguous), this assumption implies, even if it does not explicitly avow, a wholesale dismissal of religion as a peculiar, and pathologically engendered, illusion, whose survival can only be justified on the grounds that, in some instances at least, it does seem to prompt more considerate social behaviour on the part of its members. Precisely because, in the context of an all-pervasive materialism which itself underwrites our contemporary 'faith' in technology, the finitude of human being has virtually taken on the proportions of a self-evident assumption it should surely, today, be subject to the same rigorously critical scrutiny to which the religious thinking of past ages has already been subjected. For with regard to nothing should philosophy be more critical than toward that which appears to be self-evident. For this reason, I am very happy to be able to include two contributions (by Richard Kearney and Joseph O'Leary) in which the theological implications of Heidegger's thinking are explored.

That a rethinking of the relation of philosophy and theology does not need to mean a dismissal of Heidegger's contribution to philosophy is evident in the light of the impact Heidegger's thinking has had upon theology, despite his relative silence on the subject. Rahmer, Bultmann and Tillich are the names of just three theologians who have been deeply influenced by Heidegger. To take only the third of these, the starting point of Tillich's Systematic Theology is to be located in an interpretation, and theological reorientation, of Heidegger's first philosophy. It is interesting to note that in this, his seminal work, Paul Tillich should have felt obliged to appeal to the Fichtean notion of 'Being itself' in order to accomplish his synthesis of Heideggerian ontology and theology. It is also noteworthy that although Tillich published his Systematic Theology late enough (1951) to be able to take account of the Kehre (and some at least of its theological implications), he chose to go back to Heidegger's first philosophy for his philosophical grounding.

A third limitation can be identified in Heidegger's refusal to countenance any attempt to make the connection between ontological phenomenology and other relevant branches of the human sciences. I say 'refusal' not 'failure' because, on several occasions, he does explicitly refuse to make this connection despite its obvious relevance to the directives of primordiality. And yet, in his study of Heidegger's theory of being-with (Der Andere), Theunissen will talk of an 'anthropological turn'. 13 And with some justification. For, towards the end of his Kant book, Heidegger does talk of the laying of the foundations of metaphysics as 'philosophical anthropology'.

And so on to psychology. In his paper on the psychological implications of Heidegger's ontology (see chap. 60, vol. IV of the present work), Charles Scott shows how fruitful Heidegger's thinking has also proved to be for such psychoanalysts as Medard Boss and Binswanger. Merleau-Ponty's own investigation of the being-in-the-world of human being not only relies heavily upon the findings of behavioural psychology but is obliged to do so in so far as the being of human being is now determined in accordance with the fundamental principle of embodiment - as Christina Schües' paper shows. To these two instances, it would be appropriate to add a third, the opening up of the whole field of child psychology, primarily through the work of Jean Piaget but also through the labours of researchers such as Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. Moreover, this concern with the primary in connection with the psyche readily leads on, and especially through the work of Carl Jung, to a more general reassessment of human spirituality - for instance, as exhibited and attested in the discipline of mythology. In this last connection I would mention especially Eric Neumann and the Swiss cultural anthropologist, Jean Gebser.

If the direction of Heidegger's first philosophy is regressive (and this directive is, to some extent, maintained throughout the course of his development), a movement from the derivative to the primary, from the grounded to the grounding, from the outcome to the outset, then surely, those branches of the humanities which are concerned with precisely this domain (of the primordial) must have a bearing upon the ontological revolution introduced by Heidegger into phenomenology? In this connection, I would strongly recommend the current work of Hermann Schmitz, whose ten-volume System der Philosophie¹⁴ is full of insights gleaned from a careful consideration of empirical research bearing upon human reality.

Thus far, we have taken into consideration only those delimitations which refer to possible ways of doing (or of orienting) phenomenology which Heidegger explicitly took account of in order precisely to be able to discount them. Two further limitations deserve to be mentioned, limitations which refer to ways of doing philosophy which Heidegger never himself seriously entertained and which, for this reason, remain excluded from the province of his consideration: analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and Eastern philosophy, on the other.

Heidegger's refusal of analytic philosophy, in particular, or the philosophy of the English-speaking world, in general, was, though rarely referred to, quite deliberate. In his Introduction to Metaphysics, in one of those rare passages in which he talks of the forgetfulness of being in terms of the emasculation of spirit, of a spiritlessness engendered by a utilitarian intelligence which skims over the surface of things, Heidegger lumps America (by implication the Anglo-Saxon world) and Russia together as the enemies of a spirituality whose high point is to be located in German Idealism.¹⁵ But a case for the exact opposite position can readily be made, as we all know, from the example of Karl Popper whose intellectual career encompasses a massive attack (to my mind, by no means as convincing or as conclusive as it appears) on German Idealism (The Open Society and its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism) as the most important source (traceable to its roots in Platonism) of totalitarianism.16

More generally, I think it is appropriate to point out that the 'spirit' in which analytic philosophy is conducted is, in certain respects, 'healthier' than that which prevails in continental philosophy. In analytical circles there is no such thing as an unassailable theory or an unassailable theorist. Rather the contrary, progress in the field is measured by a procedure of 'challenge and response' from which no one is exempt and from which no one can withdraw, without discredit, into genial immunity. Admittedly, the cut and thrust of analytical philosophy has much to do with a somewhat naive, because epistemologically biased, criterion of validity and with a marked reluctance to attempt anything like the elaboration of a complete philosophy. For all that, Heidegger's dismissal of the epistemological concept of truth does not merely reduce the scope of his theory, it confuses the issue in so far as it leads to an (ontological) extension which borrows much of its conviction from that which it seeks to surpass - as Tugendhat has shown.

Finally, Heidegger's determination to think the meaning of being strictly out of the Western tradition, beginning with the Greeks, deliberately overlooks the more original contribution of Eastern philosophy. Greek culture was not, in fact, the beginning of philosophical culture here on earth. Long, long before the Greeks came the Indians - and possibly also the Chinese. It is indeed astonishing that of all the great Western philosophers only one, Arthur Schopenhauer, should have shown a proper appreciation of the indispensable significance of Eastern philosophy – in his case, Indian philosophy. It should however be said that although Heidegger never sought to directly address (let alone assimilate) Eastern philosophy as such, he did at various points enter into a dialogue with Japanese philosophers, a subsidiary connection which I have been fortunate enough to be able to follow up through the good offices of Graham Parkes, the editor of a volume on Heidegger and Asian Thought.17

But, it will be objected, this attempt to recuperate, with a view to further developing, the general field opened up by Heidegger's ontological phenomenology only means that one has not read, marked, learnt and inwardly digested the implications of his later philosophy, that one has not come to terms with the claim, as it is so often voiced, 'that the only question which philosophers are permitted to address today is the question of the "closure" or "end" of philosophy'.

First, as Samuel IJsseling's paper reminds us, the so-called 'end of philosophy' is not an end tout court but is also the 'commencement' of something else which Heidegger called 'thinking'. But second, it seems doubtful to me that it is possible for us to start out where Heidegger left off, with the thinking that came after the Kehre. The very fact that the Kehre took place, in part, as an auto-critical reaction means not only that we have grounds (furnished by Heidegger himself) for being wary of Heidegger's own starting point but also grounds for thinking that what follows the Kehre cannot itself, and without further qualification, form a starting point for the development of any further thinking about Being, at least not unless, and until, we too have made our own move 'through phenomenology to thought'. The more I read the productions of those who have taken late Heidegger as their point of departure, the more

convinced I become that it is not possible to start out from the Kehre without the risk of lapsing into arbitrariness and unassailable, because inaccessible, idiosyncrasv.

'By their fruits ye shall know them.' Thinkers who have returned to the source from which Heidegger originally drew his inspiration have taken Heidegger at his word and produced phenomenological programmes of their own inspired by the Heideggerian example, have proved to be amongst the most fruitful thinkers of our time, even when the course of their thinking has adopted a very different trajectory. The two figures who spring most immediately to mind are, of course, Merleau-Ponty, whose own concept of being-in-the-world (partly inspired by Husserl) led him towards an investigation of embodiment, and Sartre, whose dualistic ontology (harking back to Descartes) permitted him to offer a graphic portrait of the existential implications of alienation. But there are others. In his seminal work, Essence of Manifestation, Michel Henry chose to suspend the primacy accorded to transcendence in the Heideggerian ontology and so found himself in a position to work out the implications of an *ontology of immanence*. In his massive, ten-volume work, System der Philosophie, Hermann Schmitz chose to suspend the primacy accorded to the future in the Heideggerian ontology and so found himself in a position to work out the implications of an ontology whose existential watchword might be: live more presently! Emmanuel Lévinas not only refuses the subordination of ethics to ontology (as Jean Greisch point out in his paper) but chooses to radicalize the alterity of the other with a view to promoting a sense of the irreducibility of personal relations. With regard to the many topics with which his thinking has come to terms. Professor Ricoeur has never ceased to hold in tension the three (for him mutually supportive), parameters of empirical investigation, transcendental critique and hermeneutical interpretation.

How one thinks is in part determined by what gives itself, at any given time, as having to be thought - the gift of being, the offer of which, Heidegger said later, would depend upon being, not upon us. But surely, of one thing we may be fairly certain. There will be no lack of themes in the years to come. To take only one example; from the very earliest times, and certainly before Plato, the word 'being' has been linked with that of the 'One' or unity. But never before has unity meant what it is coming to mean today, the global unification of the human species under the compulsive thrust of contemporary technology. Epictetus already talked of himself as a 'citizen of the world', but largely on the tragic grounds of his own uprootedness and enslavement. Today, we see the unity of the globe through satellite pictures beamed down from space. Corporate capitalism thinks of the world as a whole and already operates on a global basis, regardless of national frontiers. In fact, these frontiers are becoming ever less viable, whether they are dissolved through

agreement (the European Community) or forcibly overriden (the contemporary reaction against communist domination in Eastern Europe/the black revolt in South Africa).

The unification of the world is not however likely to proceed smoothly. In fact, I suspect that the next decades will prove to be amongst the most turbulent the world has ever seen. Momentarily, we are congratulating ourselves on the suspension of the Cold War. But this suspension can always itself be suspended. More realistically, the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the Third World makes it likely that a nuclear confrontation of some kind is going to take place before very long. In the meantime, the apparent withdrawal of the threat of world war is matched by an equally apparent advance in the scope and scale of local wars, wars whose barbarism surpasses that of the world wars themselves. Countries which, like Peru or Mexico, were historically (the Inca and Aztec empires) always able to feed their people adequately are now unable to provide for a rapidly increasing population despite the resources of agricultural technology (or perhaps because of them). Famine on a scale never before known faces Africa, and epidemics on a scale rarely seen before now confront not only the undeveloped world but its fully industrialized leaders. And even if all these dangers are overcome, or circumvented, by the intelligent use of technology, this very technology threatens to bring with it an environmental destruction for which there exists no parallel in past history.

The times ahead are going to be turbutent and, for this very reason, dangerous times. In times of danger, Nietzsche claimed, philosophers are needed. But surely not to debate the question of the 'end' or the 'closure' of philosophy, or to indulge in meta-theoretical assessments of the actual situation in the discipline, still less to fall back upon a scholarly examination, or critical deconstruction, of the texts which go to make up what has come to be known as the history of philosophy. Is this not the very moment to revive the time-honoured slogan: To the things themselves! The endless discussion of the 'end of philosophy' at a time when philosophers are needed to address the very real dangers that face humanity today seems to me one of the strangest acts of professional irresponsibility since Nero fiddled while Rome burnt.

Notes

¹ Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (GA) 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, S. 309).

² Heidegger, GA 40, tr. Ralph Manheim as An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 172.

³ Heidegger, GA 13, tr. Albert Hofstadter as Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 5.

- 4 Heidegger, GA 24, tr. Albert Hofstadter as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 2.
 - 5 Heidegger, *GA* 9, S. 315.
 - 6 Heidegger, GA 21, S. 84.
 - 7 Heidegger, GA 20, S. 376.
- 8 Heidegger, GA 8, tr. by F. Wieck and G. Gray as What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 6.
- 9 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 63 (H. 38).
- 10 Joseph Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 47.
- 11 In Identity and Difference (tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969)) Heidegger actually uses, though admittedly only to refuse, the language of devilry. 'We can not of course reject today's technological world as devil's work, nor may we destroy it – assuming it does not destroy itself' (p. 40).
- 12 The incompatability of first Heidegger and Husserl is quite clear, since Heidegger refuses the transcendental apparatus Husserl considers as essential to phenomenology. The incompatibility of later Husserl with first Heidegger is however not so clear, since Husserl does at least make use of the concept of 'world', even if not that of 'being-in-the-world'.
- 13 Theunissen, Michael, Der Andere, tr. Christopher Macann as The Other (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), p. 170.
- 14 Hermann Schmitz, System der Philosophie, Band 1-5 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1964-80).
 - 15 Heidegger, GA 40, pp. 37-9.
- 16 Popper's attack on German Idealism is much more puzzling than it appears. For if he was concerned to expose the philosophical sources of authoritarianism why did he not take account of Hobbes' Leviathan, one of the most unabashed defences of dictatorial rule ever put together by a philosopher? Could it have been because the audience for which he intended his anti-totalitarian diatribe was largely British? In which case one would have grounds for querying the genuineness of his moral crusade.
- 17 Graham Parkes, Heidegger and Asian Thought (Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

The beginning and the end of philosophy

Hans-Georg Gadamer

Heidegger's influence has always been linked up with well-founded and entirely intelligible countervailing forces. This has to be understood from the very beginning if we are to come to terms with Heidegger's talk about the end of philosophy and the commencement of thinking. The first major objection which can be brought against Heidegger is, of course, his relation to logic. This is not so much a matter of logic having made astonishing progress in the last decades while Heidegger, as with all those of my generation, was brought up on the old Aristotelian school logic. It is a matter of a deeper conflict which not only concerns Heidegger but continental philosophy in general. It is for instance always possible to tear apart statements by Heidegger in the manner we have become familiar with through Rudolf Carnap. In a paper which has become very well known, Carnap dismantled Heidegger's inaugural lecture at Freiburg entitled 'Was ist Metaphysik?' by a scrupulous application of the logical rules of the game. In that text Heidegger speaks openly of an annihilation of nothingness. If one sets out with Carnap to write this statement on the board, using for the purpose the instruments of mathematical logic, it becomes perfectly clear that it doesn't work. In this formal language in which everything is supposed to have an unambiguous meaning, no symbol can be found for 'nothingness'. One only finds a symbol for the negation of an expression. Heidegger's talk thereby becomes an inaccessible mystification. From the standpoint of predicative logic, an objection of this kind may very well be legitimate. But what then becomes of philosophy?

In the eyes of modern logic, Hegel is just as badly off. And what about the dark Heraclitus? We will have to ask ourselves what philosophical discourse is and with what right it can claim to flout the laws of predicative logic. Furthermore, this holds not only of philosophical discourse but of any form of inter-human discourse which falls under the

aegis of rhetoric. So it remains a matter of the primary importance for philosophy to determine why that which is allowed by language and forbidden by logic cannot simply be put down to feeling or to a poetic game, as Carnap surmised.

The second objection, which goes together with the specific theme of the commencement of philosophy, comes from the side of philology. We will find it difficult to rule out as unjustified the complaint brought by classical philosophy (to which I belong to some degree) against the violence of Heidegger's interpretations or even the incorrectness of certain of his interpretative strategies. We shall have to ask ourselves whether, for this reason, we can claim the right to overlook this great thinker or whether, on the contrary, we might ourselves be missing something important when we close ourselves off from Heidegger on account of the unwelcome impact of his thinking.

The third objection is that of science. On the one hand, we have the social scientists, who find that their field has been ignored by Heidegger or at least only addressed in piecemeal form. To dismiss 'society' as das Man is for them unwarranted. On the other hand, we have the natural sciences, who cannot understand what Heidegger means when he says 'there is no thinking in the sciences'. But perhaps such a claim demands thinking of a quite different kind from that of the empirical sciences.

All this can be summed up in the ruling prejudice to the effect that what Heidegger has to say after Being and Time is no longer provable, is a kind of poetry, or better still a pseudo-mythical thinking. Here we find Being talked about in such a way that 'it gives', that 'it sends', that 'it reaches'; goodness knows what else is said of this mysterious something which is Being. Relative to the annihilating nothing of the Freiburg inaugural lecture to which Carnap took exception, this is something different again, by comparison with which the above-mentioned 'nothingness' indeed appears almost harmless. We come up against a question here which cannot be so easily evaded and which, in particular, requires that we take account of the role that art, and above all Hölderlin's poetry, took on in the thinking of late Heidegger.

If I mention these objections brought against Heidegger in an introductory way, it is in order to make room for the comprehensive urgency of the theme in question. This is a question which has to be posed by our civilization. Brought into being by the West, it has nevertheless spread its net over the greater part of the world. It concerns the world view which lies at the root of science and scientific theorizing, a world view which is characteristic of our epoch. The inner drive towards 'progress' which lurks therein is slowly beginning to exert its influence as something that merits attention. It was forty years ago that Heidegger wrote his paper on the end of philosophy, and this paper reads today as though he had come to grips with precisely what has preoccupied us everywhere in the meantime. Thus the topic of this paper, 'The beginning and the end of philosophy' is something that refers back to Heidegger's work. What does it mean to say that philosophy is at an end and that, at best, it has been dissolved into a number of specialized disciplines, disciplines which will perhaps be tolerated alongside the other sciences within the complex of our scientific culture? What contemporary trend is it that is being described with the formula: The End of Philosophy?

To be sure, this does not mean that nothing else is effective except the technological frenzy. When Heidegger talks of the end of philosophy. we all understand what he means. For this way of talking can only proceed from the West. In other parts of the world, philosophy was never set off so dramatically against poetry or religion, not in East Asia. nor in India, still less in the less well-known parts of the earth. 'Philosophy' is an expression of our Western destiny. To speak with Heidegger: an *ontological* destiny which, as a matter of fact, has become our fatality. Contemporary civilization strives to fulfil this destiny, or so it seems, a destiny which will bring the whole of humanity under the sway of the industrial revolution. Whether the latter is linked to this or that economy plays a subordinate role. A centralized economy, like that of the Russian five-year plan, seems to be extraordinarily similar to our own in its subjection to the necessities of capitalistic society. If we are hearing talk of the end of philosophy this has to be understood along the abovementioned lines. We are becoming conscious of the fact that the distinction between religion, art and philosophy and perhaps also the distinction of science and philosophy, is not the same for all cultures but rather places its stamp upon the particular history of the Western world. One is forced to ask: what kind of a destiny is that? Where does it come from? How did it come about that technology was ever able to exert so autonomous a sway that it has today become the distinguishing mark of human culture? If we pose questions such as these, Heidegger's at first sight surprising and paradoxical thesis sounds, all of a sudden, astonishingly plausible; that it is Greek science and metaphysics the outcome of which has commanded the emergence of present-day world civilization.

To be sure, by comparison with earlier epochs, the technical civilization of today imparts a different stamp upon our history. In a well-known paper on technology, Heidegger himself admitted that technology does not represent the simple extension of a once-familiar handicrafts culture or even the perfecting of instrumental reason but has rigidified into a self-sufficient system.

Heidegger thought about this system under the provocative aegis of the name das Gestell (the frame or the set-up) - a truly Heideggerian concept. We will have to talk later about Heidegger's tendency to devise new concepts. But in order to get closer to the concept of das Gestell, one has only to think about a familiar application of the word. We talk,

for example, of the signal-box. That is, the regulative installation in every station which directs the tracks into the different platforms. From this standpoint, anyone can understand Heidegger's concept. Das Gestell is a key concept, the sum of such setting-up and directing, such ordering and securing. Heidegger has shown convincingly that we are confronted here with an all-determining thought structure which is by no means restricted to the industrial economy in the narrow sense. His thesis is that philosophy is coming to an end because our thinking takes place under the final direction of the Gestell.

Now Heidegger asks: where does all this come from? What is the beginning of this history? Obviously, the beginning is not to be located at the point where modern science becomes more and more dependent upon technological progress. Rather, modern science is itself already technology. This means that its relationship to natural entities is an assault which aims at breaking down a resistance. In this sense science is aggressive in that it compels entities to respond to the conditions of 'objective' knowledge, and this whether these entities are natural or social in character. To take an example with which we are all familiar because we belong to society: the questionnaire. The questionnaire is a document which attests to the fact that questions are forcibly demanded of one, questions which one is supposed to answer. Whether one does or does not want to answer, whether one can or cannot answer responsibly, we are nevertheless obliged to respond in the name of science. Social science needs its statistics just as natural science applies its quantitative methods to nature. In both cases it is the predominance of a method which defines what is scientific and worthy of scientific investigation, which means that what is to count as knowledge is controllable. No matter how complex and elaborate the concepts developed by scientific theorizing, it cannot be denied that the great breakthrough of the seventeenth century is still operative today. It emerged initially out of the physics of Galileo and Huygens and found its first fundamental articulation in Descartes' reflections. It is well known how the West managed to 'demystify the world' as a result of this breakthrough in modern science. The industrial exploitation of scientific research eventually made it possible for the West to emerge as the dominant planetary power by installing an all-powerful economic and communications system. But that was not the first beginning.

There is an older, so to speak, first wave of 'enlightenment' through which science and scientific research developed the world - and that is the beginning which Heidegger has in mind and which is always at the back of his mind when he speaks of the end of philosophy. This is the Greek discovery of theoria. Heidegger's provocative thesis is that this beginning of scientific enlightenment is the true beginning of metaphysics. To be sure, modern science arose as a result of a conflict with

'metaphysics', but is it not, for all that, a consequence of Greek physics and metaphysics? In this way Heidegger posed a question which has preoccupied modern thought for a long time. It can be illustrated with reference to a particular, well-known case. At the beginning of modern science in the seventeenth century, philosophers turned to the least wellknown of the great Greek thinkers, Democritus. This led to Democritus being set up as our great predecessor, especially in the nineteenth century when the victory of modern science had taken hold of consciousness in general, a predecessor moreover who had been overshadowed by the obfuscating style of a Plato or an Aristotle. And so Heidegger was able to pose the question of our Greek origins in a much more radical fashion. He uncovered a deeper continuity in Western history which was initiated earlier and persists until today. This tradition led to the splitting up of religion, art and science and even survived the radicality of the European Enlightenment. How did Europe get on to this path? What is this path? How did it begin and how did it go on, until it finally found its most dramatic expression in Heidegger's Holzwegen?

There can be no doubt that this development goes together with what in Germany is called a Begriff (concept). To say what a Begriff is seems almost as difficult as it was for Augustine to say in what time consists. We all know the answer and still cannot say in what it really consists. When it is a question of a Begriff, words always betray us. In a Begriff something is grasped together (zusammengegriffen), put together. In the very word Begriff, we find it implied that a Begriff apprehends (zugreift), comprehends (zusammengreift) and so conceives (begreift). Thinking in Begriffen (concepts) is therefore an actively appropriating (eingreifendes) and expropriating (ausgreifendes) thinking. Thus Heidegger grasped the history of metaphysics as the expression of an original Greek experience of Being, and moreover as that development of our experience of thinking which grasps beings in their Being, so that one can get a grip on it and, to this extent, hold it in one's possession. His formulation of the task of metaphysics thereby becomes one of grasping beings, as such, in their beingness. This is the definition, the Horismos, through which what is gets conceptualized. That was the genial achievement of metaphysics and not just a deviation from the straight and narrow path which the ancient atomistic philosophy was supposedly pursuing. It was the transfer of Greek metaphysical thought to Rome and so into the Christian Middle Ages which finally led to the emergence of the modern epoch with its humanistic renewal of the Greek tradition. This is a long story. Since I am also acting here in the role of an eye-witness, I should give notice that, by 1923, Heidegger had already described the modern epoch as the 'concern with indubitable knowledge'. This still unknown literary formula from Heidegger means that the truth (Veritas) has been suppressed by certainty (Certitude). It is, so to speak, the moral of this method that small, even if modest, steps are to be preferred, provided only that they are absolutely controllable and certain. One sees how the Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy of today has remained truer to this scientific moral than Hegel or Heidegger himself. Heidegger's claim, a claim which he advanced with the whole weight of his imaginatively rich thinking, is simply that of having clarified the destinal unity of Western history, a history which began with Greek metaphysics and which has ended in the total domination of industry and technology.

A claim of this kind implied the need to go back behind propositional logic. It is very difficult to accomplish this so long as philosophy remains in competition with religion and art and poses questions which cannot be avoided but for which, nevertheless, there exist no demonstrable answers, for example, the question: 'what was there in the beginning?' The physicists cannot ask questions of this kind. If we ask them what there was before the Big Bang, they can only smile. From their own scientific standpoint, it becomes meaningless to ask such questions.

In spite of that, we all do this. We are all of us philosophers, bent upon asking questions even where there is no answer, or even where there is no clear way of arriving at an answer. This is what I meant when I talked about going back behind propositional logic. A going back behind what can be formulated in valid propositions. Such a going back has nothing to do with logic itself, with its validity and its indubitability. It does however have something to do with the fact that this monologically consequential argumentative procedure is incapable of laying to rest our imaginatively questioning thinking. The step back which takes place in such questions goes back not only behind the proposition to what we cannot avoid going on to question in everyday life; it even goes back beyond what we are able to ask and to say in our language. We continually find ourselves caught in a tension between what we are trying to say and what we are not really entitled to say. This is a constitutive linguistic need which pertains to humankind and which is assumed by every genuine thinker who, as such, finds himself unable to forgo the rigours of the concept (Begriff).

Language was not made for philosophy. So philosophy has to take words out of the language in which we live and confer upon such words a quite peculiar meaning. This results in artificial constructions which, in an ever-extending collegiate culture, lapse more and more into ghostly symbols behind which it is no longer possible to glimpse any hint of a living linguistic intuition. What follows therefrom is that tendency to Falling which Heidegger identified in Being and Time, a tendency which pertains to human existence as such. We make use of forms and norms, schools and institutions without thinking about them in an original way.

In our modern scientific age a new task arises, a task of a kind German Idealism was already familiar with but only resolved in part. I learnt how to conceptualize this task from Heidegger. It consists in becoming conscious of the concepts which one employs to think. Where do such concepts come from? What do they contain? What is unintended and unconscious in such concepts when, for example, I use the word 'subject'? Subject is the same as substance. Subject and substance are both of them confirmations of the Aristotelian expression Hypokeimenon, which means 'foundation'. This Greek concept has admittedly nothing to do with the thinking 'I'. We readily and quite self-evidently (even if we underestimate what is at stake) speak of a fatal subject. We also, as 'philosophers', speak (with nervous overestimation) of the transcendental subject in which all objects of knowledge are constituted. How far philosophical concepts have been detached from their original usage! This is the task the young Heidegger resolutely set himself when he set about the destruction of the metaphysical conceptual tradition. Within the limits of what we are capable of, we have learnt from him how to work our way back along the path from the concept to the word, not however with a view to giving up conceptual thinking, but in order to restore to it its intuitional potential. In doing this we are doing no more than was done by the Greeks before us and, in particular, we are following Aristotle who, in Book Delta of his Metaphysics, set about the analysis of fundamental concepts and sought to build up their multiple meanings from ordinary linguistic usage. In other words, it is a question of reopening the way from the concept to the word, so that thinking speaks once again. Given the burden of a two thousand-year intellectual tradition, this is no mean task. It is very difficult to draw the boundary between a concept that has been developed with some precision and a word which lives in speech. We are all taken in by a conceptual terminology which stems from the metaphysical tradition and which lives on unthinkingly in thought. Heidegger had to make use of an extraordinary linguistic facility in order to make the language of philosophy speak again. Such an undertaking brings a great deal back to life. Indeed, a great deal still waits to be done along these lines, above all, an assessment of the Christian mysticism of a Meister Eckhart, Luther's bible and the expressive power of those modes of speech which have remained inaccessibly ensconced in a discourse which employs picture language.

What was new about Heidegger was that he not only disposed of an extensive linguistic mastery, as did the shoe-maker Jacob Böhme, but that he also commanded that entire Latin School tradition which belongs to our conceptual language and, moreover, broke through this tradition by going back to its Greek origins. In this way he succeeded in rediscovering the intuitive word which lurked in the concept. This was his special contribution from the very beginning. By this we do not mean to deny that the development of a concept makes it necessary, in the interests of unequivocal definition, to reject some of the implications that have

accumulated in the course of its history. Even Aristotle did this. Similarly, it was a new Aristotle, an Aristotle with a new voice who, in the person of Heidegger, and from the time of his writings on the Rhetoric and on the Ethics, threw a new light upon metaphysics by going back beyond the neo-scholastic and Thomistic conceptual language and Aristotle interpretations. And so, in the end, it becomes understandable that, when one evokes a linguistic potential whose meaning cannot be written up on the board, one is not indulging in poetry or day-dreaming.

The potential inherent in language should serve the cause of thinking. This means that a concept should finally capture the meanings disclosed in a word through analysis. The analysis of a concept will distinguish a multiplicity of meanings all of which are operative in speech but which at the same time are restricted to a specific determination in any given discursive context, so that, in the end, one meaning takes the lead while the others are, at best, simply implied along with it in an auxiliary way. This is the thinking use of words. It is slightly different in poetry but not very different. Here it is also a matter of establishing the regulative meaning of a word so broadly that a meaningful unity emerges in poetic diction. Indeed, it is precisely through the ambiguity and multiplicity of meaning which words possess that language comes to acquire a depth. This can also happen in philosophy. The conventionally established univocity of an expression which, in itself, possesses several meanings, can let the other meanings which lurk in a word be articulated along with the former, and this can be carried so far that thinking can be thrown out of its habitual tracks. Heidegger often did this deliberately. He even called this the 'leap' (Sprung): thinking must, so to speak, be compelled to leap, in as much as the subordinate meanings of words or sentences are emphasized until they fall into explicit contradiction with the former. This can be of the first importance in a philosophical discussion as, for example, when a habitual meaning acquires an entirely new meaning through the multivocity of the word with which it is associated. Thus when Heidegger posed the question: 'Was heißt Denken?' he did not pose it in the conventional sense of heißt, where it means 'mean' but with an unexpected twist which brought out the subordinate meaning of heißt as 'offer'. This procedure should not be imitated even though, with Heidegger, it is always worth taking the new direction. Another example: in Heidegger's paper on technology, there is an explanation of causality and origin. Heidegger says there: in truth there is a rationale (Veranlassung). In connection with his presentation one suddenly becomes aware of what Veranlassung can mean. One discovers that a Lassen lurks therein. To bring something out (Anhebenlassen) always includes the implication that one lets it be $(l\ddot{e}\beta t)$. This is the kind of way in which Heidegger will encumber a normal German word so that it begins to say

something different. In this case, it says: something is allowed to be in its being, and in such a way that it stands out.

To be sure, when it is a matter of texts, trafficking with language in this way implies, in a certain sense, selling out the text. The text has its unitary intention even if the latter is not necessarily a conscious intention on the part of its author. In any case the recipient, the decipherer, is directed to what the text means. It is clear that Heidegger sometimes stands the underlying intention of a statement on its head. The word suddenly transgresses the normal ranges of its application and thereby begins to render visible what was not originally thought. Heidegger often mobilized etymology in this way. To be sure, if one appeals to scientific etymology in this fashion, one becomes dependent upon an ever-changing procedure of scientific validation. In such cases, etymology begins to lose its conviction. In other cases, on the other hand, etymology can bring to light what is implicit in our feeling for language and so confer confirmation and plausibility upon it. In such cases, Heidegger does succeed in tracing words back to the original experience from which they sprang.

In any case, it is clearly not so much a matter of statements as of words whose meaning potential can be recognized and brought to expression. Such a procedure has its precursors, above all Aristotle. The best known example is the Greek word for Being, Ousia, which acquired the meaning of essentia in Latinized metaphysics. This was the translation of Ousia which was taken over from Cicero. But what did this word mean in the spoken Greek of that time? In German we are well equipped to reproduce the configuration. Ousia means das Anwesen, the lie of the land, as we still say, a house or an individual domain. A farmer can say of his property: 'it's an attractive prospect [Anwesen].' The Greeks could say this too and they can still say it today. Those who know Athens well will appreciate the following confirmation. After the exodus of Greeks from the Middle East at the beginning of the twenties, the former Athens was increased by about one million refugees and spread out into the countryside. But everyone was housed in their own little property. So everyone still had his Anwesen, his spread. So that which as Ousia made up the Being of beings is still preserved in an actual intuition. The Anwesen is what is there and so makes up the essence (Wesen) of country living. He is in his own Oikos, his own domain, conscious of his own being, so to speak, and is so still. And so the word Ousia shows us that the genuine conceptual meaning can be clarified in the light of the original meaning of the word.

If one is aware of the entire verbal configuration consisting of ousia, parousia, apousia, one cannot but find Heidegger's employment of the concept Vorhandenheit unsatisfactory. I do not have a better proposal, but in the expression Vorhandenheit one is either too influenced by the connotation of simple existence in the sense of existentia as that term

was used in the School philosophy of the eighteenth century (which then takes the concept in the direction of the conceptual complex which belongs to modern experimental science), or else one is forced to rely on common parlance which, in any translation of the term into a foreign language, then makes it almost impossible to distinguish vorhanden from zuhanden. Neither of these two senses is to be found in the concept of Anwesen, which means something completely different from any existence of the object which is susceptible to weights and measures but which, nevertheless, cannot be assimilated to any behaviourally directed procheiron. In any case, when Heidegger decided on the expression Vorhandenheit, he neglected the difference between the understanding of being which belongs to modern natural science and that which pertains to the Greek Meta-'Physik', and therewith made it difficult to capture the presence of the divine in 'Being'. This is what happens when one tries to let words speak – the attempt sometimes by-passes the genuine conceptual intention. From Heidegger one can learn both the risks and the opportunities which attach to using language in a new way.

Especially instructive is Heidegger's translation of Aletheia as unhiddenness (Unverborgenheit). Greek usage would actually have made it more acceptable to say 'unconcealedness' (Unverhohlenheit). This is also how Humboldt translated it. When Heidegger thought of it as unhiddenness he was being true to his own vision, which carried his reflections back to the ever dimmer, because ever earlier, origins of Greek literary testimony. Hiddenness speaks in unhiddenness. In this way an association is brought to light which Heidegger wanted to release and whose content we are now in a position to grasp. In unhiddenness a suspension of 'withdrawal' (Geborgenheit) can also be found. What emerges through speech and reflection and so presents itself is precisely what lies buried (geborgen) in words and perhaps remains buried even if something of it is brought out, is unearthed (entborgen). We find lurking here in Heidegger's conceptual ambitions the experience of Being as the counter-play of revealing (*Entbergung*) and concealing (*Verbergung*).

What follows from all this for language in philosophical thinking? Can we not glimpse herein the secret of the word, and even more, of the word-concept, namely, that it not only refers to something else in the manner of a sign but burrows ever deeper into itself? It pertains to the very nature of signs that they should refer away from themselves. It is quite an achievement to be able to understand even signs as signs. Dogs can't do it. They don't look there, where one is pointing but snap at the finger that points. We are already thinkers even when we only understand signs. How much more so is this the case when we understand words? This holds not only of the understanding of individual words but of how they are spoken in the unity of a melodic flux of speech which acquires its capacity to convince from the articulation of the whole discourse. They

always stand in the connections established by discourse, and discussing is not just a running-through of a complex of meaning-bearing words. It suffices to consider the vacuity of those illustrative phrases we find in a good foreign grammar book. They are intended to be empty of meaning, so that one will not be distracted by their content but attracted to them as words. This is not genuine discourse. A language is used to speak to someone and speaks through the tone in which it is voiced. And so we find genuine and specious tones, ways of talking which are convincing and which are unconvincing, true or false - and much of this is not dragged up out of concealedness and re-presented in language.

Heidegger also sought out an etymology for the word Logos. He held it to be the legende Lese. When I read this for the first time, I disapproved, found it a forced reading of the hidden meaning of the word. But it began to take hold nevertheless. For if one follows the unearthing of the semantic field which is in question here and then goes back to the well-known concept Logos, one finds this background working its way back into one's own intellectual and linguistic intuitions about the Logos. And so I would like to make the following avowal: the Logos is the lesende Lege. Legein means read, read together (zusammenlesen) and so bring together (zusammenlegen), so that it is brought together and gathered in as a harvest, like grapes from the vine. So what is brought together in the unity of the vintage (Lese) are not merely words which make up sentences. It is the very word itself, a word in which a multiplicity is brought together into the unity of the Eidos, as Plato will say.

This issue is of special significance in connection with Heraclitus. Heraclitus was for Heidegger the most attractive of all the early Greek thinkers. His sentences are like riddles, his words like hints. In Heidegger's little hut over Todtnauberg, we find etched into the bark of the door the inscription: 'Lightning steers everything'. In Greek of course. In this statement, as a matter of fact, Heidegger's basic vision is to be found, namely, that what is present is brought out in its presentness in the lightning stroke; for a moment everything is as clear as day, but only in order to sink back suddenly into the darkest night. This instant in which the 'present' is there was disclosed by Heidegger as the Greek experience of Being. This lightning stroke which allows everything to manifest itself at one blow is preserved as present for a short while. One can understand why Heidegger was so fond of Heraclitus' sayings. Here we find an entire statement which lets the belonging-together of uncovering and covering over become apparent as the basic experience of Being. Truly, what is brought to words here is a basic human experience. For we live in the knowledge that even the absent is present, nooi (in spirit). All thinking is like a streaming out and a projection out beyond the limits of our brief existence. We are, so to speak, unable to recognize - and can never really forget - that it only lasts for a while, until the infinitude of spirit is limited by the finitude of death. Again, Heidegger gives expression to his experience in a quite simple word: 'It gives'. What is this It which gives here? And what does it give? All this swims in an unclarified haze and yet everyone understands perfectly well what is meant. 'This is it. It is this.' Heidegger did no more than find words for this straightforward expression.

To be sure, the colossal task of thought consists in trying to preserve, to incorporate in words, in readily accessible discourse, this lightning stroke in which everything suddenly becomes clear. One day I was with Heidegger up in the hut. He read me a work by Nietzsche, which he happened to be writing about at the time. After a few minutes he interrupted himself, bringing his hand down on the table, so hard that the teacups rattled, and cried out in despair: 'This is all Chinese.' This was certainly not the manner of someone who wanted to be dark and difficult. Clearly Heidegger suffered from the need to find words which could move out beyond the language of metaphysics. How is the wholeness of a vision to be elicited from the dazzling clarity in which the lightning stroke shatters the night? How can a sequence of thoughts be put together in which words vield a new mode of discourse?

What are we to think, for example, of the 'ontological difference'? It is still for the most part being misunderstood as though someone - we - made this difference. This is quite out of the question. The ontological difference is the outcome which emerges from Being itself and which makes it possible for us to think. This is what will be at issue later and what is certainly stated in the perspective of the Kehre, or the 'Turn'. But if I may be permitted once again to draw upon my fund of knowledge as a contemporary witness I would like to report that in 1924, as Gerhard Krüger and I accompanied Heidegger back to his first Marburg home after the conference and asked him about the ontological difference, he definitely rejected the idea that it might be we ourselves who make this difference. One sees then that the Kehre came before the 'Kehre'. Further, 1924 was not the moment of its first appearance. While I was still a student, at the beginning of the 1920s, we heard in Marburg that the young Heidegger had said in a lecture: 'It worlds.' This was really the Kehre before the 'Kehre'.

One final question: how, in the perspective of the later Heidegger, are we to think the experience of death, an experience which in Being and Time, and in the context of his analysis of anxiety is so flexibly developed? How can the duality of covering and uncovering be thought? As the 'range' (Gebirg) in which death is buried? Is that not a way of talking about death which is reproduced in every-human culture? Even where something like an after-life religion is installed? Certainly the description given in Being and Time is one which is drawn from Christian 28

sources. Our Western way of thinking is certainly not the only way of thinking about the experience of death. Other after-life religions, for example Islam, seem to think differently. Did the later Heidegger think his way out beyond his own Christian experience? Perhaps. In any case, he certainly thought his way back to its Greek origins. If one has not come to terms with the meaning of this Greek origin for Heidegger, it becomes virtually impossible to understand late Heidegger. This is not because of Heidegger himself but because of what we mean by philosophy and what our culture has demonstrated along the way to knowledge. We are still determined by this tradition and must allow ourselves to be empowered by it to ever new possibilities of thinking.

And in the meantime this should be said: what is so vital about Greek philosophy is that it went its way, the way of the spoken and responsive word without reflecting on what speaking is or who the speaker is. The Greeks had no word for the subject. The Logos is what is said, what is named, what is brought together and laid down. This is not seen as an operation on the part of the speaker but rather as an operation on the part of that from which everything comes together. A typical phrase by Socrates runs: 'it is not my Logos'. This holds for Heraclitus as well as for Socrates. The Logos is in common. Thus Aristotle rejected any theory which attributed to words a natural relation to things. Word signs are kata syntheken; that means they are conventions. But this does not mean unities which are arbitrarily put together at any time. They are unities which precede any differentiation in these or those words. This is the origin which has never begun but is always already effective. It grounds the indissoluble proximity of thinking and speaking and so survives the question concerning the beginning and the end of philosophy.

Translated by Christopher Macann

'Time and being', 1925-7

Thomas Sheehan

It is very significant that Heidegger chose Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, the lecture course he gave in the summer semester of 1927, to be the first publication in his monumental Gesamtausgabe. The text is rich in many ways, but one of its major claims to fame may rest in a footnote, taken from Heidegger's own manuscript of the course, that appears on page 1 of the published version. This elliptical footnote, which in fact functions like a subtitle for the whole volume, asserts that the lecture course represents a 'New elaboration of Sein und Zeit, Part One, Division Three'.²

This footnote promises quite a bit indeed. It is well known that when Heidegger published Sein und Zeit in February of 1927, the book was lacking its crowning section - Part One, Division Three - entitled 'Time and being'. The absence of this section, coupled with Heidegger's announcement in 1953 that it would never appear, has raised doubts about the feasibility of his philosophical program and has led to an abundance of speculation, much of it misleading, about the so-called 'turn' from the work of the early Heidegger to that of the later Heidegger. But now it would seem that the problem can be solved. The lecture course Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, which Heidegger began on Saturday, April 30, 1927, just over eight weeks after the publication of Sein und Zeit, would appear to fill out the missing section that was to be the climax of Heidegger's magnum opus. Indeed, on the second day of lecturing Heidegger provided his students with an outline of the course, and Parts Two and Three of that outline promised to be a complete elaboration of 'Time and being'.3 And if we required further confirmation of the hypothesis that Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie fulfills the promise of Sein und Zeit, we would seem to find it in the new, 1977 Gesamtausgabe edition of Sein und Zeit. There Heidegger

has annotated the title of all of Part One of his treatise in the following way:

The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of Temporality [notation: 'The published portion covers only this much'] and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being [notation: 'For this, cf. the Marburg lecture course of 1927, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie'].⁴

But, for better or worse, the matter is not all that simple. To begin with, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (hereafter: GP) makes almost no advance into the uncharted territory of what Sein und Zeit (hereafter: SZ) called 'Time and being'. To be sure, if in the lecture course Heidegger had covered all the material that he outlined for his students, he would have filled out 'Time and being', albeit in a different order from what he had promised in SZ. But in fact the very few pages in GP that push into the area of 'Time and being' (on a strict reading, GP, 441-5) were reserved to the second half of the second-to-last meeting of the course (July 23, 1927) and, on the whole, are among the least satisfying of all the lectures. We are faced, then, with a paradox, or perhaps even with an error. The footnote at the beginning of GP promises us an elaboration of 'Time and being', but the text itself delivers, on a strict interpretation, only four pages of such an elaboration or, on a very broad interpretation, only 28 pages (GP, 441-69), most of which provide only schematic hints.

What are we to make of all of this in terms of the philosophical program that Heidegger outlined in SZ and that he claimed to have fulfilled over the course of his philosophical career?

Heidegger's one and only topic from beginning to end – what he called the issue of philosophy – was the kinetic structure of the disclosure of entities, that is, the movement that constitutes the analogical unity (or meaning) of the being of entities. At various points in his career Heidegger called this kinetic structure of disclosure the 'time-character' of being or the 'truth' of being or the 'clearing' of being. What all these titles point to in common is the bivalence that is intrinsic to the movement of disclosure. The 'being' or disclosive structure of entities is a phenomenological movement made up of a dimension of relative absence and a dimension of relative presence. Now, whereas traditional philosophy had always known about the presential dimension of entities, Heidegger took upon himself the task of pointing out the absential dimension of such disclosure. This absential dimension (in Greek: lēthē) is intrinsic to the presential dimension (in Greek: alētheia) of the kinetic disclosure of things. To put this in an imperfect neologism, we may say that Heideg-

ger's one and only topic was 'pres-ab-sence', the kinetic bivalence that makes up the disclosive structure (or 'being') of entities.

Now, whereas Heidegger had always intended to work out presab-sence as the meaning of being, in his early works - and especially in SZ and GP - he approached the problem from within a transcendental framework. He did so specifically from an analysis of Dasein's projection of temporal schemata that would provide the horizon for the meaning of being. In his later works, however, Heidegger shifted away from the language and viewpoint of the transcendental framework and showed that the movement intrinsic to the disclosive structure of entities was responsible for the projective movement of Dasein. This shift constituted a regaining and a deepening of the archaic Greek viewpoint, where the autodisclosure of entities requires and governs the disclosive movement of man.

The main importance of GP for our purposes is that it did not complete the vector of SZ, indeed that it hardly advanced beyond the analyses contained in that work. That is, GP represents Heidegger's last effort to work out the kinetic meaning of being from within a transcendental framework. In the last part of this essay I shall use the incompleteness of GP as an occasion for discussing how Heidegger shifts away from the language and viewpoint of transcendental philosophy and effects the 'turn' into the pres-ab-sential structure of being.

On the way to that issue we notice some important question's that emerge with the publication of GP. If GP was intended to be a 'new' elaboration of 'Time and being', what happened to the first draft of that section? Were there other early programs for working out the kinetic meaning of being? What is the relation between the transcendentalism of GP and the very different approach of Heidegger's later thought? These are not just historical questions. They touch on the major issue of philosophy, the meaning of being.

In order to work out these questions and to arrive at the heart of Heidegger's thought, I divide this essay into four parts: I. Discussion of the history of the writing of SZ; II. Comparison of the structures of various programs for elaborating the meaning of being, from 1925 through 1927; III. An analysis of the argument of GP; and IV. Clarification of the significance of GP for the major issue, the meaning of being as pres-ab-sence.

I History: the genesis of Being and Time

Whatever the conditions of its gestation, SZ in the form we know it is a premature work, rushed into print under publish-or-perish conditions. Heidegger himself once spoke of the 'strange publication' of his 'long-

guarded work', and some 30 years after its appearance he remarked: 'The fundamental flaw of the book Sein und Zeit is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early.' The haste is revealed in a number of ways. There is, for example, the laundry list of topics, scattered throughout the published pages of SZ, that Heidegger promises to treat in the unpublished part. One has the sense that Heidegger is just postponing these problems without having a clear idea of how he will answer them. Above all, the haste of composition can perhaps be seen in Heidegger's inability to bring the work to completion. What, then, were the academic pressures that gave us this truncated work?

A The politics of publish-or-perish⁶

The history of Heidegger's academic promotions between 1923 and 1927 is a story of books that he promised but never published or that he published but never completed. For example, he was called from Freiburg to Marburg in 1923 on the strength of some chapters of a projected book on Aristotle, which in fact never got into print. What he did in that instance was to rewrite his 1922 Freiburg course on Aristotle and submit it to the philosophy faculty at Marburg. This draft received rave reviews from Paul Natorp and Nicolai Hartmann, both of Marburg, and in recommending Heidegger for a position there they called this essay absolutely astonishing (vollends etwas überraschends). With high scientific quality, they said, it shows how the history of philosophy from the Middle Ages through Luther to modern thinkers is determined by Aristotle. Its method and careful etymologies, they went on, show a philosophical delicacy which step by step discovers heretofore unnoticed connections between issues. His method sheds light even for experts in the field, especially on decisive points passed over by nineteenth-century scholars. Needless to say, Heidegger got the job. And two years later, when Heidegger was applying for promotion, Hartmann would again remark on the powerful achievement, philological exactness (Akribie), and penetrating interpretation that characterized this manuscript on Aristotle, and he would emphasize how it illuminates whole epochs of thought in a way long unknown in philosophy.

But the work never appeared. Although in the summer of 1925 it was declared ready for the press, Heidegger's interest now lay in the new project that was to make his name. SZ had been maturing for some while. In his last two lecture days as a Privatdozent at Freiburg (July 18 and 25, 1923), Heidegger had read material that would become Part One, Division One, of SZ, and a year later at Marburg, in July of 1924, he presented the 'Urform' of SZ as a 6000-word lecture entitled 'Der Begriff der Zeit', which contained most of the essential theses of SZ from being-in-the-world to within-time-ness. Another year later, in the summer of 1925, he read the first draft of SZ in the Marburg lecture course, Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. But just as this course got underway there began the politics of publish-or-perish.

On May 1, 1925, Nicolai Hartmann, then Ordinarius in the chair that had been vacated by the recent death of Paul Natorp, informed the University of Marburg that he would leave in October for Cologne. On May 19 Heidegger told the dean of his availability for Hartmann's position, and at a faculty meeting the following week Hartmann proposed Heidegger as his successor.

Then the trouble began. On June 24, after Hartmann had recommended to the faculty that Heidegger's name be the only one (unico loco) that they propose to the Ministry in Berlin as fitting for the position, Professor Rudolf Wedekind of the philosophy faculty raised the issue that would block Heidegger's promotion for two more years: his dearth of publications. Hartmann responded that, beside the still-promised book on Aristotle, the young scholar had a new and absolutely outstanding work (eine neue und ganz hervorragende Arbeit) in manuscript and ready for publication. To the best of my knowledge these words of Hartmann on June 24, 1925, are the first public mention of SZ, even though Hartmann gave the work no title. In any case, the faculty that day voted against an unico loco nomination. Instead, they proposed a three-person list with Heidegger's name in first place. On July 8, 1925, they briefly reversed themselves and proposed Heidegger unico loco by a vote of 6 in favor, 4 opposed, and 1 abstaining, but on July 18 they reverted to their former decision. The choice of Heidegger, incidentally, was not without opposition from the theology faculty, which used Rudolf Otto as its spokesman against Heidegger.

Between July 18 and August 3, 1925, Hartmann in the name of the faculty drafted in his own hand an extraordinary document to be sent to Berlin to the Minister for Science, Art and Education in support of Heidegger's nomination. In that document he calls Heidegger a researcher and teacher of the first rank, one who, besides his work on Aristotle, which is yet to be published, has recently produced a systematic work, now in press (sic), which is entitled - Zeit und Sein! (It seems impossible to ascertain whether that title, Time and Being, was a slip of the pen on Hartmann's part or actually the first title that Heidegger may have proposed for the work.) The book, says Hartmann, does nothing less than to broach the ultimate and basic questions of ontology in a synthesis of phenomenology - here for the first time freed from all [Husserlian] subjectivism – with the great tradition of metaphysics that stretches from the Greeks through the medievals to the moderns. Hartmann remarks that whereas older practitioners of phenomenology see it as a preliminary laying of foundations and thereby frequently give the impression of one-sidedness or narrow-mindedness, Heidegger's work gets right down to basic problems, breaks through stalemated positions,

and opens new horizons. There is simply nothing comparable to it in the broad field of Heidegger's contemporaries, he writes. Therefore, Heidegger's nomination, even though it is accompanied by that of Heimsoeth and Pfänder, stands far above the other two.

With a recommendation like that, Heidegger should have had the job in a walk. But it was not to be so. All through 1926 and most of 1927 the philosophy faculty at Marburg fought a running battle with the Ministry in Berlin over Heidegger's nomination. On January 27, 1926, the Minister wrote to the dean that, with all due respect for Heidegger's success in the classroom (which by then was somewhat legendary), the historical significance of the chair of philosophy at Marburg precluded Heidegger's being appointed to it until he had gained the respect and recognition of his colleagues by more publications. The Minister called for a new list of nominations.

On February 25, 1926, the faculty met and unanimously voted that Heidegger be urged to have SZ typed in several copies and given to the dean so that it might be submitted to a group of scholars for their evaluation. At the same time they underlined the urgency of having Heidegger produce the text at least in galley proofs. The dean paid a personal visit to Heidegger's office to pass on this news, and Heidegger replied that he was prepared to have the text in press by April 1, 1926.

In a little over eight weeks – until early March in his first-floor study at Schwanallee 21, Marburg, and thereafter at the farmhouse of Johann Brender near his retreat in Todtnauberg - Heidegger pulled together his lecture notes of Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs into SZ. On April 2, 1926. six days before Husserl's birthday celebration in Todtnauberg (see the dedication in SZ), Heidegger wrote to the dean that the work was now in press and that by May 1, 10 to 12 signatures (160-92 pages) would be ready - that is, roughly the material up to the chapter on Sorge, or, in other terms, the material on Dasein that was covered in Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. However, it was June 18 before the dean forwarded the galley pages to Berlin in the face of the Ministry's renewed call for other names and an expanded list. Finally, on November 26, 1926, came the Minister's reply. Having examined the proof sheets, he still cannot give Heidegger the job. The pages were returned, as Heidegger recalled, marked 'Inadequate'.

Three months later, in February of 1927, the book was published as the fragment we know, minus 'Time and being' and all of Part Two, 'Phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology'. Heidegger had published and perished. He had rushed his 'long-guarded work' into print and in so doing had 'ventured forth too far too early', perhaps chiefly in an effort to get a job. That venture was to block the fulfillment of his philosophical program for years to come.

B The missing sections of Being and Time

What was the status of the 'second half' of SZ when its 'first half' was published in February of 1927? Had Heidegger completed by then a draft of 'Time and being', and, if so, what form did it take and why did it not appear? My purpose in raising and answering these questions is to search out what is unique about GP.

(N.B.: In the rest of the essay I shall abbreviate references to the structure of SZ in the following way. The whole of SZ was to be comprised of two Parts, each of which would contain three Divisions. I shall abbreviate the Parts of SZ with Roman numerals and the Divisions of SZ with Arabic numerals. Thus, SZ I.1 means SZ Part One, Division One. SZ II.3 means SZ Part Two, Division Three, and so on. As everyone knows, the only published sections of the work are Part One, Divisions One and Two, i.e., SZ I.1 and I.2.)

Much of SZ II ('Basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, using the problematic of *Temporalität* as a clue') was sketched out by the spring of 1926. Specifically, a first draft of SZ II.1 ('Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of Temporalität') was delivered in the lecture course Logik from January 28 through February 26, 1926. And a first draft of SZ II.3 ('Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology') was hinted at in SZ §81 and was read on July 6 and 13, 1927, in the lecture course of GP. But what of SZ I.3, 'Time and being'?

Heidegger's letter to the dean, written from Todtnauberg on April 2, 1926, merely said that the work was in press, but neither that it was completed as a whole nor how much beyond the 160 to 192 pages was finished at that time. Two weeks later, on April 16, 1926, Mrs. Malvina Husserl wrote to Roman Ingarden about Heidegger's 'just completed work' ('seines eben vollendeten Werkes'), and on April 28 Edmund Husserl wrote to Gustav Albrecht about Heidegger's 'book which is now in press' ('seines eben in Druck befindlichen Buches'). But many years later Heidegger remembered showing Husserl at this time the 'nearly finished manuscript' ('das nahezu fertige Manuskript') of SZ, and in 1963 he claimed that 15 signatures (ca. 240 pages) were forwarded to the dean and eventually to the Ministry in Berlin, that is, up through §47 of the chapter on death. On the basis of Heidegger's letter of April 2, 1926, I believe that it is most likely that during that month he sent off to Niemeyer Publishers something like the first 190 pages of SZ (i.e., up to around chapter vi of SZ I.1). While it is conceivable that he had finished all of SZ I.2 by this time, I think that it is not probable, just as it is very unlikely that he had actually completed SZ I.3 by the spring of 1926.

However, there are three bits of evidence that attest to the possibility that Heidegger completed a first draft of SZ I.3 sometime between April and December of 1926. None of these reports, however, is very strong; at best they provide clues or hints.

First: Concerning the famous footnote at the beginning of GP, F.-W. von Herrmann, the editor of GP, has written: 'The designation "New elaboration" means that an older one preceded it. The first elaboration of the Division "Time and Being" came about in the train of writing Divisions One and Two. As Martin Heidegger has communicated to me orally, he burned the first draft [die erste Fassung] soon after he wrote it.'8 But was this first draft anything more than a sketch? We cannot be sure.

Secondly, Heidegger informed H.-G. Gadamer that SZ I.3 was ready to be printed along with I.1 and I.2 in early 1927, but it was held back because Volume VIII of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung had to be shared with (besides SZ) Oskar Becker's 370-page treatise on 'Mathematische Existenz: Untersuchungen zur Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene'.9

Thirdly, a footnote in the first edition of SZ (but omitted in later editions) at p. 349 refers the reader ahead to SZ I.3, chapter two for a clarification of the origin of Bedeutung and the possibility of Begriffsbildung (the latter being a topic that Heidegger covered in his seminars of 1926-7 and 1927-8). This is the only reference to a specific chapter within SZ I.3, and it would seem to indicate that Heidegger had at least some kind of outline of 'Time and being' when he wrote the footnote.

But what about the content of this famous missing section? Thanks to an exchange between Heidegger and Max Müller, we have a sketch of some of the material from the first draft of SZ I.3. Müller writes:

In the first elaboration of Sein und Zeit, Part One, Division Three, which, as I mentioned above, was to bear the title 'Zeit und Sein' and was to bring about a 'turn' in the treatment of being itself, Heidegger, according to a personal communication, attempted to distinguish a threefold difference.

- (a) the 'transcendental' ['transzendentale'] difference, or ontological difference in the narrower sense: the differentiation of entities from their beingness.
- (b) the 'transcendence-related' ['transzendenzhafte'] difference or ontological difference in the wider sense: the differentiation of entities and their beingness from being itself.
- (c) the 'transcendent' ['transzendente'] difference, or theological difference in the strict sense: the differentiation of God from entities, from beingness, and from being.

But because it was not experienced but only set up speculatively,

this attempt at a draft was given up as itself being 'onto-theological', because it ventures an assertion about God which even now in the experience of 'essential thinking' is not immediately made. 10

Moreover, in a marginal note to SZ 39 (published in the Gesamtausgabe version of SZ), where Heidegger gives the projected outline of his treatise, he glosses the title 'Time and being' with the following: 'The transcendence-related difference./The overcoming of the horizon as such./The turn around into the origin./Presence from out of this origin.'11 While cryptic in many ways, this gloss allows of the following interpretation. When one makes the transcendence-related difference between the beingness of entities and being itself, then one has overcome horizontal perspectives, which in fact are based on the correlativity of subjectivity and beingness, and has turned around into the origin, lēthē, whence arises alētheia. (We shall return to this towards the end of the next part of this essav.)

What might have made Heidegger destroy the first draft or sketch of SZ I.3? Besides the dissatisfaction that Heidegger reported to Müller, there is other evidence that soon after SZ went to the press he had hesitations about his program or at least about its formulation. On February 13, 1952, exactly 25 years after SZ appeared, Heidegger told the students in his Aristotle seminar at Freiburg that immediately after the printing of SZ he was startled (ich habe . . . einen Schrecken bekommen) to realize what while, as regards the issue, being was indeed alluded to and present in In-der-Welt-sein, nonetheless, as regards the formulation, being, as it were, only 'limped along behind' (hinkt es gleichsam hinten nach). Perhaps the shock of this realization is what prompted Heidegger, in the spring of 1927, to reformulate 'Time and being' all over again with GP's new draft focused on what he called the four 'basic problems' of phenomenology, namely, the ontological difference, the whatness and howness of being, the unity and multiplicity of being, and the truth-character of being. This outline of the crowning section of Heidegger's treatise held up at least through the following summer, his last semester at Marburg, when he repeated that fourfold division in his course on Leibniz (July 10, 1928), although he rearranged the outline slightly. In the Leibniz course, what was the fourth section in GP (it is now called 'The veritative character of being') is made to precede what was the third section in GP, which is now called 'The regionality of being and the unity of the idea of being'. But the whole program seemed to be in trouble. That fall (October 14, 1928), during his first semester as Husserl's successor in Freiburg, Heidegger told W. R. Boyce Gibson that it would be 'some little time' - not likely by the next issue of the Jahrbuch – before the rest of SZ appeared. 12

After the spring of 1929 we hear nothing more about the completion

of Heidegger's magnum opus. The project of SZ, which basically remains enclosed within the Marburg period, had apparently ground to a halt. In the 1953 Foreword to the seventh edition of SZ we read: 'While the previous editions have borne the designation "First Half", this has now been deleted. After a quarter of a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were presented anew.'13

II Structure: three outlines of the program

Over a span of exactly two years (May 4, 1925–May 4, 1927), Heidegger offered three different outlines of his treatise on the meaning of being (cf. the accompanying chart):

- 1. May 4, 1925: The outline of the course Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GZ), which appears on p. 10f. of the published version.¹⁴
- 2. April, 1926: The outline of SZ, published on p. 39f. of that work.
- 3. May 4, 1927: The outline of GP, published on p. 32f. of the text.

History of the Concept of Time (GZ), 1925

- I. The phenomenon of time; the concept of time
 - 1. Preparatory description: the field where time appears (=SZ I.1)
 - i. Phenomenology and the being-question \ (= SZ Introduction)
 - ii. Dasein and the being-question
 - iii. Everydayness and being-in-the-world (= SZ I.1, chaps. i-iv)
 - 1) Introduction
 - 2) Descartes
 - 3) Worldhood of the world
 - 4) Reality of the outer world
 - 5) Spatiality
 - 6) The 'who'
 - iv. Being-in and care (= SZ I.1, chaps. v-vi)
 - 1) Entdecktheit (Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Auslegung, Rede, Sprache)
 - 2) Fallenness
 - 3) Fear and dread
 - 4) Care
 - 2. The laying-free of time itself (= SZ I.2, chaps. i-iii)
 - i. Death
 - ii. Conscience and guilt
 - iii. Time as Dasein's being*

The course ends here.

- 3. The conceptual interpretation of time (= SZ I.2, chaps. iv-vi)
- II. History of the concept of time from today backward (= SZ II)
 - 1. Bergson
 - 2. Kant and Newton
 - 3. Aristotle
- III. The question of being-in-general and of the being of history and nature in particular (= SZ I.3)

Being and Time (SZ), 1926

- I. Dasein as temporality; time as the horizon of the being-question
 - 1. Preparatory analysis of Dasein
 - i. The task of this analysis
 - ii. Being-in-the-world as Dasein's basic state
 - iii. The worldhood of the world
 - 1) Introduction
 - 2) Worldhood
 - 3) Descartes
 - 4) Spatiality
 - iv. The 'who' and the 'they'
 - v. Being-in
 - 1) The 'there' (Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Auslegung, Rede, Sprache)
 - 2) Fallenness
 - vi. Care as Dasein's being
 - 1) Dread
 - 2) Care
 - 3) Reality of the outer world
 - 4) Truth
 - 2. Dasein and temporality
 - i-iii. The laying-free of temporality (cf. p. 436b)
 - iv-vi. Temporal interpretation of Dasein: first repetition of the preparatory analysis*
 - 3. Time and being
 - i. Working out Temporalität
 - ii. Answering the question of the meaning of being
 - iii. Thematic analysis of Dasein, or renewed repetition of the preparatory analysis of Dasein
 - iv. Methodology

^{*} The text ('First Half') ends here.

II. Destruction of the history of ontology

- 1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time
- 2. Ontological foundation of Descartes's cogito sum
- 3. Aristotle's essay on time

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GP), 1927

- I. Discussion of four traditional theses on being
 - 1. Kantian: being is not a real predicate
 - 2. Medieval-Aristotelian: being comprises essentia and existentia
 - 3. Modern: being's basic modes are res extensa and res cogitans
 - 4. Logic: being as the 'is' of the copula
- II. The fundamental ontological question about the meaning of being in general; the basic structures and modes of being
 - 1. The problem of the ontological difference
 - i. Common time and temporality
 - ii. Temporality as self-transcendence and as horizon
 - iii. Time as the horizon for the question of being
 - iv. Being and entities*
 - 2. The problem of the basic articulations of being (whatness, howness)
 - 3. The problem of the modifications of being and of the unity of being's multiplicity
 - 4. The truth character of being
- III. The scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology
 - 1. The ontic foundation of ontology and the analysis of Dasein as fundamental ontology
 - 2. The apriority of being and the possibility and structure of a priori knowledge
 - 3. The basic elements of phenomenological method: reduction, construction, and destruction
 - 4. Phenomenological ontology and the concept of philosophy

By comparing these three outlines we shall be able to see concretely the following: what SZ intended to accomplish but did not: whether and how GP promised to complete SZ; and above all what the so-called 'turn' in Heidegger's thought means. Because the outline of SZ is fairly well known, I will begin with that and then compare it with the earlier outline (in GZ) and the later outline (in GP).

^{*}The course ends here.

A Being and Time, 1926

SZ was projected in two Parts. Part One, which as a whole was called 'fundamental ontology', was to use a new understanding of human temporality (Zeitlichkeit) to determine the nature and structure of the timecharacter (Temporalität) of being in general and of its possible variations. Part Two, which was to be devoted to the destruction of the history of ontology, would use the time-character of being, which had been worked out in the fundamental ontology, as the clue for reducing the content of traditional ontology to the primordial and implicitly temporal experiences in which being has always been understood. It is worth pointing out that words like 'temporality' and 'time' had almost nothing to do with naturalistic chronos. Rather, they referred to the phenomenological movement of disclosure (what the Greeks called aletheuein), both in that part which human nature contributes to disclosure and in that part which is intrinsic to the nature of disclosure itself.15

Each Part of SZ had three Divisions, and in its published form the treatise got no further than Part One, Division Two. Part One as a whole bears the title: 'The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality [=SZ I.1 and I.2] and the explanation of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being [=SZ 1.3, unpublished].' That is, SZ I.1 would establish that the structure of human existence is care (Sorge); SZ I.2 would interpret the meaning of care to be temporality or existential movement (Zeitlichkeit); and SZ I.3 would show how Zeitlichkeit, in its horizon-forming function called Temporalität, determines the 'temporal' or kinetic meaning of being.

SZ I.1 reads human being as constituted by three moments: (1) existentiality: human being is ahead of itself; (2) facticity: human being is ahead of itself by being already in a world of meaningfulness; (3) fallenness: human being's already-ahead-ness opens up the realm of intelligibility within which man is present to - and for the most part absorbed in the things of his concern. Now, these three moments which make up the structure of care can in fact be reduced to two. Existentiality and facticity are but two faces of one phenomenon: man's already-ahead-ness, his being in excess of himself and other things. In turn they make possible man's encounter with wordly things. Thus, Dasein is (1) already projected possibility, which (2) renders possible the encounter with entities. Dasein's relative self-absence allows things to be present, or his excess allows him access to entities.

In SZ I.2, after showing what Dasein is already-out-towards (namely, his ownmost possibility of death) and how Dasein is called to accept that aheadness (namely, in conscience and by resolve), Heidegger goes on to spell out the temporal or kinetic structure of care.

(1) As ahead of himself, man is becoming his ownmost possibility. The

moment of existentiality is grounded in man's existential futurity whereby he is becoming (or coming towards) himself.

- (2) But to become that possibility means that, in going forward, one is returning to and indeed is reappropriating what he 'already is', his finitude. The moment of facticity is grounded in existential Gewesenheit. This word does not refer to the 'past' (Vergangenheit) but to one's own 'alreadiness', to one's essential and already operative possibility which one can appropriate anew.
- (3) The two moments of becoming what one already is make it possible that man encounter things as meaningful. The moment of having access to worldly entities is grounded in the present as a letting-be-present.

Thus, human temporality - or better, existential movement - is the unifying ground of the structure of care, and it is generated (zeitigt sich) in the aforementioned three moments of self-transcendence (called the 'ekstases'). In fact, man is nothing other than this transcendence. Just as we collapsed the three moments of care into two, so we may do the same for the three moments of existential movement or temporality. (1) By becoming what he already is, (2) man lets things be present. Or, (1) because we are in kinetic 'excess' of ourselves and things, (2) we have meaningful 'access' to ourselves and things. In fact, these two moments, in which one can hear distant echoes of 'potentiality' and 'actuality', are rooted in Heidegger's retrieval of the hidden meaning in the Aristotelian notion of movement (kinēsis) as a phenomenon of actual presence (energeia) grounded in a hidden but dynamic potentiality (dynamis). In Heidegger's retrieval, the moment of 'potentiality' (man's relative self-absence in the sense of his already being out towards his nothingness) releases from itelf the moment of actual presentness in which entities are met in their being. In its own way, then, human temporality or movement is a matter of presence-by-absence or pres-ab-sence.

While that is as far as the published form of SZ got, the next Division, SZ I.3, was to take the crucial step. The one and only issue of the treatise is the movement of disclosure. From one perspective this movement, which Heidegger called primordial time, is that which unifies Dasein's self-transcendence, and here it is called 'temporality' (Zeitlichkeit). But from another perspective this movement opens up and shapes the horizon that gives all modes of being their kinetic or temporal character, and here it is called the 'time-character' (Temporalität) of being. Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität are the same primordial movement of disclosure seen on the one hand as human self-transcendence and on the other hand as the transcendental horizon that conditions the kinetic meaning of being. In SZ I.2, §69, section 'c' (SZ 365), Heidegger did make a stab at showing how Zeitlichkeit forms the horizonal schema for understanding man's being, but he did not spell out how it shapes the

horizon for understanding other modes of being. That task was reserved for SZ I.3.

By carefully noting hints that are scattered throughout the published portion of SZ, we can see that SZ I.3 was to unfold in four steps. The following is an effort to reconstruct the format of those four steps. The numbers in parentheses refer to the pages and paragraphs in SZ where the hints can be found.

The first step is usually called the 'working out' (Ausarbeitung) of the being-question or the 'laying free of the horizon' (Freilegung des Horizontes). This initial step was to show simply that the most primordial mode of the generation of temporality as the movement of self-transcendence is the horizonal schema of presence-by-absence which possibilizes the understanding of being in terms of time (cf. SZ 231b, 437c). What is here called the 'time-character' of being is only a preliminary name for that movement which Heidegger would later prefer to call the 'truth' or 'clearing' of being: disclosure as presence (alētheia) by absence (lēthē).

The second step, closely bound up with the first, was to be the 'answering' (Beantwortung) of the being-question by an elaboration of the temporal or kinetic determination (presence-by-absence) of being in general and of its possible variations: readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, Dasein, and subsistence (SZ 231b, 333b). Here too Heidegger was to have worked out much of what we called the laundry list of topics alluded to throughout SZ I.1-2: how the intentionality of consciousness is grounded in the unity of Dasein's self-transcendence (363 note), how time has its own mode of being (406a), how space and time are coupled together (368b), the condition of notness and negativity (286a), the distinction between the 'who' of existence and the 'what' of presence-athand in the broadest sense (45a), the temporal constitution of discourse and the temporal characteristics of language patterns (349c), the differentiation between the ontic and the historical (403c), the concrete elaboration of the world-structure in general and its possible variations (366d), how the forgetting of the world leads to ontologies of entities-within-theworld as 'nature' and to ontologies of value (100d), the clarification of whatness, howness, something, nothing, and nothingness (see WG in Wegmarken, 69). Specifically within the section on truth were to be discussed: the existential interpretation of science (357a), the 'is' of the copula and the 'as' scheme (349c, 360c), how Bedeutung arises (349c), the possibility of Begrifflichkeit (39b) and Begriffsbildung (349c), and the full treatment of logos (160a). Presumably in this section too Heidegger would have discussed the possibility of regional ontologies, which is based on what he called the 'non-deductive genealogy of the different possible ways of being' (11b), as well as the question of the ontological determination of positive-ontic science ('the kind of research in which entities are uncovered') and its kind of truth (230b).

The third step of SZ I.3 was to be a further repetition (within SZ I.2, chapters iv-vi already constituted a first repetition) of the existential analysis of Dasein on the same and truly ontological level at which the concept of being would have already been discussed (333b). This treatment was to be the proper realization (Durchführung, 13b) of the Dasein-analytic, and it would be the thematic analysis of human existence (436b) as contrasted with the preparatory and primordial analyses that made up SZ I.1 and I.2. As contrasted with the first repetition of the preliminary Dasein-analysis in SZ I.2 - chapters iv-vi, which were also called the 'temporal interpretation of Dasein' (see 17c, 234c, 304c, 333b) - the treatment of Dasein in SZ I.3 would be called the 'renewed repetition' (erneute Wiederholung: 333b, cf. 17b). Among the topics to be discussed here was, for example, that of 'an adequate conceptual interpretation of everydayness' (371f.).

The *fourth* step of 'Time and being' was to be methodological. Whereas SZ §7 had offered only a 'preliminary idea of phenomenology' (28a), SZ I.3 was to present the '[full] idea of phenomenology' (357a). As far as I can see, this is the only topic that Heidegger, in SZ, promises to treat in this fourth area. The outline of GP, as we shall see below, offered a rich panoply of topics to be covered under the rubric of methodology.

B History of the Concept of Time, 1925

If we now compare the outline of SZ with the earlier outline of the course Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GZ), we discern the following issues. (Here I prescind from Heidegger's long introduction on phenomenology.)

(1) The world-analysis (GZ I.1, chap. iii = SZ I.1, chap. iii). The most developed material of GZ is the analysis of the Umwelt, a theme which Heidegger had elaborated ever since his 1919–20 course at Freiburg (which was also called *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*). In GZ, out of the 25 lectures devoted to the preparatory analysis of Dasein (June 6 through July 31, 1925), 11 of them were dedicated to the analysis of the environment (June 22 through July 13).

Within the 1925 course we notice a different order from SZ. The Descartes section of GZ is placed before the paragraphs on the worldhood of the world – just the opposite from SZ. Moreover, in 1925 Heidegger places immediately after the worldhood analyses the section on the reality of the outer world, whereas this material is saved for later in SZ (SZ §43, 'Dasein, worldhood, and reality').

- (2) Being-in and Care (GZ I.1, chap. iv = SZ I.1, chaps. v and vi). The material which SZ spreads over two chapters ('Being-in as such' and 'Care as the being of Dasein') is here lumped together under the comprehensive heading Das In-Sein, with the four articulations: discoveredness, fallenness, dread, and care.
 - (3) Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität. The 1925 lecture course makes it

clear that by 'time' (Zeit) Heidegger means the temporality of Dasein as self-transcendence (Zeitlichkeit) rather than the horizontal time-character of being itself (Temporalität). Time, says Heidegger on July 31 (p. 442 of the published text), is Dasein itself. It is that whereby human existence is its proper wholeness as being-ahead-of-itself. In fact, we should not say that 'Time is', but rather that 'Dasein, as time, generates (zeitigt) its being' (cf. SZ 328c). In other words, GZ did not get as far as the major differentiation between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität which is central to SZ and whose import Heidegger stressed to Father Richardson when he wrote that the temporality (Zeitlichkeit) characterized in SZ I.2 is not yet 'the most proper element of time that must be sought in answer to the being-question'. ¹⁶ It seems that the lecture course GZ was indeed on its way to Temporalität as the arena of presence-by-absence that gives all modes of being their temporal determination, but we will have to wait until January 11, 1926, during Heidegger's course on logic, before that concept properly emerges (Logik, p. 199).

- (4) 'Time and being' (GZ III = SZ I.3). We notice that the projected content of GZ III, which generally corresponds to SZ's 'Time and being', includes not only a fundamental ontology of the meaning of being in general (die Frage nach dem Sein überhaupt) but also two regional ontologies (. . . und nach dem Sein von Geschichte und Natur im besondern). The whole course, in fact, bore the subtitle: 'Prolegomena to the phenomenology of nature and history'. The 'Prolegomena' cover the existential analytic, the destruction of the history of ontology, and the fundamental ontology of being in general - in short, the material of the whole of SZ as Heidegger originally projected it. 17 On the other hand, neither SZ nor GP promises any regional ontologies at all. At most they might have shown the derivability of regional ontologies from fundamental ontology under the rubric of a 'non-deductive genealogy of the possible modes of being' (SZ 11b).
- (5) The Destruction of the History of Ontology (GZ II = SZ II). Finally we note the different location and the different content of the material on the history of ontology. In GZ it appears between the existential-temporal analytic and the elaboration of the meaning of being. That is to say, if SZ were to follow the outline of GZ, it would run as follows: SZ I.1-2; II.1-3; and then I.3. Moreover, the content of this area is different in GZ. Whereas SZ proposed to treat of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle, here in GZ Heidegger proposes to treat Bergson, Kant and Newton, and Aristotle.

C The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1927

In our comparison of GZ and SZ, the main points of interests concern the location and the content of what was to remain unpublished in SZ. What SZ calls 'Time and being' was, in GZ, comprised of both fundamental and regional ontologies and placed after the destruction of the history of ontology. In SZ this section is composed only of fundamental ontology (the kinetic-temporal meaning of being and its variations), and it precedes the destruction. As we turn now to the outline of GP and compare it with those same unpublished portions of SZ, we note the following:

- (1) The kernel of 'Time and being' (GP II and III) now has a twofold articulation: 1. fundamental ontology and 2. methodology. 18 The section on fundamental ontology (GP II) is in turn articulated into four basic problems that are systematically derived from four traditional theses on being: (i) the ontological difference, drawn from Kant's thesis on being; (ii) the basic articulations of being as whatness and howness (or thatness), drawn from the Aristotelian and medieval thesis that the being of entities is both essentia and existentia; (iii) the unity and the multiple modifications of being, drawn from the modern thesis that the basic modes of being are res cogitans and res extensa; and (iv) the truth-character of being, drawn from the thesis of logic that all entities can be expressed through the 'is' of the copula. We have seen above that these four theses remain operative, although in a slightly rearranged order, as Heidegger's outline for 'Time and being' as late as his course on Leibniz during the summer of 1928. And we recall that the truth-character of being was to be treated in the second chapter of SZ I.3 (see SZ, first edition, 349n.), whereas here it is relegated to the fourth chapter of GP II.
- (2) The term 'ontological difference' makes its debut (GP II.1) and seems to include both the Ausarbeitung of the being question (that is, the interpretation of Temporalität as temporal horizon) and the Beantwortung (thematic answering) of the being question, but it does not include the question of the variations of being. Moreover, within the chapter on the ontological difference there are four steps in the elaboration of the meaning of being, the first two of which are generally co-extensive with the material of SZ I.1-2. Those four steps are the following:
- (i) Time and Temporality (Zeit und Zeitlichkeit): Here Heidegger moves from Aristotle's notion of time (= SZ II.3) as the number of motion, to the roots of original time in man's threefold self-transcendence.
- (ii) Time as self-transcendence and time as horizonal (Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität): In this section the move is from temporality as constitutive of man's being, and towards temporality as formative of the horizon which determines all experience, including the understanding of being. It would seem from the title of this section (GP 389) that here Heidegger advances beyond the material contained in SZ I.2, that is, beyond Zeitlichkeit and into Temporalität. However, that is not the case; indeed, this section gets no further than the material found in SZ §69, section 'c'. One external proof of that is found in the programmatic sentence that opens the following section: 'Now we must get an idea of how

Temporalität, on the basis of the Zeitlichkeit that grounds Dasein's transcendence, makes possible Dasein's understanding of being' (GP 429).

- (iii) Time as the horizon for the determination of being (Temporalität und Sein): Here begins the new elaboration of what SZ called 'Time and being'. However, as I shall show below, the advance beyond SZ is quite minimal.
- (iv) Being and entities (Sein und Seiendes): Here the ontological difference was to be clarified on the basis of the distinction between Dasein's transcendence into the temporal ecstases and his return to the entities rendered intelligible within that horizon. Here too there is hardly any real advance beyond SZ.
- (3) The historical-destructive part (GP I) is again relocated before the systematic treatment of the fundamental ontological question about the meaning of being, just as it was in GZ. In a sense, then, GP reverts to the pre-SZ model of GZ, where the historical-destructive part of the treatise was contained within, rather than following after, fundamental ontology. Furthermore we notice that the historical-destructive part of GP (that is, GP I) now deals with being rather than with time, and that what SZ reserved for treatment at SZ II.3 (namely, Aristotle and time) is incorporated within GP II.1.
- (4) In GP there is no mention of the second repetition of the Daseinanalytic that is promised in SZ. In fact, there is not even an explicit mention of the first repetition of the Dasein-analysis (= SZ I.2, chaps. iv-vi), although pages 362-88 of GP present material from SZ I.2, chap. vi. While it is possible, but not probable, that GP III.1 ('The ontic foundation of ontology, and the analysis of Dasein as fundamental ontology') might have contained such a second repetition, it is more likely that this section would have been only methodological in nature, as indeed Heidegger seems to indicate when he delineates the scope of the section: 'So the first task within the clarification of the scientific character of ontology is the demonstration of its ontic foundation and the characterization of this founding' (GP 27).

D Conclusions

What may be concluded from this tedious comparison of outlines? In the first place, it is clear enough what Heidegger intended to do, namely, to show that the kinetic meaning of disclosure ('being') is presence-byabsence. That is, he wanted to show that the presence or aletheia or intelligibility of entities happens on the basis of a prior and possibilizing absence or lēthē or unintelligibility. Indeed, he wanted to show that man is correlative to both these moments of the disclosive process by virtue of his self-transcendence. That is, man's relative self-absence or alreadyahead-ness is correlative to the lethe-dimension of disclosure, and his being-present-to-things is correlative to the aletheia-dimension of disclosure. It is also clear that in this early period Heidegger intended to complete SZ by drawing the kinetic meaning of being as pre-ab-sence from out of the self-transcendent and horizonal temporality of Dasein.¹⁹

In the second place it is clear that Heidegger's conception of the program for elaborating the temporal meaning of being is somewhat fluid from 1925 through 1927 (and even through 1928, if we count the reshuffling of the four basic questions in Heidegger's course on Leibniz). Not only is the program fluid; perhaps it is even in trouble. One sign of that is the way Heidegger keeps rearranging the order of 'Time and being' in relation to the destruction of the history of ontology. I take these rearrangements as a symptom of the deeper problem of the relation of system and history in Heidegger's program. In a word: How can a systematic ontology be reconciled with the historicity of human existence? If the transcendental condition which renders possible the systematics of being in SZ I.3 is Dasein's own temporality and historicity, then the inquiry into being is itself characterized by historicity. To answer the question of the meaning of being in terms of time is in effect to show that the question of being is itself historical and that one has to question, historically, the very history of the question of being. It seems that Heidegger is aware of this probem and aware that the problem of system and history becomes the problem of relativism. Is the last word in this matter to be veritas temporis filia?20

In the third place, and closely linked to the former two, is the question of the relation between time as self-transcendence and time as the horizon for the meaning of being. This is the problem of the relation of priority between Dasein and being, if indeed we can speak of these as 'two'. Does being have the structure of pres-ab-sence because of Dasein's pres-ab-sential self-transcendence? Or is Dasein self-transcendent because being has intrinsically the structure of pres-ab-sence?

In the fourth place, lurking behind the above questions of history and system, temporality and truth, self-transcendence and being-as-thetranscendent, there is the question of the so-called 'turn'. We must say from the outset that the turn is not a move away from the fundamental standpoint of SZ (being as pres-ab-sence); it is not a new phase in Heidegger's development after the collapse of the SZ program in all its various forms. Rather, the turn was built into Heidegger's program from the start, and it always meant an overcoming of (1) the metaphysics of actuality and (2) the humanism of subjectivity.

Re #1: From the early twenties Heidegger always conceived of the turn as the step back from all forms of the metaphysics of actuality (being as presence) and into not only the Greek alētheia (which is still a matter of presence) but even further back to the possibilizing ground of alētheia, namely, lēthē (absence). To become aware of the lēthēdimension is not to extinguish it but to let it be. In that sense the turn

is to be understood as 'Die Umkehr in die Herkunft' (this is the gloss at SZ 39, which we mentioned above) – that is, the return to, the awareness and positive appropriation of, lēthē as the source or origin of intelligibility, so as then to see the 'derivation' of being-as-presence from out of this absence: 'Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft' (ibid.). To overcome the metaphysics of actuality does not mean to abolish it but to reinsert it into the dimension of potentiality. But actuality (energeia) embedded in potentiality (dynamis) is what Aristotle means by movement (kinēsis). If one properly understands Heidegger's retrieval of the problematic of kinēsis in Aristotle, then one can see how Heidegger's turn towards the lēthē-dimension of disclosure means a regaining of being as movement.

Re #2: In so far as all modes of being human are correlative to modes of being itself, the modern humanism of subjectivity merely corresponds to the latest phase of the metaphysics of actuality. A positive recovery of the pre-metaphysics of 'potentiality' (*lēthē*, or *dynamis* properly retrieved) would correspondingly entail the discovery of a pre-humanistic understanding of man in terms of his living-into-possibilities (his selfabsence). The correlativity between man's pres-ab-sence (SZ: Zeitlichkeit) and the pres-ab-sence that is being or disclosure (SZ: die Temporalität des Seins) is what Heidegger's thought is all about. We can also recognize here the problematic of 'authenticity' or proper selfhood. Man comes into his own by resolving not to be his own but to let himself go into the potentiality he already is. In so doing he wakes up to the fact that his transcendence is rooted in and governed by the *lēthē*-dimension of disclosure. (Transzendenz aber von Wahrheit des Seyns her: das Ereignis, new edition of SZ, 51 note a).

What then of the shift in language that characterizes Heidegger's work in the thirties? This does not make up the turn (Kehre) in the proper sense but is only a shift in direction (Wendung) within the turn.²² It merely evidences Heidegger's awareness that the turn from all forms of the metaphysics of stable presence into the non-metaphysics of privative absence (lēthē) could not be carried out within the language of the last form of metaphysics, transcendental horizonality.

The turn was to come into its own in SZ I.3. Here the whole project was to turn around, both in terms of how one thinks (the abandonment of subjectivity and 'the overcoming of the horizon as such') and in terms of what is to be thought (positive appropriation of 'Vergessenheit, Lēthē, Verbergung, Entzug . . .'). 23 Heidegger's abandonment of the program of SZ did not mean abandonment of the turn that had been built into that program from the beginning, but only of the transcendental language of metaphysics. SZ I.3, he later wrote, 'was held back because thought failed in adequately [showing] this turn and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics'.24

Yet for all that, Heidegger claims to have carried out the turn and to

have answered the question of the meaning of being. 'Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of *Being and Time* is decisively fulfilled in the thinking of the turn', he wrote to Father Richardson. And he specified. The clearing of the realm of intelligibility on the basis of *lēthē* as withdrawal is what 'being' means.²⁵

The above analyses of the various early programs for working out the temporal or kinetic meaning of being have brought us to the point where we can begin to study and evaluate the contents of GP. We shall see that GP does not in any way complete SZ. However, the fact that GP fails to complete SZ – indeed, that it failed to complete itself – has a positive meaning. It was a distant warning of the coming shift away from the transcendental language and framework of SZ so as finally to bring about the turn into 'the thing itself'.²⁶

III Argument: an analysis of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology

GP was delivered in 22 two-hour lectures on Wednesdays and Saturdays from 30 April through July 27, 1927, excepting June 2-15 and July 7-12. Preceding the three Parts was a programmatic Introduction which revealed their systematic interrelation (GP 1-33).

A Introduction

The course opens with and sustains throughout $(GP\ 2,\ 36,\ 81,\ 175f.,\ 263,\ 353,\ 467)$ an implicit critique of Husserl's phenomenology. How does one single out 'the basic problems of phenomenology'? Not from any current definition of the art! Not only are there widely divergent conceptions of the nature and tasks of phenomenology, but even if these could be harmonized into a unified definition, this would provide little help in sorting out, much less in solving, the basic problems of phenomenology. For it is emphatically not the case 'that phenomenological research today has gotten to the center of the philosophical problematic and defined the proper essence of that problematic from out of its possibilities' $(GP\ 3)$.

For Heidegger, phenomenology is neither scientific philosophy itself, nor one science among others, nor a pre-science for grounding the properly philosophical disciplines (ethics, logic, and so on). Rather, it is the method for doing scientific philosophy at all. Accordingly, in opposition to Husserl's tendency to separate phenomenology, as scientific philosophy itself, from the authority of the philosophical tradition, Heidegger asserts that phenomenology is only 'the more explicit and more radical understanding of the idea of scientific philosophy as this has been ambitioned throughout its development in ever new and coherently unified endeavors from the Greeks to Hegel' (GP 3). Thus, far from allowing any 'dog-

matic' (= Husserlian) definition of phenomenology to delineate the basic problems (GP 4), Heidegger will turn to history, both to discern in a preliminary way what scientific philosophy has claimed to be and to carry out a phenomenological-critical dicussion of four traditional theses on being. This discussion, it becomes clear, is a 'retrieve' - 'the disclosing of a problem's original and heretofore hidden possibilities so that by the development of them the problem is transformed and thus for the first time has its content as a problem preserved' (KPM 195). From out of the four traditional theses Heidegger will shape the four basic problems of phenomenological philosophy. The circularity here is both obvious and, for Heidegger, inevitable (cf. SZ 152f.), and it points to the fundamental divergence of his 'historical' approach from Husserl's presuppositionless one.

A glance at the tradition shows that philosophy by its nature is scientific (not Weltanschauung) and specifically the science of being (and not of the acts and structures of consciousness). In a word, philosophy is ontology, 'the theoretical-conceptual interpretation of being, its structure and possibilities' (GP 15). And if phenomenology is to ontology as method is to science, then explaining the basic problems of phenomenology entails demonstrating 'the possibility and necessity of the absolute science of being' (ibid.).

The three Parts of GP are the steps to accomplishing this goal. Part One: An analysis of four traditional theses on being will point up their one common problem: an inadequate determination of the meaning of being due to an inadequate determination of Dasein as phenomenological locus of the understanding of being. Part Two: Heidegger will determine the unified meaning of being from out of human temporality by resolving the four 'basic problems of phenomenology' retrieved from the four traditional theses. Part Three was to lay out four elements of the methodology of ontology.

B Four traditional theses on being

Heidegger's discussions of each of the four theses is divided into three parts, roughly: (a) a presentation of the thesis, (b) a discussion of its implicit problem-area from a phenomenological viewpoint, and (c) a preliminary indication of the direction to be taken for an adequate resolution of the problem. In the following summaries I restrict myself to only the essential strands of the argument: how each thesis points beyond itself to the need for a fundamental ontology.

1. The Kantian thesis (GP 35-107): Kant states his thesis on being within the context of his refutation of the ontological argument for the existence of God, but Heidegger's interest is only in the ontological, not the theological, import of the thesis. Negatively, Kant's thesis declares that being is not a 'real' predicate, i.e., does not deal with or in any way increase the conceptual content of a thing; it does not concern the res (whatness, hence 'realness') of the thing. Positively, the thesis maintains that being consists in the 'absolute position' of the thing as object in relation to the empirical faculty of judgment (perception). Although Kant leaves the thesis as such at that (apart from his application of it in refutation of the ontological argument), Heidegger pursues a double problem inherent in it. On the one hand, what Kant means by being as perception is unclear, for perception (Wahrnehmung) can mean either the act of perceiving (Wahrnehmen) or the thing perceived (das Wahrgenommene) or the state of perceivedness (die Wahrgenommenheit, 'the being-perceived of what is perceived in the perceiving comportment', GP 79). Heidegger takes it that the last is what Kant means by being, but the very unclarity in which Kant left the issue points to the need for a fundamental clarification of the manifold being-structure of perception. On the other hand, it would seem that perceivedness is not itself being. but must presuppose the actuality or being of the thing in question as prior to the possibility of being-as-perceivedness. This twofold unclarity of the Kantian thesis points to the need for a fundamental clarification of the manifold being-structure of perception.

Heidegger attempts this clarification by an analysis of intentionality. Perception is a perceptive being-directed-towards the perceived, such that the perceived as such is understood in its perceivedness. In this seeming commonplace one must avoid two things: on the one hand, erroneous objectivist readings of intentionality whereby it is taken as a relation of two things-on-hand: an on-hand psychic subject and an onhand physical object. Perceiving would then be a psychic act that a subject happens to perform when there happens to be a physical object on hand. Rather, Heidegger shows that perceiving is intrinsically relational, even when that to which it relates (its Wozu) is only a hallucination. Intentionality, therefore, has an a priori character of relating: it is relationality as such. On the other hand, one must avoid an erroneous subjectivizing or immanentizing of intentionality which might express itself in the question, 'How do intentions reach an "outside" world?' Intentionality is neither subjective nor objective but is rooted in transcendence itself. Here for the first time in the course Heidegger introduces his term 'Dasein' in place of 'subject': man's very being-structure (Dasein) is transcendence; transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality just as intentionality is the ratio cognoscendi of transcendence. For Dasein there can be no 'outside' to which it must penetrate because there is no 'inside' in which it can be trapped. This clarification of perception as intentional likewise clarifies the second problem, the relation between being as perceivedness and being as actual presence-athand. As intentional, perceiving is always directed to the thing perceived so as to discover it; the thing's perceivedness is its discoveredness

(Entdecktheit). But if perception really discovers the thing as it is in itself (for such is the nature and goal of perception), then it must be guided beforehand by a prior understanding of the way-of-being and the kindof-being (Vorhandensein) of the thing perceived. Perceiving must have a prior pre-conceptual understanding of that thing, one in which its being is disclosed (erschlossen). In the perceivedness that goes with this understanding, there is the prior disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of the being of perceived things.

This discussion of the intentional character of perception opens onto the later discussion of the ontological difference between being and entities. Kant's assertion that being is not a real predicate says as much as that being is not an entity. The distinction between the perception of a thing as the perceivedness or discoveredness of an entity and the prior disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of the being of the discovered thing points to the ontological difference between being and entities which is made on the basis of Dasein as transcendence: not just intentional transcendence to entities but transcendence 'beyond' entities to (i.e., the prior understanding of) their being.

This preliminary clarification of the Dasein-relatedness of being calls for a fuller analysis of how transcendence, determined by temporality, makes possible man's understanding of being. Likewise, the distinction drawn here between the disclosedness of being and the discoveredness of entities demands an analysis of the ontological difference between being and entities. Both tasks are reserved for GP II.1.

2. The Aristotelian and medieval thesis that the being of entities includes both whatness (essentia) and presence-at-hand (existentia) (GP 108-71). Just as the Kantian thesis shows the subject-relatedness of the notion of the existence (Wirklichkeit) of things, so the medieval essentia and existentia, when traced back to their Aristotelian origins, likewise reveal their relation to the intentional comportment of man and therefore call for an ontology of existence as a fundamental delineation of the unified meaning of being. Kant had shown that existence entailed relation to the subject (perception), but he took over unproblematically from scholasticism the notion of essence (in his Realität). Heidegger will show that essence too points back to the subject, specifically to productive comportment or poiēsis in the broadest sense.

From Suarez' Disputationes metaphysicae and, to a lesser degree, from Aquinas' De ente et essentia, Heidegger lays out a basic medieval lexicon of essentia and existentia and traces the various words (quidditas, forma, natura on the one hand, actualitas on the other) back to their corresponding Aristotelian terms. But those Greek words all point implicitly to the horizon of man's productive comportment (poiēsis). Why is existentia conceived as actualitas or energeia? Because of a relation to action (Handeln, praxis) or production (Herstellen, poiēsis) whereby something is brought forth and made accessible to man. The same with essentia: The forma or morphē of something is determined by its eidos prohaireton, which, as priorly directing production, has the character of revealing what something is 'before' it is actualized (to ti ēn einai, quod quid erat esse). That which, in production, is 'prior' to actualization (viz., the eidos or essentia or nature of the product) is free from all the imperfection and incompleteness of the actual thing and so determines what something 'always already was', to ti ēn einai, das jeweils schon voraus Wesende or Gewesenes – used for the otherwise lacking perfect form of einai (cf. new SZ 114 note a).

Just as the words for existence and essence point to man's 'poetic' activity of letting things come forth as they are into accessibility or use, so too the words for entities. The hypokeimenon is what 'lies present' (keisthai) in the area of man's comportment as available to his use. As an ousia, an entity, according to the pre-philosophical use of ousia, is a present possession or usable reality; its state of being (ousia, essentia) is usableness based on producedness. All of this is the unthematic and implicit horizon according to which the Greeks understood being, and it points to the need not only for a retreat from the medieval essentia and existentia to the Greek experience of being, but even more for a thematization and elaboration of what was only implicit in the Greek energeia and ousia.

A more original grasp of the basic articulation of being into essence and existence requires, preliminarily, a discussion of the intentional structure of productive activity and, in the long run, an ontology of human existence as *poiēsis* and *praxis*. Just as perception is perception of something as it is in itself, so too production, as intentional comportment, presupposes an understanding of the product's being-in-itself. Producing is at once a relating of the product to oneself and a freeing of it for its own being. This letting-free of one's products is essential to man's transcendence as intentional.

But can 'production' serve as the clue to all kinds of entities? What about nature, which requires no human production? Answer: Nature is known as such only in productive activity wherein $hyl\bar{e}$, as what is not produced, is required for what is to be produced.

But finally, the essence-existence distinction, even if rooted in production, does not apply to one kind of entity: human existence, where whatness or essence is of the unique sort, 'whoness'. Hence, even as clarified thus far, the essence-existence pair remains problematic until clarified in terms of the full meaning of being as such, its unity and multiplicity; and this, in turn, must await an ontology of man as the locus of the understanding of being. Not only does the second thesis point to the need for a deeper 'return to the "subject" but it also calls for a clarification of the meaning of being and of the basic articulations

of being. All this is left to GP II.2. (Just how important Heidegger thought this analysis of the Aristotelian and medieval thesis to be is shown by the fact that he took it over whole into his 1928 course on Leibniz as the section, 'Essentia. Die Grundverfassung des Seins überhaupt' - and that he referred to it again in the 1935 course Einführung in die Metaphysik, p. 140 = Introduction to Metaphysics, Doubleday/ Anchor, p. 154; Yale, p. 184; as well as in Nietzsche II, 14.)

3. The modern thesis (GP 172-251), from Descartes to Husserl, differentiates the being of the critically normative self-conscious subject from that of its possible objects, but it misses the unique being of subjectivity. Heidegger shows the insufficiency of the modern turn to the subject by attacking Kant's understanding of personhood.

For Kant the essence of the ego lies neither in the transcendental unity of apperception (personalitas transcendentalis) and even less in the empirical self-consciousness of the ego of apprehension (personalitas psychologica), but rather in the moral ego, calculating, acting, taking itself as its goal, self-conscious before the law (personalitas moralis). But even here Kant misses the proper being of acting, wherein the moral person is goal for himself, and instead Kant sees the existence of the person on the model of the existence of a thing. The reason: Kant too reads being as 'producedness' insofar as he takes over unquestioned the medieval notion of finite being as createdness. Only a creative producer can know a substance in its full being; man as a finite and therefore receptive knower is confined to phenomenal reality. Thus Kant continues unbroken the metaphysical tradition which reads being as produced presentness (Vorhandensein).

For a more adequate treatment of the being of subjectivity Heidegger summarizes much of SZ I.1 on being-in-the-world (GP 219-47). The point is that even before explicit self-reflection and quite apart from any supposed introspection, man as being-in-the-world already co-grasps himself as mirrored in the matrix of purposefulness called world. Transcending himself into that matrix of meaning, man is at once for-thesake-of-his-own-being and an understanding of being as such. Thus the proper being of subjectivity can only be decided out of a proper analysis of transcendence, and this will point not only to the unified meaning of being but also to differentiations of being that are more basic than subjectivity and nature. These questions are referred to GP II.3.

4. In investigating the thesis of logic (GP 252-320) that the 'is' of the copula applies to all entities regardless of their mode of being, Heidegger selects the characteritic views of Aristotle, Hobbes, Mill, and Lotze in order to show the rich manifold of meanings (whatness, thatness, trueness) that can attach to being taken as the 'is'. But here lies a double problem. First, the multiplicity of meanings is not systematically derived from a prior idea of the unity of being; and secondly, the designation of being as copula, by taking the assertion as a series of words to be connected, misses the priority of the sense of 'is' in terms of truth.

To arrive at a more adequate basis for the 'is', Heidegger rejects the notion of the assertion as a series of words corresponding to ideas and ultimately to objects, and cuts through to the logos apophantikos as intentional comportment embodying an understanding of being. But even this assertoric disclosure of being in apophantic predication and verbal communication rests on a deeper foundation. Being-in-the-world is the primordial hermeneutic (= event of interpretative understanding of intelligibilities) which discloses entities in their original and non-derived syntheses with the lived purposes of existence. Transcendence is original truth. The intentional structure of truth as disclosure, grounded ultimately in temporality, alone can provide access to the unified meaning, and with that to the truth-character, of being in GP II.4.

C Towards fundamental ontology

Each of the four theses, when broken down to its inner problems and possibilities, has pointed beyond itself to the need for reformulating the idea of being in general on the basis of an adequate ontology of human existence. Thus we are led to GP II, 'The fundamental ontological question about the meaning of Being in general and its basic structures and modes'. Whereas Heidegger here proposed to present and then to push beyond SZ's analysis of temporality and spell out the time-character of being by resolving the four basic problems of phenomenology, the course (there were only six lecture days left) did very little more than summarize the published portions of SZ.

What is interesting for our purposes are the few steps that Heidegger takes at GP 441-5 beyond SZ and in pursuance of its promise to determine the meaning of being in general from the horizon opened up by man's temporal self-transcendence. The reasons for this interest are twofold: positively, to find out how and at what point SZ I.3 would have built off of SZ I.2, and negatively, to find out why and at what point that continuation became impossible for Heidegger.

GP 389 begins the summary of the main material of SZ. Being shows up only in the understanding of being, which is intrinsic to Dasein: therefore, only by discovering the structures and ground of this understanding can we define the meaning of being in general. But all understanding is fundamentally the projection of possibilities into which one lives and from out of which one understands oneself. Projective understanding is rooted in Dasein's basic state of self-transcendence, being-inthe-world; and this in turn is grounded in the generation (Zeitigung) of temporality, or better, in temporality as self-generation in the primordial form of authentic, self-appropriated existence. I am who I really am by anticipating the most basic possibility which I already am, my death.

Authentic existence is the threefold structure of self-transcendence: being present to oneself and to things in the moment of existential insight (Gegenwart as Augenblick) by becoming (Zukunft as Vorlaufen) and renewing (Gewesenheit as Wiederholung) the most proper possibility that one is.

This primary temporality underlies the derived temporal structures of dealing with, e.g., tools in one's environment. A tool is for attaining some end: it has its being as 'in-order-to-ness'. Whenever I use a tool, not only do I already understand its being (what it is: a tool; how it is: available for doing something), but more, I implicitly relate myself to that being in a temporal way. I have the tool present to me (Gegenwart as Gegenwärtigen) by retaining it (Gewesenheit as Behalten) in terms of an expectation of what it can accomplish (Zukunft as Gewärtigen). Ordinary usage overlooks these moments and their temporal base, but when the tool is damaged or missing or just put up with, its structure, modified but still temporal, becomes noticeable. Not only that, but the various forms of breakdown of equipment make visible the modifications of the temporal moments of tool-oriented self-transcendence. Three examples will reveal the privative modifications of these ekstases.

- 1. To lack or miss something. To come out of the theater and find one's car stolen is certainly to experience the not-there-ness (das Nichtvorfinden; GP 441 = SZ 335b) of the car. But not every instance of notthere-ness is an instance of missing (we don't miss last year's flu attack), rather only those in which something needed is lacking. We cannot say exactly, therefore, that to miss means to not-have-something-present, for it is precisely to have something present as needed (the car) when in fact it is not around. The experience of missing something reveals the privative modification of the ekstasis of having-present into havingunpresent. To express this privative character, Heidegger calls the modified ekstasis an UNgegenwärtigen as contrasted with a NICHTgegenwärtigen (cf. the Greek mē on vs. ouk on). To miss is to make present something expected but not present.
- 2. To be surprised by something which unexpectedly but handily shows up. Your car gone, you are about to step on a bus when a horn honks behind you - your best friend is offering you a ride. Having the bus present in terms of that expected ride means not expecting a more comfortable ride in a car. The non-expectation, however, is not an absolute absence of expectation (Nichtgewärtigen) but a relative or privative un-expectation (Ungewärtigen, GP 442b = SZ 355c), which, in fact, is what allows us to be surprised. The experience of surprise reveals the privative modification of the futural ekstasis of tool-use from expectation to un-expectation.
- 3. Merely putting up with an implement. Say no friend offers you a ride and you have to take the bus home. You have the bus present, you

retain it in terms of the expected arrival home, but you really do not 'take the bus into account' (das Nichtrechnen mit, SZ 355d) or 'retain' it to that end; rather, you merely put up with it. This 'not taking into account', however, is not absolute non-retention but a privative 'unretention'. You 'hold on' to the bus by putting up with it as second-best. This phenomenon reveals, in tool-use, the privative modification of the ekstasis of alreadiness from retaining to un-retaining.

This is the point $(GP \ 441 = SZ \ 869a)$ where the 'new working out' of 'Time and being' was to take off. Having seen - at least in the cases of Dasein and tools - the elaboration of the unity of self-transcendence, we now await the elaboration of the corresponding horizonal schemata (the 'whereunto' of the direction of self-transcendence) which condition the meaning of whatever is experienced in correlation with the ekstasis. At one pole, the threefold self-transcendence; at the other pole, the threefold horizonal schema – the whole constituting the ekstatic-horizonal correlation that is primordial temporality. We expect, too, that each horizonal schema will have both a positive and a privative moment. Out of the interrelation of presence and absence both in temporality as a whole (where becoming and alreadiness function as relative absence for having-present) and within each moment of temporality (which includes both positivity and privation) we would expect the elaboration of the analogically unified meaning of being in general as presence-by-absence in correlation with man's own existential presence-by-absence.

