

Heidegger Reexamined

Edited with introductions by

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University of California, Berkeley

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Brigham Young University

A ROUTLEDGE SERIES

Contents of the Collection

Volume 1

Dasein, Authenticity, and Death

Volume 2

Truth, Realism, and the History of Being

Volume 3

Art, Poetry, and Technology

Volume 4

Language and the Critique of Subjectivity

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Series Introduction

Martin Heidegger is undeniably one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. His work has been appropriated by scholars in fields as diverse as philosophy, classics, psychology, literature, history, sociology, anthropology, political science, religious studies, and cultural studies.

In this four-volume series, we've collected a set of articles that we believe represent some of the best research on the most interesting and difficult issues in contemporary Heidegger scholarship. In putting together this collection, we have quite deliberately tried to identify the papers that engage critically with Heidegger's thought. This is not just because we wanted to focus on "live" issues in Heidegger scholarship. It is also because critical engagement with the text is, in our opinion, the best way to grasp Heidegger's thought. Heidegger is a notoriously difficult read—in part, because he is deliberately trying to break with the philosophical tradition, in part, because his way of breaking with the tradition was often to coin neologisms (a less sympathetic reader might dismiss it as obfuscatory jargon), and, in part, because Heidegger believed his task was to provoke his readers to thoughtfulness rather than provide them with a facile answer to a well-defined problem. Because of the difficulties in reading Heidegger, however, we believe that it is incumbent upon the commentator to keep the matter for thought in the forefront—the issue that Heidegger is trying to shed light on. Without such an engagement in the matter for thought, Heidegger scholarship all too often devolves into empty word play.

So, the first and most important criterion we've used in selecting papers is that they engage with important issues in Heidegger's thought, and do so in a clear, non-obfuscatory fashion. Next, we have by and large avoided republishing articles that are already available in other collections of essays on Heidegger. We have made exceptions, however, particularly when the essay is located in a volume that would easily be overlooked by Heidegger scholars. Finally, as our primary intent was to collect and make readily available work on current issues and problems arising out of Heidegger's thought, we have tried to select recent rather than dated articles.

In selecting themes for each volume, we have, in general, been guided by the order in which Heidegger, over the course of his career, devoted extended attention to the problems involved. Thus, the first volume con-

tains essays focusing on Dasein—the human mode of existence—and “existential” themes like authenticity and death, because these were prominent concerns in the years leading up to and immediately following the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927. The second volume centers on Heidegger’s account of truth, and his critique of the history of philosophy, because these were areas of extended interest in the 1930s and 1940s. The third volume is organized around themes indigenous to the ‘late’ Heidegger—namely, Heidegger’s work on art, poetry, and technology.

But this is not to say that the volumes are governed by a strict notion of periods in Heidegger’s work. In the past, it has been commonplace to subdivide Heidegger’s work into two (early and late) or even three (early, middle, and late) periods. While there is something to be said for such divisions—there is an obvious sense in which *Being and Time* is thematically and stylistically unlike Heidegger’s publications following the Second World War—it is also misleading to speak as if there were two or three different Heideggers. The bifurcation, as is well known, is something that Heidegger himself was uneasy about¹, and scholars today are increasingly hesitant to draw too sharp a divide between the early and late. So while the themes of the first three volumes have been set by Heidegger’s own historical course through philosophy, the distribution of papers into volumes does not respect a division of scholarship into early and late. We have found instead that the papers relevant to an ‘early Heidegger’ issue often draw on Heidegger’s later work, and vice versa.

The last volume in the series is organized less by Heidegger’s own thematic concerns than by an interest in Heidegger’s relevance to contemporary philosophy. Given mainstream analytic philosophy’s preoccupation with language and mind, however, this volume does have two thematic centers of gravity—Heidegger’s work on the essence of language, and his critique of modernist accounts of subjectivity.

In its focus on Heidegger’s relevance to ongoing philosophical concerns, however, volume four merely makes obvious the intention of the series as a whole. In his 1925–26 lecture course on logic, Heidegger bemoaned the fact that people “no longer philosophize from the issues, but from their colleague’s books.”² In a similar way, we believe that Heidegger is deserving of attention as a philosopher only because he is such an excellent guide to the issues themselves. We hope that the papers we have collected here demonstrate Heidegger’s continuing pertinence to the most pressing issues in contemporary philosophy.

NOTES

¹ Writing to Richardson, Heidegger noted: “The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what

is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II.” William J. Richardson, “Letter to Richardson,” in *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963), 8.

² *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe 21* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995), 84.

Volume Introduction

“Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist Unverborgenheit”—“the essence of truth is unconcealment.” Heidegger first makes this claim in 1925, and for the two decades following, nearly every book or essay Heidegger published, and nearly every lecture course he taught, includes a significant discussion of the essence of truth under the headings of ‘unconcealment’ or ‘*al_ theia*’ (the Greek word for truth). The later Heidegger continued his research into unconcealment through his writings on the clearing or opening of being, a topic that preoccupied him for the last three decades of his life. Thus, one could safely say that the problem of the essence of truth was one of the central topics of Heidegger’s life work. Throughout his career, Heidegger insisted that the traditional accounts of assertoric or propositional truth were basically correct, but ungrounded, and needed to be understood against the background of a more fundamental account of the way we are open in thought for the world, and the way the world opens itself and makes itself available for thought.

Heidegger’s interest in truth was always primarily directed at the way that any understanding of propositional truth opens out into some of the most fundamental issues addressed in contemporary philosophy—issues such as the nature of language and the reality or mind-independence of the world. This is because the philosophical discussion of truth can only be pursued against the background of assumptions about the nature of mind (in particular, how mental states and their derivatives like linguistic meaning can be so constituted as to be capable of being true or false), and the nature of the world (in particular, how the world can be so constituted as to make mental states and their derivatives true). Heidegger’s focus on unconcealment in his discussions of the essence of truth is intended to bring such background assumptions to the foreground. The claim that unconcealment is the essence of truth, then, is motivated by the recognition that we have to see truth in the context of a more general opening up of the world—that is, in the context of an involvement with and comportment toward things in the world that is more fundamental than thinking and speaking about them.

The first three papers in this volume review the fundamentals of Heidegger’s account of truth. Mark Wrathall’s paper reemphasizes the extent to which Heidegger remains committed, throughout his reflection

on unconcealment as the condition of the possibility of truth, to some notion of truth as correspondence, or agreement with the way things are. Carl Friedrich Gethmann analyzes important developments in Heidegger's thinking on truth while Heidegger was at Marburg—the years during which he was composing *Being and Time*. Richard Polt elaborates on Heidegger's account of a situated truth—the idea that truth is a matter of fidelity to the things themselves, but is grounded in our historical situatedness. Polt shows how Heidegger's hermeneutical reappropriation of the Greek tradition of truth both clarifies the notion of situated truth, and exemplifies the non-foundationalist practice of discovering situated truth.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger analyzed the unconcealment that grounds truth in terms of the disclosedness of Dasein, that is, the fact that Dasein is always in a meaningful world. Heidegger did not shy away from the consequences of this: “Before there was any Dasein,” he argued, “there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more.”¹ He illustrated this claim with an example drawn from physics—the best candidate for discovering independent truths about the universe: “Before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not ‘true’.”² The controversial nature of such a claim is little diminished by the qualifications Heidegger immediately adds. To make it clear that he is not claiming that Newton's laws are somehow completely dependent for their truth on their being believed, he notes: “it does not follow that they were false, or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any longer possible.”³ And he further explains, “to say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true and, with them, entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were.”⁴

In such passages, Heidegger is clearly trying to walk a fine line between realism and constructivism about truths and the status of scientific entities. But where exactly that line falls has been subject to considerable debate—indeed, this might be one of the most hotly-contested issues in contemporary Heidegger scholarship. We've included a wide variety of essays in an attempt to canvass the most important positions on the issue, and to elucidate the current state of the debate. This includes papers by Theodore Schatzki, Dorothea Frede, Hubert Dreyfus, William Blattner, Charles Spinosa, David Cerbone, Joseph Rouse, and Piotr Hoffman.

Frede tackles the problem in the context of Heidegger's famous dismissal of Kant's solution to philosophy's scandalous inability to refute skepticism. The real scandal, according to Heidegger, is that philosophy keeps trying to refute skepticism. Heidegger shows how we can be realists, Frede explains, by showing that a proof of the independent existence of

things is neither necessary nor possible. Once our essential being-in-the-world is properly understood, skepticism about the world is a position which cannot even get off the ground.

Blattner, too, frames his account of Heidegger's views with Heidegger's rejection of the Kantian framework for refuting skepticism. Blattner argues, however, that Heidegger is a transcendental idealist about being and that, for precisely this reason, he can be neither a transcendental realist nor a transcendental idealist about beings. Cerbone, by contrast, argues that what Heidegger was after was a position that was neither realist nor idealist.

Schatzki explores the problem of realism in light of the early Heidegger's views on the clearing and unconcealment. If, as we've seen, Heidegger insists that the being of beings depends on Dasein, this seems, on the face of it, to undermine the reality—the mind independence—of beings. By first clarifying the nature of the clearing, however, Schatzki argues that the idea of a plurality of clearings is compatible with realism about present-at-hand entities.

Dreyfus and Spinosa, in “Coping with Things-in-Themselves,” and Dreyfus, in “How Heidegger Defends the Possibility of a Correspondence Theory of Truth with Respect to the Entities of Natural Science,” develop an argument for robust realism and anti-essentialism. These papers develop an argument only implicit in Heidegger's work. The argument draws on Heidegger's phenomenology of the experience we have of mind-independent objects in breakdown cases, in which the available reveals itself as occurrent. In addition, Dreyfus and Spinosa articulate Heidegger's notion of formal indication which, like Kripke's later account of rigid designation, gives us a way to refer to an object independently of our current understanding of it. Hoffmann, too, looks beyond section thirty-four of *Being and Time* for arguments that could be used to support Heidegger's realism. In particular, Heidegger's account of the role of moods in disclosure shows us how objects have an independence of what we are able to think or know about them.

The historicism implicit in Heidegger's discussion of science was extended in Heidegger's subsequent work on the unconcealedness of being. In later works, Heidegger came to argue that the philosophical history of the west consists of a series of “epochs” in which the understanding of being is differently constituted, and the unconcealment of being and of beings varies as a consequence. Joseph Rouse argues that, with this change, Heidegger's view of science also changed. In earlier accounts, Rouse explains, Heidegger saw science as a practice for decontextualizing objects in order to come to an account of the way things are independently of our pre-theoretical understanding of them. In Heidegger's later work, however, science and scientific research are seen as practices distinctive of the mod-

ern understanding of being. Rather than bringing us, then, to the way things are independently of our understanding of them, science “is our way of practically engaging the world which helps focus for us the configuration and direction of modernity” (Rouse, p. 79).

Heidegger’s account of the history of philosophy was prefigured in *Being and Time* which, as is well known, is only a fragment of the volume as Heidegger originally conceived it. In the second part of the volume, Heidegger intended to provide “a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of temporality as our clue.”⁵ While the completion of *Being and Time* was eventually abandoned as a project, Heidegger did turn over the ensuing years to a sustained critique of the history of philosophy. We’ve included several essays which elucidate different facets of that critique.

We begin with Reiner Schurmann’s short overview of Heidegger’s transition from a phenomenology of the ‘meaning of being,’ to the transitional inquiry into the ‘truth of being’ and an epochal account of the history of philosophy, to the yet later concern with the event of the ‘coming-to-presence’ of being. Mark Okrent, focuses on the “transitional inquiry” to explore how the idea of the truth of being in Heidegger’s middle works underwrites his account of the history of being. The question of the truth of being replaces the question of the meaning of being in *Being and Time*, and is concerned with understanding what makes it possible for beings to manifest themselves in their being. When a certain understanding of being comes to prevail, thus making things show up as having an essential nature, then, Heidegger says, an understanding of being has been unconcealed. Different ways in which being is unconcealed mark the different epochs in the history of being. Okrent’s account of the truth of being shows how the history of being relates to the history of philosophy and to ordinary history.

Taylor Carman explains the connection between Heidegger’s account of temporality in *Being and Time* and his subsequent deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition in terms of a metaphysics of presence. Carman argues that the transition from the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* to Heidegger’s later work on the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*) was complete when Heidegger gave up the project of correcting the metaphysical tradition, because he saw that it wasn’t possible to found a better, more complete account of being on the foundation of the analytic of Dasein. Iain Thompson explains Heidegger’s critique of the history of ontology as “ontotheology”—as conflating the question of what being in general means with the question of what the highest being or cause of being is. Both Carman and Thompson allude to a peculiar outcome of Heidegger’s repeated attempts to come to grips with the history of philosophy and the history of being—namely, that the history, as it unfolded, was radically ungrounded. This is true both in the sense that it was built on an

error—a failure to inquire into the unconcealment of being that made philosophical ontology possible—but also that it needn’t have happened at all. It is at least conceivable that western thought would have taken a different course, and thereby avoided the age of metaphysics altogether. This thought becomes important to Heidegger’s hope that metaphysics will be overcome with the inauguration of a new beginning—a theme to which we will return in volume three.

Heidegger’s reading of the history of philosophy was, as he himself frequently acknowledged, a violent reading, at least from the perspective of traditional philologies and mainstream intellectual histories. “Readers,” Heidegger noted in the preface to the second edition of his Kant book, “have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation of violence can indeed be supported by this text. Philosophico-historical research is always correctly subject to this charge whenever it is directed against attempts to set in motion a thoughtful dialogue between thinkers. In contrast to the methods of historical philology, which has its own agenda, a thoughtful dialogue is bound by other laws—laws which are more easily violated. In a dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent.”⁶

Bernd Magnus, after briefly reviewing the contours of Heidegger’s account of philosophy, asks about its continuing appeal despite the fact that, from the perspective of a “straight” history of philosophy, Heidegger’s account “would have to be assigned a very low plausibility ranking.” Magnus proposes that Heidegger’s reading ought to be seen as a kind of ‘abnormal discourse,’ characteristic of attempts to move beyond the criteria which have governed a field up to that point. Such an abnormal discourse will, of course, seem violent in comparison to the straight or normal discourse which preceeded it. Magnus concludes by exploring some of the difficulties such an interpretation of Heidegger’s histories presents—the problem of relativism, for instance, and the question of whether Heideggerian discourse could ever serve as a new paradigm for thought.

NOTES

¹ *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 269.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 63.

⁶ *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, fifth ed., enlarged, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. xviii.

Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence¹

Mark A. Wrathall

Abstract

I argue in this paper that Heidegger, contrary to the view of many scholars, in fact endorsed a view of truth as a sort of correspondence. I first show how it is a mistake to take Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealment' as a definition of propositional truth. It is thus not only possible but also essential to disambiguate Heidegger's use of the word 'truth', which he occasionally used to refer to both truth as it is ordinarily understood and unconcealment understood as the condition of the possibility of truth. I then show how Heidegger accepted that propositional truth, or 'correctness', as he sometimes called it, consists in our utterances or beliefs corresponding to the way things are. Heidegger's objection to correspondence theories of truth was not directed at the notion of correspondence as such, but rather at the way in which correspondence is typically taken to consist in an agreement between representations and objects. Indeed, Heidegger took his account of unconcealment as explaining *how* it is possible for propositions to correspond to the world, thus making unconcealment the ground of propositional truth. I conclude by discussing briefly some of the consequences for Heidegger interpretation which follow from a correct understanding of Heidegger's notion of propositional truth.

Keywords: Heidegger; truth; unconcealment; correspondence; discovering; disclosing

Does Heidegger understand truth as correspondence? He is widely understood as rejecting such a traditional view of truth, and arguing instead that propositional truth² consists in 'discovery' or 'disclosure'. Tugendhat's reading of Heidegger is typical in this respect: 'Heidegger handles propositional truth and comes to the conclusion that it must be understood as "uncovering" (or – as Heidegger says later – unconcealing). This finding then allows him . . . to extend the concept of truth to all that can be uncovered and to any disclosure.'³

I will argue, however, that interpretations like this represent a rather significant misunderstanding of Heidegger's work – a misunderstanding which grows out of conflating Heidegger's views on propositional truth with his discussion of unconcealment – 'the ground of the possibility' of propositional truth.⁴ Such confusion is not surprising given Heidegger's practice of calling unconcealment 'truth'. But if one takes seriously the later Heidegger's claim that 'to raise the question of *aletheia*, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth',⁵ it becomes clear that Heidegger's commitment to unconcealment as the condition of truth does not necessarily preclude him from understanding truth as something like correspondence. I will show that Heidegger accepts a central insight into propositional truth provided by the idea of correspondence – namely, that propositional entities are true in virtue of the way the world is – while denying that a *theory* of correspondence gives us an adequate definition of truth. That is to say, there is nothing more to be said by way of defining propositional truth than to observe that it consists in our assertions correctly pointing out the way things are.

But that is not to give up on understanding what makes it possible for humans to know the truth. Indeed, Heidegger takes the traditional understanding of truth seriously and attempts to clarify its foundations rather than abandon it altogether. As he puts it, his goal is not to '*get rid of the tradition, but rather appropriate it primordially*'.⁶ In fact, as Heidegger explains, his research into unconcealment depends in a certain way on the correctness of the traditional understanding of truth: 'In fact we are relying precisely on the customary conception, so much so that we are seeking a foundation for this reliance and consequently want to confirm it all the more.'⁷ And so the inquiry into unconcealment, far from being intended as a replacement for the correspondence view of truth, in fact seeks to elucidate the way in which propositional truth is founded.

Disambiguating 'Truth'

The first step towards understanding Heidegger's account of truth, then, is to disambiguate his use of the term 'truth', separating those instances in which he refers to propositional truth from those in which he talks about unconcealment. From his Marburg lecture courses until very late in his career, Heidegger used 'truth' and 'unconcealment' interchangeably to translate *aletheia*, which he interpreted as a name for what makes truth possible. This is a practice which he publicly abandoned in 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' (1964), realizing the confusion it engendered: 'In any case, one thing becomes clear: to raise the question of *aletheia*, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this reason, it was immaterial and therefore misleading

to call *aletheia*, in the sense of clearing, "truth"'.⁸ Heidegger was even more emphatic about the importance of distinguishing unconcealment from truth in the 1966 Heraclitus seminar: '*aletheia* thought as *aletheia* has nothing to do with "truth"; rather, it means unconcealment'.⁹

This abandonment of the use of 'truth' to name the conditions of the possibility of truth, however, wasn't so much a change in doctrine as it was a shift in terminology. A close reading of Heidegger's early texts shows that his discussions of primordial truth, the truth of being, the truth of beings, ontological truth, *aletheia*, etc., were never intended to apply directly to our ordinary or 'natural' concept of truth. Indeed, his discussion of 'truth' (= unconcealment) from the very beginning defined unconcealment as the condition of the possibility of truth as it is ordinarily understood.¹⁰ Indeed, Heidegger is generally careful to distinguish the 'two senses of truth: first as *unconcealment* (openness of what is) and then as assimilation of a representation to what is'.¹¹

In 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking', then, when Heidegger acknowledges that he had made a mistake in calling unconcealment 'truth', he is simply clarifying the distinction which already existed in his work. The mistake was in failing to make clear that 'truth' had been used to refer to these quite distinct things: (1) propositional truth – truth 'understood in the traditional "natural" sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings', and (2) unconcealment, or a 'making manifest of...'. This in turn is understood in two quite distinct ways: (a) the truth of beings, or the way in which what is is presented in knowledge (which in modernity takes the form of truth as 'certainty'); and (b) the truth of Being – 'unconcealment in the sense of the clearing'.¹² Both (2a) and (2b) are understood by Heidegger as elements of unconcealment. (2a) is unconcealment viewed from the perspective of the making manifest of '*what is in its Being*'. Heidegger calls this 'ontic truth'. (2b) concerns the making manifest of 'the Being of beings', and is often referred to by Heidegger as 'ontological' or 'primordial' truth.¹³

In abandoning 'truth' as a name for unconcealment in 1964, however, Heidegger does give up one important aspect of his early understanding of truth – namely, that one can trace historically the derivation of the concept of truth from a primordial experience of unconcealment. In *Being and Time* and other early works, Heidegger tried to justify the claim that truth is grounded in unconcealment through an analysis of the ancient Greek understanding of *aletheia*. He claimed that *aletheia* must be understood as a privative alpha affixed to the stem *leth-* or *lath-*, and he referred to Aristotle and Heraclitus as support for his claim that the oldest tradition of philosophy understood truth precisely as a 'taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness'.¹⁴ Heidegger took this etymological evidence as support for his thesis that the concept of propositional truth was derived from an original understanding of

unconcealment.¹⁵ Thus, he claimed that the understanding of unconcealment would not be complete ‘until it can be shown . . . that truth, understood as agreement, originates from disclosedness by way of definite modification’.¹⁶

The derivation claim was subjected to serious and telling criticism. Friedländer and others pointed out that *aletheia* was understood as the correctness of assertions even in the earliest extant Greek texts.¹⁷ In any event Heidegger, having clarified that ‘truth’ and ‘unconcealment’ name quite distinct phenomena, eventually explicitly retracted the derivation claim: ‘the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable’.¹⁸ But rescinding this piece of his understanding of truth, while helping to solidify the distinction between truth and unconcealment, in no way undermines his research into unconcealment as the condition of the possibility of truth.

Tugendhat advances what is perhaps the most coherent and formidable argument against the thesis which I am here proposing – that propositional truth is not reducible to unconcealment in Heidegger’s work. Tugendhat sees Heidegger as sliding from a correspondence-type view of propositional truth to defining truth as unconcealment, a slide performed by means of an illegitimate and unsubstantiated step. His support for this view rests primarily on one brief passage from *Being and Time*:

To say that an assertion ‘is true’ signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ (*apophansis*) in its uncoveredness. The *Being-true* (*truth*) of the assertion must be understood as *Being-uncovering*.¹⁹

In this passage Heidegger begins, Tugendhat notes approvingly, by defining the truth of assertions in terms of their pointing out or discovering ‘what is as it is in itself’: ‘Denn da die Übereinstimmung, wenn sie zutrifft, eine Identität ist, kann man, wenn die Aussage das Seiende so aufzeigt, wie es selbst ist, auch schlicht sagen: sie zeigt das Seiende an ihm selbst auf.’²⁰ But, Tugendhat claims, Heidegger immediately deletes, without justification, the ‘as it is in itself’ from his definition of truth: ‘Die Aussage ist wahr, bedeutet jetzt schlichtweg: sie entdeckt das Seiende. Und damit ist die These erreicht: “Wahrsein (Wahrheit) der Aussage muß verstanden werden als Entdeckendsein.” Erst mit dieser Wendung hat Heidegger sich deutlich . . . seinen eigenen Wahrheitsbegriff gewonnen.’²¹

Where Tugendhat sees the latter ‘definition’ of truth as a reinterpretation of the former, however, I see it as a separate claim altogether. Tugendhat notes how remarkable it is that Heidegger offers no justification for such an important reformulation of the notion of truth. And it would indeed be remarkable if Heidegger were in fact redefining propositional truth.

But the passage in question ought instead to be construed as Heidegger’s transition from an analysis of propositional truth to its ground in unconcealment. In other words, this – the penultimate paragraph of section 44(a) – is the precise point at which Heidegger’s analysis, as promised, ‘takes its departure from the *traditional conception of truth* and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception’.²² When we say of an assertion that it is true (*ist wahr*), Heidegger notes, we mean that it discovers what is as it is in itself. He goes immediately from this observation to the claim that the being-true or *Wahrsein* of an assertion is being-uncovering. I take the ‘Wahrsein’ of a proposition to be the ‘ontological foundation’ of the proposition’s ability to be true – that is, the ‘ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be either true or false’.²³ If this is the case, Heidegger is not making a remarkable and unsubstantiated leap at all. If the truth of an assertion is uncovering what is as it is in itself, then the being-true of the assertion – the condition of the possibility of the assertion being true – is that the assertion uncovers.

Thus, while it is *possible* to construe Heidegger as reducing truth to unconcealment in this passage, it is not necessary. And, in any event, to do so is to ignore the many other passages in which Heidegger reaffirms the traditional notion of truth as agreement. That truth and unconcealment are not coextensive properties of propositional entities is moreover demonstrated by Heidegger’s observation that assertions can be true without uncovering what is in its being. In ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ for instance, he draws the distinction between truth as correspondence and truth as unconcealment in terms of correctness (‘conformity with what is’) and ‘truth’:

The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is under consideration. However, in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass. For that reason the merely correct [i.e., that which corresponds with the way things are] is not yet the true [= unconcealed].²⁴

Thus, in claiming that the essence of truth is unconcealment, Heidegger is not claiming that true or correct expressions necessarily unconceal, but rather that unconcealment is ‘what first makes correctness possible’.²⁵

In conclusion, then, because Heidegger makes a distinction between truth and unconcealment (‘truth’) as a condition of its possibility, we must question whether his discussion of ‘truth’ indeed constitutes a rejection of truth understood in terms of correspondence. To answer this, we need to see how Heidegger understands propositional truth.

Propositional Truth

In fact, Heidegger proves to be fairly conventional in his interpretation of truth understood as a property of assertions or propositions. When discussing propositional truth, he uniformly accepts that it consists in some sort of 'correspondence' or agreement with the way the world is. 'A proposition is true by conforming to the unconcealed, to what is true. Propositional truth is always, and always exclusively, this correctness.'²⁶

Where Heidegger's view differs from correspondence theories of truth is in denying that the concept of correspondence can be understood on a representational model. Heidegger rejects the 'traditional conception of truth' only insofar as it is premised on a view of truth as an agreement (*homoiosis*, *adaequatio*, *convenientia*, correspondence) between mental representations (*noemata*, *intellectus*) and things (*pragmata*, *res*). The problem faced by such theories, Heidegger argues, is finding meaningful content for the idea of 'agreement'. If it is to explain truth, a correspondence theory must be able to specify in what the truth relation consists. It is not enough just to say that it is a relation because 'not every relation is a correspondence'.²⁷ Even saying it is a correspondence relation is inadequate, Heidegger points out, because there are different ways of 'corresponding'. Numbers can correspond with regard to amount, for instance, but it makes no sense to say that an assertion corresponds to the world with regard to amount. For a correspondence theory of truth to do any work, then, it must be able to specify that with regard to which an assertion corresponds to the world: 'In clarifying the "truth-relation" we must pay attention to the characteristic peculiar to this relation-structure. With regard to what do *intellectus* and *res* correspond?'²⁸ The problem with representational theories of language is their inability to explain the 'with regard to' of the truth relation. This is because, by having posited a distinction between subjective or ideal content and objective reality, it is not clear whether 'they give us anything at all in their kind of being and their essential content, with regard to which they can correspond'.²⁹

Heidegger provides little in the way of substantiation for this last claim. But then he does not treat the argument as a conclusive demonstration of the impossibility of defining truth on the basis of a representational correspondence.³⁰ He does appeal, however, to some intuitions we have about truth, the primary one being the idea that an assertion is not true unless its content presents the world 'just as' it is. For a representation to do this, it would have to have what Heidegger calls a fullness of reference (*Beziehungsganze*). But it is hard to see how a mental representation can capture the infinity of conceivably relevant features of what it is representing.

HEIDEGGER AND TRUTH AS CORRESPONDENCE

If it does not refute all representational correspondence theories, Heidegger's critique at least prepares the way for his own phenomenological account of the correspondence relationship. Heidegger thus brackets the representational account, turning instead to a phenomenological analysis of our experience of the way in which assertions in general relate to the world, and how true assertions in particular relate to the world. We do not ordinarily experience assertions in terms of representations, Heidegger argues, but rather as directing us towards objects in the world:

If someone here in the classroom makes the assertion 'the board is black', and does so in the immediately given context of a question and answer, to what are we then directed in interpreting the assertion? Perhaps to the phonetic articulation? Or to the representation which the assertion makes, and for which the uttered sounds are 'signs'? No, rather we are directed to the board itself, here on the wall! In perceiving this board, or rather in making the blackboard present, in thinking about it, and in nothing else, we participate in and repeat the making of the assertion. That which gives itself immediately in the assertion is that *about which* it asserts.³¹

The meaning of an assertion, then, is to be cashed out in terms of that towards which the speaker and hearer of the assertion are directed through the assertion. The relation between an assertion and the world is thus not a relation of representation, according to Heidegger, but a relation of indication.

To discover in what 'correspondence' consists, Heidegger proposes a similar phenomenological analysis of instances in which an assertion is confirmed to be true:

When is truth phenomenally explicit in knowledge itself? When knowledge establishes itself *as true*. In establishing itself it is secured in its truth. Thus, in the phenomenal context of establishing [the truth of a judgment] the correspondence relation must become visible.³²

Heidegger provides the following example:

Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that 'the picture on the wall is hanging askew'. This assertion demonstrates itself when the man who makes it turns round and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall.³³

On the basis of this example, Heidegger has been interpreted by Mark Okrent as advancing the view that truth consists in verifying or confirming the assertion. Heidegger's argument, according to Okrent, runs as follows:

(1) the truth of assertions consists in the revelation of things as they are; (2) in order for us to know that an assertion is true, we must have some 'standard' or 'measure' against which we check to see whether the thing really has the determination the assertion says it has – that is, we need evidence for the assertion's truth; thus, (3) unless things are revealed to us in some way other than in the assertion, the assertion can't be true. The argument is then extended to conclude that (4) this other way of uncovering things is our practical dealings with things, so a practical understanding-how is necessary for truly understanding that some particular thing has some property.³⁴

On Okrent's reading, then, Heidegger is taken as proposing that in order 'for an assertion to be true we need current evidence of its truth'.³⁵ Okrent goes on to note that '[w]hat is odd about the argument in this form is just that it is such a bad one'.³⁶

This *is* a bad argument; but is it Heidegger's? The argument is bad because (3) confuses how we know truth with truth itself. But, as Okrent notes, 'an assertion can in fact be true even if no one now knows it to be true, and even if there is currently no evidence for its truth and thus no disclosure that currently gives the thing as it is indicated to be'.³⁷

Okrent's reconstruction of Heidegger's argument, however, goes astray from the outset. From what I have said so far, it should be clear that (1) isn't careful enough in distinguishing between truth and 'truth' (= unconcealment). While an important part of 'truth' is a revelation of things, it does not follow from this that the truth of the assertion consists in the same thing. There can be little objection to (2), of course – it says simply that we need evidence for an assertion's truth in order to know that it is true. But without (1), (3) does not follow.

If we give up (1), is there any independent evidence that (3) is fairly attributable to Heidegger? Okrent's reading relies, for instance, on a passage from *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*:

So an assertion can finally be true, be adequate in propositional content to that about which the assertion is made, only because the being it speaks of is already in some way disclosed. That is, an assertion about *x* is only true because our dealing with that *x* has already a certain kind of truth.³⁸

Okrent interprets this passage as setting up a kind of verificationism in which any assertion can be true only if the actual being of which it speaks is uncovered in our current dealing with that thing. In fact, the passage is saying something quite different – namely, that the meaning and truth of an assertion are grounded in human beings' way of being with things. In other words, our assertions can be true only because we *disclose* what is through our comporting with things in our world. Heidegger makes this clear with the important qualifications that an assertion can be true because that with which it deals is *in some way* disclosed; our dealings with things have a *certain kind* of uncovering. Thus we see that for Heidegger the unconcealment of what is does not require that each particular thing be clearly manifest. As he later explained, 'the *understanding* of Being . . . which from the outset clarifies and guides every way of behaving toward what is . . . is neither a grasping of Being as such nor even a comprehending of that which is grasped'.³⁹ Heidegger elaborated:

Human Dasein, a being situated *in the midst* of what is and behaving *toward* what is, exists in such a way that the whole of what is is always manifest, and manifest as a totality. . . . We understand its character as a totality without grasping, or 'completely' investigating, the whole of manifest being in all its peculiar connections, realms, and strata.⁴⁰

In other words, comportment opens up a world in general. And this openness makes it possible to direct ourselves towards, think about, and even make claims about particular things with which we have no direct experience. Thus, in order for an assertion to be true, we only need to uncover the things about which it asserts enough that we can make meaningful assertions about them. We need not, as (3) and (4) would suggest, have any extensive practical experience with them.⁴¹

Okrent also supports his verificationist reading of Heidegger by advertent to Heidegger's apparent belief in the historical nature of truths. For instance, there is one passage in *Being and Time* cited by Okrent in support of his position which does indeed appear to make a claim which is antithetical to traditional correspondence-type views of truth.⁴² Heidegger wrote: 'Newton's laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatever – these are true only as long as Dasein *is*. Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more'.⁴³ But Heidegger explains this passage as follows:

For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncover-
edness, *cannot* be. . . . To say that before Newton his laws were
neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no
such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws.

Through Newton the laws became true and with them, entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were.⁴⁴

Thus, the passage should not be read as saying that Newton's laws did not accord with the way the world is before Newton showed us how to see the entities explained by his laws. Instead, Heidegger claims that without the experience of being that grounded them, the laws could not discover anything. Thus, Newton's laws 'became true [i.e., 'true'] only in and with their uncoveredness, because this uncoveredness is their truth [unconcealment]'.⁴⁵ Heidegger explains:

Before being discovered the Newtonian laws were neither true nor false. This cannot mean that the entity which is uncovered with the unveiled laws was not previously in the way in which it showed itself after the uncovering and now is as thus showing itself. Uncoveredness, truth, unveils an entity precisely as that which it already was beforehand regardless of its uncoveredness and non-uncoveredness. As an uncovered being it becomes intelligible as that which is just how it is and will be, regardless of every possible uncoveredness of itself. For nature to be as it is, it does not need truth, unveiledness. The content intended in the true proposition '2 times 2 = 4' can subsist through all eternity without there existing any truth about it.⁴⁶

This passage would be clearer if Heidegger had been more careful to distinguish between truth and 'truth', but given what I have argued to this point, it should be obvious how this is to be done.

The important thing to note is that in the passage upon which Okrent relies, and many others like it, it is a mistake to read Heidegger as equating the truth of an assertion with the revelation or verification of the content of the assertion. So when Heidegger announces in *Being and Time* that the inquiry into truth will turn to a phenomenological examination of the context of verifying an assertion, he is not in the process reducing the truth of an assertion to its verification. Rather, he is suggesting that we focus on instances in which the truth of something is established in hopes of determining from such instances the nature of the correspondence relation.

And what does Heidegger discover in the course of this phenomenological analysis? That an assertion is true when what is intended in the assertion 'is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being'.⁴⁷ Thus he affirms phenomenologically the idea or intuition behind correspondence theories – that things are true by agreeing with the way the world is.

To the extent that correspondence theories are working to preserve this insight into the nature of the truth relation between propositional entities and the world, Heidegger is in agreement with them. Where Heidegger disagrees with them is in the details of their account of the nature of the correspondence relation as a relation between a representation and the world. Such accounts, Heidegger argues, go astray in 'slipping in something else'⁴⁸ – a representation – between the intentional state and the world.

Heidegger's main objection, then, to correspondence theories of truth is the way they tend to work within a model of truth understood as 'a matter of the representation of objects. The representing takes place in the "interior", and language is the "exteriorization" of this interior'.⁴⁹ Such a view, Heidegger argues, not only misunderstands the way language works, but misdirects us in our attempt to understand the nature of things and human being by taking both objects and propositional entities to be formed and describable independently of their involvement in a world. Thus, understanding truth as a relation between representation and thing misses the fact that being by things is constitutive of what it is to be human. 'To existence belongs being-by as disclosive'.⁵⁰

In his attempt to salvage the traditional, or correspondence view of truth, Heidegger is trying to show that '[t]he essential content of the traditional concept . . . does not mean, as one readily and almost universally thinks, that truth is the *image* of things outside brought about by representations in the soul'.⁵¹ The task is to get over the 'crude, unfounded preconception . . . that adequacy has to have the character of an *image*'.⁵² Heidegger emphasizes, however, that in rejecting truth 'in the sense of copying adequation', it is not necessary to 'reject truth in the sense of agreement with the actual'.⁵³ And, in fact, it is this insight of the correspondence view – that propositions are true in virtue of the way the world is – that Heidegger hopes to preserve.

Beyond this, Heidegger has little to say about the nature of propositional truth. He believes, however, that much more can be said about what makes it possible for propositions to point to the world in just the way that the world is. This is the job of the concept of unconcealment.

Truth and Unconcealment

As we have seen, Heidegger understands the truth of propositional entities to consist in their agreeing with the way the world is. The problem with truth has traditionally been a problem of explaining how the content of propositional entities could relate in the right manner to the way the world is. Heidegger suggests that this was a 'pseudo-problem'⁵⁴ arising from the attempt to define the nature of the relationship without a clear understanding of the nature of the relata: 'philosophers have tormented themselves in vain, seeking by every possible and impossible stratagem to

explain the relation between assertion (thinking) and being – in vain, because they never again carried the question of being back to its native ground and soil, thence to unfold it'.⁵⁵ The ability of propositional entities to agree with the world, Heidegger argues, is unproblematic once it is understood that content of true assertions is determined by that about which the assertion asserts. Thus, Heidegger is not primarily concerned with the truth relation itself, but rather with understanding the way in which the meaning of truth-bearing entities is fixed.

Consequently, the question of truth which Heidegger pursues is the question what makes it possible for the content of our beliefs and assertions to be fixed by things in the world, thereby securing the possibility of a conformity of knowledge with what is. One payoff for focusing on conditions of the possibility of truth rather than the truth relation, Heidegger believes, is to bypass traditional problems with truth which arise from attempting to account for the nature of the relation – problems such as scepticism. Unconcealment grounds truth in the sense that a condition of our using language is our disclosing the world in the way that it is (at least for the most part). Given that the content of propositional entities, and thus that in virtue of which they can be true, is fixed by objects rather than sensations or patterns of stimulation, Heidegger argues that scepticism about truth is fundamentally mistaken.⁵⁶

I cannot focus here, however, on the anti-sceptical force of Heidegger's understanding of truth. Nor can I develop in detail his discussion of unconcealment. But I do hope to state his position in the barest outline in order to indicate how it is that he can claim unconcealment as a condition of propositional truth – that is, as a condition of words and beliefs according with the way the world is. Heidegger's answer to the question what makes truth possible has two parts to it. First, he claims, for the content of assertion to be fixed by things in the world, those things must be manifest to us. Heidegger's inquiry into *discovery*, the making manifest of entities, aims at exhibiting the structural features of our comportment with things – in particular, those features which fix meaning. The second part of the investigation into unconcealment focuses on *disclosure* – the structural features of human existence that make possible such uncovering comportment. As Heidegger explains, 'the world which has already been disclosed beforehand permits what is within-the-world to be encountered'.⁵⁷

As Heidegger initially understood it, the investigation into primordial 'truth' (= unconcealment) is concerned with the way in which what is becomes manifest, thereby fixing the meaning of our beliefs, utterances, thoughts, etc. The reason for calling unconcealment the 'essence' of truth is that it is the ground on which beliefs and assertions could agree with the world:

The correspondence of the nexus [of subject and predicate] *with* what is and its resulting unanimity do not *as such* render what is immediately accessible. Rather, as the possible 'subject' of a predicative definition, what is must already be manifest both *prior to* and *for* our predications. Predication, to become possible, must be able to establish itself in the sort of manifesting which does *not* have a *predicative* character. Propositional truth is rooted in a *more primordial* truth (unconcealment).⁵⁸

Unconcealment makes truth possible by making assertions the kind of things which can be true. For an assertion to be true, that is, to agree with the way the world is, the assertion must be meaningful. To be meaningful, and hence to be capable of being true or false, Heidegger argues that three things are required. First, in order even to get into the truth game, the assertion must aspire to be about something in the world. For it is only in virtue of being about something that the assertion can agree or fail to agree with the way that thing is. Heidegger calls this aspect of assertion 'pointing out'.

Second, the assertion must have determinacy. That is, some definite character of a thing – some feature of the way the thing is – must be intended in the assertion. To make an assertion about a hammer, for instance, the assertion must focus on some particular involvement or characteristic of the hammer: 'The hammer is heavy.'

Finally, to be meaningful, the assertion must be able to 'communicate'. Heidegger writes:

'Communication' in which one makes assertions – giving information, for instance – is a special case of that communication which is grasped in principle existentially. In this more general kind of communication, the articulation of being with one another understandingly is constituted. . . . Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes from the interior of one subject into the interior of another.⁵⁹

That is, the 'pointing out' of something in the world in one of its definite involvements is delimited against the background of an orientation in the world which the speaker shares with the hearer. It should be obvious that Heidegger is here using 'communicate' in two distinct ways. Communication as we ordinarily understand it is made possible by 'communication' 'understood in a sense which is ontologically broad'.⁶⁰ To distinguish Heidegger's ontological use from ordinary uses of the term, I will mark the former with quotation marks. To say we 'communicate' with others means, in Heidegger's 'ontologically broad' sense, that we share a background with them. Communication in the ordinary sense, performed

through assertions, is a 'special case' of 'communication' insofar as when assertions succeed in communicating, they make explicit certain features of the orientation within the world which we share.⁶¹ 'Communication', on the other hand, constitutes 'the articulation of Being with one another understandingly'.⁶² As a result, 'communication' is essential to meaningful assertion, for only on the basis of 'communication' can what is asserted in the assertion be fixed. For instance, a sculptor and a carpenter might mean very different things in asserting 'the hammer is heavy' as a result of differences in the practices, goals, equipmental contexts, etc., within which they each use a hammer. Likewise, whether the assertion 'the hammer is heavy' is true will depend on the background which is 'communicated' by the speaker and hearer.

Hence, Heidegger holds that assertion is '*a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates*'.⁶³ The key to seeing how unconcealment makes assertion and thus truth possible is in seeing that each of the three facets of assertion depends on the uncoveredness of what is. For instance, '[i]n order for something to be a possible about-which for an assertion', it obviously 'must *already* be somehow given for the assertion as *unveiled* and accessible'.⁶⁴ Second, the assertion must pick out some feature or features of the thing. But these features, as 'primordially' experienced, are unveiled through the articulation in discovery of the thing's totality of involvements. The totality is 'dimmed down' in assertion to focus on one of the many interrelated involvements the thing bears.⁶⁵ That is, the assertion functions by focusing on some feature of the equipmental context, but that focus is possible only to the extent that that feature is articulated by our discovering comportment with things.

Finally, 'communication' depends on our sharing a world – a sharing only possible to the extent that a world is disclosed. The world provides norms of activity and directs purposive action, thereby bringing us together in focusing on certain features of entities within the world as salient. The content of an assertion, then, is fixed insofar as this 'communication' allows us to come together in focusing on certain features of the world which are discovered and articulated in our practices.

But it should be clear that this account of unconcealment in no way rules out a view that what distinguishes the true assertions from the false ones is their agreement or 'correspondence' with the world. Quite to the contrary, Heidegger's account of 'truth' as unconcealment provides the basis for maintaining that truth is correspondence, for it shows how language and world can correspond.

Implications

Let me conclude by sketching out some of the consequences for our understanding of Heidegger's project which follow from distinguishing truth

from unconcealment in his works. I begin by noting, however, that while care in distinguishing his account of propositional truth from his discussion of unconcealment or primordial truth might help minimally in understanding the notion of unconcealment, it need not change drastically our understanding of this important concept in Heidegger's work. I believe that it will help by providing a baseline for interpreting the concept of unconcealment – whatever else one says about it, it must be clear how Heidegger believed that unconcealment forms the ground of propositional truth. It will also help avoid the common error of reading Heidegger's claims about the history of the essence of truth as claims about propositional truth.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the consequences for interpreting the notion of unconcealment, and its development throughout Heidegger's career, are slight.

There are, however, important implications for his views on the status of truth claims. If we read everything Heidegger has to say about unconcealment as applying directly to truth, we end up attributing to him rather implausible claims about truth. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is Sallis' 'Double Truth'.⁶⁷ In that essay, Sallis is at times quite perspicacious in distinguishing unconcealment from truth – that is, 'the difference between ground and grounded'.⁶⁸ But his analysis from the outset slides between questioning Heidegger's 'doubling' of 'the word *truth*' to questioning Heidegger's 'doubling of truth'. The former – Heidegger's use of the word 'truth' to name both truth and unconcealment – is, of course, a legitimate target for criticism. Indeed, as we have seen, Heidegger himself addressed this 'doubling' in 'The End of Philosophy'. But, as I hope I have shown, one cannot infer from his 'doubling of the word' that he 'doubled' truth. That is to say, one is not justified solely on the basis of the 'doubling of the word' in applying Heidegger's claims about 'truth' (= unconcealment) to truth.

The fusion of truth and 'truth', consequently, leads Sallis to a misunderstanding of Heidegger's work. In 'Deformatives', for instance, Sallis analyses Heidegger's claim that unconcealment necessarily involves concealment as a claim that truth necessarily involves concealment – a move possible only on the basis of the conflation of truth and unconcealment. Thus, in the first two paragraphs of the essay, Sallis goes from questioning the possibility that truth is 'deformed, monstrous in its very essence' (an interesting, if somewhat hysterical, way of posing the problem of concealment at the heart of unconcealment) to asking: 'How could one then declare the truth – if it were monstrous?' But it should be clear that the 'monstrousness' of the *essence* of truth (i.e., 'truth') does not obviously implicate our ability to declare the truth (that is, make true claims). More importantly, Sallis is eventually led to conclude that the concealment at the heart of unconcealment forces a denial of the principle of non-contradiction.⁶⁹ But the principle of non-contradiction operates at the

propositional level, not the level of unconcealment. There is no contradiction in saying that certain things are made manifest only by the concealment of other things, for the same thing is not both concealed and unconcealed in the same respect at the same time. And only a failure to respect the distinction between unconcealment and propositional truth could force one to believe that the fact that truth is made possible by concealment also means that sentences are both true and false.

This is because, as Heidegger himself explains, it is a mistake to read the conditions of the possibility of truth as properties of true judgments – just as it would be a mistake to read the conditions of the possibility of children – take, for example, parenthood – as all being necessary properties of children. To do so would force one to say that children are necessarily parents. But from Heidegger's claim that the essence of truth is unconcealment, Sallis and many other interpreters infer that true assertions and beliefs must be true by unconcealing what is.⁷⁰ From there, it is a short step to seeing Heidegger as defining the truth of true propositions as unconcealment. But Heidegger is quite clear that the conditions he examines when asking about the essence of something are not to be interpreted as 'the one feature that holds indifferently for many things'.⁷¹ As a result, true sentences are all made possible by unconcealment, but they do not necessarily 'unconceal'. Thus, the reason for claiming that the essence of truth is unconcealment is *not* that all true assertions unconceal. Instead, true assertions are capable of being true only because a world has already opened up – a world about which meaningful claims can be made.

Finally, there are important consequences for the broader assessment of Heidegger's work that come from recognizing that he had a notion of propositional truth which, in its basic contours, was true to the intuition behind the correspondence view of truth. We have already seen how a fusion of the two undergirds Okrent's reading of Heidegger as a pragmatist. To cite just one other example, Habermas supports his reading of Heidegger as an irrationalist by contending that Heidegger, through the concept of unconcealment, performs an 'uprooting of propositional truth' and, consequently, 'a devaluation of discursive thought'. By 'reserv[ing] the title of truth for the so-called truth occurrence', Habermas claims, Heidegger 'raises which discloses the world-project meaning above any and every critical forum'.⁷² To the extent that such views of Heidegger are founded on an illegitimate fusion of propositional truth with unconcealment, they must be called into question.

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Notes

- 1 I would like to thank Hubert Dreyfus, John Ferrari, Hans Sluga, Sean Kelly, Taylor Carman, David Bohn, and James Faulconer for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.
- 2 By 'propositional truth', I mean simply the truth of those things which can have a propositional content, such as the propositional attitudes, sentences, utterances, etc. I make no assumption about the distinct existence of propositions.
- 3 Ernst Tugendhat, 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', trans. by Christopher Macann, in Brice R. Wachterhauser (ed.) *Hermeneutics and Truth*, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1994), p. 85.
- 4 *Basic Questions of Philosophy* (hereinafter *BQP*), trans. by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 91.
- 5 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' (hereinafter *EPTT*), in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 446.
- 6 *Being and Time* (hereinafter *BT*), trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 262/220. The number to the right refers to the page number in the German edition. Translation modified in this and other passages from *Being and Time*.
- 7 *BQP*, p. 36.
- 8 *EPTT*, pp. 446–7.
- 9 *Heraclitus Seminar, 1966–1967*, with Eugen Fink, trans. by Charles H. Seibert (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1979), p. 161. Heidegger went on to explain: 'What I then said in *Being and Time* about *aletheia* already goes in this direction. *Aletheia* as unconcealment had already occupied me, but in the meantime "truth" came inbetween. *Aletheia* as unconcealment heads into the direction of that which is the clearing.'
- 10 See, for example, Heidegger's 1924–5 lecture course *Plato's Sophist*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 10: 'Usually knowledge refers to a way of access and a way of relating which disclose beings as such and such and take possession of what is thus disclosed. The knowledge that discloses beings is "true". Knowledge which has grasped beings expresses itself and settles itself in a proposition, an assertion. We call such an assertion a truth.'
- 11 *BQP*, p. 95.
- 12 *EPTT*, p. 446. (2b) didn't become a central theme of Heidegger's research until the mid-1930s.
- 13 See *The Essence of Reasons* (hereinafter *ER*), trans. by Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 27.
- 14 *BT*, p. 262.
- 15 See 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth', trans. by Jean Barlow, in *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, Vol. 2, ed. William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York: Random House, 1962).
- 16 *BT*, pp. 265–6. There is evidence, however, that Heidegger early on began to doubt the necessity of doing so. In his personal copy, in the margin of the passage on the necessity of showing this derivation of truth from unconcealment, Heidegger noted 'Das werden sie so niemals.'
- 17 See *Plato*, Vol. 1, 2nd edn, trans. by Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 221ff.
- 18 *EPTT*, p. 447. See *BT* §44(c).
- 19 *BT*, p. 261.

- 20 Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), p. 332.
- 21 Ibid., quoting BT, p. 261/218.
- 22 BT, p. 257 (italic in original).
- 23 Ibid., p. 269.
- 24 'The Question Concerning Technology' (hereinafter QCT), in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 6.
- 25 'On the Essence of Truth', in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1993), p. 122 (hereinafter ET). One might nevertheless want to say that all assertions uncover things, even if in a distorted fashion. Or, more accurately, one might say that all *meaningful* assertions uncover, if uncovering is taken as pointing things out as being in some way. As Heidegger himself notes, semblance is a 'mode' of uncoveredness in which '[e]ntities look as if. . . . That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised.' BT, p. 265. Tugendhat concludes on the basis of such passages that, in the process of conceiving truth as unconcealment, Heidegger loses any relevance to the problem of truth, because both true and false ways of uncovering things are possible. See, e.g., *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, p. 329. What misleads Tugendhat (and perhaps occasionally Heidegger himself) is that assertions can both uncover and be propositionally true. Heidegger's calling unconcealment 'truth' leads to the paradoxes that something can be true but not genuinely 'true' (as the QCT passage notes), and something can be 'true' – that is, uncover – while being false. Where Tugendhat finds confusion, however, I see more evidence that Heidegger never intended unconcealment as a definition of propositional truth.
- 26 Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (hereinafter OWA) in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 177.
- 27 BT, p. 258/216.
- 28 Ibid., p. 258/216. The number to the right refers to the page number in the German edition. See *Sein und Zeit*, Gesamtausgabe Band 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976).
- 29 Ibid., pp. 258–9/216.
- 30 See Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), for arguments in support of Heidegger's claim.
- 31 *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (hereinafter MFL), trans. by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 125–6/157. The number to the right refers to the page number in the German edition. See *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978).
- 32 BT, p. 260/217.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 *Heidegger's Pragmatism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 103.
- 35 Ibid., p. 104.
- 36 Ibid., p. 103.
- 37 Ibid., p. 104.
- 38 Ibid., p. 103 (modifying Heim's translation slightly). One might argue that this translation distorts the meaning of the passage by filling in an 'x' where Heidegger leaves unspecified the object of phrases like 'assertion about . . . ' ('Aussage über . . . ') or 'comportment with . . . ' ('Umgang mit . . . '). I believe he does this to indicate that he is talking about an ontological feature of human behaviour, rather than some as yet unspecified ontic relation. The

- result is that what Heidegger is actually saying is that we are able to make assertions about whatever it is we can make assertions about because our comporting with the things with which we comport unconceals a world. This is very different than saying that an assertion about *x* is only possible when we actually have dealings with that *x*.
- 39 ER, p. 23.
 - 40 Ibid., pp. 83–5.
 - 41 Indeed, Heidegger notes that much of our actual linguistic practice is 'idle talk' – we say things without any actual experience of the things of which we speak. This does not make the things we say untrue, although 'idle talk' lacks the ability to disclose genuinely the objects of which it speaks. '[I]dle talk is from the very beginning in itself a covering up' (Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 273), even though what is communicated in idle talk may very well remain true insofar as 'it preserves an understanding of the disclosed world' (BT, p. 211).
 - 42 *Heidegger's Pragmatism*, pp. 104–5.
 - 43 BT, p. 269.
 - 44 Ibid.
 - 45 *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (hereinafter BPP), trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 220.
 - 46 Ibid., pp. 220–1.
 - 47 BT, p. 261. See also ET, p. 122: 'What is presents itself along with the presentative assertion so that the latter subordinates itself to the directive that it speak of what is *just as it is*. In following such a directive the assertion conforms to what is. Speech that directs itself accordingly is correct (true).'
 - 48 BT, p. 260.
 - 49 *Parmenides*, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 69.
 - 50 MFL, p. 129/162.
 - 51 M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche* Volume III, trans. D. Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1987), p. 54.
 - 52 Ibid.
 - 53 Ibid., pp. 126–7.
 - 54 BT, p. 262.
 - 55 *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 190.
 - 56 See BT §§ 43, 44.
 - 57 Ibid., p. 176.
 - 58 ER, pp. 19–21. See also OWA, pp. 176–7: 'Truth means today and has long meant the conformity of knowledge with the matter. However, the matter must show itself to be such if knowledge and the proposition that forms and expresses knowledge are to be able to conform to it; otherwise the matter cannot become binding on the proposition. How can the matter show itself if it cannot itself stand forth out of concealment, if it does not itself stand in the unconcealed? . . . The essence of truth which is familiar to us – correctness in representation – stands and falls with truth as unconcealment of beings.'
 - 59 BT, p. 205.
 - 60 Ibid.
 - 61 Ibid.
 - 62 Ibid.
 - 63 Ibid., p. 199.
 - 64 BPP, p. 208.
 - 65 BT, p. 197/155.

- 66 Biemel, for instance, saddles Heidegger with the view that in the modern age – i.e., since Descartes – the transformation of truth into ‘certitude’ is so widespread and familiar ‘that we have difficulty bringing about another possibility of interpreting truth’. Walter Biemel, ‘Heidegger and Metaphysics’, *Listening*, 12 (1977), p. 54. Despite Biemel’s self-assured affirmation, it is certainly not the case that truth is uniformly and self-evidently taken to be certitude. Heidegger’s claim is not, however, a claim about what modern philosophers think about truth; it is a claim about the mode in which what is is unconcealed.
- 67 *Double Truth* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).
- 68 Ibid., p. 85.
- 69 Ibid., p. 100.
- 70 Of course, I don’t deny that assertions can uncover something.
- 71 ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 50.
- 72 Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 154.

Die Wahrheitskonzeption in den Marburger Vorlesungen

Zur Vorgeschichte von *Sein und Zeit*, § 44

Die Untersuchungen und Überlegungen dieses Beitrags sind auf dem Hintergrund des breiten Interesses zu verstehen, das die philosophische Erörterung des Wahrheitsproblems bei vielen Autoren mit unterschiedlichen Arbeitsansätzen in den letzten Jahren gefunden hat. Die Arbeit an einer „Wahrheitstheorie“ ist dabei zum Schlüsselthema der „Theoretischen Philosophie“ (Philosophie der Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Sprachphilosophie) geworden. Dabei spielen auch zunehmend „heterodoxe“ Positionen wie der logische Intuitionismus, der Pragmatismus, die Sprechaktttheorie, der Konventionalismus und Wittgensteins Sprachspielkonzeption eine entscheidende Rolle. Nur wenige Autoren allerdings messen der phänomenologischen Wahrheitskonzeption Husserls, die er um die Begriffe der „Leer-Intention“ und „Erfüllungs-Intention“ herum entwickelt hat, und Heideggers kritischer Modifikation dieser Konzeption eine entscheidende Bedeutung zu. Viele Autoren, die an der Diskussion über „Wahrheitstheorie“ teilnehmen, insbesondere solche, die in der Traditionslinie von Frege, Tarski, Carnap, Quine, Putnam oder Dummett argumentieren, stellen durch ihr Rezeptionsverhalten implizit in Abrede, daß es überhaupt eine phänomenologische Wahrheitskonzeption gibt, geschweige denn einen Beitrag Heideggers zu ihr.¹

Speziell für Heidegger hat Ernst Tugendhats Buch *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* diese Irrelevanzeinschätzung unterstrichen. Tugendhat kommt nämlich zu dem Ergebnis, daß Heidegger (im Unterschied zu Husserl) den

¹ Wichtige Ausnahmen sind z. B. J. N. Mohanty: ‚Consciousness and Existence‘ und D. Føllesdal: ‚Husserl and Heidegger‘.

spezifischen Wahrheitsbegriff überhaupt verfehlt habe. Tugendhats eigene Fortführung des Wahrheitsthemas in seinen weiteren Schriften nimmt dementsprechend auf Heidegger keinen Bezug mehr.²

An Tugendhats folgenreicher Heidegger-Interpretation wurde schon früher Kritik geübt.³ Es gibt jedoch einen handfesten Grund, diese Diskussion erneut aufzunehmen, nämlich die inzwischen erfolgte weitgehende Veränderung der Textlage gegenüber derjenigen, auf die sich Tugendhats wie seiner Kritiker Heidegger-Interpretation bezog. Diese konzentrierte sich noch vor einigen Jahren auf den § 44 von *Sein und Zeit*, den man im Zusammenhang des Entwurfs und der Durchführung der Fundamentalontologie sowie gelegentlicher Äußerungen in früheren und späteren Schriften zu interpretieren versuchte.

Demgegenüber kann die Interpretation des Textes von *Sein und Zeit* nunmehr auf die inzwischen weitgehend erfolgte Veröffentlichung von Heideggers frühen Freiburger und seinen Marburger Vorlesungen zurückgreifen. In ihnen hat Heidegger das Wahrheitsproblem immer wieder behandelt, besonders ausführlich in zwei Vorlesungen, die in engem zeitlichen Konnex zur textlichen Entstehung und zum Erscheinen von *Sein und Zeit* stehen:

- WS 1925/26: „Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit“ (GA21), in einem Zeitraum gehalten, in dem Heidegger große Teile von *Sein und Zeit* konzipiert und redigiert hat;
- SS 1928: „Logik“ (GA26), gehalten im letzten Marburger Semester Heideggers.

Am Beispiel des Wahrheitsthemas sollen die folgenden Darlegungen auch demonstrieren, daß der Ansatz fruchtbar

2 Vgl. die zusammenfassende Wiederholung der Kritik an Heidegger bei E. Tugendhat: *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, 104 f., Anm. 1.

3 Vgl. C. F. Gethmann: „Zum Wahrheitsbegriff“, in diesem Band 115–136.

ist, die Vorlesungen Heideggers von 1917 bis 1928 im Sinne einer *Vor- und Zeitgeschichte von Sein und Zeit* zu lesen, d. h. als tastende und suchende Vorbereitung, als philosophiehistorische Aus- und Weiterführung sowie als kritische und diskussionsbezogene Einbettung der Philosophie von *Sein und Zeit*. Die Interpretation des Verhältnisses der Vorlesungstexte zum Text von *Sein und Zeit* wird dabei durch folgende hermeneutische Prämissen geleitet:

- (1) *Sein und Zeit* ist das Hauptwerk der Philosophie Heideggers, wenigstens für seine Philosophie bis 1929.
- (2) Trotz mannigfacher Brüche, Neuansätze und Selbstverbesserungen repräsentieren der Text von *Sein und Zeit* und die Vorlesungen eine philosophische Konzeption. Damit wird der These widersprochen, daß man von einer inkommensurablen Pluralität von Philosophien sprechen müsse; insbesondere bieten die Vorlesungen keine eigenständigen Konzeptionen, die zur Philosophie von *Sein und Zeit* in Konkurrenz treten könnten.⁴
- (3) Es besteht ein hermeneutisches Gefälle zwischen dem Text von *Sein und Zeit* und von Vorlesungstexten, einfach deshalb, weil der Autor von *Sein und Zeit* diesen Text zur Veröffentlichung bestimmte, wobei er auf die Vorlesungen allerdings häufig zurückgriff; deren Veröffentlichung stimmte Heidegger erst im Rahmen einer Ausgabe letzter Hand Jahrzehnte später zu.

Nach diesen drei hermeneutischen Prämissen ist der Text von *Sein und Zeit* das Ergebnis von Denkbemühungen Heideggers über etwa 10 Jahre hinweg. Heidegger selbst deutet an verschiedenen Stellen in *Sein und Zeit* durch entsprechende

4 Die konträre Position vertritt O. Pöggeler, wobei eine sich an entsprechende Urteile O. Beckers anschließende Abwertung des Textes von *Sein und Zeit* gegenüber den frühen Vorlesungen maßgebend ist. Vgl. zur Auseinandersetzung mit dem pluralistischen Ansatz C. F. Gethmann: „Philosophie als Vollzug und als Begriff“, in diesem Band 247–253.

Rückverweise das Verhältnis von Vorlesungen und dem veröffentlichten Text im Sinne einer entsprechenden Kontinuitätsunterstellung.⁵

Tugendhats Analyse des Heideggerschen Wahrheitsverständnisses führt ihn zu dem kritischen Ergebnis, daß aufgrund der von Heidegger vertretenen Ausweitung des Wahrheitsbegriffs auf das Entdeckend- und Verdeckend-sein dieser seine kritische (unterscheidende) Funktion verliere; da jede Aussage nach Heidegger entdeckend und verdeckend zugleich sei, werde demzufolge der Wahrheitsbegriff ungeeignet, kognitive Geltungsansprüche, wie sie sich in Behauptungen, Urteilen usw. äußern, als anzunehmen oder abzulehnen zu qualifizieren. Für die folgenden Untersuchungen sei unterstellt, daß Tugendhats Kritik berechtigt wäre, wenn die Heideggersche Position so zu verstehen wäre.

Im einzelnen begründet Tugendhat seine Analyse und Kritik durch drei Vorwürfe, auf deren Behandlung sich die folgenden drei Paragraphen beziehen:

5 Vgl. zur Interpretation dieser Stellen im einzelnen C. F. Getmann: „Philosophie als Vollzug und als Begriff“, in diesem Band 247–280. — Mit der hier vertretenen hermeneutischen These soll nicht unterstellt werden, daß die Vorlesungen nicht auch für andere philosophiehistorische Fragestellungen von Interesse sind; in diesem Zusammenhang ist darauf hinzuweisen, daß eine Reihe der wichtigsten deutschen Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts Hörer Heideggers in diesen Vorlesungen waren, so daß sie für die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts von größter Bedeutung sind (vgl. ebd. 256 f.). — Zu den Hörern der für diesen Beitrag besonders wichtigen Vorlesung im WS 1925/26 zählt neben H.-G. Gadamer, G. Krüger, K. Löwith auch W. Kamlah, der hier sein Verständnis der Phänomenologie in Heideggers Brechung aufnahm; nach Kamlahs Wechsel nach Göttingen wurde dieses Verständnis dann noch einmal durch die kritische Aufnahme der Ansätze Husserls und Heideggers in der Göttinger Lebensphilosophie, vor allem bei G. Misch, modifiziert. Vgl. dazu C. F. Getmann: „Phänomenologie, Lebensphilosophie und Konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie“.

- (1) Tugendhats Rekonstruktion läuft auf die Feststellung hinaus, Heidegger lehne die Unterscheidung von Urteilsgehalt und Urteilsvollzug ab. In der Tat würde die vollständige Ablehnung einer entsprechenden Unterscheidung zu einer Depotenzierung jeder Wahrheitskonzeption führen, weil alle Geltungsansprüche auf die faktische Inanspruchnahme von Geltung reduziert wären. Heidegger wäre lediglich ein weiterer Psychologist, in Husserls Worten: ein „Anthropologist“.
- (2) Mit der These vom Entdeckend-sein der Aussage gebe Heidegger — so Tugendhat — die traditionelle Wahrheitsvorstellung auf mit dem Effekt, daß ein Wahrheitsanspruch (eine Wahrheitsprätention) keiner besonderen Ausweisung mehr bedürfe.
- (3) Im Zusammenhang damit finde sich bei Heidegger eine Variante des Relativismus, eine Art Relativismus der Offenbarkeit, den Tugendhat exemplarisch in Heideggers Überlegungen zur Geltung der Gesetze Newtons manifestiert sieht.

1. Akt und Gehalt.

Heideggers Meta-Kritik des Anti-Psychologismus

Heidegger entwickelt im § 44 a von *Sein und Zeit* seine Wahrheitskonzeption im Rahmen einer Auseinandersetzung mit dem „traditionellen Wahrheitsbegriff“. Dieser ca. 5 Druckseiten umfassende Text ist nicht nur historisch und systematisch äußerst komprimiert, sondern auch in seiner argumentativen Struktur überhaupt nicht transparent. Die abschließend formulierte These vom Wahrsein als Entdeckend-sein steht wie eine dogmatische Definition im Raum und läßt keine klare Verbindung mit den vorherigen Abschnitten erkennen. Die Kritik am ontologischen Konzept der Substantialität (Wahrheit als Beständigkeit und Anwesenheit) erscheint textlich unentwirrbar verknäult mit einer distanzierenden Stellungnahme zu Husserls Psychologismus-Kritik. Die

Definition der Wahrheit als Übereinstimmung wird zunächst kritisiert, dann im Sinne eines „So-Wie“ reformuliert, schließlich verschwindet sie in der abschließenden Definition vollständig. Mehrfach ist nicht deutlich, ob Heidegger historische Rückbezüge im Sinne eines Berichts, einer Zurückweisung oder einer kritikbedürftigen Weiterführung vornimmt. Insgesamt ist § 44 a in einem Umfang interpretationsbedürftig, der es nicht als überraschend erscheinen läßt, daß die Literatur zu Heideggers Wahrheitsbegriff äußerst weitgehend divergiert.

Inzwischen verfügen wir nach Veröffentlichung von Heideggers Marburger Vorlesung aus dem Wintersemester 1925/26 über einen ersten geschlossenen Entwurf der Konzeption, die hinter dem Text von *Sein und Zeit* steht. Die Vorlesung ist für das Wahrheitsthema deshalb besonders attraktiv, weil sich etwa die Hälfte der Paragraphen mit eben diesem Thema befaßt. Näherhin erscheint § 44 a von *Sein und Zeit* als recht wenig geglückte redaktionelle Zusammenfassung der Argumentationsfolge, wie sie in den §§ 6–10 der Vorlesung entwickelt wird. Auf etwa 94 Druckseiten entfaltet Heidegger hier seine Position aus dem Kontext der zeitgenössischen Diskussion heraus und nimmt dabei begriffliche Klärungen vor, von denen der § 44 von *Sein und Zeit* mehrfach, ohne entsprechende Erläuterungen, Gebrauch macht. Heideggers argumentative Strategie ist die der Meta-Kritik (Heidegger: „Anti-Kritik“). Heidegger gibt Husserls Kritik am Psychologismus recht, kritisiert aber wiederum an Husserl, für den Anti-Psychologismus einen zu hohen Preis zu zahlen. Daraus kann man schließen, daß Heidegger der Meinung ist, daß man den Anti-Psychologismus mit philosophisch schwächeren Prämissen begründen kann. Mehr inhaltlich gesprochen: Husserl habe gegen den Psychologismus zu Recht auf den Unterschied von Urteilsvollzug und -gehalt hingewiesen, er habe jedoch diese *methodische* Unterscheidung mit einer *ontologischen* Unterscheidung konfundiert, nämlich derjenigen von idealer und realer Seinssphäre. Husserl habe — so läßt sich Heideggers Kritik zusammenfassen — unbemerkt und darum ungerechtfertigt

unterstellt, daß der *Anti-Psychologismus* (die Unterscheidung von Vollzug/Gehalt) nur als Idealismus (durch die Unterscheidung von real/ideal) zu haben sei.

Dieser Generaleinwand Heideggers gegen Husserl ist philosophiehistorisch keineswegs aus der Luft gegriffen, er läßt sich vielmehr durchaus in die phänomenologische Debatte einordnen:

(a) Heideggers Kritik an Husserl hat auffällige Parallelen mit Husserls tentativer Selbstkritik an den Prämissen seiner Psychologismus-Kritik, wie sie in seinen späteren logischen Schriften, nämlich in *Formale und transzendente Logik*, und in den von Ludwig Landgrebe redigierten Texten, die unter dem Titel *Erfahrung und Urteil* erschienen sind, durchgeführt wird.⁶ In diesen logischen Spätschriften problematisiert Husserl ansatzweise und durchaus nicht in letzter Konsequenz die Hauptprämissen der *Logischen Untersuchungen*, wonach die Logik sich auf das Denken und nicht auf die Sprache beziehe (Mentalismus) und wonach die Logik primär nicht Regeln vorschreibt, sondern Gesetze einer eigenen Seinssphäre beschreibt (Idealismus). Gegen den Mentalismus erwägt Husserl in *Formale und transzendente Logik*, ob nicht die Logik primär auf die Sprache zu beziehen sei, wobei dann aber im Interesse der Vermeidung eines neuen Psychologismus zwischen Rede-Vorkommnis und Sprach-Schema zu unterscheiden ist. Gegen seinen Idealismus scheint Husserl dem Ansatz näher zu kommen, auf den Begriff des Ideal-Gesetzes zugunsten des Regel-Begriffs zu verzichten. Für diese grundlegende, wenn auch bloß tendenzielle Wende Husserls in der Philosophie der Logik dürfte allerdings nicht in erster Linie die Heideggersche Husserl-Kritik in den Vorlesungen eine Rolle spielen — von dieser dürfte Husserl kaum Kenntnis genommen haben —, sondern vielmehr Oskar Beckers Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Logik und Mathematik, die

⁶ Vgl. genauer: C. F. Gethmann: „Phänomenologische Logikfundierung und Protologik“.

nach Beckers eigener Aussage vor allem unter dem Eindruck des Intuitionismus Brouwers und der hermeneutischen Phänomenologie Heideggers entstanden sind.⁷

(b) Heideggers Husserl-Kritik hinsichtlich der Wahrheitskonzeption weist eine klare Parallele mit anderen grundlegenden Themen seiner Husserlkritik auf, beispielsweise mit der Kritik an der Gleichsetzung der methodischen Unterscheidung von Konstituens und Konstitutum mit der Unterscheidung von weltlosem Ich und Welt bei Husserl.⁸ Aus diesen Beispielen läßt sich eine *Generallinie der Heideggerschen Husserlkritik* abstrahieren. Danach hat Husserl jeweils unkritisch eine *methodisch* gerechtfertigte Unterscheidung mit einer durch die *ontologische* Tradition gelieferten Unterscheidung *identifiziert*, dadurch beide Unterscheidungen *konfundiert* und dadurch wiederum unnötig starke Prämissen *präsupponiert*. Indem Heidegger diese Vermengung zwischen phänomenologisch-methodisch ausgewiesener Unterscheidung und ontologischer Deutung derselben auflöst (Destruktion), wird das methodische Verfahren der Phänomenologie von unaufgedeckten Präsuppositionen gereinigt und dadurch gemäß seinem Anspruch formal und indifferent gegenüber Konstruktionen und Positionen gehalten. Damit ist auch nachvollziehbar, warum Heidegger beansprucht, die Phänomenologie als

7 O. Becker: *Mathematische Existenz*, 441–444 u. ö. — Dieses Werk erschien zuerst im selben Band des von Husserl herausgegebenen *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Bd. 8 (1927) wie *Sein und Zeit*. Diese Gleichzeitigkeit und das intensive Interesse Oskar Beckers für Heideggers philosophische Entwicklung lassen die Vermutung zu, daß die Tendenz der Heideggerschen Kritik durchaus „in der Luft“ der phänomenologischen Schuldebatte lag. Auch Ludwig Landgrebes Redaktion der Texte Husserls, die in *Erfahrung und Urteil* vorliegt, bewegt sich trotz einer auffällig an Heidegger angelehnten Diktion durchaus im Rahmen der von Husserl und in seiner Umgebung geführten Diskussion. Zu Beckers Rezeption des Logischen Intuitionismus vgl. genauer C. F. Gethmann: „Phänomenologie und logischer Intuitionismus“.

8 Vgl. C. F. Gethmann: „Heidegger und die Phänomenologie“, in diesem Band 3–48, bes. §§ 2, 3.

Methode von substanziellen Restbeständen befreit, somit ihr Fundament tiefer gelegt und ihr Programm in Richtung ihrer eigentlichen Intentionen weiterentwickelt zu haben.

Auch der Text der Marburger Vorlesung vom Sommersemester 1925 bestätigt, was die Vorlesungen der Marburger Zeit überhaupt belegen: Heidegger stellt sich selbst als Mitarbeiter am Projekt der Phänomenologie dar und entspricht insofern sicher den Erwartungen seiner Marburger Kollegen und Hörer. Dabei hat er jedoch eine „zweite Ausbildung“ im Kontrast zu Husserls „erster Ausbildung“ der Phänomenologie im Sinn (GA20 §§ 10 ff.). Schon in dieser Vorlesung vom Sommersemester 1925 wird diese neue Ausarbeitung der Phänomenologie immer wieder in Zusammenhang mit der Betonung ihres *methodischen* Charakters gebracht:

„Sonach ist Phänomenologie ein ‚methodischer‘ Titel, sofern er nur als Bezeichnung der Erfahrungs-, Erfassungs- und Bestimmungsart dessen gebraucht wird, was in der Philosophie Thema ist“ (GA20 117).

Im Einklang mit dieser allgemeinen Selbstinterpretation Heideggers im Rahmen der Phänomenologie beginnt auch die Darstellung der Wahrheitskonzeption in der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26 mit einer Aufnahme und kritischen Weiterführung des Husserlschen Ansatzes. § 6 der Vorlesung, der die Überschrift trägt „Bezeichnung und Begriff des Psychologismus“, beginnt mit einer durchaus sympathischen historischen Motivation des Husserlschen Projekts der Phänomenologie. Heidegger behandelt die Entstehung der Psychologie in der Philosophie der Neuzeit ausgehend von Descartes' Dualismus, sodann den Psychologismus des 19. Jahrhunderts bei Mill, Lipps, Sigwart, Erdmann. Gegenüber der Dissertation (FS 1–129) wird übrigens Mill in das Zentrum der psychologischen Position gerückt, während Wilhelm Wundt im Unterschied zur Dissertation keine Rolle spielt.

Im anschließenden § 7 („Husserls Kritik des Psychologismus“) stellt Heidegger Husserls zentrale Einwände gegen den Psychologismus dar, nämlich die Verfehlung des Geltungs-

anspruchs logischer Gesetzmäßigkeiten durch die Verwechslung von Denkregel und Ideal-Gesetz, sowie den Selbstwiderspruch, in den der Psychologismus als Geltungsansprüche erhebende Position gerät.

Die kritische Rekonstruktion der Husserlschen Argumentation im § 8 („Die Voraussetzungen dieser Kritik: Ein bestimmter Wahrheitsbegriff als Leitidee“) beginnt Heidegger dann allerdings mit einem starken Kritikpunkt:

„Die Verfehlung des Psychologismus konnte nur aufgewiesen und als Widersinnigkeit erwiesen werden, sofern Husserl schon im vorhinein festen Fuß gefaßt hatte in der Grundunterscheidung des Seins als Realem und Idealem“ (GA21 53 f.).

Mit dieser Feststellung stellt Heidegger Husserls gesamte Argumentation in Frage, da sie ja von einer starken, aber unangewiesenen ontologischen Prämisse lebt. Husserls Fehler liegt darin, die Unabhängigkeit des Urteilsgehalts vom Urteilsvollzug so gedeutet zu haben wie die Unabhängigkeit des Ideal-Seienden vom Real-Seienden. Dabei expliziert Heidegger den Begriff der „Idealität“ durch drei Definitionsmerkmale: die Selbstigkeit (Identität) im Unterschied zur Vielheit des Realen, die Beständigkeit (Subsistenz) im Unterschied zur Vergänglichkeit des Realen und die Allgemeinheit (Universalität) gegenüber der Einzelheit des Realen.⁹

Worin liegt Husserls, von Heidegger mit großem rhetorischen Gestus markierter Fehler¹⁰ nun genauer? Er liegt in der Konfundierung zweier jeweils für sich berechtigter Fragen: (i) Wie verhält sich das generisch Allgemeine zum Speziellen und Besonderen? (ii) Wie verhält sich der Urteilsgehalt zum Urteilsvollzug? Auf die Frage (i) antwortet die Tradition seit

9 Die spätere Metaphysik-Kritik Heideggers, wonach die Philosophie seit Platon die Wahrheit nur als Anwesenheit und Verfügbarkeit gedacht habe, ist in der Kritik an Husserls Konfusion der Unterscheidungen bereits vorgezeichnet (vgl. Anm. 11).

10 Vgl. GA21 59 ff. „grundverkehrt“, „eine Vieldeutigkeit [...], der er zum Opfer gefallen ist“, „fundamentaler Irrtum“, „Versehen“, „Verwechslung“, usw.

Platon, daß das generisch Allgemeine relativ zum Besonderen identisch, subsistent und universell ist. In diesem Sinne ist z. B. „Farbe“ identisch, subsistent und universell gegenüber „diesem Grün“. Auf Frage (ii) kann aber nicht parallel geantwortet werden. Der Gehalt des Urteils ist zwar nicht real im Sinne der Realität des Urteilsvollzuges, er kann aber auch nicht im Sinne des generisch Allgemeinen als ideal bezeichnet werden, da er durchaus nicht-identisch, nicht-subsistent und nicht-universell sein kann. Dazu braucht bloß auf die okkasionellen Urteilsgehalte hingewiesen zu werden, die Husserl bereits in den *Logischen Untersuchungen* aufgefallen waren. Heidegger faßt seine Argumentation so zusammen:

„Der Urteilsgehalt ist zwar nichts Reales und insofern ideal; aber er ist nicht ideal im Sinne der Idee, als wäre der Urteilsgehalt das Allgemeine, das *γένος*, die Gattung zu den Urteilsakten ... Zu sagen: der Urteilsgehalt ist das *γένος* zu den Akten (zu den möglichen Urteilen), ist genauso widersinnig, wie wenn man sagen wollte: Tisch überhaupt ist das Wesen und die Gattung von ‚Teekannen‘“ (GA21 61).

Die Unterscheidung von *Genus und Spezies* betrifft die Art und Weise der Beziehungen, die Prädikatoren in Prädikatorensystemen (in Systemen von Bedeutungspostulaten) untereinander haben können. Bezüglich der Prädikatorenregeln

dies ist Biene \Rightarrow dies ist Insekt
dies ist Fliege \Rightarrow dies ist Insekt

ist „Insekt“ Genus und „Biene“ bzw. „Fliege“ Spezies. Die Unterscheidung von Genus und Spezies bestimmt also die Funktion der Ausdrücke bei der Festlegung ihrer Bedeutungen, sie ist eine *semantische Beziehung*.

Demgegenüber ist die Unterscheidung von *Akt und Gehalt* eine Beziehung zwischen einem Ereignis und demjenigen Schema, als dessen Realisierung das Ereignis gedeutet wird. Sie entspricht daher der Unterscheidung zwischen dem Vorkommnis einer Handlung und dem Schema, das der Ausführung der Handlung zugrunde liegt. Diese Unterscheidung gilt unterschiedslos für „kognitive“ Handlungen wie Urteilen

und Behaupten wie auch für sonstige Handlungen. Es handelt sich daher um eine Unterscheidung zur Handlungs-Rekonstruktion, also eine *pragmatische Beziehung*. Indem Husserl die Unterscheidung von Vollzug und Gehalt mit Hilfe der Unterscheidung von Genus und Spezies expliziert, vollzieht er eine „Ontologisierung“ der Akt-Rekonstruktion, eine Semantisierung der Pragmatik. Indem Heidegger — im Gegenzug — diese Explikation als Konfusion von Unterscheidungen kritisiert, gibt er der Pragmatik in der Phänomenologie, d. h. ihrem methodischen Charakter, den Primat. Die ontologische Destruktion hat zur Folge, daß „Phänomenologie“ primär ein Methodenbegriff ist. Genau dies hält Heidegger zu Beginn des § 7 von *Sein und Zeit* Husserl entgegen (SZ 27).

Den historischen Anstoß für den bei Husserl diagnostizierten Fehler sieht Heidegger im § 9 der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26 („Die Wurzeln dieser Voraussetzung“) im durch Lotze etablierten Begriff der „Geltung“, durch den der formale „Vorbegriff“ der Wahrheit als „Bleiben — Feststehen“ präjudiziert worden sei (GA21 66). Lotzes Rezeption der Ideenlehre Platons ist also der eigentliche Zielpunkt der Heideggerschen Kritik:

„So beruht also der Irrtum Husserls, auf einen Schluß gebracht, einfach darin, daß er so vorging: *Idee gleich Geltung gleich Satz*. Das ist die erste These. Der Untersatz: *Idee gleich Allgemeines gleich Gestalt gleich Gattung*. Schluß: *Satz gleich Allgemeines, identisch mit Idee*, und daraus: *Satz gleich Gattung zu den Setzungen*“ (GA21 73).

In diesem Zusammenhang kritisiert Heidegger besonders eingehend Lotzes Gleichsetzung von Geltung mit Bejahung, Wirklichkeit und Sein. Zwanglos legen sich sofort Querverbindungen zu späteren Aussagen Heideggers nahe:

- (1) Heideggers Polemik gegen den Begriff der „Geltung“ des Urteils in § 33 von *Sein und Zeit* (SZ 155) redet keineswegs einem Relativismus der Satz Wahrheit das Wort. Heidegger bezieht sich hier nicht auf den „Geltungsanspruch“ im Sinne der „Wahrheitspräntention“, sondern kritisiert die durch Lotzes Analyse des Geltungsbegriffs in die Debatte

gebrachte — wie Heidegger sich hier ausdrückt — „ontologische Ungeklärtheit“.

- (2) Heideggers Kritik des Primats der Anwesenheit (der Idee), der seit Platon bestimmend sei, läßt sich unschwer in Lotzes Interpretation der Ideenlehre Platons festmachen. Heideggers Konzeption einer temporalen Interpretation des Seinsbegriffs in der Absicht, diesen vom Primat des Präsens zu lösen, ist daher sehr stark bestimmt durch Lotzes Geltungsbegriff und Husserls Rezeption desselben.
- (3) Heideggers spätere Deutung dieses Wahrheits- und Seinsverständnisses als eines über dem Abendland lastenden Geschicks ist eine zur geschichtsphilosophischen Generalität hochstilisierte Lotze-Kritik.¹¹

Gegen Husserls Rückgriff auf Lotzes Geltungsbegriff stellt Heidegger im § 10 der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26 („Antikritische Fragen ...“) die Besinnung auf das Gründungsprogramm der Phänomenologie bei Brentano und, durch Vermittlung Brentanos, auf Aristoteles. Brentanos Einsicht in das Wesen des „Psychischen als Intentionalität“ betrachtet diese gerade nicht als eine Beziehung zwischen zwei Seins-Regionen, der realen und der idealen. Vielmehr — so Heidegger — ist das Psychische nach Brentano ein Sich-richten-auf-etwas, und nur als dieses ganze Sich-richten-auf-etwas ist es real. Es entsteht daher nicht das Problem, wie sich etwas Reales auf etwas Nicht-Reales beziehen kann. Die Bezogenheit auf etwas gehört zur Definition des Aktes und ist nicht ein zusätzlich aufgeworfenes Explanandum. Die Intentiona-

11 Damit wird auch ein bezeichnendes Licht auf die Kontinuität zwischen „frühem“ und „spätem“ Heidegger (z. B. in seiner Schrift über *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (PH 5–52)) geworfen: Einerseits hat die Kritik an der These vom Sein als Anwesen und die Diagnose der „Seinsvergessenheit“ in Husserls Unterscheidung zwischen idealer und realer Sphäre einen legitimen Ort, andererseits zeigt sich darin auch die philosophiehistorische Beschränktheit der generalisierten Kritik an der „Metaphysik“.

lität bezeichnet nicht das Verhältnis zwischen zwei Sphären, sondern *eine* Beziehung.

Da der Akt schon immer auf ein „Gehabtes“ bezogen ist, ist nach der primären Weise des Habens zu fragen. Dieses ist nach Husserl die Anschauung, d. h. das Haben des Seienden in seiner Leibhaftigkeit. Nur durch die Anschauung kann die Präntention eines intentionalen Bezuges ihre „Ausweisung“ finden. Dieses auf einer Analyse der Intentionalität beruhende Verhältnis von Anschauung und Ausweisung ist der Hintergrund von Heideggers Diktum von der Wahrheit als Entdeckend-sein. Diese These ist nichts anderes als eine Neuformulierung der Husserlschen Lehre von Ausweisung und Bewährung, wie der § 44 a von *Sein und Zeit* eindeutig hervorhebt.¹² Ebenso unterstreicht auch die Vorlesung die Husserlsche Wahrheitskonzeption in diesem Punkt:

„Anschauung gibt die Fülle, im Unterschied zur Leere des bloßen Vorstellens und überhaupt nur Meinens“ (GA21 105).
 „Im Ausweisen werden Leervorgestelltes und Angeschautes zur Deckung gebracht“ (GA21 107).
 „Wahrheit ist die Selbigkeit des Gemeinten und Angeschauten“ (GA21 109).

Nach § 10 der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26 kann somit kein Zweifel sein, daß sich Heidegger grundsätzlich Husserls Wahrheitskonzeption anschließt, allerdings abzüglich ihrer ontologischen „Erschleichung“. Es ist aber Heidegger selbst, der in Husserls Wahrheitskonzeption eine offene Frage sieht, deren Beantwortung er nur durch Rekurs auf Aristoteles für möglich hält, nämlich die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von der von Husserl explizierten Anschauungswahrheit zur Satz Wahrheit. Gerade dadurch anerkennt Hei-

12 Vgl. SZ 218, Anm. 1, wo Heidegger Husserls Idee der „Ausweisung“ herausstellt und die Husserl-Rezeption darin kritisiert, daß sie lediglich den Zusammenhang der phänomenologischen Wahrheitskonzeption mit der Satzlehre Bolzanos beachte. Demgegenüber stellt Heidegger vor allem die VI. Untersuchung von Band II/2 der *Logischen Untersuchungen*, insbesondere die Paragraphen über „Evidenz und Wahrheit“, heraus.

degger Tugendhats Forderung, daß jede Wahrheitskonzeption eine Erklärung der Aussagewahrheit liefern muß. Während jedoch Tugendhat Husserl in diesem Punkte für unverdächtig hält, hat gerade Heidegger darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß Husserl die Frage nach der Genesis der Aussagewahrheit nicht beantwortet. Gerade Husserl hat — so Heideggers Kritik — das von Tugendhat sogenannte „spezifische Wahrheitsphänomen“ nicht zufriedenstellend behandelt. Selbstverständlich hat Husserl geltend gemacht, daß die Satz Wahrheit eine gegenüber der Anschauungswahrheit abgeleitete Wahrheit ist. Für Heidegger bleibt jedoch offen, wie dieses Ableitungsverhältnis zu verstehen und was dabei mit „Anschauung“ genauer gemeint ist.

2. Dienlichkeit als Ausweis der Erschlossenheit.

Heideggers Pragmatismus in der Frage der Wahrheitskriterien

In der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26 behandelt Heidegger seine eigene Wahrheitskonzeption — ausgehend von Aristoteles — in den Paragraphen 12 bis 14, einem Textstück von ca. 68 Druckseiten. Inhaltlich entsprechen diesem Text die Paragraphen 44 b und c von *Sein und Zeit*, einem Textstück von ca. 11 Druckseiten Umfang. Ähnlich wie bei den oben (1.) erwähnten Textverhältnissen ist der Text der Vorlesung nicht nur ausführlicher, sondern auch in seinem inneren Aufbau und in seiner argumentativen Struktur ungleich durchsichtiger als die entsprechenden Textteile von *Sein und Zeit*. Insbesondere der § 44 c entbehrt jeder klaren Struktur, enthält zudem zahlreiche Wiederholungen zu § 44 a, läßt eine kohärente Wahrheitskonzeption nur erahnen.

Heidegger stellt sich am Beginn des § 11 der Vorlesung ausdrücklich die Aufgabe, die Aussagewahrheit, wie sie von Aristoteles expliziert wird, mit der „pragmatischen“ Grundstruktur in Zusammenhang zu bringen, welche als „erfüllende“ Anschauung gemäß Husserl der Aussage vorausliegen

soll. Das Projekt, das Heidegger verfolgt, besteht also darin, die Wahrheit/Falschheit der Aussage im Sinne der aristotelischen Urteilslogik in einem Phänomen primärer Anschauung zu fundieren. Den Ansatz dazu findet Heidegger in der aristotelischen Einsicht, daß die logische Struktur der Aussage eine aus einem Verbinden und Trennen hervorgehende Grundstruktur aufweist. Dieses Verbinden und Trennen vereinigt Heidegger unter dem Begriff der „Als-Struktur“. Das *Ergebnis* von Heideggers Überlegungen besteht darin, daß die Als-Struktur des Urteils (apophantisches Als) in einer tiefer liegenden Struktur der Auslegung (hermeneutisches Als) fundiert ist. Dieses Lehrstück, das Heidegger im § 12 der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26 entfaltet, ist hier unmittelbar im Zusammenhang mit der Beantwortung der Wahrheitsfrage konzipiert, während dieser Zusammenhang in *Sein und Zeit* (§ 33) gelöst scheint. Im § 44 b von *Sein und Zeit* verweist Heidegger jedoch auf den § 33 und macht den Zusammenhang wie folgt deutlich:

„Die Aussage und ihre Struktur, das apophantische Als, sind in der Auslegung und deren Struktur, dem hermeneutischen Als, und weiterhin im Verstehen, der Erschlossenheit des Daseins, fundiert. [...] Demnach reichen die Wurzeln der Aussagewahrheit in die Erschlossenheit des Verstehens zurück“ (SZ 223).