In fact, however, the further step Heidegger takes in that direction is very cautious – if not downright hesitant. 'In order not to complicate too much our view of the phenomenon of temporality, which in any case is difficult to grasp' (*GP* 435b), he imposes a double limit on the treatment. On the one hand, he restricts himself to the experience of dealing with tools only, and on the other he treats only of the horizonal schema that corresponds to the one ekstasis of having-present.

Correlative to but distinct from the self-transcendent moment of having a tool present, there is the horizonal schema whose time-character is called presence (Praesenz). In order to show the distinctness of the ekstatic and horizonal poles in their correlativity, Heidegger generally, but not consistently, uses German-based words for the ekstatic pole: e.g., Zeitlichkeit, Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart; and Latin-based words for the horizonal pole: Temporalität, Praesenz, Absenz; cf. GP 433 and Logik, 199f. Having-present, as an ekstatical moment, has a schematic indication (Vorzeichnung, GP 435a) of that out-towards-which transcendence is, viz., the horizon of Praesenz (also called Anwesenheit). Praesenz thus constitutes 'the condition of the possibility of understanding readiness-to-hand as such' (434). Having-present, in fact, projects all it has present and could possibly have present in terms of this horizon of

presence or presentness and so understands those things as having a 'presential sense' (433b) and as 'present things' (als Anwesendes, 436a).

But recall that in the breakdown of a tool there occurs a privative modification of having-present to having-unpresent, or, from the viewpoint of the tool, a modification of its being from readiness-to-hand to un-readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit, Abhandenheit, 433b), from presentness to un-presentness (Anwesenheit, Abwesenheit, 436a).

Thus there is in general no horizon corresponding to 'missing' as a determined [mode of] having-present, but rather a specifically modified horizon . . . of presence. Belonging to the ektasis of having-unpresent, which makes 'missing' possible, there is the horizonal schema of absence (441a).

This absential modification of the presence . . . which is given with [the experience of] missing is precisely what allows the ready-to-hand to become conspicuous [as lacking] (442b).

At this point Heidegger's advance stops. We have seen that the horizonal schema of Praesenz encompasses presentness, along with un-presentness as its privative modification. But this has been demonstrated only in the one horizonal schema corresponding to the one ekstasis of havingpresent in the one area of tool-use. Left undiscussed are: the other temporal schemata (with their privative modifications) in which tools are experienced; all the temporal schemata of non-tools; and above all, the analogically unified temporal meaning of being as such and in general.

But, although the advance stops quickly, Heidegger asks some weighty and portentious questions about the ground it covered and failed to cover. 'Within the ontological', he says (438b), 'the potential is higher than the actual' and 'everything positive becomes especially clear from the privative' (439c). Why? 'Parenthetically we may say that the reasons lie equally in the essence of temporality and in the essence of the negation that is rooted in temporality' (ibid.). However, if the rule that the potential underlies the actual and that the privative clarifies the positive helped to open the advance beyond SZ, it also has momentarily blocked further progress.

The modification of presence to the absence in which that presence, as modified, maintains itself cannot be interpreted more precisely without going into the characterization of this modification in general, i.e., into the modification of presence as 'not', as negativum, and without clarifying this in its connection with time (442a).

If the absential modification allows things to show up as lacking, then we meet the

fundamental but difficult problem: To what extent is there not precisely a negative moment (if we formally call the ab-sential a negation) that constitutes itself in the structure of this being, i.e., above all in readiness-to-hand? To ask the question in terms of basic principles: To what extent does a negative, a not, lie in Temporalität in general and likewise in Zeitlichkeit? Or even: To what extent is time itself the condition of the possibility of nothingness at all? (442 f.).

Time, we know, was only the first name for what Heidegger later called the truth of being. In both cases being is seen as pres-ab-sence. The last question above, therefore, is very close to asking: To what extent does presence itself, which must transcend the acts in which it is performed. contain within itself a privation (absence, nothingness, lēthē) which is the possibility of that very presence? The question teeters there. Granted that the modification of presence to absence has a character of negativity.

where does the root of this 'not' in general lie? Closer consideration shows that even the not - or nothingness as the essence of the not can likewise be interpreted only from out of the essence of time and that only from time can the possibility of the modification, e.g. of presentness to absentness, be clarified. Hegel is finally on the track of a fundamental truth when he says: Being and Nothingness are identical, i.e., belong together. Of course the more radical question is: What makes possible such a most primordial belonging-togetherness? We are not sufficiently prepared to press on into this darkness . . . (443a,b).

GP is hardly a completion of SZ. But its formal significance, apart from the intrinsic interest of its content, lies in its incompleteness. To be sure, it shows how Heidegger might have completed SZ if he had chosen to continue in a transcendental framework. But more importantly it leads to the brink from which, beyond the transcendental framework, the absence can begin to be seen for itself.

IV Significance: 'The thing itself'

In asking about the significance of this publication, we must distinguish between what it may contribute to Heidegger scholarship and what it offers by way of insight into the phenomenological 'thing itself', being as pres-ab-sence.

There is plenty for Heidegger scholarship. We meet the first mention of the 'ontological difference', although the concept does not get developed. (On November 17, 1925, Heidegger did speak of 'ein fundamentaler ontologischer Unterschied', but in reference to Husserl's idealreal distinction in Logical Investigations. See Logik, p. 58). There are analyses of Aquinas, Scotus, Suarez, Hobbes, Mill and Lotze. There is a suggestive insight into the three stages of phenomenological method (reduction, construction, destruction) some months before Heidegger's contributions to Husserl's drafts for the Encyclopedia Britannica article.²⁷ More important, the work provides a good portion of Heidegger's Aristotle-interpretation, including the lengthiest analysis of *Physics* IV, 10–14 that we shall ever have from his courses (GP 330-61) and the first published, but by no means last, analysis of Aristotle's De interpretatione (GP 255-9; cf. Logik, pp. 127-42).

Important for the 'thing itself' is the fact that the course gives us Heidegger's final attempt to work out the meaning of being from within the transcendental framework. I take that incompleteness as more than merely a function of 'the limited number of lecture hours' (editor's epilogue, GP 473), for on a simple extrapolation from the hours devoted to GP I, which began in late April, GP II would have been finished only by mid-September and GP III not until the end of October. Moreover, one must ask why the handful of pages that push into 'Time and being' were reserved to the second half of the second-to-last meeting of the course (July 23) and, on the whole, are among the most unsatisfying of the whole work. We have seen from Heidegger's own indications that his program was wrapped in some uncertainty in 1927. This uncertainty may have a positive meaning insofar as it gives a distant warning of the coming shift that would allow a more adequate determination of the thing itself'. The following intends to give some clues for that determination.

The question that haunts GP and prompts the shift away from the transcendental framework is this: If entities are understood in terms of their presence, and if presence is projected in terms of privative absence, what is the root of privative absence? This is 'the problem of the finitude of time' (GP 437), which, in a later formulation, is the problem of the *lēthē*-dimension of alētheia: 'Wherever alētheia emerges, lēthē itself (which is what essentially becomes present in alētheia) remains absent precisely so that some thing can become unhidden as an entity.'28 That is: entities become present against a background of privative absence which is intrinsic to the emergence of presence itself.²⁹

The point where GP breaks off and Heidegger's next phase begins is the brink from which he sees that the lēthē-dimension is intrinsic to being itself. The privative absence is not forged by man's projective selfabsence, nor is it merely the unexplainedness of this or that entity (which finally is embedded within a claim of the total intelligibility of reality) nor is it some occasional limit. Rather this privative negativity is intrinsic to being as pres-ab-sence. But to speak of being hiding and revealing 'itself' seemingly is to fall into the worst kind of metaphysical or mystical anthropomorphism.

How may we solve this problem? Discussion of the positive appropriation of absence – which is the turn – may be aided by two prefatory notes, one about the model and one about the language of the discussion.

1. Clearly the major model for Heidegger's exploration of being as

- pres-ab-sence is Aristotle's discussion of kinēsis in terms of dynamis and energeia, even though, to be sure, the model gets much transformed when put at the service of Heidegger's problematic.³⁰ In his seminar of 1928, 'Phenomenological exercises: interpretation of Aristotle's *Physics*, II' (thus the title, although it dealt with *Physics* III), Heidegger declared that the horizon from which Aristotle prepared the radical grasp of the conception of being was kinēsis, movement; the point, therefore, is to find the relation between movement and being (July 16, 1928). But being (ousia, or more specifically energeia) means always-being-the-same, selfidentity, presentness and completion, whereas moving entities are intrinsically 'on the way' and incomplete: every 'now' points to another and different now, every moment is a 'yes, but' Moving entities are $m\bar{e}$ on and aoriston. Yet Aristotle's genius is that he grasped this privative state as a mode of being through the concept of dynamis. Dynamis, when seen in terms of kinesis, is neither 'potentiality' nor 'mere possibility' but the positive event of appropriation-unto-energeia (Eignung, Ereignung); and an entity which has its being as dynamis is on dynamei hēi dynaton, an appropriated entity that is precisely in the state of beingappropriated-unto-energeia. Dynamis in this sense is, in effect, co-extensive with kinēsis as energeia atelēs: presence-by-absence. As bound up with kinesis (and quite apart from the arithmos kineseos), energeia, Heidegger says, is a Zeitbezeichnung, a time-designation (July 9). Of course, Heidegger's transformation of this model entails the reversal of the Greek priority of energeia over dynamis into the priority of dynamis over energeia. Intrinsic to that transformation is Heidegger's claim that the human understanding of being is itself the *Ur-kinēsis*.
- 2. Following the lead of Heidegger's later writings, discussion of the turn could well profit from retiring the term 'being' from the Heideggerian lexicon. Not only does the word, especially capitalized, almost inevitably suggest a metaphysical super-entity, but equally, talk of 'being itself' can lose sight of its analogical character. Heidegger is not after a univocal something subsisting on its own. Over and above the being of Dasein, the being of implements, the being of things present-at-hand, and the being of ideal objects, there is no second level of 'being itself'. Heidegger was merely searching for the analogically unified meaning of

being that is instantiated in all cases of the being of. . . . To translate das Sein I hesitantly suggest for now the term 'givenness', first, because it clearly implies a phenomenologically correlative locus of experience from which it is distinct but never separate - various forms of human perception (Vernehmen; cf. EM 106) in the broadest sense; and secondly, because the phrase 'givenness itself' seems less likely to denote something behind or in addition to the givenness of entities, but rather to connote a shift of phenomenological focus onto the unified analogical structure of givenness as a priori determinative of the regional modes in which things (or one thing) can be differently given in experience.

But with 'givenness' we have not yet arrived at Heidegger's problematic. Givenness denotes the state of an entity as given (das Seiende als Seiendes = Seiendheit), whereas Heidegger's question is not about the givenness of the given but about the very giving of givenness itself. If being is the givenness of entities (ontic disclosure or truth), what gives givenness (ontological disclosure or truth)? Or: If being accounts for ('is') the meaningful presence of things, what is the mode of the meaningful 'presence' of being?

In one sense we already know the answer: Absence possibilizes presence, possibility allows actuality, lēthē is the condition of alētheia. Furthermore, we already know the correlation-structure between man's selftranscendence and the pres-ab-sence that is 'being'. What is still undecided is the question of priority within that correlation. Let us begin by reviewing the correlation.

In terms of the phenomenologically transformed dynamis-energeia model, Heidegger deepens Husserl's empty-fulfilled model. Man is projected beyond himself towards his own self-absence, thereby opening an empty horizon which may be filled in by the entities which are given to experience. But this means that man has two distinct kinds of experience related to two distinct kinds of givenness. On the one hand, man experiences the recessive or withdrawn horizon which is the prior condition of the fulfilling presence of entities. On the other, he experiences the present entities. First, note their relatedness: Just as the experience of one's own privative absence is the basis of the experience of things (relative self-absence yields the realm of presence), so correlatively the experience of the givenness of the recessive possibilizing horizon is the basis of the experience of the meaningful givenness of present entities. Now note the difference: The givenness of the possibilizing horizon cannot properly be collapsed into the givenness of present entities. On comparison of the two, the horizon has a unique mode of givenness. It remains relatively absent or withdrawn in favor of the entities given within it. But at the same time it still is given to experience, although in the privative mode of relative absence. Specifically, the withdrawal or absence is given as correlative to the experience of one's own self-absence, whereas entities

are given as correlative to the experience of one's own presence. At one and the same time, man's presence-by-absence or temporal existence is correlative to (1) the presence of fulfilling entities and (2) the presenceby-absence of the conditioning horizon. In other words, any possible givenness of entities is based on the correlativity of the temporality of existence with the movement or 'time-character' of givenness itself.

The correlation established, the question now is whether the movement or time-character of givenness, as the condition of possible experience, is primarily due to man's kinetic temporality. More specifically: whether the possibility of error is rooted in man's finitude or in the finitude of the pres-ab-sence of givenness itself. Heidegger broaches the question in his essay 'On the essence of truth'.

Dasein as self-transcending has a disclosive function both with regard to a particular entity that happens to show up and with regard to the meaning-fraught complex of human purposes called 'world'. But everyday experience overlooks the world while it focuses on a particular entity: it conceals the world that it holds open. Or is it rather that the world, the realm of openness, 'conceals itself' in favor of the unconcealed entity? Yes, Heidegger asserts, the non-disclosure of aletheia is its most proper element. It is not something effected by Dasein's projective self-transcendence, yet nonetheless it is preserved as absential by Dasein's selfabsence. The 'withdrawal' of givenness itself is prior even to Dasein's revealing-concealing relation to entities, yet Dasein preserves the lēthēdimension of alētheia (= 'the mystery') by being projected beyond himself into the emptiness within which entities can appear.

Whereas SZ had read the correlation of Dasein and lethe from Dasein's viewpoint, Heidegger's later position reads the correlation from the viewpoint of the *lēthē*. The later writings speak of man as 'drawn out' or 'claimed', correlative to the 'self-concealing' of the dimension which lends entities their presentness. But one experiences this withdrawal only as it is registered in one's being drawn into absence (Geworfenheit, Angezogenheit, etc.31), and one experiences the epochal givenness (Geschick) of worlds of sense only as this is registered in how one makes entities present in meaning. There can be no hypostasizing of 'something' that withdraws or gives, no objectification of 'something' that disposes over the movement that is one's temporality. There is only the experience of the self as ultimately not at its own disposal. From a Derridean perspective we might speak of man as being at the disposal of 'meaning'.³² This is hardly to import some romantic mysticism into philosophy, but only to take seriously and rigorously the full structure of the phenomenological correlation.

The later Heidegger claims to have transcended the transcendental framework and yet to have fulfilled SZ's intentions of showing that the meaning of being is presence-by-absence. If GP had been completed, its last sentence might possibly have read: 'The meaning of being is time; that is, givenness is given temporally because of the transcendental projection of the temporal horizons of possible experience.' If per impossibile GP had been completed in the late thirties, its last sentence might have read: 'The meaning of being is "movement" - that is, givenness is given in the unique state of withdrawal, and thereby man is drawn out into absence and into the finite possibilities of meaning.' In both periods the 'thing itself' is the same: being as pres-ab-sence in essential correlation with man as pres-ab-sence.

Notes

- 1 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., Gesamtausgabe II, 24 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975). English translation by Albert Hofstadter, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). In the present essay I use my own translations from the German, and I refer to the German pagination. N.B.: Apparatus in this essay: I follow William J. Richardson's abbreviations for Heidegger's works: Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. xxxi. The number indicates the German page, and the letter indicates the paragraph on that page.
 - 2 'Neue Ausarbeitung de 3. Abschnitts des I. Teils von "Sein und Zeit".'
- 3 Heidegger announced the projected outline of the course on May 4, 1927 (cf. GP 32f.). For the dating of lectures I rely on the Kyoto Manuscript of Simon Moser's Nachschrift of GP, a copy of which I have placed in the Phenomenology Archives at the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.
- 4 The notes read, respectively: 'Nur dieses in diesem veröffentlichten Stück' and 'Vgl. dazu Marburger Vorlesung SS 1927 (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie)' (new SZ 53, notes a and b). On p. 134 note b of the new Gesamtausgabe edition of Wegmarken, Heidegger remarks: 'The whole of the lecture course = Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie] belongs to Sein und Zeit, First Part, Third Division, "Time and being"."
 - 5 SD 88 (E.T., 80); US 93 (E.T. 7).
- 6 For the material of this section, which is drawn from my work in progress, The Genesis of 'Sein und Zeit', I have relied in part on conversations with: Martin Heidegger, spring, 1971; H.-G. Gadamer, E. Tugendhat, and W. Biemel, January and May, 1975; M. Müller, K. Rahner, and F.-W. von Herrmann, fall, 1976; J. Ebbinghaus and Fritz Heidegger, summer, 1977; and on my articles, 'Heidegger's early years: fragments for a philosophical biography', in Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker, Thomas Sheehan, ed. (Chicago: Precedent Press, 1981) and 'The original form of Sein und Zeit: "Der Begriff der Zeit", 1924', Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, X, 2 (May, 1979), 78-83 (Italian translation in L'uomo, un segno, Rome, III, 1-2 [August, 1979], 111-21).
 - 7 Cf. Sheehan, 'Heidegger's early years', note 55.
 - 8 Editor's Afterword to new Gesamtausgabe edition of SZ, p. 582.
 - 9 Personal communication from Gadamer, Boston, April 12, 1974.
- 10 Max Müller, Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle Verlag, 1949), p. 73f.
 - 11 'Die transzendenzhafte Differenz./Die Ueberwindung des Horizonts als sol-

chen./Die Umkehr in die Herkunft./Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft', new SZ 53 note a.

- 12 W. R. Boyce Gibson, 'From Husserl to Heidegger: excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary', Herbert Spiegelberg, ed., Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, II (1971), 72. For Heidegger's rearrangement of the order of GP, see his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. Klaus Held, ed., Gesamtausgabe II, 26 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), pp. 193-94.
- 13 SZ v = Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans. (London: SCM, 1962), p. 17.
- 14 In the classroom Heidegger entitled his course Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs: Prolegomena zur Phänomenologie von Natur und Geschichte. In the published version the title has been changed: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Petra Jaeger, ed., Gesamtausgabe, II, 20 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979). I follow Heidegger's own title, and I abbreviate it: GZ.
- 15 In this regard, see my essay 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the phenomenology of religion", 1920-21', The Personalist, LX, 3 (1979), 312-24, esp. pp. 315 and 320-23 (Italian translation in Filosofia, Turin, XXXI [1980], 431-46, esp. pp. 440-44).
 - 16 M. Heidegger, 'Vorwort' to Richardson, Heidegger, p. xiii.
- 17 If we take the Critique of Pure Reason as prolegomena to a future metaphysics, and if we follow out the parallels with $\hat{S}Z$, then we get something like the following:

	Kant	Heidegger	
Critique as propaedeutic	I. Transcendental Doctrine of ElementsII. Transcendental Doctrine of Method, ch. 4 (History		$Z ext{ I = } GP ext{ II.1-2}$ $Z ext{ II = } GP ext{ I.1-4}$
System	I. Transcendental Philosophy (Metaphysica generalis) II. Rational Physiology	$\rightarrow SZ$ I.3 = G	Z III = GP II.2-4 gional ontologies

- 18 At GP 78b Heidegger says GP II and III deal with the ontology of Dasein.
- 19 'We are ourselves the source of the idea of being. But this source must be understood as the transcendence of ekstatic Dasein. Only on the basis of transcendence does there take place the articulation of the various ways of being. A difficult and ultimate problem is to define the idea of being in general. Because the understanding of being belongs to transcending Dasein, the idea of being can be drawn from the subject.' 'From the last Marburg lecture course', translation (slightly revised here) by J. Macquarrie in The Future of Our Religious Past: Essays in Honour of Rudolf Bultmann, James M. Robinson, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 321 = Wegmarken, p. 383.
- 20 At GP 460a Heidegger speaks of 'veritas temporalis', but clearly in a sense different from either Gellius' or Galileo's (cf. Friedrich Heer, The Intellectual History of Europe, Jonathan Steinberg, trans. [Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co., 1966, p. 307). Some of the material of this paragraph is drawn from SZ 20–21.
- 21 Cf. 'Summary of a seminar': 'As its privation, the concealing of being belongs to the clearing of being. The forgottenness of being, which constitutes the essence of metaphysics and became the stimulus for Being and Time, belongs to the essence of being itself. Thus there is put to the thinking of being the task

of thinking being in such a way that forgottenness $[= l\bar{e}th\bar{e}!]$ essentially belongs to it. The thinking that begins with Being and Time is thus, on the one hand, an awakening from the forgottenness of being . . . but on the other hand, as this awakening, not an extinguishing of the forgottenness of being, but placing oneself in it and standing within it. Thus the awakening from the forgottenness of being to the forgottenness of being is the awakening into appropriation.' Translation (here slightly revised) by Joan Stambaugh in On 'Time and Being' (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 29f. = SD 32.

22 Cf. Heidegger, 'Vorwort' in Richardson, Heidegger, p. xvii.

23 Cf. new SZ 53 note a; new Wegmarken notes (on p. 328) to Humanismusbrief 159.

24 In the new Wegmarken Heidegger glosses the 'Sagen' of the old text with 'Sichzeigenlassen', Wegmarken 159 = 328.

25 'Vorwort' to Richardson, Heidegger, p. xix; ibid., 'Lichtung des Sichverber-

gens (Zeit) erbringt Anwesen (Sein)', p. xxi.

- 26 Prof. Hans Seigfried, in a paper distributed at the Twelfth Annual Heidegger Conference (Villanova, Pa., May 27, 1978), has argued against the fact and the possibility of the turn in Heidegger's thought. He admits that 'Heidegger himself [in the Humanismusbrief and the Vorwort to Richardson's book] claims the necessity and the fact of a turn in the pursuit of the Being and Time project'. However, 'the claim is untenable and a simple mistake'; indeed 'in clearer moments, it seems, Heidegger himself recognized this mistake . . . '. The roots of Seigfried's misreading lie in his dogged neo-Kantian interpretations of Heidegger. Cf. his 'Descriptive phenomenology and constructivism', PPR 37 (1976), 248-61.
- 27 See Martin Heidegger, 'The idea of phenomenology, with a letter to Edmund Husserl', trans. Thomas Sheehan, Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture, XII (1977), 111-21.
- 28 This is a strict paraphrase rather than a translation of the text at Wegmarken 199 which more literally would be rendered: 'Whenever unhiddenness emerges, hiddenness itself (which essentially becomes present in this unhiddenness) remains absent so that the unhidden thing can appear as an entity.'
- 29 Cf. 'Physis . . . is a going back into itself, i.e., towards itself as always going forth'. Martin Heidegger, 'On the being and conception of Physis in Aristotle's Physics B, 1', trans. Thomas Sheehan, Man and World, IX (1976), 263 = Wegmarken p. 363.
- 30 Cf. my article, 'Getting to the topic: the new edition of Wegmarken' in Research in Phenomenology, VII (1977), reprinted as chapter 18 of Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor of Martin Heidegger, John Sallis, ed. (New York: Humanities Press, 1978). Also my 'Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle: Dynamis and Ereignis', in Philosophy Research Archives, IV, 1978.
- 31 WD 5 = What is Called Thinking? F. Wieck and J. G. Gray, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 9.
- 32 Cf. Jacques Derrida, 'The ends of Man', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXX (1969), esp. 44-57.

The preliminary conception of phenomenology and of the problematic of truth in *Being and Time*

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For Heidegger, the opening up of the phenomenological dimension implies, from the time of Marburg on, an appropriation but also a radical critique of the Husserlian idea of phenomenology in the form which it assumes as transcendental idealism in *Ideas*. It is this critique whose anticipation we can now read in volume 20 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, which, in leading phenomenology back to its possibility, ceases to make of it a tendency to make it mean 'the changing and thereby continuing possibility of thinking, that is to say, of replying in its time to what has to be thought'. Without going back here into the details of this critique and of this radicalization, we will study at greater length how the Heideggerian concept of phenomenology is worked out in *Being and Time*.

In the Introduction composed in 1949 to accompany the 7th edition of his inaugural lecture 'What is metaphysics?' Heidegger asked: 'Towards what, and on what basis, and in what sphere, would the intentionality of consciousness be able to unfold if man did not hold himself open ekstatically in the openness of being?' A question of this kind, a question in which we find a critique (first expressed much earlier) with regard to Husserl's thematization of intentionality, this question was already implied in the entire enterprise of *Being and Time*, even if one has to add the qualification that a formulation of this kind also hides – retrospectively – the path actually pursued in the course of almost twenty-five years. In fact, what underwent a change between 1927 and 1949 was not so much the interpretation of the ekstasy or of the ekstatic as rather that of the open itself, the openness of being. As Jean Beaufret said himself of this development, everything turns on $\mathring{\alpha}\gamma\mathring{\eta}\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha$. This will be the proposition which we shall want to test here.

Can one legitimately argue in talking about *Being and Time* that everything already turns on the ever more refined understanding of this central term? Or again, formulated in interrogative terms: how is one to

understand Heidegger's remark in the Parmenides (GA 54, p. 42): 'Being and Time represents that first attempt to think being on the basis of the fundamental experience that being has remained in a state of forgetfulness...'? Naturally, one thinks immediately of the first line of the first paragraph of Being and Time: 'The question [the Seinsfrage] has today lapsed into forgetfulness.' Gerard Granel correctly emphasizes — in a realm which bears upon the translation, that is, which develops in depth what has been said — that, in a certain sense, the question has always been forgotten because if it is 'out of Plato and Aristotle' that the question gets forgotten, it is also in them and through them.⁵

In the framework of Being and Time, how are we then to understand the forgetfulness into which the question of being has lapsed? Why until now – and in Husserlian phenomenology too – has this question been 'overlooked', 'missed' or 'neglected'? The basis for a first reply, already formulated in the lecture of 1925, and which constitutes a guiding motif for Being and Time, is furnished by the (problematic) concept of Verfallen, 'fallenness', or better, 'falling'. In the Prolegomena, it is Verfallen which is employed to explain, in the final instance, the breakdown of the Husserlian enterprise, attributable to two major 'omissions': the omission of the question of being as such and the omission of the question directed towards the being of intentionality. This is not, Heidegger notes,

an accidental neglect for which philosophers can be held to account. Rather, this history [Geschichte] of our being-there is itself revealed across such omissions. History interpreted not as a totality of official events but as a mode of becoming [Geschehensart] of being-there itself. Which means that being-there, in the mode of being of falling [Verfallen] – a mode of being which cannot be avoided – cannot have access to its being unless it stands opposed to the latter.

(GA 20, pp. 179-80)

Let us leave in abeyance the question of whether this concept of Verfallen, however decisive it might be with regard to the determination of the mode of being of Dasein, suffices to open up for us a way of acceding to the problematic of the forgetfulness of being, and try instead to determine more exactly the phenomenological feature of that question which arises in connection with the meaning of being. In the debate conducted by Heidegger with and against Husserl, the crucial point concerns the determination of what constitutes the proper subject matter (Sache) of phenomenology, or even of the rigorous and consequential interpretation of its leading maxim (zu den Sachen selbst).8 If the critique directed by Heidegger against Husserl can be regarded as radical, it is because, and only to the extent that, it is conducted in the name of phenomenology, in full recognition of the task which belongs to it and

in strict adherence to the maxim enunciated for the first time in the Logical Investigations.9 This is why, after reaching the extreme limit of each of his attempts at a critical dismantling, Heidegger could at the end always admit (this is a principle which still regulates the complex structure of paragraph 7 of Being and Time, including the final note): 'This obviously doesn't mean that we are not Husserl's disciples and intend to remain so.'10

If Husserl's phenomenology is not sufficiently radical, this is because it isn't sufficiently phenomenological, forgetful of its own guiding maxim for which Husserl from 1913 will substitute another principle, the 'principle of principles' (Ideas, §24), the 'principle of evidence'. With Husserl, phenomenology adopts intentionality as its special field of investigation, but without ever raising afresh the question of the being of intentionality. In fact, not only does Husserl's determination of consciousness as an absolute being in the sense of absolute givenness (Ideas, §§44-6) make it impossible to determine 'what being means here', what 'absolute being' means (GA 20, p. 140), it also entirely eliminates a question which, in truth, can no longer be posed once Husserl has aligned his phenomenological investigation with a preconceived idea, the modern (Cartesian) philosophical idea of an absolute science for which consciousness precisely constitutes the privileged object.

The fundamental question for Husserl is not at all that of the being character of consciousness. What is fundamental for him is rather this consideration, this question: how can consciousness in general become the object of an absolute science? What is fundamental and directive is the idea of an absolute science. This idea that consciousness has to be the region for an absolute science is not invented haphazardly. Rather, it is the idea which has preoccupied modern philosophy since Descartes.

Heidegger draws from this the decisive conclusion that, so far from being derived phenomenologically by way of a return to things themselves, the elaboration and the validation of pure consciousness as the thematic field for phenomenology remains the 'function of a traditional conception of philosophy' (GA 20, p. 147).

It is because it calls in question this subordination of phenomenology to the Cartesian idea of an absolute science – and therefore of a science of consciousness in its irrecusable self-presence - that Heidegger rejects the Husserlian interpretation of the reduction (GA 20, p. 151).11 The critique here is founded on the fact that, in Heidegger's eyes, the Husserlian epoché 'deprives itself (methodologically) of the very basis upon which alone the question of the being of intentionality can be worked out'. The analytic of Dasein - as one knows - is precisely intended to

furnish such a basis. By defining being-there as being-in-the-world, it does in fact become possible to address the question of the being of intentionality.

If intentionality is to be questioned concerning its mode of being, it is necessary that the being which is intentional should be given in an original way, that is to say, experienced with regard to its way of being [in seiner Weise zu sein]. The original ontological relation to that being which is intentional first has to be mastered.

(GA 20, p. 152)

It is therefore on the basis of the Husserlian conception of phenomenology, while at the same time taking account of the fundamental omission from which it suffers in not elucidating in advance 'intentional behaviour and everything implied by it', that the question of being makes itself known phenomenologically as the question of the being of intentionality and the question of the meaning of being in general.

The question of being is not an arbitrary question. It is not a question which can simply be envisaged as one among other questions. Rather, it is the most urgent of all questions, and this in the full sense of phenomenology itself.

(GA 20, p. 158)

In the end, the only decisive reproach directed by Heidegger against Husserl is that of not having been sufficiently phenomenological and so, against the very principle of phenomenology, of having failed to work out the theme which legitimately belongs to it as its authentic point of departure: intentionality. 'Phenomenology - or so Heidegger would have it - is therefore with regard to the fundamental task of determining its own proper field of application, non-phenomenological, in other words, only pseudo-phenomenological!' (GA 20, p. 158).

The background constituted by the sustained debate with Husserl through the Marburg years makes it possible for us today to situate more exactly the phenomenological impact of Being and Time. If the fundamental phenomenological question - the one which draws all the consequences of the Husserlian enterprise or better of the 'breakthrough' represented by Logical Investigations - is that of knowing 'what being means', if it is a matter first of all of 'working out the "phenomenon of being" which precedes and so is determinative of the entire ontological enquiry', 12 there then arises the possibility of rereading the master work of 1927 from a phenomenological standpoint. How is it with this 'phenomenon "being" ' ('dieses Phänomen "Sein" ')? Heidegger asked in 1925. What

is the phenomenality proper to being and how is being phenomenalized? Is this simply a way of talking, an approximate formula which has capitulated to the jargon characteristic of the phenomenological school? In Being and Time certainly, it is also a matter of the phenomenon of the world, of the phenomenon of anxiety, of care, etc.! But is it enough to underline the ambiguity, the equivocal character of the expression? Or does one, on the contrary, have to recognize the special right of being to be called 'phenomenon'? But then in what apparently peculiar sense should one understand the word 'phenomenon'?

With a view to trying to reply with some degree of precision to questions formulated all too abruptly, it would be appropriate to re-examine the way in which the being question is sketched out concretely in the introductory chapter of *Being and Time* and to follow, step by step, the movement through which the question is posed by attending to the formal parameters of the question and of its articulation.¹³ We will restrict ourselves here to an examination of Heidegger's overt expressions rather than steps actually taken, by limiting ourselves to the elaboration of the strictly phenomenological concept of the phenomenon.

How is the Heideggerian concept of the phenomenon to be distinguished from that of Husserl? Paragraph 7 of Being and Time is well known and has been only too amply commented on. We shall have to revert to it for a moment however because it is this paragraph, together with paragraph 9 of the Prolegomena (Die Klärung des Namens 'Phänomenologie'), which throws light upon the novelty and the scope of the Heideggerian interpretation of phenomenality, especially if one situates it in the context of the Introduction. Even if, or better, precisely because, in this paragraph, Heidegger first sets out phenomenology as a methodological concept, one has to guard against seeing in this text a development which is essentially methodological and susceptible of being separated without great loss from the development of the work as a whole.¹⁴ To be sure, the word 'phenomenology' should not be understood in the sense of such composite expressions as theology, ontology, sociology, etc., expressions characterizing the object of a particular field of research and which predetermine the content or the reality (Sachhaltigkeit) of a region or a domain of objects. Taken at this level of generality, as a science of phenomena, phenomenology could designate any scientific research, provided it is true that (relying upon the vulgar meaning of the concept of phenomenon) phenomenology can legitimately qualify 'any research which brings to light beings insofar as they make themselves manifest' (SZ, 35). What then distinguishes phenomenology 'as method' from the vulgar conception – and with a view precisely to applying a 'direct method of showing and validating' – is, first of all, the explicit thematization of its research, of its 'procedure'. But if one concentrates in this way upon the problematic 'formula' of its point of departure, its development, its mode of access (Ausgang, Durchgang, Zugang), this is in fact always because the guiding question is the non-methodological question concerning phenomenality in general.

To be sure, in Being and Time, the analysis looks at first like a purely terminological analysis (cf. also GA 20, §9), in the sense that Heidegger interprets the very word phenomenology (which he analyses out into its constitutive elements). But this is only a first step which comes close to concealing the peculiar character of the movement of thought in this paragraph, which latter only emerges if one recalls that the word to be explained speaks Greek and that, before and above all else - the phenomenological circle if you want - it is a matter of learning how to listen to what is said with a Greek ear. A later remark by Heidegger is particularly clear on this score.

Direct experience with phenomenology acquired in the course of discussion with Husserl made it possible for the concept of phenomenology to be forged in the manner in which it makes itself known in the introduction to Being and Time (§7). Here the reference to the fundamental words of the Greek language, words which are interpreted in this context (λόγος = make manifest; φαίνεσθαι = show itself) played a determining role.

(Qu IV, p. 181)

In fact, listening to the Greek is already for Heidegger a matter of making a phenomenological commitment to the business of phenomenology. This is where we enter into the circle. The fundamental attitude, which is phenomenology, permits us to reconquer for the whole of philosophy a more original interpretation of the leading Greek words. Conversely, the more persistently we listen to what the Greek says, the more we are able to radicalize both the point of departure and the concept of phenomenology. At Cérisy, in 1955, Heidegger used these words to explain what might at first have passed for a rather scholarly linguistic analysis.

The Greek word only opens up a path in virtue of its being Greek. . . . In the case of the Greek language, what is said is, at the same time and in a special way, what that which is said calls by its name. . . . By means of the word, heard with a Greek ear, we are already directly in the presence of the thing itself, there before us.

(Qu II, p. 20)

What are the Greek words directly questioned and conjured up by Heidegger to elucidate 'phenomenologically' the very term phenomenology? What is, in the final analysis, the function of the concept of $d\lambda \dot{\eta} \theta \epsilon \iota \alpha$?

The phenomenon of phenomenology can be elucidated in the first place on the basis of the Greek word φαινόμενον, itself taken as a synonym for τό ὄν: what shows itself from itself, in itself, as itself. What shows: itself. This is certainly a formal determination but a decisive one all the same, since it is on the basis of this first sense of auto-manifestation that the other, in fact derivative, concepts of manifestation can be interpreted or reinterpreted. The return to the Greek, underscoring the opposition between φαινόμενον and φαινόμενον αγαθόν for example, allows, or indeed requires, that one make a first distinction between phenomenon and appearance (Phänomen-Schein). If phenomenon is in fact defined from the first as 'that which shows itself from itself', it is nevertheless necessary to recognize 'this remarkable possibility that the entity shows itself precisely as that which it is not (GA 20, §9). What has to be noted here is that the appearance is itself what it is only in virtue of the fact that it is upheld by phenomenality, understood in the strict and primitive sense of auto-manifestation. 'There is only as much appearance as there is being', Heidegger notes. 15 It is only because φαίνεσθαι means, in the first instance, Sichzeigen (self-showing) that, in the second instance it can also characterize something as passing for, seeming to be, looking like. . . . The contraposition of phenomenon and appearance is therefore intended in the first instance to bring out the original and fundamental sense of phenomenon: das an ihm selbst offenbare Seinde selbst - 'being itself just as it is manifest in itself'.

This first distinction is certainly decisive but it remains insufficient and formal to the extent that it still leaves entirely open the question of the phenomenality proper to the phenomenon as such. This elementary proposition does however possess a second obvious merit. It makes it possible, or so it seems, to eviscerate as secondary such Kantian concepts as Erscheinung and bloße Erscheinung. Erscheinung - indicative phenomenon, appearance - in as much as, in announcing something it attests to something else which does not appear, assumes the form of a symptom, of an indication. The Erscheinung, qua appearance of - possesses a referential structure. Anzeigen von etwas durch etwas anderes - an indication of something which can only make itself known mediately by way of something else, a presentation which is both differed and destined to remain indirect. But even here Erscheinung, in the sense of an indicative phenomenon, is founded, in terms of its very possibility - at least if the indicative phenomenon is to make its appearance as such, that is, fulfil its mission, accomplish its indicative function - upon the phenomenon in the first and most fundamental sense.

It is therefore necessary to dismantle, to untie this indicative structure of *Erscheinung* (reference but also substitution, supplementation, rep-

resentation, if one wants to isolate the $\phi \alpha \iota \nu \delta \mu \epsilon \nu \delta \nu (= \tau \delta \delta \nu)$ in its purity and its specificity.

In the lectures of Summer 1927 (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology), as in Being and Time, Erscheinung can always be interpreted in terms of the Kantian distinction between the 'phenomenon' and the 'thing in itself'. In this framework, which Heidegger hopes to dismiss definitively, phenomena would conceal as much as they would reveal something which, while remaining in the background, would be more 'stable', would contain more being without, for all that, the phenomena taken in themselves being reduced to nothing. Behind the phenomena there would always be something of which they would precisely be the phenomenal manifestations, in the sense of appearances or ap-pearances.

We can ignore here the supplementary distinctions introduced by Heidegger with a view to elucidating the ambiguity of the German word Erscheinung - in particular, the metaphysical distinction of Erscheinung (indicative phenomenon) and of bloße Erscheinung (pure appearance) – and so simply hold on to the basic opposition between the phenomenon (φαινόμενον, *Phänomenon*) and the appearance (*Erscheinung*). Phenomenon characterizes a special mode of presentation or of encountering something in as much as, qua phenomenon, the thing manifests itself in itself, manifests itself in truth, just as it is. When it is a matter of Erscheinung, on the other hand - of the appearance or the indicative phenomenon – we are always referred to something else, to a second reality which is no doubt announced, trans-pears or ap-pears, but which precisely never shows itself in itself.

Such an analysis - Heidegger lays particular stress on this - unfolds at first in a purely formal manner (formal rather than terminological). It tends to disengage the pure concept of the phenomenon while leaving the question of determining what is intended, qua phenomenon, entirely indeterminate. A being or a character of being? asks Heidegger. But before tackling this question, it is necessary to envisage different possible applications of the 'vulgar' concept of phenomenon and of the 'provisional' (or 'preliminary') (Vorbegriff) conception of phenomenology, such as is handed down to us in the obligatory, though mistaken, framework of a Kantian exemplification. This also means that such an exemplification is necessarily paradoxical (it would surely be possible to dispense with the thematic of Erscheinung, since it is understood in advance as secondary) and as such might well lead us astray.

Heidegger notes.

That which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the 'phenomenon', ordinarily understood, and as accompanying it in every case can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the 'forms of intuition') will be the 'phenomena' of phenomenology.¹⁶

This first pre-determination must not be confused with the second, the true explanation (itself no doubt still ambiguous), of the phenomenon of phenomenology: what precisely does not show itself and which remains hidden, covered over, without ever entering in any way into the transitive structure of reference, of trans-lation or of trans-position. The beingconcealed of the phenomenon of phenomenology - that which, in the first instance, and for the most part does not show itself, that which, with regard to what shows itself, remains in retreat, that which withholds itself - this in-apparent phenomenon, even if it can be apprehended in the Kantian framework as 'that which belongs essentially and simultaneously to what shows itself because it constitutes the meaning and the foundation of the latter' (SZ, 35 B), cannot be understood on the basis of the Kantian thing in itself, since the latter is 'essentially incapable of ever manifesting itself'. The non-manifestation of the thing in itself therefore possesses a structure which is radically different both from that of the phenomenon in the sense of the non-thematic, and from that of the properly phenomenological phenomenon, the phenomenon in retreat or covered over. 'The phenomenon' – Heidegger notes – 'as the indicative phenomenon of something, does not mean simply what manifests itself but the announcement of something which does not manifest itself by means of something which does manifest itself' (SZ, 36 A). If the showing of the phenomenon of phenomenology is not that of the Kantian Erscheinung, the remaining concealed or covered over proper to the phenomenon apprehended in its phenomenological concept (being or the being of beings), 17 can no longer be identified with the non-manifestation of the thing in itself. What is it then which truly characterizes nonmanifestation, in the phenomenological sense? What is the reason for its 'being-hidden'? Before returning to this important point, we shall have to follow Heidegger in his second approach to phenomenology by way of the key concept of the λόγος.

Here again – it has to be emphasized – the $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$ is itself interpreted 'phenomenologically' in its 'veritative' or 'demonstrative' dimension as what makes things or lets things be seen, as $\mathring{\alpha}\pi \delta \varphi \alpha \nu \sigma \iota s$. It belongs essentially to the $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$, as Plato had established, to make manifest $(\delta \eta \lambda \sigma \tilde{\nu} \nu)$.¹⁸ The primordial function of the $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$ is de-monstrative or de-clarative, not in that it is effectively preferred but because it belongs to it constitutively to bring to light. It is Aufweisung. The $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$ shows, or better, shows what shows itself on the basis of itself and in itself. Why is it always necessary to show (and to show anew, as we shall see, over and over again) what precisely shows itself? To reply to this question

no doubt means being able to delimit (that is, trace the outlines but also mark the limits of) the Heideggerian interpretation of phenomenality at the time of Being and Time. Let us say, again quite crudely and provisionally, that what shows itself (the phenomenon) does in reality stand in need of that self-showing which is operative in the λόγος, to become entirely manifest, to be manifested. The ἀπόφανσις is precisely what renders manifest. It lets things be seen in as much as it brings to light (aufweisendes Sehenlassen). The proper task of the λόγος is ἀληθεύειν. To show itself, to articulate itself constitutes one of the privileged figures of αληθεύειν¹⁹ in the sense of discovering, withdrawing from its retreat, letting the being in question be seen as ἀλήθες (dis-interred, dis-closed). Such is, for Heidegger, the basic apophantic feature of the λόγος, the one which makes διαίρεσις possible, just as it does the σύνθεσις.

It is because the function of the λόγος as ἀπόφανσις consists in letting be seen what brings to light that the λόγος, is able to assume the structural form of the σύνθεσις. . . . The σύν possesses here a purely apophantic signification and means: letting something be seen, in its being together, as something.²⁰

The truth of the λόγος as speech, discourse, judgment always refers to a being-true or confirmation which belongs originally to the λόγος, even though the latter arises in its turn from αληθεύειν, which consequently assumes the form of making/letting be seen, discovering as uncovering (ἀλήθες) the being in question by letting it show itself from itself. To the extent that it dis-covers, brings to light, it can happen that the λόγος deceives or misleads in the sense of covering up. 'To place something in front of something else and so let it be seen and in this way to pass off the thing covered over as something which it is not [Schein]."21 This is the double play *Phänomenon-Schein* which makes discourse possible as true or false, on the assumption that Schein, even if it stands opposed here to the phenomenon, nevertheless only constitutes a degraded form of the latter.22

The λόγος brought back in this way to ἀληθεύειν, apprehended in all its fullness and in accordance with its multiple guises, ceases to appear as the privileged and primordial locus of the truth, but presupposes, in virtue of its being the λόγος, a more original mode of dis-covering, that of touching/seeing, pure and simple, of naming. θίγειν καί φάναι;²³ αισθησις as a direct grasp of the ίδια, the νόησις understood as an immediate apprehension of the ἄπλα, are always dis-covering, always true.24 It's the συμπλοκή, the σύν of the λόγος as λέγειν τι κατά τινος, letting something be seen as this or that, which opens up a space for the Schein, that of a giving itself out as - presenting itself as.

The 'terminological' elucidation of phenomenology, whether it takes

its cue from the φαινόμενον or the λόγος, indicates, in every instance, that the λόγος constitutes the decisive background for phenomenality in general, provided only that it always ends up by working out one and the same formal concept of the phenomenon along convergent lines and so furnishes a first, and equally, formal determination of phenomenology (λέγειν τά φαινόμενα = ἀποφαίνεσθαι τά φαινόμενα).

As we have seen on the occasion of our distinction of the phenomenon and Erscheinung, there is nothing behind the phenomena. There is no other side to the phenomena. They don't conceal or hide anything. One could therefore never go behind the phenomena to find . . . what? Indeed it belongs to the very essence of the phenomenon to show and to show itself, to give and to give itself in itself.25 The first move designed to recover the phenomenological acceptation of the phenomenon is a flattening move. The phenomenon is always one-dimensional.

But if the phenomenon is self-giving and, by virtue of that very fact, gives the thing itself - just as it is - it can however be that the phenomenon does not give itself or show itself. It can happen that what of its own accord should be brought to light remains hidden.

What is in itself visible and which ought to be luminous can very well remain hidden [verdeckt]. What in itself is visible and which is only accessible qua phenomenon in conformity with its meaning does not necessarily have to be accessible in fact. That which, in accordance with its possibility, is phenomenal, may precisely not have been given as phenomenon, but has yet to be given as such.

That which, in itself and in principle is given has yet to give itself. One has to give oneself phenomena, that is, what gives and gives itself! Why and how is one to give oneself what gives itself? Precisely because what is given does not give itself in the first instance and frequently not at all. This - the gift or the presence of the thing - remains in retreat, in the background, concealed.

One might well ask what, upon the plane of phenomenality, founds such a reticence, such a holding back or reserve? One has to admit, I think, that Being and Time does not throw much light on this point. The tendency toward recuperation, the tendency which is in question here, arises entirely out of the Dasein to which it is attributed straight off. This tendency responds in turn to the ontological constitution of beingthere, to whom the characteristic of falling (Verfallen) belongs essentially. It's the mode of being of Dasein which explains why what gives itself is in reality always already covered over and in such a way that any letting/ making itself be seen, if it is to be 'carried through methodically', will

always assume the form of a destruction or better of a deconstruction in the strict sense of that word (Abbauen der Verdeckung).

So one has to complete the first formal determination of the phenomenon and its phenomenality (the phenomenon is what, of itself, manifests itself in itself) with this other not less decisive thesis: being covered over, dissimulation is the *Gegenbegriff zu Phänomenon*²⁶ – not just simply the contrary of the phenomenon, its contradictory, but rather the counterconcept of the phenomenon and in this sense its complementary concept, the one which corresponds to it exactly as its vis à vis. But whatever can be a phenomenon is in the first instance and most frequently hidden and covered over. This covering over (Verdeckung) is itself capable of taking many forms, from dissimulation or masking (Verstellung) through internment, veiling (Verschüttung), to complete obliteration and forgetfulness.

If the possibility, even the threat, of covering over, belongs essentially to the very structure of phenomenality, it is because 'phenomena which have originally been perceived are later uprooted, torn away from what constitutes their ground'. Detached, expropriated in this way they 'remain unintelligible with regard to their true source'.²⁷ The phenomenon is naturally exposed to loss, to an obfuscation which enters into its transmission and becomes its tradition. This threat weighs permanently upon every phenomenon as such.

The covering-up itself, whether in the sense of hiddenness, burying, or dissimulation, has in turn two possibilities. There are coverings-over which are accidental; there are also some which are necessary, grounded in what the things so discovered consist in. Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character and becoming a free-floating thesis.²⁸

But if it is both possible and legitimate to distinguish between coveringsover which are accidental and coverings-over which are necessary, still it has to be conceded that the covering-over which permanently threatens the phenomenon in the originality of its showing is necessary. No phenomenon can show itself once and for all. Consequently, what shows itself must always show itself anew (on the basis of its offering source, of the *Sache selbst*). Covering-over is so far unavoidable that it is 'given with the mode of being of uncovering, and of its possibility'.²⁹ Hence the essential fragility of the phenomenon, tied as it is to its obliteration, to its inevitable obfuscation. For us, the originality of the phenomenon has therefore to be continually recuperated against its almost necessary degradation or degeneration, since it is only the shadow thrown by Verfallen, which latter features as a trait constitutive of our mode of being.

This implies naturally that the 'specific confrontation with the mode of the phenomenon has to be obtained in the first instance for all objects of phenomenological research'. 30 Since the phenomenon is never given nor secured in its phenomenality, the latter has always to be painfully reconquered, withdrawn from a multi-form covering-over. Here again, it is the peculiar structure of phenomenality which explains the necessarily methodical character of phenomenology. Things themselves are not given; still less are they given immediately in intuition, made available to a 'pure and simple' seeing. The phenomena have to be liberated. They can only be disengaged at the end of a development which seeks precisely to undo the dissimulations and disguises.

Zu den Sachen selbst - on the way to the phenomena and to the phenomenon κατ' έξογήν, the phenomenon 'being'!

On the assumption that this general response to the question of the Heideggerian determination of the phenomenon has been admitted in principle, one can still ask why, in Being and Time, Heidegger develops a 'preliminary conception' or a 'provisional' concept of phenomenology, itself characterized as 'universal ontology'. Does Heidegger stick to this preliminary conception? What would a 'definitive' conception of phenomenology be like?

It should be noted first of all that neither in the Prolegomena, whose introductory section nevertheless establishes the context for the most sustained debate with Husserlian phenomenology, nor in the lecture course of the Summer term 1927 (Basic Problems of Phenomenology) does one find this distinction between the preliminary conception and the idea of phenomenology - even if in the latter an exposition of the idea of phenomenology is announced – though without ever being carried through. Why this distinction in Being and Time? The first reply which occurs to us is the one which Heidegger presents at paragraph 69. The complete exposition of the idea could not take place until 'the central problematic' of being and of truth had been brought to light, that is, until the close connection between being and truth had been explained and the existential concept of science had been developed. Phenomenology was in fact initially defined as the method of ontology, that is to say, of scientific philosophy.

Let us elaborate a little to confirm that this idea of a 'scientific philosophy' - phenomenology is scientific philosopy, science par excellence must naturally not be allowed to conceal the opposition in principle between phenomenology, on the one hand, and the totality of the 'positive' sciences, on the other, that is to say, of all those bodies of research which bear upon an entity or a region of being which has already been determined, brought to light. In his Tübingen lecture (1929), 'Phänomenologie und Theologie', Heidegger works out this radical difference between the positive sciences which are ontic in character and a phenomenological enquiry which is ontological and does so by way of a conceptual apparatus which is precisely phenomenological and close to that of Husserl. A phenomenological enquiry is required first of all to provide its own theme (the phenomenon, i.e., the phenomenon 'being').

The idea of science in general, to the extent that it is conceived as a possibility of being-there, shows that there are necessarily two kinds of science which are possible in principle: science of beings, ontic sciences – and the science of being, ontological science, philosophy. The ontic sciences each assume as their theme a given entity which is always disclosed, in a certain way before the disclosure effected by the science. We shall call the positive sciences the sciences of a given entity, of a *positum*. It is characteristic of such sciences that the objectification which they assume as their theme goes straight to the entity, by prolonging the pre-scientific attitude which already exists towards this entity. The science of being, on the other hand, ontology, calls for a fundamental conversion of attitude toward the entity in question. From the entity, the attitude shifts to the being of the entity. Nevertheless, the entity still remains the object of attention despite the change in attitude.³¹

Having finished with this point, let us return to paragraph 69. One can now understand why the finished conception of phenomenology can only be presented at the end, in the form of an idea, when the meaning of being and of truth have been explicitly developed, when the truth of being has been exhibited. If it is the case that phenomenology furnishes the method which responds to what is required (the question of the meaning of being, the question of the truth of being), one understands that the provisional concept cannot and should not give way to the idea until its own characteristic phenomenon has been disengaged. One can also explain in a very (too?) general way the claim to the necessity of a recuperation of the provisional concept by the idea, by underlining what, in the movement of Being and Time (what therefore also belongs to the internal logic of the enterprise which unfolds therein), is propaedeutical, preparatory or precursory. At paragraph 5 ('The ontological analytic of Dasein as the laying bare of the horizon for an interpretation of the meaning of Being in general'), Heidegger indicates for example that if 'an analytic of Dasein remains the first requirement in the question of being' and if therefore the analytic, so conceived, is 'entirely oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of being', this analytic in its turn is not only

incomplete, it is also, in the first instance provisional [vorläufig]. It merely brings out the being of this entity, without interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting being may be laid bare.

Once this interpretation has been carried through or, more cautiously, once this horizon has been disengaged, this 'preparatory analytic of Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and more authentically ontological basis'.32

But this reply is undoubtedly too general and, as such, remains insufficient. In order to show this, the question at issue here will have to be reformulated in a more topical fashion. If it is important to represent the provisional concept of phenomenology as a methodological concept in its role as a guiding idea, is this not because the phenomenological characterizes, in the first instance and before all else, the initial step, the first move, the bias or the detour which aims at opening up an access to being in general and, quite specifically (reading the meaning of being off an exemplary being)33 by way of the analytic of Dasein?34

At this point we would like to venture the following hypothesis: the phenomenological method is indeed called for by the matter in hand (SZ 37 D, 38 C), in as much as the latter consists first of all – should it be added, in connection with Being and Time alone? - in bringing to light that comprehension of being which belongs constitutionally to Dasein, even if only initially in a pre-ontological mode. It is because the question concerning the meaning of being (what is at issue in this question, what it hopes to attain - das Erfragte) can only be posed concretely by way of the analytic of Dasein - qua fundamental ontology - that the phenomenological method becomes critical from the first to any ontological enquiry designed to save the question of being from forgetfulness.

This point emerges clearly, or so it seems, in the following passage from the Prolegomena where Heidegger does not hesitate to call the analytic which bears upon that entity which enjoys a privileged status in any ontological enquiry, for any elucidation of the phenomenon 'being', a phenomenology of Dasein, not only because it is this entity which poses the question of being which already understands being, but also because it is itself this very question, or better still, this questioning (das Fragen).

Working out the question of the meaning of being signifies: laying bare [freilegen] the one who questions in its capacity as a being, that is to say, Dasein itself. For only in this way can that which is sought be investigated in conformity with its own meaning. The one who questions is here co-affected by what the question itself has in mind [das Erfragte]. It belongs to the very meaning of the question of being itself that the being who questions should be affected by what the question aims at. It is in the light of this meaning that it becomes appropriate to take account of the principle of phenomenology, at least if the question of being is going to be posed clearly. The one who questions is expressly given at the same time as the question but in such a way that at the same time and before all else he loses sight of himself in the dynamic of the questioning process. What we are going to try to do here is not to lose sight of this being, not to lose sight of it in the very perspective of [im Hinblick auf] the question of being itself. Thus the effective working out of the problematic is a phenomenology of being-there. For this very reason there can never be a definitive answer, or the answer can only be hypothetical [Forschungsantwort], in as much as the working out of the question concerns the being which includes within itself a comprehension of being. Dasein is not just the decisive issue from an ontic standpoint; it is so from an ontological standpoint also, at least for those of us who are phenomenologists.35

Thus, this ontological privilege of Dasein becomes apparent from a phenomenological standpoint. And if the phenomenological method is to be recommended, it is in the first instance because it corresponds to the demand for a way of acceding to the being of this being which we are ourselves, and because it brings into play that kind of demonstration required by the manner in which this being comes to confront itself.

How does this being – both the closest and the farthest (SZ, 15-16); GA 20, pp. 201-2) - come to confront itself? How is it given to itself? How must it be brought to light phenomenologically with a view to a thematization of the phenomenon 'being'? The quite specific difficulties which the elucidation of this being (the one who questions) with regard to its being - and in particular its susceptibility to falling - runs up against lie at the root of the application of a phenomenological method (in that formal sense to which reference has been made).

One could then go so far as to say that ontology is only phenomenological to the extent that it is a phenomenology and/or a 'metaphysics of Dasein'. 36 The expression Phänomenologie des Dasein, an expression that can be found in the *Prolegomena*, has therefore to be strictly understood. It is because it focuses first of all upon Dasein and its disclosiveness (Erschlossenheit), upon its existence, that the enterprise has to be undertaken in a phenomenological fashion. It is therefore the ontico-ontological 'primacy' of Dasein, the necessity of an interminable 'detour' by way of the existential analytic, which calls for a phenomenological method in the very first instance.

Such a hypothesis immediately encounters a series of massive objections which we cannot, nor do we wish to, overlook. In the

'methodological' paragraph of *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterizes the phenomenon of phenomenology as the phenomenon of being (SZ, 35 C, 35 D, 37 D). Heidegger defines his research, fundamental ontology, as 'universal phenomenological ontology' (SZ, 38 C). He explicitly characterizes phenomenology as the science of being (GA 24, §23). Finally and most important of all, he only introduces the phenomenological method 'formally' with a view to bringing to light what has to constitute its proper subject matter intrinsically (i.e., with regard to its 'actual content' – Sachhaltigkeit), namely, the interpretation of the meaning of being. Being therefore becomes in a sense the 'cause', the 'matter' of phenomenology, but only to the extent that it is, in a more original sense, the matter of thinking – Sache des Denkens.

Before attempting to reply to these textual objections, objections whose legitimacy certainly cannot be ignored, we would like to follow up the hypothesis for a moment, with a view to bringing out its heuristic value. To insist upon what in *Being and Time* determines, or pre-determines, phenomenology to be a phenomenology of *Dasein* is also to confirm – this point, though familiar, is vital – the inextricable connection, more, the interconnection or the intimate belonging together of the question of the meaning of being and the question of the being of *Dasein* as *Da-sein* (being-there, or *die Lichtungsein*, as Heidegger will call it later).³⁷ It is to weld solidly – and this juncture remains critical to this very day – being and the understanding of being. Being is given – if it is given – as an understanding of being. Independently of this understanding, being is nothing.³⁸

To be sure, what has fallen into forgetfulness is the question concerning being. What has to be considered and worked out with the aid of a complex intellectual apparatus, is the question of the meaning of being. It is nevertheless true that in the perspective of *Being and Time* – the working out of the project if not the project itself – the phenomenological uncovering which is at work has as its initial object *Dasein*, the prior understanding of *Dasein* and of its everyday way of being. It is because, in the first instance and for the most part, *Dasein* is not given that it becomes important to open up an access to the being of *Dasein* and to the meaning of this being.

One of the fundamental features of being-there is that 'ontologically the closest and best known'; it is 'ontologically what is farthest and least known' (SZ, 15 C, 43 D, 311 B). In other words, it is that whose 'pre-givenness' (Vorgabe) can so little be taken for granted that 'its determination constitutes an essential part of the analytic of this being' (43 B). Far from being immediately evident, the 'right pre-givenness' has to be methodologically mastered by way of a development, a procedure which is as certain as possible about its point of departure and its rite of passage. The existential analytic therefore necessarily possesses

a methodological character (§63), given the formal structure of the Seinsfrage, but also the mode of presentation or of de-presentation of this peculiar being. 'The liberation of the originary being of Dasein has to be fought for against the tendencies of the prevailing interpretation which is ontico-ontologically defunct' (311 B).³⁹ On the contrary, Heidegger continues.

the mode of being of Dasein requires of an ontological interpretation which aims at the originality of a phenomenal demonstration that it wrest the being of this being against its own tendency toward a covering-over of its being. . . . Consequently, the existential analytic constantly assumes a violent character.

(ibid.)

What are the consequences of this pre-determination of phenomenology (as a phenomenology of *Dasein*) with regard to the problematic of truth in Being and Time?

If paragraph 7 of Being and Time ends up (programmatically) with the elucidation of the phenomenon of being, one might hold that paragraph 44, which closes the first section, responds to it and contributes no less decisively to the elaboration of the concept of phenomenology. Not only because the analysis of the λόγος is taken up again and developed but also, and above all, because the bringing to light of the phenomenon of truth (through which the 'originary', or 'the most originary' phenomenon of truth is pursued) contributes in a decisive way to define the subject matter (sachlich, sachhaltig) of phenomenology. 40 As Heidegger emphasizes, this paragraph, designed to work out the central problematic of truth, or better, of the essential connection being-truth, does not limit itself to concluding and so closing the first section but gives the research a 'new departure', a second wind (214 A).

If it is true, as J. Beaufret said in 1927 and throughout the later work of Heidegger, everything turns on ἀλήθεια, how exactly is the phenomenon of truth presented in the economy of Being and Time and of paragraph 44? The phenomenon of truth is already announced in the context of the preparatory analytic which is the existential analytic of the being of Dasein, that is, if, with Heidegger (and the classical problematic of the transcendentals), we recognize that being goes necessarily together with the truth. One must however emphasize that in paragraph 44 the question of the connection of being and truth is only taken up under the much more determinate auspices of the 'originary link' beingthere-truth. This is moreover confirmed in turn by paragraph 69, in which Heidegger announces the work still to be accomplished with regard to the central question of the belonging together of being and truth. How far therefore should we follow Heidegger when he presents this paragraph 44

as a 'new departure' (214 A) in the general problematic of the *Seinsfrage*? Let us recall schematically the main steps in the movement of paragraph 44: the destruction of the traditional concept of truth, designed to recuperate a more original concept of being-true; the elucidation of the ontological sense of the expression 'there is truth' and of the necessary presupposition that there is truth. To understand the move Heidegger makes in this paragraph and to appreciate what is really at stake, it is important, in our opinion, to stress the examination of the traditional doctrine of truth. This examination culminates in the discussion of the Husserlian problematic (6th Investigation, §§36-9) of the verification of a proposition. The identification which lies at the root of the verification of the proposition relates to the fact that 'the being intended shows itself just as it is in itself; in other words, in this that it is dis-covered to be identically the same as it is posited in the proposition'. 41 This confirmation (Bewahrung) means in turn 'the manifestation of the being in its identity', 42 wherein we find once again the formal determination of the phenomenon as φαινόμενον. The proposition ἀποφαίνεσθαι is true (i.e., verified) to the extent that it is apophantical, that is, that it dis-covers, de-clares the being itself. It lets the being be discovered precisely in its being-discovered. The truth of the proposition is therefore in the first instance that of ἀληθεθεύειν in the guise of ἀποφαίνεσθαι: letting it be seen, by disengaging it from its being covered over, the being in its withdrawal from retreat (being dis-covered). But the ἀποφαίνεσθαι of the λόγος ἀποφάντικος only constitutes one of the guises of ἀληθεύειν. Being-discovering through speech is a way of being of Dasein. But the possibility of the discovery of intramundane reality is itself originally founded in an exchange with those beings which are available (at hand) and the opening up of the world which goes along with the revelation (Erschlossenheit) of Dasein. With this openness of Dasein the most original phenomenon of the truth is attained. Erschlossenheit (opening, openness) names this fundamental modality of Dasein in accordance with which it is its there.43

The 'aletheiological' teaching of Being and Time, in so far as it is presented in this paragraph, can be expounded in three theses. The first thesis: 'Dasein is in the truth.' Again, and even more explicitly, 'Inasmuch as being-there is essentially uncovering, and inasmuch as, uncovering, it un-covers and dis-covers, it is essentially "true" '. But, for beingthere, being in the truth also and especially means being 'in the truth of existence'. This last proposition recapitulates the following points made previously: if Dasein is its openness, if Erschlossenheit belongs to it constitutionally, the latter is always the openness of *Dasein* in its being-thrown (*Geworfenheit*). Which comes down to saying that openness is necessarily 'factical'. Facticity and being-thrown are therefore in the background of that project by means of which *Dasein*, open to the

potentiality for being (possibilities) and to its own potentiality for being - if it is true that the project is always projective opening - decides and decides for itself. Being in the truth is therewith exposed from the first to the alternative of authenticity and inauthenticity. In authentic opening, 'Dasein can be open to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality for being'. And it is precisely this authentic openness which 'the most originary phenomenon of truth makes manifest in the mode of authenticity'.44

A second thesis is therefore immediately called for: being-there is in un-truth, from the moment that falling belongs to its ontological constitution. 'The ontological constitution of Dasein is characterized by falling. From the very first, and for the most part, being-there is lost in its "world".' Caught up with intramundane beings, being-there allows itself, literally, to be taken. Heidegger continues:

Understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of being, has diverted itself thither. Its absorption in the 'They' signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted. That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Being towards entities has not been extinguished but it has been uprooted. Entities have not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance.45

The dissimulation in question here, and which arises from inauthentic existence, which is itself certainly covering, runs the risk of being substituted for re-covering (Verdecktheit), defined in the first instance as the 'counter-concept' (Gegenbegriff) of the phenomenon. So one can very well ask whether the analysis of inauthentic existence does not constitute an impasse for a thinking which wants to be more attentive to both the reality and the status of the appearance.46

In Being and Time in any case, it is as a function of its ontological constitution, characterized by openness but also as being-projected, project, falling, that one can understand why being-there, to the extent that it is from the first in the truth or in un-truth, always has to appropriate over again and 'against appearance and dissimulation' that very thing which has already been concealed in advance.

The facticity of being-there, to which closedness and re-covery are attached, comes to the fore in this way. If the truth has to be 'wrested from being', 'torn away from its retreat', if 'factical dis-covery is in every instance, so to speak, a "seizure" ', this is because the phenomenon of truth is veiled from the first. Falling dissimulates the phenomenon as such in the appearance. This is also why the mode of being of openness is always thematized in accordance with one of its secondary

modifications which then takes the lead over all the others, the proposition and its apophantical 'as'. In this way truth is determined on the basis of, and in opposition to, the re-covering attributable to 'fallen' Dasein. At the time of Being and Time, Heidegger thought he could even find a confirmation of this analysis in the privative expression of the 'truth' with the Greeks. By way of the term ἀλήθεια, what makes itself known is 'the pre-ontological comprehension that being in un-truth constitutes an essential determination of being-in-the-world'.47

To claim that Dasein is equi-primordially both in the truth and untruth, is to affirm, in addition (the third thesis), that the truth must be counted among the existentialia. It is in fact always 'made to Dasein's measure' (daseinsmässig), and despite the fact that it is dis-covering/recovering.

The connection between being and the truth, towards which the entire undertaking in Being and Time is directed, can only emerge if one has first established the necessary reference of the truth to being-there. In the same way that being refers to something like an understanding of being, the truth is always relative to a stance, an attitude or a decision on the part of being-there. This is why Heidegger can uphold the parallel thesis that 'there is truth only to the extent that and as long as beingthere exists' and 'there is being - not beings - only as long as there is truth'. Being and truth, if they exist at all, are 'equi-primordial'.48 In reality, and Heidegger makes a great deal out of this from 1927 on, neither being nor truth exist. There is being and truth, or again, being and truth take place. But if one tries to clarify this taking place in the retrospective light of the problematic of the topology of being, one has to appreciate that its proper locus is being-there itself rather than Lichtung, a being-there which is permanently confronted with the alternative of authenticity and inauthenticity.

Why, one might ask, does Heidegger, in Being and Time, stick to the preliminary conception of phenomenology without ever managing to expound his idea? To such a question one is tempted to reply, in retrospect of course, in the following manner: if, in Being and Time, phenomenology does not arrive at its idea, it is perhaps because it is developed under the auspices of a phenomenology of Dasein, as a result of which it falls short in a certain fashion of its central theme, the phenomenon 'being'.

Is it because the work remains unfinished, dedicated in essence to the preparatory analytic of being-there, to the elucidation of its meaning of being, and only in this way to the foundation of the Seinsfrage in the name of fundamental ontology? No doubt; but the question still stands whether this abbreviation, this way of proceeding, was designed to prepare the way concretely for the reversal (implied by the second point of departure in paragraph 44), the turn that the third section of the first part was supposed to effect.

In other words, and giving the issue a polemical twist into the bargain, one might ask whether the later remark by Heidegger on the subject of the analysis of the surrounding-world and of the everydayness of the world – to wit, that it certainly constitutes an 'essential discovery', but that it only retains a 'subordinate signification' to the extent that it only represents a 'concrete way of approaching the project . . . which, as such, does not entail an analysis of this kind except as a means which is itself secondary with regard to the project', ⁴⁹ – one might well ask whether such a remark could not be applied to numerous concrete analyses undertaken in *Being and Time*, including the analysis of the 'phenomenon of truth'.

To be sure, Heidegger himself never says anything of this kind. On the contrary, he is inclined to suggest the contrary, as witness for example this indication from his UNESCO lecture: 'In what way the attempt to think a given state of affairs can sometimes go astray and deviate from what has already been incontrovertibly demonstrated is attested here by the following text from Being and Time (SZ, p. 219): "the translation [of the term ἀλήθεια] by the term 'truth', and in particular the conceptual and theoretical definitions which go along with it, recover the sense of what the Greeks considered as taken for granted in their terminological employment of 'αλήθεια' " (Qu IV, p. 134 n.).' But what had already been demonstrated? To stick to the texts, nothing other than the elucidation of the essential connection between being and truth on the basis of the truth of existence. If, in a certain fashion, Being and Time misses the phenomenon of being, this is also because it misses the phenomenon of truth. It is, as we have seen, being covered over (Verdecktheit), itself interpreted in the framework of the thematic of Verfallen, which is held responsible for determining the counter-concept of the phenomenon.

If then, from the standpoint of its guiding idea, phenomenology, in Heidegger's sense, is not to be distinguished from aletheiology, one has to push things as far as doubting whether Being and Time is still sufficiently phenomenological because it does not confront the question of $å\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ – understood in such a way that $\lambda\eta\theta\eta$ makes up its root meaning. If Being and Time brings $å\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ to light by defining the openness (Erschlossenheit) of being-there or better still by defining being-there by means of this openness as the one who is its 'There', then truth thereby becomes an existentialia. It is in fact being in the world, as Heidegger emphasizes, which constitutes 'the foundation [Fundament] of the original phenomenon of truth'.

To work out the idea of phenomenology would then perhaps amount to deepening the phenomenon of truth, or again, thinking what the essay 'On the essence of truth' called the 'non-essence' [Unwesen] of the truth',

thinking to the end the forgetfulness of being (of which it would no longer be possible to say that it represents the fundamental experience of Being and Time), thinking being in its withdrawal, its suspension, its reserve, its epoch, its absence.

If, in 1927, Heidegger still falls short of the 'phenomenon of being', this is no doubt because he has not yet taken account of the peculiarity of this strange phenomenon which precisely does not manifest itself. Being remains in retreat, hidden, missing. Being is missing and not accounted for. It has fallen into forgetfulness. If this was indeed the fundamental experience of Being and Time, one would still have to insist that Heidegger's entire enterprise was aimed at drawing being out of this forgetfulness, tearing it away from its retreat, by undoing whatever might have contributed to the obfuscation, the dissimulation of its phenomenality.

In fact, it is not until much later, at the end of what might be characterized in a sense as a total reversal, a Kehre, that Heidegger ventures to think that if being remains in retreat, if it is missing, this deficiency could well be due to being itself.⁵⁰ Being withdraws certainly, but such a withdrawal is precisely the withdrawal of being.⁵¹ It belongs to the phenomenality of being to withdraw.⁵² What is truly 'epochal' is phenomenality itself.53

The phenomenological enterprise has to be radically modified. In fact, if 'concealing itself belongs to the predilection of being, that is to say, to that in which its essence is founded',⁵⁴ it could no longer be a matter of bringing to light what remained concealed, of remorselessly wresting from its retreat what, from the first, had already slipped away. In Being and Time, after having examined a constitutive feature of the being of Dasein (falling) and shown how, by 'persisting', man devotes himself to what is immediately accessible every day, to what is 'practical' and so finds himself cast adrift by virtue of his anxious agitation,55 Heidegger was still able to appeal to a resolute conversion or better, to a resolute commitment to resoluteness, to the release of Dasein for its ownmost being in order that what thus remained in retreat, forgotten, should be brought to the light of presence. Such a step, directed toward a 'conversion', a transition from inauthenticity to authenticity based upon a strict correlation of Erschlossenheit and Entschlossenheit,56 is thenceforward radically insufficient from the standpoint of rigorously thinking through the phenomenon of being as Ausbleiben des Seins - absence, the deficiency of being itself as being itself. While offering a commentary of Heraclitus' fragment 123, Heidegger deliberately emphasizes that 'it is not a matter of overcoming the κρύπτεσθαι of the φύσις and of getting rid of it'. The task is a different one, and 'much more difficult'. It consists in 'conferring upon the φύσις, in all the purity of its being, the κρύπτεσθαι which belongs to it'.57

To respond to, without obfuscating, the withdrawal of being, which is being itself as secretive or enigmatic, this is the task which weighs upon any phenomenology for which the Schritt zurück constitutes the first step or, if you will, the ultimate metamorphosis of the reduction.

It is certainly tempting to interpret Heidegger's path of thinking as this procedure which, oriented from the very beginning toward the phenomenon of being, will lead from a phenomenology of Dasein to a resolutely aletheiological phenomenology, which will really be aphanology or, as Heidegger says himself a 'phenomenology of the non-apparent'.58 However, in order that this expression should not remain a simple formula, it is necessary to show concretely how the mediation of the clearing, of the gift or of Ereignis remains authentically phenomenological, to show how the characterization of the phenomenological aspect of Greek thinking, as its fundamental aspect, does not presuppose an improper generalization of the concept or the pure and simple ambiguity of the concept.

Then, but only then, Heidegger's movement of thought can effectively appear as a Weg in die Phänomenologie.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

- 1 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (GA) 20, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt, 1979).
- 2 'Mon chemin de pensée et la phénoménologie', Questions IV (Qu IV) (Paris, 1976), p. 169.
- 3 GA 9, p. 375. We cite here Jean Beaufret's free transposition. Heidegger wrote: 'wenn der Mensch nicht schon in der Inständigkeit sein Wesen hätte'. This 'instance' was explained a few lines further up as 'das offenstehende Innestehen in der Unverborgenheit des Seins'.
 - 4 Cf. already in the Summer term 1925, GA 20, pp. 123ff.
 - 5 Cf. G. Granel, Traditionis traditio (Paris, 1972), p. 116, n. 1.
 - 6 GA 20, §§12-13.
 - 7 GA 20, pp. 179-80.
- 8 Cf. in particular 'La fin de la philsophie et la tâche de la pensée', in Qu IV, pp. 121ff.
 - 9 Logische Untersuchungen II, 1, 6.
 - 10 GA 32, Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes, S. 40.
- 11 Cf. J.-F. Courtine, 'L'idée de la phénoménologie et la problématique de la réduction', in idem (ed.), Phénoménologie et métaphysique, pp. 159-209, esp. p. 166.
- 12 GA 20, p. 423. Cf. also the commentary by Marion, 'L'étant et le phénomène de la réduction', in Phénoménologie et métaphysique, ed. J. L. Marion and G. Planty-Bonjour (Paris, 1984), pp. 211-45.
 - 13 GA 20, p. 197: 'Das formale Gerüst der Frage.'

- 14 Cf. J.-F. Courtine, 'La cause de la phénoménologie', in Exercises de la patience, 3/4 (1982), pp. 65-83.
 - 15 GA 20, p. 119: 'wieviel Schein, soviel Sein.' Cf. also SZ, 36 C.
 - 16 SZ, 31 C.
 - 17 SZ, 31 B.
 - 18 GA 21, Logik, die Frage nach der Wahrheit, p. 133, p. 142, GA 26, p. 181.
- 19 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI, 3. Heidegger comments on this passage at the beginning of his Winter 1924-5 lecture course, Platon: Sophistes.
 - 20 SZ, 33 B; cf. also GA 21, §§12-13.
 - 21 SZ, 33 C; cf. GA 21, p. 162.
- 22 One might well ask here whether it is not precisely the inadequacy with which the concept of appearance (Schein) is worked out which marks the limits of the problematic of truth in Being and Time. It is not until 1935, in his Introduction to Metaphysics, and in connection with a reflection on Oedipus-Rex, that the ontological truth of *Schein* is plainly recognized.
- 23 Aristotle's Metaphysics, § 10, 1051b 24. Cf. Heidegger, GA 21, Logik, pp. 180-1, and esp. GA 31, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, §9.
 - 24 GA 31, pp. 99-106.
 - 25 GA 20, p. 118:

Es ist phänomenologisch widersinnig, vom Phänomenon zu sprechen als von etwas, als von Dingen, hinter denen noch etwas wäre, wovon sie Phänomenon im Sinne darstellender, ausdrückender Erscheinung wären. Phänomenon ist nichts, wohinter noch etwas wäre: genauer: bezüglich des Phänomens kann überhaupt nicht nach einem Dahinter gefragt werden, weil das, was es gibt, gerade das Etwas an ihm selbst ist.

- 26 ibid. 'Was Phänomenon der Möglichkeit nach ist, ist gerade nicht als Phänomenon gegeben, sondern erst zu geben. Die Phänomenologie ist gerade als Forschung die Arbeit des freilegenden Sehenlassens im Sinne des methodisch geleiteten Abbauens der Verdeckungen.'
 - 27 GA 20, p. 119. Cf. also SZ, 36 C.
 - 28 SZ, 36 D. Cf. GA 20, p. 119.
 - 29 ibid. Cf. also SZ, 334 A: 'Degeneration'.
 - 30 GA 20, pp. 119-20.
- 31 GA 9, p. 48. French translation in Débat sur le Kantisme et la philosophie (Paris, 1972), pp. 102-3. On the 'methodological' character of the change of attitude, of the 'conversion', see GA 24, pp. 28-9 and GA 20, pp. 136-7. On. the existential concept of science, cf. J.-F. Courtine, 'Phénoménologie et science de l'être', in Cahier de l'Herne Heidegger (Paris, 1983), pp. 211-21.
 - 32 SZ, 17 B and the note by R. Boehm and A. de Waelhens.
 - 33 SZ, 7 A.
 - 34 SZ, 37 D and the marginal note to GA 2, p. 50.
 - 35 GA 20, p. 200.
- 36 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, pp. 197, 206; cf. also Entretiens de Davos, p. 39; cf. GA 26, p. 214.
 - 37 Qu IV, p. 317.
- 38 Let us emphasize that the procedure of late Heidegger, oriented toward being itself (das Sein selbst), already emphatically presented in the Letter on Humanism, based upon the possibility or the necessity of thinking 'being without beings' (Qu IV, pp. 48, 63), of thinking the Es of Es gibt, does not lead to

anything like an untying of the knot Sein-Seinsverständnis, being-understanding of being.

- 39 GA 20, pp. 179-80.
- 40 SZ, 37 D.
- 41 SZ, 218 A.
- 42 ibid. Cf. E. Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin, 1970), pp. 337-45.
 - 43 SZ, 220 F; 298 E.
 - 44 SZ, 221 E; 297 B.
 - 45 SZ, 222 A; 298 E-299 A.
 - 46 Cf. Einführung in die Metaphysik, GA 40, pp. 75ff.
 - 47 SZ, 222 C.
 - 48 SZ, 226 D, 230 B, C. GA 24, p. 25.
 - 49 Qu I, p. 130; Qu IV, pp. 309-10.
 - 50 Nietzsche II, GA 40, pp. 353-5.
- 51 ibid. Cf. also Der Satz von Grund, GA 10, p. 113; Holzwege, GA 5, pp. 31-311.
 - 52 Nietzsche, II, p. 383.
 - 53 ibid.
 - 54 Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis, GA 9, pp. 300-1.
 - 55 SZ, 178 D; cf. also Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, GA 9, pp. 195-6.
 - 56 SZ, pp. 292-8.
 - 57 Zähringen seminars, Vier Seminare, p. 137; Qu IV, p. 339.
 - 58 Qu IV, p. 339.

Genetic phenomenology: towards a reconciliation of transcendental and ontological phenomenology

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In his Introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger sought to establish the basic principles of a new phenomenology which would be ontological in character. In so doing, he distanced himself from his former master, Edmund Husserl, and from the kind of phenomenology which Husserl had already developed.

Nowhere is both the affinity with, and the contrast to, Husserlian phenomenology more explicitly expressed than in a passage in which Heidegger takes up the Husserlian slogan: To the things themselves! – and deploys it in a new way. For the 'things themselves' concern both Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology in so far as both ways of doing phenomenology require that we first get back to things just as they present themselves with that immediacy which precludes pre-judice and pre-supposition. That Husserl arrives at 'immediacy' through an ultimate distancing (Reduction) whereas Heidegger tries to get there through a more primordial closing of the distance (Involvement) is no more important than the fact that, in one way or the other, they both seek to respond to the fundamental dictum – To the things themselves!

Phenomenology, Heidegger goes on to tell us, signifies primarily a methodological conception; that is, it concerns itself with the how rather than the what of philosophical research. Implied therein is the suggestion that the question how phenomenology accedes to the things themselves is by no means as unequivocal as Husserl might have thought, and that there might be another way of getting back to the things themselves. This other way is of course the way whose basic principles are set out in the two subsections devoted to the 'Concept of the phenomenon' and the 'Concept of the logos', from a combination of which Heidegger is able to arrive at his own 'Preliminary conception of phenomenology'.

That such a latitude is being sought becomes clear from a passage at the very end of this critical section (7) devoted to 'the phenomenological method of investigation' where Heidegger re-evaluates the relation of possibility to actuality with specific reference to Husserl.

The following investigation would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose Logische Untersuchungen phenomenology first emerged. Our comments on the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical movement. Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as possibility.²

When Being and Time was published, phenomenology was associated primarily, and almost exclusively, with the figure of Husserl who, in this sense, represented the actuality of phenomenology. In subordinating actuality to possibility Heidegger was not only claiming for himself the right to develop a new conception of phenomenology but also intimating that the phenomenological movement would only remain alive if such a re-conceiving of the nature, scope and objectives of phenomenology were constantly undertaken. What is important for philosophy, he reminds us in the Introduction to Grundprobleme, is not to know philosophy but to learn how to philosophize, which means keeping open at all times the primordial possibilities inherent in the logos of the phenomenon.

In this paper I propose to take Heidegger at his word. By first undertaking a careful examination of the sections of Being and Time in which Heidegger won his freedom from Husserlian phenomenology and claimed for himself the right to do phenomenology in a new way, I hope to find the basis for recommending yet another way of doing phenomenology, a way which, in particular, brings with it the advantage of reconciling and integrating transcendental and ontological phenomenology rather than leaving them standing as alternative, and competing, conceptions. I shall begin by following Heidegger's own differentiation of distinct concepts of the phenomenon but with a view to establishing an order of derivation between them. That is to say, not only will a basic and foundational concept of the phenomenon be established, a second and indeed a third concept will be recognized, as also an order of derivation accounting for the passage from the one to the other. I shall then use Heidegger's own analysis of the logos to locate different concepts of the logos corresponding to each of the concepts of the phenomenon which have already been differentiated, and also to reinforce the prevailing order of derivation.

This is the point at which my own programme will part company with that laid out by Heidegger. For, instead of systematically eliminating the secondary in favour of the primary, I shall recommend a re-evaluation of the secondary and, more important still, a recognition of the 'logic'

of the derivation of the secondary from the primary. In this way I shall arrive at a more Hegelian concept of phenomenology, one which traces the genesis of the different concepts of the phenomenon, each related and connected with its own appropriate concept of the logos. This logic of the derivation of secondary from primary concepts of the phenomenon will furnish the basis for a new way of doing phenomenology which might be called 'genetic phenomenology'. Finally, this 'genetic' phenomenology will be shown to be ontological in character.

A The preliminary exposition of phenomonology as the logos of the phenomenon

In the section (¶7) devoted to the phenomenological method of investigation, Heidegger begins by splitting the expression into its two components in accordance with its Greek etymology. In subsection A, he deals with the 'Concept of the phenomenon', in subsection B with the 'Concept of the logos', bringing the two back together in the third subsection devoted to the 'Preliminary conception of phenomenology'. We shall follow this Heideggerian itinerary.

The term 'phenomenon', Heidegger tells us, is derived from the Greek where it signifies 'that which shows itself in itself, the manifest'. Throughout what follows it is essential to bear in mind that, for Heidegger, this is the absolutely basic concept of the phenomenon upon which all the others are founded and to which they are consequently repeatedly traced back.

From this primary Greek concept of the phenomenon as that which shows itself in itself, Heidegger now moves on to the German concept Schein. Schein has two uses, a privative and general and a positive and specific. The privative use of Schein is introduced with a 'not', even though this negativity has later to be distinguished from that which characterizes the concept of Erscheinung. 'Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not. . . . This kind of showing-itself is what we call seeming [Scheinen].'4 A little later Heidegger confirms the privative character of Schein when he says: 'We shall allot the term "phenomenon" to this positive and primordial signification of φαινόμενον, and distinguish "phenomenon" from "semblance", which is the privative modification of "phenomenon" as thus defined.'5 This privative concept of the phenomenon as 'semblance' is entirely general, in the sense that the privative character applies, in one way or another, to all the other concepts which will be derived from it, and in particular to that of the appearing - Erscheinen. However, there is another, quite specific connotation, which Heidegger has in mind when he talks of something 'looking like' (sieht so aus wie). This 'so . . . wie'

is also presented in terms of an 'als', as when he talks of something looking like but not in reality being that as which it gives itself out to be (das so aussieht wie – aber 'in Wirklichkeit' das nicht ist, als was es sich gibt). From his later discussion of the 'as' structure we know what Heidegger means here. He is talking about the necessity of things appearing 'as', whereby the semblant character of the appearing is meant not just that they may not appear in the same way to others or to the same person at some other time, but also, that the appearing is to be taken as an immediate apprehension of what manifests itself, just as and how it shows itself, without any critical reservations as to whether it might appear differently to others or under different circumstances and so might not really be the way it presently appears. For all that, Heidegger makes it quite clear that this privative concept of Schein is grounded in that of the phenomenon. 'When φαινόμενον signifies "semblance", the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded.'6

The concept of Erscheinung is, as such, a double derivative. First, that of which it is the derivative, namely the concept of Schein, is itself a privative modification of the fundamental concept of the phenomenon – as we have already seen. The sense in which Erscheinung is a derivative of Schein has still however to be determined. Etymologically, the derivation is apparent in the very structure of the concept, since Er-scheinung includes Schein as its root. Much more important, the concept of Erscheinung presupposes a difference between the appearing and what appears. What appears is, in one sense, the appearance but, in another sense, it is not. Heidegger uses terms like announce (sich melden), indicate, refer, etc., to characterize this difference. 'Thus appearance, as the appearing "of something" does not mean showing itself; it means rather announcing itself through something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself.' To emphasize the negative character of this difference, Heidegger continues: 'Appearing [Erscheinen] is a not-showing-itself [author's italics]', and moreover goes on to confirm that the "not" we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative "not" which we used in defining the structure of semblance [Schein]'. In other words, the concept of Erscheinung presupposes both a something and its appearance or appearing. And although it is by means of its appearance that the something appears, it itself does not appear. That through which, or by means of which, what appears makes its appearance does actually appear. The thing itself however does not appear but merely announces itself by way of something else which does appear.

It is important however to note that this difference between the appearance and the something of which it is the appearance does not run the lengths of an absolute disconnection. For it is in terms of just such a conclusive disconnection that Heidegger then goes on to introduce a further and final concept of the appearance which he terms bloße Erscheinung. The difference between Erscheinung and bloße Erscheinung is brought out with reference to a difference between a something which does not appear and a something which cannot appear.

That which does the announcing – that which, in its showing itself, indicates something non-manifest – may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates from it in such a way indeed that the non-manifest gets thought of as something that is essentially *never* [author's italics] manifest.⁸

Heidegger makes it clear that with this concept of 'mere appearance', he has Kant in mind. For in addition to using appearance in the first sense, Kant also uses the term appearance to talk of appearances as appearances of things in themselves which, as such, can *never* make their appearance.

In other words, this Kantian sense of the relation between appearance and thing in itself has to be distinguished from that inherent in any traditional substance theory such as that espoused by Locke or Descartes. To be sure, Kant further confuses the issue by also making use of the concept of 'substance', as the substrate underlying all appearances, as well as that of a 'transcendental object'. But in principle Heidegger is right in arguing that the ordinary use of *Erscheinung* deserves to be terminologically distinguished from that to which he gives the name 'mere appearance' (bloße Erscheinung). Indeed, he strengthens this distinction by talking about the 'mere appearance' as ' "something brought forth" [hervorgestellt] but something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth', presumably because the noumenon is an intelligible entity (possibly also, and for this very reason, brought forth by a divine or creative intuition), whereas the phenomenon is strictly sensible.

What is noticeably missing in this critical review of the transcendental concept of 'mere appearance' is the Husserlian concept of the phenomenon. It is entirely characteristic of his strategy here that he fights his battle against transcendental philosophy on the Kantian terrain, rather than upon that occupied by his former master, Husserl. However, the omission of the Husserlian concept of the phenomenon conceals from view the extent to which Heidegger was actually pursuing a rather similar course, namely, the attempt to break through the historical legacy to a more primary conception of the phenomenon which would permit philosophy to get back to the things themselves. Thus, when Heidegger takes over the Husserlian slogan, he adds the explanation: 'It [the maxim] is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been

demonstrated.'10 In order therefore to accommodate a Husserlian as well as a Kantian concept of bloße Erscheinung, it will be necessary to draw a distinction between 'bloße Erscheinung 1' and 'bloße Erscheinung 2'. The former will be taken to represent the Kantian, the latter, a Husserlian concept of 'mere appearance'.

Such a distinction is all the more necessary because, in a certain sense, a curious affinity prevails between the two, curious in the sense that one is almost obliged to talk of an affinity of opposites. What is common to the two is that the reality of the thing has become something purely ideal. The purely ideal character of the thing in itself means, for Kant, that it must be situated in a purely intelligible (i.e., noumenal) realm lying over and beyond that of the sensible (i.e., phenomenal). For Husserl, on the other hand, the ideality of the (transcendental) object means that it does, and can only, make its appearance in and through the phenomenal manifold as a *meaning* posited by intentional consciousness. Both Kant and Husserl subscribe to the unreality of the thing in itself. But whereas, for Kant, the noumenal unreality of the thing in itself is to be attributed to its ultimate remoteness from the human subject, for Husserl, the phenomenal unreality of the noematic object is to be attributed to the absolute proximity of that sphere within which alone it can appear, namely, the sphere of immanence. For Husserl, the thing itself cannot appear not because it is a something which exists over and beyond the realm of actual and possible appearances but because it is, in itself, nothing, a no-thing, the very opposite of anything thing-like, namely, an ideality or essence. Thus the Kantian 'noumenon', which is intrinsically unknowable, becomes the Husserlian 'noema', which is so constituted as to be intrinsically and pre-eminently knowable.

Sartre drew attention to the significance of this step when he opened his Being and Nothingness with the statement: 'Modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it.'11 A little later, and in direct relation to an examination of the relation of appearance and essence, he says:

That is why we can equally well reject the dualism of appearance and essence. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series. 12

Not only does Heidegger ignore this transformation of the status of the intelligible with respect to the sensible in the two principal exponents of that transcendental style of philosophizing for which appearance is reducible to 'mere appearance', it is significant that he presents the different concepts of the phenomenon laterally, that is, without really

showing how they are derived each from the other. In such a context, what is important is to fix terminologically the bounds of each concept so as to avoid confusion. 'If one designates these three different things as "appearance", bewilderment is unavoidable.'13 What is covered over in this perfectly reasonable request for terminological clarity is the possibility of effecting a derivation of the distinguishable concepts, one which might, in the end, lead to the specification of a 'logic' of the genesis of one from the other.

In his account of Heidegger's preliminary conception of phenomenology (see chap. 3, vol. I of the present work), Jean-François Courtine recognizes the absolutely fundamental character of the distinction between phenomenon and Schein. And he is well aware that the derivation of the concept of Schein sets in motion a series of further derivations: Erscheinung-bloße Erscheinung. But he then goes on to argue that

we can ignore here the supplementary distinction introduced by Heidegger with a view to elucidating the ambiguity of the German Erscheinung - in particular, the metaphysical distinction of Erscheinung (indicative phenomenon) and of bloße Erscheinung (mere appearance).14

But if the secondary is generated on the basis of the primary and the tertiary on the basis of the secondary, then surely this very order of derivation will attest to a logic of the genesis which must be of more than accidental significance since it accounts for that very covering over which calls for an uncovering? But the question is, whether anything can be done with the genesis which is thereby suggested.

Before we attempt to lay out a logic of the genesis of the several concepts of the phenomenon which Heidegger has already distinguished, it would be best to first take account of Heidegger's own attempt to furnish the phenomenon with a logos. Perhaps we shall find not only that to each concept of the phenomenon a corresponding concept of the logos can be assigned but that the ultimate logos will turn out to be a logic of the genesis of the secondary from the primary - logic in the Hegelian sense of a necessary order of derivation.

Subsection B of ¶7 is concerned to offer a concept of the logos which will fit together with that of the phenomenon. Heidegger's main concern is to resist the temptation to effect an immediate translation of the logos into the realm of language, truth and logic, whereby it gets assimilated into epistemology. At the same time, the new concept of the logos, a concept which, according to Heidegger, is only a revival of the original Greek concept, must conceive of the logos in such a way that it is susceptible to being brought into the realm of discourse. 'Logos as "discourse" means rather the same as δηλοῦν: to make manifest what one is "talking about" in one's discourse." This double intention, freeing the logos from theories of judgment on the one hand, and freeing it for its expression in discourse, on the other is, at the same time, designed to open up a concept of the logos which will fit together with that of the phenomenon, so that phenomenology can effectively be the 'logic' of the 'phenomenon'.

Heidegger proceeds about his business in two steps. First he suggests that the *logos* 'lets something be seen'. The use of a visual terminology to express the intelligibility of what is thereby apprehended attests to the residual, but still powerful, influence of Husserl and his 'eidetic vision'. Letting-be-seen is here clearly both differentiated from and connected to the self-showing characteristic of the phenomenon. What lets itself be seen is, and can only be, what shows itself. The supplement of meaning inherent in 'letting be seen' is then brought out through the notion of 'seeing as'. 'Here the σύν has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness with something - letting it be seen as something.'16 Only in so far as the logos has the character of synthesis can a question of truth arise with regard to what lets itself be seen. 'Being false amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up: putting something in front of something and thereby passing it off as something which it is not.'17

Subsection C of ¶7 puts subsections A and B together in a formulation which articulates the connection of *phenomenon* and *logos* – phenomenology. 'Thus "phenomenology" means ἀποφαίνεσθαι τά φαινόμενα – to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.'18 The self-manifestation characteristic of the concept of the 'phenomenon' is put together with the letting-be-seen which defines Heidegger's use of the term 'logos' and in such a way that the combination is fit for expression in a discourse which makes manifest what one is talking about. In place of any correspondence theory of truth, we have a letting be seen of what shows itself which finds expression in a discourse which communicates.

But the aim of subsection C is by no means confined to simply putting the logos and the phenomenon back into relation with each other. There is a much more important objective in view, namely, to conceive of the phenomenology which results in a manner sharply contrasted with that of Husserl's own phenomenology. Heidegger brings his new conception into focus through a notion of covering up, a notion which functions as the complement of that of the *phenomenon*. Bringing to light, uncovering, always implies the possibility of covering up. What gets covered up in the kind of regional ontology undertaken by Husserl in the name of phenomenology is precisely the being of those entities whose prior demarcation (into distinct regions) serves as the point of departure for Husserl's own phenomenological analyses.

Thus Heidegger shifts the frame of reference of phenomenological philosophy in an ontological direction. While conceding that phenomenology, as a method, remains the way of access to the theme, he insists that the theme itself is being. Hence phenomenology is given out as being 'the science of the Being of entities – ontology'. The investigation of being in general is the science of ontology. But a further question arises with regard to the proper mode of access to being in general, a question which has in fact already been answered in the first part of the Introduction where Heidegger asks: 'Is the starting-point optional, or does some particular entity have priority when we come to work out the question of Being?' So we already know the answer. Dasein is that being whose being must be interrogated first with regard to obtaining the proper mode of access to being and precisely because an understanding of being (of however indefinite a kind) already belongs to Dasein's own self-understanding.

So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic.²¹

From this acceptance of a Dasein's analytic as the correct mode of access to an understanding of being, Heidegger generates his own quite distinctive conception of phenomenology. First, the *ontological* implications of a Dasein's analytic are drawn. 'With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities – ontology.'22 Second, the *hermeneutical* implications of a phenomenology of Dasein are drawn. 'Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation.'23 Finally, the *existential* implications are confirmed.

And finally, to the extent that Dasein, as an entity with the possibility of existence, has ontological priority over every other entity, 'hermeneutic', as an interpretation of Dasein's Being, has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence.²⁴

From all of the above Heidegger draws the general conclusion that 'philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of *existence*, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it *arises* and to which it *returns*'.²⁵

B The genetic re-construction of phenomenology as the logos of the phenomenon

Let us retrace our steps with a view to taking account of what has been established. The key to an understanding of the new possibility opened up by Heidegger lies in the disclosure of different concepts of appearance. Heidegger begins with a (Greek) concept of the phenomenon broad enough to cover all the various ways in which being manifests itself – i.e., shows itself from itself. These alternative ways are then reduced to three (Schein – Erscheinung – bloße Erscheinung). The question is whether an order of derivation can be established between them and, moreover, what can be achieved by establishing just such an order of derivation.

We have already given reasons for thinking that such an order of derivation can be established. Schein stands for the immediate apprehension of whatever is encountered, just as it gives itself, and without any critical reservations as to whether or not it might be in itself as it appears. There is no being beyond, or behind, the appearing. Being is its appearing and nothing more. The term Erscheinung begins the work of critical inquiry. In order to allow for the possibility of the thing being other than it appears to be, a difference has to be presupposed between the thing itself and its appearance. Thus the term appearance contains a reference to something other than itself of which the appearance is an appearance. A step back has been accomplished with a view to determining whether or not things are as they appear to be or, in other words, with a view to permitting a theory of knowledge to be constructed on the basis of the epistemologically more relevant concept of Erscheinung. The further step back represented by the term bloße Erscheinung is one which is illustrated in very different, indeed opposite, ways by the transcendental philosophies of Kant and Husserl. On the one hand, things in themselves are expelled into a realm of the imperceptible, lying beyond appearances. On the other hand, things themselves are resolved into a succession of mere appearances which is itself then unified and connected through the notion of a noematic object.

In the light of the re-orientation of phenomenology in an ontological direction, our next step must be to bring out the connection between the concept of *Schein* (as one of three modes of appearing) and the specific mode of appearing relevant to ontological phenomenology. After that, we shall have to undertake a deeper investigation of the grounding procedure with reference to the concept of the *logos* and with a view to clearing the way for a genetic re-construction of ontological phenomenology as the *logos* of the *phenomenon*.

The first sentences of subsection A of ¶7 make the connection between Schein and Phenomenon quite clear. Heidegger goes back to the Greek

to point out that not only does the word *phenomenon* have the significance 'that which shows itself', but that it also has the signification of 'semblance' or 'seeming'. 'Thus in Greek too the expression $\varphi\alpha\iota\nu\dot{\phi}\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\nu$ "phenomenon" signifies that which looks like something, that which is "semblant", "semblance" [das "Scheinbare"... der "Schein"].'²⁶ Further, when he goes into the structural interconnection of these two concepts, he makes it clear that the second is founded in the first.

Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes pretension of showing itself – that is, of being a phenomenon – can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it 'merely look like so-and-so'. When $\phi\alpha\iota\nu\dot{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\nu$ signifies 'semblance', the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded.²⁷

Thus the concept of semblance is presented as the 'privative modification' of the more original concept of the 'phenomenon'.

Relative to the concept of the phenomenon, that of Schein is derivative, and this is the reason why it is described as a privative modification. But there are more than enough clues to indicate the ontological character of Schein. Heidegger tells us that 'an entity can show itself in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access [Zugangsart] we have to it'.28 This kind of access is indicative of the perspectival and circumstantial character of any encounter with things. Entities show themselves and must show themselves from themselves in order for it to be possible for us to have access to them. Our access 'to' is however a partial and limited apprehension of what manifests itself. Ontologically speaking, it is secondary, though for us, it is primary. Further, the 'looking like' of semblance is described in terms of a 'so-wie' or an 'als was'. From the descriptions to be found later in Being and Time (especially ¶32), as also in his lectures on Logik (especially ¶12), we know that these structures are employed to characterize Dasein's circumspective involvement with things in the context of a world. Even the privative and, one might almost say, negative characterization of Schein - the showing itself 'as something which in itself it is not' - confirms the ontological status of Schein. For in this privative or negative characterization we find the origin of the mutually determining ambivalence 'revealing-concealing', an ambivalence which is basic to the ontological character of disclosure.

The relation of foundation is with Heidegger always so conceived that the derivative is ontologically less significant than the primary and indeed effects a concealment of the primary sense of the concept. This means that the transition first to *Erscheinung* and then to *bloße Erscheinung* is to be understood as a movement away from the domain of the ontologically primordial and in the direction of the ontically derivative. The Hegelian

presentation of the relative place of the concepts Schein and Erscheinung in the Logic should also be borne in mind here. For, in the Logic, Schein is the term used in so far as Being manifests itself in an immediate and unreflected manner. Erscheinung takes the place of Schein in the course of the transition from the doctrine of Being to the doctrine of the Essence. For the Essence is the mediated reflection of Being in and through itself.

It is time now to look a little more closely into the procedure of derivation. This can most effectively be done with reference to the concept of the logos, not merely in later sections of Being and Time but also in other texts, especially volume 21 of the Gesamtausgabe, entitled Logik.

It is possible to distinguish four main approaches to the ontological significance of the logos in Heidegger's first philosophy. Most of these approaches are themselves divisible into substrategies of one kind or another. And at times the borderlines between the approaches are difficult to sustain. However, for the purposes of our analysis, we shall distinguish the approach by way of the problematic of meaning, of truth, of language and of being. There is a sense in which these four problematics are themselves laid out in an order of derivation (or, conversely, of primordiality), with this main exception, that the approach by way of the problematic of being is sometimes treated as the last result of the procedure of analytical derivation, at other times, as the first condition. There is no inconsistency here. For, as the first condition in the order of being, it is always presupposed by any ontological analysis of meaning truth or language even though, in the order of analysis, it is often treated last.

Characteristically, Heidegger's interpretative procedure combines a regressive with a progressive analysis. The analysis starts out upon that plane which is more readily accessible precisely because it is not genuinely primordial. It then inquires back into the grounding conditions. Once these conditions have been disclosed, the direction of the analysis is reversed with a view to accounting for the derivation of the secondary from the primary. This characteristic method is clearly stated in a passage from Being and Time immediately preceding Heidegger's investigation of truth and its ontological foundations.

Our analysis takes its departure from the traditional conception of truth, and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception (a). In terms of these foundations the primordial phenomenon of truth becomes visible. We can then exhibit the way in which the traditional conception of truth has been derived from this phenomenon (b). Our investigation will make it plain that to the question of the 'essence' of truth, there belongs necessarily the question of the kind of Being which truth possesses (c).²⁹

At the level of an ontological analysis of meaning, the so-called 'Asstructure' is by far the most important element, though there are other elements to be taken into consideration, for example, the existential structures and the question of validity. The analysis of the 'As-structure' is most fully carried out in ¶32, where it leads on into a discussion of meaning. Heidegger first establishes the connection between understanding and interpretation. In the first instance, interpretation is presented in its most basic form as existential projection which interprets the world in terms of possibilities of being. Only later does Heidegger move on to the issue of textual interpretation, though even in this most basic understanding of interpretation Heidegger does have the latter at the back of his mind, as when he insists:

If, when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, in the sense of exact textual interpretation, one likes to appeal to what 'stands there', then one finds that what 'stands there' in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption.³⁰

Heidegger makes the move to a disclosure of the As-structure via a preliminary reference back to the concept of the ready-to-hand. The involvement character of the ready-to-hand is now brought explicitly into view as an 'in order to' which lets something be disclosed as something. 'That which has been circumspectively taken apart with regard to its "inorder-to", and taken apart as such - that which is explicitly understood - has the structure of something as something.'31 All instrumental dealingwith presupposes a prior understanding of what a thing is for and the laying out of this understanding is precisely the making explicit of its being as, or, in other words, its 'As-structure'. Understanding something 'as' is then further grounded in the triple structure of a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception. Clearly, this triple fore-structure is arranged in an order of primordiality, somewhat in the manner of Kant's triple synthesis which is so ordered as to yield an analysis both from above and from below. But even the highest level, which bears upon the conceptualization of interpretation, is pre-predicative in the sense that it involves a conceiving in advance which is, moreover, not to be interpreted as an 'a priori'.

From the articulation of the fore-structures, the analysis moves on to the theme of meaning. Implied in this analysis is both a positive laying out of the meaning of meaning and a negative critique of current conceptions of meaning. 'Meaning is the "upon-which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure

from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception.'32 From this it follows that meaning is an existential structure of Dasein, not a property of things. Only in so far as Dasein is can there be meaning, and not merely the meaningfulness of Dasein but also that of entities whose mode of being is not that of Dasein. Again, when the meaning of entities other than Dasein is in question, this meaning cannot be understood as the superimposition of meaning upon a meaning-free apprehension of the entity. There is no such thing as an as-free simply seeing³³ or a presuppositionless apprehension of something.³⁴ Indeed, Heidegger warns us that

when we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the 'as' is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands.35

And here we find ourselves right away on the terrain of the derivation of the secondary from the primary. However, rather than pursuing this theme on the plane of meaning (where it is only provisionally hinted at), we shall leave it to the plane of truth and language where it is much more extensively developed.

The very title of ¶33 ('Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation') indicates that the regressive analysis is undergoing a reversal. The first sentences of ¶33 confirm the derivative character of Assertion. Interpretation is grounded in and derived from Understanding. What is articulated in interpretation and understood in advance as articulateable is meaning. Assertion is meaningful in so far as it too is grounded in and derived from Interpretation.³⁶ In turn, assertion, which Heidegger explicitly connects with judgment (Urteil) and therefore with truth (assertion as the primary locus of truth) sets in motion its own process of derivation. Indeed, the three structures in terms of which Heidegger actually analyses assertion (pointing out, predication and communication) are themselves indicative of just such a procedure of derivation.

The formula of the Logik is slightly different from that of Being and Time. In the Logik, Heidegger distinguishes (1) Pointing out (Aufzeigen), (2) Determination (Bestimmung) and (3) Communication (Mitteilung).³⁷ In Being and Time, it is Pointing out, Predication and Communication.³⁸ The difference here is however only nominal since Heidegger takes predication to be the condition for determination. A second difference in the mode of presentation is however worth noting. As befits a treatise on Logik, Heidegger connects the Greek concept of the logos more explicitly with the primary phenomenon of meaning and truth, and thereby places greater emphasis upon the procedure of derivation. For example, a great part of the material which, in Being and Time, is distributed around Interpretation and Assertion is grouped, in the Logik, around two sections which deal with the difference between a primary, hermeneutical 'as' and a secondary apophantical 'as'. Moreover, since the Logik is primarily and almost exclusively devoted to 'the question concerning Truth', the regressive movement also has to operate at the level of language, and indeed moves back from the conventional acceptance of the statement as the locus of truth and the definition of truth as correspondence, back to a more primordial disclosure through which the 'As-structure' is brought to light.

To return to Being and Time; first, assertion is taken to signify 'pointing out' (Aufzeigen). It is no accident that the same root concept (zeigen) is employed here as was initially employed to characterize the phenomenon, with this critical difference, that in place of a self showing (sich zeigen), a showing itself from itself of being, we now have a showing which is a pointing out (Aufzeigen) of being. The primordial character of this pointing out is confirmed with a reference to the ready-to-hand way of understanding.

Second, assertion is characterized as predication. Heidegger talks of two senses of predication. The first and most primordial signification of predication lies in the pointing out of a unitary phenomenon – the being too heavy of the hammer. Here the emphasis is on its unserviceability as being too heavy. In the second sense of predication, there is not only a splitting of subject from predicate but the focus of attention undergoes a restriction (Einschränkung) to the hammer as such, and in such a way that the weight of the hammer can now figure as just one among many other possible predicates which, between them, give the hammer a determinate character. In the Logik, Heidegger employs the term 'concentrate' (konzentriert) in place of 'restrict' to characterize the way in which the focus of attention gets diverted to the thing itself as simply present at hand with certain determinations. Again, in the Logik, Heidegger talks extensively of a levelling down process (nivelliert sich das primär verstehende 'als'),39 a terminology which he reserves in Being and Time for other phenomena, for example, the emergence of das Man. In place of the language of 'levelling down', Heidegger talks in Being and Time of a 'step back' or of a 'dimming down'.

Finally, assertion is characterized as communication (Mitteilung). Communication brings with it a whole series of derivations. As if to confirm the derivative character of communication, Heidegger brings back the three fore-structures in order to show just what kind of a modification each of them undergoes. At the level of fore-having (vor-habe), the 'with which' (womit – in the Logik, wozu) of the ready-to-hand turns into an 'about which' (worüber). 40 At the level of fore-sight (vor-sicht), the hermeneutical 'as' of ready-to-hand involvement gets turned into an apophantical 'as' of properties present-at-hand. At the level of fore-

conception (vor-griff), the appropriative 'as' of understanding no longer reaches into a totality of relations but gets levelled down to a simply seeing what is present-at-hand. But the procedure of derivation inherent in the fore-structures is only the preliminary to a more widespread derivation which leads on to discourse (Rede) and eventually to idle talk (Gerede). What is expressed in an original articulation of what has been seen gets communicated. And this communication of an understanding first developed in a context of actual seeing then gets retold outside of such a context and eventually becomes mere hearsay. In addition to this line of degeneration which leads into the inauthentic understanding of das Man, there is also the degeneration that follows upon the presentat-hand way of understanding language itself, language as the being at hand of a multiplicity of words, the binding and separating of language (synthesis and diaeresis) trivialized down to the synthesis and analysis of predicative judgment and eventually formalized into the purely relational structure of conceptual combination in a logical calculus.

The above analysis is taken up again in ¶44. Indeed, so conscious is Heidegger of the possible charge of repetitiousness that he calls his earlier presentation a 'dogmatic Interpretation'. However, the difference lies less in a distinction between a phenomenological and a dogmatic interpretation but elsewhere. The first analysis was conducted in the context of the structure of being-in, the most primordial of the three structures into which the overall structure of being-in-the-world is subdivided but one which still falls short of the more radical primordiality which Heidegger has in mind with the concept of 'care', a concept through which Heidegger hopes to bring the primordial totality of Dasein's being-in-the-world back into view as a structural whole. This structural need for a repetition is complemented by a change in emphasis from the logos as the locus of meaning to the logos as the locus of truth.

Heidegger begins his investigation here (¶44(a)), as he does in the Logik, 41 with a statement of three theses which, he says, belong to the traditional conception of truth and which turn out in the end to be presuppositions without foundation: (1) That the locus of truth is assertion (judgment); (2) that the essence of truth lies in the agreement of the judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, was responsible for setting up both these misconceptions. The focus of his analysis turns on the second of these three theses and consists in an attempt to explain how the notion of truth as correspondence got set up in the first place. The method employed consists in a preliminary regressive inquiry into the ground of what is initially and naively taken for granted, followed by a progressive inquiry which accounts for the derivation of the secondary from the primary.

The regressive inquiry goes through two main steps. First, the ontological investigation of truth is stated to be one which rests on beinguncovering. 'The *Being-true* of the assertion must be understood as *Being-uncovering*.'42 Or again a little later: 'The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering.'43 Being-uncovering is itself also differentiated into a more primary and a more secondary mode. What is primarily true as uncovering is Dasein as uncovering (*Entdeckend-sein*). What is only secondarily true is what is thereby uncovered (*Entdeckt-sein*). Second, Being-uncovering is then shown to be grounded in the world's disclosiveness. Moreover, we are reminded that disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its 'there'.

The disclosure of disclosedness as a basic state of Being of Dasein in turn prepares the way for a progressive enquiry into the derivation of the secondary from the primary. For since Falling, along with thrownness and projection, also belongs to Dasein's state of Being, what is first in the ontological order gets covered up and becomes the last to be uncovered in the order of analysis, whereas what is last in the ontological order gets discovered as the first and most obvious 'truth' in the ontic order. However, though Falling is the existential structure which accounts for the derivation, the focus of the account now falls on the phenomenon of Discourse. For Discourse not only expresses the truth of disclosure in an original uncovering of inner-worldly entities, it also preserves the truth and so makes it readily available for utilization, even in contexts where no such disclosive uncovering actually takes place. Thus, the ready-to-hand utilization of Discourse as a being toward the truth becomes a present-at-hand conception of the truth, and this in a number of steps.

First, what was originally uncovered in a Being-toward inner-worldly entities now gets understood as something merely present-at-hand. Assertion, as expressed in Discourse, is still a pointing out which uncovers, but what is uncovered has a tendency to perpetuate itself as simply being what it is. Then, and as a result of the foregoing, the Discourse through which such an uncovering takes place gets understood as something merely present-at-hand. This analysis is one which Heidegger had already taken account of earlier and so is not repeated here. Finally, the relation between Discourse (now understood as judgment and as the locus of truth) and the world itself gets understood as something merely present-at-hand. Thus the correspondence theory of truth arises on the basis of a present-at-hand conception of the relation between language (as present-at-hand) and the world (as present-at-hand).

C Genetic phenomenology as ontology

Our investigation of the concept of the phenomenon led to the discovery of three distinct (German) concepts of appearance, each of which is grounded in, and traceable back to, a primary (Greek) concept of the phenomenon. The subsequent investigation of the concept of the logos served to confirm the presence of a corresponding procedure of derivation designed to show how the primary gets converted into the secondary and in such a way that the ontological import of the original root meaning of the concept is lost. In the context of Heidegger's archaeological investigation, the aim of the analysis is to recommend a regression to the ontological ground, a regression which at the same time would, disqualify any derivative notion. Our intention is quite different, to let the derivative notions stand out in their own right with a view to disclosing a logic of the genesis of one from the other. More particularly, this method has the advantage that it enables us to retain the Husserlian conception of phenomenology rather than requiring of us that we discard such a conception in favour of the Heideggerian. But in order that the Husserlian as well as the Heideggerian conception of phenomenology be acknowledged, it will also be necessary to accord a phenomenological significance to the epistemological concept of Erscheinung, together with whatever concept of the *logos* belongs to it.

Our task in this final section will therefore be as follows: we shall establish a connection between each concept of the phenomenon and that concept of the logos which might be said to belong to it. In so doing we shall, at the same time, confirm the need for a new conception of phenomenology with its own quite distinctive, 'genetic' logic, a conception of phenomenology which conceives of the latter essentially in terms of a logic of the genesis of one concept of the phenomenon (together with its own specific concept of the logos) from another.

Throughout what follows however, it should be borne in mind that the original (Greek) concept of the 'phenomenon' is not merely the most basic concept of appearance but, as such, one which lies at the root of all the other derivative concepts. The *logos* of this most fundamental (Greek) concept of the *phenomenon* may be said to lie in the disclosedness of being in general. But any determination of the meaning of being necessarily rests upon its appearing. To the several ways in which being does manifest itself, there therefore correspond so many ways in which the logos of the phenomenon can be determined.

The concept of the phenomenon which belongs to the first and most primordial stage is obviously that of *Schein*. Semblance is the appearing of being in its original immediacy, that is, in such a way that, inherent in the revealing characteristic of such a mode of appearing, there lurks a concealing. The privative aspect comes to prominence in the concept of 'semblance' or mere seeming, though, once again, it is necessary to insist that without such 'mere seeming' there could not be an appearing which could ever later be subject to the relevant criteria of validity. We may say that, for Heidegger, the *logos* of such an ontological concept of appearance, *qua Schein*, lies in uncovering or dis-closure. Precisely because disclosure is not disconnected from the appearing of being but is, on the contrary, intimately connected with the latter, this Heideggerian concept of the *logos* gets close to the original Greek notion of the *logos* as the unity of thinking and being.

Grounded in this ontological concept of the phenomenon (together with the concept of the logos appropriate to it), and derived from it, we find a quite different concept of the phenomenon. Only in so far as a distinction is drawn between the phenomenon, as it appears, and that of which it is the appearance does it become possible to talk of the truth of the phenomenon in a sense relevant to epistemology. Such a derivative notion of truth is, of course, that enshrined in the theory of adequation, which itself presupposes a radical distinction between two kinds of truth, the synthetic and the analytic. One might say that the differentiation of substance from appearance, on the side of being, is reproduced, on the side of language, by a distinction between two kinds of validation, one which does require a reference to a corresponding reality (synthetic truth) and another which requires no such reference (analytic truth). The logos here assumes the form of the conventional epistemological concept of truth. In conformity therewith we might also add that the telos of such a logos is to be found in formal logic. It is in this sense that Kant talked of the principle of non-contradiction as the 'highest principle of all analytic judgments' - whereby he also insisted that synthetic judgments must also conform to this condition as a necessary (though by no means sufficient) condition of their being true.

Finally, we find a third concept of appearance, that namely of bloße Erscheinung and, in conformity therewith, a transcendental concept of the logos. With Kant, such a transcendental concept of the logos finds its foundation in a priori synthetic judgments and the knowledge that can be derived from them; with Husserl, in an investigation of the a priori structures of a transcendentally reduced consciousness. It is however critical to our use of the concept of bloße Erscheinung that we should have chosen to follow the course marked out by Husserl rather than Kant, a course clearly and explicitly laid out in such texts as Ideas I or Formal and Transcendental Logic. Here, we might say, the telos of the logos is transcendental logic.

With this threefold connection of the concept of the *phenomenon* with its own appropriate concept of the *logos* our genetic conception of phenomenology is, strictly speaking, completed. To be sure, this threefold derivation of the concept of the *phenomenon* together with its

corresponding concept of the logos is only the most summary sketch of a theory, but one whose inspiration can readily be traced back to Heidegger's own analyses, no matter how far its conclusions may stray from those which Heidegger himself wished to draw.

Rather than leaving things in this provisional state, it is, I think, worth taking one further step, a step which will take us in the direction of vet another concept of the logos, the logos as the logic of the genesis of the several conceptions of 'phenomenology' which have just been distinguished. The model for such a final concept of the *logos* is, of course, that offered by Hegel in his Logic. Critical to such a new 'genetic' phenomenology is not merely the recognition of a procedure of derivation (that we find already in Heidegger) but the re-evaluation of what, with Heidegger, is dismissed as derivative. That Heidegger is able to carry through such a strategy of dismissal is largely due to the fact that, effectively, he recognizes only two stages, the ontological and the ontic, which latter can be dismissed as being of little or no phenomenological significance. Hence the importance of accommodating the third concept of bloße Erscheinung primarily, and almost exclusively, with reference to Kant. As soon however as the transcendental concept of the phenomenon is widened to include Husserl, it becomes apparent that the devaluation of the derivative implies a rejection of Husserl's transcendental philosophy as phenomenology, a rejection which, if it had ever been explicitly articulated by Heidegger, would immediately have invited vociferous objection.

Genetic phenomenology of the kind outlined in this paper is teleological rather than archaeological in character. That is, it proceeds forward from the ground rather than backward to the ground. The dependence of such a teleological genesis upon a prior archaeological genesis is however clear. It is only possible to proceed from the ground if the ground has first been disclosed as such. However, it is important to appreciate that there are two ways back to the ground, one (the Heideggerian way) which follows what might be called a 'direct regression' from the ontic back to the ground and another, 'indirect regression' which passes by way of a transcendental investigation. It is critical to the concept of a genetic phenomenology which has been sketched out here that any such 'direct regression' should be replaced by a 'reflective detour'. Both in my study of Kant⁴⁴ and my study of Husserl⁴⁵ as well as in my ontological philosophy, Being and Becoming, 46 I have employed the concept of an 'ontological transposition' to allow for a movement of return to the origin which takes in rather than excluding transcendental philosophy. Indeed, I would even go so far as to suggest that implicitly, if not explicitly, Heidegger has himself adopted this very route and that, in consequence, Heidegger's first philosophy may be envisaged as 'radicalized phenomenology', in the quite specific sense in which Tugendhat deploys that phrase (see chap. 36, vol. III of the present work).

In the light of such an alternative conception of the movement of return it also becomes necessary to confer a phenomenological status upon epistemology. To bring to light the phenomenological status of epistemology is to recognize that the opposition which lies at the root of the epistemological conception of reality, the opposition of knowledge and its object, of words and things or, to use the older formulation, of subject and object, is not a given opposition but one which is brought into being by human being itself. To be sure, from within the intellectual configuration established by epistemology, the phenomenological character of epistemology is by no means apparent, so little so that the conception of truth with which epistemology operates (adequation or, as it is called, the 'correspondence' theory) is simply taken for granted – as Heidegger has shown. That epistemology may not recognize its dependence upon a specific concept of the *phenomenon* and, in accordance therewith, a correspondingly specific concept of the logos, only confirms what appears to be in question. The non-original is precisely that which is most readily taken for granted and so handed down as an incontrovertible acquisition.

The advantages of such a genetic conception of phenomenology are obvious. First, the essential insights embodied in Heidegger's own ontological conception of phenomenology can be preserved. They form, so to speak, the original ground for the entire genesis and, as such, the conclusive goal in which the genesis culminates. Second, it becomes possible to accord a phenomenological significance to epistemology (especially in its contemporary 'positivist' mode) and to the objectified world view with which it operates. It is indeed strange that at a time when analytical epistemology is coming to assume a dominant role in philosophy, and indeed threatens to usurp the entire terrain of philosophy, phenomenological philosophy should persist in dismissing what Husserl called 'the world of the natural attitude' as a merely ontic affair. Ordinary language, which is the language of what Heidegger called 'average everydayness', may not present us with any very extraordinary philosophical insights. But it has its part to play in the construction and preservation of that familiar world view which lies at the root of most of our practical and theoretical activities – as Wittgenstein has shown at great length and in the finest detail. More seriously still, any attempt to dismiss (formal) logical analysis as a product of the technocratic spirit and as a sign of the dissolution of all relations into relations of calculation and manipulation will simply hasten that philosophical demise which has already been anticipated by Heidegger and so contribute to, rather than call in question, the universal sway of technology. If logic, in the formal sense, is the 'enemy', it is an enemy which cannot be wished away but one which, if it is to be restrained, will have to be subjected to the most strenuous, critical examination of the kind attempted by Husserl. In fact, Husserl has already shown in what sense formal thought rests in an essential dependence upon phenomenology, rather than the other way around; and I can see no reason why a similar kind of dependence cannot be brought to light from a more specifically ontological standpoint. Finally, and this seems to me to be decisive, rather than having to opt for either the Husserlian or the Heideggerian version of phenomenology, a genetic conception of phenomenology makes it possible to integrate them both within one overall framework that traces the self-manifestation of being and truth through its constitutive stages.

We know that it is one of the signal contributions of Heidegger's thinking about being that he should have brought the question of truth back into connection with the question of being and so have furnished the basis for what might be called an ontological concept of truth. In the last analysis however, it seems more reasonable to suppose, with Hegel, that truth is not to be located in any given concept of the truth, whether epistemological, transcendental or ontological (in the Heideggerian sense) but rather in the process whereby being becomes the medium in which the self-unfolding of truth occurs - genetic phenomenology. Moreover, if being is its appearing, and if therefore the specification of the several ways in which the logic of the phenomenon can be determined is nothing other than phenomenology, in its most fundamental and final sense, then there can be no essential difference between ontology and phenomenology. The logic of the self-manifestation of being is phenomenology, as ontology. To borrow, and then to invert, but without intending to subvert, a well-known phrase from Heidegger: only as ontology (and moreover as 'genetic' ontology), is phenomenology possible.

Notes

- 1 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 50 (H. 28).
 - 2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 63 (H. 38).
- 3 Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), S. 1, tr. Albert Hofstadter as The Basic Problems of Phenomenlogy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).
 - 4 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 51 (H. 28).
 - 5 ibid., p. 51 (H. 29).
 - 6 ibid.
 - 7 ibid., p. 52 (H. 29).
 - 8 ibid., p. 53 (H. 30).
 - 9 ibid., p. 53 (H. 30).
 - 10 ibid., p. 50 (H. 28).

- 11 Jean-Paul Sartre, L'être et le néant, tr. Hazel Barnes as Being and Nothingness (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966), p. 3. 12 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 5. 13 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 53 (H. 30). 14 Jean-François Courtine, 'The preliminary conception of phenomenology', chap. 3 in vol. I of the present work. 15 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 56 (H. 32). 16 ibid., p. 56 (H. 33). 17 ibid., p. 57 (H. 33). 18 ibid., p. 58 (H. 34). 19 ibid., p. 61 (H. 37). 20 ibid., p. 26 (H. 7). 21 ibid., p. 33 (H. 13). 22 ibid., p. 61 (H. 37). 23 ibid. 24 ibid., p. 62 (H. 37-8). 25 ibid., p. 62 (H. 38). 26 ibid., p. 51 (H. 29). 27 ibid., p. 51 (H. 29). 28 ibid., p. 51 (H. 28). 29 ibid., p. 257 (H. 214). 30 ibid., p. 192 (H. 150). 31 ibid., p. 189 (H. 149). 32 ibid., p. 193 (H. 151). 33 ibid., p. 190 (H. 149). 34 ibid., p. 191 (H. 150). 35 ibid., p. 190 (H. 149). 36 ibid., p. 195 (H. 154). 37 Heidegger, Logik, GA 21 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), S. 134. 38 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 196-7 (H. 154-5). 39 Heidegger, Logik, GA 21, S. 153. 40 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 200 (H. 158). 41 Heidegger, Logik, GA 21, S. 128. 42 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 261 (H. 218). 43 ibid., p. 263 (H. 220).
- 44 Christopher Macann, Kant and the Foundations of Metaphysics (Heidelberg: Winterverlag, 1981), see esp. Part 3, sect. 8.
- 45 Christopher Macann, *Presence and Coincidence*, Phaenomenologica 119, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), see esp. pp. 39-40, 53-4, 56-8, 72-80, 99-100 and 124ff.
- 46 Being and Becoming is as yet unpublished and indeed, as it stands, is incomplete. It is divided into four parts, a first part devoted to a genetic theory of consciousness, a second part devoted to natural philosophy (time/space/causality), a third part devoted to social philosophy (intersubjectivity/language/culture) and a fourth part devoted to practical philosophy (freedom/ethics/politics). Of this complete programme, Part 1, two sections of Part 2 (time/space), one section of Part 3 (intersubjectivity) and one section of Part 4 (freedom) are finished.

Heidegger's conception of space

Maria Villela-Petit

Space and the incomplete character of Being and Time

How is one to interpret the incomplete character of *Being and Time*, the absence of this third section which should have been called 'Zeit und Sein', given the further development of the Heideggerian work? Should we not ask ourselves what this incompleteness was implicitly bound up with? Was it simply, as appears at first sight, bound up with the question of being and of time, which *Sein und Zeit* seeks to connect in one single question? And what if this incompleteness also had to do with the third term that the dyad *being* and *time* had, in a certain manner, obscured, namely space and, in particular, the respective relations of space and time in the economy of *Sein und Zeit*?

An interrogation of this kind does not proceed solely from my interest in the question of space; it is also suggested by some remarks which Heidegger himself makes in the text of the lecture 'Zeit und Sein' (1968),¹ a lecture which adopted, let us not forget, the very title intended for the third section of *Sein und Zeit*, that which, precisely, had never been brought to completion.

The reading of this lecture calls for two acknowledgements. The first is that Heidegger names space and time together by employing the nomenclature Zeit-Raum. This titular procedure (whereby time and space are brought together through a common characteristic) is not to be understood as a tribute paid to relativist science. Rather, it signals, on the one hand, the inappropriateness of the propositional structure of language and, on the other, the incapacity of any physical theory to express what has to be thought here, namely, the deployment, the truth of being apprehended on the basis of the experience of what Heidegger calls Ereignis. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. For the moment, let us simply note that, by way of such a nomenclature, Heidegger

undoubtedly wanted to warn us against any attempt (including his own earlier attempt) to effect a transcendental appropriation of space by time or, in opposition to the former, and in the Hegelian manner, to attempt a sort of dialectical identity between space and time.

The second acknowledgement which a reading of the lecture 'Zeit und Sein' brings to light has to do with this remark: 'The attempt in Being and Time, §70, to trace the spatiality of Dasein back [zurückführen] to temporality cannot be sustained'. What is at issue in this §70, to which Heidegger refers here? And is what he says here, in the form of a retraction, intended to cover this paragraph alone or does it not rather suggest, at the same time, the unsatisfactory character of the ontologicophenomenological analysis of the spatiality of *Dasein* and of space proposed in the first section of *Sein und Zeit*?

Let us consider the first of these questions to begin with. In what does this withdrawal from what is no longer tenable (*Unhaltbar*) consist, in Heidegger's own words? To focus upon the title of this §70 alone: 'Die Zeitlichkeit des daseinsmässigen Räumlichkeit', one is obliged to recognize that there is nothing untenable to be found here. A phenomenologico-existential analysis of spatiality could very well be led to take account of temporalizing aspects, of the dominant implication of this or that temporal dimension, in the diverse modalities of the spatialization of Dasein.³ So the difficulty will have to be located somewhere other than in what, taken in isolation, is announced in the title of this paragraph alone. Once one gets into the reading of the paragraph, one quickly appreciates that Heidegger was trying to eliminate the possibility of adding to this title an 'and reciprocally' which would make it possible to write another paragraph entitled: 'Die Räumlichkeit der daseinsmässigen Zeitlichkeit.' It was precisely the possibility of just such a reciprocity which it was important for Heidegger to exclude. For it would, in addition, compromise his project of deriving historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) and inner-time (Innerzeitlichkeit) from originary temporality (Zeitlichkeit) alone, to the exclusion of an element of spatiality. As Didier Franck remarks, 'if "spatiality" has to intervene in the derivation of inner-time from originary temporality, the whole project called Being and Time would thereby be called in question'.4

That Heidegger himself had seen the problem presented by spatiality for his attempt to found the being of Dasein upon its ekstatic temporality, is evidenced by the claim he makes at the beginning of §70: 'Thus with Dasein's spatiality, existential-temporal analysis seems to come to a limit, so that this entity which we call "Dasein", must be considered as "temporal", "as also" as spatial coordinately.'5 However, for him it was precisely a matter of circumventing the menace presented by 'spatiality' by reducing this menace to a kind of semblance against which one should be protected. Couldn't such a 'semblance' lurk in this 'und auch', leading to an alignment (Nebenordnung), to an identification of the spatiality and the temporality of Dasein? But such an identification would have led to nothing less than the emergence of temporality as determining, in the final analysis, the meaning of the being of Care (Sorge) in as much as it structures Dasein existentially. Against the risk of such an identification, of just such a linkage (Verkoppelung), §70 is going to try and confirm the structure of temporality as the ground (Grund) of the ontological constitution of Dasein and of its modalities of being, amongst which spatiality figures.6

It is the temporal distentia which is going to found the spatializing dispersion (Zerstreuung) and therefore the spacing of the dis-tancing and of the orientation characteristic of the spatiality of Dasein. At the end of §70, this foundational primacy of time, where the out-of-itself of existing as 'temporality' founds the Da of Dasein, is underlined in these terms: 'Only on the basis of ekstatico-horizonal temporality is the irruption of Dasein in space possible."

But surely this understanding, moving as it does from the Da of Dasein, stands in the way of a fuller and more complete assumption of corporality (Leiblichkeit), a corporality implied by all the various modes of spatialization of being-in-the-world? A difficulty of this kind was suspected early on by Erwin Straus, this phenomenological outsider, for whom: 'The Da in which, in Heidegger's own words [Anspruch], our being is thrown, is our corporality with the structure of the world which corresponds to it.'8 In other words, with a view to getting rid of the dualism of mind and body (which is certainly one of the principal objectives of the fundamental ontology of Sein und Zeit), was it really necessary for Heidegger to subordinate the spatiality inherent in corporality to ekstatic temporality?

According to Sein und Zeit, nevertheless, the foundation of spatiality upon temporality not only serves to secure the independence of space with reference to time but also makes it possible to understand the dependence of Dasein with regard to space and, in this way, 'the well known fact concerning the abundance of "spatial images" in language'.9 This 'fact', let us recall, had been thematized by H. Bergson in Time and Free Will where space and language are found to be intricately interconnected. As for Heidegger, he claims to be able to explain it with reference to temporality itself. Does he not see in it, after all, the sign of a dominance of the present as the temporal dimension of concern (Besorgen), 10 which is the mode of being of Dasein delivered over to its concernful everydayness, by way of which, for him, its spatiality is also made manifest?

Since we are not in a position to discuss this interpretation at length, an interpretation which touches upon both language, space and time, we will limit ourselves to pointing out that Heidegger himself will not hesitate later to circumvent it, even to pronounce it wrong. In fact however, referring the spatialized images of language solely to the spatiality of everyday praxis might well have been an indication of the deficiency of the thinking on language in *Sein und Zeit* and, more especially, of the mystification of what, due to our belonging to the earth, to our habitation between heaven and earth, 'takes place', leaves its trace in language.

But let us get back to the development of §70 as a whole. What does the insistence upon designating temporality as a foundation (Grund) mean if not the persistence of the gesture, even the qualified gesture, of transcendental foundation?¹¹ The allusion to Kant in §70 – and even though Heidegger expresses a concern to take up a distance with regard to the posing of the problem by the latter – is indicative of the surreptitious continuation of this gesture. For what is it in fact that Heidegger objects to in Kant? Certainly not the intellectual gesture which seems to assure a certain primacy of time over space. But rather that deficiency in the Kantian ontology which, blinded by the metaphysics of representation, fails to gain access to a true ontologico-existential comprehension of human finitude. It goes without saying that in §70 one is very close to the reading Heidegger will give of the Critique of Pure Reason in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Written at the same time as Sein und Zeit, this work praises Kant for having seen that the question of man belongs to the question of being. The interpretative accent is placed upon the transcendental imagination as the root of the transcendental transcendence of the imagination which, according to Heidegger, is, in the final analysis, to be identified with originary time as pure self-affection. As he sets it out at §35: 'Time is the condition of the possibility of every act which is formative of representation, that is to say, it makes pure space manifest.' And further on, he adds: 'To admit the transcendental function of pure space does not in any way imply a refusal of the primacy of time.'12

It is impossible to overlook the fact that such an interpretation (debatable because unilateral) precisely tended to accentuate the primacy accorded to time over space in Kant. For this primacy was one which, in a certain sense, had already been accorded to time in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, that is, if one considers the criterion in accordance with which time, as the condition of the possibility of all representations, has a greater extension than space, since it is a prerequisite of the representations of external as well as of internal sense. To the former should be added his underestimation of the fundamentally spatial, as well as temporal, power of schematization. A primacy which, however, the *Refutation of Idealism* will serve to undermine. In any case, what concerns us here is to see how the Heideggerian interpretation of Kant, at the time of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, went along with (was congruent with)

the way in which Sein und Zeit had envisaged the relationship between spatiality and temporality.

From the foregoing it follows that if, as we find in §22 of Sein und Zeit, 'space, in a sense which has still to be determined, constitutes the world', '13 this world, which is revealed to Dasein as belonging to its own proper structure of being (cf. Dasein as 'being-in-the-world'), would remain dependent upon Dasein (and not even, or at least only laterally, upon Mitsein). One sees here a subtle continuation of the privilege of interiority over exteriority, that very privilege which the understanding of Dasein, as being-in-the-world, tried to place in question. . . .

These difficulties, these apories and their consequences for the question of being were certainly foreseen, even if only in part, by Heidegger. From the beginning of the 1930s he sets out in a direction which will be thought through later as the 'turn' (Kehre), a turn which can be situated around 1935. But this change of direction within the frame of the same quest, that of being, is both preceded and prepared by a massive hermeneutical investment in Greek philosophy. And so begins that interpretation of Plato and of Aristotle as a function of what Heidegger understands by 'the beginning of metaphysics'. In connection therewith, he turns his attention to the question of the 'truth of being', which question now takes the place of that of the 'meaning of being', the question proper to Sein und Zeit. This is also the context in which we have to situate his meditation on physis, where he tries to rejoin pre-Socratic Greek thinking. In accordance with this 'initial' comprehension, it is being which offers itself as (als) physis, as he points out repeatedly in Introduction to Metaphysics. 14 However, the deepening of the question of being will of itself bring with it a change of attitude with regard to the question of space. As we are now in a position to confirm on the basis of a reading of the Beiträge zur Philosophie, a work published in 1989 but which Heidegger composed around 1936-7. It is at this point in time, and not simply at the time of the lecture 'Zeit und Sein', that the wording Zeit-Raum impressed itself upon him.

Having made these points, we are left with two directions in which to proceed. The first consists in going back to the analytic of spatiality in *Sein und Zeit*, with a view to trying to bring out its limits; the second, in considering the effects of the turn (*Kehre*) on the thinking about space.

Space in the first section of Sein und Zeit

Let us turn to chapter III, entitled 'The worldhood of the world' (§14 to §24). Here Heidegger refuses to envisage the world as simply subsisting in space, therefore making a break with the classical attitude for which the

world did subsist, reduced to being nothing but the totality of bodies in the objective space of Euclidean geometry. In this way a critique of the attitude of modern philosophy is implied in as much as it forgets that geometrical space is itself constituted by an objectifying operation which can only be carried through on the basis of a world to which we are attached existentially and whose intrinsic spatiality we have to understand.

On the other hand, the approach to spatiality is not accomplished, as one might have expected, by way of a phenomenology of perception. The ontological strategy of Sein und Zeit makes this impossible. For, to isolate and privilege perception would be to abandon the concrecity of the being-in-the-world of Dasein in favour of a subject split up into a diversity of faculties or capacities. Heidegger, on the other hand, claims to have disclosed the world phenomenologically in the thickness of its concrete significations which, according to him, are first of all those which proceed from the daily practice of Dasein as being-in-the-world. From which it follows, as Franco Volpi has shown very clearly under the auspices of a 'reappropriation', that is, a creative translation of notions proceeding from the practical philosophy of Aristotle, that a certain priority has to be accorded to action and to doing in as much as, in everyday praxis, the latter both encompass and go much further than perception.

To understand such a step with regard to the problem of space, it is worth remembering that it has to be situated explicitly in the context of an attack upon Cartesian ontology which, under various forms, has not ceased to make itself felt throughout the course of modern philosophy. The confrontation with Descartes is so decisive here that it takes up the entire middle section of chapter III; from the very outset, it is stated that the exposition of the Cartesian ontology 'will furnish, by way of its antithesis [negativen Anhalt], a theme for the positive explication of the spatiality of the surrounding world [Umwelt] and of Dasein itself'. 15 Thus, from the very beginning ontological dualism is called in question. The distinction between res cogitans and res corporea is rejected to the extent that this distinction would, if operative, obscure the spatiality proper to human Dasein while reducing the beingness of every natural being to extensia. With regard to a physical thing, all that is taken to be true is what manifests itself as subsisting (Vorhandene) for a theoretical consciousness, what can be rendered intelligible in physico-mathematical terms; the phenomenality of the world is thus relegated to the status of a subjectivo-relativistic appearance.

But whereas in Husserl's Krisis the critique of the forgetfulness of the Lebenswelt goes together with an attempt to understand the process of idealization which underpins the 'mathematization of nature' in modern physics where the interest focuses on Galileo (cf. §9), in Sein und Zeit Heidegger tries above all to think the ontological legacy of such a procedure in Descartes and he interprets these ontological consequences in terms of a 'de-mundanization' of the world. This term designates the eclipse of any understanding of the effective modalities of our being in the vicinity of things with reference to the horizon and on the basis of the world. Correlatively, he talks of the de-mundanization of Dasein in modern times since thenceforward the latter takes its stand *vis-à-vis* an a-cosmic world, as a subject 'out of the world' and therefore capable of ignoring its originary spatiality.

With a view to re-discovering the spatiality of Dasein, Heidegger sets out from a description of the spatiality of the surrounding world (Umwelt). He takes as the guiding thread for this phenomenologicoontological description, the being of those entities which present themselves with a primordiality which precludes their reduction to res extensa or the in-itself of objectivist ontology. This kind of entity is one with which Dasein is concerned in virtue of the use (Umgang) which he makes of it in his daily life, with regard to which he is present in the mode of concernful involvement (Besorgen). It is those things which are close at hand (Zur Hand) which are ontologically determined by their availability (Zuhandenheit) for utilization. Thus they present themselves as tools or instruments (Zeuge) in their character of being-in-order-to $(Um \dots zu)$: for instance, the hammer for the fabrication of the table or the construction of the house. In virtue of this structure of being which carries with it the determination of a reference to . . . (Verweisung), each instrument is revealed as always already inserted into a whole, an instrumental totality (Zeugganzheit). 16 By way of an example of a totality of things structured with a view to their utilization, Heidegger evokes what happens in an office. The things which are to be found there are not disposed in such a way that each can be taken in isolation from the others. Together, and on the basis of their relations with others, they determine the 'physionomy' of the room. What we encounter in the first place is the room in that susceptibility for signification which belongs to it: an office and not just a volume geometrically defined by the four walls which its simple things fill up. We discover the room, Heidegger also tells us, as a residential instrument (Wohnzeug). Is it really necessary to point out that this expression betrays a thinking about dwelling, about housing, which does not go much further than a certain functionalism – which latter reminds us of what Le Corbusier was to recommend a little later, with this qualification that, in the context of an industrial civilization. Le Corbusier preferred to talk of a 'residential machine'. 17

In sum the uncovering of the environment in Sein und Zeit shows it to be a totalization of meanings and objectives, the same as those constitutive of the connection linking instruments one with another (Zeugzusammenhang, Zeugganzes). The analysis never ceases to implicate both

the spatiality proper to the being of an instrument and that inherent in the whole into which it is inserted. Those entities which are available for utilization are entities whose 'proximity' cannot be determined primordially by any system of measurement, but with reference to an oriented proximity which arises out of that concern which characterizes. Dasein in its everydayness. The being of the instrument only acquires its meaning with reference to a practice and its proximity is therefore that of its instrumental accessibility. This does not mean that, as it were, it has to be dragged around, for it does have its place, a place where it can be found, and this implies that it is not to be regarded as a simple thing subsisting somewhere in a space which is unqualified and which has not been differentiated into subsidiary places. And just as an instrument is never encountered in an isolated fashion so a place is only what it is with reference to other places together with which it constitutes a network or a 'totality' of places (*Platzganzheit*).

In turn, since it has itself to be situated, the condition of the possibility of a totality of places lies in a wherein (Wohin) in general, a wherein which concernful involvement has in mind from the first. Thus every place has to be referred to a 'region', to a 'side', all of which is already implied every time one specifies the place of a thing from 'this side' rather than from 'that side'. The word we are translating by 'region' or by 'side' is Gegend. At the time of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger is still far from having thought about Gegend or Gegnet, as he will do, on several occasions, after the Kehre. Here these Gegende are still thought as a function of the spatiality inherent in everydayness. However, for the determination of these regions which, for their part, confer a more general orientation upon the space of the surrounding world, one being, the sun, plays a privileged role. For its places, though changing, are places which are constantly and regularly available for the diverse and variable uses to which we put the light and the heat which they yield. They serve to differentiate the celestial regions which furnish pre-established points of reference for the terrestrial regions which these places occupy and articulate. 18

That such a purely pragmatic consideration of the sun and its 'orients' by no means exhausts the existential meaning that its course has for us is clearly recognized by Heidegger when he adds: 'Churches and tombs are disposed according to East and West, the life and death parameters which determine Dasein in its inalienable possibilities of being.' But should he not then have gone on to question this availability, the *Zuhandenheit* of entities as the privileged *leit motif* of the uncovering of the spatiality of the world? Before trying to do justice to this question it is worth pointing out that the spatiality of the surrounding world is only existentially relevant because it is founded on the spatiality of Dasein. In other words, the spatiality of the surrounding world presupposes the

being of Dasein, to whose spatiality it belongs essentially to adopt an orientation and to make distances disappear. Its encounter with intramundane entities implies a making space (Raum geben), an arrangement (Einräumen) which makes possible a range of places upheld by gestures such as 'displace', 'remove', gestures which do not require the intervention of a theoretical attitude or the constitution of a geometrical space.

The analyses of §22 to §24 proceed as we have seen, in a regressive fashion, on the basis of an uncovering of the spatiality of the world in the direction of its ontological presupposition, namely, the spatializing being of Dasein. This now permits us to formulate more exactly the questions which the approach to spatiality in Sein und Zeit raises.

Without recurring to the importance of highlighting the existential primacy of the practical over the theoretical, there are grounds, nevertheless, for asking ourselves whether our way of encountering the spatiality of the world and of intra-mundane entities really should be restricted to that mode of involvement which Heidegger takes account of here which, obviously, takes as its paradigm the labour of the craftsman and the world which corresponds to it. To take only one of the essential features of the Umwelt disclosed by Heidegger's analysis of spatiality, 'totalization': Zeugganzes, Platzganzheit. It is a matter of integrating each instrument, and the place which belongs to it, in a sort of system of reciprocal reference on the basis of which each can be uncovered in its usefulness for . . . , in its pragmatic significance. This was already implied in the *Um* of *Umwelt*, which has to be understood in its double meaning of um - 'surrounding' and of um - 'in order . . .'. But what then becomes of our exposition of the open space of a countryside which suspends, 'disorients', even if only for a moment, the prevision which characterizes 'everyday praxis'? Is it not the case that concernful preoccupation (promoting the 'hold' and the hand as the organ of prehension), even if it does make possible a revealing of the spatiality of the world of everyday praxis, nevertheless puts into effect something like a 'reduction', to wit, a 'neutralization of its phenomenal appearance'? What are we to make of the presentation or of the donation of nature in its 'grandiose spectacles' (sky, sea, mountain, waterfalls, etc.), those very aspects which Kant takes account of in his analytic of the sublime in the third Critique, where it is already a question of poetic vision?²⁰

But it is not even necessary to leave the space of the home²¹ with its affective and identificatory investments to recognize the limitations of an analytic which only considers the spatiality of the world from the standpoint of its significance and of its practicality as a function of that specific existential which is involvement.

Besides, what is one to say of those worlds in which instrumentality cannot be isolated in as much as the available entity (the tool) incorporates from the start other determinations and references than those of its utility alone? And how, on the basis of its *configurational* aspects, can one fail to attribute to the spatiality of the world a metaphorical and symbolic tenor which, to some extent, already encompasses and surpasses the pragmatic significance which is uncovered across our daily praxis?

Last but not least, the analytic of spatiality in Sein und Zeit suffers from the absence of any investigation bearing on the constitutive spacing of Mitsein, which latter impacts not only upon our understanding of the space of the world (spaces and distances of a social order), but also upon any consideration of the spatiality of Dasein itself as well as upon the question of Jemeinigkeit, that is to say, the question of selfhood or identity.²² How is one to understand Dasein's character of being 'mine' if one does not take into consideration the 'here' and the 'there' constitutive of intersubjectivity which, from the start, manifests itself as an intercorporeal phenomenon - as Husserl made amply clear in his Vth Cartesian Meditation? Once again we rejoin the question of embodiment which the very project of Sein und Zeit failed to articulate more exactly in its connection with the question of spatiality and of the Mitsein. The articulation of this question is however anticipated, but in a largely negative way, as emerges from §10 of the Summer 1928 lectures on Leiblichkeit, entitled 'The problem of transcendence and the problem of Sein und Zeit', where Leiblichkeit, Mitsein and the phenomenon of Raumbedeutung as the primary determination of every language (Sprache), are presented as having to be understood on the basis of spatial dispersion (Zerstreuung).23

However, if, at the heart of the Heideggerian meditation, this tangle of crucial questions remains undeveloped, this is not true of other issues which we shall now go on to mention. Two digressions which, in *Sein und Zeit*, follow upon the course of the analyses of the spatiality of the world will serve to confirm the above. The first of these digressions arises in the context of entities which are not produced, natural beings the recognition of which is presupposed by any product whatsoever. This recognition of non-produced goods arises, Heidegger points out, as a function, or in view, of (*Wozu*) the work to be produced. 'But when this happens, the Nature which "stirs and strives", which assails us and enthrals us as landscape, remains hidden.'²⁴ It is therefore not always possible to reduce nature to the *Zuhandenheit*, as is explicitly underlined in §44.²⁵ These remarks in their turn relativize the choice of the *Umwelt* or of the instrument (*Zeug*) as the only available clues to any elucidation of the spatiality of the world and of Dasein.

The other digression goes in the same direction. It takes into account the hypothesis of a 'primitive world'. In this regard Heidegger remarks that 'what is ready-to-hand within the world just does not yet have the mode of Being that belongs to equipment'. And he adds: 'Perhaps even

readiness-to-hand and equipment have nothing to contribute as ontological clues in interpreting the primitive world. But if these remarks place his interpretation of everydayness in a new perspective they do not, for all that, suffice to dissuade Heidegger from treating entities encountered within such a world under the negative sign of a 'not yet'. 'It does not yet have the mode of being that belongs to equipment.' And he does not even bother to ask what 'reduction' (of symbolic attributes, etc.) might correspond to just such an 'accession'. However, in the Second Section of Sein und Zeit (where the analytic of the First Part is reconsidered from the standpoint of the foundational element of temporality), intra-mundane entities, together with nature itself (as landscape, field for agricultural exploitation, etc.), are uncovered in their historical (geschichtlich) character, which latter goes along with, and is indeed inseparable from, the historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of Dasein as beingin-the-world.27

Nevertheless, the assumption of the historical character of the world of everyday life in this Second Section, entitled 'Dasein and temporality', an assumption which could not remain without its consequences for the question of the spatiality of the world, does not bring Heidegger to return to the disclosure of the latter; and that, as we already pointed out, because it pertained to the very project of Sein und Zeit that historicality should be derived from temporality alone. Be that as it may, it is no less true that the two digressions of chapter III from the First Section, that on nature and that on the primitive world, appear 'supplementary' with regard to the elucidation of spatiality as already explicitly carried through.

It is however worth noting that in Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger tried to explain, even to give, in his own words, 'precise reasons' for the exclusion of nature from the analytic of spatiality. This is because, he tells us, the question of nature could only be introduced on the basis of the analysis of *Befindlichkeit*,²⁸ which latter is only pursued later on, namely, in the context of the analysis of that fundamental existential structure which is Care (Sorge). But these 'precise reasons' leave the real question entirely on one side: what of the spatiality inherent in Befindlichkeit, that is to say, in each of the affective moods (Stimmungen) by way of which Dasein experiences itself and finds itself in its being in the midst of beings? The absence of any interrogation on the spatiality of moods such as anxiety, joy, fear, boredom²⁹ can only be explained as a function of the very project of Sein und Zeit to found spatiality upon temporality. . . . But then, in what concerns the thinking about space, the incompleteness of this project, as well as leading to a deepening of the question of being, is going to mean, at one and the same time, an opening and the opening move of a new attempt.

Space after Being and Time

Even though it is always possible to find several 'turns' along Heidegger's path of thought, the critical shift is that executed in the famous turn, the Kehre, around 1935. With regard to what concerns space, it makes itself known in the lecture: 'The origin of the work of art' and in the course of lectures: What is a thing? (Die Frage nach dem Ding), and especially as it is only now possible to appreciate, in the text which has remained unpublished for so long, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Let us consider the course of lectures first of all. In the first part, Heidegger reviews the different ways in which philosophy has attempted to determine the being of the thing. He questions the relationship between the identity, the particularity of the thing and the categories of space and of time. To summarize: what is the relation of the this to the here and the now? Is space a simple framework, a system of co-ordinates making possible the determination of the spatial position of one thing relative to others? What are we to make of the limit, in things, between a without and a within? In the second part of the course Heidegger tries to characterize the field, the historical ground upon which the determination of the being of the thing rests in the Critique of Pure Reason; which determination now appears to Heidegger as the metaphysical centre of Kant's work. The point to stress concerns the gap between the Greek conception of movement and of locus and that of 'modern times', the position established by Galileo and Newton and on which Kant himself relies. For the Greeks, Heidegger recalls, thinking especially of Aristotle, 'the type of movement and the locus of the body are determined by the nature of the latter'. 'For any characterization and any estimate of movement, the earth is the centre . . . the stars and the heavens in general move peri to meson, around the centre, their movement being circular.'30 On the other hand, with Newton, 'any body left to itself moves in a straight line and in a uniform fashion'. 31 It is important to appreciate the consequences of such a transformation. For it not only affects the understanding of movement and of nature but also the position of Dasein at the heart of being. Among the consequences mentioned, let us consider, in particular, the change which the concept of locus undergoes. 'The locus', writes Heidegger, 'is no longer the place to which a body belongs in virtue of its intimate nature but simply a position which it assumes from a purely relative standpoint, that is to say, in relation to other positions.' Henceforward, 'the difference between terrestrial and celestial bodies becomes otiose'.32 What could this mean if not that the gap between the sky and the earth is abolished and that loci are now only neutral positions? The result is a flattening of physical space which, in accordance with a purely geometrical representation, is, from now on, nothing but a homogeneous medium whose attributes can only be derived from mathematical representation. Conceived in this way, space does not have much to do with the spatiality of the world in which we find ourselves. What is more, it conceals this spatiality. This concealment, which touches both the spatiality of the world and that of Dasein, was thought by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, on the basis of the Cartesian ontology and its dualism. In the course of lectures Die Frage nach dem Ding, on the other hand, where the interpretation of the history of philosophy is tied together around Kant, he envisages it on the basis of classical physics while at the same time recognizing, as Catherine Chevalley's paper (chap. 63, vol. IV of the present work) shows, that this physics is itself, at least in part, called in question by the new physics. Such then is the hermeneutical background against which Heidegger takes command, little by little, of a thinking about dwelling which proceeds along the same lines and conjointly with his thinking about being.

In addition, the lectures already announce two themes which are absent from the analysis of the spatiality of the surrounding world in Sein und Zeit, namely, that of the Earth and that of place (Ort). While in Sein und Zeit it was above all a question of 'place' (Platz), and of a 'network of places' (Ganzheit von Plätzen) seen as a function of the readiness-tohand (Zuhandenheit) of an equipmental whole, it will from now on be a question of place (Ort) and of the relation between space and place. He goes back to the lecture, 'Der Ursprung der Kunstwerk', contemporary with the course of lectures, to deepen these themes. In this lecture, Heidegger further pursues his investigation into the thinghood of the thing and into the equipmental being of equipment but with this difference, that he now does this with a view to bringing to light the truth of the thing, or of equipment, on the basis of its manifestation in the work of art.

The inadequacy of the traditional determinations of the being of thing stands out most evidently when one questions the work of art. Thus the different philosophical conceptions of the thing stemming from the tradition, whether as 'informed matter' (geformter Stoff), or as 'support of qualities' (Träger von Merkmale, substantia + accidens), or as the 'unity of a multiplicity of sensations' (Einheit einer Mannigfaltigkeit des in den Sinnen Gegebenen) give themselves away as so many obstacles to any approach to the true being of the thing, and a fortiori to the truth of the being of the work of art. This obstacle has to be set aside as the condition without which it is impossible to open the way to an alternative approach to the question of truth. Normally tackled as arising out of the domain of science, as an epistemological affair, the question of truth is here paradoxically posed in terms of the work of art. Art is going to be set up by Heidegger as the phenomenological site where the truth of the being of entities makes its appearance. But if, as he says, art is the realization of truth, this can only be because the truth is not first and

foremost the object of a theoretical attitude, that it does not consist initially in an adequatio rei et intellectus. Rather than being conveyed by an objectifying judgment, the truth takes place as an event in the work of art. Thus Heidegger offers an alternative to the dramatic Nietzschean opposition between art and truth, an opposition summed up in *The Will to Power* with the adage: 'We possess art lest we perish of the truth', 33 namely, an alternative which might be expressed as follows: art as the realization of the truth.

This occurrence, this taking place of the truth is in turn set in relation to what Heidegger identifies as structuring the work of art. This 'structure' is not something internal to the order of 'representation' and which would be connected with the formal aspects of the work. It is identified by way of a contrast with what in Sein und Zeit was said on the subject of production: equipment (Zeug) or work (Werk). Here, what is produced refers back to what is not produced as to a simple material: for such is the understanding of natural beings brought to light from the standpoint of everyday praxis. The forest is considered as wood, the river as yielding hydraulic energy. The 'material' is absorbed into the product, the work itself being grasped in its being-for . . . depending on the use to which it is put. But in breaking the chain of utilitarian references in which the 'product' is caught up, the work of art opens up a more essential access to the truth of the product, a truth which is also the truth of the world to which the product belongs; in other words, that of the site to which it bears witness. As a guide to his meditation Heidegger chooses a canvas of Van Gogh in which shoes are depicted, shoes which he takes, in a way which is both debatable and has been largely debated,34 for the shoes of a peasant. This meditation, which neglects the aesthetic aspects of the work in order to come to terms with its theme, to the point of making it impossible to identify the work in its singularity, can be summed up in two affirmations: 'Across these shoes', Heidegger writes, 'there passes the silent appeal of the earth.' And further on: 'This product belongs to the earth. It harbours the world of the peasant.'35

By relating to the thing in this way, the shoes are made to appear in the work and in relation to what is co-signified in the work, that is, an Earth and a world. Thus Heidegger's meditation on Van Gogh's canvas makes Earth and world appear as the polarity which both holds open and furnishes our dwelling space with its dimensions. It does therefore point towards the rootedness of dwelling in a soil, a theme which, at the time, was not exempt from ideologically ambiguous connotations but which, at least in Heidegger's writings, was not associated explicitly with the theme of blood or with racism.³⁶

The second example of a work of art invoked by Heidegger will permit him to give a further and more adequate account of his thinking about dwelling while at the same time furnishing him with an opportunity to consider the nature of the relation of place and space. Now the work in question is a Greek temple. This is what he has to say.

It is precisely the temple as a work which disposes and collects around itself the unity of the ways and relations through which birth and death, misery and prosperity, victory and defeat, endurance and ruination confer upon human being the shape of his destiny.³⁷

It is clear that the 'Greek temple', taken with this kind of generality, is not being considered from an architectonic standpoint but as a place that unites around itself an entire network of ways and significations which articulate its space and give a meaning to dwelling. This meditation invites the reader to move beyond the point of view of what would be an aesthetic objectification and so to see the temple at work in its efficacity as a work. The temple installs a mortal world, that of the Greeks, in as much as it articulates its topology and its signifying configuration at the same time as it makes the Earth manifest and, without annihilating its obscure face, makes manifest its power of withdrawal, its reserve, the gateway opening upon being. The temple therefore constitutes the link, the unifying trait between an Earth and a world. It is thanks to this landmark that an earth can manifest itself and appear as native soil (der Heimatliche Grund), and that a space of dwelling is thereby outlined. To sum up, a space qua dwelling, has to be thought on the basis of the places which it articulates.

Starting from the lecture: 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', dwelling impresses itself as one of the most constant of Heidegger's meditative themes. This is attested in a much later text which merits our attention not only because it condenses a number of previously conducted analyses but also because it rings the changes on the terms employed in the lecture of 1935. We are talking of the lecture 'Building dwelling thinking', given in 1951 at the 'Second Darmstadt Symposium', a symposium devoted to 'Man and space'.

Before we begin, let us note that in the period between the lecture of 1935 ('Die Ursprung der Kunstwerk') and that of 1951 ('Bauen Wohnen Denken'), Heidegger's thinking on space is nourished by considerations stemming from the notion of chora. This is a very typically Heideggerian move. Greek thought, and especially pre-Socratic thought, provides him with the occasion for a remarkable meditative prolongation but one which, in reality, takes him further away rather than bringing him closer to the Greek text. Moreover, to all appearances the meditation sets out from a pre-Socratic expression while leading to something else, without this something else ever being consciously assumed. To take Heraclitus' fragment 109: in his course of lectures Heraklits Lehre vom Logos

(Summer term 1944), while criticizing the usual translations of kechorismenon, Heidegger remarks that in chorizein, chora is to be found. This furnishes him with a pretext to 'translate' the Greek in a creative fashion, that is to say, not only to find in it a linguistic equivalent, namely, Gegend or Gegnet in the sense of surrounding world (Umgebung, die umgebende Umgegend), but, on the basis of this 'finding' to develop a meditation taking as its guide the distinction between topos (Ort) and chora (Gegend, Gegnet).38

The meditation on die Gegend and its old form Gegnet is developed and deepened in 'Conversations along a country path' ('Feldweggespräch'), written a little after the course on Heraclitus to serve as a 'commentary' on Gelassenheit.39 In this work, the accent is placed henceforward on the opening of Gegend. It names the opening which surrounds us (das umgebende Offene) and on the basis of which everything that is, is able to make its appearance. It is the Gegnet as 'free extent' (die freie Weite), with which we can enter into a relation of resonance, provided only that the things (die Dinge) which appear therein 'should have lost their objective character'. 40 The thinking about the Gegend is therefore the passage required in order to leave the terrain of representative thinking to which, according to Heidegger, Husserl's thinking about the transcendental horizon still belonged. In this sense, to take up again Heidegger's own words, it has to be seen as signifying 'the end of philosophy' and inaugurating (as the title 'conversation on thinking' suggests), 'the beginning of thinking', one might even say, of poetic thinking.

What distinguishes the region, the Gegend, is its gathering character. It holds together (versammelt) and unifies a plurality of places. Heidegger's thinking experience around the notion of Gegend, an experience which marks a break with an objectifying representation of space in favour of a meditative (rather than contemplative) approach arising out of concrete (non-abstract) language, must not be lost sight of when one tries to understand the lecture 'Bauen Wohnen Denken'. As its title indicates, this lecture is directed towards the question of dwelling. But the activity of building will have to be taken account of in a manner quite different from that implied by the means-ends schema which, he now tells us, 'closes off any access to essential relations'. 41 We are certainly far from Sein und Zeit. . . .

What then does 'building' mean? To this question the answer would seem to be obvious: to construct according to a plan. But the answer undertakes a detour which brings to light the several layers of meaning encompassed by the word 'build'. For the root of the word bauen, buan means 'to dwell'. If this is so, the normal order of understanding (one builds to dwell) has to be inverted, and not because dwelling, or bauen, would come first chronologically but because, in bauen, building, wohnen, or dwelling is already in question. By that is meant that we build according to the manner in which we dwell which is, in turn, the manner in which we are on the earth. By means of bauen, in the sense of dwelling, an unusual link is instituted between dwelling and being. Just such a link had already been outlined in the context of §12 on In-Sein... But the implications of this link in what concerns space had not been drawn. Here, it is thanks to the etymological resources of language that the link can be made.

'I am' [ich bin], 'you are' [du bist] mean: I dwell, you dwell. The manner in which you are and in which I am, in which we other humans are on earth is dwelling. To be human means to be on earth as mortal, that is to dwell.42

It is clear that 'being-in-the-world' is henceforward to be understood in terms of dwelling and that, in consequence, our dwelling and the spatiality which belongs to it can no longer be uncovered on the basis of everyday praxis alone. It encompasses all the dimensions of our human sojourn here on earth. It is therefore the configuration essential to that very sojourn which it is a question of clarifying. 'Bauen Wohnen Denken' refers back to the lecture 'Das Ding' which precedes it by about one year. In the two lectures, the configuration of dwelling is thought as a fourfold game. To dwell is to sojourn here 'on earth" and 'under heaven' which is its overhang. But to be on earth and under heaven means, in addition, 'to dwell in the presence of Gods [Göttlichen]' and to belong 'to the community of men'. Such are the names given to the terms in accordance with which the game of the world takes place and which have to be thought not separately but in line with the unity which they constitute. This is what is expressed by the prefix ge of the singular form Geviert. Dwelling now appears in the light of the game which gives it its dimensions, which is its measure. The polarity earth-world from 'The origin of the work of art' gives way to the world no longer understood as one of the terms of this opposition but as the unity of that game which joins earth and heaven, mortals and divinities.

From a schematic point of view one sees here a kind of 'square', which, by the way, is one of the most ancient figures of space, referring back as it does to the four cardinal regions (Gegende). All the same, for Heidegger, the Geviert is not a spatial representation. It signifies the gathering, the non-separation of terms which are distinct but between which a dwelling is played out. Unquestionably, though he makes no such allusion, Heidegger's meditation on the world reminds one of that passage from the Gorgias where Plato has Socrates say:

Wise men, Callicles, say that the heavens and the earth, gods and men, are bound together by fellowship and friendship and order and temperance and justice, and for this reason they call the sum of things the 'cosmos', the ordered universe, my friend, not the world of disorder or riot.⁴³

But what with Plato was motivated by considerations pertaining to equality, the harmony necessary to instil wisdom in the individual and justice in the city takes on with Heidegger the meaning of an implicit critique of uni-dimensional dwelling, that kind of dwelling which no longer accords a place to the sacred in as much as it reduces the truth within the limits of scientific objectification. The figure of the *Geviert* allows him to break down what he himself had called the 'spherical character' of modern metaphysics, meaning that sphere of subjectivity which absorbs the world into the sphere of representation, thereby preventing Being from being considered on the basis of the Openness of Being.⁴⁴

Let us get back to building and to dwelling. Once dwelling has been thought in the light of a world-play, of Geviert, which latter stands opposed to Gestell, that is to say, to any imposition of technico-scientific rationality upon the world as a whole, it becomes possible to address the question of the constructed thing without running the risk of missing the belonging of building to dwelling. The constructed thing is in this case the bridge, any bridge. The meditation does not take it into account as might the engineer or the architect but in such a way as to let the totality of relations which attach it to the earth stand out. For the bridge gathers together the banks (while still permitting the river to flow) and the heavens (from which it receives its waters). Furthermore, it gathers together men (to whom it affords a passage) and the Gods (whose patron saint dwells there in effigy). 45 Only in this way, that is to say, provided one takes account of the plenitude of its signifying relations is the bridge truly thought on the basis of dwelling. The constructed thing has as its essence the management of places or, as he writes: 'The place does not exist before the bridge.' In other words, a place qua dwelling place cannot be defined by simple geometrical co-ordinates and on the basis of a homogeneous representation of space. It is not in space. On the contrary, it is on the basis of such places as a bridge that 'places and the various ways in which space is managed can be determined'.46

This way of thinking about space on the basis of place was already present in 'The origin of the work of art' in the considerations relative to the subject of the Greek temple. However, the text 'Building dwelling thinking' places the main accent upon the specificity of the constructed thing which, qua place (Ort), is capable of generating space. As one of his recapitulative proposals puts it: 'The spaces we negotiate daily are 'managed' by places whose being is founded on things like buildings.'47 The simplicity of the meditation should not be allowed to obscure the

displacement which it aims to put into effect. It is a matter of tearing our thinking about space away from the horizon of a mathematization which reduces it without, for all that, going back to a 'physics' in the Aristotelian sense of the term. What he has in mind is another way of thinking place, whereby it is both given and expressed at one and the same time as dwelling place. For what was said of the thing is also valid of place, namely, that, from all antiquity, our thinking has been habituated to assess its being too poorly.

In 1969, in one of his last texts, Die Kunst und der Raum, Heidegger returns to the necessity of thinking the space installed by art in terms other than a subjectively conditioned transformation of the objective space of a physico-technical project. The key here are the plastic arts, a term which, in accordance with the German aesthetic tradition, applies equally well to architecture as to sculpture. Once again he appeals to that comprehension of art which emerged from 'The origin of the work of art', namely, art as the work of truth, in as much as truth means here the non-retreat, the uncovering of being (die Unverborgenheit des Seins). But if space managed or installed by a work of art can be called true in the sense that it is the place where an uncovering of being takes place, the question arises whether it is possible to discover what really constitutes the reality (Eigentümlichkeit) of this space. For Heidegger, this comes down to asking what lies concealed in the word Raum. He finds in the latter the dynamic trait of spacing, of das Räumen, in the English sense of 'making room'. This spacing is a liberating, a detaching with a view to the establishment of a dwelling. It is therefore a liberation with a view to the emergence of a dwelling place, of an apportionment of places. This meditation on spacing does not invert the relation placespace as it was thought in the previously quoted texts but brings out yet more forcibly the necessity for an inhabited space, founded on constructed things, to take place on the basis of the open space of a region (Gegend). Thus Die Kunst und der Raum interweaves the two threads of Heidegger's meditation on space: that which, starting out from an investigation of the being (Wesen) of the work of art, renews the thinking of the relation place-space and that which considers the region (Gegend). the free Extent (die freie Weite), on the basis of Ereignis. We shall return to this.

But what does the 'plastic' bring to the thinking about place and space, subject, of course, to the qualification that, as we stressed above, Heidegger's analyses are never directed toward a phenomenal appearing of individual works but attempt to read across art and its works a common structure of truth? While admitting the inadequate character of his remarks Heidegger attempts to think the plastic arts (architecture and sculpture) as 'places which become embodied and which, by opening a region and taking it into their safe-keeping gather together around

themselves a free space which accords to each thing a sojourn and to man a dwelling amidst things'.48 In this way, the abstract character of an approach which makes of a work a simple volume with an enveloping surface which brings out the contrast between an interior and an exterior space is called in question. This point of view is abstract in the sense that it separates the edifice or the sculpture from the dwelling and ignores its capacity to gather man together at the very heart of a region. In addition, the work makes the place appear in its relation to the void. A void which is not a lack or a defect but whose productive efficacity has to be shown in the coming into being of a place.

Leaving architecture behind (the Greek temple) and turning towards sculpture, could we perhaps find a body of work which corresponds to Heidegger's meditation? Even though his text does not include any reference to a specific work, we shall at this point risk the name of Henry Moore. Surely the works of Moore are able to play with the void in such a way that, by defying the principle of organic continuity, they often introduce a discontinuity into the body, even a void? In addition, surely they resist the enclosure of a museum and seek to give birth to a place which gathers around itself the space of a region? This at any rate is what Roland Penrose suggests when he writes:

No site seems to defy sculpture more radically than the sky and the open horizon of a countryside and yet it's here that Moore finds the greatest affinity between nature and his own works. The wild slopes of the Scottish moors where several of his bronzes have been erected reinforce the grandeur and the dignity of this presence.49

At the end of Die Kunst und der Raum, the reference to the plastic arts is revoked. The realization of the truth which reveals space in the work of art can do without any support, any plastic incarnation, and simply float in the air or vibrate in song, in the voice or in the sound of church bells. This is the meaning of the quotation from Goethe with which this meditation comes to an end:

Es ist nicht immer nötig, dass das Wahre sich verkörpere; schon genug, wenn es geistig umherschwebt und ubereinstimmung bewirkt, wenn es wie Glockenton ernst-freundlich durch die Lüfte wogt.50

Other passages by Heidegger from about this same period are in agreement with this saying by Goethe. So, for example, we find him writing in 'The end of philosophy and the commencement of thinking': 'However, the clearing, the open, is not only free for brightness and darkness, but also for resonance and echo, for sounding and resounding. The clearing is open for everything that is present and absent.'51

Texts such as these insist upon an experience of space as the Openness which is revealed just as well by the place instituted by the work of art (whose surface vibrates to the play of light and shade) as by the resounding of sound (the church bell, for example) or of the voice. The possibility of thinking about art without resorting to the banal opposition of the temporal and the spatial arts is hereby subtly announced, since sound or voices call for that very openness of space which they at the same time bring to light.

The formula Zeit-Raum refers to just this experience, this temporal as well as spatial proof of the Open, as the medium in which the donation of being occurs. Already employed in Beiträge zur Philosophie, that is to say, in the earliest outlines of a thinking about Ereignis, it is in 'Zeit und Sein' that this formula takes on its full meaning. In fact, it is in this text that there arises the equivalence: Es gibt Zeit, Es gibt Raum: an equivalence which itself refers back to the experience of the donation of being: Es gibt Sein. Since for Heidegger it is the primary task of thinking to be the guardian of being, this task requires that the relation of space to Ereignis be taken care of.

As regards the nomenclature Zeit-Raum, a question remains as to whether it has anything to do with you-zhou, the term by means of which Chinese thinking calls 'space-time' the universe. Is the posing of such a question an underlining of the necessity of what Heidegger himself terms the ineluctable dialogue with the East? But such an unavoidable alignment also seems to mean that the thinking of the donation of being with Heidegger definitely turns its back on any thinking about a transcendence beyond space and time. This is all the more evident in view of the fact that Heidegger, in his project of the 'destruction' of metaphysics, abolishes any philosophical distinction between cosmology, psychology and theology, thereby wishing to suppress any 'creaturely' dependence between cosmos and theos, between the cosmos and the creative logos.

Let us leave these questions in abeyance, no matter how critical they might be and conclude more modestly with the question of inhabited space. There can be no question that the Heideggerian meditation frees the question of space from the disciplinary boundaries within which it used to be incarcerated (geometry, physics, geography, cosmology) or the limits which continued to be assigned to it by transcendental philosophy and by the philosophies of interiority. In this sense it still remains to be shown how Heidegger distanced himself little by little from the kind of Augustinian thinking which was so near and dear to him right up to Sein und Zeit, especially in what concerned time. As we have tried to show, thinking about space in its inseparable connection with time became with him a thinking about dwelling, which latter is in itself a thinking about Being. To get to this point called for a conversion of the utilitarian and controlling viewpoint into a viewpoint consonant with the Opening of Being, a Being which is announced in every being but to which only poetic speech and meditative thinking is capable of responding, of appropriating in the manner required by *Ereignis*.

It nevertheless remains true that in his path of thought, his Denkweg, Heidegger left to one side all the social and political aspects of the space of dwelling. He missed their hidden dimensions. Moreover, the transformation in our ways of dwelling, of communicating, brought about by the scientifico-technical complex, were only envisaged by him from the negative standpoint of the forgetfulness of Being, the inverse of the positive standpoint of the domination of beings. It was Heidegger's personal idiosyncrasy that he refused the experience of the city, no doubt seeing in cosmopolitanism and cultural pluralism nothing but a rootlessness which might be captured in the expression 'the desert extends'. One certainly has no right to object to his preference for country paths and little towns like those German university towns in which he taught. And vet, without minimizing the defects of the cities and their degradation of our civilization, can one not also see therein the crucible of a unique experience, that of a plural society in which a new consciousness of self and of humanity might eventually emerge? This too deserves to be thought. Without wishing to underestimate the significance of his thinking about dwelling and the experience appropriate to it, should we not nevertheless recognize that, in the cities too, not to mention the planetary village, the Gods, as well as poets, may very well be present?

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

^{1 &#}x27;Zeit und Sein', in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969).

² ibid., p. 24.

³ As in the wake of Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), English tr. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), the Dasein's analysis of a Binswanger links the style of certain modes of behaviour to the hypertrophy of one temporal dimension (generally the past) in the way of being-in-the-world of the patient.

⁴ D. Franck, Heidegger et le problème de l'espace (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1986), p. 115. See also P. Ricoeur, Temps et Récit III (Paris: Seuil, 1985), chap. 3 ('Temporalité, Historialité, intra-temporalité') on the aporie of the Heideggerian hermeneutics of temporality. Finally, we should note that without ever thinking of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, in connection with the visual subject, refers to a 'unique space which separates and reunites, which upholds every cohesion (even that of the past and future) since this cohesion would not exist if it were not rooted in the same space', thereby rendering invalid any approach to the past and future which tried to dispense with space or which failed to recognize the interconnection of time and space.

- 5 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, S. 367.
- 6 Cf. Sein und Zeit, S. 367: 'Dann muss aber die spefizische Räumlichkeit des Daseins in der Zeitlichkeit gründen.'
 - 7 Sein und Zeit, S. 369.
- 8 E. Straus, Vom Sinn der Sinne, Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Psychologie, 2nd edn (Berlin: Springer, 1956), S. 292.
 - 9 GA 26, S. 174.
- 10 §69, (a) 'Die Zeitlichkeit des unsichtigen Besorgens' which privileges the 'present', as the temporal dimension of concernful preoccupation.
- 11 Einführung in die Metaphysik (Summer term 1935) contains the following remark which appears as a response to an objection to the subject of the strategy of transcendental foundation in Sein und Zeit, a response by means of which Heidegger aims in particular at distinguishing himself from Husserl: 'Aber das dort gemeinte "Transcendentale" ist nicht dasjenigedes subjektiven Bewusstseins, sondern es bestimmt sich aus der existenzialen-ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit des Daseins.' (Cf. GA 40, S. 20.) But in this way the ultimately foundational character of the temporality of Dasein is simply confirmed.
 - 12 Cf. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3, S. 254.
 - 13 Sein und Zeit, S. 102.
 - 14 Cf. Einführung in der Metaphysik, GA 40, S. 134, S. 148, etc.
 - 15 Sein und Zeit, S. 89.
 - 16 ibid., S. 68-9.
- 17 It is worth noting that in Einführung in der Metaphysik Heidegger does not use the expression Wohnzeug when he evokes the 'school' as a 'dwelling place'.
 - 18 Sein und Zeit, S. 103.
 - 19 ibid., S. 104.
- 20 See Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §29; tr. James Meredith as Critique of Judgment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).
- 21 A sketch of this problematic is to be found in my essay: 'Le chez-soi: espace et identité' in Architecture et Comportement, vol. 5 (Lausanne, 1989), pp. 127–34.
- 22 In a passage from Vom Wesen des Grundes (GA 9), Heidegger tries to explain the approach to the Me and the You on the basis of being-self by noting that in Sein und Zeit it was only a question of being-self, of neutral selfhood, even when the sexual difference was in question. What interests us here is to note that at no time does he articulate the question of selfhood in connection with intersubjective spacing, which latter is however implied in the distinction of 'mine-thine'.
- 23 See GA 26, S. 173-4. The work by D. Frank, Heidegger et le problème de l'espace turns around these questions.
 - 24 Sein und Zeit, S. 70.
 - 25 Cf. ibid., S. 211.
 - 26 ibid., S. 82.
 - 27 See ibid., §75, in part, also S. 389.
 - 28 Vom Wesen des Grundes, French tr., p. 130.
- 29 See on this question the excellent work by Pierre Kaufmann, L'Experience emotionnelle de l'espace (Paris: Vrin, 1967).
- 30 Die Frage nach dem Ding, French tr., pp. 95-6; tr. W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch as What is a Thing? (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967), pp. 84-6.
 - 31 ibid., p. 97.

- 32 ibid., p. 98. See here also the article by Catherine Chevalley (chap. 63, vol. IV of the present work.)
- 33 Cf. The Will to Power. See on this question Erich Heller's essay: 'Nietzsche's last words about art versus truth', which constitutes chap. 9 of The Importance of Nietzsche - Ten Essays (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988).

34 See Meyer Schapiro, and the discussion of this text by J. Derrida in 'La

verité en pointure' in La verité en peinture.

- 35 Cf. 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes' in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), S. 233. English tr. Albert Hofstadter in Poetry, Language, Thought (Harper & Row, 1971).
 - 36 On rootedness.
 - 37 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', S. 31, in Holzwege.
- 38 Cf. 'Heraklits Lehre vom Logos' in Heraklit, GA 55 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), S. 335.
- 39 Cf. 'Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken' in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, GA 13, S. 45ff.
 - 40 ibid., S. 47.
- 41 'Bauen Wohnen Denken' in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 4th edn (Tübingen: Neske, 1978), S. 140. English tr. Albert Hofstadter in Poetry, Language, Thought.
 - 42 ibid., S. 141.
 - 43 Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 508a.
 - 44 Heidegger, 'Wozu Dichter?' in Holzwege, S. 283.
 - 45 Heidegger, 'Bauen Wohnen Denken', S. 143ff.
 - 46 ibid., S. 148.
 - 47 ibid., S. 151.
- 48 Heidegger, 'Die Kunst und der Raum' (St Gallen: Eiker. Vlg, 1969), S. 11/GA 13, S. 208.
- 49 R. Penrose, 'Au coeur de la terre natale' in Hommage à Moore (Paris: éd. XXième siècle, 1972), p. 12.
 - 50 Goethe, cited by Heidegger, 'Die Kunst und der Raum', GA 13, S. 210.
- 51 Heidegger, 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens' in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), S. 72. English tr. Joan Stambaugh in On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 65.

Heidegger on time and being

Joseph J. Kockelmans

Introduction

On January 31, 1962, Heidegger gave a lecture at the University of Freiburg in a Studium Generale directed by Eugen Fink. The title of the lecture, 'Zeit und Sein',1 is a reference to the third section of the first part of Being and Time, which was originally announced under that title in 1927, but not published at the time. The first part of Being and Time was devoted to an interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and to an explanation of time as the transcendental horizon for the question concerning the meaning of Being.² In 1927, however, Heidegger felt he was not able to deal adequately with the theme indicated by the title of the third section of Part I of the book and decided therefore to publish his work in incomplete form.³ In 1962 Heidegger stated explicitly that the lecture, 'Zeit und Sein', represented an attempt to solve the question which had been left unanswered in Being and Time; what he said in his lecture on the issue, however, is substantially different from what he would have said about it, had the essay been written in 1927. 'That which is contained in the text of this lecture, written 35 years later, can no longer be linked up with the text of Sein und Zeit', Heidegger wrote. 'And yet the leading question has remained the same; however, this simply means that the question has become still more questionable and still more alien to the spirit of the time.'4

A first reading of the text shows that in 1962 Heidegger continued to subscribe to the basic ideas developed in Being and Time. Therefore, however new this essay may be in many aspects, one must read it so that its interpretation will remain in harmony with the basic conception of his original view.⁵ On the other hand it is clear, also, that the text of the lecture contains many elements which transcend the general perspective of Being and Time. This is due mainly to the fact that Heidegger's

investigations from 1927 to 1962 on the meaning of Being (Sein) opened up new insights which could not have been expected on the basis of Being and Time in 1927. One sees in the Time-lecture, too, that whereas Heidegger's view on the meaning of Being and the aboriginal Event (Ereignis) is the same as that found in the main works written from 1935 to 1962, the conception of time defended in it is relatively new, and the explanation of the relationship between time and Being and their mutual relationship to the aboriginal Event (which constitute the main themes of the lecture), again move along lines which are new and partly even surprising.

The questions I wish to deal with in this essay are the following:

1) Precisely what does the Time-lecture say about 'time'? 2) How does Heidegger conceive of the relationship between 'time' and Being?

3) What does he say about the relationship between 'time' and Being on the one hand and the aboriginal Event on the other? But in order to be able to compare the later view with the view found in *Being and Time*, I wish first to add a few reflections on Heidegger's original conception of time and attempt to present an idea of what Heidegger might have said in the section 'Time and being', if it had been published in 1927. It seems to me that this way of approaching the Time-lecture is the one which will best enable us to appreciate the new ideas suggested here.

I am well aware of the fact that all of these questions are difficult as well as of far-reaching importance for a genuine understanding of Heidegger's thought. Obviously, I shall not be able to deal exhaustively with them within the space limitations set for this essay. But I hope, nonetheless, to be able to bring to light the elements which are vital for a preliminary understanding of the contributions Heidegger wished to make in his 1961 essay.

I Heidegger's original conception of time (1927)

As the title of the book would suggest, the concept of time occupies a privileged position in *Being and Time*. Already in the book's brief preface Heidegger presents his view on how Being and time are to be related. 'Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question concerning the meaning of Being. . . . Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.' In the title of the first Part of the book Heidegger returns to this relationship: the interpretation of *Dasein* in terms of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question concerning the meaning of Being.

The first part of the Book consists of two major divisions: A preparatory analysis of *Dasein* and a second division on the relationship between

Dasein and temporality (Zeitlichkeit). In the first division Heidegger takes as his guiding clue the fact that the essence of man consists in his eksistence, that toward which man stands out is 'the world', and thus that for this reason man can be described as 'Being-in-the-world'. The main task of the first division is to unveil the precise meaning of this compound expression; but in so doing the final goal remains the preparation of an answer for the question concerning the meaning of Being. Heidegger justifies this approach to the Being-question by pointing out that man taken as Being-in-the-world, is the only being who can make himself transparent in his own mode of Being. The very asking of this question is one of this entity's modes of Being, and as such it receives its essential character from what is inquired about, namely Being. 'This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "Dasein".'8

A preparatory analysis of Dasein's Being can only serve to describe the Being of this being; it cannot interpret its meaning. As a preparatory procedure it merely tries to lay bare the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being. Once this horizon has been reached, the preparatory analytic of Dasein is to be repeated on a higher, genuinely ontological level. Heidegger repeats here that this horizon is to be found in temporality, taken as the meaning of the Being of Dasein. That is why on a second level all structures of Dasein, exhibited provisionally in the first division, must be re-interpreted as modes of temporality. But in thus interpreting Dasein as temporality, the question concerning the meaning of Being is not yet answered; only the ground is prepared here for later obtaining such an answer.9

If it is true that Dasein has a preontological understanding of Being and if it is true that temporality is the meaning of the Being of Dasein, then one can show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Thus time must be brought to light as the horizon for all understanding of Being and this horizon itself is to be shown in terms of temporality, taken as the Being of Dasein which understands Being. It is obvious that in this context our pre-philosophical conception of time is of no help and the same thing is true for the conception of time which has persisted in philosophy from Aristotle to Bergson. This traditional conception of time and the ordinary way of understanding time have sprung from temporality taken as the meaning of the Being of Dasein.10

Normally we conceive of time as an endless succession of 'nows', whereby the 'not-yet-now' (future) passes by the 'present now' to become immediately a 'no-longer-now'. The future thus consists of the 'nows' that have not yet come, whereas the past consists of the 'nows' that once were but no longer are; the present is the 'now' which at the moment is. On the basis of this conception we can make a distinction between temporal and non-temporal entities; 'temporal' then means 'being in time'. Thus time, in the sense of 'being in time', functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being. No one has ever asked the question of how time can have this distinctive ontological function; nor has anyone asked whether the authentic ontological relevance which is possible for time, is expressed when time is used in such a naively ontological manner. These questions must be asked here and it will be clear that if Being is to be understood in terms of time and if its various derivatives are to become intelligible in their respective derivations by taking time into consideration, then Being itself must be made visible in its 'temporal' character; but in this case 'temporal' no longer means 'being in time'. From this perspective even the non-temporal and supra-temporal are 'temporal' with regard to their being, and this not only privatively but also positively. It is this temporality of Being which must be worked out in the fundamental ontology whose task it is to interpret Being as such.¹¹

Temporality is furthermore the condition which makes historicity possible as a temporal kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses. Historicity stands here for the state of Being which is constitutive for Dasein's coming-to-pass (geschehen) as such. Dasein is as it already was and it is what it already was. It is its past, not only in the sense that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along 'behind' it, and which Dasein thus possesses as a kind of property which is still present-at-hand; Dasein is its past in the way of its own Being which, to put it roughly, 'comes-topass' out of its future on each occasion. Dasein has grown up in a traditional way of understanding itself interpretatively. Its own past, which includes the past of its generation, is not something which just follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it. But if Dasein itself as well as its own understanding are intrinsically historical, then the inquiry into Being itself is to be characterized by historicity as well. Thus by carrying through the question of the meaning of Being and by explicating *Dasein* in its temporality and historicity, the question itself will bring itself to the point where it understands itself as historical (historisch).12

After making these preliminary remarks which merely describe what is to be accomplished by the analytic of man's Being, Heidegger does not return to the question of temporality and time until the last chapter of the first division which is devoted to care (Sorge) as the genuine Being of Dasein. In trying to explain just what is meant by the compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' Heidegger first focuses on the ontological structure of the world, then he tries to answer the question of who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness, and finally proceeds to explain what is meant by 'Being-in-as-such'. In the introduction to this last issue Heidegger explicitly repeats that that being which is essentially constituted by its Being-in-the-world, is itself in every case its own 'there'

(Da). When one speaks of the lumen naturale in man, one refers to this existential-ontological structure of man that he is in such a way that he is his own 'there'. This means among other things that Dasein carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off; Dasein because of this 'there' is to be characterized by its disclosedness. By reason of this fundamental disclosedness Dasein, together with the Being-there (Da-sein) of the world, is 'there' for itself. In the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness three equally constitutive components are to be distinguished, namely original understanding, original mood, and logos (Rede).16

After explaining the meaning of the compound expression 'being-inthe-world' along these lines by describing its basic constitutive elements, Heidegger sets out to account for the unity of Dasein's Being: How are the unity and totality of that structural whole which we have pointed out, to be defined in an existential-ontological manner?¹⁷ Heidegger tries to answer this question by pointing out first that care (Sorge) is the unifying factor which integrates into a unity the multiple elements of the Being of that being whose Being is precisely such that it is concerned about its own Being. By taking his point of departure in a descriptive interpretation of anxiety (Angst) Heidegger is able to show that Dasein is a being who has the inexhaustible potentiality of transcending beings into Being; but, if Dasein has the ek-static nature of ek-sistence, it is always ahead of itself. Dasein's ek-sistence, however, is essentially codetermined by thrownness; Dasein is like a process which is not its own source; it always is already begun and yet it is still to be achieved. Finally, Dasein in its essential dependence upon world is fallen to the 'world', to the intramundane things of its everyday concern and thus caught by the way things are publicly interpreted by the 'they'. Eksistentiality taken together with thrownness and fallenness explains why the very Being of Dasein is to be understood as care. 18

In order to be able to show Dasein's Being in its totality Heidegger turns to Dasein's final term, death. He describes death as a genuine, but also as the ultimate possibility of man's Being. It is that possibility in which man's own Being-in-the-world as such is at stake. Death reveals to man the possibility of his further impossibility. In other words, death is that possibility which makes the potentiality which Dasein is, limited through and through. Man is thoroughly and irretrievably finite because his own death is that fundamental possibility which from the very beginning leaves it mark upon man's life and, thus, is a manner of Being which Dasein must assume as soon as it begins to ek-sist.¹⁹

In his fallen condition Dasein tries to forget the authentic meaning of death so that the question now becomes one of how one is to come to an authentic interpretation of the meaning of death, and thus to genuine authenticity. In Heidegger's view this can be shown by interpreting the basic constituents of care (ek-sistence, facticity = thrownness, and fallenness) in terms of an existential-ontological conception of death.

Dasein which has come to authentic Being knows that death is constitutive for all of its possibilities and that the ultimate possibility of its own ek-sistence is to give itself up.20 If Dasein genuinely realizes this then it no longer flees from the definitiveness of its end and accepts it as constitutive of its finitude and thus makes itself free for it.21 Now at the moment that Dasein understands death as its ultimate possibility, as that possibility which makes its own Being impossible, and at the moment that it accepts this final possibility as its very own by listening to the voice of conscience,²² Dasein begins to become transparent to itself as that which it is in itself, in its own Self. For death does not just appear to Dasein in an impersonal way; it lays claim to it as this individual Dasein. By listening to the voice of conscience, by really understanding the genuine meaning of death in 'guilt', and by accepting it as its own death, Dasein breaks away from inauthenticity in resolve.²³

Now it will be obvious that if all of this is to be true, then man's Being must be intrinsically temporal and temporality, in the final analysis, must constitute the primordial ontological basis of Dasein's ek-sistentiality.24 For what does the authentic man do? He realizes his radical finitude by anticipating death, by including it in advance in every project. By anticipating death in all its projects Dasein receives its Being precisely as its own, as its ownmost 'personal' ek-sistence so that it really comes to itself.25 But this coming-to-itself is what is meant by 'future', if the term is taken in its primordial sense: This letting itself come towards itself in that distinctive possibility which Dasein has to put up with, is the primordial phenomenon of Zu-kunft, coming-towards, future.²⁶

But Dasein's temporality extends not only to the future; it has also the character of a 'having been'. Dasein can project itself towards its own death only insofar as it already is. In order to realize its ownmost Being, Dasein has to accept, together with its own death, also its thrownness, its facticity, that which it is already. Death cannot be its death if it has no relation to what Dasein already is. Authentically futural, Dasein is equally authentically 'having been' (Gewesen). To anticipate one's ultimate and ownmost possibility is to come back understandingly to one's ownmost 'having-been'.²⁷

Thus far we have seen that Dasein's coming is a coming to a Self that already is as having-been; on the other hand, Dasein is what it has been only as long as the future continues to come. We must now turn to temporal nearness, the present. According to Heidegger, the genuine meaning of the present consists in a 'making present' (Gegenwärtigen). Dasein, as temporalizing, makes things present; this is the essential meaning of the present as it primordially appears to Dasein. Anticipating resolve discloses the actual situation of the Da in such a way that eksistence, in its action, can be circumspectively concerned with what is factually ready-to-hand in the actual situation, that is, letting that which has environmental presence be encountered, is possible only by making such a being present.28

The 'making present' of what has presence presupposes, on the one hand, the future as anticipation of Dasein's possibilities and, on the other, the return to what has-been. By virtue of Dasein's understanding of its own Being, thus, Dasein is able to understand the human situation as a whole: at the same time intramundane beings can manifest themselves to it in their belonging to a world. Thus, what Heidegger calls 'making-present' presupposes the 'having been' and the 'future'. The present is as the resultant of the two other ek-stases of time. 'Having been' arises from the 'future' in such a way that the future which has already been releases the present from itself. What is meant by temporality is precisely the unity of this structural whole; the future which makes present in the process of having been. Only insofar as Dasein is characterized by temporality can it realize its authentic Being. Thus temporality reveals itself here as the meaning of authentic care.²⁹

From all of this, it becomes clear that *Dasein* can realize its total unity only by temporalizing itself. This 'becoming temporal' includes at the same time future, having-been, and present. These three 'phases' of time imply one another and nonetheless are mutually exclusive. For this reason Heidegger calls them the 'ek-stases' of primordial time. We must now examine the nature of the relations which connect these ek-stases of time with the structural elements of care. According to Heidegger, care must be characterized by ek-sistence (having to be ahead of itself), facticity or thrownness (already being in the world), and fallenness (being absorbed in intramundane things). As basically Being-able-to-be (Seinkönnen), Dasein is always ahead of itself, ahead of what it actually is. That is why its understanding has the character of a project. It is precisely because Dasein possesses the ontological structure of projecting (Verstehen) that it can always be ahead of its actual being. However, being ahead-of-itself, Dasein always is already in a world and is of necessity involved in it. Thus, Dasein cannot go beyond itself without being 'thrown' into the world. This means that ek-sistence as Being-ahead-ofitself always includes facticity. Finally, Dasein, which is in a world into which it has been thrown, always discovers itself there as absorbed by that which immediately manifests itself there and with which it deals concernfully (fallenness). But now the relationship between Dasein's essential temporality and care will be clear at once. Heidegger expresses it as follows: "The "ahead-of-itself" (ek-sistentiality) is grounded in the future. The "being-already-in" (facticity) makes known the "having been". "Being-at" (fallenness) becomes possible in "making-present". "30"

After showing that the very Being of *Dasein* consists in care whereas

care, in turn, is understood in terms of temporality, Heidegger tries to explain how man's temporality in its modifiability is the principle for the distinction of his possible modes of Being. Dasein is essentially temporal; it temporalizes time. If it takes the temporalization of time upon itself, it is in an authentic way; however, if it takes itself as a temporal thing which finds itself in a temporal horizon, it is in an inauthentic manner. One has to realize, however, that Dasein would not be able to temporalize time authentically, if man did not always find himself already in a temporal openness, somehow connected with his own 'inner-temporality'. In other words, man can ek-sist authentically only if in his historicity he expressly endures his destiny of having to temporalize time as finite, that is as a mortal being. But this means that 'inner-temporality' and historicity are inseparable. When man turns toward historicity, he is able to ek-sist authentically; however, if he turns to his own 'inner-temporality' he forgets himself in his concern for what is ready-to-hand or in his presentation of what is present-at-hand.31

Ek-sistence, Being-present-at-hand, and Being-ready-to-hand, thus, are intrinsically connected with man's temporality. But this means that the temporality of *Dasein* is not only the principle for the division of *Dasein*'s modes of Being, but the time which is temporalized by *Dasein* is also the principle of the division of the meaning of Being into possible significations of Being (namely Being as ek-sistence, as present-at-hand, as ready-to-hand, etc.). But this means, in turn, that a description of the various interplayings of the three dimensions of temporality can give us a guiding-clue for the division of the significations of Being.³²

We have defined Dasein's Being as care and found that the ontological meaning of care is temporality. We have seen, also, that temporality constitutes the disclosedness of Dasein's there. Now in the disclosedness of this 'there', the world is disclosed along with it. But this means that world, taken as Total-meaningfulness, must likewise be grounded in temporality. The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, taken as ek-static unity, has something like a horizon within it. For ek-stases are not simple 'raptures' in which one gets carried away; rather, there belongs to each ek-stasis a kind of 'whither' to which one is carried away. Let us call this whither of the ek-stases the 'horizonal schema'. The schema then in which Dasein comes toward itself futurally is the 'for the sake of which'; the schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in its thrownness is to be taken as that 'in the face of which' it has been thrown and that 'to which' it has been abandoned; this characterizes the horizonal schema of what has been. Finally the horizonal schema for the present is defined by the 'in order to'.

The unity of the horizonal schemata of future, present, and having been, is grounded in the ek-static unity of temporality. The horizon of

temporality as a whole determines that whereupon each ek-sisting being factically is disclosed. With its factical Being-there, a Being-able-to-be is projected in the horizon of the future, its being-already is disclosed in the horizon of having-been, and that with which Dasein concerns itself in each case is discovered in the horizon of the present. The horizonal unity of the schemata of these ek-stases connects in a primordial way the relationships of the 'in order to' with the 'for the sake of which' so that on the basis of the horizonal constitution of the ek-static unity of temporality, there belongs to Dasein in each case something like a world that has been disclosed. Just as the present (Gegenwart) arises in the unity of the temporalizing of temporality out of the future and the having-been, so in the same way the horizon of a present temporalizes itself equiprimordially with *those* of the future and the having-been. Thus, insofar as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world is. In temporalizing itself in regard to its own Being, Dasein as temporality is essentially in a world because of the ek-statico-horizonal constitution of his temporality. The world, therefore, is not ready-to-hand as a piece of equipment, nor present-at-hand as a thing, but it temporalizes itself in temporality. It is there with the outside-of-itself typical for the ek-stases. If no Dasein ek-sists, then no world is 'there' either.

In all forms of concern and in all objectification the world is always already presupposed; for all of these forms are possible only as ways of Being-in-the-world. Having its ground in the horizonal unity of ek-static temporality, the world is transcendent. It is already ek-statically disclosed before any entities-within-the-world can be encountered. Temporality maintains itself ek-statically within the horizons of its own ek-stases and in temporalizing itself it comes back from these ek-stases to those entities which are encountered in the 'there'. Thus the Total-meaningfulness which determines the structure of the world is not a network of forms which a worldless subject lays over some kind of material; Dasein, understanding itself and its world ek-statically in the unity of the 'there', rather comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back to these entities in understanding is the existential meaning of letting them be encountered by making them present.³³

There is finally a relationship between Dasein's spatiality and its temporality. Dasein must be considered as temporal and 'also' as spatial coordinately. In clarifying this relationship, Heidegger says, it cannot be our intention to explain Dasein's 'spatio-temporal' character by pointing out that *Dasein* is an entity which is 'in space as well as in time'. Furthermore, since temporality is the very meaning of the Being of care, it will be impossible to 'reduce' temporality to spatiality. On the other hand, to demonstrate that spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality is not tantamount to deducing space from time. What we must aim at is the uncovering of the temporal conditions for the possibility of the spatiality which is characteristic of *Dasein* – a spatiality upon which the uncovering of space within the world is to be founded. When we say that *Dasein* is spatial, we do not mean to say that as a thing *Dasein* is present-at-hand in space. *Dasein* as such does not fill up space, but it rather takes space in, this to be understood in the literal sense. In ek-sisting *Dasein* has already made free for itself a leeway (*Spielraum*). It determines its own position or location by coming back from the space it has made free to the place which it occupies.

When Dasein makes room for itself it does so by means of directionality and de-severance (by making distances disappear). How is this possible on the basis of Dasein's temporality? Let us give an example of our everyday concern with things. When Dasein makes room for itself and the things with which it is concerned, it has first to discover a region in which it can assign places to the things in question. In so doing it must bring these things close, and situate them in regard to one another and in regard to itself. Dasein thus has the character of directionality and de-severance. All of this, however, presupposes the horizon of a world which has already been disclosed. But if this is so, and if it is essential for Dasein to be in a mode of fallenness, then it is clear also that only on the basis of its ek-statico-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space. For the world is not present-at-hand in space and yet only within a world does space let itself be discovered.³⁴

It seems to me that this brief resumé of some of the basic ideas of Heidegger's original conception of time should suffice to explain what Heidegger intends to say in his 1962 lecture. But before turning to the lecture itself I wish first to reflect for a moment upon the intrinsic limitations of his original view of time, particularly with respect to the problem concerning the meaning of Being.

II From Being and Time to 'Time and being'35

In Heidegger's view Being and Time (1927) was meant to be a 'fundamental ontology' which was to prepare the way for a 'genuine ontology' whose main task it would be to focus on the question concerning the meaning of Being. Fundamental ontology consists substantially in an analytic of Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world, to be developed by means of a hermeneutic phenomenology. In the first part of the book Heidegger conceives of Dasein in terms of care, whereas in the second part care is understood as temporality: The meaning of the Being of Dasein is temporality. All of this was to prepare the answer for a more basic question concerning the temporal character (Zeithaftigkeit) of the meaning of Being itself. 'In our considerations hitherto, our task has been to interpret the primordial whole of factical Dasein with regard to

its possibilities of authentic and inauthentic Being, and to do so in an existential-ontological manner in terms of its very basis. Temporality has manifested itself as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of the Being of care. . . . Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's Being is only one way which we may take. Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general.'36 In other words, once temporality is laid bare as the meaning of *Dasein*'s Being, the decisive step is still to be taken: The step namely which leads from this kind of temporality to the temporality characteristic of the meaning of Being. This last step is not taken in *Being and Time*. Heidegger published the book in an incomplete form and in the last sentences of it pointed to the work that in his view remains to be done: 'The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ek-static projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ek-static temporality temporalizes. How is this mode of temporalizing temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?'37

By publishing the book in an incomplete form in 1927 Heidegger admitted that he had not completely succeeded in the task he had set for himself. The basic question he encountered was the following: Once the temporality of Dasein is grasped in the unity of its three ek-stases, how can this temporality of *Dasein* be interpreted as the temporality of the understanding of Being and how is the latter, in turn, related to the meaning of Being? Originally Heidegger thought he had found a way to answer this question, but it appeared almost immediately that that way led away from what he really wished to accomplish, namely to show that time is the transcendental horizon of the question of Being.³⁸ For on the basis of the analyses as they are actually found in Being and Time it is still not yet clear precisely what is to be understood by 'transcendence' taken as the overcoming of beings in the direction of Being. In addition there is the question of the exact relationship between *Dasein*'s temporality and time as the transcendental horizon for the question concerning the meaning of Being. Exactly what is meant here by 'transcendental'? This much is clear: The term 'transcendental' does not mean the objectivity of an object of experience as constituted by consciousness (Kant, Husserl), but rather refers to the project-domain for the determination of Being as seen from the viewpoint of Dasein's there.39 But even in this supposition it is still not yet clear what the precise relationship is between the temporality of *Dasein* and time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being, because it is not clear how Dasein's understanding of Being is to be related to the meaning of Being. Heidegger says that meaning is that in which the intelligibility of something maintains itself.⁴⁰ The meaning of Being then is that in which the intelligibility of Being maintains itself. But what is the precise relationship between Being's intelligibility and Dasein's understanding of Being? In the introduction to the second part of the book Heidegger argues that 'to lay bare the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible, is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all - an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the being called *Dasein*'. 41 But precisely what is meant by 'being tantamount to'? If one takes this statement literally, it means that Dasein has an absolute priority over the meaning of Being and then relativism seems to be the final outcome of the investigation. Heidegger saw this danger and it took him a number of years to find a way to avoid it without being forced into a position of having to appeal to a 'God of the philosophers', regardless of the concrete form in which this 'God' might be proposed.

There are a number of other issues which did not receive final answers in Being and Time, problems such as the idea of phenomenology, the relationship between ontology and science, the relationship between time and space, a further determination of logos, the relationship between language and Being, the relationship between Being and truth, etc.⁴² But rather than focusing on any one of these, let us turn our attention again to the problem concerning the relationship between Dasein's temporality and time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being, and this time from a slightly different point of view.

In Being and Time Heidegger was guided by the idea that in the ontological tradition Being was understood mainly as presence-at-hand⁴³ as continuous presence, and thus from one of the dimensions of time, namely the present. Heidegger wished to bring the onesidedly accentuated 'continuous presence' back into the full, pluridimensional time, in order then to try to understand the meaning of Being from the originally experienced time, namely temporality. In his attempt to materialize this goal, he was guided by a second basic idea, namely that each being can become manifest with regard to its Being in many ways, so that one has to ask the questions of just what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings. But this question raises others: What, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold in various modes? How can these various modes be brought into a comprehensible harmony? Whence does Being as such (not merely being as being) receive its ultimate determination?44

Heidegger had studied some of these modes of Being in the interpretative analyses of Being and Time, and thus, at the very end of the book. found himself led to consider the question of whether or not there is a basic meaning of Being from which all other meanings can be derived by taking time (understood as temporality) as a guiding clue. In view of the fact that man's understanding is intrinsically historical, the further question must be asked of whether man's understanding of Being's meaning is intrinsically historical, also, or whether the understanding of Being can perhaps in some sense have a 'supra-temporal' character. In Being and Time Heidegger was unable to answer the first question adequately because he had not been able to find a satisfactory solution for the second. For upon closer consideration his conception of historicity as found in Being and Time seems to be ambiguous. Historicity is described in the book first as the genuine temporalization of time and the principle of the distinction between Dasein's modes of Being, and then later it is said that historicity is the medium in which all ontological understanding must maintain itself.45 It does not seem to be possible to defend both theses simultaneously; and even if there should be a position from which one could defend both, even then it would still not be clear in what sense the meaning of Being itself is affected by historicity.

In the decade following the publication of Being and Time Heidegger eliminated part of the initial ambiguity by first examining more carefully how different significations of Being become differentiated in the fundamental meaning of Being and how temporality, indeed, is the principle of these distinctions. In so doing, he could maintain his original view that the meaning of Being is the 'Ground' in which all significations of Being are to be grounded and from which all understanding of Being nourishes itself. On the other hand, however, the meaning of Being cannot be understood in terms of an eternal standard being ('the God of the philosophers'); rather it must be conceived of as an abysmal, groundless 'ground'. For the fact that Being comes-to-pass in the way it does, and for the fact that an understanding of Being emerges in the way we actually find it, no one can indicate a ground, because each process of grounding already presupposes the meaning of Being. When the meaning of Being lets a determinate signification of Being become the standard signification, then it 'groundlessly' bars other significations and even itself as the ground of the manifold possible other significations. It is in this sense that Being shows and hides itself at the same time and why the meaning of Being is to be called 'truth', unconcealment, whose coming-to-pass is and remains a mystery and whose 'happening' is historical in a sense which cannot be understood on the basis of what we usually call history.

Furthermore, the world taken as the building-structure of the truth of Being is that organized structure which is stratified in many ways and is constructed according to the manner in which time temporalizes itself. This temporalization of time itself is historical and thus the stratification of the organized structure of Being's truth is historical, too; as such it can be distinguished in various epochs. In each epoch we find in the world as the building-structure of the truth of Being manifold organized and systematized 'layers' of meaning all of which refer to basic forms of 'experience' between which there is a tension, and concerning which it is difficult to see how they can all belong together. Heidegger's main concern is to explain how in a certain epoch (particularly our own) all these 'layers' can belong together in a whole, the world, and how in this world as the building-structure of Being's truth for this particular era the 'courses of Being are already traced out' and how therefore Being can encounter us in these particular, different ways, and not in others; thus how in this world Being itself shows and hides itself at the same time.⁴⁶

But between 1927 and 1962 Heidegger never explicitly returned to the main question underlying the basic idea which directed all of these investigations: The nature of time. It is obvious that the conception of time as temporality, found in *Being and Time*, is not adequate to account for all of this. Whereas in *Being and Time*, where Being and time are concerned, the priority is attributed to man, in the later works the privileged position is given to Being. If the original relationship between Being and time is to be maintained, then it would seem logical to attribute a privileged position to time in the coming-to-pass of truth, also. But if both Being as well as time do not depend upon man in the final analysis, do they then perhaps refer to 'something' else which precedes them in some sense? This is indeed the main theme of the Time-lecture which we shall now consider.

III 'Time and being' (1962)

The 'Zeit und Sein' lecture begins with a short preface in which Heidegger explains that he intends to say something about the attempt 'which thinks Being without any reference to a foundation of Being from the side of beings'. ⁴⁷ In other words, in this lecture there will be no reference to a *summum ens* taken as *causa sui* which could be conceived of as the foundation of all that is; nor is Being to be understood here within the perspective of the metaphysical interpretation of the ontological difference, according to which Being is thought of merely for the sake of beings. ⁴⁸ Heidegger believed such an attempt to be necessary for at least two reasons. First of all, without such an attempt it will be impossible to bring to light in a genuine way the Being of all that which we today encounter in the world as beings and which are fundamentally determined by the essence of technique (*Ge-stell*). ⁴⁹ Secondly such an attempt is necessary if one is adequately to determine the relationship between man and that which until now has been called 'Being'. ⁵⁰

Many people believe that philosophy should be oriented toward 'world-wisdom'. According to Heidegger, philosophy today finds itself in a position in which it must stay away from useful 'life-wisdom', and must

abandon immediate understanding, because a form of thought has become necessary from which everything that makes up the world in which we live receives its determination (works of art, complicated physical theories, technical instruments, computers, etc.)⁵¹

What is contained in the lecture to follow, Heidegger says, is no more than an attempt and a venture. The venture consists in the fact that the essay is formulated in propositions whereas its theme is such that this way of 'saying' is incongruous. What is important in the essay, therefore, is not so much the propositions of which it consists, but rather that to which the questions and answers by means of which Heidegger tried to approach that theme, point (zeigen). These questions and answers presuppose an experience of 'the thing itself', and it is for this experience on the part of the reader that Heidegger's essay tries to prepare.⁵²

1 Being and time

The first part of the essay deals with the relationship between Being and time. These two themes are mentioned together here because, from the very origin of Western thought, Being has been interpreted as Beingpresent (Anwesen), while Being-present and Presence (Anwesenheit) refer to the present (Gegenwart) which, in turn, together with the past and the future constitute what is characteristic of time. Thus as Beingpresent Being is determined by time. But in how far is Being determined by time? Why, in what way, and from what is it that time re-sounds in Being? It is obvious that any attempt to think about this relationship with the help of our everyday conceptions of Being and time is doomed to failure.