Der Vergleich zwischen dem § 12 der Vorlesung und den §§ 33 und 44 von *Sein und Zeit* zeigt, daß die systematische Konzeption in *Sein und Zeit* unverändert ist: Das Phänomen der Aussagewahrheit ist für Heidegger auf dem Hintergrund des Husserlschen Ansatzes das eigentliche Explanandum. Während Heidegger die allgemeine Vorstellung einer Fundierung der Wahrheit der Aussage in einer Vorstruktur mit Husserl teilt, rekonstruiert er diese Vorstruktur als *Auslegung* in deutlicher Absetzung zu Husserls *Anschauung*. Ausgangspunkt für die Bestimmung der Auslegung als Vorstruktur der Aussage ist das Seiende im „Wozu seiner Dienlichkeit“ (GA21 144). Der „Gebrauch“ des Seienden hat einen Primat vor jeder theoretischen Beziehung. Obwohl auch in *Sein und Zeit*

mit dem Begriff des „umsichtigen Umgangs“ (SZ 66 ff.) ein deutlicher Instrumentalismus markiert ist, wird dieser in der Vorlesung besonders drastisch hervorgehoben und von Husserls kontemplationistischem Modell des An-Schauens abgegrenzt:

„[...] daß ein sogenanntes, schlichtes Da-haben und Erfassen wie: diese Kreide hier, die Tafel, die Tür, strukturmäßig gesehen gar nicht ein direktes Erfassen von etwas ist, daß ich, strukturmäßig genommen, nicht direkt auf das schlicht Genommene zugehe, sondern ich erfasse es so, daß ich es gleichsam im vorhinein schon umgangen habe, ich verstehe es von dem her, wozu es dient“ (GA21 146 f.).¹³

Wie Husserls Begriff der Anschauung, so soll auch Heideggers Begriff der Auslegung die Antwort auf das Problem der *Ausweisung* indizieren. Die Ausweisung ist jedoch — so Heideggers Korrektur an Husserl — kein Akt des Schauens, sondern ein Akt des Sich-Verstehens-auf-etwas; die Ausweisung wird nicht am Modell optischer, sondern haptischer Erfahrungskontexte konzipiert. Der Kontext der Bewährung ist nicht mehr der der distanzierten Inblicknahme, sondern die Handlungssicherung im Rahmen geübten Umgangs. Für Heidegger ist daher der Übergang vom fundierenden Modus der Anschauung zum fundierten Modus der Aussagewahrheit umzuinterpretieren als „Umschlag vom umsichtigen Besorgen zum theoretischen Entdecken“ (SZ 360). Dieser Umschlag ist das entscheidende Moment der „ontologischen Genesis“ der Aussage, die Heidegger Husserls „Genealogie der Logik“ entgegenstellt. Diese ontologische Genesis verläuft — wie bei Heidegger allgemein — als methodische Bewegung von einem eminenten zu einem defizienten Modus. Der eminente Modus ist der umsichtige Umgang selbst, wobei die Umsicht dasjenige Moment bezeichnet, durch das der Umgang sich selbst hinsichtlich der Zweck-Mittel-Organisation des Lebens transparent ist. Diese primäre Erschlossenheit vor einzelnen kognitiven und non-kognitiven Akten bezeichnet Heidegger als „Verstehen“.

¹³ Vgl. den Paralleltext SZ 149.

Gegenüber dem Verstehen bezeichnet die „Auslegung“ den intentionalen und thematischen Akt der Selbstexplikation.¹⁴ Erst aufgrund der Auslegung gibt es sprachliche Ausdrücklichkeit. Die Auslegung artikuliert die vorprädikativen operativen Evidenzen des umsichtigen Umgangs in Ausdrücklichkeit. Dies ist nur möglich – so argumentiert Heidegger –, wenn diese primären Evidenzen bereits durch eine Als-Struktur gekennzeichnet sind. Damit setzt Heidegger sich vom Gedanken der Einfachheit und Schlichtheit der primären Anschauung Husserls ab. Die Doppelstruktur des primären Als macht es möglich, daß der Mensch im Umgang mit den Dingen diese als ein „Etwas als zum (Handlungsprädikator)“ unterstellt.

Gegenüber der Auslegung ist die „Aussage“ ein Akt, der dadurch entsteht, daß von der Zweck-Mittel-Einbettung abgesehen wird, welche die Auslegung zum Thema hat. Der defiziente Modus der Aussage gegenüber der Auslegung liegt also in der Abgehobenheit der Aussage vom unmittelbaren situativen Kontext. Auf diese Weise entsteht die Struktur der logischen Elementarsätze; das „apophantische Als“ ist im „hermeneutischen Als“ genetisch-methodisch fundiert.¹⁵

Tugendhats „Minimalbedingung“ jeder Wahrheitskonzeption, daß nämlich der Wahrheitsbegriff auf die Aussagewahrheit „paßt“¹⁶, ist bei Heidegger offenkundig ohne weiteres erfüllt. Die Frage nach dem fundierenden Modus der Wahrheit/Falschheit der Aussage kann ja nur sinnvoll gestellt werden, wenn der Wahrheitsbegriff auf die Aussage bezogen werden kann. Wie steht es dann aber mit der definitionsartigen Wen-

14 Diese Selbstexplikation ist es, die Heidegger in der Vorlesung vom SS 1923 als „Hermeneutik“ bezeichnet, also nicht eine Lehre von der Auslegung, erst recht nicht eine Lehre von der Text-Auslegung (GA63 §§ 2, 3).

15 Zur ontologischen Genesis der Aussage aus der Auslegung vgl. genauer C. F. Gethmann: ‚Der existenziale Begriff der Wissenschaft‘, in diesem Band 169–206.

16 E. Tugendhat: *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 331.

dung vom Entdeckend-sein der Aussage, in welcher scheinbar die Aussagewahrheit verschwunden ist?

Nach Tugendhat führt Heideggers Darstellung in *Sein und Zeit* zu der Festlegung: „Eine Aussage ist wahr, wenn sie das Seiende entdeckt, und sie ist falsch, wenn sie es verdeckt.“¹⁷ Durch diese Bestimmung verzichte Heidegger auf die Vorstellung, daß jede Wahrheitsprätention einer Rechtfertigung bedürfe. Somit weiche Heidegger radikal von der traditionellen Wahrheitsidee ab.

Das Gegenteil ist jedoch der Fall. Heidegger hält ausdrücklich daran fest, daß die Wahrheitsprätention der Aussage einer „Ausweisung“ bedarf:

„Obzwar also Kenntnis und Rede etwas mitteilt oder ohne Mitteilung meint, so ist sie doch eigentlich, was sie ist, nur daraus, worin sie ihre Rechtmäßigkeit ausweist und zeigt, daß sie mit Recht sagt, was sie sagt. Mit Recht – wenn sie *so* sagt, *wie* die Sache sich verhält. Sofern aber die Sache, wovon ich Kenntnis habe und worüber ich rede, nicht notwendig und ständig unmittelbar anwesend ist, bzw. ich selbst nicht bei der Sache selbst bin, bedarf unsere Kenntnis und Rede in weitem Ausmaß letztlich immer der Ausweisung [...]“ (GA21 105).

Allerdings kritisiert Heidegger Husserls Konzeption, wonach die Ausweisung sich durch Anschauung erfüllt. Heidegger hält an der Konzeption der „Ausweisung“ fest, er modifiziert jedoch die Idee der primären Anschauung von einem Kontemplationismus der Sinnesorgane hin zu einem Instrumentalismus der Werkwelt. Entsprechend wird das Verhältnis der Adäquation, das bereits Husserl als ein „So-Wie-Verhältnis“ dargestellt hat, bei Heidegger interpretiert. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch im Text von *Sein und Zeit* deutlich, daß Ausweisung und Entdeckung keineswegs einen Gegensatz darstellen:

„Zur Ausweisung steht einzig das Entdeckt-sein des Seienden selbst, *es* im Wie seiner Entdecktheit. Diese bewährt sich darin, daß sich das Ausgesagte, das ist das Seiende selbst, *als dasselbe* zeigt. *Bewährung* bedeutet: *sich zeigen des Seienden in Selbigkeit*“ (SZ 218).

17 Ebd. 333.

Allerdings wird der Zusammenhang von Ausweisung und Entdeckung nur verständlich, wenn man berücksichtigt, daß Heidegger mehr implizit als explizit einen fundamentalen *Wechsel des Wahrheitsmodells* vollzieht. Dabei wird deutlich, daß der Begriff der „Übereinstimmung“ bzw. des „So-Wie-Verhältnisses“ in beiden hier relevanten Wahrheitsmodellen eine Rolle spielt und daß diesen Begriffen somit eine tiefe Ambiguität anhaftet.

Nach dem „*propositionalen Wahrheitsmodell*“ sind die Prädikatore „wahr“ und „falsch“ Attribute von Sätzen, Behauptungen, Urteilen, Aussagen o. ä. Dies bedeutet, daß die Behauptung „p ist wahr“ dieselbe Struktur hat wie die Behauptung „dieser Tisch ist rot“. Entsprechend ergibt sich auch prinzipiell dieselbe Begründungsverpflichtung. Näherhin liegt die Übereinstimmung im Falle der wahren Aussage darin, daß die Aussage die Eigenschaft aufweist, mit etwas anderem in Beziehung zu stehen. Die Übereinstimmung ist dabei strukturell so gedacht, wie man beispielsweise sagt, daß ein Foto mit der unmittelbaren Anschauung eines Menschen „übereinstimmt“. Letztlich steht hinter diesem Modell die Vorstellung einer Urbild-Abbild-Beziehung.

Demgegenüber wird im „*operationalen Wahrheitsmodell*“ „wahr“ bzw. „falsch“ dann prädiziert, wenn eine Absicht ihre Realisierung, eine Aufgabe ihre Lösung gefunden hat. Die „Übereinstimmung“ bezeichnet ein Passungsverhältnis zwischen einem Plan und seiner Erfüllung. Husserls Wahrheitsbegriff liegt bereits in seiner Grundvorstellung auf dieser Linie. Die Termini „Leerintention“ und „Erfüllungsintention“ sind hinreichend deutlich: Die Erfüllung ist gewissermaßen der kognitive Erfolg einer in einer leeren Intention eingebauten Erwartung. Indem Heidegger auf diesen operativen Gebrauch Bezug nimmt, verstärkt er einen pragmatischen Grundzug, den Husserl in seiner Wahrheitskonzeption bereits angelegt hat. Indem er darüber hinaus den Mentalismus durch sprachpragmatische Ansätze überwindet und zudem nicht optische, sondern haptische Basishandlungen an den Anfang

stellt, verschärft er die bei Husserl zu findenden pragmatischen Tendenzen zu einem *konsequenten Pragmatismus*.

Nach dem operationalen Wahrheitsmodell verhält sich die Wahrheit nicht zur Aussage wie die Rote zum Tisch, sondern wie der Schlüssel zum Schloß. Übereinstimmung ist nicht die des Fotos mit dem Original, sondern die des Schlüssels zum Schloß. Ob der Schlüssel mit dem Schloß „übereinstimmt“, zeigt sich im Schließen, also in seinem Gebrauch, nicht im Reden über ihn. Für das operationale Wahrheitsmodell ist „Wahrheit“ eine Erfolgskategorie. Mit der Auffassung, daß die „Dienlichkeit“ das Kriterium der Wahrheit bildet, führt Heidegger somit die in dem Begriffspaar von Intention und Erfüllung liegenden pragmatischen Tendenzen radikal zu Ende. Die Wahrheit erfüllt eine Intention, wie eine Lösung eine Aufgabe erfüllt.

Die Verwendung der Prädikatore „wahr“ bzw. „falsch“ ist in beiden Wahrheitsmodellen trotz oberflächlicher Ähnlichkeiten strukturell grundverschieden. Nach dem propositionalen Wahrheitsmodell ist die Aussage selbst ein Relatum der Übereinstimmungsbeziehung, weshalb das Modell angemessen als „propositional“ bezeichnet wird. Nach dem operationalen Wahrheitsmodell besteht die Übereinstimmungsbeziehung zwischen Aufgabe und Lösung, Plan und Erfüllung; somit also zwischen zwei Sachverhalten, wobei ein Relatum Produkt einer Handlung ist (daher „operational“). Die Aussage ist danach selbst nicht ein Relatum in der Übereinstimmungsbeziehung, sondern von dieser abgeleitet. Die Aussage ist nur im abgeleiteten Sinne wahr bzw. falsch, die Wahrheit, die sie ausdrückt, liegt ihr voraus. Somit ist nach dem operationalen Wahrheitsmodell die Aussage dem eigentlichen Wahrheitsgeschehen („daß der Schlüssel paßt“) äußerlich, Wahrheit liegt auch vor, wenn sie gar nicht ausgesagt wird.

Das hermeneutische Als drückt das vorsprachliche Passen einer Handlung zu einer Handlungsaufgabe aus, also die im Handeln mitgesetzte Unterstellung, daß die Situation eine Aufgabe darstellt, die zu lösen ist. Somit geht es allgemein um

das Passen der Mittel zu einem unterstellten (selbst nicht thematisierten) Zweck. Das Wahrheitskriterium ist der Handlungserfolg. Demgegenüber drückt das apophantische Als die situationsdistanzierte Feststellung aus, daß es sich mit der Situation, also mit der Lösung der Aufgabe entsprechend verhält: Die Aussage ist wahr, wenn in der zugrundeliegenden Situation die Mittel den Zweck wirklich erfüllen. Auf diese Weise ist ohne weiteres nachvollziehbar, daß Heidegger vom Wahrsein der Aussage spricht, die Ausweisung der Wahrheit aber im Entdeckend-sein relativ zu einem tiefer liegenden Wahrheitsgeschehen sieht.

Mit Blick auf Tugendhat ist im einzelnen noch folgendes anzumerken:

(a) Tugendhat geht bei allen Überlegungen vom propositionalen Wahrheitsmodell aus.¹⁸ Es wurde bereits herausgestellt, daß Tugendhat damit auch eine schon bei Husserl liegende Grundtendenz verkennt, wenn diese sich auch bei Husserl noch nicht eindeutig Bahn bricht. Heideggers Pragmatismus wird dagegen von Tugendhat völlig verfehlt. Die Ursache dafür liegt darin, daß Tugendhat über seine „Minimalbedingung“ hinaus, nach der eine Wahrheitstheorie auch noch eine Theorie der Aussagewahrheit liefern muß, jede Wahrheitstheorie auf das propositionale Wahrheitsmodell verpflichtet. Bemerkenswert ist, daß Tugendhat in einem eigenen Abschnitt den „potentiellen Gewinn“ formuliert, den Heidegger aus seinem Ansatz hätte beziehen können.¹⁹ Dieser läge nach Tugendhat in einer Konzeption, gemäß der die Wahrheit der Aussage ihr Entdeckend-sein aufgrund einer Ausweisung ist. Das Entdeckend-sein bezieht sich immer auf das Seiende, so wie es ist. Somit entdeckt nach Heideggers Ausführungen die

18 Vgl. schon E. Tugendhat: 'Tarskis semantische Definition der Wahrheit', ferner ders.: *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, 15., 16., 26., 27. Vorlesung; allerdings gehen in Tugendhats Wahrheitskonzeption auch pragmatische Elemente ein – eine systematische Behandlung muß einer anderen Arbeit vorbehalten bleiben.

19 E. Tugendhat: *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 337–345.

Aussage das Seiende, so wie es ist, genau dann, wenn die Aussage aufgrund eines Verfahrens der Ausweisung gewonnen wurde; die Wahrheit ist der Schlußstein eines Verfahrens der Ausweisung; und dies ist der Fall, wenn die entsprechende Aussage in einen Handlungskontext paßt wie der Schlüssel zum Schloß.²⁰ Tugendhat gesteht zudem *en passant* zu, daß man einer solchen Auffassung nahekäme, wenn man den § 33 von *Sein und Zeit* hinzuzöge.²¹ Gerade diese Querverbindung stellt jedoch Heidegger selbst her²², wenn auch der textliche Zusammenhang nicht so deutlich ist wie in der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26. Erst wenn man nämlich zur Heideggerschen Wahrheitskonzeption die Ausführungen des § 33 von *Sein und Zeit* heranzieht, nach denen die Aussage ein defizienter Modus der Auslegung ist, hat man die methodische Genesis von Heideggers Konzeption der Aussagewahrheit erfaßt.

(b) Heideggers Begriff der *Erschlossenheit* liegt die ‚Schließ‘-Metaphorik zugrunde, zu der auch das Bild vom „Passen“ des Schlüssels zum Schloß gehört. Mit der Erschlossenheit meint Heidegger eine apriorische Struktur, dergemäß zwischen Mensch und Welt eine apriorische Passung wie zwischen Schlüssel und Schloß besteht. Der Wahrheitsbezug der Aussage kann nur hergestellt oder verfehlt werden auf Basis und im Rahmen dieser apriorischen Passung. Systemmorphologisch spielt die Erschlossenheit dieselbe Rolle wie die *veritas transcendentalis* bei Thomas von Aquin. Heidegger bezieht sich daher auch ausdrücklich auf diese Tradition.²³ Heidegger gibt allerdings keine „Theorie“ dieser Passung, wie sie in unterschiedlicher Weise z. B. durch die Schöpfungsmetaphysik

20 Es ist auffällig, daß Tugendhat in seinen systematischen Arbeiten gerade das „Ausweisungssprachspiel“ heranzieht, um den Wahrheitsbegriff zu explizieren; vgl. die *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, 115 f. sowie die in Anm. 18 genannten Vorlesungen.

21 E. Tugendhat: *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 337.

22 Vgl. SZ 223 und ebd., Anm. 2.

23 Vgl. SZ 38. – Vgl. dazu ausführlicher C. F. Gethmann: ‚Zum Wahrheitsbegriff‘, in diesem Band 121–128.

oder die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie angeboten wird, weil eine solche Theorie bereits von einer regionalen Ontologie und somit von einer ausgeführten Fundamentalontologie abhängen würde.

(c) Es ist ohne weiteres zuzugestehen, daß der Begriff der *Ausweisung* bei Husserl keine und bei Heidegger erst eine tendenzielle Bezugnahme auf den Gedanken der intersubjektiven Verbindlichkeit z. B. von Behauptungen erkennen läßt. Bekanntlich spielt die Idee des Geltungsausweises im Sinne der Einlösung intersubjektiver Geltungsansprüche bei Husserl noch keine Rolle.²⁴ Das Evidenzbewußtsein ist im Individuum gegeben, ohne daß schon eine Intersubjektivität konstituiert wäre. Allerdings lassen sich bei Heidegger Ansatzpunkte ausmachen, die es erlauben, der Idee des „Ausweisens“ mit der Ablösung von dem Gedanken der Anschauung durch Sinnesorgane und der pragmatischen Einbettung in das Bewährungssystem einer Werkwelt eine intersubjektive Interpretation zu geben. Durch das Verfahren der Ausweisung ist die Wahrheit der Aussage bei Heidegger nämlich bereits auf ein intersubjektives *Telos* bezogen. Während bei Husserl der Gegenstandsbezug der Aussage auch schon ihre Wahrheitsfähigkeit ausmacht (er erfüllt sich auch im *solus ipse*), wird die Ausweisung der Wahrheitsprätention bei Heidegger auf den möglichen Nachvollzug durch andere bezogen. Entsprechend unterstreicht Heidegger im § 33 von *Sein und Zeit*, daß die Bedeutung von „Aussage“ als „Mitteilung“ in direktem Bezug zur „Aussage“ als „Aufzeigung“ und „Prädikation“ steht:

„Sie ist Mitsehenlassen des in der Weise des Bestimmens Aufgezeigten. Das Mitsehenlassen teilt das in seiner Bestimmtheit aufgezeigte Seiende mit dem Anderen“ (SZ 155).

Dies ist selbstverständlich noch keine Konsensstheorie der Wahrheit, aber die Nachvollziehbarkeit durch andere ist der

Wahrheit der Aussage nach Heidegger nicht nur äußerlich (wie dies bei Husserls Evidenzkonzeption der Fall ist), sondern ein wesentliches Moment.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist daran zu erinnern, daß Heideggers Intersubjektivitätskonzeption keine Kulturkritik des „Man“ ist, welcher man wiederum entgegenhalten könnte, daß sie die qualifizierten zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen übergehe. Das „Man“ bezeichnet die indifferente Intersubjektivität, das nicht weiter qualifizierte Wir, das bei Heidegger an die Stelle des indifferents Ich der egologischen Transzendentalphilosophie tritt.²⁵

(d) Tugendhat sieht sowohl bei Husserl wie bei Heidegger den *Zirkel*, daß eine Übereinstimmungsrelation konstatiert werden soll, wobei das eine Relat („Sachverhalt“) erst durch das andere („Aussage“) konstituiert wird.²⁶ Tugendhat sieht hier die Probleme des produktiven Idealismus auf die phänomenologische Wahrheitskonzeption zukommen. Auf der Basis der hier vorgelegten Rekonstruktion der Heideggerschen Position ergibt sich dieses Problem nicht. Die Aussage im Sinne des apophantischen Als steht in einer Beziehung zum primären Handlungskontext, der diesem äußerlich ist; die Aussage konstituiert nicht diesen primären Handlungskontext. Im Handlungskontext ist die Situation aber mitkonstituiert durch die Handlung selbst, das heißt, das Wahrheitsgeschehen auf der Ebene des hermeneutischen Als ist nicht eine Beziehung zwischen zwei logisch unabhängigen Relaten. Somit gibt es nach Heidegger auf der Ebene des hermeneutischen Als weder Irrtum noch Falschheit, jedoch gibt es Falschheit selbstverständlich auf der Ebene der Aussage. Damit ist zugleich absehbar, daß das Problem der Möglichkeit von Falschheit für Heidegger an die erste Stelle rückt.

24 In diesem Zusammenhang geht auch Tugendhats Gedanke des „Ausweisungssprachspiels“ (vgl. Anm. 20) zu Recht über die phänomenologischen Ansätze hinaus.

25 Vgl. ausführlicher C. F. Gethmann: „Heidegger und die Phänomenologie“, § 3 (besonders 30 f.).

26 E. Tugendhat: *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 343 u. ö.

3. Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Falschheit. Die Unvollständigkeit von Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption

Die Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Falschheit ist die Schlußfrage von Heideggers Wahrheitstraktat in der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26. Der einschlägige § 13 der Vorlesung trägt die Überschrift „Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des *λόγος*, falsch zu sein. Die Wahrheitsfrage“. Heidegger entwickelt seine Position dabei in engem Bezug zu Aristoteles.²⁷ Die Bedeutung dieses Paragraphen mit Blick auf *Sein und Zeit* geht schon daraus hervor, daß es für ihn in *Sein und Zeit* keine klare Textentsprechung gibt.

Die nächstliegende Frage, die sich angesichts dieses Paragraphen stellt, liegt auf der Hand: Aus welchem Grunde hat die Erklärung der Falschheit der Aussage einen Vorrang vor der Erklärung der Wahrheit der Aussage? Offenkundig ist für Heidegger die Falschheit das eigentliche Explanandum, so daß sich nach Beantwortung dieser Frage das Problem der Wahrheit der Aussage erledigt. Dazu muß an den pragmatischen Grundzug des Heideggerschen Ansatzes erinnert werden. Der Mensch ist im Rahmen des umsichtigen Umgangs in eine Welt des Gelingens und Mißlingens, der „Dienlichkeit“ eingebettet. Vor jeder artikulierten Aussage ist diese Welt bereits als Zweck-Mittel-Konstellation im Umgang durch die Umsicht erschlossen. Die auf dieser Erschlossenheit beruhenden wahren Aussagen ergeben sich als ausdrückliche Artikulationen dessen, worauf wir uns aufgrund der Erschlossenheit sowieso verstehen. Sieht man einmal von der Redehandlung der Lüge ab, dann bleibt aber die Frage, wie überhaupt falsche Aussagen möglich sind. Scheinbar besteht doch zwischen der operativen Erschlossenheit und der Artikulation dieses Sachverhalts eine direkte Verbindung, so daß unvorstellbar ist, warum die ausdrückliche Artikulation dieser mißlingen könnte.

27 Besonders Met Γ, E 4 und De Int I.

Auf diese Frage gibt es zunächst eine triviale Antwort: Daß dem Dasein eine Welt a priori erschlossen ist, bedeutet nicht, daß ihm jede mögliche Konstellation von Welt erschlossen ist. Mit vielem, was denkbar wäre, sind die Menschen im Rahmen der alltäglichen Werkwelt nicht befaßt, vieles erschließt sich erst im Laufe der Zeit. Was uns nicht erschlossen ist, ist uns verschlossen. Aufgrund der Endlichkeit des Menschen ist ihm vieles verschlossen; somit ist für ihn ein Wandel der Erschlossenheit und Verschlossenheit spezifisch.

Als Exempel für diesen Wandel wählt Heidegger bewußt den Fall derjenigen kognitiven Größen, die für den Platonismus der Geltung gerade die prominentesten Beispiele für die „Ewigkeit“ der Wahrheit sind, nämlich die Naturgesetze und die Gesetze der Logik (SZ 226 f.).

Heideggers Diktum, daß die Gesetze Newtons nur solange wahr sind, „als Dasein ist“, ergibt sich zwanglos aus dem operativen Wahrheitsmodell. Ist ein Relatum der Wahrheitsbeziehung das menschliche Handeln, dann kann die Beziehung nicht bestehen, ohne daß faktische Menschen sie realisieren. Vor Newton können somit die Gesetze Newtons nicht wahr gewesen sein. Dies schließt übrigens nicht aus, daß das Seiende, über das die Gesetze Newtons reden, nicht so sein könnte, daß die Gesetze Newtons auch schon vor Newton hätten erkannt werden können. Tugendhat betrachtet jedoch Heideggers Aussage bezüglich der Gesetze Newtons als Beleg für einen unverständlichen Relativismus. Durch ihn werde die Wahrheit an das faktische Angenommen-Werden der Wahrheit durch Menschen gebunden.²⁸ Tatsächlich ist diese Kritik an Heidegger lediglich ein Indiz dafür, daß Tugendhat die tiefgreifende Differenz zwischen dem propositionalen und operationalen Wahrheitsmodell nicht berücksichtigt bzw. nicht auf die Interpretation des Heideggerschen Textes bezogen hat.²⁹ Dieser Vorwurf kann am besten durch die „Ge-

28 E. Tugendhat: *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 334.

29 Vgl. C. F. Gethmann: „Zum Wahrheitsbegriff“, in diesem Band 115–136, § 3.

genprobe“ belegt werden, indem nämlich gefragt wird, was derjenige unterstellt, der meint, die Gesetze Newtons seien auch schon vor Newton wahr gewesen. Er unterstellt, daß zwischen Aussage und Sachverhalt eine Relation besteht, unabhängig davon, ob ein Mensch sie vollzieht. Somit gibt es Aussagen, die existieren, ohne daß sie ausgesagt werden. Folglich ist zwischen Aussagevollzug und „Aussage an sich“ zu unterscheiden; dieser Unterschied ist in der Geschichte der Philosophie mit verschiedenen Termini charakterisiert worden, wie „Idee“, „Geltung“, „Aussage in specie“. In jedem Falle wird der Wahrheit ein präexistenter Status zugeschrieben, so, wie Heidegger ihn im Zusammenhang mit Lotzes Geltungsbegriff vorfindet. Wahrheit wird — wie oben (1.) dargestellt — als identisch, subsistent und universell, mit Heidegger als „beständige Anwesenheit“ verstanden.

Im Rahmen eines operationalen Wahrheitsmodells ist Heideggers Diktum von den Gesetzen Newtons dagegen trivial, weil die „Passung“, die der Artikulation der Wahrheit in der Aussage zugrunde liegt, an eine aufgabenstellende Umgebung gebunden ist. Eine Lösung ist als solche nicht existent, bevor nicht die Aufgabe gestellt ist. Die Gesetze Newtons sind so wenig vor Newton wahr, wie die Indische Partie eine gute Eröffnung vor Erfindung des Schachspiels war. Dies schließt nicht aus, daß es auch vor der Erfindung der Indischen Partie das Schachspiel gab und daß es auch vor Erfindung des Schachspiels Holz gab, aus dem man Schachfiguren hätte schnitzen können. Zusammenfassend kann man bezüglich des Problems der Gesetze Newtons also sagen, daß sich die dazu möglichen zwei Positionen deduktiv aus dem propositionalen bzw. operationalen Ansatz ergeben. Die Frage fällt somit auf die Diskussion dieser Grundmodelle zurück. Im Rahmen eines operationalen Wahrheitsmodells ist jedenfalls ohne zwingende relativistische Konsequenzen formulierbar, daß die Aussagewahrheit im Zuge des Entdeckungsgeschehens „entsteht“.

Allerdings ist damit die Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Aussagefalschheit, sieht man vom Entstehen

und Vergehen von Erschlossenheiten ab, nicht beantwortet. Heidegger gibt im § 13 c der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1925/26 eine dreifache Antwort, die über den Hinweis bezüglich der Gesetze Newtons weit hinausgeht. Diese Antwort besteht im Aufweis von *drei Strukturbedingungen der Falschheit*, die abschließend im einzelnen untersucht werden sollen.

1. Strukturbedingung:

„Die Tendenz zur Entdeckung von etwas — das vorgängige Meinen und Haben des Worüber“ (GA21 187).

Offensichtlich greift Heidegger hier Husserls Gedanken der dem Wahrheitsgeschehen vorausliegenden Leerintention auf. Allerdings gibt Heidegger diesem Gedanken eine affirmative Uminterpretation, die aufgrund eines „switch“ des Gedankens der Leere möglich ist. Während Husserl durch die Vorstellung der Leere die Abwesenheit der Erfüllung akzentuiert, stellt Heidegger die Antizipation des Woraufhin der Intention heraus. Ohne ein vorgängiges, vermeintliches Haben des Woraufhin gibt es weder Erfüllung noch Enttäuschung. Vor jeder Falschheit muß somit ein apriorisches Haben, eine vorgängige Wahrheit liegen, die nicht durch ein Mißlingen angefochten sein kann. Dies ist nach Heideggers Interpretation der Grundgedanke der von Aristoteles herausgestellten Synthesis-Struktur. Ihr entspricht Husserls Vermeinen und Heideggers Entdeckend-sein. Bezüglich dieser *veritas transcendentalis* gibt es keine Wahrheitsdifferenz. Daraus darf man aber nicht, wie Tugendhat es tut, schließen, Heidegger habe die Wahrheitsdifferenz und damit das spezifische Wahrheitsphänomen aufgegeben.

2. Strukturbedingung:

„In diesem entdeckenden Grundverhalten als von ihm durchherrscht und geführt ein Schenlassen des Worüber vom anderen her, denn nur aufgrund dieser Struktur besteht die Möglichkeit des Ausgebens von etwas als etwas“ (GA21 187).

Mit dieser Strukturbedingung der Falschheit stellt Heidegger die Doppelstruktur der Auslegung im Sinne des herme-

neutischen Als heraus. Das Woraufhin der Leerintention ist nicht selbst Grund der Erfüllung oder Enttäuschung, sondern der Mensch muß eine Auslegungsoption haben und mit dieser an das Seiende herantreten. Heideggers Beispiel ist die Täuschung der Sinne: Wir legen im dunklen Walde etwas als Reh aus, das sich dann als ein besonders geformter Strauch erweist. Besser wäre gewesen, wenn Heidegger anstelle dieses optischen Beispiels ein haptisches gewählt hätte, beispielsweise den Fehlgriff. Im Rahmen des sonst von Heidegger bevorzugten Hammerbeispiels: Ich suche etwas zum Hämmern, greife den solide aussehenden Brocken, aber der zerbricht beim ersten Schlag.

3. Strukturbedingung:

„Dieses Sehenlassen vom anderen her gründet zugleich in der Möglichkeit des Beisammen von etwas mit etwas“ (GA21 187).

Mit dem „Beisammen“ wird wiederum der Synthesis-Charakter herausgestellt. Selbst im Verfehlen, also der Enttäuschung der Leerintention, haben wir eine Komplexität von intentionalem Gegenstand und Auslegungsoption. Es gibt somit keine „einfachen“ Gegenstände, denn sobald sich unser Interesse auf den Gegenstand richtet, ist die präsupponierte Einfachheit überwunden. Sobald auch nur ein Gegenstand menschliches Interesse findet, ist die Zwiefalt von Gegenstand und interessegeleiteter Auslegungsoption gegeben. In diesem Gedanken liegt die stärkste Begründung für die von Heidegger behauptete Doppelstruktur der der Aussage zugrundeliegenden Auslegung. Diese Doppelstruktur wiederum ist maßgebend dafür, daß Heidegger die Auslegung an die Stelle der Wahrnehmung setzt.

Was ist aber der Grund dafür, daß das Vermeinen gelegentlich zur Erfüllung und gelegentlich zur Enttäuschung wird; im Beispiel gesprochen: Wie kommt es, daß das vermeintliche Hammerding zum Hämmern manchmal geeignet, manchmal ungeeignet ist? Die Frage ist wohl gemerkt nicht die, warum manche Gegenstände zu manchen Zwecken un-

geeignet sind, sondern die, warum wir uns manchmal vergeifen und manchmal nicht. Wie kommt es somit eigentlich zur Möglichkeit der Wahrheitsdifferenz? Heideggers Antwort ist: Die Auslegung kann das anfänglich entdeckte Seiende auch verdecken. In diesem Falle legt die Auslegungsoption das Seiende nicht *so* aus, *wie* es ist (GA21 188). Das anfängliche Haben des Seienden gerät nicht zur Entdeckung in Erfüllung, sondern es mißlingt zur Verdeckung in Enttäuschung. Ist damit von Heidegger eine Antwort auf die Frage gegeben, wie es zur Falschheit der Aussage kommen kann? Die Antwort hängt davon ab, wie man grundsätzlich ‚Woher-kommt-es, daß‘-Fragen versteht. Ein reduktives und ein produktives Verständnis sind dabei zu unterscheiden. Reduktiv sind derartige Fragen beantwortet, wenn man die Möglichkeitsbedingungen angegeben hat, die vorhanden sein müssen, damit das Explanandum eintreten kann. In diesen Fällen sind diese Fragen als Fragen nach den *notwendigen* Bedingungen verstanden. Versteht man diese Fragen jedoch produktiv, dann verlangt man eine rationale Genesis des Explanandum aus den Möglichkeitsbedingungen; mit anderen Worten: Die Fragen sind erst durch Angabe der *hinreichenden* Bedingungen beantwortet.

Im Sinne einer produktiven Auffassung der Frage, woher es kommt, daß Aussagen falsch sein können, ist diese Frage durch Heidegger nicht beantwortet. Heideggers Konzeption ist auf dem Hintergrund dieser Frageauffassung *unvollständig*. Sie hat daher auch keine Kontur, die es erlaubte, sie mit anderen Konzeptionen, z. B. den Konsenstheorien oder Kohärenztheorien in Beziehung zu setzen. Heideggers Abhandlung des Wahrheitsthemas ist somit kein vollständiger Wahrheits-traktat.

Allerdings ist zu beachten, daß es weder in *Sein und Zeit* noch in den Marburger Vorlesungen Heideggers Absicht ist, einen solchen auszuarbeiten. Die Wahrheitsfrage ist für ihn ein Durchgangsthema, um die Seinsfrage zu explizieren. Für diese Aufgabenstellung ist durch die reduktive Beantwortung der ‚Woher-kommt-es, daß‘-Frage einiges geleistet. Insbeson-

dere stellt Heidegger heraus, daß das Sein des Seienden als Gegenstand menschlichen Interesses, das heißt als apriorische Entdecktheit komplex im Sinne des hermeneutischen Als ist. Somit wird eine Synthesis antizipiert, die durchaus „anthropozentrisch“ bestimmt ist. Dieses Synthesis garantiert jedoch nicht die apophantische Wahrheit, sie ist nur notwendige und nicht hinreichende Bedingung der Aussagewahrheit.

Im produktiven Verständnis der ‚Woher-kommt-es, daß‘-Frage hat Heidegger somit die Möglichkeit der Wahrheitsdifferenz bezüglich der Aussage nicht erklärt. Es kann jedoch kein Zweifel sein, daß Heidegger an der Wahrheitsdifferenz festhält, die Notwendigkeit der Ausweisung der Aussagewahrheit durchweg betont und somit am Geschäft der Philosophie, der kritischen Aufklärung, teilnimmt.

HEIDEGGER'S TOPICAL HERMENEUTICS: THE SOPHIST LECTURES

RICHARD POLT

1. Heidegger and the Possibility of Situated Truth

My intention in this article is to show how Heidegger's hermeneutics, as instantiated in his lectures on Plato's *Sophist*, may offer us a way to move beyond an old dispute which can be called the conflict between objectivism and relativism.

Objectivists insist that claims to truth must be judged by criteria that are universally valid. Relativists insist that no criteria are universally valid, and that since all claims to truth are nothing but appeals to arbitrary criteria, no claim to truth is ultimately justified. A sophisticated contemporary form of this dispute is the controversy concerning postmodernism. So-called postmodern thinkers such as Rorty and Derrida have attacked objectivism by pointing to the failure of all attempts to mirror nature, or to attain a univocal re-presentation of what is present. This critique seems to invite relativism, and many postmodernists have in fact joined the relativist camp. Discourse then becomes a conversation that should not take itself too seriously, or a play of signifiers – anything but a claim to truth, since such a claim seems to suffer from the naive hubris of thinking that we can gain privileged access to things by escaping from our situation.¹

But this old dispute takes place on the ground of an unacknowledged agreement. As Richard J. Bernstein has argued, both objectivism and relativism rest on the assumption that without ahistorical, unsituated criteria of truth, there is no truth at all. Bernstein aptly diagnoses this assumption as the “Cartesian Anxiety,” and proposes that this anxiety can be cured by a *hermeneutic* approach to knowledge and rationality.² Such an approach acknowledges that all inquiry is situated within an evolving community of inquirers, and that the practices of such a community cannot be justified by any appeal to absolute criteria. But this is not to say that there is no justification at all: as we participate in the ongoing evolution of inquiry, we discover that some reasons work better than others, that some theories are more appropriate than others. This approach is a defense of the possibility of *situated truth*. The tradition of hermeneutics has long tried to show that truth need not be placeless, that in fact situatedness is, at least on occasion, a *prerequisite* for truth: for instance, if one is interpreting the New Testament, one's situatedness in a Christian heritage can enable one to make good sense of the text. But situated truth need not apply solely to the interpretation of certain types of text; thanks in part to Gadamer's work, we now see that this

hermeneutic theme can be radicalized into an *ontology of all forms of understanding*.

The thinker who has done the most to make such a radicalization viable – as Gadamer would be first to admit – is Heidegger. For Heidegger, situatedness is *always* a prerequisite for truth. More precisely, we all inherit certain shared ways of dealing with what matters to us, and it is our appropriation of this heritage that makes it possible for what is, as such, to matter to us at all: our appropriation of the heritage to which we belong thus enables Being to make a difference to us, and makes it possible for us to encounter things in the first place – whether these “things” be texts, human beings, facts about nature, mathematical theorems, or Being itself. Heidegger thus insists that we can experience things only because we inhabit a There, a finite field that opens itself for a particular community.

If situated truth is one of Heidegger’s fundamental themes, then readings of Heidegger should do justice to both of the elements of situated truth: the manifestation of things, and the finitude of manifestation. But the Cartesian Anxiety continues to distort many interpretations of the very thinker who points a way beyond it. In particular, the relativist strain in postmodernism has fostered readings of Heidegger that neglect the element of truth, the element of the manifestation of things. It has too often been assumed that Heidegger, as a philosopher of finitude, ought to renounce the phenomenological byword, “To the things themselves!” Yet Heidegger never did stop appealing to the “things.” He does reject the notion that truth can be definitively captured by any assertions, or guaranteed by any method; yet he insists that truth does occur, that is, things themselves display themselves to us.⁴ This display is not hindered, but is made possible by our dwelling in a place. It follows that although all interpretations are situated, we can rightfully distinguish between better and worse interpretations. A good interpretation evidences its “thing,” its topic or subject matter – not by escaping from its situation, but by authentically embracing it. Our interpretations have access to their *topic*, precisely because we inhabit a place, a τόπος. We may thus speak of Heidegger’s conception of situated truth as his *topical hermeneutics*.⁵

Nothing short of a thorough reflection on *Being and Time* – and on Being and time – can decide whether Heidegger’s conception of situated truth is legitimate. This essay sets itself a lesser but necessary task: by examining Heidegger at work on a particular interpretive project, we will see both how he articulates the aims of his topical hermeneutics, and the concrete results this hermeneutics can yield. This approach lets us consider the possibility of situated truth not only in the abstract, but also in terms of its viability in practice. An excellent opportunity for such an approach is provided by the recently published lecture course of 1924-25 on Plato’s *Sophist*.⁶ This course

displays Heidegger at work on a detailed interpretation of ancient texts which is especially notable for its emphasis on the ideal of *Sachlichkeit* – fidelity to the things themselves. Heidegger returns repeatedly to this ideal as he reads Plato and Aristotle, explains his own interpretive approach, and calls for a certain attitude on the part of his listeners. The *Sophist* course is especially suited, then, to provoke reflection on Heidegger’s attempt to combine truth and situatedness – for *Sachlichkeit* involves both of these dimensions, as I will suggest by translating the word as “topicality.” First, topicality is guided by the things themselves, the topic that the interpretation is trying to understand; secondly, it is authentically historical because it does not lose sight of its own historical situation, its τόπος, as what makes the act of interpreting possible and meaningful. We can thus provisionally define topicality as a commitment to appropriating one’s own heritage in order to evidence phenomena.

In the course of his concrete interpretation of the ancients, Heidegger makes invaluable remarks on the ideal of topicality, and against the extremes of objectivism and relativism. These “methodological” reflections will be our main focus. But, as I will show, the very notion of topicality implies that Heidegger’s method of interpreting ancient philosophy can be isolated neither from the content of his interpretations of the ancients, nor from the content of his own philosophy: the very distinction between method and content proves to be untenable. Heidegger himself alerts us to the superficiality of the distinction when he discusses the “distinctive bond between investigative and methodical thought in Plato” (252).⁷ Plato “offers what is positive only in its execution” (532): the way in which Plato’s thinking is carried out conveys the central message of his thought. Similarly, Heidegger’s interpretation of ancient philosophy and his reflections on this process of interpretation are part and parcel of his own philosophical inquiry: “the ‘question of method’ ... is itself research into the things themselves [*Sachforschung*]” (62).

In order to do justice to these connections, this article has three interrelated parts. First, I consider Heidegger’s general hermeneutics, his account of truth and interpretation as such; my account, based on both the *Sophist* course and *Being and Time*, begins with the phenomenon of the hermeneutic circle and then explains the two crucial dimensions of topicality: fidelity to the things themselves and authentic historicity. Secondly, I consider how the lecture course develops a specific hermeneutics for reading ancient philosophical texts. Finally, I close with an overview of the individual features of Heidegger’s reading of Plato and Aristotle that most illuminate his notion of topicality. This sequence is not a simple descent from a universal to an instance; rather, Heidegger’s general account of truth and interpretation is itself indebted to his encounter with the ancients. We are

involved in a circle – as is the case, claims Heidegger, in all genuine understanding.

II. The Hermeneutic Circle

The interdependence of knowledge of the parts and knowledge of the whole has long been a theme either for despair – if one cannot accept the possibility of situated truth⁸ – or for hermeneutic reflection. Heidegger's version of the hermeneutic circle develops this theme not primarily in terms of parts and whole, but in terms of temporality; thus, his hermeneutics is ultimately grounded in his analysis of the temporality and historicity of Dasein. But for now, I will consider the hermeneutic circle simply as an initial approach to the two crucial dimensions of topicality: fidelity to the things themselves and authentic historicity. When I discuss authentic historicity, I will return to the ontological grounds of the circle.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger speaks of fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception as the essential prerequisites of any interpretation (SZ 150). He develops these concepts with reference to practical interpretation, which makes sense of “ready-to-hand” entities such as tools; but the concepts are meant to apply to any interpretive act whatsoever. Interpretation re-possesses something that we already have: before we can deliberately interpret anything, the thing must be available to us in advance in some way, whether through practical experience or through previous theoretical projects; otherwise, we would have no access to the thing at all. The thing to be interpreted must be accessible as offering the possibility of further inquiry; thus, since Heidegger refers to our relation to possibilities as “understanding” (SZ §31), he calls interpretation an “appropriation of understanding” (SZ 150). This is Heidegger's account of a phenomenon which was discussed already by Plato in the guise of the myth of recollection.

The fact that interpretation requires a prior grasp of its topic does not imply that we are locked into a prison of *a priori* presuppositions: our fore-conception – the concepts with which we approach a phenomenon – may be either “definitive or provisional,” and an interpretation “can either create the concepts pertaining to the entity that is to be interpreted on the basis of this entity itself, or force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed according to its way of Being” (SZ 150). It is clear that for Heidegger, a good interpretation is a mutual exchange between the interpreter and what is to be interpreted. One's established acquaintance with a thing allows one to make sense of it; this interpretation can in turn form the basis for a deeper familiarity with the thing itself, which can then lead to a more appropriate interpretation. This is the circle of understanding (SZ 7-8, 152-3, 314-5).

In the *Sophist* course, Heidegger alludes to the hermeneutic circle when

he interprets the Platonic expression ζήτημα πρῶτον (literally “what is first sought,” *Sophist* 221c) as a “fore-having”:

[The fore-having is] that which ... is grasped in advance about the phenomenon, and which ... is held fast in all further looking towards the object – [it is thus] an ingredient in every further determination of the phenomenon; but it is not arbitrarily established once and for all as the apex of the pyramid, as it were, and then left to itself – rather, it has the distinctive function of working itself out in every concrete determination. (264)

On the face of it, this may sound as if the entire interpretation is potentially contained within the fore-having and needs only to be made explicit. However, it is clear from the passage we considered from *Being and Time* that interpretations are in no sense immanent to the fore-having that makes them possible: they emerge from the encounter of this fore-having with a phenomenon other than itself. As the fore-having “works itself out,” it can be enriched and transformed by the thing that is being interpreted. For this reason, meaning should be understood neither as the active production of the interpreter nor as something that we passively receive, but rather as a process that occurs beyond the distinction between active and passive.

III. Topicality as Fidelity to the Things Themselves

This brings us to the hermeneutic ideal: *Sachlichkeit*. *Sachlichkeit* is, to begin with, a fidelity to the “thing” that one is interpreting, a fidelity that lets the process of interpretation be guided by the phenomena, rather than forcing the phenomena into an interpretation. “Objectivity” would be an inappropriate translation of *Sachlichkeit*, because it usually implies an appeal to ahistorical norms or criteria that guarantee the correctness of our statements about things. But I will show that for Heidegger, *Sachlichkeit* is possible only if we embrace, rather than reject, historicity; furthermore, he holds that the correctness of statements is a dependent and derivative form of truth (SZ §33). These are my grounds for proposing “topicality” as an English counterpart to *Sachlichkeit*. Topicality is the interpretive ideal implied by a topical hermeneutics: it involves both fidelity to the topic of one's interpretation, and explicit participation in one's τόπος, one's historical situation. Below I will consider topicality as authentic historicity; in this section, I concentrate on the first dimension of topicality – its fidelity to the *Sachen selbst*.

In the *Sophist* course, Heidegger identifies genuine thinking, or “scientific” and “systematic” philosophy, with phenomenology, and he defines phenomenology in terms of its commitment to the *Sache*, the topic of thought: “the systematic [element of phenomenology] is grounded in the prior disclosure of the things themselves” (560). The basis for systematic research is not some method that precedes any experience of what one is researching; all legitimate method grows out of the manifestation of a thing, a topic. Thus, it would go against the very sense of phenomenology to treat it

as a formal technique or a set of rules, a method in the Cartesian sense. Phenomenology is simply *seeing things*: “Phenomenology means nothing but the addressing exposition, the exhibition of what is, of what shows itself, in the ‘how’ of its showing itself ...” (586; cf. SZ 34).

Of course, seeing things is not as easy as it may sound, since phenomena do not simply fall into our lap: phenomenology is no “comfortable science in which one lies, as it were, on the sofa, puffs on a pipe, and intuits essences” (587). Genuine topicality forces us to reflect critically and carefully on how things can present themselves to us at all (321-2). Furthermore, phenomenology demands not only rigorous thought, but a definite existential stance. Topicality is not only an intellectual but also an ethical commitment, a commitment which must ground and cannot be grounded upon philosophical work:

We must learn to forgo this demand to be supported by science, and above all by philosophical research. To the contrary, the possibility of proper research and questioning, and hence the possibility of existing scientifically, already presupposes a support – not a support of the religious kind, but the quite distinctive support that belongs solely to this way of existing, the support I call the *freedom of topicality*. Only where this has been developed is it at all possible for an existing individual [existenziell möglich] to do science. (256)

Heidegger echoes Husserl in insisting on the severe demands that phenomenology makes on its practitioners; below I will show how Heidegger departs from Husserl in claiming that one of phenomenology’s demands is that we embrace historicity.

Heidegger is also especially interested in our tendency to avoid genuine confrontation with the things themselves. Heidegger dubs this tendency *Gerede*, idle talk or chatter. Chatter is a kind of discourse and thought that is not committed to the things themselves, but “rests satisfied with what one says” (197):

I can repeat and understand sentences without having a primordial relation to the entity about which I am speaking. ... Sentences take on a peculiar form of existence [Dasein]; one is directed by them, they become correct, so-called truths, while the original function of ἀληθεύειν is not carried through. (25)

Mere words can never *capture* the truth in such a way as to guarantee that those who hear, read, or repeat the words are led to see the things that the words are about. A sentence may be correct, and yet, if it is used in chatter, it will not serve to unconceal something (this is what Heidegger means by the term ἀληθεύειν – cf. *Nic. Eth.* VI.3); the sentence will not bring speaker and listener face to face with what is. Chatter “fixates on the word” (248) rather than focusing on the things that words are about. Of course, words would be unintelligible if they did not show us any thing; but chatter disregards the fact that unless we enter the hermeneutic circle and strive for better interpretations, our experience of the things is bound to be superficial. This also applies, of course, to the written word (and thus, chatter will prove to have important implications for the reading of philosophical texts).

What is written, what is published and said, can only be the *impetus to return* from that point to the things themselves again. Thus, in taking up and understanding something written or said, each individual must already have seen that which is being spoken about. He must set out on his own to see the things. What is said and written – this is the essential point – is unable to offer anything on its own. (343)

Heidegger’s ideal of topicality, of setting out on one’s own to see the things, is thus a prerequisite for writing and reading philosophy. We have also seen that topicality involves an ethical commitment; thus, it is no surprise when Heidegger tells us that “the topiclessness of speech [Sachlosigkeit der Rede] is *equivalent to the unguineness and rootlessness of human existence*” (231; cf. SZ §35).

Heidegger’s analysis of chatter implies that truth is not a property of assertions, of mere words. Where, then, is truth properly situated? The answer lies in the second dimension of topicality – in historicity.

IV. Topicality as Authentic Historicity

One might suppose that any philosophical position that emphasizes contemplation of the things themselves would demand that contemplators transcend their own historicity; conversely, any embrace of historicity would amount to a renunciation of the things themselves. But to pose the alternatives in this way is to perpetuate the Cartesian Anxiety and to disregard the possibility of situated truth, a possibility which Heidegger wishes to defend.

Heidegger does acknowledge that there can be a conflict between topicality and the *inauthentic* form of historicity which he calls “tradition.” The Cartesian Anxiety is not wholly illegitimate, since when historicity becomes mere tradition, it discourages topicality: one’s choice is then “either to give the things themselves their due and thus to commit oneself to disregarding every preconceived theory, or simply to stick to *tradition* because it is *venerable*, and thus to give up oneself and one’s research, which is, after all, always *research into the things*” (411-12). Genuine thought requires that one lay aside all “school dogmas” (411), and perhaps even become a “parricide,” as Plato’s Eleatic Stranger says (*Sophist* 241d). According to Heidegger, the Stranger shows that “he is capable of becoming a parricide, i.e. of smashing his teacher’s position at its basis. Only if he is capable of this may he perhaps be someone who is to be taken seriously with respect to the things” (241).

But for Heidegger, the choice between tradition and topicality is not a choice between *historicity* and topicality. In fact, research into the things themselves demands that the researcher become authentically historical – and it is on this very point that Heidegger shows his own willingness to “kill” his intellectual father. Heidegger’s primary criticism of Husserlian phenomenology – sometimes expressed in a rather *ad hominem* and anecdotal manner – was always that Husserl neglected the historical nature

of meaning.⁹ For Heidegger, commitment to the phenomena is inseparable from authentic participation in history.

The problem, then, is *how* we can incorporate the philosophical past into our current thought without falling into mere tradition, which is a form of chatter – that is, without mistaking the repetition of someone else’s words for an encounter with the things themselves. Heidegger must distinguish between the living and the ossified strands of our past, between the moments of revelation and the traitorous tradition that has betrayed these moments:

In posing philosophical questions – precisely in the way of questioning that intends to reach the things themselves – the point is not to free oneself from the past, but rather *to make the past free for us, to free it from the tradition*, from the ungentle tradition which characteristically distorts the gift in its very giving, its *tradere*, its handing down. (413)

The genuine moments in the philosophical past are indispensable to philosophy in the present – not because they express ahistorically valid propositions, but because they are authentically *historical*: that is, they hold out the promise of a process of unconcealment that can occur if the present enters into dialogue with its past.

What endures in history – and endures not in the sense of an eternal present, but as authentically temporal historicity – is not the systems, but the element of truly investigative work, which is often hardly recognizable only when we have established communication [with the past] do we have a prospect of being historical. *Disregard for the tradition is respect for the past* – and it is genuine only when it appropriates the past by destroying the tradition. (413-4)

Heidegger’s destruction, or destructuring, of the tradition was later to be projected as part of *Being and Time* (cf. SZ 19-26) and in fact forms the bulk of his writings.

Of course, the distinction between mere tradition and genuine past research requires a criterion. This criterion is one’s experience of the things themselves: one must already have in view the thing that a philosophical text takes as its topic before one can decide which parts of the text are rooted in real understanding, and which parts are mere chatter. This is an instance of the hermeneutic circle: all interpretation of a phenomenon requires a fore-having, and an interpretation of a text requires a fore-having of the phenomenon that the text is *about*. Once we have begun to do the work of sorting out the fruitful and the sterile elements of a text, we can appropriate what is fruitful and use it to deepen our original understanding.

But I have not yet shown just how deep our relation to the past is: the past is much more than a handy source of sayings that we may choose to use as helpful supplements to our own insights. In fact, it can be misleading even to speak of our “relation” to the past; it is better to say that we *are* the past, for according to Heidegger, the way we appropriate the past constitutes our very Being:

The past ... comes to life only when we have understood that we ourselves are it. As regards our intellectual [geistiger] existence, we, the philosopher as well as the scientist in general,

are what we were; we will be what we appropriate and master in what we were, and we will be *how* we do that. On the basis of these simple temporal relations, the temporal relations of human, and especially of intellectual existence, one can see the real sense of actual research as a confrontation with history – and history becomes existent only when research is historically, i.e. understands that it itself is history. ... In order to justify such research, then, there is no need to appeal to supratemporal, eternal values and the like. (229)

Not only does Heidegger see no incompatibility, then, between a “confrontation with history” (229) and a “confrontation with the things [Dingen] which are being considered” (230); he goes farther, and claims that phenomena can display themselves to us only on the basis of *authentic historicity* – that is, only if we struggle to be someone on the basis of who we already are. The passage above could serve as a pithy summary of the central points of *Being and Time*. The “simple temporal relations” Heidegger points out are especially relevant to *Geist*, that is, to the dimension of human beings that is capable of encountering what is, as such. To put this point in the language of *Being and Time*, the temporality of Dasein – our thrownness into a situation and our projection of possibilities on the basis of this thrownness – makes “presencing” possible. That is, temporality lets entities present themselves to us in the first place and consequently enables us to conduct research into the “things themselves” (see especially SZ §65).

Heidegger’s contention that it is temporality that makes it possible for us to encounter phenomena cannot be further explored in this article; but if he is right in this contention, then it follows that phenomenologists (who investigate the very phenomenon of *encountering*) must themselves depend on temporality in order to encounter this phenomenon. If Heidegger is right, then philosophers should be the last to deny or overlook their own temporality: they should comprehend that all comprehension is an appropriation of what one already is.¹⁰

The “simple temporal relations” pointed out by Heidegger also shed light on the nature and the necessity of the hermeneutic circle, which until now I have merely *asserted* to be an essential structure of understanding. Heidegger holds that all interpretation is an appropriation of possibilities that are given to us by our past. If this is so, then all interpretation depends on something that has been given to us in advance, an inherited fore-having; this fore-having must be appropriated, that is, it must be taken up in a project which allows the interpreted “thing” to show itself to us. As our project proceeds, the thing shows itself to us more thoroughly – and thus our past, our fore-having, is enriched. This fore-having must then be re-appropriated in a circular process, if we are to be authentically historical. This point undermines the distinction between method and content: we must let our method grow out of our experience of the things, and lead us to new experiences which may force us to adopt a new method.

We are also in a position now to understand the phenomenon of chatter.

Chatter is a form of understanding that has lost sight of its own temporality: it appropriates its past without recognizing that it is doing so, and thus simply accepts what it inherits from the past as if it were an immediate view of the nature of things. Chatter takes it for granted that things are obvious, immediately present, and self-evident. This attitude substitutes truisms for truth, since it does not recognize that things present themselves to us only through the finite, historical interplay of a heritage and a destiny. And yet this finitude of ours is so unsettling that we are all reduced to chatter most of the time (SZ 348).

Heidegger insists, then, that fidelity to the things themselves demands that we recognize our own historicity. We have seen that for Heidegger, “there is no need to appeal to supratemporal, eternal values” in order to guarantee the topicality of our interpretations (229). These “values” are the logical and epistemological norms and criteria to which the defenders of topicality as *objectivity* will appeal. To say that a proposition is objectively true implies that it is correct, regardless of the circumstances of the person who discovered it; this “truth” is then universally valid and binding. But Heidegger opposes topicality to this sense of objectivity:

Truth amounts to topicality, understood as an attitude of Dasein towards the world and towards itself such that what is, is there according to the thing itself. This is “objectivity,” properly understood. The original sense of this concept of truth does not yet imply objectivity as universal validity, general binding force. This has nothing to do with truth. Something can be universally valid and generally binding, and yet not be true. Most prejudices and platitudes are such universal validities, which are distinguished by the fact that they obscure what is. (23–4)

According to the ideal of objectivity, the universal validity of a theory or proposition is guaranteed by its conformity to a certain set of rules (a method of scientific research, for example); these rules are taken to be rationally self-evident, that is, known independently of historical contingencies. But any rule is empty unless it is based on an experience of the things to which it is supposed to apply: “Truth, unconcealment, discoveredness, orients itself ... according to the entity itself, and not according to a definite concept of scientificity” (24). If the experience of the entity must take precedence over method, and if experience is always made possible historically, that is, through an appropriation of the past, then authentic historicity must take precedence over objectivity.

The Cartesian Anxiety leads us to fear, however, that any position that stresses historicity at the expense of objectivity must amount to a form of historicist relativism. And it is true that the elevation of history to a supreme principle has, in some cases, ended in relativism. The vicissitudes of German historicism may lead us to conclude that despite the best intentions of its originators, such an orientation necessarily leads to despair about the possibility of truth itself.¹¹ But Heidegger wishes to combat any such

conclusion, because he claims that traditional historicism inhibits authentic historicity by misunderstanding what history is in the first place:

Historicism is no danger at all for whoever has understood what is meant by research into the things, for historicism is a theory of history that has never taken the trouble to ask what history is, and what it is to be historical. Historicism is a characteristically modern theory which has arisen with regard to a thing, history, in such a way that this thing, history, has not really become a problem at all. The freedom of topicality, I say, will first be able to give us the possibility of being historical in the genuine sense, that is, not to cross ourselves before history as if it were Old Nick, but to know that that is where all the possibilities of our existence lie. Only if we are historical will we understand history, and if it is understood, it is *eo ipso* overcome. (256–7)

Heidegger’s remarks need explication. First, his jibe against “characteristically modern” theories is an implicit attack on the modern notion of objectivity. For Heidegger, modernity privileges method over experience (as is clear in Descartes). It begins with assumptions which are not properly used as a fore-having which could initiate a hermeneutic circle, but are imposed as *a priori* principles that determine all phenomena and hence cannot be revised in the light of phenomena. In short, modern theory is “objective” but not topical: it establishes propositions that are correct, but it cannot reflect on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the concepts in terms of which its propositions are couched, because it does not engage in the hermeneutic process that mediates between concepts and phenomena.

Heidegger now charges historicism with this same apriorism – a rather surprising charge, when one reflects that historicism originated (for example, with Herder) as a defense of the concrete individuality of historical phenomena in the face of the Enlightenment’s emphasis on universal reason and natural law. It would seem that historicism is precisely a defense of the priority of concrete experience over abstract method. Nevertheless, the historicism of the nineteenth century tended to result in despair about the very possibility of truth. This result shows that historicism does subscribe to an unquestioned assumption: the assumption that truth is essentially ahistorical. Historicism suffers from the fatal flaw of modernity, because it operates with a vague, naive fore-having of phenomena such as history and truth, takes this fore-having for granted, and does not enter into the hermeneutic circle in a genuine spirit of topicality. The entire question of the way of Being of history and truth needs to be raised anew.¹²

Heidegger claims that if we genuinely understand and accept our historicity, history is “*eo ipso* overcome” (257). But he cannot mean that we will escape the past and be reborn into pure objectivity. There is no hope, for Heidegger, that phenomena will show themselves to us in a moment of total presence that will dispense with all temporality: that simply is not the way truth works, at least not for human beings, since history is “where all the possibilities of our existence lie” (257). Rather than appealing to an

ahistorical realm, then, Heidegger attempts to rethink history in such a way that it is the very source of truth. Thus, things themselves *can* show themselves to us through history, and this display of phenomena can be enriched indefinitely if we take the proper hermeneutic approach. What can be “overcome” about history is the inertia that puts a halt to the process of interpretation and slips into the mere chatter of tradition. Ironically, the very ideal of objectivity encourages the assumption that things can be immediately present to us; thus, objectivity is nothing but an inauthentic form of historicity that promotes chatter and discourages a rich and significant encounter with things.

V. The Application of Topical Hermeneutics to Philosophical Texts

I have surveyed the two dimensions of topicality – fidelity to the things themselves and authentic historicity – and explained how these two dimensions are meant to be compatible; now we can see how Heidegger tries to develop an interpretation of ancient philosophy that is guided by the ideal of topicality. In the *Sophist* lectures, Heidegger uses three interpretive principles for reading philosophical texts. First, he holds that the reader must approach the text with a rich and articulated fore-having of the phenomena with which the text is concerned. Secondly, the reader must pay attention to what is necessarily left unsaid and unthought in the text. Thirdly, later thought can be used as a clue to the concerns of earlier thought: thus, Heidegger introduces Plato with a reading of Aristotle. Once I have considered these three principles, I will survey a few elements of Heidegger’s interpretation of the ancients – the elements which are most closely related to his ideal of topicality and his critique of objectivity.

Heidegger’s first interpretive principle is that a topical reading of Plato must be focused in advance on the phenomenon with which Plato himself is concerned. The interpretation is concerned not primarily with Plato’s text as such – that is philology, not philosophy – nor even with Plato’s teaching, but rather with the issue to which Plato’s text is a response. Thus, the ideal is “to bring properly into view the *coherence of the whole*, and thereby the thing about which the dialogue is really and ultimately speaking, so that the understanding of every single sentence takes its nourishment from this thing, as from a unitary source” (231). Curious as it may sound, the best interpretation of Plato will not be about Plato; it will be about the topic evidenced in the Platonic text.

We have seen, however, that all understanding must be guided in advance by a fore-having, because things are revealed only when we appropriate what has already been given to us. Heidegger thus tries to set the stage for his interpretation of Plato by developing an adequate fore-having, an introduction. After some 200 pages of introduction, Heidegger laments that

he has fallen short of his ideal – and thus gives us an insight into the nature of this ideal:

An ideal preparation would be attained only if it put you in a position (assuming a rigorous and unhurried reading) actually to appropriate the dialogue in one swoop, with no restriction on your understanding – that is, if it had brought it about that all the topical [sachliche] horizons within which the dialogue moves had become completely awake and accessible for the reader. (227)

The perfect introduction would familiarize prospective interpreters with the themes at issue, the “topical horizons.” One must have a sense of the field of problems, a philosophical lay of the land, before one can understand what is provoking Plato’s questions and answers. Truth is situated: one must inhabit a place, a τόπος, in which the phenomena in question have already begun to show themselves.

A good interpretation of a text, then, must ultimately be based not on other texts (228-9), but on an experience of the things. Heidegger makes it clear that the “things” in question for him here are the very phenomena that are the explicit theme of *Being and Time*: human beings (Dasein) and their understanding of Being.

The real significance of these connections [in Plato’s text] can be seen only if one has positively appropriated the phenomena in advance, i.e. if one investigates the primordial phenomena such as concern [Besorgen], the Being of the closest world, etc., on the basis of the thing itself, and thus has at one’s disposal horizons which allow one to assess the significance of these matters. That is the genuine sense of so-called systematic work in philosophy. *We do not philosophize systematically in order to make a system, but in order to understand ourselves in the foundations of our existence [des Daseins]. ... the point is not to produce a system of phenomenology or a new direction, but simply to make the horizons accessible, in order to be able to understand what was better known by Plato.* (277-8)

Heidegger takes care here to ward off the objection that he is fitting ancient philosophy into a predetermined set of theses. He claims to be “systematic” only in his rigorous concern with the topic of human existence. The final remark in the passage above seems to say that he aims to approximate our level of understanding to that of Plato. The implication seems to be that Heidegger’s dogged reading of a philosophical text in terms of his own analyses of Dasein would not be an act of violence, but would be a way of bringing us closer to the author’s own insights.

However, the situation is not so simple. Heidegger’s method will often involve going beyond what lies obviously in the text. This brings us to his second principle: the reader must focus on what the text leaves unthought. Heidegger’s use of this principle is particularly striking in his reading of Aristotle. Aristotle seems less esoteric and more direct than Plato, and his texts invite a reading that sticks closely to the letter of the text; thus, Heidegger must defend his topical approach to Aristotle, an approach that goes *beyond* the text in order to read it in terms of the topic, the thing, to which the text is responding:

As regards the *method* ... of the interpretation which is being practiced in this lecture course, let it be noted that it is based on a *phenomenology of Dasein* The interpretation is not a matter of adducing as-yet-unnoticed texts and passages of Aristotle – he has been available for 2000 years – but rather, in the preparation for this reading there already lies a rich hermeneutics It is a *presupposition* of the interpretation, then, that Dasein is a theme, and if the interpretation “reads something into” Aristotle, the point is to regain and to understand what is really going on with him. (62)

Again Heidegger stresses that he does not fit other thinkers into his own system, but in fact recovers “what is really going on” in the texts he reads. However, he implies that Aristotle himself did not sharply and explicitly reveal what was “going on with him,” and that a certain amount of reading between the lines is required.

Why is this so? Is Aristotle esoteric after all, or did his powers fail him? In fact, for Heidegger, the unclarity in the text is neither deliberate, nor the result of a personal weakness: *all* philosophical work necessarily fails to understand what is most important about itself. He argues for the position that in order to allow a text to speak to us and teach us as we interpret it, we must in a sense be superior to it:

We must hold fast to the ideal of an interpretation that simply has the goal of *letting the dialogue speak purely for itself*. That is a platitude; today everyone claims to let texts speak for themselves. ... And yet, the obligation that one takes upon oneself with this claim is for the most part not understood. For it is not enough to present as great an amount of textual material as possible and not to say what does not stand in the text. ... Rather, in this claim to let the text speak for itself there lies ... the *obligation to be farther along in principle in the understanding of the topical problematic* than that which is the object of the interpretation. (227-8)¹⁴

Above I have discussed Heidegger’s claim that we cannot understand a text unless we have an independent understanding of the “topical problematic” of the text; Plato and Aristotle themselves would surely be sympathetic to this claim. But to say that the reader must be “farther along” than the text may be surprising: after all, we cannot learn from reading a text if we already know more than the author did. However, Heidegger is at pains to avoid the impression of arrogance:

Being farther cannot mean for us that it is “up to me” to pass judgment on the situation, it cannot mean arrogance towards Greek scientific philosophy, but can only mean having understood that we must put ourselves in a *position of service* to these researches, in order to make the attempt in the first place, under their guidance, to distinguish the *immanent tendencies*, to grasp them and hold them fast in a more primordial elaboration and thus more firmly to establish the *basis* on which the discussion of the things must develop. (228)

This position may seem inconsistent: who has priority, the author or the reader? But in fact, there is no inconsistency here; we stand before another case of the hermeneutic circle. The preliminary understanding which one has when one approaches a text must not be hard and fast, but must be open to instruction. The text must deepen one’s fore-having of the things themselves, at the same time as one’s fore-having of the things enhances one’s reading of the text. The goal of this circle must be to progress *beyond* the level of articulation achieved in the text itself.

But one might object that it may not be possible at all for us to be “farther along” than Plato. Should we not consider the possibility that Plato simply understood the truth, perhaps better than we ever will – or is this not at least a good hermeneutic assumption, since it prevents us from thoughtlessly fitting Plato into our own prejudices? Heidegger would grant that we must try to avoid naively repeating traditions that we take for granted and are hence invisible to us; he would also grant that Plato is great, and that we have much to learn from him; but he would add that “he who thinks greatly must err greatly.”¹⁴ This idea is crucial to Heidegger’s thought. Early in the *Sophist* lectures he asserts that “what is elementary in creative research” is that “it does not understand itself in what is decisive” (11). He later makes the same point somewhat more cautiously:

A scientific investigation usually runs up against phenomena that are quite unclarified and undetermined. And thus, ... within this dialogue, which intends to distinguish the things in question quite clearly and sharply ... new states of affairs [Sachbestände] also show themselves, states of affairs which are not being investigated but which become visible, which is enough to give them philosophical significance. (249)

The *Sophist*, and all “creative research,” goes deeply into the phenomena, and for that very reason gets in over its head. The original intention of a philosophical project is bound to be undermined by its own success, by the things which it reveals.

In order to understand the grounds for this claim, we can consider it in terms of the hermeneutic circle. I have shown that, for Heidegger, this circle is grounded in historicity: since all understanding originates in the appropriation of what we already are, all interpretation of a topic requires a fore-having. Our fore-having is no rationally guaranteed principle or rule which would be valid *a priori*; it is a contingent understanding, inherited from our past, that remains open to revision in the future. Hence, all interpreting takes place in a context which may be altered, but never mastered, by the result of the interpretation: our access to phenomena is ineluctably finite. For Heidegger, there can be no *definitive* results of an interpretation. Interpreting is not merely a means to developing a conclusive theory, but is the fundamental character of truth: things are unconcealed only if we continue to engage in the process of appropriating what we have already achieved. Since interpretation continually transcends its fore-having but never transcends its indebtedness to its past, truth is always accompanied by untruth (cf. SZ 223).

If any genuine philosophical work is necessarily incomplete and in some sense goes astray, then there is a kind of imperfection that can be taken as a sign of genuine thought, and is no cause for reproach:

The entire Platonic corpus shows how difficult it is, even when one is interested purely in the things themselves, to take even a few steps forward, and how everything can remain preliminary. That is true of Aristotle no less than of Plato. The romantic assessment of Plato in the history of philosophy fails to see precisely what is truly positive in him, i.e., what is

incomplete and fragmentary, what is left on the way with him. That is what is really positive in any research. (412-3; cf. 190)

Plato's imperfection is fruitful imperfection: it opens up the things themselves at the same time as it fails to guarantee their unconcealment. "The *Sophist* – and every dialogue – shows Plato on the way; it shows how fixed propositions break up, and how the phenomena come to understanding; and it shows at the same time how Plato must remain at a *standstill* and does *not* make a breakthrough" (14). It is impossible not to see a parallel here to Heidegger's favorite self-interpretation as being "on the way." Plato, remarks Heidegger in his personal notes to the lecture course, "stirred up the things in his brilliant unclarity. 'Brilliant' – because it carries in it genuine roots of discovery. Not a fantastic unclarity, blind to the things" (625). The same can be said of Heidegger himself; and indeed, he always saw himself not as establishing definitive theses, but as revealing the difficulty of the problems.

If all great philosophical work must contain an element of obscurity, then interpretations of philosophical texts must in fact do violence to the author's self-conception if they are ever to see through the author's blind spot. "Perhaps, for one who has learned to understand an author, it is not possible to take what this author himself designates as most important as the foundation of the interpretation. Precisely what an author keeps silent is where one must begin in order to *understand* what the author himself designates as essential [das *Eigentliche*]" (46). Understanding the Greeks thus requires "uncovering what was implicitly present among the Greeks" (77-8), "focusing on what is silently at work" in the text (264).

We have heard Heidegger say that Aristotle's work, no less than Plato's, remains incomplete. But in the *Sophist* course Heidegger uses an interpretation of Aristotle (in particular, Aristotle's discussion of the ways of ἀληθεύειν or unconcealing in *Nicomachean Ethics VI* and *Metaphysics I*) as an introduction to the problematic of the *Sophist*. This brings us to Heidegger's final interpretive principle: he uses later thought as a clue to the concerns of earlier thought.

This reverse chronological order resembles Heidegger's plan for *Being and Time*: in Part Two of the work he planned to proceed from Kant to Descartes to Aristotle (SZ 40). There could be several reasons for such a procedure. Above all, there is the simple fact that "we always come from the successors, and it is as successors that we return to the predecessors" (189). Here Heidegger implies that we *already* approach Plato through Aristotle (and through the entire successive history of philosophy), whether we know it or not. Beginning with the successors, then, makes us aware of the history that we already bring with us.

But once we have become aware of the history that we bring with us –

one might object – we must surely ask whether it reveals or distorts our predecessors. Is it a history of truth, or of untruth? According to Heidegger's account of historicity, the answer must be: both. Mere tradition is necessarily part of history, but our history has also been formed by truly topical thinkers, who have been capable of appropriating their past in order to see the things themselves. However, Heidegger is somewhat inconsistent on this issue. He asserts at one point that "successors always understand their predecessors better than they understood themselves" (11). This is surely too broad. After all, as he himself stresses, it often happens that the adherents of a philosophical school make a great deal of noise "without appropriating or taking cognizance of that which the teacher himself once traversed, and which he discovered in this traversal and this confrontation" (239). In fact, especially in his later thought, Heidegger tends to see the entire history of Western philosophy as failing to appropriate the implicit insights of the pre-Socratics. Perhaps the most consistent Heideggerian position would be this: a thinker always initiates the unconcealment of things in a way that leaves something unthought; thoughtless disciples will repeat their predecessor's statements, but lose the connection to the things; thoughtful successors will appropriate the predecessor for the sake of a fresh revelation of the things, but will also inevitably fall prey to a fresh kind of blindness. A genuine history of thought, then (or a "history of Being") would neither celebrate the progress of enlightenment nor bemoan the growing darkness, but would trace the interplay of the clear and the obscure.

Aristotle, then, is one of the rare students who does not merely mouth the words of a teacher, but struggles with and against the teacher for the sake of a mutual confrontation with a topic. *Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas*: a topical thinker is devoted to seeing the things themselves rather than to the words in which the teacher tried to express his own vision – and yet, the teacher's words can be a way to the things themselves, when these words are properly appropriated. Heidegger holds that Aristotle was a genuinely topical interpreter of Plato's thought:

Even one who knows Aristotle only roughly will see ... that it is not audacious to hold that Aristotle understood Plato. ... This implies no value judgment about Plato. What Aristotle says is what Plato put into his hands, just developed more radically, more scientifically. (11-12)

Heidegger stresses Aristotle's indebtedness to Plato in the same breath as he praises Aristotle's "scientific" spirit. This is quite consistent with the ideal of topicality as a *situated* confrontation with the phenomena. In another account of his own approach, Heidegger again stresses the relation between scientificity and historicity:

One cannot understand Plato scientifically, that is, return to him historically, unless one passes through Aristotle. ... According to the basic hermeneutic principle, we thus go back from the clear into the obscure, from what is lucid or relatively developed into what is

confused. "Confused" is not ... a disparaging evaluation, but means that the various directions of seeing and questioning are still intermingled in Plato, not on account of a subjective intellectual failing, but on account of the difficulty of the problems. What is confused and undeveloped can be understood only if guidelines to the immanent tendencies are available. [The guidelines are] *the question of Being* [and] *the question of truth*. (189-190)

These guidelines are, of course, the main themes of Heidegger's own thought. But they are certainly not alien to Plato and Aristotle; and in fact, young Heidegger was inspired to think about Being when he read Brentano's study of Aristotle's concept of Being. Thus: Heidegger's appropriation of Brentano's appropriation of Aristotle eventually allowed Heidegger to appropriate Aristotle's appropriation of Plato. The history of thought is a history of appropriations, because only through appropriation is it possible to encounter phenomena, and thus to think.

The principles Heidegger uses to apply his hermeneutics to philosophical texts illuminate this hermeneutics itself. I have called it a topical hermeneutics because it defends the possibility of situated truth by insisting both on our access to the topic or "thing" that we understand, and on our belonging to an historical site or *τόπος*. Heidegger's way of interpreting ancient philosophy shows the implications of situated truth: if truth is situated, it must be a process of appropriation and confrontation, in which the present struggles to rescue the insights of the past in order to make insights possible in the future.

VI. Heidegger's Reading of Ancient Philosophy

We can now briefly consider how, when Heidegger applies his interpretive principles to ancient philosophy, he confirms and develops his own concept of topicality through his reading of Plato and Aristotle. The 600-page *Sophist* course is rich in detail and pursues many themes, but one story in particular emerges and holds pride of place: the story of the ancient philosophers' commitment to the things themselves, a commitment which went astray because of their incomplete interpretation of *the locus of truth*. This interpretation, which points to what the ancients left unthought, is made possible by Heidegger's own fore-having of the phenomenon of truth; but it also enriches Heidegger's own views, so that he learns from the ancients at the same time as he critiques them. Heidegger's reading of Plato and Aristotle is thus not only an excellent example of the hermeneutic circle and the ideal of topicality, but also a source of his topical hermeneutics itself.

Heidegger repeatedly contrasts the topicality of Plato and Aristotle with the *Sachlosigkeit*, or topiclessness, of the sophists. The sophists prize speech for the sake of glory and influence, not for its power to reveal what is; thus, their topiclessness is rooted "in a particular *estimation of the rule of speech* [*Rede*] and of the speaking human being" (230; cf. 215).¹⁵ True philosophers

The *opposite of this rootless existence* (and of the way in which it expresses itself in the intellectual life of the society), the authentic meaning of existence, lies in *topicality*, in the discovery or the fundamental understanding of what is – in the idea of *scientific philosophy*, as it came to life at first through Socrates, and then in its concrete development through Plato and Aristotle. (231)

The goal of Plato's dialectic and of his dialogues is "to depart from *λόγος* as chatter – what is initially given, what is said and prattled about everything – and to go through genuine speaking to a *λόγος* that truly, as *λόγος ἀληθής* [unconcealing speech], says something about what is being discussed" (195). Dialectic is meant to be "a speaking that, in its speaking for and against, leads [one] more and more toward what one is talking about, and lets this be seen" (197). Thus, the good dialectician (such as Plato's Stranger) gets his interlocutor "to look exactly toward what is to be discussed" (405; cf. SZ 164). This is "the thing itself," *τόπρᾶγμα αὐτό* (251).

But despite Plato's admirable commitment to the things themselves, dialectic is ultimately inadequate to the task of revealing phenomena; Heidegger claims that this was recognized by Aristotle. "*Aristotle saw the immanent limits of dialectic because he philosophized more radically*" than Plato; "he could do so only because he understood the function of *λόγος* and *διαλέγεσθαι* within scientific study, and within human existence in general" (199; cf. 165, 625, and SZ 25). *Λόγος*, understood as speech, is not the place or locus of truth: it is not primarily through speech that we encounter phenomena. Heidegger thus disputes the traditional interpretation of Aristotle, according to which Aristotle understands truth as the correctness of a proposition. In Aristotle's expressions *ἀποφαίνεσθαι* (revealing) and *ἀληθεύειν* (unconcealing), Heidegger finds at least a hint of a more primordial conception of truth: "Speech [*Rede*] is not the primary and sole bearer of the *ἀληθές* [what is true, what is unconcealed] *Λόγος* is not the site [*Stätte*] in which *ἀληθεύειν* is at home, is rooted [*bodenständig*]" (182; cf. SZ 33, 165).

Heidegger sketches a history of the degeneration of the primordial sense of truth as unconcealment into the derivative conception of truth as the correctness of a proposition. Speech, *λόγος*, is a prominent way of unconcealing things; what is spoken, the *λεγόμενον*, can then be taken as "true" in a secondary sense; one can then forget that what is spoken is true only when it functions to reveal things, and one can take what is spoken as a correct proposition that is somehow "free-standing" rather than bound to its function of revealing (24-25). The Greeks' reflection on *λόγος* thus becomes the formal analysis of theoretical assertions, propositional logic (252-3). But this logic is oblivious of the fact that speech reveals things (598); it does not consider this event of revealing worth thinking about. In essence, logic reflects the everyday "falling" of *Dasein*, its chatter; the development of logic represents the triumph of chatter over topicality (25, 27).

But Heidegger's story is rather ambiguous on several points: were all Greek thinkers fatally seduced into logocentrism, or did Aristotle have a proper estimation of speech? Or is λόγος, when rightly understood, the locus of truth after all? Heidegger asserts that Aristotle put λόγος in its place (199), but also that Aristotle centers his entire analysis of ἀληθεύειν on λόγος (27). He claims that the question of the "milieu" in which it is possible to ask about Being (438, 448) is answered by "the Greeks" (and thus presumably by Aristotle) in terms of λόγος (438). Of course, we are considering a series of lectures in which Heidegger is working out an interpretation, rather than a work which is organized around a single thesis. But it may also be the case that the meaning of λόγος for the Greeks is sufficiently indeterminate that Heidegger can find in it the potential for both a genuine and a superficial understanding of truth; this approach would be consistent with an understanding of history as the interplay of the clear and the obscure. For instance, later in his career, Heidegger was to appropriate Heraclitus' and Parmenides' λόγος as a name for the primordial "gathering" of truth; he would also say that "language is the house of Being."¹⁶ This does not necessarily mean that Heidegger repudiated his claim in the *Sophist* lectures that speech is not the "site" in which one should seek Being (182). Everything depends on how we approach the phenomenon of speech, or language. It may be that logic as it developed in Western philosophy is superficial; but even illusions and superficial phenomena are phenomena – they are the self-showing of something (SZ 31) – and thus, even the superficial has the potential to lead us to see the things themselves. In his later thought, then, Heidegger is trying to respond to a phenomenon that showed itself to the Greeks, but which they appropriated inadequately.¹⁷ Heidegger's readings are never purely destructive, but are meant to deconstruct a text in order to find the insights that hide within it; this is the case in his treatment of λόγος.

As for Heidegger's own answer to the question of the site of truth, we have already heard it. He insists that if we are to understand λόγος, we should interpret it not in terms of traditional logic, but in terms of Dasein (639). To be Dasein is to be in the world (cf. 585). To be in the world (as we know from *Being and Time*) is to be temporal, historical. In short, the site of truth is history. Things themselves can present themselves to us only when we appropriate the past, and thus authentically inhabit the historical site in which we find ourselves situated. It can be said that all of Heidegger's thought is an attempt to re-situate truth. He persistently draws our attention to the τόπος, the historical site, in which things are unconcealed.

The motif of *place* has long been recognized as central to Heidegger's later philosophy. But it can be traced back to his earliest publications; and from the beginning, this motif takes the form of an appropriation of ancient

philosophy, in particular Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics. In the final two books of his *Metaphysics* and elsewhere, Aristotle argues that mathematics is restricted to studying certain attributes which it abstracts from substances; mathematics is hence a special science that is subordinate to the science of substance – that is, the science of being qua being, the science of what is, as such. In particular, mathematics abstracts from place, whereas all individual entities in fact have a place (*Met.* XIV.5.1092a18). Heidegger appropriates and develops this insight in numerous writings, using it as an attack on the essentially "mathematical" character of modern science and philosophy, and as a defense of the priority of ontology. He originally wanted to write his *Habilitationsschrift* on the "logical essence of the concept of number."¹⁸ We can see what form this study might have taken from certain passages in the *Habilitationsschrift* that Heidegger did produce, a study of a medieval text attributed to Duns Scotus. Heidegger is interested here in the medieval appropriation of the Aristotelian priority of first philosophy over mathematics; he especially stresses that the mathematical concept of the number one is subordinate to the ontological concept of unity.¹⁹ As he begins to focus on the historicity of the human understanding of Being, Heidegger begins to stress our situatedness, employing words such as *Da-sein* in his discussion of how Being makes sense to us. He holds that Dasein's understanding of Being, which is made possible by Dasein's situatedness, is more fundamental than the apparently unsituated perspective of modern mathematical science.²⁰

In the light of these ongoing, central concerns of Heidegger's thought, we can see that the "digression" on Aristotle and mathematics that interrupts the *Sophist* course (100-121) is in fact close to heart of his project. Explaining Aristotle's concept of τόπος, he writes: "Place is the *possibility of the proper belonging of an entity*. ... Place is the *potential-to-be-present that belongs to what is* and co-constitutes its Being" (109). In this passage, Heidegger's topical hermeneutics is both applied and enriched. Guided by his fore-having of the things, Heidegger interprets Aristotle's text by going beyond it: he takes Aristotle's concepts as partial indications of the things themselves. The ultimate "thing" for Heidegger, the *Sache des Denkens*, is Being. We tend tacitly to identify Being and presence. But Heidegger asks how it is *possible* for entities to present themselves, and *where* we can be presented with them: he asks about the site that lets presence occur. This ultimate τόπος is history. Heidegger strives, then, to be topical: by participating in history, by appropriating the past, he aims to understand the very presentation of what is. It is in this spirit that he appropriates an ancient Greek text and reads it as a manifestation of Being.

VII. Conclusion

The Cartesian Anxiety leads us to dead ends. When we search for truth, it robs us of our experience of situatedness, which it relegates to “subjectivity”; when we find that our “objective” search for truth is in fact still dependent on the repressed dimensions of experience, then the Cartesian Anxiety gives us back our situatedness, but robs us of truth. The possibility of situated truth is an attractive alternative to the Cartesian Anxiety. Such an alternative can demonstrate its viability only by developing a topical hermeneutics – an account of understanding that combines truth and time, combines fidelity to the things themselves and authentic historicity. This topical hermeneutics must not remain a matter of pure theory, but must propose an ideal of topicality and show that worthwhile, concrete interpretations of phenomena can be guided by this ideal.

Heidegger has attempted to do precisely this in all his writings. The lecture course on the *Sophist* is a particularly important exemplar of this topical hermeneutics, because it explicitly defends the possibility of situated truth, shows how to apply the ideal of topicality to the interpretation of philosophical texts, and shows how the content of topical hermeneutics can be confirmed and enriched through a confrontation with the philosophical past. Those who wish to read Heidegger from either an objectivist or a relativist standpoint should first assess his own way of reading, a way of reading that attempts to do justice to the situatedness of truth. Such an assessment must decide: does Heidegger make any progress in revealing the phenomena that he interprets? If so, does Heidegger reveal these phenomena on the basis of ahistorical criteria, or – as he claims – on the basis of authentic historicity? If we disagree with Heidegger’s interpretations – that is, if we find that he does not make progress in revealing the phenomena – then this disagreement must stem from our own experience of the phenomena, and we can ask ourselves, once again: what is the basis of this experience? Such questions are essential if we are to try to escape the impasse of objectivism and relativism. My goal has been to open a space in which such questions can be asked.²¹

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References

1. Richard Rorty, e.g., presents an incisive critique of objectivism, but seems to abandon truth altogether when he writes, “We have to ... see sentences as connected with other sentences rather than with the world”: *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p.372.
2. R.J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), esp. pp.16-19.
3. See e.g. D.C. Hoy, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” in C.B. Guignon, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and H.L. Dreyfus, “Holism and Hermeneutics,” in R. Hollinger, ed., *Hermeneutics and Praxis*

(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985). Hoy claims that when Heidegger insists that we be true to the things themselves, he really means “that beliefs can be checked only against other beliefs” (p.185), or that claims can be tested “only by appeal to other commitments that the interpretation is not willing to give up” (p.187). This amounts to abandoning knowledge in favor of the will to consistent opinion. Dreyfus is at pains to avoid such nihilism by steering clear of mentalistic language and stressing the virtue of openness. Yet he claims that (at least for “early Heidegger”) “there is *no thing* (fact or theory) to be right or wrong about ... better interpretations are merely those which are more liberating ... [i.e. which make] the interpreter more flexible and open to dialogue with other interpretations” (p.237). If Dreyfus is right, then Heidegger calls on us to have better conversations, but simultaneously makes all conversations vacuous, since there is nothing which they are about. For a similar critique of Rorty on Heidegger, see J.D. Caputo, “The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case of Heidegger and Rorty,” in Hollinger, *Hermeneutics and Praxis*, 248-271.

4. Cf. *Sein und Zeit* (henceforth *SZ*), 16th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986), pp.228-9.
5. The closest counterpart in Heidegger to my expression “topical hermeneutics” is *Erörterung* (discussion), taken as essentially related to *Ort* (place): see *On the Way to Language* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp.159-160. On *Erörterung* and *topos*, cf. O. Pöggeler, “Metaphysics and the Topology of Being in Heidegger,” in T. Sheehan, ed., *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), pp.173-85. The term “topical” has further connotations. First, it suggests a concern with the pressing issues of the day. Heidegger invariably looks down on our absorption in “current events,” yet he is ultimately concerned with the present situation of mankind; he simply holds that an adequate understanding of this situation must reach into the past. Thus, his concerns are not altogether divorced from the “topical” in the everyday sense. Secondly, the term recalls “topics” in Aristotle’s sense, the study of dialectical arguments. Since such arguments are not meant to be absolutely sound but are, rather, appropriately plausible at a particular stage in the search for knowledge, this sense of “topics” involves a kind of situated truth and thus has a connotation that is not unwelcome (cf. Pöggeler, pp.183-4).
6. *Platon: Sophistes, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 19 (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992). Further references to this text will take the form of parenthesized page numbers. Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.
7. This and the following quotation are italicized in the original.
8. Cf. Pascal, *Pensées*, trans. A.J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin Books, 1966), p.93.
9. See e.g. *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p.35.
10. Cf. Gadamer on “belonging” to a tradition: *Truth and Method*, 2d ed., tr. J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1992), pp.262, 290, 295, 458.
11. Ernst Troeltsch, for instance, argued in *Historicism and its Problems* (1922) that historicism undermines all norms and truths; his own attempt to rescue knowledge and value seems to rest on pure faith. See G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*, revised ed. (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), pp.189-190.
12. This point underlies Gadamer’s thesis that historicism, like Enlightenment rationalism, disengages truth from tradition: *Truth and Method*, p.270.
13. Here we may recall Schleiermacher’s goal: “to understand an author better than he understood himself.” (Cf. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp.192-6.) But the difference is crucial: Heidegger is not speaking of understanding the psychology of Plato as a creator, but of understanding the *thing* that Plato’s text is about.
14. “The Thinker as Poet” (“Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens”), in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p.9.
15. The usual translation of *Rede* in *SZ* §34 is “discourse.” I translate it as “speech” because while in *SZ Rede* refers to the intelligibility of the world, in the *Sophist* course it seems to refer to the act of using language, primarily by making assertions.

16. "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings*, ed. D.F. Krell, 2nd ed. (Harper San Francisco, 1993), 236. On pre-Socratic λόγος, see e.g. "Logos," in *Early Greek Thinking*, tr. D.F. Krell and F.A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1975).
17. Cf. "Logos," p.77.
18. O. Pöggeler, "Heideggers logische Untersuchungen," in S. Blasche *et al.*, eds., *Martin Heidegger: Innen- und Außenansichten* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), p.82.
19. *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, in *Frühe Schriften, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, pp.231, 255.
20. See e.g. SZ §§19-21 on Cartesian space and existential space.
21. I thank Charles B. Guignon, Duane H. Davis, Julie Gifford, and Gregory Fried for their comments on this article.