In our everyday life we say that things are in time; or also that they have their time. This way of speaking, however, does not apply to Being, for Being is not a thing. And since Being is not a thing it is not in time either. And yet Being is determined by time. On the other hand, what is in time we call the temporal. The temporal refers to what elapses with time. Thus time itself elapses; but while elapsing continuously, time nevertheless remains as time. Now 'to remain' means 'not to perish', and thus 'Being-present'. But this means that time is determined by a kind of Being. But how then can Being be determined by time? We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that Being is not a thing and thus not something temporal, although as Being-present it is determined by time. And on the other hand, time is not a thing and thus not something-which-is, and yet in elapsing it permanently remains, without it itself being something temporal. Therefore, Being and time determine one another in such a way that Being is not something temporal and time is not something-which-is.

By adopting Hegel's dialectic approach one could try to overcome these contradicting statements by transcending Being and time toward a

higher and more encompassing unity. But such an approach would certainly lead away from the 'things themselves' and their mutual relations; for such a procedure would certainly no longer deal with time as such nor with Being as such, nor with their mutual relationship. The genuine problem with which we are confronted here seems precisely to consist in the question of whether the relationship between Being and time is a relationship which results from a certain combination of Being and time, or whether perhaps this relationship itself is primary, so that Being and time result from it. In order to find an answer for this question we must try to think circumspectly about these 'things themselves', that is about Being and time, which are perhaps the two main themes of thought. The labels 'Being and time' and 'Time and being' refer to the relationship between these two themes, to that which keeps these two themes together. To reflect circumspectly upon this relationship is the theme of thought.53

Being is a theme of thought, but it is not a thing; time is also a theme of thought, but it is nothing temporal. Of a thing we say: It is. With respect to Being and time we are more careful; here we say: There is Being, and there is time. 54 'There is', this English expression stands for the German 'Es gibt'. This can be understood to mean: 'It gives' in the sense of 'there is something which grants'.55 If we follow this suggestion then the question is one of what this 'It' is which grants Being and time. And also: What is Being which is granted here? What is time which is given here? Let us first try to think about Being in order to grasp it in what is characteristic of it.

Being which marks each being as such means Being-present (Anwesen). In regard to that which is present, Being-present can be conceived of as letting-something-be-present. It is on this letting-be-present that we must focus our attention here. It is characteristic for this letting-be-present that it brings something into unconcealment. Letting-be-present means to unveil, to bring into the open. In the process of unveilment there is a kind of granting at work which grants Being-present, while it lets-bepresent that which is present, namely beings. In this process we come again upon a granting, and thus upon an 'It' which grants.⁵⁶ We do not yet know precisely what this granting means, nor do we know what this 'It' refers to. One thing is clear, however. If one wishes to think about what is characteristic of Being as such, he must abandon the attempt to understand Being from the viewpoint of beings, to conceive of Being as the ground of beings. On the contrary, he must focus his attention on this typical granting and that mysterious 'It' which grants. Being somehow belongs to this granting; it is the gift of the 'It' which grants. Being is not something which is found outside the granting, as is the case with a common gift. In the granting Being as Being-present becomes changed. As letting-be-present it belongs to the unveilment itself, and as gift it

remains contained in the granting. For Being is not. Being as the unveilment of Being-present is granted by a mysterious 'It'.57

Heidegger is of the opinion that the meaning of this 'It grants Being' can be explained in a clearer way by means of a careful reflection on the various changes which have taken place in what has been called 'Being'. As we have mentioned, since the origin of Western thought in Greece, Being has been referred to as Being-present. And even today, in the era of modern technique, Being is still pointed to as Being-present, namely as Being-present in its availability on which one can continuously count (Ge-stell). The fact that Being must be referred to as Being-present manifests itself in an analysis of what is ready-to-hand and present-athand. We find the same thing back when we reflect on the meaning of Hen, Logos, Idea, ousia, energeia, substantia, actualitas, perceptio, monad, objectivity, Reason, Love, Spirit, Power, Will-to-will in the eternal return of the same.

The unfolding of the fullness which shows itself in these changes manifests itself at first sight as a history of Being. However, Being has no history in the way a city or a nation has its history. The history-like character of the history of Being is determined only and exclusively from the way Being comes-to-pass, that is from the way in which 'It' grants Being.58

Now from the very beginning people have reflected on Being, but no one has ever thought about the 'It' which grants Being. This 'It grants' withdraws in favor of that which it grants, namely Being. And Being itself, in turn, was almost immediately thought of in terms of beings, that is in its relationship to beings.

According to Heidegger, the kind of granting which grants only its gift but which itself withdraws should be called 'sending' (Schicken). This becomes immediately clear when one compares the case in which someone gives someone else a present with the case in which he sends it to him. Viewing it from this perspective, one may say that Being which is granted is that which has been sent and which (as sent) remains in each one of the modifications which we find in history. Thus, the historical character of the history of Being must be determined from that which is characteristic of this sending, and not from an undetermined coming-topass.

History of Being, therefore, means mittence of Being. And in the various ways of sending, the sending itself as well as that mysterious 'It' which sends, hold themselves back in the various manifestations in which Being shows itself. To hold oneself back means in Greek epochē. That is why we speak of epochs of Being's mittence. Epoch does not mean, therefore, a certain period of time in the happening, but the basic characteristic of the sending itself, that is to say this holding-itself-back in favor of the various manifestations of the gift, namely Being with

respect to the discovery of beings. The sequence of the epochs in Being's sending is neither arbitrary nor can it be predicted with necessity. And yet what is co-mitted manifests itself in the mittence also, just as well as that-which-belongs-to manifests itself in the belonging-together of the epochs. These epochs overlap in their sequence so that the original mittence of Being as Presence is more and more concealed in the various modifications of the unveilment. Only the 'demolition' of these concealments (destruction) will grant to thought a provisional insight into what then manifests itself as the mittence of Being.

When Plato represents Being as *Idea*, when Aristotle represents it as energeia, Kant as positing, Hegel as absolute Concept, and Nietzsche as Will to power, then these are doctrines which are not just accidentally brought forth. They are rather the 'words' of Being itself as answers to an address which speaks in the sending but which hides itself therein, that is to say in that mysterious 'It grants Being'. Each time contained in a mittence which withdraws itself, Being is unconcealed for thought in its epochal variational fullness. Thought remains bound to the tradition of these epochs of Being's mittence. This is true also, and particularly so, when thought reflects upon the question of how and from what Being itself receives the determinations which each time are characteristic of it, namely from this mysterious 'It grants Being'. For this granting manifests itself as mittence.

But how are we to conceive of this 'It' which grants Being? From the preceding pages as well as from the title of this essay, Heidegger says, one might expect that this is to be found in time.⁵⁹

Briefly summarizing this part of the lecture, we may say that Heidegger for the greater part repeats his view of Being as contained in Letter on Humanism (1947) and later works. Just as in Letter on Humanism, Heidegger states here that the basic conception of Being and Time is to be maintained in this new perspective, although he warns explicitly that we should not confuse Dasein's historicity with the 'historicity' of Being itself. Finally, in this part of the lecture many references are made to the aboriginal Event (Ereignis) under the guise of that mysterious 'It' which grants. Heidegger is to return to this in the last part of the lecture. But let us first look at his view on time.

We all know what time is and just as was the case with Being we have a common sense conception of it. It will be clear once again that this common sense conception is of no help here. We do not yet know what is characteristic of time as such. We have just seen that what characterizes Being, that is to say that to which it belongs and in which it remains contained, manifests itself in that mysterious 'It grants'. That which is characteristic of Being is not something being-like (Seinsartiges). Trying to understand what Being is, we are led away from Being toward the mittence which grants Being as a gift. We may expect that the same thing will be true for time and that is why our common sense conception will be of no avail here, either. And yet the titles 'Being and time,' and 'Time and being' suggest that we try to understand what is characteristic of time, the moment we try to understand what is characteristic of Being. For, as we have seen, Being means Being-present, letting-something-be present. Presence.

Presence is not the present, although the former almost immediately leads to the latter. Present (Gegenwart) suggests past and future, the earlier and the later in regard to the 'now'. Usually time is described in terms of the 'now', assuming that time itself is the 'sum' of present, past, and future. We seldom think of time in terms of Presence. The conception of time in terms of the 'now', as a series of 'nows' which succeed one another, of a one-dimensional continuum, was suggested by Aristotle and has since been defended by many thinkers. It is this time which we refer to when we measure time, when a 'temporal interval' is to be measured.60

But obviously all of this does not answer the question of precisely what time is. Is time and does time have a place? Time is obviously not nothing. If we wish to express ourselves more carefully, we should say here again: There is time (Es gibt Zeit). Time must be understood from the 'present' and this must not be taken as 'now' but as Presence.

But what is to be understood by Presence (Anwesenheit)? Presence is that which determines Being as letting-be-present and revealing. But what kind of thing is this? In Anwesen (Being-present) we find wesen and wesen means währen (to last, to continue). But by realizing this we much too often jump immediately from währen to dauern (to last, to endure); this duration, in turn, conceived of in the light of our common sense conception of time, is mostly understood as an interval between one 'now' and another one. However, our speaking about An-wesen demands that we become aware of a staying and lingering (weilen) and dwelling (verweilen) in this währen as Anwähren (continuous lasting). This An-wesen concerns us men. But who are we? In trying to answer the question we must again proceed carefully; for it could very well be the case that man is to be defined in terms of what we are trying to reflect on; man himself is affected by the Presence while this 'goes on' and it is because of this that he himself can be present to all that is present and absent. Man stands in that which thus goes on (Angang) and in which Presence takes place; it is man who receives the Presence which that mysterious 'It' grants as a gift, while he learns what appears in the letting-be-present. If this were not so, man would not be man.⁶¹

It seems that by talking about man, we have lost the way, Heidegger says; for we are trying to determine what is characteristic of time. In some sense this may be true, and yet we are closer to what we are looking for than it may seem at first sight. Presence means: The continuous lingering-dwelling (verweilen) which concerns man, reaches him, and is granted to him. But from where does this granting reaching come? We must realize here, Heidegger continues: 1) that man is always concerned with the presence of something which is present, and that he never immediately heeds the Presence itself; 2) that which is no longer present still concerns man and as such it is still present to him; in what has been, Presence is still granted in some sense; 3) that which is not yet presented is present in the sense that it approaches man; in that which approaches man, Presence is already granted to him. From this it follows that Presence does not always have the character of the present.

But how are we to determine this granting of the Presence in the present, past, and future? Does this granting consist in the fact that it reaches us, or does it reach us because it is in itself a granting? There is no doubt that the future grants and adduces the past, whereas the past grants the future. And this mutual granting gives the present at the same time. In this way we attribute a temporal character to this mutual granting. And thus it is not right to call the unity of this mutual granting time, for time is not something temporal; nor can we say that present, past, and future are there 'at the same time'. And yet their mutual granting of one another to each other belongs together in a unity. This unity which unites them must be determined from what is characteristic of them, namely from the fact that they grant one another to each other. But what is it that they grant to each other? Themselves, that is to say the Presence which is granted in them. That which comes to light in the mutual granting of one another to each other of present, past, and future is the Open, or also the time-space. This time-space precedes what we commonly call space and time. It is a three-dimensional Open in that it comes to light by means of a three-fold granting of present, past, and future 62

But from what are we to determine the unity of the three dimensions of this time-space? We know already that a Presence is at work in the coming of what is not-yet-present as well as in the having-been of what is no-longer-present, and in what we usually call the present. This Presence does not belong to one of these three dimensions to the exclusion of the others. While the three dimensions give themselves over to one another and precisely in this passing of the one to the other (*Zuspiel*) still another granting manifests itself which opens up a fourth dimension. It is this latter granting which is characteristic of time itself and which brings about the Presence which is typical in each case for the coming, the having-been, and the present. It keeps these latter dimensions separated, and nevertheless it keeps them in each other's proximity, also, so that these three dimensions can remain close to one another. This is why one can call the primordial granting in which literally everything begins (anfängt) and in which the unity of genuine time precisely consists, a

proximity which brings near (nahernde Nähe). It brings close to one another the coming, the having-been, and the present by keeping them apart. For it keeps open the having-been by denying it its coming as present, just as it keeps open the coming by withholding the present in this coming, that is by denying it its being present. Thus the proximity which brings near has the character of a denial and withholding.⁶³

Time is not. 'It' gives time. The granting which gives time is to be determined from the proximity which denies and withholds. 'It' grants the Open of time-space and guards that which is denied in the havingbeen and that which is withheld in the coming. This granting thus is revealing and concealing at the same time; while granting the Open of time-space it hides itself as granting.

But where now is this mysterious 'It' which grants time and timespace? Obviously this question is not correctly formulated, for time has no place, no 'where'. Time is that pre-spatial 'place' which makes each 'where' precisely possible. Since the beginning of Western thought, people have asked this question and many of them have said with Aristotle and Augustine that 'time is in the soul'. Thus, time cannot be without man. The question, however, is one of whether or not it is man who gives time, or whether it is man to whom time is granted. In the latter case the question still remains of who or what 'It' is which gives time. One thing is clear, however, man is what he is only and exclusively because he stands within the three-fold granting and 'endures' the proximity which denies and withholds, and determines this granting. Man does not make time, and time does not make man. Expressions such as 'making', 'producing', and 'creating' do not make sense here.64

Notwithstanding the great differences, the preceding passage on time undeniably is strongly reminiscent of what was said in Being and Time about the 'horizonal schemata' and spatio-temporality. It seems to me that the last paragraph of the Time-lecture which we have just considered refers to these sections of Being and Time and reminds us that the perspective of Being and Time is and remains pre-understood in the current reflections on time. Dasein plays an essential part in the comingto-pass of Being as well as in the coming-to-pass of time as the transcendental horizon of Being. It is clear by now, however, that in this complex process Dasein is not the one who grants, but rather the one to whom all of this is given. But this still entails that without Dasein the granting would not have taken place. In that sense it remains true that if no Dasein ek-sists, then no world is 'there' either. On the other hand, if it is true that Dasein does not have the priority in the coming-to-pass of Being and time, then all that which Being and Time tried to describe from Dasein's point of view, must now be described from the viewpoint of that mysterious 'It' which grants Being as well as time. Where, in Being and Time, the horizonal schemata were understood as that which Dasein's understanding projects, it is now said that 'It' gives time in such a way that in time the ek-stases grant one another to each other. In other words, where in Being and Time the ek-stases were determined by the 'for the sake of which', the 'in the face of', and the 'in order to' of Dasein's projecting, they are determined now by the Open which is granted by the 'It' while the three dimensions give themselves over to one another.

2 'It' grants Being and time

We have seen that we must say: There is something which grants Being as well as time. But what now is this 'It'? In answering this question, Heidegger suggests, we must not think of this 'It' as a 'power' or a 'God'. We must try to determine it from Being as Presence and from time as the transcendental domain in which the clearing of the multiform Presence is granted.

The granting which is found in 'It grants Being' manifests itself as a mittence of Presence in its epochal transformations, whereas in the expression 'It grants time', it appears as a lighting presenting of a four-dimensional domain, the Open, time-space. Taking into consideration that in Being as Presence time manifests itself, one could expect that genuine time, the four-fold granting of the Open, constitutes that mysterious 'It' which grants Being as Presence. Genuine time would then be the 'It' we have in mind when we say 'It grants Being'. The mittence in which Being is granted, would then consist in the granting of time. But is it really true that time is that mysterious 'It' which grants being? By no means, for time itself, too, is the gift of an 'It grants'. Thus this mysterious 'It' is still undetermined.65

Heidegger points out that perhaps we find ourselves in a very difficult situation here in that we have to use sentences of Indogermanic languages which do not have a clear theory about 'impersonal propositions'. He invites the reader, therefore, not to pay too much attention to the propositions, but rather to the 'thing itself' to which they refer. What is meant by the 'It' must be determined from that granting-process which belongs to it, that is the granting which at the same time is mittence (Geschick) and lighting presenting (lichtendes Reichen).

In the mittence of Being and the presenting of time there manifests itself an ap-propriation making Being as Presence and time as the Open that which they properly are. That which makes both, namely Being and time, what they properly are (Eigenes) and makes them belong together, is what Heidegger calls Ereignis, aboriginal and ap-propriating Event. The Ereignis makes Being and time belong together and brings both to what they properly speaking are. In other words, that mysterious 'It' about which we have spoken is the Ereignis. And this Ereignis is ontologically prior to Being as well as to time, because it is that which grants

to both what they properly are. - This expression is correct and yet it is not completely true, because it hides the original relationship between Being, time, and the Event.

But what then is this ap-propriating Event? Before trying to answer this question we must point once again to two difficulties connected with this question. We have already seen that this typical Event is such that it cannot be captured in a proposition. Furthermore, in asking the question: What is this ap-propriating Event we ask about the quiddity (Wassein), the essence, the mode of Being, the way in which the Event abides and is present. But this presupposes that we already know what Being is and how Being is to be determined from the viewpoint of time. We have already seen that the mittence of Being rests on the revealingconcealing presenting of the pluriform Presence in the Open domain of time-space. But this presenting as well as that sending belong within the Event, and thus cannot be presupposed in the determination of the Event.66

That is why it is perhaps better to say first what Event does not mean. The word 'event' does not have its common meaning here. It usually means occurrence, whereas in this case it means the ap-propriation taken as a presenting and sending. In other words, whereas it does not make sense to speak about the occurrence of Being, it does make sense to speak about Being as Event.

In the past people have tried to conceive of Being as Idea, actualitas, Will, and so on. One could think that Heidegger is suggesting here that it is now time to think of Being as Event. That this is not so becomes clear the moment one realizes that any attempt to understand Event as a modifying interpretation of Being is tantamount to trying to understand Being in terms of a typical kind of being, namely an event. One might proceed here along the following lines. Until now we have tried to think about Being in terms of Presence and letting-be-present in its relation to the showing-and-hiding presenting of genuine time. In this way it became clear that Being belongs to the Event. Thus it is from the Event that the granting as well as its gift (Being) must be determined. In this case one could say that Being is a kind of Event, but Event is not a kind of Being. Such a solution of the problem, however, is too cheap in that it hides the original relationship. Event is not a summum genus under which one must distinguish Being as well as time. As we have seen, Being has manifested itself as the gift of the mittence of Presence which is granted through the presenting of time. As such Being remains a property (Eigentum) of the ap-propriating Event; Being vanishes in the Event. And the same is true for time. In the ap-propriating Event, Being as letting-be-present is sent just as time is presented there. In the Event, Being as well as time are ap-propriated (ereignet im Ereignis).

But what about the Event itself? Is there anything more we can say about it?

Heidegger is of the opinion that, indeed, one could say more about it. In the preceding pages we came across expressions such as 'denying', 'withdrawing', 'withholding', etc., which made it clear that a certain 'withdrawal' (Entzug) is characteristic of the aboriginal Event. This clue can and should be followed up in greater detail. But Heidegger refrains from doing so for purely practical reasons.⁶⁷ He concludes the Timelecture with a few general remarks on certain characteristics of the Event.

We have seen that the sending in the mittence of Being was determined as a granting; that which grants was said to hold to itself, to adhere to itself, to withhold itself; it withdraws from the revealment. A similar statement was made in regard to the presenting characteristic of time. But if it is true that the Event withdraws from revealment we may say that the Event ex-propriates itself from itself and that a certain expropriation is characteristic for the ap-propriating Event. This does not mean that the Event gives up itself, but precisely that it preserves its own property.

We have seen, also, that in Being as Presence there manifests itself a process which is going-on and which concerns us men in such a way that the vital characteristic of our humanity is to be found in becoming aware of this procedure and thus taking it over. But this acceptance of Presence's going-on rests on the fact that we stand in the domain of presenting which the four-dimensional time has passed on to us.

Insofar as Being and time are found only and exclusively in the appropriation (das Ereignen) there belongs to this as a characteristic the fact that it brings man who receives Being to that which is characteristic of him as he stands within the domain of genuine time. This belonging to rests on the complete ap-propriation characteristic of the ap-propriating Event. It is this complete ap-propriation which lets man enter this Event. This is why we cannot conceive of the Event as something opposite to us or as something which encompasses everything. Representational thought has as little access to the Event as does a speaking in propositions.

Finally, by going from Being to the mittence of Being and from time to the presenting of time-space we have gained some access to the Event. It is of importance, however, to repeat once again: The Event is not a thing. The Event is not, nor is there something which gives the Event. The only thing we can say is: das Ereignis ereignet. This tautology points to what hides itself in truth as a-letheia.⁶⁸

IV Conclusion

We must now return to the main question Heidegger left unanswered in Being and Time. There can be no doubt that his thought has made considerable progress since 1927. Part of this development was already evident in Letter on Humanism (1947), where the priority in the comingto-pass of truth is given to Being and a historicity is attributed to Being itself which is distinguished from, and independent of, Dasein's temporality and historicity. In other words, it is stated in Letter on Humanism that the historicity of the understanding of Being is not identical with Being's own historicity. In this and other works of the same period it was not yet clear how Heidegger believed he would be able to avoid relativism once the finitude and historicity of the Being-process is explicitly recognized and admitted. In this regard in Letter on Humanism Heidegger seems to adopt the following point of view.⁶⁹ The thinking of Being thinks Being as this grants itself in mittences. The various mittences taken together constitute Being's history. 'That is why thought which thinks upon the truth of Being is as thought historical.'70 When a foundational thinker thinks the mittences of Being and formulates this in words, then his thought is historical. When he retrieves the thought of an earlier foundational thinker then his thought is historical in a second sense, but both these senses are complementary; in both cases Being comes (future) to the thinker as having-been in what is (past) and is made manifest (present) through the articulation of words. That is why the fundamental structure of thought is that of recollection.⁷¹ All thinkers then are engaged in the identical task, namely to think the mittences of Being, but each one accomplishes this in a different way. That is why there is no real progress in foundational thought.⁷² That the coming-topass of Truth in foundational thought leads to different expressions is connected with the fact that Being discloses itself while partly hiding itself. From this it follows that each expression is equally meaningful provided it understands itself as historical. Refutation in foundational thought is absurd. 73 Heidegger himself is aware of the danger of relativism which remains present in this view, also. He believes that one can overcome this danger by realizing that relativism makes sense only within a subject-object opposition. Once it is realized that the truth of an object is not to be considered as relative to a subject, relativism loses its meaning.74 But this does not answer the question adequately, and the danger of relativism was not yet completely overcome in 1947. For there can be no doubt that Heidegger does not admit an absolute truth in the sense that there is a truth which is 'eternal' or 'praeter-historical'. Furthermore, in his view there is no necessary link between the various epochs of Being's history. 'The epochs never permit themselves to be derived from one another and, indeed, to be reduced to the sequence

of a consecutive process.' On the other hand, there is a relationship between the epochs in that each later epoch comes 'out of the concealment of the mittence'.' 5

When later in Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954) and Identität und Differenz (1957) the ambiguity of the *Ereignis* conception as found in *Brief über* den Humanismus is removed, Heidegger was in a position to sharpen his position in regard to the question of relativism. It seems to me that it is one of the main contributions of the Time-lecture that it makes this later view explicit. Heidegger emphasizes once again the finitude of man, the finitude of man's comprehension of Being, the finitude of the comingto-pass of truth, that is the finitude of the *Ereignis* itself. And yet he asks the question of whether a contemplative turning toward the Ereignis could perhaps lead to the end of Being's history. Heidegger says that the experience for which the lecture tried to prepare the reader, does not lead to an identification of Being and thought (Hegel), and yet in some sense this experience does lead to the end of the history of metaphysics. True, the Ereignis contains possibilities of unveilment which thought cannot yet distinguish and even less can push aside as irrelevant; thus the contemplative turning toward the *Ereignis* cannot 'stop' future mittences. But could it perhaps be that after the experience has been lived in that contemplative turning toward the *Ereignis* one can no longer speak of Being's history. Before the experience is lived thought remains either within one of the epochs (relativism), or it tries to transcend this epoch by appealing to the 'God of the philosophers' or another absolute. However, once this experience is lived one can understand each mittence as one possible mittence in which the *Ereignis* itself withdraws.⁷⁶

Heidegger returns to this issue in the question concerning the meaning of the term 'change' as found in the lecture in the expression Wandlungs-fülle des Seins. From within classical metaphysics this means the changing forms of expressions in which Being shows itself historically in each epoch. Then the question is: By what is the sequence of the various epochs determined? Or, from where is this sequence determined? Why is the sequence the way it actually is? Hegel thought that the sequence is determined by a necessity which at the same time is the highest freedom. Heidegger believes that on this level one cannot ask and answer this question. One can only say here that the history of Being is the way it is. This 'that' is the only datum which, for thought, is to be accepted inevitably and thus 'with necessity'. One can even indicate then a certain regularity in the sequence and (for instance) claim that the sequence is 'guided' by an increasing forgottenness of Being.⁷⁷

From the viewpoint of the Time-lecture, however, that is to say from the viewpoint of the *experience* for which it tries to prepare us, the term has a different meaning. In the lecture it is said that Being is changed into *Ereignis*. On that level, the expression does not point to the various

manifestations of Being which follow one another, but to the fact that Being (with all its possible, epochal manifestations) is taken back into the Ereignis. In other words, if the philosopher looks at the Wandlungsfülle des Seins as has always been done in classical metaphysics, then this fullness falls apart in epochs which are no longer related to one another in a way that can be justified with necessity. One can bring a unity to the multiplicity only by introducing the 'God of the philosophers' as the one who gives the series a goal, or eventually who constitutes this goal. One can bring a kind of unity to this multiplicity by setting up a law or rule which somehow justifies the sequence of the epochs, one similar to that suggested by Heidegger. But underlying this way of looking at things there is the classical conception of time which conceives of time in terms of isolated 'now'-moments which as such do not necessarily belong together.

However, if the philosopher looks at this 'fullness' from the viewpoint which Heidegger tries to suggest in this lecture, then the unity of the multiplicity is never broken. The question then is not how this particular and isolated epoch could ever change into another isolated epoch, but how the Being process as a whole 'changes' into the Event in which future and past are held together in the Presence. For in this case one understands, or perhaps more accurately stated, experiences that the various epochs are no longer mysteries, but are the necessary consequence of the inherent finitude of an aboriginal Event which presents the Open and grants Being, and in so doing withdraws in favor of this domain and its gift.

Notes

- 1 Heidegger, Martin: 'Zeit und Sein', in L'endurance de la pensée. Pour saluer Jean Beaufret, ed. René Char (Paris: Plon, 1968), pp. 13-71; also in: Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 1-25.
- 2 Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 63.
 - 3 Zur Sache, p. 91.
 - 4 ibid.
- 5 'Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag "Zeit und Sein" ', in Zur Sache, pp. 27-60, 29-35, 46-8. (These 'minutes' were written by Alfredo Guzzoni and later corrected and completed by Heidegger himself.)
 - 6 Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time, p. 19.
 - 7 ibid., p. 67.
 - 8 ibid., p. 27.
 - 9 ibid., p. 38.
 - 10 ibid., p. 39.
 - 11 ibid., pp. 39-40.
 - 12 ibid., pp. 41-2.
 - 13 ibid., pp. 91-148.

58 ibid., pp. 6–8. 59 ibid., pp. 8–10. 60 ibid., pp. 10–11.

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14 ibid., pp. 149-68.
  15 ibid., pp. 169-224.
  16 ibid., pp. 171-2.
  17 ibid., p. 225.
  18 ibid., pp. 228-41.
  19 ibid., pp. 279-90.
  20 ibid., p. 308.
  21 ibid., pp. 308-9.
  22 ibid., pp. 315-35.
  23 ibid., pp. 341-8.
  24 ibid., pp. 349-64.
  25 ibid., pp. 364-70.
  26 ibid., p. 372.
  27 ibid., p. 373.
  28 ibid., pp. 373-4.
  29 ibid., p. 374.
  30 ibid., p. 375.
  31 ibid., pp. 383–401.
  32 ibid., pp. 401-18. See for the foregoing passage also: Otto Pöggeler, 'Hei-
deggers Topologie des Seins', in Man and World, 2 (1969), pp. 331-57, 337-45,
and William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 71–93.
  33 Being and Time, pp. 415–18.
  34 ibid., pp. 419–21.
  35 See for what follows: Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), pp. 63–6.
  36 Being and Time, pp. 486-7.
  37 ibid., p. 483.
  38 ibid., p. 63.
  39 Zur Sache, p. 29.
  40 Being and Time, p. 193.
  41 ibid., p. 274.
  42 ibid., pp. 133-4, 203, 273, 382, 400, 402-3, 408-9, 411-12, 420, 423, 458,
487.
  43 ibid., pp. 41–9, 244–56.
  44 Heidegger in a letter to William J. Richardson, op. cit., p. x.
  45 Being and Time, pp. 41-62, 424ff.
  46 Pöggeler, Otto: 'Heideggers Topologie des Seins', pp. 337-45.
  47 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 2.
  48 ibid., p. 36.
  49 ibid., p. 35.
  50 ibid., pp. 1–2.
  51 ibid., p. 1.
  52 ibid., pp. 2, 27–8.
  53 ibid., pp. 2–4.
  54 ibid., pp. 4–5.
  55 ibid., pp. 41–3.
  56 ibid., pp. 5, 39–41.
  57 ibid., pp. 5–6.
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- 61 ibid., pp. 12-13.
- 62 ibid., pp. 13-15.
- 63 ibid., pp. 15-16.
- 64 ibid., pp. 16-17.
- 65 ibid., pp. 17-18.
- 66 ibid., pp. 18-21.
- 67 ibid., pp. 21-3. See for other approaches to the 'Event': ibid., pp. 44-5.
- 68 ibid., pp. 23-5.
- 69 Richardson, William J.: op. cit., pp. 545-8.
- 70 Heidegger, Martin: Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den 'Humanismus' (Bern: Francke, 1947), p. 81.
 - 71 ibid., p. 111.
 - 72 ibid., p. 81.
 - 73 ibid., p. 82.
- 74 Heidegger, Martin: Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954),
 - 75 Heidegger, Martin: Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 154.
 - 76 Zur Sache des Denkens, pp. 53-4.
 - 77 ibid., pp. 55–7.

The ekstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality

Françoise Dastur

The title of this paper is borrowed from The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology. In the name of this title, I would like to raise some questions concerning the meaning and role of the concept of horizon in the Heideggerian thinking between 1926 and 1928, i.e. during the years immediately preceding and following the publication of Being and Time in February 1927.2 For it is precisely on this subject that the lecture course from the Summer semester 1927 gives us explanations that were not forthcoming in Being and Time. In spite of the fact that the complete title of the first part of Being and Time - the second part was never published - runs: 'The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being', the last sentence of the second section – i.e. the last sentence of the text published in 1927 - still assumes the form of a question: 'Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?'3 The explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being should have constituted, in fact, the theme of the third section, under the title 'Time and being', as it is indicated in the plan of the book presented in section 8.4 A marginal note in Heidegger's own copy (the famous Hüttenexemplar), a marginal note which is reproduced in the text published in 1977 in the Gesamtausgabe, refers the reader to the Marburg lecture course of the Summer semester 1927 entitled The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology for an explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being.⁵ At the beginning of this lecture course there is a note indicating that these lectures constitute 'a new elaboration of the third (section) of the first part of Being and Time'.6 We know, on the report of the editor of the Gesamtausgabe, Friedrich von Herrmann, that Heidegger burnt the first elaboration of this third section soon after it had been written.7 It has been necessary to recall

these detailed references in order to emphasize the fact that the 1927 lecture course throws a new light on what Heidegger calls, in Being and Time, the Temporalität des Seins, which should be strictly distinguished from the Zeitlichkeit des Daseins.8 The theme of the horizon as the correlate of a temporal extasis, on one hand, and the theme of the Temporalität of Being, on the other hand, are tightly knit together, as we can see from this sentence from the 1927 lecture course that reads: 'Temporalität is Zeitlichkeit with respect to the unity of the horizonal schemas which are its own.'9 We can of course find some indications about this in Being and Time. The expression Temporalität des Seins appears in §5 when, after having exposed the preliminary character of the existential analysis, i.e. of the theory of the Being of Dasein as care, Heidegger emphasizes that the temporal interpretation of care, which constitutes the second section (Dasein und Zeitlichkeit) does not yet furnish the answer to the leading question, that is, the question of the meaning of Being in its entirety (Sein überhaupt), but only provides an initial basis for arriving at such an answer. 10 But in fact §5 (together with §8 which sets out the plan of the whole treatise), is the only passage in Being and Time where we can find a reference to the leading problematics of the book. The latter does not consist – it is necessary to recall – in furnishing the basis for a philosophical anthropology, but in the explication of time as the horizon for any comprehension of Being, starting from temporality as the Being of Dasein, i.e. of the being characterized by a comprehension of Being.¹¹ Only this explanation of Temporalität can give a concrete answer to the question asked in Being and Time, the question concerning the meaning of Being. 12 But to inquire about the meaning of Being does not consist in looking for what lies behind Being, but in questioning Being itself in so far it is included in the comprehensibility of Dasein.¹³ For 'meaning' is an existential of Dasein and not a property of a being; it is that within which the comprehensibility of something maintains itself, the horizon (the Woraufhin, literally, the 'whither') of the project from which something as such is comprehended.14 It is therefore comprehension itself and the conditions of its possibility which have to be questioned in order to bring to light the horizon for the donation of Being. And the condition of the possibility of such a comprehension is, precisely, temporality. But Being and Time does not show how all comprehension implies a comprehension of Being as such, which is itself possible only on the basis of the temporality of Dasein. 15 This point is developed in §20 of The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology under the head 'Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität'.

Being and Time also offers some indications about the ekstatico-horizonal structure of temporality. It is in §65, where temporality is characterized as the ontological meaning of care, ¹⁶ that temporality is defined as sheer *ekstatikon* (*ekstatikon schlechthin*). ¹⁷ But it is only in §69, which

deals with the temporality of being-in-the-world that, in less than three pages (§69 C), the temporal problem of the transcendence of the world is explicitly treated, i.e. what, in temporality, makes the event of the world possible - the horizonal 'schema' that constitutes the 'whither' (Wohin), the 'rapture' (Entrückung) in terms of which the ekstasis takes place. 18 This analysis of the ekstatico-horizonal character of temporality is taken up again and developed in The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology and it is completed in the lecture course from the Summer semester 1928 entitled The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.¹⁹ The first part of this lecture course consists of an analysis of transcendence and intentionality and is a prefiguration of the problematics of the text written in the same year (which Heidegger dedicated in 1929 to Husserl for his seventieth birthday) under the title Vom Wesen des Grundes. In a passage from this 1928 lecture course (where we find the very first auto-interpretation of *Being and Time*²⁰), Heidegger seeks to show, in a retrospective manner, that the entire second section of *Being* and Time is dedicated to the elaboration of a transcendence which is in fact only explicitly mentioned in §69 C. He recalls therefore that, in a note from page 263 in Being and Time (which deals with the Husserlian primacy of intuition), it is explicitly said that the intentionality of consciousness is based upon the temporality of Dasein.²¹ This note indicates moreover that the showing of the relation between intentionality and ekstatico-horizonal temporality will be dealt with in the next section, i.e. in the famous third section. It is the only indication in Being and Time concerning the connection between the phenomenon of intentionality and ekstatico-horizonal temporality, a connection which is also mentioned, but not explicitly developed, in The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology.²² What is characteristic of the Marburg lectures (held in the period when Heidegger wrote Being and Time²³), is the continuity of the discussion with Husserl and the emphasis on the problem of intentionality, a problem which the lecture course from 1925 already recognizes as a phenomenon which will furnish contemporary philosophy with its own proper dynamic.²⁴ The lecture course from 1927, like the one from 1928, gives an essential place to the notion of intentionality. In the discussion of Kant's thesis stating that 'Being is not a real predicate', which can be reformulated in a more positive way as 'Being is position or perception', Heidegger declares that the constitutive elements of the intentionality of perception are not only the intentio and the intentum but also the comprehension of the mode of Being of what is aimed at in intentum, 25 showing therefore that the ontological condition of the possibility of all intentionality as such is the comprehension of Being. He further emphasizes that the possibility of bringing to light the ontological difference also calls for an investigation of intentionality, i.e. of the mode of access to Being.²⁶ The investigation of intentionality is

necessary because, as Heidegger says (in his foreword to the Lectures for a Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness, edited by him, at Husserl's request, in April 1928), intentionality is not a key word, but the title of a central problem.²⁷ To dwell inside this problem does not mean that intentionality should be regarded as a master-key capable of opening all doors, 28 but grasped in its principal and philosophically central signification.²⁹ On the one hand, it is necessary to see that the idea of intentionality refers (beyond Brentano's conception of intentionality as the central notion of his Psychology from an empirical point of view) to the question posed by Plato and Aristotle, i.e. to the ontological question.30 and precisely because the notion of intentionality annihilates the apparent problem of the subject-object relation³¹ considered by the theory of knowledge of the nineteenth century as the basis of its problematics and therefore breaks with the classical conception of subjectivity, i.e. with the opposition of consciousness and world understood as the juxtaposition of two equally present-at-hand beings. But on the other hand, it is necessary to become aware of its limits, i.e. of the fact that intentionality is understood by Husserl as noesis, as a rational determination which should not be referred to the entire personality - as Max Scheler thought was the case.³² As a dimension of existence itself, intentionality is therefore only an 'ontic transcendence', a transcendence in the vulgar meaning of the word, which, as a relation to beings, has itself to be founded upon an 'archi-transcendence', the transcendence of Beingin-the-world.33 For the intentional relation is only the factual mode of an actually required appropriation of what is already surpassed, i.e. revealed on the basis of transcendence.³⁴

By way of the theme of intentionality, and so subject to the condition of seeing in intentionality a problem and not a solution, 35 the question of transcendence, as a dimension of existence, still therefore has to be raised. For to exist means nothing else than to bring about the distinction between Being and beings.36 To the Husserlian phenomenology that sees in intentionality the archi-phenomenon, ontology therefore stands opposed as this other transcendental science³⁷ which, on the contrary, sees in transcendence, qua archi-transcendence, the condition of the possibility of all 'ontic transcendence', i.e. of all intentional behaviour. But this essential determination of Dasein, i.e. of the fact that it transcends itself by itself, depends upon the ekstatico-horizonal character of temporality. It is therefore now necessary to unfold the relation of transcendence to temporality. The term 'transcendence' is certainly not taken by Heidegger in its philosophical (medieval or modern) sense but only in the original sense of the word for which transcendere means to go beyond, to get across, to pass over.38 What Heidegger calls the ontologically 'authentic' meaning of transcendence,³⁹ understands the transcendens as what goes over as such and not as that in the direction of which a 'passing over' is undertaken. It is therefore not possible to consider Dasein as immanent nor the objects as transcendent, as is the case with the vulgar, i.e. Husserlian, meaning of transcendence, because such a transcendence is not the ontic transcendence of the subject-object relation, but the comprehension of oneself from that world which constitutes the true correlate of the surpassing movement. Dasein is a being that is in the modus of self-surpassing, in the modus of epekeina. 40 That is the reason why Dasein's selfhood does not imply a substantial centre from which the transcending movement is supposed to start, but is, on the contrary, founded upon transcendence itself – as the condition of its very possibility. But what makes the transcendence of Dasein possible is the ekstatic character of time. 41 In order to understand what that means, it is necessary, first of all, to pay attention to the transformation inflicted upon the classical opposition between objective and subjective time by the Heideggerian thinking, once the subject-object relation has become invalidated as a plausible problem. In his 1928 lecture course, Heidegger emphasizes that he deliberately names original time 'temporality' in order to give expression to the fact that time is not a predonated being (a Vorhandene), but, on the contrary, something whose essence is temporal.⁴² This means that, strictly speaking, time is not, but temporalizes itself and so can never be imprisoned in an ontological concept. 43 To think time as temporalization means giving up the attempt to elaborate a physics, or even a psychology, of time. Featuring neither as a frame for worldly events, nor for the internal processes of the psyche, it has to be accepted that time does not exist in any way at all. The 1925 lecture course closed with this conclusive statement: 'Nicht: Zeit ist, sondern: Dasein zeitigt, qua Zeit, sein Sein' (Not: time is, but Dasein temporalizes its Being, as time).44

This implies that the unfolding of time coincides with the unfolding of Dasein and that the movements of nature are, as such, completely free with regard to time: they acquire an intra-temporality only when they are encountered 'in' the time that we ourselves are. The 1928 lecture course is even more explicit and declares that temporality is the *Urfaktum*, the originary fact, and that entering into the world of beings is the *Urgeschichte*, the originary history. Such an identification of Dasein and time allows us to understand why Heidegger is much less interested in the analysis Husserl gives of the phenomenon of time itself (in his lectures on *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*) than in the elucidation of intentionality through the analysis of phenomena like perception, remembrance, expectation, etc. Many years later, when Heidegger gave a short speech at a conference organized for the thirtieth anniversary of Husserl's death, he peremptorily declared that his own question concerning time was wholly determined by the Being question and had been developed in a direction that always remained foreign to

the Husserlian investigation of time consciousness.⁴⁷ We find the same judgment in the 1928 lecture course, at a time when Husserl's lectures had just been published by Heidegger. Heidegger acknowledges, as he had already done in a note to Being and Time, 48 that Husserl's investigations on time constitute a measure of progress relative to contemporary psychology and the theory of knowledge, but he sees Husserl's essential achievement in the analysis of the intentional structures of time consciousness. For as far as the problem of time itself is concerned, nothing has changed relative to the tradition because time is still taken as something immanent, something internal to the subject. For Heidegger, what Husserl names 'temporal consciousness' is precisely time itself in its originary sense.49 To understand that originary time is in fact nothing other than the totality of the modalities of temporalization belonging to existence means precisely to understand the ekstatic character of time. The phenomenon of 'expectation' as well as that of 'remembrance' are not only a way of perceiving the future and the past, but a way of interrogating the very sources of these modalities of time, not only a mode of time consciousness but, in an originary sense, time itself. 50 In the 1927 lecture course, Heidegger distinguishes clearly between the primary concept of future, past, present, i.e. the existential sense of temporality as unfolded by Dasein itself, and the expression of time that has always to do with intra-temporality. To characterize pure transcendence without the subject, that is, without Dasein, Heidegger makes use of the term ekstasis which, in its non-philosophical sense, simply means to stand out, which makes it a term appropriate to the literal sense of the word ex-istence. The 1928 lecture course is even more explicit in presenting originary temporality as a triple transport (Entrückung) without a centre, that is, without any substantial nucleus from which a temporal ekstasis could spring out, as a raptus through which the temporal dimensions are opened, or as a spring or swing (Schwung) that makes of temporalization the free swinging (die freie Schwingung) of originary temporality in its entirety, which alone can explain the Beingin-the-throw of Dasein, i.e. of the connection in Dasein of thrownness and projection (Geworfenheit und Entwurf).51

But this ekstatic character of originary temporality cannot be separated from the horizonal character that belongs to all ekstasis as such. It is important to emphasize that the relation of the ekstasis to its horizon cannot be of the same kind as the relation of intentio and intentum (or noesis and noema) in ontic transcendence, that is, in intentionality. In this case, the correlate cannot be something determined because transcendence is precisely defined as the movement by which all limitations are exceeded. But the ekstasis is however not a transport towards nothingness, or a completely undetermined rapture. Rather, it projects an horizon which presents itself as a specific openness or as a schematic

pre-tracing (schematische Vorzeichnung) of what transcendence is aiming at.⁵² The term 'schematic' is an allusion to the Kantian transcendental schematism, about which Heidegger speaks in his lecture course from the Winter semester 1925-6 and again, in 1929, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.53 The Kantian schema is the representation of a general procedure of the imagination with a view to procuring an image for its concept;⁵⁴ in the same way, the horizonal schema of the temporal ekstasis is the condition of the possibility of the comprehension of Being. 55 But what is the exact meaning of horizon in this context? The 1928 lecture course gives the answer. Despite its usual meaning of a circular visual limit, the term horizon is not originally connected to seeing and intuition. It means, in accordance with the Greek verb horizein, what limits, surrounds, encloses.⁵⁶ The ekstasis, as pure rapture, surrounds and limits itself under the form of an horizon that makes it possible. Such an horizon, in spite of the fact that it belongs to ekstasis, is neither located 'in' the subject nor 'in' time or space, because it is not something that is, but something that temporalizes itself as pure possibility. Heidegger speaks of the horizon as constituting the ekstema of the ekstasis in analogy with the correlation of noesis and noema in the structure of intentionality, but in a completely different sense from that characteristic of the immanent structure of the noetic-noematic unity that remains internal to consciousness. The structure of transcendence, one that brings together the unity of all ekstases in the ekstematic unity of their horizons reveals the 'internal productivity specific to temporality', a productivity whose product is nothing else than the world itself. It is this productivity that Kant encountered for the first time in his theory of the productive transcendental imagination. And in spite of the fact that this genial intuition got forgotten later, it still testified to the fact that the Being of Dasein possesses the internal possibility of self-enrichment, not in an ontic, but in an ontological sense. This capacity for self-enrichment that characterizes Dasein is, in fact, nothing other than transcendence itself and it produces nothing ontic, but only this nothingness that is the world, a world which can never be understood as the sum of beings. Even though this nothingness is not a nihil negativum, it is, as Heidegger stresses, the nihil originarium that arises with and through temporalization.⁵⁷ Temporality finds its end in the horizonal schemata whose unity constitutes the nothingness of world. Since the very finitude of time precludes the possibility of its being projected upon something else, it is able to provide the ultimate light for the knowledge of beings and for the comprehension of Being. But we find no justification of the finitude of time in the 1927 lecture course since this would require a return to the question of Being-towards-death, a question developed in the second section of Being and Time and which alone permits us to understand what is said in §65, namely, that original time is finite precisely because it

temporalizes itself from the authentic future as anticipatory resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit), i.e. as authentic Being-towards-death.58 But death is not an end in the sense of what puts a stop to Dasein but is, on the contrary, the foundation of its finite existence. In the same manner, the finitude of time (the corollary to the finitude of Being mentioned only in the Freiburg inaugural lecture of 1929; 'What is metaphysics?'59) is not an extrinsic limitation of Dasein but, on the contrary, the origin and starting point of its very own Being, i.e. of all possible projection – a limitation which, because it is internal, makes possible its own surpassing, i.e. makes possible both ekstasis and transcendence.

The Temporalität des Seins therefore constitutes the unity of that horizon from which each being can present itself in the world. It is true that in §21, in The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger accords an apparently excessive importance to the horizon of praesens which latter constitutes the condition of possibility of the comprehension of the Being-ready-to-hand of the instrument, and it is equally true that the thesis developed in Being and Time to the effect that the future furnishes the direction for temporalization and is the primary phenomenon for originary temporality⁶⁰ is not reaffirmed in the 1927 lecture course, precisely because there is no mention of the finitude of time. But this does not mean that this thesis is given up or called in question, since it is taken up again in the 1928 lecture course. 61 Moreover the primacy of the future is relative: it only characterizes the sense of originary temporalization, and that is the reason why such a primacy can be transferred to another ekstasis, depending upon the mode of existence of Dasein. Heidegger speaks in this respect of the unsteadiness of existence, an unsteadiness which comes from the fact that temporality is capable of modification and that the sense of temporalization can be changed by giving the primacy to an ekstasis other than the futural.62 The relation to the Zuhandenen, to the ready-to-hand, can occur only in the horizon of praesens which is the corollary of the primacy granted to the present (Gegenwart) and to presentation (Gegenwärtigen). In the determined perspective of a temporal interpretation of Being as Beingready-to-hand,63 the horizon of praesens is the leading horizon because it is the one which commands all relation to inner-worldly beings of any kind whatsoever - and in this sense it also commands the relation to the Vorhandenen, to the merely present being.64 But it has to be stressed that only the unity of the horizons (not only of the praesens but also of what should logically be called the praeteritum and the futurum⁶⁵) can accommodate what the 1928 lecture course already names as the event of the entrance into the world of beings (das Ereignis des Welteinganges des Seienden). Because this event is the primordial event (Ureignis), originary temporalization can only be the temporalization of the world itself as the ekstematic horizon for temporality in its entirety.66

In the context of such an analytic of the Temporalität des Seins, 67 Heidegger still seems to be developing his project of an ontology as a temporal and transcendental science. ⁶⁸ But the 1928 lecture course also declares that this temporal analytic is at the same time die Kehre, the turning which brings ontology expressly back to the ontic metaphysics in which it has implicitly always stood.⁶⁹ Is this reversal to meta-ontology (mentioned in the 1928 lecture course) already, and of itself, the announcement of a Kehre which will allow us to think the epocality of Being and the foundation of this epocality under the name of Ereignis? It is difficult to answer this question as long as we do not have access to all the texts from the beginning of the thirties, and especially to the first version of 'The essence of truth' from 1930. It seems in any case that the transcendental perspective that allows the constitution of the 'metaphysics of Dasein' (developed in the writings published in 1929) as a continuation of the meta-ontological turning of 1928 must, on the contrary, be abandoned - so that the Kehre can be achieved. But 'abandoned' is perhaps not the correct word here: 'surmounted' says a marginal note from the Hüttenexemplar regarding the title of the third section in the plan presented at the end of §8 of Being and Time. This marginal note seems to suggest that only the surmounting of the horizon could allow a return to the origin. 70 Is this not an indication that the concept of horizon has finally proved to be inadequate to think the domain of openness, the Spielraum within which all beings can be encountered?71 In a text from the years 1944-5 that bears the title Gelassenheit, such a 'space' is given the strange name of Gegnet.72 Here representative and 'transcendental-horizonal' thinking is called in question as the dominating mode of thinking and a transformation of representative thinking into a waiting for the Gegnet, i.e., into an open extent⁷³ oriented toward the 'region'. 74 Such a transformation does not in fact require that the former point of view be abandoned, but rather that it should be seen in another light, after an effective change of position with regard to it. The horizon as such is also only the side, turned towards us, of an openness⁷⁵ which surrounds us and this openness should, as such, be named Gegnet, 'region' in the sense of a gathering locus for all extended and enduring things. 76 Surely the Kehre consists in considering the Kehrseite, the reverse side of that horizon which remains concealed from us and to any representative thinking that only draws the meaning of the terms 'horizon' and 'transcendence' from objects opposed to it?'7 To experience what 'lets' be - sein lässt - is to experience an horizon which leads us beyond such a representational, transcendental-horizonal thinking to a waiting that can never be understood as an anticipating because it has no object, 78 a waiting for the opening of that Gegnet to which we all belong. In the same manner, in 1949, the necessity of thinking the ekstasis more adequately will lead to the experience of endurance (Ausstehen), of the openness of Being. In this new light, the ekstatic essence of existence can no longer be understood as a Being-out-of-itself⁷⁹ because this could still imply a reference to the substantial centre of the self. Rather it now has to be understood as the Being in the truth of Being, as *Innestehen*, standing inside, *Inständigkeit*, in-stance.⁸⁰

That is why the ekstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality has to be reconsidered in the light of what Heidegger, after the *Kehre*, no longer calls the 'meaning of Being', but the 'truth of Being', the truth of a Being that is no longer understood as an *existential* of Dasein and as the goal of Dasein's transcendence, but as the origin of Dasein. For, as *The Letter on Humanism* puts it, if Being is brought to light for human being in the ekstatic project, this project does not however create Being. And so what is thrown into the project is not human being itself. Rather, it is Being itself that destines human being to be its own ek-sistence, to be the 'there' of Da-sein as its very own essence.⁸¹

Notes

- 1 See Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975), Gesamt ausgabe Band 24 (abbreviated GA 24), p. 279: 'die ekstatisch-horizontal Verfassung der Zeitlichkeit'. The term Verfassung which is here translated in a conventional manner by 'constitution' refers more precisely to the idea of 'composition' and has the meaning of an articulated totality.
- 2 On the circumstances of the publication of *Being and Time* see 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie' in Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 88.
 - 3 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 437 (abbreviated SZ).
 - 4 SZ, p. 39.
 - 5 See GA 2, p. 41.
 - 6 GA 24, p. 1.
 - 7 See GA 2, p. 582 (Nachwort des Herausgebers).
- 8 The distinction between Temporalität and Zeitlichkeit is essentially a terminological distinction: see GA 24, p. 324. But this distinction was not drawn from the very beginning. In the lecture course from the Winter semester 1925-6, Heidegger still uses the term Temporalität to characterize the Being of Dasein. He explains that zeitlich means to happen in time, whereas temporal means to be characterized by time (GA 21, p. 199). At that time Heidegger still understands Zeitlichkeit in the 'vulgar' sense of intra-temporality and that is the reason why he then prefers the term Temporalität to characterize the mode of Being of Dasein. He speaks there of the Temporalität of care, whereas in Being and Time Temporalität refers to Being and Zeitlichkeit to Dasein.
 - 9 GA 24, p. 369.
- 10 SZ, p. 17. It is not possible to translate 'Sein überhaupt' by 'Being in general' because Heidegger, following Aristotle, insists on the fact that there is no generic unity of Being. That is why I propose to translate it by 'Being in its entirety', and this in line with the primal meaning of 'überhaupt' a word that

originally belonged to the vocabulary of the cattle keepers and so retains the meaning of 'the whole' in opposition to 'in detail'.

- 11 See SZ, p. 17.
- 12 See SZ, p. 19.
- 13 SZ, p. 152.
- 14 SZ, p. 151.
- 15 There is in fact an analysis of the temporality of comprehension to be found in Being and Time at §68a but it tends only to elucidate the temporal meaning of comprehension in general and not to elucidate the fact that temporality is the condition of the possibility of the comprehension that Dasein has from itself.
 - 16 SZ, p. 323.
 - 17 SZ, p. 329.
 - 18 SZ, p. 365.
 - 19 Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik, GA 26.
- 20 As Jean Greisch emphasizes in his presentation of the complete edition of Heidegger's works in Martin Heidegger (Paris: Cahier de L'Herne, 1983), p. 467.
- 21 GA 26, p. 215: 'Und daß die Intentionalität in der Transzendenz grundet, ist gerade hier [§363, Anm.] gesagt und als ontologisches Grundproblem fixiert.' The note itself says only: 'Daß und wie die Intentionalität des "Bewußtseins" in der ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit des Dasein grundet wird der folgende Abschnitt zeigen.' The term 'transcendence' does not appear in the note itself in spite of the fact that it can be found on the same page, 363.
 - 22 GA 24, p. 448.
- 23 Heidegger recalls in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 95, that he began to write Being and Time in 1923 and we know that the book was finished in 1926.
 - 24 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, GA 20, p. 34.
 - 25 GA 24, pp. 100ff.
 - 26 GA 24, p. 102.
- 27 See E. Husserl, Vorlesung zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1928), p. 1: 'Auch heute noch ist dieser Ausdruck kein Losungswort, sondern der Titel eines zentralen Problems.' It is necessary to recall that it was Husserl himself who asked Heidegger to edit his lectures and not the reverse. Regarding the history of the manuscript of these lectures see R. Böhm's Introduction to volume X of the Husserliana (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966) and W. Mieskiewicz's article in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (1984).
 - 28 See GA 26, p. 166.
 - 29 See GA 26, pp. 167-8.
 - 30 See GA 20, p. 184.
 - 31 See GA 26, p. 168.
- 32 GA 26, pp. 167 and 169. In this lecture from the Summer semester 1928 during the course of which Max Scheler died (19 May 1928), Heidegger emphasizes Scheler's mediating role between Husserl and himself. Scheler refuses to see in intentionality a character of knowledge but does not go so far as to consider it a dimension of existence itself. He insists on understanding intentionality as a character of the still not thoroughly elucidated notion of personality.
 - 33 GA 26, pp. 194 and 169.
 - 34 GA 26, p. 253.
- 35 According to Heidegger, Husserl in *Ideen I* sees in intentionality a solution because he understands intentional being as the fundamental region of being, the region of pure consciousness and its correlates. Intentionality is then no

longer a question of presence but provides the 'final' solution for modern philosophy, i.e. the accomplished system of transcendental subjectivity. See the Letter to Richardson (1962) in W. Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. xiv: 'Meanwhile "phenomenology" in Husserl's sense was elaborated into a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set up by Descartes, Kant and Fichte.' On this point see Brisart's excellent paper: 'L'intentionalité comme "titre d'un problème central" selon Heidegger', Cahiers du centre d'études phénoménologiques (CEP 2) (Louvain la Neuve: Cabay, 1982), pp. 32-84.

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36 GA 24, p. 254.
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37 GA 24, p. 374. See also SZ, p. 38 where phenomenological truth is said to be veritas transcendentalis.

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38 ibid., p. 423.
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39 ibid., p. 425.

40 ibid.

41 ibid., p. 428.

42 GA 26, p. 264.

43 ibid.

44 GA 20, p. 442.

45 ibid.

46 *GA* 26, p. 270.

47 See M. Heidegger, 'Uber das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage' in Phänomenologie - lebendig oder tot? (Karlsruhe: Badenia Verlag, 1969), p. 47.

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48 See SZ, p. 433.
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- 49 GA 26, p. 264.
- 50 GA 26, p. 263.
- 51 GA 26, p. 268.
- 52 GA 24, p. 435.

53 To show how the 'horizonal' thematic is dependent on a still transcendental questioning would require a thorough examination of all the texts Heidegger dedicated to Kant between 1925 and 1930. For the moment we can only stress the importance of transcendence in the Kantian sense and point out that this was as decisive for the elaboration of the Being question as Husserlian intentionality.

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54 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B. 180.
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- 55 GA 24, p. 437.
- 56 GA 26, p. 269.
- 57 GA 26, p. 272.
- 58 SZ, §62.

59 Was ist Metaphysik? (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1960), pp. 39-40. Being is finite because it 'needs' the transcendence of Dasein in order to be revealed, because (as Sein und Zeit puts it on p. 212) 'there is' (es gibt) Being only as long as Dasein is.

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60 SZ, p. 331.
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- 61 GA 26, p. 273.
- 62 GA 24, p. 408.
- 63 See the title in GA 24 of §21 a.

64 See SZ, p. 363, where it is stressed that the objectivation, which is the operation through which the mere presence (Vorhandenheit) of beings is given, has the sense of a distinctive presentation (ausgezeichneten Gegenwärtigung).

65 It should be stressed here that, on the one hand, and in a certain sense, every horizon, as a project of Dasein, has the sense of a future from which it is possible to come back to the beings given within such an horizon but also, on the other, that the (implicit) primacy of the horizon of the praesens is the foundation for all traditional ontology. That is why Heidegger accords such importance to the temporal interpretation of Being as Vorhandenheit.

66 GA 26, pp. 273-4.

67 ibid., p. 201.

68 GA 24, p. 201.

69 GA 26, p. 201.

70 GA 1, p. 39. The whole marginal note runs as follows:

'Die transzendenzhafte Differenz

Die Uberwindung des Horizonts als solchen

Die Umkehr in die Herkunft

Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft.'

71 See Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1973), §16, p. 67.

72 Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Neske, 1979), p. 31.

73 ibid., p. 41. The old form Gegnet for Gegend means literally what stands opposite and comes from gegen, meaning against or opposite to, and has to be formed on the model of the Latin contrata, region. Compare the French contrée and the English 'country'.

74 ibid., p. 52.

75 ibid., p. 39.

76 ibid., p. 42.

77 ibid., p. 39.

78 ibid., p. 44.

79 See SZ, p. 329 where the pure ekstatikon of temporality is understood as 'das ursprungliche "Aussersich" an und für sich'.

80 See Der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik (1949) Einleitung zu Was ist Metaphysik? (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1960), p. 15:

Die Stasis des Ekstatischen bruht, so seltsam es klingen mag, im Innestehen im 'Aus' und 'Da' der Unverborgenheit, als welche das Sein selbst west. Das, was im Namen 'Existenz' zu denken ist, wenn das Wort innerhalb des Denkens gebraucht wird, das auf die Wahrheit des Seins zu und her denkt, konnte das Wort 'Instandigkeit' a, schonsten nennen.

See also Gelassenheit, p. 62 and Humanismusbrief in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967), p. 161.

81 Wegmarken, p. 168.

What did Heidegger mean by 'Essence'?

Alfons Grieder

1

The word 'Wesen' ('Essence') frequently occurs in Heidegger's writings.¹ It is indeed one of his key-words. Unless we understand what he means by it we are unlikely to understand his philosophy. After all, philosophy was for him essential thinking (wesentliches Denken). Yet 'Wesen' is also one of his most enigmatic terms and greatly in need of elucidation, despite the fact that he commented on its meaning in many places, scattered throughout his writings, from the thirties right through to the seventies. It is not only tedious to collect these comments but, as we shall soon see, difficult to understand and adequately interpret them.

In the following I shall focus on the three periods 1925–30, 1934–8, and 1949–57. In all three periods Heidegger's meaning of 'Wesen' is inseparable from that of 'Sein' ('Being') and 'Wahrheit' ('Truth'), and by the fifties its connection with 'Language', 'World' and 'Thing' assumes a new significance. From the mid-thirties he uses the word in an increasingly unfamiliar and puzzling manner. Its change of meaning is closely associated with the famous 'turn' ('Kehre'). One has to come to grips with this metamorphosis, otherwise what the later Heidegger has to say, for instance on art and technology, will hardly be intelligible.

Unfortunately, few commentators have bothered to analyse this term 'Wesen', and to my knowledge none has done so in sufficient detail and in a way which makes sense to the uninitiated too. Obviously, little is achieved by simply repeating Heideggerian phrases and assertions as if they were crystal-clear. (As a rule they are not at all.) I am aware, of course, that the following remarks and analyses are still in some sense provisional and cannot fill this important gap in the Heidegger literature: they will almost certainly have to be complemented and revised in the light of the many still outstanding volumes of the Gesamtausgabe.

2

Let us begin with Sein und Zeit (1927). Here the term 'wesenhaft' is more frequently encountered than 'Wesen'. The adjective 'wesentlich' repeatedly occurs, and so do various compounds such as 'Wesensbestimmung', 'Wesensstruktur', 'Wesensverhalt', 'Wesensgehalt', 'Wesenscharakter', 'Wesenserkenntnis', 'Wesensaussage'. We notice a strange ambivalence, however. At the beginning of his treatise Heidegger writes:

Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz³ (The 'Essence' of Dasein resides in its existence),

and he puts the term we are here concerned with into quotation marks. In subsequent places he drops the quotation marks, and we read for instance:

The analysis of this being took as its guiding thread what was in an anticipatory way determined as the Essence of Dasein;⁴

or

And if existence determines the being of Dasein and participates in the constitution of its Essence . . . ⁵

On the one hand, then, Heidegger is inclined to put the term 'Wesen' 'on ice' as it were. On the other he seems to apply it without such reservations: indeed he intended *Sein und Zeit* to be a phenomenological description and interpretation of essential structures and essential characteristics of Dasein

To understand the reasons for this ambivalence let us first recall that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger set out to clarify the sense of Being. The published first half of the work was meant to lay the foundation for that clarification. It is obvious that not only Being, but also the traditional distinction between essence and existence (essentia and existentia) was for him in need of elucidation, and the application of the traditional term 'existence' to Dasein highly questionable. He was unwilling to take this term 'essence' for granted as its meaning was at least partly determined in contradistinction to a suspect notion of existence. So why did he not drop it altogether, and with it all talk concerning what is 'wesentlich', 'wesenhaft', 'Wesensbestimmung', etc.? Is his procedure not viciously circular? As may be gathered from one of the above quotations Heidegger would have argued that his use of 'Wesen' and related terms is based on a 'Vorgriff', a preliminary conceptual understanding of Essence which he intended to clarify and justify in the course of the inquiry. He would

have argued that the circle in question, far from being vicious, is an unavoidable hermeneutic circle. Already at this stage, then, Heidegger must have believed that there is some proper sense of 'Essence' and that it does not coincide with that of 'essentia'.

Almost twenty years later, in a letter to Jean Beaufret, Heidegger commented on his famous proposition 'The "essence" of Dasein resides in its existence'. 6 Again, he underlined that 'Wesen' must not be understood as essentia and 'Existenz' not as existentia. However, he also claims that the quotation marks in 'Wesen' indicate that here Essence has to be determined with respect to the ek-static character of Dasein; that Dasein essences (west) in standing out into the opening of Being (Dasein as Ek-sistence). Nevertheless, one main reason why the author of Sein und Zeit put the word into quotation marks was simply that he wished to guard against the misunderstanding that this Essence of Dasein was a 'what-being' (Wassein) or property of the kind we ascribe to beings which are present-at-hand (Vorhandenes). He emphasized instead that the Essence of Dasein is a way of being (eine Weise zu sein) for Dasein; it depends upon what Dasein chooses to be, upon possibilities it projects itself into; its Essence is inevitably of concern to Dasein and inseparable from its selfhood; Dasein is said to become 'essential' in authentic existence and resoluteness.7 In short, Heidegger wished to stress the fundamental difference between the Essence of Dasein, which is explicable in terms of existentials (Existentialien), and the Essence of beings presentat-hand. These have a different mode of being whose basic determinations are categories.8

Although committed to a phenomenological approach, Heidegger was aware that Husserl's Wesensschau (intuiting of Essences) constituted a philosophical problem.

By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding (the circumspection of concern is understanding as common sense [Verständigkeit]), we have deprived pure intuition [Anschauen] of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology. 'Intuition' and 'thinking' are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological 'intuition of essences' ['Wesensschau'] is grounded in existential understanding. We can decide about this kind of seeing only if we have obtained explicit conceptions of Being and of the structure of Being, such as only phenomena in the phenomenological sense can become.9

In this passage Heidegger is less concerned with essences themselves than with the problem of intuiting them. However, essence and intuiting of essence belong together, as do, in a different way, the ready-to-hand (Zuhandene) and the circumspection of everyday dealings. Not only does that intuiting derive from Dasein's understanding (Verstehen), but the mode of being of the intuited, too, is derivative, at least in the sense that it cannot be established what mode of being essences have unless the Being of Dasein has been explicated to some degree. Hence Heidegger was unwilling, at this juncture, to take Husserl's Wesensschau and phenomenological method for granted. The 'Vorgriff' he refers to does not extend to them but is confined to a particular way of seeing which concentrates on what is non-accidental in Dasein or in other beings, and to what constitutes the sense and ground of the immediately given.¹⁰

3

Some of the above points are borne out in Heidegger's Marburg lectures entitled *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, which he delivered in the summer semester 1927. He clearly takes his approach to be a phenomenological one:

Phenomenology is the title for the method of ontology, that is, of scientific philosophy.¹¹

His manner of characterizing the phenomenological Wesensschau is rather brisk, however:

Seeing and, in analysis, interpreting in an unprejudiced way and rendering accessible and holding fast on to suchlike as an intentional structure of making something, and forming one's concepts to measure regarding what is thus got hold of and seen – this is the sober sense of the much chatted about so-called phenomenological intuition of Essence.¹²

The intentional structures referred to are ontological structures, of course. Phenomenology is the seeing and interpreting of such structures, which Heidegger also calls essential.¹³ The above passage may be taken to indicate that Heidegger is not prepared to accept the Husserlian Wesensschau and the Husserlian essences. On the other hand, he is committed to the essential structures and Essence of Dasein and their accessibility.¹⁴ Significantly, no detailed explanation of this Essence and the way it is given, i.e. the correlated intentional structures, is provided here.

This omission is not surprising, in view of the main theme of the lectures: the clarification of certain fundamental ontological structures,

and the critical elucidation of some traditional ontological theses. For one of these is precisely

the thesis of medieval ontology (scholastics) going back to Aristotle: What-being (essentia) and existence (existentia) belong to the constitution of a being.15

In Heidegger's view the traditional distinction between essence and existence is in need of elucidation and cannot be properly understood unless the question of the sense of Being is posed and answered first. Commenting on that distinction he says:

Every being is something, i.e. it has its What and has as such a certain determinate possible manner-to-be. . . . For us the question arises: Can we, starting from the sense of Being itself, i.e. the temporal, find out on what grounds every being must and can have a What, a τί, a possible manner-to-be? Do these determinations, What-being and 'manner-to-be', sufficiently widely conceived, belong to Being itself? 'Is' Being, in accordance with its essence, articulated by these determinations? We thus face the problem of the fundamental articulation of Being . . . 16

Heidegger then allows us to catch some glimpse of that phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology to which he intended to devote the Second Part of Being and Time. 17 He tries to show that the notions of essentia and existentia originate from one of Dasein's fundamental comportments called Herstellen – producing, the making of something. 18 The same applied, according to his analysis, to a number of Greek notions, in particular to μορφή, είδος, τὸ ην είναι and οὐσία, all of which are closely connected with, and in one sense or other, precursors of 'essentia'. 19 He claims that Herstellen and, ultimately, the ontology of Dasein and its temporality provide the horizon within which the notion of essentia has to be clarified. If he also held that this clarification must precede the explication of his own notion 'Wesen', then it is plausible to suppose that he postponed this explication until after the completion of substantial parts of his fundamental ontology and of the phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology.

A few further points are worth emphasizing. Heidegger questions and doubts the universal applicability of 'essentia' and its Greek precursors to all and every being. Precisely because he believed that these notions originated in the realm of Herstellen and its artifacts he was unwilling to grant them that ontological universality. In particular, he doubted whether the mode of being of Dasein can be understood in terms of essentia and existentia, and whether the Who of Dasein coincides at all

with the What in the sense of essentia.20 However, in these lectures he also says:

In accordance with the Essence of its existence, Dasein is 'in' truth . . . 21

Here the connection which Heidegger emphasized in his letter to Beaufret, and which was already explicitly made in *Being and Time*, is pointed out again: being 'in' truth belongs to the Essence of Dasein.²² The two doubts – the one arising from the who of Dasein, the other from its being 'in' truth – are closely connected. The phrase 'being in truth' echoes Kierkegaard's Essential truth and the authentic self-disclosure of Dasein that goes with it.

Finally, the following passage is of interest, especially in view of Heidegger's later meditations on Essence:

what each being, whatever is real, has already been, is in German denoted by essence. In this essence, $\tau \delta \tau i \hat{\eta} \nu$, in the was, resides the moment of the past, the previous.²³

Relating back to Aristotle, and to Hegel's 'Essence is being passed away' (Hegel connects 'Wesen' with 'gewesen'), these lines also remind us that already for the Heidegger of the twenties the question of Essence was intimately bound up with that of temporality, a point we shall return to.

4

Heidegger's essays Vom Wesen des Grundes and Vom Wesen der Wahrheit appear to have originated in the late twenties. However, while the former truly belongs to this time and stage in his philosophic development, the latter does not quite. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, first published in 1943, is, in his own words, the repeatedly revised text of a lecture first delivered in 1930.²⁴ Its fourth edition of 1961 contains a short but important addition to section nine. The essay contains various traces of Heidegger's philosophic re-orientation in the thirties.

Although the word 'Essence' occurs in both titles, its meaning remains unclear in several respects. However, the texts – above all *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* – throw at least some light on the problem which concerns us. According to Heidegger, not only is the question of Essence inseparable from that of Being, but 'in the concept of "Essence" philosophy thinks Being'. Essence and Truth are similarly intertwined, Essence of Truth and Truth of Essence interwoven. Furthermore the question of the Essence of Ground is said to be interlaced with the questions of

Being and Truth.²⁷ There is little hope, then, of elucidating Essence without getting entangled with a number of other Heideggerian notions. In Vom Wesen der Wahrheit Heidegger says:

'Essence' . . . is understood as the Ground for the inner possibility of that which is at first and in general admitted as known.²⁸

Thus, the Essence of something, X, is the Ground for the inner possibility of X, where X is admitted as known. From the level of our first, common knowledge of things we have to penetrate to a deeper level, that of their inner possibility, if we want to find their Essence. We set about from 'truths' or 'grounds', say, as they are generally admitted, and determine their conditions of possibility. Of course, what Heidegger has in mind is not the Leibnizian logical possibility (consistency) at all, but something closer to, though distinct from, the Kantian transcendental conditions of possibility. In the two essays he points out that the Essence of truth as well as the Essence of ground are found in one and the same: in freedom.²⁹ Freedom here means: freedom of Dasein. Dasein is not conceived of as isolated from beings; but being-in-a-world belongs to its Essence, and so do Transcendence and Ek-sistence.³⁰ From what Heidegger tells us we cannot conclude that the Essence of all things is found in the Being of Dasein. However, we may at least take it to depend upon the Being of Dasein, and, correspondingly, take the way it is determined to depend upon fundamental-ontological considerations. It is not clear what the qualification 'inner' is meant to refer to. Probably he wishes to exclude any reference to such conditions of the possibility of things which are external to these things.

According to Heidegger, the Essence of truth is 'what characterizes each "truth" as truth'. 31 His quotation marks indicate that 'truth' is first to be taken in the sense of 'what is generally admitted as truth'. To articulate something as a truth does not, in his view, necessarily imply that the Essence of what is thus articulated is also grasped; there may be a pre-conceptual and pre-ontological rather than conceptual and ontological understanding of its Being. 32 Generalizing Heidegger's remark a little, we arrive at a second way of determining Essence: the Essence of something, X, is what characterizes each 'X' as X. For instance, the Essence of Dasein is that which characterizes each 'Dasein' as Dasein, the Essence of ground that which characterizes each 'ground' as ground. But does this second definition agree with the first? Is that which is the inner Ground of the possibility of something, X, the same as what characterizes each 'X' as X? Only if what characterizes each 'X' as X is not an ontic feature of 'X', but an ontological condition of its possibility.

Vom Wesen der Wahrheit circumscribes Essence in vet a third way, namely as 'the hiding singular (Einzige) of the unique history of the

disclosure of the "sense" of what we call Being and for a long time used to think as beings in their entirety'. 33 In the light of this passage, Essences are out of the question: for Heidegger there seems to be one Essence only. This Essence underlies the history of disclosure of Being and beings alike. As we shall see, Essence is not 'in' history but rather founds history. Essence hides in at least two senses. Firstly in history, even in the past of philosophy, reigns what Heidegger calls the forgetfulness of Being; to an extent Being and Essence can be disclosed by humans, but humans have so far failed to bring about this disclosure. Secondly, however, he holds that all disclosure of Essence, Being, and beings as beings is necessarily tied to closure. It is with this in mind that we have to approach Heidegger's strange notion of Inessence (Unwesen). Inessence, he says, is essential to Essence: if Essence founds the history of the disclosure of Being and beings, and if this disclosure is inseparable from the closure, or hiding, of Being and beings, then Inessence too founds that history and is essential. On the other hand, in Essence as the hiding, the inessential (to be distinguished from the non-essential³⁴) comes into play. The way in which Essence and Inessence together come into play constitutes 'the essential possibilities of historical mankind'.35 In this third approach much bears the stamp of the thirties. How precisely it fits in with the two earlier approaches is difficult to establish, because Heidegger gives us little to go by. However, if (as indicated above) what characterizes something as something is taken in an ontological sense as the Ground of its possibility, and if Essence is understood as the Ground of the history of the disclosure of Being, then the three ways of delineating essence need not be incompatible or incoherent.

Heidegger emphasizes again that 'Wesen', in his sense of the term, is not 'the empty "general" ', not '"abstract" generality'. ³⁶ Traditional essence (κοινόν, γένος) he considers to have 'fallen away' (abgefallen) from Essence in his original sense. In this 'falling away' Inessence asserts itself. However, Inessence must not be identified with this 'fallen off' essence, which is only one – and a derivative – meaning of the term 'Inessence'. ³⁷ A similar relationship holds, according to Heidegger, between Ground and the grounds or reasons which the traditional principle of reason (Satz vom Grunde) is concerned with; in this principle, too, Inessence asserts itself and obstructs our inquiry into the Essence of Ground. ³⁸

5

By the mid-thirties Heidegger had begun to think in new ways about Essence; ways which are not at all peripheral to his philosophic development. In a note added to later editions of *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* he

explains that the lecture, first given in 1930, should have been followed by a second lecture entitled 'Von der Wahrheit des Wesens' (Of the Truth of Essence), but that this project failed for reasons indicated in his letter On Humanism.³⁹ There is little doubt, then, that thinking about Essence and Truth, in particular about the Truth of Essence, played its part in the famous 'Kehre'.

In the following I shall draw mainly on three texts dating from the period 1935-8: his lectures on Hölderlin's hymns 'Germanien' and 'Der Rhein' (1935/6, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 39), the essay 'The origin of the work of art' (1935/6), and the Freiburg lectures entitled Grundfragen der Philosophie (1937/8, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 45). These latter lectures contain some relatively detailed reflections of Essence, unfortunately in the form of a slightly confusing mélange of Aristotelian and Heideggerian trains of thought. Here the Truth of Essence, a theme hinted at but (to my knowledge) not dealt with in detail before, is finally taken up and to some extent elucidated. 40 It is hardly accidental that this happened at a time when Heidegger was intensely occupied with art and poetry: as we shall see, in a sense the Truth of Essence is for him the Essence of art, is Poetry.

In Grundfragen Heidegger's basic question concerns Truth, or rather the Essence of Truth. In pursuing this question he is led into an inquiry into Essence, essential knowledge (Wesenswissen), and essential Truth (Wesenswahrheit). When he speaks of the Truth of Essence he frequently means the Truth of the Essence of something - e.g., of a table, a window, a house. It is important to take note of this and also of the somehow conventional character of Heidegger's discussion of Essence in these lectures; the more radical notion of Essence which we find in his later writings has not yet come to the fore, although his 1935/6 Hölderlin lectures already contain some indications of it. In Grundfragen he makes the following main points: (1) the Essence of things is brought forth rather than found in the way facts are found;41 (2) essential Truth and essential knowledge are not grounded in anything and do not have to conform to anything (unlike factual truths which must conform to factual states of affairs), but essential Truth is itself the ground and measure and is as such 'original' ('ursprünglich');42 (3) factual truth and factual knowledge depend upon essential Truth and essential knowledge.⁴³ In the light of these three theses Heidegger tries to show that the (already Aristotelian) claim that truth is rectitude (Richtigkeit) is itself essential Truth, 'ursprünglich' and without foundation. Thus, Heidegger dismisses the view that all truth is rectitude.

Let us examine his points in more detail! According to (1) the Essence of things is brought forth ('hervorgebracht' is his term), brought to light, while previously it is concealed, hidden, unknown. This might be taken to imply that it was there before, though unnoticed. However, to bring it forth is according to Heidegger not simply to notice, in a leisurely sort of way, what went frequently unnoticed. He speaks of 'Er-sehen' of Essence, indicating that an effort is involved in making it accessible, and a special 'vision' required to bring us face to face with it.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the decisive point is not sufficiently clarified. Is this 'hervorholende Heraussehen' in the end constitutive of the Essence of things, or is it not? If it is, then the bringing forth Heidegger means is creative in a sense it would not be, if it were merely a matter of coming face to face with what was already there before any 'vision' comes into play. By the way, the term 'holen' is already made use of in 'The origin of the work of art', where artistic work is said to be a drawing out (to use Hofstadter's translation of the term);⁴⁵ but there too the basic ambiguity is unresolved, and it remains to some extent unclear how art, as projecting and disclosing, relates to Essence.

On the face of it, then, two interpretations seem possible: (a) the Essence of things is independent of whether it is 'seen' or not 'seen', but it may be brought forth and become accessible; or (b) the Essence of things is only what it is through being 'seen', and bringing it forth amounts to an articulation without which it could not be what it is. It might appear that (a) is the more plausible interpretation of the two. Does not Heidegger's choice of words - 'hervor-gebracht', 'Zu-Gesichtbringen' - clearly point in this direction? If (b) were the correct view, would we not expect him to explain the constitutive character of 'seeing' and 'conceiving' ('Erfassen')? Yet interpretation (a) is hardly consistent with his main point: that Truth of Essence is not rectitude. For if the Essence of things were independent of the 'seeing', would not our 'vision' of them and whatever claims we make about them be true to the extent that they conform to this essence, and false to the extent they do not? If so, then essential Truth and truth of fact would be analogous in that both would be grounded in something else; hence both would be rectitude, Richtigkeit. But this is precisely the position which Heidegger rejects, and we are therefore back to (a), despite some obvious connotations of the word 'hervorbringen'. This is not to argue, of course, that for the author of Grundfragen Essence was simply a human creation. Rather we have to think of it as some primordial response of men to Being and beings in accordance with which these disclose themselves to men. Given this interpretation, what is Truth as disclosure, Unverbogenheit? Clearly, 'disclosure' could not simply be taken to mean the making accessible of something which was already there before and was there independently of being disclosed; rather, disclosure would have to be the coming-into-being of the 'disclosed'. Such a notion of Truth raises fundamental problems of its own. Pursuing them, however, would lead us far beyond the confines of this essay.

Heidegger's argument that if we did not 'see' or 'conceive' Essence,

we would be blind to particular things and what they are; that therefore factual truth depends upon essential Truth, seems fairly traditional.46 Knowledge of Essence guides us constantly and everywhere, he says.⁴⁷ Facts are disclosed only if there is disclosure of Essence. In this context, however, Heidegger makes some less familiar remarks, too, which point forward to his later thoughts on Essence and also back to his meditations on art and poetry, in 'The origin of the work of art' and in the Hölderlin lectures. Speaking of our knowledge of Essence, he remarks:

This strange state of affairs indicates that it is not the immediately given facts - the singular actual, tangible visible and that which in each case is meant and argued - which has the definite nearness to our 'life'. 'Closer to life - to use the current term - 'closer to life' than the so-called 'actuality' is the Essence of things which (Essence) we know and do not know. The near and distant is not that which the so-called man of facts (Tatsachenmensch) thinks he grasps, but the nearest in Essence, which indeed remains for most the most hidden.⁴⁸

Already here, then, Essence is what brings about nearness, neighbourhood, and thus grounds our daily 'life' while remaining mostly hidden. Heidegger goes a step further, however, when he asserts that:

the authentic calling and saying is indeed the original positing of Essence, but not by convention and adjustment (Abstimmung), but by measure-giving sovereign saying.49

Hence it is through Language that essence originates, and with it that nearness, which is said to guide us everywhere.

Other features of Heidegger's account of Essence are perhaps less obvious. For instance, he tends to avoid the term 'Wesenheiten' and the plural of 'Wesen'; he prefers to speak of the Essence of things rather than the essences of things. A hint that the Essence of one thing and that of another are not separable in the way philosophers, speaking of the essences of things, often take them to be. We should recall that according to Heidegger beings are disclosed in their entirety. He seems to think of the Essence of things as a way they are disclosed within a whole of beings. Another important feature is hinted at in an appendix entitled 'Die Wahrheitsfrage', 50 which appears to have been composed at about the same time as the preceding lectures. Here he makes use of the unusual term 'Wesung'; he writes of 'Wesung der Wahrheit', 'Wesung des Seins' and 'Seyns'), using 'Wesung' side by side with 'Wesen'.⁵¹ The untranslatable 'Wesung' is meant to emphasize the historical eventcharacter of Essence, the sudden uncalculable disclosure of a whole of beings, and (in a sense) of Being itself.⁵² In this event, Heidegger tells us, What-being (Wassein) and How-being (Wiesein) are not yet dissociated but in original unity, and he adds: 'We speak of experience (Erfahren) of *Wesung* and mean by this the knowing, voluntary, attuned *moving into* (Einfahren) *Wesung*, to stand in it and to stand it.'53 Here (and in later writings, as we shall see) Essence and movement are brought together: essential experience is moving into, and (we may add) being moved by, Essence;54 being attuned belongs to it – it is e-motion.

6

Grundfragen der Philosophie throws much light on Heidegger's notion of Essence but contains only a few passing references to art. On the other hand, in 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes' and the lectures on Hölderlin's 'Germanien' and 'Der Rhein' much remains unclear just because the notion of Essence is left unclarified. Thus, with the publication of Grundfragen, a more thorough analysis of Heidegger's philosophy of art, as expounded in those writings of the thirties, is within reach. Of course, it is not my intention to attempt such an analysis here, and I shall restrict myself to considering how the notion of Essence relates to that of the work of art.

'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes' makes three basic assertions about the work of art: (1) that it is an event (or happening) of Truth (ein Wahrheitsgeschehen) and opens up the Being of beings, (2) that it sets up a World (stellt eine Welt auf) and sets forth Earth, (3) that the work of art speaks to us: art is Poetry (Dichtung) as projective Saying (entwerfendes Sagen). 55 The term 'Wesen' appears on almost every page. As in previous texts Heidegger questions its traditional meaning, but now in particular regarding its application to art. He refers to three works of art in order to illustrate his point: a Greek temple, Van Gogh's painting of a pair of shoes, and Meyer's poem 'Der römische Brunnen'. He points out that a Greek temple does not represent the idea of a temple, that Meyer's poem does not render the universal essence of a Roman fountain, and that Van Gogh's painting does not show us what all shoes have in common. 56 On the other hand he writes:

The picture that shows the peasant shoes, the poem that says the Roman fountain, do not just make manifest what this isolated being as such is – if indeed they manifest anything at all; rather, they make unconcealedness as such happen in regard to what is as a whole. The more simply and essentially the shoes are engrossed in their Essence, the more plainly and purely the fountain is engrossed in its Essence

- the more directly and engagingly do all beings attain to a greater degree of being alone with them.⁵⁷

This passage indicates that although Heidegger rejects the view that a work of art represents or expresses some general essence of things, he does hold that in the work of art Truth occurs and beings rise up into, and merge with, their Essence. 58

However, a reader trying to find out more about Heidegger's notion 'Wesen' is likely to be puzzled. 'Wesen' enters in at least three respects, and neither of these is clearly explained in the essay. Firstly, there are the Essence and essential features of the work of art itself. To this essence, we are told, belong the event of Truth, but also the setting up of a World and setting forth of the Earth, and further Poetry and Language.⁵⁹ Secondly, there is the Essence of beings which, through the work of art, 'rise up into, and merge with, their Essence'. This Essence is presumably what the projective Saying of art 'brings forth' (to use the term of Grundfragen). The bringing forth of their Essence opens a World. Thirdly, Heidegger speaks of the essential space (Wesensraum) of a work of art, the 'space' in which it 'essences' (west). 60 With the help of the context we may infer that this essential space is in fact the World which the work of art sets up, or opens. As we shall see, the verb 'wesen' does not here simply mean 'being present', but also 'to reign' or 'govern', even 'to pervade'. Let us stress the crucial point: the Essence of the work of art consists in bringing forth the Essence of beings. The event of truth we are concerned with here is one of essential Truth (in the light of Grundfragen we are entitled to assert it). It is also a historical event. Again, not in the trivial sense that it is found 'in' history, but in the sense that it founds history and its epochs. Beings in their entirety are disclosed differently, and their Being is determined differently in different epochs.61 'Each time, a new and essential World opened up', Heidegger writes. 62 Works of art brought forth the Essence of things in a new way, and in so doing set up a World. Each time beings were disclosed in their entirety, which neither means that each being was disclosed totally nor that no being remained undisclosed, but that the beings disclosed formed a whole due to an all-pervading and epochfounding way of disclosure. As an event of Truth the work of art is said to be the strife of concealment and unconcealment. Heidegger's word 'Riss', by which he characterizes the work of art, may be translated as either 'rift' or 'drawing': art draws out the Essence of things and thus brings about a 'rift' of concealed and unconcealed, and also of Essential and Inessential.63 The projective Saying he refers to is not anything separate from this bringing forth of Essence but one and the same. Language in Heidegger's original sense is this articulation of Essence and hence prior to, and much more than, an 'audible and written expression of what is to be communicated'.64 To summarize: In accordance with 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', World and the Essence of beings are inseparable. Beings have their Essence through belonging to a World, in which beings as a whole are disclosed. As the World changes, Essence changes. World and Essence are historical. The Essence of beings concerns their Being. In art Essence is brought forth through projective Saying, and a World is opened up. The Essence of the work of art consists in bringing forth the Essence of things. As this Essence is brought forth and constituted in different ways, different epochs and a change of Essence arise – 'the history of the Essence of occidental art unfolds'.65

When we turn again to Van Gogh's painting of the shoes, some questions arise. Heidegger's comments on the painting appear more questionable than might have been thought at first. What Essence – or the Essence of what - did the artist's projective Saying bring forth? As Heidegger assures us, this Essence cannot be some general notion or universal essence 'shoe' or 'peasant shoe'. In view of the above one would expect it to be some mode of Being of shoes which is due to a disclosure of beings in their entirety, which opens a world and founds an epoch. This is not quite what Heidegger tells us, however. He points out that the painting reveals what equipment is; that through the painting we find 'the equipmentality of equipment'.66 This poses further problems. Firstly, is 'equipmentality' not precisely what Heidegger wants to exclude, namely a general notion, a traditional universal essence applicable to every piece of equipment? Or is there perhaps some mysterious individual mode of being equipment which cannot possibly apply to more than one pair of shoes and which is revealed in Van Gogh's painting? But of course, being equipment is for Heidegger not at all a general property inherent in shoes, bricks, hammers and the like; nor is it a general notion, or an eternal, invariable essence which exists somehow over and above particular pieces of equipment. What he denies is not so much the general significance of equipmentality as its identification with some general property, notion or traditional essence. Instead, equipmentality is meant to characterize a mode of Being, a way in which some beings are disclosed to humans. In the light of Being and Time and its analysis of equipment we may agree that if the painting discloses the Being of equipment, then it reveals a basic trait of our world and of the worlds which were historically realized. That analysis also shows that equipment is disclosed as a whole within a structure of in-order-torelations.⁶⁷ Secondly, in what way, if any, does such a disclosure of the mode of Being of equipment set up a World? It goes without saying that long before Van Gogh created this painting Worlds were in existence and shoes put on and off, worn and bought, and all kinds of other equipment used. Presumably, the painting provides an essential insight over and above that 'pre-ontological understanding of Being' (to use an

earlier term of Heidegger's) which guides us in everyday life and guided people in past Worlds. What Heidegger has primarily in mind here is an ontological insight and not an ontic one. His main point is not that through the work of art we become more aware of what kinds of shoes there are, of their actual and potential uses, or of the role they play in our daily lives. When he writes that the painting provides us with a knowledge of what shoe-equipment truly is,68 he means that by revealing its equipmentality it reveals to us what we tend to overlook and forget while using it: its Being and with it worldliness. Thus, we may at least understand one sense in which the picture is supposed to open a World: it is meant to give us an ontological insight into the worldliness of World. However, seeing that the equipmentality of shoes is not just characteristic of our or Van Gogh's World but also e.g., of the medieval and Roman Worlds, in what sense, if any, can the picture be said to set up a World, to found a World or a specific epoch? 'Van Gogh's painting has spoken', Heidegger insists. But in what way has it spoken of Essence? The essay does not tell us in sufficient detail, and we are left with a few puzzling questions.

7

Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen, 1962) comprises the texts, or enlarged texts, of a few lectures which Heidegger delivered in the years 1949, 1950 and 1955. Its first part, entitled 'Die Frage nach der Technik' also appeared in Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954) while the second part, 'Die Kehre' was published for the first time in 1962.69 For anybody concerned with Heidegger's notion of Essence Die Technik und die Kehre is a most important text. However, commentators have frequently failed to address themselves to the problem of Essence and did not notice how closely it is bound up with the question of technology. Heidegger writes: 'It is technology which requires of us to think in a new sense what is usually understood by "essence". But in what sense?" On the preceding page he remarks: 'Up to now we have understood the word "essence" in the current meaning.'71 Its current meaning is that of quidditas, whatness. It is not obvious whether he did in fact, up to page 29, use 'Wesen' consistently in this current sense. It is even less obvious in what new way 'Wesen' has to be thought of, in response to the question of technology.

'The Essence of modern technology shows itself in that which we call Ge-stell.'72 According to Heidegger, the Essence of technology is nothing technological. 73 He considers this Essence to be highly ambiguous. 74 On the one hand, as Ge-stell it is Being itself; it provokes man into disclosing the real as Bestand and (what is on order, stock). 75 On the other hand, modern technology appears as the opposite of disclosure, as closure, blocking out, in a variety of ways: (a) it blocks out its own Essence, 76 (b) it blocks out Things, 77 (c) it prevents the nearness of World, 78 (d) it blocks the π 0(π 01s, the genuine bringing forth, 79 (e) it refuses the Truth of Being, 80 (f) it prevents man from encountering himself and his Essence, 81 and (g) Ge-stell even conceals its own blocking out. 82 We conclude that according to Heidegger, the Essence of technology consists in the provocation of humans into a peculiar disclosing of beings which is at the same time a closure and blocking out. At first sight one might see here merely the Heideggerian insistence that all disclosure is bound up with closure. However, he makes the more specific point that the seven-fold blocking out is a special and extreme kind of closure, unprecedented in the history of men.

Some linguistic signposts are meant to lead us on to the new sense of 'Wesen'. Firstly, Heidegger draws our attention to the German nouns 'Hauswesen', 'Staatswesen', and to the old word (still used by J. P. Hebel) 'die Weserei'. He points out that 'Wesen' does here not mean the universal, the general of the genus, but rather a way of 'walten', 'verwalten', unfolding and decaying. The word 'walten' is difficult to translate; the dictionary renders it as 'govern', 'rule'; but the word also has the more general sense of being active and 'in one's element' (e.g. in the phrase 'schalten und walten'). Die Weserei is the town hall, 'in so far as there communal life gathers and village life remains in play'.83 Wesen, then, should be thought as that which governs – in the sense of: gathers, brings together, maintains, keeps in play. Secondly, Heidegger takes 'Wesen' in a verbal sense and emphasizes its reference to time; Wesen as persisting and lasting, not just that which persists and lasts.84 Thirdly, he refers to the connection of 'das Wesende' and 'das Währende' with 'das Gewährende': with that which grants (Things).85 According to Heidegger, then, 'Wesen', 'walten', 'währen', 'gewähren' belong together. It is in this context that the word 'Wesen' is given its meaning. Surprisingly perhaps, he does not draw our attention to that good old Alemannic phrase 'es Wäse mache' ('ein Wesen machen' - to put on a show, a display, make a fuss).

At first sight 'Wesen' as introduced in Die Technik und die Kehre seems to have nothing or little to do with the Socratic, Platonic or Aristotelian essences. However, Heidegger points out that these too were closely related to the temporal: and they were said to last. The Aristotelian $\tau \delta \tau i \tilde{\eta} \nu \epsilon l \nu \alpha l$ was considered to 'precede', to be prior to, particulars and by translating the term as 'the what-it-was-being' Heidegger attempts to bring out this reference to time. See As Essence governs, pervades, brings together the many particulars; as it grants Being to them and grants us knowledge of them, it corresponds in his view to the Socratic and Platonic $\epsilon l \delta o s$ or $l \delta \epsilon \alpha$. However, these were understood as remaining forever invariant and in some sense beyond the variety of changing

things and instances.88 This Heidegger did not accept: Essence is lasting (während) and changing (sich wandeland). In short, then, Heidegger's notion 'Wesen' retains some fundamental traits of είδος, ίδεα and τὸ τί εἶναι, while excluding (i) what he sees as their 'most current' and 'most superficial' character, namely to be simply the general with regard to a range of instances, 89 and (ii) the claim that essence is perennial-invariant, in some realm beyond time.

What, then, is Wesen according to Die Technik und die Kehre? To answer the question (tentatively at least) let us recall how Heidegger determines the Essence of technology. It is the Ge-stell (the Enframing, to use a current but easily misleading translation) and is said to be the lasting (das Währende), the gathering (das Versammelnde), and the granting (das Gewährende). However, this still leaves much undetermined and does not vet bring out a most crucial feature hinted at in the following lines:

For, according to all that has been said the Ge-stell is, rather, a destiny that gathers together into the provoking disclosure.

... the provoking into the ordering (Bestellen) of the real as that which is on order (Bestand, stock) still remains a destining that leads man into a way of disclosing.91

It is extremely difficult to translate this passage and preserve the meanings of, and connections between, the main verbs and nouns which Heidegger employs. Two points emerge, however: (a) the Essence of technology is a destiny (Geschick), and (b) it is a destiny that leads man into a particular way of disclosing the real - namely into disclosing it as Bestand. But what does he mean by 'Geschick', or 'destiny'? Obviously not some 'iron fate' which is imposed upon men by some non-human power; nor something which rules mankind eternally in the same way. 'Geschick' means, literally speaking, all that is sent, and all that we fit into. Here however it refers to a way of disclosure humans get into and find themselves confined to, for a certain time 'in history'. We have seen above that according to Heidegger such Geschicke do not simply occur 'in history' but bring about history; without them there would be no history at all. Geschick depends upon humans, and humans depend on Geschick. Those ways of mankind are not in the power of men: they cannot be brought about, continued or discontinued at will. They are what happens to mankind, or to peoples; what men are engaged in, neither in a purely 'passive' nor in a purely 'voluntary' manner. One destiny may give way to another, and thus a historical epoch may end and another begin to take its course. There was an ancient Greek way of disclosing the real, and now there is the technological way. Each time humans disclose the real, and the real discloses itself to them, in a particular way. This way pervades all human thinking and doing, and the relation of men to beings as beings, and thus gives rise to an 'epoch' of history. Essence is this way of disclosing: the lasting (namely for an epoch), the gathering (of beings into a whole governed by a mode of disclosure), and the granting (making the real accessible to humans in a particular way).

8

Finally, I shall turn to Heidegger's book *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfulingen, 1959). Under the title 'Vom Wesen der Sprache' it contains three lectures which he originally gave at Freiburg in 1957 and 1958. Here, in particular in the third lecture, the notion of Essence as a way of disclosing is further elaborated. Essence is now said to be das Be-wëgende – the Making way, or that which makes way.⁹² 'Be-wëgen' is then interpreted as the Saying of Language ('Essence speaks') and the interplay of the Fourfold (Heaven, Earth, Gods, Mortals).⁹³ Of course, it would be mistaken to believe that in the mid-fifties Heidegger suddenly discovered the intimate connection between what he called Essence and Language; it should be clear by now that this was a theme he had been preoccupied with long before.

As mentioned above, in *The Question Concerning Technology* we first encounter the term 'essence' with its traditional (and still current) meaning and are then directed to 'Essence' in the later and specifically Heideggerian sense. In the lectures on the Essence of Language we find a similar deliberate division and transition, but now within one single sentence, the most important sentence of the essay, perhaps, and the one which is meant to provide 'the guiding word':

The essence of Language: The Language of Essence.94

In the first line, the word 'essence' is taken in its traditional-philosophical sense as the what-being, Wassein, while in the second line 'Essence' means a way of disclosing. Heidegger attempts to elucidate this latter sense as follows:

Now however the word 'Wesen' no longer means that which something is. 'Wesen' we hear as a verb [Zeit-wort] . . . 'Wesen' means lasting, enduring. Only, the turn of phrase 'Es west' says more than just: It lasts and endures. 'Es west' means: it is present [es west an], lasting it concerns us, moves [be-wegt] and belongs [be-langt] us. Thought in

this way Wesen names the lasting, that which concerns us in everything, because it is that which moves everything.95

The translation hardly speaks for itself. The slightly puzzling phrase 'wesend wie anwesend und abwesend' is difficult to render in English in such a way as not to confuse the reader even further, and I have therefore omitted it; Heidegger probably wants to say that we hear the word 'Wesen' as a verb meaning wesen, as in anwesen (being present) and abwesen (being absent). The word 'be-wegen' is one of Heidegger's own linguistic creations and derives, as he explains, from the Swabian-Alemannic 'wege' (making, laying out, paths or roads) and the High German 'bewegen' (to move). 6 'Be-wegen' means to make (lay out, prepare) ways and to make way, also to get under way; but here it does not at all mean to pass from one location in space to another. In the last sentence of the quotation one might expect the word Wesen to be put into quotation marks; for is it not the word 'Wesen' that names the lasting and what concerns us in all things? Or is Heidegger indicating here that Wesen names itself? This is indeed a possibility. For according to Heidegger it is above all Language that names; and as Language is said to be Wesen's 'ownmost character', Wesen too may be said to name things and even itself.

Wesen, Essence, is thus characterized in a twofold manner: (a) it is the Moving or (the term I shall from now on mainly use) Making-way; (b) it is that which speaks, that to which Language properly belongs. These are not two independent 'aspects' of Essence. In making way Essence speaks; and in Speaking it makes way. The Speaking we are concerned with here is the Making-way, and the Making-way of Essence its Speaking. Can we render this notion of Essence more intelligible at all? Let us try. In the previous section we found that Essence was conceived as an epoch-founding way of disclosing beings in their entirety. 'Way' must be understood in a verbal sense. Heidegger groups it together with other words such as 'wiegen' (to rock), 'wogen' (to wave, to surge), 'wagen' (to venture). 97 Here 'way' does not primarily refer to some static assembly of paths, but to the setting or laying out, finding, preparing of paths, and also to moving on a path to and fro. The setting out and the going to and fro is not meant in the spatial sense (as commonly understood), nor in the sense in which scientists may say that they have found a way or method. Rather, the ways and movements refer to the basic historical modes in which beings in their entirety disclose themselves as beings to humans. According to Heidegger this disclosure is tied to, and inseparable from, closure, not because wherever something is disclosed, something else just happens to be hidden too, but rather because disclosure depends on closure. Heidegger maintains that we find such ways of closure/disclosure in the physis of early Greek times, in the creation (the

world of created beings) of the middle ages, in the will to power and finally the Ge-stell in modern times. But what has all this to do with language? Very little, obviously, if we simply take a language as a system of signs and rules for the sake of communication. For Heidegger, however, Language is primarily a way in which Being discloses itself and beings appear as such, are *shown as beings*. Given this primeval sense of 'Language', and given also that Essence is Making-way (in the sense explained), then Language may be said to belong to Essence. It may be asked on what grounds Heidegger used the word 'language' in this highly unusual way, and how precisely this primeval Language is connected with language in a more ordinary sense. However, these and other questions must remain open here, as I do not intend to give a detailed account of Heidegger's approach to language.

One last point should be mentioned: that Heidegger takes the Makingway and Speaking of Essence as constitutive of World. At this stage, however, the notion of World as expounded in *Being and Time* has been considerably modified. Now World is the interplay of the Fourfold: Earth, Heavens, Divines and Mortals.⁹⁹ The ways of disclosure, i.e. the Making-way and Speaking of Essence, are correspondingly interpreted as ways of interplay of the Four. It is these ways which grant the appearance of beings, are the enduring of a historical epoch, pervade, and gather together for a time, beings into a whole. Not surprisingly, Heidegger now says of Language that it is world-moving.¹⁰⁰ He means that the Language of Essence, by making way, laying out the paths of disclosure of beings as beings, and of Being itself, constitutes a World. Or, to use the phrase the later Heidegger was fond of: the Making-way of Essence constitutes the worlding of World – das Welten der Welt.

9

Let us try to sum up the preceding analysis and come to some – almost inevitably critical – conclusions. What did Heidegger mean by 'Essence'? It should at least be obvious by now that there is no simple answer to this question. The simple negative reply that he meant different things by it at different times is of course correct but insufficient and misleading. In the almost four decades considered, Heidegger's notion 'Essence' changed in quite fundamental respects. Yet this change was regulated by some relatively constant, though initially not fully clarified, philosophic intentions.

Among these 'constants' are the following:

1) Heidegger's conviction that philosophic thinking is essential thinking, or the thinking of the Essence of beings.

- 2) His refusal to identify this Essence with the essence of traditional metaphysics.
- 3) The insistence that the Essence of things concerns their Being and the way they are disclosed, as beings, to humans.
- 4) That this disclosure takes place within a World, the ways of disclosure structuring the World.
- 5) An intention to let himself be guided by the verbal rather than substantival sense of 'Wesen'.

These assertions are inevitably formal and sketchy, and merely indicate a range of possible orientations; words such as 'philosophic thinking', 'beings', 'disclosure', 'World', 'Essence' serve here as indicators only, each pointing to a sequence of more or less distinct Heideggerian notions.

Regarding the evolution of Heidegger's notion 'Essence', it is beyond question that significant shifts of meaning took place. To characterize this development let us distinguish three stages (a very rough distinction must suffice here):

- A. In the second half of the twenties his notion of Essence is hardly elaborated at all. On the one hand he suspends the traditional 'essentia' as questionable; on the other he makes frequent use of 'Wesen', taking his notion of Wesen to be a 'Vorgriff', i.e., a preliminary grasp of something still in need of an ontological-phenomenological clarification on the basis of the first part of Being and Time. Although he determines the Essence of Dasein as existence and concerns himself with the analysis of what he took to be essential structures of Dasein, 'Wesen' remains a largely indeterminate notion.
- B. The thirties are marked by an original thrust towards a new though still preliminary conception of Essence. This development owes much to his intense occupation with the philosophy of art, the work of Hölderlin and Nietzsche, and with Greek philosophers (especially Aristotle, Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus). Essence, he holds, has to be brought forth by projective Saying (as in the work of art). In this way a World and historical epoch is founded. Essence is a way in which beings are disclosed as beings, which disclosure is bound up with closure (and World and Earth).
- C. In the forties and fifties his mature notion of Essence as Making-way emerges, in close connection with his attempt to come to terms with technology on the one hand, language on the other. Essence is further determined as the lasting, gathering, and granting, and thus can be seen to respond to the Platonic, Aristotelian and scholastic essences (conceived as persisting perennially, comprising particulars and granting the what-being of these as well as the possibility of their being known). But Essence as the Making-way, the speaking, and the

Moving of the Fourfold obviously takes us far beyond the philosophic tradition.

At stage A the Essence of Dasein is taken to be the key for unlocking the Essence of beings of other kinds, whatever this Essence may turn out to be. Dasein projects its own being-in-the-World; and through this project the Being of beings is disclosed. Worldiness is an existential, characteristic of the Being of Dasein. Language is a worldly manifestation of discourse, and hence (according to Being and Time) of 'the primordial existentiale of disclosedness'. 101 The development from A to B and C shows a shift away from the project of Dasein, in at least two respects: the Essence of things becomes historic 'Geschick' ('sent' rather than projected by Dasein; Dasein 'fits into it' instead of originating or founding it), and its movement of disclosure 'decentralized', as it were, and involving besides Dasein (or Mortals) also Divines, Heaven and Earth. Thus, worldliness and Language cease to be existentials in the strict sense of Being and Time. First it was Dasein who was said to speak, then it was the work of art, finally Essence itself. First, Making-way (if we may for a moment use this term in a general, formal sense) was Dasein's projective disclosing, then it was the event of Truth in the work of art, and finally the basic determination of Essence itself. In more than one respect the work of art became the focus of an intermediate position in this shift from A to C. For instance, Heidegger insists on the 'projective Saying of art' while playing down the artist's project of saying, which in 'The origin' remains peripheral. The event of Truth in the work of art is said to come about through strife; yet the strife meant here is not (at least not primarily) the artist's own, but that of Earth and World (some historic World). Heidegger's point is not that there is first World, which then enters into strife with Earth; but rather that through strife a 'thrust' into the unfamiliar and extraordinary occurs, and a historic World with its 'paths of essential directions' 102 constitutes itself. Essence as Makingway and historic Geschick are here foreshadowed.

10

My objective was to give the reader an idea of what Heidegger meant by 'Wesen' and how his notion of Essence evolved. However, an exposition of this kind may easily create the impression that this notion is ultimately unproblematic and that philosophically all is well with Heidegger's approach – an impression I would prefer not to convey. I shall therefore end with a few critical reflections on what seems to represent the core of Essence. Seeing that his philosophy was, throughout the period under investigation, essential thinking, i.e., thinking of the essen-

tial, it is amazing how vague, ambiguous and fluctuating his conception of Essence was. Even what I called his mature notion is far from lucid and remained in many respects indeterminate. Of course, it is possible (though perhaps unlikely) that this judgement will have to be substantially revised once the Gesamtausgabe is complete. Some features of Wesen may readily be appreciated. That what there is discloses itself to men 'as a whole' in specific ways constitutive of historic epochs; that this disclosure is inevitably tied to specific ways of closure; that the closure/ disclosure comes about above all through works of art and philosophic thought rather than the sciences: these are at least thought-provoking proposals. If it is so (to take a particularly pertinent case) that our modern technological age is characterized by an all-pervading mode of disclosure and 'blocking out' of what there is, a mode specific to this epoch of ours and not at all to Greek, medieval and even early modern times, then it is high time to think about it. But has Heidegger given us sufficiently clear indications of how to think about this fundamental constellation, how to think the Essence of things? Or are we simply plunged into the vague and controversial? To be fair to Heidegger, he never claimed to provide us with a precise, intersubjectively testable and generally acceptable theory. Far from it! He merely claimed to have made a few steps in a new direction and asked some basic questions about something that had long been forgotten - Being. He would have readily agreed that these questions - let alone the answers - remained tentative and to some degree vague, and that his way of recalling Being was bound to be controversial.

'The Essence of . . .' is not only frequently encountered in Heidegger's writings, but it also occurs in a bewildering variety of phrases, such as

the Essence of a tree, the Essence of a jug, the Essence of science.

the Essence of man.

the Essence of Truth,

the Essence of Being,

the Essence of Essence,

to give a small but representative sample. A tree or a jug are particular beings. According to the above analysis of stages B and C, the Essence of beings is an epochal way in which their Being is disclosed (or in which they disclose themselves as beings) to men. Heidegger frequently emphasizes that this epochal way concerns the disclosure of beings as a whole. For example, in ancient Greek times the Being of beings was physis, in modern times objectivity (Gegenständigkeit, Vorgestellheit), then will to power, and finally, in the technological age, beings show themselves as stock (Bestand).¹⁰³ In each case we are concerned with an all-pervading way of Being of beings. Heidegger also speaks of the disclosure of the Being of a specific range of beings as when he determines the Essence of *Things* as 'versammelnd-ereignendes Verweilen des Gevierts' – 'the gathering-eventful dwelling of the four' (to offer one of various inadequate translations). ¹⁰⁴ Now, the mode of Being of a jug cannot be identical with that of a tree, for instance. Jugs are man-made, trees are not (at least not in the same sense); trees grow and reproduce themselves in a manner jugs do not. On the other hand, neither Gegenständigkeit, nor Bestand, nor any other all-pervading way of Being seems to exhaust the Being of a jug, or that of a tree. How then is the Essence of any particular being, such as a jug, connected with those all-pervading ways? Do these differentiate themselves into a manifold of specific ways and traits of Being? Do we perhaps have to interpret the 'gathering' character of Essence primarily with an eye to *this* plurality rather than to that of particular beings?

As is well known, Heidegger insisted on the ontological difference, the fundamental distinction between beings and Being. Yet he speaks both of the Essence of beings and the Essence of Being, a fact which is puzzling. The Essence of beings, as we interpreted it, depends upon three conditions: that there 'is' Being, that there are men, and that the Being of beings is disclosed (or that they disclose themselves as beings) to men. Essence itself does not depend upon there being jugs or trees. That is, various kinds of beings may 'have' their Essence even if there were no jugs and no trees at all. However, Essence - the Essence of anything - cannot be detached from man, Truth, and Being. On these Essence depends - in an 'essential' manner, one is tempted to say; or, the Essence of Essence (Wesenheit, Essentiality) depends upon man, Truth, and Being. But can we speak of the Essence of Being, Truth or Essence in the same or at least in an analogous way in which we speak of the Essence of particular beings such as trees and jugs? The Essence of Truth would have to be the epochal way in which the Being of Truth is disclosed to men; the Essence of Being the epochal way in which the Being of Being is disclosed to them. What sense, if any, can be given to 'Being of Truth', 'Being of Being', 'Being of Essence'? As regards Truth, Heidegger calls it the Essence of the true (das Wesens des Wahren). 105 Thus the Essence of Truth would be the Essence of the Essence of the true, and hence an epochal way in which the Being of an epochal way of the disclosure of the Being of the true is disclosed. Logically complex states of affairs which it is difficult to see through! Furthermore, if Essence is the disclosure of the Being of beings and of Being itself, would we not have to conclude that Essence is the Truth of Being?¹⁰⁶ But how can this be brought into agreement with Heidegger's hints that Truth is the Essence of Being?¹⁰⁷ Of course, that Essence is the Truth of Being must not be taken to imply that the notion of Essence is reducible to that of Truth of Being, and hence superfluous. For Truth and Being in turn have to be characterized by Essence, or rather Essencing ('Essence' taken in a verbal sense). Essencing is lasting and dwelling (Weilen, Verweilen); 108 Truth and Being last and dwell. It would be erroneous, however, to interpret this lasting and dwelling simply as 'going on in time', and to suppose that there is first a time, in which this or that may occur, for instance the disclosure of Being. Heidegger would have dismissed such a conception of time. Proper time belongs to Being and Truth and grants the appearance of beings. Essence seems to have its Time, Time its Essence, Truth its Being and Being its Truth, Being its Essence and Essence its Being. . . . It is obvious that for Heidegger Essence, Being, Truth, and Time belong together, are inseparable; but how precisely they are connected is far from obvious. In the end it remains unclear how 'Essence of Being', 'Essence of Truth' and 'Essence of Essence' have to be understood.

Heidegger seems to oscillate between an epochal Essence and an Essence which is in some sense transepochal. On the one hand he refers to some kind of epochal disclosure of the Being of beings, of Truth and Being itself. What the Being of beings, what Being and Truth are disclosed as characterizes an epoch; it is a way of disclosure which will give way to another. 109 On the other hand, Heidegger appears to hold that there is some proper Essence of beings, of Being and of Truth, an Essence which is not merely relative to an epoch. For instance, Heidegger frequently points out that man's Essence resides in his openness for Being, his Ek-stasis, his being the guardian of Being. 110 It looks as if this Essence is his proper Essence, not just an epochal way among others in which his Being shows itself. We are given the impression that this Essence was involved throughout history, from early Greek times onwards, but that it remained concealed, and in our own technological age even 'blocked out'. If so, this Essence can hardly be taken to be an epochal way in which man's Being is disclosed but instead has to be some enduring fundamental way of being. By contrast, 'animal rationale' appears to refer to an epochal Essence of man, a way he was and understood himself. Now, we have to insist, I think, that something can only be disclosed to the extent it shows itself as it is. If man is the guardian of Being, and if animal rationale is not what he truly is, then he cannot be disclosed as the latter. We might say that for the age of Descartes he was animal rationale, that is, 'believed' to be such; but that he was then not understood as he truly is; as humans did not understand what man truly is there is a sense in which man was not what he truly is: the Guardian of Being – his proper, still unfulfilled and epochally undisclosed *possibility*. That is, we might take the proper Essence to be a possibility and 'potential' being of man, and animal rationale to be the Essence of man as he actually was and understood himself in seventeenth

century Europe. Although this may appear a plausible manner of resolving the problem of the 'two Essences' it is a rather un-Heideggerian way of overcoming it. The following account would be more in line with Heidegger's view: The one Essence of man - the guarding of Being - is an ongoing event of disclosure/closure, and epochs arise as ways in which this Essence refrains from disclosing itself in some respects to humans (refraining we take as epoché). This one Essence of man changes and manifests itself in different epochal ways of disclosure/closure, 'animal rationale' indicating one such way. However, this still does not remove the initial difficulty that seventeenth century man would have to be simultaneously both guardian of Being and animal rationale. Is man always guardian of Being, even as animal rationale? Was he never animal rationale at all, but did he merely for a time believe himself to be such? In my opinion neither of these two questions can be answered with a firm 'yes'; indeed it is not easy to see how the 'two Essences' can be made compatible. By the way, similar difficulties arise in connection with Heidegger's notion of truth. Here Unverborgenheit (Unconcealment, aletheia) is taken to be the proper though long forgotten Essence of Truth, while for instance rectitude (Richtigkeit) is presumably an epochal Essence of Truth which, according to Heidegger, determined history since the time of Plato and Aristotle.

After all that has been said the patient reader may still wonder whether he has gained the crucial insight into the Essence of Essence, or into Heidegger's essential thinking. I have attempted to set up some signposts, but without any guarantee that they will lead on to some holy grail of Heideggerian philosophy. With some philosophers we feel that it is clear what they say, and the question is then whether what they assert is true, or how what they assert relates to other comments on the same or similar topics. Some philosophic texts, however, appear so unclear, puzzling and confusing that we first have to ask what, if anything, is asserted at all. Heidegger's place among the enigmatic thinkers seems assured. But before condemning him or treating him as a figure of fun, let us remember that sometimes the significant and profound appears in an initially unclear form. In a time like ours when so many relatively insignificant clear philosophers with relatively contracted horizons make so much noise, Heidegger's radical questions and far-reaching perspectives are bound to retain their appeal.

Notes

1 As a rule I have written crucial typically Heideggerian terms, such as 'Essence', 'Being', 'Truth' and others, with capital initials. However, in a few places (especially in Section 5) it was difficult to separate the genuinely

Heideggerian from non-Heideggerian meanings; in such cases I did not use capitals. Unfortunately, it was not possible to put German words and phrases into italics throughout as these had to be reserved for the titles of writings as well as for specially emphasized words or phrases. Unless otherwise stated, the subsequent translations from the German are my own.

The more frequently quoted Heideggerian works are referred to as follows (I have used the editions within my reach which, in most cases, do not differ significantly from earlier ones):

- Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24, Frankfurt GPa.M., 1975.
- GFPGrundfragen der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 45, Frankfurt a.M.,
- TKDie Technik und die Kehre, 2nd edition, Pfullingen, 1962.
- SZSein und Zeit, 9th edition, Tübingen, 1960.
- UKWDer Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Stuttgart, 1960.
- US Unterwegs zur Sprache, 3rd edition, Pfullingen, 1965
- WGVom Wesen des Grundes, 3rd edition, Frankfurt a.M., 1955.
- WWVom Wesen der Wahrheit, 4th edition, Frankfurt a.M., 1961.
 - 2 SZ, pp. 49, 52, 56, 121, 123, 136-7, 216.
 - 3 SZ, p. 42.
 - 4 SZ, p. 231.
 - 5 SZ, p. 233.
- 6 'Uber den Humanismus', in M. Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den Humanismus, 2nd edition, Bern, 1954; see especially pp. 68–72.
 - 7 SZ, p. 323; the quotation marks in 'essential' are Heidegger's own.
 - 8 Compare SZ, pp. 42-5.
 - 9 SZ, p. 147 (transl. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson).
 - 10 Compare e.g., SZ, p. 35.
 - 11 GP 24, p. 27.
- 12 GP 24, p. 161. As I am not of the opinion that only tailors ought to worry about elegance, I should like to apologize, once and for all, for the sometimes rather inelegant translations of Heidegger's phrases. However, it is important, in view of the objective of this paper, to keep as close as possible to the meaning of his words.
- 13 This is obvious from various places in these lectures (e.g., pp. 29, 219, 224, 239, 241-2) and from some of Heidegger's other writings of the period, especially Being and Time.
- 14 He goes on using terms such as 'Wesen', 'wesentlich', 'wesenhaft', much as he did in Sein und Zeit. See e.g., GP 24, pp. 9, 29, 31, 109, 135.
- 15 GP 24, p. 20. Here I had to translate Heidegger's term 'Vorhandenheit' as 'existence', for lack of another suitable term. In this context 'Vorhandenheit' is not at all synonymous with 'present-at-hand', the term used in Being and Time.
 - 16 GP 24, pp. 23-4.
 - 17 SZ, p. 39.
 - 18 GP 24, pp. 148, 152-3, 158-60.
 - 19 GP 24, pp. 149-51.
 - 20 GP 24, pp. 169-70.
 - 21 GP 24, p. 25.
 - 22 SZ, p. 221.

- 23 GP 24, p. 120.
- 24 'Revised' is my translation, and interpretation, of Heidegger's slightly ambiguous term 'überprüft' which may in fact merely mean 'checked' or 'examined'.
 - 25 WG, p. 2.
 - 26 WW, p. 23.
 - 27 WG, pp. 17, 50.
- 28 WW, p. 13. I hope I do not have to apologize for some harmlessly un-Heideggerian phrases which I had to restort to in the interpretation of this quote.
 - 29 WG, pp. 53, 44, 50; WW, p. 12.
 - 30 WG, p. 22; WW, p. 14.
 - 31 WW, p. 5.
- 32 Compare WG, pp. 13–14. In Vom Wesen der Wahrheit Heidegger mentions the 'Wesenblick' through which Essence is supposed to be revealed, thus suggesting that something over and above ordinary thinking and experience is required to discover Essence.
 - 33 WW, p. 25.
 - 34 WW, p. 20.
 - 35 WW, p. 17.
 - 36 WW, p. 25.
 - 37 WW, p. 20.
 - 38 WG, p. 53.
 - 39 WW, p. 26.
 - 40 Compare WW, p. 23 and UKW, p. 53.
 - 41 *GFP*, pp. 83, 85–6.
 - 42 *GFP*, pp. 81, 83, 86, 95–6.
 - 43 GFP, p. 93.
 - 44 GFP, p. 85.
- 45 UKW, pp. 80, 87; M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (transl. by A. Hofstadter), New York, 1971.
 - 46 *GFP*, pp. 65–6, 84.
 - 47 GFP, p. 81.
 - 48 GFP, p. 82.
 - 49 GFP, p. 80.
 - 50 GFP, pp. 193-223.
 - 51 Now this term is only occasionally put into quotation marks.
 - 52 *GFP*, pp. 201, 210, 218.
 - 53 GFP, p. 202.
- 54 Notice the relation of *Erfahren* and *Einfahren* which the English translation fails to preserve.
- 55 UKW, pp. 32, 37, 44, 60, 62, 63, 82-4. 'Earth' is a rather difficult notion giving rise to problems of its own. I shall make no attempt to interpret it in any detail here.
 - 56 *UKW*, pp. 34–5.
- 57 UKW, pp. 60-1. This is A. Hofstadter's translation except that I have inserted the words 'Essence' and 'essential' where Hofstadter unfortunately uses 'nature' (for 'Wesen') and 'authentically' (for 'wesentlich').
- 58 'Rise up and merge into' is, approximately, what Heidegger means by 'aufgehen' (which Hofstadter translates as 'engross').
 - 59 UKW, pp. 49, 62, 67, 85-6.
 - 60 UKW, p. 39.
 - 61 *UKW*, pp. 86, 88–9.

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62 UKW, p. 88.
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- 63 Compare *UKW*, pp. 51, 70-2.
- 64 UKW, p. 83; Hofstadter's translation.
- 65 UKW, p. 94.
- 66 *UKW*, pp. 32, 36.
- 67 See SZ, §§15 and 18.
- 68 *UKW*, p. 32.
- 69 TK, Vorbemerkung.
- 70 TK, p. 30.
- 71 TK, p. 29.
- 72 TK, p. 23.
- 73 TK, p. 23.
- 74 TK, p. 33.
- 75 TK, pp. 23, 37, 42-3.
- 76 TK, p. 21.
- 77 TK, pp. 37, 44.
- 78 TK, pp. 44, 46.
- 79 TK, p. 30.
- 80 TK, pp. 37, 45.
- 81 TK, p. 27.
- 82 'Das Ge-stell verstellt sogar noch dieses sein Verstellen.' TK, p. 44.
- 83 TK, p. 30. This translation is deficient in at least two respects, but I am unable to improve it: 'dörfliches Dasein' I rendered as 'village life', although 'Dasein' means 'being here', strictly speaking; 'town hall', the usual translation of 'Rathaus', unfortunately does not tie in with 'village life'.
 - 84 TK, pp. 30-1.
- 85 The connection between 'to grant' and 'walten' is brought out e.g. by the fact that the German 'Walte Gott!' corresponds to the English 'God grant it!'
 - 86 Compare *GFP*, p. 59.
 - 87 'Was sie durchwaltet', TK, p. 5. See also GFP, p. 59.
 - 88 TK, p. 30.
 - 89 Compare *GFP*, p. 60.
 - 90 TK, p. 31.
 - 91 TK, p. 31.
 - 92 US, p. 201.
 - 93 US, pp. 201-2, 211, 214-15.
- 94 US, p. 200. Compare the similar Heideggerian inversion 'The Essence of Truth, the Truth of Essence'.
 - 95 US, p. 201.
 - 96 US, pp. 197-8.
 - 97 US, p. 198.
 - 98 Compare *UKW*, pp. 83-4.
- 99 US, pp. 211-15; see also Vorträge und Aufsätze, 2nd edition, Pfullingen, 1959, pp. 176-80.
 - 100 US, p. 215.
- 101 Being and Time (trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson), chap. 34, p. 161.
 - 102 *UKW*, p. 59.
- 103 See e.g., GFP, p. 129; Der Satz vom Grund, Pfullingen, 1957, pp. 99-100; Nietzsche, vol. 1, Pfullingen, 1961, pp. 26, 235-40; Holzwege, Frankfurt a.M., 1950, pp. 226–7; TK, p. 16.
 - 104 Vorträge und Aufsätze, Pfullingen, 1954, p. 172.

105 E.g., UKW, p. 53; Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 54, Frankfurt a.M., 1982, p. 242.

106 This must not be taken to imply that Heidegger agrees with the *Hegelian* thesis that essence is the truth of being; that being passes over into essence, to be dialectically sublated in it. What Heidegger calls Essence is more akin to the Hegelian 'Gestalten' of world spirit (but without their dialectic-progressive synthesis).

107 Compare Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 54, p. 242; GFP, p. 169; Holzwege, p. 332; Nietzsche, vol. 2, Pfullingen, 1961, pp. 335-6.

108 Zur Sache des Denkens, Tübingen, 1969, 'Zeit und Sein', p. 12.

109 Heidegger points out (in Zur Sache des Denkens, pp. 8-9) that 'epoch' refers to the refraining of being rather than to some section of a process. (The reader will recall that $\epsilon \pi o \chi \hat{\eta}$, refraining, abstention, was a key term of Greek scepticism and of Husserl's phenomenology.) Nevertheless, Heidegger clearly associates these epochs and ways of disclosure/closure with particular eras and their succession.

110 See e.g., Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit: Mit einem Brief über den Humanismus, Bern, 1954, p. 94; Identity and Difference, 5th edition, Pfullingen, 1976, p. 18.

Theological resonances of Der Satz vom Grund

Joseph S. O'Leary

Is God the ground of the universe, the ground of our being? Has this question any meaning? Like so many religious questions it is tantalizingly obscure. Under analysis each of its terms dissolves into the thinnest of mists, which we no longer much like to hail as the thickest of mysteries. What is God? What is 'the universe'? What is ground? What is 'our being'? The tone of these questions is now more likely to be one of irritated puzzlement than one of reverent wonder. One is tempted to jettison all these determinations as survivals of an older metaphysical culture, or to regard them as only murky expressions of religious sentiment: Faust's Gefühl ist alles;/Name ist Schall und Rauch. Some theologians attempt to rethink theism by dissolving God into Buddhist emptiness or into the Lacanian real. God then becomes a quality of things rather than their creative foundation and cause.

In this crumbling of theistic language, it is natural that we should turn to the philosopher who has most devoted himself to topics considered beyond the pale of reason and speech. If metaphysics cannot give precision and grip to our God-language, perhaps a really profound phenomenology can? The remedy is a risky one, but the power of the phenomena at the heart of religion assures us that the turn to a thinking led by the phenomena cannot be fruitless.

Heidegger's essentialism

The word that came most easily to Heidegger's lips was: Wesen (essence). The method and content of his work can be summed up under the rubric: a thinking of essence. Whenever he brings the essence of something into view, in a phenomenological Wesensschau, in the course of one of those stubborn, patient analyses where he has us think 'into the wind of the

matter' (GA 13, p. 78),¹ the result is so illuminating that we are likely to overlook the rarefied character of his constructions. History, to the X-ray vision that cuts through mere contingencies and distracting loose ends, knows no other movement than a parade of shining essences, e.g.:

The metaphysical beginning of the modern period is a transformation in the essence of truth, of which the ground remains hidden. . . . In the beginning of the modern period the beingness of beings undergoes a transformation. The essence of this historical beginning resides in this transformation.

(N II, pp. 295-6)

Beginning, essence, transformation, ground . . . if these constructions have any validity at all they can only benefit from being reinserted in the pluralistic texture of empirical history.

Heideggerian essences replace metaphysical foundations. We can see them only when - by a step back, or a leap of thinking - we relinquish our clinging to foundations. The dominant figure in the science of Heidegger's time is that of the field. His own thought moves in the field of essences (the open, the region) mapping its topology. He suggests an affinity with Einstein's space-time field in naming the open in which being is given to thought, the four-dimensional Zeit-Raum (ZSD, pp. 14-17). For the theological equivalent of this, one can point to Karl Barth, a phenomenologist of the Word of God, whose field of thought was the truth of revelation, grasped in its essential topology. Barth knew well the plurality of forms that Christian discourse had taken, the plurality of ways in which the divine Word made itself heard across the oblique testimonies of Scripture and church tradition. But all these forms are under judgment, and the Word which judges them is a unitary, essential instance. The judgment falls particularly heavily on non-Christian religions, seen as deluded human constructs, whereas Christianity in its essence is not a religion, but the hearing of the Word in faith. At the heart of the other religions lies no such essential revelatory and salvific event

Today, a pluralist theology is in the making, which bears the same relation to Barth as the post-modern novel does to Proust or as the pluralistic music of Zimmermann or Stockhausen bears to Wagner. The great works of this pluralism are not cathedrals which contain and unite everything, but crossroads open to an irreducible variety of divergent cultural realms. Theology is learning to celebrate a pluralism of religious systems based in different cultural forms of life, and to see Christianity itself as a vast congeries of local theologies. Religion becomes as polymorphous as art and all its experiments are granted legitimacy, subject only to the criterion of quality, which, as in the case of art, eludes

universal formulation and presents itself in a different guise in each new cultural or historical context. The tension between essentialism and pluralism in Heidegger's thought - which is a cathedral of being, but also, to a lesser extent, a potential crossroads of dialogue – resonates with the most basic tension in religious thinking today.

The problem of theologians is: how retain the depth of Barth's meditation, the firmness of his sense of Christian identity, while embracing a pluralism that sees divine truth at work in all authentic religions? The problem of philosophers may be: how retain the depth of Heidegger's meditation, his sense of having a foothold in being, while recognizing the pluralism of philosophical languages and allowing all unitary categories to be dissolved into the multiplicity of disparate usages which they feebly attempt to mask?2

For it is increasingly apparent that the luminous meanings Barth and Heidegger established cannot be immunized against the floods of information about cultural and anthropological diversity which provide the element in which reflection of a humanistic order is today obliged to move. Heidegger's and Barth's essences are swallowed up and relativized in that pluralistic element. Their passion for the essential is alien to the more open-ended world of post-structuralism and chaos theory, where reason pursues cross-disciplinary connections, fascinated by its own margins and the dissolution of established identities. Intelligibility in this economy of thought is not the constitution of an essence but the grasp of connections. The passion for the essence of the Word of God has been abandoned by theologians who are more impressed by the historical diversity of religions and see their own tradition as an amalgam just as impure as any other. Heidegger's passion for the truth of being is seen as the last dam built by the West against its dissolution in the pot-pourri of emergent cultural holism.

There is a tension between his sense of the finite historicity of Western tradition and the implicit claim to universality in the way he talks about being. In a philosophy centred on reason such a claim is indispensable, since it is of the essence of reason that it aims at universality. But no such imperative is inscribed in Heideggerian wonder at the coming to presence of beings. This discourse on being has the radiance of an aesthetic tradition – it is universal more as Mozart is than as Euclid is. Jean Beaufret stresses the finitude of being and takes it to mean that 'being' is conceived historically as the theme of Greek reason: 'Heidegger has too much respect for the "other" to pretend to resolve the still enigmatic unity of Western thought, or the infinitely more enigmatic problem of the possible unity of the human species' (*Encyclopaedia Universalis*, 11 (Presse Universitaires de France) p. 261). Indeed he is the thinker who has most vividly revealed the pluralism within Western culture and between the West and other cultures, for the differences he

indicates are differences that count, irreducible epochal and cultural essences, not a mere encyclopedic assortment. He is a pluralist in that he is aware of the existence of other fields and is content to let them be; but he focuses his own thought on the field of Western metaphysics conceived as a unity.

Beaufret's association of the finitude of being with history applies in the case of the limited mittences of being that happen in the course of the history of being, but as far as I can see the field of being that is brought into view in the thought of the Ereignis is not finite in any historical sense, but only in so far as its dimensions are those of a world. a dwelling for mortals, on whose mindfulness it depends for its radiant deployment. As a prophet of the Ereignis Heidegger shows no modest sense of the limits of Western tradition. The word is put forward as a name for the very essence of reality itself, and Heidegger boldly suggests that its status and scope are comparable to the Chinese Tao. In alluding to the world-formula sought by Heisenberg (ZSD, p. 1) he betrays the immoderate ambition to think time, space and being from their unifying origin. I feel that he overreached himself at this point. In erecting the Ereignis as the caput mortuum of his thought he consigned his critical reprise of Western metaphysics to a closed system of essence instead of opening it out into a pluralistic dialogue. Still the variety of trails that lead to this dogmatic summit exhibit the pluralistic texture of Heidegger's own thinking, and his efforts to force them to converge remain blessedly inconclusive. A pluralistic reprise of Barth might show the same thing.

Heidegger's brooding on the essence of metaphysics and of what metaphysics conceals is strongly defended against empirical falsification or even modification. Whenever he is so imprudent as to step outside the phenomenological theatre of the essentializing operations, his vacuous and reactionary pronouncements on politics, culture and (in the seminars with Medard Boss) psychotherapy reveal the 'blindness' on which his 'insight' depends. At those embarrassing junctures the thoughtful differentiation of essences gives way to crude identifications - of Russia and America, or - most scandalously - of Nazism and technology. The clairvoyance with which he summons forth the essence from philosophical or poetic texts or certain phenomena of existence turns into pathetic delusion in those realms of cultural or political judgment in which one cannot make declarations about the essence without immersing oneself in a study of the facts. But even within the limits of a pure phenomenology of being, does not his refusal of pluralist solicitation entail a narrowing or a premature arrest of thought?

In what follows I shall try to discover possibilities of a pluralistic loosening up of Heidegger's style of thinking in connection with three topics: (1) his account of the essence of metaphysics, onto-theology, the history of being; (2) his proposal of a leap of thinking or a step back

from metaphysics to its forgotten origin; (3) his account of that origin itself, the truth of being, the Ereignis; and (4) the implications for theology. In spoiling the purity of Heidegger's essences, we must take the risk of losing the colour and relief of his vision and falling into a mere encyclopedic indifferentism. That danger has menaced the efforts of post-modernist theoreticians to think pluralism and difference more thoroughly than Heidegger's essentialism allowed. (Deleuze and Foucault, through diligent empirical study, have escaped this danger better than Derrida, Lyotard or De Man.) The pullulation of differences cannot have the power and strength that comes from insight into essence. Yet it seems that a relinquishing of essence is an imperative of contemporary thought in every field - in literary and religious studies and even in science. In forfeiting the unity of the Ereignis and rejoicing in a plurality of finite human worlds - many 'clearings' rather than a single one - do we devalue the world in which we live, making it just one among many possibles, and thus a mere fiction? Or is this multiplicity of the essence of human worldhood, so that the pathos or splendour of its finitude cannot be tasted without it? In any case there is not a choice; we are obliged to be tolerant under pain of being fanatical - the fate of not a few dogmatic Heideggerians.

The plurality of reason

Heidegger's project of 'overcoming metaphysics' has been the most popular of his philosophical proposals, especially among theologians, literary critics and theorists of the post-modern. A critical reconsideration of this project can never be superfluous; for even the most zealous overcomers can hardly deny that justice must be done to the metaphysical tradition and its rational claims. It may be claimed that Heidegger's most mature and serene enactment of an overcoming of metaphysics is found in Der Satz vom Grund (The Principle of Reason), and that it is also in this work that the questionable aspects and the limitations of his thought are most apparent.

(Linguistic problems, which I cannot discuss here, begin with the translation of the title. The vision of essence that comes to speech in Heidegger depends heavily on the contingencies of the German language and the lucky accidents of his own manipulations of it. In translation it invariably loses much of its imposing force. Thus cultural relativity gnaws away at the pretensions of essence. Religious thinking is also at the mercy of the contingencies of language; even the basic dogmas of the Church are unthinkable except in Greek. Translation plays the same treacherous role for Christianity as for Heidegger.)

The notion of ground was one of Heidegger's central preoccupations,

rehearsed with references to Aristotle, Leibniz, Crusius, Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer in 1928–9 (GA 26; GA 9, pp. 123–75). Many of the historical queries one might pose while reading Der Satz vom Grund turn out to have been touched on, if not fully resolved, in these earlier discussions. In Der Satz vom Grund academic issues are left behind, leaving us free to follow a clear line of thought according to the rhythm of thought itself. But does the tangled history of the philosophy of causes and reasons admit of being grasped in such a serene play of thinking? Can thought gain access to a single perspective in which everything falls into place? Perhaps Heidegger's meditation needs to be refocused as merely one possible way of viewing the question, a modest clearing in a jungle it cannot pretend to master.

An Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) opens with a striking phenomenological evocation of the inevitability with which the question 'Why does anything exist rather than nothing?' emerges in human experience (GA 40, pp. 3-32). The 'rather than' (potius quam) carries the existential thrust of the principle of sufficient reason, a principle on which the being of beings depends. It imposes itself not only with a logical necessity and universality, but also at the existential level, emerging in the deepest human experiences. It is not surprising that this renewal of the whyquestion was taken up as the point of departure for the transcendental Thomist arguments of Karl Rahner. But Heidegger never sought to answer the question along such metaphysical lines; the answer is rather a leap away from the question, toward a different way of thinking the being of beings, not as indebted to a cause or reason, but as freely granted, as a 'there is' which is 'without why'. Aristotle's aition, 'that to which a thing is indebted for its being that which it is' (GA 9, p. 245), is apprehended as a letting-be of beings (VA, pp. 15-19).

In Der Satz vom Grund this shift is ingeniously anchored in Leibniz's formula, when we hear it in a new way: instead of 'nothing is without ground' it becomes 'nothing is without ground'. We listen, successively, to the harmonics of the two accentuations of the proposition. The basic chord of the atomic age undergoes an enharmonic shift into the basic chord of a post-metaphysical thinking. This eschatological reversal is of the same order as the shifts effected by the characteristic Heideggerian chiasmus of the type: 'The essence of speech is the speech of essence.'

The first question we must put is this: does Heidegger so absolutize the principle of reason – in both the first and the second accentuations – as to project a simplistic and rigid picture of the history of metaphysical thinking? We can pursue several aspects of this query: (1) the self-evidence and universality attributed to the principle; (2) the way in which the principle is claimed to point beyond itself by its own enigmatic character: (3) the role of the principle in metaphysics grasped as onto-theology and history of being.

I Is there a unitary principle of reason?

1 Simplistic treatment of Leibniz

Heidegger's notion of ground is a unitary one not only at the metaphysical level but in his own essential thinking. The metaphysical unity of ground is secured by Leibniz's historic enunciation of the principle of sufficient reason. Henceforth, ground is no longer in danger of falling apart into a variety of causes and principles. Yet the perfection of Leibniz's principle serves to highlight the lack of the essential thinking of ground, which Heidegger intends to provide. In 1928 the principle simply occluded the essence of ground: it was 'questionable whether the problem of the ground coincides with that of the "principle of ground" and whether it is posed at all by this principle' and discussion of the principle served only to 'provide the occasion and mediate a first orientation' for thinking of the essence of ground (GA 9, pp. 125-6). The later Heidegger's more radical method of 'looking metaphysics in the face' (GA 29/30, p. 5)3 forbids such facile leaps and obliges him to come to more intimate grips with the power of the principle of reason.

Yet there is a limit to his engagement in both periods, in that he glosses over the immense variety of forms this principle has taken in the contexts of different philosophers' systems. As one historian remarks: "Sufficient reason" acquires its meaning more from the context in which it is used than from any established definition attached to the words themselves.'5 Before Leibniz, one might cite many discussions of causality which implicitly recognize the validity of some such principle, perhaps allowing a variety of retrospective formulations of it for each of them. There are a plurality of formulations in Leibniz himself: it is a logical principle: all predicates are precontained in the notion of the subject; it is a principle underlying events: everything that happens is a consequence of the notion of the monadic substance to which it happens; as a principle grounding existence, it is the (determinative, rather than merely sufficient) principle of the most perfect; in the physical world it is a principle of efficient causality, which has merely phenomenal status.⁶

Heidegger gives a nod to this diversity but tries to put it aside as a merely historical problem:

Admittedly the principle underlies . . . manifold interpretations and evaluations. For the present purpose, however, it is convenient to take the principle in the version and role which Leibniz first explicitly gave it. But just here it is controverted whether the principium rationis was for Leibniz a 'logical' or a 'metaphysical' one or both.

(GA 9, p. 128; see GA 26, pp. 135-6)

Here we seem to catch Heidegger eluding the plurivocity of the notion

of ground; it is presumed that some unitary instance underlies the diverse interpretations; the suspicion that the diversity of interpretations sheds doubt on this unity is repressed. The principle of reason is declared to be much too rich to fit into the current distinctions made concerning it (GA 26, p. 145). It can be lit up only in that region in which the nature of the logical and the metaphysical, truth and ground, are first to be determined. Just as the essence of truth (unconcealment) cannot be adequately grasped in Leibniz's formulations in terms of subject and predicate, so the essence of ground eludes the terms of the principle of sufficient reason. 'The problem of the ground finds its home only there whence the essence of truth derives its inner possibility, in the essence of transcendence' (GA 9, p. 135). Though this Dasein-centred topology is later abandoned, the realm of the truth of being remains the locus of the authentic sense of ground. Both early and late the task of thinking the essence of ground from its origin presupposes some unitary sense for the expression 'ground' which is never put in question. Since the same can be said for the expressions 'truth' and 'being', one may well have qualms about the project of grasping phenomenologically how being, truth, and ground belong together. And when it came to the crunch, Heidegger himself, we suspect, let this project drop in favour of loose variations on Heraclitean notions of Logos and cosmic play.

No effort is made to clarify the principle by descending to its applications, with the result that the principle retains an almost oracular obscurity - in both accentuations, it is a word from being, which casts a hypnotic spell. As Vincent Descombes points out,7 Leibniz's principle applies primarily to matters of contingent existence – justifying them as the best states of affairs possible; whereas Heidegger, in accord with his usual practice of listening to metaphysical texts with an ear for the repressed wonder at 'the marvel of all marvels: that beings are' (GA 9. p. 307), wants the principle to be an utterance about being. Even in raising the question 'why are there beings rather than nothing?' Leibniz wants to justify the contingent existence of things whereas Heidegger wants to deepen a sense of the mysterious fact that 'beings are'. Has Heidegger understood Leibniz better than he understood himself, or is he interested in understanding Leibniz at all? Either his thinking of being grounds and masters reason or it is a skilful avoidance and oblivion of reason. Perhaps Heidegger's thought will remain fruitful and challenging only as long as we are unable to decide this issue, only as long as the mutual solicitation, the tug-o'-war, between reason and thinking maintains its tension.

In hailing Leibniz as paradigmatic, Heidegger tones down the idiosyncratic speculative charge the principle carries for the great rationalist. He sees that 'the Leibnizian derivation of the *principium rationis* from the essence of propositional truth thus reveals that a quite determinate

idea of being in general lies at its basis', namely, 'the monadologically understood "subjectivity" of the *subjectum* (substantiality of substance) (GA 9, p. 135; cf. GA 26, pp. 86–123; N II, pp. 436–57). However, in SG he gives prominence to versions of the principle that sound quite innocuous and seem self-evident (helped by Wolff and his successors who had released the principle from Leibniz's speculative web). Shorn of its dazzling speculative applications the principium grande risks becoming a banality. Its rational force is simplified to an existential claim that hangs over ground-seeking humanity at all times. It becomes the heartbeat of the modern world. Aspects of modernity that do not fit it are glossed over.

2 Simplistic account of science

Leibniz's reduction of cause to reason is quite anti-modern in its opposition to Hobbes' and Newton's reduction of causality to merely efficient causality. 'The principle demands that everything that happens to a thing, including the causations, have a reason.' This is a retrieval of Plato's glorification of the Forms as the supreme aitiai. Leibniz invokes the key passage, Phaedo 97C, in his polemic against a causality not reducible to reasons 9

Seen from the point of view of its cosmological application, the principle of reason is less modern than is claimed. We see that it is a compromise, an effort at conciliation [between modern rationality and] the possibility of a musical experience of the world. 10

In presuming that the modern universe is tightly bound in a network of Leibnizian deductive intelligibility, Heidegger gives an impoverished account of the texture of contemporary science. The law of universal causality is for positivists no more than a piece of methodological advice on what regularities to expect.¹¹ Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle (1927) seemed to make a breach in the stability of causality within science, though his view is criticized as a positivistic inference from the impossibility of knowing the cause of a given event to the meaninglessness of talking of its cause. 12 H.-J. Engfer states:

Modern theory of science seems to exclude any conclusive sufficient or adequate grounding of what is known: the principle of sufficient reason has now as a causal principle only the status of a hypothesis which can neither be verified nor falsified, a 'pragmatic presupposition' of research.

(Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 7, pp. 1132-3)

One wonders if Heidegger has not chosen the wrong target in making

so much of a principle which has so questionable a hold on the contemporary mind. Yet his critique stems from the cultural milieu in which 'acausality was being espoused years before the enunciation of Heisenberg's Principle, which was seized upon as a triumph rather than a disaster'. 13 He might accept all the scientific criticisms of causality and still maintain that they only verify the powerful hold of the principle of reason.

The recently much-treated controversy about the nature and scope of the validity of the principle of causality has a basis and ground only through the fact that the participants in the controversy all stand under the same claim for the delivery of the sufficient reason of our representations.

(SG, p. 99)

The principle of sufficient reason, because not interrogated in its essential claim, functions all the more smoothly and powerfully in scientific and technological discourse. The 'only fruitful way' out of this rationalism 'leads through modern axiomatic representation and its hidden grounds' (SG, p. 42).

But how is this maxim compatible with the leap that Heidegger actually makes? He leaps from the principle of reason to the source from which it springs; but he does so from relatively abstract versions of the principle, never descending into the details of modern axiomatic thinking. He apprehends this thinking very globally as taking place at the behest of the principle of reason, which is 'something other than science itself'. 'The drive and the urge to remove contradictions within the multiplicity of conflicting theories and irreconcilable states of affairs stem from the claim of the principium reddendae rationis' (SG, p. 59). This is a wooden and monochrome account of scientific activity. Heidegger is merely vehiculating a common belief about the nature of science, which can do no justice to the vast complexity of the textures of causes, reasons and explanations in scientific discourse or in philosophical discourse including Leibniz. In attempting to make this belief operative as an analytic principle he falls headlong into a journalistic rhetoric about the 'atomic age'.

3 The pluralism of religious conceptions of ground

If this essentialist conception of ground cannot do justice to the complexities of Western philosophy and science, still less could it handle the no less complex notions of cause and reason in Indian and Chinese thought, notably the many varying accounts of 'dependent co-arising' in the Buddhist tradition. Nor can it deal with the variety of languages in which the biblical God is spoken of as maker and cause of the universe. Heidegger's understanding of this tradition is a threadbare one: religious thinking has often been hampered by simplistic notions of cause and reason, but Heidegger himself is simplistic in what he says of the creator God of the Bible and the Scholastics (which he tends to conflate).

'Behold the heavens and the earth: they cry out that they have been made' (Augustine); that is superb, but it needs to be thought through in a way that does justice to the plurality and the obliqueness of the ways in which the world intimates its divine ground. In so far as the history of metaphysics and theology does conform to the rigid structure of onto-theology that Heidegger imposes on its variety, the notion of God as first cause enjoys a stability to which it is not entitled and which occludes the enigmatic polyvalence with which the world speaks to us of that great mystery which lies at its ground.

4 The existentializing of the principle of reason

Heidegger's unconcern with the pluralism in the history of the principle of sufficient reason is due to his primarily existential interest in the human quest for grounds and the modern rationalization of the universe in terms of grounds. It is a Kantian rather than a Leibnizian or even Wolffian version of the principle of reason that is uppermost in his mind, for it is in Kant that the principle as shaping existence and the human world comes most clearly into perspective.

What Kant says of the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason, that it is 'a remarkable pointer to investigations which are still to be carried out in metaphysics,' holds true equally of his own highest principle of all synthetic knowledge, insofar as therein the problem of the essential interconnection of being, truth and ground lies hidden.

(GA 9, p. 136)

Being, truth and ground here have little in common with scientific notions of existence, fact, cause or explanation. Kant is stretched into existentialphenomenological shape in accord with the existential resonances of his mapping of the relation between reason and world.

Kant followed Crusius in restricting the principle to the phenomenal realm, eventually reducing it to an epistemological matter, which Heidegger translates as the grounding activity of Dasein. Things in themselves elude the principle of reason. Kant's noumenal space is thus a predecessor of the Heideggerian realm of being as groundless ground. Heidegger's existential translation of Kant permits him to eschew discussion of the epistemological or logical detail of the quest for grounds and to focus on its most simple features. However, it would not be correct to say that Heidegger accepts Kant's reduction of the principle to an epistemological, subject-centred one; for to Heidegger Kant's subjectcentredness is a distortion of the phenomenality of being; the search for

grounds is an aspect of that phenomenality and as such cannot be seen as merely subjective. There is no objective ground beyond Dasein's apprehension of being as ground, not because of an epistemological phenomenalism, but for quite the opposite reason: being is truly manifest in its phenomenality; it cannot be meaningfully distinguished from its phenomenality; there is no being-in-itself beyond the phenomenality of being. Kant has served to break the power of the principle of reason. its power to point to unknown, hidden causes and grounds. Heidegger venerates the principle as an existential phenomenon and wrestles with it to regain access to the authentic phenomenality of being. But it seems that his method of thinking is inherently unable to do justice to the metaphysical reach of why-questions. It can demystify such questions in their historical forms (including especially the theological ones) by showing how they overleap the phenomena at their base; but it cannot repress the stirrings of reason that prompt their recurrence in an unpredictable variety of forms and contexts.

The phenomenology of the 'Why?' is less dramatic, more mundane, in *Der Satz vom Grund* than in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. The focus is on everyday thinking, not on privileged moods in which the question 'why?' sounds in the depths of the soul:

human understanding itself everywhere and always, where and when it is active, is forthwith on the lookout for the ground on the basis of which that which encounters it is as it is... The understanding demands a basis for its statements and its assertions. Only statements with a basis are comprehensible and sensible.

(SG, p. 13)

There is nothing ambitious or questionable about this description, which provides a solid point of departure for Heidegger's meditation.

Without being rightly aware of it, we are always in some manner or other claimed by and called to the task of attending to grounds and the ground. . . . Our behaviour in every case takes into account what the principle of sufficient reason says.

(SG, pp. 13-14)

Many classics of metaphysics begin with such declarations on the essence of the human. The opening of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, on the universal desire to know, is echoed in that of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, on the way human reason is forced by its own nature to pose questions to which the answers lie beyond its capacities. The opening of *Der Satz vom Grund* in turn echoes both texts. All three are stylized sketches of the mind and its activities, shaped by the scientific and theoretical prac-

tices of the cultures to which they refer. A pluralist account of human dealings with principles and reasons could undermine at the base the universality and necessity here claimed for the Leibnizian principle. But it might also make these dealings less amenable to any pretence to have mastered their upshot from the vantage of a more originary kind of thinking.

5 The incubation period

Implicit in all our behaviour and ever echoing in our ear is the statement: 'nothing is without a ground.' Why then did it take over two thousand years of philosophy before Leibniz was able to enunciate that proposition explicitly? 'How strange, that a principle that lies so near to hand, and that - unarticulated - guides all human representation and comportment everywhere, should have taken so many centuries to be articulated' (SG, p. 15). The principle of identity as signifying a dialectical self-relation also had a long incubation period: 'For it is the philosophy of speculative idealism, prepared by Leibniz and Kant, that first establishes through Fichte, Schelling and Hegel a lodging for the intrinsically synthetic essence of identity' (ID, pp. 11-12). In both instances, Heidegger may be making a mountain out of a molehill. After all, isn't identity already recognized as dialectical self-relation (auto d'heauto tauton) in Sophist 254D and doesn't *Timaeus* 28C ('what has come to be must necessarily have come to be by some cause') come close to formulating the principle of reason? (Leibniz's best of all possible worlds echoes *Timaeus* 30A: 'all things should be good and nothing evil as far as possible', cf. 41B, 46D.) If the principle of reason is sleeping here, its sleep seems of the lightest.

Moreover, when Leibniz rethinks ground or Hegel rethinks identity, are they bringing to light something concealed over millennia, or are they not rather inventing a new style of thinking, a style that in our day may seem rather old-fashioned? Heidegger preserves as much as he can of the timeless and monolithic character of these principles by treating their historical formulation as a revelation of what has always lain hidden. What makes this view doubly implausible is that the emergence of the principles sends being into a still deeper sleep, while one awaits the true enunciation of the essence of identity and ground in the recovered light of being, which Heidegger brings. But looking at these proceedings naturalistically, should we not say that Heidegger, too, is inventing a new style of thinking, within a certain cultural and historical context, a style that is also already taking on an old-fashioned air?

Before Leibniz, Heidegger claims, the sheer generality and self-evidence of the search for grounds prevented us from stepping back and viewing it in its unity as a principle. But this coming to prominence of the principle of reason is not an unambiguous advance into the light. It throws into deeper darkness the unquestioned fringes of the principle of reason. We do not seek to understand the principle of reason since it shapes all understanding; thus the step to its explicit formulation is a dizzying self-apprehension of the light in which all our thinking takes place. Yet when the light becomes self-reflexive it becomes less light; the self-apprehension fixes it and dims it.

A pluralistic reading of these claims could sight here a variety of processes whereby reflection dims the light of immediacy, but would at the same time refuse a stylized dialectical ordering of these processes in the manner of Hegel or a reduction of these processes to a single one, the forgetting of being, in the manner of Heidegger. Similarly, the move beyond reflective insight to a more originary apprehension is a simplification; there is a bundle of such possible moves in different contexts; and each of them is the creation of a new language, not a stepping back to some primitive immediacy. Both the reflective grounding of metaphysics and the essential thinking of Heidegger are epochs within the complex texture of human awareness, bracketings of its complexity in order to explore its possibilities in a stylized form. When thinking opens itself to an awareness of its own complexity, pluralism and irrepressible creativity, then it puts aside the props of these metaphysical and neo-metaphysical orderings.

II Is the principle of reason inherently enigmatic?

1 A self-contradictory principle?

The principle is so obvious that any intellectual puzzling about it seems superfluous and unnatural. 'And yet – perhaps the principle of reason is the most enigmatic of all possible propositions' (SG, p. 16). Heidegger has been teasing at such apparent self-evidence at least since his querying of banal notions of being at the beginning of Sein und Zeit, and his suspicions already focused on the self-evidence of the basic laws of thought: 'Suppose that it belongs to the essential character of philosophy to make just that which is self-evident into something incomprehensible, and that which goes without question into something questionable!' (GA 26, p. 6). It is not just petrified philosophoumena that are open to question, but the everyday understanding of being, and the everyday routine of seeking reasons for things; unquestioned, this routine tightens into a tyranny, as the principle of reason extends its sway into every department of life.

In questioning the principle, Heidegger never invokes the plurality of its possible forms or interpretations, which might cause its unity to unravel. Rather, he seeks to subvert it by finding an enigma in its essential structure; an enigma which can be resolved only by a more originary clarification of this essential structure. The enigma is one that

bothered post-Leibnizian philosophers: namely, that the principle of sufficient reason lacks a sufficient reason, and is thus intrinsically placed in contradiction with itself (SG, p. 37).

To accentuate the enigma, Heidegger dwells on the necessity and universal scope of the principle. What it posits, it posits as something necessary. This it utters as something un-circumventable through the double negation "Nothing . . . without . . ." (SG, p. 18). He never considers the view that

the principle of sufficient reason may be applied to everything save to itself and to such elements of discourse as function as explainers in a given context. Such a limitation of the range of the principle of sufficient reason, far from curtailing the programme of attaining a rational understanding of the world, is rather a condition for its consistent fulfilment, for it avoids both vicious circles and the assignment of a fictitious 'final reason of things'.14

Does he resolve the puzzle? He claims to do so by a step back into the light: 'On what is the principle of ground grounded? . . . What light does the principle need in order to be luminous? Do we see this light?" (SG, p. 18). Compare 1928:

It is easily seen that this thesis, namely, the principle of reason taken in its broadest sense, itself requires to be grounded. And that this grounding is clearly only to be attained with the clarification of the essence of being in general.

(GA 26, p. 138)

To this one may object that if the essence of being grounds the principle of reason it does so with a quite other kind of grounding than that which the principle in its first accentuation so imperatively demands. The inner contradiction of the principle is thus not resolved; unless by a complete collapse of the principle in its first accentuation in favour of the looser connections of the second.

2 Much ado about nothing?

'The principle of ground is the ground-principle of all ground-principles. This indication ushers us with a scarcely perceptible push into the abyss of riddles that yawns about the principle and about what it says' (SG, p. 21). The principle of identity, for example, can be interpreted as 'the belonging together of different things on the ground of the same. On the ground? The same comes into play here as the ground of the belonging-together' (SG, p. 22), so the principle of identity appears to depend on the principle of reason. But the principle of reason 'presupposes that it is determined what a reason is, that it is clear in what the essence of reasons consists' (SG, p. 23). How can a ground-principle take something so essential for granted?

The abysses Heidegger finds here are scarcely hinted at in most discussions of sufficient reason. Indeed, Heidegger's awe presupposes that the question of ground is one that governs human existence through and through and that involves the whole of being. Is he transposing onto a logical puzzle the pathos that properly appertains only to the sense of the ungroundedness of existence that one has in the experience of anxiety? Or is he exploiting an apparent antinomy, somewhat as Kant did, in order to dissolve the metaphysical question of ground into an existential vertigo? Infiltrating the riddles of reason with the obscurities of existence, he risks losing a precise grip on both.

The self-evidence of the principle could have been undermined by a more prosaic logical analysis, which would have whittled down its claimed necessity and universality rather than forcing it to a paroxysm in which it begins to undermine itself. The detected antinomy could be dissipated if one showed that the unitary principle, rather than rendering transparent their essential law, occludes a great variety of grounding activities, which are irreducible to a single rubric. A similar plurality might also be uncovered in everyday searches for reasons and grounds.

'The principle of ground is the ground of the principle... Here something coils in on itself, yet does not close itself off, but at the same time unbolts itself. Here is a ring, a living ring, something like a snake' (SG, p. 31). The vertigo induced by these reflections indicates something like a black hole of thought into which reason cannot proceed without becoming twisted. Metaphysics is thus overcome by its own devices. Yet is this the trail back to the origin that Heidegger actually follows? The change of accentuation engineers a shift from representational thinking of beings to contemplative listening to being. The logical riddles of the basic principles play at most the role of disabling metaphysical thinking as it tries to reach back to its ultimate grounds.

Having used logical antinomies to launch the leap of thinking, Heidegger leaves them unsolved. Did he really take them seriously or were they a mere pretext?

Heidegger took reason seriously all his life. [To echo Carlyle: 'Egad, he'd better!'] True, but now we can see that he did that in order to make a leap out of its domain into the play. He took reason seriously just long enough to show that there is a sphere of play outside the reach of the principle of reason.¹⁵

This seems an accurate description of Heidegger's strategy – but can one choose to patronize reason in this way?

3 The strict formulation

Heidegger turns to the strict formulation of the principle of reason as the principium reddendae rationis, the principle that 'for every truth (that is, according to Leibniz, for every true proposition) the ground can be given back' (SG, p. 44). Allers objects that this is not the stricter version for Leibniz, but a methodological version; whereas the looser version is ontological. Moreover reddere means simply to give, rather than to give back, and principium grande means simply 'big' rather than 'mighty' principle. Here, as in the ontological reading of 'the rose is without why', Heidegger's attention to the archaic or etymological undertones of words can be defended for its fertility in launching thought. Descombes points out that reddendum does not have the imperative thrust Heidegger gives it, and does not justify the transition marked in a comment of Derrida's rendering of Heidegger's account: 'From the moment that reason can be delivered [reddi potest], it must be.'16

How explain this leap in the modalities? Since when has the possibility of something sufficed to determine its necessity? This transition is still more astonishing than that of the so-called ontological argument. . . . For we see here, in addition to the illegitimate transition from a weak to a strong modality, a personal ('destinal') surcharge of the necessity in question.

One might justify such exegesis on the basis that 'The immoderateness of metaphysics demands that the translator always choose the meaning which is most serious, most difficult and which bears most consequences'.17 Heidegger is always on the alert for the great world-shaping forces indicated by a mere rustle in the language of the texts he studies. What is only a gentle hint in Leibniz is pregnant with the immoderate demands of Reason that will sound ever more mightily in Kant, Hegel, Marx, contemporary science and technology. It is because we find ourselves under the sway of this unconditional demand of the principle of reason that we are sensitive to the faintest intimations of its force in the Leibnizian text. However, Descombes rejects this way of reading Leibniz as a surrender to the very immoderateness it aims to overcome. Heidegger allows the awesome claim of the principle of reason to swallow up all philosophical reasoning in a single massive call from being. Had he instead relativized the principle of reason by putting it back in its historical context in Leibniz and others, he might have found a more serene path beyond the darkening of the world in technology, one more practicable and more convincing than the apocalyptic leap to which he finally invites us.

Our representations do not become genuine knowledge unless their

ground can be delivered (SG, p. 45). Is this second version of the principle confined to cognition only? No, it insists that the object of cognition must be something grounded (SG, p. 46). It means: 'Something "is' only, that is, is identified as a being, when it is stated in a proposition that satisfies the ground-principle of ground as the ground-principle of the giving of grounds' (SG, p. 47). It is a requisite for existence. The might of the demand for the delivery of the ground, which dictates whether anything deserves to be recognized as a being, lays claim on everything that is. 'Only that which is brought to a stand in a grounded representation can qualify as being' (SG, p. 54). Again, the metaphysical force of this is blunted by Heidegger's focus on its implications for the phenomenality of being and world.

'Whence speaks this claim of the ground to its own delivery?' (SG, p. 57). To hear the language of this claim we must attend to it phenomenologically rather than continue to obey it somnambulistically as the ultimate force behind the 'atomic age': 'The claim to the delivery [Zustellung of the ground is for science the element in which its cogitation [Vorstellen] moves as the fish in water or the bird in air' (SG, p. 59). But to realize this is more difficult than to be aware of the radioactivity of the atmosphere, which we have instruments to measure (SG, p. 57). An element of nuclear panic or paranoia seems to be associated with this magnification of the power of the principle of reason. This power is uncanny, unhomely: it takes away from contemporary humanity the ground under their feet; the more we blindly comply with its claim, the less we can build and dwell in the realm of the essential (SG, p. 60). This play between delivery of the ground and withdrawal of the ground under our feet (Entzug des Bodens) is our sinister epochal variant of the 'play of being' to which reference is made later (SG, p. 109, 188).

All of this now has a fifties air to it, and seems inapplicable to the contemporary condition, which we cannot see as explicable from a single principle. If our consumerist world-culture were so firmly in the grip of a principle, then the promised leap and reversal would be attractive. But its uniformity has nothing to do with metaphysical reason; it floats detached from any claim of the ground; we can leap from the ground all too lightly, but with little hope of landing in a play any more substantial than that which is going on. The pluralistic texture of our experience dissolves the claim of unitary grounds, and also of unitary leaps. What path of thinking can negotiate the promise and threat of this state of affairs?

III Metaphysics as onto-theology and history of being

1 A phenomenological perspective

Heidegger's gaze on metaphysics is a phenomenological one; that is why he pays so much attention to the obstacles to this gaze, the natural

tendency to turn one's eyes away from any deeper apprehension of the metaphysical enterprise. The plot is thickened from the fact that metaphysics itself is an effort to look in the face a truth that everyday reason looks away from. By bringing into one's gaze the shape of one's thinking - not of any ordinary thinking, but that thinking that has attained metaphysical status – one finds that metaphysics itself is constitutionally inadequate to the phenomenon of being; that being is manifest in metaphysics as that which remains withdrawn. What comes into view is the finitude and brokenness of thinking, not in the sense that the grasp of reason fails to seize its object or that its systems crumble, but in the sense that the more it succeeds the more the truth of being eludes it.

Heidegger projects an essence of metaphysics, most tightly formulated as onto-theology, which need not be perfectly congruent with the empirical development of the history of philosophy. Great historical hypotheses are not falsified by a few facts that fail to fit; indeed their greatness is shown by the number of such discordant facts that they can take in their stride. Heidegger's hypothesis is sufficiently well-grounded and illuminating to be immune to random empirical objections; it will lose its force only when replaced by a better one. The objection that he ignored the Hebraic component in the history of philosophy should be expanded to embrace his systematic ironing-out of all pluralistic interferences in his focusing of the Greek essence, an essence that has sufficient autonomy to support Heidegger's constructions, which can be replaced only by a better account of what metaphysics meant.

Starting from a sense of the pluralistic texture of intellectual history, how might we revise, or eventually replace, Heidegger's constructions so as to make them more fruitful for our own intercultural regime of thinking?

2 What is onto-theology?

Onto-theology is the supreme self-grasp of the intelligibility of being. It is a product of the question of ground.

Since being appears as ground beings are the grounded, but the highest being is that which grounds in the sense of the first cause. . . . The onto-theological constitution of metaphysics stems from the sway of the difference, which holds apart and together being as ground and beings as grounded-grounding.

(ID, p. 63)

The authentic phenomenology of being and beings in their difference resides in

a realm which the leading words of metaphysics, being and beings,

ground-grounded, no longer suffice to say. For what these words name, what the way of thinking led by them represents, stems as the different from the difference. Their source no longer allows itself to be thought in the field of vision of metaphysics.

(ID, pp. 63-4)

The onto-theological constitution of metaphysics originates from the effort to think about 'being' and 'beings' in terms of identity and causal or explanatory grounds (cf. GA 42, pp. 87–8, 130–47). For metaphysics, being is that which all beings have in common, being-as-such. Thought of in its generality, being-as-such is an identity in difference which provides the horizontal onto-logical dimension; thought of as a whole being-as-such is referred to a supreme being, the apex of the vertical theological dimension, who unifies beings-as-a-whole. Both lines of thought proceed in mutual dependence.

Metaphysics thinks the being of beings both in the foundational [ergründend] unity of the most general, i.e., that which everywhere amounts to the same, and in the founding [begründend] unity of totality, i.e., that which is highest over all. Thus the being of beings is thought of beforehand as grounding ground.

(ID, p. 49; cf. GA 9, pp. 378-9; ZSD, p. 62)

Metaphysics seeks the being of beings by grounding it in a highest being (the cause of existence) or an exemplary mode of being (the ground of essence, e.g. the Kantian subject as the condition of possibility of all objectivity); the transcendent, theo-logical and transcendental, onto-logical modes of grounding coincide in the Hegelian 'determination of the highest being as the absolute in the sense of unconditioned subjectivity' (N II, p. 347). What is afoot here is no wooden construction but the self-constitution of reason, faithful to its own most intimate principle.

Heidegger makes much of the notion of causa sui, which Pierre Hadot defines as the production of God's existence through his essence (Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 1, pp. 976-7). He sees it as the logical culmination of onto-theo-logy, a kind of death's head before which it is impossible to pray (ID, pp. 51, 64). He presented an attractive version of the idea in Schelling's account of the interplay between ground and existence in God, with its echoes of Eckhart and Boehme (GA 42, p. 204) and its basis in the paradox that while God, the ultimate reason for the existence of anything at all rather than nothing, himself depends on the principle of reason, the mighty working of the principle must itself have a cause: 'The principle of reason is valid only in so far as God exists. But God exists, only in so far as the principle of reason is valid' (SG, p. 55). The controverted status of the causa sui within meta-

physics - a metaphorical expression in Plotinus (Stanislas Breton, HQD, pp. 253-6), replaced by divine aseitas in the Scholastics, rejected by Kant, treated as a simple expression of the purity of being in the later Schelling - is ignored by Heidegger, who probably sees it as a failure of metaphysics to recognize its own logic.

When Christians have asked such questions as 'What is the ground of God's being the ground of creation?' they have tended to answer by radicalizing the grounding nature of God, but not by saying that God is causa sui. The question of ultimate grounds in Christian thinking leads to the abyss of divine freedom; his actions are grounded in free decrees whose motives are 'unsearchable' (Romans 11.33). All theology can do is defend God's actions against the charge of absurdity or contradiction and meditate on their appropriateness (convenientia) to divine goodness and justice. Such an 'overcoming of metaphysics' based on the 'difference' of divine transcendence and freedom is of no interest to Heidegger. His aim is to overcome metaphysics from within, tracing the inner transformations of its essence. Measured against the pattern of onto-theology isolated by Heidegger, all traditional metaphysicians (Leibniz and Hegel included) provide impure amalgams of metaphysical reason and mythical or biblical factors.

If for one moment the possibility is admitted that this distillation of the essence of metaphysics is only a possible interpretation among others, then the project of overcoming metaphysics by tackling its essential structure falls to the ground, and a more flexible and mobile strategy must be devised, one that recognizes the irremediable impurity of the tradition and the impossibility of moving to a less pluralistic level of thinking. The refusal of the onto-theological possibilities of thinking then becomes one of the possible tactics whereby one moves from a vaguely defined 'metaphysical' regime of thought to a dimly apprehended post-metaphysical economy. In each case one identifies possible schemata of 'metaphysical' thinking, whose limits can be discerned, and one tests the styles of thinking that may emerge when one leaps beyond these schemata. In the context of such a project of conquering new spaces for thought it is a matter of secondary importance whether the schema to be overcome ever had any identifiable embodiment in history or whether it subsisted only in an irreducible plurality of guises. The fragility of Heidegger's reconstructions of the essence and history of metaphysics argue for such a pluralistic reinterpretation of his experiments in overcoming.

3 The history of being

'The leap [away from metaphysics] is a backward-looking leap. It looks back into the realm from which it has leaped away, in order to keep it in view' (SG, p. 129). After the leap of thinking we may revisit the various detours which have prepared it and bring into view their inner

connection (SG, p. 96). 'In leaping, the leap becomes a thoughtful appropriation of the destiny of being' (SG, p. 158). The first major theme to be reviewed is that of the incubation period, now seen in a new light in view of the fact that 'what the principle truly says, being, is really still sleeping' (SG, p. 97). The incubation period is now revealed as an epoch in which being as being withdrew itself. The emergence of the principle in the strong form of the *principium reddendae rationis* is seen as a change in the destiny of being, the release of the full might of the principle; but this release brings with it the complete eclipse of the possibility that the principle can be grasped as a 'Satz ins Sein' (leap into being) (SG, p. 98), and entails a still more decisive withdrawal of being as being.

The question 'whence speaks the demand of the ground for its delivery?' (SG, p. 100) also appears in a new light. What holds sway in this all-prevailing demand is 'the destiny of being in a previously unheard manner. . . . Thought first brings into view the essence of being in the extremest withdrawal of being' (SG, p. 101). The leap which places us on the way to an exploration of the 'place' of the principle of reason is a leap away from a region which can now be surveyed from the distance this leap has accorded (SG, p. 107). Then the destiny and withdrawal of being comes into view: 'being destines itself to us in withdrawing itself' (SG, p. 108), that is 'being turns to us comfortingly and becomes clear and in this becoming clear grants the temporal space of play in which beings can appear' (SG, p. 109).

Heidegger sees the historical necessity of Kant's leap or of his own as dependent on the ways in which being grants itself from epoch to epoch. Similarly, 'it would be foolish to say that the medieval theologians misunderstood Aristotle; rather, they understood him differently, in accord with the different way in which being granted itself to them' (SG, p. 136). Such language is defensible only if the successive grantings of being are in each case rigorously demonstrated by phenomenological studies of characteristic thinkers of the epoch. That would demand a tentative and open-ended quality to the characterization of the epochs. Heidegger's language seems to posit at the heart of each epoch a single founding event, a granting-cum-withdrawing of being, which shapes and gives unity to the whole epoch. A more open-ended and tentative account of the shifting ontological sensibilities of the West could have increased the phenomenological power of Heidegger's analyses while dismantling the eschatological myth in which he wraps them. His benchmark identifications and discriminations of the characteristic phenomenological upshot of various styles of thinking are caricatures when they shift from the register of description to that of prescription, when instead of noting that Plato tends to think being as eidos he goes on to pronounce that Plato cannot think being except as eidos, or when instead of noting that the modern age tends to grasp being as objecthood for the subjectivity of reason (SG, p. 138) he makes this the sole central truth of the modern age, its very being.

The history of being depends on a definitive grasp of the essential nature of the mittence of being characteristic of successive epochs. This is an impossibly rigid expectation, which omits all the diversity of the interpretations to which every great thinker is exposed. However the strictly phenomenological focus of Heidegger's account reduces the scandal of his historical essentialism. Heidegger's governing phenomenological inquiry to the great metaphysical systems is not the merely preliminary one: 'What is the texture and structure of the thinking afoot here?' but rather: 'How stands it with being?' (GA 40, p. 36). The sequence of the answers to this inquiry forms the 'history of being', and provides a solid enough phenomenological core to this theorem, to which the critique developed by Habermas and others fails to do justice.

The historical picture of a progressive withdrawal of being and forgottenness of being is a stylization rendered implausible by its suggestions of the mythic. Yet no other language seems to Heidegger to capture the phenomenological essence of the process of forgetting of being. The notion that metaphysics has reached its culmination and its end in German idealism (SG, p. 114) and in technology also seems to need demythification, which would entail reducing the grandiose project of 'overcoming metaphysics' to the modest one of a critical questioning of metaphysical tradition in view of its occlusions; the massive opposition of metaphysics and the thinking of being as being could similarly be broken down into a series of local critical engagements. Finally, instead of awaiting an eschatological turn-about in which 'being as such awakens in such guise that it gazes at us from its awakened essence' (SG, p. 97), thinking should attend to the great variety of modes in which one is addressed by being, none of which can be established as pure or definitive or as a historical moment of arrival. We can practise Heidegger's art of listening all the better if we abandon his hope of picking up pure signals of being.

'The history of Western thought rests in the destiny of being. That, however, in which something else rests must itself be rest' (SG, p. 143), that is, the gathering of movement. Not only is each epoch unified by its central principle as identified by the historian of being, but the entire history is unified by reference to being itself whose destining presides over it. One's doubts redouble at this further leap to a position of such extreme generality which totally eludes verification or falsification. That the history of thought rests in the destinings of being, Heidegger insists, is not a mere opinion, but is received from being. A partial verification can be found in our subservience to the claim of the principle of reason (including its transcendental and dialectical forms) and the withdrawal of being that corresponds to this. We stand in the clearing of being as those taken into the claim of the being of beings; we find ourselves caught up in a project of being (SG, p. 146).

'Through the fact that the being of beings grants itself as the object-hood of objects the destiny of being brings itself to a previously unheard of decisiveness and exclusiveness' (SG, p. 149) to which corresponds 'the most extreme withdrawal of being' (SG, p. 150). This continues to beg the question. Heidegger makes much of the indefinability of being, though insisting that we understand somehow the sense of the words 'being' and 'is' (SG, pp. 153-5). But his theory of the history of being has given concrete determinations to the notion of being that seem to have little to do with the everyday phenomenon of being. Withdrawal (Entzug) may indeed characterize the phenomenon of being, but a historical sequence of grantings and withdrawals introduces elements into the notion of being that quite clutter and distort its phenomenality. That being somehow is, one quite recognizes, but that it somehow acts, in an ordered sequence, seems a drift into inappropriate categories.

Philosophical thinking moves from 'what is more manifest to us' to 'what is more manifest in itself' (Aristotle, SG, p. 112). But its stylization as one from beings to being as such is only one of the possible languages that can serve as vehicle and stimulus of this movement. Sankara's movement from atman to Brahman or Nagarjuna's from conventional truth to absolute truth or Lao-tse's from things to void cannot be reduced to the ontological schema nor is the converse reduction possible. This plurality of paths must limit the bearing of Heidegger's sketch of the history of being. Moreoever, it leaves open alternative perspectives on the history of Western thought, notably those which can be constructed in the light of the biblical heritage and its influence. Jewish and Christian constructions of history have been even more myth-bound than Hegel's and Heidegger's (which are in part a sublation of those constructions): the conflict of myths reveals history as a battlefield of warring interpretations; acceptance of this pluralism opens a new conversation about history, as an open field of possibilities rather that the cumulative realization of a pattern. This conversation is oriented by concern for the future rather than desire to conquer the past.

The questionable nexus

1 The leap of thinking

In the discussion of Leibniz in the first lectures (broken off at SG, p. 81), Heidegger engages quite firmly the conceptual and argumentative texture of metaphysical thinking. The core of Heidegger's thinking is phenomenological, going behind or beyond the level of thinking to which con-

cepts and arguments belong. Yet unless it engages with concepts and arguments the strength of such phenomenological thinking cannot be demonstrated. At a certain point, however - with the introduction of Angelus Silesius' rose (SG, p. 68), the emergence of the second accentuation, 'nothing is without ground' (SG, p. 75), and the 'leap of thinking' concealed in this abrupt change of accent (SG, p. 95) – Heidegger for-sakes such critical argumentation as he listens for what lies unthought in the principle of reason, the way in which being announces itself as ground. It is here that the central rift in Heidegger's thinking comes into view.

Does he at this point fall away from this concentrated interrogation of Leibniz into a pot-pourri of his favourite myths and dogmas? This danger certainly looms and Heidegger himself shows an awareness of it in the care with which he maps out the implications of the leap, going back over earlier questions from the new vantage it yields. As Greisch remarks:

The operation of detachment which permits the transition to the other way of thinking paradoxically appears as both simple and complex. It is simple, for all that is asked is the performance of a 'leap of thinking.' It is complex, for this leap itself has to be thought.¹⁸

It is on this leap that his thinking stands or falls. Heidegger has certainly put his best foot forward on this occasion, dramatizing the event of the leap with great art, shoring it up with sober and persuasive reflections, and finding felicitous words to speak of its strangeness, its necessity, the freedom it yields, the landscape it opens up. If the leap were simply a leap away from reason it might not be easy to argue with Heidegger, though it would be easy to dismiss him. But the leap is a leap to the ground of reason. Not however to a metaphysical ground, but to an apprehension of the phenomenological essence of truth to which reason belongs, in which reason finds its dwelling, its home. However, though Der Satz vom Grund approaches it via the notion of being as ground, the goal of Heidegger's thinking back is not adequately named by this expression: the Ereignis which grants being is rather to be thought of as a phenomenological focusing of the truth of being. To see Heidegger as tracing 'a return back into the ground, the origin' (ZSD, p. 33) is a misreading of his thought according to the metaphysical pattern.

The leap of thinking is not a leap away but a leap home to the Ereignis in which being and thinking fundamentally belong. Just this claim conceals, I suspect, the central weakness of Heidegger's thought. The questionable stylization of the metaphysical tradition we have queried in the previous section is motivated by a vision of reason, metaphysics, as a derivation from and a decline from originary contemplative thinking. Whenever Heidegger tries to explain how metaphysical notions arose on the basis of the forgetting of this originary domain there is an unconvincing gap in the account. Its two ends don't meet. Conversely, whenever he vaults beyond reason to the region of thinking his feat of transcendence fails to exemplify the status he claims for it. It is not a leap back to the ground, the origin, but rather a leap elsewhere, related to the rational tradition only in an oblique, marginal or tangential way. Heidegger has attained a realm from which the tradition of metaphysics can be questioned and helped to open itself to its phenomenological context – which is far richer than Heidegger is prepared to envisage, so rich that it eludes the control of the thinker of being just as much as that of the metaphysician. Heidegger has not attained a vantage point from which the history of metaphysics can be controlled and mastered in its 'essence'. Rather, reason and its processes maintain their autonomy alongside and in tension with contemplative thinking. Nor can the thinking of being pretend to have such privileged insight into the essence of these processes that it knows what scientists and logicians are doing in advance of any study of their work. Rather than seeing reason as a 'stiff-necked adversary¹¹⁹ to be overcome, thinking had best acquire a sense of its own limits, recognizing that if its privilege is to attend to things that elude the mastery of reason, reason's privilege is to penetrate where poetic thinking can never follow.

Heidegger has allowed its full force to the Leibnizian principle, never contesting its claim, yet slowly negotiating a space of freedom beyond the grasp of the principle, a space in which Christian theologians will surely find an occasion to rediscover divine freedom as well. Having led us into the darkest secrets of the atomic age by his musings on the might of the principle of reason, he suddenly produces a poem about a rose: 'The rose is without why; it blossoms, since it blossoms, attends not to itself, asks not if it is seen' (SG, p. 68). This introduces the turn (Kehre) in the argument, the step back or the leap away from the dominance of 'why' to the granting of ground indicated by the word 'since'. 'Why' seeks the ground; 'since' provides a ground, in a new sense (SG, p. 70). 'Between the blossoming of the rose and the ground of its blossoming there intervenes no attending to grounds, whereby the grounds could first come to be as grounds' (SG, p. 71).

Is Heidegger eluding the principle whose power he has so eloquently evoked? Or does he rather allow the principle its unrestricted sway, while indicating its inherent limits (which correspond with the limits of metaphysical reasoning): no being can be without a ground, yet this does not begin to exhaust the phenomenality of a being. 'The principle is valid of but not for the rose; of the rose in so far as it is an object [Gegenstand] of our representation; not for the rose in so far as the latter stands in itself, is simply rose' (SG, p. 73).

Being is given; it is the ground of beings in a sense that is missed if we busily go in search of their grounds. The question 'why' puts the ground at a distance; the answer 'since' reveals its nearness. The rose's avoidance of the principle of reason and its provision of ground in a different sense reveals that 'The principle of ground [in its first accentuation] says *nothing about* the ground' (SG, p. 75) and prompts us to listen to it in the second accentuation, which indicates being and ground as imponderables lurking in the apparently so transparent principle.

'The principle of ground, understood in the usual way, is not a statement about the ground but about a being in so far as it is in each case a being' (SG, p. 82). This discovery brings us into 'a critical zone of thought' (SG, p. 84) where every step exposes us to errance. The principle now says: 'To being belongs something such as ground. Being is groundlike, ground-ish. . . . Being deploys its essence in itself as grounding' (SG, p. 90).20 'Being "is" in its essence: ground. Therefore being can never now first have a ground, which would ground it' (SG, p. 93). This independence of ground makes being the Ab-Grund ('abyss'). What is the accord between these two propositions: 'Being and ground: the same. Being: the Ab-grund' (SG, p. 93)?

2 Can thinking ground reason?

In naming being as a ground that does not need to be further grounded has Heidegger resolved the riddle of the principle of reason? The faulty nexus between thinking and reason in Heidegger can be discerned in the unbridged gap between ground in the normal logical and metaphysical sense and being-as-ground. Similarly, what is called 'truth', 'error', 'being', 'nothingness', 'identity', 'difference', 'logos', at the level of the thinking of being has but an equivocal relationship to what these terms denote in metaphysical discourse. To begin with they have a plurality of senses in their use in metaphysical argument, as in everyday usage, whereas Heidegger adheres to a univocal sense for each of these terms and so can discourse freely on their 'essence'.

It may be that, starting from a particular example of 'truth' or 'ground' in a particular context, one can think back to the more essential depths of the phenomenon which thus comes into view. But the paths of such thinking back do not converge in a single bourne - the region of the Ereignis. They are trails of exploration as diverse as the styles of artistic creation or of religious imagination. A single unifying idea fails to impose itself. The big words, the transcendentals – being, good, beauty, ground – are only gasps before the immensity of things. Nor is 'God' a unified concept. The meaning of the word is inherently, thoroughly, contextual, as is the meaning of the word 'being'. There are contexts in which neither word has any meaning and in which the universal features of 'everyday understanding of being' or sense of the absolute have deployed and dispersed themselves in quite different verbal universes. When people ring the changes on 'God' and 'being' they are doubly blinding themselves against the pluralism of the stories through which humans create and explore their worlds. The 'God' that is dead is the univocal God; language about God retains its sense as a constantly self-correcting, self-renewing language, variant from culture to culture, from context to context, changing at its margins into other varieties of religious language, such as language about the absolute, emptiness or the Tao.

It may be that the basic tenet of the phenomenality of being is based on a misappropriation of Husserl's categorial intuition; gradually it becomes apparent that the major phenomenological *Sache* for Heidegger is not being but world, the open realm of manifestation. The forgetfulness of world in the natural attitude (everydayness) or in metaphysical world-constructions cannot be translated directly into an oblivion of being as being. The two lines of criticism fall apart and the latter is never given a firm phenomenological content.²¹ But Heidegger might accept that the phenomenon which conceals itself in the presence of being can be called 'world' just as well as 'being'. Descombes notes the 'defect of construction'²² of the question of being which he sees as condemning Heidegger's search for the unthought-of Western metaphysics to remain a pipe dream.

But do these criticisms rest on a careful consideration of Heidegger's development of a 'phenomenology of the unapparent' (GA, p. 15)?²³ What Descombes proposes instead is merely the 'ontological clarification of the presuppositions of an epoch'.²⁴ But this remains on the level of conceptual thinking, affords little scope for the liberating leap to a contemplation of the Sache selbst. How does one explicate the ontological implications of a poem? Whatever the inadequacies of Heidegger's commentaries, they have opened up a meditation on the essence of literature - in Maurice Blanchot for example - which can never be recalled to the platitude Descombes recommends, which risks being absorbed by the 'cybernetic' (ZSD, p. 64). 'The dialogue of thinking with poetry is long'. It has scarcely begun' (GA 12, p. 34). Heidegger's meditative thinking has an autonomy and a strength which is independent of his constructions of being and its history. Beneath all great philosophical utterances lies a fathomless unthought and Heidegger is the one thinker who has provided us with a compass for exploring that dimension. The aporias of his thought are a challenge to pursue its project along new lines.

Heidegger's search for originary phenomenological senses of 'being' and 'true' is in tension with the emergence of non-phenomenological senses in ancient Greece contemporaneously with scientific and philosophical thinking. Being, within metaphysics, figures as ground, in a sense that is not primarily phenomenological (see ZSD, pp. 2, 36-7), and that cannot be reduced to the phenomenological (as Der Satz vom Grund seems to attempt). Even at the humble everyday level from which

both types of discourse begin, there is a gulf between the phenomenological sense of being as presence and the logical functioning of the word 'to be'. If one says: 'it is true that three and three are six' one has to draw on senses of 'to be' and 'true' that are autonomous in regard to such phenomenological matters as presence and concealment. These senses of being and truth neither transcend nor fall short of the phenomenological senses. They are simply other.

The fusion of the copulative, existential and veritative senses of 'is' constitutes a grammatical mistake. The effort to hold them together in a unitative way under the rubric of the pollachos legetai does not work phenomenologically - it forces Heidegger to gloss over the 'wonder' of the veritative sense ('it is' = 'it is true') and dismiss it as mere correctness (*Richtigkeit*) or as simply 'ontic'. The veritative sense can be brought into view phenomenologically only as something that gives the slip to phenomenology. Faced with the fact that some simple utterance – 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' - is true and not false, phenomenology finds it has nothing to say, whereas reason may find here a starting point for deep metaphysical probings. Conversely, the sense of being as presence, of truth as unconcealment, eludes the kind of reasoning that deals in logical and factual truths. This mutual eluding of the phenomenological and the rational, neither of which can ground the other, is a situation no more enigmatic than the mutual eluding of, say, chemistry and music. We do not have a world-formula that can reveal these various perspectives unfolding from a single unitary instance.

Thinking of being does not succeed as 'an endeavour which brings the essence of metaphysics to the fore and thereby brings it within its limits for the first time' in view of an 'originary appropriation' of the metaphysical tradition (GA 12, pp. 103-4). Thinking can open up new realms but it is not qualified to declare a closure on the range of reason.

3 The supremacy of play

What grounds a being is nothing that can be cast in the form of a rational account, but is the donation of its presence from the event of being. This grounding phenomenon loves to conceal itself: 'Being conceals itself as being, namely in its initial destinal belonging-together with the ground as logos. . . . As it conceals its essence, being allows something else to come to the fore, namely the ground in the form of archai, aitiai, rationes, causae, principles, causes and rational grounds' (SG, p. 183) to all of which attaches a character of self-evidence that masks their forgotten origin. Being can now no longer be explained by reference to a ground; as grounding it is itself groundless; so to thought remains the duty of corresponding to the measure of being, not by any unsuitable procedures of reckoning or measuring, but by thinking being as being (SG, p. 185). To think thus is to be drawn into the play of the world, a play 'without why'. 'Being as ground has no ground, plays as the non-ground, abyss, of that play which as a destiny plays to us being and ground' (SG, p. 188). The cryptic conclusions demand to be supplemented by Heidegger's discussions of Heraclitus in GA 55 (cf. VA, pp. 207–29; GA 15, pp. 9–226).

A question remains, as with all Heidegger's reductions of metaphysical principles to pre-metaphysical openings of being: does the principle of sufficient reason really derive from the play of the world? Does reason not have an autonomous force independent of the aesthetics of play? Has Heidegger in his step back really restored metaphysics to its forgotten essence, or has he lost it from view? Is the emergence of the principle of reason governed by a destining of being, that is by a phenomenological instance of manifestation and withdrawal, or does it emerge like the laws of mathematics and logic through a process of thinking which cannot be brought under the aegis of the phenomenological? Does the principle of reason cast the truth of being in the shade by its very nature or only because it is applied ruthlessly in matters where it cannot be normative or adequate?

Some later texts (Zur Sache des Denkens) may show a willingness to let metaphysics go its own way, as the effort to ground scientific reason in the most strenuous reflection possible, and to abandon the effort to found such rationality in the contemplative attention to the phenomenality of being. Scientific philosophy may be one of those 'sieves which let through only quite particular aspects of the matter' (GA 55, p. 229) but the same may be equally true of contemplative thinking. When Heidegger claims that only Seinsdenken grasps the truth of what is and that it has an essentiality and radicality from which merely rational thinking is barred by its very constitution, is he not in fact appealing to a form of that absolutism which he so often undermines in the work of his predecessors? To be sure, mystics and Zen masters depreciate the devices of reason in a similar style, but do they go so far as to claim that all rationality derives ultimately from Zen or mystic insight? It is this extra claim that allows Heidegger to take his place among the great metaphysicians. But the step back to 'thinking' may exact the relinquishment of any claim to such a place. To have retrieved the contemplative dimension of philosophy is enough; it is exorbitant to claim to have retrieved the foundation of its rational dimension as well. If reason marches on, oblivious of Heidegger's intervention, that is not necessarily a great tragedy. The thinker of being like the mystic can perhaps flourish only in marginality. Sufficient to have planted seeds of reflection which may have here and there a greening effect on the landscape of science and philosophy (cf. ID, p. 67). His thought, attuned to the one thing necessary, may afford a place of retreat when one tires of the struggle to grasp the world by reason. But it does not seem that its

role is to criticize and direct the operations of reason. Its relation to them can only be an oblique one.

There is a version of reason which reduces the being of beings to what can be mastered by concepts and definitions. 'Now this easy intelligibility becomes the standard for what obtains or can obtain, and that now means for what may be or be called a being' (GA 65, p. 336). Reason which makes itself small makes reality small as well. If there are occasions on which metaphysical, logical and scientific reason must reassert its dignity over against Heidegger's depreciation, it is also a mark of true rationality to recognize the value of Heidegger's mapping of the margins of the rational. If in his attempt to restore reason to its fuller context, Heidegger tended to bring philosophy down the blind alley of a pure thinking of the phenomenon of being, none the less he struck out on paths that free reason from a self-ideal of dispassionate objectivity, giving it a more contextual and participatory notion of its own operations. Conscious of the presence of Seinsdenken as its other, reason moves more humbly and more soberly, instead of chattering loudly in selfobsessed arrogance; the effect is similar to that produced on Christianity by an awareness of its coexistence with Judaism and Buddhism.

Pluralism at the origin

1 The deconstructive opening-up of Heidegger

Derrida undoes Heidegger's essentialism by focusing on the fact that Heidegger uncovers the originary as 'different', as inherently other, thus unsettling the grounding and founding movement of his return to the essence. For the essence as Heidegger locates it is always marked by heterogeneity in regard to that of which it is the essence - the essence of technology is not anything technological, the essence of truth is nontruth, being comes into view as non-being. Derrida characterizes Heidegger's 'powerful thinking repetition' as 'a retreat or an advance towards the most originary, the pre-archi-originary which thinks . . . no other content than that which is there, be it as the promise of the future, in the heritage of metaphysics'.25 In thus bringing being into view – as given and possibilized from out the e-vent of being (ZSD, p. 8) - Heidegger invents a new sense of the originary, one which is hétérogène à l'origine, heterogeneous to anything metaphysics think of as origin, not a fundamentum inconcessum but one which is concussum (ZSD, p. 34), one which always reveals itself as other, as a rift. It looks then as if Heidegger himself is aware of the questionability of his claim to ground metaphysics in the thinking of being, and that the grounding progressively turns into its opposite, an ungrounding, an uncovering of irreducible enigma at the heart of the basic notions of metaphysics throughout its history.

Yet for Heidegger enigma retains a quiet authority that teases us out of thought. It is the essential heart of things, and remains immune to pluralistic dissemination. Ludic and an-archic readings of Heidegger, such as those of Caputo and Reiner Schürmann²⁶ may find much to nourish them in the final pages of *Der Satz vom Grund* which create a sense that we have moved from a prison to a playground; but such readings miss the degree to which the *Logos* – however enigmatic it has become – remains a principle, an essence, a unifying factor; only as such does it retain the quiet power that can overcome the might of the principle of reason.

Whither leaps the leap away, when it leaps away from the ground? Does it leap into an abyss? Yes, in so far as we only think of the leap and in the field of vision of metaphysical thinking at that. No, in so far as we leap and release ourselves. Whither? To the place into which we have already been released: in belonging to being. Being itself however belongs to us; for only with us can it be as being, that is, be present.

(*ID*, p. 20)

Being is abyss, Ab-grund, only because it is itself Grund, ground (SG, p. 185). The play of being is 'free of all arbitrariness' (SG, p. 186), so much so that Heidegger can retrieve in a new key Leibniz's 'Cum Deus calculat fit mundus' which he translates 'While God plays, world becomes' (SG, p. 186).

Caputo dilutes this sense of order when he writes:

There are no hidden comforts, no hidden assurances, no steadfast guarantees concealed in this play. The play has the improbability of a child at play and an uncertainty which is marked by the question ['whether and how, hearing the movements of this play, we play along with and join in the play' (SG, p. 188)].

There seems to be little uncertainty about the serene order of the play of being, as far as its essence is concerned, though our failure to participate may imperil its actualization. It is misleading to say that by our participation in the play we 'deny it rest and arrest' as Caputo goes on to say; metaphysics, as an arrest of thinking, is to be overcome, but thinking itself rests in the play of being. It has nothing of the arbitrary improbability of a game of chance. To say of the dominant epochal terms that 'there is no grounding of these elemental words' and 'they cannot lay claim to anything more than a certain historical aptness', a situation which is 'one of the most embarrassing things in the history of metaphysics', is to smuggle into Heidegger's thought something that it

conspicuously lacks: an emphasis on the contingent pluralism of the historical languages of metaphysics.

Heidegger's 'destinal formations' (ID, p. 58) replace Hegel's epochs and Nietzsche's theory that 'as the law [Gesetzlichkeit] of history nihilism unfolds a series of different stages and forms of itself' (N II, p. 279). Their sequence is not a chance one, though it is also not a necessary one (ZSD, p. 9). For Heidegger, the law underlying the nihilistic sequence of the mittences of being is the *Ereignis* which is their principle; thought of the Ereignis ends the history of being by recalling it to its source (ZSD, p. 44). 'The Ereignis is the law, in so far as it gathers mortals in the appropriation to their essence and keeps them therein' (GA 12, p. 248). It is the true Grund. The strangeness and otherness of this Grund which turns out to be an Ab-grund does not license Caputo's interpretation, that 'everything is caught up in a certain fortuitousness', nor his suggestion that 'television and advanced forms of communication will spread the message . . . of the apocalypse without truth and revelation, 27

Schürmann, who tries to think with Heidegger beyond Heidegger in seeing the movement to the arche as betraying an an-archic thrust, does not do justice to the primacy, strongly affirmed in Heidegger, of identity - the belonging together of being and thinking in the *Ereignis* - over difference. Far from being a differential pullulation the Ereignis is a gathering of things into their essence. Heidegger remains a traditional metaphysician to the degree that the *Ereignis* is the truth, the ground, the essence of all that is. It first dawned on him as a great revelation in the 1936-8 manuscript (Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis), which rather than being thought of as Heidegger's second masterpiece or even as his one true masterpiece (thus Otto Pöggeler in various publications) should rather be seen as the magma from which his masterly later writings were to emerge. It is clear that Heidegger is constructing a first philosophy:

The truth: ground as abyss [Abgrund]. Ground not: whence, but wherein in the sense of belonging. Abyss: as time-space [Zeit-Raum] of the struggle; the struggle as struggle of earth and world, since relation of truth to what-is! . . . [Truth] is the ground as what takes back and what pervades, which towers above the hidden without abolishing it; the affective tone which sounds as this ground. For this ground is the Ereignis itself as deployment of the essence of being.

(GA 65, p. 346)

The *Ereignis* is what lies at the heart of the simple there-isness of being, the 'il y a' of one of Rimbaud's *Illuminations* (ZSD, pp. 42-3). Beings do not emerge into presence in the medium of flat objecthood nor of

Husserlian transcendental consciousness. Teasing at the mode of the givenness of being Heidegger moved beyond all former apprehensions of objectivity and subjectivity and came up with his own apprehension of the event of being, one which cannot be adequately expressed in propositions (ZSD, p. 25) but only in the visionary simplicity of the poetic word as found in the essential poets. And the heart of this word is a silence, which is inscrutable. The difference emergent here is of a contemplative order, which deconstructionism no less than metaphysical rationalism is quite incapable of espousing.

2 Mutual irrecuperability of faith and thinking

But it seems that in mapping the world according to the *Ereignis* Heidegger glossed over the pluralistic texture even of such contemplative simplicity, and hypostatized a unitary element in which all things fall into their proper place, in which the world worlds and the thing things according to their proper natures. Even the deconstructive version of the *Ereignis* as essentially difference, unless it is worked out in terms of a concrete pluralism, still risks projecting a unitary instance which undercuts all religions and philosophies as the unnameable other.

In some ways theologians are in a better position than philosophers when it comes to detecting the pluralistic texture of reality even at the depths involved here. Perhaps some theologians have identified their own radicality with that of Heidegger, misread in a still metaphysical sense, as Derrida suggests in the humorous closing pages of *De l'esprit*. The more alert, however, have stumbled on the differentiations inevitably emerging in any encounter between biblical thought and the thinking of being. The dialogue between Heidegger and the theologians does not converge on the celebration of a single bedrock reality, beneath being and Spirit alike. Rather it is an experience of difference, of a gulf between the radicality that proceeds from the metaphysical tradition of naming being and the biblical tradition of naming God (and there are other gulfs, notably with the Buddhist tradition of emptiness). When abyss speaks to abyss in this way, a relativization is inevitable.

Heidegger cannot be recuperated in a theological scheme, such as that which seeks in the *es gibt* the presence of the Creator who 'gives' beings (Maria Villela-Petit, HQD, p. 95). Such religious constructions spoil the integrity of the phenomenon, and are a failure to let being be being. The *Ereignis*, the granting of being, is a gracious event, a constant source of wonder; but the invocation of the Creator to provide that wonder with a ground seems only to undermine it, to rationalize it. Here then is a depth of which theology cannot speak. Conversely, the Bible cannot be recuperated in a Heideggerian scheme, despite his attempts to bring it under the rubric of the Sacred – and thus is broken the imperialism of the thinking of being. As both traditions realize their finitude the

question of an ultimate originary instance becomes more profoundly obscure. One can practise 'faith' and one can practise 'thinking of being'; the coexistence of the two practices can involve a greater or lesser degree of interaction. To claim the all-importance of one and the relative triviality of the other (as Heidegger presumed theologians would have to do) is a formula for fanaticism.

The hypothesis of a single unitary granting of being and world certainly provided a grand theme for phenomenology; but it seems destined to dissolve into acceptance of the infinite plurality of human worlds as historically constituted. One may talk of an abstract form of worldhood in general, but this is something far more tenuous than the richly furnished world on which Heidegger meditates. There is a biblical experience of world on the basis of a vivid sense of dependence on the Creator which is neither reducible to onto-theological ratiocination or assimilable to the Greek experience of world (Heidegger's alternative ways of dismissing it). A tension between different forms of the worlding of world, worked out in different cultures, may be constitutive of the post-modern experience of the worlding of world. Within each culture the way the world worlds is undergoing constant modification. There is then no step back from the technological world to a unitary experience of the fourfold, but only an opening-up to a great variety of ways of being-in-the-world. This variety blurs any unitary notion of the truth of being and any unitary notion of God. Philosophical and religious languages, like artistic and literary ones, multiply according to the laws of historical and cultural pluralism.

It is misguided to set up a Pascalian clash between the Ereignis and the God of Abraham (see HQD, pp. 172-3) since both 'God' and Ereignis are unstable notions that dissolve into a plurality of historically constructed contemplative perspectives. The dialogue of theology with Heidegger (or of the biblical with the philosophical tradition) is much like the dialogue with literature - it offers a great variety of points of encounter and a great variety of points of tension, much as any exchange between human beings does. The pluralistic coexistence of the thinking of faith and the thinking of being cannot be reduced to a simple pattern by the imposition of an approved Christian evaluation of Heidegger's thought or of an approved Heideggerian reading of Christian tradition. That is not to say that the dialogue will not occasion many firm judgments, both positive and negative; but the mutual solicitation is inherently open-ended, a space of thought whose contours cannot be rigidly demarcated – just as the contours of the encounter between Christianity and Platonism cannot be demarcated, even today.

3 For a general theory of pluralism

The acceptance of pluralism both in reason and in thinking does not invalidate the movement, the basic inspiration, of Heidegger's thought – the reaching back from convenient conceptual lucidities to the obscure wonder of the presence of things – but it diversifies this movement into a great variety of local and contextual paths of thinking. Each of these can be the critical overcoming of some form of blindness or forgetfulness and the bringing to light of some 'essential' phenomenon. Within the great religions such thinking back will try to renew the original impact of the revelation from which the tradition lives, but of course all such retrievals are recreations; even in the Pentateuch what a gulf there is between Deuteronomy and the earlier traditions it repeats! Any discipline may be inspired by the orientation of Heidegger's depth-hermeneutic of retrieval/recreation; thus his influence may extend as his doctrines wither.

Heidegger's insight into the *Ereignis* is not a pure intuition of essence. It is a cultural product, the fruit of an engagement with poetic and mystical traditions. Greisch finds a lack of coherence between the phenomenology of the Ereignis as simple, ineffable 'identity' - in which being and thinking (Identität und Differenz), or being and time (Zur Sache des Denkens), belong together - and the phenomenology of the carrying out (Austrag) of the dif-ference between being and beings.²⁸ He suggests that the coherence can be found by pursuing the matter further, entering more fully into the simplicity of the Ereignis and leaving the question of the dif-ference to metaphysics; but it seems the destiny of any phenomenology of 'world' or of 'being' to come undone in a pluralism of perspectives. The Ereignis, as 'the post-metaphysical name of the Pre-Socratic aletheia', 29 as 'the most unapparent of the unapparent, the simplest of the simple, the nearest of the near and the farthest of the far' (GA 12, p. 247) – and as too much else besides – is a rubric under which a variety of contemplative perspectives are forced into unity.

As for the next grand principle, the fourfold, subordinate to the Ereignis almost as the Nous is to the One in Plotinus, it, too, seems to patch together into a dreamlike unity phenomenological quantities that are more convincing when left separate – mortal Dasein as the 'there' of being, and the struggle between the concealment of earth and the openness of world, make perfect sense in certain particular contexts, but the gracious dance of earth, sky ('world' in the first version, GA 65, p. 310), mortals and gods is just pleasantly poetic; can one believe that it lights up a structure at the heart of things, one of universal import? Had Heidegger attended more to the particularity of the worlds of his poets (instead of fusing them into a single phenomenological amalgam dominated by Hölderlin – as Heidegger interpreted him) he would have relinquished the search for a unified phenomenology of world, as Paul Ricoeur

in Time and Narrative relinquishes the search for a unitary phenomenology of time. Or at least he would have been more prudent in expounding the form of the phenomenality of world, refraining from giving it such charged concrete content. To justify the identification of being with world Heidegger has to posit that being is always manifest in a timespace, as the 'abode of the moment [Augenblicksstätte] for the founding of the truth of being' (GA 65, p. 323), a moment of destiny in which the space of history is concentrated.

4 The theological leap to a pluralism of origins

Theological imitations of Kant's transcendental leap ground Christian revelation in a metaphysics of human spirit opening onto the divine; they remain within the realm of subjectivity, subjectivity not in the sense of subjectivism but as 'the essential law-character of the grounds which sufficiently provide the possibility of an object' (SG, p. 137). This, too, must be relinquished in the thinking leap to the truth of revelation (this phrase, too, is shorthand for a variety of contemplative perspectives), a leap which can only happen as a response to the call and claim of the divine Word. Barth is the one who has succeeded best in such a naming of the essence of Christianity, eclipsing the previous efforts of Schleiermacher, Feuerbach or Harnack. What is lacking in Barth is the pluralism which opens the truth of revelation to the truth of the other 'great beginnings' in the religious sphere.

What is the element in which the great beginnings can encounter one another? Is it the element of being? Of Buddhist emptiness? Of the biblical Holy Spirit? Of dialogue? Of an ethos of liberation? It is not, at least, any of the metaphysical elements that have been proposed as the ground of theology: the transcendental consciousness of Rahner, the Hegelian realm of spirit, the Whiteheadian realm of process, or the older Augustinian and Thomist ontologies. Nor is it the kerygmatic-existential element of Kierkegaard, Barth or Bultmann, for this demands to be released from its narrow isolation and exposed to the wider sweep of religious and human reality. Nor is it any discourse that savours of old ecclesiastical wineskins. Great as are the historical constructions of the churches, they appear in the light of the present interreligious horizon far too shrivelled and sectarian to serve as vehicles of spirit. They, too, are to be overcome.

The dimension towards which we must think is one in which all the great religious texts can speak their essential truths with the maximum resonances. It must be pneumatic, 'empty', liberational, dialogal in the strong sense of mutual solicitation. Only so can it allow the essence of religion to be released from its counter-essence of sectarianism, intolerance, fanaticism, fundamentalist sclerosis. What is the unifying element in which these qualities can flourish? These qualities are not ahistorical attributes. They emerge with a special force at this specific historical moment in a conversion away from sectarian traditions, in a movement of expropriation that brings us into a new communality. How name this process? Just as the new realm of the thinkable opened up by Heidegger's leap can be discerned only in light of the previous history of thinking, now seen for the first time as a destining of being, so the new realm opening up in religious awareness can be grasped only in a critical retrieval of religious traditions as happenings of revelation, happenings always intrinsically pluralistic and open-ended.

5 God as Creator in a pluralist perspective

Heidegger raged throughout the thirties and forties against the reduction of beings to 'products' which the belief in a creator brought about.³⁰ Jean Beufret objected to the monopoly enjoyed by God in the Christian view of being:

In the beginning God created, or rather created for himself, the heavens and the earth and finally his man. Everything is there, Heidegger says: the earth, the heavens, humans, the God – except the essential. . . . For in the scriptural narrative three of the four depend on a *Primus* who is their origin and their centre as well. In place of the divine priority or primacy, Heidegger names a Fourfold or rather *Unifourfold* of which the centre is none of the four.

(HQD, pp. 28-9)

The centre of the Fourfold is the holy as the chaos which yawns.

K. Rosenthal remarks that 'the subordination of the God or the gods to chaos is the contrary of what is intended in the creation narrative'. But Beaufret points out that Heidegger is using the term 'chaos' in a special sense 'in the closest connection with an originary interpretation of the essence of *aletheia*, as the bottomless as it initially opens up' (N I, p. 350) the Open as it first opens to bring everything into its grasp, to accord to each differentiated being its presence within limits. (Michel Haar points out that Hölderlin only once uses 'the holy' as a substantive and that 'the idea of a genesis of the gods from the Sacred is visibly unilateral and excessive'. 32)

Jean-Luc Marion sees here an idolatry of being and the sacred as a screen against the sovereignty of God (HQD, pp. 60-6). Maria Villela-Petit defends Heidegger on the grounds that in the Bible God appears as a being, so that the experience of God depends on a prior experience of being (HQD, pp. 91-2). Heidegger does not present being as the ground for God but as the space in which God is encountered (HQD, p. 94). He is clearing the space for a renewed encounter with God, though his way of putting this is highly misleading, e.g. 'the divinity as

it deploys its essence receives its origin from the truth of being' (GA 13, p. 154). One might add that Marion's project of thinking God as love 'outside' the question of being, and his dismissal of the play of being as mere inanity, could undercut the human basis for a full-blooded encounter with the divine. His Pascalian gesture of putting being at a distance - the distance measured and granted by the Cross - seems phenomenologically tenuous. But the entire framework of this debate is undercut if we register the historical texture both of the scriptural language of creation and the Heideggerian language of being.

Marion intends to verify this Pascalian subordination of the order of being to the order of charity on the purely philosophical plane through a phenomenology of love. One gathers that love will continue to let being play, but will judge its play to be 'inane'. Pascalian ennui, in its indifference to beings, 'suspends the claim of being and by that very fact confirms that the claim precedes being and alone makes it possible. The pure form of the call comes into play before any specification, even of being.' This is rather dizzyingly rarefied; in prising the claim structure apart from being and siting it 'beyond being' is Marion making an apologetic attempt to discern the presence of a Creator through a depreciation of being? In ascribing such powers to ennui Marion seems to betray a notion of being as a projection of Dasein, a quasi-idealistic understanding from which Heidegger increasingly distanced himself, and to miss the simplicity and undeniability of the es gibt.³³

Dasein's refusal to hear the call of being reveals a new existential, 'a counter-existential, which suspends Dasein's state of being destined to being' to which corresponds 'a new abyss, anterior, or at least irreducible, to being', namely 'the pure form of the call' which is the unrecognized condition of possibility of Heidegger's call of being. Here it seems that a unitary logic that insists on the primacy of a single principle, whether being, or the call in general, or love, or the other, or God, suppresses the plurality of forms which each of these take and the ample room for interaction between them. Is not the human being always addressed by many calls, irreducible in their variety: the quiet call of being, the urgent call of duty, the cry of the oppressed, the lure of the beautiful; this variety of calls is found within the biblical kerygma alone – which is not exhausted by the 'Hear, O Israel!' of Deuteronomy 6.4.34

A more originary language of faith is not to be constructed from a general unitary form - whether the *Ereignis* or the pure form of the call or the Word of God. It can emerge only from a plunge into the concrete texture of the world of faith, both in its past sources and its present enactments. One might distil pure forms of logic or ontology independently of the complexities of the metaphysical tradition, but there are no such pure forms in the world of faith, because that world is not a unitary realm. There is no eidetic science of the religious, either to be read off from a privileged tradition (the form of love from Christianity, the form of spiritual liberation from Buddhism), or to be constructed a priori and later filled with concrete content. In this respect faith is more like art or literature than like ontology or logic.