How to Read Heidegger

Reiner Schürmann

In one of the Four Seminars that have now become accessible in Japanese, Heidegger makes a brief remark which, if correctly understood, tells one how his entire work should be read. In order to avoid misapprehensions about his very starting point, he writes, "after *Being and Time* (my) thinking replaced the expression 'meaning of being' with 'truth of being'. And so as to avoid any misapprehension about truth, so as to exclude its being understood as conformity, 'truth of being' has been elucidated as 'locality of being'—truth as the locus-character of being. That presupposes, however, an understanding of what a locus is. Hence the expression topology of being."¹

His itinerary, then, has been traced by three successive guiding words, the first two of which, however, remained open to misapprehensions: meaning of being, truth of being, and topology of being. The first of these had been misunderstood as re-issuing a (neo-Kantian) philosophy of meaning, and the second as presupposing that truth is a quality of linguistic performances conforming to an extra-linguistic state of affairs. The third guiding word alone allowed Heidegger to answer the age-old question about the truth of being: it is the "locus-character" of being. An additional and enduring misapprehension to which the vocabulary of "being" lent itself—namely, that being be represented as the sum total of entities—was also discarded as Heidegger spoke of the difference between presence and presencing rather than of the ontological difference.

Only in his last writings does he raise the question of presencing as that of "loci." These loci are the historical economies. In each moment they constitute a field of presence. Across the epochs, presencing articulates itself differently, sets itself to work (*poiein*) differently. The 'poietic' character of presencing is what Heidegger calls *Dichtung*, "poetry." "Poetry that thinks is in truth the topology of being." Needless to say, this has nothing to do with the art of composing verse, or even with

¹This essay was initially published in a Japanese translation in *Soubun* (June, 1985), pp. 18-20. This is the first appearance of the English original.

human language. "The poietic character of thinking" is only the echo, the reverberation of presencing and its poietic character. Presencing crystallizes (*dichten* means 'to thicken', 'to render dense') into successive orders. Conversely, these epochal crystallizations determine the kind of words with which we speak and write. The self-ordering of presencing thus must be understood as the primordial language. Throughout his texts, the essential concern of Heidegger's thinking remains the same: to understand 'being' phenomenologically as presencing, and to understand it through the manifold modes that entities have of rendering themselves 'dense', of ordering themselves, of constituting a text or 'poem'. When the guiding idea of Heideggerian phenomenology is "the meaning of being," this manifold is one of regions: entities given for handling, entities given as objects, and being-there. When its guiding idea is "the truth of being," the manifold is one of epochs: Greek, Latin, Modern, Technological. Finally, when the guiding idea is "the topology of being," the manifold is no longer a matter of regions or epochs, but it is the "coming-to-presence" itself: an event of multiple origination which, as a transcendental condition, renders the spatial, temporal, linguistic and cultural "loci" possible.

Only with this last form of multiplicity does the thrust of the problematic appear which moved Heidegger throughout the trajectory of his polymorphic writings with their shifting vocabularies: to grasp presencing as a force of plurification and of dissolution. From the genealogical perspective, the historical constellations of entities appear as orders arranged under a First ordering. But once the phenomenological gaze moves back from the quality and interplay of things present towards their presencing, the line of descent in which these constellations were put into place by figures of an epochal First proves to have itself sprung from an initial concealment: from the forgottenness of the event of presencing and the inability to sustain its manifold. The genealogy, then, which calls attention to the multiplicity of historical orderings, discovers at this line's start the incapacity to stand or bear, and hence to understand or grasp, the "poietics" in those orderings, the plasticity of their making and unmaking. The quest for principles springs from a lack of stature.³ Heidegger's last writings could therefore be read as the attempt to elaborate the chief traits of an economy of presencing that is not reducible to one *arche*—the traits of a plural economy.

If this is the case, it is clear that the "phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology" promised in *Being and Time*, can be fully understood—and carried out—only from the standpoint of Heidegger's last writings. Only then does it become apparent how time can be "der Sinn des Seins": not the "meaning" of being, but its directionality; the "sense" as the direction in which something, e.g., motion, takes place

(this acceptance of both the English 'sense' and the French *sens*—the sense of a river, or of traffic—stems, not from Latin, but from an Indo-European verb that means to travel, to follow a path). Time is not the "signification" of being for a man and hence "a human accomplishment" (a misunderstanding that Heidegger says threatened the deconstruction in its first phase, that of *Being and Time*), but it is the directionality of the orderings by which constellations of presencing produce themselves. Nor is time the *sens unique*, the one-way street of the epochs unfolding across the ages (a misunderstanding that threatened during the phase of "the history of being"),⁵ but instead the multiple presencing in which things present emerge from absence. These distinctions are what is most difficult in Heidegger. The point here is that the correct understanding of his early writings is obtained only if he is read backwards, from end to beginning.

The hermeneutical dilemma of whether Heidegger should be read forwards or backwards appears most clearly in connection with *praxis*. Much has been written on the possible political implications of *Being and Time*. According to some, the pronouncement to follow the *Führer*, made six years after its publication, could already be seen in germ in that book. The address delivered by Heidegger at the inauguration of his university rectorship, with its call for triple mobilization in the service of work, arms, and knowledge,⁶ would show the outcome of a direction taken by him ever since the *Existential Analytic*. The key term which supposedly indicates this continuity of thinking is that of resolve, *Entschlossenheit*. The same themes are said to reappear still later with the praise of the great statesman (compared to other "creators" like poets, artists and thinkers) in the late thirties. Heidegger's early writings are thus supposed to constitute the framework that his political speeches would only have had to fill out as rallying cries to a leader capable of walking alone and resorting to violence. Hence the themes of the *Rektoratsrede* and other speeches of that period, focusing on "the community of combat comprised of professors and students," would be neither accidental nor isolated in Heidegger.⁷ Later, his hands burned by politics, Heidegger is said to have chosen less compromising subjects for his publications, notably Hölderlin's poetry. It would be all too understandable how on several subsequent occasions he declared himself incapable of seeing any practical implications of his thinking. Thus, if Heidegger is read from beginning to end, Karl Jaspers' judgment seems to have bearing: not only did he never renounce his nostalgia for a certain past, but "the fundamental constitution of that way of philosophizing must lead, in *praxis*, to total domination."⁸

When read backwards, from the last writings to the first, Heidegger appears in a different light. Once again, only his texts are at issue.

From the viewpoint of the topology, *praxis*—just like *theoria*, it should be added—is only the response that the actors in history give, and cannot but give, to the constellations of presencing that enclose them. If there is a 'normative' aspect to this phenomenology of the epochal constellations, it consists in the possibility of a withering away of the principles and a plurification of action. Under different titles—the "four-fold" or "quadrate" is only one of many—Heidegger then attempts to think presencing explicitly as plural. The actions that respond to presencing so understood, will be diametrically opposed to the 'Führer principle'; it will be a type of action irreconcilably alien to all reduction to the uniform, an action hostile to the standard.

The hermeneutical dilemma is noteworthy here: reading Heidegger forwards, that is, from the Existential Analytic to the Topology, an "idealization of unity to the detriment of plurality" may be construable out of a few sparse texts. But in reading Heidegger backwards, from the Topology to the Existential Analytic, the evidence is to the contrary. Presencing then appears more Nietzschean, deprived of metaphysical principles. "Chaotico-practical."⁹ Instead of a unitary concept of ground, we then have the "fourfold"; instead of praise for the firm will,¹⁰ detachment; instead of the integration of the university into civil service, protest against technology and cybernetics; instead of a straightforward identification between *Führer* and right,¹¹ anarchy.

Such is the immense value of the brief methodological remark Heidegger made during the 1969 seminar at Le Thor. He suggests that the two steps taken during the course of his writings—from "the sense (*Sinn*) of being" to "the truth (*aletheia*) of being," and then to the "topology of being"—brought his thinking closer, each time, to the appropriate starting point. If the topology, alone, provides the adequate access to the one question Heidegger kept pursuing from the start, the question of being, then it is obvious that his works should be read backwards, not forwards.

NOTES

1. Martin Heidegger, *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), p. 73.
2. The two quotations are from Martin Heidegger, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1954), p. 23; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 12, a text written in 1947, the first in which Heidegger speaks of "the topology of being."
3. Understanding, *Verständnis*, is to be taken "in the originary sense of

vorstehen: to be standing before, to be on a par with, to be of a stature to sustain that before which one finds oneself" (Martin Heidegger, *Vier Seminare*, p. 72). See also Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1957), p. 143; *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 183.

4. Martin Heidegger, *Vier Seminare*, p. 73.
5. Martin Heidegger, *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität* (Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), pp. 15f.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 18. This reading of Heidegger is defended most coherently in the article by Karsten Harries, "Heidegger as a Political Thinker," *Review of Metaphysics* 29 (1976), pp. 642-669, reprinted in Michael Murray, ed., *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 304-328. That the structure of "resolve" in *Being and Time* implies a need for authority appears highly debatable to me. Even those who find such a reading convincing would still have to acknowledge what in 1953 Jürgen Habermas called a transformation in the "quality of appeal" between *Being and Time* and *Introduction to Metaphysics*. In *Being and Time*, writes Habermas, "Heidegger still exalted the quasi-religious decision of the private, self-individuated existence as finite autonomy," while the praise of power and violence was only a momentary "fascist coloration" of the subsequent discovery of "the history of being" (Jürgen Habermas, *Philosophisch-politische Profile* [Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971], pp. 67-75, trans. Dale Ponikvar, "Martin Heidegger: On the Publication of Lectures from the Year 1935," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 6:2 (1977), pp. 155-164). What makes for this tendency in reading *Being and Time* is a voluntarist interpretation of *Entschlossenheit*. But to convince oneself of the weakness of this starting point, it is enough to see Henri Birault, for example, sustain with at least equal cogency that *Entschlossenheit* prefigures the later notion of *Gelassenheit*. See Henri Birault, *Heidegger et l'expérience de la pensée* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), p. 519. This latter reading can at least avail itself of an explicit affirmation in Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), p. 94, translated in *Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 138. Yet the same concept in *Being and Time* can hardly yield both the call to service and the call to letting-be.
7. Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger* (München: R. Piper, 1978), p. 183. See also his *Philosophische Autobiographie* (München: R. Piper, 1977), pp. 92-111. These two publications continue a debate opened by Georg Lukács and Theodor Adorno and summarized by Beda Allemann, "Martin Heidegger und die Politik," in Otto Pöggeler, ed., *Heidegger: Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1970), pp. 246-260. It has been taken up more recently in slightly different terms by Jürgen Habermas, who now opposes enlightenment to the "new right," a distinction which for him coincides with that between modernism (whose spokesman is Kant) and post-modernism (whose spokesman is Heidegger). This typology becomes cruder still when rationality and communication are described as modern enlightened ideas, whereas today's "young conservatives" (early Wittgenstein, late Gottfried Benn) stand accused of identifying modernism and nihilism, state intervention and totalitarianism, anti-militarism and sympathy for terrorism, etc. Habermas has formulated some of these criticisms in a summary treatment of the late Adorno and Heidegger: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, 2 vol. (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1981), for instance, vol. I, pp. 516ff. My earlier remarks about enlightenment may suffice at this point to suggest how untenable these facile disjunctions and amalgamations are.

8. K. Harries, "Heidegger as a Political Thinker," p. 669.
9. H. Birault, *Heidegger et l'expérience de la pensée*, p. 74.
10. "Firmness of the will" and "clearness of the heart" are the themes of the funeral eulogy delivered by Heidegger in 1933 for Leo Schlageter; see *Nachlese zu Heidegger. Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken, mit zwei Bildtafeln*, ed. Guido Schneeberger (Bern: privately published, 1962), p. 48.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 63f. and 136.

Heidegger's Concept of Presence

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The central question in Heidegger's philosophy, early and late, is that concerning the meaning of being. Recently, some have suggested that Heidegger himself interprets being to mean presence (*Anwesen*, *Anwesenheit*, *Praesenz*), citing as evidence lectures dating from the 1920s to the 1960s. I argue, on the contrary, that Heidegger regards the equation between being and presence as the hallmark of metaphysical thinking, and that it only ever appears in his texts as a gloss on the philosophical tradition, not as an expression of his own ontological commitments. In his early work Heidegger seeks to confront and even correct the traditional interpretation of being by challenging its narrow preoccupation with presence and the present. By the 1930s, however, he abandons the idea that there is anything to be intrinsically right or wrong about with regard to the *meaning* of being and turns his attention instead to what he calls 'appropriation' (*Ereignis*) or the *truth* of being, that is, the essentially ahistorical condition for the possibility of all historically contingent interpretations of being, including the metaphysical interpretation of being as presence.

One of the most persistent themes running throughout Heidegger's philosophy, both early and late, is his idea that all thought, indeed all intentionality, rests on an ordinarily tacit understanding of what it means to be, and that metaphysical thought specifically consists in interpreting being as a kind of 'presence' or 'presentness' (*Anwesen*, *Anwesenheit*, *Praesenz*).¹ This much is well known. What is less widely understood, or even acknowledged, is that Heidegger's frequent references to presence as the meaning of being comprise two very different claims. At times Heidegger is describing what he takes to be the ontological conditions of our understanding of the temporal present as one of the three 'ecstases' that constitute time, which is in turn the most general horizon or condition for our understanding of being. At other times he is articulating and interpreting what he takes to be the central assumption underlying the metaphysical tradition itself, which he thinks has focused so narrowly on the temporal present as to obscure the very question of being, effectively removing it from the full ecstatic horizons of temporality at large.

This distinction between Heidegger's own ontological claims, on the one hand, and his ontological interpretation of the history of metaphysics, on the other, is crucial and needs emphasis, if only because a number of scholars have recently argued that Heidegger was himself committed to the identification of being with presence, indeed that such an identification

constituted his answer to the question of being. Frederick Olafson, for example, attributes to Heidegger 'a concept of presence under which presence in the present tense and absence (past and future) are both subsumed'.² Consequently, he takes Heidegger, both in his early and his later writings, to be endorsing the traditional equation: "Presence" is the term that Heidegger uses to express the fundamental character of being as such', he writes. 'That being is to be understood as presence remains the basic postulate . . . throughout Heidegger's thought.'³ This attribution to Heidegger of what Heidegger himself regarded as the very essence of metaphysical thinking, I shall argue, is based on a misreading of the relevant texts, particularly Heidegger's lectures from the summer semester of 1927 and his 1962 lecture, 'Time and Being'.⁴ David Farrell Krell offers a rather closer reading of the 1927 and 1962 lectures,⁵ but like Olafson he too seems to suppose that Heidegger himself ultimately identifies being with presence, and that presence is itself a temporally neutral or general horizon that embraces not just the present, but all three temporal ecstases: past, present, and future.

On the contrary, I shall argue, Heidegger does not endorse the interpretation of being as presence, nor is presence itself the horizon of all three temporal ecstases, and so in effect synonymous with being. Olafson and Krell are right, of course, that Heidegger draws a distinction between the temporal horizon of presence and the ecstasis of the present. But that is nothing more than the distinction, familiar in phenomenology, between a horizon and what it is the horizon of. It in no way suggests an equation between presence and being *tout court*. Like Olafson, Krell reads too much into the distinction between the horizon of presence and the ecstasis of the present, and as a result misconstrues Heidegger's criticism of common sense and the tradition in his 1927 lectures as a kind of self-critique, indeed an implicit repudiation of the very project of fundamental ontology as the beginning of an answer to the question of being. This approach too, it seems to me, rests on an elementary misreading of the text itself.

Understanding Heidegger's philosophy requires that we distinguish more carefully between his own positive claims and his critical interpretations of both 'fallen' everyday understanding and traditional philosophy. Admittedly, that distinction is often difficult to draw, in part because Heidegger himself seldom makes it explicit. In the 1962 lecture, for example, Heidegger says, apparently on his own behalf, 'Being means presencing, letting presence, presentness' (ZSD 10, OTB 10). But even here, I contend, a careful reading of the text, especially the minutes of a seminar devoted to a critical discussion of the lecture,⁶ shows that what looks at first glance like an assertion of Heidegger's own about the meaning of being is in fact an interpretative gloss on the metaphysical tradition by way of an account of the conditions that made that tradition possible in the first place.

Those conditions constitute what Heidegger eventually came to refer to as 'event' or 'appropriation' (*Ereignis*) and the *truth* of being, which I shall argue is something quite different from the *meaning* of being. The distinction between the meaning of being and the truth of being has never to my knowledge been given a fully adequate account, and yet it is essential to any understanding of Heidegger's later thought.⁷ Indeed, by sharpening the focus of what had been the basic theme of *Being and Time*, the distinction casts retrospective light on the project of fundamental ontology itself and the challenge it presented to the philosophical tradition.

I

Heidegger's early philosophy, *Being and Time* in particular, is devoted to the question concerning the meaning of being (*der Sinn von Sein*) (SZ 1).⁸ The question of being is really a question concerning the *meaning* of being, since it has to do with our understanding of being, not with anything putatively independent of us. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, one might say that being is just what we understand when we have an understanding of being.⁹ For just as Wittgenstein conceives of linguistic meaning, so too Heidegger conceives of being as the correlate of human understanding and practice. Moreover, having an understanding of being, which is to say understanding what it means for something to be, is the *sine qua non* of the kind of entity we are, namely Dasein. So, for Heidegger, being is only being whose meaning is understood by Dasein, just as there is no understanding of being that is not an understanding of what it means for something to be. For without Dasein there is no understanding of being, and without an understanding of being, though there may be entities, there is no being, for being itself is not an entity:

being 'is' only in the understanding of the entity to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs. Being can therefore remain unconceptualized, but it is never not understood at all. . . . [there is a] necessary connection between being and understanding. (SZ 183)

"There is" (*gibt es*) being only in the specific disclosedness that characterizes the understanding of being. . . . There is being only . . . if Dasein exists' (GP 24–25).¹⁰ In short, 'only as long as Dasein is . . . "is there" (*gibt es*) being' (SZ 212).

In *Being and Time*, however, Heidegger never tells us what the meaning of being in general is, or even if there is a single general meaning. The only general claim he advances is that, however else being is understood, it is always understood in terms of time. Time is what most fundamentally determines the meaning of being, which is to say it always underlies or

frames our understanding of being. This is the central thesis of the book, and the import of the title.

Heidegger's more specific claims in Division One of *Being and Time* make explicit what he takes to be our understanding of three different senses of being: the utility or 'availability' (*Zuhandenheit*) of artifacts and practical settings, the 'occurrentness' (*Vorhandenheit*) of objects, and finally Dasein's own existence (*Existenz*) or being-in-the-world. Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between human beings and things available or occurrent in an environment, since availability and occurrentness are radically unsuited to the understanding we have of ourselves. For whereas artifacts and objects owe their mode of being to the temporal horizon of the present in which they show up as either useful or useless, or in which they occur as either present or absent, we understand our own being above all in terms of a future horizon of projected possibilities and a past horizon of traditions, customs, or more generally speaking 'attunements' (*Stimmungen*) in which the world is, as Heidegger likes to say, 'always already' meaningful for us in advance.¹¹ Heidegger calls these past and future horizons of Dasein's intelligibility 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*) and 'projection' (*Entwurf*), respectively, and together with our 'falling' (*Verfallen*) in the present they constitute the temporal structure of being-in-the-world. Dasein's mode of being is 'thrown projection' (*geworfener Entwurf*), and this means that Dasein never understands itself purely in terms of the temporal present, and so never understands itself as available like a tool or occurrent like an object. Instead, human beings are essentially historical: we are what we are in light of our attunements and traditions and in the face of our possibilities.¹²

Traditional ontology, by contrast, has always interpreted being in terms of the temporal horizon of the present, and has understood entities as essentially occurrent, that is, as objects or substances. But the condition of our understanding things as occurrent is our having an understanding of things as available or unavailable for use, and the condition of an understanding of availability is in turn our thrown projection in a world defined by already meaningful practical possibilities. Heidegger never completed the projected Third Division of Part One, nor indeed any of Part Two of *Being and Time* (see SZ 39–40). And yet his lectures from the late 1920s, immediately following the publication of the text as we now have it, as well as the bulk of his later writings, offer a detailed reading of the history of metaphysics as a series of interpretations of the meaning of being. Metaphysics has invariably oriented itself toward the temporal horizon of the present (*Gegenwart*), and has therefore always identified being with some form of presence or presentness. As a result, philosophers typically ignore their own tacit interpretation of being as presence altogether in favor of the entities themselves understood as things present. In this way,

metaphysics continually loses sight of the question of being, all the while clinging tacitly to its own interpretation of being as presence.

The history of metaphysics, Heidegger therefore says, is nothing less than a history of the forgetfulness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). Thus the various entities featuring prominently in metaphysical systems, from Plato's *eidos* and Aristotle's *ousia* to Cartesian *substantia* and Nietzschean will, are all so many entities meant to make sense, *per impossibile*, of the very conditions of there being anything at all. And in the midst of all this metaphysical talk of entities, being itself, or more precisely the meaning of being, has been all but forgotten. Forgetfulness of being is the mark of metaphysical thinking and has reached a new extreme in our own contemporary technological understanding of being as 'enframing' (*Gestell*), and of entities as resource material or 'standing reserve' (*Bestand*).¹³ All metaphysics, and indeed everyday pre-theoretical common sense,¹⁴ then, from Greek antiquity to modern technology, rests on the interpretation of being as presence, while forgoing, and indeed blocking, inquiry into the temporal conditions of entities being present, not to mention the conditions of Dasein's own historical existence as thrown-projection.

II

What, then, does it mean to interpret being as presence? First, it means granting privileged status to the present itself, not by denying the reality of past and future, but by defining the past and the future privatively in relation to the present. Granting primacy to the present means defining the past as that which is *no longer* present, and the future as that which *will be* present. Not that past and future are themselves unreal or that time is an illusion, rather the primacy of the present means that something in the past *is not* (any more), just as something in the future *is not* (yet): 'If we are to characterize time in terms of the present, we understand the present as the now as opposed to the no-longer-now of the past and the not-yet-now of the future.' Both in metaphysics and in common sense,

time – the unity of present, past and future – is represented in terms of the now. Even Aristotle says that that of time which *is*, i.e. presences (*anwest*), is the prevailing now. Past and future are a *mē on ti*: not an entity, though not a mere nothing, but rather something that presences that lacks something, a lack named by the 'no longer' now and the 'not yet' now. Seen in this way, time appears as a succession of nows, each of which, barely named, already vanishes into the just now (*Soeben*), and is immediately followed by the about to be (*Sogleich*). (ZSD 11, OTB 11)¹⁵

Of course, there is an evident difference between the temporal sense of the word 'present' and 'present' in the sense of being somehow at hand or nearby: 'the present understood in terms of the now is not at all the same as the present in the sense of the presentness of guests.' And yet Heidegger insists that the two notions are essentially linked: 'the present also means presentness. However, we are not accustomed to defining what is peculiar to time with a view to the present in the sense of presentness' (ZSD 11, OTB 10–11). Rather, as we have seen, we customarily define time in terms of the present in the sense of the now.

Heidegger wants us instead to understand each temporal ecstasis – past, present, and future – in terms of its own 'temporal horizon' or 'horizontal schema'. In *Being and Time* Heidegger describes the temporal horizons corresponding to each ecstasis:

The existential-temporal condition of the possibility of a world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has something like a horizon . . . The ecstatic horizon is different in each of the three ecstases. The schema in which Dasein comes toward itself futurally, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the for-the-sake-of-itself (Umwillen seiner). We take the schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself as thrown in affectivity as the before-which (Wovor) of thrownness, or as the to-which (Woran) of abandonment. This indicates the horizontal structure of having been. For the sake of its existing in the abandonment to itself as thrown, Dasein at the same time is enpresenting as being amidst such-and-such. The horizontal schema of the present is defined by the in-order-to (Um-zu). (SZ 365)

Elsewhere Heidegger refers to the temporal horizon or horizontal schema of the present simply as presence or presentness, meaning the ontological condition or criterion for anything to occupy the temporal present by being either available or occurrent. Only by being either present or absent within the horizon of presence is it possible for something to be present to us here and now, which is in turn the condition for its occupying the now of clock time, namely this objectively specifiable moment in a measurable series.¹⁶

Of course, no horizon contains itself as an entity, so the temporal horizons of the three ecstases do not themselves occupy any of the ecstases and are therefore themselves neither past, present, nor future. Presence is therefore not itself something in the present. In his lectures of the summer of 1927, immediately following the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger says:

Presence is a more original phenomenon than the now. . . . Is presence then identical with the present? In no way. We characterize the present, the enpresenting of something, as one of the ecstases of temporality. The very name 'presence' indicates that we do not have in mind any ecstatic phenomenon, as with present and future . . . None the less there is a connection between the present and presence that is not accidental. . . . Presence is not identical with the present, rather as the basic determination of the horizontal schema of this ecstasis it goes toward making up the full temporal structure of the present. Corresponding points hold for the two other ecstases, the future and having been (Gewesenheit). (GP 434–5)

That is, just as presence is not itself something in the present, so too Dasein's for-the-sake-of-itself as the horizon of its projection on to possibilities is not itself something in the future, nor is Dasein's before-which or to-which of its abandonment in thrownness something in the past.¹⁷

Over and beyond granting primacy to the ecstasis of the present, then, interpreting being as presence means understanding being in terms of the temporal horizon in which available and occurrent entities can be either present or absent, revealed or concealed, here or there, useful or useless. Heidegger is not just concerned with the privileged status of the ecstasis of the present itself, he also wants to know what makes possible any understanding of that ecstasis, and so how it was possible for metaphysics to construe the temporal horizon peculiar to it as the very meaning of being in general. For the metaphysical tradition presupposes presence as the most general horizon for any understanding of being, including our understanding of our own being.

1. The Presocratic Understanding of Being as Physis

Consider one of the earliest examples of such an interpretation, namely the archaic Greek conception of *physis*. The term is ordinarily translated by 'nature' via the Latin *natura*, but in his 1935 *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger interprets it instead to mean emerging or dawning (*Aufgehen*) and lingering:

What does the word *physis* mean? It means that which emerges from itself (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), self-unfolding, entering into appearance through such unfolding and holding fast and persisting in it, in short, the reign of what dawns and lingers. The lexical meaning of *phyein* is to grow, or to make grow . . .

Physis as dawning can be experienced everywhere, e.g. in celestial events (the rising of the sun), in the surging of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the emergence of animal and man from the womb. (EM 11, IM 14)¹⁸

Crucial to this understanding of being is the way it defines coming into being and going out of being privatively with respect to the present moment in which a thing is present, shining forth, in full bloom, emergent, here and now.¹⁹

Heidegger regarded the Presocratic tradition as the least distorted starting-point in a long history of metaphysical distortions, since the concept of *physis* itself facilitates the very question of being by reminding one of the horizons of obscurity surrounding the dawning and lingering of things. Subsequent metaphysical interpretations of presence, beginning with Plato's *idea*, which Heidegger interprets to mean showing itself or seeming (*Sichzeigen*, *Scheinen*),²⁰ amount to a denial of those horizons and tend to rob the question of its very motivation. And although the Presocratics

arguably understood the present as a kind of open or extended temporal region rather than a dimensionless instant between the future and the past, none the less *physis* as presence undoubtedly means dawning and lingering in the openness of the present. Again, that Heidegger did not himself embrace the ontology of the Presocratics is clear from his own account of Dasein as fundamentally futural: *Being and Time* portrays human beings not as things dawning and lingering in the world, but as agents interpreting themselves and their situation by projecting into possibilities.

More important than the priority of the present itself, however, is what Heidegger takes to be an identification of the horizon of presence with being in general. For the Greeks, to be means ultimately to be present in such a way as to make possible the kind of dawning and lingering expressed by the word *physis*. The ancient term Heidegger thinks describes that horizon of presence itself, namely the temporal condition for the very possibility of dawning and lingering, is *ousia*. Heidegger rejects the standard translation of *ousia* as 'substance', but accepts the conventional rendering of *parousia* and *apousia* as 'presence' and 'absence', respectively:

For *parousia* we have a corresponding German expression, *An-wesen*. This word refers to a self-contained farmhouse or estate. Even in Aristotle's day, *ousia* was used both in this sense *and* in the sense of the fundamental philosophical term. Something is present (*west an*). It stands on its own and presents itself. It is. At bottom, for the Greeks, 'being' means presentness. (EM 46, IM 61)

Both here and in *Being and Time* Heidegger is clear about the difference between his own philosophical question – What is the meaning of being? – and what he calls 'the fundamental question of metaphysics', namely, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' (EM 1, IM 1). It is impossible to understand Heidegger's philosophy without understanding the difference between these two questions. For although philosophers have in the past occasionally asked themselves why there is something rather than nothing, Heidegger thinks they have never explicitly posed the question concerning what it means for something to be. Moreover, Heidegger maintains, no account of *why* there is anything will even be coherent if we have never asked ourselves what we understand when we understand *that* there is anything. For every direct or indirect answer to the metaphysical question in terms of forms, substances, God, the subject, or the will inevitably begs the question why any of these entities exist in the first place. Precisely because of their fixation on entities and their forgetfulness of being, philosophers have sought time and again to account for the general order of things by appeal to some entity or other that is present and somehow embodies or manifests presence to the highest degree. That the meaning of being is presence at all is of course the tacit assumption underlying all such appeals.

Olafson's reading of Heidegger rests in part on a failure to distinguish between Heidegger's question and the question of metaphysics, and so between Heidegger and the tradition he interprets. For example, he writes:

when the question, 'Why is there something (*Seiendes*) rather than nothing?' is asked at the beginning of EM, and Heidegger sets about answering it, he simply assumes, as a matter that does not require supporting argument, that what notions like *physis* and 'being' signify is the emergence from hiddenness by virtue of which entities first become observable; and this, of course, is the notion of being that was developed in the period of SZ.²¹

If Heidegger is without an argument for the claim that being means *physis* or coming into presence, it is simply because he is not advancing the claim. His point is just that the ancient Greeks understood being as *physis*, and *physis* as presencing. Nor does he set about trying to answer the fundamental question of metaphysics. On the contrary, he insists that the question is itself doomed to obscurity in the absence of any prior reflection on the meaning of being.

2. Kant's Conception of Being as Positedness in Perception

Consider next Kant's claim that 'The concept of position or positing is totally simple and on the whole identical with the concept of being in general'.²² Position, for Kant, means one of two things: either the 'relative position' of a predicate in relation to a subject, or 'absolute position', which means existence or actuality defined in terms of the givenness of an object in perception: 'For that the concept precedes the perception signifies the concept's mere possibility; the perception which supplies the content to the concept is the sole mark of actuality.'²³ In his 1927 lectures Heidegger quotes these passages (GP 52, 62) and concludes that, for Kant, 'It is perception that in itself reaches out to the existence, the reality, or in our terminology the occurrentness of things' (GP 62). Later, he elaborates:

When Kant says, then, that existence (*Dasein*), i.e. for us being occurrent (*Vorhandensein*), is perception, this thesis is extremely rough and misleading, but none the less points in the proper direction of the problem. Being is perception, once interpreted, means: being is an intentional comportment of a peculiar kind, i.e. enpresenting, i.e. an ecstasis in the unity of temporality with its own schema, presence. Being equals perception, interpreted in primordial phenomenological terms, means: being equals presentness, presence. (GP 448)

Only by quoting the last three or four words of the final sentence in that passage out of context is Olafson able to create the impression that Heidegger himself endorses the claim.²⁴ In fact Heidegger is articulating in his own terms the temporal significance of Kant's conception of being as being posited in perception. Heidegger's conclusion is that *for Kant*, 'being

means presence'. Indeed, this section of the published text (§21b) bears the title, 'The Kantian interpretation of being and the problematic of temporality', and in it Heidegger tries 'to clarify the temporal content of Kant's thesis that being equals perception' (GP 449). The temporal content of the equation between being and perception is that being means presence, namely the temporal horizon of the present.

A few pages later Heidegger says 'being bespeaks (*besagt*) presence' (GP 451), and again, of course, quoted out of context this is misleading. The point is that presence is the temporal horizon or ontological condition of our making things present to ourselves as available or occurrent, which is what allows us to 'posit' entities in perception. But being can only indicate presence if our attention is narrowly fixed on the present at the expense of past and future. Indeed Heidegger is at pains to remind his listeners that the analysis here in §21 applies exclusively to the ecstasis of the present and its horizon:

In order not to confuse our view of the phenomena of temporality, which are otherwise so difficult to grasp, we shall restrict ourselves to an explication of the present and its ecstatic horizon, presence. Enpresenting is that ecstasis in the temporalizing of temporality that understands itself as such on [the basis of] presence (GP 435–6).

'*Temporalität* is temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) with respect to the unity of the horizontal schemata belonging to it, in our case the present with respect to presence' (GP 436, emphasis modified).²⁵

3. Aristotle's Understanding of Being as Ousia

Finally, consider the lectures from the winter semester of 1925–26, which Olafson also cites in support of his interpretation.²⁶ Here Heidegger analyzes Aristotle's conception of truth in light of an interpretation of being as presence, which he says is common to Aristotle and Plato, and which goes hand-in-hand with an interpretation of time as defined by the present. In approaching Aristotle this way, he says, we can understand 'under what presupposition and according to what meaning of being uncoveredness or truth can itself indicate a mode of being'. To do so, we must get back to 'the unexpressed presuppositions, in terms of the unexpressed, not explicitly given understanding of being in Aristotle and the Greeks' (*Logik* 191). What is that unexpressed, inexplicit understanding of being in Plato and Aristotle? It can only be that being means presence, Heidegger argues, since Plato and Aristotle had already interpreted entities as essentially occurrent, therefore as enpresented, therefore as in the present:

Our question is this: what does *being mean*, such that *truth* can be understood as a *characteristic of being*? It has already been indicated that the determination of

being . . . which Aristotle introduces in [*Metaphysics*] Book IX (Φ) 10, means occurrentness . . . primary occurrentness . . . must, however, be understood as *presentness, presence*. Why? If being means and is understood to mean, though often inexplicitly, presence, then the comportment that genuinely corresponds to entities as entities is a comportment that itself, qua comportment, has a presenting character. . . . A comportment qua comportment is presenting, however, insofar as it has the sense of making present, or as we say in German, *Gegenwärtigen* (enpresenting). (*Logik* §14: 191–2).

Here Heidegger says explicitly that if being is interpreted as presence, then authentic comportment toward entities must amount to enpresenting, which indeed it does – for Aristotle and the Greeks. Enpresenting, moreover, means making things present in the present:

the pure uncoveredness of entities, as it is conceived by Aristotle . . . means nothing other than the pure unmoved and unmoveable present of what is present. Uncoveredness, i.e. here the pure present, is qua present the highest mode of presentness. Presentness, however, is the fundamental determination of being. Uncoveredness, then, as the highest mode of presentness, namely as the present, is a mode of being and indeed the most authentic mode of being, presentness itself presenting. What is therefore of concern in the enpresenting of something, i.e. in this uncovering, is the uncoveredness or the present of what is present, and presentness characterizes what there is itself, in so far as it is. That is, in so far as being is understood as presentness, and uncoveredness as the present, [so that] presentness and the present are presence, being as presentness can be defined in terms of truth as the present, and even must be, so that the present is the highest form of presentness. (*Logik* 193)

Heidegger sums up the result of his critique of traditional logic and Aristotle's conception of truth in the following three theses: 'Being means presentness. Truth means the present. Presentness and the present as characteristics of presence are modes of time' (*Logik* 199, cf. 205).

Passages like these, it seems to me, give no indication whatever that Heidegger himself is inclined to interpret being as presence. The question Heidegger is asking is, 'what does being mean' – that is, what specific interpretation of being is at work in Aristotle's thought – 'such that truth can be understood as a characteristic of being?' The answer is that, inasmuch as Aristotle and the Greeks identify truth with the present, being can only mean presentness or presence. Olafson is right to suggest that Heidegger sometimes draws a distinction between presence and presentness.²⁷ But he goes on to insist that 'An explicit statement of this contrast between the ancient and the Heideggerian understanding of *ousia*/*Anwesenheit* can be found in . . . *Logik* . . . 193'.²⁸ On the contrary, what Heidegger says there is that

the Greeks, Plato, and Aristotle . . . were far from understanding what it really means when they define being as presentness and the present. The present is *one*

characteristic of time. Understanding being as presentness in terms of the present means understanding being in terms of time. (*Logik* 193)

It is not that Plato and Aristotle were far from understanding what it really means to define being as presence in the sense that they failed to do so properly or in the right way, it is rather that they were unclear about the temporal presuppositions underlying the definition in the first place. For in these lectures, as in *Being and Time*, the conclusion Heidegger is finally aiming at is simply that we always understand being in terms of time. That Aristotle interpreted being as presence is thus a premise in the argument for that conclusion:

For Aristotle, being means presentness.
The present is the highest mode of presentness.
Presentness and the present are modes of time.
Therefore, Aristotle understands being in terms of time.

Compare this to an argument one might, for the sake of analogy, reconstruct from Book One of Plato's *Republic*. Socrates argues that Thrasymachus, in spite of his avowed immoralism, nevertheless conceives of the good life in terms of virtue. So, Socrates might say:

For Thrasymachus, the good life means gaining power and profit.
Ruling well is the best way of gaining power and profit.
Ruling well is a virtue.

Therefore, Thrasymachus conceives the good life in terms of virtue.²⁹

Socrates, that is, argues from the fact of Thrasymachus' identification of the good life with power and profit to the conclusion that even the love of power and profit amounts to a positive conception of virtue, which is consequently subject to rational scrutiny. Obviously this in no way implies that Socrates himself identifies the good life with gaining power and profit.

Similarly, Heidegger's argument for the temporal character of Aristotle's conception of being in no way implies that Heidegger himself equates being with presence. Indeed, it is not hard to see how Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle in the 1925–26 lectures prepares the ground for the claim in *Being and Time* that traditional ontology has always focused narrowly on the present by tacitly assuming an equation between being and the temporal horizon peculiar to the present:

the ancient interpretation of the being of entities is oriented toward the 'world' or 'nature' in the widest sense . . . in fact it derives its understanding of being from 'time'. The external – but of course *merely* external – record of this is the determination of the meaning of being as *parousia*, or *ousia*, which in ontological-temporal terms means 'presentness.' What is, is grasped in its being as 'presentness,' i.e. it is understood with respect to a particular mode of time, namely the 'present'. (SZ 25)

Here Heidegger distances himself from the worldly or naturalistic orientation of ancient ontology, insists that the Greeks derived their interpretation of being from their understanding of time, criticizes that conception of time as narrowly occupied with the present, and so reveals the origins and limitations of the interpretation of being as presence.

Olafson takes Heidegger to be in fundamental agreement with the tradition that being means presence, though metaphysicians themselves would stray from that insight. I think it is clear, on the contrary, that Heidegger faults the tradition for advancing a temporal interpretation of being focused narrowly on the horizon of the present, thus mistaking time for a series of nows, identifying being itself with presence as the horizon of the present understood as the now, and finally blurring the distinction between being and entities altogether.

III

David Farrell Krell also seems to suppose that Heidegger identifies being with presence. He begins by quoting the letter to William Richardson, in which Heidegger says, 'The ecstatic-horizonal time indicated in *Being and Time* is itself in no way what is most proper to time as sought in accordance with the question of being'.³⁰ He then refers to the following passage in the 1962 'Notes on a Seminar':

Being and Time is . . . by way of the temporality of Dasein in the interpretation of being as *Temporalität*, on the way toward finding a concept of time, that which is most proper to 'time,' on the basis of which 'being' gives itself (*sich er-gibt*) as presencing. (ZSD 34, OTB 32)

Krell then asks, 'Why and how does ecstatic-horizonal Time fall short of the meaning of Being as presencing?'³¹ To be sure, *Being and Time* was ultimately aiming at something it could never accomplish, namely a full and general account of temporality as the horizon or condition of the possibility of the understanding of being, including the understanding of being as presence. I have been arguing, however, that the interpretation of being as presence is the mark of metaphysics and common sense, and that Heidegger's early philosophy was an attempt to resist that interpretation by appeal to Dasein's own temporality as thrown projection. Krell, by contrast, takes the foregoing passages to imply that Heidegger himself understood being as presence all along, and that the account of Dasein's temporality was simply inadequate to the task of explicating it fully.

The root of the problem, I think, is that, like Olafson, Krell misconstrues the distinction between the temporal horizon of presence and the ecstasis of the present. Turning his attention to the 1927 lectures, Krell says, 'Kant's

identification of Being and perception, phenomenologically interpreted, suggests the identity of *Sein* and *Anwesenheit* or *Praesenz* (448).³² This much is right but potentially misleading since, as we have seen, Heidegger is talking not about his own, but about 'the Kantian interpretation of being' (GP §21). Krell continues: 'At this point Heidegger concedes something vital. *Praesenz* is not at all the moment of the present, it is not simply *Gegenwart* (433–4).' True, for as we have seen, Heidegger says, 'The very name "*presence*" indicates that we do *not* have in mind any *ecstatic phenomenon*, as with present and future' (GP 435). Krell goes on to suggest, however, that this distinction between presence and the present constitutes 'a first reply to the question of why and how the ecstatic-horizonal analysis of Time falls short of the meaning of Being as presence'.³³ And further on: 'The horizon of presence/absence, that is, of *Praesenz*, cannot be reduced to any of the temporal ecstases as such. Whether *Praesenz* is temporal at all is a question that no a priori proposition can settle.'³⁴

Fortunately, no a priori proposition is needed to settle the question, since the empirical fact of Heidegger's repeated insistence is sufficient to establish that the notion of *Praesenz*, as Heidegger intends it, is temporal through and through. Krell is right that *Praesenz* is not an ecstatic phenomenon, that it cannot be reduced to any of the ecstases as such, but this is only because it is the horizon of the ecstasis of the present. The fact that presence is the horizon of the present does not, as Krell suggests, 'put into question the relationship of *Anwesen* and *Gegenwart*'.³⁵ To infer that presence may not even be a temporal notion would be like supposing that there is nothing visual about one's visual field since the visual field is not reducible to any of the things one sees within it. Moreover, to suppose that presence is a kind of temporally neutral or general horizon of all three ecstases would be like calling the visual field the horizon not just of vision but also of hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Heidegger's distinction between presence and the present, then, is not the startling admission Krell supposes, but rather the perfectly standard phenomenological distinction between a horizon and what it is the horizon of.

What is startling, however, is the conclusion Krell draws from the distinction as he understands it. If Heidegger is already admitting by the summer of 1927 that presence is the meaning of being, that it is distinct from and irreducible to the present, and perhaps not even a temporal phenomenon at all, then it looks as if the project of fundamental ontology itself, that is, the attempt to approach the general question of the meaning of being on the basis of an account of the temporality of Dasein, is already doomed to fail, and that Heidegger knows it.³⁶ Krell claims to find confirmation of this conjecture in a passage in the lectures in which Heidegger describes the perils of philosophical thinking in the face of

Dasein's failure to understand its own being in everyday life. 'In its factual existence', Heidegger says, 'factual Dasein is disoriented with regard to being'. This disorientation leads Dasein to 'a misunderstanding, a faulty interpretation' of itself and its own being, which he insists is no mere failure of intelligence but is rooted 'in the historical existence of Dasein itself'. As Krell sees it, 'Heidegger is compelled to recognize the entanglement of his own analysis in "a fundamental untruth" (459)'.³⁷

But the 'fundamental untruth' Heidegger is referring to here is nothing specific to his own project, it is rather what he says 'dwells together with what is really seen and genuinely interpreted' in all genuine philosophizing, indeed in 'every science':

In the end, these faulty interpretations *must* be put forward, so that Dasein can find its way to the true phenomena by correcting them. Without knowing where the faulty interpretation lies, we can be quietly confident that a faulty interpretation lies hidden here too, in the temporal interpretation of being as such, and that it is no accident. It would be contrary to the sense of philosophizing, and of every science, if we did not want to understand that a fundamental untruth dwells together with what is really seen and genuinely interpreted. The history of philosophy bears witness that all ontological interpretation, with respect to the necessary horizon essential to it, and to the assurance of that horizon, is more like a groping about than a methodically unambiguous questioning. Even the fundamental act in the constitution of ontology, i.e. philosophy, the objectification of being, i.e. *the projection of being on the horizon of its intelligibility*, and precisely this act, is given over to uncertainty and stands constantly under the threat of subversion since this objectification of being must necessarily project itself in a direction that runs counter to our everyday comportment toward entities. This is why the projection of being itself necessarily turns into an ontical projection, or else reverts to [the concepts of] thinking, conceptualizing, soul, spirit, subject, without understanding the need for an original preparatory ontological delineation of precisely those fields, i.e. the need to get serious about its work. (GP 458–9)

Heidegger, I think, takes himself to have understood the need to get serious about his work. He even talks about getting back to the phenomena by 'correcting' Dasein's everyday misunderstanding of being – hardly the words of a philosopher suddenly acknowledging the failure of his enterprise. The point of these remarks is simply that fundamental ontology is subject to the same horizons of obscurity that situate all philosophical thought, nor do I think one would be tempted to read the passage in a confessional spirit in the first place absent the false assumption that Heidegger himself understood presence as the most general meaning of being to which his own phenomenological ontology had ultimately to aspire.

IV

Of course, Heidegger may well have had serious doubts by 1927, or even earlier, concerning the projected Third Division of *Being and Time*. The

foregoing passage from his 1927 lectures, however, is not an expression of that doubt, nor did Heidegger subsequently reorient his thinking so as better to accommodate the concept of presence as the true meaning of being.

What does distinguish Heidegger's later work from the fundamental ontology of the 1920s, and what finally becomes fully explicit in the 1962 lecture, 'Time and Being', is his finally abandoning any attempt to confront and correct the metaphysical tradition by trying to articulate the meaning of being in general more truly or authentically than that tradition itself ever could. The dead-end to which *Being and Time* was leading, then, had to do not with the untenability of the account of Dasein's being-in-the-world itself but with Heidegger's realization of the impossibility of any transition from the analytic of Dasein to a general account of the meaning of being *per se*. As Heidegger would later put it, 'the foundation of fundamental ontology is not a foundation on which anything could be built' (ZSD 34, OTB 32).

What Heidegger came to realize, indeed I believe what ultimately lay behind the 'turn' (*Kehre*) from the early phase of his thought to the later, is that there is nothing with respect to the meaning of being to be intrinsically right or wrong about, there is only a tradition of interpretations. No interpretation of being is more or less correct than any other, though one may well be better or worse than another by either shedding light on or obscuring the conditions of our asking the question of being in the first place. Heidegger is fond of the Presocratics precisely because their understanding of being as presencing seems to foster contemplation of the question, just as he criticizes our own technological understanding of being inasmuch as it blinds us to the fact that we have an understanding of being at all. Heidegger's later philosophy is thus largely concerned with the conditions for asking the question of being, and their relative obscurity, in so far as they make possible the history of ancient, modern, and contemporary interpretations of being as presence. The temporal but essentially ahistorical conditions of the history of being constitute what Heidegger comes to call the 'truth of being', which he interprets as 'event' or 'appropriation' (*Ereignis*). Thinking the *truth* of being means thinking the conditions of the possibility of thinking the *meaning* of being. But 'the truth of being' does not mean the *true meaning* of being: to ask about the truth of being is not to ask what the meaning of being really is, it is to ask what makes it possible for us to have any understanding at all of the meaning of being.

To conclude, then, I want to suggest that Heidegger's distinction between the meaning and the truth of being is crucial for understanding the philosophical position he eventually settles on in the 1960s, not least of all because it accounts for what might otherwise look like strong evidence against my interpretation of the role of the concept of presence in his

reading of the metaphysical tradition. For in the 1962 lecture we find a passage that at first glance seems to confirm Olafson and Krell in their claim that Heidegger himself embraces the interpretation of being as presence:

From the dawn of Western-European thought to today, being means the same as presencing. Presencing or presentness bespeaks the present. This, according to the common conception, along with the past and future, characterizes time. Being is defined as presentness by time. (ZSD 2, OTB 2)

But again, reading this passage in its full context shows that the equation is not Heidegger's own claim but instead an interpretation of the metaphysical thinking of the past and present. For although he says, 'Being means presencing, letting presence, presentness' (ZSD 10, OTB 10), the claim is strictly historical:

Presencing, presentness speaks in all metaphysical concepts of being, speaks in all determinations of being. Even the ground as what already lies before us, as what underlies, considered in itself, leads to lingering, to lasting, to time, to the present. Not only the Greek determination of being, but also the Kantian 'position' and the Hegelian dialectic as the movement of *thesis*, *antithesis*, *synthesis* (thus here again positedness) bespeaks the present, intimates the priority of presencing (cf. *Nietzsche*, vol. 2, pp. 399 ff., and *Wegmarken*, pp. 273 ff., 'Kants These über das Sein'). (ZSD 36, OTB 34)

So, again, the metaphysical tradition interprets being as presence. Is that interpretation true, or binding for us? Interestingly, Heidegger now admits that it is binding for us, and yet he does *not* admit that it is therefore *true*:

But where do we get the right to characterize being as presencing? The question comes too late. For this coining of being was long since decided without our doing, let alone to our credit. We are accordingly bound to the characterization of being as presencing. It has drawn its binding force from the beginning of the unconcealment of being as something sayable, i.e. thinkable. Since the beginning of Western thought with the Greeks, all saying of 'being' and 'is' is held in remembrance of the determination of being as presencing, which is binding for thought. This also holds for the thinking that guides modern technology and industry, though of course only in a certain sense. (ZSD 6-7, OTB 6-7)

Does any of this imply that the interpretation of being as presence is true? No. In fact, in the 'Notes on a Seminar' pertaining to the lecture, Heidegger insists that his own expression of the traditional interpretation is in fact a question, as it were, a problematic rather than an assertoric statement of the metaphysical understanding of being, but in no way an affirmation of it. Citing his own references to the definition of being in the Greeks, in Kant, and in Hegel, he says,

A priority of presencing that is definitive in all coinings of being emerges from these references. How, in what way this definition is, what meaning the intimated priority

of presencing has, remains unthought. The priority of presencing thus remains an assertion in the lecture, 'Time and Being,' but as such a *question* and a task for thinking, namely the task of thinking whether and whither and to what extent the priority of presencing obtains. (ZSD 37, OTB 34)

Something new has entered into Heidegger's thinking here, if only the overt expression of something implicit in earlier texts. The claim here is not that the metaphysical interpretation of being as presence is true, but that it is *binding* for us. What does this mean?

I take it to mean that we are so embedded in the metaphysical tradition, indeed that that tradition so shapes our philosophical and pre-philosophical thought, that as long as we endeavor to articulate the meaning of being in fully general terms, we will find ourselves expressing it in terms of presence. So, just as the grammar of our language and our style of dress hold sway over what we say and what we wear, but is not for that reason true of anything, so too the interpretation of being as presence holds sway over what we say and think about what it means for there to be anything, but is not on that account true. Indeed, the interpretation of being as presence cannot by itself be true or false, any more than the grammar of a language or a musical style could be true or false. Grammars, styles, and customs of all kinds are normative and binding for us simply because we belong to the tradition that constitutes them, but they are not true of anything, so asserting them as true makes no sense. Similarly, for Heidegger, the notion of presence exerts normative force on our interpretation of being, not because it is or could be true of anything, but because it constitutes the metaphysical tradition to which our technological understanding of being still belongs.

What becomes explicit in the 1962 lecture, then, and indeed what may have been implicit earlier on, is the suggestion that the tradition was not, nor could it be, strictly speaking *wrong* in its conception of being as presence. But neither was it right. Instead the tradition fell short by failing to articulate its own understanding of the distinction between being and entities, and failing to comprehend the conditions for our having an understanding of being at all. *Being and Time* was an attempt to locate the conditions of the possibility of the understanding of being in Dasein's temporality, thereby undermining the metaphysical conception of being as presence. Heidegger's later philosophy leaves the analytic of Dasein largely intact but altogether abandons the effort to correct or compete with the tradition in its interpretation of the meaning of being.

Heidegger spells out his new position by supplementing the famous 'ontological difference' between being and entities with a new distinction between the meaning of being and the truth of being. In the 1962 lecture, then, Heidegger draws a threefold distinction among entities, (the meaning of) being, and the truth of being.³⁸ The distinction is captured, verbally

anyway, by saying that entities *are*, whereas being and time *are* not, though *there is* (*es gibt*, literally 'it gives') being and time. Heidegger had in fact always preferred the latter formulation as a way of avoiding the Platonic problem of self-predication and preserving the ontological difference, for if what *is* is an entity, and being and time are not entities, then being and time cannot *be*. But entities *are* only because *there is* being. As he had explained in the 1947 'Letter on Humanism', the phrase

'there is' (*es gibt*) is used first of all in order to avoid the locution, 'being is'; for 'is' is ordinarily said of something that is. Such a thing we call an entity. But being 'is' precisely not 'an entity'.³⁹

Heidegger would later acknowledge, however, that texts like this blurred the distinction between being and appropriation, that is, the distinction between the meaning and the truth of being. Again in the 'Letter on Humanism' we read: '*Being and Time* (SZ 212) purposely and cautiously says . . . "there is" being. . . the "it" that "gives" here is being itself' (ibid.). In the 1962 lecture, by contrast, Heidegger insists that the It of 'it gives' (the *Es* of *es gibt*)⁴⁰ is neither an entity nor being, but is instead what defines or gives being, however we understand its meaning, though as a matter of historical fact we have always understood it and continue to understand it as presence. Consequently, 'the It that gives in "it gives being", "it gives time", proves to be appropriation' (ZSD 20, OTB 19). In the notes on the seminar Heidegger explains that, terminological ambiguities notwithstanding,

the term 'being itself' in the passage in question in the 'Letter on Humanism', and thus almost throughout, already names appropriation. (The relations and contexts constituting the essential structure of appropriation were worked out between 1936 and 1938.) (ZSD 46, OTB 43)

Only by 1962, then, did Heidegger's terminology begin to reflect the real content of his position.

Viewed in retrospect, then, the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* proves to have been a transcendental inquiry into the meaning of being from the point of view of one particular entity, namely Dasein. It is transcendental because it concerns itself with the existential conditions for the understanding of being, and in particular the metaphysical conception of entities. For while the meaning of being could be said to constitute the truth of entities, the truth of being itself lies even more deeply buried beneath the history of only semi-articulate interpretations of the meaning of being. So, although fundamental ontology grew out of a realization of the forgetfulness of being, *Being and Time* could not completely disentangle itself from the tradition whose conditions it sought to uncover:

The experience that tries to express itself for the first time in *Being and Time*, and which in the transcendental question it poses must in a certain sense still speak the language of metaphysics, is that in all metaphysics the being of entities had indeed been thought and brought to a conceptual level, thereby also bringing to light the truth of that which is, [but] that in all manifestations of *being*, its truth as such never came to language, but remained forgotten. The fundamental experience of *Being and Time*, then, is that of the forgetfulness of being. (ZSD 31, OTB 29, emphasis added)

The specific forgetfulness of being with which *Being and Time* had concerned itself was a forgetfulness of the meaning of being, in particular the meaning of the being of Dasein. By 1962 Heidegger insists that 'the forgetfulness of being . . . manifests itself in not thinking about the truth of being' (ibid.), which is to say the condition for any understanding of the meaning of being.

So, as we have seen, although in 1927 Heidegger thought some misunderstanding of the meaning of being was inevitable, he nevertheless insisted that 'faulty interpretations *must* be put forward, so that Dasein can find its way to the true phenomena by correcting them' (GP 458–9). The task of fundamental ontology had been to resist and reject the metaphysical interpretation of being as presence by articulating, however imperfectly, the meaning of being that lay hidden in our everyday understanding of ourselves as being-in-the-world. As the notes on the seminar have it:

Heidegger's thinking could be understood – and *Being and Time* itself suggests this – as the preparation and opening up of the foundation upon which all metaphysics rested as its inaccessible ground, and indeed in such a way that the prior forgetfulness of being would thereby be overcome and eliminated. (ZSD 31, OTB 29)

Heidegger later came to regard metaphysical misunderstandings of being as constitutive of the very conditions for our having any understanding of being at all, and thus as essential to being itself. For the seminar notes immediately continue:

Whereas for a proper understanding it is crucial to see that prior non-thinking is not an omission, but must rather be thought to be the consequence of the self-concealment of being. The concealment of being, as its privation, belongs to the clearing of being. The forgetfulness of being, which constitutes the essence of metaphysics, and which became the impetus for *Being and Time*, belongs to the essence of being itself. This presents the thinking of being with the task of thinking being in such a way that forgetfulness belongs to it essentially. (ZSD 31–32, OTB 29)

Misunderstandings and faulty interpretations of the meaning of being can therefore never be corrected, overcome, or eliminated. And yet we can contemplate the truth of being or appropriation understood as the condition for all such (so-called) misunderstandings.

The interpretation of being as presence was precisely the misunderstanding that Heidegger initially sought to correct and overcome, but which he subsequently regarded as the fundamental interpretative turn in the constitution of the metaphysical tradition in which our own technological practices are still so deeply implicated. At no point was Heidegger in a position to endorse or assert the underlying premise of that tradition itself.⁴¹

NOTES

- 1 All translations of Heidegger in this article are my own, though I have included references to the English editions. In an effort to keep ambiguity at a minimum, I shall render Heidegger's terms as follows: *Anwesen* = presencing; *Anwesenheit* = presentness; *Anwesendes* = what is present; *Praesenz* = presence; *Gegenwart* = the present; *Gegenwärtigen*, *Gegenwärtigung* = enpresenting.
- 2 Olafson, 'Individualism, Subjectivity, and Presence: A Response to Taylor Carman', *Inquiry* 37 (1994), p. 333. Hereafter Olafson (1994). In my view, by contrast, presence does *not* subsume past and future, nor should we understand past and future in terms of absence. See below, section III.
- 3 Olafson, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. xvii, 174. See esp. ch. 2 ('The World as Presence') and chapter 8 ('Being as Presence in the Later Writings'). Olafson is right to suggest that there is sometimes an important distinction in Heidegger's texts between *Anwesen* and *Anwesenheit*, but he undermines the point by appealing to both terms indiscriminately to support his argument. See Olafson (1994), pp. 333, 339, n.4. Moreover, regrettably perhaps, Heidegger often uses the two terms along with the word *Praesenz* as near synonyms to mean the temporal horizon of the present.
- 4 'Zeit und Sein', in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), here and throughout ZSD. Cf. *On Time and Being*, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), here and throughout OTB.
- 5 David Farrell Krell, *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being* (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1986), ch. 2. Hereafter *Intimations*.
- 6 'Notes from a Seminar on the Lecture "Time and Being"', written by A. Guzzoni, authorized and supplemented by Heidegger, in ZSD.
- 7 Mark Okrent offers an account of the distinction that is very close to my own, if not exactly the same, in *Heidegger's Pragmatism: Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphysics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). See below, section IV, note 38.
- 8 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 15th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979), here and throughout SZ. Cf. *Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
- 9 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), §560: 'The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation of the meaning.'
- 10 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe* 24 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), hereafter GP. Cf. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982; revised edition, 1988).
- 11 Heidegger's distinction between Dasein's being-in-the-world and the being of 'intra-worldly' things in the environment might seem to raise awkward questions about the ontological status of other human beings. Do I not in some sense confront others as 'intra-worldly' things in my environment? Heidegger's equivocation on this matter, even if merely terminological, has led some to charge him with a kind of lingering individualism, or methodological solipsism. But in fact Heidegger rejects individualism by rejecting all

- reductive individualistic analyses of community, or what he calls Dasein's 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). The 'fundamental ontology' of Dasein undermines the traditional problem of how an already self-conscious individual is supposed to know or even make sense of others as distinct self-conscious individuals. Instead, Heidegger interprets the individuation of persons in terms of the anonymous normativity of shared everyday practice, which he calls *das Man*. See my 'On Being Social: A Reply to Olafson', in *Inquiry* 37 (1994), no. 2.
- 12 For an excellent discussion of Heidegger's account of temporality in *Being and Time*, see William Blattner's 'Existential Temporality in *Being and Time* (Why Heidegger Is not a Pragmatist)', in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, Dreyfus and Hall (eds) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), and his forthcoming *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*.
- 13 See Heidegger, 'Die Frage nach der Technik', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1954). Cf. *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).
- 14 When Heidegger himself talks about common sense, he means it either neutrally or pejoratively, never as entailing truth.
- 15 Belief in the primacy of the present is ubiquitous throughout the history of philosophy, though of course the explicit accounts of Brentano and Husserl must have been foremost in Heidegger's mind. Heidegger was in fact the editor of Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, which appeared in 1928, not long after the publication of *Being and Time*. For an excellent discussion of Brentano and Husserl, see Izchak Miller, *Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), chs 5–7.
- 16 In addition to the distinction between the temporal ecstases and their horizons, there are equally important distinctions among (1) the ecstases of existential temporality themselves, (2) what Heidegger calls 'world time', that is, time dominated by the now in which we are ordinarily absorbed in everyday activity, and finally (3) 'the vulgar concept of time' or clock time, namely the measurable series of instantaneous moments defined in terms of earlier and later.
- 17 Blattner points out in addition that the temporal ecstases themselves do not lie in the past, present, or future of clock time. Thrownness, for example, is not something that occurs earlier than projection. Existentially speaking, then, my past is not something that happened yesterday or an hour ago, nor is my future something that will happen tomorrow. My point here is slightly different, namely, that the temporal horizons, or horizontal schemata, are distinct from the ecstases themselves, so that I am neither thrown nor projected into them. Temporal horizons are rather something like the conditions that define the possibility of my having, respectively, a future into which I project, a past in which I am thrown, and a present in which I encounter things.
- 18 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 5th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1987), here and throughout EM. Cf. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), here and throughout IM.
- 19 See also EM 47, IM 61: 'Physics means the dawning arising, the self-unfolding that lingers in itself.'
- 20 See 'Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit', in *Wegmarken*, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 231. Cf. 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth', in *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, W. Barrett and H. D. Aiken (eds) (New York: Random House, 1962).
- 21 Olafson, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*, p. 279n.
- 22 Kant, *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, bilingual edition, trans. G. Treash (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 73.
- 23 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (B273), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929). Hence Kant's refutation of the ontological argument for the existence of God: existence is a linguistic predicate but not a 'real' predicate, therefore the existence of God can never be inferred from any of the real predicates that make up the concept of God.
- 24 Olafson (1994), p. 334.
- 25 I shall distinguish *Temporalität* from *Zeitlichkeit* by leaving the former untranslated.
- 26 *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Gesamtausgabe* 21 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976). Hereafter *Logik*. See Olafson (1994), pp. 333–4.

- 27 Olafson (1994), p. 333.
- 28 Olafson (1994), p. 337, n. 4.
- 29 Tellingly, the argument says nothing about what kind of virtue is at stake, and while Socrates himself has his mind on justice, a specifically moral virtue, he famously demonstrates no compelling transition from an amoral to a moral conception of virtue.
- 30 'Letter to Richardson', in W. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. xiii.
- 31 *Intimations*, 30 and 31.
- 32 *Intimations*, 33. Krell's unmarked page references are to GP.
- 33 *Intimations*, 34.
- 34 *Intimations*, 35.
- 35 *Intimations*, 38.
- 36 Krell suggests that Heidegger may have already seen the impossibility of completing the projected Third Division of Part One of *Being and Time* as early as 1925, before he had even finished writing the book, or even by 1919, when he wrote a critical review of Jasper's *Psychology of Worldviews*. See *Intimations* op. cit., p. 180, n. 3, and ch. 6.
- 37 *Intimations*, 34.
- 38 Mark Okrent argues for a different threefold distinction among entities, being, and the meaning or truth of being, according to which 'the phrase "the meaning of being" has roughly (but only roughly) the same sense as "the truth of being"'. So the phrase "the meaning of being" is itself ambiguous between "being" and "the truth of being" ' (*Heidegger's Pragmatism*, op. cit., p. 225). See also Okrent, 'The Truth of Being and the History of Philosophy', in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, op. cit. On my reading, by contrast, what we understand when we understand being just is the meaning of being, so there is no substantive distinction to draw between being and the meaning of being, though there is a crucial difference between the *meaning* of being and the *truth* of being. In short, I take the truth of being to be the ahistorical condition for the possibility of our having contingent historical understandings of the meaning of being.
- 39 'Brief über den Humanismus', in *Wegmarken*, 2nd ed, p. 331. Cf. 'Letter on Humanism', in *Basic Writings*, D. F. Krell (ed.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 214.
- 40 In English one might approximate the point by appealing to the There of 'there is', except that this duplicates the translation of Heidegger's expression *das Da*, which often names something specific to Dasein.
- 41 I am grateful to Bill Blattner, Bert Dreyfus, John Richardson, and Charles Spinosa for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger's *Destruktion* of Metaphysics*

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Abstract

Heidegger's *Destruktion* of the metaphysical tradition leads him to the view that all Western metaphysical systems make foundational claims best understood as 'ontotheological'. Metaphysics establishes the conceptual parameters of intelligibility by ontologically grounding and theologically legitimating our changing historical sense of what is. By first elucidating and then problematizing Heidegger's claim that all Western metaphysics shares this ontotheological structure, I reconstruct the most important components of the original and provocative account of the history of metaphysics that Heidegger gives in support of his idiosyncratic understanding of metaphysics. Arguing that this historical narrative generates the critical force of Heidegger's larger philosophical project (namely, his attempt to find a path beyond our own nihilistic Nietzschean age), I conclude by briefly showing how Heidegger's return to the inception of Western metaphysics allows him to uncover two important aspects of Being's pre-metaphysical phenomenological self-manifestation, aspects which have long been buried beneath the metaphysical tradition but which are crucial to Heidegger's attempt to move beyond our late-modern, Nietzschean impasse.

Keywords: Heidegger; ontotheology; metaphysics; deconstruction; Nietzsche; nihilism

Upon hearing the expression 'ontotheology', many philosophers start looking for the door. Those who do not may know that it was under the title of this 'distasteful neologism' (for which we have Kant to thank)¹ that the later Heidegger elaborated his seemingly ruthless critique of Western metaphysics. The forcefulness of Heidegger's 'deconstruction' (*Destruktion*)² of the metaphysical tradition helped turn a generation of post-Heideggerian thinkers into anti-metaphysicians. But Heidegger's deconstruction is actually premised on his attribution to metaphysics of

an unparalleled pride of place in the historical construction and maintenance of intelligibility. Heidegger's deconstruction presupposes that metaphysics is not simply the esoteric concern of philosophers isolated in their ivory towers, but that, on the contrary, 'Metaphysics grounds an age' (QCT 115/II 75). To put the matter too quickly, but by way of anticipation, Heidegger's claim is that by giving shape to our historical understanding of 'what is', metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what *anything* is, including ourselves.¹ 'Western humanity, in all its comportment toward beings, and even toward itself, is in every respect sustained and guided by metaphysics' (N4 205/III 343).

By codifying and disseminating an understanding of what beings *are*, metaphysics provides each historical 'epoch' of intelligibility with its ontological bedrock. And by providing an account of the ultimate source from which beings issue, metaphysics supplies intelligibility with a kind of foundational justification which (for reasons which we will examine shortly) Heidegger characterizes as 'theological'. To assert that 'metaphysics grounds history', then, is to claim that metaphysics establishes both the most basic conceptual parameters and the ultimate standards of legitimacy for history's successive 'epochs' of unified intelligibility. Such epochal 'constellations of intelligibility' are thus neither contingent nor free-floating, but are grounded in and reflect a series of historical transformations in our metaphysical understanding of what beings *are*.² Straightforwardly enough, Heidegger calls this understanding of what it means for something to be an *understanding of Being*, and his famous *history of Being* is simply shorthand for designating the historical series of such epoch-grounding understandings of Being.

In what follows I will give a much more carefully nuanced exposition of Heidegger's account of the way in which the metaphysical tradition establishes the foundations for every epoch of intelligibility by ontologically grounding and theologically legitimating our changing historical sense of what is. If common sense has much of a grip on us, however, we are likely to shrink back before the claim that our understanding of what is changes with time. Nevertheless, Heidegger's doctrine of 'ontological historicity' does indeed entail that ontology is a temporally dynamic construct, and this central doctrine of the later Heidegger now forms a taken-for-granted point of philosophical departure for virtually every major practitioner of post-structuralism, post-modernism, and deconstruction.³ Why then is it that nowhere in the immense philosophical literature elaborating or criticizing these otherwise diverse schools of thought do we find a careful reconstruction of the idiosyncratic understanding of metaphysics upon which Heideggerian historicity is based? (Even thinkers like Baudrillard and Irigaray who speak not just of metaphysics but of philosophy *tout court* as 'ontotheology' never unpack the meaning of the term.) This paper can be understood as a response to this

glaring exegetical lacuna. But beyond clarifying an unspoken presupposition of much recent continental philosophy (and so laying some necessary groundwork for those who would understand and challenge that work on its own terms), there is an even more important motivation for reconstructing the results of Heidegger's deconstruction, Heidegger's conception of the foundational role played historically by the metaphysical tradition provides much of the philosophical background for his mature critical philosophy, a background without which his later views can often seem arbitrary and indefensible. I thus take it that Heidegger's understanding of metaphysics as ontotheology is sufficiently important to merit careful elaboration in its own right, and this will be my primary task in this paper.

In the first section I unpack the meaning of Heidegger's initially strange claim that metaphysics has an ontotheological structure. In section II I situate Heidegger's understanding of ontotheology within the broader context of his thought, outlining the significance of his deconstruction of metaphysical foundationalism for his critique of nihilism. In section III I reconstruct the most important components of the original account of the history of metaphysics which Heidegger offers in support of his claim that metaphysics is ontotheology, investigating one of the deepest problems for this account. In the fourth and concluding section I show briefly that Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics has a positive dimension whereby it helps motivate the recovery of a non-metaphysical understanding of Being.

I Metaphysics as Ontotheology

Every question specifies [*grenzt*] as a question the breadth and nature of the answer it is looking for. At the same time, it circumscribes [*umgrenzt*] the range of possibilities for answering. In order for us to ponder the question of metaphysics adequately, it is necessary in the first place to consider it as a question, rather than considering the procession of answers descending from it in the history of metaphysics.

(N4 206/III 344)

From the late 1920s through the mid 1940s, Heidegger worked to reduce the structural commonalities of the metaphysical tradition to a formal framework into which he could fit every 'fundamental metaphysical position' in the history of the Western tradition (N3 179/II 25). In so doing, he continued to refine his understanding of metaphysics until, in 1940, he presented what he called 'The concept of the essence of metaphysics', which states that: 'Metaphysics is the truth of the totality of beings as

such' (N3 187/NII 257). What does this 'concept of the essence of metaphysics' tell us? Let us take Heidegger's advice and consider the way in which the question of metaphysics specifies and circumscribes its own possible answers.

As Heidegger understands the history of metaphysics, 'Western-European thinking is guided by the question: "What are beings?" [or "What is that which is?" – "*Was ist das Seiende?*"]. This is the form in which it asks about Being [*Sein*]' (KTB 10/W 448–9). Metaphysics asks what it means for a being to *be* and understands the answer to this question as 'Being'. For Heidegger, however, the answer to the question of what beings *are*, which metaphysics takes as 'Being', really needs to be understood as 'the Being of beings [*das Sein des Seienden*]'.⁶ This Heideggerian locution may sound odd initially, but really it is a fairly straightforward philosophical clarification. Asking what beings *are* (or what a being *is*) means asking about the *Being* of those beings. As Heidegger puts it: 'Whenever it is said of beings, the little word "is" names the *Being* of [those] beings' (PR 125/GA10 183). To establish an answer to the question 'What is a being?', metaphysics makes a claim about what (and how) beings *are*, and thus about the *Being* of those beings.

According to Heidegger, these metaphysical postulates about the Being of beings take the same form throughout the entire history of metaphysics: 'Metaphysics speaks of the totality of beings as such, thus of the *Being* of beings' (N4 151/NII 205). Metaphysics' most basic postulates – what Heidegger calls the 'fundamental metaphysical positions' – endeavour to establish 'a truth about the totality of beings as such' (N3 187/NII 258/GA50 4). Heidegger's formal analysis of this 'core content' (*Kerngehalt*) of metaphysics leads him to a surprising discovery: the metaphysical understanding of the *Being* of beings is essentially 'two-fold' (KTB 11/W 450). That is, metaphysics actually gives two subtly different but interrelated answers to this 'question of the *Being* of beings'. In its simplest form, Heidegger's claim is that each fundamental metaphysical position about the 'totality of beings as such' has two separable components: an understanding of beings 'as such' and an understanding of the 'totality' of beings.

Structurally, 'What is a being?' is a 'two-fold question', then, because in pursuing it metaphysical inquiry follows two paths at the same time, expecting of the question 'What is a being?' two very different kinds of answers (KTB 11/W 449).⁷ As Heidegger explains, 'What is a being?' asks about the Being of beings by searching both for *what* makes a being a being (the essence or 'whatness' of beings) and for the *way* in which a being is a being (the existence or 'thatness' of beings). Given the ambiguous form of the question, both are legitimate and (as we will see) historically pervasive ways of understanding 'the Being of beings'. On Heidegger's analysis, the *Kerngehalt* of metaphysics (its understanding of

the Being of beings) turns out to be conceptually 'two-fold', ambiguous to the core, and out of this fractured kernel grow two historically intertwined stalks.

By 1946, Heidegger has clearly identified these two stalks of the metaphysical question as 'ontology' and 'theology' respectively, and he begins to articulate what he will henceforth understand as 'the fundamentally ontotheological character of metaphysics' (N4 209/NII 348).⁸ In 1961, with the advantage of hindsight, Heidegger gives us perhaps his clearest account of the ontotheological structure of the metaphysical question:

If we recollect the history of Western-European thinking once more, then we will encounter the following: The question of Being, as the question of the Being of beings, is double in form. On the one hand, it asks: What is a being in general as a being? In the history of philosophy, reflections which fall within the domain of this question acquire the title ontology. The question 'What is a being?' [or 'What is that which is?'] simultaneously asks: Which being is the highest [or supreme] being, and in what sense is it the highest being? This is the question of God and of the divine. We call the domain of this question theology. This duality in the question of the Being of beings can be united under the title ontotheology.

(KTB 10-11/GA9 449)

Here Heidegger succinctly outlines the formal ontotheological structure of the metaphysical question. It is a question folded over on itself so as to yield two distinct answers, one of which is then folded back on itself once more. Let us carefully explicate these 'folds'.

'What is a being?' asks, on the one hand: 'What is a being as a being?' Heidegger calls this the *ontological* question because it gives an account (*logos*) of the *on hēi on*, being *qua* being, or as Heidegger puts it, 'beings with regard to Being, that is, solely with regard to what makes a being the being it is: Being' (MFL 10/GA26 12). Heidegger's interpretation makes obvious appeal to the fact that in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle immediately glosses 'first philosophy', the study of the *on hēi on*, as *episkopei katholou peri tou ontos hēi on*, that is, the inquiry which investigates 'beings in so far as they are in Being'.⁹ (Here 'Being' renders Aristotle's participle *to on*. While Aristotle does not use the infinitive or abstract noun *to einai*, 'Being', Heidegger's point is that he might as well have; Aristotle's first philosophy investigates beings in so far as they have being, which is precisely what Heidegger characterizes as the metaphysical question of 'the Being of beings'.)

Heidegger's main claim here is that as ontology, metaphysics searches for the most general ground of beings; it looks for what all beings share in common. Ontologists understand the *Being* of beings in terms of that

being beneath or beyond which no more basic being can be 'discovered' or 'fathomed' (*ergründet*). This 'exemplary being' (*EP* 20/NII 421) then comes to play the ontological role of 'giving the ground' (*ergründen*) to all other beings, in the sense that this basic ontological being designates that kind of being in whose being all other beings share and by which they are thus unified or composed. In Heidegger's words, metaphysics is ontology when it 'thinks of beings with an eye for the ground that is common to all beings as such' (*I & D* 70/139). Historically, different metaphysicians determine this universal ground according to different 'historical molds [*Prägung*]: *Physis*, *Logos*, *Hen*, *Idea*, *Energeia*, Substantiality, Objectivity, Subjectivity, Will, Will to Power, Will to Will' (*I & D* 66/134), and, of course, '*Ousia*', the proto-substance, that ontological 'mold' of the Being of beings with which, as we will see, 'metaphysics proper begins' (*EP* 4/NII 403).

On the other hand, 'What is a being?' (or 'What is that which is?') simultaneously asks: 'Which being is the highest (or supreme) being, and in what sense is it the highest being?' Hence the question of metaphysics can be heard theologically as well as ontologically. As Heidegger's locution suggests ('*Welches ist und wie ist ...*'), the theological dimension of the metaphysical question itself has two aspects. In so far as metaphysics – as theology – is not satisfied with striving to identify the highest or supreme being (the question of God), but asks further about the mode of God's existence, metaphysics seeks to understand the being of God (that is, the sense in which God 'is', or the kind of being which God has). Metaphysics thereby finds itself asking questions about 'the divine', such as: What kind of being makes a being divine? What mode of existence constitutes *divinity*? Taken together, this 'question of God and of the divine' is the *theological* question, so-called because it inquires into and would give an account (*logos*) of the existence of the *theion*, 'the supreme cause and the highest ground of beings' (*N4* 209/NII 347).

Heidegger's main point here is that metaphysics thinks theologically when it 'thinks of the totality of beings as such ... with regard to the supreme, all-founding being' (*I & D* 70-1/139). That is, metaphysics is theology whenever it determines the Being of beings as an 'all-founding being', whether as an 'unmoved mover' or 'self-caused cause' (that is, a '*causa sui*,' which Heidegger characterizes as 'the metaphysical concept of God'), or whether this 'all-founding being' is conceived with Aristotle as a 'first cause' or with Leibniz as the *ens realissimum* (the 'beingest of beings' (*Seiendsten des Seienden*), as Heidegger aptly renders Leibniz's highest being). Likewise, Kant thinks 'theologically' when he postulates 'the subject of subjectivity as the condition of the possibility of all objectivity', as does Hegel when he determines 'the highest being as the absolute in the sense of unconditioned subjectivity' (*I & D* 60/127; *N4* 208/NII 347). According to Heidegger, even Nietzsche 'thinks the *existentia* of the

totality of beings as such theologically as the eternal return of the same' (*N4* 210/NII 348).

Thus it is that when applied to the history of Western metaphysics, Heidegger's understanding of ontotheology as the frame according to which every metaphysical edifice is constructed allows him to unearth the sets of paired ontotheological distinctions shown in Table 1.¹⁰

II Deconstructing Metaphysical Foundationalism

We will return to the contents of this table (and one of the deepest problems it harbours) in section III, but first let me emphasize what for our purposes is the single most important point in the foregoing explication of Heidegger's understanding of metaphysics as ontotheology. This is Heidegger's claim that the primary historical role of metaphysics is the *establishment* and – in the paradoxical continuity of 'an unbroken sequence of transformations' (*GA* 15.395) – the *maintenance* of a 'ground' for beings. As Heidegger writes: 'Since the early days of Western thought, Being has been interpreted as the ground or foundation [*Grund*] in which every being as a being is grounded' (*I & D* 32/96). (Here we need to recall that "Being" means always and everywhere the Being of beings' (*I & D* 61/129).)

In Heidegger's assertion that the Being of beings 'grounds' beings, it is crucial to recognize that 'to ground' (*gründen*) is fortuitously ambiguous between the ontological and theological senses in which metaphysics 'grounds'. Ontologically, the basic being 'grounds' in the sense of 'giving the ground' (*ergründen*) to beings; ontology discovers and sets out the bedrock beneath which the metaphysician's investigations cannot

Table 1. The ontotheological structure of metaphysics.

Ontological	Theological
beings as such	beings as a whole
Most basic being	Highest being
Whatness	Thatness
<i>Koinotaton</i>	<i>Katholon</i>
<i>Essentia</i>	<i>Existentia</i>
<i>Idea</i> as universal	<i>Idea</i> as paradigm
<i>Deutera ousia</i>	<i>Prōtē ousia</i>
<i>Ultima ratio</i>	<i>Causa prima</i>
<i>Ens commune</i>	<i>Summum ens</i>
<i>Quidditas</i> (essentiality)	<i>Quomodo</i> (modality)
Reality	The real
Subjectivity	The subject
Substantiality	Substance
The transcendental	The transcendent
Content	Form
Action	Organization
Will-to-power	Eternal return of the same

'penetrate'. (*Ergründen* means not just 'to fathom, penetrate, or discover', but also 'to get a matter upon its ground' or 'through searching to establish more precisely'.) Theologically the highest (or supreme) being 'grounds' in the sense of 'founding' [*begründen*] beings, 'establishing' the source from which beings issue and by which they are 'justified'. (*Begründen* means not only 'to give reasons for' or 'justify', but also 'to establish' or 'found', in the sense of 'to give for the ground'.)¹¹ As Heidegger explains:

Metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both [ontologically] in [terms of] the ground-giving [*ergründenden*] unity of what is most general, that is, of what is uniformly valid everywhere, and also [theologically] in [terms of] the founding [*begründenden*] unity of the all, that is, of the Most High above all others. The Being of beings is thus thought of in advance as the grounding ground [*der gründende Grund*].

(*I & D* 58/125)

I interpret this strange-sounding claim to mean that within the metaphysical tradition, this ontotheological 'grounding ground' 'grounds' in *both* the ontological and theological senses. It is by simultaneously 'giving the ground' ontologically and 'founding' theologically that the ontotheologically conceived Being of beings accomplishes its distinctively *double* 'grounding'.

Heidegger's first law of phenomenology, 'the law of proximity', dictates that the obvious is most likely to escape our notice (*PAR* 135/GA54 201). In thinking about the preceding, let us not overlook the following. When metaphysics conceives of the Being of beings ontologically, as a being in whose being all other beings share, and theologically, as an all-founding being from which (or whom) all beings issue, what is thereby 'taken for granted' is that Being (although understood only as the Being of beings) plays the role of a 'ground of beings', that is, a foundational role. 'Because Being is understood by metaphysics as the ground of beings, metaphysics always drives toward ultimate grounds, the ultimate principles that account for everything else.'¹² Indeed, metaphysics reinforces its foundational claim about what beings *are* by coming at the problem from both ends simultaneously (as it were), effecting both a top-down (or outside-in) theological 'founding or justification' (from a highest being) and a bottom-up (or inside-out) 'ground-giving or establishing' (on a most basic being) (*I & D* 61/129; *I & D* 39/104). The most successful (epoch-grounding) metaphysical systems *combine* these two different forms of foundationalism.

After painstakingly reconstructing this conception of how metaphysics grounds history, Heidegger asks the question which pulls the rug out from under the entire history of foundationalist metaphysics: What kind of a ground is this *really*? If metaphysics' ontotheological postulates of the Being of beings doubly 'ground' those beings, then *what in turn grounds*

the Being of beings? Only two kinds of answers can halt the regress. Either there must be something beyond the Being of beings in or by which the Being of beings can itself be grounded, or else the Being of beings must be self-grounding. Heidegger develops a variation of the former answer himself. ('Being as such' will be Heidegger's problematic name for that which makes possible – but does not ontotheologically 'ground' – metaphysics' various epochal postulates of the Being of beings.) But Heidegger is clear that the metaphysical tradition chooses the latter option: 'The Being of beings reveals itself as that ground which [ontologically] gives itself the ground and [theologically] founds itself' (*I & D* 57/124).

We have seen that the peculiar 'double grounding' attempted by all metaphysics would have beings ontologically anchored in a basic being and theologically derived from (and justified by appeal to) a supreme being. As I will show in the following section, however, Heidegger's deconstructive analysis of metaphysics reveals that these 'fundamental metaphysical positions' constitute neither an unimpeachable ontological *Ur-grund*, a 'primal foundation' for beings, nor merely an *Ab-grund*, a groundless 'abyss' beneath beings. Rather these fundamental metaphysical positions provide beings with what Heidegger characterizes as an *Un-grund*, that is, the 'perhaps necessary appearance of ground' within each epochal constellation of intelligibility (*IM* 3/*EM* 2). The peculiar 'double grounding' attempted by metaphysics always leaves beings 'suspended' precariously between foundation and abyss. This helps explain why the history of metaphysics looks like a *succession* of relatively durable accounts of what is rather than either a single unbroken epoch or a continuous flux. When Heidegger reminds us that 'to hold back is, in Greek, *epochē*' (*T & B* 9), his point is that each ontotheologically structured metaphysical postulate about the Being of beings effectively 'holds back' the flood-waters of ontological historicity for a time – the time of an 'epoch'.¹³ These metaphysical suspensions endure for an 'epoch', doubly grounding the succession of historical 'constellations of intelligibility', only to be replaced by the next ontotheologically grounded epoch.

And so it continues, down through the history of Being, until – on Heidegger's reading – Nietzsche cuts the philosophical strings of the very project of metaphysical grounding, first by dislodging the ontological anchoring (when in 'The History of an Error' he contends that no unbroken epistemic chain can be constructed which could anchor this world in a 'true world' beyond or within it), and second by abolishing as cognitively unsatisfying the appeal to a highest being (when his 'madman' brings the news that 'God is dead ... And we have killed him' to the marketplace).¹⁴ On this latter point we should remember that Nietzsche stages his 'madman' as a messenger who would have us face up to the profound significance of an 'event' which has already occurred. For Nietzsche it is Kant who 'killed God' in this sense (by demonstrating

the limits of metaphysical knowledge and the fallaciousness of the three traditional 'proofs' for God's existence).

By unearthing the 'unthought' ontotheological *unity* of Nietzsche's metaphysical doctrines of will-to-power and eternal recurrence, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's own fundamental metaphysical position anticipates the nihilism (or meaninglessness) which Nietzsche himself, in so far as he accepts his own metaphysical presuppositions, is helpless to combat. Taken together, Nietzsche's doctrines of will-to-power and eternal recurrence embody the final fulfilment and collapse of metaphysics understood as the project of providing beings with a double ontotheological foundation. But this does not stop the Nietzschean metaphysics of the 'atomic age' from taking the groundless free-fall of eternally recurring will-to-power as its own metaphysical starting point. For Nietzsche, beings *are* only concatenations of forces in the service of human will, a will which aims ultimately only at its own unlimited self-aggrandizing increase and thus becomes nothing but 'the will to insure the overpowering of everything', that is, sheer 'will to will' (*EP* 64/NII 468; *I & D* 66/134).

Before Nietzsche, the metaphysical tradition had refused to give up the foundationalist project of securely 'grounding' beings in an ontotheological Being of beings, despite the fact that its own history, as an unbroken succession of epochal overturnings (in which each metaphysically grounded epoch rose from the ashes of the metaphysics which preceded it), shows that time and again metaphysics has proven incapable of providing itself with the unimpeachable ontotheological foundation it sought. Ironically, the epoch of the metaphysical tradition which Nietzsche himself inaugurates now effectively deprives itself, and thus us, of any ground whatsoever. The groundless Nietzschean metaphysics of eternally recurring will-to-power pre-conceptualizes 'the totality of beings as such' as concatenations of energy in the service of human will; and all beings, ourselves included, are thereby conceived of ultimately only as 'raw materials' (*Bestand*), resources merely to be optimally ordered and efficiently disposed of in a dangerous spiral of 'constant overcoming'. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's legacy is our nihilistic epoch of 'cybernetics' which, in its pursuit of 'truth' (a notion already understood in modernity only in terms of security and predictability), comes progressively to embody its own groundless metaphysical presuppositions, levelling down all attempts to justify human meaning to empty optimization imperatives like 'Get the most out of your potential', and reducing all intelligibility to that which can be stockpiled as bivalent, programmable 'information' (TTL 139-41). Consequentialist modes of abstract resource distribution may flourish against such a background, but this technological understanding of the Being of beings is no longer actually in the service of any person or goal; rather, accelerated by the proliferating technologies of cyberspace, beings increasingly enter into 'a state of pure circulation'.¹⁵

We need not further elaborate this dystopian Heideggerian vision of late modernity (according to which we seem to be *stuck* historically, playing out a kind of cybernetic endgame to the atomic age), nor need we take up the controversies this picture has understandably engendered.¹⁶ All we need recognize for now is that the continuing failure of metaphysics to secure its own ontotheological ground prompts Heidegger to ask: *Why* is the Being of beings historically 'thought in advance' as ground? How did Being get cast in such a mould? How did it happen that, as Heidegger puts it, 'Being is pre-stamped as ground' (*I & D* 57/124)? Let us be very clear from the start about the aims of this question by recognizing, with Dreyfus, that 'there is no sense in looking for a cause of such profound "events" that determine what counts as being and intelligibility; one can only try to free oneself from them by recounting their history'.¹⁷

It is in this spirit of a genealogical deconstruction of the form that metaphysical foundationalism has taken historically (a deconstruction in which we recount its history in order to call its necessity into question, as a first step toward understanding things differently), rather than as yet another metaphysical attempt to secure an unbroken causal chain between our present understanding of Being and its historical origins, that we turn now to examine Heidegger's own response to one of the deepest problems inherent in his understanding of metaphysics as ontotheology.

III 'One of the Deepest Problems'

Heidegger's extremely ambitious description of the historical structure of metaphysics may initially strike students of the history of philosophy as a massive oversimplification.¹⁸ For although Heidegger certainly acknowledges the fact that as this two-fold metaphysical question is pursued historically, different metaphysicians formulate the ontotheological duality in different terms, he nevertheless maintains that all the major historical 'fundamental metaphysical positions' remain within the ontotheological framework. As he puts it: 'All great thinkers think the same' (*NI* 36/*NI* 46). Heidegger recognized that such a blanket statement calls forth an immediate objection. As he writes in *What is Philosophy?* (1955):

[I]t will be pointed out with ease that philosophy itself and the way in which it conceives its own nature have transformed frequently in ... two thousand years. Who would deny this? At the same time, however, we ought not to overlook the fact that philosophy from Aristotle to Nietzsche, precisely on the basis of these transformations throughout its course, has remained the same. For the transformations vouch for the kinship of the same.

(*WIP* 61/60)

Here Heidegger puts the point provocatively: all fundamental metaphysical positions think 'the same' (*das Selbe*). Certainly metaphysics' self-conception has been frequently transformed throughout the long history of the tradition, but 'these transformations vouch for the kinship of the same'. How are we to understand such apparently paradoxical assertions?

Like most provocations, Heidegger's are misleading *prima facie*; their point depends on our being *provoked* to think the matter through rather than turning away from seemingly obvious falsehoods. Heidegger is actually making three important points here. First, as we might by now expect, he is claiming that all the different metaphysical systems have the following in common: they are all attempts to 'lay the ground' for beings. As Heidegger had already recognized in 1929:

An explicit ground-laying of metaphysics never happens *ex nihilo*, but rather arises from the strengths and weaknesses of a tradition which designates in advance its possible points of departure. With reference to these this tradition is self-enclosed, for every ground-laying is, in its relation to what came before, a transformation of the same task.