Not only does Christian identity vary from epoch to epoch and from culture to culture but it is constitutionally dependent on its others: the question what Christian faith is cannot be thought through to the end without an ongoing reference to Judaism, Islam, modern secularism, Hinduism, Buddhism. This means that the question is never fully thought out. Christian faith remains an open-ended project, intersecting with many other open-ended projects. God is revealed and is at work in Christianity, but not in such a way as to curtail or disrupt its dialogal dependence on the other traditions that coexist with it; and by Christian principles God is revealed and at work in all those other traditions as well. Christianity is far more a diachronic adventure than a synchronic system of tenets. The involvement with metaphysics is an important part of this story, which cannot be undone by a single leap elsewhere. It is a story to be told and retold, therapeutically. Its significance cannot be encapsulated in a single definitive Wesensschau.

These remarks may apply also to Levinas's reduction of ontology to a prior foundation in the claim of the other person (*HQD*, pp. 238–47). That claim seems to arise in an ontological desert - to the point that being lacks the certainty of its 'justification', which it can find only by attending to the moral claim which alone is ultimately or originally significant. But a quarrel of precedence between ethics and ontology supposes that both are grasped as unitary instances. The radical pluralism to which the ethical tear in the texture of ontology points is missed when one talks of grounding ontology in ethics. This unconvincing hierarchy of grounding relationships - metaphysics founded on Seinsdenken founded on the ethical - must yield to a pluralistic autonomy of all three instances, each an end in itself, or rather, each a language in itself, intersecting the others richly, but not in a way that admits a synthetic concord of the three languages. There is a touch of absolutism in the refusal of Heidegger, Levinas and Marion to entertain such a possibility. Heidegger does dally with it a little, in leaving the relation of his thought to theology and to 'the other great beginnings' open-ended; but usually only to quickly add the Parmenidean warning that whatever is 'comes to pass in the dimension of being' (GA 15, p. 437).

To set this dimension against the creation-perspective is to be deceived by abstractions. If one lets both languages melt back into their historical contexts, it may be found that both have valuable functions, but that neither can serve as an all-purpose explication of the world. Unless this is done each style of thought is doomed to wage iconoclastic war against the other. Thus Beaufret has to repress the biblical Creator: the music of Bach, though used to celebrate the divine primacy, 'speaks of the relation of the divine to the Uni-fourfold rather than of its isolation as supremacy over the rest of what is'. 'Being in the Greek sense opens no possible access to the God of the Bible, but to a "theology" completely other than that of the Creator of heaven and earth' (HQD, pp. 31, 34). Heidegger tries to bring Christ, the prophets and the Holy Spirit under the aegis of a Hellenic and Hölderlinian notion of the sacred (VA,p. 183). This effort to grasp the biblical in terms of the fourfold never succeeds; it is felt to be the imposition of an idolatrous screen cutting short the movement of faith which the phenomena evoke. But the converse imposition of the creation-perspective on other poetic apprehensions of nature may equally lack phenomenological justice.

Michael Zimmerman makes a suggestion which Heidegger himself does not explicitly rule out:35

Does this conception of God exhaust the Jewish tradition of the Creator? Or does the Jewish tradition have a non-productionist, nonmetaphysical experience of God, one that was 'corrupted' at the hands of St. Paul, St. John and other early Christians influenced by Greek metaphysics, especially Platonism? If the Jewish God may be construed as non-metaphysical, then perhaps there is another possibility for renewing the West: an originary encounter with the God of the Old Testament.36

One should add: an originary encounter with the God of St Paul and St John, who is essentially Spirit, and only to a minor degree shaped by Hellenistic conceptions; and indeed with the God of Christian faith of all periods, who is always in tension with the metaphysical constructions of his nature. 'Lift up your eyes on high and see: who created these? He who brings out their host by number, calling them all by name' (Isaiah 40.26, RSV). In such texts the event of creation (of absolute divine Lordship) is in resonance with the election and liberation of Israel and the confounding of the might of the nations and their false gods. There are many other traditional ways of imagining creation, each of which deserves close literary and phenomenological study. None of them are simply reducible to productionism, not even the Johannine 'all things were made [egeneto] through him' (John 1.3) or the Pauline 'since the creation of the world his invisible nature . . . has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made' (Romans 1.20), though in this latter text a Greek metaphysical component is undeniable.

The rhetoric of Creation seems to license talk of God as ground, usually in a sense that would be more pleasing to Samuel Clarke than to Leibniz; but closer phenomenological analysis of it may show that it frustrates the quest for grounds. The multiplicity of ways of conceiving

the Creator dissolves the unitary notion of ground into a plurality of projections of the absolute or the supreme real. Our thought, our faith, are drawn toward this realm, but can never reach a point of arrest; they reach out into the plurality of the mystery as art reaches out. It turns out that the inherited conceptions of God are only starting-points in the dialogue about that reality to which talk of God points, a reality that can henceforth be explored only in dialogue with Buddhism. That reality is in some sense 'grounding' but how this is to be said and thought remains more than ever an open question.

Notes

- 1 Abbreviations: Works of Heidegger: GA = Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Klostermann); $SG = Der Satz \ vom \ Grund$ (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957); $SZ = Sein \ und$ Zeit $(GA\ 2)$; $VA = Vorträge \ und$ Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954); $ID = Identität \ und$ Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957); N = Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961); $ZSD = Zur \ Sache \ des \ Denkens$ (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969); $HQD = Heidegger \ et \ la \ question \ de \ Dieu$, ed. R. Kearney and J. O'Leary (Paris: Grasset, 1980).
- 2 See Jean-Luc Petit's discussion of this pluralism for the category of action in L'Action dans la philosophie analytique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990).
- 3 Jean Greisch, in his contribution to these volumes, seems to confine Heidegger's attempt to revision metaphysics to the period from 1928 to 1936, but the programmatic text he quotes (GA 65, p. 176) looks forward as well as backward. Even if the thought of the *Ereignis* became a higher priority, pursued independently of metaphysics, Heidegger never ceased to return to the question of the essence of metaphysics.
- 4 Heidegger already begins to reduce the variety of historical discourse on causes and grounds to a single monolithic 'essence of ground' when he attempts to discover what unites the four aitiai of Aristotle (GA 9, pp. 124-5, 273-94). He describes a variant Aristotelian set as 'four manners of possible grounding, laying and giving of ground: essence, cause, argument (in the sense of: "a truth"), motive' (GA 26, p. 137). Ute Guzzoni has criticized this too unitary and dynamic account which apprehends the aitiai under the rubric of production (Herstellen), which was not Aristotle's concern (Grund und Allgemeinheit (Meisenheim: Anton Hain, 1975)). Heidegger admits that the origin and order of the Aristotelian aitiai are obscure, but maintains none the less that they indicate that 'to being belongs ground' (GA 26, p. 138). Isn't this rather massive utterance an imposition on the pluralism of Aristotle's analyses?
- 5 John Edwin Gurr, The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems 1750–1900 (Marquette: Marquette University Press, 1959), p. 161; Schopenhauer notes 'its extremely varied applications, in each of which it acquires a different meaning' (Sämtliche Werke, ed. Deussen, III (Munich, 1912), p. 4).
- 6 C. D. Broad, *Leibniz: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 6-12; Benson Mates, *The Philosophy of Leibniz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 154-5.
 - 7 Vincent Descombes, Philosophie par gros temps (Paris: Minuit, 1989).
 - 8 Gilles Deleuze, Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque (Paris: Minuit, 1988), p. 55.

Heidegger thinks Leibniz equates cause and reason (SG, p. 43-4), but Rudolf Allers notes texts in which Leibniz distinguishes cause as the 'reason outside the thing' from reason as inherent ('Heidegger on the principle of sufficient reason', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 20 (1958/9), pp. 365-73.)

- 9 Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, para. 20, pp. 35-6; see G. Vlastos, 'Reasons and causes in the *Phaedo*', in Vlastos (ed.), *Plato I* (New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 132-66.
 - 10 Descombes, Philosophie par gros temps, p. 113.
- 11 Jonathan Powers, Philosophy and the New Physics (London: Methuen, 1982), p. 43.
- 12 See Werner Heisenberg, Gesammelte Werke, ed. W. Blun et al., vol. C 1 (Munich: Piper, 1984), pp. 29-39; idem, Physics and Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 90:

If we wanted to know why the alpha-particle was emitted at that particular time we would have to know the microscopic structure of the whole world including ourselves, and that is impossible. Therefore, Kant's arguments for the a priori character of the law of causality no longer apply.

- 13 Powers, Philosophy and the New Physics, p. 150.
- 14 Mario Bunge, Causality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 246.
- 15 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 225.
 - 16 Cahier du Collège International de Philosophie 2 (1986), p. 16.
 - 17 Descombes, Philosophie par gros temps, pp. 102-3.
 - 18 Jean Greisch, La parole heureuse (Paris: Beauchesne, 1987), p. 227.
- 19 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 112.
- 20 The principle of identity, similarly heard in a new way, also reveals its ontological import:

Properly, it sounds: A is A. What do we hear? In this 'is' the principle says how each and every being is, namely: itself the same as itself. The principle of identity speaks of the being of beings. The principle holds as a law of thinking only in so far as it is a law of being.

(*ID*, p. 12)

- 21 See Klaus Held, 'Heidegger und das Prinzip der Phänomenologie', in Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 111-39.
 - 22 Descombes, Philosophie par gros temps, p. 127.
- 23 See Jean-Luc Marion, Réduction et donation (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), pp. 90-7. Unconvincing is Marion's claim that Husserl himself was engaged with the Seinsfrage (ibid., pp. 217-40); ontology was in the air at that time, but Husserl's discussion of it centres on matters having nothing to do with what for Heidegger was the unicum necessarium, and which he found hinted at in the categorial intuition.
 - 24 Descombes, Philosophie par gros temps, p. 124.
 - 25 Derrida, De l'esprit (Paris: Galilée, 1987), p. 183.
- 26 Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).
 - 27 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 202, 203, 225, 205.

28 Jean Greisch, 'Identité et différence dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger', Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 57 (1973), pp. 71-111.

29 Greisch, Parole heureuse, p. 305.

30 Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie (Frankfurt: Campus, 1988) makes much of this, tending to underestimate the intellectual validity of Heidegger's critique of scholasticism and 'Christian philosophy'.

31 'Martin Heideggers Auffassung von Gott', Kerygma und Dogma 13 (1967),

pp. 212-29; p. 224.

- 32 In Friedrich Hölderlin, ed. J.-F. Courtine (Paris: Cahiers de l'Herne, 1989), p. 504.
- 33 Greisch notes the total absence of the es gibt in 'Réduction et donation', Révue de métaphysique et morale, 1991; Villela-Petit contests Marion's Daseincentred reading of the Letter on Humanism (HQD, pp. 89-90, vs Marion, HQD, pp. 65-6).

34 Greisch, 'Réduction et donation', pp. 297, 283, 296, 295.

- 35 For Robert S. Gall (Beyond Theism and Atheism: Heidegger's Significance for Religious Thinking (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 29-30) Heidegger is so radically anti-theological as to make 'unaccountable' the recourse to him proposed in my book Questioning Back: The Overcoming of Metaphysics in Christian Tradition (Minneapolis: Winston, 1985). I was building on the 'analogy of proportion' proposed by Heidegger to his theological colleagues in the fifties, and which no doubt indicates a mellowing of his position from the texts of the thirties on which Gall relies.
- 36 Michael Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 183. Zimmerman's discussion of 'productionist metaphysics' like so many discussions of onto-theology fails to engage Heidegger's critique of the principle of reason and his awareness of the force of that principle.

Heidegger, hermeneutics and ontology

Reiner Wiehl

Heidegger's thinking concerns itself with the fundamental question of European metaphysics. What is strange and unusual about this thinking is above all its contention that European metaphysics has not yet 'authentically' asked in any way its own most fundamental and defining question. Insofar as it has not yet even expressly entertained it, Heidegger claims that European metaphysical thought has been without a conception of its own essence and remains without a conception of itself. The question, which until now has not been authentically thought, is the question concerning the Being of beings, the question of the meaning of Being posed in terms of the ontological difference between Being and beings. This provocative thesis is formulated by Heidegger in ever new approaches and variations and is constantly repeated. Through willful interpretations of the classic components of European metaphysics he attempts to confirm it. Accordingly, all the classical thinkers of European metaphysics, whether Plato or Descartes, Leibniz or Kant, Hegel or Husserl, failed to consider that basic question 'authentically'; they failed to think it fundamentally. Their obvious 'forgetfulness of Being' led them to philosophical answers that failed to address the authentic and original question of metaphysics. Moreover, within the limits of metaphysical thought this failure remained, with a certain inevitability, unintelligible.

Heidegger's interpretations of metaphysics, which have meanwhile become classic, do not intend simply to undergird his contention concerning the hidden and unthought essence of this metaphysics. Heidegger intended above all that these interpretations open up new ways of thinking Being that, while allowing this unthought to be thought, simultaneously allow it to be preserved in its status as 'that which could not have been thought before' (*Unvordenklichkeit*). This demand to bring the unthought, as opposed to the thought, into the circle of the thinkable, the evident paradox of making this unthought into the thinkable and

that which is thought and doing it in such a way that it simultaneously retains its not being thought (*Ungedachtsein*) is a strong challenge to philosophical thinking. One can say that this challenge directly or indirectly finds its present-day response in a highly stimulating hermeneutical activity directed at the classical texts of traditional metaphysics. But this answer to the provocation of Heidegger's thinking must remain inadequate as long as the individual interpretations, however intelligent and subtle, do not say where they stand with respect to the alleged unthought of previous metaphysics.

Heidegger himself clearly saw the dangers and the risk of failure in his own thinking of Being. It was not just modesty and discretion regarding method when he described this thinking as being-on-the-way and thereby set it in sharp opposition to a thinking that develops from an absolute starting point to a definitive goal. And it was not simply a renunciation of audacity or pure prudence when he spoke of a 'step back' when he could have spoken of a 'step forward'. It could very well be – he ponders the possibility in his philosophical discussion with Hegel – that this 'step back' may fail, given the frantic development of modern technology, the heir of the old metaphysics. And still another danger could bring the new thinking of Being to naught, namely the danger that lies hidden in our facility to mistake the thinking of Being for the traditional contents of metaphysics so that 'everything that gives itself along the way of this "step back" will only be used and processed as a result of representational thinking'. In either case, he feared that the 'step back' will have possibly been in vain.

But is this testimony to the dangers of failure that threaten the new thinking of Being perhaps only the expression of an extreme and unredeemable demand made upon thought? Did Heidegger himself perhaps sense that such a thinking, which wants to think the unthought as such, that which is forgotten in the entire tradition of metaphysics, may easily get lost in the limitless realm of that which is not binding (das Unverbind-liche)? Is the marked refusal of every possible mediation (Vermittlung) between the thought and the unthought, the renunciation of the production of a conceptual relation between the one and the other, a sign of disdain for that hermeneutical enterprise in which the interpretation is more important than an authentic understanding of the subject matter (Sache)? Or does the preservation of the irreducible difference between thought and the unthought, between the manifest and the hidden, concern something else? What is at issue – a philosophical truth or, ultimately, a philosophical error?

Heidegger's testimony to the dangers that threaten the new thinking of Being refers to an aporia basic to this thinking. On the one hand, like every thinking that aims at insight into some questionable issue (Sache), this thinking must try to gain an appropriate distance from this

issue so that it can show itself in its proper light. Hence it is justly demanded of this new thinking of Being that a distance, appropriate to the sought-after essence of metaphysics, be gained as a condition of the possibility of being able to think this essence. The 'step back' must meet this condition by gaining the proper distance, which involves a step away from and possibly beyond metaphysics. But where does this step lead? Which way out does such a thinking intend to take? For on the other hand such a thinking of Being comes from the metaphysical tradition and it is, thanks to this origin, a metaphysical thinking that is grounded in the essence of metaphysics and it is to this essence that his thinking must correspond. Must not such a thinking lose the ground under its feet when it attempts to distance itself from its own essence for the sake of a supposedly 'objective' distance? Can the thinking of Being as a metaphysical thinking take the required step back at all if it is true that metaphysical being is the final and most primordial Being? Does this not demonstrate that Heidegger's attempt to think the unthought of traditional metaphysics is, even before the possibility of failure, from the very outset meaningless, even absurd?

Now it is no exaggeration to say that no one saw this aporia so clearly or brought it so unmistakably to general awareness than Heidegger himself. He interpreted this aporia as the fate of metaphysics in our time. The most characteristic traits of his new thinking of Being are connected directly with this interpretation. Hence his refusal to characterize his own thinking as a metaphysical thinking; hence, also his peculiar formulation of coming to grips with (Verwindung) metaphysics, which mitigates (ablösen) the talk of 'overcoming' (Uberwindung) and 'destruction' (Destruktion). In particular the 'hermeneutical ambiguity' that attaches to all of his interpretations of traditional metaphysics corresponds to this aporia and its interpretation of the history of Being. All of these interpretations say basically one and the same thing: that in all that metaphysics has hitherto thought there is an unthought that is not to be mistaken for the thought and that does not allow dialectical mediation. Thus, this contradiction between the thought and unthought, the manifest and the hidden, shows up in all forms of traditional metaphysics. Hermeneutical ambiguity defines the human way of relating in terms of a relation to Being and the world. But this ambiguity just as much defines the relation of thinking to metaphysics. Heidegger sees an essential belonging-together between both ambiguities, for the essence (Wesen) of man and the essence of thinking Being belong together for him. Both ambiguities are sedimented in human language, for language expresses itself both in our relation to Being and world and in thinking the Being of beings. Heidegger attempted in the language of his thinking to correspond to both these hermeneutical ambiguities and to the aporia described and its own interpretation of the history of Being. Hence his language of thinking seems to vacillate between a literal faithfulness to the language of metaphysics and another unfamiliar (unvertraute) language of the new thinking of Being. These languages, however, are inseparable. They are only apparently different languages. Both intend the same: they intend to intimate something in their very hiding of something. They intend to leave something unexpressed in their referring to it. In short, they intend to correspond to the essence of truth.

What these two inseparable ways of speaking intend simultaneously to intimate and hide is not ultimately the feared-for loss of meaning of the traditional language of metaphysics and the hoped-for gain in meaning from the language of this new thinking of Being. Both expressions of thinking intend much more to preserve the essence of human thought and thereby to make further thinking possible. The question concerning the possible success or failure of Heidegger's thinking of Being is accordingly inseparable from the other question: Are the characteristically winding and strange paths of this new thinking attempts to overcome the aporia of metaphysical thinking and thereby to arrive on the other side of metaphysics on the firm ground of an unquestionable valid knowledge? Or is this thinking with its constant being-on-the-way and its concomitant unending attempts at new approaches satisfied if it illuminates this aporia, addressed simply as the fate of metaphysics in our present age, without any demand to resolve this aporia, but, instead, rejecting every attempt to explicitly develop the conditions of its possible transcendence (Aufhebung)? Is Heidegger's apparently extremely demanding thinking in the final analysis in a specific sense undemanding? Heidegger makes it intentionally difficult for his readers to decide one way or another. He plays with both possibilities of either making or renouncing this demand, perhaps for the sake of the authentic hermeneutical ambiguity, which must leave undecided whether the thinking of Being today has stepped out of the ambit of traditional metaphysics, or whether it even can.

And yet even with the value that this intentionally ambiguous thinking and speaking places upon consistency, one question cannot be dismissed out of hand: Hasn't Heidegger taken too seriously this aporia of metaphysical thinking that we have described? Hasn't he blocked off without reason all paths to its resolution through his arbitrary interpretation of the history of Being? What really compels us to comprehend this aporia as the inescapable fate of metaphysics in our day? Why not see it instead as a possible occasion and contingent point of departure for metaphysical knowledge in our age?

It is not by accident that this aporia reminds us of the old argument of indolent reason, according to which learning is absurd because without a presupposed knowledge it is impossible but with such knowledge it is superfluous. There appears to be a real kinship between this and the old sophistic game of unmediated opposites. For while we have, in the case

of these sophistries the unmediated opposites of being and nothing being played upon in order to produce the appearance of the impossibility of becoming and movement, we have in the case of Heidegger a conceptual game concerned with the absolute difference between essence and ground (Grund), a difference that threatens concept and knowledge with absence of sufficient reason (Grundlosigkeit) and unfathomableness (Abgründigkeit). Must one not ask in the face of this kinship and in light of the lack of mediations (*Vermittlungen*) whether Heidegger hasn't simply revived the ancient sophisms and lent them a profundity through his admittedly epochal interpretation of the history of Being that, for all that, is not beyond question? Or is this kinship and proximity something superficial, only a deceptive illusion that obscures the real meaning of Heidegger's thinking of Being?

Already ancient philosophy, particularly Plato's, noticed this strange proximity between the then modern sophistry and the ancestral speculative mythology, and it saw in this neighborly mingling a danger to wellgrounded knowledge and clear human insight. Against this danger Plato developed the idea of a philosophical knowledge and the concept of a clear, well-grounded knowledge. He grounded this idea on both experience and thought and linked up this concept of cognition with the modes of thought, that is, the thought of experience and the thought of beings. And finally he elaborated this mode of thought into the first attempt at a philosophical, fundamental science, the science of dialectic. The thinking of experience, the recollecting of the perceived and the supposedly known, created, when methodically pursued, a counterweight against the nonbinding and seductive thought games played with sophistical and mythologizing paradoxes. Moreover, the thought of beings as beings served not only as an instrument to disentangle the confused and to illuminate the dark and obscure, but it made it possible to lay the foundations of a philosophical science concerned with first principles and causes. Ever since Plato's initial founding of a philosophical science of first principles, all metaphysics has been based on these two fundamental supports; on experience and on thought. These two, however, are bound together by common principles.

2

Heidegger's new thinking of Being, however, has contrasted these two fundamental instances of secured and well-grounded knowledge to his own; the thought of experience with the experience of thought and the thought of beings with the remembrance of Being. But what does such a contrast mean? What insight can thereby be gained? Do these contrasts point to the possibility of a new speculative mythology, in the manner of pre-Socratic thought, through which the tradition of metaphysics as a science of first principles will be overcome? Or is this characterization of the new thinking of Being as speculative mythology one-sidedly influenced through the critical perspective of Plato? Is this opposition and contrast in any way sufficiently determined to answer questions of this sort?

One is tempted to see in the philosophical hermeneutics founded by H.-G. Gadamer a counterproposal to the Heideggerian thinking of Being, and in his relationship to the latter to see something like a repetition of the old philosophical history of the Platonic critique of speculative mythology and its sophistic application. But the history of philosophy knows pure repetition, in the strict sense of the word, just as little as actual history does. Instead we find both stronger and weaker analogies in the basic traits of different histories, as well as progression and even regression in problems and their solutions. In fact, Gadamer's hermeneutics is far removed from a renewal of traditional metaphysics and from a revival of its idea of a philosophical science of first principles. To be sure, this hermeneutics has contributed to the defusing and neutralization of the ontohistorical aporia of Heidegger's thinking. Gadamer himself wants to see in his historical hermeneutics no unbridgable opposition to Heidegger's thinking of Being. Rather, he sees the essential difference to be in the posing of questions and problems. But this difference points unintentionally in the direction of an opposing position.

A sign of this can be seen in the loss of significance that the fundamental aporia of the metaphysical thought of Being suffers in historical hermeneutics. For a loss of significance always inevitably occurs when a single and absolute essence (Wesen) splinters into a multiplicity, thereby losing the original unity of its essence. Gadamer's hermeneutics has, in fact, replaced the one and single history of the thinking of Being with a multiplicity of histories of interpretations and so has apparently relativized the meaning of the one absolute history of Being. For the manifold histories of understanding Being and self-understanding do not initially present a unity subsisting in and for itself. Rather in each of these different, individual histories a distinct historical context of effects (Wirkungszusammenhang) constitutes itself from one or more other histories. In such a context of effects, the different histories that belong to it form a historical relation of ideal simultaneity, regardless of their lack of real simultaneity. A definite, particular history, regardless of what kind, allows its determinate character as such to be known in the mirror of other histories that project a spectrum of this character. A history that allows the character of another history to be known acts as its 'effectivehistory' (Wirkungsgeschichte). The temporal relation of an 'effectivehistory' is a dual relation involving being past (Nachzeitigkeit) and being simultaneous (Gleichzeitigkeit) with respect to all histories over against

which it functions as an effective-history. Accordingly, there belongs an effective historical reflection to each history, with respect to the determination of its character. Hence the character of a history can present itself with many shadings in accordance with the number of effective-histories that belong to the history in question.

The absolute ontological history of thinking (Seinsgeschichte des Denkens) is, from the standpoint of historical hermeneutics, only a particular history, even if a meaningful history. Thus what is binding in principle for each history binds it as well. The possibility of knowing its character is dependent on effective-historical reflection. This character can display itself in innumerable shadings in one of many other histories. Given this in-principle infinite multiplication of the one absolute ontological history of thinking, (Seinsgeschichte des Denkens) the absolute and irreducible difference between the determination of essence and the ground of essence loses that eminent significance which that history possessed as its constitutive aporia. In the splintering and multiplication of the one absolute history of Being, that one major aporia splinters and multiplies itself into innumerable lesser aporias. These in no way lose their meaning only because of their indeterminate number. Their relation to understanding differentiates itself from the relation of that fundamental aporia to thinking. This thinking intends to preserve the absolute difference between essence and ground for its own sake and for the sake of Being. It leaves this difference, and with it the aporia, as it is, and it always only gives it new expression.

In contrast, understanding looks always for agreement in communication. In the attempt to come to an understanding, historical hermeneutics asks a question for which an answer is sought. Such an approach implies that an answer can be found even if it is not completely convincing, even if it leaves behind something not understood or even, perhaps, if something not understood is engendered. The relation between a history and its effective-history presents itself in respect to this immanent aporia as a relation of question and answer. In its context of effects with other histories effective-history forms a structural whole of question and answer. The difference between Gadamer's historical hermeneutics and Heidegger's thinking of the history of Being is not just a difference in the estimation of the history of Being in comparison to other histories, nor is it simply a difference in the weight given to the two fundamental concepts of understanding and thinking within the whole structure of the human comportment toward Being. These differences in estimation refer rather to specific differences in the determination of basic, historical relations of the relation between absolute and relative Being, between the unity and multiplicity of beings, and further, between question and answer, Being and self, and between truth and mediation.

Initially, specific differences of this kind find a unified expression in a

different position with regard to the problem of ontology. Gadamer consciously gives his hermeneutical philosophy an ontological foundation in order to mark itself off from a methodological hermeneutics, that is, from a technique or method. In contrast, the idea of an ontological grounding of Heidegger's thinking of Being runs counter to the meaning of this thinking, to its self-characterization as being-on-the-way, as well as in the consistency with which it maintains its irresolvable hermeneutical ambiguity. For this ambiguity claims that in this epochal thinking of Being it cannot be definitely decided whether thinking still moves within the essential realm of traditional European metaphysics or whether it has already reached the ground of this essence and thereby has pushed beyond the sphere of its validity and influence. And it cannot be definitely decided whether that which has been thought in the metaphysical tradition is being thought about further in another form and way of speaking or whether Heidegger is not already in the realm of the unthought when he attempts to think in these new forms of expression and ways of speech. In the face of such an indecisiveness and undecidability, the talk of a new ontology as opposed to the old is, at least provisionally, meaningless.

In contrast to this, what is the meaning of the ontological self-grounding of hermeneutics? What we find first of all, instead of hermeneutical ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) in relation to the thinking of Being in traditional metaphysics is a certain manifold of ambiguities (Vieldeutigkeit)¹ which determines Gadamer's relation to traditional metaphysics and distinguishes it from Heidegger's ambiguity, even when this 'many-sided' ambiguity is often superimposed on Heidegger's ambiguity. This manysided ambiguity marks certain strengths and weaknesses of ontological hermeneutics, particularly in comparison to the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's thinking of Being. Hermeneutical ontology defines itself as a universal ontology of experience and language. With this self-grounding, hermeneutics certainly neither intends a new ontology in the place of the traditional one, nor does it intend simply to take over traditional ontology just as it is and to undergird itself with this foundation. Gadamer's hermeneutical ontology of experience and language cannot be forced into a dichotomous framework that separates old and new. In this 'neither-nor' it is analogous to the hermeneutical ambiguity of Heidegger's thinking of Being.

But the many ambiguous ways it relates to traditional ontology and metaphysics points in yet another direction. It remains undetermined whether the ontological region of experience and language is primary with respect to the region of traditional ontology only according to time or also according to Being and knowledge. In its ontological foundations philosophical hermeneutics leaves a question unanswered that presented a key problem for traditional metaphysics to which it sought an answer

in the form of a methodologically basic principle, namely, the principle of the difference between that which is 'for us' and that which is 'in and for itself' the first and most original principle. The old metaphysics was well aware that a region of Being preceded it, a sphere of experience, of everyday language and pragmatic behavior from which it took its own point of departure. But it recognized the priority of this region only in a limited sense, namely in the sense of a certain temporal priority. While in its own sphere - the sphere of true and authentic knowledge of first principles – it claimed absolute priority. This absolute priority is a priority in a three-fold sense, namely a priority in respect to Being and to time as well as to knowledge. Now certainly the historical hermeneutics of our day is in no way a stranger to the classical principle of methodological mediation, of the systematic ordering of beings according to basic priorities. On the contrary, this hermeneutics makes a specific hermeneutical use of this principle in its effective-historical ontology and its logic of question and answer. In this respect, a given effective-history consequently has, in a certain sense, priority for us vis-à-vis its preceding history and in another sense it does not. Similarly, with regard to the relation of question and answer, there are priorities in more than one sense and in more than one respect. In this sense it follows that a given effective-history is prior to its prehistory (Vorgeschichte) with respect to knowledge, but not in a temporal sense. And it is this priority of a knowledge 'for us', considered as effective-historical, that allows us to see the point of departure of a question in-this effective-history, which seeks its answer in the historical context in which it has its ontological and logical locus. At the same time, it appears that the hermeneutical use of this classical principle of mediation is not limited to its application in the sphere of effective-historical ontology and the logic of question and answer. On the contrary, it seems that this principle is being applied beyond these realms to the relation of hermeneutics as a whole to traditional metaphysics. For the hermeneutical ontology of experience and language advances the claim to be both more original and more comprehensive than traditional metaphysics. It claims absolute priority over traditional metaphysics.

From the standpoint of such absolute priority, traditional metaphysics necessarily appears as derivative and secondary. Paradoxically, it takes on the appearance of a particular ontology insofar as hermeneutics presents itself as a general, that is, universal, ontology. The strength of Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy over against Heidegger's thinking of Being lies in this definition of its own fundamental relationship to traditional metaphysics. While Heidegger's thinking of Being takes a path that remains continually on-the-way to and beyond the ground of thinking, hermeneutical philosophy gives itself from the start such a primordial and comprehensive foundation that it must appear meaningless to want to think beyond it toward something still more primordial. It is this apparently absolute primordiality and breadth that lends hermeneutics its specific distance from metaphysics and thereby makes possible the conditions of a possible critique of metaphysical thought. In this manner, hermeneutics places itself within the traditional ambit of contemporary philosophical critiques of metaphysics.

Moreover, the breadth of its foundation also opens up worlds of experience and linguistic expression that demand a new right and significance of their own over the predominance of metaphysical thinking. These are worlds of nonmetaphysical experience and language within a general culture shared with metaphysics, as well as the nonmetaphysical worlds of experience and language of other cultures. In this respect, Gadamer's hermeneutics is related to Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. In a similar fashion, hermeneutics seeks insight into the comprehensive foundations of cross-cultural research; in a similar fashion, hermeneutics is a philosophy of culture and a general cultural anthropology. On the other hand, hermeneutics shares with Heidegger's thinking of Being the attempt to come to grips (*verwinden*) with metaphysics. In this, hermeneutics shows itself to be, in a certain respect, more successful in gaining a theoretical distance to metaphysics than Heidegger's unfathomable (*abgründigen*) thinking of Being.

But how are we to interpret the intellectual proximity of hermeneutical philosophy to such opposing positions as those of Cassirer and Heidegger? Does the former succeed in bridging these extremes? Is hermeneutical philosophy in any way suited to such a task? What differentiates how hermeneutics comes to grips with metaphysics from a transcendental-philosophical critique of metaphysics in the style of late Neo-Kantianism? The strength of philosophical hermeneutics is, as it is with any philosophical theory, simultaneously somehow its weakness. Thus the laying of the philosophical foundation of a hermeneutical praxis in a universal ontology of experience and language certainly could not be thought out more comprehensively. At any event, it has extended and enriched the region of prelinguistic worlds of expression through presenting it as a special kind of language world.

But this extraordinary breadth of the hermeneutical grounding has been paid for with a loss of depth. At least this picture forces itself upon us when one compares this self-grounding with the unfathomableness (Abgründigkeit) of Heidegger's thinking of Being, which places the whole essence of a ground (Grund) in question. If Heidegger wins depth at the cost of breadth, Gadamer reverses this relationship. And in both cases signs of the trivial begin to show themselves, as it always does where philosophical thought can do one only at the cost of the other. Thus even hermeneutics has its characteristic triviality which lies precisely in its ontological self-grounding. Its actual weakness, however, lies in its

failure to clearly distinguish between philosophical theory and a theoretical principle, between ontology and an ontological principle. An ontological principle no more makes an ontology than a logical principle makes a logic. This pertains to both the ontological principle of effective-history and to the logical principle of the correspondence of question and answer. Both principles are not by themselves sufficient to 'ground' an ontology and an ontological logic.

3

An ontology is an interrelated whole, a system of ontological principles formulated with respect to a definite manifold of beings, which is, in turn, determined by these principles. This interrelation demands a manifold of logical principles for its systematic presentation. This systematic unity of these principles belongs to that ontology and they present us with a constitutive logic for the same. An ontological logic belongs to every ontology and makes up the form of its presentation, a form that is intrinsic to it as its inner form. An ontology is universal with respect to the universality of its principles and with respect to the universality of the manifold of beings for which the same principles are valid as universal principles. Hermeneutical philosophy's neglect of the difference between an ontology and an ontological principle makes its ontological foundation ambiguous in many ways (Vieldeutigkeit). The hermeneutical ontology of experience and language is ambiguous both in terms of its concept and in terms of its function. This ambiguity allows a series of different interpretations. According to one such interpretation, hermeneutical philosophy is not an ontology at all in the strict and proper sense of the word. Rather, it specifies several general conditions that form the outer limits for a possible universal ontology that, before all else, requires future elaboration in conjunction with the development of a hermeneutical, ontological logic. Accordingly, both the principle of effective-history would have to be developed into a universal ontology of histories and historical relations, and the logical principle of question and answer would have to be elaborated as a universal theory of forms and structures. In this way, the universal ontology of histories and the logic of forms and structures would form an interconnected theoretical whole. Then the infinite multiplicity of human experiences and linguistic forms of expression would allow themselves to be thought as embedded in determinate historical relations and as formed and structured in respect to determinate structural relations.

A second possible way of interpreting a hermeneutical ontology is based on the supposition that certainly in theory one must differentiate between an ontology and one or more ontological principles or, more exactly, between an ontology and an indeterminate multiplicity of ontological principles, but that in each concrete case no such difference can be made without qualification and with sufficient clarity. On this supposition rests the distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' ontologies. An ontology is strong inasmuch as it can make this difference clearly visible and it is all the more strong the better it succeeds in doing so. Thus we can take as a model of such a strong ontology those which satisfy the following conditions: an undetermined multiplicity of principles is developed into a unified ontological framework within which each individual principle, as an ontological principle, is, with respect to every other principle, univocally determined according to its concept, position, and function. At the same time, this ontological framework makes it possible to recognize the completeness of all the principles, as well as their general and special validity for a certain region of being. And finally, it holds for this model of a 'strong' ontology, that it can bring any other principle that has no well-defined logical place within it into a well-defined logical relation with those principles that belong to it, be it into a relation of a specific compatibility or of specific incompatibility.

In contrast, 'weak' ontologies are those that do not satisfy the general conditions of a strong ontology. And they are all the weaker the further they remain from the model of a strong ontology, and the less they are in a position to develop an indeterminate manifold beyond a mere 'rhapsody' of general principles into a well-defined ontological framework. Even if the difference between a strong and a weak ontology has been sketched only provisionally and, in reality, remains a relative difference, still this definition suffices to enable us to characterize hermeneutical philosophy with regard to its self-grounding as a very weak ontology.

This characterization holds by no means only in comparison to the paradigmatic strong ontologies of traditional metaphysics, such as, for example, Hegel's ontology, which has always been recognized, even by Heidegger and Gadamer, as a paradigm of a very strong ontology. Hermeneutics is also a weak ontology compared to itself insofar as it is considered not only as an actual ontology but also a possible ontology for which it provides a general context of meaning. Both these ontological interpretations of hermeneutical philosophy have primarily a theoretical character. According to each, the infinitely many-sided, in each case concrete hermeneutical practice of communication and interpretation retains a theoretical basis, be it in the form of the conditions of a possible strong ontology, be it in the form of an actual, even if weak ontological foundation. Here the individual ontological principles function as theoretical elements whose validity extends to the infinite multiplicity of the possibility of human experience and expression as the matter and content of hermeneutical practice.

Besides such a primarily theoretical interpretation of the foundations

of hermeneutical philosophy a pragmatic-ontological interpretation is also possible. In this case the ontological principles do not function as theoretical building blocks of a possible or actual ontological foundation but as pragmatically valid principles of an ontological interpretation. A pragmatically valid principle, such as effective-history, is not to be confused with a methodical rule of procedure for understanding or interpretation. Rather, it presents, so to speak, a metahermeneutical principle, which is in one way or another applicable to interpretative contexts, which are more or less regulated in various ways. Despite their differences, all three ontological interpretations of hermeneutical philosophy agree in their claim that the presupposed ontological principles are valid for the comprehensive contents of human experience and expression and that they function for these contents as formal principles of the most general sort

From such an ontological interpretation of the self-grounding of hermeneutics, we may now distinguish an interpretation which, from the point of view of its actual content, may be called the ontological selfinterpretation of hermeneutics. Here we must seek the universal ontological foundation of concrete hermeneutical practice in the complete range of the possibilities of experience and expression. And correspondingly we find here that within this given complete framework the individual experiential and expressive elements function as ontological principles in regard to the comprehensive multiplicity of possible interpretative contexts.

Analogous to the three formal-ontological interpretations of hermeneutical philosophy presented above we can think of three interpretations that are content-oriented. The first provides only the general boundaries for the conditions of a possible ontology of experience which is to be formulated with respect to the multiplicity of experiential and expressive possibilities. The second implies what can be called a 'weak' ontology of experience. This weakness can be defined analogously to the aforementioned weakness, namely as inadequately differentiating between the context of the experience and an individual experience. In the third, we have finally the pragmatic-ontological interpretation according to which the individual principles of experience function as principles of a pragmatic-ontological interpretation of all possible contexts of interpretation.

By means of this fundamental difference between form and content within the ontological self-interpretation of hermeneutical philosophy, we can discern a further fundamental ambiguity. It remains an open issue whether the hermeneutical-ontological principles have the character of general thoughts and basic concepts or whether they pertain to general experiences and modes of expression or whether we have to do with mixtures of one with the other. Accordingly, hermeneutical philosophy leaves the fundamental ontological relation between thinking and

experience undetermined. Thereby possibilities of distinguishing between the thinking of experience and the experience of thinking are left open. As we have already said, an ontological logic belongs implicitly or explicitly to a philosophical ontology, and its principles serve the systematic development of ontological principles in their mutual conceptual and functional determination. In this, we must take into account throughout that the principles of this logic may be distinguished from the corresponding ontological principles only in regard to their function, not, however, in regard to their conceptual determination and logical space. To this extent, the difference between an ontology and an ontological logic has a purely functional character. But however one distinguishes between an ontology and its ontological logic, the ambiguity of one brings in its wake a corresponding ambiguity in the other. Thus analogous to the three, or, as the case may be, six ontological interpretations of hermeneutics, we can think of a corresponding plurality of interpretations of that hermeneutical-ontological logic that belong to hermeneutics. According to the first, such a logic serves only to provide the general framework of the conditions for a possible ontological logic; according to the second, we have to do with a weak logic, the weaknesses of which corresponds to that of the ontology to which it belongs; according to the third, we deal finally with a pragmatic-hermeneutical logic. Over against the pure theoretical differences between thoughts and experiences, between conceptual and linguistic realities, the logical principles of hermeneutics behave like the ontological principles, ambivalently.

This is not the least of reasons why the relation between ontology and ontological logic remains open and relatively inexact in hermeneutical philosophy. The hermeneutical ambiguity of the principles affects especially the ontological and logical function of essences, justifications, and definitions. Contemporary hermeneutics gives at least the appearance of assigning absolute priority to understanding and interpretation over thought and knowledge. Such a move has conditionally disabled the essentially different priorities of traditional metaphysics and its epistemology; perhaps even turned them upside down into their opposites. Along with this change of epistemological priorities, a change in attitude took place simultaneously with regard to the traditional validity claims of the principles of 'essence', 'justification', and 'definition'. Thought, for traditional metaphysics, was directed toward the determinate goal of knowledge of essences, of adequate justification and conclusive definitions. In contrast, understanding and interpretation cannot be said without qualification to be built on a universally binding and definitive ideal of knowledge. Of course, every attempt at understanding and communication has its provisional, immanent goal that regulates it in this instance. And such an attempt must satisfy certain criteria and conditions if it is finally to be recognized as a successful, as a sufficient, and as an ultimately true understanding. Nevertheless in such a process of understanding it always remains at first an open issue to what extent these criteria and conditions are valid only in this and not other processes, and to what extent they can claim beyond this a general or even an absolutely general binding validity. In any case, these criteria and conditions do not without qualification simply correspond to those of an essential, basic, and definitive knowledge of truth. Rather, it appears that much understanding can reach its goal even without any insight into essence or without adequate self-justification. But this does not mean that the principles of true knowledge can be fundamentally divorced from the processes of understanding and interpretation.

If philosophical hermeneutics grants an absolute priority to understanding and interpretation over thinking and knowledge, then it seems that it is in a position to claim that an unmistakable freedom has accrued to the first-mentioned epistemological procedures in their relation to the principles of thinking and knowledge, that is, to essences, justifications, and definitions. Thus it can be that these principles never come directly into view in the attempt to understand. But it can also be the case that this attempt to understand directs itself specifically and consciously toward a pre-given essence, toward a given justification or definition, as its determinate object and content. On the other hand, a specific understanding can present itself in the form of an essential insight, a specific justification or definition. And neither can we rule out the possibility that understanding, regardless of the difference between form and content, will orient itself at least indirectly by those principles, at least unconsciously and in an unfathomable (abgründige) manner.

But is understanding's relative independence of the principles of thought and knowledge sufficient to justify the priority of understanding over thought and knowledge? Have we thereby found sufficient means to differentiate one of these epistemological attitudes (Verhalten) from the other? The position of hermeneutical philosophy with respect to the principles of 'essence', 'justification', and 'definition' is, as it is with respect to any principles, fraught with a many sided ambiguity. Thus it remains entirely open whether or not and to what extent these principles play a specific role in the event of understanding and interpretation. Moreover, this ambiguity, which in general characterizes the hermeneutical use of principles, does not disappear even if we presuppose that philosophical hermeneutics allows these principles at least a certain limited meaning in the processes of understanding. Also in the case of the principles of 'essence', 'justification', and 'definition', one can clearly distinguish conceptually what neither hermeneutical praxis nor its ontological self-justification sufficiently distinguishes, namely the general conditions of the possible validity of principles, so-called weak principles, and the pragmatic use of principles.

What is 'weak' in such principles is not to be confused with the mere insufficiency of their conceptual and functional determination. 'Weak' also implies even here a particular form of indeterminancy and ignorance. We must differentiate a weak essence from a definition of an essence that is obviously insufficient, just as we must distinguish a weak reason from an insufficient justification, and a weak definition from an inadequate definition. A weak essence is, furthermore, not to be confused with a concept of essence, such as we find in nominalism, where essence is seen as a subjective-linguistic posit (Setzung) without objectively real content. Rather in this context we take a weak essence to be an essential unity of coherent phenomena and essential determinations of a subject matter (Sache), which, despite the obvious unity of this evidence, does not allow itself to be known on this basis, whether because, as an essential unity of this questionable subject matter, it does not have sufficient state of stable determination (hinreichenden Bestand) or whether because it points beyond its unity to a primordial unity of determinations, even if this turns out to be a hidden essential ground of the matter at issue. Analogous determinations of weakness, as opposed to mere inadequacy, obtain for justification and definitions.

Weak principles, as we have denoted them here, can also be characterized as aporetic principles. This aporetic character determines the indeterminate and unknowable nature of weak principles. Inasmuch as the hermeneutical use of these principles leaves open to what extent they do or do not fulfill their function, it also leaves undecided the direction in which thinking led by these principles takes understanding. We cannot decide whether it is in a direction of growing insight into essence or in increasing distance from such; whether it is in the direction of an always adequate justification or in the opposite direction; whether it is in the direction of a conclusive definition or back to a conceptual tentativeness.

4

This presentation of the many-sided ontological-logical ambiguity of hermeneutical philosophy in its use of principles is not an end in itself. More than anything else it should help us gain a critical perspective on the problems of Heidegger's thinking of Being, his intentional obscurities, and his hermeneutical ambiguities. Before all else, the consideration of the hermeneutical ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) of this thinking of Being, mirrored in the manifold of ontological ambiguities (Vieldeutigkeit) of Gadamerian hermeneutics, should make clear how the strenuous attempt of that thinking to think the unthought in traditional metaphysics unavoidably calls forth of itself its own thought. As we have said, Heidegger's hermeneutical ambiguity has its own strengths and weaknesses as

does Gadamer's manifold of ontological ambiguities. A comparison of both promotes, at first, that which is common or at least the appearance of a fundamental commonality. This is the thought of the absolute priority of Being, of Being over thinking and knowledge, over consciousness and human existence. In light of this absolute priority of Being one is tempted to speak of the highest ontological principle of hermeneutics and the thinking of Being under which all other ontological and logical principles, from whatever source, are subsumed. This highest ontological principle presents itself under many names and in many forms, sometimes under its own name, sometimes as the principle of finitude and limitation, sometimes as the principle of substantiality and existence. However these principles are related to the highest principle, however they represent it, in any case certain priorities are posited. Priority is given to finitude over infinitude, to the conditioned over the absolute, to thing-like substantiality over self-conscious subjectivity, to the concrete, individual existence over the abstract and general essence.

It was not without reason that Gadamer stressed the internal consistency and unity of this thought with the much discussed 'Kehre' in Heidegger's thinking of Being, which occurred after Sein und Zeit. He maintained that it was not first after the 'Kehre' but already in his magnum opus that Heidegger placed the absolute priority on the question of Being before all other questions of metaphysical thought. In this interpretation, Gadamer shows where despite the difference in their questions, he sees the essential common element of his hermeneutical thought with Heidegger's thinking of Being, that is, in the recognition of the absolute priority of Being as the highest ontological principle. From such a vantage point the 'Kehre' seems to be the essential common concern of their thought. The 'Kehre' is first of all and primarily a turn in opposition to that turn of thought that Kant termed 'Copernican' and took as a general characteristic of his newly founded critical transcendental philosophy. Kant's 'revolution' was also in a certain sense a turn, namely a reversal of the traditional priority of Being over knowledge in favor of the opposite absolute priority of thought, of the knowledge of objects, of the conscious knowing subject over Being. In light of Kant's Copernican revolution, the turn of both hermeneutical thinking and the thinking of Being appears as a 'return' to the original thought of Being before that turn, as a 'step back'.

But doesn't this commonality of a turn (Kehre) of thinking, of a step back in hermeneutical thinking and in thinking of Being, hide an essential difference? What is to say that this step back takes a different direction in each case; in one case back to the dialectical ontology of Plato and in the other case still farther back to the beginnings of Greek ontological thought in the Presocratics? Isn't this different direction of the 'step back', that is, the different region that is reached by each 'step back', an indication perhaps of the significance of the difference between the many-sided ontological ambiguity of hermeneutics and the hermeneutical ambiguity of the thinking of Being?

This question is directly related to another: Have we adequately understood the meaning of this 'turn' (*Kehre*) of thought, of this 'step back' in general? Is not the interpretation addressed above at the very least misleading? Is not the observed proximity addressed above at the very least misleading? Is not the observed proximity of Gadamer's hermeneutics to the philosophy and cultural anthropology of late neo-Kantianism not the only thing that speaks against this interpretation? Does not Heidegger's high regard for Kant's thesis that 'being is not a predicate', a thesis that he brought into express proximity to his own thought, just as much argue against this interpretation? In fact, both Heidegger and Gadamer have essentially promoted this misleading interpretation. And it is just this interpretation that has produced the no less misleading impression of a kinship with other very influential tendencies of thought in our time. Hence, in Marxism, economic 'Being' is given priority over the political and cultural 'Being' of human beings. Thereby an absolute priority of Being over thought, of objectivity over subjectivity is claimed. In a similar manner, psychoanalysis – as metapsychology and therapeutic practice – makes use of this absolute principle of Being in that conscious knowledge gives place to the conditioned priority of the unconscious being of the modern psyche. Existentialism and structuralism also belong among those theories that give precedence to Being absolutely and to absolute Being over knowledge: the first in the form of the priority of concrete existence over abstract essence; the second in the form of the priority of structural over subjective Being. It is this elementary use of the absolute foundational principle of Being that gives the appearance of a real commonality between these highly divergent and different theoretical frames and thus has enabled their incidental syntheses. But is the use of this fundamental ontological principle in such an elementary way really meaningful? Is the use of this principle in any way sufficiently defined in order to speak of a theoretical foundation thanks to its employment? It seems that the employment of such a principle draws its alleged meaning from the completely meaningful task of correcting the widespread self-overvaluation of human consciousness and thereby of counteracting the genesis of a false consciousness of the theoretical and practical capabilities of human beings. But is this fundamental principle useful at all for such a task? Are not maxims of reason much more effective in promoting theoretical and practical insight in the life practices of human beings than an abstract conceptual formula? In fact, this absolute principle of Being finds its application as a critical court of appeal over philosophical theories that overestimate human consciousness, which appear to aid and abet the human spirit, such as, in particular, the

philosophical theories of transcendental and speculative idealism. But is this critical use against traditional theories any better justified? Is it any more effective in its critical intent? Is it true at all that philosophical idealism necessarily fosters the overestimation of the human spirit against the power of nature? Or does this interpretation hold only for a certain reductive reading of idealism? Does not idealism after all make something clear to humans other than their own essential determination?

This positing of a highest and absolute foundational principle is in no way sufficient to render powerless an ontology as whole and this even to a lesser extent if, as in the case of idealism, this principle is integrated into its opposed position in a determinate way. For in this idealism, the priority of Being over thought is not a meaningless idea. Rather, it is conceived in connection with the opposed priority and this in a carefully differentiated and methodically harmonized manner. The theoretical foundational relation of nature and spirit rests here on a general ontological foundation whose individual ontological priorities are ordered according to the priorities of Being, of time, and of knowledge - for us and in and for themselves.

There are many deficiencies observable in the use of this ontological foundational principle in the postidealistic and antiidealistic movements of the recent and most recent past. Such a deficiency lies already in the isolating and absolutizing of a single foundational principle. For the positing of the absolute priority of Being yields in general no ontological principle, but instead only a quite general concept of such a principle, without any content and without any guidance in how to obtain such a content. Instead, the unmethodical use of this absolute principle of Being fosters the resuscitation of those old metaphysical errors that Kant set out to definitively defeat in his critique of reason and its 'Copernican revolution'. These are the old metaphysical errors of confusing principles and categories that now present themselves again in different forms and contents. Such confusions are, as always, the confusion between form and content, of possibility and actuality, and ultimately all the confusions that are possible between the abstract and the concrete.

A further deficiency in the use of this absolute foundational principle arises from the consistency of its isolation. In its absolute autonomy, in its isolated use without those complementary principles, which give this use a determinate meaning in the first place, we see the general loss of the validity of this principle that we have denoted as the principle of mediation, that is, the systematic ordering of beings according to wellordered priorities. In place of the methodically interconnected context of things, worked out according to well-differentiated priorities of Being, time, and knowledge - priorities on the one hand for us and on the other hand in and for themselves - we find, henceforth, individual contingent positings of this or that absolute priority. And this methodical foundational principle of traditional ontology appears only in a reduced form, be it as the difference between the priorities time and knowledge or of Being and time. The widespread and widely recognized talk of the decline of the great systems of modern philosophy in the course of the nineteenth century signifies by no means only that the universal ontological foundation dissolves and that its corresponding conceptual vocabulary loses its general binding force, but it also signifies that philosophy suffers the loss of a universally recognized method. In place of this loss we find isolated and occasional use of this or that principle and as a consequence of these uses, ambiguities, and confusions about principles.

Heidegger's thinking of Being and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics have, more or less, consciously placed themselves squarely within this effective context of this recent and most recent history of metaphysics. To this extent, the hermeneutical ambiguity of Heidegger and the ontological ambiguities of Gadamer are reflections of this effective context. Being and Time is not only the title of Heidegger's magnum opus, it is also a key for understanding this effective context that emphasizes the loss of validity of that methodical foundational principle of traditional ontology: 'Being and time' and not 'Being and time and knowledge in relation to us and in and for itself'.

The hermeneutical ambiguity of Heidegger's thinking of Being corresponds to the paradoxical situation in which an ontological principle as a foundational principle is opposed to a degenerate (verfallenden) ontology. It is paradoxical because such degeneration requires no counterforce and because that which is valid cannot be disarmed through an isolated and contingent principle. But the many-sided ontological ambiguity of hermeneutics also corresponds in its own way to the effective-historical context in which it stands. It is not difficult to recognize in the manifold of ambiguities of the ontological self-grounding of this thought, the ambiguity of its use of ontological and logical principles in the abovenamed movements of the past and present century, which, like hermeneutics, rest on the foundational principles of Being.

But have we adequately understood Heidegger's hermeneutical ambiguity and Gadamer's ontological ambiguity in taking them as reflections of an effective history? What is the specific difference between these reflections?

Heidegger has attempted to think the hermeneutical ambiguity that he discovered as the destiny of metaphysics; not simply its most recent destiny, but rather its ancient destiny implicit from its inception. Yet hasn't he simply repeated in another form Nietzsche's thought that the destiny of European metaphysics, and with it the destiny of European culture, is nihilism? Is the hermeneutical ambiguity in the end only another expression for the completely primordial skepticism, for an unfathomable (abgründig) nihilism? Without a doubt, Heidegger had

other intentions. It was not by chance that he characterized Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. He did so to avoid having to characterize himself as the last. His thinking of Being aims to go beyond nihilism in that he conceives this to be the most conclusive form of metaphysics; namely, as the ultimate consequence of the attempt of thought to gain a sufficient ground. For this reason his thinking of Being seeks no sufficient grounding. Rather, it intends to think the essence of a sufficient ground in order to think beyond this essence. But does this thinking succeed in getting beyond the thinking of this unfathomable nothing (abgründigen Nichts)? Can it think beyond nihilism? Does it enable us to think our way around nihilism? Didn't Nietzsche himself run aground precisely on this problem? Hermeneutical ambiguity corresponds to fundamental, ontological, hermeneutical truth. This is more primordial than the truth of metaphysics, which in the end turns out to be only the result of a successful thought process, a successful act of knowing that brings to light nihilism. This hidden and late-emerging nihilism in the truth of metaphysics is not, however, the unthought-of metaphysics. Were it so, it could not appear as the ultimate consequence of metaphysics. Hermeneutical truth intends to open a place for the secret, for the unthought, for the ineffable on the other side of the effable nothing of nihilism. But is the unthought really thought in this thinking of truth, in the thoughtful preservation of its countertrait of 'disclosedness'?

Gadamer's historical hermeneutics has integrated this fundamental ontological and hermeneutical concept of truth into his own hermeneutical thought and displaced it into its own conceptual space of ontological and logical ambiguities. Truth, in Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy, is as ambiguous as the ontology and the hermeneutical use of ontological and logical principles. Hermeneutical truth contains something of that idea of a critique that limits human knowledge to that which is humanly possible. But, on the other hand, we cannot fail to overhear an emphatic augmentation of our experience found in the completed fullness of inexhaustible being, which is experienced in the essence of the work of art. Lastly, we should not fail to recognize a sobering significance of a truth that appears in connection with the many ambiguities, in that it exhorts us to the idea of univocal and complete determination. All these descendants of the hermeneutical concept of truth have a great deal in common with the concept of truth in traditional metaphysics.

In comparison to all these many ambiguities, the strength of Heidegger's thinking of Being lies in 'the univocity of hermeneutical ambiguity'. But is this ambiguity really so 'univocal' as it appears? In fact, it only superficially conceals all those ontological ambiguities previously developed. Every one of their possible meanings can be considered in light of hermeneutical truth. A particular affinity appears to exist between 'weak' ontologies and weak principles on the one hand and hermeneutical truth on the other. But in order to think the unthought-of metaphysics, Heidegger's thinking of Being attempts to avoid ontological thinking. He attempts to avoid the use of ontological and logical principles by thinking these principles in light of hermeneutical truth, that is, in terms of their own hermeneutical ambiguity. In this respect, thinking of Being is fundamentally different from hermeneutics, which, with all of its many-sided ambiguities, remains within the ontological, logical realm of principles and possible justification. In contrast, Heidegger attempts to avoid the many ontological and logical ambiguities of traditional metaphysics and its effective history in order to be able to think the unthought. In this manner he shows, whether intentionally or unintentionally, not the unthought-of metaphysics but rather the unthought of his own thinking of Being.

Translated by Brice R. Wachterhauser

Note

1 Wiehl is obviously playing here on the difference between zwei (two) and viel (many). Both Zweideutigkeit and Vieldeutigkeit can be translated as 'ambiguity'. The latter, however, suggests in this context a more complex, many-sided ambiguity. – Trans.

Being as appropriation

Otto Pöggeler

Part one

Being and Time

Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, takes up Plato's question of what the expression 'being' (seiend) actually means. In fact, he sees himself forced, first of all, to reawaken an understanding of the question of the meaning of Being (SZ 1¹). This question must be understood if one is to inquire after the Being of beings and the modes in which Being becomes materialized in other than a naive and short-sighted manner. 'And precisely the ontological task of a nondeductive, constructive genealogy of the various possible modes of Being requires a preunderstanding of that which we actually mean by this expression: "Being" '(SZ 11). The question of Being (die Seinsfrage) is not the 'concern of a free-floating speculation on the most general generalities', but rather, is both the most fundamental question and the most concrete. If ontological research does not wish to remain suspended without a foundation, it must presuppose a clarification of this basic question (SZ 8ff.).

While the question of the meaning of Being still occupied a central position in the investigations of Plato and Aristotle, it was later forgotten. Being is held to be the most general and most empty concept and thus, an undefinable but yet self-evident concept. 'Thus, that which, as something hidden, drove the philosophizing of the ancients to, and kept in, restless activity thereby achieved a crystal-clear self-evidence, such that whoever now asks about it (i.e., die Seinsfrage) is charged with a methodological error' (SZ 2). How did this come about?

Metaphysics asks: what is Being? It inquires after the Being of beings. It orients itself toward the beings which it finds in the 'world' and can thus represent them. Metaphysical thinking is, from the very beginning, representational (vorstellendes) thinking. It therefore has the temporal

structure of a pure making-something-present. Beings, understood as that which actually is, are interpreted in terms of presence, 'i.e. they are conceived as presence $(o\mathring{v}o\mathring{u}a)$ ' (SZ 26).

If the Being of beings is grasped as presence, it is understood with respect to a specific mode of time, the present (SZ 25). Metaphysics, however, does not further pursue the problem hidden in the fact that Being as presence is always already understood within the horizon of time. Metaphysics does not inquire after Being as such, but rather, forgets and disguises the whole question of Being. Even though Being, as presence, is, in a still hidden manner, thought in the light of time, ontology from its earliest beginnings seems to focus all its efforts on the attempt to keep the primordial characteristics of time out of consideration. Ontology supersedes time or levels it off to static time, i.e., eternity. The meaning of Being is then determined on the basis of this 'frozen' time, but in such a way that this meaning is never considered by itself. Thus, the Being-question as the question of the meaning of Being itself never really becomes a problem. When Heidegger inquires after Being and time, he raises the question of Being itself. The delineation of the meaning of Being is no longer to be merely presupposed, but must be thought through in itself. In contrast to this, when Being in metaphysics is understood as presence, the temporal moment remains simply in the present and thus the meaning of Being remains that which is always left unthought.

With the question concerning Being and time, Heidegger addresses to metaphysics the decisive question: Is it possible or not to go behind the presupposed understanding of Being? Have metaphysics and its central discipline, the doctrine of Being, i.e., ontology, even got to their own ground if they presuppose that Being must be grasped as presence? If the answer is no, how is time to be thought of within a 'fundamental ontological' investigation, if presence itself is to be thought of from the horizon of time? How is time, within whose horizon the meaning of Being is delineated, to be thought? When Heidegger speaks of Being and time, time does not mean something which stands alongside Being, which perhaps must be superseded if Being itself is to be expressed. Being and time are rather so intertwined that one can be understood on the basis of the other. Neither does time mean that time alongside of which space is situated, but rather, that primordial movement to which even space belongs, a movement which, as Being itself, releases beings from out of itself. That time which is meant in the title of Being and Time cannot be understood on the basis of traditional metaphysical thinking at all. Time has a fundamental ontological function in metaphysics, to be sure, since Being is understood, in a hidden manner, as presence from a temporal horizon. Yet, metaphysics obtains no knowledge or understanding of this ontological function, and has no insight into the ground of the possibility of this function. 'On the contrary: Time itself is taken as a being among other beings, and the attempt is made to grasp time in its Being-structure within the horizon of that inexpressibly naive understanding of Being which is itself oriented toward time' (SZ 26). What time is, is read off from those beings which are themselves in time. In this manner, time itself is naturally not thought of in its Being.

Since Heidegger inquires after Being and time, he must show, in contrast to that manner in which the concept of time plays a role in traditional ontology, 'that and how the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, provided it be correctly viewed and correctly made explicit'. He must critically detach himself from the traditional concept of time 'which has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson, and even later' (SZ 18). Proceeding from the problematic of temporality, Heidegger raises Western metaphysics anew as something concerning which a decision must be made. The second part of Being and Time, which was planned but never published, was to have given the 'principle characteristics of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology on the basis of the problematic of temporality'. Heidegger had wanted to go back beyond Kant and Descartes to Aristotle, whose treatise on time was to have been treated as 'a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology' (SZ 39ff.).

How can the problematic of 'Being and time' - that which is left unthought by metaphysics – be taken up? How can time be primordially intertwined with Being? Being is always the Being of beings and for this reason, the formulation of the question of Being and Time can be found via an explanation which interprets beings with respect to time. If Being is to be thought as fundamentally interconnected with time, then time must show itself when the Being of beings is questioned. Among the beings in question, one being assumes a privileged position: Dasein. By Dasein, Heidegger understands man as the 'there', i.e., as the place of the disclosure of Being. It is Dasein which raises the question of Being. Therefore, Dasein which raises the question, must be disclosed in its Being if the question of Being itself is to become transparent. Dasein can ask about Being because it is distinct from other beings in that, in its Being, Dasein is concerned about this very Being. Since the essence of Dasein lies in 'ek-sistence', in its being-able-to-be (Sein-können), understanding Being is a characteristic of the Being of Dasein. Thus, Dasein has not only an ontic priority - as being among beings - but also an ontological priority: Dasein is in itself ontological: it has an understanding of Being. This does not mean, to be sure, that Dasein immediately develops an ontology as a questioning after Being which is simply transparent to itself. Dasein's being-ontological is at first merely a preontological, unclear, and unconceptualized understanding of Being.

However, Dasein not only understands itself in its Being, but also the Being of beings which are unlike Dasein. The soul of man, as metaphysical tradition says, is in a certain sense everything that is. Thus, Dasein becomes the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of all ontologies (SZ 11ff.).

Dasein, as a privileged being, must first of all be explained in its Being, if ontology, the science of Being, is once more to be raised as a problem, and if access is to be gained to the question of Being and time. The Being of Dasein must show itself as primordial temporality in order that on the basis of the temporality of Dasein, that time, in whose light the meaning of Being comes to be determined, can be thought. That is why Heidegger, during the summer semester of 1923, entitles a lecture course Ontology or Hermeneutics of Facticity, and the analytic of Dasein becomes for him the way to determine the meaning of Being. Heidegger forces into harmony here the metaphysical tradition, which thinks Being in a hidden manner in the light of time, and a nonmetaphysical and antimetaphysical tradition, which brings the temporality and historicity of man's factical ek-sistence into view. Or more precisely, Heidegger's thinking proceeds from that utmost tension which is indicated by the titles Ontology or Hermeneutics of Facticity and Being and Time. Since one was unable to relive the tension of this course of thought in the way that Heidegger did, his thinking was misunderstood on the one hand as a traditional, static ontology, and on the other hand as a historicism radicalized into an existentialism.

Since Heidegger poses the question of Being on the basis of man's understanding of Being, he, in a certain sense, led to transcendental philosophy. Husserl had radicalized phenomenology into a doctrine of transcendental constitution, and Heidegger places himself in the context of this school of thought. Husserl had attempted to open up for philosophical investigation that region of primordial origins in which the constitution of every being occurs. Being and Time is dedicated to Husserl: Heidegger takes over Husserl's orientation toward questions of origin, and in his analytic of Dasein inquires after the mode of Being of that transcendental ego which carries out the constitution of beings (des Seienden). He grants Dilthey, as well as Husserl and Scheler that they, indeed, no longer grasp the person as something 'thing-like', or as a substantial entity. And yet, Heidegger says, the actual mode of Being of the person has not yet been made properly clear and has always been covered up time and again by the traditional anthropological determinations (SZ 46ff.). Such determinations remain oriented within the traditional and inadequate conception of Being, even then and precisely then, when the person is no longer 'reified' as a mere thing and is determined directly through 'nothingness'. The question of the mode of Being of that being 'in which "world" becomes constituted, is, as Heidegger wrote to Husserl, the central problem of Being and Time. 'It must be shown that the mode of Being characteristic of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other beings, and that precisely this mode of Being, such as it is, contains the possibility of transcendental constitution.' Heidegger's transcendental ego, however, is not the cogito of Descartes and not the pure consciousness of Husserl. Rather, it is 'ek-sistence' taken as the essence of Dasein and characterized by Being-in-the-world, care, finitude, temporality, and historicity. 'Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the ek-sistence of the factical Self. . . . '2

In the cogito sum, the mode of Being of the sum must again become problematic, if the meaning of Being is to be successfully determined as no longer oriented toward 'thing' and 'substance'. On the other hand, the mode of Being of the sum cannot be properly determined without a deepened determination of the meaning of Being. On the one hand Heidegger's 'ontology' must not be understood on the basis of the pre-Kantian ontology, which was oriented toward things, but from the critical, transcendental-philosophical point of departure; on the other hand, Heidegger's transcendental philosophy is oriented from the very beginning toward that Being which supersedes beings to such an extent that it is 'transcendence per se'. Heidegger thus uses the term 'transcendental philosophy' not only in Kant's sense, but also in the sense of the scholastic doctrine of transcendentals (SZ 38). In his Kant book (1929), he treats Kant's transcendental philosophy as metaphysics, i.e., ontology. He attempts to show, in the same sense in which he formulated the problematic of Being and Time, that the foundation of transcendental philosophy collapses and the abyss of metaphysics becomes revealed when the I think of the transcendental ego is seen in its primordial relationship to time. Thus, that which was left unthought by metaphysics is now finally allowed expression.

The fundamental ontology of Being and Time is concerned with that which metaphysics has left unthought and thus, with the ground (Grund) and the abyss (Abgrund) of all metaphysics and ontology. The structure of the first part of this work is determined by the attempt to tear thought away from its orientation toward things and to lead it back to its ownmost self and its temporality so that, through the clarification of transcendental constitution, it becomes possible to give a determination of the meaning of Being. In the first part, the basic structures of Dasein are outlined. Here it becomes clear also, why traditional and, in particular, our everyday thinking is oriented toward things that are present-at-hand. The second chapter shows that ek-sistence, in its essence, is temporal and historical, and thus makes transcendental constitution possible. In the third section, which was not published then, the temporality of Dasein, as that being which understands Being, was to have been treated as the transcendental horizon of the question of Being, so that within this

horizon, the determination of the meaning of Being which was the main issue of these investigations would have been made possible, and thus ontology would have been brought back to its ground, i.e., its foundation, which had been up to that point left unthought.

Since thought is placed in a primordial relationship to temporality and historicity, this investigation can reach a ground only there, where it always already is, i.e., in history. Since there can be no radically new beginning on the basis of 'the things themselves' (as Husserl had required), Heidegger himself introduces the destruction of metaphysics, the return to the primordially historical, into phenomenology. There can be no systematic presentation apart from such a destruction. Therefore, Heidegger adds to the first, more systematic section of *Being and Time* a second, more historical section. Yet, the basic issue here is not the juxtaposition of the two sections, but rather their interdependence. The first section is permeated with 'historical' references; the second is concerned with a 'systematic' task.

I would like to attempt to establish the point of departure of Being and Time somewhat more precisely by means of a few more references to the published portion. The first section of this work gives a 'preliminary analysis of the fundamental characteristics of Dasein'. The fundamental structure of Dasein is described as Being-in-the-world. This structure is then examined according to its various moments, and finally grasped in its unity as care. Dasein is not to be thought of as a worldless subject, from which (at least since Descartes) the attempt had to be made repeatedly to bridge the gap between it and the 'world'. Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is always already alongside of things. While Husserl's constitutive phenomenology attempted to clear the way to an absolute, all-constituting ego, Heidegger posits, as the essence of man, the 'there' of that Being which makes human being possible in such a manner that it always already places man in the totality of beings, as oriented toward things. Phenomenological constitution is made possible by means of a Being which is not at our disposal. Thus, phenomenology becomes ontology for Heidegger. Ontology no longer furnishes merely the guidelines for phenomenological constitution, and no longer merely precedes phenomenology, as in Husserl. Phenomenology rather refers to the method, whereas ontology designates the content of one and the same enterprise.

The tendency of metaphysics to trace everything back to an ultimate ground is once more realized in Husserl. In the modern era, this ground has been found in an unconditioned subjectivity. Heidegger breaks this 'will' toward an unconditioned subjectivity. Being, which is not at our disposal, places man into the totality of all beings, but in such a way that man comports himself to beings as beings, and thus is the clearing, the 'there' of Being. The fact that Being is not at our disposal holds

sway over man as his 'dispositionality' (Befindlichkeit). This reveals the fact that man finds himself (sich befindet) within the totality of all beings. This 'dispositionality' also opens up access to nature thought of in a primordial manner or, as Heidegger later says, the 'earth'. The Self is understanding determined by mood, and not pure consciousness. The point of departure from pure consciousness stems from an unsurmounted Cartesian dualism; it cannot be completed by a consideration of man's 'bodiliness' since man is neither body and soul, nor mind as a synthesis of both, but rather the factical Self. 'The one-sided observations of somatology and pure psychology', observes Heidegger with regard to Husserl,³ 'are possible only by reason of the concrete whole of man which, as such, initially determines his mode of Being.' Heidegger is concerned with the concrete wholeness of man when he determines Dasein as factical ek-sistence, as the unity of thrownness and project, or of moodedness and understanding. Dasein is just as little a worldless 'I' or a pure consciousness as it is an isolated individual. Rather, it is always already with others, and even arises primarily in the 'Anyone' (das Man).

Dasein is, however, not alongside of things and with other people in the sense that it conceives of them in a purely theoretical attitude as abstract entities, merely present-at-hand. Rather, everything is bound to a 'for-the-sake-of-which' made possible by Dasein's being-able-to-Be. Thus, things are not primarily presented in the temporal mode of presence characteristic of what is present-at-hand, but enter into a more primordially thought temporal design (Zeitspielraum). Being is no longer revealed by the *intuitus*, which is oriented toward seeing and directed toward the being-present of what is present-at-hand, nor even by Husserl's intentio, but by care. The intentional relationship becomes rooted in that achievement of Dasein which is concerned with the 'meaningfulness' of things, and which thus is always factical. That which is in the world is, philosophically, not first discovered in its pure potentialities, in order afterwards to receive back its factical being in a colorless and totally empty realization. Rather, facticity - which is irreducibly unique and historical, and thus cannot be converted into an idea - has already entered into the world. Heidegger's historical conception of world is oriented toward the New Testament, toward Augustine and Dilthey, but not toward the Greek conception of the cosmos. Heidegger accuses the ontological tradition (which originated from Greek thought) of having passed over the phenomenon of the world - and explicitly in Parmenides - even at its very beginning and of continuing to pass it by (BT 100). In place of the unrecognized world-phenomenon, a distinct region of eternal entities arose. For this reason, 'even the relationship to the world, in the sense of a distinct comportment to this being, was interpreted as $\nu o \epsilon (\nu)$, as intuitus, as no-longer mediated perception or reason'. Heidegger wishes to turn this tradition of thought back to a more primordial experience when, in *Being and Time*, he begins with a clarification of the structure of Being-in-the-world.

The analysis of Dasein, furthermore, lets one grasp why the traditional understanding of Being is governed by an inadequate ontology of what is present-at-hand (SZ 130) and a logic (SZ 129) that is grounded therein. Because Dasein is Being-in-the-world, it is 'proximally and for the most part fascinated by its world' (SZ 113). In this manner, Dasein does not take the world as such into view. Because it is a characteristic of Dasein that it is thrown in among beings it remains, as long as it is, 'being thrown'. It is cast into the swirl of that inauthentic understanding of Being which arises from having fallen prey to beings. The constant danger of fallenness belongs to Dasein, which as Being-in-the-world is 'in itself tempting' (SZ 177). As Being-in-the-world, Dasein not only falls prey to beings, but even understands itself on the basis of thinglike beings; it lifts these beings out of their movement and the ever-changing relationship to itself; it assures itself of them by going beyond things which are present and merely present-at-hand, to something eternally present and always present-at-hand. When Heidegger speaks of presence-at-hand, he does not wish to discuss primarily the question of the reality or the 'independence from consciousness' of things, but rather, to point out that sudden changeover by which the original relationship to things becomes a mere seeing of something merely present-at-hand. This changeover is not only factically present in our knowledge; it is the ideal of our traditional conception of knowledge. 'The idea of the intuitus has guided all interpretations of knowledge from the beginnings of Greek ontology until today, whether or not that intuitus can be factically reached' (SZ 358). Thus, since Descartes, mathematical thinking has been given a priority, because thinking was always oriented toward the eternally present. Mathematics, however, is concerned with that which is always present, always remains, and outlasts all change. And it is precisely mathematics which reveals the all-leveling changeover from our primordial relationship to things to a mere 'presence-at-hand' in its final radicality (SZ 96).

It is precisely because Heidegger retrieves ek-sistence from fallenness that he can primordially unveil the temporality of ek-sistence. The second section of *Being and Time* shows that the 'essence', i.e., the ontological meaning, of Dasein lies in temporality, and that care as the articulated structural totality of the Being of Dasein is to be understood in terms of temporality. The result is a deeper understanding of the fact that Dasein is tempted to fall a prey to being, and thereby to become inauthentic. Inauthentic thought and behavior are oriented toward that which is in time, and in this manner are set in opposition to authentic thinking and behavior, which grasp themselves as the temporalization of time. The determination of Dasein in terms of temporality expresses a decision in regard to the metaphysical concept of time. This conception of time

ultimately remains oriented toward that which is in time, and thus fails to grasp primordial temporality, the temporalization of time itself. Primordial temporality is historicity. Still, the temporality of the 'common' conception of time; which is oriented toward what is in time, is equiprimordial with historicity and is, in a sense, thereby justified (SZ 377). Dasein, as the temporalization of time and thus as transcendental constitution, is only historical and world-founding insofar as it (as factical ek-sistence) is already in the world alongside beings that are in time. Everydayness and inauthenticity cannot simply, once and for all, be left behind. Dasein can only be authentic when it continually tears itself away from inauthenticity, which thus is always already presupposed.

The unfolding of the temporality of Dasein into the equiprimordial structures of historicity and inner-temporalizing shows the ontological direction of the analysis of Dasein, whose goal it is to reveal temporality as the horizon of the understanding of Being, and to gain a victory over the metaphysical undertanding of Being. Yet even the analyses of the second section, such as those of death and conscience, which at first seem to be solely an ek-sistential appeal, serve primarily an ontological purpose, provided they are properly understood. They sharpen the insight that Dasein, as factical ek-sistence, is temporality rooted in moodedness or thrown project (geworfener Entwurf). As understanding or as being-able-to-Be, Dasein is possibility, but it is authentically this possibility only when it constantly anticipates the utmost unsurpassable possibility. This utmost possibility is death. To die - 'i.e., to feel death as present (Luther)' - deepens that possibility which Dasein is, to the utmost possibility which is boundless impossibility, namely, the impossibility of each and every mode of ek-sisting as a determinate being-able-to-be. That possibility which Dasein, as being-able-to-be, is springs from an ultimate impossibility of anticipating this utmost possibility as an anticipation of an ultimate impossibility, in that it gives Dasein to understand that it is 'guilty'.

Being guilty does not mean here the incurring of moral guilt but, quite formally, 'being the ground of a negativity'. With regard to its first aspect, this negativity arises from the fact that Dasein has not laid its own foundation, which is its thrownness, but must nevertheless accept this thrownness. Through the acceptance of this thrownness, Dasein must itself become this foundation, which yet is not Dasein itself but which Dasein must rather always first let be given to itself. It 'has been released from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as this basis' (BT 284f.). When Dasein, as the understanding of Being, resolutely brings itself before Being, the access to Being shows itself as determined by a 'not'. Dasein is powerless before Being. Dasein is always already in debt to Being because Being proves itself to be the condition for the

fact that Dasein is. This having-to-go-into-debt of Dasein appears in Heidegger's later works in a new fashion, as thinking is brought into a relatedness with thanks and thanksgiving. In *Being and Time* the concept of guilt does not, therefore, accentuate a 'dark aspect' of Dasein, but is much more part of the attempt to find an ultimate foundation for thinking, as was attempted by Schelling in a similar, though metaphysically speculative, fashion. Schelling, after his *Investigations concerning the Essence of Human Freedom* thought he could go beyond Hegel's metaphysics by means of a more deeply laid foundation for metaphysics.

Yet, being-guilty as the basis of negativity still has a second aspect, and Heidegger's analysis derives this aspect, too, from that type of thinking which the late Schelling attempted to develop under the heading of 'positive philosophy'. Dasein is not nugatory merely as a result of its concrete project insofar as this project is a distinct choice, which may choose one thing only while, at the same time, having to give up something else. Thrownness has always already marked off a region of possible choices. Dasein discovers its factical possibilities in resoluteness, and thereby its Being-in-position as a Being-in-a-position, i.e., as situation. Resolute ek-sistence is certain of its own truth only insofar as it takes note of the 'situational' character of this truth. Ek-sistence should not become frozen in one determinate situation, but must leave itself free for a possible taking-back or a resolute repetition. The truth, in which ek-sistence stands, is thus always 'located'. Its light streams into the openness of a 'there', which is distinguished by a situation, and therefore also by temporality and historicity. Being gives itself only into a bounded openness, and is to this extent characterized by a 'not' (Nicht). This imitation cannot be overcome by a speculative metaphysics of history.

The ontological aim of Being and Time is obvious throughout. This goal leaps into view if one casts only a first, superficial glance (and this, of course, without some sort of self-induced blindness) at the basic concepts, inasmuch as they are characteristic of Heidegger on the one hand, and of the metaphysical tradition on the other. In Heidegger, a radical isolation takes place which leads to an always factical ek-sistence. (This eksistence need not be a single individual, but may also be a community.) Within the metaphysical tradition, on the other hand, facticity is seen as mere realization. The irreplaceability of each Dasein does not come into view, and the situation, as historical localization, is left unconsidered. Metaphysics does not orient itself toward the openness of the future as a tensely drawn possibility, which arises out of an utmost impossibility, but rather toward 'reality', which then is transcended toward a compelling, eternal necessity. If no eternal soul substance can be found in the Self, there is certainly still a pure subjectivity which remains constantly present-at-hand through all changes from subject to subject. The constant unrest in the being-able-to-Be of man's ek-sistence is stilled. Eternity, as continuously abiding presence, takes the place of temporality and historicity. Thus, in the search for something eternally certain and perpetually present-at-hand, which one can cling to, all sense of being threatened is left behind. Thinking steps out of primal uncanniness and makes itself at home in something eternally present-at-hand. Man's resting in this eternity overcomes all being-guilty and all negativity. Finitude enters into an endless being-with-itself.

Heidegger's exposition of the basic concepts of metaphysics finally focuses on the question of whether or not Being can be understood as continuous presence. Does not an understanding of Being which grasps Being as continuous presence shrink back from the actual task at hand. namely that of bringing the temporal character of this presence to expression? These questions were to have been worked out in the third and unpublished section of Being and Time, which had as its task the 'explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being'. The fact that Heidegger increasingly put off matters until they could be treated in this section and in the investigations which were to follow it indicates to what a great extent the whole work was directed toward this section. Thus, the discussion of the forgetting of the world by Western thought (100), the new determination of logos (160), the fuller development of the idea of phenomenology (357), ontology (230), and science (357), and the discussion of the problem of language are all postponed for later treatment. The 'as' in 'taking-something-as-something' and therewith presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand are to be later clarified (333, 351, 360, 366, 436f.); everydayness is to be more deeply understood (372); the relationship of space and time worked out anew (368); and the question of how time has its own mode of Being is to be answered (406). The whole ek-sistential analysis demands a 'renewed recapitulation within the framework of a fundamental discussion of the concept of Being' (333, 436). The published portion of Being and Time therefore quite concretely fails to hit the mark. For this reason, Heidegger states quite explicitly at the end of the published portion that what he has done is only a way, i.e., a way toward working out of the question of Being.

The working out of the question of Being is the attempt to inquire into the meaning of Being as such, whose characterization remains simply an unthought presupposition of metaphysics. In the introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly gives an 'exposition of the question of the meaning of Being'. All questioning, he says there, asks about something, namely, that which is asked about (das Gefragte). It inquires after that which is asked about in that it asks something. It has in addition that which is interrogated (das Befragte). That which is asked about is determined by that which is interrogated and is directed toward that which is to be found out by the asking (das Erfragte). 'Furthermore, in what is asked about there lies also that which is to be found out by asking; this is what is really intended' (SZ 5). In the question of Being, that which is asked about is Being. That which is interrogated are beings, and among these beings, one being, i.e., Dasein, in particular. That which is to be found out by the asking is the meaning of Being. The published portion of Being and Time gives an analysis of that which is interrogated, i.e., Dasein, but purely for the sake of that which is asked about, i.e., Being. Nevertheless, the investigation does not reach that which is to be found out by the asking, i.e., the meaning of Being. Thus, the investigation fails to reach its goal and is prematurely broken off.

This is not to say that the investigation was not leading up to that goal. To be sure, Heidegger does not ask about some Being-in-itself beyond the world – for in this case. Being would simply be a determinate being once more - but asks rather about the meaning of Being, and thus, he asks the question of how Being is revealed to man. To ask the question concerning the meaning of Being means to ask about a possible understanding of Being. 'Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself' (SZ 151). The meaning of Being means that horizon of understanding in which Being is revealed (not, however, an 'ultimate meaning of Being'). Within this horizon, Being enters that primordially thought truth which Heidegger calls nonconcealment. Being - not beings - is only 'insofar as truth is' (BT 230). Being 'is' as truth, as the openness and intelligibility of beings, as that clearing in which beings may appear. The meaning, i.e., the truth and openness of Being, 'is' only in the Da (i.e., there) of Dasein, which is nothing other than a realm of openness. The question of the meaning of Being and the question concerning Dasein's being-understanding aim, even though from different directions, at the same central point, in which the meaning of Being and Dasein's being-understanding are one. 'But to lay bare the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible, is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all - an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the being called Dasein' (SZ 231).

The clarification of the understanding of Being is carried out in the published portion of *Being and Time*. The Being of a being, i.e., the meaning of the Being of Dasein, is determined so that Dasein may show itself to be the place of the truth of Being, as the one who understands the meaning of Being. Since Heidegger grasps Dasein primordially as the temporalization of time, authentic ek-sistence is revealed as that place in which Being can be temporal. Time is thus able to disclose itself as the horizon for any and every understanding of Being. 'The projection of the meaning of Being in general can be carried out within the horizon

of time' (SZ 235). Being and Time, taken in its basic intention, aims at this turning point in which the thinking of the temporality of Dasein enters into time as openness, as the meaning or truth of Being. Yet precisely there were Heidegger finished his preparations and arrived at his ownmost formulation of the question, he lacked the appropriate language in which to express his basic intention. He thus broke off the attempt. Since only the first two sections of Being and Time were published, there arose the misunderstanding that the so-called 'reversal' (Kehre) indicated a turning away from an earlier (ek-sistentially philosophical) position to an (ontologically historical) position which had been worked out later. A glance at the course which Heidegger's thinking takes, however, makes it quite plain that the published portion of Being and Time was already thought out on the basis of the 'self-reflective' consideration of the relationship of Being to beings or (as the case may be) of beings to Being. Furthermore, the work itself shows that, from the very beginning, man's ek-sistence enters into play only from a consideration of the 'reversal'. Being and Time begins with an exposition of the question of the meaning of Being; indications are constantly given that the analytic of Dasein is on the way to a determination of the meaning of Being, and actually already presupposes a conception of this meaning and therefore is caught up in a circle. The completion of the 'reversal' is not turning to a new position but rather a return to the original point of departure and a return to that ground upon which this circle-of-thought has rested from the very beginning. This ground is, of course, not only the basis of Heidegger's own thinking, but also that which was left unthought by metaphysics.

The break

Why, we must ask, does Heidegger prematurely break off what was attempted in Being and Time, and how does he still manage to bring his thought to its goal? In Being and Time, it is stated that 'that which is to be found out by the asking', i.e. the meaning of Being, demands its own manner of being grasped, which manner may not be oriented toward beings (SZ 6). In the Letter on Humanism, then, Heidegger admitted, in retrospect, that the thinking of Being and Time denied to the 'reversal' an appropriate language, because it could not be carried out within the language of metaphysics.⁵ Metaphysics conceives of beings as beings; it inquires after the Being of beings, but not after Being itself. Metaphysics thus presupposes a determinate conception of the meaning of Being, merely insofar as it does not think through the character of that time in whose light Being becomes determined. Thus, the conceptual framework of metaphysics prevents the question of Being itself from being raised. In fact, this question simply fades away if the questioning does not give up the language of metaphysics. Heidegger has attempted to substantiate this thesis through a reflection on the thought of Ernst Jünger, a contemporary of Heidegger's on this path of thought. Jünger believed himself to have gone beyond the 'zero meridian' of nihilism, and yet his conceptual framework still remains within the sphere of metaphysics. If, however, the question concerning Being itself is the first and only fruitful step toward the overcoming of nihilism, then the conceptual framework of classical metaphysics must be abandoned, since it does not allow this question to come into focus. After the failure of *Being and Time*'s endeavor, Heidegger still attempts to bring his questioning to its destination, in that he seeks radically to overcome metaphysics by a *return into the ground of metaphysics*.

The question of the meaning of Being brings that which metaphysics leaves unthought and ungrounded, i.e., the abysslike ground of metaphysics, to expression. An excursus through the history of metaphysics (which the second portion of Being and Time was supposed to have attempted) must reveal the abysslike ground so that thought, by means of its own questioning, may return into it. Heidegger now considers above all the beginning, the completion, and the end of metaphysical thought, from the earliest Greek thought, to the philosophy of mediation of German Idealism, and to Nietzsche. Nietzsche is not treated as that existential thinker whose utterances must be held in suspension. Rather, Nietzsche is drawn quite close to Aristotle, and taken simply in his most basic ideas. As a metaphysical thinker, Nietzsche thinks from the idea of the eternal recurrence. Yet, as a 'thinker of eternity', he is not the prelude to a philosophy of the future, but rather, the consistent end of the metaphysical tradition. Metaphysics represents beings in their Being, but in this representation it relates them to subjectivity. This subjectivism, which was present from the very beginning in metaphysics, finds its radical completion in Nietzsche, who made the will to power the essentia of all beings. Metaphysics thinks Being as perpetual presence: metaphysics reaches its completion when Nietzsche determines the existentia of beings to be the eternal recurrence of the same. Nietzsche's doctrine, as the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of all things, overthrows the metaphysics of essences because now there can no longer be any essential difference between things. Thus, metaphysics ends with Nietzsche. Heidegger seeks not only to bring metaphysics to this end, but even the whole of Western history which, even in the phase of our scientifictechnical organization, is still determined by metaphysics. Heidegger understands the all-destroying world wars of our time in the light of the final history of metaphysics. He interpets metaphysics and its end with the help of the concepts and catchphrases of total war.

Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism does not overcome nihilism at all, but rather entrenches it all the more firmly. In a thought which thinks from the viewpoint of the will to power and the eternal recurrence

of the same, Being cannot appear in its truth, cannot appear as that destining (Geschick) which it, in fact, is but which is 'not simply at our disposal'. As Heidegger stated in his Nietzsche lectures during the summer semester of 1939, 'In the eternal recurrence of the same, the final historical essence of this last metaphysical explanation of beingness [Seiendheit] - i.e., as the will to power - is conceived of in such a manner that the essence of truth is denied any possibility of becoming that which is most questionable, and the meaninglessness which is thereby placed into power unconditionally determines the "horizon" of our times and brings about its completion'.9 The completion of meaninglessness reveals itself to the historical-technical consciousness of our time not as the end, 'but as the "liberation" for a steadily-increasing loss of Self, and ultimately, to an intensification of everything'. 'One neither knows nor ventures that Other, which in the future will be the One and Only, because it was already abiding in the very beginning of our history, even though ungrounded: the truth of Being, our standing in this truth, out of which world and earth alone struggle to achieve their essence for man, and man, in this struggle experiences the reply of his essence to the God "of" Being'. Only in a new experiencing of Being can nature and history find man and God in their essence. Since the end of metaphysics forcibly brings about this new beginning, i.e., of a 'standing in' truth insofar as essential thinking should continue to exist at all - thinking is obliged to repeat the first beginnings of thought, the earliest Greek thought, and redecide all those decisions on the basis of which metaphysics arose. Heidegger demands to go back into the ground of the first beginnings of thought. 'What has been in the first beginnings of thought is thereby forced to rest upon the abyss of its ground, which has remained ungrounded up until now, and thus, for the first time, to become history.'

This newly beginning thought, which arises from the end of metaphysics, raises once more the question which Being and Time had to leave unanswered. The completion of the reversal, toward which Being and Time not only tended but out of which this whole work was already conceived, cannot simply be considered a further carrying out of the point of departure of Being and Time. The 'reversal', as Heidegger actually carries it to completion, is a turning away from this first point of departure, which still asked about the Being of beings in the metaphysical manner of questioning. Just as a skier does not make a turn arbitrarily or out of pure high spirits, neither does Heidegger arbitrarily break off the train of thought of Being and Time just when it is in full motion. An abyss had opened up before him, the abyss of the meaningless which had been revealed by Nietzsche's bringing metaphysical thinking to a close.

Thought cannot simply by-pass this abyss. Insofar as thought does not wish to carry out merely an underground restoration and ever again fall

into the same abyss, it must itself enter this abyss. Thought must go through metaphysics to that which remains unthought in metaphysics; it must appropriate metaphysics before it can abandon it. That is why Heidegger asks the question: What Is Metaphysics? (1929), why he attempts an Introduction to Metaphysics, 10 which aims at a basic overcoming of metaphysics. Already the fact that Heidegger takes up the leading concepts of metaphysical thought in order to do away with them one after the other, indicates that he wishes to overcome metaphysics by appropriating it and thinking through it to that which it left unthought. Metaphysics is simultaneously ontology and logic. Already in his Kant book, Heidegger rejects formal and transcendental logic (in contrast to Husserl's efforts at that time). Formal logic, he says, must be deprived of its privileged position in metaphysics, which it has maintained since antiquity. The very idea of a formal logic is questionable. The idea of a transcendental logic is simply meaningless. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the heading 'ontology', which was first adhered to, is rejected also. Heidegger wishes to separate himself from other contemporary 'ontological' efforts in philosophy (p. 31). The Letter on Humanism thus states that ontology – in keeping with its name – always thinks only the meaning of beings, and therefore not Being itself. Heidegger seeks first of all to establish a connection between the sciences and the wanting-to-have-an-awareness of Dasein. However, the sciences, which supposedly were to have been metaphysically grounded, finally become mere derivatives of a metaphysics which itself is to be overcome. This consideration, which takes up the wanting-to-have-an-awareness of Dasein on a new level, is placed in opposition to the sciences. The later Heidegger does not wish to have his thought understood as phenomenological research or even as philosophy. That is why he now seeks out art. Art emerges out of an inner necessity into the horizon of the thinker who prepares himself to think the truth of Being: primordial art, of whose end metaphysics speaks, sets the truth of Being into motion; it makes beings 'more being' (seiender) by guarding Being in beings. The disclosure of the world, as it occurs in art and, above all, in poetry seems to be the only one which stands on that primordial level upon which thought, too, seeks to make itself at home. Thought itself has a hidden poetic character because it no longer is the metaphysical proposing presentation of beings in their Being as continuous presence, but reaches out into an open future, thereby bearing presence and absence simultaneously. At this point Heidegger comes close to early Greek aphoristic thinking as well as to the more recent Western 'sayings of the soul which should be sung rather than spoken' - an expression through which Nietzsche for some time laid himself open to the experience of the god Dionysus, who is simultaneously presence and absence.

Yet it is not a 'poetry' beyond metaphysics which leads into the abyss-

like ground of metaphysics, but rather the attempt to retrieve primordially the questions of metaphysics. Shortly after Being and Time, Heidegger attempts in the lecture What Is Metaphysics? and in the essay 'The essence of reasons' to reflect upon the 'Nothing' (das Nichts), and upon the Nothing between Being and beings, i.e., the ontological difference. In this way, Heidegger meets the demand which he himself had made in the analysis of guilt and conscience in Being and Time, namely, the demand to raise the problem of the ontological origin of Nothing (SZ 285ff.). Since Nothing is thought of as a 'no' with regard to all beings, the question arises of why there are beings at all, rather than Nothing? Not only facticity of Dasein, but even the fact that there are beings as such is called into question in this metaphysically greatly expanded problem. When metaphysics asks something of this nature, it turns to a highest being as the ground of all other beings. In this fashion. however, metaphysics does not think Being as such. By including in his question a '... rather than Nothing' Heidegger cuts off the path to a highest, unquestionable Being. He reduces this question to the question of the meaning, the truth or openness of Being itself. In the leading question of metaphysics – i.e., What are beings? – which asks about the Being of beings, the fundamental question is presupposed, in which the meaning of Being itself - that which is left unthought by metaphysics is brought into question.

The meaning or the truth of Being, as that which metaphysics leaves unthought, is the abysslike ground of metaphysics. The truth of Being is that center in which being and Dasein (which has an understanding of Being) come together, in which the 'reversal' thus completes itself. That thinking which wishes to bring the abysslike ground of metaphysics to expression must enter into this center. Heidegger reflects upon this center when, in the two decades after the appearance of Being and Time, he makes the problem of truth and Being the foremost theme of his thought. The lecture 'The essence of truth' and the essay 'Plato's doctrine of truth' give some insight into his working on this theme. Heidegger reflects upon the unthought foundation of the Western conception of truth, that non-concealment which must ever again be wrested from forgottenness and hiddenness, and which thus first makes truth as the adequatio of thought and thing possible. Truth, which is thought of as a nonconcealment, is the happening of truth (Wahrheitsgeschehen), and in this happening prevails the temporality of Dasein and that time in which Being itself gives itself in its openness. We are concerned here not simply with the essence of truth in the sense of Dasein's standing-in-truth, but rather, concerned even more with the truth of Being taken as abiding Being, i.e., with truth as the openness of Being. In this way, the 'reversal' is completed: Dasein as Being-in-the-world no longer stands at the center of these considerations, but rather Being in its meaning and its truth,

and thus Being as that which makes 'world' possible. Thought no longer moves from beings to Being, but rather from Being to beings.

If the relationship of Dasein to Being is determined by a double nothing then Being in its transition to beings is characterized by a double 'superiority'. There is, of course, no Being without beings – Being is the 'granting' of beings – but yet, Being brings about in itself the difference between Being and beings. It releases beings out of itself into openness, and among these beings there is Dasein as the privileged place of Being's openness. However, for its part, Dasein, taken in itself, does not have Being at its disposal. To this a second aspect is to be added, namely, the place of the openness of Being is bounded by the fact that at each given time it 'whiles' in a determinate way (Jeweiligkeit): the openness or nonconcealment of Being takes place at each given time only upon a background of concealment. Being, which appropriates Dasein as the place of its disclosure, remains fundamentally not at Dasein's disposal, just as it ever again transcends the mode of abiding characteristic of Dasein.

Being, taken as the unavailable and at each time historical destining of Being (Seinsgeschick), reveals itself in its meaning, or in its openness and truth, as the event of appropriation (Ereignis). 'Ereignis' does not mean here, as it still did within the terminology of Being and Time, a certain occurrence or happening, but rather Dasein's complete self-realization in Being, and Being's appropriation (zueignen) to Dasein's authenticity. The word 'Ereignis' cannot be made plural. It determines the meaning of Being itself. It is, as a singulare tantum, a key concept of thought like the Greek word logos or the Chinese word tao. 12

Being as the event of appropriation: with this definition Heidegger's thinking has arrived at its goal. In the event of appropriation, time, in whose light Being has always been understood, though in a hidden manner, is simultaneously thought also. Heidegger's thinking returns to its own ground in that it brings the abysslike ground, that which was left unthought by metaphysics, to expression. Thus, the way of thought finds its course to the continually circumnavigated center. Thought gradually finds its genuine structure by thinking its only thought. As a carrying out of the question of Being, and thus as the carrying out to completion of thought's way, Heidegger's thinking strictly limits itself to adhering to that one and only thought 'which one day will remain fixed like a star in the heavens of the world': 'To approach a star, and only this. . . .'13

Part two

In his confrontation with metaphysics, Heidegger raises the first and last questions of thought anew. Thus, that which was left unthought by

metaphysics achieves expression. Heidegger seeks to think that which was left unthought by returning to the ground of metaphysics. He thinks Being in the sense of the appropriating event. This determination of the meaning of Being was thought through in 1936 but did not appear in an exact formulation until twenty years later.

Because Heidegger thinks the meaning of Being itself, he can take up the metaphysical question of the Being of beings, of Being in its various modes of realization. He seeks to secure beings in the truth of Being. In so doing, he cannot simply take over the logic of metaphysics, but must forcibly bring about a new decision concerning the logos.

Through the return to the ground of metaphysics, that which has been thought by metaphysics is posed anew as something which must be decided upon and, in this manner, can be primordially adopted. By means of a meditation which is focused on Being's history, Heidegger reflects upon the characterizations of the meaning of Being which, although prevailing in various phases of metaphysics, were not expressly put into question there. Thus, Heidegger seeks to place metaphysical thinking back upon that ground which itself has remained unthought, to incorporate his own thinking into that 'happening' of the truth as it comes to us from our tradition.

I cannot go further into all these efforts of Heidegger's, of which at least some bits were made available in lectures and essays. Nevertheless, I still would like to attempt three things: First of all, I would like to reflect once more upon the course of Heidegger's thinking as a whole, to be able to more accurately grasp the central point and the inherently tense unity of Heidegger's thought, and thereby ward off some misunderstandings. Thus, I shall pay particular attention to what the word 'ground' (Grund) means in the discussion of fundamental ontology and the return to the ground of metaphysics. Secondly, I would like to give at least a few indications of how Heidegger seeks to think that-which-is on the basis of the event of appropriation, and determine the logos which his thinking follows in so doing. Finally, I would briefly like to show how Heidegger's thought gains its cohesiveness by placing traditional, metaphysical thought back upon its ground, which has remained unthought.

The ground

Heidegger's thinking grows out of a reflection upon metaphysics. But what is metaphysics? Metaphysics (ontology in the broader sense) seeks to determine beings in their Being, and to articulate Being according to its various modes of realization. This is why metaphysics asks the question: What are beings? At one point, metaphysics asks about beings as beings in general, or about beings as such; then it is general metaphysics (ontology in the narrower sense). Metaphysics, however, does not only inquire after those characteristics which can be discovered in every being,

in beings as such, but it inquires also after that Being which makes a particular, individual being to be what it is. It is then special metaphysics (metaphysica specialis). Metaphysics, from the very beginning, asks about beings as beings only in such a manner, that it defines beings as a whole in terms of a privileged being – a highest or divine being. When, in the Christian faith, God was understood as the creator of mankind and the world, theological metaphysics was incorporated into the three parts of traditional metaphysica specialis (natural theology, psychology, cosmology).

Metaphysics asks about beings in such a way that it grounds the Being of beings in a highest being, and defines it in terms of this highest being. Metaphysics thinks beings in their Being, but does not determine this Being in its own proper meaning, but rather thinks it immediately in terms of a highest being, which for its part is determined in terms of a meaning of Being which is not thought in itself, as such. Being and beings are not kept apart in such a way that the meaning of Being could become problematic. The meaning of Being remains unthought; its meaning is merely presupposed. Metaphysics, as representative thinking, orients itself toward thinglike beings, which it finds present in the 'world' as present-at-hand. It thus understands Being, and even the Being of the highest being, in terms of presence-at-hand or presence. Since it is never explicitly put into question, this understanding of the meaning of Being takes place only in a hidden manner in the light of time: presence (Anwesenheit) is thought of from the perspective of the temporal mode of the present time (Gegenwart). It is for this reason that Heidegger asks: If Being is determined as presence, how then is time itself to be thought of which in a hidden manner is cothought with the notion of presence? 'Through the question contained in the expression "Being and Time", that which was left unthought in all metaphysics is indicated."¹⁴ The question about Being and time seeks to think that which metaphysics has always forgotten to think: the meaning of Being itself.

Heidegger finds an approach to that time in whose light the meaning of Being comes to be determined by examining the Being of that being which is characterized by an understanding of Being, in terms of temporality. That being which is so characterized is Dasein. Metaphysics can find no approach to the question of Being and time because it must interpret time in its Being in terms of a 'now', precisely because it understands Being in terms of an inadequately thought-through temporal mode, namely, 'the present time'. Metaphysical thinking orients itself toward that which is present-at-hand within the world, and transcends this present-at-hand to something which is eternally present at hand or present. Thus, this sort of thinking must overlook that typical standing-out toward a future which is not simply at one's disposal which is characteristic of primordial temporality. Time is grasped as a succession of

now-points which are present, were present, or will be present. Christian theology reveals a more primordial relationship to time and temporality, i.e., a relationship of standing-out toward a future which is not at one's disposal. Heidegger mentions frequently in Being and Time the impulses which he received from the theological thought. It is these impulses which have led him to that path which his questioning takes.

Heidegger asks about Dasein and its temporality merely for the sake of the question of Being. The privileged position which Dasein receives does not mean that a subjectification of all beings is to be undertaken. Of course, Heidegger's thought remains separated by an abyss from that kind of metaphysics which, by means of a transcendental reflection, believes itself capable of defining the 'gradation' of beings with respect to Being. But precisely because Heidegger reflects upon the fact that we can approach beings which are not like Dasein merely through that openness which Being receives in our understanding of it, these beings can 'speak' to man in their total otherness and foreignness, without immediately being anthropomorphically misinterpreted. The analysis of Dasein should not be understood as giving support to modern anthropologism in any way. In such anthropologism, man is put into the position of the highest being. Everything which is is delivered over to man. Beings are only insofar as they are for man and given over to him. Everything revolves around man and seems to be connected with him. Man, made thusly dependent upon himself, becomes understood as 'nihilistic' in the sense of 'merely temporal' and 'finite'. As a matter of fact, Being and Time has been misinterpreted as just such an anthropologism. One was thus forced to regard the thought of the later Heidegger as a turn to a completely different position. In Heidegger's later thinking, the foundation upon which everything is founded is supposed to be no longer resolute ek-sistence, but rather, a mythologized Being.

Yet, neither Dasein nor Being is an ontic fundament, an ultimate ground in the sense of metaphysics. Thus, it is meaningless to say that Heidegger has changed his view by substituting one fundament (Being) for another (man). Dasein is the 'there', the place of the truth of Being, and therefore by no means 'something' different from Being. And yet, there actually is an equivocation in Heidegger's earlier speaking about a fundamental ontology supposedly to be discovered through the analysis of Dasein. It sometimes appears as if the analysis of Dasein were not only the way to the working out of the question of Being, but even prior - if not superior - to it, its 'fundament'. 15 These various 'tensions' which are found in Heidegger's course of thought are obviously not to be simply explained away, for then Heidegger's thought could not be regarded as an authentic 'searching for the way'. One must bear in mind, however, that Heidegger constantly calls attention to the fact that the analysis of Dasein must already presuppose a clarification of the meaning of Being,

and that this analysis must be repeated after the clarification of the meaning has appeared to be successful. Thus, there can be no talk of a one-sided grounding of the question concerning Being through a clarification of man's understanding of Being. Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly puts the equivocation which is inherent in his speaking about fundamental ontology into question at the end of *Being and Time*: 'Can one', he asks, 'provide ontological grounds for ontology, or does it also require an ontical foundation? And which being must take over the function of providing this foundation?' (SZ 436).