(KPM 2/GA3 2)

Heidegger's claim is that *within* the tradition of Western metaphysics (we will ask where this begins in a minute), all metaphysical systems attempt a 'ground-laying', and, as we have seen, one which takes the form of a 'double grounding' of beings in a fundamentally ontotheological duality. Nevertheless, each 'fundamental metaphysical position' determines this ontotheological duality *differently*, whether in terms of whatness and thatness (EP 2/NII 401); *koinotaton* and *katholon* (GA9 450); the *idea* as universal and as paradigm (EP 13/NII 413);¹⁹ *prōtē* and *deutera ousia* (EP 6-8/NII 405-6); *quidditas* and *quomodo* (WIT 236-8/GA41 238-40); *ultima ratio* and *causa prima* (I & D 60/127); *ens commune* and *summu ens* (WIT 118/GA41 119); essence and existence (EP 82/NII 489);²⁰ content and form (PI.T 27/II 12); the real and the reality of the real (WIT 212-20/GA41 214-18); subjectivity and the subject (I & D 60/127, 66/134); substantiality and substance (*ibid.*); the transcendental and the transcendent (N4 211/NII 349); organization and action (EP 66/NII 471);²¹ or even, as we have seen, will-to-power and eternal return of the same (EP 70/NII 476).

Second, despite the fact that he includes the eternal return of the same as Nietzsche's theological contribution to this list, Heidegger's claim that these different ontotheological conceptions of the Being of beings all think 'the same' should not lead us to imagine the 'monotonous' recurrence of something 'merely identical'. To recognize that Heidegger is not committing such a massive oversimplification, we need to know that:

'Sameness implies a relation of "with", that is, a mediation, a connection, a synthesis: the unification into a unity. . . . But that unity is by no means the stale emptiness of that which, in itself without relation, persists in monotony' (I & D 25/87). The worry disappears when we recognize that for two things to be the same *requires* that they be different. As Heidegger puts it: 'The same [*das Selbe*] is not the merely identical [*das Gleich*]. In the merely identical, the difference disappears' (I & D 45/111). Heidegger credits German Idealism with getting us to pay attention to 'the mediation that prevails in unity' (I & D 25/87-8), but it is Derrida who, true to form, gives this claim about 'the non-self-identity' of the same its most succinct and provocative rendering: 'The other is in the same.'²² Such assertions sound paradoxical, but the intended distinction is clear enough: sameness requires likeness in some significant respect (a shared ontotheological structure, for example); identity requires likeness in every respect. Heidegger's provocations thus draw attention to the seemingly paradoxical fact that there will always be some *difference* between two things that are 'the same'.

Finally, Heidegger's assertions that 'all great thinkers think the same' and that metaphysics' 'transformations vouch for the kinship of the same' are also intended to make a third and even subtler claim. These assertions point toward the phenomenological fact that, as Schürmann recognized, 'beneath the epochal differences something shows forth that remains the same'.²³ 'This same', Heidegger tells us, 'is so essential and rich that no single thinker exhausts it' (NI 36/NI 46). Indeed: 'Only with difficulty do we bring this same into view in its proper character, and seldom in its full richness' (PR 91/SVG 153/GA10 135). This notion of the 'same' is recognizable as one of Heidegger's names for 'Being as such' (that is, Being in its difference from the metaphysically conceived Being of beings). Hence Heidegger also refers to the same as: 'It, Being, [*that which is*] given to thinking/to be thought [*Daß Es, das Sein, zu denken gibt*]' (N4 228/NII 372). The same designates a matter that Heidegger associates with Parmenides (for whom 'thinking and Being are *the same*'). It names a pre-differentiated phenomenological givenness and an extra-conceptual phenomenological excess that Heidegger finds mysterious and compelling enough to give the Nietzschean title, 'the *enigma*'.²⁴ Despite the difficulties involved, this attempt to gain access to this original phenomenological 'showing-forth' which all metaphysicians name but none 'exhausts' is the ultimate motivation of Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysical foundationalism. In fact, we touch here on the idea at the very core of *Heideggerian hope*, for it is Heidegger's philosophical contention that a non-nihilistic futural understanding of Being will come, if it comes at all, only from a phenomenological experience and articulation of the continuing epiphanies of that which remains 'the same' beneath all change.²⁵ This mysterious 'same' is thus part of Heidegger's own attempt

to elaborate an alternative to thinking of Being metaphysically as the ontotheological ground of beings.²⁶

As we will now see, there is a sense in which, despite his own later criticism of its pre-critical status, the later Heidegger successfully carried out to the letter (if not the spirit) the deconstructive project famously called for in *Being and Time*: 'taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to *deconstruct* the traditional content of ancient ontology until we reach into and recover those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being – the ways that have guided us ever since' (*B & T* 44/S & Z 22). For as we will see, Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics both grants us access to the phenomenological record of those primordial Western experiences of Being and, moreover, allows us to understand the sense in which these original experiences turned out to be historically *determinative* without being *necessary*. In order to follow Heidegger's approach toward this original phenomenological showing-forth, let us investigate the difficulty of bringing this 'same' into view by expanding on the previous objection.

After considering Heidegger's claim that all metaphysics has an ontotheological structure, the philosopher who has been disabused of a certain *naïveté* by the post-structuralist revolution will have an obvious question to ask of Heidegger: Why think that all metaphysics has this deep ontotheological structure? If Heidegger is not simply legislating an indefensible claim about the *a priori* structure of metaphysics, then he owes us an account of *how* it happened that these two ways of asking about the 'ground' of beings – and hence of postulating the ontotheological 'Being of beings' to fill the role of that ground – became so inextricably linked. Only such an account can tell us whether this entanglement of ontology and theology at the heart of metaphysics is a necessary connection (which we had better learn to live with), or merely a fateful historical contingency (to which alternatives can be envisioned).

As I will now show, Heidegger does in fact countenance this 'deepest problem' himself, although for the most part only obliquely, under the obscure rubric of 'the still *unthought* unity of the essence of metaphysics' (*I & D* 55/121).²⁷

Where does the essentially ontotheological constitution of metaphysics come from? To take-up the question thus posed means, at the same time, to carry out the step back.

In this step we now contemplate the essential ancestry of the ontotheological structure of all metaphysics.

(*I & D* 56/123)

According to Heidegger, investigating this question requires that we take 'the step back', meaning that we step back from our unquestioning

adoption of a particular metaphysical doctrine and consider the entire history of Being within which we are immersed, asking, in this case, about the genealogical 'ancestry' of 'the ontotheological structure of all metaphysics'. Like so much of his account, Heidegger's answer to this question must be drawn from what are for the most part only more or less elaborate 'sketches' of the 'in-ception' (*An-fang*) of Western philosophy.²⁸ Taking this post-structuralist skepticism as our point of departure, we will now move beyond the formal account of the metaphysical question by following Heidegger's 'step back' and thereby approaching his understanding of what it is that shows-forth as 'the same' beneath the successive epochal permutations of metaphysics as ontotheology.

To be as clear as possible, this 'deepest problem' can be restated as follows. *How did the metaphysical project of 'grounding' beings come to have this ontotheological structure?* We will have answered this question once we understand the answers to the three sub-questions which constitute it: (Q₁) *Whence* – and (Q₂) *With what necessity* – did the first ontotheological fissure in the kernel of metaphysics develop? (Q₃) *How* did this fissure become incorporated into the structure of metaphysics so as to be decisively perpetuated throughout its entire history?

In his 1957 lecture on 'The Ontotheological Constitution of Metaphysics', Heidegger situates his account of metaphysics as ontotheology within the context of ancient Western philosophy in such a way as to answer question Q₁, the question of *whence*. As the first Western metaphysicians investigated the 'primordial matter [*ursprüngliche Sache*] of thinking', what Heidegger calls 'the primal matter' (*die Ur-sache*), they attempted to put this *prōtē archē* into language (*I & D* 60/127).²⁹ Heidegger translates *prōtē archē* as 'the first ground', and argues that it was as a result of this quest for such a first ground that the earliest Western metaphysicians postulated two different kinds of beings as the *prōtē archē*: an ontological 'universal and first being' and a theological 'supreme and ultimate being' (*I & D* 61/128). In other words, the first Western metaphysicians pursued the *prōtē archē* in terms of two different kinds of grounding beings, attempting both a bottom-up ontological 'ground-giving' based on an 'universal and first being' and a top-down theological 'founding' from a 'supreme and ultimate being'. Here, then, Heidegger provides a historical analysis in support of his thesis that 'since the earliest days of Western thought, Being has been interpreted as the ground in which every being as a being is grounded' (*I & D* 32/96). But of whom is Heidegger thinking?

Several years before *Being and Time* (in his 1924-5 lectures on Plato's *Sophist*), Heidegger told his students that: 'The Greeks asked how the *on* is there in *logos*, or, more precisely: how a *koinonia* in *onta* is possible' (*S* 354/GA19 512). Here Heidegger is recalling the fact that the ancient Greek attempt to put Being (*on*) into language (*logos*) was carried out

as a search for a *koinōnia* amidst *onta*, a unity (or 'community') within beings. This is Heidegger's reading of the famous Presocratic search for the *hen* within the *polla*, the One within the Many. We might initially think that this was solely a proto-ontological endeavour. But in 1941, Heidegger writes: "The *hen* to the *polla* . . . is the One as *koinon*, as [both] the whence [*Woher*] and as the common-to [*Gemeinsame*] the Many" (*EP* 2/MII 400-1). His point is that originally *koinon* is ambiguous between 'whence' and 'in-common', that is, the One is both *that from where* the Many (beings) emerge and *what* the Many (beings) hold *in common*. Such considerations allow us to surmise that when Heidegger recounts the archaic split of the *prōtē archē* into a proto-ontological 'universal and first being' and a proto-theological 'supreme and ultimate being', he is thinking of Thales and his student Anaximander (who, in the course of their pursuit of a *prōtē archē*, could be understood as having first articulated what would later become the ontotheological division).

Heidegger does not directly name these thinkers of the Milesian school as responsible for this proto-ontotheological division of the *koinon* into a *what* and a *from where*. If, however, we remember his explanation that metaphysics operates in an ontological mode when, surveying the totality of beings, the metaphysician tries to isolate their universal ground, the ground which all beings share in common, then it seems clear enough that Thales – with his understanding of water as the paradigmatic being ('the one element') – is best thought of as Heidegger's proto-ontologist.³⁰ For metaphysics is *ontology* when it 'thinks of beings with an eye for the ground that is common to all beings as such' (*I & D* 70/139), and certainly water plays such a role for Thales. Further, if we recall that metaphysics operates in a *theological* mode when it searches for a 'supreme or highest' being, a being from whom all beings issue or by which all beings are justified, then Anaximander – with his doctrine that 'the *archē* is *apeiron*' – is the best candidate for the role of proto-theological thinker.³¹ For it is theology '[w]hen metaphysics thinks of the totality of beings as such . . . in regard to the supreme, all-founding being', the being from which all beings issue, even if that being is Anaximander's *to apeiron*, 'the limitless' (*I & D* 70-1/13).

Thus, in answer to question Q₁ above – namely, *Whence* arose the first ontotheological fissure in the kernel of metaphysics? – we can say that this fissure first emerged at the end of the seventh century BC in Miletus (on the west coast of modern Turkey), where the ancient Milesian school of Presocratic thinkers' quest for the *prōtē archē* turned up both Thales' proto-ontological 'universal and first being' and Anaximander's proto-theological 'supreme and ultimate being'. Postponing question Q₂, let us return to question Q₃, namely: How did this fissure become incorporated into the structure of metaphysics, so as to be decisively perpetuated down through the history of metaphysics as the ontotheological division?

On Heidegger's reading, metaphysics is not explicitly formalized as a single, unified ontotheological doctrine until Aristotle.³² In the *Metaphysics*, when Aristotle explicates his own *prōtē philosophia*, he formalizes the proto-ontotheological ambiguity inherent in the Presocratic conception of the *koinon* (as both the theological 'where-from' and the ontological 'in-common' of beings). Aristotle explicitly divides this *koinon* into an ontological '*koinotaton*', a universal being 'shared in common', and a theological '*katholon (theion)*', a being 'on the whole, [or] in general (the *theion*)' (*GA9* 450, note a). In assigning Aristotle credit for the inauguration of metaphysics as ontotheology, Heidegger does not overlook Plato's distinctive contribution to its earlier development. On the contrary, he asserts that Aristotle's inaugural act could only have been accomplished on the ground previously laid by Plato. As he writes (in 1941):

The distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* was established in the light of history by Aristotle, who – after Plato's thinking had responded to the appeal of Being in a way which prepared that distinction by provoking its establishment – first conceptualized the distinction, thereby bringing it onto its essential ground.

(*EP* 4/MII 403)

It is Aristotle who formally articulates the metaphysical distinction between what 'later came to be called' *essentia* and *existentia*, and who thereby transforms and 'establishes in the light of history' the prior distinction between 'whatness' and 'thatness'. For although Plato took over the ambiguity inherent in the Presocratic *koinon*, the distinction remained only implicit in his thinking (*EP* 8/MII 407-8). We will say more about this Aristotelian inauguration of ontotheology after briefly characterizing the sense in which Plato himself 'provoked' or 'invited' this metaphysical distinction *par excellence*.

In 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth' (1940), Heidegger claims that the ontotheological distinction had already been brought together implicitly in Plato's doctrine of the *ideas*. 'Since the interpretation of Being as *idea*, thinking about the Being of beings is metaphysical, and metaphysics is theological' (*PDT* 268/*GA9* 235-6). Heidegger seems to be thinking of the middle Plato's doctrine of *ideas*, in which the *ideas* are conceived of both (theologically) as the paradigms that beings only imperfectly instantiate and (ontologically) as the universals common to the many instances of each being.³³ Here the *ideas* explain both the 'thatness' and the 'whatness' of beings (*EP* 2-3/MII 401). Heidegger points out (in a particularly murky passage) that within this implicit ontotheological ambiguity, thatness is subordinated to whatness: 'The *idea* accomplishes presence, namely, the presence of every being as what it is. Every being becomes present in its whatness. . . . For Plato, then, Being has its proper essence in whatness'

(PDT 262/GA9 225). Plato subordinates thatness to whatness, for he holds that without their respective *ideas*, beings could not exist. A being's existence is dependent on its *idea*, for it is this *idea* that the being (more or less imperfectly) instantiates, whereas its *idea* is independent of the existence of any of the particular beings that instantiate it. As Aristotle's famous empiricist objection to Platonic rationalism contends, however, Plato cannot say, consistently, that the existence of an *idea* is independent of the entire 'class' of beings which instantiate that *idea*.

Nevertheless, it is Plato's implicit distinction between whatness and thatness which Aristotle explicitly formalizes – even as he reverses Plato's privileging of whatness over thatness (or essence over existence) – when Aristotle asserts in the *Posterior Analytics* that 'our capacity for discovering *what* a thing is [*ti estin*] depends upon our awareness *that* it is [or *that* it exists, *hoti estin*].'³⁴ On Heidegger's reading, Aristotle carves the ontotheological distinction into the heart of metaphysics when, in order to differentiate explicitly 'whatness' from 'thatness', he distinguishes between *prōtē* and *deutera ousia*.³⁵ The *prōtē ousia* is Aristotle's answer to 'the *hoti estin*', the metaphysical question of 'whether something is'. Aristotle contends that the *prōtē ousia* is 'the *This*, the singular', the fact 'that something is [or exists]'. In accordance with Heidegger's understanding of 'presence' as the basic characteristic of Western metaphysics here inaugurated, he characterizes Aristotle's description of this 'persisting of something which lingers of itself' as 'presence in the eminent and primal sense' (EP 7/NI 406-7). On the other hand, the *deutera ousia* answers Aristotle's question *ti estin*; it describes 'what something is', which Heidegger renders as 'presence in the secondary sense' (EP 7-8/NI 407). For Aristotle, on Heidegger's reading, to be is to be present.³⁶

Heidegger claims, plausibly, that Aristotle's distinction between *prōtē* and *deutera ousia* constitutes a decisive juncture in the history whereby Western metaphysics becomes ontotheology. For it was this very distinction that the medieval Scholastics would treat as the self-evident difference between *existentia* and *essentia*, 'existence' and 'essence'. Hence Heidegger's answer to question Q₁ – namely, How did the ontotheological fissure come to be built into the very structure of the metaphysical question, and thus decisively perpetuated? – is that when Aristotle formalizes the difference between thatness and whatness in his distinction between *prōtē* and *deutera ousia*, the ontotheological fissure first opened up by the Milesian Presocratics and then implicitly taken up into Plato's doctrine of the *ideas* is made decisive for the ensuing history of Western metaphysics – 'with the help of the subsequent conceptual formulation [of *essentia* and *existentia*] common to the metaphysics of the schoolmen', the tradition of medieval Scholasticism upon which Aristotle's metaphysics would exert such a profound influence (EP 4/NI 402).

Yet, even as Heidegger answers question Q₁ by recounting the inauguration of 'metaphysics proper', he cannot help but pose question Q₂, namely: *With what necessity* did the first fissure in the kernel of metaphysics develop?

Essentia answers the question *ti estin*: what is (a being)? *Existentia* says of a being *hoti estin*: that it is. In this distinction a different *estin* is named. Herein *einai* (Being) manifests itself in a distinction. How can Being be divided in this distinction? Which essence [*Wesen*] of Being shows itself in this distinction, as if putting this essence out in the open?

(EP 4/NI 403)

As we have seen, the *ti estin* and the *hoti estin* refer to two different kinds of *estin*, two different ways of understanding what beings *are*; that is, of understanding the *Being* of those beings. But how is this possible? It is crucial to grasp that again Heidegger is asking a *phenomenological* question, and thus is looking for a phenomenological rather than a causal explanation. His question should be heard accordingly as: What is it about the original Western manifestation of Being that lends itself to being understood in terms of this distinction between two different kinds of *estin*? How can phenomenological givenness yield two such different ways of understanding the ground of beings, ways which, as we have seen, will *both* be handed down by the metaphysical tradition, maintained as the 'unified ontotheological ambiguity' at its heart?

Heidegger still needs an answer to this question (question Q₂, the question of the *necessity* of the original ontotheological fissure), because his answer to question Q₁ (which showed how Aristotle's distinction between *prōtē* and *deutera ousia* decisively unified and formalized the ontotheological structure of metaphysics) not only leaves question Q₂ unanswered, but seems to lead to the kind of regress which makes us despair of *ever* finding an answer. Heidegger's claim that in formalizing the ontotheological structure of metaphysics Aristotle was 'thinking the unthought' of Plato (or further, that Plato himself was thinking that which went 'unthought' in the Milesian Presocratics) does not answer the question of whether and in what sense this original fracture was itself *necessary*; it only pushes back the question another step further in time. The missing phenomenological explanation of the original ontotheological distinction thus remains perhaps the 'deepest problem' inherent in Heidegger's understanding of the metaphysical tradition as ontotheology; the very possibility of answering it seems to recede into the mists surrounding the beginnings of Western history.³⁷ Can we safely conclude, then, that this ontotheological fracture in the core of metaphysics was merely a fateful historical happenstance, an ultimately *arbitrary* – albeit historically determinative – effect of chance?

Despite his interest in thinking Being otherwise than as the 'ground' of beings, Heidegger rejects this response as phenomenologically unsatisfying, for it fails to allow us to understand the presumed logic of the phenomenon under investigation.³⁸ Heidegger's interpretation of the 'inception' of Western metaphysics relies instead upon the phenomenologically *consistent* presupposition that the ontotheological split at the core of metaphysics must have resulted from the way in which Being showed itself in the beginning of Western history. As he writes (in 1961):

Obviously, the two-foldness of the [metaphysical] question about being must result from the way the Being of beings manifests itself. Being manifests itself in the character of that which we name ground: being in general is the ground in the sense of the basis upon which any further consideration of beings takes place; being, as the highest being, is the ground in the sense of what allows all beings to come into Being.

(KTB 11/W 449-50)³⁹

Here Heidegger postulates that Being originally must have 'manifested itself' as 'ground', and this – as we saw when we explicated Heidegger's interpretation of the Milesian school of Presocratics – in two distinct senses: the proto-ontological bottom-up 'grounding' on the *ground-giving* 'basis' (*Boden*) of a basic being (like Thales' water), and the 'grounding' of a proto-theological top-down *founding* from a highest being (like Anaximander's *apeiron*).

The problem is that if, having uncovered this Milesian bifurcation of the *prōtē archē* into a proto-ontological 'universal and first being' and a proto-theological 'supreme and ultimate being', we try to take another step back in time by reposing the question of the necessity of this split, asking what it was about the original phenomenological manifestation of Being that lent itself to being interpreted as the ontotheological ground of beings, we find ourselves running up against the limits of philosophical self-knowledge as it is preserved within the Western tradition. Nevertheless, at one point (*circa* 1941) Heidegger speculates about *how* the original phenomenological manifestation might have lent itself to being understood in terms of the ontotheological 'distinction between whatness and thatness'. His contention is this: conceived phenomenologically as an 'emergence to visibility, presencing has in itself the distinction between the pure proximity of that which lasts and the gradations of [its] remaining' (EP 8/NII 407).

Unfortunately, Heidegger abruptly breaks off and does not explain this contention at all. But the basic idea seems to be that if we examine the emergence of beings into phenomenological visibility, there is an implicit difference between the dynamic *showing* and the more passive *lasting* of

those beings – a difference Heidegger will later formalize as that between 'presencing' (*anwesen*) and 'presence' (*Anwesenheit*). In other words, in the process whereby beings come into being, linger, and pass away, we can distinguish between their dynamic emerging and disappearing, on the one hand, and the more static aspect of that which lasts, on the other. To take a very un-Heideggerian example, we could think of a time-lapse film showing the life-cycle of a flower. In the stark drama of this 'insurrection against nothingness' (EP 1/NII 399), we watch the young plant burst forth into the light, see its stem grow and unfurl, then the flower itself open, linger in its openness, partially closing and reopening (as the quick exchange of light and darkness in the background conveys the succession of days), and finally, ineluctably, we watch the flower die and wither away.

Here it might seem difficult to distinguish anything truly lasting in what the time-lapse recording reveals to be a thoroughly dynamic process. But without the aid of such technological supplements to our own vision, the exact opposite is much more likely to be the case. We generally have difficulty noticing anything passing in and out of what seems to be a very static existence; what Heidegger calls the '*presencing* of presence' is very difficult to detect. Indeed, when we are faced with the immediacy of a being's existence, be it a flower, a loved one, or ourselves, it is quite easy to forget that that being is caught up in a process of coming-into and passing-out-of existence. Our phenomenological numbness to the immediate makes it seem natural to arrest a being's dynamic phenomenological manifestation, freezing it into a pre-conceived permanent presence. (Heidegger later advocates a phenomenological comportment he calls 'releasement' [*Gelassenheit*] in part to help break the hold of such preconceptions.) Once this dynamic emergence is mistaken as a permanent presence, the path is open for conceiving it as a ground in both the ontological and theological senses. Heidegger suggests, moreover, that the 'awe' felt by ancient humanity before the 'overwhelming' primordial phenomena of the *earth* and the *heavens* may have disposed them to these particular foundationalisms (MFL 11/GA26 13), but for reasons which we will conclude by investigating, he also contends that this *mythos* preserves an understanding of Being as 'what shows itself in advance and in everything as that which [actively] presences in all [so-called] "presence"' (PAR 60/GA54 89).

IV Conclusions

The conclusion to which Heidegger's painstaking deconstruction of Western metaphysics leads him is this: while we must suppose that the project of ontotheological 'grounding' is in fact rooted phenomenologically in some basic aspects of Being's original self-manifestation, we can

nevertheless conclude that this ontotheological project is not historically *necessary*. Why? Because the project of metaphysical 'grounding' is *underdetermined*, even by those aspects of Being's original self-manifestation from which this project derives. For as we will now see, these Milesian aspects of the original Western manifestation of Being do not themselves exhaust that inceptive self-showing – even in the fragmentary form in which it has been preserved for us by the tradition.

It is at precisely this juncture – his deconstruction of metaphysical foundationalism having taken him back to the beginnings of Western metaphysics – that the later Heidegger, rather than trying to take another (diachronic) step back in time (as though back behind the 'inception' itself), instead makes a lateral (or synchronic) historical move, turning to other Presocratic thinkers in an attempt to illuminate further aspects of the original self-manifestation of Being in the West. In this way, Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics clears the way for an anamnestic recovery of what remains of any original understandings of Being which preserve this pre- and extra-conceptual phenomenological givenness otherwise than as an ontotheological *ground* of beings.⁴⁰ It is for this reason that, as Schürmann has shown, the later Heidegger is concerned to elaborate a synchronic analysis of the multi-faceted 'clearing' (*Lichtung*) of Being at the 'inception of its history'. About this multi-faceted clearing, Heidegger will conclude that:

In the inception of its history, Being clears itself as emerging (*physis*) and disclosure (*alētheia*). From there it acquires the cast of presence [*Awesenheit*] and permanence [*Beständigkeit*] in the sense of enduring (*ousia*). Thus begins metaphysics proper.

(EP 4/III 403)⁴¹

In other words, before Being became interpreted in terms of the permanent presence of *ousia* it was thought and named as emergence and disclosure, *physis* and *alētheia*. *Physis* and *alētheia*, names given by Heraclitus and Parmenides (respectively) to the self-manifestation of Being, manage to safeguard two apparently pre-metaphysical aspects of this clearing, so Heidegger calls this *physis-alētheia* couple 'the inceptive essence of Being' (EP10/III 409).⁴²

Heidegger thus traces the fractured ontotheological core of metaphysics back into the mists surrounding the inception of Western thought. Since *different* aspects of Being's self-showing are named and preserved within the Presocratic textual ruins, Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics not only uncovers what comes to stand out as the single monolithic ontotheological beginning effected by Thales and Anaximander, but also reveals a historically intervening but soon forgotten alternative: the multi-aspectival self-showing of Being preserved in the writings of Parmenides

and Heraclitus. On Heidegger's account of the Parmenidean and Heraclitean aspects of the inception of Western philosophy, Being shows up phenomenologically – and is named by these 'basic words' and so caught in the 'fangs' of time – not as a 'ground' but rather simply *as showing up*. That is, 'Being' is expressed in pre-metaphysical, temporally dynamic, non-foundational terms by the Heraclitean understanding of *physis*, the 'self-opening unfolding' or 'self-blossoming emergence' of phenomenological intelligibility, as well as by the conception of truth as an active historical 'clearing' which Heidegger argues is inherent in the 'unconcealment' or 'disclosure' of Parmenidean *alētheia* (IM 14/EM 11). Within two generations of thought, however, as the history of Being took its first formative steps, our earliest metaphysicians made the first fateful 'historical decisions' we have recounted, and this other Presocratic understanding of Being as *physis* and *alētheia* was 'forgotten', ossified into the 'permanent presence' of *ousia* and thus swallowed up into the metaphysics of substance whose self-reifying entrenchment so profoundly shapes the history of Being. The temporal dynamism inherent in the manifestation of Being and preserved by Heraclitus and Parmenides was thereby obscured and subsequently forgotten through a kind of 'double-forgetting' – against which Heidegger mobilizes the anamnestic forces of the deconstruction we have recounted.⁴³

It is thus that, his genealogical deconstruction of metaphysics having established that the ontotheological split accomplished by Thales and Anaximander was not historically necessary, the later Heidegger struggles to bring into focus other aspects of Being's 'inceptive' self-showing, not out of some antiquarian 'nostalgia' (pace Derrida), but rather in an anamnestic attempt to recover ways of understanding Being otherwise than as the ontotheological 'ground' of beings. Heidegger's hope is that careful philosophical study of such roads not taken might help us envision alternatives to our own metaphysical epoch of 'enframing'. This it might do not only negatively, by contesting the necessity of the Nietzschean metaphysics underlying our increasingly homogenized 'age of technologically-leveled world-civilization' (D 187), and thereby clearing the conceptual space for understandings of Being other than the metaphysics of the atomic age (now fulfilling itself in the almost uncontested spread of the cybernetic paradigm), but also positively, by recovering concrete (if fragmentary) historical examples of a non-metaphysical understanding of Being, elements of which (such as the temporal dynamism of Heraclitean *physis* and the active conception of truth as a historical clearing inherent in Parmenidean *alētheia*) we might draw on in order to elaborate heretofore unthought-of historical paths leading beyond our own late-modern, Nietzschean impasse. Here we touch again upon the later Heidegger's central philosophical project, the vision behind his enigmatic call for 'an other beginning', a beginning which he always insisted could only emerge out of a renewed and

sustained hermeneutic altercation with the first beginnings of Western thought.

In the end, then, while I do not expect that my interpretive reconstruction of ontotheology will have purged the notion of all of its strangeness, or made it entirely convincing as a reading of metaphysics, I do hope to have made clear the significance of Heidegger's claim that metaphysics is ontotheology, to have demonstrated convincingly the centrality of this long-overlooked notion to Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics, and at least to have conveyed plausibly something of the importance of this deconstruction for Heidegger's larger project. If so, then it is my hope that those who might once have found themselves heading for the door at the mention of ontotheology, having made it this far, will find themselves moved to respond a bit more philosophically instead.

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Abbreviations for Heidegger's Texts (Translations Frequently Modified):

- B & T** *Being and Time*. Trans. Macquarrie and Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- BPP** *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- BQ** *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected 'Problems' of 'Logic'*. Trans. Rojcewicz and Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
- D** *Denkerfahrungen*. Ed. H. Heidegger. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1983.
- EM** *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1953.
- EP** *The End of Philosophy*. Trans. Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1973.
- FCM** *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Trans. McBride and Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- GA3** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 3: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1991.
- GA9** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 9: *Wegmarken*. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1996.
- GA10** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 10: *Der Satz vom Grund*. Ed. P. Jaeger. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1997.
- GA15** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 15: *Seminare*. Ed. C. Edwald. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1986.
- GA19** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 19: *Platon: Sophistes*. Ed. I. Schüssler. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1992.

- GA24** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 24: *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1975.
- GA26** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 26: *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. Ed. K. Held. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1978.
- GA29-30** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vols 29-30: *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit*. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1983.
- GA41** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 41: *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*. Ed. P. Jaeger. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1984.
- GA45** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 45: *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik'*. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1984.
- GA50** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 50: *Nietzsches Metaphysik*. Ed. P. Jaeger. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1990.
- GA54** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 54: *Parmenides*. Ed. M. S. Frings. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1982.
- GA79** *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 79: *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*. Ed. P. Jaeger. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1994.
- H** *Holzwege*. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1994.
- HCE** *Hegel's Concept of Experience*. Trans. Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
- I & D** *Identity and Difference*. Trans. Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
- IM** *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Trans. Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
- KPM** *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Trans. Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- KTb** 'Kant's Thesis about Being'. Trans. Klein and Pohl. *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 4(3) (1973), pp. 7-33.
- MF1** *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Trans. Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
- N1** *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art*. Ed. and trans. D. F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1979.
- N3** *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*. Ed. D. F. Krell, trans. Stambaugh, Krell, and Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, 1987.
- N4** *Nietzsche: Nihilism*. Ed. D. F. Krell, trans. Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.
- NI** *Nietzsche*, Vol. I. Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1961.
- NI1** *Nietzsche*, Vol. II. Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1961.
- OWL** *On the Way to Language*. Trans. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

- PAR *Parmenides*. Trans. Schuwer and Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- PDT Plato's 'Doctrine of Truth'. Trans. Barlow. In *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, ed. W. Barrett and H. Aiken. New York: Random House, 1962, Vol. 3, pp. 251-70.
- PLT *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- PR *The Principle of Reason*. Trans. Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
- QCT *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Trans. Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- S *Plato's Sophist*. Trans. Rojcewicz and Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- S & Z *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1993.
- SVG *Der Satz vom Grund*. Pfullige: G. Neske, 1957.
- T&B *On Time and Being*. Trans. Starmlaigh. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- TTL 'Traditional Language and Technological Language'. Trans. Gregory. *Journal of Philosophical Research*, 23 (1998), pp. 129-45.
- U25 *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Stuttgart: G. Neske, 1959.
- W *Wegmarken*. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1996.
- WBGM 'The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics'. Trans. Kaufmann. In *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. W. Kaufmann. New York: New American Library, 1975, pp. 265-79.
- WCT *What is Called Thinking?* Trans. Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
- WHD *Was Heißt Denken?* Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1984.
- WIP *What is Philosophy?* Trans. Kluback and Wilde. New York: Twayne, 1958.
- WIT *What is a Thing?* Trans. Barton and Deutsch. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967.

NOTES

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- 1 'It is not as easy to invent new words as one thinks, because they are contrary to taste, and in this way taste is a hindrance to philosophy' (Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, ed. and trans. K. Ameriks and S. Naragon

- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 120). Kant coined 'ontotheology' and 'cosmotheology' in order to distinguish between two opposing kinds of 'transcendental theology'. 'Ontotheology' is Kant's name for that kind of transcendental theology which (like Anselm's famous 'ontological argument' for the existence of God) 'believes it can know the existence of an [original being, *Unwesen*] through mere concepts, without the help of any experience whatsoever' (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Kemp Smith (New York: St Martin's, 1929)/*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. R. Schmidt (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1926), A632/B660).
- 2 In an erudite genealogy of *Destruction*, Moran traces a family of similar philosophical concepts back through medieval thought to Plato's *Euthydemus*. (See Dermot Moran, 'The Destruction of the Destruction: Heidegger's Versions of the History of Philosophy', in K. Harries and C. Jamme (eds), *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology* (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1994), pp. 176-96.) Moran translates Heidegger's *Destruction* as 'destruction', in part to stress its difference from what has come to be known as 'deconstruction'. My riskier rendition of *Destruction* as 'deconstruction' throughout is arguably justified by the fact that, although the word 'deconstruction' has taken on a life of its own, Derrida originally coined the term as a translation of Heidegger's *Abbau* ('quarrying', 'dismantling', or 'decomposing'), a synonym for *Destruction* which Heidegger later hyphenated and employed in order to emphasize that *Destruction* is not merely a negative act, a *Zerstörung*, but rather 'must be understood strictly as *de-struere* [the Latin *struere* means "to lay, pile, or build"], "*ab-bauen*" [quite literally, "un-building or de-construction"]' (GA15 337, 395). (See Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other*, ed. C. V. McDonald, trans. Kamuf and Ronell (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), pp. 86-7.) As I will show, Heidegger's deconstruction of Western metaphysics does not destroy or even destructure metaphysics; on the contrary, it decomposes or decompiles metaphysics' sedimented historical layers, reconstructing their hidden ontotheological structure and seeking to uncover the 'decisive experiences' responsible for this shared structure (experiences which Heidegger hopes will help us to envision a path beyond ontotheology). I am, however, in complete agreement with Moran's concluding claim that: 'The concept of destruction as used by Heidegger is ... bound to a certain view of history ... that has not been clarified' (op cit., p. 192). Indeed, it is precisely this gap in the literature that this paper attempts to fill.
 - 3 As Dreyfus puts it: 'The practices containing an understanding of what it is to be a human being, those containing an interpretation of what it is to be a thing, and those defining society fit together. Social practices thus transmit not only an implicit understanding of what it is to be a human being, an animal, an object, but, finally, what it is for anything to be at all' (Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics', in Charles Guignon (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 295).
 - 4 I get this nicely descriptive phrase by combining those of Dreyfus and Schürmann (see Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); and Reiner Schürmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*, trans. Gros and Schürmann (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990)). On Heidegger's account, Western history presents us with five different ways of understanding what beings *are*, and hence five overlapping epochs in this history of Being: the Presocratic, ancient, medieval, modern, and late modern.

- 5 For a Hegelian criticism of 'historicity' and the 'left Heideggerians' who espouse such a doctrine, see Robert B. Pippin, 'Heideggerian Postmodernism and Metaphysical Politics', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 4(1) (1996), pp. 17–37.
- 6 During the early 1940s, Heidegger recognized that 'Being' and the 'Being of beings' are in fact crucially different (see esp. *NA* 210/*NI* 349/*GA*50 6, but cf. *OWL* 20/*U*ZS 109).
- 7 The metaphysical question *par excellence*, the Socratic *to dia ti*, was formulated 'by Aristotle as the enduring question of thinking' (*NA* 206/*NI* 344; see, e.g., Aristotle, *Physics* II.1, 192b38).
- 8 Of course, Heidegger had been making important strides toward his mature conception of ontotheology since the late 1920s. Perhaps most notable in this respect is his fascinating but deeply confused 'Appendix' to *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (*MFL* 154-9/*GA*26 196–202). Reading this Appendix in the light of Heidegger's mature understanding of metaphysics as ontotheology suggests that the short-lived project of 'metontology' he advocates here – 'a special problematic which has for its proper theme beings as a whole' (*MFL* 157/*GA*26 199) – is best understood as Heidegger's attempt to jump from the sinking ship of 'fundamental ontology' to its metaphysical complement, a kind of 'fundamental theology' or 'theiology' (cf. *HCE* 135/*H* 195). In 1928 Heidegger still regards metaphysics as a positive 'task', indeed as 'the one basic problem of philosophy itself' (a task which Heidegger thinks that he will be able to accomplish). Nevertheless, Heidegger comes very close to his later recognition of metaphysics as ontotheology when he writes: 'In their unity, fundamental ontology and metontology constitute the concept of metaphysics' (*MFL* 158/*GA*26 202). What this shows, I take it, is that Heidegger had to recognize the untenability of his own ontotheological endeavours ('fundamental ontology' and 'metontology' respectively) before decisively rejecting metaphysics as ontotheology.
- 9 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Tredennick, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), IV.1, 1003a.
- 10 This table is not meant to be exhaustive (nor does it imply that all the pairs named here succeeded in metaphysically grounding an historical epoch), and there is no 'master pair' which can be employed to explain all the others. But nor do the pairs merely bear a 'family resemblance' to one another; rather, they are best understood as a series of different instantiations of the same ontotheological structure (in the sense explained above). I must thus part company with the kind of orthodox Heideggerianism which would dismiss 'the impulse to multiply lists of terms, order them, fix them in some set structural pattern' as 'academic pedantry' which, unconsciously betraying its 'Christian concern with true (correct) doctrine', treats 'the slipping [sic], resonating, evocative primal words of thinking as if they were beings to be manipulated' (Gail Stenstad, 'The Turning in *Ereignis* and Transformation of Thinking', *Heidegger Studies*, 12 (1996), pp. 92–3).
- 11 See HarperCollins' *German Dictionary*, unabridged edition (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), Unabridged Edition, pp. 220, 98, and Wahrig's *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Lexikon, 1994), pp. 519, 289.
- 12 Mark Okrent, *Heidegger's Pragmatism: Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphysics* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 227.
- 13 All the different metaphysically grounded epochs in the history of Being suspend historicity by 'holding back' (i.e. leaving out of account) 'Being as such', the phenomenological source of their own intelligibility. Like 'the same' (see below), 'Being as such' is one of Heidegger's later names for that pre-conceptual phenomenological givenness and extra-conceptual phenomenological excess which, by both eliciting and defying conceptual circumscription, makes ontological historicity possible. Since metaphysics leaves 'Being as such' out of account when it codifies and disseminates the fundamental conceptual parameters for each constellation of intelligibility, its purview is not total; thought is never entirely imprisoned within its epoch. But Heidegger thinks that, under the influence of metaphysics, we tend to forget this. Indeed, for Heidegger 'the greatest danger' is that the Nietzschean understanding of the Being of beings as eternally recurring will-to-power could succeed in pre-emptively delegitimizing the very notion of 'Being as such', a phenomenon which appears as 'nothing' (*NA* 203/*NI* 340), as 'the last wisp of an evaporating reality' (*IM* 40/*EM* 30), from within the perspective of Nietzsche's metaphysics of 'constant becoming'. Heidegger characterizes this reduction of 'Being as such' to 'nothing' as 'nihilism proper' (*NA* 202/*NI* 339), because it elides the phenomenon underwriting Heidegger's hope for a non-nihilistic, post-epochal age.
- 14 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 50–2; *The Gay Science*, trans. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), #125, p. 181. (For the account that follows, see Heidegger, 'Nietzsche's Metaphysics' (*N3* 185–251/*NI* 257–333).)
- 15 Jean Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena*, trans. Benedict (London: Verso, 1993), p. 4. Indeed, we come to treat even ourselves in the terms underlying our technological refashioning of the world: as resources to be optimized, ordered, and enhanced with maximal efficiency (whether cosmetically, psychopharmacologically, or – increasingly – genetically and even cybernetically).
- 16 Such controversies include, most recently, the Sokal-led scientific backlash. See Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, *Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science* (New York: Picador, 1998). On a closely related front, see my 'From the Question Concerning Technology to the Quest for a Democratic Technology: Heidegger, Marcuse, Feenberg', *Inquiry* 43(2) (2000) pp. 203–16.
- 17 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, p. 127. See also *BQ* 144-9/*GA*45 166–72.
- 18 Derrida explicitly raises this objection (see Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures (Nietzsche/Heidegger): Two Questions', in D. P. Michelfelder and R. E. Palmer (eds and trans.), *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer–Derrida Encounter* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 69–71). On Derrida's critique of Heidegger, see my 'Can I Die? Derrida on Heidegger on Death', *Philosophy Today*, 43(1) (1999), pp. 31–44.
- 19 See also *PIST* 268/*GA*9 234.
- 20 'The distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* underlies all metaphysics.'
- 21 With this distinction, Heidegger attributes an ontotheologically structured metaphysics to American 'pragmatism'.
- 22 See Derrida, 'Ellipsis', in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), esp. pp. 295–7.
- 23 Schürmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting*, p. 118 (see also *I & D* 25/87).
- 24 See also *I & D* 23-41/85-106 and *GA*15 410–7.
- 25 See esp. 'The Turning' (*QCT* 36-49/*GA*79 68–77).
- 26 I cannot here take up the question of whether the later Heidegger's understanding of the explanatory role played by 'Being' in the history of intelligibility escapes his own charge of ontotheology. It should be clear, however, that the answer will turn on whether or not he understands 'Being' metaphysically, that is, as an ontological or (more plausibly) a theological 'ground' of beings.
- 27 Cf.: 'For it still remains unthought by what unity ontologic and theologic belong together' (*I & D* 60/128). In 1930 Heidegger had already posed an early version of this question: 'Why precisely this doubling of whatness

- and thatness belongs to the original essence of Being is one of the deepest problems [*der tiefsten Probleme*] . . . that indeed has hitherto never yet been a problem at all, but something self-evident. This can be seen, for example, in traditional metaphysics and ontology, where one distinguishes between *essentia* and *existentia*, the whatness and thatness of beings. This distinction is employed as self-evidently as that between night and day' (FCM 357/GA29-30 519-20).
- 28 Heidegger's hyphenated use of *An-fang* connotes that the 'in-ception' of history takes place as a grasping of Being 'in the fangs' of time (see *N4* 199/NII 335).
- 29 With this notion of a 'primal matter', Heidegger draws our attention to the sememes constituting the ordinary word for 'cause' (*Ursache*).
- 30 'The much discussed four substances - of which we say the chief is water, making it as it were the one element -- by combination and solidification and coagulation of the substances in the universe mingle with one another' (Thales, in K. Freeman (ed.) *Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 19).
- 31 'The Non-limited [*apeiron*] is the original material of existing things; further, the source from which existing things derive their existence is also that to which they return at their destruction, according to necessity: for they give justice and make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to the arrangement of Time' (Anaximander, in *Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 19). For an analysis supporting this reading of Thales' and Anaximander's pursuit of the *archē*, see G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield (eds) *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 88-90, 98-9, 108-17.
- 32 '[M]etaphysics represents the beingness [*Seiendheit*] of beings in a twofold manner: in the first place, the totality of beings as such with an eye to their most universal traits (*on katholou, koinon*); but at the same time also the totality of beings as such in the sense of the highest and therefore divine being (*on katholou, akrotaton, theion*). In the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, the unconcealedness of beings as such has specifically developed in this twofold manner (cf. *Met.* Bk. 3, 5, 10)' (WBGM 217/GA9 378).
- 33 See esp. Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), 73a-77. In an analysis that confirms Heidegger's, David Bostock writes: 'the forms are both perfect paradigms and universals. This ambivalent conception is found in all the middle dialogues' (T. Honderich (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 684).
- 34 Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, trans. Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 93a28-9 (my *italic*).
- 35 Aristotle, *Categories*, trans. Cooke (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), 2a11ff.
- 36 Thus we get the claim, implicit in Heidegger but made explicit by Derrida, that Aristotle here inaugurates a 'metaphysics of presence' in which for the next twenty-five hundred years, whatever else changes, the Being of beings will be characterized in terms of 'permanent presence' (*Anwesenheit*). See Derrida, 'Différance', *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 16-27, esp. p. 22.
- 37 Thus Heidegger writes that 'the *unthought* unity of the essence of metaphysics . . . remains what is most thought-worthy for thinking, so long as thinking does not arbitrarily break off its fateful dialogue with the tradition' (*I & D* 55/121-2). See also Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 37-41.
- 38 Schürmann should be credited for recognizing that Being is a 'plural' phenomenon (see Schürmann's 'How to Read Heidegger', *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 19(2)-20(1), (1997) pp. 4-6).
- 39 Heidegger repeats this crucial claim in various registers, e.g. in WBGM 218/GA9 (1999) 379: 'This ontotheological nature of philosophy proper (*prōtē philosophia*) must be grounded in the way in which the *on* brings itself into the open, namely as *on*. . . [I]t is due to the way in which beings have from the very beginning revealed themselves as beings.'
- 40 See Schürmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting*, pp. 168-81.
- 41 On the temporal dynamism of *Anwesen*, see the crucial remarks at WHD 143 (unfortunately elided in the translation: see WCT 237).
- 42 In *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935), Heidegger already spoke of 'the unique and essential relationship between *physis* and *alētheia*' (*IM* 102/*EM* 78). See also *BQ* 153/GA45 178.
- 43 On this 'double-forgetting' and its relation to Heideggerian 'deconstruction', see also *B & T* 43/*S & Z* 21, and *PAR* 71/GA54 104-12.

HEIDEGGER'S METAHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY REVISITED

This reading of Heidegger's reading of the history of philosophy divides into three unequal parts. The first section glosses Heidegger's construal of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche as the metaphysics of presence, as ontotheology, as Being's own historic destiny, a destiny of *Seinsvergessenheit*; and it glosses Heidegger's construal from within the standard canons of historiography, from the perspective of today's conventional wisdom. In brief and unsurprisingly, viewed from the strict constructionist standpoint—viewed as a “straight” reading of philosophy's history—Heidegger's interpretation cannot stand. The fact that it is an historical misreading proves to be stunningly uninteresting, however, and fails to account for its influence. So an altogether different approach to Heidegger's (mis)reading is proposed in the second section of this paper. Turning the historical tables, the tables of influence, Heidegger's appropriation of the tradition, his deconstruction of it, is construed—in Bloom's terms—as poetic misprision, as a strong misreading, one which responds to its own imperatives. The temptation to construe the straight reading (reconstruction)/strong misreading (deconstruction) distinction as like the “historical” vs. “philosophical” distinction in reading the history of philosophy is entertained briefly. It is later urged that we give up altogether the distinction in kind between historical and philosophical readings of the history of philosophy; for that distinction makes sense only if we accept the picture of philosophy as an enterprise whose business it is to confront a reasonably fixed list of issues within a timeless neutral matrix: To give up this picture is to give up the distinction at the same time. These two readings of Heidegger—strict constructionist straight reading and deconstructionist strong misreading—appear irreconcilable; so an attempt is made in section III to trope this difference in readings. Specifically, the incommensurability of the two perspectives, the two readings of philosophy's history, is analyzed in terms of the difference between normal and abnormal discourse.² Abnormal discourse, like Kuhn's “revolutionary science,” may well be tomorrow's normal discourse; but in exploring this suggestion further some important points of contrast between Kuhnian and Heideggerian readings emerge. In Kuhn's reading of, for example, the history of science the question whether the normal science of the day is to be supplanted (eventually) by the new (revolutionary) paradigm may be decided by a complex gestalt-switch, a reorientation occasioned by anomalous cases, a

reevaluation of data hitherto ruled out by the discourse of the day. Kuhn's "revolutionary" paradigms drive practitioners back upon data; but Heidegger's metahistorical reading of the history of philosophy does not drive us back to data, back to the texts. This raises the question of the sense in which Heidegger's abnormal discourse ever could become normal discourse, ever could function as a new paradigm. I conclude, with Rorty, that Heidegger's metahistory of philosophy cannot be institutionalized as some abnormal discourse can and that, in consequence, Heideggerians who approach the history of philosophy as if he had found the key to unlock its mysteries—or its horrors, if you prefer—are confused about Heidegger's discourse, confused about its possibilities in a way that he himself was not.

I

An attempt to gloss Heidegger's perception of the history of philosophy will undoubtedly do violence to it. To begin with, the contributions of major philosophers are, for Heidegger, matters for thought, invitations to think—through the problematic of great thinkers, rather than doctrines, labels, slogans or clever mnemonics to be learned and reproduced as the occasion demands. Entering the thought of a major philosopher is, therefore, an initiation into philosophy and thought proper, for Heidegger, not an exercise in doxography. In this respect, the relationship which holds between a great philosopher's philosophizing, on the one hand, and an account of that philosophy, on the other hand, is rather like the relationship which holds between a great novel and its plot summary; we learn everything and nothing from it.³

With these remarks I do not mean to beg in advance the question—whether *he* is a "great" philosopher—in Heidegger's favor. In any event, that question may be as undecidable as it is uninteresting. I wish, rather, to underscore the extent to which it has become a cliché to say of Heidegger that he is "the thinker of Being (*Sein*)," just as it has become a cliché to observe that the preposition in the phrase "thought of Being" really does intend to leave open the question whether Being is the object of Heidegger's thought or whether Being thinks through Heidegger, becomes articulate through him: whether Heidegger's thought-path was Being's own thought.

Heidegger's initial project, in *Being and Time*, was designed to reawaken the question, What is the sense of the Being (*Sein*) of beings (*Seiendes*)? This thrust toward what he called a fundamental ontology required a "recapitulation and destruction" of the history of ontology. Today we would have called it a "deconstruction" of metaphysics, without violating Heidegger's sense in the least. But it may be useful also to remember that metaphysics was not only a traditional branch of philosophy for Heidegger. He frequently used the

term in a broad sense in which it was said to express man's relationship to the Being of Beings. In this sense, Heidegger regarded man's relationship to what is as "metaphysical."

In so far as man relates to beings, he represents being to himself with reference to the fact that it is, what and how it is, how it might be and ought to be; in short he represents being with reference to its Being. This re-presentation is thinking . . . In whatever manner man may re-present beings as such to himself he represents them in view of their Being. Because of this man always goes beyond beings and crosses over to Being. In Greek, "beyond" is *meta*. Hence man's every relationship to beings as such is metaphysical.⁴

So Heidegger's critique of metaphysics is directed at "metaphysics" in the narrower sense, the sense in which it constitutes a certain way Being has been understood since Plato, which is synonymous with the history of Western philosophy. It is this narrower sense of "metaphysics" Heidegger originally sought to overcome, precisely in the name of a fundamental ontology which finds its roots in an older "metaphysics"—that of the pre-Socratic philosophers. In effect, Heidegger's initial endeavor to reawaken the allegedly lost sense of Being was an attempt to recall traditional metaphysics from its obliviousness to its own origins—the thought of Being. He was persuaded initially that the traditional categorial treatment of Being failed to articulate clearly what is meant for a thing "to be" in general. The tradition which informed an account of "Being" was inherently defective, according to the early Heidegger. He argued that the criteria which sustained an approach to Being—indeterminability, universality, and self-evidence—are not simply inadequate but are themselves the result of an inadequate account of Being, *viz.* the narrow sense of metaphysics. The criteria are allegedly derived from the success of discursive speech in application to beings, to entities. According to this view, categorial inquiry since Plato enjoys considerable success in eliciting the sense of beings, the ontic, but misapplies its energies in treating Being in the categorial mode, through discursive thought: "What characterizes metaphysical thinking which grounds the ground for beings is the fact that metaphysical thinking departs from what is present in its presence, and thus represents it in terms of its ground as something grounded."⁵ "Plato," "philosophy," "metaphysics," "the metaphysics of presence" as presence, all signify the same event: "Since Plato, thinking about the Being of beings becomes—'philosophy' . . . The 'philosophy' first begun with Plato hereafter possesses the characteristic of that which is later called 'metaphysics' . . . Even the word 'metaphysics' is already molded in Plato's presentation."⁶ And,

All metaphysics including its opponent positivism speaks the language of Plato. The basic word of its thinking, that is, of his presentation of the Being of beings,

is *eidos*, *idea*: the outward appearance in which beings as such show themselves. Outward appearance, however, is a manner of presence.⁷

The unity of philosophy as Platonic metaphysics conditions its possible forms up to Nietzsche, after which its inner logic is exhausted, after which philosophy comes to its end in the triumph of calculative thinking:

Throughout the whole history of philosophy, Plato's thinking remains decisive in changing forms. Metaphysics is Platonism. Nietzsche characterizes his philosophy as reversed Platonism. With the reversal of metaphysics which was already accomplished by Karl Marx, the most extreme possibility of philosophy is attained. It has entered its final stage. To the extent that philosophical thinking is still attempted, it manages only to attain an epigonal renaissance and variations of that renaissance.⁸

As is known widely, Heidegger's narrative tried to show that philosophic discourse, since Plato, assumes an unanalyzed conception of truth as correctness, i.e., a correspondence between a statement and a state-of-affairs. "... non-concealment is *alētheia* in Greek, which is translated as 'truth'. And, for Western thought, 'truth' has for a long time meant the agreement between thought's representation and thing: *adequatio intellectus et rei*."⁹ Heidegger always maintained that this sense of truth is derivative.

Three theses characterize the way in which the essence of truth has been traditionally conceived and the way it is supposed to have been first defined: (1) that the 'locus' of truth is assertion (judgment); (2) that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' of the judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus, but has set going the definition of 'truth' as 'agreement'.¹⁰

Before Plato truth, *alētheia*, meant disclosure; being-in-a-state-of-uncovering: "Because concealment pervades the nature of Being as a self-concealment for the Greeks, and thus determines beings in their presence and accessibility ('truth'), the Greek word for that which the Romans called 'veritas' and we call 'Wahrheit' is designated by the *a-privative* (*a-lētheia*)."¹¹ Truth, according to Heidegger, originally meant wresting from concealment. *Lēthō*, *lathanō*, originally suggested covering-up, hoarding, concealing, disguising, forgetting. The alpha-privative in *alētheia*, consequently, was said to uncover, unconceal; to bring into the light. Heidegger maintained that truth, in the epistemological sense—*adequatio rei et intellectus*—while applicable to ontic discourse, to talk about things, is incapable of grasping Being, the emergence within which things come to be. Ontic discourse about Being has characterized the history of philosophy as metaphysics. Truth devolves, historically, from *alētheia* (pre-Platonic), to *orthotes* (the "correct" discourse about things), to *adequatio intellectus et rei* (medieval period), to certitude (Descartes), to error (Nietzsche). The revelatory essence of truth is allegedly

subservient to correct speech, in Plato. "Correctness" then evolves its own career; from medieval correspondence, to Cartesian self-evidence in which mathematical certainty serves as paradigm of truth, to Nietzsche's extraordinary claim that truth is the sort of error, the sort of falsification of fluid becoming, without which human beings could not live.

As evidence of this it is sufficient to cite the principal propositions which are characteristic of the perpetual molding of the nature of truth within the principal ages of metaphysics.

A statement of St. Thomas Aquinas holds true for Medieval Scholasticism: *Veritas proprie invenitur in intellectu humano vel divino* (*Quaestiones de veritate*; qu. 1 art. 4, resp.), "truth is really encountered in the human or in the divine understanding." It has its essential place in the understanding. Here truth is no longer *alētheia* but *homoiōsis* (*adequatio*).

At the beginning of the modern age Descartes sharpens the above quotation by saying: *veritatem proprie vel falsitatem non nisi in solo intellectu esse posse* (*Regulae ad directionem ingenii*; Reg. VII, Opp. X, 396). "Truth or falsehood in the genuine sense cannot be anywhere else except in the understanding alone."

And in the age in which the fulfillment of modern times commences Nietzsche sharpens the above statement even more: "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live. The value for life decides in the end." (Notation made in 1885, *The Will to Power*, n. 493) ... Nietzsche's concept of truth is an example of the last reflection of the extreme consequences of that changing of truth from the unconcealment of beings to the correctness of the glance. The change itself takes place in the definition of the Being of beings (i.e., according to the Greeks, the presence of what is present) as *idea*.¹²

As a consequence of the sharpening of truth in the epistemological sense, Being devolves from *Anwesenheit*, the pre-Platonic presence of emergence, to Idea (Plato), to transcendence (God), to "will" (modern period). Heidegger maintains, I need only add briefly, that Being appears as will in the entire post-Cartesian period, not only in Nietzsche.

If one construes Heidegger's metahistorical approach as an attempt to give a factual account of philosophy's history his account will necessarily appear circular. The circularity will arise because, as the thinker of Being, Heidegger takes this to be the task of every thinker. Every major philosopher attempts to make *Sein* become word, from this perspective, and the history of Western metaphysics is then the summons of Being, the manifold ways in which Being becomes presence as absence, absence as presence.

But what if one doesn't want to play this game? What if, for example, our paradigm is not Being but "Saying Yes to contradiction and strife, to becoming, together with the radical rejection of even the concept 'Being' (*Sein*)?"¹³ Is it at all plausible to assert, as Heidegger does, that Nietzsche

was fated to think the Being of beings as will to power, whose *existentia* is eternal recurrence? That is, do attributions of this sort make sense for one who writes:

Believe me, my brothers: it was the body that despaired of the body and touched the ultimate walls with the fingers of a deluded spirit. Believe me brothers: it was the body that despaired of the earth and heard the belly of Being (*Sein*) speak to it . . . But 'that world' is well concealed from humans—that dehumanized inhuman world which is heavenly nothing: and the belly of Being does not speak to humans at all, except as a human.¹⁴

These rhetorical questions are not designed to make one choose sides. Rather, they are meant to raise the difficult issue of how one can possibly choose sides, choose approaches, and on what basis. Is there a topic-neutral matrix to relieve this conundrum? An Archimedian insight? Some sure footing?

A strict constructionist historian of philosophy would answer by returning to the texts themselves. What he or she would discover is that the texts, at best, may *permit* a Heideggerian reading of, say, Nietzsche or Plato, but that such a reading would have to be assigned a very low plausibility ranking. Moreover, sometimes such readings would be simply untenable.

The case of Plato is particularly instructive because it is one of the two which are crucial to Heidegger's story and because Heidegger came to have his own reservations about his reading of Plato. His argument amounted to two assertions—that after Plato "the nature of truth surrenders the basic feature of unconcealment"¹⁵ and that . . . "what underlies Plato's thinking is a change in the essence of truth, which becomes the hidden law of what he says as a thinker."¹⁶—accompanied by a textual claim that this change occurred in Book VII of *The Republic*, in the allegory of the cave:

The transition from one context to another consists in vision's becoming more correct. Everything depends on the *orthotes*, on the correctness of vision. Through this correctness seeing and knowing are made right . . . In this self-directing, perception is compared with that which is to be sighted. This is the "appearance" of beings. As a consequence of this assimilation of perception as an *idein* to an *idea*, a *homoiosis* remains, a correspondence between knowledge and the thing itself. And so, out of the foreground of *idea* and *idein* a change in the nature of truth springs forth before *alētheia*. Truth becomes *orthotes*, correctness of perception and expression.

In this transformation in the nature of truth a change in the location of truth is simultaneously affected. As nonconcealment truth is still a fundamental feature of beings themselves. As correctness of "vision," however, it becomes the designation of man's relationship to beings.¹⁷

Dramatic and influential though this reading of Plato may have been, it was quickly attacked and in all probability permanently undermined by Paul

Friedländer's discussion.¹⁸ Friedländer showed skillfully that the correspondence sense of truth pre-dates Plato, indeed that "In Homer *Alēthuein* and *alēthes*, with a single exception, always occur connected with and dependent on, verbs of assertion."¹⁹ He supports equally convincingly the claim that, from Homer on, *alētheia* is used in three senses: the truth of a written or spoken word, correspondence with what is the case, "reality," and truthfulness of character.

Heidegger, it should also be pointed out, did not insist on treating his own Plato interpretation as dogma. In *Zur Sache des Denkens* he virtually conceded the case to Friedländer and others.

The natural concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, not in the philosophy of the Greeks either. It is often and justifiably pointed out that the word *alēthes* is already used by Homer only in the *verba dicendi*, in statement and thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment. But this reference means only that neither the poets nor everyday language usage, not even philosophy see themselves confronted with the task of asking how truth, that is, the correctness of statements, is gained only in the opening of presence. . . . we must acknowledge the fact that *alētheia*, unconcealment in the sense of the opening of presence, was originally only experienced as *orthotes*, as the correctness of representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable.²⁰

This extraordinarily candid concession amounts to nothing less than an explicit rejection of his earlier Plato essay.

At least two points remain, therefore, which are worth mulling-over in connection with Heidegger's misreading of Plato, the linchpin of his metahistory. The first is that—with very few exceptions—Heidegger's reading of his predecessors is almost always defeasible. The second point follows from the first: if Heidegger's readings are misreadings, why is his metahistory regarded a source of insight and continuing discussion, rather than error and outright dismissal?

II

At least two answers won't work. Although many historians of philosophy may still believe this, it has simply become implausible to continue to ascribe the influence of Heidegger's misreadings to the ignorance of Heideggerians. Too many informed historians of philosophy, detractors and admirers alike, have found Heidegger's misreadings sources of insight to continue to maintain that his influence is the result of ignorance. A second response which won't work is nevertheless more tempting. It is to suggest that

Heidegger is really “doing” philosophy—not history—in his metahistorical misreadings.

The allure of this response is that it flatters conventional philosophic wisdom, the dogma that “properly philosophical” questions *have* no history, in a certain sense,²¹ that philosophical problems transcend vocabularies, natural languages, and are in principle commensurable. “Philosophy does not take kindly to being chopped into centuries,” as Passmore put it pithily.²² Philosophy, on this view, is concerned to discover the truth about perennial questions, to solve them, or to help the enterprise progress toward their solution: questions concerning “the one and the many, permanence and change, the real and the ideal, reason and experience, form and matter, structure and process.”²³ Given this perspective, perhaps the sole justification for reading philosophy’s history is that “like artists, philosophers constantly return to ‘Old Masters’, seeking new inspiration in their inexhaustible resources.”²⁴ For those self-starters who are in no need of “new inspiration” in their trek toward truth it might, on this view, be just as easily maintained that

... nothing can do more to stultify original thinking than a thorough knowledge of past philosophers acquired too early in life; because it brings with it the deadening discouragement of realizing that most of the ideas one thinks up have been thought of by some one else before. (Perhaps the classic example of the advantages of ignorance was Wittgenstein).²⁵

The other side of the dogma that philosophical questions are timeless is that historical research in philosophy, in contrast, is a contingent affair, a question concerning the correspondence of interpretations to texts: a question of accurate representation. This typically involves commitments to subordinate theses as well: that the meaning of a text is in principle—if not in fact—univocal, that ambiguity arises only in borderline cases, that authorial intention can be established, and that it controls a text’s meaning.

Regrettably, whatever the force of this dogma it does not capture Heidegger’s misreading at all. To begin with, it is not clear that Heidegger is “doing philosophy” in anything remotely like the sense mentioned. What is clear is that Heidegger never took himself to be “doing philosophy” at all, if contributing to the solution of a philosophical problem is to count as “doing” it. It can even be argued that Heidegger did not address “philosophical” questions in *any* traditional sense, unless one is prepared to embrace the counterfactual—that the question, What is the meaning of the Being of beings?, is a traditional philosophical “question” or “problem.”

In addition, the view that there *are* philosophic questions proper which are commensurable without regard to time or place, without context, is open to question. Unfortunately, the moment the point is put this way we are in

difficulty. The difficulty is of at least two sorts. There is, first, the specter of historicism (or “conceptual relativism”²⁶ or “epistemological behaviorism”²⁷) implicit in the remark. Second, there is the problem of reflexivity, of self-reference and “the self-excepting fallacy.”²⁸ I defer discussion of these substantive matters until later. For now, I simply want to flag the fact that the term “dogma” was not chosen for rhetorical effect. I shall maintain later that the distinction between “historical” and “philosophical” readings of the history of philosophy is better given up.²⁹

I am thus far maintaining that the puzzle of the influence of Heidegger’s metahistory won’t be solved by appeal either to the putative ignorance of his followers or by appeal to the dogma that he is contributing to the resolution (or even the discussion) of timeless philosophical questions. Such facile answers may well apply in instances involving marginal philosophers, philosophers who wittingly embrace the prevailing norm of what is to count as “doing” philosophy for any given period, those who embrace the day’s conventional wisdom and vocabulary. This may, parenthetically, also help to account for the celebrity which some marginal philosophers enjoy in their own age, a celebrity later often found unintelligible. For example, as Passmore has observed, “had I written this book in 1800 I should probably have dismissed Berkeley and Hume in a few lines, in order to concentrate my attention on Dugald Stewart—and in 1850 the centre of my interest would have shifted to Sir William Hamilton.”³⁰ For it is a common feature of marginal philosophers to be appreciated and judged by their journeymen contemporaries and that, in consequence, they sometimes look like Titans to their own age, if not to posterity.

One often characteristic feature of major as contrasted with marginal philosophers is that they alter radically what is to count as “doing” philosophy, what is to count as a philosophical question, answer, and perhaps especially what is to count as philosophic method. And one further consequence is that after they have appeared upon the scene we can no longer return to lost innocence, we can no longer understand the history of philosophy as we did prior to their appearance. Plato did not simply propose to “solve” problems which sophists were not clever enough to solve, for example. He “invented” the enterprise instead, in a certain sense, a sense which condemned the wise men of his day to an eternal bad press. It is one of the lingering ironies of Plato’s achievement, after all, that the love of an absent wisdom (*philosophia*) was to become more esteemed than its possession, since the sophists presumably already *were* wise men (*sophoi*). Similarly, Aristotle’s reading of Plato, Locke’s reading of Descartes, Kant’s Hume, or Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s readings of everybody and anybody are not captured well

when such misreadings are construed as in principle avoidable mischaracterizations of their predecessors, en route to the solution of common philosophic questions on a neutral philosophical grid.

Under the sway of recent deconstructionist French readings—which, in turn, often trace their genealogy to Heidegger and to Nietzsche—the literary critic Harold Bloom has proposed an interesting theory of intra-poetic relationships, one which may help us better understand intra-philosophic relationships.

Poetic history, in this book's argument is held to be indistinguishable from poetic influence, since strong poets make that history by misreading one another, so as to clear imaginative space for themselves.³¹

Strong misreadings, "poetic misprision," on this view, are not regrettable accidents but central to strong poets. It is "weaker talents [who] idealize; figures of capable imagination appropriate for themselves."³² The influence of a predecessor strong poet upon a successor strong poet differs from his or her influence upon a "weaker talent" in that

Poetic influence—when it involves two strong, authentic poets,—always proceeds by a misreading of the prior poet, an act of creative correction that is actually and necessarily a misinterpretation. The history of fruitful poetic influence, which is to say the main tradition of Western poetry since the Renaissance, is a history of anxiety and self-saving caricature, of distortion, of perverse, wilful revisionism without which modern poetry as such could not exist.³³

Moreover, there is a structure to strong misreadings, a six-phase structure, only the first two of which are of interest for our purposes:

1. *Clinamen*, which is poetic misreading or misprision proper; I take the word from Lucretius, where it means a "swerve" of the atoms so as to make change possible in the universe. A poet swerves away from his precursor, by so reading his precursor's poem as to execute a *clinamen* in relation to it. This appears as a corrective movement in his own poem, which implies that the precursor poem went accurately up to a certain point, but then should have swerved, precisely in the direction that the new poem moves.

2. *Tessera*, which is completion and antithesis; I take the word not from mosaic-making, where it is still used, but from the ancient mystery cults, where it meant a token of recognition, the fragment say of a small pot which with the other fragments would re-constitute the vessel. A poet antithetically "completes" his precursor, by so reading the parent-poem as to retain its terms but to mean them in another sense, as though the precursor had failed to go far enough.³⁴

The notion of strong misreadings may be useful in helping us to understand philosophers' misreadings of their predecessors better, while at the same time avoiding the suggestion that any misreading is as powerful as any other,

that the novice's ignorance of the history of philosophy, for example, is really only a misreading of it. At the same time the notion of strong misreadings is helpful in that it captures the sense of appropriation as misappropriation instead of solution, and of continuity as departure, as new beginning—in short, of the incommensurability of discourses apart from considerations of genealogy.

From this perspective, a major philosopher's aspectual takings³⁵ of his predecessors is always a misreading, a creative correction, a misinterpretation. The misreading is a clinamenic movement, a swerving or veering-off which appears as a correction of the precursor philosopher(s)—"which implies that the precursor . . . went accurately up to a certain point, but then should have swerved, precisely in the direction that the new [philosophy] moves." This misrepresentation by one major philosopher of a prior philosopher at the time generates the appearance of progress—it may even be the origin of the notion of "progress" in philosophy for all I know—in the solution of common "problems" because the successor philosopher antithetically "completes" his precursor, by so reading him as to retain his terms but to mean them in another sense, as though the predecessor had failed to go far enough.

In the case of Heidegger's interpretation of the tradition, therefore, his concession that he had misread Plato, for example, will do little to discredit his interpretation. Nor will it diminish its influence. There can be no crossfire between straight readings and strong misreadings here: only misfirings. To charge Heidegger with misreading the tradition—as was suggested in the previous section of this paper—is therefore not so much to object to it as it is to characterize its point.

III

The compatibilist temptation is overwhelming—to yield to a reconciliation between straight constructionist readings and strong misreadings of the history of philosophy. Each partner to the marriage presumably lives happily ever after, after reconciliation. The one gives a factual, "historical" account of the contributions made by major philosophers to the resolution of outstanding philosophical questions by worrying about what X *really* said in text Y, what he actually meant by saying it, whether and how what X said in Y is consistent with what he said in Z, and so on. The other partner is doing conceptual, not factual history, on the other hand. That partner merely uses X as the occasion for his or her own reflections on the philosophical issue itself, "endeavoring to comprehend and express not what another thinker thought/said, but what he did not think/say, could not think/say, and why he could

not think/say it."³⁶ Peace and harmony can be restored when the partners realize that theirs was a trivial quarrel, that their differences had been exaggerated, that they had said things about each other which they now deeply regret having said. It was a lovers-quarrel after all, a misunderstanding, a spat between persons who cannot otherwise live without one another. So the bone of contention can be removed from this marriage therapeutically by the insertion of a scare-quote: it is said that one partner worries about X, while the other is really worrying about 'X'. Enter the happy ending.

Not every marriage is worth saving, however, and I think this one is not. The price may well be too high. The price is too high if the proposed reconciliation reinforces the dogma that the difference between "historical" and "philosophical" readings of the history of philosophy is a difference in kind.

What I want to suggest and argue for briefly is that both terms in the disjunction " 'historical' or 'philosophical' " are oversimple. And, to vary the metaphor, I want to fire a shot across both bows: "historical" and "philosophical." The first salvo stems from the fact that it now seems to me that the paradigm of philosophy's history as conceptual—as consisting of a reasonably fixed set of questions and a common method which get embedded, temporarily, in a given time and place—misleads. That conception is itself an historical product, primarily the triumph of the Platonic paradigm,³⁷ which typically, though not necessarily entails a commitment to foundationalism. What I am saying amounts to endorsing the proposal that we give up the model of philosophy as consisting of a set of timeless questions, questions which we set out to solve or resolve forever. The second salvo is fired across the bow of the good ship "historical." The briefest—and hence misleading—way to put the point is to ape Nietzsche and say that there are facts relative only to interpretations. "Historical" readings of the history of philosophy cannot, in this view, dissolve into the question of accurate representation of facts, of correspondence of interpretations to texts, nor of immaculate perceptions of texts whose meaning can be fixed in some neutral, atemporal frame. Or better, "historical" readings of the history of philosophy cannot be any of these things unless foundationalism is true, in which case historical knowledge may paradoxically serve as "first philosophy." In brief, my view is that the contrast in kind between "philosophical" and "historical" readings of the history of philosophy is itself parasitic upon philosophy viewed as a foundationalist enterprise.³⁸ To give up the one just *is* to give up the other. There is another way to put this point. It is to say that the contrast in kind between philosophical and historical readings of the history of philosophy assumes that philosophical discourses are commensurable, that historical discourses are commensurable, but that philosophical and historical discourses

are incommensurable.³⁹ And given the *de facto* lack of agreement within philosophy, history's commensurable discourse becomes, paradoxically, a model of philosophic commensurability proper.

There is a more promising notion available than the one that the straight reading/strong misreading distinction is equivalent to the historical reading/philosophical reading distinction. The distinction between "normal" and "abnormal" discourse is far more helpful:

Normal discourse (a generalization of Kuhn's notion of "normal science") is any discourse (scientific, political, theological, or whatever) which embodies agreed-upon criteria for reaching agreement; abnormal discourse is any which lacks such criteria.⁴⁰

More generally, normal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon set of conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as answering a question, what counts as having a good argument for that answer or a good criticism of it. Abnormal discourse is what happens when someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant of these conventions or who sets them aside. Epistēmē is the product of normal discourse—the sort of statement which can be agreed to be true by all participants whom the other participants count as "rational." The product of abnormal discourse can be anything from nonsense to intellectual revolution, and there is no discipline which describes it, any more than there is a discipline devoted to the study of the unpredictable, or of "creativity."⁴¹

What is being proposed is that the contrast between straight readings (reconstructions) and strong misreadings (deconstructions) should be understood in terms of Rorty's distinction between normal and abnormal discourse rather than being construed as distinguishing between historical and philosophical readings of the history of philosophy. The assumption that there is a distinction in kind between "historical" and "philosophical" readings of philosophy's history leaves philosophers like Heidegger out in the cold. For he grants that he is not doing straight history; but he is not "doing" philosophy either. Hence the facile shibboleth that Heidegger is not *really* a philosopher, for there are no other options. Rorty's proposal therefore has several distinct advantages, the most important of which may be that "philosophical readings" no longer has a univocal sense, a sense which typically converts the consensus of a sub-set of current practitioners into the equivalent of an eternal neutral matrix. What is given up, then, is the notion that what counts as normal today holds and held always for competent "philosophers." As a corollary,

In this conception, "Philosophy" is not a name for a discipline which confronts permanent issues, and unfortunately keeps misstating them, or attacking them

with clumsy dialectical instruments. Rather, it is a cultural genre, a "voice in the conversation of mankind" (to use Michael Oakeshott's phrase), which centers on one topic rather than another at some given time not by dialectical necessity but as a result of various things happening elsewhere in the conversation (the New Science, the French Revolution, the modern novel) or of individual men of genius who think of something new (Hegel, Marx, Frege, Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger), or perhaps of the resultant of several such forces. Interesting philosophical change (we might say "philosophical progress," but this would be question-begging) occurs not when a new way is found to deal with an old problem but when a new set of problems emerges and the old ones begin to fade away. The temptation (both in Descartes's time and in ours) is to think that the new problematic is the old one rightly seen.⁴²

The sort of view of philosophy which Rorty and others before him have proposed is found by many to be either threatening or repellent. Charges against it range from "relativism" to "nihilism." While this is scarcely the place to address such questions—indeed they fall outside this paper's purview—I do want to enter some brief observations on the shape of this debate.

Those who argue that "philosophy" is not the name for an activity whose discourses are commensurable metahistorically are quickly charged with relativism (or historicism), or worse. In an analogous debate, the one concerning paradigm shifts and paradigm acquisition in Kuhn, for example, Sheffler remarks that "It follows that each paradigm is, in effect, inevitably self-justifying, and that paradigm debates must fail of objectivity: again we appear driven back to non-rational conversions as the final characterization of paradigm shifts within the community of science."⁴³ This way of putting the "conceptual relativist" charge can be as easily applied to Rorty's conception of philosophy as to Kuhn. Its difficulty, however, is its force—that it converts a prevailing paradigm into a timeless neutral matrix in terms of which "objectivity" and "rationality" are presumed to be understood. Only when "philosophy" (or "science") is viewed in the foundationalist sense that there are "facts of the matter" apart from their interpretation—indeed that the "fact"/"theory" distinction has some ultimate, decidable ontological purchase—does the "conceptual relativist" charge have any force. Then, however, the meaning of "objectivity" and "rationality" are begged against the "relativist" in advance. For the charge presupposes the validity of the very notions at issue, that there exists some neutral vocabulary which will dispense with the need as well as the possibility of further descriptions, that there can be final agreement to some ultimate description which will match the discourse once and for all to its referent, to what is "outside." A related but somewhat different sort of argument—that conceptual relativists must presuppose an "outside" to discourse in a nontrivial sense—is argued by Mandelbaum. Mandelbaum, here, is talking about linguists, Whorf in par-

ticular, but means to make the charge against Kuhn and *a fortiori* against Rorty too. The conceptual relativist

takes statements made in each language to be referential, and in each case seeks to establish that to which they refer. If it were the case that every statement in a language received its meaning solely through other expressions used within that language, each language would be self-enclosed, and no equivalence of meaning between statement in any two languages could be established.⁴⁴

Mandelbaum sometimes seems to assume that the question of translatability and commensurability are the same thing—and I take it that they need not be—as a result of which he is able to give a sense to the notion of languages as "self-enclosed," as receiving their sense solely through other expressions, which implies for him that "sameness of meaning" between any two languages could not be established. Since any such claims prove counterfactual and self-referentially self-defeating, conceptual relativists

... initially had to assume that the same objects and activities were being referred to in both languages. Therefore, it cannot be the case that how the world appears to those who speak a particular language is in *all* respects determined by the language they speak. While varying grammatical forms may lead to varying ways of classifying objects and relating them to one another, languages presuppose a world of extra-linguistic objects to which the speakers of a language refer. Since, however, it is possible to refer to the same aspects of this world when using radically different languages ... it cannot be maintained that those whose thought is expressed in different languages do not share a common world.⁴⁵

From considerations of this sort, plus the alleged dilemma that Kuhn simultaneously accepts a fairly standard set of criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory while also accepting that observations are always theory-laden, it follows that

It is only if [the results of existing experiments and observations] are initially taken to be neutral with respect to alternative theories that they provide a test for those theories ... Therefore, one can test the adequacy of a theory as a whole by attempting to show whether or not the ascribed connections among observables, as deducible from the theory, do or do not exist; and whether their relations have been accurately determined. In addition, of course, a theory is tested through seeking out new observational or experimental data which, if the theory were true, could be immediately absorbed by it, or which, alternatively, would call for adjustments in it.⁴⁶

Mandelbaum's "different languages"/"common world" distinction parallels his "theory"/"observation data" distinction. Different languages require a common world, competing theories require observation data. And "common world," like "observation data," must initially be taken to be neutral—which is not the same thing as to *be* neutrally taken.

In reply, it might be argued that to be a conceptual relativist is to agree with much of this but is simply to be a behaviorist in epistemology, and that

To be a behaviorist in epistemology . . . is to look at the normal scientific discourse of our day bifocally, both as patterns adopted for various historical reasons, and as the achievement of objective truth, where "objective truth" is no more and no less than the best idea we currently have about how to explain what is going on . . .⁴⁷ It is merely to say that nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence.⁴⁸

Therefore, "truth," "reference," "objectivity" and the like should be understood relative to a conceptual scheme, in the sense in which inference to the best explanation is.

To say that we have to assign referents to terms and truth-values to sentences in the light of our best notions of what there is in the world is a platitude. To say that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual scheme" sounds as if it were saying something more than this, but it is not, as long as "our conceptual scheme" is taken as simply a reference to what we believe now—the collection of views which make up our present-day culture.⁴⁹

Against the possible *reductio* which this "historicism"⁵⁰ may seem to imply, it should be added that

To say that the True and the Right are matters of social practice may seem to condemn us to a behaviorist approach to either knowledge or morals . . . Here I shall simply remark that only the image of a discipline—philosophy—which will pick out a given set of scientific or moral views as more "rational" than the alternatives by appeal to something which forms a permanent neutral matrix for all inquiry and all history, makes it possible to think that such relativism must automatically rule out coherence theories of intellectual and practical justification. . . For the view that there is no permanent neutral matrix within which the dramas of inquiry and history are enacted has as a corollary that criticism of one's culture can only be piecemeal and partial—never "by reference to eternal standards."⁵¹

Regrettably, phrases like "coherence theories of intellectual and practical justification" have built into their usage a contrast with "correspondence theories" such that coherence of beliefs seems to leave the relevant "facts" of the matter out of account. To think in such contrast terms may already be to invite the thought of "coherence" or "conceptual scheme" as a temporary place-holder for something else—for "accuracy of representation," correspondence to reality, or something of this sort. Terms like "historicism" and "pragmatism" fare no better, it seems to me. One is tempted to ask whether a prevailing social practice (or disciplinary matrix) really "corresponds" to the way things are—whether coherence theories "correspond"—and other equally pointless questions. Worse still, one is

tempted to ask whether the notion of philosophy as a voice in the conversation of mankind is itself true, if the notion of normal and abnormal discourse is normal or abnormal. A central point of conceptual relativism, however, is therapeutic—to see through the picture of inquiry which holds us in its grip and without which such questions lose their force. "A voice in the conversation of mankind" is not the temporary incumbent of an office marked "philosophy," where the office itself is a permanent neutral matrix: It *is* the office. And when that voice sees its task as grounding, dominating and adjudicating all conversations, as in Plato, Descartes and Kant, the office and incumbent get confused—perhaps as recent presidents of the United States have tended to confuse their incumbency with the nation's destiny. Then and then only can questions about "coherence" leaving "correspondence" out of account arise or questions of self-reference—just as it was commonly thought in, say, 1966 that the fellow in the Oval Office really must know something Vietnam war critics don't and that to challenge his claims was therefore to dishonor the Presidency, the country: was treason in short. If "the True and the Right are matters of [informed] social practice," then to ask whether in saying that we are articulating an eternal standard is to assume the permanent neutral matrix paradigm which is being given up, to confuse office and incumbent once again.

What has all this to do with our questions, questions concerning straight readings/historical readings/normal discourse, on the one hand, and strong misreadings/philosophical readings/abnormal discourse, on the other hand? And what has all that to do with Heidegger's reading of the history of philosophy?

The point of the discussion was to show that I was not merely expressing a preference by invoking the distinction between "normal" and "abnormal" discourse—rather than the prevailing distinction between historical and philosophical—as a way of explaining the prior distinction between straight readings (reconstructions) and strong misreadings (deconstructions) of the history of philosophy. Rather, I was arguing that the dogma which distinguishes in kind between philosophical and historical approaches to the history of philosophy is itself the product of a tacit conception of philosophy as an enterprise which confronts a reasonably fixed set of issues within a permanent neutral matrix. To give up this picture of philosophy is therefore also to give up the dogma it generates. And to give up this dogma is essential to understanding why Heidegger's metahistorical reading of the history of philosophy is sunk neither by falsifying his (re)constructions of the views of his predecessors nor by acknowledging that he is not "doing" philosophy.

The Oakeshott-Rorty conception of philosophy is almost certainly going to be found threatening—although it need not be. It follows that my proposal that we give up the distinction in kind between philosophical and historical

readings of the history of philosophy is also likely to seem menacing, and for similar reasons. I think the threat comes from the notion that to be worth doing, to have value, philosophy, like science, must somehow “progress” in some absolute sense, and Rorty-like views challenge these viscera in just the way Kuhnian readings of the history of science force us to modify our conception of what it means to “progress” in the sciences.

Had we told the leading practitioners of the 17th and 18th centuries that they can give up without collapse the notion of science as a map of the universe—or as discovering the Language of Nature, if you prefer—they would probably have resisted the suggestion strenuously. To give up the prospect of Truth with a capital “T” was often thought shattering—as in some reactions to Hume. And, interestingly enough, to replace mapping metaphors in science with those of approximation—that correspondence to the way things “really are” is an unrealizable ideal which scientists simply seek to approximate—would not have placated 18th century absolutists in the least, even though it should have. What both paradigms preserve—the one that science maps the Laws of Nature and the other that it asymptotically approximates the way things really are—is the notion of progress. So to suggest that this notion is itself now to be taken differently, if taken at all, is thought to attack science at its roots. It may turn out, of course, that all we need mean by “increasing approximation to the way things are” is that our procedures are not arbitrary.⁵² And even if the notion of nonarbitrariness will permit the sciences to flourish as before, we should expect resistance to the suggestion that talk about nonarbitrariness captures everything relevant to scientific *praxis*, that talk about approximation can be given up without any loss being incurred.

The situation in philosophy is similar, I think. To suggest that the concept of a timeless neutral matrix just *is* the standard preconception of our own day nurtured by two thousand years of effort, but that it is *no more* than this—indeed that it can *be* no more—is to relativize “normal” philosophical discourse to the best (nonarbitrary) conventions of the day. Relativizing to contexts, however, is thought to undermine the notion that something like absolute, ahistorical “progress” in philosophy can occur, since the notion of “progress” in philosophy is typically parasitic on the permanent neutral matrix paradigm.

The question remains what to make of Heidegger’s abnormal discourse about the history of philosophy, even *after* we have dispensed with the dogma which would have ruled out the possibility that Heidegger’s misreading is “philosophical.” One possibility, of course, is to see Heidegger’s abnormal discourse as tomorrow’s normal discourse, as representing a revolutionary paradigm. On such a reading, the impenetrability of much of the later Heidegger’s prose is not an obstacle but a plus, since no revolution can hope

to succeed which is cast in a vocabulary and in arguments commensurable with the old one. “So bad arguments for brilliant hunches must necessarily precede the normalization of a new vocabulary which incorporates the hunch. Given that new vocabulary, better arguments become possible, although these will always be found question-begging by the revolution’s victims.”⁵³ But there are terribly strong reasons to suppose that Heidegger’s abnormal discourse is at a far remove from the project of offering a new revolutionary paradigm. Heidegger’s own indifference to the very question whether he is in any sense a “philosopher” tells against the institutionalization of his abnormal discourse. To say, as Rorty does, that Heidegger’s abnormal discourse is “revolutionary” is not to suggest, therefore, that it is capable of professionalization, of normalization. Heidegger’s “edifying” philosophy can no more become a new paradigm—in Kuhn’s sense—than Nietzsche’s approach can be professionalized. No details of the history of philosophy, no further revelations about the meaning of any given text can tell for or against Heidegger. His approach to the history of philosophy pushes an insight to the point of caricature, and in so doing forces us to recognize that an institutionalized picture of “philosophy,” also a caricature of sorts, lies at the heart of our own straight readings and sustains them too; but this recognition should not drive us to read the history of philosophy “abnormally”—to try to Heideggerize it as it were. Few things should be more foreign to Heidegger’s discourse than its institutionalization. What he has helped us to do, however, is to try to read the history of philosophy thoughtfully, something the conventional distinction between philosophical and historical readings inevitably subverts.⁵⁴

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NOTES

1. This is a revisit in more than one sense. Internally, as concerns the “argument” and structure of this paper, Heidegger’s reading of his predecessors is visited twice, from two seemingly irreconcilable perspectives. Externally and autobiographically, I return to the scene of an earlier crime I committed, one in which I dogmatically assumed the conventional wisdom about how the history of philosophy is to be read. Although I do not entirely recant here, I think I understand better why the sort of text-criticism many of us levelled at Heidegger misfired so badly.

2. The distinction between normal and abnormal discourse and the notion of “edifying” discourse derive from Rorty’s *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). (Cited hereafter as *PMN*.)

3. The opinion that there exists a crucial difference between the history of philosophy as history and as philosophy is, of course, a central dogma of “analytic”

philosophy too. Without this dogma one reason—the most important one perhaps—for automatically domiciling courses in the history of philosophy in philosophy departments instead of (“intellectual”) history departments vanishes. Hence the facile shibboleth that philosophical *problems*—the “problem of knowledge,” for example—transcend natural languages, dictions, idioms, historical circumstances, and that they require philosophers, in consequence. Philosophy, on this reading, is not unlike a United Nations translation service, except that in this case the living may converse with the dead.

In a previous issue of this journal (October 1969, vol. 53, no. 4) devoted to the topic “Philosophy of the History of Philosophy,” Lewis White Beck states the dogma diplomatically:

... philosophers . . . continually criticize the approach of the historians of ideas to the history of philosophy, not merely on grounds that they commit philosophical howlers, but on grounds that the connections between philosophical positions are dialectical or properly philosophical, not contingent and merely historical. The historian of philosophy therefore falls between two stools. He seems to be not quite a philosopher, and not quite a historian either (pp. 523–524).

And J. H. Fautot adds, plainly and with charming innocence:

To the working philosopher, the historian is something of a bore, like a person with total recall who persists in breaking into a conversation in order to straighten out matters of fact which are quite immaterial to what is being said. It is not that philosophers have no interest in the work of their predecessors, for, from earliest times, a large part of their activity has consisted in criticizing and reconstructing the claims and recommendations of earlier philosophers. Still this interest is one that can be served by fiction almost as well as by fact. (p. 643) . . . It remains to note that, on its professional side, philosophy does undergo a progressive development . . . Major figures, such as Descartes and Locke, leave many problems unresolved. The professional philosopher, normally, is a disciple who devotes his technical skills to resolving these strictly philosophical problems (p. 655).

4. *Sein und Zeit*, 7. Aufl., (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), pp. 19–27. (Cited hereafter as *SZ*)

5. *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), p. 62. Translated by Joan Stambaugh in *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1972), p. 56. (Cited hereafter as *OTB*)

6. *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (Bern: A. Francke, 1947), p. 49. (Cited hereafter as *PLW*)

7. *OTB*, p. 67.

8. *OTB*, p. 57.

9. *PLW*, p. 26.

10. *SZ*, p. 214.

11. *PLW*, p. 25.

12. *PLW*, pp. 44–46.

13. Nietzsche, F. *Ecce Homo*. “The Birth of Tragedy,” 3: GA XV, p. 65.

14. Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part I, “On the Afterworldly.”

15. *PLW*, p. 49.

16. *PLW*, p. 25.

17. *PLW*, pp. 41–42.

18. Cf. Friedländer, Paul. *Platon: Seinswahrheit und Wirklichkeit*, second edition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Company, 1954); translated by Hans Meyerhoff as *Plato*, vol. 1. (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1958). Chapter XI “*Alētheia*; a discussion with Martin Heidegger,” pp. 221–230.

19. Friedländer, p. 223.

20. *OTB*, p. 70: *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 78.

21. See footnote 3, above, for the same point.

22. Passmore, John. *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, 1957), p. 11. (Cited hereafter as Passmore, *AHYP*)

23. Passmore, John, in a review of J. H. Randall's *The Career of Philosophy* in *Scientific American*, May 1963, pp. 177–78.

24. Passmore, *AHYP*, p. 11.

25. Wood, Allan. “Russell's Philosophy” in Bertrand Russell's *My Philosophical Development* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. 274. As an ascription this assertion is probably no more true of Wittgenstein than of Russell.

26. Mandelbaum, Maurice. “Subjective, Objective, and Conceptual Relativisms,” in *The Monist*, vol. 62, no. 4, October 1979. (Cited hereafter as Mandelbaum, *Monist*)

27. Rorty characterizes his view in this way in *PMN*.

28. Mandelbaum, *Monist*. Also see his *Philosophy, Science, and Sense-Perception* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), and “Some instances of the Self-Excepting Fallacy” in *Psychologische Beiträge*, 6, 1962.

29. It does not follow, of course, that in giving up this distinction we must also give up others, for example, distinctions between good and bad readings of the history of philosophy, simplistic and informed readings, thoughtful and superficial readings, normal and abnormal readings. What is given up is the foundationalist underpinning for our distinction between “philosophical” and “historical” readings without which the dogma ceases to have a real grip on our allegiance.

30. Passmore, *AHYP*, pp. 7–8.

31. Bloom, Harold. *The Anxiety of Influence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 5. (Cited hereafter as Bloom)

32. Bloom, p. 5.

33. Bloom, p. 30.

34. Bloom, p. 14.

35. The term “aspectual takings” is Peter Jones'. See his interesting *Philosophy and the Novel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

36. Richardson, William. *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 22.

37. It may be of more than passing interest to note that Whitehead and Heidegger agree that, in a sense, the history of philosophy is a footnote to Plato.

38. By “foundationalism” I mean to characterize the dominant theme within philosophy since Plato. There have been antifoundationalists within the career of philosophy, to be sure; but they have always been understood as exceptions, as advocates of the irrational, sometimes even as aberrations within the foundationalist enterprise. Philosophy conceived as foundational in this sense sees its business as securing the foundations, as permanently grounding all inquiry, all of culture; it is reason's own tribunal, whose task it is to be the ultimate arbiter of epistemic and moral claims. More specifically, “foundationalism” usually implies preanalytic commitments to several of the following theses as well:

(1) Time and place apart, the list of issues, i.e., the questions philosophers raise are pretty inelastic: what is truth? beauty? justice? goodness? knowledge? What are the generic traits of existence?

(2) What gets called “knowledge” or “truth” or “beauty” or “justice” or “goodness” or “reality” at any time is of course an empirical matter. However, for any of these expressions whether what is called *X* is really an instance of that kind of

thing is open to question, specifically to nonempirical—"conceptual," theoretical—investigation.

(3) Even if agreement has not been reached about the nature of any Xs we (a) now know what answers won't work and (b) we are closer to getting the right answers.

(4) For some Xs we may already have the right answers; only matters of detail remain to be worked-out, fine-tuned.

(5) The Xs whose nature we seek to know are not just any Xs; ours provide the justification for any rational culture. Without *knowing*, for example, whether A is an instance of X we can merely claim that A is X. Nonphilosophers typically claim to know what they don't know.

(6) The consequences of (5) are sometimes devastating not only to the growth of knowledge, but to nations, sometimes to humanity itself.

(7) Even in the absence of agreement among philosophers about (1)–(6), the business of philosophy is to attempt to work toward permanent consensus, toward permanent agreement.

What I am calling "foundationalism" Nietzsche called Egypticism. It assumes that inquiry can function as meaningful pedagogy only if it is in principle self-terminating, only when it offers the hope of being a conversation-stopper.

39. I understand "commensurable" in the Kuhn-Rorty sense: "able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict." *PMN*, p. 316.

40. *PMN*, p. 11.

41. *PMN*, p. 320.

42. *PMN*, p. 264.

43. Scheffler, Israel. *Science and Subjectivity*. (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1967), p. 84.

44. Mandelbaum, *Monist*, p. 417.

45. Mandelbaum, *Monist*, pp. 417–18.

46. Mandelbaum, *Monist*, pp. 421–22.

47. *PMN*, p. 385.

48. *PMN*, p. 178.

49. *PMN*, p. 276.

50. It is perhaps unfortunate that Rorty was driven to characterize his view in these terms, since "historicism" is a contrast term which makes sense primarily in terms of the paradigm of philosophy "historicism" recommends we give up. And within that older paradigm the term "historicism" buys all the difficulties raised against "relativism."

51. *PMN*, pp. 178–79.

52. This suggestion is Larry Wright's. While I have profited here, as elsewhere and always, from exchanges with Wright I absolve him from the misuse to which they are being put.

53. *PMN*, p. 58.

54. The list of persons to whom I am indebted is too long to enumerate, but I owe Richard Rorty a triple debt: inviting me to contribute to this issue; making helpful editorial suggestions; and—unknown to him—forcing me to rethink some basic metaphilosophical questions as a result of his own recent writings. He is of course in no way responsible for the (mis)use I have made of his insights.

7

The Truth of Being and the History of Philosophy

Mark B. Okrent

Introduction

In a recent article, Richard Rorty has attempted to juxtapose Heidegger and Dewey. While finding significant points of agreement between the two, and by implication praising much of Heidegger's work, Rorty also suggests a series of criticisms of Heidegger. The problems which Rorty finds with Heidegger can, I think, all be reduced to one basic criticism, which has two main sides. In Rorty's view Heidegger cannot really differentiate between Being and beings in the way that he wants, and thus can give no sense to the word 'Being' other than the old metaphysical one. That is, Being and the ontological difference are metaphysical remnants, the last evaporating presence of the Platonic distinction of the real world and the apparent world. This is indicated in two ways. First, Rorty feels that Heidegger can make no real distinction between philosophy, which they both agree has ended, and "thinking" in the specifically Heideggerian sense. Second, Rorty claims that it is impossible to distinguish ontic from ontological becoming. That is, the various epochs of Being which Heidegger distinguishes are, for Rorty, parasitic upon and reducible to the ordinary history of man's activity in relation to things, material and social. As such Heidegger's account of ontological epochs is a species of idealistic reflection upon the history of man's activity upon things.

This paper attempts to reflect upon the adequacy of both main parts of Rorty's criticism of Heidegger. Is it possible to differentiate Being and beings in such a way as to allow for epochs of Being which are not simply reducible to ordinary historical periods? If not, then we will have reason to accept Rorty's criticism of the ontological difference, and hence of Heidegger's formulation in regard to Being. If this distinction can be maintained then one major element of Rorty's pragmatist criticism of Heidegger will need to be abandoned. Is it possible to distinguish the matter of Heidegger's thought from the concerns of philosophy in such a way as to preserve this thought given the end of philosophy? If not, then Heidegger's thinking is just another attempt to keep alive a bankrupt tradition. If

this distinction can be maintained, then the other major element of Rorty's criticism must be abandoned.

2 Varieties of difference

Rorty thinks that Heidegger is necessarily impaled on the horns of a dilemma in regard to the history and historicity of Being. *Either* Being is radically different and distinct from beings, in which case "Being" can be nothing other than the old Platonic "real" world, a "real" which is impossibly vague, abstract, and lacks content and historical determinacy, *or* in order to give the historical becoming of Being definiteness, the history of "Being" can be seen as utterly dependent on the history of beings. If Heidegger accepts the first alternative then he is committed to, in words Rorty quotes from Versenyi, "an all too empty and formal, though often emotionally charged and mystically-religious, thinking of absolute unity."¹ On the other hand, if Heidegger admitted that the history of Being must be seen in terms of the history of beings, then he would see that Philosophy (or Heidegger's own alternative, "thought"), as a discipline or even a distinct activity, is obsolete. That is, his concern with Being would be replaced by concrete attention to beings. In fact Rorty feels that Heidegger wants it both ways. While maintaining that he is giving us a history of Being, Heidegger necessarily has recourse to the ordinary history of nations, persons, and their relation to beings in order to give concreteness and definiteness to his ontological history.

It seems clear that before we can evaluate this criticism we need a better notion of just what Heidegger means by 'Being' and how it is supposed to be different from beings. Rorty, of course, denies that Heidegger can give any other than a negative account.

All we are told about Being, Thought, and the ontological difference is by negation . . . Heidegger thinks that the historical picture which has been sketched offers a glimpse of something else. Yet nothing further can be said about this something else, and so the negative way to Being, through the destruction of ontology, leaves us facing beings-without-Being, with no hint about what Thought might be of.²

But Rorty himself inadvertently indicates Heidegger's attempt to hint at the matter to be thought, although he doesn't discuss it. In the first quote from Heidegger in the paper, from the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger clearly distinguishes the truth of Being from Being itself. "Ontology, whether transcendental or pre-critical, is subject to criticism not because it thinks the Being of beings and thereby subjugates Being to a concept, but because it does not think the truth of Being."³ Often Heidegger commentary does not recognize that in all of his periods Heidegger focuses not so much upon Being as on the *sense* of Being, or the *truth* of Being, or the *place* of Being.⁴ The distinction between Being and the truth of Being is swallowed, as it were, by the distinction between Being and

beings. This failure to note the distinction between Being and the truth of Being is perhaps not surprising, given that Heidegger himself is often unclear in regard to it. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics* for example, which Rorty cites extensively, this distinction barely makes an appearance as the distinction between the inquiry into Being as such and the inquiry into the Being of beings.⁵ Nevertheless, this distinction is both present in Heidegger's texts and the hidden light which illuminates those texts. Heidegger "knows with full clarity the difference between Being as the Being of beings and Being as 'Being' in respect of its proper sense, that is, in respect of its truth (the clearing)."⁶

"Being" then is used by Heidegger in two different, indeed opposed, senses. First, "Being" is the Being of beings, what each being is thought to need so that it is, rather than nothing. That is, "Being" in this first sense refers to that which each being involves simply and solely in so far as it is at all. The science which studies Being in this sense is metaphysics, the science of Being *qua* Being. Equally, metaphysics, as the science of Being *qua* Being, increasingly comes to see Being in this sense, i.e., the Being of beings, as the ground of beings and itself. "The Being of beings reveals itself as the ground that gives itself ground and accounts for itself."⁷ Metaphysics thus comes to see Being in this first sense as both what is most general, that which every being possesses in that it is, and as that which supplies the ground for all such beings. "Metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the ground-giving unity of what is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that accounts for the general, that is, of the All-Highest."⁸ As such, such views of Being as pure act, as absolute concept, or even Heidegger's own view of the Greek notion of Being as the presence of the presencing, all speak to this first sense of Being.

The question of Being also concerns the *aletheia* of Being, that which allows for the possibility of *any* answer to the question of Being in the first sense.

The question of Being, on the other hand, can also be understood in the following sense: Wherein is each answer to the question of Being based i.e., wherein, after all, is the unconcealment of Being grounded? For example: It is said that the Greeks defined Being as the presence of the presencing. In presence speaks the present, in the present is a moment of time; therefore, the manifestation of Being as presence is related to time.⁹

In this second sense "Being" is sometimes used, unfortunately, as a shorthand expression standing for the "sense of Being," or the unconcealment (truth) of Being, or, more simply, the clearing or opening in which Being, in the first sense as presence, occurs. This "Being," as the sense of Being, time, is the concern of Heidegger's thought from *Being and Time* onward.

What then does Heidegger mean by "the truth of Being?" (Although there are serious differences among Heidegger's successive formulations, the sense of Being, the truth of Being, and the place of Being, for the sake of brevity I will speak mainly of the truth of Being, the formulation from his "middle" period.) Abstractly, the truth of being is thought as the opening or clearing which allows Being as presencing to appear and manifest itself. In order to think this it is necessary to explicate the sense in which Heidegger uses the term "truth."

Beginning with *Being and Time* and continuing until very late in his career Heidegger interprets "truth" with the aid of an idiosyncratic and etymological translation of the Greek *aletheia*. Etymologically "*aletheia*" is a privative of "*lethe*," it is the not-hidden, the uncovered. "Being-true" ("truth") means Being-uncovering."¹⁰ Yet equally essential to Heidegger's thinking on truth is the claim that unconcealment also involves concealment, hiddenness.

The nature of truth, that is, of unconcealment, is dominated throughout by a denial. Yet this denial is not a defect or a fault, as though truth were an unalloyed unconcealment that has rid itself of everything concealed. If truth could accomplish this, it would no longer be itself . . . Truth, in its nature, is untruth. We put the matter this way in order to serve notice . . . that denial in the manner of concealment belongs to unconcealedness as clearing.¹¹

The initial motivation for this interpretation of truth is clear enough. In order for there to be truth in either of the traditional senses, as correspondence or coherence, there must be evidence. That is, the object referred to in the true statement must be manifest, must show itself, it must be uncovered. But that the being disclosed can be uncovered depends upon the possibility of such uncovering. In *Being and Time* this possibility is supplied by the being whose Being consists in Being-in-the-world, Dasein. Thus the early Heidegger distinguishes two senses of "true," the Being-uncovered of beings and the Being-uncovering of Dasein.

Circumspective concern, or even that concern in which we tarry and look at something, uncovers entities within-the-world. These entities become that which has been uncovered. They are "true" in a second sense. What is primarily "true" – that is, uncovering – is Dasein. "Truth" in the second sense does not mean Being-uncovering, but Being-uncovered.¹²

When the later Heidegger speaks of truth as unconcealedness he is speaking on analogy with the Being-uncovering of *Being and Time*, without the subjectivist bias of the latter. That is, "truth" is that which allows beings to show themselves through providing an area of showing. As such Heidegger's "truth" is analogous with the horizon of earlier phenomenology, but with Heidegger the horizon allows for the possibility of focus, or being manifest, and in that sense is primary truth. As such however it itself is that which is ordinarily *not* manifest, not present. "Only what *aletheia* as opening grants is experienced and thought, not what it is as such. This remains concealed."¹³ The concealedness and hiddenness which is fundamental to truth is primarily the essential non-presence (in the sense of not being in the present) of the opening which allows beings to be present. Only secondarily is it the perspectival hiddenness native to those beings themselves.

After 1964 Heidegger gives up the translation of *aletheia* as truth, without giving up the matter thought by *aletheia*. This matter, the clearing or opening in which both beings and Being can appear, remains the primary "object" of

Heidegger's thought. In *On Time and Being* Heidegger returns to his earliest treatment of the clearing, in terms of temporality. The ecstatic temporality which is the meaning of the Being of Dasein in *Being and Time* is now thought as "time-space." Time-space is introduced during a discussion of presence in terms of the present and absence. As opposed to the traditional understanding of the present as a now point in a sequence of now points, Heidegger interprets the present as that which concerns human being, the matter illuminated in concern. "What is present concerns us, the present, that is: what, lasting, comes toward us, us human beings." "Presence means: the constant abiding that approaches man, reaches him, is extended to him"¹⁴ Presence, understood in this way as that which lasts in concern, involves more than the present ordinarily so called. It necessarily also involves absence, the absence of that which has been, and of that which is coming toward us. That which is "past" and "future" for Heidegger, is equally present, but *only* in the sense of being of concern, not in the sense of being in the temporal now. There is a presence of "past" and "future" precisely in so far as they are absent from the now, i.e., as having been and coming toward.

But we have to do with absence just as often, that is, constantly. For one thing, there is much that is no longer present in the way we know presencing in the sense of the present. And yet, even that which is no longer present presences immediately in its absence – in the manner of what has been, and still concerns us.

. . . absence, as the presencing of what is not yet present, always in some way concerns us, is present no less immediately than what has been.¹⁵

Thus not every presencing involves the present. But the present too is itself a mode of presence.

Heidegger's concern, however, is not with that which is present, past, or future. Reverting to a distinction which is focal in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, he is rather interested in temporality itself or the opening in which that which is temporal can be so. "For time itself is nothing temporal, no more than it is something that is." "Time-space now is the name for the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past, and present."¹⁶ Time-space supplies this openness in which present and absent beings can be, however, only in that the dimensions of time, past, present, and future, are both related to one another and distinct. Within this distinction lies a withholding of the present. The past and future are present *only* through their absence.

we call the first, original, literally incipient extending in which the unity of true time consists "nearing nearness", "nearhood". . . . But it brings future, past, and present near to one another by distancing them. For it keeps what has been open by denying its advent as present Nearing nearness has the character of denial and withholding.¹⁷

It is both possible and helpful to distinguish Heidegger's truth of Being, as we have just interpreted it, from certain other contemporary notions which seem to

be similar to it. First, the truth of Being should not be seen as analogous to a conceptual scheme. Aside from the obvious fact that Heidegger associates the truth of Being with temporality, rather than concepts, there is a deeper difference between these notions. As Donald Davidson pointed out in his paper "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," the idea of a conceptual scheme depends ultimately upon something like the hard Kantian distinction between sensibility and understanding. But Heidegger rejects this distinction as fully as do Davidson, Sellars, and Rorty. As early as *Being and Time*, Heidegger held that we never have merely "raw feelings."¹⁸ Rather, for Heidegger, all human "experience" is only possible within a *world*, a world which is always already linguistically articulated. But then, perhaps the truth of Being should be seen as similar to the analytic notion of a set of linguistic rules which allow for the possibility of language use? There is more to be said in favor of this analogy, as Heidegger frequently remarks on the connection between the truth of Being and the pre-thematic articulation of a world by language. We must be careful here with the concept of a rule. The word "rule" suggests a situation in which a person acting according to a rule must either be obeying the rule (i.e., the rule is a principle which is explicit for the agent) or merely acting in conformity to a rule (i.e., the agent's acts fall into a regular, perhaps causal, pattern, although the agent is not aware of this).¹⁹ Heidegger wishes to avoid both of these alternatives, which he sees as metaphysical. In both cases we are seen as capable, in principle, of giving a single correct interpretation and explication of what is involved in acting according to any particular rule. That is, every rule can be made explicit and focal, either by the agent (in the case of obeying a rule) or by a scientist observing the behavior (in the case of conforming to a rule). For Heidegger, the necessity of the hermeneutic circle, which precludes the possibility of any fully grounded interpretation, points to the *necessarily* nonfocal character of both language and the truth of Being. Thus Heidegger's truth of Being must also be distinguished from the notion of a set of linguistic rules. Put bluntly, Heidegger's position is that "rules" cannot be successfully used to account for the possibility and actuality of language use.

The matter of Heidegger's thought, then, is the truth of Being, the clearing in which beings can appear and in which Being, as the presencing of presence, can manifest itself. The clearing is analogous with the phenomenological horizon. As such it is the concealed possibility of unconcealment, the "truth" of Being. Further, the opening is temporality, the ecstatic extendedness and distinction of past, present and future. All of this is different from Being, or presencing as such. But how is any of this relevant to Heidegger's insistence on the epochal history of Being, and his distinction of thought and philosophy, and Rorty's criticism of these?

3 The truth of Being and the history of philosophy

The thrust of Rorty's criticism of Heidegger is aimed at the supposed vacuity of Heidegger's thought of Being without beings. In order to overcome this vacuity,

Rorty thinks that Heidegger has recourse to the history of beings. But the form ordinary history takes for Rorty's Heidegger is the alienated form of the history of philosophy. "If he [Heidegger] were true to his own dictum that we should 'cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself,' he would have nothing to say, nowhere to point. *The whole force of Heidegger's thought lies in his account of the history of philosophy.*"²⁰ For Rorty's Heidegger, therefore, the content of the history of Being arises out of the history of philosophy. But the history of Being can be subsumed under the history of philosophy, for Rorty, only if philosophy is *of* Being. Thus Rorty's Heidegger is necessarily committed to the view that metaphysics was always about Being, and that his own thought is tied to this tradition. "The only thing which links him with the tradition is his claim that the tradition, though persistently sidetracked onto beings, was really concerned with Being all the time – and, indeed, constituted the history of Being."²¹ But if Heidegger's "thought" is really different from the tradition as Heidegger claims, then he is committed to the odd view that his thought is essentially a continuation of the *same* thinking as metaphysics, although at the same time he utterly rejects everything in that tradition. The criticism thus has three steps. First, Being without being is a vacuous notion. Second, this vacuity is overcome through a consideration of the history of philosophy. This in turn commits Heidegger to the absurd position that his thought is both entirely different from the tradition and also a continuation of the tradition which is about the very same thing as that tradition. Heidegger needs the tradition in order to identify the matter of his thinking, but then turns around and denies that the tradition tells us anything about that matter.

The criticism is dominated throughout by the reading of Heidegger which sees his primary distinction in the difference between Being and beings. Rorty's initial claim, that Being without beings is a vacuous notion, is motivated by this reading. We have argued in the previous section that this understanding of Heidegger is inadequate. Nevertheless, this fact, by itself, is not sufficient to show that the criticism is not cogent. It still may be the case that this other matter of Heidegger's thought, the truth of Being, may also prove to be vacuous. That is, Heidegger might be equally unable to determine the truth of Being without recourse to his version of the history of philosophy. As Heidegger rejects that tradition as, at least, inadequate, he would once again be in the position of identifying the matter of his thinking through ontology, while denying that ontology has anything positive to say about that matter.

Although Heidegger's truth of Being is in no sense the same as is thought in Kant's thing in itself (the truth of Being is not a "real world" or beings as they are independent of experience), there does seem to be a certain formal analogy between them. The truth of Being cannot successfully be made into an object of experience. This is because it is not an object at all, whether of experience or in itself. It is not. Rather it is meant as the concealed space in which objects can be. But if the truth of Being can never be an object of experience, how can it be indicated, "pointed to"? It can't be ostensively determined, it cannot be distinguished as this as opposed to that, and it cannot be defined in terms of some being. The reference to Kant, however, suggests a transcendental procedure for the determination of the truth of Being. But, even though Heidegger often uses

transcendental sounding language, even in his late writings, he specifically precludes the option of considering the truth of Being as merely the necessary condition for the possibility of experience, as this would be overly subjectivistic. Nonetheless Heidegger often *does* use quasi-transcendental arguments in order to identify the place and role of the truth of Being. Indeed, the characterizations we have already given to the truth of Being in the last section all arise out of such transcendental considerations. On the other hand, the base step for these procedures is not the certainty of experience. When the truth of Being is discussed as the clearing, that which it supplies the condition of the possibility of is not experience, but Being. Similarly, when *aletheia* or temporality are under consideration it is Being in the sense of present evidence or presencing as such which is the basis for the transcendental discussion.²²

It is clear that Heidegger thinks there can be no direct access to the truth of Being, no uncovering of the truth of Being such as occurs in regard to beings. I am suggesting that Heidegger substitutes a quasi-transcendental approach. The foundation for this transcendental access is not experience, however, but rather Being. But how is Being itself to be determined and characterized? It seems that we are back to Rorty's problem. If the truth of Being can only be identified in and through Being, then Being itself must be available to us. But Being as presencing is not. It, Being, is not in the open to be viewed. Where then does Heidegger get the determination of Being as presencing? Heidegger explicitly addresses this question in "On Time and Being." He suggests two answers, one of which is a blatant statement of Rorty's contention that Heidegger can only determine Being from out of the tradition of ontology.

But what gives us the right to characterize Being as presencing? This question comes too late. For this character of Being has long since been decided without our contribution . . . Thus we are bound to the characterization of Being as presencing. It derives its binding force from the beginning of the unconcealment of Being as something that can be said . . . Ever since the beginning of Western thinking with the Greeks, all saying of "Being" and "Is" is held in remembrance of the determination of Being as presencing which is binding for thinking.²³

In this same passage Heidegger also suggests a second mode of access to Being or presencing. Harkening back to *Being and Time* he asserts that a phenomenological approach to *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit* will also yield a characterization of Being as presencing. We will leave aside this second answer to the question concerning the determination of being as presencing and concentrate on the adequacy of the first answer, given Rorty's criticism of it.²⁴

Heidegger explicitly asserts that Being has already been characterized as presencing, and that this has been done at the beginning of the Western philosophical tradition.²⁵ It would thus seem that Rorty is right in regard to the first two steps of his argument. Even though Heidegger is not primarily concerned with Being, but rather with the truth of Being, the characterization of the truth of Being depends upon the determination of Being. Apart from the phenomenological arguments developed in *Being and Time* and then mostly

ignored by Heidegger, there is no way to determine Being except through the supposedly already established determination given by the tradition. Rorty is thus apparently correct in his contention that Being is a vacuous notion which is only given content in and through the history of philosophy.

The third step in Rorty's argument is accomplished through the juxtaposition of Heidegger's dependence upon the tradition with his rejection of that tradition. But Heidegger *never* simply rejects or refutes the tradition of Western thinking as wrong. In speaking specifically of Hegel, he makes the general point that it is impossible ever to give such a refutation or to hazard such a rejection. "Whatever stems from it [absolute metaphysics] cannot be countered or even cast aside by refutations. It can only be taken up in such a way that its truth is more primordially sheltered in Being itself and removed from the domain of mere human opinion. All refutation in the field of essential thinking is foolish."²⁶ But if Heidegger does not see himself as refuting or rejecting the history of ontology as wrong, then what is the character of his rejection of the tradition? For reject it he does. The answer has already been given. The tradition is inadequate because it never thinks the truth of Being. This, necessarily, remains hidden from metaphysics " . . . the truth of Being as the lighting itself remains concealed from metaphysics. However, this concealment is not a defect of metaphysics but a treasure withheld from it yet held before it, the treasure of its own proper wealth."²⁷

In the history of Western thinking . . . what is, is thought, in reference to Being; yet the truth of Being remains unthought, and not only is that truth denied to thinking as a possible experience, but Western thinking itself, and indeed in the form of metaphysics, expressly, but nevertheless unknowingly, veils the happening of that denial.²⁸

The tradition of ontology, for Heidegger, is not wrong in regard to its continuous thinking of Being as presencing. It is inadequate and incomplete in that it fails to think the clearing, or truth of Being, in which there can be both present beings and presencing itself, Being.

Two crucial conclusions rest upon the character of Heidegger's rejection of the tradition. First, the fact that Heidegger rejects metaphysics in the way he does, does not commit him to the position that metaphysics is wrong in regard to its characterization of Being. Quite the contrary appears to be the case. It is not even possible for us to "give up" the content of Being as presencing, we necessarily live in terms of it. We can no longer *do* metaphysics not because it is wrong, but rather because it has ended in, and been continued by, technology and the positive sciences. Second, Heidegger's thinking is *not* about the very same thing metaphysics was about. Rorty is just wrong in his contention that it is. Rather, Heidegger's thinking is distinguished from metaphysics precisely in so far as it is not concerned with Being, but is concerned with the truth of Being. It is in this sense that we must read his dictum that we need to leave metaphysics to itself. Heidegger would seem to agree with Rorty that the proper "end" to philosophy is in the sciences, natural and social, and in practical, technological activity. But

there is something left unthought in philosophy, the clearing in which philosophy happens, the truth of Being.

Indicating the nature of Heidegger's rejection of metaphysics does not yet, however, decide the issue between him and Rorty. One additional step is necessary. We have already seen that there is a sense in which Heidegger cannot "leave metaphysics to itself." Even though he is not directly determining the matter of his thinking through the characterization of Being in the history of philosophy, Rorty is right in thinking that Heidegger does need the tradition in order to identify that matter. The truth of Being is identified by asking how Being as presencing is possible. Only through rethinking the tradition as the successive revelation of Being as presencing does it become possible to ask this question. But *this* relation between Heidegger and the tradition is not open to the criticism Rorty levels. There is nothing odd, contradictory, or impossible about rejecting ontology as incomplete because it does not think the truth of Being, which is necessary for its own possibility, and then determining the truth of Being through a quasi-transcendental discussion of the possibility of the ontological tradition. On the contrary, this is the "method" which is adequate and appropriate to the task.

4 The truth of Being and epochs of Being

Rorty's criticism of Heidegger in regard to the possibility for thinking at the end of philosophy is co-ordinated with a second criticism. This criticism concerns the relation among Heidegger's account of Being, the history of Being, and ordinary history. Heidegger's account of Being is, admittedly, dependent for its determination upon his understanding of the history of Being. Rorty claims that this history of Being is reducible to history in the usual sense. At best it is a history of ideas, which itself is parasitic upon the social, political, and economic history of peoples. At worst it is vacuous.

There are two distinct though related claims involved in Rorty's criticism of Heidegger on the history of Being. For most of his paper Rorty asserts that Heidegger's history of Being must be seen as simply a version of the history of philosophy. "Heidegger's sense of the vulgarity of the age . . . is strongest when what is trivialized is the history of metaphysics. For this history is the history of Being."²⁹ On this account, the history of Being is both constituted by and manifest in the writings of the great philosophers. As such, ordinary history is seen as secondary to metaphysical history – a period is characterized as a failure or a success in terms of its ability to actualize the thought of its philosophers. On the other hand, Rorty also claims that the history of Being must be seen in terms of, and gets its content from, the ordinary history of "ages, cultures," etc. "Unless Heidegger connected the history of Being with that of men and nations through such phrases as 'a nation's relation to Being' and thus connected the history of philosophy with just plain history, he would be able to say only what Kierkegaard said,"³⁰ i.e., his history of Being would be vacuous. These two claims do not, of course, contradict one another. Rather, together they amount to

a single assertion concerning Heidegger's history of Being. For Rorty, Heidegger sees the history of Being as the history of philosophy. But, for Rorty, following Marx and Dewey, the history of philosophy itself is composed of a series of *Weltanschauung*, which in turn are determined in and through ordinary history. Rorty emphasizes those passages in Heidegger which connect the history of Being with ordinary history because for Rorty it is ultimately through this reference that the history of philosophy is made definite.

There are thus two relations in question in Rorty's discussion of Heidegger's history of Being – the relation between the history of Being and the history of philosophy, and the relation between the history of philosophy and ordinary history. We have already seen that there is a sense in which the history of metaphysics is a history of Being for Heidegger. The various metaphysical determinations of Being as presencing do constitute something like a history of Being. "The development of the abundance of transformations of Being [in metaphysics] looks at first like a history of Being."³¹ It is also the case that whatever genuinely characterizes the history of Being for Heidegger, the indications for the concrete stages of this history are taken almost exclusively from the thinking of philosophers. But these metaphysical systems are not *themselves* the epochs of Being which compose the history of Being, for Heidegger. Rather, Heidegger attempts to differentiate the epochs of Being, which are the stages of his history of Being, from the metaphysical systems, which are merely the concrete indicators for discovering the content of this history. This differentiation can be seen clearly in Heidegger's use of the term "epoch" to stand for the stages of the history of Being. For the word "epoch" has a specific technical sense in Heidegger's thought which goes beyond and is different from its ordinary sense.

To hold back is, in Greek, *epoche*. Hence we speak of the epochs of the destiny of Being. Epoch does not mean here a span of time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental characteristic of sending, the actual holding-back of itself in favor of the discernability of the gift, that is of Being with regard to the grounding of beings.³²

An epoch of Being, then, is not characterized by what is positive in any metaphysical thesis in regard to Being. Rather, it is determined by what is absent, held back, in that position. The history of Being is a history of hiddenness, not of presence. It is a history of the specific ways in which the place and truth of Being have been forgotten, not of Being in the ontological sense, itself.

At this point an apparent, but only apparent, similarity between Heidegger and Hegel suggests itself and is instructive. Hegel's history of philosophy is also a history of absence, of holding back. For Hegel, each successive stage in philosophical development (corresponding roughly to moments in the *Logic*) is, as finite, determined by its limit. A philosophical system is as it is because it fails to incorporate within its own thought something which is nonetheless necessary for itself. This other, its limit, is both the determination of the philosophy, and, ultimately, its *Aufhebung*. But in Hegel's "history of Being" this holding back is

itself limited. That is, thought progressively overcomes each of its successive limits until limitation itself is finally incorporated into philosophy in the *Science of Logic*. In this culmination the form of finitude, temporality, is also *Aufgehoben*. In Heidegger's history of Being, on the other hand, there is not and can not be any such final reappropriation of the hidden. At best there can be only a simple recognition of the hidden, non-present limit of all philosophical discourse.

Returning to the main problem, however, how does the epochal character of Heidegger's history of Being affect the relation between that history and the history of philosophy? The history of Being is obviously dependent upon Heidegger's critical rethinking of the history of philosophy, but only in a negative way. The actual content that Heidegger gives to his history of Being is both discovered through and different from the actual content of the history of philosophy. It is discovered through the tradition in that it traces what is forgotten by but necessary for each specific moment in the history of philosophy. It is different from the content of the tradition in that no particular stage in the tradition, or even that tradition taken as a whole, thinks what is at issue in the history of Being. For what is at issue in the history of Being is *not* Being, but the truth of Being. The history of Being includes, for example, a history of the ways in which temporality functions but is passed over, and must be passed over, in ontology. But if this is the case then it is clear that the history of Being is not simply reducible to the history of metaphysics. Rorty's claim that "this history [the history of metaphysics] is the history of Being" is just false. As was the case in regard to the relation of thinking and philosophy, Rorty has confused an admitted *dependence* of Heidegger on the tradition with the false proposition that the matter of Heidegger's thinking must be *identical* with the content of the tradition.

If Heidegger is not committed to the view that the history of Being is reducible to the history of metaphysics, then what are we to make of the relation between the history of Being and ordinary history? A simple transitive relation like the one implied by Rorty will not do. That is, if the history of Being is *not* the history of philosophy, then the determination of the content of the history of philosophy by ordinary history does not necessitate, by itself, an equal determination of the content of the history of Being by ordinary history. But *we* can *discover* the actual content of the history of Being only through recourse to the actual content of philosophical thought. Doesn't this imply the dependence in question? Not really. As the history of philosophy and the history of Being are correlative, and the history of philosophy and ordinary history are also, at least, correlative, there must be some correlation between ordinary history and the history of Being. But this correlation would allow for a criticism of Heidegger only if it made it impossible to differentiate Being or (more accurately) the truth of Being, from beings. That is, if the history of Being were a function of ordinary history, and ordinary history was not reciprocally a function of the history of Being, then the truth of Being would also be a simple function of the actual history of beings. In that case the investigation of the history of Being, in Heidegger's sense, could only be an alienated and unselfconscious study of the ordinary history of beings. Being and the truth of Being would not be radically different from beings, but only abstract and alienated ways in which a tradition of scholars had indirectly

encountered beings. Rorty accepts this inference because he thinks of the history of Being as identical with the history of metaphysics and further thinks of the history of metaphysics as a function of ordinary history. We have already seen, however, that the history of Being is *not* identical with the history of metaphysics, for Heidegger. Given this lack of identity, Rorty's argument could work only if he showed that the history of Being were a function of the history of metaphysics. This relationship between the history of Being and the history of metaphysics he does not show, and Heidegger would deny. Although there is a correlation between an epoch of Being and a positive metaphysical assertion in regard to Being itself, which allows for the possibility of discovering the content of an epoch of Being, the metaphysical assertion does not *determine*, causally or otherwise, the holding back which is definitive for an epoch. Rather, Heidegger suggests, the reverse is more likely. Thus, even if the history of philosophy is a function of ordinary history, it does not follow that the history of Being is a function of ordinary history. An epoch of Being is defined by the field of openness in which both beings and Being can be manifest in the particular way they are in that epoch. This "clearing", as the truth or place of Being, is itself hidden from the period. The correlation between ordinary history and the history of Being can be accounted for and is necessitated by the fact that the truth of Being opens a field or world of possibility in which the life of peoples, nations, etc., occurs. This implies no priority to either the ordinary historical events and structures or to the particular character of the open during a particular temporal period. Nor does this correlation make it impossible to distinguish and differentiate beings from the truth of Being.

The history of Being, although discoverable for Heidegger in and through the history of metaphysics, is not the history of metaphysics. Equally, the history of Being, although correlated with ordinary history, need not be for Heidegger simply a function of ordinary history. We then see that the second main aspect of Rorty's criticism of Heidegger fails to be conclusive. As was the case with the first main aspect of his criticism (in regard to the relation of thinking and philosophy), Rorty's failure to identify the difference between Being and the truth of Being in Heidegger's thought is crucial here. If this distinction is ignored, then the history of Being can only be identified with the history of metaphysics. If this were the case, Rorty's criticism would be correct and cogent. But as the history of Being is not simply a new version of the history of metaphysics, Rorty's criticism must be rejected.

5 Conclusion: Heidegger, Rorty, and appropriation

Although the aims of this paper have now been reached, there is still a matter involved in the paper that needs further elucidation. I have somehow managed to write a paper which is primarily concerned with Heidegger but which never once speaks of *Ereignis*, or "appropriation."

It has been suggested throughout this paper that the real "matter" of Heidegger's thinking is not Being, but rather the truth of Being. This is not

entirely accurate. The ultimate concern of Heidegger's thought is neither Being nor the truth of Being. It is appropriation. "What lets the two matters [Being and time] belong together, what brings the two into their own and, even more, maintains and holds them in their belonging together – the way the two matters stand, the matter at stake – is Appropriation."³³

Why then have I intentionally suggested that the matter is temporality, or the truth of Being? This has been done for the sake of simplicity. Appropriation itself can only be grasped in terms of the relation between Being and the truth of Being. As such, it is almost totally incomprehensible without a prior thinking of the truth of Being, a thinking which Rorty's paper lacks. For appropriation operates for Heidegger precisely in the relation, the belonging together, of the two. "The matter at stake [appropriation] first appropriates Being and time into their own in virtue of their relation."³⁴ Heidegger often speaks of appropriation as the "It" which gives both time and Being. This suggests that appropriation is some third thing, a Being over and beyond Being and time. But this substantialization of appropriation is a mistake. "Appropriation neither *is*, nor *is* Appropriation there."³⁵ Rather, the mutual opening up and belonging together of Being and the truth of Being is at issue in appropriation, and only that. In appropriation Heidegger is suggesting an entirely "formal" feature of all historical worlds, the difference and relation of Being as presencing and the truth of Being as temporality. A preliminary attention to the truth of Being is thus necessary to open the way to Heidegger's appropriation. Since Rorty's article fails to give this attention to the truth of Being, this paper has attempted to remedy this lack. To have brought up *Ereignis* prematurely would only have muddled the waters.

Then does this paper assert that Heidegger is right and Rorty is wrong, that "thinking" is possible at the end of philosophy, and that there is indeed a history of Being independent of ordinary history? No, it remains uncommitted in regard to these issues. Neither does it suggest that there is no significant difference between Rorty and Heidegger. There is indeed such a difference. But Rorty has misidentified it. Rorty thinks that the difference between Heidegger and himself lies in Heidegger's insistent consideration of "Being." This amounts, for Rorty, to the "hope" that even after the end of ontology there might still be philosophy, as thought, which searches for the "holy," which while rejecting the tradition, still looks for something analogous to the "real world." In an odd way Rorty's interpretation and criticism of Heidegger mirrors Derrida's reading and criticism of Heidegger. For Derrida, "Being" is used by Heidegger as a "unique name," signifying a "transcendental signified." That is, the verb "to be" is thought of by Derrida's Heidegger as having a "lexical" as well as a grammatical function, a lexical use which signifies a transcendental "Being" in a unique way. This supposed Heideggerian meaning of "Being" amounts, for Derrida, to a certain "nostalgia" for presence. In fact, as we have seen, neither of these interpretations can be justified in Heidegger's texts. The truth of Being is not Being as presencing, and *Ereignis* is nothing outside of the open field in which beings and meanings occur. Heidegger does not "hope" for a "real world," nor is he nostalgic concerning presence. Dominique Janicaud has made this point persuasively in regard to Derrida's criticism.

I do not think it right to claim that there is nostalgia in Heidegger's works . . . The Heideggerian *Ereignis* does not mean any self-closure or self-achievement, but rather an *ek-statikon*. My last words on this point will be taken from "Time and Being": "*Zum Ereignis als solchem gehört die Enteignung*," which one might translate as follows: disappropriation belongs to appropriation as such. I thus do not see how one could assimilate the Heideggerian *Ereignis* to the appropriation of presence.³⁶

But if "Being" in Heidegger is not a "transcendental signified," if Heidegger does not hold out any "hope" for a "holy" real world, what then does oppose Heidegger and Rorty? It is precisely the same thing which really distinguishes Rorty from Derrida. Both Heidegger and Derrida consider the field in which presencing can occur, in Heidegger's language the open and appropriation, in Derrida's language "*différance*," as worthy of thought. Heidegger is claiming that there is a "formal" necessity involved in any actual world of activity and meaning, the opposition and belonging together of Being and time. This clearing and belonging together is approachable for Heidegger through something like transcendental argumentation. These arguments do not get us outside of our world, however, only into it in a different way. It is this claim and this "hope" which Rorty is really denying. "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey" unfortunately does not address this issue.

NOTES

- 1 R. Rorty, "Overcoming the tradition: Heidegger and Dewey," in *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XXX, No. 2, December 1976, p. 297 (cited hereafter as OTT).
- 2 OTT, p. 297.
- 3 OTT, p. 280.
- 4 Otto Pöggeler and Thomas Sheehan are among those who *have* recognized the importance of the meaning or truth of Being in Heidegger's thought. For example, cf. Pöggeler's "Heidegger's Topology of Being," in Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed.), *On Heidegger and Language*, Evanston, IU.: Northwestern University Press, 1972; and Sheehan's "Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle: *Dynamis and Ereignis*," in *Philosophy Research Archives*.
- 5 This distinction itself appears mostly in an interpolation into the text which was written after 1935. Cf. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961, p. 14ff.
- 6 Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 20.
- 7 Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in Stambaugh (ed.), *Identity and Difference*, New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 57.
- 8 Ibid., p. 58.
- 9 Heidegger, ed. R. Wisser, *Martin Heidegger in Conversation*, New Delhi, India: Arnold Hinneman Publishers, 1977, p. 45.
- 10 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p. 262, H. 219.
- 11 Heidegger, "The origin of the work of art," in Hofstadter (ed.), *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 54.
- 12 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 263, H. 220.

- 13 Heidegger, "The end of philosophy and the task of thinking," in Stambaugh (ed.), *On Time and Being*, New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 71.
- 14 Heidegger, "On time and being," in Stambaugh (ed.), *On Time and Being*, p. 12 (cited hereafter as *OTB*).
- 15 *OTB*, p. 13.
- 16 *OTB*, p. 14.
- 17 *OTB*, p. 15. At this point Heidegger's discussion of time bears a striking resemblance to Hegel's treatment of time in the *Philosophy of Nature*. What distinguishes Heidegger's treatment from Hegel's, however, is his insistence that temporality is irreducible to a mode of thought.
- 18 Cf., *Being and Time*, s.34, etc.
- 19 This tendency can be seen in Sellars' article, "Some reflections on language games," in *Science, Perception, and Reality*. As I understand it, Sellars' own attempt to avoid these poles ultimately depends on a simple conformity, perhaps causal, to metarules.
- 20 OTT, pp. 302-3.
- 21 OTT, p. 303.
- 22 I describe Heidegger's procedure for identifying the truth of Being as "quasi-transcendental." This term needs some explication. For Heidegger, there is a sense in which the truth of Being is phenomenal, roughly the same sense in which a phenomenological horizon is phenomenal. (As opposed to a Husserlian horizon, however, the truth of Being can *never* be made focal.) It is this that leads Heidegger to assert, in the Introduction to *Being and Time*, that both the sense of Being and the Kantian forms of intuition are 'phenomena'. So, if a transcendental argument is seen as one which necessarily argues to a conclusion which asserts the being of a non-phenomenal condition, Heidegger's procedure can not be termed transcendental. Nevertheless, Heidegger's method for identifying and determining the truth of Being does have a transcendental form. That is, he moves from that which is admitted to be the case, beings and their Being, to the necessary condition for the possibility of beings, the truth of Being. For this reason I have called his procedure quasi-transcendental. I have no objection, however, to calling this method "transcendental," as long as it is remembered that: (1) the argument does not start from experience and (2) the condition argued to is neither an existent nor non-phenomenal.
- 23 *OTB*, pp. 6-7.
- 24 But cf. section 4 of this paper.
- 25 *OTB*, p. 8.
- 26 Heidegger, "Letter on humanism," in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Krell, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, pp. 215-16.
- 27 Heidegger, "Letter on humanism," p. 213.
- 28 Heidegger, "The word of Nietzsche," in Lovitt, (ed.), *The Question Concerning Technology*, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 56.
- 19 OTT, p. 299.
- 30 OTT, p. 296.
- 31 *OTB*, p. 8
- 32 *OTB*, p. 9
- 33 *OTB*, p. 19
- 34 *OTB*, p. 19.
- 35 *OTB*, p. 24.
- 36 D. Janicaud, "Presence and appropriation," in *Research in Phenomenology*, vol. VIII, 1978, p. 73.

4

Early Heidegger on Being, The Clearing, and Realism

Theodore R. Schatzki

Perhaps the most prominent concept in Heidegger's philosophy is that of a clearing in which entities can be, a space or realm of illumination in whose light things can show or manifest themselves to people. Heidegger's central concern, throughout his philosophical career, was to understand the nature and constitution of this clearing. In his earlier writings, the clearing is identical with human existence because the light that constitutes the clearing is human understanding, the *lumen naturale* in man.¹ In his later writings, however, Heidegger no longer identifies the clearing with human understanding. The light in whose illumination things manifest themselves to us is something distinct from human understanding and existence, and the latter are now viewed as that by which we apprehend (in Heidegger's language, are "open for") this light and what appears in it.

In this chapter, I explore Heidegger's early views on (1) the clearing and its relation to human existence, and (2) realism and the oneness of reality. I will organize my discussion by addressing two questions, which Frederick Olafson has recently raised about Heidegger's ideas in his excellent study of Heidegger's thought, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*.² These two issues are, first, how can the clearing, which is the realm in which things can be, be identified with human existence given that there exists a plurality of human existences whereas being and reality are presumably one? And second, if the clearing is identified with human existence, does this mean that entities would no longer exist, or would never have existed, if suddenly there were no more, or had never been, any people? Olafson claims that Heidegger is unable to answer the first question and that

The central paradox of Heidegger's philosophy stems from the fact that he wants to say that Dasein is the clearing and also that being is the clearing. If Dasein is inherently plural and being is just as inherently singular and unique, it is not apparent how both these assertions can be true. (*OL*, 226)

Olafson contends, further, that Heidegger fails to resolve the second question. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Heidegger does answer the second question and that this answer is part of his solution to the first issue. *Pace* Olafson, Heidegger's positions at the time of *Being and Time* on realism and on the compatibility of the singularity of being and reality with the plurality of human existences are coherent, although they are perhaps too individualist for the tastes of many twentieth-century philosophers.

1 Dasein and individual people

Heidegger does not employ everyday expressions such as "person" and "people." In order to refer to people, he uses, instead, a term of art: Dasein. It is obvious that the object of Heidegger's existential analytic in *Being and Time* is the nature of individual ongoing human existence and that, correspondingly, the term "Dasein" refers, in some sense, to individual people. Complications arise only because this term is not a count noun (nor a mass noun) and has no plural form, whereas people are denumerable and plural. This apparent complication is easily dissolved, however, by noting Heidegger's comment that he chose this term to denote "This entity which each of us is himself" (BT, 27) because it expresses this entity's way of being (BT, 33). "Dasein" means being-the-there, and this is man's way of being (BT, 47). Thus Dasein refers to entities of a certain kind, while at the same time expressing the way of being peculiar to and definitive of that kind. These entities are people and not also dogs and baboons, on the one hand, or corporations, nations, and sports franchises on the other.

It is important to stress that Dasein refers to individual people, not only because the problems that Olafson raises presuppose this fact, but also because failing to grasp it makes understanding Heidegger's view on the socio-historical nature of human existence and understanding impossible. Heidegger's conception of socio-historical embeddedness is one of the topics we shall discuss later. Here, in order to nail down the equation of Dasein with individual people, I shall mention five reasons for reading Heidegger this way.

1 Heidegger says repeatedly that the existence that is an issue for Dasein is in each case mine (e.g., BT, 67). Existence, that is, is characterized by mineness. In each instance, consequently, Dasein's existence is someone's existence. As a result, Heidegger remarks, one must always use personal pronouns when addressing Dasein (BT, 68). These claims, and others like them, strongly suggest that Dasein refers to individual people. Whereas people speak out the mineness of their own existence with the expression "I" and must be addressed with personal pronouns, these facts are not true, for instance, of corporations, nations, and sports franchises. It is important to realize, however, that the two expressions, Dasein and human being, the latter thought of as a term standing for members of a particular biological species, are not coextensive. Not all human beings are Dasein – for instance, infants and severely brain-damaged individuals. Rather, Dasein are functional human beings able of their own initiative to

interact intentionally with and to take account of the things in the world amidst which they exist.

2 The second reason is closely connected with the first. The possibility of authenticity, the mode of existence in which Dasein leads a life of its own (choosing), as opposed to one prescribed to it by the state of the world and the way things are customarily understood and done (inauthenticity), is grounded in the fact that Dasein is in each case mine (BT, 68). This shows again that instances of Dasein are individual people. Even if it is possible for a corporation to take over and make its being something of its own, this possibility cannot be grounded in the fact that the corporation's existence is intrinsically mine. For mineness does not pertain to the being of corporations. Only in the case of individual people can the possibility of authentic existence be grounded in mineness. Further support for identifying the referents of Dasein as individual people is furnished by Heidegger's thesis that, in authenticity, a Dasein is individualized in the consciousness of death as a possibility of its own (e.g., BT, 308). Neither individualization, consciousness of death, nor the transformation in manner of being (authenticity) consequent upon these two phenomena can be ascribed to anything but individual people. In fact, these phenomena capture something extremely individualistic about individuals, something that pertains to each individual alone in isolation from others.³

These remarks do not deny, incidentally, that entities such as corporations and nations partake to some extent of the mode of being belonging to people. After all, such entities consist, at least in part, in people (more precisely: in particular aspects of people's lives). These entities consist also, however, in entities which, according to Heidegger, have modes of being different from that of individual people, e.g., buildings, telephone systems, and sidewalks. Consequently, the mode of being belonging to social formations is more complex than, and thus different from, that of individual people. Hence, these formations are not among the referents of Dasein. On the other hand, unlike in the case of social formations, Heidegger believes that animals share hardly any of Dasein's way of being. His conception of animal life, however, is closely tied to the biology of his day (Driesche, Uexküll): animal existence is a series of blind, nonconceptually mediated, instinctual reactions activated by an animal's meeting up with certain entities in its environment.⁴ It is true that, on a more contemporary view of animal life, creatures such as dogs and baboons do share certain components of Dasein's way of being, for instance, conceptually mediated apprehension of the environment. Even so, only if an animal's way of being is identical with Dasein's way of being, and thus only if the animal exhibits all the components of the latter, can the animal be a Dasein. The extent to which any animal shares in Dasein's way of being is, I believe, an empirical question. It seems unlikely, however, that any animal partakes in all of it, since it seems unlikely, for instance, that being-toward-death and the possibility of authenticity are features of anything other than human lives.

3 A third reason is furnished by Heidegger's practice, occasional in *Being and Time* and widespread in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, of identifying Dasein as the "subject." This manner of speaking indicates that Heidegger considers his analysis of Dasein to be a more

adequate analysis of what was intended by the Cartesian concept of the subject but misanalyzed by that philosophical tradition.⁵ In a nutshell: whereas the subject was traditionally viewed as essentially outside and distinct from the world, in Heidegger it is analyzed as being-in-the-world. The point in the present context, however, is that, since individual subjects have been traditionally associated with individual people, Heidegger's use of the term "subject" reinforces the impression that Dasein refers to individuals (cf. also Heidegger's use of the expression "the individual Dasein," e.g., *BT*, 219, 221; *GB*, 429). These linguistic facts do not, of course, prove my reading. Philosophers have advocated various notions of subjects that transcend individual people; and purely linguistically, the expression an "individual Dasein" could encompass corporations and dogs. Still, in combination with the other reasons, Heidegger's language here supplies supplementary evidence.

4 A fourth reason, which I shall merely mention, lies in the fact that the object of much of Heidegger's analysis in chapters 3 and 4 of Division I of *Being and Time* is how Dasein encounters (*begegnen*) entities. Heidegger believes that the notion of encountering applies solely to people's lives. For encountering something means experiencing it *as* something; and, as indicated, animals, in Heidegger's view, do not experience the objects they run up against in their environment *as* objects. Rather, these objects serve simply as causal releases for instinctual drives. Accordingly, if encountering is discussed as part of an account of Dasein's way of being, it follows that, in Heidegger's view, Dasein refers to individual people.

5 Finally, a fifth reason is contained in Heidegger's remark that, although Dasein is not the "ontic isolated" individual, in the sense of an egotistical individual acting for his or her own interests in oblivion to the interests of others, talking about Dasein does imply the "metaphysical isolation" of the human being (*MFL*, 137). Part of what he means is that Dasein is the way of being of an individual person taken in and for itself. He is also saying something, however, about the metaphysical self-sufficiency of a person *vis-à-vis* being, namely, that each individual, taken for itself, is a clearing of being in which things can show themselves. This interpretation is supported by his later implication that each *Dasein* has its own transcendence (*MFL*, 190). I think that this remark shows conclusively that Dasein refers to individual people. In fact, Heidegger claims that a consequence of the metaphysical isolation of the human being is that Dasein, as factual, is in each case dispersed into a body and into a particular sexuality (*ibid.*: for further references to Dasein's body, see *BT*, 419; *HCT*, 232). Corporations and nations are neither embodied nor sexed and thus cannot be Dasein.

2 The clearing and being

Now that it is clear that Dasein refers to functional men, women, and children, we can begin examining the two questions that Olafson poses about Heidegger's early thought. The first of these questions, the subject of the current section, is: How do the facts (1) that human existence is a clearing, (2) that there is a plurality

of people and thus, presumably, a plurality of clearings, and (3) that being is unique and singular, cohere? Doesn't a multiplicity of clearings entail a multiplication of realities, therewith raising the specter of incommensurability?

What does Heidegger mean when he claims that Dasein is a clearing? As indicated in the Introduction to this chapter, a clearing is an openness, or space, in which things can be, a lit-upness in whose light things can manifest themselves as themselves. Less metaphorically, Heidegger conceives of this space as a space of possibilities, an indefinitely complex space of possible ways for things (including people) to be (e.g., *BT*, 183–5). Existing and not existing are two such possibilities. Others include being red and being green, being hard and being soft, being useful for hammering or being unusable for hammering, going to school and going home, being happy and being piqued, and so on. The clearing is a clearing of being in the sense that what constitutes it (the light in which things can show themselves as being some way) is a totality of possibilities pertaining to the what, how, and that of entities.

Heidegger connects the clearing to people by way of the phenomenon of understanding (and also the phenomenon of *Befindlichkeit*, attunement, although I shall set this aside in what follows).⁶ Human understanding opens up the clearing. For the possible ways of being that constitute a clearing are objects of understanding. More strongly: these possible ways of being do not exist except as objects of understanding (cf. *BT*, 117–18). Understanding clears, i.e., establishes the clearing in which things can be, for it is only as understood that the possible ways in which things can be themselves are. Understanding, as the *lumen naturale* in man, is the light in which things can be manifest (cf. *MFL*, 147).

It is now possible to describe what Heidegger means by "being." Analytically, the term "being" embraces all modalities of "is": that something is (*Dass-sein*), how something is (*Wie-sein* or *So-sein*), and what something is (*Was-sein*).⁷ Being is also the mode of the possible manifestation of entities to people; that is, entities show themselves to people as things that are such and such (or that are not such and such), that are a certain sort of thing (or that are not a certain sort of thing) and that are (or that are not). That being is the mode of the possible manifestation of entities helps explain why Heidegger believes that all encountering of entities occurs and is possible only on the basis of an understanding of the being of the encountered entities (e.g., *BT*, 363, 371; *BP*, 325). Entities are encountered existing, being such and such, and being a certain sort of thing because entities are encountered in the ways of being already projected as possibilities in Dasein's understanding. In sum, being is the "how" of the possible accessibility of entities, the mode in which entities can manifest themselves as entities (cf. *GB*, 484).⁸

The idea that understanding projects ways of being in which things can be manifest is not unknown in the history of philosophy. Its most important forerunner is embodied in Kant's picture of experience. In Kant, experience is something in which things manifest themselves, or in Kant's language, "appear." How things manifest themselves in experience, moreover, what they appear as, depends on understanding; more specifically, on the categories, the most general, *a priori* concepts contained in the understanding (and also on the forms of intuition contained in the sensibility). The possibilities of appearances are laid

down, at a high level of generality, in these categories; more precisely, in the schemata of these categories, since everything that appears instantiates the latter. Everything in experience is something of a particular extensive and intensive magnitude, connected with other things, and either possible, actual, or necessary. The analogy between Kant's and Heidegger's views of human understanding is thus unmistakable, even though Kant does not think in terms of possibilities of being, and understanding in Heidegger is not the faculty of a subject but a component of the structure of ongoing lived existence. In both philosophers, understanding sets up a clearing of possible being in whose terms things can manifest themselves as something, either in the experiences of a subject or in the encounterings of a person involved in the world.

In both Kant and Heidegger, moreover, there are as many clearings as there are people. In Kant, each person (i.e., subject) has its own understanding (and experiences). Thus, because there exists a plurality of people, there exists a plurality of clearings, in each of which things can manifest themselves in the experiences of a particular subject. (Kant, of course, never talks in this way.) In Heidegger, similarly, each person has his or her own understanding (and encounterings). (Understanding, Heidegger writes, is an ontic characteristic of Dasein; e.g., *BT*, 33.) Thus, because there exists a plurality of persons, each with his or her own numerically distinct understanding, there exists a multiplicity of clearings in each of which entities can manifest themselves in the encounterings of a particular person. In Kant and Heidegger, there are as many clearings as there are entities – people or subjects – to whom other entities can manifest themselves. Notice too that, in both philosophers, the clearing is the realm of possible, as opposed to actual, experiences/encounterings.

Now that we have established that there are as many clearings as there are people, we can turn to the problem Olafson raises about this idea. The issue is whether a plurality of clearings entails a pluralization of being and reality, where being is understood as the clearing, and reality is understood as things being certain ways. Each clearing is a realm of ways in which entities can be. What, however, if these clearings differed, i.e., if the range of possible ways in which entities can be varied from one clearing to the next? If such were the case, it would seem that, instead of there existing one realm of being and thus one reality, there would exist a plurality of such realms and thus a plurality of realities, each associated with a different individual. As Olafson says, however, being and reality are “most naturally thought of as unitary and single” (*OL*, 70). This means that one and the same being and reality are there for each of us in our individual existences. The aspects of this reality that a given individual apprehends often differ from those that others apprehend, but these aspects are still aspects of the same one reality. How, then, does this presumption cohere with the picture of a plurality of clearings?

Olafson believes that the two ideas are incompatible. He writes:

it might seem just as plausible to hold that in each case the uncoveredness belongs to the Dasein that realizes it, and that being as presence [i.e., as the realm of possible manifestation], like Dasein, is essentially plural in character. But such an assumption would miss entirely the dimension of

being as presence in which it is independent of any particular Dasein. (*OL*, 146)

What, for Olafson, the independence of being from particular Daseins amounts to is that being is a realm in which entities can be “for a plurality of existing subjects” (*OL*, 144). The independence of being, in other words, consists (1) in the existence of a single clearing of being that is common to people as opposed to belonging to any one of them, and (2) in the consequent fact that, when entities manifest themselves in the clearing, they become accessible to an indefinite multiplicity of people in common. This single clearing is a single realm of being on the basis of which things are able to show themselves to any creature in the position and with the capacities to apprehend them.

In Olafson's view, the singularity and uniqueness of both being and reality require that there exists a single clearing in whose terms things are able to show themselves to people. If there were to exist a plurality of clearings, then, on this view, being would be “essentially plural in character.” As I shall now explain, however, the singularity and uniqueness of being and reality can be understood in a second way, as the existence of certain commonalities between multiple clearings; and when it is so understood, the oneness of both being and reality is compatible with a plurality of clearings.

This commonality between clearings has three dimensions. The first consists in universal features of the notion of being as such. Being, Heidegger reiterates in several places, is a complex rather than simple concept. This means that there exists a multiplicity of general ways, or senses, of being in which entities can be. Entities, for instance, can be encountered as present-at-hand (i.e., occurring), ready-to-hand (e.g., usable/not usable), or being-there-with (*Mitdasein*; this way of being pertains to other people). More generally, as discussed earlier, Heidegger, in his lectures, identifies that-, how-, and what-being as the most general modalities in which entities can be manifest. Heidegger believes that these various general ways of being are universal among people. Any clearing happens, in part, as an understanding and projecting of possible ways of being differentiated along these lines (*GB*, 519, 528–30). Since each clearing happens as the same differentiations, being is “common” to and thus one in all clearings. Being, consequently, is singular, i.e., the general ways of being are one and the same in all clearings, even though clearings are multiple.

The second dimension of commonality is a socio-historical one. Olafson claims that the alternative to the view which, in treating being as plural in character, misses the dimension of being in which it is independent of any particular Dasein, is to construe being *qua* clearing as social and historical in character. He then claims that, although Heidegger emphasizes the notion of being-with (*Mitsein*) in *Being and Time*, this notion remains so undeveloped as to be unable to specify the sociohistorical character of the clearing and to ensure thereby the clearing's singularity and independence from individual people. Heidegger certainly should have said a lot more in this context about *Mitsein*. Olafson misses the significance of what Heidegger does say about it, however, because Olafson wants this notion to perform a task it is not designed to perform: establishing a single clearing in relation to a plurality of individuals. In Olafson's eyes, the

notion of being-with should help define the “relationship in which one *Dasein* stands to another in grounding the same world” (OL, 72), the way in which disclosing is “joint” and “co-operative” (OL, 146, 71). In other words, this notion should help explain how people co-operate in opening up a single clearing on the basis of which things can be for them in common. On the view that there are as many clearings as there are people, on the other hand, the role of *Mitsein* looks quite different. It then denotes the existence of commonalities and references between numerically distinct clearings. These commonalities and references are part of the story about why these distinct clearings are the same (i.e., the same possibilities constitute them) and why, as a result, being can be “one” even though clearings are multiple.⁹

The two most important notions expressing these commonalities are the anyone (*das Man*) and tradition. The anyone is Heidegger’s term for a particular structure found in every individual’s existence: that an individual, in the first place and for the most part (*zuerst und zumeist*), acts in ways in which anyone acts. That is, a person acts, firstly and mostly, in either normal and customary or acceptable ways. In Heidegger’s view, in other words, the possible ways to act that an individual understands and actualizes are, for the most part, ways of acting either accepted by or common to and approved by an open-ended totality of individuals who exert pressure on others to conform to them:

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *one* takes pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *one* sees and judges; likewise we shrink back from the “great mass” as *one* shrinks back; we find “shocking” what *one* finds shocking. The anyone, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness. . . . The anyone-self, for the sake of which *Dasein* is in an everyday manner, articulates the referential context of significance. When entities are encountered, *Dasein*’s world frees them for a totality of involvements with which anyone is familiar, and within the limits which have been established with the anyone’s averageness. (BT, 164, 167; translation modified)

In saying that individuals project and realize ways of acting that anyone projects and realizes, Heidegger claims that individual existence is intrinsically social in character. Heidegger’s object of analysis is individual existence, but his analysis construes sociality as part of the essence of this existence. As he writes, being-in-the-world is constituted by being-with (BT, 156).

Moreover, Heidegger contends that, since people encounter themselves and others in what they themselves and others do (BT, 163), the ways in which people can encounter themselves and others is determined by the possibilities of action they understand. He further demonstrates that what entities manifest themselves to people as being also depends, in certain cases, on the possible ways of acting people project. For some entities show themselves as usable/unusable or as servicable/unservicable (*dienlich/undienlich*). Heidegger calls such entities “equipment.” And things showing themselves as equipment depends on people realizing ways of acting since it is in relation to particular ways of acting that

things *are* usable or unusable, servicable or unservicable. Thus, because most of the ways of acting any given individual projects are ways of acting anyone projects, and because these ways of acting are projected in an indefinite plurality of individual existences, it follows that there exist extensive commonalities in what individuals can encounter themselves, other people, and equipment as being.

It turns out, therefore, (1) that clearings are largely the same, i.e., are constituted largely by the same (anyone) possibilities, and (2) that what people and entities can and do show themselves as being is thus largely the same from clearing to clearing. Being is unitary and common even though there exists a plurality of clearings.

Thown into its “there,” every *Dasein* has been factically submitted to a definite “world” – its “world”. At the same time those factual projections which are closest to it, have been guided by its concerned *lostness* in the anyone. (BT, 344).

In sum, the commonality of being, in so far as it is effected by being-with, lies not in the existence of a single realm of being independent of and prior to any particular projecting of it, but in a commonality that holds between a plurality of clearings concerning the specific ways of being in which things can manifest themselves (cf. MFL, 172).

Of course, whereas the first dimension of commonality, common general modalities of being, embraces all clearings whatsoever, the different sociohistorical commonalities constituting the second dimension embrace various lesser sized sets of clearings. Being is less “singular” at the sociohistorical level than at the level of being as such. This lesser degree of singularity reflects (1) the fact that what other people and the entities we use show themselves as depends on what these people do and how we use the entities, and (2) the fact that possibilities of activity vary between societies, communities, and the like. The range of possible being-there-with and readiness-to-hand of people and entities varies between societies, etc., whereas being-there-with and readiness-to-hand as such are common to all.

Now, Heidegger maintains that people always fall into the anyone, into acting and encountering entities and people in the ways anyone does. People are *thrown* into this kind of existence – inextricably. Olafson simply overlooks this aspect of Heidegger’s thought. (It is significant that the extremely important term “thrownness” appears almost nowhere in Olafson’s account.) He writes: “it may sound as though a radical and original uncovering were effected in each case by an individual *Dasein*, unless, of course, it has relapsed into the unauthentic and anonymous mode of *das Man*” (OL, 147). Relapsed? *Dasein* is constantly and always already in the mode of *das Man*. Because of this, there are always considerable commonalities between the clearings of different people. Olafson reveals his misunderstanding of Heidegger, therefore, when he writes, in criticism of Heidegger: “What I am suggesting is that, if the [projections] of one *Dasein* were not made in such a way as to relate them, at least to some minimal degree, to the [projections] of other *Daseins*, it is hard to see how the specific uncoverings they effect could be shared” (OL, 148). The anyone ensures not

merely that different people's projections (understandings) are "related" to one another, but that they are for the most part the same. So the anyone helps ensure that clearings are "shared," i.e., the same.

Moreover, the contrast Olafson sets up in the above quotation from page 147, that between *das Man* and a radically individual and original clearing, further discloses his undervaluation of the breadth and domination of the anyone. If there could be an original and radically individual uncovering (which, given the contrast, presumably corresponds to the general way of being Heidegger calls "authenticity") it would indeed seem doubtful whether clearings were shared and being/reality one. Heidegger emphasizes at a number of places, however, that the authentic mode of existence cannot escape the anyone but, instead, involves merely a transformation in a person's relation to and cognizance of the anyone (e.g., *BT*, 168, 224, 422). The possibilities that an authentic individual projects and from which he or she chooses him- or herself are always still for the most part anyone possibilities. Thus an original and radically individual clearing is, in Heidegger's eyes, impossible. Such a clearing would nullify the sociality and commonality intrinsic to human life.

Of course, the authentic individual chooses him- or herself from a range of possibilities that is broader than that offered by the anyone. This broader range of possibilities is found in tradition. Tradition contains possibilities beyond those carried by the anyone since there always exist possible ways of acting handed down through tradition which have fallen into disfavor or disuse. The authentic individual, no longer blindly held captive to the anyone, is able to see that more is possible in the current situation than what is prescribed by the anyone and offered by the entities with which he or she is currently dealing (e.g., *BT*, 345). These further possibilities, in Heidegger's view, are all drawn from tradition (*BT*, 435–7).¹⁰ It is from tradition, he thus writes, that the authentic individual can "choose a hero" (*BT*, 437). Tradition is not, however, a broader envelope or clearing within which individual clearings are suspended. An individual person is always already projecting some traditional possibilities, namely, those belonging to the past of his or her generation, which past he or she "has grown up both into and in" (*BT*, 41). Other traditional possibilities are preserved in entities encountered in existence, e.g., books, sayings, and stories. The key point here is simply that tradition is a second dimension of the sociohistorical commonality between clearings; and, as indicated, it consists in both a commonality in the possibilities that constitute clearings and a commonality (and similarity) in the possibility-preserving entities encountered in clearings. (The latter component of this commonality is an example of the topic of section 3.) Heidegger's notion of the destiny of a community reflects this second dimension of sociohistorical commonality. The destiny of a community, he writes, is not something put together out of individual fates and situations (*BT*, 436). Rather, it is a commonality in the situations and fates faced by the members of a community, a commonality constituted and made possible by commonalities both in projected possibilities and in the entities and people which people encounter or have to deal with.

Incidentally, Olafson's belief that a plurality of clearings is incompatible with the singularity and uniqueness of being is based, in part, on his misconception of

the "choice-like" character of understanding and projection. In his view, the possibilities that any given person projects are subject to choice, and since choice varies between individuals, so too do the possibilities projected. In arguing this way, Olafson misunderstands the nature of the shared projections of the anyone and tradition. Olafson is correct to use the facts (1) that what equipment at any moment shows itself to someone as being depends on what that person is doing, and (2) that what a person is doing depends on that for the sake of which he or she acts (his or her end), to argue that what things show themselves as is determined by choice, at least in so far as choice determines a person's ends and how he or she acts so as to realize them: "choice figures not only as a partial determinant of what will actually be the case . . . but also as defining the practical meaning of the state of the world that does result" (*OL*, 69). In Heidegger's view, however, inauthentic action-determining choices are always choices from among, and thus they occur on the background of, the totality of possible anyone actions and ends that each individual projects.¹¹ The projection of anyone possibilities itself, however, is not a matter of choice – in Heidegger's eyes, it is simply a universal structure of human existence. Inauthentic individuals do not choose to project anyone possibilities (cf. *BT*, 312). And authentic individuals are unable to choose not to project them. Consequently, the clearing, *qua* space of anyone possibilities, is not subject to choice. Choice helps determine the range of projected actions only when authentic individuals take over nonanyone possibilities from tradition. These possibilities are few in number, however, in comparison to those constituting the anyone. So the facts that inauthentic choice varies between individuals and that authentic choice can occur do not nullify the sameness of people's clearings.

Finally, the third dimension of the singularity of being and reality, when singularity is construed as commonalities between clearings, is one and the same realm of present-at-hand entities entering each clearing. This idea is the topic of section 3. At this point, section 2 can be summarized as follows: resolving the paradox that Olafson raises about Heidegger's philosophy, how being can be one and clearings multiple, requires a correct understanding of the multiplicity of clearings and the oneness of being. A multiplicity of clearings consists in the existence of a plurality of people together with the fact that what things can show themselves to any one of these people as being is governed by the particular space of possible ways of being understood by that individual. The singularity of being, on the other hand, consists in possible ways of being being common to a plurality of clearings, i.e., to different people's understandings, with regard to both the specific and the types of possibilities involved.

3 Realism

For my purposes here, the issue of realism versus idealism is the issue of whether the entities that people encounter in lived experience exist, and are what they are, independently of people. If the answer to this question is yes, then even if there were suddenly no more (or had never been) any people, entities other than people

would nonetheless continue to be and to be what they are. If, on the other hand, the answer to this question is no, then, if there were suddenly no more people, other entities too would no longer exist and be that which they are. The distinction between that-being and how-being, of course, multiplies the possible flavors of realism and idealism. This distinction plays a secondary role in Heidegger's views on this issue, however, since he takes a single position with respect to being in general.

Heidegger clearly thinks that entities exist, and are what they are, independently of people. A sample of quotations proves this beyond a shadow of a doubt: "Entities *are*, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained." (BT, 228). "[This] does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the real be that which in itself it is" (BT, 255). "[Nature] is, even if we do not uncover it, without our encountering it within our world . . . Nature can also be when no Dasein exists" (BP, 169, 170; cf. BP, 222–3). "Beings are in themselves the kinds of beings they are, and in the way they are, even if, for example, Dasein does not exist" (MFL, 153; cf. 194). The interpretive issue, in this context, is whether Heidegger's avowals of realism are consistent with another sort of statement he sometimes makes, usually in conjunction with these avowals: "But being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs" (BT, 228); "only as long as Dasein is . . . 'is there' being" (BT, 255).

Statements of these two sorts are *prima facie* inconsistent. Existing and being such and such are modalities of being. Hence, if there is being only in the understanding of being, entities can exist and be what they are only because and hence so long as there is understanding of being. If there are no people, however, there is no understanding of being. In such a situation, consequently, it would seem to follow that entities could neither be nor not be in any modality of being. Yet Heidegger clearly claims that beings are and are what they are even if there are no people.

The resolution of this *prima facie* incompatibility is only hinted at in *Being and Time*, appearing more prominently in Heidegger's subsequent lecture courses. To see it, we must first understand what Heidegger means by statements of the second sort. As sketched earlier, being is the "how" of the possible (and thus actual) manifestation of entities to people. What was not emphasized earlier, however, is that being is *nothing more* than the how of uncoveredness. Since being is nothing more than the how of uncoveredness, however, it cannot be independently of uncoveredness. So because there is no uncoveredness apart from understanding, there is no being apart from understanding. This is what Heidegger means, then, when he writes that "being 'is' only in the understanding of . . . being." Being, as the how of possible uncoveredness projected in the understanding, "is" only in this projection and thus so long as there is this projection and the accompanying uncovering of entities. Heidegger thus writes: "Being is there primordially and in itself, when it gives access to . . . beings." (MFL, 153).

This interpretation of statements of the second sort, however, only seems to make it harder to understand how entities can be and be what they are independently of and thus even when there are no people. Doesn't the latter

independence require, contrary to the interpretation just given, that being characterizes entities even when there are no people, thus no understanding of being, and hence no being for entities to manifest themselves in? Heidegger claims that there is one particular modality of being, presence-at-hand, which is such that, when something present-at-hand shows itself to be a certain way, it shows itself to have been already or all along that way. Whenever, for instance, Newton's laws disclose something, "the entity which is uncovered with the unveiled laws was precisely in the way in which it showed itself after the uncovering and now is as thus showing itself" (BP, 220; connect with BT, 269). Heidegger does not explain why this is the case, although it might have something to do with the fact that "present-at-hand" (*Vorhandensein*) as we understand it means something like occurring or abiding. In any case, an entity that, in showing itself, shows itself as having been already what it shows itself to be, is what it shows itself to be independently of its showing itself. Hence, it lies in the meaning of one modality of being that entities that show themselves in this modality exist, and are what they show themselves in this modality as being, independently of their showing themselves thus. The independence of present-at-hand entities is an implication of presence-at-hand *qua* modality of being that itself is only as something understood (cf. BP, 169; see BP, 315 for a similar formulation pertaining to perceivedness). As Heidegger says, it is only in so far as Dasein gives itself being that beings can emerge in their in-themselves, i.e., it is only in so far as Dasein gives itself being that it is possible to understand that beings are in themselves the kinds of beings they are, and in the way they are, even if people do not exist (MFL, 153).

This reading of Heidegger's position reveals that, in the preceding passage from MFL, 153, as well as in others quoted earlier, Heidegger does not use the expression "in itself" as Kant does. In Kant, the thing in itself is how something is independently of how it is for us, thus how it is independently of any possible knowledge we can have of it. In Heidegger, on the other hand, what something is "in itself" is what it is independently of our actually encountering it. Thus, when Heidegger claims that what present-at-hand things show themselves to us as being is what in themselves they are, he means only that they are the present-at-hand entities they show themselves as being – and not something else – even if no one encounters them. Heidegger, in other words, is an empirical, and not a transcendental, realist. That this is so is in fact presupposed by the phenomenological character of his enterprise, which enterprise aims to "let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the way it itself shows itself to be" (BT, 58, retranslated). At the same time, even though what entities in themselves are is what they are independently of our actually encountering them, what they are independently of our actually encountering them is not, as we have seen, independent of our understanding of being. Heidegger is also an idealist.

This reading also enables us to explain the enigmatic second full paragraph in *Being and Time*, p. 255. Heidegger opens by saying that there is being only so long as Dasein is. He then writes:

When Dasein does not exist, "independence" "is" not either, nor "is" the "in-itself." In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither

be disclosed nor lie hidden. *In such a case* it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not.

In other words, if there is no Dasein, and hence no understanding of being, there doesn't exist the understanding of that modality of being (presence-at-hand) by virtue of which either the independence of things or what things in themselves are can show itself or even be conceived. More radically, in fact, if there is no understanding of being, there is no understanding of any modality of being, and thus nothing by virtue of which to say or to understand anything, positive or negative, about the being of entities. Nonetheless, Heidegger concludes: "But *now*, as long as there is an understanding of being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that *in this case* entities will still continue to be," i.e., given our understanding of being and thus our understanding of presence-at-hand, we do have something on the basis of which to answer (and, indeed, pose) the question about the independence of things in themselves; and in accordance with our understanding of presence-at-hand, the answer is yes, entities would still be.

Now, since present-at-hand entities exist as such independently of their showing themselves, they form a realm of entities that can show themselves to an indefinite number of people. Existing independently of all encounterings, their showing themselves is not intrinsically tied to any particular encountering or person. Of course, as noted, present-at-hand entities can show themselves thus only because people understand presence-at-hand: "beings, among which Dasein also factually is, get surpassed by" Dasein's projection of possible ways of being which "first makes it possible for these [beings], previously surpassed as beings, to be ontically opposite [to Dasein] and as opposite to be apprehended in themselves" (MFL, 166). Still, because all people understand presence-at-hand, it is possible for present-at-hand entities to manifest themselves as themselves to an indefinite number of people while remaining what they are regardless of whether they show themselves or not.

It is even possible to speak of one and the same realm of entities "entering" different clearings. Olafson claims that Heidegger has no business talking about present-at-hand entities "entering the world." His claim is based, however, on the mistaken idea that Heidegger lapses into transcendental realism. Olafson begins his criticism from the idea that, since a clearing is constituted by the totality of possible ways of being that someone understands, it embraces the totality of what that person can understand as being in any way. He then claims that this characterization of a clearing entails that anyone who speaks of present-at-hand entities as "entering," and thus as "outside" of, clearings, presupposes that she can understand how entities are (i.e., present-at-hand) when they lie outside the totality of what can be in any way for her; outside, that is, the totality of what she can understand as being in any way (OL, 51; cf. 183). Such an understanding is unavailable to finite creatures such as ourselves. Consequently, Olafson concludes, Heidegger should abandon talk of entities "entering" the clearing. Of course, Heidegger himself, as the discussion of the paragraph from BT, 255 demonstrates, denies that people have access to a nonfinite viewpoint. In saying this, however, he is not, *pace* Olafson, being

inconsistent. For Olafson misunderstands what Heidegger means by entities "entering" the clearing.

The happening of a clearing is the occurrence of possible ways of being in which things can show themselves. Entities "enter" a clearing when the clearing happens, when, that is, possibilities are projected (i.e., when Dasein exists; MFL, 194). And what it means to say that entities enter the clearing is simply that, with the occurrence of possible ways of being, it *becomes possible* for entities to show themselves (cf. *ibid.*, 166, 193–5). The entities that are able to show themselves whenever Dasein exists, furthermore, are already what they are prior to their being able to do this. As Heidegger writes, "World-entry and its occurrence is solely the presupposition for extant things announcing themselves in their not requiring world-entry regarding their own being" (*ibid.*, 195). In entering the clearing, moreover, they undergo no change in being: "Entry into the world is not a process of extant things, in the sense that beings undergo a change thereby and through this change break into the world. The extant's entry into the world is 'something' that happens to it" (*ibid.*, 194; cf. GB, 406). As discussed earlier, however, the pre-existence and independence of entities follows from the meaning of one of the modalities of being (presence-at-hand) we understand. To speak of entities as "outside" of and as "entering" the clearing, therefore, is to conceive of them in one of the modalities of being we understand. So thinking of entities of a certain kind as "entering" the clearing does not require, as Olafson claims it does, that we understand how these entities are when they lie outside the totality of what we can understand as being in any way. It requires merely the understanding of being that we possess.

In other words, what it is for an entity to be "outside" a clearing is not for it to lie outside the totality of ways we can understand things to be. Rather, it is an entity's not having the possibility of showing itself. Consequently, Heidegger is not being muddle-headed in claiming that what something is "outside" a clearing, i.e., prior to its being possible for it to manifest itself to some person, i.e., prior to the existence of this person, is what it can show itself to that person as being.¹²

Although Heidegger is a realist, we must not forget the idealist character of his views. Things show themselves in the modalities of being because they show themselves in the possibilities grasped by understanding. Unlike Kant, however, Heidegger does not treat understanding as the "property" of a transcendental subject analytically distinct from the empirical subject. (I here pass over the issues of whether the transcendental and empirical subjects are identical and whether it makes sense to attribute understanding to the empirical subject). Since there are no Kantian things in themselves in Heidegger, there are likewise no transcendental subjects. As a result, the understanding on the basis of which a person encounters entities is the property of one of the entities that that same person encounters, namely himself. That is, the understanding in whose light entities manifest themselves to someone is an ontic property of that entity which in this light is revealed to that person as himself. Heidegger, finally, also surpasses Kant's idealism. For, in treating existence in the same way that he treats how and what being, Heidegger indicates that to speak of something as existing is to conceive of it in terms of the modalities of being that we understand.

Thus he would side with Hegel against Kant and claim that, since Kant attributes existence to the thing in itself, the Kantian conception of the thing in itself is a conception of a way things are for us and not a conception of how things are independently of any way they are for us.

4 Conclusion

The existence of one and the same realm of present-at-hand entities which enter into a multiplicity of clearings completes the story of how such a multiplicity is compatible with the singularity and uniqueness of being and reality. Not only are certain general modalities of being common to all clearings, but the same entities that show themselves to any given person can and do show themselves to others. Reality is a single totality of entities which show themselves to people in common as existing, being such and such, being of certain kinds, and so on. Furthermore, since the same possibilities of present-at-hand being are found in different clearings, what present-at-hand entities show themselves to any one person as being can be and often is what they show themselves to others as being. The anyone and tradition, lastly, embrace additional commonalities between varying pluralities of clearings in possibilities of ready-to-hand and being-there-with being. Because of these lesser commonalities, entities show themselves to different people as the same, and as the same types of, ready-to-hand entities; and people show themselves to themselves and to others as performing the same, and the same sorts of, actions.

In this essay, I have endeavored to show the consistency of Heidegger's earlier views on clearings, being, and reality. I also have been concerned to explore the individualist, idealist, and realist character of these views, together with the way *Being and Time* combines these elements with an analysis of the intrinsic sociohistoricity of human existence. This coexistence of idealist, realist, individualist, and historicist elements lends Heidegger's early position unique contemporary and historical philosophical significance.¹³

NOTES

- 1 Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), p. 171. References to this work are henceforth indicated by *BT*. Other abbreviations for Heidegger's works are as follows: *BP* = *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982; *GB* = *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Volume 29/30 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983; *HCT* = *History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985; *MFL* = *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
- 2 Frederick Olafson, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987. References to this work are henceforth marked by *OL*.
- 3 Additional evidence for this reading of Heidegger is provided by his comments about authentic community. If communities were instances of Dasein, then a discussion of

authentic community would seem to offer an especially favorable moment at which to indicate this, say, by stipulating that authentic individuality presupposes authentic community as something distinct from it. Heidegger, however, propounds the opposite thesis. Authentic community is the coming-together of authentic individuals (*BT*, 159, 344–5; *BP*, 288). This emphasis on individuals reinforces the claim that Dasein refers to individual people.

- 4 See the long discussion of animals at *GB*, part II, chapters 3–5.
- 5 For this way of describing Heidegger's relation to Cartesianism, cf. *BT*, 366, and his comments on Husserl's concept of intentionality at *HCT*, 303–4.
- 6 In the end for Heidegger, human existence is a clearing because human existence is the ecstatic, self-opening temporalizing of temporality. For the purposes of this essay, however, it is clearer to discuss Heidegger's position in terms of understanding.
- 7 Cf. *GB*, part II, chapter 6, *passim*. Elsewhere, Heidegger often differentiates only what-being and that-being, or what-being and how-being.
- 8 Olafson very nicely points out that, since existing, being such and such, and being a certain sort of thing are states of affairs, and since being is the "how" of the uncoveredness of entities, it follows that entities show themselves to humans as articulated into states of affairs. A red apple, for instance, shows itself as red and as existing when someone looks at it. Olafson then makes the immensely productive suggestion that the difference between entities and being in Heidegger corresponds roughly to the difference between things and states of affairs (facts). So understood, the irreducibility of being to entities is analogous to the irreducibility of states of affairs to things. See *OL*, 232ff.
- 9 For the purpose of space, I will not discuss the references that link clearings. What I have in mind is that, when Heidegger says that being-in-the-world is constituted by being-with, part of what he means is, first, that it is always the case that some of the ways of being in which (1) things can be manifest and (2) Dasein itself can exist contain references to others. For instance, an entity might show itself to someone as John's pliers or as usable for pulling John's teeth, whereas helping Maud and acting for the sake of Maud's well-being might be disclosed to him as possible ways (for himself) to be (see *BT*, 153–63). References such as these clearly establish linkages and dependencies between clearings. In saying that Dasein is essentially being-with, part of what Heidegger means is, second, that it is always the case that some of the ways of being that constitute the clearing are ways for others to be. On this point, see *BP*, 278–9; and *BT*, 183.
- 10 Notice that it is a bit difficult to see where, on Heidegger's view, new possibilities come from; that is, how tradition evolves.
- 11 The choices people make, moreover, quite often are the choices that "anyone" would make. So even to the extent to which what things show themselves as depends on choice, what things show themselves to different people as is not necessarily different.
- 12 These remarks explain the sense in which Heidegger believes that readiness-to-hand is "projected upon" entities. Heidegger certainly does not believe that this projection works as follows: in using, say, a hammer we first cognize the existence of a present-at-hand entity; second, project a "function predicate" (e.g., "for hammering") upon it; and third, on the basis of this projection, use it for hammering. Rather, in the flow of ongoing activity, entities are often immediately encountered in a "practical meaning" without an explicit projection of this meaning occurring. At the same time, however, ready-to-hand entities are not ready-to-hand independently of human existence. For something's being ready-to-hand, unlike its being present-at-hand, is relative to possible projects, purposes, and ends. So entities cannot be ready-to-hand "outside" a clearing, even though outside of one, i.e., prior to and following the existence of the particular understanding on the basis of which they can

show themselves to a particular person, they can be what they show themselves to that person as being when he or she encounters them as present-at-hand. From the reconstructive point of view made available by our acquaintance with present-at-hand entities, consequently, it is possible to say that, even if something is *encountered* in the first place as ready-to-hand, (1) it can be present-at-hand prior to, and even during, its being something ready-to-hand (cf. *BT*, 103), and (2) it first becomes, and remains, ready-to-hand when it is swept up into, and so long as it remains involved in, human activity. As Heidegger says, there are ready-to-hand entities only by reason of present-at-hand entities (*BT*, 101). From the reconstructive point of view, therefore, it makes good sense to speak of human activity "projecting" a meaning on entities.

- 13 I would like to thank Dan Breazeale, Hubert Dreyfus, and Jürgen Habermas for comments on earlier versions of this essay.

HEIDEGGER AND THE SCANDAL OF PHILOSOPHY

The topic of this paper is a criticism ventured by Heidegger against Kant's attempt to prove the objective reality of the objects of experience. This proof is given by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a refutation of psychological idealism.¹ It has been further elucidated by Kant in the preface to the second edition, where he calls it "a scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general that the existence of things outside us must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubt by any satisfactory proof."² And Kant expresses the hope to have made up for this scandal by a *strict* proof.³ It runs as follows:⁴

Thesis

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

Proof

I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of time presupposes something *permanent* in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined. [But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence which are to be met with are representations; and as representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so my existence in time wherein they change, may be determined.]⁵ Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a *thing* outside me and not through the representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me. Now consciousness in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination; and it is therefore necessarily bound up with the existence of things outside me, as the condition of time-determination. In other words, the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

Since unanimity among scholars on the interpretation of this proof, its stringency and function within the *Critique*, has not been achieved (in fact, no two interpretations I have looked at are quite in agreement⁶), I will not even try to give an interpretation of my own but merely want to draw attention to some of the problems involved in the

proof so that we can see more clearly what Heidegger refers to in his criticism. Various questions come to one's mind when one looks more closely at Kant's proof.

What kind of "proof" is it? Is it a deduction, and if so, is it an empirical, metaphysical, or transcendental one? Or, to use Kant's own terminology, is he dealing with a *quaestio iuris* or a *quaestio facti*? Since he expresses himself in a quite general way, i.e. that experience of one's own self necessarily presupposes the experience of the external world, the former seems to be indicated. And, indeed, the often arbitrary or even chaotic order of our internal psychological states and changes seems to be in need of a stable framework, a coordinate system, such that an objective experience of one's own self within time can be reached or else one would forever be lost in the maze of one's own representations. A proper order presupposes something permanent, something "to count on" to allow for the unity and objectivity of experience quite generally.

What would the sceptic say to Kant's "strict proof"? He would probably claim that Kant is begging the question and merely appealing to the *facticity* of our experience, an experience which is based on the coexistence of different kinds of appearances and wherein the relatively stable can be used to sort out the changing; but the *relatively* stable or periodically recurrent would be quite sufficient even if we lived in a more obviously Heraclitean world than our present one. The plausibility of Kant's argument seems to rest on the dualism of internal and external experience, a division which the sceptic may refuse to accept. Kant is mistaking, so the sceptic may maintain, his own basic tenets when he makes use of the concept of the permanent in his analysis of sense-experience. To do so must, of course, be tempting on account of the central role which the "permanent" plays in the transcendental deduction of the category of substance, the schematism of substance and the first analogy of experience. The sceptic who does not accept the division of empirical reality/transcendental ideality, however, may maintain that Kant can in fact only point to the receptivity of our sense-experience, while any further insistence on more than a relative permanence contained in the external appearances would be a sin against the Kantian spirit for it would be backed up only by the assumption of something like the "thing in itself." Whether Kant's "strict proof" can be defended against such criticism of the sceptic empiricist cannot be discussed here. I just wanted to mention

some of the sensitive points and now want to turn to Heidegger's criticism of Kant's dealing with the "scandal of philosophy".

Heidegger discusses Kant's proof in connection with the problem of the concept of reality in §43 of *Being and Time* under the title "Dasein, Worldhood and Reality."⁸ His objections to Kant's treatment of the problem of the reality of the external world, as we shall see, are not addressing themselves so much to the actual proof itself but rather to the *demand* for such a proof.⁹ These objections are worth studying because not only do they seem justified, in my opinion, if one accepts Heidegger's analysis of the notion of being, but — if properly understood — they also help us to achieve a better understanding of Heidegger's own enterprise of *Being and Time*. Heidegger never denied his indebtedness to traditional philosophy, and his treatment and criticism of his predecessors mirror the development of his own thought. This fact is often overlooked by modern interpreters who conceive of Heidegger only as an existentialist philosopher rather than, as he himself preferred, as the originator of a general ontology based on a new understanding of the meaning of *Being*.

What is the question of being? Heidegger is the only philosopher of whom one can say that one and the same question occupied him very early on till the end of his life.¹⁰ As he frequently claims, what went wrong with traditional western philosophy was due to a misunderstanding of the meaning and importance of the question of being and, finally, forgetfulness of them altogether. As he claims right at the beginning of *Being and Time*, Plato and Aristotle still understood the problem of the meaning of being; this understanding gradually got lost in the history of ontology until "being" was regarded as the most universal, indefinable, emptiest, and self-evident of concepts, therefore neither needing nor allowing any further elucidation.¹¹ This neglect is the reason why Heidegger imposed the mission upon himself to "destroy the history of ontology"¹² and give back to the concept its old importance. And this mission explains why especially the younger Heidegger remained under the influence of traditional philosophy, its problems and attempted solutions, just as much as he criticized them.¹³

When we nowadays discuss the question of a thing's being (if we do that at all) we normally just mean whether it "can be found," "is real," "occurs somewhere," etc., and are usually not able to give any more concrete meaning to the term. "Existence," so we have learned from

Kant, "is not a predicate" and cannot be defined; its function is usually taken to be as wide as that of the existential operator. When we look at the ontology of Plato and Aristotle, as to the authorities to whom Heidegger appeals, we can see that Heidegger's complaints were not just the complaints of someone who was "das Land der Griechen mit der Seele suchend." Plato and Aristotle did indeed understand the notion of being in a sense different from the one described by my vague terms above. For them, "to be" was always "to be something"; there was no genuinely absolute use of "being". A thing's *being* was for them "τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι," "that which it was to be," or in other words, what it consists in, the thing's nature and essence. This use of being is not unfamiliar to us; for example, we may say of someone that he "feels questioned in his very being" and not mean that he feared for his life, but challenged in what he felt essential about himself.¹⁴ In this sense, then, being may have as many different meanings as there are different kinds of natures.