It is a characteristic of metaphysics that it presupposes an ontic foundation for ontology, and lets the meaning of Being be determined from the perspective of a particular being. In contrast to this, Heidegger cuts off the path to a highest being, which is no longer questioned in its Being, with the question: 'Why is there anything at all, and not simply Nothing?' In this way, thought enters into the happening of truth, in which the meaning of Being itself becomes revealed. Since Heidegger pays particular attention to the temporal character of this happening of truth, to the concurrence of concealment and nonconcealment, he succeeds in determining the meaning, and therefore the truth, of Being, by explicitly discussing the temporal moment which, as presence, remains hidden in the traditional understanding of Being: Being as the event of appropriation.

That which was left unthought by metaphysics, not merely the Being of beings, but the meaning of Being itself, comes to be thought. In this way, metaphysics comes to its 'ground'. What the word 'ground' may mean here is explained by Heidegger where he rethinks the fundamental concepts of metaphysics: identity, difference, and ground. Heidegger does not simply ask what identity, difference, and ground have to say about beings, but asks rather, how they belong to Being itself, Being as the event of appropriation. The identity of Being is 'self-sameness' (Selbigkeit), and not equivalence (Gleichheit). Identity articulates beings in their essence in such a manner that this essence remains a 'determining characteristic' (Eigentum) of the event of appropriation. The essence of, e.g., technology or poetry, is not the transtemporal validity of an eternally present, unchanging idea, but rather that destined (geschickt), historical essence which is not simply at our disposal. This essence reveals itself each time in a strict, but still temporal commitment when Dasein accepts the destining of Being (Seinsgeschick), and as the 'there' of Being is 'identical' with it. Beings can then be understood in their Being as beings. If beings are understood in their Being, the difference between Being and beings is broken open. This difference (Unterschied), the ontological difference (Differenz), constitutes the center of that thinking which, as meta-physics, transcends being to Being. Heidegger seeks to show how this difference is at the same time the carrying-out of 'overcoming' or transcendence, as well as 'arrival' or presence. Just as Heidegger thinks transcendence from the perspective of Dasein, as the act in and through which Dasein's understanding being-able-to-Be supersedes beings and in which this being simultaneously arrives at a new truth before Dasein's attuned moodedness, he also thinks the transition of Being to beings as the simultaneous arrival of beings in the unconcealment of Being. The carrying out of the difference - the happening of truth – is thought of as the carrying out of the event of appropriation. In contrast to what is the case in metaphysics, Heidegger no longer grounds the transcendence from beings to Being in a highest being which grounds itself and everything else, i.e., a causa sui. If Being is conceived of as a 'ground', it not only grounds beings, but must itself be grounded in a highest being. In this way, metaphysics becomes onto-theo-logy: it thinks Being on the basis of the divine as the ground (logos) of all beings. Being and beings are then not kept sufficiently distinct, so that Being cannot reveal itself in its meaning and be determined as the event of appropriation. Being itself does not become a problem here. Even the highest being is understood as something eternally present-at-hand, because the understanding of Being has oriented itself above all toward beings which are simply encountered, toward things present-at-hand. Even if, in a new approach, thinking is grounded in an ultimate 'I think', even then this 'I think' is, in turn, understood from the perspective of eternal presence as a 'pure, primordial, unchanging consciousness', which in every consciousness remains the same and thus is its ground.

Metaphysics, as the science of grounds, comes to completion in the technique of an absolute knowing, which makes available an ultimate ground. In contrast to this, thought (in Heidegger's sense) remains directed toward historical Being, which is nondeterminable and not simply at our disposal, and which is thought as the 'destining of Being' (Seinsgeschick), as the event of appropriation. The meaning of Being as the 'ground' which remained unthought in metaphysical thinking, can perhaps be thought of as an 'abysslike ground', but in the final analysis cannot really be thought of as a 'ground' at all. The discussion of ground is given up after having been explicitly worked out. Because the event of appropriation is just itself, and nothing more, it is without a 'why?' which asks about grounds or reasons. 'It remains', Heidegger says at the conclusion of his lecture on 'The principle of sufficient reason', 'just play: the highest and the most profound play. But this "just" is everything, the one, the only.'16

Being as the event of appropriation is neither an ultimate ground nor a highest being, but this is not so precisely because it is the 'granting' of beings (das Geben vom Seienden), because it is the 'it grants' itself. The 'it grants' (es gibt) is not a 'ground for the world': neither is it the power over its 'granting': it is not God, who 'creates' beings. Being as the event of appropriation gives beings into openness, and allows them to reveal themselves as the Being 'of' beings.

Being as nondeterminable, historical destining of Being which is not simply at our disposal grants at any given time the clearing in which beings become manifest. It thus makes possible the 'bursting open' of the world as an historical world (history to be taken here in the sense in which it is not limited only to man). Since Heidegger seeks to develop a primordial concept of world (world as 'Fourfold'), he overcomes the forgetfulness-of-the-world characteristic of Western ontology which had already been discussed in *Being and Time* (100). Being, as the Being of beings, itself becomes a 'derivative' of world. The more Heidegger enters into his own thinking, the more he leaves metaphysical concepts behind. He even drops the fundamental concept 'Being', because it is a specifically metaphysical concept. He is able to drop this concept because that which metaphysics thought under this heading is the event of appropriation, when it is rethought by means of a reflection on the meaning of Being.

That which is

When Heidegger seeks to think Being in its meaning, when he seeks to think the event of appropriation, this does not mean that he rejects the question of the Being of beings. Rather, this whole question becomes fruitful in a totally new fashion when the meaning of Being is thought of as the event of appropriation. Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysics still maintains a positive attitude toward metaphysical questions. That thinking which on its 'forest trails' (Holzwege) abruptly becomes confronted with that which was never before trodden, i.e., the question of the meaning of Being, reaches this question in that it comes out of metaphysics and thinks back through metaphysics to that which metaphysics left unthought. This thinking ever again travels along those paths which metaphysics has opened up for it; it takes up the metaphysical question concerning the Being of what is. 'Does the soul speak? Does the world speak? Does God speak?' These questions conclude the prose piece 'Der Feldweg' (1953). 'Everything addresses renunciation toward the Self-same. Renunciation does not take. Renunciation grants.' The questions of metaphysica specialis about the soul, the world, and God are once more brought back into the question about 'that which is the Same', about Being. Thus, these questions can become fruitful in a new sense. The extent to which Heidegger has always borne these questions with him is shown by a mere glance at the course his thought has taken.

At the end of his Duns Scotus book, Heidegger – addressing himself to the scholasticism and mysticism of the middle ages and to Hegel – calls for a 'philosophy of the living spirit, of active love, of the worshipful intimacy with God [Gottinigkeit]'. The sharpest possible distinction

between theology and metaphysics follows immediately upon this leap into the theological metaphysics of the West. He appeals to Luther, who in the name of a 'theology of the cross' rejected the 'theology of glory', which - in its metaphysics understood as theodicy - calls evil good and good evil (as Luther says in the twenty-first thesis of the Heidelberger Disputation). When thought sees itself thrown back upon itself, it must come to grips with Nietzsche who, as the 'last German philosopher who passionately sought God', expresses the fate of the West in his declaration: 'God is dead!' Only in this way can thought, with Hölderlin, enter inquiringly the level of the holy, in which the Divine, God or gods, have the abode where they can appear. Inasmuch as this thought abandons the God of the philosophers as a dead, merely being, and 'defined' God, it perhaps comes closer, as Godless thinking to the 'godly God'. It holds true for this thinking that 'Whoever has experienced theology in its own roots, the theology of the Christian faith as well as that of the philosophers, prefers today to remain silent about God within the realm of thought'.17

Nature is to be thought primordially as 'earth', so that it can be torn free from both the one-sided objectivization of science, and from technology with its one-sided interest in permanent availability and usefulness. Thus, nature can be experienced anew on the basis of the event of appropriation. Man is no longer thought of as a 'subject', but rather as the one who has to carry out the event of appropriation. The work of art, the thing, language are thought from the viewpoint of the event of appropriation.

The Being of that which is is not simply understood from the perspective of continuous presence, from the 'idea', thought of statically, or with reference to an unchanging universal. Rather, it is asked if the Being or the essence of beings is not to be properly understood as a 'historical abiding' [Wesen], from the perspective of the event of appropriation. That thinking which orients itself toward 'seeing', which represents beings as beings with respect to a Being or essence which is continuously present, is transformed into an explaining thinking which grasps the essence of beings as historical abiding, or as the 'place' which at any given time it always gains through the event of appropriation. If truth is to be thought of as a happening, then representational thought must make a fundamental change. It can no longer orient itself simply toward the temporal mode of the present, but rather, must 'stand-out' toward time more primordially. Heidegger has brought this fundamental change in thought to completion by conceiving of ontology as phenomenology, but phenomenology as hermeneutics, and then by going back from hermeneutical thought to a thinking which follows a logos that remained concealed in metaphysics, and was not primordially developed either in theological or historical hermeneutics.

The character of Heidegger's thought has been variously misunderstood. It is believed that talk about Being must be completely empty, if Being is not grounded in a being. It was said that ontology was to be placed upon an ontic foundation, e.g., God, or at least an eternal world or man himself. As a matter of fact, that thinking which Heidegger himself characterizes as 'preparatory' is marked by a certain 'emptiness' or formalism (e.g., within the analysis of Dasein, Heidegger distinguished between 'existential' and 'existentiell'). In fact, however, the relationship to beings is already posited along with the thinking of Being. The early Heidegger therefore spoke of the formal-indicative nature of his concepts. The formalism of these 'indications' is not that of an empty, self-sufficient form which is separated from its content. Rather, the relationship to the fulfillment through the content is already posited in the form, but held back and in suspension, so that the formality is maintained. The form is not an empty shell, but rather always ready to make the leap to the concrete through a content. This fulfillment is held back, however, because it is irreducibly factical. That for which resolute Dasein resolves itself, 'which' reveals itself in Being as the event of appropriation, remains open, since thought can neither posit it nor derive it without destroying the character of the event of appropriation.

It has been further said of Heidegger's 'ontology' that it fails to achieve its sought-after formalism, since it springs from a particular-historical understanding. However, this abstract alternative, namely that between the ontological-universal and the ontic-historical, also fails to do justice to his formal-indicative conceptuality.

When Heidegger, in Being and Time, brings a particular structure to light, it appears to be a phenomenon in the sense of Kant's 'condition for the possibility of experience', or Plato's eidos. The provisional conception of phenomenology, as Heidegger develops it at the beginning of Being and Time, must lead one to hold Heidegger's investigations to be eidetic investigations in the sense of Husserl's phenomenology. Nevertheless, whoever understands Being and Time in this fashion must be shocked when Heidegger, in this work, quotes Count York's statement to the effect that, with regard to the inner historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of self-consciousness, a systematization which is separated from historiography (Historie) is simply inadequate (SZ 401f.). If, however, the meaning of the Being of Dasein lies in its factical ek-sistence, which properly speaking is historicity, then for such a Dasein no purely unhistorical possibilities can be in actual fact essential. The universality of formal-indicative concepts is only a certain sort of 'universality', which always aims toward its fulfillment in that which at any given time is historical. For this reason, Heidegger had already proposed the destruction of a systematization in Being and Time. For the same reason, Heidegger later attached the analyses of Being and Time to that region of history where they belong. Thus, it is shown by the lecture 'What is philosophy?' for instance, how that moodedness which as a rule (and thus in a certain universality) determines man is capable of being grasped only with the perspective of a basic mood (Grundstimmung), which at each given time is characteristic for an epoch.

The meaning of the Being of Dasein, as grasped through the existential analysis, can just as little be made into an 'idea', as the meaning of Being can be determined on the basis of a statically thought idea. The universal, binding character of Heidegger's thought does not come about through the contemplation of something which is always, ideally present, but rather, because it 'stands out' toward a destining which at any given time makes our historical abiding possible. The identity of this abiding, which achieves only a certain 'universality', is derived from the event of appropriation. The enduring of the destiny, however, is only then binding, and not simply arbitrary, when it thinks from what has been into the future. This thought moves within the circle of historical understanding, and for this reason must seek, in a never-ending motion, to get behind those presuppositions which it has always already made for itself. It 'grounds' itself by moving back and forth in this circle. Of course, it must allow the ultimate 'ground' upon which it rests to be historically handed over to it, as something which is not simply at its disposal. It can never (as in Hegel) supersede this immediacy in an all-grounding dialectic. The final paradox of this thought's circular but never ultimately terminated movement lies in this, that the emergence of the historicity of thought itself happens historically.

Since Heidegger moves within the circle of historical understanding, he must make the initial presupposition of this understanding, i.e., language, a theme for reflection. And thus, it is not an uncritical aspect of thought which manifests itself in his 'etymologizing', but rather a critical aspect: the attempt to put into language those very presuppositions which thought makes when it speaks. Hamann, in his metacritique, once objected against Kant, that the highest and final purification or critique of reason, namely the purification of language, could never be achieved. According to Hamann, language is the organon and criterion of reason: and yet language is historical. However, since Heidegger pays particular attention to the incorporation of thought into historical language, one may also characterize his thought as 'metacritical', at least insofar as it can be measured against critical theory at all.

Of course, one does not recognize the metacritical character of Heidegger's thought in its necessity if one simply keeps staring at his often noted etymologies, or dismisses Heidegger's thinking as 'mere' poetry. It is even possible to gain access to Heidegger's methodological procedure through the Western tradition of thought (and not just exclusively from early Greek aphoristic thought). Heidegger attempts a topology, 18 i.e.,

a saying of the place, and thus a thinking of the truth, of Being, where he analyzes such guide words and guiding principles as 'physis', 'logos', 'Nothing is without ground', or 'man dwells poetically'. If we call these guide words and guiding principles 'loci' or 'topoi', we gain a second meaning for the word 'topology', a meaning which Heidegger himself, however, does not consider. We may thus connect Heidegger's thinking with a tradition which was once of utmost importance. In his attempt to make a science out of philosophy, Aristotle distinguished 'Topics' or 'Dialectics' from 'Apodictics' as the properly rigorous method of philosophy. Even Vico still made mention, though with somewhat different intentions, of the priority which 'Topics' has over 'critical theory', i.e., over the exact methodology of our era. The Christian dogmatists (e.g., Melanchthon) utilized most decisively and for the longest time, the term 'loci' because they were striving for a systematization while still having to heed the irreducible historicity of faith. Heidegger's latest endeavors of thought, too, form a topology, i.e., they are designations of the place, or sayings of the place of Being's truth, with the help of a selection of loci or a collection of the guiding concepts and principles of Western thought. Modern philosophy, linguistics, and research into the history of concepts all, in their own particular ways, attempt something similar. Furthermore, the methodically developed limitation to only exemplary guide words and guiding concepts is today a necessity. We have only to consider Dilthey's work, which remained fragmentary, to see that the traditional methods of research in the human sciences are no longer adequate for historical reflection.19

The later Heidegger, of course, rejects any attempt at constructing 'methods' in order then to reflect upon them. He does not even wish explicitly to propose that manner in which the event of appropriation needs thought as the hermeneutical circle itself. Instead, he wishes in his thought to turn more primordially back to and to dwell in the hermeneutical relationship itself, in which the meaning of Being is 'announced' to Dasein, which already has an understanding of Being (SZ 37). We have seen already that even the formal-indicative concepts are not to be thought of as universal forms, through which representational thought gets a grip upon beings, but rather a guidance toward the happening of truth. The guiding words upon which the later Heidegger reflects are to be understood as clues and indications, which are addressed to questioning thought so that it may enter more purely into the event of appropriation. Thus, as a thought which 'explains' it may gather together everything which is into the event of appropriation.

Hanging-together

To determine Being in its meaning as the event of appropriation, to secure beings as beings in the truth of Being, i.e., the event of appropri-

ation, to attain the 'logos', i.e., the language which is capable of properly responding to the event of appropriation: this is what Heidegger attempts. That destiny, as which Being itself prevails, which is not at our disposal and cannot be conceptually determined, is to be experienced as such. This experiencing should neither be covered over by a dialectic, in the sense of a metalogic (Hegel), nor should this experiencing be altogether avoided, as is the case when thought, confronted with the traditional conceptual forms, yields to the historical representation of the past, thereby failing to do justice to historicity (Dilthey). This experiencing can be authentically endured only if thought goes through metaphysics and overcomes it, both as ontology and logic, from the 'ground' on upwards.

On the basis of its understanding of Being as continuous presence, traditional ontology grasps the Being of beings as a continuously present, ideal something. Heidegger seeks to ground this ontology through the return to a mode of thought which thinks Being's historical abiding from the event of appropriation. In the same way, he seeks to go back through traditional logic (and not merely to bypass it) to a more primordial *logos*. The young Heidegger wrote: 'What is logic? Already here we are faced with a problem, the solution of which is reserved for the future.' Then as thinking became the endurance of a future which was not at one's disposal. Heidegger held that the whole idea of logic was dissolved in the swirl of a more primordial questioning.²⁰ But Heidegger is concerned precisely with giving that thought which springs from the event of appropriation a 'logical' and not simply a rhapsodic form. For this reason he seeks, by means of a reflection upon the fundamental principles of logic, to go back to the ground of traditional logic and thus discover the logos of his own thinking. Naturally it goes without saying that through this return to the 'ground' of metaphysics, traditional logic and contemporary logic just as little lose their rights, within their own limits, as do the demonstrations of unchanging essences. The rather uncautious polemic which prevails today between 'hermeneutical' philosophy and logical positivism serves only to obliterate the fact that a fruitful dialogue between those who are attempting to construct a 'hermeneutical' logic (Lipps) and the representatives of logical positivism is more than possible.

True, in his own thinking, Heidegger never made the possible positive meanings of 'idea' or 'logic' thematic, at least in the classical sense of these words. His thinking complies only with the free-floating structure of a whole, the moment we eliminate those one-sided formulations and directions of questioning which grew out of the attempts at a breakthrough and out of those polemical arguments which, to be sure, are occasionally necessary. Thus, one might pose the question, whether or not the experience of a continuously present idea as well as logic, and connected with it the whole of classical metaphysics, are to be considered

a derivative or even degenerate mode of thought, or if they should not rather be considered a mode of thinking that, within certain limits, does in fact do justice to primordial phenomena.

If the answer to this question is to be other than a merely traditional or positivist-pragmatic presupposition, it must be arrived at through a thinking which enters into dialogue with that which metaphysics has left unthought. Only such a debate over Being preserves the possibility of reappropriating that which metaphysics has in fact thought. Heidegger himself does not think that which metaphysics has left unthought exclusively in terms of the event of appropriation, but also attempts, by means of his ontological-historical reflections, to raise anew the question concerning those particular articulations of the meaning of Being which dominated certain phases of metaphysics, even though they were not explicitly thought through in themselves. The understanding of Being as Idea, energeia, objectivity, will to power, etc., must be thought through on the basis of what was not thought in it, i.e., time as the horizon of the understanding of Being. In this manner, thought, as it has been understood up until now, is to be placed back onto its own ground.

Heidegger, however, does not think that which metaphysics left unthought by placing himself at the 'end' of history and making the law of a self-contained system into the law of history, and thus superseding history (Hegel). Much more, Heidegger's thinking places itself into history in the full knowledge that it itself is finite and historical. The reflection which brings to completion the step backwards into that which has always at any given time been left unthought does not itself arrive at a final end or absolute completion.

Heidegger thinks his single thought, in that he goes back to what metaphysics left unthought, and thus frees himself for a thought yet to come. His thinking is a way of thinking and not simply a way which Heidegger brings to completion, but rather a way by means of which metaphysics goes beyond itself. The necessity of Heidegger's thought grows out of the fact that it must bring into language that which thought, up to now, has left unthought. This thought gains its binding character in that it is concerned with the whole of the Western tradition, which determines us all. The dialogue with Heidegger must gain its rigor from this binding character, from the relationship to the Same.

Notes

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- 1 SZ refers to the 7th ed. of Sein und Zeit (Tübingen, 1953) and the corresponding marginal pagination of Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, 1962).
- 2 See Walter Biemel, 'Husserls Encyclopedia Brittanica Artikel und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu', in Tijdsschrift voor Filosophie, 12 (Leuven/Utrecht, 1950), pp. 246ff.; see especially p. 274.
 - 3 ibid., p. 279.
- 4 Vom Wesen des Grundes, 4th ed. (Frankfurt, 1955), p. 41; The Essence of Reasons, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston, Ill., 1969), p. 94.
- 5 Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den 'Humanismus', 2nd ed. (Bern, 1954), p. 72; Letter on Humanism, trans. Edgar Lohner, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, vol. 3, ed. William Barret and Henry Aiken (New York, 1962), p. 280.
- 6 Zur Seinsfrage (Frankfurt, 1965); see especially p. 26; The Question of Being, trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New Haven, 1958), p. 72.
- 7 See Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen, 1953), p. 155; Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1959), p. 203.
- 8 Since the 5th edition (1949), Was ist Metaphysik? has been prefaced with an introduction bearing this title.
 - 9 Nietzsche (Pfullingen, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 27ff.
- 10 The lecture course given under this equivocal title during the summer semester of 1935 was published in 1953.
- 11 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1951), pp. 200ff.; Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), pp. 229ff.
- 12 See Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen, 1954), p. 25; Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York, 1969), p. 36.
- 13 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (Pfullingen, 1954), p. 7; 'The thinker as poet', trans. Albert Hofstadter, in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York, 1971), p. 4.
- 14 Was heisst Denken? (Tübingen, 1954), p. 42; What is Called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York, 1968), p. 103.
- 15 See SZ, pp. 13ff.; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, pp. 200ff.; Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 229ff.
- 16 Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen, 1957), p. 188. See also my book, Der Denkweg Martin Heidegger (Pfullingen, 1963).
 - 17 Identität und Differenz, pp. 51, 71; Identity and Difference, pp. 54, 72.
 - 18 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, p. 23; 'The thinker as poet', p. 12.
- 19 See my essay, 'Dichtungstheorie und Toposforschung', Jahrbuch für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 5 (Cologne, 1960), pp. 89-201.
- 20 See 'Neuere Forschung über Logik' in Literarische Rundschau, vol. 38, ed. J. Sauer (Freiburg, 1912), p. 466. See also Was ist Metaphysik?, 7th ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1955), p. 37; 'What is metaphysics?' trans. R. F. C. Hull and Allan Crick, in Existence and Being, ed. Werner Broch (Chicago, 1967), p. 343.

Way and method: hermeneutic phenomenology in thinking the history of being

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann

To Hans-Georg Gadamer on his 90th birthday

In his first elaboration of the question of being in terms of fundamental ontology Heidegger characterizes the method of this ontology (in Section 7 of Being and Time) as both 'phenomenology' and 'hermeneutic phenomenology'. However, not only do the terms phenomenology and hermeneutics disappear from Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)² – where he takes the second way, i.e., elaborates the question of being according to the history of being – but there is also no mention of a 'method' that thinking in terms of the history of being might have. And yet, those who pay attention, not only to the external use of such terms, but also to what is most fitting in phenomenological seeing and the self-showing of the Sache (Sichzeigenlassen der Sache) know that thinking in terms of the history of being is also phenomenological through and through – that is, is guided by the self-showing of the Sache for thinking.

But the question still remains: why does Heidegger retain the principle of phenomenology while he abandons the terms *phenomenology* and *hermeneutics*? In the 'Dialogue on language' he responds to this question: 'This happened, not – as is often thought – in order to deny the importance of phenomenology, but rather to let my own pathway of thinking remain in the realm of the nameless' (GA 12, p. 114). At the end of Heidegger's 'My way into phenomenology' there is a still more articulate confirmation that thinking in terms of the history of being remains bound to what is most fittingly phenomenological:

Phenomenology . . . is the possibility of thinking, at times changing and only thus persisting, to correspond to the claim of what is to be thought. If phenomenology is thus experienced and kept hold of, it

can disappear as title, in favour of the Sache of thinking, whose disclosure remains a mystery.4

This says everything that is decisive regarding the point that we are making. Elucidations of the preliminary conception of phenomenology in Being and Time already conclude with this remark: 'The only way to understand phenomenology is to grasp it as possibility' (GA 2, p. 52). For Heidegger the phenomenological way of dealing with 'things themselves' lies in its enabling character of possibility. As possibility, phenomenology is higher than its actuality in any given case, because as possibility phenomenology can always be grasped anew and more originally.

Because phenomenology, as the method of self-showing of the Sache of thinking, is essentially at the service of this Sache, therefore phenomenology as the possibility of thinking transforms itself along with the transformation of the Sache which shows itself. If Husserl sees the Sache itself as intentional consciousness and transcendental subjectivity, Heidegger sees the Sache in a transformed way, as being what gets disclosed in Dasein's understanding of being. But with this transformation in the Sache there is also a transformation in the very meaning of phenomenology: as possibility, now understood in a new way. And when the Sache is again transformed within Heidegger's thinking of being - such that being as such is no longer thought within the transcendental-horizonal perspective, but as the unity of the relation of the truth of being to Dasein and of Dasein's essential relation to the truth of being - then this transformation yields a new and transformed understanding of phenomenology. And yet, throughout this manifold transformation, phenomenology remains thinking's possibility.

At this point phenomenology is characterized as that possibility which 'corresponds' (entspricht) to the 'claim' (Anspruch) of what is to be thought. By characterizing phenomenology as that possibility of thinking which makes possible this 'corresponding with the claim of what is to be thought', Heidegger clarifies phenomenology precisely as the enactment of thinking in terms of the history of being. For both of these words, claim and correspondence, are the root-words by which the unity of the relation (Bezug) of being to Dasein as well as Dasein's comporting relationship (Verhältnis) to being is grasped conceptually and in language within thinking in terms of the history of being. The unity of this relation and this comporting relationship is what thinking in terms of the history of being thinks as the unfolding of being itself (Wesung des Seins selbst), as *Ereignis*. In its way of enactment, thinking which thinks being's root unfolding as Ereignis is phenomenology. Thinking being in terms of the history of being thus becomes such a pure enactment of phenomenological self-showing of the Sache itself that the title 'phenomenology' can fall away.

As we stressed at the beginning, Heidegger calls phenomenology as the possibility of thinking being: hermeneutics. In the afore-mentioned 'Dialogue on language' Heidegger declares emphatically that, in the transformation from the transcendental-horizonal perspective to the perspective of thinking in terms of the history of being, phenomenology retains its basic hermeneutical character. There he speaks of the 'hermeneutical relation' and elucidates it as the bringing of a manifestation in the hearing of the message as the unconcealing of the twofold of emergent emergence (Anwesen und Anwesendes). This wording of the basic hermeneutical feature of phenomenology in terms of the history of being comes out of that context wherein claim and correspondence belong together, i.e., comes out of Ereignis. Thus there is no doubt that, in its enactment, thinking in terms of the history of being is determined phenomenologically and hermeneutically. Our task, then, is to work out the hermeneutical-phenomenological structure in the thinking in terms of the history of being.

It is true that, as it understands itself, thinking in terms of the history of being no longer talks about method. Instead it replaces methodological considerations with reflections on the way or pathway of thinking. In thinking in terms of the history of being, the words way or path of thinking are not used as metaphors. If we recall that way or obos is the root-word in the word *method* – a coming together of the Greek words μετά and ὁδός - then we are called to understand, in this reflection of 'way', the transformed shape of hermeneutic phenomenology. In thinking in terms of the history of being, the word way is the root-word for the 'problem of method' as it fits the thinking of being. But because what is said with the word way in the thinking of being cannot be compared with modern thinking on method – either in philosophy or science – and because 'way' here is the direct opposite of 'method' in the modern sense, Heidegger no longer uses the word method in his reflections on the way. Rather he employs this term only in the sense of its modern usage. Hence his reflections on the question of the 'way' immediately mark this 'way' off as distinct from the modern understanding of method. Thus the title 'Way and method' indicates the pathway of thinking of being in its difference from the method of modern thinking and representation. With this differentiation the word way constitutes the basic hermeneutical-phenomenological feature of thinking in terms of the history of being.

Our task, again, is to work out the hermeneutical-phenomenological structure of thinking in terms of the history of being. But before we can do this, we must bring to mind explicitly how hermeneutic phenomenology functions as the method of dealing with the question of being in terms of fundamental ontology.

1 Hermeneutic phenomenology within fundamental ontology

(a) The three senses of hermeneutics

By interpreting the two root-words of Greek thinking that make up the term phenomenology, Heidegger defines phenomenology as 'letting what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself' (GA 2, p. 46). Phenomenology is the manner of dealing with, the mode of access to and the manner of determining the theme of fundamental ontology. The theme of fundamental ontology, however, is Dasein in its Existenz, i.e., understanding being. In the enactment of its Existenz Dasein understands, along with its own being, the manifold being of beings that are not Dasein as well as the meaning of being in general. Understanding being through existing, discloses being as a whole, existentially-horizonally, or transcendentally. Therefore the task of phenomenology as a method is step by step to let Dasein - in its Existenz, i.e., understanding being - be seen as what shows itself of itself from itself, such that Dasein's understanding of being shows itself as the transcendental-horizonal disclosure of being as a whole.

The logos of phenomenology, we are told, has the methodological character of έρμηνεύειν (GA 2, p. 50). Phenomenological description in the sense of showing and demonstrating what is to be seen from itself has the 'methodological sense' of interpretation (Auslegung). With this characterization of the methodological sense of phenomenology as interpretation or έρμηνεύειν, Heidegger distinguishes his notion of phenomenology from that of Husserl, who defines phenomenological description as reflection – a reflection which takes place in reflective acts as intentional acts of consciousness of a higher level.⁵ Thus interpretation is distinct from reflection.

But this distinguishing characterization is not sufficient, because phenomenological analysis which proceeds reflectively can understand itself as interpretive, too - interpretation of the intentional act of consciousness as the intentional object of the reflective act. The distinction between interpretation and reflection will be adequately made only when interpretation is no longer determined as an intentional act of consciousness, but rather from out of the mode of being of Dasein, i.e., from Existenz.

As theoretically explicit enactment, phenomenological interpretation is rooted in the existential mode of being of interpretation, as discussed in Section 32 of Being and Time. And interpretation understood existentially is essentially the unfolding and laying out of what is projected in advance in a projecting understanding. It is because Heidegger considers philosophical questioning itself to be 'a possibility of the being of each existing Dasein' (GA 2, p. 18) that Dasein exists as thrown projection – in the Existenz-possibility of a questioning which is phenomenological

and fundamental-ontological (Dasein as thrown into its Existenz, i.e., understanding being) – and as interpreting what is thus projected. Section 63 of Being and Time characterizes the root character of ontological interpretation as projection and the unfolding of what is projected. The being which, in the pre-phenomenological enactment of Existenz according to the Existenz-possibilities of being-in-the-world, is implicitly projected as Existenz - and as the being of beings other than Dasein - this being is explicitly and thematically projected in the phenomenological enactment of Existenz and gets interpreted in terms of its structural content. In this sense the question of being is 'the radicalizing of an essential tendency of being that belongs to Dasein, i.e., of the preontological understanding of being' (GA 2, p. 20).

Hermeneutical-phenomenological thinking is not reflection, but rather a projecting-interpreting understanding. Because hermeneutic phenomenology as the method of fundamental ontology thematizes Dasein (in terms of its being, i.e., understanding being) by projecting and interpreting, phenomenology is the hermeneutical phenomenology of Dasein. Through έρμηνεύειν as a projecting-interpreting seeing of what shows itself of itself, 'the proper meaning of being and the basic structures of Dasein's own being are made manifest to the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein' (GA 2, p. 50). Thus Heidegger elucidates interpreting by going back to the Greek sense of the word έρμηνεύειν which as interpreting also means proclaiming and making manifest. Phenomenological interpreting as making manifest is what Dasein itself accomplishes. In the phenomenology of Dasein and out of an understanding of being which is always already unthematically in enactment in and through the έρμηνεύειν which Dasein explicitly enacts, Dasein makes manifest to itself the basic structures of its own being (which are concealed in its unthematic understanding of being), the mode of being of beings other than Dasein, and the meaning of being in general. Dasein's making manifest to itself takes place as interpreting unfolding of the projecting understanding of being which has been explicitly thematized. Because the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of έρμηνεύειν in the sense elucidated, this phenomenology is characterized as hermeneutics. This is the first sense of the word *hermeneutics*.

The second sense of hermeneutics follows from the first. In the existential root-structures of Dasein, which simultaneously constitute the understanding as understanding of being, the being of beings other than Dasein, the manifold modes of beings, and the manifold of what beings are are all horizonally disclosed. But along with temporalization of the temporality of Dasein, the temporalized horizonal time, i.e., Temporalität, is disclosed as the unity of the meaning of being of all beings other than Dasein. By phenomenologically uncovering the root-structures of Dasein and of the meaning of being that is understood by means of these structures, the horizon of investigation for an ontology of beings other than Dasein opens up. Considering ontologies of beings other than Dasein, hermeneutics of Dasein as understanding being (hermeneutics in the first sense) becomes hermeneutics in the second sense, i.e., in the sense 'that it works out the conditions for the possibility of every ontological investigation' (GA 2, p. 50). It is in view of this task that the words hermeneutics of Dasein appear without quotation marks. But when they appear with quotation marks - 'hermeneutics of Dasein' - this indicates that hermeneutics which serves regional ontology.

The third sense of hermeneutics is also included in the first. The meaning of being as such can be phenomenologically interpreted and laid open only after Dasein is interpreted with regard to its Existenz, wherein Dasein implicitly understands the meaning of being. Considering the priority of this task within fundamental ontology, hermeneutics gets its third sense as 'the analytic of the existentiality of Existenz' (GA 2, p. 50).

As far as the sequence of steps is concerned, this third sense of hermeneutics is the 'primary' one, because only by taking this step can hermeneutical-phenomenological fundamental ontology come to an answer to the basic question concerning the meaning of being.

(b) Conditions for the enactment of hermeneutics

Phenomenological hermeneutics is interpretation in a certain sense. However, it is called hermeneutics because it is not interpretation in its pretheoretical mode of being nor the theoretical way of comportment known as interpretation of texts, nor 'the methodology of historical humanistic disciplines' (GA 2, p. 51). This phenomenological hermeneutics interprets Dasein in its being as a projective and interpretive understanding. It is this phenomenology which shows first and foremost that, in its being, Dasein is constituted by projection and interpretation. The phenomenological-hermeneutical insight into the ontological constitution of Dasein also includes an insight into the mode of enactment of any phenomenological interpretation of one's own Dasein, namely that what enables this phenomenology is precisely what it brings forth, i.e., projection and interpretation, as they belong to the ontological constitution of Dasein.

The mode of being of the hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein and its understanding of being is explicit projection and explicit interpretation of what is projected. There is no interpretation without projection and no projection without interpretation. Thus at the beginning of Section 32 of Being and Time we read: 'The projection of understanding carries within itself the possibility of self-unfolding. We shall call the unfolding of understanding: interpretation' (GA 2, p. 197). Moreover we read: 'Existentially, interpretation is based in understanding, not the other way around' (ibid.). Interpretation does not shape the understanding; rather, as appropriation, interpretation emerges from that primary understanding which takes shape in projection. For this reason hermeneutics of Dasein is a projective-interpretive understanding of Dasein and its understanding of being.

However, projection is what it is as projection only in conjunction with the existential mode of being of thrownness. Projection can only disclose projectively what it is thrown into. For the hermeneutics of Dasein this means that explicit projection projects Dasein unto its Existenz, i.e., understanding being – an Existenz given in advance to projection by thrownness, as what is explicitly projectable.

Moreover, co-original with thrownness and projection is Rede, the root unfolding of language. Both of these basic existentials 'are co-originally determined by Rede' (GA 2, p. 177). For the hermeneutics of Dasein this means that when thrown projection is explicitly enacted – when Dasein is projected unto its Existenz, i.e., understanding being – this projection holds what is projected in an articulated understandability that stems from Rede.

If interpretation is existentially based in the projective understanding and if this understanding is what it is in conjunction with thrownness and articulated *Rede*, then the *totality* of explicit projection, thrownness and articulated *Rede* is where the phenomenological interpretation of hermeneutics is based.

Only when we see these subtle interconnections clearly do we grasp the extent to which interpretation is subject to the three conditions of enactment, namely fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping. We might say: what is projected in the explicit projection - or: what is projected in the hermeneutic enactment of the thrown and articulated projection - is what is primarily understood as fore-having. As appropriation of understanding, phenomenological interpretation moves within a being that understands Dasein, which is projected unto its Existenz, i.e., understanding being. It is this Dasein that has become fore-having for interpretation. Interpretive disclosing carries out the appropriation of what is primarily understood (thought still in a hidden way) under the guidance of a regard for that unto which what is projected is to be interpreted. This 'regard' which guides interpretation in advance is the fore-sight. In accord with its ontological relationship to its fore-having, interpretation already reaches ahead into a graspability which it (interpretation) draws from fore-having and into which it (interpretation) brings what gets interpreted. The third condition of enactment of phenomenological interpretation is fore-grasping. Because phenomenological interpretation is based within the totality of thrownness, projection and Rede, the conditions for the enactment of this phenomenology are fore-having, foresight and fore-grasping. Thrownness is carried out in fore-having; projection, in fore-sight; and *Rede*, in fore-grasping (cf. GA 2, p. 200).

(c) The circle of hermeneutics

Fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping are the conditions for enacting any interpretation and thus also for enacting the phenomenological interpretation of hermeneutics. All interpretation - including hermeneutic interpretation - moves within this threefold structure. This structure implies that, when something is phenomenologically interpreted by hermeneutics, hermeneutics must have understood this something in advance - in an understanding which takes shape in a primary projection. With fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping as conditions for enactment, interpretation dwells in a fore-understanding of what interpretation is to interpret and make its own. For this reason no interpretation - and thus also no phenomenological hermeneutic – is 'a pre-suppositionless grasping of something given in advance' (ibid.). Interpretation of hermeneutics, too, operates essentially within a fore-understanding which takes shape and unfolds in the hermeneutic projection of Dasein, which projects Dasein unto its Existenz, i.e., understanding being. In so far as interpretive understanding nourishes itself from the projectible fore-understanding, in a certain sense it moves in a circle, though not an empty one. Rather, this circle deepens and differentiates understanding. This circle of understanding, the circle of hermeneutics, 'is the expression of the existential fore-structure' (GA 2, p. 203).

Because the circle of hermeneutics is the essential structure for interpretive understanding, this understanding requires that we 'enter' this circle 'in the proper way' (ibid.). Interpretation of hermeneutics must have understood

that its first, constant, and final task is not to let fore-having, foresight and fore-grasping be given by flashes of inspiration and popular conceptions, but to solidify the scientific thematic by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.

(ibid.)

This is a characterization of the enactment of interpretation in view of its basic *phenomenological* feature and its three conditions for enactment. Interpretation must see to it that what is understood in fore-having, foresight and fore-grasping is obtained from the things themselves, i.e., from what shows itself by itself. Only when projection projects Dasein in its existing understanding of beings – as Dasein shows itself by and from itself – can the interpretation of what is thus phenomenologically projected be in turn enacted phenomenologically.

As stated already, philosophizing Dasein makes manifest to itself the

basic structures of its own being, the mode of being of beings other than Dasein, and the meaning of being as such through έρμηνεύειν of the phenomenology of Dasein and out of its non-thematic understanding of being. For the sake of this hermeneutic proclamation (hermeneutische Kundgabe) philosophizing Dasein explicitly projects the existing understanding of being, which is otherwise enacted only implicitly. Hence we can call this project the 'hermeneutic project', which belongs essentially to the interpretation of hermeneutics.

2 The basic hermeneutical-phenomenological feature of thinking in terms of the history of being

(a) The hermeneutic relation

Heidegger's oft afore-mentioned 'Dialogue on language' is of extra-ordinary significance for our inquiry, because in that text with a few sharp strokes he marks out the transformed structure of hermeneutic phenomenology in thinking in terms of the history of being. In this dialogue we read that 'έρμηνεύειν is that revealing which brings tidings because it is capable of hearing for a message' (GA 12, p. 115). A little later we read: 'All of this makes it clear that hermeneutics does not mean just interpretation, but goes even deeper than that and means bringing of a message and tidings' (ibid.). What Heidegger then calls 'hermeneutic relation' is, as relation, the bringing of a message by way of listening to it. Bringing tidings is έρμηνεύειν, which takes place in hearing for a message. The message which is passed along to listeners is 'being itself', i.e., 'the emergence of the emergent, the twofold of the two out of their onefold' (GA 12, p. 116). We are told that it is this twofold that lays claim on 'humans in their root unfolding' (ibid.). And the root unfolding of humans consists 'in corresponding to the claim [Zuspruch] of the twofold' (ibid.). Humans correspond to this claim by listening to the message of the twofold, by proclaiming the message that they hear, and by bringing tidings of it.

This characterization of the hermeneutic relation articulates thinking in terms of the history of being - a thinking that thinks the relation (Bezug) of being to Dasein and the comporting relationship (Verhältnis) of Dasein to being, thinking this whole relation as Ereignis.

But which experience of thinking is it that transforms the initial posing of the question of being in terms of fundamental ontology into the approach to this question in terms of the history of being? What is called 'claim' (Anspruch) and 'appeal' (Zuspruch, Zusage) in thinking in terms of the history of being has the same structure of relation as the 'throw of being' (Wurf des Seins) in the Letter on Humanism.⁷ It is the 'throw of being' that gives rise to the 'thrownness of Dasein'.⁸ Thus it is the phenomenological experience of the origin of thrownness in being's throw ('throwing forth') of the truth of being that opens up the way for thinking the question of being in terms of the history of being.

However, we cannot enter the pathway that works out the question in terms of the history of being without having gone the way of elaborating that question in terms of fundamental ontology. The way-opening experience of existential thrownness as coming from the throw of the truth of being is, finally, the decisive insight into being's root unfolding as Ereignis.

In this context there is a key passage from that work of Heidegger's which, by way of a sixfold, conjoined lay-out, opens out the elaboration of the question of being in terms of the history of being, namely Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). This key passage states that:

the thrower of projection experiences itself as thrown, as appropriated by being. The opening which is achieved through projection is an opening only when it occurs as the experience of thrownness and thus as a belonging to being. This is the essential difference vis-à-vis all transcendental ways of knowing with regard to the conditions of possibility.

(GA 65, p. 239)

One cannot fail to hear here that thrownness of projection is the same as its being-appropriated through being for the sake of the root unfolding of the truth of being. Appropriating means that humans are determined as 'proper to being' (GA 65, p. 263) in terms of being's relation to them. The thrown projection which occurs in terms of appropriating takes place in such a way that it picks up the 'counter-movement of appropriating' (GA 65, p. 239). But depending on how projection picks up this 'countermovement', the free character of projection comes into play.

Already in Beiträge Heidegger sees the relation of appropriating (being-thrown) as needing (Brauchen) and the projective relationship to the appropriating truth of being as the belonging (Zugehören) of humans to being's root unfolding: 'In order to unfold, being needs humans. And humans belong to being so that they accomplish their uttermost calling as Da-sein' (GA 65, p. 251). The onefold of appropriative needing and projective belonging makes up the 'innermost occurrence' in Ereignis. It is this innermost occurrence, the unfolding of being as Ereignis, that Heidegger calls 'the turning in Ereignis' (GA 65, p. 407). In one of the most precise formulations Heidegger says: 'The turning unfolds between the call (to the one who belongs) and hearing the call (by the one who is being called). The turning is a re-turning' (ibid.). Thus Beiträge thinks the basic structure of thinking in terms of the history of being, which from now on undergirds, guides and governs all of Heidegger's writings, including what is properly called his 'later philosophy'.

When thinking thinks being as such in its unfolding as Ereignis and as the returning in Ereignis, then this thinking gets accomplished as a listening which hears for the appropriating call of being, i.e., hears for the message, and as a manifesting of what is heard. In hearing-for, thinking receives the truth of being as what throws itself forth. Thinking experiences its thrownness in this receiving. By bringing tidings of what it receives, thinking comports itself *projectively* towards and preserves the truth of being which throws itself forth (cf. GA 12, p. 119). In the language of thinking and in the word of the work of thinking, thinking preserves/shelters being's root unfolding as *Ereignis* and the turning in Ereignis – whose root unfolding is thrown forth and projected. In hearing for the call, thinking comports itself phenomenologically-hermeneutically: phenomenologically, in so far as thinking lets the self-showing of things themselves or being as such be seen; hermeneutically, in so far as in projection thinking brings tidings of the self-showing and, in preserving/ sheltering, interprets what throws itself forth and is projected, bringing it into the articulated word of the work of thinking.

The transformation of hermeneutic phenomenology in the thinking in terms of the history of being follows from thinking the root unfolding of being as Ereignis. In hearing-for a message, hermeneutic bringing of tidings shows in itself the structure of *Ereignis* as an occurrence. When Heidegger says that humans stand within the twofold through the hermeneutic relation, the term Bezug (relation) does not mean Beziehung (connection). Rather it means Brauch (need) in the sense that we discussed above: human being in the root unfolding as Ek-sistenz is needed by the truth of being and for this truth, so that humans belong to 'a need which claims them' (GA 12, p. 118).

The hermeneutic relation in which humans stand takes place when the appropriating-needing relation to the truth of being and the appropriated relation belonging to the truth of being come together. This becomes clear when Heidegger says that the relation in which humans stand, in accordance with their root unfolding, is called 'hermeneutical, because it brings tidings of that message' (GA 12, p. 128). This message 'claims humans in order that they correspond to it' (ibid.). In the word message we must think solely the truth of being which in its throw to humans discloses them as Dasein and throws them into Dasein, such that they exist as thrown. Similarly we must think the bringing of tidings by the message solely as claimed, i.e., as a thrown projection which corresponds to the appropriating throw of the truth of being. Correspondence is the mode of enactment of projection. Thus the word message is the fundamental word in hermeneutics for the throw, i.e., for the 'bringing of the tidings'. This word is also the fundamental word in hermeneutics for the projection as projected from within the throw of the truth of being. In so far as in their projective thinking humans bring tidings of the message that they have heard, they are 'messengers of the message' (ibid.). Bringing tidings of the message is also 'a course/pathway taken by the message' (ibid., p. 148).

Within the fundamental-ontological perspective, phenomenological hermeneutic is characterized as an έρμηνεύειν which, as the explicit, projective interpreting that lets-be-seen-from-itself, makes the fundamental structures of Dasein's ownmost being and the meaning of being as such manifest to the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein. What is disclosed through hermeneutical (philosophical) projection is given in advance (by thrownness) as projectible and interpretable. What is given in advance to this projection is Dasein as it exists implicitly in its understanding of being - Dasein which as such is projected hermeneutically onto its existential structures and onto the meaning of being as such, disclosed existentially and horizonally.

If we now turn to the experience marked by the history of being, according to which Dasein's thrownness into the disclosure of being as a whole stems from the throw of the disclosure of the truth of being, then what is projectible by hermeneutic projection is no longer solely given in advance in thrownness, but comes from out of the throw of the truth of being. But then έρμηνεύειν no longer means making manifest, but rather bringing tidings of what throws itself forth.

But why did the thrownness which was phenomenologically-hermeneutically laid out in the transcendental-horizonal perspective prove inadequate for the thinking that determines being as such? Because the transcendental-horizonal perspective could not let the historicality of being itself and its truth be thought. To be sure, the fundamental ontology of Being and Time thinks through the historicality of Dasein, its existing in the possibilities of being-in-the-world, comprehended either as appropriate or inappropriate. But what is left unthought in this ontology is the historicality of the disclosure of being as a whole. And it becomes necessary for Heidegger to think the historicality of being itself when he undergoes the phenomenological experience that the WAY that beings emerge gets historically transformed. We can think the mode of emergence of beings as standing reserve (Bestand) in the root unfolding of technique only when we phenomenologically-hermeneutically think the historicality of the truth of being as the historically transformed unfolding of being. We gain an insight into the historical unfolding of being itself when we experience and think thrownness into the disclosure of being from out of the appropriating throw of being.

(b) The way of regioning

Phenomenological-hermeneutic thinking, bringing tidings of the message heard in listening, takes place as a 'way' of thinking. The question now concerns this 'way' as a pathway and how this pathway relates to thinking and to what is to be thought. The elucidation of these questions takes place in a reflection on 'way'.

A decisive reflection on 'way' is found in the series of lectures entitled Das Wesen der Sprache: The Root Unfolding of Language⁹ (GA 12, p. 167). The question concerning the root unfolding of language occupies an eminent place in the elaboration of the question of being by thinking in terms of the history of being. In the 'Dialogue on language' we read in this regard: 'Language, accordingly, is the predominating and sustaining element in the relation of human beings to the twofold. It (language) determines the hermeneutic relation' (GA 12, p. 116). We mentioned at the beginning that reflection on the 'way' as a pathway of thinking being differs from method as it is understood in the modern sense. The fact of this differentiation already makes clear that, in dealing with the 'way', we are dealing with the incomparable 'question of method' as it pertains to the thinking of being. Because the word method gets its determination in terms of the modern understanding of method, the thinking of being renounces the word method when it reflects on 'way'. This is true, even though, when considered in its literal sense, the word method means 'along the way' and would be an appropriate word for the kind of going that occurs as thinking of being on a 'way'. 10

How does Heidegger characterize the root unfolding of method in modern science? As a way of knowing, scientific method is not just an 'instrument at the service of science' (GA 12, p. 167). The modern conception of method does not have the character of serving, but of dominating. This character shows itself in the manner in which for its part method 'takes sciences into its service'. The relationship between subject-matter and method in the sciences indicates a priority of method over subject-matter. The domineering character of the scientific method reflects the domineering position of the subject in the modern sense, which in its representational and domineering relation to beings represents and produces them solely as objects, eventually reducing beings to an orderable standing reserve. Method controls subject-matter, i.e., the beings to be examined scientifically, in such a way that not only does method determine the subject-matter, but also 'places the subject-matter into the method', thus making subject-matter 'subordinate' to method (ibid.). Gathering up, Heidegger characterizes the relationship of method to subject-matter in modern science by saying: 'All power of knowing lies in the method. The subject-matter is taken up and absorbed by the method' (ibid.). The method prescribes what is to be considered a valid

object of knowing and how this object is to be known. Beings themselves do not provide the pattern for access to them. Rather, method forces beings to show themselves according to method's instructions. This domineering way in which modern method unfolds is an essential way for the modern subject to establish its reign over beings.

Considering how thinking being differs from scientific representation, we might expect to see in the thinking of being a simple reversal of the relationship of method to subject-matter. But this is not the case. Heidegger says: 'Here there is neither a method nor a subject-matter' (ibid.). This is to say that in the thinking of being there is neither a method nor a subject-matter as these terms are posited in scientific representation. That thinking of being has no subject-matter does not mean that this thinking is without a matter for thinking. That thinking of being has no method does not mean that this thinking is without a pathway. It simply means that the relation between matter for thinking and pathway of thinking in the thinking of being is a totally different relationship from that of subject-matter to method in the thinking of the sciences.

Instead of method and subject-matter, thinking of beings thinks 'way' and 'region'. Whereas in characterizing scientific thinking Heidegger puts method ahead of subject-matter, in characterizing the thinking of being he first mentions 'region' and then 'way'. Region is called a region 'because region regions and makes free what is to be thought by thinking' (GA 12, p. 168). As in all basic words from Heidegger's later thinking, the word Gegend/region, too, at first seems strange. But as in all basic words from Heidegger's later thinking, the word Gegend/region, too, is drawn from letting the matter show itself. When Heidegger says Gegend gegnet (region regions), he is reaching back to the Middle High German word gegenen - a word which is lost in the modern High German which means entgegenkommen (coming over against) or begegnen (meeting). When Gegend takes place in the regioning of the region, what is to be thought comes over against thinking; it meets thinking. Regioning of the region frees up for thinking what is to be thought.

But 'regioning of the region' as 'coming over against' shows the same structure as the message that belongs to the hermeneutic relation, i.e., from the disclosing of the twofold of emergence and emergent that thinking takes up. The basic disclosing character of the regioning of the region is what Heidegger thinks as freeing or freeing up - from out of concealment into the open of unconcealment.

In the same way 'regioning of the region' shows the same structure as the call (Zuruf), appeal (Zuspruch) or claim (Anspruch). But this is nothing other than the 'throw' of being from which the thrownness of Dasein emerges into the truth of being. In that it regions, region frees up 'what is to be thought by thinking', i.e., the matter to be thought. In a broad and formal sense region and what it always frees up is the 'subject-matter' of thinking. But this subject-matter is not just posited by the 'method' which controls it; rather, it is freed up by a preliminary appeal for thinking as what is to be thought. What is freed up as the matter for thinking is what shows itself by itself; and this self-showing lets thinking hear the call, the message. Because what is to be thought is freed up by the regioning of the region, therefore thinking comports itself to it as the self-showing of the matter itself, as a phenomenological thinking.

This way of thinking, which receives what is its to think from the freeing up that occurs in the region, 'dwells in the region by going the ways of the region' (ibid.). To the extent that thinking grasps what is in each case freed up, it becomes a way for thinking. The genitive 'ways of the region' is a genitivus possessivus. These are ways which belong to the region in as much as this region frees them up. When thinking hears, understands and unfolds what is freed up as what meets thinking, then thinking sets upon a way that gets shown from the region. In the thinking of being, 'the way belongs in the region' (ibid.).

It is important to note this determination of the relationship between way and region, in order to distinguish *this* relationship from the relation of method and subject-matter in modern thinking and representation. Whereas in modern thinking subject-matter belongs to method, in the thinking of being way always belongs to the region. In scientific representation subject-matter submits to the method which controls it. By contrast, in the thinking of being the way is joined to the region, because it is the region which, in its freeing up the being which it must think, lays out the way to be gone. For such a thinking the 'method', now thought as 'way', gets its determination from within the matter to be thought, in so far as this matter opens access to itself in a preliminary way.

What in 1959, in the lecture trilogy Das Wesen der Sprache, Heidegger thought in the phrase 'ways of the region' he had first worked out in Beiträge zur Philosophie, his second major work, after Being and Time. In Beiträge he worked out the phenomenological-hermeneutic thinking of *Ereignis* in terms of the history of being. *Beiträge* refers to thinking in terms of the history of being as 'Gedanken-gang': 'a pathway of thought which runs through and lights up the hitherto concealed realm of being's unfolding and obtains this realm in its ownmost character as Ereignis' (GA 65, p. 3). The 'work of thinking' which occurs as thinking in terms of the history of being can and must be 'a pathway, with all the ambiguities of that word: a going and at the same time a way – thus a way which goes itself' (GA 65, p. 83). And this way is the way of access to being as *Ereignis*. Of course, being the way it is, this way is freed up by the appropriating throw of the truth of being; and only as always freed up in appropriated projection can it be grasped and gone.

For this reason the way of thinking's projection 'does not have the firm contours of a map' (GA 65, p. 86). Instead the land/region emerges only through the way, granted that this way 'is determined by being itself', i.e., is freed up in the appropriating throw as a projectible and goable way (GA 65, p. 80).

In making this sharp distinction between way and method, Heidegger is not engaging in self-criticism regarding his initial account of the 'phenomenological method'. From the outset Heidegger's understanding of method in the 'letting what shows itself by itself be seen from itself' is contrary to the modern understanding of method. The phenomenological method that is worked out in Section 7 of Being and Time, as a method of letting what shows itself be seen from itself, is precisely not the same as a method which controls the subject-matter of scientific knowing. Rather it is a method which is joined to the philosophical subject-matter, namely the meaning of being as such and the ontological make-up of Dasein, i.e., understanding being. As far as the phenomenological method of Being and Time is concerned, the matter for thinking has the first and last word. As self-showing of the matter itself, phenomenological method is completely and diametrically opposed to the modern understanding of method. The modern understanding of method is as far removed as is possible from the basic phenomenological attitude. This understanding of phenomenological method, which Heidegger also calls the formal concept of phenomenology, was instituted by Husserl and summed up in the maxim 'to the things themselves'. Heidegger's thinking from beginning to end lives off this understanding of phenomenology an understanding which the later Heidegger formulated simply as 'letting the matter show itself'. For this reason the only proper way of access to Heidegger's thinking is the way of phenomenological interpretation.

(c) The turning in Ereignis and the circle of hermeneutics

As it is outlined for the first time in Being and Time, phenomenological hermeneutic includes in essence a fore-understanding, given in forehaving, fore-sight and fore-grasping, and - along with this fore-understanding - the circle-structure of hermeneutics. How do both fore-understanding and the hermeneutic circle-structure fit in the hermeneutic relation of thinking in terms of the history of being?

We find instructive responses to these questions again in the 'Dialogue on language'. As Heidegger specifically points out, what is discussed in this dialogue - particularly with regard to the question of language's root unfolding – is significant for all the issues of thinking in terms of the history of being. In that dialogue Heidegger characterizes the question concerning the root unfolding of language, as well as the question concerning being as such, as putting a question to (Anfrage-bei) and asking after (Nachfrage-nach). In the question of being we put a question to

being and ask after being itself, i.e., being's root unfolding. In order to initiate this questioning and inquiry, we must open ourselves to a 'regard' or 'sight' which, as Heidegger emphasizes, is not limited to the questions just touched upon (GA 12, p. 164). That to which we put the question and ask after 'must already have been addressed to us' (ibid.). The structure of having already been addressed by what is to be taken into the question is the structure of the necessary fore-understanding within which every question originates.

This regard which must open up questioning as putting-the-questionto and asking-after, in order to see through its own conditions of enactment - this regard we can call the hermeneutic regard. Heidegger formulates this in a general way when he says:

Putting the question to something [Anfrage] and asking after something [Nachfrage] need here and everywhere first to be addressed by that which touches them in questioning and which they pursue in questioning. The starting point of any question always already dwells within the appeal of that to which the question is put.

(ibid.)

In the realm of thinking in terms of the history of being every question receives its essential and necessary fore-understanding from the appeal or that which first of all enables questioning as such. As a putting the question to something or asking after something, questioning would run into a vacuum, were it not guided in advance by what questioning asks about and searches for (cf. Being and Time, Section 2). The question of being as such has its fore-having in the appeal of that to which the question is put and which is asked after. As a questioning, this question looks to this fore-having, within a fore-sight and a fore-grasping. This questioning that always already dwells within the appeal is the structure of the hermeneutic circle.

If questioning in the realm of thinking in terms of the history of being is so decisively made possible from out of the appeal, then questioning is not 'the genuine gesture of thinking . . . but rather hearing the appeal of what must come into question' (ibid.). Such an essential hermeneutic insight into the basic posture of thinking in terms of the history of being does not abolish questioning as questioning, in favour of a mere listening. This by no means denies the questioning character of thinking in terms of the history of being. It is simply and solely a matter of detecting the condition for initiating and enacting the question. If it turns out that the starting point for the question has the appeal of fore-having as its condition, then mere questioning can no longer be the basic posture of thinking, but rather an understanding that hears what is offered for questioning and asked after. Only if thinking above all is an understanding hearing of that which lights up as what is to be thought and questioned – only then can thinking begin its questioning in the right manner (as putting a question to something and asking after it) and enact it step by step. In the enactment of questioning, thinking is primarily an understanding hearing of that which thinking inquires into.

The thinking which thus makes its basic posture transparent to itself is not at all a thinking without questioning, but attempts to gain clarity about that which makes possible this thinking's ability to question.

Thinking of being which receives its fore-having for its enactment from a hearing understanding of what is offered to it has the character of a self-joining. This thinking does not exercise control over the matter that this thinking has to think. Rather, this thinking is joined to the matter for thinking which is thrown toward thinking as something to be thought. The basic phenomenological attitude of this thinking speaks from out of that joining, in which the matter to be thought shows itself for this thinking's enactment of questioning. But the basic phenomenological attitude of this thinking is at the same time its basic hermeneutic character. Hearing understanding of the appeal of that 'to which all questioning is put by asking after the root unfolding' (ibid.) is the same hearing that we are familiar with in the 'hermeneutic relation' as that hearing of the message which brings tidings of it.

Thinking in terms of the history of being accounts for the essential hermeneutic insight into the hearing understanding of the appeal of that which is put into question when, as is the case in questioning the root unfolding of language, this thinking formulates the following directive for the continuation of its questioning thinking: root unfolding of language: language of root unfolding. The expression which follows the latter colon is the formal indicator of the fore-understanding of what is asked after. Thus thinking in terms of the history of being is also held within that peculiar movement which Being and Time calls the circle of understanding.

There is an instructive passage in Beiträge zur Philosophie in which as is to be expected from everything that we have said so far - the circle of hermeneutics is transformed and re-rooted into the 'turning in Ereignis'. This passage reads:

The innermost occurrence in Ereignis and its widest reach lies in the turning. The turning that unfolds in Ereignis is the hidden ground for all other turnings and circles - each one subordinated, unclear in its origin, remaining unquestioned, and wanting to be taken as the 'very last' turn or circle. (Cf. the turn in the contexture of the guiding question and the circle of understanding.)

As presented earlier, the turning in Ereignis is the appropriating relation of being to Dasein and the appropriated-projecting belonging of Dasein to the unfolding of the truth of being. The appropriating relation, or as Heidegger puts it in Beiträge, 'being's breakthrough [Anfall] as appropriating the Da' (ibid.) is that appeal which has always to be heard and understood before thinking can put a question to being or ask after it. Questioning as putting-a-question-to and as asking-after gets enacted according to the hearing understanding of the appeal as a thinking projection. Only what is projected in the hermeneutic project out of hearing the appeal can be interpreted in the narrower sense as a thrown-projection. The circle of understanding is rooted in the turning which unfolds in Ereignis as the counter-movement of the appropriating-throw and appropriated-projection.

Thinking in terms of the history of being which thinks the root unfolding of being (being as such) as Ereignis and as the turning in Ereignis and which is understood in its character of enactment as appropriated from out of Ereignis - is a phenomenological and then a hermeneutic thinking. Not only does phenomenological hermeneutic or hermeneutic phenomenology think the root unfolding of being as Ereignis, but it also has its enabling ground in *Ereignis* and in the turning that belongs to Ereignis.

The interpretive glimpse into the basic phenomenological-hermeneutic feature of thinking in terms of the history of being leads to this insight: in its manifold ways Heidegger's thinking can be appropriately and adequately interpreted only if each stage of interpretation heeds the basic hermeneutic-phenomenological character of this thinking. We owe hermeneutic phenomenology as phenomenology to Edmund Husserl's original establishment of this basic philosophical posture. Only one who has thoroughly mastered Husserl's phenomenology in the sense of its actual maxim 'to the things themselves' and who has worked through this phenomenology by enacting it - only such a one is called upon and capable of entering into a philosophical dialogue with Heidegger's thinking, as caretaker of this phenomenological-hermeneutic thinking and of the two ways of elaborating the question of being.

Notes

- 1 Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe (GA) 2.
- 2 Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65.
- 3 'Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache', in Unterwegs zur Sprache, GA 12, pp. 79ff.
- 4 Martin Heidegger, 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie', in Zur Sache des Denkes (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 90.

5 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. II, Part 1, Husserliana Bd.

XIX/1, ed. U. Panzer (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), para. 3.

6 Given the central role that *Rede* has in Section 34 of *Sein und Zeit*, this word moves deeper than any meaning or connotation it has in its ordinary usage. For reasons as to why in Heidegger's German *Rede* cannot be taken simply at face value and identified with 'discourse', 'speech' or 'talk' see F.-W. von Herrmann, *Subjekt und Dasein* (1985), p. 103.

7 Martin Heidegger, Brief über den Humanismus (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio

Klostermann Verlag, 1981), p. 18.

8 ibid., p. 33.

9 'Das Wesen der Sprache', in Unterwegs zur Sprache, GA 12, pp. 147ff.

10 For a discussion of the difference between way and method see also Martin Heidegger, 'Der Fehl heiliger Namen', in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, GA 13, pp. 231ff.

Looking metaphysics in the face

Jean Greisch

So sind wir zum letzten Mal in all diesen umwegigen Versuchen einer Kennzeichnung der Metaphysik gescheitert. Haben wir dabei nichts gewonnen? Nein und ja. Gewonnen haben wir nicht eine Definition oder dergleichen. Gewonnen haben wir wohl eine wichtige und vielleicht wesentliche Einsicht in das Eigentümliche der Metaphysik: dass wir selbst ihr gegenüber ausweichen, uns von ihr selbst fortschleichen und uns auf Umwege begeben; dass aber keine Wahl bleibt, als uns selbst aufzumachen und der Metaphysik ins Gesicht zu sehen, um sie nicht wieder aus den Augen zu verlieren.¹

My title was suggested by the poster of a congress on 'Heidegger and metaphysics' carrying a sketch by Paul Klee of a human face whose principal feature was an enormous eye. The phrase 'looking metaphysics in the face' is not my own invention but comes from Heidegger himself, who uses it several times with marked emphasis in the introduction to *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, a course given at Freiburg during the Winter semester 1929–30. It occurs in the text I have chosen as epigraph:

So for the last time in all these circuitous efforts at a characterization of metaphysics we have failed. Have we gained nothing in the process? No and yes. We have not gained a definition or anything of that sort. But we have gained an important and perhaps fundamental insight into what is proper to metaphysics: that we ourselves edge away from it, side-step it and embark on detours; but that no choice remains except for us to set forth anew and to look metaphysics in the face, never to lose sight of it again.

Metaphysics, if we take these statements seriously, would then be essen-

tially a matter of looking, a particular optical system. This was indeed the sense in which Heidegger envisaged it from the time of his Habilitation thesis, at the end of which we find the following statement: 'Philosophy cannot in the long run do without its proper optics, which is metaphysics.'2

1 An exposed reading of Heidegger

Later we will examine the context of our epigraph, clarifying in particular the reference to certain 'detours'. For the moment let us focus on a twofold question: What does it mean - for Heidegger and for us - to 'look metaphysics in the face'? Was Heidegger himself able to fulfil the aspiration expressed in that formula, or did he himself not progressively and increasingly lose sight of metaphysics? These are not random questions; they emerge from a concrete hermeneutical site, a precise moment in the history of the reception of Heidegger's problematic. Otherwise it would be arbitrary to single out from the vast stretch of thinking covered in the 1929-30 course a brief formula which might after all be no more than professorial rhetoric. What defines the site for the reading I present here is an exposure - in every sense of the word - to the powerful initiative of Emmanuel Lévinas in developing the theme of the face of the other, a theme which is both phenomenological and metaphysical. Read in this light, Heidegger's apparently harmless reference to 'the face' claims our attention as something that deserves to be thought about, and that should not be allowed to slip by unquestioned. It may be that a rigorous confrontation between the thought of Lévinas and that of Heidegger – doubtless the two most empathic thinkers of our time – is the royal road to grasping in terms accessible to contemporary thought the invitation which Heidegger at a given epoch in his thinking addressed to his hearers and his future readers: 'look metaphysics in the face'.

To make progress in this line of questioning, it is essential to respect on both sides the singularly complex données of the problematic, instead of confining ourselves to convenient clichés. In dealing with Heidegger there is a temptation to fall into the cliché that has been canonized during a whole phase in the reception of his thought, namely the hasty reduction of the relation between 'Heidegger and metaphysics' to a clearcut and massive opposition – 'Heidegger against metaphysics'. Of course it cannot be denied that the latter slogan has a certain legitimacy; it is warranted by too many texts of his to allow it to be ignored. It is true that from a certain period – roughly from about 1936, the time of the famous turn (*Kehre*) in his thinking – Heidegger, after long study of Nietzsche, makes much of the exhaustion (Verendung) of metaphysics and postulates the necessity of another beginning for thought (andersanfängliches Denken). However, the complexity of the terminology he chooses (Verwindung-Uberwindung, relinquishment-overcoming) shows that 'to lose sight of metaphysics' is not a simple business. The process of overcoming is regularly described as nothing less than a conversion to another way of looking, or as exposure to the gaze of the Ereignis (appropriation), of which we had been hitherto unaware. This theme of the new way of looking is richly orchestrated in a major text, surely destined to play a decisive role in the future interpretation of the genesis of Heidegger's thought: the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Contributions to Philosophy) recently published in the Gesamtausgabe on the occasion of the centenary of the philosopher's birth.

The central theme of this new post-Kehre way of looking is expressed at the conclusion of the essay 'Uberwindung der Metaphysik', which is devoted to the problematic of the Verwindung of thought's previous way of looking:3 that which we must look in the face is the Ereignis which itself is looking at us.4 Precisely because we know that Heidegger thus turned his gaze in another direction than that of metaphysics, it is of great importance to us to be clear on what looking metaphysics in the face meant to him at an earlier phase of his itinerary. The concrete hermeneutical site of my inquiry is further defined by this conviction: that what is most needed for a lucid grasp of Heidegger's achievement today is not so much to reflect more deeply on the nature and difficulties of the Heideggerian exit from metaphysics as to grasp correctly the conditions of his *entrance* into metaphysics. Instead of confining ourselves exclusively to the question: how did Heidegger (or did he) succeed in leaving metaphysics, we should take up the more opportune and promising query: how, for what reasons, did Heidegger (or did he) succeed in entering into metaphysics? Or to put it more dramatically: it is by the gate of life rather than by the gate of death that we can best enter into the issue of Heidegger's relation to metaphysics.

2 From Husserl's eyes to the gaze of the Ereignis

The question thus formulated may occasion some surprise. For is it not obvious that in the first period of his thought Heidegger was a metaphysician? But just this is what is open to question, not only for the interpreters of Heidegger, but, in my opinion, first of all for Heidegger himself! Instead of immediately imputing to him a metaphysics, we must recognize the fact that at the beginning of his philosophical itinerary nothing was less evident for him than that he could install himself in metaphysics! The motives that prevented him from declaring himself a metaphysician are quite complex. The most obvious ones are of a polemical order, and they surface throughout the lecture courses of the period

preparatory to Being and Time. The term 'metaphysics' had become too inflated at that time not to inspire mistrust in one who was struggling for an intransigent intellectual probity. It is not surprising that Heidegger does not adopt the analyses of Peter Wust who was noisily announcing the 'resurrection of metaphysics'. But this polemical antipathy cannot be separated from a more positive and for that reason more decisive philosophical motive. Since we have placed our reflections under the sign of the metaphor of looking, we cannot omit mention of the remarkable avowal of Heidegger in his 1923 course Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity: 'My travelling companion in research was the young Luther and my model Aristotle, whom Luther detested. Kierkegaard gave me impulsions, and as for the eyes, it is Husserl who put them in my head.'5 If it is Husserl and he alone who gave Heidegger his eyes, it follows that it is with Husserl's eyes, in other words those of phenomenology, that one is supposed to look metaphysics in the face. Now for someone like Heidegger who estimates - sincerely, not hypocritically - that it is Husserlian phenomenology and it alone that furnishes the basis for a radical rehandling of the question of being, to define a metaphysical position could not be a matter of course. For a phenomenological ontology, metaphysics as an academic tradition has ceased to exist. Nor is it at all obvious that it can recover an existence outside academic tradition. Such a recovery demands that one reinvent the phenomenological signification of the term 'metaphysics'. (And here we come on the first basic reason necessitating a confrontation of the positions of Heidegger and Lévinas: both of them, though for dissimilar motives, tackle the same task of giving a phenomenological signification to the term 'metaphysics'.)

My reflections thus far imply a particular reading of the itinerary of Heidegger. I would propose the following perhaps over-schematic periodization:

(1) In a first period, corresponding to the phase of the elaboration of Being and Time, the question of metaphysics is posed for Heidegger only in a lateral way, that is, as a question whose primordial importance is sensed and which for that very reason has to be deferred. Other tasks take priority: that of developing a hermeneutics of facticity which would realize all that the philosophers of life had unsuccessfully promised to accomplish; that of an existential analytic permitting the constitution of a fundamental ontology. This first period may be seen as ending in 1927 with the course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology which is of capital importance for the explication of the ontological programme sketched in Being and Time, especially for the interpretation of the problematic of the ontological difference.

Nothing better indicates the problematic status of metaphysics in this

period than the ambiguity attaching to the status of the existential analytic. Should it be seen as a 'metaphysics of Dasein'? That is what is suggested by several expressions in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, where we read, for example, that 'Fundamental Ontology is the metaphysics of human Dasein which is required for metaphysics to be made possible'. Heidegger is indebted to Kant for the realization that before being a theoretic discipline metaphysics 'belongs to human nature', hence the task of clarifying in what exactly this natural disposition consists. This is the specific task of the existential analytic, which thus indeed is pursuing a 'metaphysical' goal. But nothing guarantees that it has already attained this goal. The problematic title, 'metaphysics of Dasein', indicates a task rather than the solution of a problem, and the perception of that task is inseparable from the admission that 'metaphysics is the title of a fundamental philosophical difficulty'. As we shall see, this dilemma or aporia is connected with the fact that behind the title 'metaphysics' is concealed a more fundamental and decisive problem, that of the status of first philosophy (protê philosophia).

We are thus obliged at least to put to ourselves the following question: does the existential analytic exhaust the totality of metaphysics or does it represent only a partial aspect, the prolegomena, of a much larger task? But we could go on to ask whether the very nature of the existential analytic does not forbid us to confuse it with metaphysics properly speaking. Warnings against this confusion permeate the reinterpretation of Being and Time which Heidegger proposed in 1928 in the course The Metaphysical First Principles of Logic beginning from Leibniz. The dominant theme of the twelve leading theses of which this self-interpretation is composed is the neutrality which characterizes the existential analytic and the fundamental ontology associated with it. As a mere analytic, Heidegger reminds us, the existential analytic necessarily involves a 'metaphysical neutrality' because in it 'the metaphysics of Dasein is not yet central'.8 In other words: let us not seek in Being and Time a metaphysical position of any kind, because so far there is no question of anything but a mere analytic, neutral in respect to every metaphysical engagement and demanding that all questioning of an ethical kind be left aside. One could also show - and it would not be irrelevant to the confrontation for which I am here preparing the ground - that in the same self-interpretation metaphysical neutrality and ethical neutrality (not to be confused with indifference!) support one another.¹⁰

One could seek a genetic explanation for this alternation between two viewpoints – the description of the analytic in terms of a 'metaphysics of Dasein' and the prohibition, in almost contemporary texts, against identifying the analytic with metaphysics. But this would, I feel, be a futile enterprise. The ambivalence of Heidegger's language must be taken

for what it is: the expression of an aporia which attests to the problematic status of metaphysics and the difficulty of 'looking it in the face'.

(2) The second period, opening at the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties, can be said without exaggeration to be devoted to really looking metaphysics in the face. To look metaphysics in the face now means first of all to undertake an enormous labour of reappropriation of the founding texts of the Western metaphysical tradition: Aristotle, Kant, Leibniz, Hegel and Schelling. A passage from the Beiträge indicates that this work of reappropriation did not proceed haphazardly but was directed by a systematic intention:

To make visible the unfathomable pluriformity of Leibniz's way of questioning, yet to think Da-sein instead of the monad.

To repeat the principal steps of Kant, yet to overcome the 'transcendental' approach through Da-sein.

To question through Schelling's question of freedom, yet to set the question of the 'modalities' on another foundation.

To bring Hegel's systematic under a gaze that masters it, yet to think in a quite contrary manner.

To risk the confrontation with Nietzsche as the one who is nearest, yet to recognize that he is the one who is farthest from the question of Being.11

Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche: it can easily be seen that this series in fact corresponds to the major courses of this second period. In 1936, at the moment of the emergence of another new way of looking, in the most decisive change of all, Heidegger no doubt judged it necessary to reaffirm one last time the systematic purpose that animated the work he had done until then. 'To look metaphysics in the face' all through this period meant chiefly to ask himself about the possibility of a metaphysics! That meant to re-enact, in all its strangeness and outside the reassuring limits of an academic discipline, what one may call the 'meta' function. An external, but revelatory, symptom shows the change of climate from the first period: in the course of this second period the term 'phenomenology' disappears from the titles of the courses - which of course does not mean that the cause of phenomenology is abandoned! - to be replaced by the term 'metaphysics'. After The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger first interests himself in the logic of Leibniz, but choosing to read it as the proposal of a metaphysics, as the title of the course shows: The Metaphysical First Principles of Logic beginning from Leibniz. Then comes The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, 1929-30, which provided our basic formula. All these changes of title conceal deeper changes in the way of approaching the issues, changes sufficiently important to be announced in the language of the turn, die Kehre, a term which now makes its appearance in the Heideggerian vocabulary. It is important not to confuse this with the famous turn in the question of being evoked in the Letter on Humanism, a turn situated around 1936 as the marginal notes of that text make clear.

(3) The interpreter who accepts the validity of this Heideggerian self-interpretation must thus deal with two turns: the 'metaphysical' turn of 1928-30 and a later turn which coincides with the discovery of the *Ereignis* and the exit from metaphysics. This second turn brings with it a mutation in the way of looking. One recalls the well-known passages from *Identity and Difference* which show – not only as an etymological exercise – that the *Ereignis* is an affair of looking, 12 because it is it which has always been looking at us. 13 On their own such passages might seem too allusive to be exploited, but a careful reading of *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, now the principal document of the new turn, shows the degree to which throughout the discussion of the *Ereignis* the issue is one of discovering 'another way of looking'.

To learn this unprecedented way of looking is the task which from now on prevails more and more exclusively in Heidegger's thinking to the end. In the absence of a detailed analysis of this transformation of the way of looking, I shall content myself with a few summary notations. important for my thesis. I note first a negative declaration bearing on his relationship to metaphysics: 'In the domain of the other beginning there is neither "ontology" nor "metaphysics".'14 These lofty titles, each of which in its own way resumes the destiny of Western thought, are now no more than 'transitory names'. Moreover, since ontology has always been closely associated with logic, the other beginning signifies the rupture of that alliance almost as old as thought itself. But how is one to replace logic, especially the most accomplished logic produced by the history of philosophy, that of Hegel's Science of Logic? To this question Heidegger's response is curious, not to say paradoxical: the essence of logic consists in a sigetics. ¹⁵ In thesis form: the logic of the *Ereignis* is a sigetics. I attempted to trace the contours of this paradoxical logic in my work La parole heureuse. My guiding hypothesis in that analysis was that the 'philosophy of language' of Heidegger's last phase should in reality be understood as an attempt to define the 'logic' of the other beginning of thinking. What was a mere working hypothesis in that work now finds explicit confirmation in Heidegger's statements in the Beiträge, for instance in paragraph 89, 'The transition to the other beginning': "Logic" as a doctrine of correct thinking transforms itself into meditation on the essence of language as inaugural naming of the truth of being.'16 Numerous statements in the same work confirm, if that is still necessary, that the key figure in this transformation is Hölderlin and that this poet occupies a unique place in the history of being grasped in the light of the Ereignis, so that 'the historical determination of philosophy culminates in knowing the necessity of creating a hearing for Hölderlin's word' 17

3 Beyond the science/Weltanschauung alternative

After this summary account of the genetic hypothesis which underlies the following reflections, I would like now to attempt a kind of reading backwards, through defining in a more precise way the state of the problem in the intermediary period which, for reasons which will progressively appear, seems to me the most promising for the confrontation for which I am preparing the ground. To do this I shall recommence from the text about 'looking metaphysics in the face'. The formula occurs in the long preliminary discussion which opens the course of the Winter semester 1929-30, The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics. The first chapter of the preliminary discussion is entitled: 'The detours in the direction of the determination of the essence of philosophy (metaphysics) and the unavoidable necessity of looking metaphysics in the face'. 18 This talk of detours makes sense only on the premise that metaphysics is no longer what it was for the venerable tradition prevailing at least since Suarez and until Wolff: a firmly established discipline of philosophy, of which one could undoubtedly question one or other affirmation but of which the existence and the identity were not open to question. The first fundamental prejudice which Heidegger attacks at the opening of his course is just this conviction that metaphysics is an established discipline of philosophy.¹⁹ Contrary to appearances, metaphysics does not exist, it must be invented! This slogan, no doubt a rather cavalier one, sums up the message Heidegger wants to impress on his hearers at the outset. This unprecedented open-endedness of the question of the nature of metaphysics, no longer simply a matter of defining the epistemological status of an already existing discipline, makes it necessary to deal with various 'detours' which suggest themselves as we try to determine the essence of philosophical thinking. These detours take many forms and are of unequal value; but in each case one proceeds by a comparative method, that is, one tries to understand what metaphysics is through a comparison with what it is not. Heidegger insists that the first decision one must make is to refuse to be bound by the conventional alternative: either metaphysics is a science or else it is only a world view (Weltanschauung). Metaphysics as the epistemè zêtoumenê (the science which is sought) which Heidegger wants to found can be neither of these. Against the upholders of absolute knowledge and against the neo-Kantians, it must be clearly asserted that philosophy (metaphysics) owes

nothing to science and is not comparable with it. But it must be said equally firmly that this does not condemn philosophy to be only the expression or elaboration of a world view.

This is not the first time that this alternative has occupied Heidegger's attention: the problem of the relationship of philosophy and world view comes up as early as 1919 in a course corresponding to the 'War need semester for war participants' which forms the first part of GA 56/7 and carries the significant title: Towards the Determination of Philosophy.²⁰ Whether because Heidegger was conscious of addressing an audience traumatized by the experience of war or because he wanted to tackle a problem that was in any case a topical issue since Dilthey, this course, the earliest of those which have been preserved, begins with the Weltanschauung issue. For a disciple of Dilthey this term was not yet synonymous with ideology, though there is some overlap. The same issue occupies a considerable place in most of the introductions to the later courses up to The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, where it is directly linked with the question of the possibility or impossibility of finding a definition of philosophy. In 1919 it seems to be connected rather with the 'philosophico-political' problem of university reform. Heidegger takes a stand in this debate at the start when he declares:

the much-discussed reform of the university is entirely misled and is a complete misconception of every authentic revolutionizing of the mind, if it now expands itself in proclamations, protest meetings, programmes, leagues and federations: means hostile to mind at the service of ephemeral ends. We today are not ripe for *genuine* reforms in the domain of the university. And becoming ripe for this is the affair of a *whole generation*. Renewal of the university means rebirth of genuine scientific consciousness and ordering of life.²¹

Against the phraseology of a philosophy degraded to 'ideology', it is above all important to recover the originary idea of science. Now this refusal to let himself be harnessed to the cause of an ill-conducted university reform is motivated by the notion that Heidegger has formed of philosophy in the proper sense, of which the primary and fundamental vocation is to realize itself as proto-science, *Urwissenschaft*. In his eyes, science understood in this originary sense is inseparable from a certain form of life. The *Urwissenschaft* is rooted in what he designates as an 'archontic form of life', that of 'the researcher who lives absolutely in the pure contents and origins of his problematic'.²²

Heidegger is aware that this bold position obliges him to match himself against a universal prejudice according to which 'every great philosophy perfects itself in a world view',²³ which proposes to give directions for living. What is the philosophical value of this universal need of a world

view which can be found just as much among the peasants of the Black Forest as among religious believers or factory workers, political militants or even scientists who advocate a 'scientific world view'? Can or should the philosopher recognize himself in this type of need? Two philosophical positions seem to be present here. On the one side, the widespread attitude that entirely ratifies the equation, philosophy = world view. On the other, the more nuanced position of the neo-Kantians, whom their obsession with the epistemological problem kept from making the world view the true immanent task of philosophy, and who saw in that notion rather an exterior limit of philosophy. But for Heidegger both positions are insufficiently radical. Going against all previous philosophy, he advances a still more radical personal thesis: the world view is a phenomenon foreign to philosophy, in other words: philosophy (correctly understood) has strictly nothing to do with a world view (correctly understood).

Hence the importance of clarifying the notion of philosophy 'correctly understood'. As we have seen, it has been designated *Urwissenschaft*, proto-science. This title seems to include a paradoxical demand, implying a vicious circle: how can one found such a science of the 'ultimate principles' which 'are to be grasped only from themselves and in themselves'?²⁴ To begin with, one must become aware that this circle is unavoidable and that the various efforts to bypass it lead to so many impasses. For there is no lack of attempts to locate on another ground this foundation of the science of foundations. The most facile of these has recourse to the genetic approach to the history of philosophy. If this has the merit of recalling that 'philosophy in the course of its history has always stood in a some determinate relation to the idea of science'25 and has given itself the task of matching itself against scientific knowledge, the historical method on its own cannot resolve the specific problem of understanding which decides access to the idea of philosophy as a protoscience. Heidegger registers a first negative finding which contains a problem to be elaborated in later courses:

there does not exist a genuine history of philosophy, unless it be for a historical consciousness that itself lives in genuine philosophy. All history and history of philosophy in a capital sense constitutes itself in that life in and for itself which is itself historical - in an absolute sense.26

The comparative approach which works out a typology of attitudes – in the manner of Karl Jaspers – is still more impracticable, since it brings us back directly to the Weltanschauung problem, as shown by Simmel's view that 'art is an image of the world, seen through a temperament; philosophy, on the contrary, can be apprehended as a temperament, seen through an image of the world'.²⁷ If then the only business of philosophy is to create a world view, one has lost sight of the very idea of a proto-science. Heidegger, in these early days, rejects as well the way of 'inductive metaphysics' (Külpe, Messer, Driesch),²⁸ which relies on the particular empirical sciences in order to derive a philosophical idea of science as such. Must we conclude then that the viable interlocutors for the philosopher are the theoreticians of the teleological critical method invented by such major neo-Kantians as Rickert, Windelband and Lotze? It is indeed against these, some of whom were his own teachers, that Heidegger had first to match himself, as we see in his courses at the beginning of the twenties.

Heidegger saw from the start that it was not enough to adopt the opposition established by Rickert between the 'law of nature' as principle of explanation and the norm as principle of judgment which was at the heart of the so-called teleological critical method. Even if this method was a considerable improvement over a purely genetic one, it turned out to be incapable on its own of furnishing a criterion adequate to found philosophically an axiomatics.²⁹ The great neo-Kantian masters did not really succeed in bridging the gulf between empirical fact and universal validity. Or rather, they succeeded in doing so only by adopting a very special formulation of the method, namely the Wissenschaftslehre of Fichte for which 'the ought is the foundation of the is' (Das Sollen ist der Grund des Seins).30 But as the fate of the Fichtean doctrine itself showed, the price to be paid was a heavy one: 'his teleological method turned about to become a constructive dialectic.'31 It is precisely because they could not agree to this option and had discovered 'the internal impossibility of a dialectic-teleological deduction of the system of the necessary forms and operations of reason', 32 or in other words the sterility and unproductivity of dialectic, that the neo-Kantian theorists of the teleological critical method found themselves obliged to have recourse to the empirical sciences, psychology or history, in order to find a material 'cellaring'.33 At least Heidegger owes this much to the great neo-Kantians: they closed off the path of dialectic to him for ever.

Heidegger turns his critical gaze on these experiential data which are necessary presuppositions of the teleological method. Does not the obligatory reference to them destroy the method of founding an axiomatics on the *ought* alone? It is maintained that the ideal norm is itself given independently of the real psychical elements that provide the material 'cellaring', and this trans-experiential *Sollensgegebenheit* would even be the originary objecthood, *Urgegenständlichkeit*?³⁴ But this decisive phenomenon, the very core of the method, remains entirely obscure, and the reference to it also further undermines the pretensions of the method to be a purely theoretical formation. Thus:

When without the least disquiet, because of an absolute blindness to

the world of problems enclosed in the phenomenon of the ought. one applies the ought as a philosophical concept, the result is unscientific chatter, which is not ennobled by the fact that one makes this ought the foundation stone of an entire system.35

Rickert is the chief target of this polemic. Heidegger proceeds to quiz him with a view to clarifying the play of presupposition inherent in the apparently so obvious notion of Sollenserlebnis (sense of the ought). What is the relation between the notion of the ought and value? Are they synonymous or does one ground the other? Why insist that only a value can give any ought its basis? 'An ought can also be based on something that is' (auch ein Sein kann ein Sollen fundieren). 36 Moreover, the phenomenon of realizing that 'something has meaning' has its own originary constitution, not reducible to the ought.³⁷ These criticisms do not amount to a fundamental rejection of the legitimacy of describing knowledge in terms of the ought. Heidegger himself takes over the opposition between a derivative Für-Wert-Erklären (designation as value) and the originary phenomenon of Wertnehmen (apprehension of value).38 But he presses the question as to whether truth itself can be said to constitute itself as an originary apprehension of value. He rejects the equation of validity with value, which Rickert wanted to make the point of departure of all philosophy, thus justifying the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. 'To end the confusion about the problem of validity it is essential to keep the phenomenon of value at a distance', 39 though truth may be a value in some wider context. In any case the numerous unjustified presuppositions that have come to light show how premature is the attempt to make first philosophy a philosophy of values. At most the status of the philosophy of values will be a derivative and partial one.

Heidegger agrees with Rickert that the one-sided domination of the theoretical should be overcome. This is not to be achieved by declaring a primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason, but rather by investigating how the proto-science which is sought - thus one might name a future 'metaphysics' - constitutionally needs to have recourse to a pre-theoretical sphere: 'the theoretical itself as such refers back to something pre-theoretical'.⁴⁰ That presupposed material basis of the theoretical is to be sought in the psychical in the widest sense. This prompts immediately another fundamental question: 'what, basically, is the psychical?' This question clearly goes beyond all questions about the epistemological status of empirical psychology; it asks whether there is a way to consider the psychical which would make of it the originary sphere in which the proto-science which is sought could establish itself.41 But this implies the necessity of dwelling descriptively in this sphere, renouncing theorems and opinions about it, so as to see how the significations of things are constituted there and according to what mode of givenness.

Recalling the importance of the motif of the es gibt (there is, there is given) in the later thought of Heidegger it seems to me altogether remarkable that from the beginning of his teaching the question of the mode of givenness of phenomena is already formulated in terms of es gibt. 'Can there really be anything, if there are only things? In that case there are no things at all; there is not even nothing, because in a universal dominance of the sphere of things there is not any "there is" either. Is there a "there is"?'42 This question which at first sight seems a clumsy professorial play on words in reality marks the threshold which gives access to the identification of phenomenology as the 'theoretical protoscience'. And it is indeed to this first major philosophical decision that the science/Weltanschauung alternative brings us, for phenomenology and it alone makes it possible to transcend that opposition. But in Heidegger's eyes that represents a decision which has the allure of a true philosophical conversion, rendered still more solemn by the emphatic declaration:

we find ourselves at a methodical crossroads which decides the life or death of philosophy in general, before an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, the absolute domination of things, or else we manage to leap into *another world*, or more exactly: for the first time into the world as such.⁴³

So hic Rhodos, hic salta: every hearer of Heidegger is supposed to grasp that the first decisive choice is that for phenomenology as proto-science against the neo-Kantian philosophy of culture and values.

4 Towards grasping metaphysics without detour

In 1929, in the introduction to the course on *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, the choice just mentioned has long become a reality, so that now the question can be posed as to where this choice allows one to go. It is all the more remarkable that Heidegger still feels the need to present this alternative once again to his hearers. But now the refusal to be bound by the science/*Weltanschauung* alternative has a different meaning: it is directly linked to the question of the possibility of metaphysics. Heidegger here embarks on what could be called, in Schelling's language, a 'tautegorical' determination of metaphysics, that is, one that tells directly what metaphysics is, one that attempts to grasp 'without detour' that which renders metaphysics incomparable with anything else.

One might well doubt whether this is possible, a doubt scarcely dispelled by the fact that, having set aside the twofold impasse of science

and world view, Heidegger proceeds to embark on yet another detour: the comparison with religion and art. This comparison played a major role in the thinking of some neo-Kantians, especially Rickert. The detour it inaugurates is qualitatively different from the preceding one, for while the passage through science and world view is unfaithful to the distinctive character of metaphysics, 'an unwarranted disparagement of its essence', the comparison with art and religion represents 'a fully warranted and necessary placing of its essence on an equal footing'44 with them. It might be said that the first detour is in every case a road that leads nowhere, a Holzweg, while the second, though it too is closed off, seems none the less to promise a fruitful encounter. Another detour suggests itself: research into the history of the word 'metaphysics' - 'a remarkable history of a remarkable word'45 – and of the discipline it names. This approach also fails to yield experience of the thing itself, for 'philosophy does not allow itself to be apprehended and determined by detours and as something other than itself'.46

Rather surprisingly, the discussion now continues as if it devolved on the utterance of a poet, Novalis, to supply the password of a tautegorical interpretation of metaphysics and with it our capacity 'to look metaphysics in the face, never to lose sight of it again'!47 'Novalis says once in a fragment: "Philosophy is essentially homesickness, a drive to be at home everywhere" ' (Die Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh, ein Trieb überall zu Hause zu sein).48 It is this statement which enables Heidegger to characterize the fundamental affect of metaphysics. Philosophy wants to be at home everywhere - which implies that it has no other home than this 'everywhere', in other words that its 'element' is none other than that uncanniness evoked in connection with anxiety in Being and Time. Novalis also intimates that something drives philosophical existence and keeps its quest going; it is this drivenness (Getriebensein), and not some limitation of its cognitive powers, that is the true mark of its finitude. Finally, the saying of Novalis has value only if assumed in the first person; the adventures it launches are always singular ones. The fragment thus prompts three questions: what is the world? What is finitude? What is singularization, that is, the solitude of Dasein? Taken together these three questions define the space within which metaphysical thinking proceeds.

Note that this poetic way of access occasions yet again a comparison between science and philosophy which is unfavourable to the former: while poetry is the 'sister' of philosophy, 'all science in relation to philosophy is perhaps only a handyman'. 49 Even if one makes allowance for the element of pedagogic exaggeration in the introduction to a course, this distribution of roles poses a riddle: why, on the basis of what criteria, is the poetic word not also a mere detour - at best an 'illustration' - on the way to metaphysics? In virtue of what does it yield access to metaphysics? One might ask a still more sceptical question: what are the criteria which allow one to say that it is a poet which speaks in the fragment quoted and not a mere philosophical dabbler?

Be that as it may, once the fundamental mood (Grundstimmung) of homesickness is introduced, all the elements seem to be in place to characterize not only the major themes of metaphysical thinking but also its style or economy. Of this style Heidegger gives a twofold characterization - in two variations, so to speak, on the semantics of the German term Begreifen, to grasp, conceive, comprehend. On the one hand, metaphysical concepts or conceptuality presuppose that one has oneself already been grasped by a fundamental mood (Ergriffenheit). 50 On the other, metaphysical thinking should be conceived as 'inbegriffliches Denken [thinking as total grasp] in this double sense: going to the whole and penetrating one's existence'. 51 Thus from a double point of view metaphysical thinking eludes the logic of conceptual representation. It plunges into an Ergriffenheit of which representation is not capable and, contrary to the habitual notion of it as a conceptuality reduced to abstract generality, it embraces all in itself, including in the first place the existence of the one involved in this activity. This implies that it is a 'highrisk' activity to which there inevitably attaches an element of ambiguity. Here Heidegger indulges in a third variation on the semantics of Begreifen, passing to the theme of Angriff, attack: 'in philosophizing the Dasein in man directs its attack against man'. 52 This means at least that the religious associations of Ergriffenheit must be left aside. Whatever else about metaphysics, it will never be a 'beatific vision', but is rather 'the combat with the insurmountable ambiguity of all questioning and of all being',53 which is not of course to be seen as despairing activity, quite the contrary!

By this unconventional approach to his subject, Heidegger creates a problem which occupies him for the rest of the introduction to the course: why must recourse be had to the history of the term 'metaphysics' in order to characterize the functioning of the thinking just described? Or again: why not leave the term 'metaphysics' to itself? The question is all the more warranted in that the history of the word 'metaphysics' teaches us that it is not in fact an *Urwort*, a word of origin, one that 'has formed itself out of a fundamental and originary human experience as its *utterance*'. This is the case for such terms as *physis*, *logos* and *aletheia*, but the complex and eventful history of the term 'metaphysics' which Heidegger is intent on tracing has no such originary dimension.

At the end of his reconstruction of this history, Heidegger is faced with the following choice: once one had rejected metaphysics as a philosophical discipline, why still keep that which is most accidental – one is tempted to say most nominal – namely the term 'metaphysics'? And his response is again quite disorientating: whatever about the history of this

word, it retains after all a link with that which should most deeply interest the thinker, namely the Aristotelian project of a first philosophy which is for him not the Aristotelian designation of one philosophical discipline among others but the characterization of philosophy in the proper sense. We could say that metaphysics is a name, doubtless misleading, but none the less unavoidable, to signal the fact that in speaking of first philosophy it is in reality fundamental philosophy – or rather fundamental philosophizing - that one seeks to determine. Such is the true nature of the task Heidegger assigns himself in this matter: instead of letting oneself be led by the traditional signification of the title,

to first supply its signification to the already existing title starting from an originary understanding of the protê philosophia. In short: we should not interpret the protê philosophia starting from metaphysics but should rather, inversely, justify the expression 'metaphysics' by an originary interpretation of that which is afoot in the protê philosophia of Aristotle.55

In this sense the expression '"metaphysics" is the title of a problem'56 and nothing else. And the only question one can address to the historical tradition of metaphysics is the question of the reasons for which this problem has never been perceived as a problem so that one has been content with a merely exteriorizing treatment, which consisted in making the supra-sensible a being-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) of a superior order, thus confusing continually supra-sensible being and the non-sensible characteristics of beings, and finally installing oneself in a complete indifference to the problems.⁵⁷

5 The chiasmus of the gaze

If then our dealings with the notion of metaphysics in reality concern the identity of first philosophy, we discover the true reason which makes the confrontation between Heidegger and Lévinas absolutely unavoidable. For the famous question of Lévinas, 'is ontology fundamental?',58 makes sense only if we understand it as an effort to promote ethics to the rank of a first philosophy and thus place metaphysics above ontology. Implicitly present from the first pages of Totality and Infinity, the thesis of the primacy of ethics over ontology is formally enunciated in a version which puts directly in question the Heideggerian conception of the ontological difference: 'Before the unveiling of being in general as the basis of knowledge in general, there pre-exists the relation with the being that expresses itself; the ethical plane comes before the ontological one.'59 My working hypothesis on the capital point of difference between the two thinkers is then the following: this debate, or Auseinandersetzung, between the positions of Lévinas and Heidegger is as necessary and as inevitable at the level of a post-Husserlian philosophy as that between Plato and Aristotle was necessary and inevitable at the dawn of metaphysics.

Let us try to make more precise the meaning of this confrontation and its stakes. As the quotation from Heidegger mentioned above makes clear, it was the jolt of the Aristotelian einai pollachos legetai discovered through the work of Franz Brentano thanks to the friendly and paternal complicity of Conrad Gröber which decided the direction of his philosophical itinerary. In Heidegger's self-interpretation the reference to that central motif of Aristotle's ontology plays a capital role, as attested by the 'Dialogue with a Japanese', the 'Le Thor Seminar', and the following passage from the Zollikon Seminars:

The impulsion of all my thought goes back to a statement of Aristotle which says that being is enounced in a multiplicity of ways. To tell the truth, that statement was the lightning-flash which triggered the question: what then is the unity of these multiple significations of being, what is the meaning of 'being' as such?⁶⁰

At first sight there is nothing of this sort in Lévinas's intellectual career. However, there is another text in the classical metaphysical tradition which occupies a similar place in his thought to that occupied by Aristotle's phrase in Heidegger's, the place of an epigraph and leitmotif which decides an itinerary. I refer to the famous Platonic motif of epekeina tês ousias, beyond being (Republic 509B). Already at a very early date, as we see from the first preface to De l'existence à l'existant, we find Lévinas invoking this motif to postulate the necessity of an 'exit from being and the categories which describe it'. In his eyes the Platonic formula means

that the movement which brings an existent to the Good is not a transcendence by which the existent raises itself to a superior existence, but an exit from being and the categories which describe it – and *ex-cendence*. But ex-cendence and Happiness necessarily stand on a basis of being and that is why it is better to be than not to be.⁶¹

Thus referred to the history of metaphysics the issue controverted between the two thinkers becomes a fundamental question bearing on the very nature of first philosophy: is metaphysics first of all an 'agathology' which places the good above being or is it rather in the first place an effort to elucidate the various senses of the word 'being'? Are these two approaches necessarily hostile to one another and if so for what

reasons? More exactly: what becomes in Heidegger of the motif of epekeina tês ousias? Inversely: how does Lévinas on his side interpret the Aristotelian motif of einai pollachos legetai?

These are assuredly vast questions. But the play of contrast between the historical epigraphs adopted by the two thinkers throws a decisive light, in my opinion, on the meaning of the choice between 'ontology' and 'metaphysics' as the name of first philosophy. That play is rendered more complex by the fact that in both cases the choice has to meet the requirements of a phenomenological Ausweisung (evidencing). There can be no question in the present context of opting definitively. Before resolving the alternative in one direction or the other one must meditate on it as such. Placing myself on the Heideggerian side, I would like to conclude by at least indicating some elements of a reply which are no more than altogether provisional benchmarks in view of a more thorough reflection.

If it is really first philosophy that is responsible for the 'problematic word' (Problemwort) 'being' the thinker is obliged to thematize the horizon whence the question of being arises. This is what Heidegger indicates in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, in a series of interrogations which are guided by the metaphor of looking:

How is the question 'What does Being mean?' to find its answer if it remains obscure as to from whence in general we can come to expect this answer? Must we not first ask: From whence in general do we lay hold of the point of view from which to determine Being as such and thus to win a concept of Being from out of which the possibility and the necessity of the essential articulation of Being becomes understandable? Hence the question of 'First Philosophy', namely, 'What is the being as such?' must drive us back beyond the question 'What is Being as such?' to the still more original question: From whence in general are we to comprehend the like of Being, with the entire wealth of articulations and references which are included in it?62

What is striking in this cascade of interrogations is its progressive radicalization commanded by the question: 'in which direction should one direct one's gaze?' Once it is articulated, this question must draw the thinker irresistibly to some 'beyond being', giving a certain inevitability to the encounter with the Platonic epekeina tês ousias to which Heidegger devotes considerable space in the 1927 course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology as well as in the Leibniz course of the following year. 63

These references are more than a formal nod, as their insistent recurrence shows. There is nothing incidental about their appearance, which occurs in discussions of the key concept of Heidegger's ontology, namely the concept of understanding. To make of ontology the discourse in

which is deployed the *understanding* of being implies the need 'to find a sufficiently original concept of understanding'.⁶⁴ This concept entails the existential structure described as 'to project oneself upon a possibility'.65 And what holds for existential understanding must hold a fortiori for ontological understanding in turn: 'We understand a being only as we project it upon being. In the process, being itself must be understood in a certain way; being must in its turn be projected upon something.'66 This understanding of being is inseparable from a fundamental mood which makes itself felt as a pre-understanding to be explicated in what Heidegger still calls a 'scientific ontology'. 'It is in the objectification of being as such that the basic act constitutive of ontology as a science is performed.'67 But this constitution of ontology as a science (in a sense that lies beyond the science/world view alternative), in other words as an explicitation of the ultimate conditions of possibility of the understanding of being, implies the necessity 'of inquiring even beyond being as to that upon which being itself, as being, is projected'. 68 It is in the course of this attempt 'to get beyond being to the light from which and in which it itself comes into the brightness of an understanding'69 that Heidegger encounters the Platonic formula designating the Good as epekeina tês ousias. 'The understanding of being is rooted in the projection of an epekeina tês ousias'70 he states explicitly. Far from adopting this formula in isolation, he immediately indicates that his interpretation demands a new reading of the entire allegory of the cave:

We, too, with this apparently quite abstract question about the conditions of possibility of the understanding of being, want to do nothing but bring ourselves out of the cave into the light, but in all sobriety and in the complete disenchantment of purely objective inquiry.⁷¹

'What we are in search of is the epekeina tês ousias.'72 What is the bearing of this search? Does it refer the understanding of being to an ethical transcendence? To the contrary, what is astonishing to the contemporary reader aware of Lévinas's use of the same motif, is that in all these reflections Heidegger scarcely adverts to the fact that the light of understanding comes specifically from the idea of the Good. That theme is touched on only towards the end of the analysis, but is instantly dismissed for a precise reason: the Platonic idea of the Good is itself tributary of an ontology of production (Herstellung) which makes of the Good 'the demiourgos, the producer pure and simple'. And Heidegger wants to hear nothing about a demiurgic ontology! That is why his own interpretation – that is, his attempt to find a phenomenological signification for the epekeina tês ousias – quickly turns its back on the idea of the Good to introduce another motif, of which the least one can say is that it does violence to the Platonic text: it is originary temporality that

becomes for him the true name of the epekeina tês ousias. This shift is comprehensible if one recalls that understanding as such is structured temporally and that 'the instant [the Augenblick, the twinkling of an evel'74 plays a signal role in it.