Taken in this sense, the concept of being presents us with a metaphysical problem, for it could, then, have (a) indefinitely many meanings — if one held that every individual is essentially different from all others — or (b) as many as there are different kinds of entities. Plato and Aristotle each tried solutions in their own way; for Plato (at least in his middle period) there must have been as many meanings as there were forms and the form of the Good provided the overall unifying metaphysical principle. Aristotle tried to solve the problem by assuming as many meanings as there are categories: for whatever is, has being in the sense of being a substance, or a quality, quantity, relation, etc., of some sort. The members of different categories do then have a fundamentally different kind of being; the concept of "being itself" when transcending the categories would, as Heidegger claims, be entirely devoid of content. It seems, however, that Aristotle did not let matters rest with such a homonymy or analogy of the meaning of being in the categories but eventually introduced a device which does establish some kind of unity of being. This device has been called "focal meaning"¹⁵; it assigns the central meaning of *being to substance* and a secondary one to all the *qualities* in the other categories in the sense that whatever else exists, exists by inherence in a substance. Just as there are many different meanings of "healthy" (such as a healthy color, healthy food, healthy climate) which focus on a common central concept, namely "health", so there are

many meanings of "being" which focus on the central concept of "substance". And on this focus, if on anything, the hope for metaphysics as a master-science is based.¹⁶

I do not know whether Heidegger ever took notice of this change and refinement in Aristotle's doctrine of being. But it is clear that it was the alleged *homonymy of being* which attracted his attention at a very early age when someone presented him with a copy of Brentano's dissertation, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*.¹⁷ The problem interested young Heidegger at once and kept him under its spell for his lifetime.¹⁸ As Heidegger saw it, the history of philosophy was to a large extent determined by this question, and different philosophers tried different answers. Descartes's division of all being into *res extensa* and *res cogitans* is a witness to this, as is Kant's attempt to give a complete account of the categories of human reason which constitute our understanding of the different kinds of entities as presupposed and "given" in experience.¹⁹

And Heidegger's own task, as he had set it out for himself in *Being and Time*, was designed to work out a new analysis of the manifold meaning of being and its unification and foundation in the notion of *time* as the horizon of all understanding of being. As it stands, Heidegger never fulfilled his task to his own satisfaction and therefore never published *Being and Time*, vol. I, division iii, nor the whole of vol. II.²⁰ What we do have was originally only meant as the first step in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, namely the analysis of that entity which has in its very nature a concern for and understanding of the question of being — man ("Dasein") himself. I will now try to give a very brief résumé of Heidegger's analysis of man's existence insofar as this is necessary for our understanding of his discussion of the concept of "reality" and his denial that anything like the proof of the existence of the external world is necessary or possible.

Man, according to Heidegger, is never an isolated entity, an independent substance, that eventually can take up contact with the things outside itself by the aid of its perceptive and cognitive faculties — as depicted in traditional philosophy. Instead, there is always already some kind of understanding of being, and what Heidegger does, according to his own view, is merely to unfold what this understanding of being already contains and to provide a fundamental analysis of the structure which underlies this normally vague and inarticulate understanding. This understanding always already displays,

as Heidegger explains at great length, an intrinsic relationship to both the self and the world. The relatedness to the self ("in-each-case-mineness") and to the world ("being-in-the-world") together constitute human existence, and what Heidegger does in *Being and Time*, as we have it, is just to work out what this being-in-the-world consists in, how we encounter the things in the world, and how we understand ourselves in this concerned dealing.²¹ In order to avoid all prejudices about the constituents of human nature which we may have inherited from traditional philosophy, Heidegger starts in his analysis with a mode of being that we are familiar with before any kind of theorizing and that should be immune to cultural and historical difference, namely our *average everydayness*, which is what characterizes us normally and for the most part. This attempt to give a phenomenological description of man in the most low-keyed way possible also explains part of the much maligned Heideggerian terminology. For since he takes it that even our pre-ontological concepts are heavily (yet inconspicuously) laden with meaning allegedly "natural" but in fact derived from tradition, he often coins his own.²² The importance Heidegger attributes to the approach via the state of everydayness and to a clarification of our implicit understanding is due to the fact that for Heidegger the meaning of being is constituted by this very understanding and is to be elicited from it. The structure of being cannot be elicited in any other way, and Heidegger hopes to be able to unearth gradually what is behind the everyday understanding. For though we have no other access to "being," this does not mean that we are already conscious of the structure of being; in fact, a lot of archaeological work has to be done before Heidegger can bring to light the *a priori* conditions of human understanding which underlie our everyday existence.²³

The upshot of this analysis can only be indicated here. 1. Man at first does not approach the things around him as mere indifferent "objects" given by sense-perception but always in a practical context which determines their function. They are "equipment" for something and their readiness-to-hand is their way of being.²⁴ Our whole environment, in fact, can be compared to a huge workshop wherein everything has its use, its purpose, its place. This "practical meaningfulness", as I prefer to translate "Bewandtnis" (rather than by "involvement"), in its totality constitutes the intelligibility of our everyday world, lets us find our way around in it, and assigns things their place

and being. 2. Heidegger does not deny that things can also be encountered without any such practical reference or function, as merely "occurring" objects ("occurrence" seems to be a much less confusing translation of "Vorhandenheit" than "presentness-at-hand").²⁵ He claims, however, that leaving aside the practical aspect under which the things are usually encountered by us offers only a secondary way of approaching the things in our world. It is in this way that theoretical investigation studies its objects and their attributes; and because philosophers, like scientists, leave aside the practical meaningfulness of the everyday world they have taken pure indifferent occurrence ("reine Ding-Vorhandenheit") as the natural ontological determination of things.²⁶ 3. "Readiness-at-hand" and "occurrences" are not the only two ways we understand entities in the world. The being of our fellow-men is based on a yet different way of understanding, which Heidegger calls "being-with," claiming that we have in our very being a definite relationship to, and dependence on, other entities like ourselves.

I cannot go into a further discussion of Heidegger's analysis of our everyday existence, how our being-in-the-world which contains readiness-at-hand, mere occurrence, and being-with constitute a meaningful whole, and how all this is ultimately explicable in terms of *time*. It is sufficient for our understanding of Heidegger's discussion of Kant's proof to see what Heidegger's categories of being are and how he derived them, i.e., that they are the elements of our understanding of being. Although this introduction may be too brief it should be clear where and why the question of the reality of the things in themselves might be brought in. One just cannot help wondering if it matters to Heidegger whether the things we encounter in our concerned dealing with the world can be proved to exist or not. Would the concept of our being-in-the-world be the same if a sceptic could maintain that the entities dealt with might be only the product of our imagination, hallucination, dream, or, *horribile dictu*, that we might be brains in vats? Furthermore, one wonders, does it make any difference to Heidegger's ontology whether we can or cannot accept as certain that the things really do have the properties which we attribute to them. In other words, do we encounter them as they are *in themselves*?

Heidegger seems to have anticipated that his readers might see a difficulty here and therefore included a discussion of the problem of *reality* in *Being and Time*.²⁷ He tries to point out that the whole

question of whether the existence of the external world can be demonstrated is, if properly understood, a pseudo-problem, which could only arise on the basis of a misconceived ontology and an unquestioned concept of "reality." Against Kant he ventures to say that the real scandal consists not in the *lack* of a proof of the existence of things outside us, but rather in the fact that such proofs are still *demand*ed. And he repeatedly asserts that if our ontological presuppositions were properly understood it would be clear that such a proof is neither necessary nor possible.²⁸ Yet, although Heidegger discusses the whole matter at some length, it is not immediately clear *why* he thinks that a properly worked out ontology makes any proof of the existence of the external world superfluous.

A first scrutiny of Heidegger's argument here and elsewhere in *Being and Time* seems to suggest that Heidegger only wanted to discard this concept in a very special sense, a sense which is not necessarily presupposed by all philosophers who demand a proof for the reality of the external world. Heidegger, in fact, thinks that the very expression "re-ality" ("res") shows what kind of ontology is behind such a demand: "Real" things are totally independent objects which merely occur alongside one another and with us.²⁹ As Heidegger sees it, this concept of reality which is based on the notion of "substantiality of independent self-subsistent objects"³⁰ led to all the difficulties which have troubled philosophers for centuries. All these difficulties, such as the question how the subject can have an object, how there can be any connection between the psychical and the physical, the material and intelligible, could only arise because the whole phenomenon of our being-in-the-world and the ontological status of things in the world was passed over. And they were passed over precisely because reality was conceived as Dingvorhandenheit or the indifferent occurrence of independent things.

Now, even if one accepts Heidegger's criticism and his analysis of our being-in-the-world and the ontological status of the things therein and promises never again to use the term "reality" in the criticized sense, the question would still remain whether the entities encountered in our dealings with the world are in fact "there," i.e. whether they exist in a strong sense, and whether we can have any certainty about them and their properties. Furthermore, there is the question of the nature of the "things in themselves" and whether we can have access to them and describe them in the way Heidegger claims for pheno-

menological ontology.³¹ For even if we agree with Heidegger that we always already have a world in which we live and in whose terms we understand ourselves and the other entities, it would seem to make all the difference if we can suppose that the entities encountered are *there* (and not only on faith) to be encountered and are not just the products of our disposition to make up such a world and fill it with what is "Zuhanden," "Vorhanden," and "Mitsein." And it is hard to imagine that Heidegger does not see the difference.

Now, one plausible explanation is that for Heidegger the very fact that we have a world wherein we encounter the various things in the way described guarantees that the things we deal with are there to be encountered. In this case Heidegger himself would maintain a "realist" position, a position of "critical" realism, however, which is not based on the assumption of indifferently occurring substances.³² On this interpretation Heidegger would hold the view that if there were no things to be encountered there could be no everydayness as he described it. For we could not move around in various places, deal with things ready-to-hand for this or that purpose, find those things either fit or unfit for our purposes, etc. A being-in-a-dream-world, Heidegger might claim, would be totally different from our being-in-the-world in everydayness. Thus, if we accepted his phenomenological description as fitting our intuitions of everydayness, we would also have to accept for certain that there *are* all those inner-worldly entities.

A defender of a "realist" interpretation of Heidegger can count on considerable evidence for support. First Heidegger's own terminology seems to suggest it, e.g., when he calls it the task of phenomenology merely to "free" things, "set them free in their being," "let them be seen in their being," "disclose being," etc.³³ Besides his terminology there are other indications. In the section where he discusses Kant's proof and the notion of reality he concedes that even if there no longer were any human beings who could encounter other entities in the way described, there still would *be* those entities. "But the fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists can the real be as that which in itself it is."³⁴ And in the same context he admits that even after any understanding of Being has ceased to exist, "it can indeed be said that then entities will still continue to exist." Thus Heidegger's realism seems to be reduced to a disagreement about what "to be real" means, and one might want to assume that

Heidegger would accept the realist's position as soon as he gives up the old notion of "substantiality" and "objective existence" as the basis of his ontology.

This view can be fortified further by the fact that Heidegger himself states that there is a *doxographical* agreement between his ontology and the assumption of the realists, and "in so far as this existential assertion does not deny that entities within the world are occurrent (*vorhanden*) it agrees doxographically with the thesis of realism in its results."³⁵

If Heidegger held such a position of "reformed" realism, it would seem understandable that he rejects Kant's proof, claiming that "if Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because in its Being it already *is* what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it."³⁶ This and many similar passages suggest that Heidegger holds that since we have a world, the existence of the entities within the world can be deduced (in the Kantian sense) *a priori* from the character of our existence which thus defies or denies the very demand for such a proof.

It is easy to see, however, that if Heidegger did hold such a realistic position with respect to the existence of the external world, his justification for the rejection of Kant's proof would not do.

For it would not be clear why he claims that such a proof would be neither necessary nor *possible*. At best he could maintain that it would not be *necessary*, because the existence of the inner-worldly things can be inferred already from our being-in-the-world. But this would not make the proof *impossible*, for Heidegger's arguments, as reconstructed by me, would be something like a proof.

Furthermore, though I cannot fully discuss the problem of imaginary worlds, it seems possible that all the phenomena which Heidegger takes to be characteristic of our being-in-the-world (the handling of things ready-at-hand successfully or unsuccessfully; the being with others; the theorizing about merely occurring things; etc.) could somehow be reproduced in a dream-world as mere creations of our imagination.

What seems to be even more important, however, is the fact that according to Heidegger all the structures of our being-in-the-world are founded on our nature, our understanding. Consequently, one would assume that for Heidegger other entities with differently structured minds would have a different world, differently furnished — if they have a world at all. It is clear that this must present a difficulty to a

realist Heidegger. The acceptance of *any* kind of world would, perhaps, still allow the inference that there exist some things outside, whether outside of us or outside of the other intelligent entities. But this does not answer the questions (a) whether things really exist and (b) whether they can be known "in themselves" as Heidegger claims.³⁷ For how could there be an in-itself if differently structured intelligent beings could encounter totally different entities or encounter them *as* totally different?

Since Heidegger emphasizes the fact that he is describing the having-a-world of a particular kind of entity, i.e., man, he cannot have simply overlooked this point, even though he never discusses the possibility of different sorts of minds. It seems therefore unlikely that he held that the fact that we have a world guarantees that we have access to things unqualified. At best it could be said that they somehow "allow" us to encounter them in such a way.³⁸ When Heidegger straight-forwardly rejects any proof he must therefore have more in mind than the fact that we move around with relative certainty in our everyday-world. To do this, "faith" in the sense criticized by Kant would be sufficient.

There is, indeed, much in the text which runs contrary to an interpretation which ascribes a "reformed" realism to Heidegger. For example, he mentions it as one of the points in which idealism is superior to realism that the idealist at least locates being and reality within consciousness. And it seems that Heidegger disagrees with the idealist only because the latter has omitted any attempt to give a proper ontological analysis of "consciousness" and its special relation towards the concept of being.³⁹ I have to admit, in fact, that I had to treat the text in quite an eclectic way in order to construct a realist interpretation of Heidegger. For at the same time that he asserts a certain *independence* for the entities outside us he also stresses a *dependence* of their being on our understanding. "Of course only as long as Dasein *is* (that is, only as long as understanding of Being is ontically possible) 'is there' Being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in itself'."⁴⁰ And Heidegger explains further that "Being (not entities) is dependent on the understanding of Being; that is to say, reality (not the real) is dependent upon care. . . ."⁴¹ There are many similar passages which confirm that Heidegger wanted to maintain a dependence of the being of all things on human understanding.⁴²

Admittedly, for those not familiar with Heidegger's philosophy the

distinction between entities and their Being and his talk of the latter's dependence and the former's independence must sound quite puzzling. I hope to be able to work out the rationale behind that distinction.

When I mentioned the importance of the notion of Being for Heidegger's philosophy I claimed that he takes it in a meaning similar to the one presupposed by Plato and Aristotle, that is, that to be always is to be something, that a thing's being is determined by what-it-is.⁴³ That is to say, for them "being" did not confer such a vague sense of "existence" that all sorts of different entities would be regarded as "existing" in the same sense. As Aristotle stresses time and again: "τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς. . . ."⁴⁴

For Heidegger, and this is an important point, it must further be understood that a thing's being is what is intelligible in its "what it is." This is not to say that for Plato and Aristotle intelligibility is excluded: in pre-Kantian, or better pre-sceptical times there was just no question of a possible discrepancy between being and intelligibility and therefore also no question of whether a thing's being *depended* on its intelligibility or not.

Let me illustrate what this means for Heidegger: When he defines man's everyday-being as "being-in-the-world," what he means is that this is what is contained in our *self*-understanding (and not just a matter of fact), that is, that we understand ourselves as being in our very essence related to the world. And this is the principle which allows Heidegger to determine what the being of all the entities encountered within the world is: because this is how we understand them. We understand something either as being for some use, or as existing in its own right — such as the entities occurring in nature — or as another such as ourselves (if we are able to see it in this light).

Heidegger himself often does not express himself in so simple a way, but there are several passages which make it quite clear that this is what he has in mind: "When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of man [Dasein], that is, when they have come to be understood, we say they have meaning. But that which is understood, taken strictly, is not meaning but the entity, or rather, its Being."⁴⁵ And this, as mentioned earlier, is Heidegger's mission: to reawaken our understanding of this meaning of being. "In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being — that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood."⁴⁶

Once this point about Heidegger's philosophy is understood, many other points become clearer and also more acceptable; e.g., his talk about man's "disclosedness," the notion that we have a "lumen naturale" which we carry with us such that we can bring light to wherever we are and to whatever we are doing — and to ourselves in the situation, too.⁴⁷ And it also becomes clear why Heidegger sees himself as the heir of Parmenides, the first philosopher who emphasized the connection between thought and being.⁴⁸

What is important for the present discussion, however, is that this notion of being allows Heidegger to maintain that there *is* no being unless there is some entity who has an understanding of being; in other words, every thing's being depends on the structure of the entity which has this understanding of its being. This explains why Heidegger always emphasizes the fundamental difference between the things and their being. If a thing's being consists in its *meaning* then it only has a being when there is someone for whom this *is* its meaning. And it becomes clear why the entity's being but not the entity itself depends on understanding: One and the same thing may for one person *be* a rusty tool, for another a piece of modern art. We all know the frustration over ontological debates of this kind where we cannot agree on the object's *being* (leaving its physical properties aside).⁴⁹ In this context it also becomes intelligible why Heidegger can claim, what at first sight seems quite unintelligible, that we encounter things in everyday-life as they are *in themselves*.⁵⁰ The ready-at-hand just *has* this in-itself that one can hammer with it, cut, read, etc. It can be used in a definitive way and is always already understood in terms of its "practical meaningfulness." This usability is, on the other hand, not something which we can attribute to the equipment at will. There are often painful limits to our license: A hammer is too heavy, a nail too short, a screw-driver missing.

Heidegger's position can, of course, be called subjectivistic and he in fact acknowledges this at various stages of his analysis⁵¹ by asserting,

Of course, only as long as Dasein is, is there Being. When Dasein does not exist, "independence" is not either, nor is the "in itself." In such a case even entities within the world can be neither discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. . . .⁵²

But the term "subjective" can only be applied if the qualification is

made explicit that it is the "what the things are understood *as*" which depends on the subject, viz. on the *a priori* conditions of his mind while sheer arbitrariness is excluded. Whether Heidegger's position with respect to *what* he states as the basic structure of our being-in-the-world is plausible, whether his fundamental analysis is acceptable is quite another matter and cannot be dealt with here.

From all this it should be clear how Heidegger's rejection of Kant's proof should be understood: things have an "in themselves" only if there is some understanding within which they are what they are. The question what they are apart from this meaning turns out, then, to be senseless. Thus, there is no "in itself" if one transcends the entity who has this understanding, that is, there is no such thing as "indifferent occurrence," "substantiality," "autonomy," etc., if there is nobody who conceives of things in these terms. And the question whether things really do have the physical qualities they seem to have to us would have to be answered in the same way: there are physical qualities only if there is someone who has a concept of "physical qualities." Heidegger illustrates this by referring to Newton's laws. "To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton those laws became true; and with them, entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein."⁵³

We can now also understand what Heidegger meant when he said that "doxographically" his interpretation of the things-in-the-world agrees with the thesis of realism that the external world exists as "occurring" (*vorhanden*). There is, in fact, only a verbal agreement. For Heidegger "*Vorhandenheit*" (occurrence) does not mean existence independent of any understanding (which is what the realist is trying to establish) but "indifferent occurrence" *in* our understanding. For it is the ontological status *we* ascribe to some kinds of entities, e.g., in the case of things in nature it may mean that they can be found, studied, admired, etc., that they last for some time, some longer, others shorter, that they behave in a certain way, occur and flourish under certain conditions. We can say that they occur "indifferently" because they seem to possess all these attributes whether or not someone takes any notice of them. With things ready-at-hand it is different. They do lose their ontological status as soon as there is nobody who *could* make use of their practical meaningfulness or at least thinks that they have their functions.

This distinction is behind Heidegger's otherwise rather paradoxical remark that even after mankind has ceased to exist, though there will be no more being, there still will be the entities; "But now, as long as there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of 'occurrence' it can indeed be said that *in this case* entities will still continue to be."⁵⁴ The point is really quite simple. Since the things' occurrence, as *we* understand occurrence, does not depend on our noticing or using them, it is clear that those things which apparently last for a long time will still "occur" after all of us have closed our eyes for good. To express it in a different way: *ontically* such things do not depend on us and can be manipulated only as far as our powers reach; *ontologically* their being or essence does depend on us because that is what "being" means!

Given the basis of Heidegger's concept of being it seems, then, justified to reject the demand for a proof of the existence of the external objects. Such a proof is not necessary because the thing's being is already "given" or constituted by our understanding; it is not possible because there is no being which *means* anything aside from the one which we already understand. The only thing one can reasonably try to do is to see whether *ontologically* our understanding is well worked out, whether we have the right categories and criteria for determining them. Then there might also be the ontical (factual) problem whether we are actually dreaming, hallucinating, etc. The modern scientist may indeed find it sometimes embarrassing to have to classify his objects, not just ontically, but ontologically too. What kind of things are quarks, for instance? Are they hypothetical entities but the subject of empirically verifiable or at least falsifiable theories? But these problems are not what is the issue when a proof of the existence of the external world is demanded.⁵⁵

It would seem, however, that this rejection of the Kantian proof would only be accepted by philosophers who *share* Heidegger's conception of being. Others might want to maintain that it does make sense to use the term "exists" in a much wider sense, e.g., to distinguish everything there is in the external world from the products of our mind. And it might seem that in this weak sense "there is" is innocuous enough to make even Heidegger accept it alongside his strong concept of being. For he might have to admit that there is a difference between what can be verified externally and what depends only on our imagination (such as owls and rabbits on the one side,

unicorns and chimaerae on the other). And this would bring back the old question as to what this distinction amounts to and how we can be sure that the external world is *there*.

I think that Heidegger would readily admit the difference between the imaginary and the external but would point out that this very distinction shows that it depends on our *understanding* of "being" in each case. And in order to give a proof of the existence of the external world we would have to know already what "being" means in the case of external objects, such as rabbits and owls, and how their being differs from that of the imaginary objects, such as unicorns and hydras. We would thus be in Heideggerian waters again, for we would clearly assume what we are going to demonstrate.⁵⁶

Let me illustrate this further, though the point of my example is only the question of *subsuming* a given entity under given kinds of being. For someone who does not know what "mammoths" are, the assertion "there are mammoths" does not have any precise meaning. As long as he does not know whether mammoths are a religious sect, a kind of garment, a type of car, or a species of animals now extinct, he will not know what he is asked to do if someone demands of him to prove that there are mammoths. Only after consulting an encyclopedia and finding out what they are, where they have been found, where they lived, where one can find their remains, does the question make any sense. Before that he will feel as embarrassed as Pooh Bear was when asked to search for Small, because with Rabbit's friends and relations one never knew what kinds of animals they were and whether one ought to be looking at the top of a tree or in the petal of a buttercup.

The difficulty of someone asked to give a proof of a vague kind of existence without any precise kind of knowledge seems to be quite similar: The only kind of proof one could reasonably demand is either that a particular kind of entity in *fact*, ontically, has this or that being, or that our ontological classifications make sense. The latter is what the phenomenologist is trying to do.

I will now, finally, try summarily to state what inconsistency Heidegger finds Kant to have committed when he demands the proof for the existence of the external world. When Kant asks whether the external objects of experience are "real" he does not doubt that they are given to us in experience. They are, he asserts, immediately given to us.

Kant, of course, realized the "subjectivity" of the objective. As Körner expresses it, "there can be no *it* unless there is an *I* which could be aware of it and thereby of itself."⁵⁷ What Kant did not realize is that "objectivity" and "reality" must remain suspect as long as they are not further differentiated and that this is not achieved in his analysis of what is perceived by the senses and thought by reason. In fact, Kant merely appeals to an already established conception of the empirically *given* which centers around the notion of substance and pure "Dingvorhandenheit." Since this undifferentiated notion is already presupposed and cannot be demonstrated, some Kantian scholars have suspected that he may have had more in mind than the already given, thereby transgressing the borders he himself tried to establish in the *Critique*, namely that human reason in its dogmatic use has to stay within the limits of experience. But the dogmatic use itself stands in need of qualification and must remain vacuous until one introduces the appropriate differentiations.

Heidegger does not deny that we can be wrong in our understanding of particular things (he is quite in agreement with Kant about this point),⁵⁸ nor that it is difficult sometimes to draw the line between the "real" and the imaginary. But these are ontic questions and settled by ontic means such as consistency, coherence, etc. Then there are ontological problems which are often tied together with factual ones. The whole situation is complicated by the fact that there is no presupposition-free understanding; we cannot escape Meno's contention that all inquiry is necessary circular because we cannot get to know something we do not already (at least implicitly) understand. As Heidegger sees it, all we can do is to get into the "hermeneutic circle" in the right way, by clarifying what has been understood indistinctly beforehand.⁵⁹

Applied to Kant this means that if the concept of the "permanent" is an empirical one, it is already understood and cannot be used to prove that what seems to be given is in fact "there". If being has many meanings then "reality" cannot be treated as an unambiguous concept. What the many meanings are, and whether we find Heidegger's own analysis plausible, we cannot discuss here. The notion of "Vorhandenheit" seems especially to be in need of more refined distinctions, and the scientist may have to revise the concept in the course of his research all the time. *The external world*, taken as a whole, seems to be an elusive lady when we do not confine ourselves to the everyday-

world. The philosopher is therefore well advised to revisit Heraclitus's kitchen once in a while.

Heidegger's criticism of Kant should not just be regarded in a negative sense. His main reproach is that Kant was simply not Kantian enough but still misguided by traditional philosophy, the notion of the "inner" versus the "outer," the "psychological" versus the "physical," "things" and their "properties."⁶⁰ That this is Heidegger's main concern comes more to the front in his two monographs on Kant which could not be discussed here.⁶¹ A more penetrating analysis would show how Kantian (although in a critical sense) Heidegger himself was and understood himself to be in his earlier philosophy.

Postscript: It should be noted that Kant himself saw the need of a clarification of the notion of being, and that he did so in his discussion of the ontological argument for the existence of God, the very place where he contends that existence is not a predicate. And he later affirms that the notions of reality, substance, and causality, when attributed to the highest transcendental object of our understanding, can have no meaning. It is therefore understandable that Heidegger remains ominously silent about questions of God in his earlier "critical" philosophy while in his later philosophy some mystic divinity seems to be attributed to *Being* itself. Both the younger and the older Heidegger realized with Plato that there can be no definitive talk of what *is* beyond being in a meaningful sense, about what is "ἐπέκεινον τῆς οὐσίας".

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NOTES

¹ Kant (1929), B 274–279.

² *Ibid.*, B XXXIX–XLI.

³ *Ibid.*, B XXXIX.

⁴ *Ibid.*, B 275.

⁵ In brackets is the altered version suggested by Kant in the preface to the second edition, p. XXXIX.

⁶ I just want to enumerate the most relevant literature: Vaihinger (1981), Kemp Smith (1923), Paton (1936), Ewing (1938), Körner (1955), Kaulbach (1958–1959), Lehmann (1958–1959), Strawson (1966), Prauss (1971) and (1974), and Wilkerson (1976).

⁷ Kant (1929), A 84, B 116.

⁸ Heidegger (1962a), pp. 244–256.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹⁰ See "My Way into Phenomenology" in Heidegger (1972), p. 81, for his early fascination with the problem. See also Heidegger's letter to W. Richardson, printed in the preface to Richardson (1963), pp. viii–xxiii.

¹¹ Heidegger (1962a), pp. 21 ff.

¹² See *ibid.*, pp. 41 ff.

¹³ In recent years more attention has been paid to the development of Heidegger's earlier years since his earlier work is now becoming accessible in the piecemeal edition of his Nachlass under the editorship of F. W. von Hermann.

¹⁴ As Heidegger insists, the most crucial wrong step in traditional philosophy was the separation of being and essence. Already the title of *Being and Time* indicates how Heidegger (in all due modesty) saw his task in history: to put together again on the horizon of time what Thomas Aquinas has separated in *On Being and Essence* (see (1962a), §1). (Sartre again tried to give a different turn to the history of philosophy by shifting the emphasis to *Being and Nothingness*.)

¹⁵ See Owen (1960).

¹⁶ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003a33 ff. Cf. Ross (1953), p. 254, and Kirwan (1971), p. 1.

¹⁷ Brentano (1960).

¹⁸ See Heidegger (1972). See also the preface to the editions of (1962a) after 1953.

¹⁹ The question of the similarities and dissimilarities of the categories of being in Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant is a very difficult one and cannot be dealt with here.

²⁰ We may forever remain in the dark about the reasons for Heidegger's "holding back" volume I, 3, and the entire volume II, since he gave explicit instructions not to include it in his Nachlass even though the manuscripts existed.

²¹ See Heidegger (1962a), chapters 2–4. These chapters are the most vivid and accessible of *Being and Time*. See Prauss (1977).

²² Very often it is just a question of getting used to the terminology, a task which is much easier in German than in English because there are peculiarities of connotations, etymologies (even if they are false) which are not noticeable in their English counterparts, such as "Dasein" for man, "Zeug" for equipment, "Bewandtnis" for involvement, and the untranslatable "Das Man."

²³ See Heidegger (1962a), §§5–7, especially §7c, "The Preconception of Phenomenology."

²⁴ The analysis in terms of "equipmentality" is one of the reasons why Heidegger is often compared to the American pragmatists. See Rorty (1976–1977); Wilshire (1977); and Zimmerman (1978).

²⁵ The translation of "Zuhandenheit" and "Vorhandenheit" is a problem because the two words which look so much alike have had a different history in German. While "Zuhandenheit" kept the notion of "handiness," "Vorhandenheit" lost it and does not imply nearness. One can speak of things' Vorhandenheit, e.g., of some star in some distant galaxy, or of a fish somewhere at the bottom of the sea, or some old relic in an attic. This is not conveyed by the translation "present-to-hand." I therefore prefer the translation of "indifferent occurrence" even though the etymology gets lost. I also prefer to translate "Bewandtnis" by "practical meaningfulness" because "involvement" is ambiguous. When we know a thing's "Bewandtnis" we know what "is the matter with it," e.g., in the case of Aladdin's magic lamp.

²⁶ Because "indifferent occurrence" designated the being of entities when one looks aside from their practical meaningfulness, Heidegger calls it a "founded mode" ((1962a, §13) of the understanding of the world. Ever since philosophers have moved away from Heraclitus's kitchen (Aristotle, *De partibus animalium*, 645a17), they have been oblivious to the primary, i.e., practical, meaning of things. Instead, they adopted the ontology of "substantiality" and indifferent occurring thinghood. This ontology is the result of the philosophers' fallenness: since they are preoccupied with "theoria," sheer indifferent "looking" at things, they have overlooked the primary givenness of the ready-to-hand. The scientists inherited this notion, and the little man in the street was much too much in awe of both philosophers and scientists to regard practical meaningfulness and everydayness as anything but trivial. It takes a lot of subtlety (although the philosophers could have learned something about it from Socrates) to realize that the hammer's in-itself consists in its hammering.

²⁷ Heidegger (1962a), §43, pp. 244–256.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 249 and 207.

²⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 201 ff and 89 ff in criticism of Cartesian ontology.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49 ff.

³² A realist, it seems, could easily accommodate the distinction of readiness-to-hand, indifferent occurrence, and being-with. In fact, almost any kind of metaphysical system could adopt this division.

³³ Heidegger (1962a), pp. 87 ff; 32 et passim.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 255; cf. pp. 227–228.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249; cf. p. 246.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 245–246.

³⁸ One is strongly reminded of Kant's contention that our senses in their receptivity are somehow affected by whatever the unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself may be — and what the difficulties of this position are.

³⁹ Heidegger (1962a), p. 246.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 255–256.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁴² See *ibid.*, p. 228: "Entities *are*, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But Being *is* only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs."

⁴³ For a discussion of the predicative, copulative, and absolute use of 'to be', see Kahn (1973).

⁴⁴ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003a33 and 1028a10.

⁴⁵ Heidegger (1962a), pp. 192–193; cf. pp. 198–199.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁴⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 341–348 and 256 et passim.

⁴⁹ The three modes of "readiness-to-hand," "indifferent occurrence," and "being-with" are probably not the only ones. Heidegger mentions the problem of understanding of "nature" (see (1962a) §43 c). The question of the proper interpretation of works of art is explicitly discussed in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in (1950), pp. 7–69.

Heidegger also mentioned the difficulty of classifying animals in a private discussion reported in Neske (1977).

⁵⁰ Heidegger (1962a), pp. 105, 106, 120–121, and 255.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 140–141 and 417 et passim.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 255. Earlier Heidegger had given a very suggestive discussion of how objects can defy us, how they can become conspicuous, obtrusive, and obnoxious because they lose their handiness and become mere things. The question of how much one can change the ontological status of things becomes urgent in the question of what counts as art and pieces of art and how much liberty the artist can take. If Christo should finally manage to wrap up the "Reichstag" in Berlin is the whole thing a piece of art? What does this imply? One can see that the artist has an ontological problem just as much as the more or less sympathetic spectator does on his side. Legal problems arise here, too, and the Heideggerian knows why.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 265. Heidegger's insistence that "truth" should be understood in its primordial sense as "unhiddenness," while the "truth" as presupposed in a correspondence theory is only a derivative mode becomes intelligible on this background. See (1962a) §44 and (1947).

⁵⁴ Heidegger (1962a), p. 255.

⁵⁵ It is clear, then, why the question of the certainty of the existence of the external world is intractable. It is intractable as long as we do not treat the *ontical* and the *ontological* question separately. For what is ontically explicable may be ontologically confused and vice versa. As Heidegger sees it, all major crises of sciences are ontological ones and are fundamentally different from problems we may have concerning ontic questions. In this connection we can understand why Heidegger claims that there cannot be a genuine sceptic ((1962a), pp. 271–272), for if he understands himself he has to negate, and eradicate, his own "givenness".

⁵⁶ In the case of the imaginary we may need more than one kind of ontology, e.g., in the case of mythology we may need one kind, in fiction another, with symbols yet another, etc.

⁵⁷ See Körner (1955), p. 62 (his italics).

⁵⁸ See Kant (1929), B XLI: "... we must in each single case appeal to the rules according to which experience ... is distinguished from imagination." But these rules presuppose already the appropriate ontological understanding.

⁵⁹ See Heidegger (1962a), §2. The notion of the hermeneutical circle has become fruitful in theology and in the interpretation of literature, especially after Gadamer's (1975) became widely known.

⁶⁰ Heidegger (1962a), pp. 248–249.

⁶¹ See Heidegger's (1962b) and the little treatise (1963). A lot of literature on Kant has appeared during the last years which I could not discuss here. I just want to refer to the contributions to *L'héritage de Kant* (1982), especially section IV ("Kant et Heidegger"), and the new bibliography by H. Sass (1982).

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10 How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science

Hubert L. Dreyfus

Science has long claimed to discover the relations among the natural kinds in the universe that exist independently of our minds and ways of coping. Today, most philosophers adopt an antirealism that consists in rejecting this thesis. Contemporary antirealists argue that the independence thesis is not just false but *incoherent*. Thus, these antirealists say they are as realist as it makes sense to be. Such *deflationary realists*, as I shall call them, claim that the objects studied by science are just as real as the baseballs, stones, and trees we encounter with our everyday coping practices, and no more.¹ In contrast to deflationary realism, I shall defend a *robust realism* that argues that the independence claim makes sense, that science can in principle give us access to the functional components of the universe as they are in themselves² in distinction from how they appear to us on the basis of our daily concerns, our sensory capacities, and even our way of making things intelligible.³

The deflationary and the robust realist positions are each part of the heritage that Heidegger has left us. Consequently, I shall, in my first section, present the deflationary realist's arguments against independence. Then, in the second section, I shall show that, although Heidegger pioneered the deflationary realist account of the everyday, he sought to establish a robust realist account of science. In the third and final section, I shall draw on Saul Kripke's account of direct reference to work out Heidegger's account of formal indication, and using this worked-out version of Heideggerian rigid designation, I will argue that we do, indeed, have practices for achieving access to things that are independent of all our practices.

The argument for deflationary realism

The argument for deflationary realism turns on the rejection of the traditional Cartesian view of human beings as self-sufficient minds whose intentional content is directed toward the world. Both Heidegger and Donald Davidson, a leading antirealist, reject this view and substitute for it an account of human beings as inextricably involved with things and people. Heidegger holds that human beings have to take a stand on who they are by dealing with things and by assuming social roles. Davidson thinks of human beings as language users

who, in order to have any mental content of their own, must take up the linguistic conventions of their community. I call Heidegger and Davidson practical holists because they both claim that meaning depends ultimately on the inseparability of practices, things, and mental contents. Heidegger captures this idea in his claim that human beings are essentially being-in-the-world; Davidson makes the same point in his causal theory of meaning.

Both thinkers claim that their holism enables them to answer the Cartesian skeptic. Heidegger argues that, if human beings are essentially being-in-the-world, then the skeptical question of whether the world and others exist cannot sensibly be raised by human beings, and, as Heidegger asks, 'Who else would raise it?' (Heidegger 1962: 246–7). Heidegger thus claims that any attempt to *answer* the skeptic is mistaken. The attempt to take the skeptic seriously and prove that we can know that there is an external world presupposes a separation of the mind from the world of things and other people which defies a phenomenological description of how human beings make sense of everyday things and of themselves. Davidson argues, on the basis of a logical reconstruction of the way people learn a language that, although people may differ concerning the truth of any particular belief, in order for a person to acquire a language at all that person must share most of the beliefs of those who speak the language and most of these shared beliefs must be true.

It follows that we cannot make sense of the question whether the *totality* of things could be independent of the *totality* of our practices or whether things are *essentially dependent* on our practices. To raise these questions meaningfully requires thinking that we can conceive of the totality of things and of the totality of practices with sufficient independence from each other to claim that one is logically prior. But it turns out that we can get no perspective on our practices that does not already include things and no perspective on things that does not already involve our practices. Thus, practical holism seems to make unintelligible all claims about both things in themselves apart from our practices and the totality of practices apart from things. It seems that, since true statements about objects cannot imply *either* the dependence *or* the independence of objects *vis-à-vis* our practices, these statements must be understood as describing objects as they are in the only sense of 'are' that is left, which is the 'are' of ordinary situations. Thus we arrive at a deflationary view that repudiates both metaphysical realism and transcendental idealism.

Once the deflationary realist has argued that one cannot make sense of transcendental idealism or of metaphysical realism, he is able to accept the results of science at face value so long as he makes neither the robust realist's claim that science gives us an account of the functional demarcations of the universe as it is in itself, on the one hand, nor the extreme constructivist's claim that nature must be a cultural creation, on the other. When asked whether it makes sense to claim that things existed in nature before human beings came along and that they would have existed even if human beings had never existed, the deflationary realist can sound like a scientist, saying, on the basis of empirical findings, that of course it makes sense to claim that some

types of entities were there before us and would still be there if we had never existed and others would not. But the Davidsonian practical holist says this on a background of meaning that makes any talk about nature as it is in itself incoherent.

Heidegger's attempt at robust realism

Like Davidson, Heidegger answers the skeptic by showing that our practices and the everyday world are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, he argues at length that 'Dasein is the world existingly' (Heidegger 1962: 416).⁴ Moreover, Heidegger seems to agree with the deflationary realists that, while entities show up as independent of us, the being or intelligibility of entities depends on our practices. So any talk of things in themselves must be put in scare quotes. Thus, Heidegger says of natural entities:

It must be stated that entities as entities are 'in themselves' and independent of any apprehension of them; yet, the being of entities is found only in encounter and can be explained, made understandable, only from the phenomenal exhibition and interpretation of the structure of encounter (Heidegger 1985a: 217).

And he seems even more deflationary when he adds:

Of course only as long as Dasein [human being] is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically possible), 'is there' being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself' (Heidegger 1962: 255).

Joseph Rouse, in his book *Knowledge and Power* (1987), sees the parallel between Heidegger's and Davidson's holistic answer to the skeptic and wonders why I fail to see that Heidegger must therefore be a deflationary realist. But, as I will now seek to show, in *Being and Time* Heidegger describes phenomena that enable him to distinguish between the everyday world and the universe and so claim to be a robust realist about the entities discovered by natural science. Moreover, he has the conceptual resources to turn his description of these phenomena into a persuasive defense of robust realism.

The first two phenomena Heidegger calls to our attention are two different ways of being. He points out that normally we deal with things as equipment. Equipment gets its intelligibility from its relation to other equipment, human roles, and social goals. Heidegger calls the equipmental way of being *availability* (*Zuhandenheit*). But Heidegger also points to another equally important phenomenon: we sometimes experience entities as independent of our instrumental coping practices. This happens in cases of equipmental breakdown. Heidegger calls the mode of being of entities so encountered, *occurentness* (*Vorhandenheit*). Occurent beings are not only revealed in

breakdown but also revealed when we take a detached attitude towards things that decontextualizes or – in Heidegger's terms – deworlds them. In this detached attitude, we encounter occurrent entities as substances with properties.

This experience of the occurrent is still contextual and meaningful in a weak sense. Were it not for a world in which entities could be encountered, the question of whether there could be entities independent of our concerns could not be asked, and, more importantly, without our giving meaning to the occurrent way of being, the question of independence would not make sense. So Heidegger concludes that the being or intelligibility of even the occurrent mode of being depends on us: '[B]eing "is" only in the understanding of those entities to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs' (Heidegger 1962: 228, with a minor translation correction). But he still insists that, 'entities are independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained' (Heidegger 1962: 228, with a minor translation correction).

This amounts to the seemingly paradoxical claim that we have *practices for making sense of entities as independent of those very practices*. This intellectual *Gestalt* figure can flip one of two ways depending upon whether one emphasizes the *dependence* on the practices or the *independence* from those very practices. It has thus led to a three-way debate in the scholarly literature over whether Heidegger is a robust realist, a transcendental idealist, or a deflationary realist.⁵ I have argued, using the above quotation from *Being and Time* to back me up, that Heidegger is a would-be robust realist (Dreyfus 1991). William Blattner has countered that Heidegger must be understood as a transcendental idealist and that, consequently, all the citations that seem to support robust realism, should be read as supporting merely empirical realism (Blattner 1994). David Cerbone has responded to Blattner with a reading in the spirit of Davidson in which Heidegger's account of the inextricable involvement of human beings and the world commits him to the view that neither robust realism nor transcendental idealism is intelligible (Cerbone 1995).

In order to see more clearly why I claim that Heidegger is a would-be robust realist, we must return to the phenomenon of deworlding. As I said, Heidegger points out that in situations of extreme instrumental breakdown, we encounter things as occurrent, as independent of the instrumental world – that is, as having no *essential* relation to our everyday coping practices – and as all along underlying our everyday equipment. '[W]hat cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental thing which looks so and so, and which, in its availableness, as looking that way, *has constantly been occurrent too*' (Heidegger 1962: 102–3, my italics).⁶

Nature is thus revealed as *having been there all along*. In such cases, Heidegger holds, 'The understanding of being by which our concerned dealings with entities within-the-world have been guided *has changed over*' (Heidegger 1962: 412, Heidegger's emphasis).⁷ Our practices for coping with

the available are significantly different from our practices for dealing with the occurrent. Thus, Heidegger understands this changeover from dealing with things as available to dealing with them as occurrent as discontinuous. This changeover is crucial for Heidegger's answer to deflationary realism.

The radicality of this discontinuity is often hidden by inadequate phenomenological descriptions of breakdowns. When a hammer is so heavy that the carpenter cannot use it, it is then experienced as too heavy. But since being-too-heavy is context-dependent, it still presupposes the equipmental nature of hammers. But breakdown can be so severe that all that is left in experience is a mere something – 'just occurrent and no more' (Heidegger 1962: 103) – whose properties are not connected to its function in any intelligible way and are thus beyond everyday understanding. Heidegger claims that, among other experiences, anxiety gives us access to this unintelligible occurrent. 'Anxiety,' he writes, 'discloses . . . beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other' (Heidegger 1977: 105).⁸

Of course, the uninterpreted beings experienced as radically other are not theoretical entities. Heidegger knows that for us to have access to theoretical entities the beings revealed in total breakdown must be recontextualized or reinterpreted in theoretical terms. Heidegger is thus clear that the data used by science are theory-laden. He says, 'The "grounding" of "factual science" was possible only because the researchers understood that in principle there are no "bare facts"' (Heidegger 1962: 414). He is, unfortunately, not clear how these theory-laden data are supposed to be related to the radically other that is revealed in extreme breakdown; that is, he is not clear about how theoretical recontextualization is supposed to work.⁹ The important thing for him is that theoretical entities are taken to be elements of nature, that is, of a universe that is anterior to and independent of our everyday mode of making sense of things. In this important sense, science is, according to Heidegger, about the *incomprehensible*. He writes:

Nature is what is in principle explainable and to be explained because it is in principle incomprehensible. It is the incomprehensible pure and simple. And it is the incomprehensible because it is the 'unworlded' world [i.e. the universe], insofar as we take nature in this extreme sense of the entity as it is discovered in physics (Heidegger 1985a: 217–18).

The point is *not* that the phenomenon of total breakdown, theoretical inspection, or anxiety gives us *sufficient grounds* for believing in the independent existence of natural things none of whose properties we understand. Although the quotation may suggest this, we shall see that the phenomenon of total breakdown cannot supply such grounds. What the phenomenon of total breakdown supports is the more minimal claim that nature can be experienced as independent of our coping practices and as underlying everyday things. If we had only the 'available' mode of encountering entities, we could never encounter entities more independent of our coping practices than particular

hammers are. But, if Heidegger is right, we can deworld such entities and be led to see them as occurrent components of the universe.¹⁰

Heidegger clearly wants to embrace robust realism, for he exceeds the limits of deflationary realism when he writes: '[T]he fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the real be as that which *in itself* it is' (Heidegger, 1962: 255, my italics).

We are now in a position to see that, in defending a robust realism concerning scientific entities, Heidegger makes two significant moves which, although they seem to be the right way to proceed, do not, as Heidegger presents them, fully succeed in supporting robust realism.

- 1 Heidegger points to two special attitudes (confronting equipmental breakdown and anxiety) that, on the face of it, break out of our everyday, equipment-using practices. Since Heidegger bases his account of meaning on equipment-using practices, he concludes that such special attitudes, by 'deworlding' entities, break out of our everyday meanings altogether and give us access to the 'incomprehensible' as it is in itself. But, if one has a broader conception of everyday meaning that includes perceiving things outside of use-relations, such a 'switchover' would not get one outside the everyday.¹¹
- 2 Heidegger contends that the switchover he describes gives us beings that can be recontextualized in a theory that makes no reference to our everyday practices. But he has no account of how the meaningless beings revealed by breakdown can serve as data for science nor what sort of practices could be left after the switchover that would allow dealing with the incomprehensible while leaving it independent of all our practices. That is, in showing we can encounter things shorn of their everyday *functionality*, Heidegger has not shown that we can encounter them as independent of *all* our practices for making things intelligible. There are still the very peculiar practices of making them intelligible as unintelligible.

In addition, when Heidegger later investigates how scientific research as an institution works, he claims that research is based on what he calls the projection of a total ground-plan (Heidegger 1977b). Research, he claims, is a modern way of studying nature that proceeds by setting up a *total* theory of how nature works and then dealing with the anomalies that show up when the theory is assumed to cover all phenomena. Thus, normal science has, for Heidegger, the ongoing job of trying to account for anomalies, while revolutionary advances in science occur when resistant anomalies lead scientists to propose a new ground-plan.¹²

What is essential for modern science as research, then, is its totalizing claim. Heidegger argues that this totalizing claim is the modern version of the series of totalizing claims about the beingness of beings that have characterized our

metaphysical culture perhaps since Anaximander, certainly since Plato. Thus a pervasive cultural practice of just the sort that the deworlding and recontextualization of the incomprehensible were meant to exclude turns out to be fundamental to Heidegger's account of modern scientific research as an institution. This acknowledgment of the cultural practices of research would seem to undermine robust realism.¹³

We shall soon see, however, that the practices of research could, nonetheless, constitute an institution that could intelligibly be said to get at the functional components of the universe as they are in themselves. To save his robust realism, Heidegger would have to argue that, although the practice-based structure of encounter that gives us access to entities depends on us *essentially*, what we encounter only *contingently* depends on this structure. Then both our everyday and our scientific practices, although ineliminable from an account of the entities revealed by science, could be understood, not as *constitutive* practices, but as *access* practices allowing 'genuine theoretical discovering' (Heidegger 1962: 412).

To do this Heidegger would need, to begin with, to find a practical form of noncommittal reference that could refer to entities in a way that both allowed that they could have essential properties and that no property that *we* used in referring to them need, in fact, be essential. It turns out that Heidegger had discovered such a practice in facing a different problem. In the 1920s he realized he wanted to talk about important features of human being and yet he could not claim at the beginning of his investigation that these were *essential* ones. This methodological requirement put him in opposition to Husserl in two related ways: Husserl held that (1) general terms refer by way of the essential features of the types the terms referred to and (2) that one could have an immediate eidetic intuition of essential structures. Since Heidegger saw that his hermeneutic method deprived Husserl's eidetic intuition of any possible ground, he needed some other way to approach the essential structures of human being. How could he refer to kinds without knowing their essential features?

To solve this problem Heidegger developed an account of 'noncommittal' reference made possible by what he called formal indicators or designators (*formalen Anzeige*). Noncommittal reference begins with contingent features and arrives at essential features, if there are any, only after an investigation.¹⁴ Heidegger explains:

The empty meaning structure [of the formal designator] gives a direction towards filling it in. Thus a unique binding character lies in the formal designator: I must follow in a *determinate direction* that, should it get to the essential, only gets there by fulfilling the designation by appreciating the non-essential (Heidegger 1985b: 33, translation by Hubert L. Dreyfus with Hans Sluga).

Thus, Heidegger held that reference need not commit one to any essential

features; rather, it binds one to investigate, in whatever way is appropriate to the domain, which features, if any, of an object referred to by its inessential features are essential. Heidegger continues:

[We must] make a leap and proceed resolutely from there! . . . One lives in a non-essential having that takes its specific direction toward completion from the maturing of the development of this having . . . The *evidence* for the appropriateness of the original definition of the object is not essential and primordial; rather, the appropriateness is absolutely *questionable* and the definition must precisely be understood in this questionableness and lack of evidence (Heidegger 1985b: 34–5).¹⁵

Although he never used this idea of noncommittal reference to defend his realism, this methodological principle – that one can designate something by its contingent properties and then be bound by that designation to search for its essential properties – would have allowed Heidegger to use the switchover to the occurrent and its properties to show how access practices can break free of everyday meaning. One could consider the properties, revealed by theory-driven practices after the switchover, to be strictly *contingent* properties of the entities revealed – properties that could serve as a way of designating entities whose essential properties, if any, would have to be discovered by further investigation. The practices of investigation too would be considered contingent rather than constitutive.

Thus, Heidegger has the basic resources to answer the objections that he can get outside neither everyday practices (in a broad sense) nor culturally determined practices. But he does not use these resources. To do so he would need to admit that our everyday skills survive the switchover and that, indeed, they are necessary for (1) identifying the occurrent entities that the detached attitude reveals and (2) working data over in labs so that they can be taken as evidence for the essential properties of theoretical entities. He could then add that none of these practices, however, was essential to what was revealed in the laboratory. For, after the switchover, everyday practices, as well as the practices of the scientific institution, would be themselves experienced and deployed as questionable or contingent, and so the entities encountered could, in principle, be encountered as essentially independent of us. Heidegger seems to say just this in an interesting passage in *Basic Problems*: 'Intraworldliness does not belong to the essence of the occurrent things as such, but it is only the transcendental condition . . . for the possibility of occurrent things being able to emerge as they are [in themselves]' (Heidegger 1982: 194).

A final phenomenological argument for robust realism

For the most part, we encounter people, equipment, and even natural things as both perceptually and instrumentally familiar and inextricably bound up with our everyday practices. We can, however – though we do it rarely –

encounter things and even people in an attitude of unfamiliarity. A trivial instance of encountering something in this attitude can be produced quite easily. If we say a familiar word over and over, we eventually hear the word switch over into a strange acoustic blast. Let us call this experience *defamiliarization* and the way of being it gives access to *the strange*.¹⁶

Defamiliarization is the breakdown of everyday coping, and all that remains of intelligibility after defamiliarization are coping practices that enable us to *identify* things in a noncommittal, contingent, *prima facie* not fully adequate way. Access to entities independent of our practices for making them intelligible is thus secured by a radical switchover in the *role played by everyday practices* so that they become *contingent practices* for identifying objects. If we were to engage in the investigation of the relation between the strange thing and its everyday mode of being, we might be able to describe it in terms of sufficient features to reidentify it, but we cannot even be sure of that. Hence, our everyday practices are understood as inappropriate for defining what shows up. As Heidegger puts it, 'the appropriateness is absolutely *questionable* and the definition must precisely be understood in this questionableness.'¹⁷

Reference here works as Saul Kripke describes the working of *rigid designation*, particularly the rigid designation of samples of a natural kind (Kripke 1980). So, to take two of Kripke's examples, I start by investigating some shiny golden-colored stuff and eventually find out that its essence is to have an atomic weight of 197. Or, I contingently identify lightning as a flash of light in the night sky and eventually find out that it is an electrical discharge. Thus something is designated by a description or by a pointing that is not taken to get at the thing's essence¹⁸ and such a pointing or description leaves open the possibility that investigation may discover the thing's essence. As we have seen, Heidegger calls this mode of reference 'noncommittal formal designation' and says it is empty but binding.

The practice of rigid or formal designation, as I have described it, shows that we do, indeed, have practices that enable us to read the paradox of our having practices for gaining access to things independent of those very practices in a robust realist way. Moreover, we can make sense of the strange as possibly having some necessary unity underlying the contingent everyday properties by which it is identified.¹⁹ This unity is enough to make intelligible the notion of a natural kind whose essence is independent of our ways of making things intelligible.²⁰

Notes

I would like to thank the following people who helped me work out my position, in many cases by arguing against it and writing detailed criticisms: William Blattner, Taylor Carman, David Cerbone, Donald Davidson, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Sean Kelly, Lisa Lloyd, Jeff Malpas, Stephen Neal, Joe Rouse, Ted Schatzki, Mark Wrathall, and especially Charles Spinosa.

- 1 Crucial essays for the deflationary realist position are: Davidson (1991, 1984). For an independently developed account of deflationary realism, see Arthur Fine's description of what he calls the Natural Ontological Attitude in *The Shaky Game* (Fine, 1986). Jeff Malpas and Joseph Rouse have generalized Davidson's arguments concerning the relation of *beliefs* to things to cover the relation of *all coping practices* to things. Malpas and Rouse have also tried to show, contrary to my view, that Martin Heidegger is a deflationary realist. See Malpas (1992) and Rouse (1987, 1996b).
- 2 When I speak of 'things in themselves,' I am not referring to Kant's notion of things independent of any conceptual scheme and hence unknowable but rather to the knowable functional components of the universe. Some have thought that a belief in natural kinds requires that the 'lines' in the universe between one kind and another must be sharp. I, however, assume that one needs only to be able to distinguish sharply between paradigm cases of kinds in order to describe the universe as divided into natural kinds.
- 3 The question – whether the idea of an essential structure of the universe independent of our practices for investigating it makes sense – can be taken up without regard to other important discussions of the natural sciences. I, therefore, do not take a stand on: (1) whether unobservable entities are real (the question of instrumentalism), (2) whether events in the universe are lawful throughout or exhibit a degree of randomness (the question of determinism), and (3) whether there are good arguments for metaphysical realism based solely on conceptual analysis. See, for instance, Searle (1995: 149–97), where he argues for the conceptual necessity of brute facts which are discovered, not constituted.
- 4 When Heidegger speaks of everyday practices or everydayness, he generally means instrumental coping practices or these practices and what we encounter through them. When I speak of everyday practices, I refer more broadly to our familiar ways of encountering things in general, including therefore our familiar perceptual way. The only practices that I deal with in this paper as *non-everyday* are encounters with what I call the strange and scientific practices. More broadly, for me institutional practices, including scientific, religious, and certain aesthetic practices whose intelligibility is founded on non-everyday experiences, count as non-everyday practices. When, however, I explicitly describe Heidegger's views, I shall use the term 'everyday' as he uses it.
- 5 Heidegger himself seems to be conflicted on the subject. Eight years after his seemingly realist stand in *Being and Time*, he writes in *Introduction to Metaphysics*: 'Strictly speaking we cannot say: There was a time when man was not. At all times man was and is and will be, in so far as time temporalizes itself only insofar as man is' (Heidegger 1959: 71). This claim follows from the argument, already in *Being and Time*, that without Dasein there would be no before and after. But Heidegger also says in a lecture given in 1928 and published in 1978: 'The question of the extent to which one might conceive the interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way is a question which I am myself not able to decide – one which is still completely unclear to me' (Heidegger 1984: 210). I think Heidegger should have realized that the occurrent time of nature escapes idealism since it can be understood not in terms of our everyday sense of a before and after but only as an asymmetrical ordering of states.
- 6 In his later marginal notes, Heidegger adds that this revealing of the occurrent does not require either actual breakdown or an active disregard of the use aspects of equipment but can also be arrived at by training oneself to focus on properties of entities in a way that is not directly related to our coping activity. See Heidegger (1996: 57, note).
- 7 Rouse rightly thinks that 'Heidegger is disturbingly vague about the changeover which is said to occur' (Rouse 1987: 74–5).

- 8 Joseph P. Fell develops this point in his 'The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of Praxis in Early Heidegger' (Fell 1992: 65–80).
- 9 Rouse is again right in demanding Heidegger be more specific on this point. One could ask, for example, by what skills do the scientists interpret their data and, if skills are required, how does the scientist have the right to claim that the theoretical objects confirmed by their data are independent of all human activity?
- 10 Though Heidegger is a realist with respect to natural entities, he is not a reductionist, or naturalist. He argues at length in Sections 19, 20, and 21 of *Being and Time* that our practical ability to disclose ways of being, and thus to discover beings, cannot be understood in terms of the occurrent, and that therefore the occurrent, even recontextualized in a successful science of nature, could not provide the fundamental building-blocks of reality. Natural science can tell us only what is *causally* real, it cannot account for our ability to make intelligible various ways of being, thereby disclosing various domains of being or realities, one of which includes the entities described by physical science. Thus science cannot be a theory of *ultimate* reality. This is Heidegger's reason for rejecting *reductive* realism. He says: 'Realism tries to explain reality ontically by real connections of interaction between things that are real . . . [But] being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity' (Heidegger 1962: 251).
- 11 Thus, Rouse can reasonably object that:

It is not that such things, which Heidegger calls 'present-at-hand,' [occurrent] exist independent of the behavioral responses of persons within a configuration of practices and functional equipment. It is that the appropriate behavioral responses to them are carefully shorn of any functional reference (Rouse 1987: 74).
- 12 Heidegger in 1938, thus, anticipates Thomas Kuhn's account of normal science in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Heidegger also already recognized in *Being and Time* that science progresses by means of revolutions. 'The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision' (Heidegger 1962: 29).
- 13 Indeed, Rouse holds that later Heidegger gave up the realism of the *Being and Time* period. He notes Heidegger's Kuhn-like remark back in 1938:

[We cannot] say that the Galilean doctrine of freely falling bodies is true and that Aristotle's teaching, that light bodies strive upward, is false; for the Greek understanding of the essence of body and place and of the relation between the two rests upon a different interpretation of entities and hence conditions a correspondingly different kind of seeing and questioning of natural events. No one would presume to maintain that Shakespeare's poetry is more advanced than that of Aeschylus. It is still more impossible to say that the modern understanding of whatever is, is more correct than that of the Greeks (Heidegger 1977b: 117).

Here Heidegger is obviously trying to counter the claim that Galileo has refuted Aristotle. But he is not doing so, as Kuhn does in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, by holding that neither theory is true of nature, but rather by holding that *both* are true. This could be the innocuous observation that both are 'illuminating,' but in the context of another of Heidegger's remarks, namely, 'that what is represented by physics is indeed nature itself, but undeniably it is only nature as the object-area, whose objectness is first defined and determined through the refining that is characteristic of physics' (Heidegger 1977c: 173–4), it

must be the stronger claim that different theories can reveal different aspects of nature. Of course, if one thinks of Aristotle's theory of natural place as an account of *physical* causality meant to explain, for example, why rocks fall, in the same sense that modern physics claims to explain that phenomenon, his position is untenable. The law-like gravitational account given by modern physics, as far as we know, is right and Aristotle is simply wrong. It may well be, however, as Heidegger holds, that Aristotle and Galileo were *asking different kinds of questions*, and so each could be right about a different kind of causality.

- 14 See, e.g., *Being and Time* where Heidegger speaks of 'a noncommittal formal indicator, indicating something which may perhaps reveal itself as its 'opposite' in some particular phenomenological context' (Heidegger 1962: 152). Henceforth I will translate *Anzeige* as 'designator' rather than 'indicator.'
- 15 What Heidegger presumably has on his mind here when he says that the phenomenological given is absolutely questionable is the fact that any interpretive investigation has to begin with everyday experience which is likely to be distorted both by individual fleeing and by the tradition. Yet the investigator has to begin where he is and can only hope gradually to work himself out of cover-ups and distortions. The recognition that it is necessary to start with the contingent and distorted if one wants to get to the essential explains Heidegger's enigmatic remark in *Being and Time* concerning the hermeneutic circle: 'What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way' (Heidegger 1962: 195).
- 16 Of course, not all encounters with the strange are alike, and I am not describing the unfamiliar in all its forms. Aesthetic wonder which gives us extraordinary things that are sublime does not give us strange things of the sort I am concerned with here, nor does the religious awe that gives us an experience of a radically other being, nor philosophical wonder that takes us outside the ordinary so we can relate ourselves to the everyday as a whole.
- 17 Martin Heidegger (1985) *Gesamtausgabe, Band 61, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*, Frankfurt, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann, pp. 34–5.
- 18 I do not believe that the necessity involved in making claims about essences requires claims about David Lewis's possible worlds. Dagfinn Føllesdal, for instance, argues for a form of rigid designation much like Kripke's only with an even more minimal ontology. For Føllesdal, considerations of 'all possible worlds' are resolved into considerations about objects which our language enables us to keep track of although we have many false beliefs about the objects, do not know many of their properties, and do not know how their properties will change over time. (Føllesdal 1986: 97–113, esp. 107; Kripke 1980: 15–21).
- 19 The claim that essentialism follows from rigid designation is argued by all who care about rigid designation. For the claim closest to mine, see Føllesdal (1996: 356–9).
- 20 A realist science would have to make sure that it had practices for seeking the essences of objects in its domain that did not depend on everyday canons of what makes sense. Such a realist science could separate itself from the everyday by granting full autonomy to a discipline of puzzle-solving within the theoretical projection. Under such a regime, a solution that solves a puzzle, no matter how perceptually and intellectually counterintuitive, would have the power to force scientists to abandon even their current principles of intelligibility. Quantum physics is a case study of long-accepted principles of intelligibility being cast aside. That solutions to puzzles create more puzzles suggests that puzzle-solving is the activity of letting the nature of the universe guide conceptions of it away from human ways of conceiving toward a view from nowhere, appropriate to the universe as it is in itself.

Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?

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It is argued that Heidegger should be seen as something of a Kantian Idealist. Like Kant, Heidegger distinguishes two standpoints (transcendental and empirical) which we can occupy when we ask the question whether natural things depend on us. He agrees with Kant that from the empirical or human standpoint we are justified in saying that natural things do not depend on us. But in contrast with Kant, Heidegger argues that from the transcendental standpoint we can say neither that natural things do depend on us, nor that they do not. His reasons for saying this, however, represent an attempt to rework both Kant's temporal idealism and his temporal interpretation of the concept of an object (which shows up in Heidegger as a temporal interpretation of being). Heidegger suggests that Kant was led astray into a transcendental idealism about natural entities, because he did not understand the implications of transcendental idealism about being.

Of course, only as long as Dasein is, that is, the ontical possibility of the understanding of being is, 'is there' being. If Dasein does not exist, then 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in itself'. Such a thing is then neither understandable nor not understandable. Then also intraworldly entities neither are discoverable, nor can they lie in hiddenness. *Then* it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are not. Nevertheless, it can *now* be said – as long as the understanding of being, and thereby the understanding of occurrentness are – that *then* entities will continue to be.

As we have indicated, the dependence of being, not of entities, on the understanding of being, that is, the dependence of reality, not of the real, on care. . . . (Heidegger [1979, p. 212])

I

In this passage from *Being and Time*,¹ Heidegger accepts at least one strategic feature of Kant's transcendental idealism. Kant enframes his discussion of realism within a distinction between two standpoints from which one may ask about the status of natural things. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*,² he distinguishes the empirical or human standpoint from the transcendental standpoint. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, he writes:

It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever. (1929, p. 71/A26 = B42).

From the human standpoint, there is space outside the mind. But when we abandon this standpoint and take up a different standpoint, one that does not share the assumptions of the human standpoint, we cannot say that there is space. Indeed, according to Kant, from that standpoint we must say that there is no space. On the next page of the *Critique*, Kant identifies these standpoints as the empirical and transcendental, and he speaks of space as empirically real and transcendently ideal.

Heidegger too writes of two standpoints from which one asks whether there are things independent of us. In the passage above from *Being and Time*, he refers to the two standpoints as 'then' and 'now', or in the standard English translation, as 'in this case' and 'in such a case'. The question merits different answers from the different standpoints. If we *now* ask the question, 'Are there entities independent of us?' the answer is 'yes'. Indeed, *now* we can say that entities will continue to be, even if we do not. The idea seems to be this: if we *now* ask ourselves, 'Will the sun continue to exist, even if we humans all die out?' the answer we give is, 'yes'. Why? Because we understand the sun as something occurrent (*vorhanden*, M&R: present-at-hand), and occurrentness is independence of human practices. If we *now* ask the same question of my hammer, the answer is 'no'. Hammers are not occurrent, but rather available (*zuhanden*, M&R: ready-to-hand). For something to be available is for it to be made what it is by human practices. Hammers are defined in terms of the human skills for using them and the human practices (of carpentry and retail hardware, for example) in which they are involved. If we humans did not exist, and thus if these skills and practices did not exist, then hammers would not exist either. So, *now* we can say that hammers will not continue to exist after the demise of the human race. This contrasts with how we answer the parallel question about the sun.³

Dreyfus (1991)⁴ clarifies Heidegger's view by relying on Fine (1986, esp. chs 7–8). Fine introduces what he calls 'the core position'. He writes:

Let us say, then, that both realist and antirealist accept the results of scientific investigations as 'true', on par with more homely truths. (I realize that some antirealists would rather use a different word, but no matter.) And call this acceptance of scientific truths the 'core position'. (1986, p. 128).

This core position – which I shall call 'empirical realism'⁵ – simply holds that there are no general reasons to doubt the truth of scientific claims, and no need to distinguish scientific claims from ordinary ones, in order to say of the former that they are true in some strange or attenuated way.⁶ Fine suggests that this empirical realism is implicit in natural scientific practice, and in the beliefs of many ordinary non-scientists as well. Physicists talk, for instance, about electrons, and empirical realism holds that they exist.

(Dreyfus does not identify Heidegger just with Fine's 'core position', but with Fine's stronger view, the 'natural ontological attitude' [NOA].⁷ This cannot be quite right, however, since two of the distinguishing features of Fine's NOA are incompatible with Heidegger, even on Dreyfus's interpretation of him. First, Fine defines his NOA as rejecting 'all interpretations, theories, construals, pictures, etc., of truth, just as it rejects the special correspondence theory of realism . . .', [1986, p. 149]. But Heidegger certainly does provide a theory or interpretation of truth. NOA only accepts a Tarski-Davidson disquotational account of truth, but Heidegger, for better or worse, offers much more.⁸ [It is not important to explore Heidegger's account here. Suffice it to say that it proposes far more than Tarski-Davidson.] Second, Fine explicitly states that his NOA is anti-essentialist, in that it rejects any attempt to specify some invariant element or method in science [1986, pp. 147–9]. Dreyfus plausibly interprets Heidegger, however, as believing that science differs essentially from ordinary practice in that it decontextualizes entities, and that science and everyday practice thereby take differing ontological stands towards everyday paraphernalia and natural things.⁹ In a footnote, Fine takes a swipe at those whom he calls 'mainline hermeneuts', to whom he assigns, *inter alia*, the thesis that science has to do with a 'dehumanized' world [1986, p. 148n]. Hence, the assimilation of Heidegger's view to Fine's NOA is not right, though Fine's 'core position' does capture Heidegger's empirical realism.)

Empirical realism thus asserts, for example, that the sun exists independently of us, that is, that it would go on existing, even if we all died off. This is a claim to which current science is committed, and empirical realism accepts its truth, just as it accepts the truth of ordinary claims, such as that there is a glass of water on the table before me.

II

But what is the other standpoint ('then', 'in such a case') to which Heidegger refers? Heidegger describes this other case as obtaining 'when Dasein does not exist'. His precise words offered in explanation of what he means are these:

If Dasein does not exist, then 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in itself'. Such a thing is then neither understandable nor not understandable. Then also intraworldly entities neither are discoverable, nor can they lie in hiddenness. *Then* it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are not. (1979, p. 212)

(I shall, for brevity's sake, call this the 'then passage'.) I want to explore two readings of this passage, a weak one (this section) and a strong one (next section).

The weak reading – by ‘weak’ I here mean the reading that construes Heidegger as claiming less – focuses on the first three sentences of this passage. Why would independence not ‘be’,¹⁰ if Dasein did not exist? Well, independence is independence *of* (i.e. *from*) Dasein, presumably, and so if Dasein did not exist, then nothing could be independent of it. (Neither could anything be dependent on it then.) No Dasein, no independence. Furthermore, intraworldly entities could not be discovered, because Dasein is the one who discovers them. (Since there would be no one to succeed or fail at discovering them, it is misleading to say that they would lie hidden.) No Dasein, no discovery. Finally, almost trivially, if there were no Dasein, then nothing could be understood. (It would even be inappropriate to say that things were not understood, since that implies that there would be a *failure* of understanding.) No Dasein, no understanding. So, the weak reading points out that independence, discovery, and understanding depend on Dasein, and thus that without Dasein there can be none of these things.

I want to argue, however, that the view the weak reading attributes to Heidegger is trivial, or nearly so. To see this, let us consider what Heidegger says just after the ‘then passage’. There he introduces the claim that being depends on Dasein. He writes: ‘As we have indicated, the dependence of being, not of entities, on the understanding of being, that is, the dependence of reality, not of the real, on care . . .’ (1979, p. 212). Heidegger presents this claim as something of a clarification, or explanation, of the ‘then passage’. But it does not sit well with the weak reading, unless we give a certain, I claim trivializing, interpretation to the word ‘being’. (Note that this statement also claims that entities do not depend on Dasein. *That* is consistent with the weak reading, since nothing argued for above entails that entities depend on Dasein.) The weak reading undercuts the apparent strength of the claims in the ‘then passage’ by taking them as only asserting a trivial dependence of a relational concept on Dasein. (For example, the sun’s independence is its independence from Dasein, and nothing can be independent of something that does not exist.) The same strategy is problematic when applied to ‘being’.

This becomes apparent in the treatment of Heidegger’s term ‘being’ in Olafson (1987). According to Olafson, Heidegger’s usage of ‘being’ ‘expresses’ his decision ‘to link’ the concept of being with that of Dasein. He takes ‘being’ to mean, roughly, ‘intelligibility to us’, usually more precisely, ‘presence to us’. If being is intelligibility, then being certainly depends on us. After all, intelligibility is intelligibility *to us*, and so without us there is no one or nothing that can make sense of entities. Olafson himself grants that this is not as interesting as it seems to be:

It does appear, however, that even if this construal of the concept of being proves to be justifiable, those who, like Heidegger, use it in this way must use it in an

implicit pairing with a concept of being that is *not* tied to understanding or to Dasein and is in fact applicable to anything that can be described as an entity. (1987, p. 140)

In other words, if one defines ‘being’ to mean ‘intelligibility to us’, then one is still left with our normal concept of being as ‘that in virtue of which anything that is is’. The strategy of the weak reading, when applied to ‘being’, argues by redefinition.

It could, of course, be that Olafson’s interpretation is right, even though if so Heidegger ends up saying something far less interesting than at first appears. But fortunately, Olafson’s interpretation of ‘being’ is incorrect. Being is connected with the understanding, but not definitionally. Heidegger formally introduces his notion of being thus:

In the question we are to work out, *what is asked about* is being – that is, that which determines entities as entities, that in terms of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. (1979, p. 6)

Being is that which ‘determines entities as entities’, i.e. that in virtue of which any entity is an entity, that in virtue of which anything that is is. Being does function as the horizon for our understanding – that is, we cannot understand anything except in terms of being – but this is not to say that being simply *is*, or worse yet, *is by definition*, the intelligibility to us of entities. Hence, it is certainly right that without Dasein there would be no understanding. But it is not so obviously or easily right that without Dasein being would not ‘be’.

III

The strong reading departs from the last sentence of the ‘then passage’. ‘*Then* it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are not.’ If Dasein does not exist, we can say neither that there are entities, nor that there are not entities. Now, there is a trivializing reading of this sentence too, in line with the weak reading of the whole passage. The sentence could simply say that if Dasein does not exist, then we (Dasein) cannot say whether there are entities. Why? Because we do not exist, of course. I take this interpretation of the last sentence to have all the trivializing deficiencies of the weak reading. But perhaps Heidegger is not saying that *under the circumstances* of our non-existence, we cannot say whether there are entities, but rather, *of those circumstances* we cannot say, etc. An argument for the latter claim can be derived from a standard account of the pre-suppositions of questions. In order to develop this argument, let me approach the prohibited statements – ‘Entities then depend on Dasein’, and ‘Entities then do not depend on Dasein’ – as answers to a question, namely, ‘Do entities then depend on Dasein?’

I want to suggest that this question is senseless, because one of its presuppositions is false. As a model for the sort of failure here, consider the following example: it is senseless to ask, 'Who is the president of England?' because there is no presidency of England. This question is not properly asked of the circumstances obtaining in England, not because no one speaks English there and thus could not understand the question, nor even because no one there has the concept of a president, but rather because the governmental system of England does not allow that this question should be asked of it. The question gets no grip on England, because it makes an assumption about England that is false, namely, that it has a presidency. The question makes no sense in this respect: no answer to it can have a truth-value.¹¹ Let me offer this as a way of understanding why Heidegger says that 'we cannot say' either of the prohibited statements.¹²

Let me develop this account of why a question might not be sensibly askable of some circumstances (senseless). Questions are often asked in terms of a *framework*. For example, the question, 'What was Willie Mays's batting average in 1959?' is asked in terms of the framework of baseball. This framework makes a number of presuppositions: the existence of baseball fields, bats, balls, umpires, players, etc. (This particular question, moreover, assumes that Willie Mays was a baseball player, who batted, etc.) If one or more of the presuppositions made by this framework were false, we could say that the question would be senseless. (If the framework were legitimate, but some particular, material presupposition of the particular question were false, then the question would likewise be senseless.) In asking this question of 1959, we are trying to make sense of something in 1959 in terms of the framework of baseball. If the circumstances should resist that framework, in that one of the presuppositions of the framework were false of 1959, then we could not ask any question of 1959 in terms of that framework. This does not concern the circumstances *under* which one asks the question. (It is true that one could not ask the question unless one 'occupied' the framework of baseball, that is, unless one were familiar with that framework.) It concerns, rather, what happens when one asks a question of some circumstances that resist the framework of the question, in that some material presupposition made by the framework is not true of those circumstances.

Now, how do we distinguish those circumstances of which Heidegger's question – 'Do entities then depend on Dasein?' – is askable from those of which it is not? Heidegger connects the senselessness of his question with *being's* dependence on Dasein. I think we can well see why. If being is the ontological framework that determines whether something of some specific ontological sort is, then without being in place, the question, 'Does that thing exist?' is senseless. If we ask, 'Would the sun exist?' of circumstances

that resist the ontological framework of the question, then the question is senseless. If being depends on Dasein, then when Dasein does not exist, neither does the question's framework.

Just as the weak reading involved an interpretation of the dependence of being on us, so must the strong reading. Let me suggest the following understanding of that dependence. When we examine the meaning of the word or concept of being, that is, when we examine what we mean by 'being', we find that the structures that we identify with being depend on us. Here we can return to Kant. In the *Transcendental Analytic*, Kant argues that our concept of an object must refer to the temporal structure of things. He argues for this in two stages.¹³ First, he argues that the concept of an object must be applicable to sensory experience and is spelled out by the categories. Second, he points out that a problem thus arises for the concept of the object. Sensory experience is empirical, but the categories are pure. So, how can the categories, and that means in turn the concept of an object, apply to experience? The solution is to remind the reader that sensory experience also has an *a priori* form, viz. time, and that the categories can thus apply to the temporal form of sensory experience. The categories are then understood as rules for the time-determination of sensory experience. This means, however, that our concept of an object can only apply to temporal things. And since Kant has argued in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* that time depends on us, he concludes that all objects depend on us.

Heidegger does something analogous, and so turns out to be a Kantian in a fairly detailed sense.¹⁴ First, when we examine the meaning of the being of natural things – indeed, he argues with almost full generality, if we examine the meaning of being in general – we find that our understanding of being makes sense of things in terms of time. If Heidegger were talking about concepts, he would say that our concept of being applies only to temporal things. His own non-mentalistic way of putting the point is to say that the in-terms-of-which of our projection of being is time.¹⁵ Heidegger calls this the 'Temporality of being'. It gets us to an analogue of Kant's result in the B-Deduction:

(a) The understanding of being (Kant: the concept of an object) discloses (Kant: refers to) the temporal structure of things.

Heidegger, like Kant, also believes that time depends on us. I shall call this 'temporal idealism'.

(b) Time, and thus the temporal structure of things, depends on us.

Heidegger can marry temporal idealism to the Temporality of being, and conclude that being depends on Dasein. That is, (a) and (b) entail,

(c) That in virtue of which an entity is an entity (Kant: an object is an object) depends on us.

(a) and (b) are independently supported claims, which in turn imply (c). Heidegger does not get (c) by (re)definition. He does not just say that being is intelligibility, and that intelligibility (trivially) depends on the one to whom things are intelligible. Rather, he argues that the structures in terms of which we understand being are temporal structures, and that those structures – and not just the understanding of them – depend on us. What can we conclude? The item we pick out with ‘being’ depends on us. That is, being depends on us.

Let me offer a few texts to support my attributions to Heidegger. As for claim (a), the Temporality of being, a text and a promissory note. Heidegger says in chapter two, §5 of the Introduction to *Being and Time* that:

Dasein is such that, in so far as it is, it understands something like being. With this connection in mind it will be shown that *time* is that in terms of which Dasein in general implicitly understands and interprets something like being. Time must be brought to light and genuinely conceived as the horizon of all understanding of being and every interpretation of being. In order to make that transparent, we must provide an *originary explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being, and we must do so in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein who understands being*. (1979, p. 17).

As I argued above, being is not *simply* the intelligibility of things, although it is that in terms of which we do make sense of things. The being of a thing is first and foremost that in virtue of which it is and is what it is. So, being is the set of structures that determine or fix things as entities, and being must be interpreted in terms of time. The promissory note is this: if one works through the final quarter of *Being and Time*, one finds that Heidegger begins to do just what he said he would do, namely, concretely rework his understanding of the being of Dasein, the available, and the occurrent in terms of their temporal structures. He does not finish the task, because he notoriously never gets to the point of interpreting the understanding of being in general. He gives hints of that project in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, and refers to it both there and in §5 of *Being and Time* as the ‘Temporality [*Temporalität*] of being’, which is the temporal structure of being in general.¹⁶

As for the second claim, (b), that time depends on us, I shall present a couple of texts and a promissory note. Heidegger writes:

There is, in itself, the possibility that man not be at all. There indeed was a time in which man was not. But strictly speaking, we cannot say: there was a time in which man *was* not. In every *time*, man was and is and will be, because time only temporalizes itself in so far as man is. There is no time in which man was not, not because man is from eternity and to eternity, but rather because time is not eternity,

and time only temporalizes itself in each case in every time as human-historical. (1966, p. 64)

There is no nature-time, since all time belongs essentially to Dasein. (1982, p. 262)

I also claim, but cannot show here, that if one again works through the final quarter of *Being and Time*, one finds an extended argument for the thesis that time depends on human beings. The argument is complex, working in two stages. First, he argues that time as ordinarily conceived by philosophers and scientists, natural time, or what Heidegger calls the ‘ordinary conception of time’, is a leveled off version of world-time. I take this to mean that there is world-time, and we can choose to look away from some of world-time’s defining features. When we do so prescind from those features, we come to terms with an abstraction, natural time. Second, world-time, as the flow of everyday qualitative times, depends on human temporality, or the time structured by Dasein’s way of being. So, natural time depends on world-time, and world-time on human temporality.

Let me now draw these lines of thought together: How are we to characterize the other case, ‘then’, ‘in such a case?’ The empirical standpoint is that of natural science, which (now) holds that the sun is not causally dependent on us. Hence, it claims that the sun would exist, even if we did not. The transcendental standpoint, however, asks the same question while thinking away Dasein. To think away Dasein, however, is to think away time, which entails thinking away being, and that is in turn the framework on which depends the truth-value of answers to the question, ‘Do entities then depend on Dasein?’ From this transcendental standpoint, the question makes no sense, at least in so far as its answers cannot have truth-value.

But one might object that this is trivial. After all, if we think away the framework that allows the answers to a question to have truth-value, *of course* we cannot answer the question. That is roughly like saying, ‘Imagine that France has no governmental system. Now, who is president of France then?’ Why would anyone engage in this procedure? One can think of Heidegger’s approach like this: Since being depends on us, there is *prima facie* a problem about asking of circumstances in which we do not exist whether there are natural things. The reasoning above exposes that problem. Given this problem, let us distinguish two standpoints from which to ask questions. The human standpoint declines to think away the being of natural things, even though it thinks us away. It is true, however, that being does depend on us, but from the human standpoint we just *ignore* that dependence. The transcendental standpoint does not ignore that dependence; it keeps the dependence clearly fixed before it, and then draws the inevitable conclusion that we cannot answer the question we are asking.

IV

There are several objections that can be made to this construal of the two standpoints in Heidegger.

(A) Dreyfus denies that the dependence of time on Dasein represents Heidegger's considered judgment. He marshals a nice quote where Heidegger (in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*) confesses that he is puzzled by the whole issue.¹⁷ It does seem that Heidegger is not of one mind about temporal idealism, and that his position shifts around. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* represents, perhaps, a high-water mark for his realism.¹⁸ But *Being and Time*, the *Basic Problems*, and *Introduction to Metaphysics* all embody a robust idealism. Perhaps this Kantian idealism, based on temporal idealism, is only one thread of Heidegger's thinking. But it is this thread that I am trying here to trace.

(B) Dreyfus's motivation for denying that Heidegger is a temporal idealist is his suspicion that it conflicts with empirical realism. But I do not think it does. From within the empirical standpoint we can think humans away and ask what is or would be the case in our absence. We ask, what happened *before* humans came to be, what is likely to happen *after* we pass away, and what would have happened, if we had *never* been. These are all questions about past, future, and possible *times*. They thus indicate that we are asking our questions from the human standpoint. We are thinking ourselves away, but not time. But time does depend on us, and so if we leave this human standpoint behind, and think time itself away, we find that the criteria that would determine answers to our questions have been thought away as well. From this transcendental standpoint, our questions cannot be answered, and not because we do not know how to answer them, but rather because the framework that should determine an answer is now gone. There is no conflict between empirical realism and 'Kantian' or transcendental idealism.

(C) One might try to argue, however, that if my reading is right, Heidegger is claiming (implausibly) that natural science is just making a mistake by ignoring a metaphysical fact, namely, the dependence of time on Dasein.¹⁹ As I have indicated, natural science does rest upon ignoring an important philosophical claim, but this does not mean that natural science rests on a mistake. Natural science is not making a metaphysical (or transcendental) claim at all. Natural science must play by the rules of its ontological framework, the framework of the occurrent. It is not in the business of saying what might be the case independently of this framework. Now, time is basic to this framework, and so, natural science asks its questions assuming time as a given. If natural science were to try to ask about the nature of things independently of time, and thus independently of the basic structure of occurrentness, it could no longer be natural science.²⁰

(D) But this defense suggests a further and more far reaching challenge, one to the very idea that Heidegger could think that such a transcendental standpoint is coherent or conceivable. Heidegger insists that all understanding takes place in the context of an involvement in the world, and hence the detached, uninvolved perspective of the transcendental standpoint is simply impossible. Indeed, its impossibility has a lot to do with what is wrong with traditional philosophy.²¹ In more detail, one could say that since all understanding presupposes an understanding of being, no understanding can take place absent an ontological framework. If one thinks away the ontological framework – as I am arguing one does from the transcendental standpoint – then one can say nothing at all. The rules of the ontological game are no longer in place. If this is right, then the claim that from the transcendental standpoint one can say neither of the prohibited statements turns out to be a disappointing consequence of a more general and debilitating failure of the transcendental standpoint as I have described it.²²

The general thrust of this objection is correct. However, one can say *something* from the transcendental standpoint, though not because something makes sense from *within* it. Rather, the transcendental standpoint is defined in terms of a thought-experiment. This thought-experiment makes a presupposition – namely, that we are talking about a situation in which there is no Dasein – and we may exploit the consequences of this presupposition. Heidegger claims the absence of time, and thus being, follows from this presupposition. And this is all that is claimed from the transcendental standpoint.

Here it may be helpful to distinguish two things one might mean by 'the transcendental standpoint'. In Kant, the transcendental standpoint is in the first instance the standpoint one occupies when one asks after the conditions for the possibility of a priori knowledge.²³ From this standpoint one discovers that space and time are mere forms of sensibility (for that is the only way to explain their status as objects of a priori intuition). From this last claim arises a distinction between two standpoints or attitudes from within which one may ask which things exist and what they are like. The empirical standpoint accepts the conditions of human sensibility as rules governing our answers, and thereby endorses the existence, independent of you and me, of tables, chairs, and especially Newtonian matter. What one can also call the 'transcendental standpoint' (because its possibility only arises through the discovery of the conditions of sensibility) does not accept the conditions of sensibility as rules governing our answers. It wants to know what things are like independent of the conditions of human sensibility. Of course, all we can learn here is something negative, namely, that they are not spatio-temporal. The point of this outline of Kant is to show that the term 'transcendental standpoint' really gets used in two ways:

(1) to refer to the standpoint one occupies in asking after the conditions for the possibility of a priori knowledge; and (2) to refer to the standpoint from which one asks after the nature of things independent of the conditions of sensibility discovered from the transcendental standpoint in sense (1).

A similar distinction is at work in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Most of *Being and Time* is written from a transcendental standpoint in sense (1). Heidegger would prefer the term 'ontological' or 'phenomenological' – which he takes to amount to the same thing – for this standpoint. But he does write:

Being is the *transcendens* pure and simple. . . . Every disclosure of being as the *transcendens* is transcendental knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis.* (1979, p. 38)

From this transcendental standpoint, we discover – as in Kant – that being is always understood in terms of time, and that time depends on us. This leads to the possibility that we might ask what things are like independently of us, and hence of time too. This is the transcendental standpoint in sense (2). It is the one articulated in the 'then passage' from Heidegger (1979, p. 212). As with Kant's transcendental standpoint in sense (2), we can only say something negative from within it, in this case, that being 'is' not.

V

But all this is not to deny that there are substantial disanalogies between Heidegger and Kant. I want to argue, though, one of these disanalogies favors Heidegger. Kant infers that since the structures (space, and esp., time) in virtue of which there are objects for human cognition depend on the subject, all objects of human cognition do as well. So, Kant concludes that nature depends on us, at least when we consider nature from the transcendental standpoint. Now, if Heidegger and Kant held parallel positions, Heidegger should be able to draw a far stronger inference: since being depends on us, all entities should in turn depend on us too. But Heidegger explicitly *denies* this. Kant need not claim that all entities depend on us, because he claims only that objectivity depends on us; he does not claim that being depends on us. Heidegger does claim that being depends on us, and so he seems saddled with the claim that all entities depend on us too. This disanalogy suggests a problem for my reading of Heidegger: if I have explained Heidegger's views correctly, then his position seems incoherent, because he appears to deny something entailed by his account of the dependence of being on us.

However, Kant's position is not coherent, and I want to argue briefly that if we examine the way in which it is not coherent, Heidegger, as I

understand him, is off the hook. Kant's transcendental idealism is puzzling. No judgment about the way things are, from the transcendental standpoint, can have truth-value. Consider the judgment form, 'x exists', made of circumstances in which we do not exist, from the transcendental standpoint. 'Existence' – as well as 'possible existence' and 'necessary existence' – are categories of the understanding to be found in the Table of Categories under the heading 'Modality'. In order for these categories to be able to contribute to a judgment that can have truth-value, they must be 'schematized', that is, have their application spelled out in terms of the temporal features of the things or situations that they describe. In other words, their only possible application is to temporal things. But when we do not exist, there is no time, according to Kant's temporal idealism. Therefore, the judgment form 'x exists', cannot have truth-value, when made from the transcendental standpoint.

Let me distinguish the issue that I have just raised from two others that are closely related, but none the less distinct. There is another venerable objection to Kant that goes like this: How can Kant claim that there are things in themselves, when he explicitly denies that we can have any knowledge of them? This worry, so far as I can tell, is easily met. He does *not* claim that there are things in themselves. It was once thought that he did, because the picture of what is called 'double affection' was attributed to him. But this interpretation of Kant is seldom endorsed any longer, though there are some tricky passages in the *Critique*.²⁴

A second related issue is raised by those, such as Strawson (1966) and Bennett (1966), who take Kant to be a verificationist. They argue that Kant is a verificationist in the sense that he believes that the meaning of a concept is spelled out by the experiential evidence that we could have to apply that concept. But according to Kant's doctrine of the in-principle unknowability of things in themselves, there could be no evidence to apply the concept of the thing in itself. Hence, the concept is meaningless. But more recent interpretations of Kant point out that he does not claim that concepts without empirical application are meaningless, but only that they cannot contribute to judgments with 'objective validity', i.e. the ability to be true or false. There are non-empirical concepts, such as that of the thing in itself, God, and the soul, which although they have no empirical application, still are not meaningless. Nevertheless, even though these concepts have meaning independent of experience, apart from application to possible experience they cannot be used to form judgments that could be true or false.²⁵

This returns us to the problem raised above. Although the concept of existence is not utterly meaningless apart from experience, it cannot be used to form judgments that are true or false. Thus, the judgment, 'There are things in themselves', is not just unknowable and irrefutable by us. It

cannot have truth-value. There might still be a role for this judgment – or at least the concept of the thing in itself, a thing utterly independent of us – to play in transcendental philosophy, although it cannot be a fact-stating role.

However, it follows from this that we cannot say that entities depend on us, even from the transcendental standpoint. To say that one thing depends on another is at least to say that in that possible situation in which the second thing does not exist, the first thing does not exist either. But from the transcendental standpoint within Kant's system, it follows that no judgment of the form, 'x then exists', can have truth-value. Hence, it also follows that no judgment of the form, 'If the subject did not exist, then x would not exist either', can have truth-value.

Now let us take up the transcendental standpoint in *Being and Time*. Think away not just human beings, but also time. Of this possible situation, what are we to say? Well, *ex hypothesi* time does not exist. Within Heidegger's system, being 'is' then not either. But what about entities? The competing claims or judgments, that entities then do exist and that they then do not, are both incapable of having truth-value. So, we cannot say of that situation that entities do not exist. Hence, we also cannot say that in that possible situation in which Dasein does not exist, entities do not exist either. But we have to be able to say this, if we are to say that entities depend on Dasein. So, we cannot say that entities depend on Dasein. Of course, we also cannot say that they do not depend on Dasein. We can, however, say that being depends on Dasein, because as we saw, the situation is *ex hypothesi* one in which time, and hence being, is not to be found.

Therefore, Heidegger was exactly right to say that being, but *not* entities, depends on Dasein. This is not because entities are, from the transcendental standpoint, independent of Dasein either. Heidegger is a transcendental idealist about being, but not about entities. But this is not because he is a transcendental realist about entities. *Rather, it is because one can be neither a transcendental idealist nor realist about entities, if one is a transcendental idealist about being.* This is something that Kant did not understand. He failed to understand it, because he did not work through the implications of his theory of objective validity. Or to put the point from a more Heideggerian perspective, he failed to understand this, because he did not properly draw the distinction between being and entities. He did not understand the ontological difference.²⁶

NOTES

1 All references to *Being and Time* are to the 15th German edition: Heidegger (1979). All translations are my own, though of course I have relied heavily on Macquarrie and

Robinson's English translation: Heidegger (1962). I have tried to indicate most of my divergences from Macquarrie and Robinson's translations of technical terminology by giving the German and their translation (indicated by 'M&R:') in parentheses.

- 2 References to the *Critique* – Kant (1929) – will cite first the page in the English translation and then the pages in the first and second original German editions, by the standard 'A = B' format.
- 3 The issue is actually a bit more complicated than this, since everything hangs on whether one thinks that the hammer is the very same entity as (is numerically identical with) the hunk of metal and wood out of which it is made. If the two items are numerically identical, then the hammer does survive the demise of the human race, though not *as* a hammer.
- 4 I want to adopt, yet modify, Dreyfus's 'hermeneutic realism'. The section on realism is to be found on pp. 251–65. Hermeneutic realism is introduced on p. 254. Beyond endorsing the ontic claims of natural science – which I will explore in a moment – Dreyfus's 'hermeneutic realism' has two aims. First, the hermeneutic realist 'spells out what everyday scientific practices take for granted, namely that there is a nature in itself, and that science can give us a better and better explanation of how that nature works'. Second, the hermeneutic realist 'seeks to show that this self-understanding of modern science is both internally coherent and compatible with the ontological implications of our everyday practices' (p. 254). This account is helpful, and a good guess at one thing Heidegger was up to in §43c of *Being and Time*.
- 5 This is the minimum of what is contained in Kant's empirical realism, and it may also be what is central to Husserl's natural attitude, in so far as it is applied to science. We could call it the 'natural scientific attitude'.
- 6 I take it that this either is or is very close to the 'epistemological realism' of Horwich (1982, p. 181).
- 7 Fine indicates that his NOA is very close to – if not identical with – Horwich's (1982) 'semantic realism'.
- 8 For Heidegger's account, see 1979 (§44). For Dreyfus's interpretation of that account, see 1991 (pp. 265–80).
- 9 Dreyfus (1991, pp. 79–83). Here Rouse (1985) agrees with Dreyfus's interpretation of the early Heidegger's philosophy of science.
- 10 Heidegger has several strategies for avoiding saying of items that are not entities that they are. One is to put the verb 'to be' in quotation marks. He does that here, because independence is not an entity. Another strategy, pretty much reserved for being (which clearly is not itself an entity), is to say, '*Es gibt Sein*', which is close to our English expression, 'There is being', although it has the virtue of not using the verb 'to be'. A third strategy is to appropriate or invent a verb tailored to the item in question, such as, 'Time temporalizes itself'. (Time is not an entity, because it is the horizon for understanding being.)
- 11 Belnap and Steel (1976, pp. 108–19) use the term 'S-presupposes' to describe what is going on here: the question, 'Who is president of England?' S-presupposes the statement, 'There is a presidency of England', because the truth of the latter statement is required for any answer to the former question to have a truth-value. It would not significantly alter my analysis if one chose to use Belnap and Steel's own notion of interrogative presupposition, namely that a question presupposes a statement, if the truth of the statement is logically implied by every true answer to the question. If one did use their notion, then one would say the question is 'false'.
- One might ask, 'Is not the answer, "*No one* is president of England", the right one? Is that not true?' This answer, however, is really just a disguised way of rejecting the question because its presupposition is false. One is not directly answering it. We can see this by contrasting this case with the same answer, *mutatis mutandis*, given in response to the question, 'Who is president of the US?' asked after the president dies, but before the vice president has been sworn into office. Here it is literally and directly true that no one is president of the US.
- 12 Dreyfus's formulation of what Heidegger is doing here could lead one astray, so let me say something about it. He talks about what would have been the case if 'Dasein had never existed' (1991, p. 257). This is not really helpful, because there is nothing fundamentally

different about asking about what is going on in the possible situation when we are not here, and what went on before us, and what will go on after us. All are issues that natural science can, in principle, address. After all, natural science could ask the question, 'What would have become of the California Condor, if human beings had never existed?' It may be that it is hard to come up with evidence about what would have been if we had never been, but this question hardly seems ruled out of court a priori. Dreyfus knows this, which explains why he attaches the stipulation that we are asking this question, when 'it makes no sense'. But by singling out the question, 'What would have been the case . . . ?' he gives the impression that there is something special about that question, in contrast to questions about dinosaurs and the like. But the stipulation that he adds (we are asking the question when 'it makes no sense') is doing all the work.

13 See Kitcher (1987).

14 I shall below draw out, and then exploit, a disanalogy with Kant.

15 For Heidegger's anti-mentalism, see Dreyfus (1991).

16 See 1979 (p. 19) and 1982 (§§20–22).

17 ' . . . the question of the extent to which one might conceive the interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way . . . is a question which I am myself not able to decide, one which is still completely unclear to me' (1984, p. 210). See Dreyfus (1991, p. 259).

18 See also Heidegger's discussion of world-entry and the ability of things to pre-exist world-entry (1984, pp. 185–95).

19 I owe this objection to Mark Lance.

20 I shall not here evaluate the substantive claim that the framework of occurrentness, and thus of natural science, essentially makes sense of things in terms of time.

21 The objection in this form was put to me by Bert Dreyfus during an oral presentation of an earlier version of this paper.

22 The objection in this developed form was made to me by Mark Lance and Ted Schatzki.

23 See the definition of 'transcendental' at Kant (1929, p. 59/A11–12 = B25).

24 See Gram (1975).

25 See Matthews (1982) and Allison (1983).

26 I thank Bert Dreyfus, Mark Lance, Mark Okrent, Terry Pinkard, and Ted Schatzki for helpful comments on earlier drafts, as well as Georgetown University's Graduate School for a Summer Academic Research Grant on which I partly relied to write this paper.

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Coping with Things-in-themselves: A Practice-Based Phenomenological Argument for Realism

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Against Davidsonian (or deflationary) realism, it is argued that it is coherent to believe that science can in principle give us access to the functional components of the universe as they are in themselves in distinction from how they appear to us on the basis of our quotidian concerns or sensory capacities. The first section presents the deflationary realist's argument against independence. The second section then shows that, although Heidegger pioneered the deflationary realist account of the everyday, he sought to establish a robust realist account of science. Next, the third section develops two different sides of Heidegger's thinking. Resources developed by Thomas Kuhn are drawn on to work out Heidegger's account of plural worlds. This argument shows that it makes sense to talk about things-in-themselves independent of our practices, but falls short of the robust realist claim that *we can have access* to things as they are in themselves independent of our practices. So, secondly, Saul Kripke's account of rigid designation is drawn on to work out Heidegger's account of formal designation. On the basis of a Heideggerian elaboration of rigid designation, it is argued that we do indeed have practices for achieving access to things independent of all our practices. But this second argument leaves us unable to reject metaphysical nominalism. So, thirdly, it is proposed that the currently most persuasive philosophical argument for nominalism depends on a logico-mathematical space of possibilities. But the proto-theoretical space opened by the pre-scientific access practices has features that provide reasons for believing that the independent stuff to which we have access has a determinate structure and specific causal powers.

Science has long claimed to discover the relations among the natural kinds of the universe. As such it has rested on two core theses of metaphysical realism: (1) the universe has a single order, and (2) that order and its components exist independently of our minds or ways of coping. Today most philosophers, other humanists, and social scientists adopt an antirealism that consists in rejecting the second thesis and maintaining the spirit of the first by holding that all true descriptions of the universe are compatible.¹ But, unlike the previous generation of antirealists,² who also rejected this thesis, today's antirealists argue that the independence thesis is not just false but *incoherent*. Thus, today's antirealists say they are as realist as it makes sense to be. Consequently, such *deflationary realists*, as we shall call them, claim that the objects studied by science are just as real as the baseballs, stones, and trees we encounter with our everyday coping practices.³ Donald Davidson is the philosopher most closely associated with this view.

In contrast to deflationary realism, we defend a *robust realism* that argues for the independence claim. We will argue that it is coherent to believe that science can in principle give us access to the functional components of the universe as they are in themselves⁴ in distinction from how they appear to us on the basis of our quotidian concerns or sensory capacities.⁵ But, in doing so, we shall have to give up the first thesis, that the universe has a single order of kinds. Instead, we shall allow that the universe can function in a finite number of different ways, each having its own components or kinds. In short, we shall accept and argue for the claim that multiple realism makes sense.

We take both the deflationary and the robust realist positions to be part of the heritage that Heidegger has left us. Consequently, we shall, in our first section, present the deflationary realist's arguments against independence. Then, in the second section, we shall show that although Heidegger pioneered the deflationary realist account of the everyday, he sought to establish a robust realist account of science. Next, in our third section, we shall develop two different sides of Heidegger's thinking. First, we shall draw on resources developed by Thomas Kuhn to work out Heidegger's account of plural worlds. This argument shows that it makes sense to talk about things-in-themselves independent of our practices, but it does not support the robust realist claim that *we can have access* to things as they are in themselves independent of our practices. So, secondly, we shall draw on Saul Kripke's, Hilary Putnam's, and Keith Donnellan's accounts of direct reference to work out Heidegger's account of formal designation. With our worked-out version of Heideggerian rigid designation, we will argue that we do indeed have practices for achieving access to things independent of all our practices. But this second argument does not leave us with any reason to claim that we have access to (a) components of the universe that (b) have the sorts of causal powers that could determine a course of the universe.⁶ In short our arguments to this point bring us only so far as a metaphysical nominalism. So, thirdly, we shall seek to show that the currently most persuasive philosophical argument for nominalism depends on a logico-mathematical space of possibilities, in order to argue that the universe can be carved up in infinitely many different ways.⁷ But the proto-theoretical space opened by the access practices we identify has features that provide reasons for believing that the independent stuff to which we have access has a determinate structure and specific causal powers. Finally, there is no reason for claiming that the proto-theoretical space must conform to the logico-mathematical space. These three arguments support our conclusion that robust realism is coherent. We shall not attempt to determine whether current Western science systematically deploys the practices that would enable it to claim to know the essences of things-in-themselves. But we will conclude by drawing out of our account of a practice-based robust realism the structural elements of a realist science, and we will argue that certain practices from our current science embody these structural elements.

I. The Argument for Deflationary Realism

The argument for deflationary realism turns on the rejection of the traditional Cartesian view of human beings as self-sufficient minds whose intentional content is directed toward the world. Both Heidegger and Davidson reject this view and substitute for it an account of human beings as inextricably involved with things and people. Heidegger holds that each human being has to take a stand on who he or she is by taking up some social role or other and then dealing with the things appropriate to the role. Davidson thinks of human beings as language users who, in order to have any mental content of their own, must learn simultaneously about (1) the entities in the world, (2) the mental content of other minds, and (3) the linguistic conventions of their community. We call Heidegger and Davidson practical holists because both claim that meaning depends ultimately on the inseparability of practices, things, and mental contents. Heidegger captures this idea in his claim that human beings are essentially being-in-the-world; Davidson makes the same point in his causal theory of meaning.

Both thinkers claim that their holism enables them to answer the Cartesian skeptic. Heidegger argues that if human beings are essentially being-in-the-world, then the skeptical question of whether the world and others exist cannot sensibly be raised by human beings, and as Heidegger asks, 'Who else would raise it?'⁸ Heidegger thus claims that the attempt to *answer* the skeptic is mistaken. Any attempt to take the skeptic seriously and prove that we can know that there is an external world presupposes a separation of the mind from the world of things and other people which defies a phenomenological description of how human beings make sense of everyday things and of themselves. Davidson argues, on the basis of a logical reconstruction of the way people make sense of things, that although people may differ concerning the truth of any particular belief, in order for a person to acquire a language at all that person must share most of the beliefs of those who speak the language and most of these shared beliefs must be true. Thus, the skeptic's expression of his skepticism in language presupposes that a shared world of things and of other persons exists and that most of the beliefs he tries to doubt must be true.⁹

Let us look at Davidson's argument in greater detail. In 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', Davidson argues that the only way we can make sense of someone's learning a language is to suppose that the learner (1) already has access to a shared world containing shared objects, (2) shares most of the coping practices of the linguistic community he or she is about to enter, (3) understands what it is for him- or herself and others to have beliefs, and (4) takes for granted that the majority of his or her beliefs and the beliefs of others in the community are true. Thus meaning is inextricably related to things and other minds. That is, although we can separate beliefs from what makes them true, and coping practices from their objects *in specific situations* where

meaning is already shared, we cannot distinguish the roles of objects, others, and our own mental content in the constitution of the shared meanings themselves. Davidson writes:

The assumption that the truth about what we believe [i.e. how our beliefs are related to things] is logically independent of the truth of what we believe [i.e. whether any particular belief is true] is revealed as ambiguous. Any particular belief may indeed be false; but enough in the framework and fabric of our beliefs must be true to give content to the rest. The conceptual connections between our knowledge of our own minds and our knowledge of the world of nature are not definitional but holistic.¹⁰

It follows that we cannot make sense of the question whether the *totality* of things could be independent of the *totality* of our practices or whether things are *essentially dependent* on our practices, because to raise these questions meaningfully requires thinking – contrary to the conclusions of Davidson's rational reconstruction – that we can conceive of the totality of things, and the totality of practices with sufficient independence from each other to claim that one is logically prior. We can gain no perspective on our practices that does not already include things and no perspective on things that does not already involve our practices. Thus practical holism makes unintelligible all claims about both things-in-themselves apart from practices and the totality of practices apart from things. Indeed, since true statements about objects cannot imply *either* the dependence *or* the independence of objects *vis-à-vis* our practices, these statements must be understood as describing objects as they are in the only sense of 'are' that is left, which is the 'are' of ordinary situations. Thus we arrive at a deflationary view that repudiates both robust realism and idealist antirealism.

Once the deflationary realist has shown that one cannot make sense of transcendental idealism or of metaphysical realism, he is able to accept the results of science at face value so long as he makes neither the robust realist's claim that science gives us an account of the functional demarcations of the universe as it is in itself on the one hand, nor the extreme constructivist's claim that nature must be a cultural creation on the other. When asked whether it makes sense to claim that things existed in nature before human beings came along, and that they would have existed even if human beings had never existed, the deflationary realist can sound like a scientist in saying on the basis of empirical findings that, of course, it makes sense to claim that some types of entities were there before us, and would still be there if we had never existed and others would not. But the Davidsonian says this on a background of meaning that makes any talk about nature as it is in itself incoherent.

II. Heidegger's Attempt at Robust Realism

Like Davidson, Heidegger answers the skeptic by showing that our practices and the everyday world are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, he argues at length that 'Dasein is the world existingly'.¹¹ Moreover, Heidegger seems to agree with the deflationary realists that, while entities show up as independent of us, the being or intelligibility of entities – what entities *are*, Joseph Rouse would say – depends on our practices. So any talk of things-in-themselves must be put in scare quotes. Thus, Heidegger says:

It must be stated that the entity as an entity is 'in itself' and independent of any apprehension of it; yet, the being of the entity is found only in encounter and can be explained, made understandable, only from the phenomenal exhibition and interpretation of the structure of encounter.¹²

Heidegger seems even more deflationary when he adds: 'Of course only as long as Dasein [human being] is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically possible), "is there" being. When Dasein does not exist, "independence" "is" not either, nor "is" the "in-itself"'.¹³

Rouse sees the parallel between Heidegger's and Davidson's holistic answer to the skeptic and wonders why Dreyfus fails to see that Heidegger must therefore be a deflationary realist. But, as we will now seek to show, in *Being and Time* Heidegger describes phenomena that enable him to distinguish between the everyday world and the universe, and so to claim to be a robust realist about nature. Moreover, he has the conceptual resources to use this phenomenon for a persuasive defense of robust realism.

The first two phenomena Heidegger calls to our attention are two different ways of being. Normally we deal with things as equipment. Equipment gets its intelligibility from its relation to other equipment, human roles, and social goals. Heidegger calls the equipmental way of being *availability* (*Zuhandenheit*). But he also points to another equally important phenomenon; we sometimes experience entities as independent of our instrumental coping practices. This happens in cases of equipmental breakdown. Heidegger calls the mode of being of entities so encountered *occurrentness* (*Vorhandenheit*). Occurrent beings are not only revealed in breakdown but also revealed when we take a detached attitude to things that decontextualizes or – in Heidegger's terms – *deworlds* them. In this detached attitude, we normally encounter occurrent entities as substances with properties.

This experience of the occurrent is still contextual and meaningful in a weak sense. Were it not for a world in which entities could be encountered, the question of whether there could be entities independent of our concerns could not be asked, and, more importantly, without our giving meaning to the occurrent way of being, the question of independence would not make sense. So Heidegger concludes that the being or intelligibility of even the occurrent

mode of being depends on us: '[B]eing "is" only in the understanding of those entities to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs.'¹⁴ But he still insists that 'entities *are* independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained'.¹⁵

This amounts to the seemingly paradoxical claim that we have practices for making sense of entities as independent of those very practices. This seeming paradox has led to a three-way debate in the scholarly literature over whether Heidegger is a robust realist, a transcendental idealist, or a deflationary realist.¹⁶ Dreyfus has argued, appealing to the above quotation from *Being and Time*, that Heidegger is a would-be robust realist.¹⁷ William Blattner has countered that Heidegger must be understood as a transcendental idealist, and that consequently all the citations that seem to support robust realism should be read as supporting merely empirical realism.¹⁸ David Cerbone has responded to Blattner with a reading in the spirit of Davidson in which Heidegger's account of the inextricable involvement of human beings and the world commits him to the view that neither robust realism nor transcendental idealism is intelligible.¹⁹

In order to explain more fully why we claim that Heidegger is a would-be robust realist, we must bring to fuller consideration the phenomenon of deworlding. As we have said, Heidegger points out that in situations of instrumental breakdown, we encounter things as occurrent, as independent of the instrumental world – that is, as having no *essential* relation to our everyday coping practices – and as all along underlying our everyday equipment. '[W]hat cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental thing which looks so and so, and which, in its availability, as looking that way, *has constantly been occurrent too*.'²⁰ Nature is thus revealed as *having been there all along*. In such cases, Heidegger holds, '[t]he understanding of being by which our concerned dealings with entities within-the-world has been guided has changed over'.²¹ The practices for coping with the available differ significantly from the practices for dealing with the occurrent. Thus, Heidegger understands this changeover from dealing with things as available to occurrent as discontinuous. This discontinuous changeover is crucial for Heidegger's answer to deflationary realism.

The radicality of this discontinuity is often hidden by inadequate phenomenological descriptions of breakdowns. When a hammer is so heavy that the carpenter cannot use it, it is then experienced as a combination of substances (the wood and metal) with the property 'heaviness'. But since heaviness is context-dependent in that it draws directly on our concerns. But breakdown can be so severe that all that is left in experience is a mere something – 'just occurrent and no more'²² – whose properties are not connected to its function in any intelligible way and are thus beyond everyday understanding. Heidegger claims that among other experiences, anxiety gives

us access to this unintelligible occurrent. 'Anxiety', he writes, 'discloses . . . beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other.'²³

Of course, the uninterpreted beings experienced as radically other are not theoretical entities. Heidegger knows that for us to have access to theoretical entities these beings must be recontextualized or reinterpreted in theoretical terms. Heidegger is thus clear that the data used by science are theory-laden. 'The "grounding" of "factual science" was possible only because the researchers understood that in principle there are no "bare facts";' he writes.²⁴ He is unfortunately not clear about how these theory-laden data are supposed to be related to the radically other that is revealed in anxiety; that is, he is not clear about how theoretical recontextualization is supposed to work.²⁵ The important thing for him is that theoretical entities are taken to be elements of nature, that is, of a universe that is anterior to and independent of our everyday mode of making sense of things. In this important sense, science is, according to Heidegger, about the *incomprehensible*.

Nature is what is in principle explainable and to be explained because it is in principle incomprehensible. It is *the incomprehensible pure and simple*. And it is the incomprehensible because it is the 'unworlded' world, insofar as we take nature in this extreme sense of the entity as it is discovered in physics.²⁶

The point is *not* that the phenomenon of total breakdown, theoretical inspection, or anxiety gives us *sufficient grounds* for believing in the independent existence of natural things none of whose properties we understand. Although the quotation may suggest this, we shall see that such phenomena cannot supply such grounds. What the phenomenon of strangeness revealed in total breakdown supports is the sparer claim that *we can make sense* of nature as independent of our coping practices, and as underlying everyday things. If we had only the 'available' mode of encountering entities, we could never encounter entities more independent of our coping practices than particular hammers are. But if Heidegger is right, we can deworld such entities and be led by our experience of them as strange to see them as occurrent components of the universe. Two problems arise, however, for Heidegger's analysis. First, in showing we can encounter things shorn of their everyday *functionality*, Heidegger has not shown that we can encounter them as independent of *all* our practices for making things intelligible. There are still the very peculiar practices of making them intelligible as unintelligible. Thus, Rouse can reasonably object that:

It is not that such things, which Heidegger calls 'present-at-hand' [occurrent], exist independent of the behavioral responses of persons within a configuration of practices and functional equipment. It is that the appropriate behavioral responses to them are carefully shorn of any functional reference.²⁷

Second, even if, in anxiety or some kind of breakdown, we have an

experience that in no way draws on 'behavioral responses', why should we claim that the experience of the incomprehensible or strange is the experience of anything at all? Why should we believe that the experience of the incomprehensible, or strange, is an experience of the radically other and not of our own breakdown? What allows us the category of the radically other to begin with?

Heidegger clearly wants to embrace robust realism, for he exceeds the limits of deflationary realism when he writes: '[T]he fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the real be as that which *in itself* it is.'²⁸ But how can Heidegger have it both ways? Does the real exist and have properties *in itself* or only 'in itself', relative to our background practices?

We are now in a position to review how, in defending a robust realism concerning scientific entities, Heidegger makes two significant moves which, although they seem to be the right way to proceed, do not, as he presents them, succeed in supporting robust realism.

1. Heidegger points to two special attitudes (confronting equipmental breakdown and crucially anxiety) that break with our everyday, equipment-using practices. Since Heidegger bases his account of meaning on equipment-using practices, he concludes that such special attitudes, and particularly anxiety, by 'deworlding' entities, break with our everyday meanings altogether and give us access to the 'incomprehensible' as it is in itself. But, if one has a broader conception of everyday meaning that includes merely perceiving things outside of use-relations, such a 'switchover' would not get one outside it.
2. Heidegger contends that the switchover he describes gives us beings that can be recontextualized in a theory that makes no reference to everyday practices. But he has no account of how the meaningless beings revealed by breakdown can serve as data for science nor of what sort of practices could be left after the switchover that would allow dealing with the incomprehensible while leaving it independent of all our practices.²⁹

To save his robust realism, Heidegger would have to develop two quite different arguments. First, he would have to explain how a domain independent of our practices could be conceived. Heidegger could make an argument for a domain independent of us inhabited by things independent of us by claiming, first, that Dasein could inhabit two different totalities of practices, or two different worlds. Thus, Dasein could cope with the same thing under different aspects in each world – aspects that no third set of practices could make compatible. Heidegger could then claim that whatever

was experienced differently in the two incompatible worlds had an existence independent of the practices of each.

The evidence that Heidegger could conceive of two such worlds comes from his discussion of the 'primitive world' in *Being and Time*. There Heidegger suggests that, although primitive people are certainly Dasein, their world might be so different from ours that they understand the entities they deal with as neither available nor occurrent.³⁰ Heidegger does not work out how we could make sense of such a radically different world: how we could see what appears to us – given our world – as a piece of equipment also as not equipment – given the world of these people – and how we could avoid thinking that either in our own world or in some third world these differences in mode of being could be seen as two aspects of a third, richer mode of being. By drawing on Thomas Kuhn in the next section, we shall show how Heidegger could have worked out such a plural-world mode of understanding.

Second, if Heidegger is going to argue for more than the theoretical possibility of things independent of human practice, he will also have to argue that, although the practice-based structure of encounter that gives us access to entities depends on us *essentially*, what we encounter depends only *contingently* on this structure. Then both our everyday and scientific practices, although ineliminable from an account of the entities revealed by science, could be understood not as *constitutive* practices, but as *access* practices allowing 'genuine theoretical discovering'.³¹

To do this Heidegger would need, to begin with, to find a practical form of non-committal reference that could refer to entities in a way that both allowed that they could have essential properties, and that no property that *we* used in referring to them need, in fact, be essential. It turns out that Heidegger had uncovered such a practice in facing a different problem. In the 1920s he realized he wanted to talk about important features of human being and yet could not claim these were *essential* features. This methodological requirement put him in opposition to Husserl in two related ways: (1) Husserl held that general terms refer in part by way of the most general essential features of the types, and (2) Husserl held one could have an immediate eidetic intuition of essential structures. Since Heidegger saw that his hermeneutic method deprived eidetic intuition of any possible ground, he needed some other way to approach the essential structures of human being.³² How could he refer to kinds without knowing their essential features? To solve this problem Heidegger developed an account of 'non-committal' reference, which he called formal designation, that began with contingent features and arrived at essential features, if there were any, only after an investigation.³³ He explains: 'The empty meaning structure [of the formal designator] gives a direction towards filling it in. Thus a unique binding character lies in the formal designator; I must follow in a *determinate direction* that, should it get to the essential, only gets there by fulfilling the

designation by appreciating the non-essential.³⁴ Thus, Heidegger held that reference need not commit one to any essential features; rather, it binds one to investigate, in whatever way is appropriate to the domain, which features, if any, of an object referred to by its inessential features are essential. Heidegger continues:

[We must] make a leap and proceed resolutely from there! . . . One lives in a non-essential having that takes its specific direction toward completion from the maturing of the development of this having. . . . The *evidence* for the appropriateness of the original definition of the object is not essential and primordial; rather, the appropriateness is absolutely *questionable* and the definition must precisely be understood in this questionableness and lack of evidence.³⁵

Although he never used this idea of non-committal reference to defend his realism, this methodological principle – that one can designate something by its contingent properties and then be bound by that designation to research its essential properties – would have allowed Heidegger to use the switchover to the occurrent and its properties to give us an example of how access practices can break with everyday meaning. One could consider the properties, revealed by theory-driven practices after the switchover, to be strictly *contingent* properties of entities – properties that serve as a way of designating entities whose essential properties, if any, must then be discovered by further investigation.

Thus, Heidegger has the basic resources to answer the objections that he can get outside neither everyday practices (in a broad sense) nor culturally determined practices. But he does not use these resources. He would need to show how the possibility of plural worlds allows him to make sense of things-in-themselves. And he would need to admit that our everyday skills survive the switchover and that, indeed, they are necessary for (1) identifying the occurrent entities that the detached attitude reveals and (2) working data over in labs so that they can be taken as evidence for the essential properties of theoretical entities. But Heidegger could then add, under his breath so to speak, that, nevertheless none of these meaning-giving practices was essential to what was revealed in the laboratory. For, after the switchover, everyday practices, as well as the practices of the scientific institution, would be themselves experienced and deployed as questionable or contingent, and so the entities encountered would, in principle, be encountered as essentially independent of us. Heidegger seems to say just this in an interesting passage in *Basic Problems*: 'Intraworldliness does not belong to the essence of the occurrent things as such, but it is only the transcendental condition . . . for the possibility of occurrent things being able to emerge as they are.'³⁶ But he never uses his idea of formal designation to give him the right to this claim. Perhaps, he realized that, as Kuhn and Foucault have each argued, what counts for us as essential and accidental may itself depend on our framework.

But there still remains the question, Could we discover a posteriori that such a framework nevertheless allows us to discover the essential characteristics of entities? Is there anything in our experience that would enable us to make sense of this possibility?

If something in our experience allowed us to make sense of the possibility of creating a framework which could a posteriori be shown to enable us to get at things-in-themselves, then we would have a justification for a science that could claim to get at things as they are in-themselves. Of course, an actual scientific institution such as our current one could have developed in history by focusing on phenomena quite different from the experience we shall recur to – defamiliarized things – that justifies the claims of a science to get at things-in-themselves. That historical motivation and philosophical justification should come apart is not unusual. It happens frequently that the actual historical understanding that did indeed motivate (and was supposed to justify) the development of an important practice fails as justification. That money was valuable because it was made of or backed by gold is a good example of this. We now see that unthematized practices of trust were primarily responsible for the value of money; backing money by gold was merely a way of stimulating trust.³⁷

III. The Phenomenological Argument for Robust Realism

First, we will draw on some of Kuhn's thinking to give a phenomenological picture of two partially incommensurate worlds which enable a person to encounter the same thing under contradictory descriptions.³⁸ Only that would enable us to make sense of something-in-itself that underlay the descriptions. After developing the possibility of encountering things-in-themselves as underlying descriptions, we shall show how we in fact have access to such things-in-themselves.

Multiple Realism

The Quine-Davidsonian paradigm claims that two lexicons would have to be intertranslatable or else speakers of each language could not understand the other as speaking a language. Kuhn, however, points out that, if there were two such worlds whose language for describing kinds of objects could not be mutually translated, a bi-lingual person might nevertheless be able to make sense of each language even though she could not translate the kinds referred to in one language into the kinds of the other.³⁹ To fill this out, we should imagine a child immersed in linguistic world 'A' for a while and then in 'B' for a while and then back again repeatedly. For example, suppose the initial immersions were with the child's father in environment A which is urban and

then with the child's mother in environment B which is rural. As a consequence, we suppose that the child did not intertranslate terms until she already had a firm grip on each language.

To see in finer detail what this would be like, one might take as an example a bi-worldly (as opposed to strictly bi-lingual), person who feels at home with seeing the kinds that make sense in a Christian world *and* also feels at home in her profession making psychological assessments of kinds of psychological disorders.⁴⁰ So, at times, our Christian psychologist will see people either as members of the kind 'saved' or as members of the kind 'sinners', and, at other times, she will see people either as members of the kind 'normal' (having successful coping strategies), or as members of the kind 'mentally ill' (having dysfunctional coping strategies). The fact that, as a psychologist, she cannot help but see certain saintly practices as dysfunctional will raise a tension or a disharmony that shows that, on this matter, she has found an instability that marks a boundary between the two separate but equal worlds in which she is at home. (It is crucial to recognize that, for the Christian, saints are as much natural kinds in God's creation as are lions and maples. Likewise for the psychologist, the various dysfunctions are natural kinds.) We are not saying that, as a psychologist, she sees certain so-called saints as dysfunctional or that, as a Christian, she sees certain kinds of so-called dysfunctional people as saints. We insist that there is no kind-kind translation of *crucial terms* between these genuinely different worlds. Rather, as a psychologist, she sees as dysfunctional the same people who, when engaged in Christian practices, she would venerate and call saints.

If the Christian psychologist tries to merge her two sets of kinds, she will get inconsistencies. Imagine a version of Christianity where the Christian defines the kind 'saint' as a person worthy of imitation because he manifests his love of God by not caring where his meals or clothing come from. Imagine, too, a version of psychotherapy where, as a psychologist our Christian defines the kind 'dysfunctional person' as a person to be cured of his irresponsible disregard for planning. Then, we can see that the Christian psychologist would apply the kinds 'saint' and 'dysfunctional person' to the same person and understand these predicates to hold at the same time. Yet we and the Christian psychologist would also see that one could not consistently claim that the same person is one whose behavior is simultaneously to be imitated and to be eliminated; that is, we and the Christian psychologist would see that a kind from one world is inconsistent with a kind from the other.

We hold that people inhabit different worlds if and only if those terms that the inhabitants themselves consider crucial to their self-understanding are translatable in another world only instance by instance. Thus, certain terms, 'saint' and 'dysfunctional person' in the case of the Christian psychologist, can only be translated instance-by-instance. Sometimes for the psychologist

the term 'saint' will indicate someone who copes dysfunctionally, sometimes someone who copes eccentrically, and so forth. Sometimes for the Christian the term 'dysfunctional' will indicate someone who is to be admired, sometimes someone who is to be cared for, and so on.

If any single kind of thing underlies the two crucial kinds from the Christian and therapeutic worlds, it is not one that makes sense in either of these two worlds (since to do so it would have to have contradictory essential features).⁴¹ Nothing requires the existence of any third world in terms of which this contradiction can be resolved. Therefore, if there is a kind (or even some internally consistent unity like a kind) that underlies these two and only these two kinds, it makes sense to think of it as outside both worlds. Since our example can, in principle, be generalized over all worlds, it makes sense to talk of some internally consistent unity like a kind that is outside any world.

This reasoning mirrors Kantian reasoning about the existence of a thing-in-itself independent of conceptual schemes, with the important reservation that we do not have to claim that the properties of this thing-in-itself as experienced are practice-relative, in the way that someone who thought in terms of conceptual schemes would have to claim that the properties of things were necessarily scheme relative. For, while there is no way for someone with a *conceptual* scheme to have an experience in which the concepts (the pure categories) that govern experience are themselves experienced as contingent with regard to the thing they enable us to recognize, practices do allow us to have an experience that reveals that they and the meanings they provide are contingent.⁴²

Access to Things-in-themselves

Once we find it coherent to think of beings independent of human practices, we can examine our experiences and ways in which our practices work, to see if we could have access to such beings as they are in themselves. Experience lets us know that, because for the most part we encounter people, selves, equipment, and even natural things as both perceptually and instrumentally familiar, we normally encounter things inextricably bound up with our everyday practices. We can, however – though we do it rarely – encounter things and even people in an attitude of unfamiliarity. A trivial instance of encountering something in this attitude can be produced quite easily. If we say a familiar word over and over, we eventually hear the word switch over into a strange acoustic blast. We call this experience *defamiliarization*, and the way of being it gives access to *the strange*. We can also produce this defamiliarization by staring for a long time. Recall staring at a flame until it seems so strange it can hardly be called even a shifting shape. Once we get

enough experience with the defamiliarization that comes from repeating or staring, we can develop skills for achieving this state with things in any domain.⁴³

Although special experiences of strangeness in other unfamiliarizing attitudes may give rise to various institutions such as art and religion, we are interested exclusively in the defamiliarizing that enables us to make sense of things as they essentially are in the physical universe.⁴⁴ We shall examine three features of such defamiliarizing and then summarize them to show how they make intelligible the claim that we are dealing with something independent of our practices for revealing it. These three features tell us what constitutes what is more traditionally called an objective stance. The summary tells why this stance yields objects.⁴⁵

First, when we defamiliarize something, its most salient feature for us is its strangeness. By this we mean that none of our normal ways of making sense of what we encounter do it justice. When we encounter a familiar word as a strange acoustic blast, we certainly know by virtue of how we produced the sound that it is indeed the sound of the familiar word, but to say that we are hearing the sound of the word as we normally pronounce it precisely misses the strangeness of it. We are not at all sure what the relation is between this strange sound and the class of familiar meaningful sounds that normally count as the word. We simply know that on this occasion, this is the sound that was made when we said the word. To know anything further about it requires further investigation. We thus know that we are in unfamiliar territory. As Heidegger says, we must 'make a leap and proceed resolutely from there'. That is, we must be true to this strangeness that is a component of our access to the acoustic blast and then go on to find out more.

Second, thanks to our familiar speaking practices, we certainly are able to identify the acoustic blast with the familiar word which we were pronouncing. But when we do, these practices are not working in their *normal mode*. Normally, our practices for encountering things reveal for us those things as they are. Our practices for using chairs enable us to encounter chairs as equipment for sitting. Our practices for encountering professors, students, stock brokers, lawyers, doctors, and so forth enable us to encounter those people as who they are. And our practices for encountering ourselves whether they are practices for talking about our feelings, for taking stock of our resources, our accomplishments, our sins, or whatever, enable us to encounter ourselves as who we are. But our everyday practices *do not* enable us to encounter the strange as what it is. The thing's very strangeness puts us on notice that we are not encountering it in the way that enables us to understand it.

Defamiliarization is, therefore, the breakdown of everyday coping, and all that remains of intelligibility after defamiliarization are coping practices that enable us to *identify* things in a non-committal, contingent,⁴⁶ *prima facie* not

fully adequate way. Access to entities independent of our practices for making them intelligible is thus secured by a radical switchover in the *role played by* everyday practices so that they become contingent practices for identifying objects. If we were to engage in the investigation of the relation between the strange thing and its everyday mode of being, we might be able to describe it in terms of sufficient features to reidentify it, but we cannot even be sure of that. Hence, our everyday practices are understood as inappropriate for defining what presents itself. As Heidegger puts it, '[T]he appropriateness is absolutely *questionable* and the definition must precisely be understood in this questionableness'.

Third, our way of referring to the defamiliarized strange thing takes its cue from the contingency of our means of identifying it. For this reason, reference here works as Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan describe *rigid designation*, particularly the rigid designation of samples of a natural kind.⁴⁷ So, once defamiliarized, something is designated by a description or by a pointing that is not taken to get at the thing's essence.⁴⁸ Such a pointing or description leaves open the possibility that investigation may show that there is no thing or kind of thing being pointed at but rather some unusual mixture of things. Recall that Heidegger calls this mode of reference 'non-committal formal designation'⁴⁹ and, as we have seen, he says it is empty but binding.

Though Kripke, the penultimate Putnam, and Donnellan take this form of reference to be generally applicable for singular terms, demonstratives, and natural kind terms in our everyday dealings with things, we hold that its applicability is confined to the results of defamiliarization and perhaps other unfamiliarizing attitudes like it and institutions, like science, justified by interactions with the non-familiar.

To understand our and Heidegger's position, we can begin by looking at Dagfinn Føllesdal's account of what characteristics of things and ourselves require rigid designation. Føllesdal writes that we are forced to designate things in this way because things have many important properties we do not know about, because the properties of things change over time, and because our knowledge is fallible.⁵⁰ We accept the direction of Føllesdal's thinking but note that he should *not* be talking about hidden properties, changing properties, and fallibility as we experience them in everyday life. We can refer to things despite everyday hiddenness, changes, and ignorance by virtue of a cluster of perceptual and other dispositions to cope with the thing in one way or another, most of which have to be reliable. We do need rigid designation, however, when crucial properties are radically hidden, radically change, or our fallibility is radically problematic. We need it for referring to something that behaves in a way that is radically contrary to expectation, when referring, for instance, to the man who turns into a butterfly. We shall use phenomenological description to show that everyday reference occurs by means of what we may loosely call description while reference in certain

experiences that are alienated from the everyday works by rigid designation.⁵¹

In everydayness, the reference of both general and singular terms⁵² is bound up with our *practical* encounters with the things which the terms name. In everydayness, the descriptive meaning of a general or kind term, not something we subsequently come to understand about its referent, normally settles its reference. Hammers are for hammering, and if the thing we pick up and with which we hammer in nails functions smoothly as a hammer, then that is what it is and we refer to it as a hammer. Likewise, for *that* hammer that I point to.⁵³ If I reach out to the position of its location grab it and hammer in a nail with it just as I expected I could when I designated it as that hammer, then it is 'that hammer'. My various dispositional readiesses were sufficient for determining the reference. Our everyday practices for finding and using things constitute the nature of everyday things, even particular everyday things. Without practices for hammering, we would have no hammers. Without other practices for identifying particular things as they are related to us in our environmental contexts, we would not have *this* or *that* hammer. And so it goes for other singular terms in everydayness. It is functionally useful to have 'this' hammer, 'that' woman who is Joe's wife, and 'Joe' himself. We cope with each of these as an individual thing. And part of our way of coping with it as an individual thing is to have a singular term that designates it. These terms refer to the thing across any of the unknown properties, changing properties, or fallibilities that are part of everyday life.⁵⁴ We can summarize this point by recurring to a version of the deflationary claim: in the everyday, our practices for identifying something or referring to it are inextricably bound up with our practices for dealing with that thing, and those practices are also involved in constituting the nature of the thing. Even in cases where there are confusions of identity in the everyday, we usually resolve the problem by reference to our everyday shared ways for coping with things and people. So if we ask, 'Is the hammer lying next to me the one I called *that* hammer?', we answer ourselves by saying: 'The one I saw in the location next to the beam is not there and I do tend to grab things without thinking about it, so I must have grabbed *that* hammer and put it down on the bench when Joe interrupted me.' Likewise, if in an everyday way, I ask, pointing to the person with a baton, 'Is that Joe's wife?'. I will answer myself by recalling that Joe once told me that his wife was a conductor.⁵⁵

It is fairly obvious why rigid designation must be used for dealing with strange things. The strangeness of the strange thing defies sense. We can only refer to it or reidentify it by contingent details. We will draw on a simple illustration to show that scientific practice also treats things as though the essence were unknown, while everyday coping normally does not.

In everydayness, breakdowns in reference usually occur when our anticipations do not pan out and we are startled. We ask for a glass of water and someone gives us a glass of milk. We take a gulp, and until we can get a grasp on what is in our mouths, we have no idea what, if anything, we are experiencing.⁵⁶ The same sort of thing happens if we are bank tellers, identify someone before us as a customer, and then suddenly find ourselves facing what we later realize is a gun. For a moment, we are in such a state of consternation that we have no idea how to identify or even refer to what is before us. Another case of such an everyday breakdown of reference, which is easier to compare to what occurs in scientific procedures, is the first time that while cooking we crack open a fertilized egg. We cannot make sense of the bloody monstrous mess until the proper identification clicks into place. Now, if in everydayness we referred to or identified kinds of things as Kripke says we identify natural kinds, then we should have no breakdown of reference in any of these cases. We should immediately understand that we are dealing with a potential kind of object that we identify by contingent features and that these features might well turn out to be inessential. We could, of course, on the Kripke account, be intellectually surprised that the expected kind did not appear, and we might consequently respond to the thing in an uncoordinated way, as we do when tripped up by something recognizable. But we should always, on the Kripke account, retain our capacity to identify or refer to what we are experiencing. But this is precisely the capacity that we lose when we are startled.

The above examples should make clear that the Kripkean account of reference does not work for our experience of most everyday breakdowns in reference.⁵⁷ If we were to examine what goes wrong in such breakdowns where we are so startled, we would say that, in having our dispositional and skillful anticipations so disturbed, we lose our sense of what is happening and thereby lose our ability to respond with skillful coordination. We may notice too that, in everydayness, we only stop being startled when we can again identify or refer to the thing to which our attention is directed as something soliciting a certain other cluster of skills, expectations, beliefs, and so forth. It is also at that time that we regain a sense of how to deal with it. Thus, we conclude that our everyday identifications arise from our ways of coping.

In contrast, the attitude of the scientist toward the objects of her study, like the attitude of a movie audience toward the content of a movie, is non-committal in the relation of her current identification practices to the rest of her coping practices. We can see this point more clearly if we imagine a geneticist who has been changing the genetic make-up of certain chickens so that they produce eggs with a higher percentage of white. Suppose that the geneticist is checking the results of her intervention, without knowing which eggs are from the control group and which from the chickens whose DNA she has altered. She is carefully cracking open eggs, examining what she sees, and

noting it down. She cracks open a fertilized egg. Doubtless, she will be surprised. She will not know what exactly she is looking at. But since her genetic intervention and its results are based on nothing more than a hypothesis, she does not assume that she knows what the results of her intervention will be and is ready for all sorts of experimental data. She therefore acts not only as though the percentage of whites is a contingent matter but also as though whether the shells contain whites at all is contingent. So when she sees the contents of the fertilized egg, her skills for coping with such a thing might be uncoordinated and she might even be disgusted by what she sees, but her attention will be directed towards the contents of the egg as something that did not have the properties she expected, in much the way we are surprised in the movies when a character has properties we would not expect. She will not, however, be stunned into consternation as we are when in everyday life we would face the fertilized egg or, if we are banktellers, the robber. In short, the scientist will have been identifying, or referring to, the contents of the eggs, and probably the eggs themselves, as known only by a collection of contingent properties, not by their essence, which is to say *not* by preparing to cope with them in a familiar way. Such a mode of identification goes with the non-committal, detached state we enter when we are engaged in aesthetic appreciation or scientific investigation.⁵⁸ For this reason, we think that, although Kripke's account does not work for the instrumental kinds we cope with in our everyday dealings, rigid designation works well for dealing with the strange in general and within the institutions that are made sense of in terms of such dealings: science, some forms of art, and so forth.

In sum, the *strangeness* of things as they appear to us when defamiliarized, the *contingency* of our everyday practices in helping us make the strange thing intelligible, and the practice of *rigid designation* make intelligible the claim that we can have access to things-in-themselves. For strangeness is precisely our recognition of the breakdown of our everyday practices for making sense of what we are encountering, i.e. a breakdown in making the strange thing fully intelligible.⁵⁹ Strangeness, then, is neither a way of making something intelligible as weird or strange *in its own nature*, as we may make something intelligible as having a certain mass, nor is it making something intelligible as *strange* by the way we interact with it, as we may make something commonplace by the way we interact with it; rather, strangeness is our experience of our incapacity to make sense of what we are attending to.

Nominalism and the Structure of the Strange

The practice of rigid designation, as we have described it, implies that we can make sense of the strange as having some necessary, strange unity underlying the contingent everyday properties by which it is identified.⁶⁰ This unity is

enough to make intelligible the notion of a natural kind whose essence is independent of our ways of making things intelligible.

But philosophical nominalists, such as the most recent Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman, argue from certain logico-mathematical considerations that rigid designation must ultimately be a mistaken account of reference because it makes no sense to claim that there are essential attributes.⁶¹ For this they argue from certain logico-mathematical considerations. We shall show that the argument between the essentialist rigid designators and the philosophical nominalists fail to touch each other, because each argues from within a different space of conceptual possibilities in which one can make sense of things. We can agree that from within the logico-mathematical space, objects can have no necessary unities. But we will seek to show that the logico-mathematical space is not the space in which the strange could be encountered and therefore in which we could have genuine investigations of natural kinds of objects. We shall start by laying out the nominalist argument in its basic form.

Suppose we have a group of planets moving in some systematic way. We will be able to develop a system of relations that will describe where any one of them is by assuming that the sun is the center of the system. But notice that we could and did develop another system of relations that could do the same descriptive work when we assumed that the earth was at the center. We could do the same with any of the planets at the center. And if this is the case, we ought to be able to do the same by putting the place in respect to which the planets are moving anywhere in the galaxy. Moreover, we could develop descriptions that did not take account of whole planets but rather particular features on the planets. It should be clear that these considerations leave us with infinite possible centers and infinite possible descriptions of infinitely many features, all of which would serve as the basis for a system of calculable nomological regularities that enable predictability. Moreover, no feature included in one system would fail to be accounted for by another system, though it might appear to be non-essential. Thus, each description would give as complete an account as the any other so far as law-based predictions were the criterion of completeness. The only way one description could have priority over another would be if some feature extrinsic to the system, such as our ease in handling the mathematics for making the predictions most important to us, grounded the selection. But that would be to accept nominalism, since kinds would be relative to our abilities.⁶² Obviously, if the universe is chaotic, then realism fails as well.

Concerns like these, however, arise only if we are thinking within a logico-mathematical space, where any conceivable determinate relation among things is to be treated as just as important as any other. And once we are outside everydayness altogether, what constraint could there be? In the space of logico-mathematical possibilities, none. But our interactions with the

strange establish proto-theoretical space, still cut off from the everyday, but with certain constraints on what count as significant relations. We shall try to show that there are pragmatic constraints on us, when we encounter the strange, that require us to investigate the strange in a particular way if we are going to have any encounter with the strange at all. We shall then try to show why this proto-theoretical space with its constraints on our observation of the strange has priority over the seeming logico-mathematical necessity of nominalism.

We encounter the strange by means of properties which we must assume are contingent because none of them enables us to understand the strangeness of the strange. In saying this, we are merely recurring to the fact that the strange is always found underlying some ordinary thing and that the strange can be contingently identified by the same properties used to identify the ordinary thing. But when one identifies the strange in this way, one misses the crucial feature of the strange: its strangeness. Therefore, we can say that any encounter with the strange requires that the strange have some properties not crucial to its strangeness (namely everyday properties) by which we can identify it. This feature is necessary for encountering the strange. A skillful or practical intelligence such as ours could only have access to the strange as independent of us by means of such non-crucial properties. Second, as practical beings, once we enter into an investigation of the strange, we can only claim to be designating the strange by means of properties that are not essential if we practically recognize that identification by such designation is tentative. And the only way to mark such tentativeness for practical beings is to seek identification of the strange thing in its strangeness. These are the constraints on the ability of practical beings to encounter the strange. We call the space determined by such constraints the proto-theoretical space, since it allows for a plurality of theoretical investigations of the possible essential properties of the strange. It is only in such a proto-theoretical space that there could be the means of designation with which we could make sense of things independent of us.

But what should we make of the constraints on us of the proto-theoretical space in which the strange is encountered? How do they tell against the reasoning of the space of logico-mathematical possibilities? After all, in the proto-theoretical space, nominalism remains a *possibility*, since it is possible that our investigations could find that the strange has no essence. But in the logico-mathematical space, nominalism is a *necessity*, because when we move the strange from our consideration of it in the proto-theoretical space in which we first encounter it to the logico-mathematical space, precisely the constraints of the proto-theoretical space on our ways of dealing with the strange get left behind. But does the space of logico-mathematical possibility really deal with the strange at all? It seems that if it did, the strange would have to be designated in precisely the way in which it is designated when we

encounter it in a primordial way. But if it is designated tentatively by contingent properties, then the search for essential properties must still make sense when we contemplate the strange in logico-theoretical space. However, as we have just seen, thinking about entities in logico-mathematical space entails nominalism. Hence, in the logico-mathematical space, no practice that implied designating natural kinds could make sense. This contradiction shows that the mathematico-logical space is incompatible with our experience of the strange.

We might claim that we can have rigid designation without its teleology. That is, we might claim that we designate things by a bundle of contingent properties, one of which is that we experience the thing as strange. But practical beings cannot do this. If we attempted designation by contingent properties alone, that is without the proviso that we were missing something crucial, we would not be identifying the strange things revealed by defamiliarization, but anything in so far as we can always pick out things by their contingent properties. Consequently, we simply cannot even *refer* to a strange thing as strange inside the logico-mathematical space where the nominalist argument works. These considerations show that the nominalist argument, based on logico-mathematical considerations, cannot account for the strange as we encounter it in the proto-theoretical space determined by our practices of defamiliarization. We can only make sense of the strange so far as we can make sense of seeking the essences of kinds that are independent of our practices for making sense of them.

IV. Conclusion

We have not claimed, and do not claim, that a realist science would have, in fact, to develop from interactions with strange things. Indeed, a realist science could develop through the accretion of procedures for dealing with things gathered from many contingent circumstances where there had never been an encounter with the strange. But interactions with the strange provide us with two important ways of defending the possibility of a realist science. First, encounters with the strange along with our claims for multiple realism and for a non-nominalist proto-theoretical space enable us to make sense of the attempt to describe the components of the universe as they are in themselves. We can thus defend the claim of a science to be realist against claims that such a notion is incoherent from the start. Secondly, encounters with the strange show us three basic structural elements that a realist science's core practices would have to have. A realist science would have to reveal for us entities that are (1) defamiliarized, (2) identified by contingent properties, and (3) investigated without dependence on everyday understanding for the determination of essences.

On the basis of how we deal with the strange then, we can point to five practices from today's science that provide an illustration of how a science could develop around these three structural elements in order to ground its claims to realism. (In drawing on these illustrative practices, we are saying nothing about whether they are central or marginal in today's science.)

The first structural element of a realist science is defamiliarization. A realist science could not simply deal with everyday objects as everyday objects. For the essences of everyday objects, if they have them, depend on us. Today, the institutional practice that most clearly provides for defamiliarization is the scientific practice of opening up a theoretical space or principle of recontextualization (within the proto-theoretical space in which dealings with the strange would take place) for understanding the phenomena of a particular domain. One such space, the theoretical space of Newtonian physics, focuses only on mass and motion, which, from the everyday point of view, seems a rather impoverished and arbitrary restriction of what counts as important. All theoretical spaces open us to objects under such a non-familiar aspect.

Objects within the theoretical space must be identified by contingent characteristics until their essences are known. Here, there are two more practices (our second and third) we can point to that allow us to make sense of this structural point. First, a realist science would need practices of Kripkean reference to enable the scientist to remain detached from the everyday properties she uses in identifying the objects under investigation. Secondly, a realist science would need to reidentify objects in a way that is not wholly dependent on either the everyday way of making sense of things or that of a particular theoretical projection. Such reidentification practices would be the accumulations from various *ad hoc* developments in science and various historical theoretical contextualizations, minus any of those that a particular currently dominant theoretical contextualization excludes. This mix of reidentification practices prevents practitioners from reidentifying things solely in terms of one or another explanatory perspective and therefore enables reidentification across scientific revolutions.

A realist science would have to make sure that it had practices for seeking the essences of objects in its domain that did not depend on everyday canons of what makes sense. Again, there are two practices (our fourth and fifth) that illustrate how such a structure could be institutionalized. A realist science could separate itself from the everyday by granting full autonomy to a discipline of puzzle-solving within the theoretical projection. Under such a regime, a solution that solves a puzzle, no matter how perceptually and intellectually counterintuitive, would have the power to force scientists to abandon even their principles of contextualization (i.e. a theoretical projection). (Quantum physics is a case study of long-accepted principles of contextualization being cast aside.) For a realist science could allow itself

no assumption regarding how the universe agrees with any of our intellectual dispositions and must credit even puzzle solutions that, on the one hand, embody counterintuitive assumptions about cutting up the universe and, on the other, come as a result of solutions to puzzles. That solutions to puzzles create more puzzles suggests, given our analysis of strangeness, that puzzle-solving is the activity of letting the nature of the universe guide conceptions of it away from human ways of conceiving toward a view from nowhere, appropriate to the universe as it is in itself. Also, for its account of essences to remain free from the everyday understanding of the dispositions of things, the essences of a scientific account should be related to the course of the universe of which they are components by nomological explanation.⁶³ Such explanations force a science to keep its puzzle solutions coherent with each other. Thus, nomological explanations have the job of showing how all data that are about non-contingent properties of things in some domain must make sense in terms of the basic regularities of that domain. So while nomological explanations are retrospective reconstructions of what took place in an investigation, they should account for all the results, even the unwanted interactions registered by the instruments, not just the results of stabilized experiments.⁶⁴

We have illustrated with five practices the way a science could institutionalize the three basic structural features it would need in order to have its realism supported by our arguments. We do not comment on whether our current science has sufficiently instituted these practices.⁶⁵

NOTES

- 1 A few exceptions are: R. N. Boyd, 'Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology', *PSA 1980*, ed. P. D. Asquith and R. Giere (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1981), 2, pp. 613–62; R. N. Boyd, 'The Current Status of Scientific Realism', *Scientific Realism*, ed. J. Leplin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 41–82; Michael Devitt, *Realism and Truth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and John Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. 119–49.
- 2 The most important predecessor antirealisms include Hilary Putnam's internal realism, which is a form of Kantian idealism, and Thomas Kuhn's and Nelson Goodman's nominalisms. See Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). See also Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970), and Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978).
- 3 For an example of the deflationary realist claim, see Stanley Fish, 'Professor Sokal's Bad Joke', *The New York Times*, 21 May 1996, A23. Concerning the 'everyday', we distinguish our sense of this term from Heidegger's. When Heidegger speaks of everyday practices or everydayness, he generally means instrumental coping practices or these practices and what we encounter through them. When we speak of everyday practices, we intend to refer more broadly to our familiar ways of encountering things in general, including therefore our familiar perceptual way. The only practices that we deal with in this paper as *non-everyday* are encounters with what we call the strange and scientific practices. More broadly, for us institutional practices including scientific, religious, and certain aesthetic practices whose

- intelligibility is founded on non-everyday experiences count as non-everyday practices. When, however, we explicitly describe Heidegger's views, we shall use the term 'everyday' as he uses it.
- 4 The three crucial essays for the deflationary realist position are: Donald Davidson, 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', *A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays*, Royal Institute of Philosophy, supplement 30, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 153–66; Donald Davidson, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 183–98; and Donald Davidson, 'The Inscrutability of Reference', *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, op. cit., pp. 227–41. For an independently developed account of deflationary realism, see Arthur Fine's description of what he calls the Natural Ontological Attitude in *The Shaky Game* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Jeff Malpas and Joseph Rouse have generalized Davidson's arguments concerning the relation of *beliefs* to things to cover the relation of *all coping practices* to things. Malpas and Rouse have also tried to show, contrary to our view, that Martin Heidegger is a deflationary realist. See J. E. Malpas, *Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Joseph Rouse's two books: *Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) and *Engaging Science: How to Understand its Practices Philosophically* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
 - 5 Our question—whether the idea of an essential structure of the universe independent of our practices for investigating it makes sense—can be taken up without regard to other important discussions of the natural sciences. We therefore do not take a stand on: (1) whether unobservable entities are real (the question of instrumentalism), (2) whether events in the universe are lawful throughout or exhibit a degree of randomness (the question of determinism), and (3) whether there are good arguments for metaphysical realism based solely on conceptual analysis. See, e.g., John Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, op. cit., pp. 149–97, where he argues for the conceptual necessity of brute facts which are discovered, not constituted.
 - 6 We understand causal capacities to be dispositional and therefore as supporting counterfactuals. We take it that capacities and potentialities reside in things, while counterfactuals reside in our ways of talking about (and coping more generally with) such things as capacities and potentialities.
 - 7 We will not take into account descriptive arguments for nominalism such as Andrew Pickering's. See Andrew Pickering, *The Mangle of Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 1–112.
 - 8 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 246–7.
 - 9 Neither Heidegger nor Davidson has a knock-down argument against the skeptic. Against Heidegger, a skeptic could object that human beings might only be being-in-the-world contingently while essentially being Cartesian minds or Searlean brains in cranial vats. The skeptic could similarly claim against Davidson that we could be Cartesian minds with innate ideas. Also, the Davidsonian skeptic could, as Barry Stroud suggests, question whether in formulating his doubts, he is making sense.
 - 10 Davidson, 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', op. cit., p. 160.
 - 11 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 416.
 - 12 Martin Heidegger, *The History of the Concept of Time*, trans. T. Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1985), p. 217.
 - 13 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 255.
 - 14 Ibid., p. 228 (with minor correction in translation by Hubert L. Dreyfus).
 - 15 Ibid., p. 228 (with minor correction in translation by Hubert L. Dreyfus).
 - 16 Heidegger himself seems to be conflicted on the subject. He writes: 'The question of the extent to which one might conceive the interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way is a question which I am myself not able to decide—one which is still completely unclear to me. (*Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984], p. 210.)
 - 17 See Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991).
 - 18 William D. Blattner, 'Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?', *Inquiry* 37 (1994), pp. 185–201.
 - 19 David R. Cerbone, 'World, World-entry, and Realism in Early Heidegger', *Inquiry* 38 (1995), pp. 401–21.
 - 20 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., pp. 102–3 (our italics). In his later marginal notes, Heidegger adds that this revealing of the occurrent does not require either actual breakdown or an active disregard of the use aspects of equipment, but can also be arrived at by training oneself to focus on properties of entities in a way that is not directly related to our coping activity. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 57, asterisked note.
 - 21 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 412 (Heidegger's emphasis). Rouse rightly thinks that 'Heidegger is disturbingly vague about the changeover which is said to occur' (Rouse, *Knowledge and Power*, op. cit., pp. 74–5).
 - 22 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 103.
 - 23 Martin Heidegger, 'What Is Metaphysics?', *Basic Writings*, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper, 1977), p. 105. Joseph P. Fell develops this point in his 'The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of Praxis in Early Heidegger', *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 65–80.
 - 24 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 414.
 - 25 Rouse is again right in demanding that Heidegger be more specific on this point. One could ask, for example, by what skills do the scientists interpret their data and, if skills are required, how the scientist could claim that the theoretical objects confirmed by the data are independent of us?
 - 26 Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, op. cit., pp. 217–8. Though Heidegger is a realist with respect to natural entities, he is not a reductionist, or naturalist. He argues at length in Sections 19, 20, and 21 of *Being and Time* that our practical ability to disclose ways of being, and thus to discover beings, cannot be understood in terms of the occurrent, and that therefore the occurrent, even recontextualized in a successful science of nature, could not provide the fundamental building blocks of reality. Natural science can tell us only what is *causally* real, it cannot account for our ability to make intelligible various ways of being, thereby disclosing various domains of being or realities, one of which includes the entities described by physical science. Thus science cannot be a theory of *ultimate* reality. This is Heidegger's reason for rejecting *reductive* realism. He says: 'Realism tries to explain reality ontically by real connections of interaction between things that are real. . . . [But] being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is "transcendental" for every entity' (*Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 251).
 - 27 Rouse, *Knowledge and Power*, op. cit., p. 74.
 - 28 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 255, italics ours.
 - 29 When Heidegger later investigates how scientific research as an institution works, he claims that research is based on what he calls the projection of a total ground-plan. (See Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt [New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977].) Research, he claims, is a modern way of studying nature that proceeds by setting up a *total* theory of how nature works and then dealing with the anomalies that show up when the theory is assumed to cover all phenomena. Thus, normal science has, for Heidegger, the ongoing job of trying to account for anomalies, while revolutionary advances in science occur when resistant anomalies lead scientists to propose a new ground-plan. (Heidegger in 1938, thus, anticipates Thomas Kuhn's account of normal science in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* [1962] and supports Karl Popper's account of research in *Logik der Forschung* [1935] as proceeding by falsification.) What is important about modern science as research, then, is its totalizing claim. Heidegger argues that this totalizing claim is the modern version of the series of totalizing claims about the beingness of beings that have characterized our metaphysical culture perhaps since Anaximander, certainly since Plato. Thus a pervasive cultural practice, of just the sort that deworlding and recontextualization of the incomprehensible were meant to exclude, turns out to be fundamental to Heidegger's account of modern scientific research as an institution. This acknowledgment of the cultural

practices of research would seem to undermine robust realism. (Indeed, Rouse holds that later Heidegger gave up the realism of the *Being and Time* period.) But we shall claim that the practices of research could constitute an institution that could be said to get at the functional components of the universe as they are in themselves.

30 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 113.

31 Ibid., p. 412.

32 Ibid., p. 187.

33 We translate *anzeige* as 'designation' rather than 'indication'.

34 Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, II, *Abteilung: Vorlesungen*, Band 61 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), p. 33 (translation by Hubert L. Dreyfus with Hans Sluga).

35 Ibid., pp. 34–5.

36 Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 194.

37 John Searle first brought this example to our attention. This distinction enables us to answer an important objection. In his essay, 'Decontextualization, Standardization, and Deweyan Science', William Blattner criticizes Heidegger (and Dreyfus) for giving an incoherent genetic account of the rise of the theoretical attitude from the breakdown of everyday coping. Blattner points out that even when there is a breakdown in our coping with available equipment, we do not normally find ourselves outside all practical activity. Rather, the occurrent stuff of the broken equipment is normally encountered on the background of activity with the available. Blattner goes on to argue, that if we did find ourselves outside all practice, as we do in Heideggerian anxiety, we would then have no motive for trying to find a scientific account of the meaningless stuff that appears in the total breakdown. We agree with these descriptive psychological claims. But phenomenological description, as opposed to psychological or historical genetic reconstruction, looks for experiences that give rise to the intelligibility or unintelligibility of that toward which we comport ourselves. In the case of the occurrent, Heidegger claims that the experience we have of meaningless stuff either in equipmental breakdown or in anxiety allows us to make sense of things radically other than what our everyday practices could make sense of, and makes intelligible our sense that in our scientific practices we deal with objects as they are totally independent of our everyday concerns. Whether scientific practices are *motivated* by equipmental breakdown, anxiety, or any other psychological state is irrelevant to the phenomenological question of what experience enables us to *understand the mode of being* of the objects of scientific practice. Arguing that the same practices that *motivate* our dealings with the occurrent also have to *found* the meaning of the occurrent would be to invite the genetic fallacy.

38 For a more extended account of partial or weak incommensurability and its consequences for plural-world thinking, see our 'Two Kinds of Anti-Essentialism and their Consequences', *Critical Inquiry* 22 (Summer, 1996), pp. 735–63, and 'Single-World vs. Plural-World Antiessentialism: A Reply to Tim Dean', *Critical Inquiry* (Summer, 1997). The second essay takes up our objections to Davidson's 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'. See also Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Heidegger's Hermeneutic Realism', *The Interpretive Turn*, ed. David R. Hiley, James F. Bohman, and Richard Shusterman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 25–41.

39 Thomas Kuhn, 'Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability', *PSA* 1982, ed. Peter D. Asquith and Thomas Nickles (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1983), 2, pp. 681–797, esp. 669–88.

40 To fend off worries about whether a Christian could be bi-worldly, we can begin by assuming that our Christian is a Dostoevskian Christian in the mold of Father Zossima from *The Brothers Karamazov*. Dostoevsky gives us a hint of what it might be like to be a bi-worldly Christian psychologist in his telling of the life of Zossima. He points out that Zossima became notorious for prescribing drugs to cure what his fellow monks regarded as spiritual maladies such as some cases of seeing devils.

41 One might object that this multiple world (or multiple realist) ontology violates the principle of non-contradiction, since it looks as though our instance of an irresponsible saint (let us call him Simon), who is also an instance of a dysfunctional person, has the properties of being both venerable (to be admired) and dysfunctional (not to be admired) in the same

respect at the same time. In response to this objection, we need, first, to recognize that the law of non-contradiction is broken only if one simultaneously employs both a *pragmatic* way of making things intelligible and an *essentialist* one. When making things intelligible in an essentialist way, we classify things according to a set of kinds, all of which are related to each other according to a principle or something like a principle such as a style. The Christian sees Simon as a saint because she sees him as instantiating various interrelated kinds of virtue such as humility, absolute trust in God's love, and, so forth. These are the kinds of virtue that make sense in a universe governed by a loving God. That there is such a God governing is the principle that organizes the Christian's classifications into kinds. In contrast, for a psychologist, the principle according to which kinds are discovered would be that of mental health defined in terms of some model of successful functioning. When the Christian acts as a psychologist, she sees Simon as ill because of his passivity and refusal to take responsibility for his future. When making things intelligible in this way, everything encountered will be understood according to the principle that guides that form of thinking. So the Christian will see everything in terms of a loving God. The psychologist will see everything in terms of furthering or impeding personal flourishing. Furthermore, things that are considered indifferent or contingent with regard to a loving God or to personal flourishing will be understood as indifferent or contingent in one of these ways. That is, the notions of indifference or contingency will have their meaning according to one or another of these principles.

For an essentialist way of making things intelligible, there are no contingencies that remain identical across worlds. That Simon wears a red hat will be in the Christian case indifferent or contingent with regard to his eternal salvation and in the psychological case indifferent or contingent with regard to his mental health. What looks admirable to the Christian (i.e. humility, self-sacrifice, etc.) will be incommensurable with what looks admirable to the psychologist (i.e. autonomy, high self-esteem). So, for the essential mode of intelligibility, there can be no violation of the law of non-contradiction within each world and no violation between worlds because, for such essentialist thinking, there can be no neutral predicates and so no predicates in common between worlds.

It might appear that if we were to follow this reasoning, the Christian (who happens also to be a psychologist) would see her psychologist self as completely incomprehensible and her psychologist self would see the Christian self as mad. What enables her to recognize both essentialist ways of understanding the universe as sensible? We have another way of making things intelligible than the essentialist way. We can cope with things pragmatically much the way animals would. In this coping we can identify things that are different from an essentialist point of view as identical. To show this we will stick with the example of Simon's red hat. The red hat that was *contingently* a red hat because it was indifferent to salvation within the Christian world and also but differently *contingently* a red hat because it was indifferent to personal flourishing in the psychological world can be treated as identical so far as we are coping pragmatically with people in these two different worlds. We say that we understand something under this alternative 'pragmatic' form of intelligibility if, instead of being familiar with the guiding principle of classification as with the essentialist form, we are able to cope in the other's world by making accurate predictions about how kind terms will be applied. That is, as pragmatic copers we can predict *how* the kind terms like saint and sinner are applied without understanding *why* they are applied this or that way. This pragmatic form of intelligibility thus gives us good ground for recognizing the two sets of practices as belonging to two separate forms of intelligibility and also for recognizing that there are situations in which the two forms of intelligibility dictate the application of contradictory predicates. Our pragmatic coping lets us identify Simon the saint and Simon the dysfunctional as the same guy because he is wearing the red hat, and therefore our pragmatic coping enables us to say that his behavior is both to be imitated and eliminated.

Precisely on these grounds, one might claim that pragmatic intelligibility is not a form of intelligibility at all. But if we were to say this, we would be left with two unfortunate results. First, we would not be able to describe a crucial way in which we understand things: in terms of accurate projections of what behavior we can expect in certain situations. Second, since we would have no form of intelligibility that could give us comparability

- among various forms of essentialist intelligibility, we would have no grounds for thinking that there could be more than one. Thus, in order not to violate the principle of non-contradiction, we would be confined to forms of thinking that are essentialist in the traditional universalistic way. We, in fact, engage in this pragmatic form of intelligibility frequently in our everyday lives. A simple instance is when we deal with slangy terms that members of other generations use. We can take today's twenty-something's use of 'whatever' as an example. Those of us who are not twenty-somethings do not have much sense of why anyone would use 'whatever' as they do. We do not understand the style that governs this generation's form of speaking. We can, however, see that 'whatever' is usually comparable with our 'I'll accept *whatever* you say on this trivial point'. We can predict that 'whatever' will be used where we might have used the above circumlocution, *even though we do not understand why*.
- 42 To be more precise, practices allow us to experience two ways in which our practices and the meanings they provide fail. First, practices can reveal anomalies: things *some* of whose crucial aspects are imposing themselves on us in ways that we cannot make sense of. Together with Fernando Flores, we explore anomalies in *Disclosing New Worlds* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997). Secondly, practices can reveal cases of the strange or incomprehensible where we encounter none of the essential aspects of the strange as making sense. We shall develop this notion of the strange or incomprehensible in the next section.
- 43 We hasten to add that not all encounters with the strange are alike, and we are not describing the unfamiliar in all its forms. Aesthetic wonder which gives us extraordinary things that are sublime does not give us strange things of the sort we are concerned with, nor does the religious awe that gives us an experience of a radically other being, nor philosophical wonder that takes us outside the ordinary so we can relate ourselves to the everyday as a whole.
- 44 Joseph Rouse points out to us that these defamiliarized strange things may turn out to be only identifiable by means of our everyday practices. Rouse's claim is, of course, true, but one can discover its truth—as, for example, in the case of the acoustic blasts of vocalized words—only after one begins by thinking of the strange thing as a thing that might exist independently of our everyday practices. And there is nothing incoherent about beginning that way.
- 45 For a detailed account of the four traditional aspects of objectivity, see Elisabeth A. Lloyd, 'Science and Anti-Science: Objectivity and Its Real Enemies', *A Dialogue Concerning Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science*, ed. Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack Nelson (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996).
- 46 When we say that our coping practices enable us to identify something in a *contingent* way, we mean the following: When our coping practices enable us to encounter a strange thing, they do not eliminate the strangeness which is crucial in our experience of it. It, in its strangeness, can thus be understood as independent of our practices. Consequently, our coping practices are not constituting what is crucial about the thing. They have, we then say, a *contingent* relation to the thing in its strangeness: they merely enable (though not incorrigibly) the identification and reidentification of the thing. If the thing in its strangeness should turn out to be a natural kind, then the way in which our coping practices enable us to encounter it would be contingent in a further sense. They would not reveal it in its defining features.
- 47 Saul A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). The most relevant articles by Putnam are: Hilary Putnam, 'Explanation and Reference' and 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', *Philosophical Papers II: Mind, Language, and Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 196–271. Donnellan's most significant contributions for us are: Keith Donnellan, 'Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms', *Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays*, ed. Carl Ginet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 84–104 and 'The Contingent "a Priori" and Rigid Designators', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 2 (1977), pp. 45–60. For a good general account of these issues, see Nathan U. Salmon, *Reference and Essence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). Dagfinn Føllesdal also takes up the issues of rigid designation in his 'Conceptual Change and Reference', *Cognitio humana—Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte*, XVII Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, Leipzig, 23–27 September 1996, *Vorträge und Kolloquien*, Herausgegeben von Christoph Hubig.
- 48 We do not believe that the necessity involved in making claims about essences requires claims about David Lewis's possible worlds. Dagfinn Føllesdal, for instance, argues for a form of rigid designation much like Kripke's only with an even more minimal ontology. For Føllesdal, considerations of 'all possible worlds' are resolved into considerations about possible properties of objects in our world. On his view, our language enables us to keep track of objects although we have many false beliefs about them, do not know many of their properties, and do not know how their properties will change over time. See Dagfinn Føllesdal, 'Essentialism and Reference', *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, vol. 18 *The Library of Living Philosophers* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1986), pp. 97–113, esp. p. 107. See also Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, pp. 15–21.
- 49 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 152 (as before we translate *anzeige* as 'designation' rather than 'indication'.)
- 50 Føllesdal, 'Conceptual Change and Reference', op. cit., p. 360.
- 51 We will not argue about what the resources of language *in general* tell us about reference, but speak of language as used in everyday circumstances, in certain unusual circumstances, and in the institution of science.
- 52 Natural kind terms are, as we shall show, treated as general terms in everydayness.
- 53 For our purposes here, what we say for demonstratives and proper names applies for any singular term.
- 54 We believe that this analysis of the everyday reference of singular terms could be assimilated to descendants of Frege's descriptivist view, such as John Searle's, but clearly what counts as 'descriptive' for us need not be propositional. See John R. Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 157–74.
- 55 In cases of severe breakdown, usually forensic cases, we may draw into our everyday world practices for identification of things and people that have their origin in science: DNA-testing, finger-printing, carbon-dating. These are all practices for identifying or re-identifying some person or something independent of our everyday dealings, but which we deploy with everyday purposes. In such cases where the practices are no longer deployed with a thoroughly scientific discipline, but are also not part of everyday coping, reference seems to work according to some sort of propositional descriptivist account, not our dispositional one.
- 56 We emphasize that we are focusing on the experience of this event. As an after-the-fact reconstruction, we can tell ourselves that our mouths, tongue, and so forth were dealing with some liquid. We also may experience that this strange stuff was poured into our mouths, but this feature, that the strange was poured, seems to be, phenomenologically speaking, a wholly contingent aspect of our experience. In the experience we simply experience ourselves being startled by the strange and incomprehensible. If it seems that this experience of the strange is no more than the experience of exercising a limited set of skills for dealing with an unidentified liquid, we only need compare the experience of being startled with the experience of the blind taste test. In blind taste tests, we do experience ourselves as deploying a restricted set of skills, and we do experience ourselves as dealing with an unidentified liquid. That is wholly different from the experience of the incomprehensible or strange that we experience when startled.
- 57 We speak of *most* everyday breakdowns in reference because the everyday domain has taken over some practices from science and kept the scientific attitude that goes with these practices. For example, journalistic reporting, which is an everyday practice, sometimes includes practices from forensic science. When journalists are engaged in such forensic practices as part of their everyday journalistic activity, breakdowns in reference might well be experienced as they are in science.
- 58 We are not claiming scientists or aesthetes can enter states in which they have a non-committal relation to *all* their coping practices. They can, however, put those practices relevant for dealing with the object under their disciplinary attention into this non-committal state. The aesthetic case can help us to understand the scientific. We have developed practices for witnessing events in movies that we have little doubt would startle us into stunned consternation if witnessed in everyday life. In the non-committal, detached

aesthetic state, would-be consternation is transformed into disgust, repulsion, wonder, curiosity, or some other strongly felt state where we are able to keep our distance and refer. In contrast, if while watching the movie, we turn to witness a huge snake striking someone a few feet from us, we will be started into consternation and will not be able to make sense of anything for a few moments. When we are in a non-committal stance toward the events we witness on the screen, we are nevertheless wholly involved in sitting in the movie theatre.

- 59 By 'fully intelligible' we mean as intelligible as the normal things that we encounter in everydayness where we know how to cope with every aspect of the thing that is relevant to our lives.
- 60 The claim that essentialism follows from rigid designation is argued by all who care about rigid designation. For the minimal claim, see Føllesdal, 'Conceptual Change and Reference', *op. cit.*, pp. 356–9.
- 61 For an example of a philosophical nominalist's argument, see Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth, and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978). Non-philosophical nominalists such as Ian Hacking and Andrew Pickering make their claims for nominalism on the basis of observations of our empirical ways of dealing with things as opposed to conceptual argument or logical reconstruction. Empirical nominalism does not claim that the robust realist project is unintelligible, just that it does not describe how our science is actually done.
- 62 If the concern that determined that one description was better than another was not one that had any systematic relation to the rest of the universe—such as the arbitrary will of a creator God—then that concern could not be treated as a kind in a table of systematically related kinds, and consequently, realism would fail because the key feature of the universe would not be systematic.
- 63 Nomological explanation, as we use the term, need have nothing to do with everyday causality. Rather, the science we are describing finds regularities and seeks to discover strict covering laws (i.e. laws with no *ceteris paribus* conditions). For more on what kinds of scientific explanations count as nomological, see John Haugeland, 'The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism', *Mind Design*, ed. John Haugeland (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981), pp. 243–9. The strange, however, does not justify making strict nomological explanation a regulative principle of science. Nor need one believe that the nomological explanation of a domain at one level of description is reducible to an explanation of the same domain at another level.
- 64 So nomological explanations of the actions of a certain sub-atomic particle must, for instance, account for why one bubble chamber produced the expected results and the other did not. The engineering jiggling that makes science look like a dance—as Andrew Pickering puts it—of resistance and accommodation leading to mere recurrent stabilities of effects instead of natural kinds must be accounted for before a scientific institution can claim that the nomological explanations describe interactions among natural kinds. A full response to Pickering's rich work would require an investigation of the precise status of our current science.
- 65 We thank the following people who helped us work out our position, in many cases by arguing against it and writing detailed criticisms: Bill Blattner, Taylor Carman, David Cerbone, Donald Davidson, George Downing, Fernando Flores, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Martin Jones, Sean Kelly, Lisa Lloyd, Jeff Malpas, Stephen Neal, Joe Rouse, Jack Sanders, Ted Schatzki, and Mark Wrathall.

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World, World-entry, and Realism in Early Heidegger

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Interpretations of Heidegger's *Being and Time* have tended to founder on the question of whether he is in the end a realist or an idealist, in part because of Heidegger's own rather enigmatic remarks on the subject. Many have thus depicted him as being in some way ambivalent, and so as holding on to an unstable combination of the two opposing positions. Recently, William Blattner has explained the apparent ambivalence by appealing to Kant's transcendental/empirical distinction. Although an ingenious reading of *Being and Time*, there are a number of difficulties involved in cashing out its central claims. I argue that it fails, moreover, to capture Heidegger's avowed animus toward *both* realism and idealism. After criticizing Blattner's reading, I recount several features of Heidegger's 'existential analytic' of Dasein in Division I of *Being and Time* and connect them with his (slightly later) notion of world-entry. This latter notion provides a way of explaining how Heidegger retains a realistic conception of natural entities, while offering an overall view that cannot be identified with either realism or idealism.

I. Introduction

A persistent difficulty in interpreting Heidegger's *Being and Time* has been the question of whether, and to what extent, his position is amenable either to realism or idealism. Two passages, which I will hereafter refer to as the 'puzzle passages', exemplify most pointedly the difficulty. The first of these passages is the following:

Entities *are*, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs.¹

The first sentence of this passage suggests a realistic understanding of entities, since Heidegger declares their independence from human experience, from any of the ways in which we discover them, understand them, or determine them. If this were *all* Heidegger says regarding the status of entities, i.e. that they exist independently of human experience, then the question of whether he is a realist or idealist would be easily settled in favor of realism. The second sentence, however, gives one pause: although

not the opposite of the first sentence, that the *being* of entities depends upon the being who has an understanding of being (Dasein or human beings)² seems to qualify considerably any ascription of realism. This is so especially if we take seriously Heidegger's explication of being as 'that which determines entities as entities' (BT 25) – if what determines entities as entities depends upon Dasein (i.e. on our way of being), then Heidegger (the first sentence of our first passage notwithstanding) seems to be offering a view more along the lines of idealism.

The felt need for qualifying what initially appeared to be a straightforwardly realistic conception of entities becomes even more pressing when we examine the second passage:

Of course only as long as Dasein *is* (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically possible), 'is there' being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself'. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. *In such a case* it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But *now*, as long as there is an understanding of being and therefore an understanding of the occurrent, it can indeed be said that *in this case* entities will still continue to be. (BT 255)

This passage renders even more problematic the independence ascribed to entities in the first sentence of the previous passage, since now it appears that the independence of entities is itself dependent on Dasein. In other words, this passage has the effect of nesting the independence claim within a broader claim of dependence, thereby undercutting a straightforwardly realistic understanding of entities.³

On the face of it, these passages display a certain ambivalence with respect to realism and idealism, and have engendered numerous interpretative difficulties. For example, Hubert Dreyfus, who wishes to interpret Heidegger as what he calls a 'minimal hermeneutic realist', provides the following gloss on the second of our two puzzle passages:

But since human beings do exist and have an understanding of occurrentness as a way of being, we can make sense of the questions, What was here *before we started to exist?* and even What would be left of nature *if Dasein ceased to exist?*⁴

Dreyfus's gloss again suggests something like a realistic understanding of natural entities (occurrent beings), but only given the proviso that human beings have come into existence. Thus, he continues the above passage by noting that there are, for Heidegger, limits to such a realistic understanding:

But of course we must ask these questions from within that understanding of being that alone gives sense to the questions. We cannot meaningfully ask, What would have been occurrent if Dasein *had never existed?* if by that we mean, What would have been the case if the above question made no sense?⁵

Such a qualification raises the following question: if we (Daseins) can make sense of how things were before we were around and how things would be should we cease to be around, why can we not make sense of a question as to how things would be had we never been around? Dreyfus's explication of the counterfactual question suggests that the difficulty with it is that one of its presuppositions, namely that we never came into existence, undermines the possibility of its making sense as a question (since there would not be anyone ever to understand it). But that appears to misconstrue the character of the counterfactual: of course, had there never been any human beings around, the question (and indeed any other proposition) would not make sense to anyone (since there wouldn't be anyone to whom it made sense), but that doesn't prevent the question from making sense *now*. What the question asks is how things would be in a situation where the question did not make sense to anyone, and indeed never would make sense to anyone, because nobody was, is, or ever will be around. There seems to be nothing more extraordinary about this counterfactual question than about questions concerning how things were before our coming into existence or how they would be should we cease to exist since, in both of the latter cases, the situations asked after are also ones in which there isn't anyone to understand the question. Just because a question's making sense presupposes the existence of language-users, it does not follow that it cannot ask after a situation in which there are no language-users.⁶

Dreyfus's gloss on the puzzle passages exemplifies what I referred to as nesting above, namely that the characterization of Heidegger as a kind of realist is qualified by a broader claim which undermines the ascription. In Dreyfus's case, there being a determinate way that entities are presupposes that Dasein come into existence at some point, and only when that happens is there some way they are (and, it appears, have been). A similar ambivalence can be found in Schatzki, who, shortly after characterizing Heidegger as a realist, writes the following:

At the same time, even though what entities in themselves are is what they are independently of our actually encountering them, what they are independently of our actually encountering them is not . . . independent of our understanding of being. Heidegger is also an idealist.⁷

A recent interpretation offered by William Blattner⁸ has gone the farthest in terms not only of acknowledging the 'two-handed' character of Heidegger's attitude toward realism and idealism, but also of explaining it. On Blattner's reading, Heidegger should not be seen as equivocating or being otherwise ambivalent, but instead as distinguishing between two standpoints or perspectives, the human or empirical and the transcendental, much as Kant does in his critical philosophy. Heidegger is thus, on this reading, an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist (of sorts). This

disentangling of two perspectives helps to explain the puzzle passages cited at the opening of this paper.

But is Blattner's reading the best way to understand Heidegger? One point, although hardly convincing, is that if this were Heidegger's considered view, why, given his intimate familiarity with Kant and so with Kantian terminology and distinctions, does he not just say that this is his view as regards realism and idealism? Blattner's reading cannot, of course, stand or fall on the basis of an answer to this question. In the next section, after adding some more detail to Blattner's interpretation, I assess critically several of its key features, and in doing so question its appropriateness as a reading of Heidegger. In the third section, I examine Heidegger's conception of world and of world-entry, which Blattner himself cites as a 'high-water mark for Heidegger's realism'.⁹ If it can be shown that the puzzle passages of *Being and Time* can be reconciled with the admittedly realistic notion of world-entry offered in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* and *The Essence of Reasons*, that will further tell against Blattner's claim of having limned a 'robust idealism' in the former work. In the final section, I offer some suggestions for understanding Heidegger's response to realism and idealism. In particular, my interest lies in explicating his remark in *The History of the Concept of Time* that both realism and idealism 'can exist only on the basis of a neglect'.¹⁰

II. The Empirical and the Transcendental Standpoints

Blattner's interpretation of Heidegger as a Kantian idealist takes off from the second of our two puzzle passages, wherein Heidegger contrasts two situations. The salient contrast between the two cases is the presence in one (and the absence in the other) of Dasein. The former situation is referred to by Heidegger at the end of the passage as 'now' and the latter as 'in such a case'.

According to Blattner, there is a weak and a strong reading of Heidegger's remarks concerning the differences between the two situations. On the weak reading, Heidegger's assertions regarding the absence of Dasein are to be understood as concerning what would take place *in* that situation. On this construal, it's just obvious (indeed, trivially obvious) that 'in such a case' independence would not be that nothing would be either understood or not understood, discovered or lie hidden, nor would it be *said* that entities are or are not. All of this is so because Dasein is the being from whom things either are or are not independent, who understands or fails to understand, discovers entities or leaves them in hiddenness, or says anything at all about entities. If Dasein is absent from a situation, then it

follows that none of these things is taking place. This weak construal has the advantage of being true, but at the cost of being more or less trivial.

Blattner further argues that the weak reading founders on its attempt to cash out Heidegger's claim that being (as opposed to entities) depends on Dasein. On the weak reading, the dependence of being on Dasein is explained by equating being with *intelligibility to us*. But this move, Blattner contends, turns out to be nothing more than an argument by redefinition, and so again the weak reading interprets Heidegger as making a more or less trivial claim.

The strong reading, on the other hand, construes Heidegger's assertions as concerning what can be said *of* the situation in which Dasein is absent, as opposed to what can or would be said *in* that situation. On this reading, Heidegger's assertions are hardly trivial, especially if we consider the fifth of them from the second puzzle passage, where he says: '*In such a case* it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not.' How is this claim to be understood on the strong reading? To answer this question, we must first briefly spell out Blattner's remarks about frameworks.

Central to Blattner's account is the idea of a framework which is presupposed in the asking and answering of questions and the making of assertions. Various questions and assertions presuppose various frameworks. For example, when we ask the following question about a particular player's batting average:

(1) What was Jose Canseco's batting average in 1987?

we presuppose the framework of baseball. So, our question could be more explicitly put:

(1') Given the framework of baseball, what was Jose Canseco's batting average in 1987?

Note that we may be presupposing more than one framework at a time, but for simplicity's sake, let's stick to one. One might say that all of our questions about baseball presuppose the framework of baseball, so that whenever we ask after the performance of a specific player, the outcome of a game or series, etc., our questions always have, implicitly, a 'pre-supposition operator' ('Given the framework of baseball . . .'), and the same is true for our answers. Of course, for the most part, we don't form our questions and answers about baseball that way, since it's tedious and, again for the most part, unnecessary given the general familiarity of baseball within our culture. None the less, the framework *is* there, because without

the framework of baseball none of the questions we usually ask and answer about baseball would have any sense.

The crucial move for Blattner is the extension of this idea of a framework as a way of explaining Heidegger's claim that being depends on Dasein. We are not to think of just this or that local framework, such as a baseball framework or football framework, but, one might say, a maximally general framework, namely *being* as 'that which determines entities as entities'. Given the dependence of being on Dasein, this maximally general framework can also be considered the *human framework* (or what Blattner calls 'the human standpoint'). To see the role of this framework, let us consider another example. When someone asks whether there are any such things as electrons, the question usually takes the following form:

(E) Are there such things as electrons?

But what this question really asks is the following:

(E') From the human standpoint (or given the human framework), are there electrons?

If by (E) one is really or implicitly asking (E'), then the answer is yes, given that our best theories tell us that there are electrons.¹¹

Just as with our questions and answers about baseball, we don't ordinarily include the presupposition operator 'From the human standpoint . . . ' in our posing of questions and in our giving of answers about the existence of entities. We just ask whether there are electrons, if all liquids refract light, whether most sharks are carnivorous, etc. This is so because it would be tiring always to include the presupposition; one simply takes it for granted. The omnipresence (implicitly speaking) of the presupposition operator does not, furthermore, prevent us from asking questions about how things are in cases where there are no human beings. So, we can ask questions such as the following:

(W) What sorts of creatures roamed the earth before there were any human beings around?

where that's shorthand for:

(W') From the human standpoint, what sorts of creatures roamed the earth before there were any human beings around?

And the answer might include descriptions of dinosaurs, various insects, fish, and certain kinds of mammals. For Blattner, one who holds that

there are determinate, positive answers to questions such as (E) (when understood as [E']) and (W) (when understood as [W']) is an *empirical* realist about things such as electrons, dinosaurs, the earth, etc. The realism being maintained here is only empirical because the intelligibility of these questions and answers still presupposes the human framework. As Blattner notes: 'The human standpoint declines to think away the being of natural things, even though it thinks us away. It is true, however, that being does depend on us, but from the human standpoint we just *ignore* that dependence.'¹²

Ascending to the transcendental level thus means thinking away, as opposed to just ignoring, the human framework. Consider the following question:

(I) Independent of the human standpoint, what sorts of creatures roamed the earth before there were any human beings around?