In the course on Leibniz, the same movement is repeated, though now the leading problem is that of the essence of transcendence. Dasein itself is transgression' (Das Dasein selbst ist der Uberschritt).75 Transgression, the act constitutive of Dasein, is not presented as the abolition of a limit – as it would be for Hegel: the transgression of the finite/ infinite difference - but is a stepping beyond beings.76 In other words, transgression is nothing other than the putting into operation of the ontological difference itself. This new concept of transcendence, which Heidegger opposes to the deficient epistemological and theological concepts of transcendence, τ leads inevitably, once again, to a confrontation with the epekeina tês ousias. This time the critique of Plato takes a different course: the Platonic formulation of the ideas errs in making intuition - theorein - the act in which transcendence is supremely realized. Plato himself, under pressure from the phenomena themselves (!), was obliged to see that true transcendence exceeds the correlation idea/intuition.78 A more originary transcendence emerges in the epekeina tês ousias. But again Heidegger shrinks from the idea that this more originary transcendence could announce itself through the idea of the Good. This time the reason for his shrinking is clearly indicated: it is the fear of falling back into the rut of a philosophy of values. Thought can make progress in this domain only by untiring phenomenological patience which attends to the mode of donation of the phenomena. From being an idea, the Good must return to being a phenomenon. Then it can manifest its true structure, as Umwillen (that in view of which we will). Thus in a coup de force Heidegger connects the transcendence of excess that emerges in the idea of the Good to the concept of world.⁷⁹ The idea of the Good then merely confirms the fundamental fact that Dasein is nothing other than the freedom to project a world. So again the way is cleared that leads to originary temporality as ultimate response to the riddle of transcendence. It is not the idea of the Good that allows Dasein to understand itself; on the contrary: 'Dasein as temporality poses to itself the task of understanding itself in its temporalization.'80 And it is for this reason alone that one may say - what Kant already wanted to show - that metaphysics is part of human nature as such. Heidegger creates a forceful synthesis of the Aristotelian hou eneka (Umwillen), the Platonic epekeina tês ousias and the potius quam (rather than) of the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason⁸¹ to make of the productive transcendental imagination (which is the other name of originary temporality) 'the first instant in which metaphysics tries to liberate itself from logic'82 and, we may add, borrowing the terminology of a later course, the instant in which ontology is obliged to change into ontochrony.83

But can such an invocation of an originary temporality in favour of which the idea of the Good is eclipsed really be the last word on the riddle of transcendence? Or to put the same question in a more phenomenological way: is this all that can be said about the structure of the Umwillen? Is there not also an Umwillen which cannot be reduced to the projection of a freedom but which consists precisely in exposing oneself to the other? Such questions bring into view the gap between the Heideggerian and Lévinasian treatments of the Platonic motif. When it is a matter of determining the relations between metaphysics and transcendence,84 Lévinas, too, allows himself to be guided by the word of a poet, in this case the voice of Arthur Rimbaud declaring that 'real life is absent'.85 This poetic utterance places us at the antipodes to the statement of Novalis quoted above, in so far as it implies a fundamentally different determination of metaphysical desire: 'Metaphysical desire does not long for a return, for it is the desire of a country in which we were not born.'86 It is because metaphysical desire is oriented to the absolutely other who is the other person that it becomes necessary to say that 'metaphysics precedes ontology'87 and that ontology – including Heideggerian ontology as first philosophy – is suspected of being a philosophy of power and injustice.88

It is to Plato's credit that he glimpsed the 'non-nostalgic character of desire and of philosophy', 89 despite the insufficiency of eros to manifest its true essence. In introducing the idea of the Good separated from the totality of essences, Plato obliged thought to articulate the relation between separation and the absolute. It is in this sense that the motif of epekeina tês ousias confronts us with a question which is quite central for any first philosophy worthy of the name: that of the articulation of transcendence and intelligibility. Thus for Lévinas the transcendence which the idea of the Good unveils has the sense of a separation from, a rupture with all forms of participation in a totality. To retrieve this sense we must step back from neo-Platonism to Plato himself:

Plato did not in any way deduce being from the Good: he posits transcendence as surpassing the totality. It is Plato who, alongside needs which are satisfied by filling an emptiness, glimpses as well aspirations which are not preceded by suffering and lack and in which we recognize the pattern of desire, the need of one who lacks nothing, the longing of one who does not fully possess his being, who goes beyond his plenitude, who has the idea of the infinite. The place of the Good lies beyond all essence in the most profound teaching, the definitive teaching – not of theology, but of philosophy.⁹⁰

The task of the phenomenologist as Lévinas conceives it and as he tries to carry it out in the rest of his book is to show in what sense 'the excess measured by desire is face'.91

'Looks which cross give birth to strange relations' says Paul Valéry in Tel quel. Nothing allows us to imagine that in coining this phrase Valéry was thinking of what Lévinas calls 'the oddnesses of the ethical'.92 But a little farther on when he is discussing the 'exchange' of looks and notes that it produces 'a transposition, a metathesis, a chiasmus of two "destinies", we may ask ourselves if this is true only of the looks that we exchange with others. Are we not entitled to transfer the same remark to the look which thought turns on its own history to read there perhaps - a destiny. The confrontation of Heidegger and Lévinas seems to me in this sense not only a chiasmus between two 'destinies' but equally one between two possible destinations of thought.

Notes

- 1 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe (GA) 29/30, p. 5.
- 2 'Die Philosophie kann ihre eigentliche Optik, die Metaphysik, auf die Dauer nicht entbehren', Frühe Schriften, GA 1, p. 348.
- 3 'Es ist das Er-eignis, in dem das Sein selbst verwunden wird' (Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 71): 'It is the ap-propriation in which being itself is relinquished.'
- 4 'Wie aber naht ein Geleit, wenn nicht das Ereignis sich lichtet, das rufend, brauchend das Menschenwesen er-äugnet, d.h. er-blickt und im Erblicken Sterbliche auf den Weg des denkenden, dichtenden Bauens bringt?' (Vorträge und Aufsätze, p. 99): 'And how can a leading instance come near us, unless the Ereignis lights up, which calls, uses, eyes the human being, that is, brings the human being into its view and in its gazing conducts the mortal on the way of thinking, poetizing building?'
 - 5 Martin Heidegger, Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität, GA 63, p. 5.
- 6 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 1; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 4th edn (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1973), p. 1.
- 7 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 4; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 7.
- 8 Martin Heidegger, Die metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26, p. 181.
 - 9 GA 26, p. 171.
- 10 For this analysis see my forthcoming study, 'Ethique, Métontologie, philosophie première: Quelques considérations hypocritiques'.
 - 11 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65, p. 176.
- 12 See especially *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 24-5.
- 13 Compare the formula already cited from 'Uberwindung der Metaphysik', in Vorträge und Aufsätze.
 - 14 Beiträge zur Philosophie, p. 59.

- 15 GA 65, p. 79.
- 16 GA 65, p. 177.
- 17 GA 65, p. 422.
- 18 Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt Endlichkeit Einsamkeit, GA 29/30, pp. 1-15.
 - 19 GA 29/30, p. 2.
- 20 Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. 1. Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem. 2. Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie, GA 56/7.
 - 21 *GA* 56/7, p. 4.
 - 22 GA 56/7, p. 5.
 - 23 GA 56/7, p. 8.
 - 24 GA 56/7, p. 16.
 - 25 GA 56/7, p. 18.
 - 26 GA 56/7, p. 21.
 - 27 GA 56/7, p. 22.
 - 28 GA 56/7, p. 27.
 - 29 GA 56/7, p. 36.
 - 30 GA 56/7, p. 37.
 - 31 GA 56/7, p. 37.
 - 32 *GA* 56/7, p. 40.
 - 33 GA 56/7, p. 41.
 - 34 GA 56/7, p. 44.
 - 35 GA 56/7, p. 45.
 - 36 GA 56/7, p. 46.
 - 37 *GA* 56/7, p. 47.
 - 38 GA 56/7, p. 48.
 - 39 GA 56/7, p. 50.
 - 40 GA 56/7, p. 59.
 - 41 GA 56/7, p. 60.
 - 42 GA 56/7, p. 62.
 - 43 GA 56/7, p. 63.
 - 44 GA 29/30, p. 4.
 - 45 GA 29/30, p. 5.
 - 46 GA 29/30, p. 6.
 - 47 GA 29/30, p. 5.
 - 48 GA 29/30, p. 7.
 - 49 GA 29/30, p. 7.
 - 50 GA 29/30, p. 10.
 - 51 GA 29/30, p. 13.
 - 52 GA 29/30, p. 31.
 - 53 GA 29/30, p. 31.
 - 54 GA 29/30, p. 37.
 - 55 GA 29/30, pp. 61-2.
 - 56 *GA* 29/30, pp. 61–2
 - 57 GA 29/30, p. 62.
- 58 See Emmanuel Lévinas, 'L'ontologie est-elle fondamentale', Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (January 1951), pp. 88-98.
- 59 Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totalité et infini* (Hague: Nijhoff, 1961), p. 175; *Totality and Infinity*, tr. A. Lingis (Hague: Nijhoff, 1969).
- 60 Martin Heidegger, Zollikoner Seminare (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987), p. 155.

- 61 Emmanuel Lévinas, De l'existance à l'étant, 2nd edn (Paris: Vrin, 1981), p. 1.
- 62 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 153; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 217.
- 63 See also Vom Wesen des Grundes, in Wegmarken (GA 9), pp. 160-2; Alain Boutot, Heidegger et Platon (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987), pp. 154-67. See also: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (WS 1931-2), GA 34, pp. 95-117.
- 64 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, tr. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 275; Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, p. 390.
 - 65 Basic Problems, p. 277; GA 24, p. 392.
 - 66 Basic Problems, p. 280; GA 24, p. 396.
 - 67 Basic Problems, p. 281; GA 24, p. 398.
 - 68 Basic Problems, p. 282; GA 24, p. 399.
 - 69 Basic Problems, p. 282; GA 24, p. 400.
 - 70 Basic Problems, p. 284; GA 24, p. 402.
 - 71 Basic Problems, p. 285; GA 24, p. 404.
 - 72 Basic Problems, p. 285; GA 24, p. 404.
 - 73 Basic Problems, p. 286; GA 24, p. 405.
 - 74 Basic Problems, p. 287; GA 24, p. 407.
 - 75 GA 26, p. 211.
 - 76 GA 26, p. 212.
 - 77 GA 26, pp. 207-8.
 - 78 GA 26, p. 237.
- 79 'Das Ganze der im Umwillen liegenden Bindung ist die Welt', GA 26, p. 247; 'The whole of the binding that lies in that whereto one wills is the world'. 80 GA 26, p. 274.
- 81 'Ratio est in Natura, cur aliquid potius existat quam nihil' (C. J. Gerhardt, Die philosophische Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, VII, p. 289); 'There is a reason in Nature, why something exists rather than nothing'; see GA 26, pp. 141-4.
 - 82 GA 26, p. 272.
 - 83 See Martin Heidegger, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, GA 32, p. 144.
 - 84 Lévinas, Totalité et infini, pp. 3-23.
 - 85 ibid., p. 3.
 - 86 ibid., p. 3.
 - 87 ibid., p. 13.
 - 88 ibid., pp. 16-17.
 - 89 ibid., p. 34.
 - 90 ibid., p. 76.
 - 91 ibid., p. 33.
- 92 'But in truth the apparition in being of those "oddnesses of the ethical" marks of the humanity of man - is a rupture in being, a rupture carrying a distinct significance, even if being closes over it again' (Lévinas, Ethique et infini, pp. 91–2).

The power of revelation of affectivity according to Heidegger

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As with Scheler, so also the thought of Heidegger is characterized, in counter-distinction to classical philosophy, by the importance which it accords to the phenomenon of affectivity ontologically grasped and interpreted as a power of revelation, as well as by the fundamental meaning which Heidegger's thought recognizes in it. This meaning is immediately apparent and shows itself in the fact that affectivity is not merely taken as a power of revelation in the ordinary sense of the word, a power of revealing something, this or that thing, but precisely the power of revealing to us that which reveals all things, namely, the world itself as such, as identical to Nothingness. The fact that the fundamental ontological and peculiarly decisive meaning of the power of revelation peculiar to affectivity most often remains unnoticed and does not call it in question merely shows that this power is in principle indifferent to the manner in which thought understands and habitually interprets it, to the manner in which the subject understands himself, the subject who experiences a feeling and then interprets it in order to hide its true meaning and what is in each instance agonizing in this meaning.

Nevertheless, in anxiety this meaning appears: 'Anxiety is the fundamental feeling which places us before Nothingness', thus opening to us the Being of everything which is, for 'the Being of a being is comprehensible . . . only if *Dasein*, by its very nature, maintains itself in Nothingness'. That anxiety places us face to face with Nothingness and thus opens Being itself to us, this is what confers upon it its fundamental and decisive character, and not the intention of arbitrarily making it a privileged tonality among others: 'Anxiety is declared to be the decisive fundamental faculty [736] [Grundbefindlichkeit], not in order to proclaim, from the point of view of some Weltanschauung or other, a concrete existence-ideal but solely with reference to the problem of Being as such.'1

The specifically ontological fundamental character of anxiety is nevertheless not peculiar to it; in anxiety, affectivity itself is envisioned together with the power of revelation which in general belongs to it, viz. the power of maintaining itself face to face with Nothingness. For this reason, such a character is found in every affective disposition; regardless of what it is, this disposition opens the world to us in every case, its meaning in all cases is ontological. Fear opens the world to us as that through which the undeniable object whose approach arouses fear comes to us. In the same way, hope projects the space which separates it from that in which it sets itself to hope and wherein first the hoped-for thing shows itself to it. Hope and fear certainly do not discover the world in the same way that anxiety does; they do not hand us over to Nothingness in the same way. The discovery of fear is inauthentic, it takes place according to the mode of Verfallen. By this we must understand that fear guards against a being which it fears and not against its origin. namely, against the world as such; in fact, it hides from this, from the origin of all fears behind a being which it attends to. Attention to a being presupposes the discovery of the world and moves about in it. The inauthenticity of fear is a mode of this discovery, a mode of anxiety and its disguise. The different tonalities are none other than modes according to which in various ways, whether authentic or not, either by making it apparent or by hiding it, the revelation peculiar to affectivity takes place, namely, the discovery of the world as such and its Nothingness.

Transcendence is what discovers the world in the very act whereby it projects it beyond a being as its horizon. [737] To the extent that affectivity opens the world to us and places us face to face with Nothingness, its power of revelation resides in transcendence itself and is constituted by it. The following evidence henceforth presents itself without delay: The essence of revelation peculiar to affectivity and taking place in it is completely lost to Heidegger, confused by him with the essence of the ontological understanding of Being to which it nevertheless remains heterogeneous both in its structure and in its phenomenality. Thus stripped of the power of revelation which properly belongs to it and whose essence is in no way recognized, affectivity keeps its ontological meaning, and more specifically, the power of revealing something only insofar as, confused with transcendence, it works after the fashion of transcendence and in the manner of an act taking place in the milieu opened by transcendence, regardless of the mode, whether authentic or inauthentic, according to which such an act takes place: 'One's mood discloses in the manner of turning thither or turning away from one's own Dasein." Because affectivity, to the extent that it accomplishes the work of revelation, works after the fashion of transcendence, namely, on the foundation in it of the ontological power of the understanding of Being, a given feeling and every possible feeling in general, can be no more than a brute and blind fact, of itself foreign to the element of phenomenality, a fact only through the mediation of this power and as a mode of understanding. 'Every *Befindlichkeit*', says Heidegger, 'is one in which one understands.'³

To the extent that the power of revelation which is thought of as belonging to the ontological understanding of Being and residing in transcendence, affectivity, in keeping with the eidos of this power, necessarily reveals something other than itself and its own essence, something other, namely (1) the world, i.e. the pure milieu of otherness, and (2) a being which [738] manifests itself in this milieu in the form of Beingother and as an object. Nevertheless, this is a far cry from limiting the power of affectivity to the revelation of the world. Each Befindlichkeit 'discloses the total Being-in-the-world in all those items which are constitutive for it'.4 Disclosing the total Being-in-the-world in all its items, affectivity reveals the world as co-belonging to this total structure and carried along by this structure, but also and in a more essential manner. carried along by Being-in as such, existence itself ontologically interpreted and grasped as constituted by this 'Being-in', by transcendence. Nevertheless, affectivity does not float in thin air, as an abstract power separated from existence and burdened with grasping it; it is the affectivity of existence and belongs to it as its most essential determination. That affectivity reveals the total Being-in-the-world in all its items consequently means that in it, in each of the tonalities in which existence exists and realizes itself, is revealed existence itself, existence as ontologically interpreted and grasped as Being-in and as transcendence. Here the radical meaning of the power of revelation peculiar to affectivity is discovered, viz. that of revealing, not merely a being, not merely the world wherein a being appears, but the very power which discloses the world to us in the projection of Nothingness. With affectivity there comes a sort of possibility which transcendence has, by revealing itself to itself and hence maintaining itself in itself within the structure of this revelation and its unity, of constituting itself as a coherent and concrete essence.

Such a possibility for transcendence, for existence, of revealing itself to itself and hence of constituting itself as a coherent and concrete essence, the possibility for the ontological foundation of every possible manifestation in general of founding itself, is neither theoretical nor abstract; because it defines the essence of existence and its ultimate foundation, this possibility is visible in it as its affectivity [739] and can be recognized in each of the dispositions and tonalities in which existence exists and realizes itself. For example, fear reveals not merely or primarily the object whose menacing approach arouses fear nor the milieu in which this approach takes place and in which the menacing object arises; this object could not be menacing and could not arouse our fear unless existence, rather than simply surpassing itself toward the object as toward an exterior reality which would not really concern it, permits it to turn

back as it were, back to this existence which is handed over to the object at the very interior of the relation which it maintains with the object, unless in fear existence originally reveals itself to itself as handed over to the world and bound to it. This revelation of existence to itself in fear – existence in fear – it is true, hides fear from itself; it hides the anxiety which harks to existence handed over to the world; fear projects this anxiety onto a being to which it attends and which it takes as its origin or cause. The flight of existence toward the object of its fear nevertheless presupposes, as flight from itself, its revelation to itself, the original self-revelation of existence such as takes place in its very affectivity. Nevertheless, it pertains to the original self-revelation of existence in affectivity that, as revelation of the world which is consubstantial and contemporaneous with it, it can take place either in an authentic or in an inauthentic way.

The original self-revelation of existence in affectivity takes place in an authentic way in anxiety. In anxiety, existence ceases to lose itself in the intramundane being about which fear is anxious; rather, this being has moved into the shadows of indifference; the tasks which it calls for and through whose mediation it presents itself to us in a mode of life fallen into daily banality appear deprived of meaning; now there alone appears, as its true Being, the Nothingness of a being, the world as such. Moreover, anxiety, in its encounter with the world and its Nothingness, does not merely reveal the world, it finds itself returned to Being-in-the-world as such, to existence [740] itself as handed over to the world. To the extent that it is handed over to the world, existence is first of all handed over to itself; this is precisely what reveals to it its anxiety; this anxiety brings existence face to face with itself, it reveals it to itself, it reveals to it the fact of its existence and at the same time what it is, i.e. its Being handed over to itself as Being handed over to the world. That the revelation of existence itself, of its Being handed over to itself in order to be handed over to the world, takes place in an inauthentic manner in fear and likewise in the ensemble of affective tonalities of existence. while it takes place in an authentic manner in anxiety, this means that this revelation is not peculiar to anxiety; like the revelation of the world, the revelation of Being-in-the-world, the revelation of existence to itself is the fact of affectivity as such. For this reason, such a revelation takes place in each of the affective tonalities of existence, tonalities which precisely represent diverse modes according to which this revelation takes place, viz. the modes of revelation to itself of existence as originally and essentially constituted by its affectivity. Each affective disposition, says Heidegger, 'brings Dasein more or less explicitly . . . face to face with the fact that it is'.5

The ontological determination of the power of revelation peculiar to affectivity is identical to that of affectivity itself, to the determination of

its nature and the essential structures which constitute and define it. Because in its affectivity, in each of the tonalities in which existence exists and realizes itself, while it reveals the world to which it is related and handed over, existence reveals itself to itself such as it is; feeling, on the foundation in it of this essence which constitutes feeling and determines it, permits itself to be determined as what it is, as a feeling which is never merely or primarily a feeling with regard to the world and to what manifests itself in the world, i.e. a feeling with respect to an object, but also and [741] necessarily, in this revelation of existence to itself which constitutes its affectivity, a way for it to sense itself, to experience itself, a feeling of self. Hence it is that pleasure, for example, 'is not only pleasure in something', or the pleasure of possessing it, 'but also a state of enjoyment - a way in which a man experiences joy, in which he is happy. Thus, in every sensible (in the narrow sense of the term) or non-sensible feeling, the following structure is to be found: feeling is a feeling for . . . and as such is also a way of feeling oneself.' And further on: 'Feeling is having feeling for . . . so that the ego which experiences this feeling at the same time feels itself.'6

Nevertheless, upon what is the structural determination of feeling as feeling of self founded? What is the essence of existence insofar as it reveals itself to itself in its affective dispositions? In what does the power of revelation peculiar to these dispositions, the power of revelation of affectivity, consist? 'In every mood wherein "things are this or that way" with us, our own Da-sein is manifest to us. We have, therefore, an understanding of Being even though the concept is lacking. This preconceptual comprehension of Being, although constant and far-reaching, is usually completely indeterminate." The power of revelation of affectivity consists in the ontological understanding of Being. The essence of existence insofar as it reveals itself to itself is transcendence. When, therefore, in anxiety, for example, existence, no longer being able to lose itself in the object of its concern and coming into conflict with the world, finds itself returned to itself, to the in-der-Welt-sein as such, then its revelation, the revelation of existence to itself, credited to anxiety, is the fact of transcendence and finds its essence in the structure of the ontological understanding of [742] Being and takes place as a mode of this understanding: 'But when our "Verstehen" has come up against the world, it is brought to in-der-Welt-sein as such through anxiety.'8

Because in anxiety existence finds itself face to face with itself, the inthe-face-of (Wovor) of anxiety turns out to be identical to the aboutwhich (Worum) existence is anxious, namely, its own existence. Because the revelation of existence to itself takes place in anxiety as a mode of the ontological understanding of Being, the Worum of anxiety is not merely identical to its Wovor as having the same object; it further finds in it, in the structure of a mode of presentation which it essentially

achieves as a presenting in-the-face-of its own structure. It is in this ontologically radical sense that the Worum of anxiety is identical to its Wovor, insofar as it itself takes place as a Wovor, as a mode of transcendence. To put existence in the presence of itself, to confront it with itself in such a way that this 'bringing-in-the-face-of' does not merely mean 'to reveal' in some undetermined manner, but designates the mode according to which this revelation takes place and also its internal structure as constituted by transcendence, this is the fact of affectivity in general.

Because this bringing of existence into the presence of itself takes place in each instance in affectivity as a mode of transcendence, it is likewise in every instance and necessarily invested with the form of an ecstacy. The ecstatic structure of the relation to self of existence in affectivity is visible in all its tonalities, including those wherein this relation takes place according to the inauthentic mode of 'decadence'. If fear reveals existence to itself and consequently is essentially determined in its very possibility as a fear for self (Sichfürchten), it is a 'specific ecstatical unity [743] which makes the Sichfürchten existentially possible'.9 In the same way hope, to the extent that it is never merely the awaiting of a future good but first concerns, as hope for self, him who hopes, presupposes the ecstatic relation of existence with oneself as the only possible ontological foundation of 'hoping for something for oneself' which really constitutes 'the affective character . . . of hope itself'. 10 If the relation of existence to self, i.e. its revelation to self in affectivity, takes place in every case as a mode of transcendence and for this reason is invested with an ecstatic structure, this is because this revelation is not the fact of affectivity considered as a specific power, distinct from existence and serving as its foundation, but that it rather belongs to existence itself as identical to transcendence. It pertains to transcendence, to existence, upon the foundation in it of its own structure, namely, precisely as existence, as transcendence, to relate itself to itself at the same time that it relates itself to the world. 'It is essential to Dasein that along with the disclosedness of its world, it has been disclosed to itself, so that it always understands itself.'11 Here we see in its full light the fundamental ambiguity of the Heideggerian Erschlossenheit. The revelation of existence to itself is ontologically homogeneous with the revelation of the world; the power of affectivity whether it be understood as the power of revealing existence or of revealing the world is the same, it is the power of transcendence.

The power of the revealing of existence to itself, thought of as the power of affectivity, is not merely ontologically homogeneous with the power of revealing the world; it is not merely a question of the same power either, as if this power could freely 'wheel and deal' either with existence itself or with the [744] world: it is through one and the same act of this unique power that there takes place conjointly and necessarily in affectivity, the revelation of existence and of the world. The unique power whereby there takes place conjointly and necessarily in one and the same act of this power the revelation of existence and of the world is time. Time, in its original temporalization, is the movement whereby existence, projecting the horizon of the future in advance of itself and coming into confrontation with it, turned back by it and brought back to itself, discovers in the unity of this twofold movement, in the ecstasy of the project 'in advance toward' contemporaneous with the ecstasy of the return 'back upon', both the world as finite world and its own existence to which it is handed over. The power of revelation of affectivity is precisely the power of time. It is time which, in fear, opens up the horizon wherein the menacing object to come arises; it is time which permits this object to turn back to the menaced existence and in this turning back to it, uncovers existence to itself in the ecstasy of its inauthentic past. It is time which causes the pure horizon of the future to arise in-front-of 'anxious existence' as a finite horizon, as the horizon of its death; it is time which, permitting this existence to turn back to itself starting from this horizon, uncovers existence to itself in the ecstasy of the authentic past as a finite, fallen existence handed over to the world as to its own death. That the revelation of existence to itself, and in parallel fashion the revelation of the world, takes place in affectivity in an authentic or inauthentic fashion, results precisely from the fact that it pertains to temporality to temporalize itself in principle in different ways, whether authentic or not. Nevertheless, temporality is only transcendence itself in the mode of its effective and concrete accomplishment such that its temporalization necessarily occurs in an ecstatic form so that the different ecstasies which constitute it and in which it takes place, constitute diverse modes of realization of transcendence itself. Consequently, that the power of revelation of affectivity is [745] that of time means that the power of revelation of affectivity is the power of transcendence.

When it is understood as the power of transcendence, the power of revelation peculiar to affectivity is lost – together with the very nature of affectivity as constituted by this power. The existential ontological interpretation of affectivity as temporality brings about the disappearing of what properly constitutes the affective character of what is affective and loses this character in principle; it loses in principle the essence of affectivity as such. Heidegger had a presentiment of this truly essential lacuna in the philosophy of affectivity as presented in Sein und Zeit: 'If we are to interpret Befindlichkeit temporally, our aim is not one of deducing Stimmungen from temporality and dissolving them into pure phenomena of temporalizing. All we have to do is to demonstrate that except on the basis of temporality, Stimmungen are not possible in what they

"signify" in an existentiell way or in how they "signify" it." However, just what are these Stimmungen independently of what they 'signify in an existentiell way', independently of their power of revelation understood as the power of transcendence? The thought of Heidegger is characterized, at least this is one of its most remarkable traits, by the deliberate rejection of psychologism considered as one of the modes of thought of consciousness which clings to a being without asking about its Being; it is characterized, as far as feeling is concerned, by the refusal to consider it as a 'fact', a 'psychic fact', a 'state of the soul', a 'lived state', all of which are determinations in which the Being of affectivity, the essential and fundamental meanings with which it is invested as an original power of revelation, are lost, whereas feeling itself, fallen to the level of an object, henceforth presents itself as the simple correlate of a thought or an action.

This 'falling' of feeling is particularly obvious in [746] the modern world of technology where the will, treating everything in its relation to itself and in this way considering it as the object of its will and its action, renders thought blind to what takes place and encloses the event in its blindness in such a way that nothing, not even suffering, precisely because the latter is itself reduced to the condition of an object on which one can act, is capable of producing any change: 'Even the immense suffering found all over the world cannot directly inaugurate any change because we experience it merely as suffering, viz. passively, as an object for action and consequently as lodged in the same regions of Being as action: in the region of the willing of the will.'13 Furthermore, this is why at this time when metaphysics is 'breathing its last', in this world of technology which constitutes the last step of metaphysics and finds in psychologism as it does generally in the extraordinary development 'of the human sciences' to which technology gives rise a remarkable illustration among others 'under the reign of the will', therefore, 'it almost seems that the Being of suffering as well as the Being of joy is closed off to man'.14

However, the surpassing of the metaphysics of the will and the surpassing of the psychologism cannot take place with regard to feeling, this latter cannot be anything more than a state viz. the ontological element of manifestation, and hence, as Heidegger explicitly states, 'a mode of self-consciousness', a 'pure feeling', 15 unless this ontological element which constitutes the Being of feeling is grasped as being its own, as its own essence. Nevertheless, what element does the philosophy of transcendence possess in order to sketch an ontological interpretation [747] of the Being of feeling, unless it be transcendence itself? To the extent that he rejects psychologism, Heidegger finds himself forced to found the Being of feeling on the ecstatic relation of Being-in-the-world and to understand it as a determination of this relation. 'Freedom', says Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 'means participation in the revealment of what-is-in-totality, freedom has attuned [abgestimmt] all behavior to this from the start. But this attunement [Gestimmheit] or mood [Stimmung] can never be understood as "experience" and "feeling" because, were it so understood, it would at once be deprived of its being [Wesen] and would only be interpreted in terms of, say "life" and "soul" – which only appear to exist in their own right [Wesensrecht] so long as they contain any distortion and misinterpretation of that attunement. A mood of this kind, i.e. the ex-sistent exposition into what-is-in-totality, can only be "experienced" or "felt", as we say, because the "experient" without having any idea of the nature of the mood, is participating in an attunement revelatory of what-is-in-totality."

The reduction of the essence of affectivity to the essence of transcendence takes place in two ways. First of all, affectivity is understood as a determination of transcendence in such a way that transcendence, the ex-sistent exposition into what-is-in-totality, is invariably affected by a tonality, bound to it and always accompanying it, transcendence takes place as an affective attunement. 'All understanding', says Heidegger, 'is accompanied by a state-of-mind.'¹⁷ Or again: 'Dasein is constituted by Erschlossenheit – that is, by an understanding with a state-of-mind.'¹⁸ Because understanding always takes place in a certain affective situation, it is logical for the problematic to ask, [748] when faced with a determined mode of its accomplishment, 'which Stimmung corresponds to this understanding'.¹⁹ The Erschlossenheit of Gewissen, for example, may thus be characterized as the understanding by existence of its abandonment, an understanding to which anxiety corresponds as its specific tonality.²⁰

Nevertheless, on what is the correspondence of understanding and the Stimmung in Erschlossenheit founded? Why does transcendence necessarily become reality in an affective form? The impossibility of permitting the affective character of transcendence merely to subsist side by side with it as an unfounded determination and as a gratuitous presupposition, explains why an attempt is made very quickly – in spite of the affirmation of the irreducibility of Stimmungen to the pure phenomena of temporalization - to give a foundation to these Stimmungen, not merely their existentiell meaning but specifically their affectivity, on the very Being of understanding which they determine in each case, i.e. on the ecstatic structure of temporality. The reduction of the essence of affectivity to the essence of transcendence now takes place in such a way that it leads to their pure and simple confusion. This confusion is obvious when it is said that we must 'exhibit . . . the ontological structure of having-a-mood in its existential-temporal constitution', that more precisely, 'Befindlichkeit temporalizes itself primarily in having-been', that is to say 'in the Geworfenheit', that 'the existentially basic character of Stimmungen lies in bringing one back to something', in brief, that the properly ontological element of affectivity, its Being, resides in the ecstatic structure of transcendence and in the concrete modes of its temporal accomplishment. Because its Being, that which is properly ontological in it, resides in the very structure of transcendence, affectivity is not merely juxtaposed [749] to transcendence and henceforth as an unexplained determination, but the affective character of understanding ceases to be a presupposition without foundation and it is possible to comprehend 'how the ecstatical unity of one's current temporality will give any insight into the existential connection between one's Befindlichkeit and one's Verstehen.'21

That the ontological structure of affectivity resides in its existentialtemporal constitution is not something that can be merely affirmed. Heidegger undertakes to show it. If the simple waiting for a menacing object which approaches is not fear, this is because 'it is so far from being fear that the specific character which fear as a mood possesses is missing'. This character resides, according to Heidegger, in the fact that the waiting of fear concerns existence itself; it is not a simple waiting but a sort of 'anticipation', it resides in the fact that 'in fear the awaiting [anticipation] lets what is threatening come back to one's factically concernful potentiality-for-Being', namely, to come back to existence itself, co-discovered by itself in this movement of turning back to, namely, in the ecstasy of the past. 'The awaiting which fears is one which is afraid "for itself", namely, fearing in the face of . . . fearing about; therein lies the character of fear as mood and as affect."22 However, the discovery of existence by itself in the ecstasy of the past as 'factical' existence which is approached by the menacing object coming back to it from the future, as such, i.e. as a transcendent perception homogeneous to the simple perception of the menacing object in the future, no more than this latter, does not contain anything affective, or anything which can constitute something like an affective characteristic such as the characteristic of 'Stimmung' of fear. Such a discovery could very well take place in a purely theoretical consciousness, in a consciousness which is indifferent - or better a-tonal - to its own existence [750] and to the object which comes toward it. Moreover, it is as a consciousness of this sort, viz. as a purely theoretical consciousness, indifferent and a-tonal, that the discovery of existence to itself would take place, if it were to take place in the ecstasy of the past or, in a general way, as a mode of transcendence. Founded solely on the ecstatic relation, no fear is possible.

No anxiety is possible either. Never could a grasping of an existence abandoned and doomed to death, as to that which dominates the very horizon of its world and its time, be able to arouse the Stimmung of anxiety if it were to take place under the form of a simple apperception and as a mode of understanding, as an ecstatic relation. Actually, such an apperception is of itself no more than the indifferent presentation of an indifferent object, and the understanding of existence as Being-untodeath in no way determines this understanding as anxiety. This it cannot do; the abandonment of existence handed over to the world in death is not terrifying or agonizing, unless the power which discovers this abandonment is capable not only of discovering it - in what is of itself the a-tonal opposition of the ecstasy - but of being terrified, of being anxious, unless this power is not merely an understanding but is once and for all constituted in itself and prior to everything which it can understand, as affective and capable of being determined affectively, as affectivity. Understanding is assuredly affective and for this reason the a-tonal consciousness of the simple apperception here postulated by the problematic as that of ecstasy, namely, of opposition, never takes place, or takes place only as an indifferent consciousness. The affectivity of understanding resides, not in itself nor in the ecstatic structure which the understanding develops in each case, but in the anti-structure of this structure, in the antiessence of transcendence. The entire ambiguity of the philosophy of transcendence consists in presupposing the affectivity of understanding, a presupposition which does not merely presuppose the essence of affectivity but which, by reducing it to that of the understanding itself and confusing it therewith, denies it. [751]

The preceding remarks are valid, let it be understood, for all species of feelings including those which, like resentment, presuppose opposition and seem to find in it a principle of sufficient explanation. Let us consider revenge. According to Nietzsche, it is 'the resentment of the will toward time and its "there was" '.23 Actually, the will comes into conflict with time, with its 'passing' and with what takes place in it and with the past, as a thing before which it is powerless and from which it suffers. The suffering impotence of the will determines in it the spirit of revenge whereby it belittles everything which happens and even life itself, while at the same time it posits the absolute of supraterrestrial ideas. This spirit of revenge determines man's meditations, namely, the manner in which he understands his relation to the Being of a being and lives this relation. Because this spirit of revenge determines man's relation to the Being of a being, Nietzsche, says Heidegger, 'from the outset thinks revenge metaphysically'.24 What is important in revenge is not so much that to which it is opposed, namely, time and its 'there was', but the very fact that it is opposed to it, i.e. opposition as such. This is why the spirit of revenge endures when, rather than despising it 'a man who suffers much takes life under his wing', 25 lives it as a broadened experience (Dionysius) and absolutizes the becoming in the eternal Return of the identical.

The fact that in vengeance opposition as such is important, this is precisely what makes of it a metaphysical characteristic. 'Metaphysical thought', says Heidegger, 'rests on distinction'.26 Actually, not on the distinction between what truly is and what is merely apparent, but on

the distinction whereby existence [752] relates itself to Being as constituted by this very distinction, as opposition. Opposition to Being understood as time – whether this opposition be instituted in order to 'valuate' or devaluate it - is Being itself, is time. With the metaphysical thinking of revenge, there arises the possibility of an exhaustive existential-temporal interpretation of the Being of this feeling, for revenge is completely explained by time when it designates a relation to time constituted by time itself. However, that which is lacking to this existential-temporal interpretation of the Being of revenge is no less than the affective character of the relation whereby existence relates itself to what takes place and assumes an attitude regarding it, is nothing less than the affective character of revenge. Because such a character never resides in opposition as such, so neither can opposition explain other feelings which seem to find in it and in the separation which in each case constitutes their natural origin, viz. the suffering of separated-Being, i.e. nostalgia. It is true that transcendent Being - and the world in general - which never finds the condition of its presence and its proximity except in the remoteness of separation arouses our suffering: 'Nostalgia', says Heidegger, 'is the pain which the proximity of remoteness causes us.'27 But the transcendence of the world, if it constitutes the foundation of the separation from which nostalgia suffers, never constitutes the foundation of the suffering characteristic of this separation, i.e. nostalgia itself and its affectivity, which does not reside in the act of this transcendence, but in its original auto-affection and in the very essence of affectivity.

That transcendence never constitutes the foundation of affectivity and does not constitute its essence we see in the fact that it likewise does not found that to which affectivity is bound by virtue of an essential connection, namely, ipseity. Such a connection can be comprehended in the existential-temporal interpretation of affectivity where the [753] power of revelation of affectivity, understood as the power of time, no longer concentrates on the world, but on the existence handed over to it, in such a way that this existence takes first place as the peculiar, and so to speak, specific content of this power, in such a way that it is existence itself which in affectivity discovers itself and reveals itself to itself. That this revelation to self of existence, its original relation with self, and ultimately its Being-self, presents itself as an essential determination of its affectivity and as consubstantial with it we see still more clearly when it is said, with regard to hope, that its 'character as a mood lies primarily in hoping as hoping for something for oneself', which, adds Heidegger, 'presupposes that he has somehow arrived at himself [ein sich gewonnen haben]'.28 The 'having arrived at self' of existence, presupposed in it as the very possibility and essence of its affectivity, because it constitutes this essence, can be seen in each of its tonalities: in fear to the extent that it is originally and necessarily determined as 'fear for

self'; in anxiety which, in the same way, is possible only as the anxiety of Dasein confronted with its own existence and as anxiety for it. It is precisely because the having-arrived-at-self of existence and its original revelation to itself, plus that which in every case determines it as a self, find their foundation in the ecstasy of the past that the past plays, in the ontological interpretation of affectivity as temporality, the role peculiar to it and ultimately presents itself as the foundation peculiar to affectivity and its essence in such a way that the different tonalities appear as diverse modes of its realization, that, for example, the 'Befindlichkeit' of anxiety is explicitly presented as constituted by a specific ecstatic mode of the past.²⁹ However, in its relation to itself such as takes [754] place in the ecstasy of the past, existence can relate *itself* to whatever it is related only to the extent that it is henceforth constituted in itself as a self; it can relate itself as to itself only to the extent that this Self, cast into the milieu of otherness opened by the past, and yet presenting itself in this otherness as a self and as its own self, is nothing other than the objectification of its original Self and its representation.30 No more than opposition in general, and precisely because it is a mode of this opposition, can the ecstasy of the past constitute the ipseity of existence consubstantial with its affectivity or constitute its foundation; rather it presupposes ipseity as its peculiar condition.

The impotence of opposition as constituting of itself the essence of ipseity becomes obvious when the problematic undertakes to determine the 'transcendental, fundamental structure of the transcendence of the moral self'.31 It is noteworthy that the question of this determination of the Being of the self starting from transcendence intervenes interior to an analysis explicitly oriented toward grasping the essence of respect and through it toward the essence of feeling in general. How does this determination of the essence of ipseity starting with transcendence take place in feeling, and more especially in respect? How does respect constitute in itself the Being of the Self? Insofar as it reveals this Self. 'In respect for the law, the ego which experiences this respect must also, in a certain sense, become manifest to itself. This manifestation', adds Heidegger to emphasize its essential character, 'is neither subsequent [to the acts] nor is it something that takes place only occasionally.'32 In what does it consist? In no way in respect itself nor in what makes it what it is or in the original revelation of its Being to itself which is as such constitutive of its affectivity as well as of its Being-self [755] and of the essence of ipseity in it. The revelation of the ego to itself in respect, as Heidegger and Kant understand it, is only indirect; it takes place through the mediation of a complex process which, far from founding the Being of the ego, rather presupposes it as the very condition for its accomplishment. Such a process is nothing other than transcendence itself. The revelation of the ego to itself taking place 'in respect', but in fact through the mediation of transcendence, breaks down as follows: Respect uncovers the law in such a way that this uncovering is precisely the task of transcendence; nevertheless, the law is the law of action, it commands action; consequently it implies and presupposes an ego which submits itself to its commandment and accomplishes it. To this simple presupposition of an acting self submissive to the law is actually related the entire content of a proposition such as the following: 'Respect for the law this specific way of making the law manifest as the basis of the determination of action - is in itself a revelation of myself as the self that acts.'33 Thus, the order of factors, the hierarchy of essences, is reversed: From opposition taken as self-evident, from the representation of the law, viz. ultimately from the simple concept of the law, is deduced the real existence of an ego who nonetheless constitutes the ontological condition for the possibility of and the foundation for this representation, for this concept as for all opposition in general, while this deduction is baptized with the name of a 'disclosure'.

Far from being able to be deduced from the representation of the laws and as that which is submissive to it, the ego rather constitutes the ontological condition for the possibility of and the foundation for this representation, for opposition in general; this we see in the fact that reason presents the law to itself³⁴ in such a way that the Being of this [756] reason, and prior to this, its Being-self, i.e. that which allows it to present the law to itself, is again simply presupposed in such a way that the ego which presents the law to itself, for lack of appearing in respect and of being grasped in respect as its very affectivity, is now no more than some condition 'x', some metaphysical reality. Between the metaphysical reality of the ego of reason which posits the law and the empirical reality of the ego which submits to it in respect a difference now intervenes which stems not merely from the fact that the first ego eludes the sphere of experience in which the second is plunged but from the very nature of the relation which is established between the two, insofar as this relation, mediated through the representation of the law and constituted by it, is constituted by the difference itself as such.

Because the two egos, the one which posits the law and the other which submits to it, are defined starting with the difference of the representation and consequently as essentially different, the affirmation of their unity, the affirmation according to which 'respect for the law' (with regard to the metaphysical ego wherein it finds its origin) 'is respect for oneself'35 also remains without foundation. The ontological interpretation of the Being of the ego starting with transcendence, here more precisely starting with the representation of the moral law, presupposes in each case not merely the ipseity of the two egos which it is led to posit starting from this representation but also the ipseity of the ego as such, and furthermore it likewise causes the break-up of this ego into an unthinkable plurality of different and irreducible egos.

To the ego of experience which encounters the law and to the metaphysical ego which posits it, there is now added a third, the one which becomes real in the submission of the first to the second and through it: 'I am myself in this act of submitting to myself.'36 Such an ego, [757] progressively realizing itself in the free and contingent submission of a first ego to a super-ego is the authentic and true ego, 'the true Beingself', as if this did not first of all have to designate the very essence of the ego and its possibility, as if this essence or any essence in general could ever realize itself progressively and be something which becomes. Because it rests ultimately on the same foundation or rather, as far as the essence of ipseity is concerned, on the same absence of foundation, the philosophy of transcendence joins classical mythology and reaches its achievement in it. By submitting itself to the law which becomes for it the law of pure reason, the ego raises itself to the latter, raises itself to itself as being free in such a way that it is henceforth impossible for it to despise itself. 'Consequently, respect is that mode of being-as-self of the ego which prevents the latter from "rejecting the hero in his soul"." '37 Thus a definition of the hero is substituted for the ontological determination of the essence of ipseity. Since it is not able to reveal itself as itself and in its essence, it 'reveals the ego in its "dignity" ',38 and a feeble ontology once again yields to moral enthusiasm.

That the interpretation of the Being of the self, starting with the representation of the moral law, and in general starting from the essence of transcendence, should inevitably fail as does the interpretation of the essence of affectivity starting from the power of revelation peculiar to transcendence, namely, starting with transcendence itself, these confirm the problematic in its acquired results, which means that the essence of ipseity and likewise of affectivity which founds this essence and is consubstantial with it, cannot be founded on transcendence or understood starting with it but only by starting from what it really is; the essence of ipseity can be understood only as immanence. [758]

Translated by Girard J. Etzkorn

Notes

This chapter originally formed ¶65 of Michel Henry's The Essence of Manifestation. This was first published as L'Essence de la manifestation, 2 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1963). Numbers in square brackets refer to the pages of this original edition.

1 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) 246.

- 2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) 390.
 - 3 ibid. 385.
 - 4 ibid. 235.
 - 5 ibid. 321.
 - 6 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 164.
 - 7 ibid. 234. [Henry's italics]
 - 8 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 393. [Henry's italics]
 - 9 ibid. 392.
 - 10 ibid. 396.
 - 11 ibid. 317. [Henry's italics]
 - 12 ibid. 391.
- 13 Martin Heidegger, Uberwindung der Metaphysik, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, I. 3 ed. Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967, 90-1.
 - 14 ibid. 91.
 - 15 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 164.
- 16 Martin Heidegger, On the Essence of Truth, tr. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, in Existence and Being. (London: Vision Press Ltd., 1949) 338-9. [Henry's italics]
 - 17 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 310.
 - 18 ibid. 304.
 - 19 ibid. 342.
 - 20 ibid. 333, 343.
 - 21 ibid. 390.
 - 22 ibid. 391-2. [Henry's italics]
- 23 On this point and the analyses which follow, cf. Martin Heidegger, Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra? in Vorträge und Aufsätze, I, 3 ed. (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967) 107 and 93–118.
 - 24 ibid. 104.
 - 25 ibid. 114.
 - 26 ibid.
 - 27 ibid. 100.
 - 28 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 396.
- 29 Cf. ibid. 395. The same remark is made about fear: 'The specific ecstatical unity which makes it existentially possible to be afraid, temporalizes itself primarily out of the kind of forgetting characterized above . . . as a mode of having been . . .' 392.
- 30 The theory of the constitution of this transcendent Self is one of the tasks proper to the Phenomenology of the Ego. There was no room for it among the topics of these present investigations.
 - 31 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 166.
 - 32 ibid. 165.
 - 33 ibid.
 - 34 ibid.
 - 35 ibid.
 - 36 ibid.
 - 37 ibid.
 - 38 ibid.

An interpretation of Heidegger's Bremen lectures: towards a dialogue with his later thought

Kōhei Mizoguchi

The positive reception of Heidegger's philosophy in Japan can be roughly divided into two types. The first focuses entirely on the earlier period of Heidegger's thought, as does the great majority of Europeans who appreciate his philosophy. The other views the later Heidegger as of extremely positive value, and tries to reinterpret his early period from this latter standpoint, as Heidegger himself does. This tendency in Japan is probably due less to a desire to follow Heidegger himself very closely than to a recognition of an affinity with Oriental thought, and especially with Zen Buddhism, in the later Heidegger. This evaluation is largely attributable to the Kyoto School established by Kitarō Nishida, who tried to universalize and rationally explain his Zen Buddhist experiences through his encounters with Western philosophy.

The European philosophy which Kitarō Nishida critically confronted and assimilated was extremely broad-ranging, but Nishida only had occasion to learn of Heidegger's early thought, and therefore he could not help but be critical of Heidegger's failure to escape from what he perceived as a subjectivistic locus. This position of Nishida's was intensified by his coinage of the term 'the logic of place' in his later years, wherein he anticipates Heidegger's 'turning' (Kehre) and goes beyond him, reaching the standpoint of 'absolute nothingness' (which for Nishida is also absolute realism and absolute objectivism, transcending the polar opposition of subject and object). Nishida's 'absolute nothingness' goes beyond the standpoint of Hegelian abstraction (Idee); it is a philosophy of fundamental place, which lets things be the self-limitation of this place, and which accepts the reality of things as they are, established from that basic standpoint. According to this philosophy, the working of the self-limitation of 'place' is at the same time the self-consciousness of the historically grounded human self having a concrete physical body.

If we may be allowed a comparison, the thought of absolute nothing-

ness, as far as its form is concerned, has the character of a synthesis of the 'topological' thought of the later Heidegger and the 'existential' thought of the early Heidegger. Thus the Kyoto School, which tries to follow the tradition of Nishida, naturally esteems very highly the topological thought of Heidegger after his turning. In addition to structural similarities, of course, the existence of common terms and elements also plays an important role in making possible the dialogue between these two different traditions. But at the same time, the danger of lapsing into subjectivity (or losing our objectivity) always lurks within the posture of such a cross-philosophical dialogue. This danger increases in the philosophies of Nishida and Heidegger, which are both grounded in basic experience, and also try to go beyond the usual styles of thinking and forms of expression. To retain our objectivity, therefore, we must always be conscious of their differences. This should be a fundamental precondition of our mental attitude towards the appeal of any foreign philosophical tradition, and serve to shock us out of preconceptions which might otherwise lead us into subjectivism. With these provisos in mind, then, this essay will attempt to interpret Heidegger's Bremen lectures, Einblick in das was ist (1949), which both express the fruits of his middle period and serve as an approach to his later thought.

Heidegger gave four successive lectures under the above title: 'The thing' (Das Ding), 'The enframing' (Das Gestell), 'The danger' (Die Gefahr), and 'The turning' (Die Kehre). Taken as a whole, these lectures connect the shift from the 'being-historical thought' (seinsgeschichtliches Denken) of his middle period with the notion of 'Event' (Ereignis) which is central to his later thought. To put it a little differently, these lectures suggest certain relations between Heidegger's topological-transcendental side and his being-historical side, which constitute the most difficult problem in understanding both Heidegger and his appraisals by the Kyoto School. While Nishida and the later Heidegger show some similarities in their topological and transcendental standpoints, there is a discrepancy between their views on the historicity of thinking itself, most visible in their specific critical analysis of the contemporary historical world. For Heidegger, the modern technical world is analyzed and characterized concretely as the Enframing, which is a privative form of the coming-topass (Geschehen) of Being itself, and this analysis comes from his beinghistorical thought and his topological investigations. Nishida also treats the world as a concrete historical bodily presence. But even if he formally emphasizes the historical world, since he sees history in an abstract and formalistic view as the 'self-limitation of absolute presence', he fails to look specifically at historical periods and analyze them. The presence or absence of this critical analysis will not ultimately be due to whether they treat history as a central issue, but to how radically historically grounded they see themselves as being. I want to focus on this problem of the historicity of thought as one of the noteworthy differences between us and Heidegger. In the following interpretation, I shall treat the problem of the historicity of thought as a problem of the relationships between event (*Ereignis*) and Enframing (*Gestell*). In particular, I shall focus on an analysis of the internal structure of Heidegger's thought, as an attempt to lay the groundwork for a concrete philosophical dialogue.

T

The overall title of the lecture series which we are considering here, Insight Into That Which Is (Einblick in das was ist), is itself significant. This title has a double meaning, which suggests the twofold nature of the lectures' contents. First of all, 'that which is' signifies the things which exist and present themselves to us. But of course it does not just refer only to the various things and events before our eyes. As Heidegger says, 'Without Being . . . all beings would remain without being'.² Thus, beings have to be seen from the perspective of Being. Moreover, we must take the relative pronoun 'which' (was), following Heidegger's technical vocabulary, as referring to the active expression of essence (Wesen). Then 'that which is' expresses the 'belonging together' (Zusammengehörigkeit) of Being itself and the particular things which are for us within it. 'Being could not come to presence without beings'.' So 'Insight into that which is' implies firstly the investigation into and thinking about the coming-to-presence of Being, in terms of beings that are proximally present. Heidegger treats the primary mode of the being of beings in terms of technology (*Technik*). Enframing (*Gestell*), in turn, refers to the destiny (*Geschick*) of Being which controls in and through the form of technology. If we follow the structure of being-historical thought, then the things which are must be taken from the assembling (versammelnde) presence of history, and thus Enframing is understood as the ultimate completion or fulfilment of metaphysics, the collective state of Western traditional metaphysical essence. In this sense, for Heidegger, the interpretation of the present period and of historical thought becomes one. So 'Insight into that which is' is firstly an inquiry into technology, namely a philosophical investigation of the nature of technology. nology, or Enframing.

If Heidegger's thought had stopped at the standpoint of the traditional ontological questions, *Insight Into That Which Is* might have finished with the question concerning technology. This is because ontological issues tend to take as their central theme the study of the being of beings; their enterprise begins and ends there. In fact, the system of ontological-metaphysical inquiry treats truth as fixed and static, overlooking the ever-changing reciprocity between truth and the being of the

people who are inquiring into it. As far as the being of truth is concerned, the being of the inquirer is not necessarily essential to the being of truth itself. However, for thinking which takes as its basis the dynamic reciprocity of truth and the 'historical' (geschehende) being of its inquirers, truth becomes something whose appearance (Erscheinen) is dynamically modified through that reciprocity with existence.4 Therefore a philosophy which looks into the essence of technology, witnesses or experiences the essential modifications of Being as it is presented to human beings, within the belonging together of human beings and Being (Zusammengehören von Mensch und Sein),5 which in other terms is the mutual reciprocity of thinking and truth. It is here that the relative pronoun 'which' (was) in his title takes on the secondary meanings of an active verb. The philosophy which would look into the essence of technology - that which is - by experiencing the presence of that essence, gains the possibility of witnessing a new world different from that technology. In this sense the 'that which is' (was ist) no longer signifies the modern technological way of being, but the coming-to-presence (Wesen) of the new, modified world. This modification of the world does not of course mean a change in the subjective perspective of beings. The entire mutual interrelationship between Being and beings undergoes a revolution. In my view, 'that which is' means in Heidegger 'what truly is', and this means 'what essentially is' (was west), and that is the essential being (Wesen) of another new and authentic world as Event (Ereignis).

It is true that at the end of his lectures, Heidegger himself views 'that which is' as the presence of Being itself.⁶ But even Being itself is not something independent of beings, but refers to the whole, including both elements in their belonging together. If that were not the case, Being itself would, Heidegger emphasizes, again become something structurally similar to a metaphysical substance. We must also interpret from this perspective his position that the thing has no special elemental status in the Fourfold (Geviert), when he develops the Fourfold in his lecture 'The thing'.

Heidegger takes this changing world (it is still a potential world) as the world in which things themselves each express their own peculiar characteristics (dingen). It is a presence (worlding) of the world itself in which the four elements of earth and heaven, mortals and divinities, are constantly and reciprocally reverting (enteignen), particularized into their individual being, and at the same time unified (vereignen) in their nature - a world of mirror-play (Spiegel-Spiel). He calls this world the Fourfold, and these kinds of happenings 'Event' (Ereignis).7 Thus this 'Insight into that which is' is a philosophical inquiry into things, and things as they come to express themselves as things. But if we take the modifications of this world as the movement of Being itself, then an 'Insight' (Einblick) does not simply mean an insight from the human side. Rather, it refers

primarily to a 'flash' (Einblitz) of the whole turning of affairs.⁸ Thus Insight Into That Which Is is also 'The turning' (Die Kehre).

Especially in this case, the relationships between Enframing and Fourfold are not clear and distinct, but harbor problems. While both can be seen as the presence of Being itself, Enframing should be taken primarily in terms of a refusal of the world as the neglect of the thing (die Verweigerung von Welt als die Verwahrlosung des Dinges). On the other hand, the Fourfold, as the preserver of Being (Wahrnis des Seins), is also regarded as the truth of the presence of Being (Wahrheit des Wesens von Sein). Fourfold and Enframing are not similar (das Gleiche), but are the same (das Selbe). Yet in another place, Heidegger calls Enframing the prelude (Vorspiel) of Event. Furthermore, the world as Fourfold is never a single mode of Being. Here, we once again confront the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity from Being and Time, and the eschatological dimension of Heidegger's middle and later periods. Whether Heidegger's thought can contribute to modern philosophy depends largely on how we interpret this relation between Fourfold and Enframing.

Thus Insight Into That Which Is comprises first 'The enframing', then 'The thing', and then 'The turning'. What is then the relation of these to the remaining lecture, 'The danger' (*Die Gefahr*)? If we follow Heidegger, the Danger means the essence, coming-to-presence itself, of Enframing, which is the essence of technology. Heidegger tries to explain this curious relationship between the Danger and Enframing from the Old High German etymological root fara, which connotes both urging forward and exposing to danger. Leaving aside the accuracy of this derivation, we can explain the essence of the dominant function of the setting (Stellen) within 'Enframing' as urging (Nachstellen), and that urging as Danger (gathering of urgings). At the same time, the extremity of Danger which we feel within the word we read as 'Danger' points to a peculiar privative 'hiddenness' (Verborgenheit) in the nature of Being itself. The Danger also expresses the coming to presence of hiddenness which is a fundamental tendency of Being itself. 'Enframing comes to presence as Danger'. 11 Therefore Enframing, as the Being of beings, refers to the present unhiddenness (Unverborgenheit) of beings which are.

Then 'The danger' refers to the coming-to-presence of Being itself which withdraws itself by conferring Enframing, namely the experience of the coming-to-presence of Being itself in the period in which Enframing dominates. In other words, 'The danger' comes to refer to a constellation of hiddenness and unhiddenness as a whole, or the simultaneous presence of both elements. From another perspective, if we can say that Being itself can turn, then Being itself can turn in that constellation. This is the terminus of the correlative circular movement of thought and experience itself (both of which progress from technology to Enframing). It

expresses the extreme experience of Being itself, under the domination of technology. Here we have the conclusion and gathering of the workings of the being-historical thought (seinsgeschichtliches Denken) which Heidegger had carried out through his middle period. So 'The danger' is 'The turning' from 'The enframing' to 'The thing', and that which gives form to the point of contact of that move. The locus of this movement, which is given form and opened by the Danger, is the one and only place where we can treat the problem of the relations of Enframing and Fourfold. It is here that the experience of the domination of Enframing, as oblivion of Being, as distress, and as pain¹² (Seinsvergessenheit, Not, Schmerz), comes to take on a definite meaning, because this experience first proclaims the possibility of the modification of the world. Thus Heidegger's lectures on Insight Into That Which Is are formulated on the necessary internal relations of each lecture, and as a whole, they point to one 'occurrence' of Being - or in Heidegger's words, the Event.

Now as we noted before, these lectures occur in the order: 'The thing', 'The enframing', 'The danger', and 'The turning'. But if we follow the above interpretation, considering their internal relations, the lecture on 'The thing' ought to come last. Then why is it put first? For the time being, we can think of two reasons. One is based on the peculiarly cyclical nature of Heidegger's thought, on the insight that 'Primordial [anfänglich] earliness shows itself to man only at the end'. 13 Thus the world of Event presented in 'The thing' is at once the last element and the earliest origin, and so is placed at the beginning as the origin. The second point is a problem of methodology which is essentially related to the first issue. In order to accomplish the fore-project (Vorentwurf) in terms of the hermeneutic circle, 'The thing' is placed first and so gives from the start to the subsequently developed thought a horizon which becomes a locus where the thought is achieved, and can later serve as a criterion. In this case, too, that which is placed first can also be placed last.

As has been often pointed out, the world of the Fourfold as Event articulated and developed in 'The thing' is a Presocratic Greek world dominated by myth (*muthos*), and is thus the oldest and earliest world. But Heidegger's philosophy does not assert simply its recurrence. If we follow being-historical thought, the oldest things endure in hidden form and are gathered even into the present age, as having been (Gewesen). For Heidegger, the oldest thing is at once the beginning and therefore the origin (Anfang und Ursprung). Those ancient origins which are now hidden are in fact the truth of Being itself. So if we want to think about the truth of Being, we first have to recollect the past (das Gewesene) itself. That is at the same time not only the oldest of things, but when we think about it, it must become the first thing to stand in our memories. In other words, we have to 'pre-think' (Vordenken) against the arrival of the earliest origins again in the future. Heidegger writes: 'Recollecting the past is pre-thinking into that which is unthought and should be thought. Thinking is recollecting pre-thinking [Denken ist andenkendes Vordenken].'14 Thus the position of 'The thing' as the first lecture is most significant.

There arises here another confusing problem. Even if the world of Event is based upon the past, as long as it is pre-thought to be in the future, then it is no more than a possible world and not the real world of experience and actual occurrences. Moreover, the object of this kind of thinking has the danger of becoming merely a kind of thought-construction or idea. In one dialogue Heidegger mentions the arrival of Event as follows: 'I don't know if this will ever happen or not! But within the essence of technology, I see the first glimmer [Vorschein] of a much deeper mystery, of what I call the "Event" '.15 Does it suffice that we treat this as simply another case of Heidegger's often-touted prophetic personality? If we take Heidegger as being merely prophetic here, then we learn nothing from this statement, for there is no ultimate conclusion nor universal theory of Being within this view of his forwardlooking thought of Event. Rather, it is precisely at this point that we find the most basic characteristic of Heidegger's perpetual inquiry into 'that which must be thought'. We may say that this is the integrity of Heidegger's thinking. Thus an interpretation which over-emphasizes the notion of Event is in danger of mistaking the basic direction of his thought. It is here that we see the decisive gap between Heidegger, who follows the process and direction of historical thought, and Nishida, who tries to draw out all reality based on a dialectical theory from absolute nothingness as the ultimate ground. Heidegger tries to ground the forward-looking character of his thought in a historical process. Therefore it is more appropriate to take his thought as the unification of the present, the future, and the past, based on the entirety of his Insight Into That Which Is. This entails a re-examination of the meaning of the lecture. 'The thing' in its relation to the whole, from the standpoints of the cyclical nature of his thought and the structure of the hermeneutic circle.

II

The ontological hermeneutic circle, as presented in *Being and Time*, must be taken for the basic and necessary structure of human thought of which the basis is the mutual interdependence or correlativity between historical existence itself and the object of thought.¹⁶ In the working of the hermeneutic circle, a fore-project takes over the past as legacy, and

is revised through concrete interpretation and then concretely articulated. If we apply this kind of structure to the present case, then the world of the Fourfold presented in 'The thing' covertly plays the role of foreproject for Heidegger's thought, and as a criterial horizon, through a concrete interpretation of the present world as Enframing it itself becomes concretized, resulting in a new expression of the world of Event.

The world of the Fourfold as Event is not simply a world prophetically anticipated, rather it is the criterial horizon for the ontological interpretation in a broad sense of the present technological world. This may be recognized at several points. For example, only by using the world of Event as a criterion can we perceive the deficiencies of previous Western metaphysical systems which return into Enframing: 'oblivion of Being', 'neglect of the thing', the loss of true closeness (Nähe) in 'uniform distance' (das gleichformig Abstandslose).17

The being-historical thinking of Heidegger's middle period had continually seen that kind of negative, privative structure within the history of Western metaphysics, and thus tried to interpret and accomplish the fore-project of Event by making this Event a criterion and clue. This fore-project of Event was already made within a limited realm and covertly through Heidegger's turning. Of course this is not something concrete or thematized from the beginning; it shows its concrete form first through the process of circular practice.

Moreover, the criterial characteristics of the Fourfold go so far as to take the privative characteristics of Enframing as the coming-to-presence of Being itself. For example, this can be seen in the case of The Question Concerning Technology (Die Frage nach der Technik). In this treatise, Enframing is regarded not only as the coming-to-presence of Being itself, but also as a derivative of the producing and exhibiting (Her- und Darstellen) seen in the ancient Greek technē. 18 For there is a similarity between Enframing and the revealing (Entbergen) as bringing-forth (Hervorbringen) seen in technē. Thus we can interpret the present world of technology as the working of the revealing of Being. On this point as well, the world of the ancient Greeks again functions as a fore-projected criterion for drawing out an interpretation of Heidegger. But in this case, the world of the Fourfold as Event which takes ancient Greece as its model is again the recurrent conclusion reached through a hermeneutic circle. Here we have to reflect more closely on that circular structure.

The horizon of meanings (Sinnhorizont) which bears the role of the fore-project in the movement of the hermeneutic circle does not exist independently in itself, nor is it derived or invented purely from thought. If we follow the thought of the earlier Heidegger and of other hemeneutic philosophies, the horizon of meanings originates and is derived dialogically from the past as history which already forms its present basis. 19 In this regard, insofar as Heidegger tries to take over the ancient Greek experience of Being as the true past, that Greek experience becomes the criterion and the fore-project underlying all interpretation of Being. But the situation is not so simple when the problem concerns the ontological horizon of meanings itself, since the ontological horizon of meanings has already been transmitted in some form or another from the past, before meeting with the past clearly and thematically. Gadamer calls this transmitted horizon of meanings 'prejudice' (Vormeinung). 20 Here the horizon of meanings itself as prejudice is already a historical past condition, upon which the thematic engagement with the past can for the first time take place, and based on which dialogical circle a modified horizon of meanings becomes possible. The immediate past horizon of meanings, as 'prejudice', is the primarily transmitted horizon of meanings of the present period, but it is not necessarily either self-conscious nor are its origins clearly discerned. Rather, it is because those origins are unknown that that prejudice wields its power.

But when Heidegger started down the road towards the question of Being in Being and Time, the first problem he encountered, in trying to clarify its meaning and origins, was the ontological horizon of meanings as just this prejudice. He did not start his analysis from the authenticity of Dasein, but rather from 'everydayness'. This shows that he took the prevalent prejudice for the fundamental reality, and therefore for the basic issue. Now if we want to look at prejudice for what it is, and treat it as a new problem of its own, then we need a new horizon that is not under the sway of prejudice. Again following the ideas of hermeneutic philosophy, that new horizon must be formed out of the dialogical interaction of prejudice and tradition. In Heidegger's case, the formation of a new horizon of meanings whereby to take prejudice for itself does not come immediately out of the encounter with the tradition of ancient Greece. Ever since Being and Time, the early Greek experiences of Being were a leading thread to which Heidegger continually referred.

This is not to say that the form and expression of ancient Greek experience directly guided all the concepts and analysis of Being and Time. Rather, what first contributed to forming the horizon of prejudice was traditional Western metaphysics, which he later was to characterize as privation - especially the philosophy of the eighteenth century onwards - which had already confronted and criticized such traditional metaphysics from a limited realm. (We may consider, among others, the names of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Husserl in particular.) But it is Heidegger's horizon that becomes a problem again in terms of its prejudices; it is here that the clear and dialogical encounter with ancient Greece first takes place. Thereafter, within this encounter, prevalent prejudice and traditional Western metaphysics, which help form the horizon by which that powerful Greek tradition is interpreted, become a single great historical prejudice.

What does all of this clarify? First, insofar as we continue to have a limited perspective on the structure of the hermeneutic circle, then the new horizon formed from Heidegger's central encounter with ancient Greece must be formed from a dialogical encounter between Greece and the (later Western) metaphysical tradition as the prevalent prejudice. So of course we cannot call this new horizon objectively and historically equivalent to the ancient Greek experience of Being. Heidegger himself achieves 'the effort to think through original thinking more originally',²¹ and recognizes this point when he calls that which must come 'the other beginning' (der andere Anfang). Secondly, the newly-formed horizon becomes a criterial horizon for the interpretation of both ancient Greek experience and the traditional and currently predominant interpretations of Being; but insofar as this new horizon is formed from a kind of fusion in the encounter with these two traditions, we cannot imagine that either will be completely adequate for a self-interpretation of this new horizon as a whole.

To put it a little differently, it is not the case that of the two - the ancient Greek experience and the predominant modern interpretations of Being – one would become a standard of truth, and the other merely a derivative. So, we cannot take the Fourfold of ancient Greek experience presented in 'The thing' as referring simply either to Heidegger's 'protection of the truth of Being', nor to a unique form of the coming-topresence of the world itself (worlding), nor to the expression of that which is awaited in the future. Rather, the fore-projected horizon leading Heidegger is not yet adequately and concretely articulated. So the world of the Fourfold as Event presented in 'The thing', even if it appears to take the final form of a fore-project itself, in the movement of the hermeneutic circle, is nevertheless in its basic nature something different. Nor can we say that the world of the Fourfold is a criterion by which the Enframing comes to be interpreted. As Heidegger tried to express their relations above, both are identical in their revealing (Entbergen), and with respect to the coming-to-presence of Being, not equivalent but the same. At the same time, Enframing is the privation of the Fourfold, and the 'luminescence of things to come'. But these complicated expressions show us rather that their relations are not yet adequately experienced or understood. Heidegger could not achieve a dialogue synthetically fusing the classical Greek experience of Being and the traditional Western metaphysics which presently wields power in our prejudices; he was not able adequately to structure a horizon of meanings fusing the two. If that were possible, then from the viewpoint of the Fourfold, Enframing would be something other than mere privation; it would be given a concrete basis. Similarly, the world of the Fourfold would be locatable within the united whole of the present Enframing

and the Fourfold and not need to be based in some future state separate from the present.

If we can make the comparison here, Nishida's standpoint of 'absolute nothingness' tries to combine at one stroke both authenticity and inauthenticity, by locating it in the self-development of the dialectical selfdetermination of absolute nothingness. While this move of Nishida's philosophy bypasses metaphysics in its traditional sense, by grounding everything at once in absolute nothingness, it retains the metaphysical character of affirming everything in its hierarchic order of Being. Conversely, everything is ultimately reduced to the absolute presence of absolute nothingness, by which it takes on a trans-historical position. Certainly Nishida himself thinks of the historical world as 'the selfdetermination of the absolute present', and 'immanence as transcendence'.22 But the specific historical contents of that self-determination are the focus of the world and neglected within 'unlimited creativity'. Even if the philosophy of absolute nothingness talks about historical determination, it fails to look at itself within that context. The world of technology which appears privative to Heidegger is indiscriminately given a positive valuation as the active intuition of absolute nothingness in Nishida's philosophy.23

By contrast, because he wants to ground his thought in history and to avoid placing the authentic Event within a transcendentally absolute present, Heidegger tries to base his thought on the historical future. We do not have time to examine the implications of these differences here. but if we limit ourselves to Heidegger's side, we might make the following conjectures. The fore-project guiding Heidegger's thought may best be sought within the 'and' linking Enframing and the Fourfold - and the domain opened up through their relationship might provide for the first time a criterion for interpretation. It is perhaps this question which covertly guided Heidegger's thinking on this issue.

Contrary to our original intentions, we have here abandoned the standpoint of looking at Insight Into That Which Is as a complete movement of the hermeneutic circle for which 'The thing' is both fore-project and result. The lectures in their entirety constitute an attempt at a dialogue between current prejudices and ancient Greek experience, in the progressive pursuit of the formulation of a new horizon of Being. From this perspective, 'The danger' and 'The turning' express the hidden points of contact in the dialogue between 'The thing' and 'The enframing'. This also sheds light on the role and position of the world of the Fourfold as Event, which are full of mysteries uninterpretable at a glance. Heidegger's pre-thinking is not towards the world of the Fourfold, but rather towards the unifying and fusing dialogue of Greek and modern thought hinted at in the 'and' linking the Fourfold and Enframing.

Based on this understanding of the internal relations and the overall

meaning of these complicated lectures, we can gain a better perspective on our own activities of interpretation. There has been hardly any work done on the internal criticism of Heidegger's idea of Event, which is central to his later thinking, nor of his lectures on Insight Into That Which Is taken together - except for the work of Otto Pöggeler. This may be partly due to the fact that these lectures were not published as a whole, but more importantly to the fact that his thinking about Event takes a form which hardly admits of any criticism. That difficulty of criticism rests rather in our own tendency to view Heidegger's thought on Event as his ultimate teaching. If so, then the way to the idea of Event is closed to us, insofar as any approaches to Event are not indicated by Heidegger except through the 'Turning of Being' and the 'Leap' (Sprung). For by what kinds of criteria, in what way can we criticize a philosophy of something we have never even approached, much less experienced?

At this point, we can simply point out certain questions which arise. If the thought of Event originates in the dialogue with Greek philosophy and takes ancient Greece as its model, is it not always something progressively self-determined, and not the ultimate conclusion of Heidegger's philosophy, nor adequate to express the entire domain of his problem? If this question is appropriate, then it gives us another chance and indeed a sounder ground upon which critically to re-examine the dialogue which Heidegger is conducting. Such a critical re-examination would start, not from a one-sided use of ancient Greece as a criterion, but from the possibility of the fusion of the Greek experience with the present horizon of meanings. Then we come to wonder whether it is necessary for the present horizon of meanings to include a dialogue with ancient Greece - or, to put it differently, whether the 'dialogue with ancient Greece' itself is not already one of Heidegger's prejudices, which needs to be reconsidered. The possibility of this criticism in turn prepares the way for the dialogue with Nishida's philosophy.

Translated by Carl Becker

Notes

- 1 Cf. Nishida Kitarō Zenshū (The Complete Works of Nishida Kitarō) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965-6), 10:406.
- 2 Martin Heidegger, Was Ist Metaphysik?, 9th ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1965), Nachwort, p. 46.
 - ibid.
- 4 We can see how the ideas of the appearance of truth in the twentieth century are influenced by Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes; see H. Rombach, Leben des Geistes (Freiburg i. Br., 1977), p. 302.
 5 Cf. Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 17.

6 Heidegger, Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962), p. 43 (abbreviated as TK below).

7 Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, vol. 2 (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967), p. 52f. (abbreviated as VA below).

8 TK, p. 43f.

9 TK, p. 46f.

10 This is from *Identität und Differenz*, p. 25; in other contexts Heidegger uses the expressions *Vor-Schein* and *Vor-Erscheinung*. Cf. Heidegger, *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), p. 105; also R. Wisser, *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch* (Freiburg/München, 1970), p. 73.

11 TK, p. 37.

12 Cf. $\hat{T}K$, p. 38; and also Heidegger, *Nietzsche II* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 391f. Concerning *Schmerz*, cf. Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965), p. 27.

13 VA 1:22.

14 Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965), p. 159. Concerning Vordenken, cf. Identität und Differenz, p. 30.

15 R. Wisser, Martin Heidegger im Gespräch, p. 73.

16 Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 10th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1963), p. 148ff.

17 VA, 2:38.

18 VA, 1:13, 20.

19 Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975), p. 250ff. (Grundzüge einer Theorie der hermeneutischen Erfahrung).

20 ibid.

21 VA, 1:22.

22 Nishida Kitarō Zenshū, 11:442.

23 ibid., 10:353.

The end of philosophy as the beginning of thinking

Samuel IJsseling

In the middle of the sixties, Heidegger wrote a few texts which take the end of philosophy as their express theme.¹ They can be read as the development of earlier texts which deal with the overcoming of metaphysics and in a broader context they can be understood as a development and radicalization of what in *Being and Time* and in the 'Marburg Lectures' was still characterized as the destruction of traditional ontology. What is at issue in this discussion of the end of philosophy, Heidegger tells us, is 'the attempt, repeatedly undertaken since 1930, to reformulate the questions of *Being and Time* in a more original way'.² The carrying through of the destruction of the ontological tradition in which, according to *Being and Time*, 'the question of being first achieves its true concreteness', belongs essentially to this posing of the question.³

The frame of reference into which Heidegger fits the problem of the end of philosophy, generates, on the one hand, a thinking exchange or dialogue with Hegel and, up to a certain point, also with Husserl and Nietzsche; on the other hand, it gives rise to reflection on, or an entry into, the essence of technology and modern science and, before all else, of computer science. The opposition Heidegger establishes between philosophy and thinking also belongs within this frame of reference. And finally, there belongs within this framework the attempt to achieve 'a determination of the matter of thinking'. And – as we hope to show – one aspect at least of this matter of thinking is, for Heidegger, what remains concealed in the end of philosophy, that is, what really happens when philosophy comes to an end. It belongs to the matter of thinking to ponder what is peculiar to the end. We want to try and throw some light on these three points.

In the frame of reference in which Heidegger poses the problem of the end of philosophy, there belongs, in the first place, the thinking exchange, or the dialogue with Hegel. What is astonishing is not, as Heidegger notes in *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*, that philosophy is, 'in a certain sense, thought to an end by Hegel';4 and that the theme of the end of philosophy is expressly raised. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel sets himself the task of 'bringing philosophy nearer to the form of science – that goal whereby it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge'. 5 In actual or absolute knowledge philosophy arrives at its completion. According to Heidegger, this completion is the radicalization and realization of the whole original project of philosophy since the Greeks, and in particular of the Cartesian philosophy. Theme and method have become one and the same, and in absolute knowledge the being of beings as presencing has, in the form of substantiality and subjectivity, reached the fully developed certainty of self-knowing knowledge. According to Heidegger, there is a tendency to suppose that philosophy has achieved its highest perfection here at its end. Heidegger is of the opinion however, that it is not possible to talk of perfection. He writes:

Not only do we lack any criterion which would permit us to evaluate the perfection of one epoch of metaphysics as compared with any other epoch. The right to this kind of evaluation does not exist. Plato's thinking is no more perfect than Parmenides'. Hegel's philosophy is no more perfect than Kant's. Each epoch has its own necessity. We simply have to acknowledge the fact that a philosophy is the way it is.6

For Heidegger, completion of philosophy does not mean perfection but rather 'being gathered in its most extreme possibility'.7 It may be noted here that in Being and Time the 'most extreme possibility' of Dasein is death and that it gives expression to the finitude of Dasein. If Heidegger talks about the completion of philosophy as 'being gathering in its most extreme possibility' the finitude of philosophy is also announced therewith.

A thinking conversation with Hegel oriented around what is peculiar to the end of philosophy is not a matter of criticizing Hegel, or even of contradicting him. In the essay 'Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?' Heidegger says: 'The business of mounting refutations never succeeds in getting on the path of thinking. It belongs to that smallness of spirit whose expression is required for the maintenance of publicity.'8 And a few pages earlier he says: 'The unique thing that thinking is capable of saying can be neither logically nor empirically proved or disproved. It is a matter not of mounting refutations but of a 'dialogue', as Heidegger calls it in the appendix to the Nietzsche volume in the Gesamtausgabe. 10 There he tells us that this dialogue is not a fault-finding or an underlining of failures. It is the establishment of limits, not with a view to denying the latter as limiting or to doing better or trying to show that one has done better. The limits belong to its greatness. The limits of anything great are the margins of what is other and created. These limits are constitutive for philosophy and belong to the finitude of philosophical thinking. This finitude - again itself an aspect of the end of philosophy - is not based solely, or in the first instance, upon the limitedness of human faculties but upon the finitude of the matter of thinking or upon the finitude of being itself.11

In this connection Heidegger speaks of the unthought, of the unthought in thinking. Here too the 'reference to the unthought in philosophy is not a criticism of philosophy'. 12 The unthought is not a lack but belongs essentially to philosophy. In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger writes: 'The more original a thinking is, the richer will its unthought be. The unthought is the most precious gift that a thinking has to convey'. 13 And in The Principle of Reason he writes:

The greater the work of a thinker, the richer is what is unthought in this work, that is to say, what initially and exclusively through this work emerges as having not yet been thought. Of course, this unthought has nothing to do with what a thinker might have overlooked or not mastered and which his more knowledgeable successors have to make good on.14

The unthought increases, so to speak, to the extent that more is thought. For this very reason, according to Heidegger, the unthought is greatest with Hegel, who thought everything that could only be thought. In my opinion, a reading of Heidegger is not possible in which this unthought does not in any way possess a positive content. It is true that with Heidegger the unthought is sometimes ambiguous and there are texts which convey the impression that it is something positive. In any case, it is never what in the metaphysical tradition is called the ineffable or what surpasses our thinking. It is rather what reveals itself in anxiety, in the depths of boredom, or at and in the end of philosophy. This becomes still clearer with Heidegger's deliberations about the essence of technology and modern science.

The end of philosophy manifests itself most evidently in modern technology or, as Heidegger expresses it,

as the triumph of the controllable institution of a technologically scientific world and the social order which corresponds to this world. The end of philosophy means: the beginning of that world civilization which is founded in Western European thinking.¹⁵

The end of philosophy is therewith now understood as the resolution of philosophy into technical science. In a certain sense, a first step towards this resolution is the *release* of the sciences from philosophy and the institution of their independence.¹⁶ A technologically scientific interpretation of thinking is bound up with this. Thinking becomes philosophical and the latter is conceived and developed in a technologically scientific fashion. This already comes to light in the Greek era as a decisive trait, as a direction. Many other steps are important in this development, as, for example, the translation of Greek thought into Roman, which is imperialistic and has the character of power-oriented knowledge - truth is what holds out and possesses power – and further on, the translation of Roman into the Roman-Christian, in which the being of beings is understood as brought into being in the sense of creation. A decisive step is the formulation of 'The principle of sufficient reason' with Leibniz, which latter required a long 'incubation period', as Heidegger tells us, but which was already announced in certain features of the entire metaphysical tradition. From now on, everything is in principle susceptible to calculation and control, planning and mastery. At the End now means this, that being is no longer understood as subject or object, as was the case with Descartes, Hegel and Husserl, but as disposable reserve. The so-called subject-object schema as the basis for an explanation of all appearances loses its significance. Industrial society is, as Heidegger tells us, neither subject nor object, 17 and what is known as the enframing (Gestell) no longer belongs within the horizon of representation, and so remains foreign to traditional thinking. Today's world is guided by technological science in which truth is equated with efficiency and in which, through such cybernetic key-words as information, regulation and feed-back, primary concepts such as ground and consequence, cause and effect, subject and object, theory and practice, concepts which played a leading role in science hitherto are transformed in an almost uncanny manner. A new basic attitude comes into being, a new relationship, and the key word for this basic attitude is Information, whereby Heidegger remarks somewhat cynically that we have to hear the word in its American-English accent. 18 This information, as for example the data stored up in DNA which determines the manner in which the organism develops, can be understood neither as subject nor consciousness nor as object nor matter. It is neither the same, as was the Platonic ειδοζ nor the Aristotelian μορφη nor forma. All of our philosophical categories have lost their meaning. It is a monstrous, uncanny possibility, a 'most extreme possibility', that all philosophical concepts have become meaningless. This possibility belongs to the essence of the end of philosophy.

To reject or to criticize Hegel is as unimportant for Heidegger as it is

To reject or to criticize Hegel is as unimportant for Heidegger as it is to pass judgment upon technology or the entire development which has led to it, although Heidegger is sometimes the victim of his own rhetoric. He writes in *Identity and Difference*: 'To be sure, we cannot repudiate the technological world of today as the work of the devil nor should we

destroy it, assuming that it does not do this to itself.'19 There is no evil genius of technology but only the secret of its essence. This essence is being itself²⁰ which, to a very large extent, remains ambiguous. It is, so to speak, that which makes possible and permits the appearance of what we today call reality, but it also conceals within itself the most extreme danger. We cannot destroy technology or overcome it, let alone reverse it, but it can destroy itself, either through a nuclear war or through the total destruction of the environment, as Heidegger wrote in 1950. It can also bring with it the needlessness of that complete thoughtlessness which Heidegger takes to be much more dangerous. Technology and science would then lose their meaning. Here we run up against that most extreme limit which can no longer be thought.

Technologized science is that into which philosophy is resolved, and according to Heidegger, that is a legitimate advance.21 At the end of philosophy, that direction which philosophical thought has been pursuing in the course of its history from the very beginning makes itself known.²² This history is the history of being itself and, in a certain sense, it is the technicians who are most true to this history and who follow its direction most faithfully, although Heidegger never formulated it quite so explicitly. In this history or in the coming-to-its-end of philosophy something still remains hidden: a task of thought. This task consists, in the first place, in pondering what really comes to pass at this end. To ponder this belongs to the matter of thinking.

In connection with this entire problematic, the opposition Heidegger draws between philosophy and thinking plays a large role. And here it should be noted that Heidegger often uses the word thinking for philosophy and the word philosophy for what he understands by thinking. Moreover, it is not a matter of an absolute opposition. On the one hand, there remains in philosophy something which is still always kept from thinking and, on the other, thinking can probably never occur entirely without philosophy.

Philosophy is for Heidegger metaphysics, or, in the end, ontology. And this then possesses an onto-theological constitution. Metaphysical thinking is an explanatory and a grounding thinking. It inquires into causes and grounds, into motives, conditions of the possibility and it never rests content with the thing itself because it is always looking for something else behind the thing, a more original thing. It is - especially since Descartes - a representational thinking which, because it always understands its subject matter as that of a representing subject or as represented object, is even less capable of sticking with it. It may also assume the form of a reasoning process, a logical progression that also keeps on going right past the subject. Metaphysical thinking can, in addition, take on the form of a conceptualization which seeks to see everything in one large connection or in a unity and which is characterized by a making-own (sich-eigen-machen) or appropriation (Aneignung) or by interiorization. This conceptualization - a word that Heidegger otherwise seldom employs - is directed to the freeing of everything from its alienness, its strangeness and to taking it up into itself as being-withitself. It is domestication. Philosophy is, above all since Descartes, a seeking after security, after certainty, a safe-keeping. Truth then becomes the complete certainty of self-knowing knowledge. This understanding of truth is characteristic of modern times and so it is also not accidental that modern philosophy begins with doubt and no longer with wonder and moreover with a view to transforming this doubt into certainty as soon as possible. One form of metaphysics at the end is calculative thinking, which has been especially successful since Leibniz and which claims sovereignty over everything, computes everything and takes account of everything. This thinking can, according to Heidegger, proceed better and much more quickly through thinking machines, computers which in one second flawlessly calculate thousands of relationships. In connection with such a thinking, human being is an inconvenience. At the end, or with the completion of philosophy, this thinking will simply become data storage and data processing. At that point, traditional metaphysical concepts have lost their meaning.

This metaphysical thinking with its – according to Heidegger – secretive history and development makes it possible for modern man to master and control everything. At the same time, this very man is mastered and bewitched by this thinking and it is precisely this that slips out of his command and control in an almost uncanny fashion. That means that in this thinking something still lies concealed which remains alien to it, something to which the thinking in question has no access and which escapes it. In other words, metaphysical thinking is enveloped by a limit, by a margin which makes this thinking possible, which limits it and determines it and, at the same time, also continually threatens it.

To metaphysical thinking, Heidegger counterposes another kind of thinking which he calls recollective (andenkende) thinking. Under Hölderlin's influence, it is also associated with celebrating, greeting, remembering, thanking. It is an abiding-with, a wonder-ful tarrying, a holding out, an ability to wait – indeed for a lifetime – a stepping back, an abode. It reminds us perhaps of Far Eastern wisdom which was not alien to Heidegger or of a probing of reality of the kind to be found in Paul Klee, a man who astonished Heidegger and whose theoretical and pedagogical writings the latter perused thoroughly. In my opinion, it can also be understood as the realization and the radicalization of the original idea of phenomenology. Thinking as the enduring of being, as an abiding with beings in their being, an abiding with thinking and precisely in view of the fact that we really do think in this way and finally, as an abiding

with what determines our thinking, what calls us to think, what commands our thinking and so points the way.

One question which keeps on arising is: is such a thinking (still) possible? Does it not once again and necessarily amount to a metaphysico-technical thinking? If we are dominated by metaphysico-technical thinking and, in the end, are solely directed by the key concepts of computer science, is another kind of thinking then still possible? One should not underestimate this difficulty and Heidegger is himself fully aware of the seriousness of this problem. He will contend that this other thinking can only be prepared, that it is essentially, and indeed remains, untimely and can always only be a task. It requires quite specific strategies to guard it and to protect it against the danger which threatens it to an ever-increasing degree from the side of the sciences and their cybernetic organization within a self-regulating world civilization. Heidegger knows that this other thinking can never be a purely university or academic affair because these organizations, with their indigenous research operations, their conferences and their literary directives are carried along by the metaphysico-technical thinking and themselves belong to world civilization. Still less can it subsist outside of a particular historical, technico-economic, politico-scientific, institutional and linguistic frame of reference. For this reason, the greatest possible care has to be taken to prevent it from being the victim of the attempt to interpret it and to integrate it within the existing frame of reference. Much of Heidegger's rhetoric must be viewed in this light.

Heidegger's strategy - if one may use this word for his path of thought - is a matter of transgressing the limit, a transgression which, in general, is immediately reproved or neutralized by the dominant thinking. A transgression with respect to which a limit, an end, must first be established and with respect to which, finally, a question has to be asked with regard to the determination of this limit, this end. For Heidegger, a limit is never the place where something comes to an end but, on the contrary, where it begins. A limit is constitutive for what is. The establishment of a limit, its transgression and the question concerning the determination of the limit, belong to the problematic of the end of philosophy. The question concerning the essence of the limit of thinking or concerning the finitude of all thinking is the question concerning the determination of the matter of thinking which - according to Heidegger - is itself finite and whose finitude is much more difficult to experience than the previous positing of an absolute.23

Heidegger employs many and various names to describe the matter of thinking, as for example, being itself, the event of appropriation (Ereignis), αληβεια, distinction, clearing, difference as difference, decision and many, many others. All these names and their multiplicity have in turn a strategic significance, that is, they refer not to a positive content but simply point in a specific direction. They incline the glance. They are pointers (Winke) or paths (Wege).

Here, it might be thought that one runs up against a transposition into another language, and into another frame of reference of what, in the Marburg lectures, Heidegger still called the 'phenomenological reduction'. There he distinguishes it markedly from that of Husserl. Whereas for Husserl the phenomenological reduction is a method for leading the phenomenological viewpoint from the natural attitude of human being living in the world of things and persons back to transcendental consciousness and its noetico-noematic experiences (experiences in which the object is constituted as a correlate of consciousness), for Heidegger, the phenomenological reduction leads the phenomenological viewpoint back from the always determined conception of beings to the understanding of the being of these beings.²⁴ Whereas for Husserl the wonder of wonders is transcendental subjectivity, a subjectivity 'beyond which it is pointless to question back', and which proves to be 'the one and only absolute being, 25 for Heidegger, the wonder of all wonders, as one can read in the Postface to What is Metaphysics? is 'that entities exist'.

The reduction or the leading back becomes, in the later Heidegger, way, or better ways. In the multiplicity and the character of these ways lies the 'step back'. Way and 'step back' cannot be understood here as a method, because the concept of method belongs within the realm of metaphysico-technical thinking. The becoming-a-method of the way - a process which, in the epoch of the completion of thinking, is, in a certain sense, brought to a close in the conclusion of Hegel's Science of Logic - is constitutive for metaphysics and for the end of philosophy. 26 Way and 'step back' mean here not an isolated movement of thought but the way in which the movement of thought takes place, and a long way which demands a duration and endurance whose scale we cannot know.²⁷

The 'step back' moves out of metaphysics into the essence of metaphysics and is, from the standpoint of the present and the insight one has into it, the step out of technology into that essence of modern technology which can now be thought for the first time.²⁸ Metaphysics and, at its end, technology constitute a determinate conception of beings or a determinate way of dealing with things and with human beings. The essence of metaphysics or technology - Heidegger calls it what is 'to be thought' - is being itself and points in the direction of ἀλήθεια, of clearing, of difference, etc. 'Αρχή or ἄρχειν, that is, the mastery of metaphysics or technology is what makes possible, determines and limits metaphysics and technology. It is, as it is called in What is Metaphysics? the ground of metaphysics and technology. At that time, step back still meant 'regression into the ground of metaphysics' - in the words of the title of the Introduction, subsequently added. Later, the word ground

becomes problematic, because it still belongs to metaphysical thinking, just as does the word being.

The essence of metaphysics is probably also the end of metaphysics as what is to be thought, and end is here to be understood in a spatiotemporal sense. In *Identity and Difference*, where the problematic of the 'step back' is extensively handled, Heidegger says that with the step back it is a matter of a step out of the already thought into an unthought from which the thought receives its essential space (Wesensraum).29 Heidegger frequently thinks the essence and the end of metaphysics in terms of the categories space, spatiality, place, limit. Clearing too, the free openness, is supposedly that in which pure space and everything in it which is present and absent receives its all-gathering and preserving place.³⁰ Space, place and end belong together.

Heidegger writes: 'With the step back philosophy is neither abandoned nor does it disappear into a memorial for thinking human being.'31 The step back out of metaphysics into its essence does not mean that the discipline gets thrown out of the cultural circuit of philosophical 'formation'. It is much more a matter of the attempt to make of philosophy an 'over against' with respect to itself, a factum, a work, a work of language - I would like to say here: as text, and text must here be regarded as an abode, as a place or a there where being occurs as discovering and covering up, as revealing and concealing (both necessarily and accidentally). The step back out of metaphysics can for this reason only be carried through as an analysis of metaphysics, as an analysis of technology. And this analysis can only be endless because it is directed towards and upon an unthought which essentially remains unthought and which becomes more extensive to the extent that more is thought and thought in a more original manner. Most of Heidegger's texts after Being and Time consist in endless analyses of great texts out of the history of philosophy, analyses whose goal is not to say better what was said there, to criticize, and still less to refute them but rather to get on the track of what happens in these texts.

When one tries with Heidegger to approach philosophy as a work, as a work of language, one must avoid at least three things; first, this work should not, and cannot be regarded as the pure product of humankind. That would be a form of subjectivism, whereas the philosopher tries to say what is given to him to say and tries to show what shows itself from itself. Second, the work of philosophy should not, and can not be regarded as a more or less adequate reproduction or presentation of a reality given from outside philosophy. To conceive of truth as adequation may well be correct but belongs to the finite sphere of metaphysics and never succeeds in seeing what is accomplished along the way in philosophy as a work. Third, the words and sentences out of which the work is constructed cannot be viewed as signs or a complex of signs, which is supposed to indicate a reality given outside the work. 'The essence of speech is not determined out of the sign-character of words', Heidegger writes in What is Called Thinking?³² 'Saying is showing.' Indeed, Heidegger claims that the moment in which the word's showing became a signifying was one of the most important moments in the history of truth, of the understanding of truth as adequation and of the understanding of being as present at hand or 'continual presence'. In 'The origin of the work of art' we read:

Where no language prevails . . . there is also no openness of beings and also, accordingly, no openness to what is not and to emptiness. In as much as language first names beings, such naming first articulates beings and makes beings appear. This naming first nominates the entity in its being and out of its being.33

And another passage. 'Through the word, in language, things first are and become what they are.'34 'Language first grants the very possibility of standing in the midst of the openness of beings.'35 And 'if our essence did not take up its stand in the power of language, the totality of beings would remain closed to us, the entities which we are ourselves no less than the entities which we ourselves are not'. 36 What is said here about language is especially valid for the language of the thinker and for that linguistic work which is philosophy.

Philosophy as a work can be understood neither as a human product nor as a more or less adequate reproduction of a reality present at hand nor as a constellation of signs. More positively expressed, it can be said that every great philosophy is a building, a construction. As a construction, it is not an image or a representation of the world. Rather, it institutes or grounds a world. The building of philosophy stands there as the temple at Paestum stands there and, in this standing there, it opens up a world, confers a visage upon humans and Gods and makes things visible. Philosophy is a finite and limited place where reality is revealed and, at the same time, concealed. On the basis of this revealing and concealing, there arises something like what we call a world. The building that philosophy is cannot subsist without human beings but, for all that, it does not find its origin in human beings. The construction of a philosophy is, before all else, a matter of receiving and remaining open, hearing and listening. In a certain sense, philosophy constitutes itself. It is not however a creatio ex nihilo but is necessarily put together out of pre-given material. This material is not, as in architecture or painting, made up of stones or of colours but, as in poetry, of words. The fragments and sections which are taken over from, and have to be taken over from, already existing philosophical texts also belong to that material out of which a philosophy is built. Not one work, not one text stems completely from itself. Rather, it continually refers to other texts to which it is related. A text is always taken up in a context of meaning or a referential totality. The network of references to other works is a condition of the possibility for the emergence and the understanding of a work. At the same time, it also creates the greatest obstacle for this emergence and this understanding, and it establishes its confines. As Heidegger writes: 'Modern thinking is in its basic traits much less accessible than Greek thinking, for the writing and works of the modern thinker are built differently, more intricate, intermingled with tradition and everywhere inserted into Christianity.'37 On the basis of this 'developed state of affairs', philosophy runs the danger of deteriorating into 'groundless chatter' and becoming totally incomprehensible, and that means that instead of uncovering, it covers up. This danger, or so says Heidegger, is inherent in the language by which philosophy is guided. Language is - according to a famous text from Hölderlin which Heidegger is happy to cite - 'the most dangerous of the goods given to human being'. In Heidegger's opinion, it is the danger of dangers and indeed for several reasons. First, because 'the greatest good fortune of the first, instituting speech is at the same time the deepest pain of loss'. 38 Second, because any, even the purest, the most original and the deepest forms of expression can be taken up into a readily accessible way of talking. Words get used, used up in being used, and indeed necessarily so. And third: in the course of reproducing, of repeating, it is never established whether the original words still put into effect what they were formerly able to effect. This belongs to that which Heidegger calls the 'dis-essence [Un-wesen] of language' and, as he expressly remarks, it can never be avoided.39

Because philosophy is a construction it can also be subject to a destruction, or perhaps better, a de-construction. This leads us to the question concerning the relationship between the end of philosophy and what, in the Marburg period, was called the destruction of traditional ontology. Heidegger has frequently repeated that this destruction will not bury the past in oblivion and that it is not a negation or condemnation of the past to oblivion. It is a critical taking apart of concepts which were handed down and, in the first instance, necessarily applied and, at the same time, it is a regression to the sources from which they were drawn.⁴⁰ In Being and Time Heidegger speaks about an investigative exposition of the 'birth certificates' of ontological concepts and he says:

But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this must always mean keeping it within its limits.41

It is clear that this destruction can only be carried through as an analysis of the factically present ontology. It runs parallel with the analytic of Dasein which belongs, together with the destruction, to the dual task of *Being and Time*. Dasein's analysis and destruction are two sides of fundamental ontology or the question of being.

The most important, though often overlooked, feature of the destruction is that it is guided by the question: what does really happen in the history of philosophy? What happens when a philosophy constitutes itself as a specific philosophy? The answer to this question runs: being itself happens, αληβεια as uncovering and covering up, clearing, etc. but that brings with it in the first place ever new questions. More concretely: at the end of his Kant book Heidegger writes with reference to his interpretation of Kant: 'Don't ask what Kant says but what happens in his laying of the foundation of metaphysics. The interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason carried out above is aimed solely at the laying bare of this happening.'42 He says much the same thing with regard to his interpretation of Schelling and Hegel, of Leibniz and Descartes. More generally expressed: Heidegger poses questions like What is Metaphysics? and What is Philosophy? Here, the is must be understood transitively, as he himself remarks. 43 That means: what allows the, or a, philosophy to be what it is and to be as it is? Or What is meant by Thinking? whereby 'means' is meant something like require, evoke, call into existence. orient, etc. Or again: 'Regression to the ground of metaphysics' and return to the source. These questions question into the matter of thinking. And precisely the same problematic, though now thought out in a more original fashion, comes back again in the question concerning the end of philosophy. What happens when philosophy comes to an end, is gathered up in its most extreme possibility? The answer to this question runs again: being itself, here thought as withdrawal, expropriation. In this sense, the problematic of the end of philosophy is the same as that of the destruction of ontology. But there are differences. There is a tendency to see the difference in the fact that, for philosophers, destruction was still a task and that philosophy in the end destroys itself. It is true that the role and responsibility of the thinker in Being and Time are greater than with the later Heidegger. But if one formulates the problem in this fashion, one only too readily assumes that the destruction and the end of philosophy are an annihilation. More important is perhaps the fact that the destruction is directed towards reaching an original level, a ground in which philosophical concepts are rooted and grounded or a source from which they were drawn, whereas that cannot be the case with the end of philosophy. Still, one has to proceed carefully with words like origin, ground or source in connection with Being and Time - in any case, this is my view, though such an interpretation is perhaps disputable. Indeed, the original has always already been lost and refers

in the last instance to a past which never was present. In other words, the origin, the ground or the source is, according to Being and Time, Dasein itself, which is essentially finite, never in possession of its self and never really with its self. Besides, the question of Being and Time is how something like Dasein is possible. Dasein is the being that is there. On the other hand, the question concerning the end of philosophy is also directed towards something more original, towards what makes this end possible. Even here the question runs: what is the end of philosophy?

To conclude, I would like to come back once again to the Heidegger-Hegel relationship in connection with the problematic of the end of philosophy. In the end, one can pose the question whether Heidegger's thinking is an inverted Hegelianism. This is a severe reproach, and all the more so since Heidegger somewhat cynically remarks that 'since Hegel's death everything has simply become a movement in reverse'.44 And he specifically wants to get away from this movement. Heidegger: an inverted Hegelianism? Even Derrida hinted at this years ago when he posed the question of whether Heidegger's thinking might not constitute the deepest and most powerful defence of what he sought to bring to discussion under the title 'philosophy of presence'. 45 Derrida would no longer express himself in this way but the problem remains. Heidegger's thinking - a Hegelianism because he followed Hegel in still trying to think what Hegel's thinking actually makes possible, namely, what it means to say that philosophy reaches its completion in technology and what lies hidden in this end. An inverted Hegelianism, because Heidegger always starts out from history, with the supposition – in opposition to Hegel – that the commencement is what is most strange and powerful, and that what comes thereafter is not a development but a levelling down in the form of simple diffusion, a not being able to remain within the commencement in which philosophy does not proceed toward absolute knowledge but much rather towards technology, a technology which neither understands itself nor masters itself nor calls itself into question nor is even able to call itself into question. It is not difficult to cite texts from Heidegger which say this kind of thing. Everything depends on the question of what Heidegger means by end and by commencement.

Commencement (Anfang) is clearly distinguished by Heidegger from beginning (Beginn). One can say that philosophy begins with the Greeks and that calculative thinking begins with Leibniz. This beginning lies behind us. The commencement however lies before us precisely as the to-be-thought and the unthought. It is not a matter however of an unthought which can be thought. It is far more of a limit and in this sense also an end; a limit which makes thinking possible in limiting. This limit cannot be thought in the sense of an appropriation. But if one pays

attention to precisely what happens when thinking takes place, if one abides by what happens in philosophy when thinking dwells, one runs up against the limit, against the 'other' of thinking. Even the expression 'the other of thinking' which Heidegger intentionally avoids can easily be misunderstood if one views the other in the light of the dialectic, or if one links it up with the limitations of the human faculties. It is much more the finitude of being itself. Just as a distinction obtains between beginning and commencement so also does it between end (Ende) and end (Ende). The end of philosophy can mean that philosophy ceases/ either in the nineteenth century, with the absolute knowledge of Hegel, or in the twentieth century, with technology. This is however not the end of philosophy with which Heidegger is concerned. The end which concerns Heidegger is already there with the Greeks, at that moment in which philosophy establishes itself. In our time, it has reached a culmination or has been gathered into its most extreme possibilities, but it accompanies all thinking.

What remains most questionable with Heidegger is perhaps that he always thinks the outset and the outcome in the light of history and historicality. The concept of history's (Geschichte) is, in my view, the most questionable in Heidegger's thinking and a concept which can only be phenomenologically justified with great difficulty. Perhaps Heidegger already appreciated that and, for this reason, speaks of 'destiny' (Geschick). According to Heidegger, destiny is not to be thought out of a happening which can be characterized by means of a course of events and through a process. Sending (Schicken) means preparing, arranging, bringing each thing to that place where it belongs, making room for, assigning. Destiny is what furnishes the temporal play-space (Zeit-Spiel-Raum) in which beings can make their appearance and in which philosophy in general first becomes possible. This furnishing is a self-proffering and self-withdrawal and therefore also essentially bound up with commencement and end. The phrase 'destiny of being' is however not an answer but a question, amongst other things, the question concerning the essence of history, the essence of commencement and end. To think this belongs to the task of thinking at the end of philosophy.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

¹ The most important are: 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens', in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 61-90, and Zur Frage nach der Besümmung der Sache des Denkens (St Gallen: Erker Verlag, 1984).

^{2 &#}x27;Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 61.

- 3 Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe (GA) 2, p. 26.
- 4 Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, p. 400.
- 5 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), p. 12.
- 6 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 62.
- 7 ibid., p. 63.
- 8 Vorträge und Aufsätze, GA 7, p. 121.
- 9 ibid., p. 119.
- 10 Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, GA 43, p. 277.
- 11 Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung, p. 20.
- 12 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 76.
- 13 Was Heißt Denken?, GA 8, p. 72.
- 14 Der Satz vom Grund, GA 10, pp. 123-4.
- 15 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 65.
- 16 ibid., p. 63.
- 17 Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung, p. 12.
- 18 Der Satz vom Grund, GA 10, p. 202.
- 19 Identität und Differenz, GA 11, p. 33.
- 20 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 38.
- 21 Die Frage nach der Bestimmung, p. 13.
- 22 ibid., p. 7.
- 23 ibid., p. 20.
- 24 Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, p. 29.
- 25 Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, Husserliana XVII, p. 278.
- 26 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, GA 13, p. 233.
- 27 Identität und Differenz, GA 11, pp. 46-7.
- 28 ibid., p. 48.
- 29 ibid., p. 49.
- 30 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 73.
- 31 Die Frage nach der Bestimmung, p. 20.
- 32 Was heißt Denken?, GA 8, p. 123.
- 33 Holzwege, GA 5, pp. 60-1. 34 Einführung in die Metaphysik, GA 40, p. 63.
- 35 Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, GA 4, p. 35.
- 36 Einführung in die Metaphysik, GA 40, p. 63.
- 37 Der Satz vom Grund, GA 10, p. 123.
- 38 Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', GA 39, p. 60.
- 39 ibid., pp. 63-4.
- 40 Cf. Samuel Usseling, 'Heidegger and the destruction of ontology', in Man and World, 15 (1982), pp. 3-16. Included in J. J. Kockelmans (ed.), A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time' (Washington, DC, 1986), pp. 127-44.
 - 41 Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 22.
 - 42 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3, p. 193.
 - 43 Was ist das die Philosophie?, p. 22.
 - 44 Vorträge und Aufsätze, GA 7, p. 76.
 - 45 J. Derrida, Positions (Paris: Minuit, 1972), p. 75.
 - 46 Der Satz vom Grund, GA, 10, pp. 108-9.