If one is a transcendental realist about *entities*, then the question (I) has a determinate, and positive answer: there is some way the world is independent of human beings and the entities in that world are as they are independently of any human perspective. If one is a transcendental idealist about *entities*, then the answer to (I) is either 'nothing' or, at best, 'things-in-themselves'.

About Heidegger, Blattner wants to claim that he is neither a transcendental idealist nor a transcendental realist *about entities*, and this means that any answer to (I) lacks a truth-value. Disregarding the human standpoint, we can say neither that entities are nor that they are not. To say one or the other would be to take up either the transcendental realist or transcendental idealist position about entities. But Heidegger is, according to Blattner, a transcendental idealist *about being*, which entails a denial of both transcendental realism and idealism about entities. Heidegger does say that being depends on Dasein, and, on Blattner's reading, this means that all of our (truth-valued) claims about the world carry with them, implicitly, the presupposition operator 'From the human standpoint . . . '. As Blattner writes: 'The transcendental standpoint does not ignore that dependence; it keeps the dependence clearly fixed before it, and then draws the inevitable conclusion that we cannot answer the question we are asking.'¹³

A crucial feature, then, of the transcendental idealism Blattner ascribes to Heidegger is the failure of bivalence when assertions are considered apart from the human framework. The question I want to raise at this point is whether such a strong conclusion follows from what Heidegger says in the puzzle passages, and, even if it does, whether it has the consequences

Blattner takes it to have. Let us consider again the fifth sentence from the second puzzle passage:

In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. (BT 255)

Again, the very trivial reading of this sentence, which I think Blattner shows to be too trivial, is to say that of course it could not be said in that situation because nobody would be there to say it. What Blattner wants to claim, and far less trivially, is that we cannot say *of* that situation either that entities are or that they are not. From this, Blattner concludes that the assertion 'Entities are' lacks a truth-value (and likewise with the assertion that entities are not). I want to suggest that Heidegger's own words do not imply such a strong conclusion.

From the fact that we cannot say *p* and that we cannot say *not-p*, it doesn't follow that we cannot say *p or not-p*. Furthermore, from the fact that we cannot say either *p* or *not-p*, it doesn't follow that neither of them is true (which is what Blattner's reading requires). The wording of Heidegger's sentence strongly suggests that his point concerns what we are entitled to say of that situation, and *not* what is or is not the case in that situation. The restriction is upon what we can *legitimately say*, not on what there is.

Consider the following propositions:

- (1) From the transcendental standpoint, we cannot say that entities are
- (2) From the transcendental standpoint, we cannot say that entities are not

What I'm claiming is that it does *not* follow from this that

- (3) From the transcendental standpoint, entities neither are nor are not

Nor, even, does it follow from (1) and (2) that

- (4) From the transcendental standpoint, we cannot say that entities either are or are not

All that does follow from (1) and (2) is

- (5) From the transcendental standpoint, we cannot say either that entities are or that they are not

Note the placement of 'either' after 'entities' in (4), rather than before 'that', as in (5). This is a crucial difference.

My point thus far is that what Heidegger says in the second puzzle passage only implies (5) and this is not tantamount to saying that there is a failure of bivalence for assertions when detached from the presupposition, 'From the human standpoint . . .'. The truth of (5) is not, however, a triviality along the lines of Blattner's characterization of the weak reading. That we cannot say of that situation either that entities are or that they are not shows that there is *something* peculiar about the situation Heidegger is considering.

There is, moreover, a further difficulty for Blattner's interpretation. He claims that, when conjoined with the presupposition-operator 'From the transcendental standpoint . . .', the assertions 'Entities are' and 'Entities are not' both lack a truth-value. His argument for this is that since, given the nature of the standpoint, the presuppositions necessary to determine something as an object are lacking, the claims therefore lack a truth-value. This argument invites the following question: when conjoined with the presupposition operator, 'From the transcendental standpoint . . .', does the claim 'Entities are' mean *Entities are*? If it does, then it is not at all clear why the claim lacks a truth-value. That is, if 'Entities are' means *Entities are* when conjoined with the transcendental presupposition, then, since the presuppositions are such that the conditions necessary to determine objects as objects are lacking, the claim is false: in that situation, there are no entities, just as of the situation in which baseball has never been and is not played, the claim 'There are baseball bats' is *false*, not nonsensical.

If, however, the claim 'Entities are' does *not* mean *Entities are* when conjoined with the transcendental standpoint prefix, then we do not learn anything at all about entities in that situation, since the words no longer mean what we want them to mean. What appeared to be a well-formed claim, namely

(S) From the transcendental standpoint, entities are

is really, given the presuppositions of the framework, of the following form:

(S') From the transcendental standpoint, blah blah blah

If (S) collapses into (S'), that would explain why there is a failure of bivalence when assertions are attached to the operator 'From the transcendental standpoint . . .', since any would-be assertions thereby become nonsensical. This collapse, furthermore, explains why it is that when asked from the transcendental standpoint, any question becomes one that we

'cannot answer'. But it also raises the problem of just what question we *are* asking. If any possible answer to any question asked from the transcendental standpoint is nonsensical, it is difficult, to say the least, to give sense to the idea that there is any well-formed question being asked of these circumstances either. All of this is again, however, a point about what we can *say* regarding a situation in which Dasein is thought away. The resultant nonsensicality of our assertions (or our questions and answers) does not imply either that entities are or are not (or, more strangely, that they neither are nor are not) *in* that situation, since nonsense doesn't imply anything.¹⁴

From what we have seen thus far, Heidegger's assertions concerning the case where there is no Dasein (are no human beings) entail *either* that we are not in a position to say which of the claims 'Entities are' and 'Entities are not' is true (and so we cannot [are not entitled to] say one or the other) *or* that the putative assertions 'Entities are' and 'Entities are not' are not really assertions at all when made of that situation. Either way, Heidegger's remark suggests a restriction upon us, upon our capacities for understanding a particular kind of situation. All I have argued thus far is that this restriction is not enough to establish anything determinate about the status of entities (either that they exist or do not exist) 'in such a case'. What needs to be explained, however, is just why Heidegger thinks there is such a restriction at all and, moreover, just what the import of acknowledging the presence of this restriction is. If the puzzle passages are best understood neither as putting forward trivialities (as the weak reading would have it) nor as offering a kind of transcendental idealism, as Blattner argues, what are they meant to show? I want to suggest here, and will argue in the next section, that the purpose of the puzzle passages is to highlight the priority of the phenomenon of *world*, which is precisely what Heidegger thinks traditional philosophy has passed over.

III. Dasein, World, and World-Entry

Heidegger's aim in Division I of *Being and Time* is to provide what he calls an existential analytic of Dasein. In the first Introduction, Heidegger argues for the necessity of an analysis of Dasein as preparatory to answering the question of being. He begins by noting that any inquiry presupposes some understanding or conception of what is being investigated; otherwise, any would-be investigation amounts to nothing more than blind groping. Since Heidegger is interested in inquiring into being, the inquiry must start with some kind of understanding of being, however vague or unthematized. There must, in other words, be some suitable starting-point for this investigation which, while not necessarily giving the game away from the start,

provides a foothold of sorts for finding an answer to Heidegger's principal question. Now, Dasein is a being who always has *some* understanding of being – this is, ontologically speaking, what separates human beings from every other kind of being. No other kind of being takes a stand on its being, whereas Dasein is precisely that being whose being is an issue.

Thus, Heidegger concludes that an investigation into Dasein, so as to make more explicit its pre-ontological understanding of being, will at the very least provide clues for an answer to the question of being as such. Division I is, therefore, what Heidegger calls a 'preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein'. The starting-point of this analysis is the claim that Dasein's 'basic state' is *being-in-the-world*. The task of Division I can be seen as developing and defending this initial claim. For the purposes of this paper, three features of Heidegger's subsequent analysis are important: first, the disambiguation of the different senses of 'world'; second, the relation between equipment and natural things (between the way of being of the available and the occurrent); and third, the relation between understanding, interpretation, and assertion. Having examined these three features, we will then be in a position to understand Heidegger's notion of world-entry, which does not appear in *Being and Time*, but is, I will argue, compatible with what he says there.

In putting forward the claim that Dasein's basic state is being-in-the-world, Heidegger takes great care to avoid numerous misunderstandings. First, by 'being-in-the-world', he does not mean that Dasein is in the world in the sense of being contained in it, as though Dasein were water and the world a glass.¹⁵ The sense of 'in' being used here is closer to the sense in which one is *in* the army, *in* love, or *in* business; in each of these cases, the use of 'in' suggests a particular kind of involvement, and so it is with Heidegger's claim that Dasein is being-in-the-world: Dasein is always involved in and with the world. But what does Heidegger mean by 'world' here? His denial that 'in' conveys physical containment already suggests that by 'world' he means something other than the natural, physical world.

In fact, Heidegger distinguishes four different senses of world:

1. 'World' is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be occurrent within the world.
2. 'World' functions as an ontological term, and signifies the being of those entities which we have just mentioned . . .
3. 'World' can be understood in another ontical sense – not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that '*wherein*' a factual Dasein as such can be said to live . . .
4. Finally, 'world' designates the ontological-existential concept of *worldhood*. (BT 93)

When Heidegger asserts that Dasein is being-in-the-world, he means world in the third of the four senses (the fourth sense [worldhood] gives the way of being of the third).

Although Heidegger distinguishes these different senses, he nevertheless claims that they are interconnected, in that the different senses stand in the relation of the first's being privative with respect to the third and the second's being privative with respect to the fourth. By 'privative' I mean here that the way of being of the natural world can be rendered intelligible by means of the world of involvement in which Dasein dwells, but not vice versa. Heidegger's claim that these senses of 'world' stand in such a relation marks one of his central moves against traditional philosophy: whereas traditional philosophy has claimed that the natural world is basic and that the world of involvement can be explained solely in terms of natural entities (by a process of their being 'invested with value'), Heidegger wants to claim just the opposite and thereby to show just how it is that traditional philosophy cannot account for, and so has missed, the phenomenon of world (in the fourth sense). To understand more fully the nature of Heidegger's claim, we must consider the relation between equipment and natural entities.

Heidegger begins §15 of *Being and Time* with the following:

The being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday being-in-the-world, which we also call our 'dealings' in the world and *with* entities within-the-world. (BT 95)

What is the way of being 'of those entities which we encounter as closest to us'? A tempting answer (but one which Heidegger wants to show is incorrect) is 'things', or, in other words, spatio-temporal objects. The problem with this answer, Heidegger claims, is that it ignores the character of the 'things' which we encounter and manipulate in our everyday lives. Take Heidegger's favorite example: a hammer. A hammer is not merely a thing in the sense that reciting a list of its physical characteristics is insufficient for telling what kind of thing it is. To say what a hammer is, one must describe the ways in which a hammer is *used*; one must, that is, describe *hammering*, and in doing so one will inevitably mention other 'things' such as nails, saws, and lumber, and *purposes* such as holding two pieces of wood together, constructing a house or piece of furniture, and *roles* such as being a carpenter or craftsperson.

What a hammer is, first and foremost, is a piece of *equipment*, and in saying what any one piece of equipment is, one must mention other pieces of equipment, as well as their respective uses in fulfilling various aims and purposes. That is why Heidegger says that 'taken strictly, there "is" no such thing as *an* equipment' (BT 97). He continues:

To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something-in-

order-to . . . '. A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. (BT 97)

Thus, any piece of equipment is not merely some discrete, spatio-temporal thing; what it is is captured by (and only by) describing its place within a holistic structure constituted by other items of equipment, and by an array of tasks and purposes. A hammer is something *with which* to hammer in nails *in order to* hold pieces of wood together *toward* the construction of something *for the sake of* Dasein's self-understanding as a carpenter. Any piece of equipment has been assigned a place in this network of relations. 'The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of *signifying* (*be-deuten*)' (BT 120). The totality of this significant structure is 'that wherein Dasein always is', in other words the *world*.

Before examining the relation of natural entities to this scheme, it is useful to consider the question of dependence when asked of the relation between human beings and this notion of world. Without Dasein, there would be no world in the sense that there would be no significant structure of involvement. Thus, Heidegger writes:

Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered within a world with involvement (availability) as their kind of being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves. (BT 120)

Note, however, Heidegger's somewhat wry use of 'discover' and 'in themselves' in the above passage. It is not as though a hammer is *really* something else and is only subjectively a hammer. Rather, its being a hammer is as 'objective' as one likes, but it only is objectively a hammer in so far as there are people to use it *as* a hammer within all of the familiar contexts in which hammers are ordinarily used. Furthermore, the question of dependence cuts both ways in that there is no sense, according to Heidegger, to asking what human beings are like independently of world. Throughout *Being and Time*, he insists on the perversity of starting an account of human beings with a worldless subject, for example a Cartesian ego. While this is not the place to explore the intricacies of Heidegger's argument for the 'perversity' of Cartesianism, his rejection of the intelligibility of a worldless subject shows that there is something queer about insisting either that the world is dependent on Dasein or the other way around (as though one had a completely independent notion of either).

Natural entities have a derivative status relative to the significantly structured world of equipment and Dasein's tasks and projects. Natural entities are discovered when a breakdown occurs in Dasein's ongoing coping with equipment. First, equipment becomes noticed when it is malfunctioning, missing, or otherwise *unavailable* (unavailability marks a

middle stage between the availability of equipment and the occurrence of natural entities). Second, once something has become unavailable, Dasein's comportment toward that thing can go in one of two directions: either the equipment is repaired or replaced and Dasein becomes reabsorbed in its ongoing activity, or Dasein becomes interested in the piece of equipment merely as a thing, as opposed to something useful and significant. When the latter response to the unavailable occurs, the occurrent way of being emerges. The discovery of the occurrent marks, for Heidegger, the possibility of the practice of natural science, since it allows for entities' being de-worlded and then recontextualized in a theoretical framework.¹⁶

A difficulty with Heidegger's story of the emergence of the occurrent from the available is that the claim of priority of the latter over the former appears only to be a point about the order of discovery, and so is only of psychological interest as a fact about how Dasein (we) make sense of things. However, Heidegger's deeper aim is to resist the claims of traditional philosophy (and here again he has Cartesian metaphysics in mind as the paradigmatic example) of the priority of material substance (*res extensa*) as the basic building blocks of the world (including the everyday world of concern). On this traditional view, equipment must be accounted for in terms of causal properties (the hardness of the hammer, for example) plus the addition of some subjective ingredients: items of equipment, on this view, are things 'invested with value', whereas Heidegger wants to claim the exact opposite, namely that natural entities are first encountered only by stripping items of equipment of their significance. Heidegger's challenge to traditional philosophy is for it to tell a plausible story which starts from atomistic building blocks and ends with equipment. Given the holistic structure of the world of everyday activity Heidegger describes, the hopes for such a story's being plausible are *prima facie* low.¹⁷

Heidegger's story about the emergence of occurrence out of availability does not, however, mean that the cross-over of Dasein's comportment from what he calls *circumspective concern* to *disinterested beholding* makes it the case that there are occurrent entities, as though this cross-over causes them to spring into existence. Heidegger's story is about the discovery of the occurrent, not about its creation. Once discovered, the occurrent can be seen as having been there all along and as continuing to be regardless of whether Dasein ever becomes disinterested again. Thus, the priority of the available over the occurrent consists in the priority of the *intelligibility* of the former over the latter, and *not* in the existence of the one before the other. (This is enough for the purposes of Heidegger's attack on traditional philosophy.) This is, in part, a fact about us, about how we Daseins make sense of things, but it is at the same time a fact about equipment and natural entities. One might say, moreover, that it is a fact about making sense of things *simpliciter*.

The priority of the available over the occurrent is reflected in Heidegger's account of linguistic activity as well. This latter account concerns the relation between understanding, interpretation, and assertion. What's basic for Heidegger is the first of these relata, understanding, since it corresponds to Dasein's basic state, being-in-the-world: 'Understanding is the existential being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-being' (BT 184). This is as much as to say that Dasein always, insofar as it is Dasein, has some understanding of possible ways to be, that is, of the roles and tasks of the significantly structured totality in which it finds itself. Dasein's understanding is not itself linguistic, but it provides the basis for linguistic activity in that this structure of significance is what, in the first instance, gets articulated and so interpreted:

But in significance itself, with which Dasein is always familiar, there lurks the ontological condition which makes it possible for Dasein, as something which understands and interprets, to disclose such things as 'significations'; upon these, in turn, is founded the being of words and of language. (BT 121)

Interpretation, for Heidegger, means making something explicit as something. Heidegger is careful to point out that this notion of making something explicit as something is not a matter of taking something which is 'in itself' purely occurrent as something else, namely a piece of equipment: 'In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a "signification" over some naked thing which is occurrent' (BT 190). Rather, that 'which is disclosed in our understanding of the world . . . gets laid out by the interpretation' (BT 191). In the first instance, what gets picked out by the 'as' of interpretation is the available, and to this corresponds Heidegger's primary notion of assertion, namely, the linguistic pointings which are made in Dasein's ongoing activity. These primary assertions are contextualized in the sense that what gets pointed out are not objective properties but context-specific aspects of situations. (Heidegger's example is 'This hammer is too heavy' or simply 'Too heavy!' – here, a determination is made about the usability of some specific item of equipment in a specific situation, rather than a property of the hammer *per se*.)

Just as the available provides a basis for the emergence of the occurrent, primary assertion is the basis for the kind of assertion suited to the occurrent:

This levelling of the primordial 'as' of circumspective interpretation to the "as" with which occurrentness is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion. Only so does it obtain the possibility of exhibiting something in such a way that we just look at it. (BT 201)

Dasein's capacities for asserting, for making natural entities explicit by means of true-or-false assertions about them, are founded on Heidegger's

primary notion of assertion, and so in turn on interpretation and understanding. This is why Heidegger says that 'assertion is not a free-floating kind of behavior which, in its own right, might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary it always maintains itself on the basis of being-in-the-world' (BT 199).

I previously noted that in the second puzzle passage especially, Heidegger's remarks suggest the imposition of a restriction on us, on our capacities for making sense of, and so making assertions about, a certain kind of situation, namely one in which there is no Dasein. Heidegger's claim that 'assertion is not a free-floating kind of behavior' sheds light on the character of that restriction. Since assertion 'maintains itself on the basis of being-in-the-world', a Dasein-less situation is one where such a basis for assertions is lacking. Our capacity for making assertions is grounded in our familiarity with the everyday world of significance and so cannot, Heidegger claims, be considered in isolation from it.

Thus, when Heidegger says that 'in such a case it cannot be said . . .', what he means is that our understanding of natural entities cannot be detached from our fundamental way of being, namely being-in-the-world. It does not follow from this that natural entities themselves therefore *depend* upon our fundamental way of being, but only that what we *say* about them does. To put the point another way, an assertion's being true-or-false (i.e. its having sense) depends on us, but its being true or being false does not depend on (is not up to) us.

I now want to turn to Heidegger's discussion of world-entry (*Welt-egang*), which does not appear in *Being and Time*. Heidegger introduces the notion in §11(c) of *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (a briefer discussion appears in *The Essence of Reasons*), following, not surprisingly, an examination of the concept of world and Dasein's 'transcendence'.¹⁸ For Heidegger, transcendence is another name for being-in-the-world, for Dasein's always already comporting itself toward entities and other Daseins in a significantly structured world (in the third of Heidegger's senses of 'world'). Thus, when Heidegger speaks of world-entry or entities entering a world, it must be remembered that by 'world' here he does not mean the physical world ('world' in the first of his four senses). If world-entry were understood as meaning entry into the physical world, then it would be a thoroughly *causal* notion along the lines of an account of the generation of organic and inorganic matter. On the contrary, the world into which entities enter is the world of Dasein's involvement.

What, then, does it mean to say that (occurrent) entities undergo world-entry? To begin answering this question, let us examine several passages where Heidegger first deploys the notion:

Only insofar as Dasein in its metaphysical essence, freely presenting its own for-

the-sake-of, overshoots itself, does Dasein become . . . the occasion (from a metaphysical viewpoint) for beings to emerge as beings. (MFL 193)

Thus Dasein, seen metaphysically as this being-in-the-world, is therefore, as factually existent, nothing other than the existent possibility for beings to gain *entry to world*. (MFL 193)

Heidegger's talk of emergence in the first passage makes it clear that an entity's entering the world does not mean its coming into existence. That it does not mean this is further reinforced by the following passage:

Ocurrent things are beings as the kind of things they are, even if they do not become intrawordly, even if world-entry does not happen and there is no occasion for it at all. (MFL 194)

Given that world-entry means neither that entities come into existence nor change in any way, what positive significance does this notion have? It will be helpful here to recall Heidegger's account of the emergence of the occurrent out of the available described above. The principal lesson of that account is that the intelligibility of natural entities depends upon the (ontologically) prior intelligibility of equipment: only given a significantly structured nexus of equipment and practices is it possible for natural entities to be understood, to be revealed in their way of being. World-entry can be seen as another name for that process of emergence Heidegger describes in *Being and Time*: an occurrent entity's entering into a world means its becoming intelligible as the kind of thing it is; in order for that to happen, there must, of course, *be* a world and *that* is only possible if there is Dasein:

World-entry happens when transcendence happens, i.e. when historical Dasein exists. Only then is the being-in-the-world of Dasein existent. And only when the latter is existent, have occurrent things too already entered world, i.e. become intrawordly. And only Dasein, qua existing, provides the opportunity for world-entry. (MFL 194)

World-entry thus depends on Dasein. Moreover, world-entry 'is the condition for existing Dasein's experience and comprehension of things as they are' (MFL 194). This last remark is another way of saying that the world of involvement is prior in terms of intelligibility to the natural world of occurrent entities: only given an understanding of the former, is an understanding of the latter possible. That world-entry 'is the condition for existing Dasein's experience and comprehension of things' accords with, and indeed underscores, the interpretation of the puzzle passages I've been arguing for. Recall that of the case where there is no Dasein, 'it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not'. It cannot be said one way or the other because in such a case, entities have not entered into the world. Any assertions about entities presuppose (are made possible by) a prior familiarity with the world; take away Dasein and one thereby takes

away the world, and this in turn means a removal of the conditions for our comprehension of natural entities.

Thus, the notion of world-entry is compatible with and furthermore helps explain the puzzle passages of *Being and Time*. The contrast Heidegger draws between 'now' and 'in such a case' can be understood as one between a situation where world-entry has occurred and one where it has not respectively. That *now* we can say that entities are and will continue to be is revelatory not about entities, but about their *intelligibility*; it shows that their intelligibility depends on world, and not the other way around. Assertions about natural entities only become possible given Dasein's involvement with equipment. To say that entities have entered the world just is to say that assertions about them can be made, even if such assertions are ones to the effect that such entities lie hidden.¹⁹

IV. Realism and Idealism Reconsidered

In this last section, I want to consider Heidegger's more general attitude toward realism and idealism. Although I have tried throughout this paper to develop and defend an interpretation of Heidegger as having a *realistic* conception of entities, nevertheless his hostility to *realism* cannot be overlooked. However, to say that Heidegger is hostile to realism is not tantamount to saying that he is an idealist. His intent is instead to overthrow both positions, to show, as I mentioned previously, that both 'can exist on the basis of a neglect'.

The full sentence from which this last remark is taken reads as follows:

In elucidating [realism and idealism] it is not so much a matter of clearing them up or of finding one or the other to be the solution, but of seeing that both can exist only on the basis of a neglect: they presuppose a concept of 'subject' and 'object' without clarifying these basic concepts with respect to the basic composition of Dasein itself. (HCT 222–3)

What realism and idealism neglect is 'the basic composition of Dasein' or, in other words, being-in-the-world. Instead, the two views take for granted the legitimacy of the subject–object distinction, and seek to explain one in terms of the other. Heidegger's contention is that Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is not purely a subject in the idealist's sense, nor is the world in which Dasein dwells purely objective (composed of objects) in the realist's sense. Dasein and world interpenetrate one another in a manner that precludes the kind of independent characterizations talk of subjects and objects requires.

The realist helps himself to the notion of an object, as autonomous substance, and seeks to explain the world (including the everyday world of

Dasein's involvement) in terms of those objects. He believes, in other words, that he 'can clarify reality by means of a causal process' (HCT 223). The idealist, on the other hand, helps himself to the concept of a subject, and then explains what it is to be an object in terms of subjectivity. Small wonder that on this account objects turn out to be dependent on the presence of subjects. Heidegger rejects *both* explanatory attempts by questioning the legitimacy (he might here say the primordially) of the respective theorists' starting-points.

Although Heidegger seeks to repudiate both realism and idealism, he none the less makes an effort to accommodate what he takes to be the basic insights of both positions. Thus, after charging that both are founded upon a neglect, he continues by noting that 'every serious idealism is in the right to the extent that it sees that being, reality, actuality can be clarified only when being, the real, is present and encountered' (HCT 223). This remark dovetails with our discussion of how it is on Heidegger's account that asserting emerges out of a more fundamental way of encountering the world (practical involvement). However, 'every realism is right to the extent that it attempts to retain Dasein's natural consciousness of the occurrentness of the world' (HCT 223), which is another way of saying that our being in a position to make assertions about occurrent entities does not make it the case that there are such entities. There is, then, *something* right about realism and idealism, but each position misfires by ignoring the legitimate claims contained within the other.

Heidegger, on the other hand, acknowledges these claims, while accepting neither position *in toto*. I have tried to show in this paper that Heidegger's acknowledgement amounts neither to a hazy ambivalence, nor to a more sophisticated form of idealism. Instead, what Heidegger presents is at once a reassurance that his phenomenology of Dasein does not vitiate the presence of an objective world (what I've been calling a realistic conception of entities), and a reminder that in giving an account of human beings and the world one cannot start either with pure subjects or pure objects. Such a reminder has the effect of revealing to us that when we speak we do so on the basis of our being-in-the-world. This basis is not merely the human standpoint, as Blattner maintains, but is, one might say, a *worlded* one.²⁰

NOTES

- 1 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 228. All further references to this work are made parenthetically in the text by means of the abbreviation BT together with the appropriate page or section number of the English translation. For all of the Heidegger texts cited in this paper, I have modified the published translations in order to secure terminological consistency. Thus, 'Zuhandenheit' and 'Vorhandenheit', which Macquarrie and Robinson translate as 'readi-

- ness-to-hand' and 'presence-at-hand' respectively, I have translated as 'availability' and 'occurrence'. Moreover, I have in all instances translated 'Sein' as 'being' with a lower-case 'b'.
- 2 'Dasein' is Heidegger's term of art both for our way of being and for the particular beings we are (i.e. we are all 'cases' or expressions of Dasein). At BT 32, Heidegger provides the following clue as to what he means by 'Dasein': 'Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very being, its being is an *issue* for it.' What this means is that Dasein differs from other kinds of beings in that it has in each case an understanding of being (what it means to be something) and so is a being that can take a stand on what it is to be a human being. See BT, §9 (pp. 67–71) for Heidegger's more thorough explication of this central term.
 - 3 This double-effect has been noted by, among others, Dorothea Frede, in her investigation of Heidegger's critique of Kant's proof for the existence of an external world ('Heidegger and the Scandal of Philosophy' in *Human Nature and Natural Knowledge*, ed. A. Donagan, A. N. Perovich, and M. V. Wedin [Boston: D. Reidel, 1986], pp. 129–52). After constructing an interpretation of Heidegger as a kind of 'reformed realist', Frede then remarks: 'There is, indeed, much in the text which runs contrary to an interpretation which ascribes a "reformed" realism to Heidegger. For example, he mentions it as one of the points in which idealism is superior to realism that the idealist at least locates being and reality within consciousness . . . I have to admit, in fact, that I had to treat the text in quite an eclectic way in order to construct a realist interpretation of Heidegger. For at the same time that he asserts a certain independence for the entities outside us he also stresses a dependence of their being on our understanding' (p. 139).
 - 4 Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 256–7.
 - 5 *Ibid.*, p. 257.
 - 6 Here I agree with, and to some extent follow, the criticisms William Blattner makes of Dreyfus's appeal to counterfactuals. Blattner is correct in noting that Dreyfus's stipulation that we are asking this question when it *makes no sense* is doing all the work. Below, however, I question Blattner's own interpretation of the puzzle passages. See his 'Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?', *Inquiry* 37 (1994), pp. 185–202; see esp. note 12.
 - 7 Theodore R. Schatzki, 'Early Heidegger on Being, the Clearing, and Realism', in H. Dreyfus and H. Hall (eds), *Heidegger: A Critical Reader* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 81–98; cited passage from p. 93.
 - 8 Blattner, op. cit.
 - 9 Blattner, *ibid.*, p. 194.
 - 10 Heidegger, *The History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1985), p. 222. All further references to this work are made parenthetically in the text by means of the abbreviation HCT together with the appropriate page number.
 - 11 I ignore here the many controversies concerning the issue of scientific realism.
 - 12 Blattner, op. cit., p. 193.
 - 13 *Ibid.*
 - 14 In other words, my argument of the last two paragraphs has been to show that Blattner's interpretation is faced with a dilemma: if, when conjoined with the operator 'From the transcendental standpoint . . .', 'Entities are' means *Entities are*, then the claim is false, but if this is so, Heidegger turns out to be a transcendental idealist about *entities*. If on the other hand, 'Entities are' does not mean *Entities are*, then the failure of bivalence is explained by our words becoming nonsensical. Accepting this latter horn of the dilemma, however, is tantamount to accepting that 'being' does just mean 'intelligibility to us', which Blattner explicitly rejects as trivial. In Sections III and IV below, I equate being with intelligibility, but I try to show that this is not as trivializing a move as Blattner makes it out to be.
 - 15 Thus, Heidegger's starting-point is not the naturalistic one articulated by Quine, who, for example, begins 'The Scope and Language of Science' with the observation, 'I am a physical object sitting in a physical world'. See Quine, *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 228. Although Heidegger would not, I

think, deny Quine's observation, he would none the less question its legitimacy as a starting-point for understanding our way of being.

- 16 Heidegger offers an 'existential conception of science' in BT, pp. 408–15.
- 17 Heidegger's most detailed criticisms of Cartesian metaphysics can be found in BT, §§18–21.
- 18 Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). All further references to this work are made parenthetically in the text by means of the abbreviation MFL together with the appropriate page number. For the parallel discussion of world-entry, see *The Essence of Reasons*, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), esp. pp. 89–91.
- 19 And of course, once world-entry has occurred, we are then in a position to say how things were prior to our existence, how they would be should we cease to exist, and even how they would be had we never existed, since world-entry, Heidegger tells us, affords us access to 'beings as the kinds of things they are . . . even if world-entry does not happen.' As I read Heidegger in the puzzle passages, then, he is asking what makes such retrospection, prediction, and entertainment of counterfactuals possible, and the answer is being-in-the-world. The situation Heidegger appeals to as one 'where Dasein does not exist' and so as being one about which we cannot make assertions is thus extremely difficult to characterize adequately (as commentators' struggling with counterfactuals and standpoints shows), especially since we do not want either to conclude that his philosophy leads back to Kantian idealism or rules out the possibility of natural history, for example. What I take Heidegger to be doing ultimately is not distinguishing two situations, standpoints, or perspectives, but rather reminding us of the basis upon which we speak of entities *at all*. He can, in other words, be seen to be attacking a certain kind of (philosophical) fantasy of what objectivity consists in, namely in attaining a completely detached, presuppositionless standpoint (one deserving perhaps of the label 'transcendental').
- 20 I would like to thank Hubert Dreyfus, Eric Kaplan, Sean Kelly, and Mark Wrathall for discussing earlier drafts of this paper. I have profited greatly from their comments and criticism. I would especially like to thank William Blattner, whose thoughtful and insightful essay prompted this paper in the first place.

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HEIDEGGER'S LATER PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

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Although rarely recognized as such, reflection upon science was a central theme in Heidegger's thinking, one which illustrates clearly both the continuity and the important changes between his earlier and later work. I want to situate Heidegger's later account of science in two ways: to show its place in the development of his own work, and to juxtapose it to more recent Anglo-American philosophy of science. In some important respects, Heidegger anticipates more recent work, even where his account lacks detailed explication and exemplification. But in several ways, Heidegger's position remains unique, and addresses issues perhaps not satisfactorily dealt with by philosophers of science.

Throughout his work, one issue remains decisive for Heidegger. Stated with respect to truth, his fundamental claim is that it is only within a "clearing"¹ opened by our dealings with things that things manifest themselves, and come into relations of truth or falsity, and thus only within a clearing can sentences be true or false.² The clearing itself, however, cannot show up as something we can describe. It cannot be an object which comes into relations to sentences describing it, for there is no further clearing within which it or such sentences could be situated in order to show themselves. Thus, there is an ontological difference between the things, in the broadest sense of the term, which show up within the clearing, and the clearing itself, which can never be made clear.

Heidegger's philosophical project has always been to probe the extent to which our belonging to the clearing can be indicated or articulated, and to reflect upon what it means to belong to the clearing, and why it matters if there is a difference between the clearing (truth) and what shows up within it (things true or false), and if we are aware of this difference. His interpretation of science plays a fundamental role throughout this project, although this role changes significantly, with important consequences for what science is and how it works. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger thought that while the particular clearing we are in cannot be fully described, there is a general structure to being in a clearing which we could get clear about. Its basic features are that

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beings are disclosed as occupying a place within the whole of the practices or “dealings” (*Umgang*) of a culture. Neither the things nor the place they occupy are “there” prior to the clearing opened and sustained through those practices. The clearing is sustained by the socialization into and conformity to the prevailing practices of those within a culture, who must go along with those practices in order to be intelligible to themselves and others.³ These ways of comporting oneself and dealing with things provide a grasp of *possibilities* for dealing with the world (and thereby interpreting oneself). The possibilities one actually seizes upon slowly modify this understanding and provide a new grasp of possibilities. The particular possibilities open within a culture can be articulated, but the understanding of what it is to be (the clearing) which opens up just *these* possibilities is not articulable.⁴

Within this interpretation, science occupies an important place. Beings are only originally disclosed within the practices of a particular culture and within a local situation. Science has an ontologically distinctive task, to decontextualize and objectify these things as merely present-at-hand. Such objects lose the intelligibility which arises through everyday practical concern,⁵ but acquire a new, delocalized lucidity within scientific theories. Science, then, reveals a new way of being for objects, which nevertheless is derivative from the way things manifest themselves in everyday concern. Heidegger never quite says so, but presumably this possibility of gradually stripping a thing of its involvement in everyday life and seeing it as present-at-hand is in principle available to any culture, even though it might be unclear in some cases why one would want to do this, or how one might begin to do so.

By the mid-1930's, Heidegger abandoned the attempt to articulate any but the most general structures of being in the clearing. Whereas earlier, the structure of temporality temporalizing itself was *the* horizon within which the meaning of Being was to be interpreted, he later repudiated any final understanding of the relation between the clearing and the beings revealed within it. There is instead a “history of Being,” within which the clearing itself underwent fundamental change.⁶ His task is to indicate the possibility of such change, and to interpret what it is to be in the “modern age” (*Neuzeit*). Science is no longer a possibility open to *Dasein* whenever it decontextualizes beings and merely looks at them. It is rather an activity which makes sense only within the modern age, and which indicates what modernity is all about. As an essential phenomenon of modernity,⁷ science is not just something which matters to us, or is influential in our culture. Nor does science effect the clearing in the modern age; if anything, the reverse. But science is a distinctive event within that clearing which can give us a better sense of our situation, with its possibilities and its dangers.

If we succeed in reaching the metaphysical ground that provides the foundation for science as a modern phenomenon, then the entire essence of the modern age will have to let itself be apprehended from out of that ground.⁸

Heidegger asks first what characterizes science as a modern phenomenon, and only then inquires into the metaphysical basis for this manifestation. He begins, “The essence of what we today call science is research.”⁹ Research has three fundamental characteristics: projection (and its associated rigor), procedure (*Verfahren*), and ongoing activity (*Betrieb*).¹⁰ Projection (*Entwurf*) will be familiar to readers of *Being and Time* as the form taken by the understanding which is embedded in all our interpretive dealings with the world. Projection is not the entertaining of specific possibilities, but rather the background from which particular possibilities stand out as worth entertaining. Ian Hacking has recently distinguished a sentence being true or being false, from its being true-or-false, i.e., from its becoming a possible *candidate* for truth or falsity.¹¹ ‘Projection’ in Heidegger’s sense is comparable to the latter: it concerns the understanding through which possibilities become candidates to be taken up in an interpretation, and not the consideration of which ones to take up. Scientific research cannot proceed without some such understanding of what it is to deal with, and how it is to be approached.

Every advance already requires an open region in which it moves. And it is precisely the opening up of such a region that is the fundamental event in research. This is accomplished through the projection within some realm of what is—in nature, for example—of a basic outline (*Grundriss*) of natural events.¹²

Scientific research thus already embodies an understanding of the natural world, the ways it can manifest itself to research, and the possibilities it opens for further exploration. Research binds itself rigorously within that basic outline, pushing ahead into the region it projects, and exploring its possibilities and limits. This rigorous adherence to its projected possibilities is essential to projection as “the fundamental event in research”:

Only within the perspective of this basic outline does an event in nature become visible as such an event. This projection of nature finds its guarantee in the fact that physical research, in every one of its questioning steps, is bound in advance to adhere to it.¹³

This first point generally anticipates more recent Anglo-American developments. It is now commonly claimed that theories, paradigms, or research programs project the ontology and methodology which determine what can count as a fact, and that to disclaim them is to abandon the field or research program.¹⁴ Indeed, Heidegger’s concept of ‘rigor’ can provide a cogent interpretation of Kuhn’s notion of ‘normal science’.¹⁵ We shall later indicate an interesting and important difference, however, between this projection of a basic outline, and recent philosophers’ account of presuppositions.

The second characteristic of science as research is a distinctive way of proceeding (*Verfahren*) through which “projection and rigor first develop into what they are.”¹⁶ In a rather obscure passage, Heidegger

characterizes this in terms of 'rule', 'elucidation', and 'experiment'. By 'rule' (which is closer to what is now called 'law'), he means a fixed representation of the changing, which allows the manifold changing phenomena it covers to be established as facts about objects. Within the context of 'law', this constancy through change shows itself in its necessity, which is manifest only through such representation. An example may clarify this. Kepler's Laws ('rules' in Heidegger's terms) are themselves fixed, yet they represent the structures underlying the incessantly changing positions of the planets. Such rules make otherwise senseless change intelligible. The necessity of these particular rules only becomes clear when they are shown to be the necessary outcome of a "lawlike" configuration of things (classical mechanics shows the necessity of Kepler's Laws when the universe is exhibited as a gravitational field of interacting massive bodies). Research aims to extend the realm within which it can exhibit facts under the guidance of rule and law, by gradually extending the laws ('theories' in our sense) which it has already disclosed. Heidegger calls this "clarifying on the basis of what is clear" 'elucidation' (*Erklärung*).¹⁷ Elucidation serves a double function: it brings new phenomena within the realm of law, and it justifies the laws already established by the fruitfulness displayed in the extension.

Elucidation is always twofold. It accounts for an unknown by means of a known and at the same time it verifies that known by means of that unknown.¹⁸

This theoretical ('lawlike') way of proceeding makes possible experiments in the modern sense. The modern experiment is distinguished from earlier observation of nature by its subservience to theory ('law').

Experiment begins with the laying down of a law as a basis. To set up an experiment means to represent or conceive the conditions under which a specific series of motions can be made susceptible of being followed in its necessary progression, i.e., of being controlled in advance by calculation.¹⁹

To sum up so far, the research experiment is a distinctively modern way of proceeding to interpret nature in being guided by a fixed representation of natural events in their necessity (a theory), which opens up possibilities for the exacting calculation of the course of natural events and binds itself to them. It confirms its calculative representation of events by its ability to proceed and elucidate still more events under its guidance.

The third characteristic for research is its 'ongoing activity' or 'drive' (*Betrieb*). Research always opens up further possibilities for research, not merely coincidentally, but because this is its essential aim.

The way of proceeding through which individual object-spheres are conquered does not simply amass results. Rather, with the help of its results, it adapts itself for a new advance. . . . More and more the proceeding adapts itself to the possibilities of advance opened up through itself.²⁰

Heidegger would agree with those philosophers who take the growth of knowledge to be the essential aim of modern science,²¹ although he would refuse to defend its rationality. Drawing upon his interpretation of Nietzsche on will-to-power ("power is power only as enhancement of power"),²² he characterizes science as an incessant drive to expand its calculative control over the course of natural events. This expansiveness governs what science discloses in its research.

What is taking place in this extending and consolidating of the . . . sciences [as ongoing activity]? Nothing less than the making secure of the precedence of proceeding over whatever is (nature and history), which at any time becomes objective in research.²³

Research as ongoing activity sheds light upon the demand for certainty commonly associated with the epistemology of modern science. An expanding science must secure those results which ground its further advance. Thus, how much confirmation a result requires will depend upon the practical needs of the subsequent research which relies upon it. As Heidegger has emphasized, the security of science's representations is in fact established by its ability to build upon them. Similarly, the growth of knowledge has become, for many philosophers of science, the guarantor that it is indeed knowledge which is growing. Note that by the expansion of "calculative control" Heidegger does not mean technological applicability (although research does lead to this), but rather the ability to secure a representation of the course of natural events (actual or possible) which omits nothing, and makes everything explicit and subject to calculation. Theoretical representation is itself calculative control.

Modern science's way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces.²⁴

Science and technology are closely connected on Heidegger's account, but pointing to the technological application of scientific knowledge or the employment of technical devices in research shows this only superficially.

We can now consider Heidegger's ontological interpretation of modern science. He has abandoned the claim that science decontextualizes things, and allows us to see them as merely present-at-hand.²⁵ Instead, science is our way of practically engaging the world which helps focus for us the configuration and direction of modernity. Science is not something ontologically different from everyday practical concern; it brings before us more clearly what is also happening in our everyday practices. Everything we do embodies an interpretation of what it is to be, but science is a phenomenon with which we can perspicuously bring this interpretation to reflection. Heidegger has provided two distinct, but convergent accounts of how this interpretation manifests itself in modern science. First, he takes the advent of research to reflect the interpretation of the world as picture,

which is the genesis of the modern conception of subject and object. Second, this same event is later described as *Ge-stell*,²⁶ the clearing in which beings are disclosed as “standing-reserve” (*Bestand*). They are held together by their interpretation of beings in terms of power and control, which for Heidegger raises the question of nihilism.

To see this, let us consider each interpretation in turn. What does it mean for the world to become picture? It is not just that the world is now depicted or copied. The notion of *right* representation, of getting things as they (really) are, becomes a focus of our dealings with things. Thus, Heidegger notes,

“Picture” here does not mean some imitation, but rather what sounds forth in the colloquial expression, “we get the picture” concerning something. This means the matter stands before us exactly as it stands with it for us. To put oneself in the picture with respect to something means to set whatever is, itself, in place before oneself just in the way that it stands with it, and to have it fixedly before oneself as set up in this way.²⁷

The ideal of objectivity, of getting things to show themselves as they are, is characteristic of the interpretation of the world as picture. But accomplishing this does not call for a change in the things depicted, i.e. in the world. On the contrary, we want the world to show itself *unchanged*. So what is called for is a change in the way we approach the world. If only we were to acquire the right way of access, the right first principles or the right method, then the world would show itself aright. That science (or the careful observation upon which science is often supposed to be based) is to be the arbiter of what is real is a reflection of this interpretation. But Heidegger asks us to note a decisive shift which has already taken place here. A concern for things appearing correctly has become a concern to view them correctly. Our way of looking at the world has become decisive for what is to count as real.

Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth.²⁸

Only what can show up within the procedures by which we achieve a “proper perspective” on the world is real. Whatever stands outside of the picture we get is mere appearance. Thus the basic outline which projects a field of possibilities for scientific research also comes to determine systematically what can count as real.

Once this shift from correct appearance to correct viewing is recognized, we discover the possibility of alternative world pictures. Different ways of approaching or viewing the world show us different “worlds”. The position we take up with respect to the world is determinative of how the world appears. But Heidegger is concerned to understand the event whereby the world first came to show itself as picture, standing over against us, who have taken up such a position.

For Heidegger thinks that the very notion of alternative worldviews arises from our peculiarly modern form of representation.

In distinction from Greek apprehending, modern representing . . . means to bring what is present at hand before oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the decisive realm. Wherever this happens, man puts himself in the picture, in precedence over whatever is. . . . What is decisive [in this event] is that man himself expressly takes up this position as one constituted by himself, that he intentionally maintains it as that taken up by himself, and that he makes it secure as the solid footing for a possible development of humanity. Now for the first time is there any such thing as a “position” of man.²⁹

In making this point, Heidegger is not trying to abandon the notion of objectivity in favor of an absolute subjectivity. Rather he is trying to bring to reflection the understanding of what it is to be which is manifest in the supposed opposition of objectivity and subjectivity. This understanding of ourselves as taking up a position toward the world is not itself a position we have taken up, but a situation in which we find ourselves. As we shall see, it is a situation which Heidegger finds disturbing and questionable.

The second interpretation of the transformation of science into research seems initially to contradict the first. Heidegger calls the clearing in which beings are challenged to be totally orderable ‘*Ge-stell*’.³⁰ *Ge-stell* discloses beings as neither subjects nor objects. Instead, they are now revealed as standing on call (*Bestand*), pliantly and interchangeably at the disposal of ordering activity. Thus,

Whatever stands by in the sense of standing on call no longer stands over against us as object.³¹

What stands on call is not primarily depicted, but is challenged and ordered about. This is accomplished neither *by* human beings nor for their sake. We do determine what any particular being will be used for, as in whether it will be on call as strip mine or wilderness preserve. But that it is on call for such deployment in either case, that it is a *resource*, is in no way our doing.

Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. . . . But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, any more than is the realm through which man is already passing every time he as a subject relates to an object.³²

Beings in the world no longer seem to stand over against us as picture; rather they are bound up with us in being mutually challenged and disposed.

We must first dissolve this apparent opposition, before we can consider what unifies these two interpretations. We first note that the opposition between human beings who *take up* a position over against the world conceived as picture, and human beings who are *challenged* by the orderability of all beings within *Ge-stell* is merely apparent. On

both accounts, modernity overtakes us; we do not bring it about. Objects appear as what we can represent objectively, but that they come to appear this way cannot also be depicted. As Hacking suggested, we must decide in each case whether a given theoretical representation is true, or is false, but not that theoretical representations are to be the candidates for truth or falsity.³³ We cannot choose what is up for choice; the projection of possibilities opens a clearing which must always come “before” our deliberations and choices. Likewise, while Heidegger claims that beings standing on call are not autonomous objects present at hand, the same can be said of beings within the world conceived as picture. For it is not *objects* which are depicted, but the world. How objects are depicted will depend upon their place within the projection of a field for research.

Ongoing activity in research is a specific bodying-forth and ordering of the systematic, in which, at the same time, the latter reciprocally determines the ordering.³⁴

Heidegger would thus insist that the referential nominalism of Quine, Putnam, Rorty or Hesse³⁵ is a characteristic feature of modern knowledge.

We can now consider why Heidegger regards these two accounts as essentially convergent. He is claiming that the same grasp of what it is to be is at work in theoretical science and in the technological control of nature. Consider first Heidegger's interpretation of theoretical science. He claimed in “The Age of the World Picture” that,

The research worker necessarily presses forward of himself into the sphere characteristic of the technologist in the essential sense. Only in this way is he capable of acting effectively, and only thus, after the manner of his age, is he real.³⁶

This can be seen both by the place of experiment in modern science, and by the sort of theory which makes experiment possible. Experiment is not just the attempt to illustrate or justify theoretical representations. Experiment is the creation of a fully calculable, controllable “world”. Everything is ordered so that what takes place can be kept track of and taken account of. The experiment aims to establish a “world” in which we are fully in the picture. Theory in turn is a way of getting ourselves in the picture in this way. The possibilities it opens for tracking, accounting, and manipulating are at the heart of our theoretical conceptions on Heidegger's account.

Modern science's way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces. Modern physics is not experimental physics because it applies apparatus to the questioning of nature. Rather the reverse is true. Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it therefore orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself when set up in this way.³⁷

The conception of theory as a discovery of things decontextualized and present-at-hand has given way to understanding it as a new, totalizing

practice which treats everything as potentially calculable and manipulable. Heidegger is not trying to establish the ontic priority of theory over experiment (or vice versa), but to show that theory and experiment take their modern forms within an understanding of everything as systematically calculable and manipulable.

Consider next what Heidegger thinks is at issue in our scientific and technological projects. He notes that technology is commonly interpreted as the means we employ to achieve our various ends, but he counters that this misunderstands what happens in technological development. When we dam up a river for a hydroelectric station, we do more than just use the river for our purposes; it is now an alternative to coal mines and furnaces, or nuclear reactors. The river becomes an interchangeable part of a system of efficient ordering. Various forms of energy, from many sources, are organized and distributed for a variety of uses, whose ultimate aim is still more “unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about.”³⁸ Regulating, securing and expanding the ordering about of all beings yields still more ordering. Conceived by no one, it is no one's doing, yet its development is neither arbitrary nor directionless. It constantly aims to encompass whatever is, more systematically and efficiently. In the terms of *Being and Time*, the in-order-to-for-the-sake-of structure within which technologies make sense has flattened out; the for-the-sake-of which has disappeared in the face of ceaseless innovation. The next generation of a technology is called for not because it is useful or necessary, but because it technically surpasses its obsolete predecessor. Heidegger thinks the same thing is happening when the ongoing activity of research regulates and secures its objects in order more effectively to employ them for further research. The ultimate aim of research, on his account, is more research. The point is not that research degenerates into triviality, as in Popper's interpretation of Kuhnian normal science.³⁹ Research aims at a genuine incorporation of more of the world within the calculative possibilities of research.

Ongoing activity becomes mere busyness whenever, in the pursuing of its proceedings, it no longer keeps itself open on the basis of an ever-new accomplishing of its projection, but only leaves that basic outline behind itself as a given; never again confirms and verifies its own self-accumulating results and the calculation of them, but simply chases after such results and calculations. *Mere busyness must at all times be combated precisely because research is, in its essence, ongoing activity.*⁴⁰

What I think Heidegger is saying here is that not just the danger of mere busyness but also the resistance to it come from within science itself. As ongoing activity, research aims to project non-trivial possibilities for further research. Scientists are concerned not just with the truth of their results, but also with their significance. What disturbs Heidegger is not the fear that science will degenerate into triviality, or that technological developments will become pointlessly baroque. He wants to bring to

reflection the possibility that the relentless expansion of scientific/technical calculation and control will continue to press toward

the securing of supreme and absolute self-development of all the capacities of mankind for absolute dominion over the entire earth [which] is the secret goad that prods modern man again and again to new resurgences.⁴¹

We thus can conclude that for Heidegger what is at issue in the interpretation embodied in modern science and technology is power. We have seen this implicitly already. When the world picture which results from correct viewing becomes the criterion for what is real, the subject or viewer has been elevated into a position of dominance over what is.

The more extensively and the more effectually the world stands at man's disposal as conquered, and the more objectively the object appears, all the more subjectively, i.e., the more importunately, does the *subiectum* rise up, and all the more impetuously, too, do observation of and teaching about the world change into a doctrine of man, into anthropology.⁴²

When technical control increases and the world becomes ever more calculable, our power as technicians seems to be enhanced. We determine what shall count as real and make of it what we will. But Heidegger thinks that this attempt to locate power as in the hands of human beings is mistaken.

Meanwhile man . . . exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself.⁴³

That is, we seem to encounter only the world as we represent it and manipulate it. But Heidegger claims that the understanding of everything as resources for us to control and manipulate, and the ongoing effort to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of such control, are not themselves chosen. We find ourselves in a technological world where this interpretation already governs the possibilities open to us. As Heidegger notes,

Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, any more than is the realm through which man is already passing every time he as a subject relates to an object. . . . Thus when man, investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing which challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve (*Bestand*).⁴⁴

We are constantly being pulled into the growth of scientific knowledge and technical control. It would be tempting to say that Heidegger regards the growth of modern science and technology to be out of control. But this very description presupposes the preeminence of a

technological understanding. In effect, this description says that the understanding of the world as something to be controlled is now "out of control". This suggests that the attempt to control the growth of science and technology, to rationalize it, will only contribute to the dominance of this understanding. This is why Heidegger says that "[man] merely responds to the call of unconcealment even when he contradicts it."⁴⁵ For he thinks the understanding of everything, even ourselves, as material for manipulation and control, is not something we now know how to escape. This is why Heidegger concludes that scientific research and technological development are not just things we happen to do, but are essential and characteristic phenomena of the modern age.

We can now consider how Heidegger's interpretation stands with respect to recent Anglo-American philosophy of science. There clearly are deep similarities between Heidegger's later account of science and post-empiricist philosophy of science: the role of presuppositions (projection) in opening a domain of inquiry; the anti-positivist emphasis upon theory; the theory-ladenness of observation; the stress upon problem-solving or "normal science"; the occurrence of conceptual revolutions; and the preeminence of the growth of knowledge (rather than its cautious verification) as the aim of research.

But there are at least three points at which Heidegger would take issue with prominent themes in post-empiricist philosophy of science. The first has to do with what is taken for granted in the practice of research, and in justifying its results. With the notable exceptions of Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi, post-empiricist philosophers have generally characterized the presuppositions underlying a research program as articulable theories or parts of a theory. Lakatos, for example, claims that scientific research programs are governed by a "hard core" of theoretical assumptions which are invariable within that program.⁴⁶ Laudan admits that this core may gradually change, but agrees that "a research tradition is a set of assumptions."⁴⁷ Hesse, drawing upon the work of Duhem and Quine, describes a "network model" of theories, in which "there is no theoretical fact or lawlike relation whose truth or falsity can be determined in isolation from the rest of the network."⁴⁸ In each case, the prior acceptance of some theoretical statements and values (or "coherence conditions" as Hesse calls them⁴⁹) is what is supposed to permit a decision about the acceptability of other statements relevant to the research program.

Heidegger himself suggested something like a holistic account of justification in his discussion of 'elucidation', but he would argue that such an account does not go far enough. We must also be concerned with the projection which makes manifest a domain of objects and a language in which to speak of them. Theories of justification are concerned to show why some statements within the domain are accepted and others not. Heidegger is concerned with how those statements become the ones to be decided about. Hacking's distinction

between what is true or false, and what is true-or-false, is again a useful comparison. But Hacking suggests that it is a style of reasoning which produces statements as true-or-false, and that some statements, not requiring reasoning for their justification, are true-or-false for anyone. Heidegger would reply that the way we reason cannot be easily separated from the other things we do, and from the equipment we encounter and use. It is our whole way of coping with the world, our "comportment" to use his term,⁵⁰ which allows statements to emerge as true-or-false. Hacking might not object to this, since he includes experimental exploration and measurement as part of the Galilean style of reasoning which we have inherited, and claims that "experiment has a life of its own unrelated to theories or schemes."⁵¹ But Heidegger would certainly include within our comportment the transformation of our perception of space and our grasp of spatiality by the construction of a "carpentered environment."⁵² It is perhaps more difficult to see this as part of a style of reasoning, yet it may be essential to the emergence of the objects of modern science. *Contra* Hacking, it does not indicate that even our most straightforward perceptual judgments may be more problematic than Hacking wishes to admit.

In any case, Heidegger would certainly agree that the emergence of statements as true-or-false has nothing to do with conceptual schemes, for he claims that the notion of such schemes (or 'pictures', which is his term) itself only emerges within the practices of the modern world.

The expression . . . 'modern world picture' . . . assumes something that never could have been before, namely, a medieval and an ancient world picture. The world picture does not change from an earlier medieval one into a modern one, but rather the fact that the world becomes picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modern age.⁵³

Heidegger would insist that this context of practices, which discloses the world to us and allows statements to be true-or-false, *cannot* be articulated as a network of explicit assumptions or beliefs, i.e. as a Quinean conceptual scheme. It embodies an understanding of the world in the skills and techniques which scientists are socialized into in their training and practice, but which cannot be depicted as beliefs or dispositions to believe. Thus what Heidegger would take issue with is the tendency within recent philosophy of science to see theories as alternative conceptual frameworks. Like Davidson, albeit for different reasons, Heidegger thinks there is something misleading about the very idea of a conceptual scheme.

Kuhn and Polanyi have made similar points about the importance of tacit skills, but they do not provide the reasons Heidegger has given as to why these skills cannot be fully articulated.⁵⁴ Heidegger provides two related arguments for this. I have discussed elsewhere his argument that the finite temporality of understanding is manifest in science as an open-ended, non-thematic grasp of how to go on with research. The point was that only a completed science, a science with no ongoing

possibilities for research, could be presented as a fully articulable network of assertions.⁵⁵ The second argument has to do with the difference between the clearing opened by our practices, and the things which show up within it. The clearing marks for us the limits of sense, of what actions and statements are intelligible. The context of practices within which we find ourselves provides us a range of intelligible responses to any situation, but an account of why just these responses are possibilities for us and "others" are not cannot be forthcoming. There are no others we can make sense of, and hence no difference we can get clear about. The clearing is not a scheme or framework which confronts reality; it is the way the real hangs together for us. What characterizes it is so pervasive that it is hard to notice from within, and there is nothing "without" to which it can intelligibly be contrasted. The clearing may be shared by persons who disagree about fundamental issues raised within it. What they share is a concern for what is at issue, what they disagree about, even though there may well be no neutral articulation of this concern. They share a field of concerns, a social world, a "form of life." It is not something in addition to the things discussed and agreed or disagreed about. It is the unity of the discussion as a common field of discourse and practice.

The recognition of this difference between beliefs about the world, which we can formulate and agree or disagree about, and the clearing opened and sustained by shared social practice, leads to Heidegger's second criticism of recent philosophy of science. Heidegger would argue that the arguments as to whether science is a rational enterprise are pointless. This prevalence of discussions of rationality is one of the results of the decline of logical empiricism. Philosophers have generally shifted from trying to show that science arrives at valid knowledge, to showing that science generally proceeds rationally, or that scientists generally accept or reject theories for good reasons.⁵⁶ Laudan, for example, takes this position in a strong form,

. . . suggesting that we can have a theory of rationality *without presupposing anything about the veracity or verisimilitude of the theories* we judge to be rational or irrational.⁵⁷

But there is some ambiguity about what a demonstration of the rationality of science is supposed to show us. It might mean merely rehearsing (or perhaps revising) the reasons for particular choices of theories, methods, or problems. This might be worth doing, but it would be the same sort of thing scientists are already doing when they give reasons for their original decisions. In both cases, a basic grasp of what counts as good reasons is presupposed in developing and accepting the reasoning. Alternatively, one might try to give a general account of what counts as good reasons for us, trying to make explicit that basic understanding of reasoning which we usually take for granted. This, too, could be worthwhile, as could any other attempt to clarify to ourselves what it is we do. But such an account would also

presuppose a prior grasp of what counts as good reasoning, which after all is what is being clarified. I think that neither of these potentially worthy projects are what most philosophers have in mind for a theory of rationality. More commonly, they aim to show that the reasons for accepting most scientific theories really are good reasons, independent of the social practices within which they function as reasons for us. Their aim is to justify generally “the image that the scientific community likes to project of itself . . . as the very paradigm of institutionalized rationality.”⁵⁸

Heidegger would object to such a project for two reasons. The first has to do once again with the difference between the clearing and what shows up within it, and his interpretation of science as an essential practice within the clearing in the modern age. As Charles Taylor has noted, the conception of rationality which underlies such discussions is closely bound to a long-standing conception of theoretical understanding:

A theoretical understanding aims at a disengaged perspective. We are not trying to understand things merely as they impinge on us, or are relevant to the purposes we are pursuing, but rather grasp them as they are, outside the immediate perspective of our goals and desires and activities.⁵⁹

Thus, to show that a practice is rational in this unqualified sense, one must disengage from it and put it in question. Its aims, procedures, and achievements must be examined from without, without regard for our involvement with it. Heidegger, however, is arguing that science is too integral to the range of possibilities open to us to be itself up for choice as a whole. It is not simply one alternative practice for us, which we can examine by contrast to others. We do not know what an alternative would look like. Or rather, the alternatives we can conceive are still the modern world, but with the place of science within it left unfilled. What we cannot conceive so easily, and certainly not very concretely, is what the world would be like without a place in it for science in the modern sense. Even our interpretations of “pre-scientific” or non-scientific cultures take them as lacking modern science, rather than having no place for it. This situation is perhaps not irrevocable; there are certainly cultures around us which resist modernity, and fragments of cultures which may be unassimilable to it. These are open to interpretation, and such interpretation may broaden our horizons. But we are not now in a position easily to disengage ourselves seriously from the practices and standards of modern science in order to put them into question as a whole.

Just how difficult this is for us is suggested by Heidegger’s second argument against the attempt to justify the rationality of science in this strong sense. Heidegger would argue, I think, that the attempt to justify generally the rationality of science is characteristic of modernity, and hence is part of what would need to be put in question and examined.

Assessing the rationality of a practice involves standing outside it and picturing it, calculating its place within a context of reasons and consequences, and ordering one’s relation to that practice based upon the results of the calculation. In Heidegger’s terms, such an assessment reveals this practice as challenged to stand on call to be ordered about on the basis of a calculative rationality. ‘Rationality’ in this sense thus belongs to *Ge-stell*. But modern science, he has argued, gets its sense from its place in *Ge-stell* also. If one is to justify the rationality of modern science, one must justify the rationality of *Ge-stell* as a framework for our understanding. But because *Ge-stell* is the context within which this sense of rationality is itself intelligible, there is not much point to showing that *it* is rational. As Rorty has said about scientific realism, such an appeal for justification “is just paying ourselves a pointless epistemological compliment.”⁶⁰ It is important to emphasize that Heidegger is not saying that science is irrational. He is only saying that science and the ascription of ‘rationality’ are practices which are too closely linked for the latter to provide justification for the former. Heidegger thinks that neither “assuring” the rationality of science, nor denying it, can contribute to the attempt to understand science and its significance for modernity.

Heidegger’s third objection to the direction of post-empiricist philosophy of science may seem at first to conflict with his refusal to affirm or deny the value of science and scientific knowledge. His concern is to undermine the almost unquestioning confidence in the growth of scientific knowledge which post-empiricist philosophers share with almost everyone else in our culture. It is important to understand just what Heidegger is trying to say here. He does not deny that knowledge continually grows; growth is essential to science. Nor does he think science misleads us as to how the world is. Heidegger expresses no doubt that science increasingly gets things right. Nor, as we showed, does he argue that science degenerates into a trivial working out of what it already posited in its presuppositions. Instead, he attempts to uncover and focus a distress over the possibility that scientific knowledge will continue to grow in exactness, correctness and power. Knowledge does not threaten something else which is important to us. The threat he sees is the possibility that in the modern world nothing is important to us. Everything has become material for representation and manipulation. Heidegger is asking why more knowledge and control are important to us. He discovers not an answer, but a realization that the relentlessly objectifying practices of the modern world foreclose any answer. Even what we regard as important becomes distant and objectified; it becomes a value. Values can be clarified, argued over, and chosen, but in the process they lose any hold over us.

Value appears to be the expression of the fact that we, in our position of relationship to it, act to advance just that which is itself most valuable; and yet that very value is the

impotent and threadbare disguise of the objectivity of whatever is, an objectivity that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.⁶¹

Heidegger's claim here must seem strange. We are accustomed to thinking of knowledge as unquestionably good. The growth of knowledge and technical control is progress. At most, we might worry that our technical capabilities will outpace our wisdom, escape our control and destroy us. And what will save us, if anything will, are our values. But Heidegger suggests the danger lies in trying to subject ourselves and the world to control, and in conceiving of our deepest concerns as values. The danger is greatest if we succeed, and do not destroy ourselves. This is perhaps less paradoxical if we remember his claim that knowledge has changed. It is no longer a "beholding that watches over truth," but "a refining of the real that encroaches uncannily upon it."⁶² Science changes the real not physically (although it sometimes does that, too), but by changing what it is to be real. It changes how the real can matter to us. The danger facing modernity is that, at its culmination, there can be neither danger nor hope, neither disaster nor triumph. In a world ordered wholly for the sake of ordering, it is not clear what these could be, since nothing would matter to us enough. In Heidegger's terms, then, the growth of knowledge leads to nihilism, and is to be understood as the growth of the "wasteland."⁶³

If Heidegger's account is not convincing, if the growth of knowledge still seems like progress rather than desolation, he has no further argument to offer. His is not an objective account of what is really going on, not another attempt to put us in the picture, but an interpretation of our situation from within. He is trying to focus things in a new way, to prepare us to respond to them differently. Even here his goals are limited. He offers us no alternative way of knowing which does not contribute to the wasteland. He does not ask us to desist from science or technical mastery, for he does not think we can. To attack science as demonic, as something to avoid, only contributes to what he thinks is questionable in science and modernity. We cannot change our values, for the idea that we posit or choose values is part of what he sees as dangerous. The most we can do is achieve a more perspicuous understanding of what we are doing, which will free us for a new clearing should it emerge. This response may seem disappointingly unambitious. But if Heidegger is right, even this is a serious and difficult task.⁶⁴

NOTES

¹ Heidegger also uses 'meaning of Being', 'truth of Being', 'regioning', 'Nothing', and many other terms for this phenomenon.

² Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in *Basic Writings*, edited by D. F. Krell, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 124.

³ This reading of *Being and Time* owes much to Hubert Dreyfus, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983).

⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 182-195.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 412-415.

⁶ Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 8.

⁷ Martin Heidegger, "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," in *Holzwege*, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1950), p. 69; English translation by William Lovitt, in *The Question Concerning Technology*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 116; hereafter cited as ZWB, QT.

⁸ ZWB, p. 70, QT, p. 117.

⁹ ZWB, p. 71, QT, p. 118.

¹⁰ ZWB, p. 79-80, QT, p. 126 (translation modified).

¹¹ Ian Hacking, "Language, Truth and Reason," in Steven Lukes and Martin Hollis, eds., *Rationality and Relativism*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), p. 49.

¹² ZWB, p. 71, QT, p. 118 (translation modified).

¹³ ZWB, p. 72-73, QT, p. 119.

¹⁴ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Second Edition, 1970); Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Larry Laudan, *Progress and Its Problems*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

¹⁵ Kuhn, *op. cit.*; Joseph Rouse, "Kuhn, Heidegger and Scientific Realism," *Man and World*, 14, October 1981, p. 269-290.

¹⁶ ZWB, p. 73, QT, p. 120 (translation modified).

¹⁷ ZWB, p. 74, QT, p. 121 (translation modified).

¹⁸ ZWB, p. 74, QT, p. 121 (translation modified).

¹⁹ ZWB, p. 74, QT, p. 121.

²⁰ ZWB, p. 77, QT, p. 124 (translation modified).

²¹ Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962); Lakatos, *op. cit.*; Laudan, *op. cit.*

²² Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism*, translated by Frank Capuzzi, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 7.

²³ ZWB, p. 78, QT, p. 125 (translation modified).

²⁴ Martin Heidegger, "Die Frage nach der Technik," in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1954), p. 29; English translation by William Lovitt, in *The Question Concerning Technology*, *op. cit.*, p. 21; hereafter FT, QT.

²⁵ Joseph Rouse, "Science and the Theoretical 'Discovery' of the Present-at-hand," in Don Ihde and Hugh Silverman, eds., *Descriptions*, (Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1985).

²⁶ The published translation renders this as "Enframing." This does not seem illuminating to me, but I have no good alternative, so I leave it untranslated.

²⁷ ZWB, p. 82, QT, p. 129.

²⁸ ZWB, p. 82, QT, p. 129-130.

²⁹ ZWB, p. 84, QT, p. 131-132.

³⁰ FT, p. 27, QT, p. 19.

³¹ FT, p. 24, QT, p. 17.

³² FT, p. 25-26, QT, p. 18.

³³ Hacking, *op. cit.*, p. 64-65.

³⁴ ZWB, p. 93, QT, p. 141.

³⁵ W. V. O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Mary Hesse, *Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

³⁶ ZWB, p. 78, QT, p. 125.

³⁷ FT, p. 29, QT, p. 21.

³⁸ FT, p. 24, QT, p. 16.

Heidegger and the Problem of Idealism

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Was Heidegger a 'realist' or an 'idealist'? The issue has been and continues to be hotly debated in Heidegger scholarship. Here it is argued that the much more desirable realistic interpretation of Heidegger can be sustained, provided his theory of moods is given its due. Moods, I argue, are not only 'equiprimordial' with Dasein's understanding of being, but are also irreducible to the latter. It is often held – correctly, as it seems to the author – that Heidegger's idealism is all but inevitable if Dasein's awareness of entities is grounded only in Dasein's understanding of being. But in *Being and Time* Heidegger speaks also of how what there is is 'disclosed moodwise'. The essay closely analyzes this specifically moody mode of disclosure, and shows both its autonomy *vis-à-vis* the understanding of being and its function of securing, for Dasein, an access to a truly independent reality.

Half a century ago, Alphonse de Waelhens, at that time perhaps Europe's most influential Heidegger commentator, was concluding his examination of Heidegger's 'early' philosophy on a rather pessimistic note. According to de Waelhens, Heidegger is in no position to escape the threat of idealism. Entities are rendered intelligible, both in their essence *and* in their existence, only on the basis of Dasein's understanding of their being. Consequently, any ascription, to entities, of an existence truly independent of Dasein must be deemed unintelligible and contradictory.¹ Recently, the argument has been renewed, albeit from a somewhat different angle, by William Blattner.² Blattner's claim is a bit weaker than de Waelhens': the ascription, to entities, of a Dasein-independent status is not, perhaps, altogether unintelligible and contradictory, but it is certainly devoid of truth value. Blattner arrives at this conclusion by focusing upon the function of Heideggerian temporality. Temporality is both the meaning of Dasein's own being and the horizon of the meaning of the being of entities other than Dasein. To ask whether entities are dependent or independent *vis-à-vis* Dasein means to apply the category of existence beyond the boundaries of its permissible use – beyond the boundaries of Dasein's temporal understanding of being. And so, the only legitimate application of the category of existence to entities other than Dasein is relative to Dasein's own understanding of the being of these entities.

Whichever way we interpret it, the threat of Heideggerian 'idealism' is very real. In fact, just about all the traditional conceptual devices employed in the past to set aside such a threat seem to fail, often very openly, in the case of Heidegger. Nothing can be more significant, in this respect, than Heidegger's

³⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 99.

⁴⁰ ZWB, p. 85-86, QT, p. 133 (my emphasis).

⁴¹ FT, p. 34-35, QT, p. 27.

⁴² FT, p. 26, QT, p. 18-19.

⁴³ FT, p. 26, QT, p. 19.

⁴⁴ Karl Popper, "Normal Science and its Dangers," in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 51-58.

⁴⁵ ZWB, p. 90, QT, p. 138.

⁴⁶ Lakatos, *op. cit.*, p. 48-49.

⁴⁷ Laudan, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁴⁸ Hesse, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁵⁰ "On the Essence of Truth," *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁵¹ Hacking, *op. cit.*, p. 50, 64.

⁵² Patrick Heelan, *Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 248.

⁵³ ZWB, p. 83, QT, p. 130.

⁵⁴ Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 43-51; Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 49-65.

⁵⁵ Rouse, *op. cit.*, p. 272-274.

⁵⁶ Laudan, *op. cit.*, p. 121-133; W. H. Newton-Smith, *The Rationality of Science*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 1-17; Imre Lakatos, *op. cit.*, p. 123-138; and others.

⁵⁷ Laudan, *op. cit.*, p. 125 (original emphasis).

⁵⁸ Newton-Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁵⁹ Charles Taylor, "Rationality," in Lukes and Hollis, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁶⁰ Richard Rorty, "A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor," *Review of Metaphysics*, XXXIV, September 1980, p. 43.

⁶¹ ZWB, p. 94, QT, p. 142.

⁶² QT, p. 165, 167.

⁶³ Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?*, translated by J. Glenn Gray and F. Wieck, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 29-30.

⁶⁴ Much of the work on this paper was done during a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar in Berkeley, California in 1983. The paper was written at the Center for the Study of Values, University of Delaware. I would like to thank the Endowment and the Center for their support.

own clarification of the concepts of 'in itself' and 'in themselves' as applied to entities. These expressions have a distinctly Kantian flavor, but this is not how Heidegger chooses to understand them; the Heideggerian being 'in itself' of entities has nothing to do with the Kantian thing in itself, or things in themselves, underlying the spatio-temporal phenomenal world. Quite the contrary: on this particular issue Heidegger explicitly endorses what can only be viewed as a radical version of idealism. If we speak of entities as being 'in themselves', we do so only because we 'understand and conceptualize' precisely such a 'characteristic of Being'.³ And since all 'characteristics of being' are relative to Dasein, the 'in itself' status of entities is also relative to Dasein. Nor should it be supposed that by speaking of the entities' being 'in themselves' Heidegger uses this term only in some purely technical fashion, unrelated to what we mean in everyday life when we speak plainly of things as 'independent' of us. For the entities' 'independence' too, and for the same reason, is interpreted by Heidegger as an ontological characteristic derivative from Dasein's understanding of Being (BT, p. 251). To be sure, Heidegger also states that only 'Being (not entities) is dependent upon the understanding of Being' (BT, p. 255). He elaborates on this, explaining that 'entities are, quite independently of that experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained' (BT, p. 228). But, taken as they are, and at their face value, these statements fail to remove the threat of idealism. Certainly, since Heidegger rejects explicitly 'psychological' idealism (BT, p. 251), entities cannot be viewed as dependent upon our mental acts of experience, apprehension, and so on. But this does nothing to abolish their dependence upon our understanding of their being, for exactly the same reason as Kant's empirical realism does nothing to abolish his transcendental idealism. As long as entities are said to be intelligible only in terms of our understanding of being – and this, not just in their essence, but in their existence as well, as Heidegger makes it abundantly clear in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (BPP, pp. 205, 212) – we cannot encounter them in their independence from us. To encounter them as so independent, we would have to encounter them as stripped of any intelligibility, as totally alien and undomesticated *vis-à-vis* our human Dasein.

Would such a way of gaining access to entities be even *possible* for the Dasein of Heidegger's early writings? His intention, at least, seems clear. He thinks that we are, after all, aware of *nature* and (in the early Heidegger at least) nature is precisely that alien, undomesticated reality contrasted with the man-made *world*. The world, says Heidegger, 'is . . . a . . . characteristic of Dasein' (BT, p. 92), 'the world is, so to speak, Dasein-ish' (BPP, p. 166). In this respect the world is very different from nature. To quote Heidegger again, 'World is only, if, and as Dasein exists. Nature can also be when no Dasein exists' (BPP, p. 170). To the extent, then, that Dasein discovers nature as

Heidegger understands it here, Dasein has access to a truly independent reality.

But the question remains: *can* Dasein discover nature as nature is here contrasted with the man-made, intelligible, and domesticated world? Certainly, this can't apply to nature understood as ready-to-hand, as when Heidegger speaks famously of 'the wood [as] a forest of timber, the mountain, a quarry of rock' (BT, p. 100). This is clearly part of the humanized 'world', sustained by our everyday understanding of the being of nature. But then nature as ready-to-hand has its boundary conditions in nature as present-at-hand. 'Hammer, tongs and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that they consist in these' (BT, p. 100). Now, the present-at-hand nature is often encountered *within* the world, but Heidegger also allows for our encounter with an 'unworldly' and 'unmeaning' present-at-hand nature. He speaks of nature in this particular sense in a key passage of *Being and Time* in which he points out how such an 'unworldly' and 'unmeaning' nature can 'break in' upon Dasein and even destroy it (BT, p. 193). In such passages, it seems, Heidegger means clearly nature as an alien, undomesticated region of reality to which Dasein finds itself vulnerable.

But how does Dasein become even aware of nature as so understood? We can notice immediately how Heidegger takes away with one hand what he gives with the other. Even in the same key passage of *Being and Time* the 'unworldly' and 'unmeaning' status of nature is itself identified as nature's 'ontological characteristic'. But Dasein, and Dasein alone, posits ontological characteristics of entities, all the way down to entities' very existence. The present-at-hand as such and, we now see, the peculiar meaning of the present-at-hand as 'unworldly' and 'unmeaning', is dependent upon Dasein's understanding of being. To put it plainly, the status of entities as independent from Dasein on account of their unmeaningness and unworldliness is itself nothing other than Dasein's conception. Part of what is involved in this conception is just this: we *conceive* entities as independent of us. But this does not entail the proposition that there are in fact such entities or that we have some access to them.

However, in what follows I argue that Heidegger does have a way of escaping the idealistic consequences of his doctrine of Dasein's understanding of being. I take, as my point of departure, Heidegger's often quoted, and often dismissed, statements from the lecture *What is Metaphysics*. In anxiety, nihilation 'discloses . . . beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other'. And again: 'only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the total strangeness of beings overwhelm us'.⁴ We need not go beyond the text of *What is Metaphysics* to see why many people tend to dismiss those statements. For in the very same lecture Heidegger tells us that 'in the face of anxiety all utterance of the "is" falls silent' (ibid., p. 103). And, if this is true, then the 'radically other' said to

be disclosed in anxiety eludes not only Dasein's everyday understanding of being, but Dasein's very capacity to understand entities in their existence. Unless we can find some alternative way of disclosing entities in their existence – alternative to their being disclosed in Dasein's understanding of being – we seem to be involved in a hopeless venture.

But there is such an alternative way of disclosing entities, and this is precisely what allows us to disclose them as genuinely independent from Dasein and its world. In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (hereafter MFL), Heidegger comments in the following way on the subject-matter of philosophy in general and of *Being in Time* in particular. 'Let us keep in mind that philosophy, as first philosophy, has a twofold character: the knowledge of being and the knowledge of the overwhelming. (This twofold character corresponds to the twofold in *Being and Time* of existence and thrownness)' (MFL, p. 11). And so, it turns out, our knowledge of being is only one of the two ways of disclosing entities, since they can also be disclosed in our knowledge of the overwhelming. The first kind of knowledge is achieved on the level of Dasein's existence, that is, in terms of projection and understanding. The second type of knowledge is achieved on the level of Dasein's thrownness, that is, through our state-of-mind, our moods. The mood of anxiety, then, discloses to us the reality of entities as 'overwhelming' us.

Is the metaphysical mood of anxiety the *only* mood in which we can apprehend that alien, undomesticated overwhelmingness of entities? No. In the ordinary moods, too, some sense of this status of entities is preserved. Speaking of the ordinary moods – speaking of *all* of them – Heidegger says: 'the mood brings Dasein before the "that it is" of its "there", which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma' (BT, p. 175). But Dasein's own 'there' is the 'there' in the midst of entities. And so they too, as parts of Dasein's 'there', are 'disclosed moodwise' (this is Heidegger's expression: BT, p. 173) in the same way. This 'inexorability of an enigma' with which Dasein's 'there' is disclosed represents a watered-down, everyday counterpart of the overwhelmingness and strangeness of beings as they are disclosed in anxiety. The inexorable is what overwhelms, overpowers, and overtakes Dasein. But this must still be the inexorability of an 'enigma', for it is prior to, and it eludes, our rational explanations and justifications.

Everything I will say from now on will be an elaboration upon these two main points: (1) Heidegger does have a way of escaping idealism because, aside from Dasein's knowledge of being, he allows for Dasein's knowledge of the overwhelming; and (2) this knowledge of the overwhelming is present, however dimly, in the ordinary moods, and the everyday Dasein is thereby given an access to genuinely independent beings. Thus, on both the metaphysical and the everyday level the menace of idealism can be removed.

The first question I now want to raise is this. In his *Metaphysical*

Foundations of Logic's comments on *Being and Time* Heidegger is categorical: the distinction between the knowledge of being and the knowledge of the overwhelming is said to be operative in *Being and Time* itself. Since there is no explicit analysis of this in the text of *Being and Time*, we must first see if the conception of anxiety developed in *What is Metaphysics* (anxiety is the mood in which the overwhelmingness of entities is disclosed on the metaphysical level) is not at odds with what is said about anxiety in the text of *Being and Time*.

Let me start with the following distinction drawn by Heidegger in *Being and Time*. 'Anxiety [says Heidegger] can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute. He who is resolute . . . understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders him' (BT, p. 395). The distinction here is between, on the one hand, Dasein's *understanding* of anxiety and, on the other hand, the *actual mounting* of anxiety. It is not unlike the distinction between one's readiness for grace and one's being in the actual state of grace. Indeed resoluteness itself is described as a 'reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready-for-anxiety' (BT, p. 343). As such a readiness-for-anxiety resoluteness prepares Dasein for the actual experience of anxiety. Still, being ready for anxiety and being in the actual state of anxiety are very different. In one's readiness-for-anxiety the everyday world does not collapse into insignificance; nor is the ready-for-anxiety Dasein affected by that 'radical otherness' of beings the anxious Dasein is exposed to. And that is so because in mere readiness-for-anxiety anxiety is still understood as a possibility, that is, it is still apprehended from within Dasein's projection towards the future.

It is otherwise with the actual state of anxiety, as is demonstrated by Heidegger's analysis of the temporality of anxiety. This form of temporality differs not only from the inauthentic but even from the authentic form of temporality. In the temporality of anxiety the past is neither the inauthentic forgetting and remembering, nor is it the authentic repeating. And the present of the temporality of anxiety is neither the inauthentic making present nor is it the authentic moment of vision (BT, p. 394). In the temporality of anxiety, Dasein 'is taken all the way back to its naked uncanniness and it becomes fascinated by it' (ibid.); here 'anxiety . . . brings one back to the pure 'that-it-is' of one's ownmost individualized thrownness' (ibid.) where Dasein finds itself in the midst of entities. Since in anxiety the entire context of intelligibility collapses, entities are now stripped of their domesticated, worldly significance, and Dasein can discover them in their radical otherness.

This, however, cannot mean, and it does not mean, that understanding as such is altogether missing in the temporality of anxiety. As a general proposition, mood and understanding are equiprimordial. Concerning anxiety itself, Heidegger states clearly that anxiety is 'an understanding state-of-

mind' (BT, p. 226). To put it in the terms I have borrowed earlier from Heidegger's own clarifications: our knowledge of the overwhelming is equiprimordial with our knowledge of being. But if the knowledge, or the understanding, of being is present in anxiety's disclosure of the overwhelming, then, it seems, we are once again confronting the menace of idealism, since both what counts as an actual state of anxiety and what is disclosed in that state are now made intelligible – even if not in terms of everyday intelligibility – within Dasein's understanding of being.

But this, I think, is too hasty an inference. State-of-mind and understanding, knowledge of the overwhelming and knowledge of being, are indeed equiprimordial, but in the temporality of anxiety understanding is wholly determined by mood. Understanding, for Heidegger, has a structure of projection and, as such, it exhibits the priority of the future. But in the temporality of anxiety both the present and the future temporalize themselves out of the past. Precisely because of that, the temporality of anxiety is, as Heidegger says, 'peculiar'. 'The temporality of anxiety is peculiar; for anxiety is grounded primordially in having been, and only out of this do the future and the Present temporalize themselves' (BT, p. 394). To be sure, the temporality of *all* moods shows the priority of the past. But in all ordinary moods there is still ample room for projection, that is for Dasein's pursuit of its for-the-sake-of-whichs. In the temporality of anxiety no such projection is possible, since all for-the-sake-of-whichs are suspended, including even Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being. Like everything else about Dasein, that potentiality too is now merely *given* (ibid.). Since the future, and hence also projection and understanding, here temporalize themselves only in terms of the past, that is in terms of thrownness, thrownness determines the entire content of what is here understood by Dasein. That is, the knowledge of being, while still present, is here wholly subservient to the knowledge of the overwhelming.

I now want to turn to the everyday Dasein and to *its* way of experiencing thrownness in the midst of being via the everyday, ordinary moods. Even in these moods, we have noted earlier, Dasein's thrownness in the midst of beings is disclosed to it moodwise with the 'inexorability of an enigma'. This expression, we have also noted, is tailor-made to convey a more modest, watered-down sense of what is disclosed, on the metaphysical level, in the anxious Dasein's encounter with the overwhelmingness and strangeness of beings. But how can the everyday Dasein encounter even such bits and pieces of the overwhelming? To be sure, even to the everyday Dasein its thrownness, its pure 'that it is and has to be', 'shows itself', or even 'bursts forth', as 'naked' (BT, p. 172). And this description, it seems, could have been applied, without any modification, to the anxious Dasein's coming face to face with *its* thrownness. Moreover, the everyday Dasein, too, seems to have a way of gaining access to this 'naked' thrownness. To the everyday Dasein its naked

thrownness is, we recall, 'disclosed moodwise' (BT, p. 173). Thus, even the ordinary moods are given an autonomous cognitive function *vis-à-vis* understanding; and this, again, is quite in line with Heidegger's overall distinction between our knowledge of being and our knowledge of the overwhelming. Equiprimordial they may be, but unless our moody, affective ways of disclosing reality are to have *some* margin of autonomy, the distinction between state-of-mind and understanding will be a distinction without a difference. Everything, then, is in place here: to the everyday Dasein its thrownness in the midst of entities imposes itself with that 'inexorability of an enigma', and the everyday Dasein is in possession of the specifically moody disclosure – very different from the disclosure by understanding – of that inexorable enigma of entities.

However, there is a difficulty with this view. My latest quotes and references were all taken from *Being and Time*'s paragraph 29, where Heidegger carries out his main analysis of moods, at least as far as *Being and Time* is concerned. But only a few pages later, in paragraph 31, Heidegger seems almost to reverse his position. If, in paragraph 29, the naked thrownness was said to be 'disclosed moodwise', thrownness is now said to be 'understood', and understood 'in every case'. Now, understanding is based on projection, and the everyday understanding is based on the everyday projection, with its pool of for-the-sake-of-whichs. Consequently, the everyday understanding shapes and conditions the everyday Dasein's disclosure of its thrownness in the midst of beings. Whatever it is that affects, and gets through to, the ordinary Dasein is made intelligible by our everyday understanding. There is no place, in it, for the 'inexorability of an enigma' with which beings could be 'disclosed moodwise' to the ordinary Dasein.

I do not want to minimize this difficulty, but I think Heidegger does give us a way of overcoming it, provided that we take seriously what he says about moods. Let me first make my point about the two moods, fear and indifference, which underlie, respectively, the inauthentic and the everyday understanding – if indeed inauthenticity and everydayness can be kept separate. I then follow Heidegger in generalizing from these two moods onto all ordinary moods. It is probably easier to start with fear, for there are numerous places in which Heidegger asserts its kinship with anxiety. Fear and anxiety are 'kindred phenomena' (BT, p. 230); anxiety 'makes fear possible' (ibid.), 'fear is anxiety fallen' (ibid.), fear is 'anxiety which has been made ambiguous' (BT, p. 298). Now, to say that fear is anxiety 'made ambiguous' allows us to understand how the radical otherness of beings – their strangeness and overwhelmingness – disclosed in anxiety is still preserved, however indirectly, in fear. To be sure, fear reveals thrownness in so far as fear is but an effort to flee thrownness – indeed at some point Heidegger asserts that all forms of flight are based on fear (HCT, p. 283) – while

indifference is most often described as outright forgetfulness. And it is easier to see how fleeing, rather than forgetting, could represent a way of rechanneling and repressing – and thereby preserving – the message of anxiety. Fear is bewilderment, but there is no element of bewilderment in indifference – in that ‘pallid lack of mood’ which underlies Dasein’s everydayness. True, but on the other hand Heidegger also stresses that fear is bewilderment *precisely* in so far as fear is a forgetting of thrownness (BT, p. 392). So the element of forgetfulness is present even in fear. At the same time, the mood of indifference is described, just as fear was, as the ‘inauthentic way of having been’ (BT, p. 396). Given all these qualifications, the difference between fear and indifference begins to appear less and less striking. Above all, not only fear and indifference, but all everyday moods are ways of disclosing Dasein’s thrownness by evading it (BT, p. 175). This is due to the nature of evasion since, in Heidegger’s words, ‘in the evasion itself the “there” is something disclosed’ (BT, p. 174).

Let me conclude this argument. Even in the ordinary moods, Dasein’s ‘there’ in the midst of beings gets disclosed with the ‘inexorability of an enigma’. This is Heidegger’s reply, on the level of the plain and the everyday, to the challenge of idealism. The threat of idealism can be removed, because knowledge of being is not our only access to what there is; our knowledge of the overwhelming is just as important and, at least as far as the issue of idealism is concerned, it is precisely our knowledge of the overwhelming which carries the day in favor of realism, both on the metaphysical and on the plain, everyday level. This is why, as Heidegger puts it, ‘we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to “bare mood”’ (BT, p. 177).

Earlier on, I considered the contrast between the man-made, humanized ‘world’ and the alien, undomesticated ‘nature’ – the contrast Heidegger appealed to, in *Being and Time*, in order to point to a region of reality genuinely independent of Dasein. Strangely enough, Heidegger himself – here as elsewhere his own best critic and commentator – went on, very quickly, to express dissatisfaction with his treatment of nature in *Being and Time*. Already in *The Essence of Reasons* (1928) Heidegger states⁵ that in *Being and Time*’s analytic of Dasein the ‘concept of nature is missing’, and he offers his diagnosis as to why this is so. ‘Nature is primordially manifest in Dasein . . . only insofar as situatedness (thrownness) belongs to the essence of Dasein’ (ibid.). Presumably, then, he does not think that in *Being and Time* he has established clearly enough the connection between this ‘primordially manifest’ nature and Dasein’s thrownness. But how deep is here his discomfort with *Being and Time*? To say that nature as primordially manifest only ‘seems’ to be missing in *Being and Time* is not quite the same thing as stating categorically that primordially manifest nature *is* missing in that work. It rather looks as though Heidegger himself hesitated in evaluating *Being and*

Time on this particular point. Now, in most passages of *Being and Time* nature is indeed construed in terms of our understanding of being. Even in that key passage, we recall, where Heidegger talks about nature as ‘unmeaning’ and ‘unworldly’ telling us how such a nature can ‘break in’ upon and ‘destroy’ Dasein, he at once identifies these features of nature as its ‘ontological characteristics’. He thereby relates nature as so apprehended to our knowledge of being, not to our knowledge of the overwhelming. But are there some other passages in *Being and Time* where our knowledge of nature is achieved not through our knowledge of being, but through our knowledge of the overwhelming? And, since *such* knowledge would have to be achieved on the level of thrownness – are there passages in *Being and Time* where nature is disclosed from within our thrownness? Here is one passage where Heidegger comes close to saying just that. ‘In its thrownness Dasein has surrendered to changes of day and night. Day with its brightness gives it the possibility of sight; night takes this away’ (BT, p. 465). And so, I think, even on the issue of nature, some of Heidegger’s moves in *Being and Time* have a consistently realistic thrust. But to be appreciated for what they are, they must be taken jointly with Heidegger’s fundamental distinction between our knowledge of being and our knowledge of the overwhelming.

NOTES

- 1 A. de Waelhens, *La philosophie de Martin Heidegger* (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts), Cinquième édition, 1967 (first ed. 1942), pp. 309, 316.
- 2 William D. Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), see esp. pp. 251–3.
- 3 M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper Row, 1962), p. 251 (henceforth cited as BT). I also use the following abbreviations: M. Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. M. Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984) = MFL; M. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982) = BPP; M. Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. T. Kisiel (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1985) = HCT.
- 4 M. Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics*, in M. Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (New York: Harper Row, 1977), pp. 105, 111.
- 5 M. Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, trans. T. Malik (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 81–82 fn.

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